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Michael A. Peters
Editor

Encyclopedia of Educational Philosophy and Theory

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With 34 Figures and 14 Tables

Editor

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This Encyclopedia is dedicated to Professor Berislav Žarnić who passed away on May 25, 2017. Berislav was an Associate Editor of the Encyclopedia and we deeply regret that he wasn't around to see the publication of the project to which he was greatly committed. We would like to acknowledge his important contribution.

Preface

The Encyclopedia of Educational Philosophy and Theory began its life in 1999 when Paolo Ghiraldelli and I decided to establish an encyclopedia dedicated to philosophy of education although a decidedly different kind of philosophy of education than what most English-speaking scholars have been conditioned to expect. Paolo came from Brazil with a double Ph.D. and experience in media. He was interested more widely in critical and cultural accounts. I came to philosophy of education from philosophy after working on Wittgenstein to a field dominated by analytic philosophy of education. I also brought to my vision of the field an interest in philosophy of science, existential philosophy, and critical theory. “Philosophy of education” is often taken to be an application of philosophy either looking back to the philosophical tradition of philosophers who wrote specifically on education like Plato, Rousseau, and Kant or the application of an analytic method to the clarification of education concepts. In my Ph.D. thesis on Wittgenstein, I came to the conclusion that while the analytic method (if against Wittgenstein admonitions we can talk of *one* method) provided rigor, logic, and argumentation, it did not recognize the cultural and social significance of language, as revealed by the early Wittgenstein who inspired a generation of thinkers on viewing education as a set of practices. Methodological rigor notwithstanding I decided that the Springer *Encyclopedia of Philosophy and Theory*, named after the journal of the same name, should embrace a much wider view of education in terms of both philosophy and theory. This construction to my mind helped to wider the terms of reference and aided the process of making “philosophy” and “theory” more socially and culturally inclusive. It helped also to recognize the fact that much theoretical work that has not raised an eyebrow in the field deserves attention of philosophers and educational theorists. Education as an academic subject is such a huge enterprise embracing many different specialities that it is given to a kind of fragmentation. This Encyclopedia while not attempting to provide a unified view at least is based on the intention of recognizing the theoretical and philosophical significance of many different branches. It is also explicitly based on two further principles: first, the Encyclopedia attempts to be socially inclusive and culturally responsive; second, while respectful of different traditions and specialities the Encyclopedia is forward looking as much as it is sensitive to the past. This means, for example, that we can include sections on Socrates and the Socratic tradition alongside Confucius and the

Confucian tradition. One of the motivating ideas is to update educational philosophy and theory in terms of the contemporary movements in policy, technology, teacher education, to name a few possibilities, and to see them in terms of the unfolding and development of globalization.

This philosophy of the Encyclopedia requires a full exposition in terms of the dynamic evolution and development of education as a discipline. It is a philosophy of openness and inclusion that admits for instance the significance of critical theory, postcolonialism, feminism, indigenous studies, gay studies, and disability studies. The same editorial openness is implicitly based on the principles of technology-enabled features of intertextuality and dynamic updating to make the Encyclopedia a living and working document. The intention is to include new sections and entries every year.

Finally, a word of thanks to Springer staff Nick Melchior, Alexa Singh, and Sunaina Dadlwal; to my Associate Editors Andrew Gibbons, Berislav Zarnic, and Tina Besley; and to all Section Editors and contributors. This reminds me how much of worthwhile scholarship and research is a *collective* process based on some form of peer review – a notion that while relatively recent is enhanced with the digital turn.

Michael A. Peters

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
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About the Editor



Michael A. Peters is Professor in the Wilf Malcolm Institute for Educational Research at Waikato University, New Zealand, Emeritus Professor at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, USA, and Professorial Fellow at James Cook University, Australia. He holds degrees in Geography, Philosophy, and Education from New Zealand universities. He trained as a secondary school teacher and taught for 7 years during the years 1971–1978 and taught at NZ universities before holding posts at Glasgow and Illinois. He has been a Visiting Scholar and Fellow at many universities around the world. He is the Executive Editor of *Educational Philosophy and Theory* and Founding Editor of several other journals, including the *Open Review of Educational Research* and *The Video Journal of Education and Pedagogy*. His research interests are broadly in areas of education, philosophy, social theory, and policy.

His recent writing and scholarly activity revolves around two main areas: contemporary philosophy focusing on critical theory and poststructuralism with a particular interest in philosophy of education, and the politics of education and social policy. The two areas of interest inform each other. In the first category, Peters develops a distinctive poststructuralist approach in philosophy and education.

He writes: “The deepest influences upon my thinking and writing include Wittgenstein, Nietzsche, Lyotard, Derrida and Foucault. These philosophers teach us how to think or philosophize in the postmodern condition in an age when the grand *récits* or metanarratives have lost their legitimating power. They also provide a positive philosophical response to nihilism, globalization

and to the fragmentation and dissolution of Western culture. For these thinkers also the question of the style of philosophy is paramount and it is productive to approach their philosophies as a kind of writing.”

He is currently editing *The Companion to Wittgenstein and Education: Pedagogical Investigations* (Springer) with Jeff Stickney. He coauthored *Saying and Doing: Wittgenstein as a Pedagogical Philosopher* (2008) with Nicholas Burbules and Paul Smeyers; and *Wittgenstein: Philosophy, Postmodernism, Pedagogy* (1999) with James D. Marshall. Other philosophical works include: *Education and the Postmodern Condition* (ed.) (1996); *Poststructuralism, Politics, and Education* (1996); *Derrida, Deconstruction and Education* (2004) and *Deconstructing Derrida: Tasks for the New Humanities* (2005) with Peter Trifonas; *Derrida, Politics and Pedagogy* (2009) with Gert Biesta; and *Subjectivity and Truth: Foucault, Education, and the Culture of the Self* (2008), *Why Foucault?* (eds.) (2007), and *Governmentality Studies in Education* (eds.) (2009), all with Tina Besley.

He is also interested in the philosophy and political economy of knowledge production and consumption within the academy having written many books on knowledge economy and the university. His current projects in this area include work on distributed knowledge, digital learning and publishing systems, and “open education.”

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Berislav Žarnić is Full Professor of University of Split in philosophy, branch of logic. He works at the Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of Split doing scientific research and teaching logic, philosophy of

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Professor Besley returned to New Zealand in late 2011 after 11 years in universities in the United Kingdom and United States. From 2000 to 2006, she was Research Fellow and Lecturer at the University of Glasgow, Scotland.

She spent 6 years in the United States, which included 2 years as a full tenured Professor at the Department of Educational Psychology and Counseling (College of Education, California State University, San Bernardino) teaching masters students in the Counseling program.

Tina spent 4 years at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign (UIUC), where for the last 3 years she was a Research Professor in the Department of Education Policy, Organization and Leadership in the College of Education. In this position, she taught graduate programs in Global Studies in Education and Critical Thinking. She also held a Ph.D. seminar on Michel Foucault. She remains an Adjunct Professor at UIUC.

Prior to her career in academia, Tina was a secondary school teacher, school counselor, and Head of Department (Guidance). She is MNZAC, a long-standing member of the New Zealand Association of Counsellors having been involved on both the Auckland subcommittee and the NZ membership committee.

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Academic Literacy Across the Curriculum

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Introduction

This entry examines academic literacies across the curriculum with respect to the orientations scholars have developed to the nature of the knowledge of reading and writing required for academic literacy and to the extent to which that knowledge is generalizable across different texts and different contexts. The focus is on reading and writing here as these are the most prevalent modes of participation in academic settings, recognizing both that students engage in a wide variety of other literacies outside school and that both in-school and out-of-school literacies could be enriched by a more permeable boundary between those settings. The questions of if, when, and how learners transfer or appropriate knowledge across domains and contexts has long been of interest to

educational psychologists, and research in academic literacy has paralleled those debates (Smagorinsky and Smith 1992). Three distinct understandings have emerged: academic literacy as general knowledge, as genre-specific knowledge, or as membership in a community of practice. How teachers and researchers view the nature of literacy across classrooms, disciplines, and content-areas is largely a function of how they have been informed by the three views. Each differs in its assumptions toward the nature of knowledge itself, the extent to which literacy embodies a kind of knowledge, and the manner in which literacy instruction should be approached. Drawing upon influential research and theory, this entry will describe each view and address its theoretical and pedagogical assumptions.

The General Knowledge View

The governing assumption behind a general knowledge view of academic literacy is that the robust strategies employed by expert readers and writers are common across domains and disciplines. The general knowledge view has proven to be highly influential in the structure and organization of conventional educational curricula, as evidenced by the extent to which English and language arts classrooms are held as the primary arenas in which reading and writing are taught, as well as the role of first-year composition courses across most universities as the chief means of preparing incoming students for the demands of reading and writing that will follow in their later coursework. It is assumed that what students learn in such settings will transfer to other contexts. Teachers and researchers who embrace a general knowledge view hold an *a priori* belief that reading and writing, as forms of activity, involve a set of essential processes that operate independent of the specific type of text being read or written or the context in which the activity is being carried out. Although recent, large-scale reform efforts have begun to consider the role of discipline-specific approaches to reading and writing in the design of curriculum and instruction, the general

knowledge view is still largely dominant in educational practice.

General knowledge views of academic literacy are rooted in an understanding of learning as individual cognition. For example, driven by Piaget's notions of accommodation and assimilation, schema theory (Anderson and Pearson 1984), one manifestation of the general knowledge position, articulates the role of individual cognition in the processing of written text. Comprehension is understood as the interaction between a reader's existing knowledge, or schema, and the new knowledge encountered through the activity of reading. A schema represents a summation of abstracted knowledge that organizes what is known about a collection of cases which may differ in their particulars. To understand what has been read is either to encode it onto a mental representation that matches with a preexisting schema or to modify a preexisting schema so as to accommodate the new information. Anderson and Pearson (1984) demonstrate the schematic basis of reading comprehension through a series of experiments in which readers are presented with deliberately ambiguous texts. In one example, the text could be read as a description of a prisoner escaping a cell or as a wrestler escaping a hold. The initial inference made by each reader to determine which schema to activate dictates how subsequent information is processed. Schema theory reflects a general knowledge orientation toward literacy because it takes as its locus of concern the individual reader's cognitive equipment as opposed to the linguistic demands of specific text types or contextual circumstances surrounding the activity of reading. Whereas the nature and variety of schema will differ across individuals, the general knowledge position holds that all readers employ schema in similar ways.

In writing theory, the role of individual cognition as the basis for general knowledge is most clearly reflected in cognitive process models that describe the mental systems involved in the composition of a text. By analyzing a series of think-aloud protocols carried out by writers of varying degrees of expertise, Flower and Hayes (1981) developed a dynamic model for the writing

process as the interplay of the task environment, the writer's long-term memory, and the various cognitive activities involved in the actual writing of a text: planning, translating, and reviewing. By categorizing the cognitive elements of the writing process, scholars compared the strategies employed by expert writers with those employed by novice writers, revealing, among other things, valuable insights into how writers set and adapt goals, anticipate audience needs, and make micro-level choices about style and diction. As a result, the emphasis of composition instruction shifted from product to process. Learning to write could be framed as developing declarative understandings of the elements of the process coupled with facilitated opportunities to engage the process across a variety of tasks. Although differences across writers and tasks invite different ways of engaging the cognitive processes involved in writing, the processes themselves are essentially the same according to the general knowledge position.

General knowledge views of academic literacy have given rise to the importance of metacognition as a distinct aim of both research and instruction. Guided by the belief that students develop as readers and writers when they approach texts with the appropriate schematic resources and master the robust strategies employed by experts, research design and classroom practice have introduced methods for making such strategies visible artifacts of analysis and bodies of content. Teachers and scholars have become just as interested in how a text has been read or composed as they are in the resulting understandings or written products. The underlying hope is that, if literacy involves a set of universal processes, those processes can be named, taught, practiced, and transferred.

More recently, scholars in composition have called into the question the universality of literacy processes while still maintaining a general knowledge orientation toward composition instruction. Downs and Wardle (2007) argue that the best approach to composition instruction is one in which inquiry into writing itself is the curricular focus. In other words, the field of writing studies should be the central topic of a writing course. Taking as their framework the notion of threshold

concepts – discipline-specific concepts that must be mastered before one can engage in the actual work of a particular field – Downs and Wardle (2007) assert that the general knowledge of writing most relevant and useful to students involves key understandings of writing itself: that it is highly contextual, that written texts mediate activity, that reflection is a part of the writing process, etc. While several widely adopted textbooks suggest that this view has gained uptake among university writing programs, there is less evidence that middle and secondary classrooms have developed comparable interest. However, the work exemplifies efforts to make general knowledge approaches more compatible with genre-specific and communities of practice views of academic literacy.

The Genre-Specific View

Critics of the general knowledge view oppose its focus on individual cognition as the primary agent in literate activity. They argue that literacy is not solely a cognitive phenomenon – it includes social, cultural, and historical forces that shape the habits of mind and patterns of reasoning that involve written texts. One such view focuses specifically on the social functions carried out by typified forms of texts, or genres. While broad similarities among text types such as narrative or expository are visible on a macro-level, genre theorists attend to the microlevel differences among text types within these broader categories. For example, even within the broad category of narrative, there are key differences in the forms and functions of allegories, ironic narratives, epistolary novels, etc. Because they are socially constructed, microlevel genres reflect a specialized kind of knowledge that cannot easily be generalized across contexts, especially in situations where different genres have few similarities, or with genres that operate within esoteric communities, such as social science reports. Consequently, advocates of a genre-specific view of academic literacy favor the analysis of specific genres in order to identify the strategies most relevant to reading and writing particular kinds

of texts. Literacy, in this sense, is not a kind of general knowledge but a repertoire of task-specific proficiencies.

Traditionally, genre studies aimed to classify text types according to shared rhetorical elements. Miller (1984) first theorized genre as a representation of conventionalized social purposes. Typification – the patterning of text types over time – is a cultural process through which social action can be carried out. Rather than viewing genre as a function of the formal properties of similar texts, it is understood as a level of meaning in which personal, idiosyncratic motives are mediated through typified, rule-governed textual structures. Genre is rhetorically significant because it mediates social action: it is a set of normative, interpretive rules that allow for cultural artifacts to carry meaning. For students, genres are the vehicles through which they can participate in the literate activities of the classroom community.

Genre-specific orientations toward reading examine the relationships between the conventional features of particular text types and the interpretive strategies readers bring to those text types. Understanding a written text is neither a strictly objective matter of correctly decoding the words on the page nor is it a strictly subjective matter of the word's potential to evoke a response. Instead, it is an act of coordinating the autonomous elements of the text itself with the readers' capacity to arrive at culturally viable understandings. According to Rabinowitz (1987), culturally viable understandings are genre-dependent. Different genres, he argues, invite and reward different interpretive operations. He details how authors count on shared understandings of genre-specific rules as they play out across different types of texts. Rabinowitz (1987) offers a metaphor to make his case. Reading a text, he proposes, is like building a swingset. Given the right parts, the task is easily accomplished as long as the builder knows what it is he or she is building. If the builder is given the parts without knowing what it is he or she is meant to assemble from them, the task becomes far more demanding. Comprehending or understanding a text is a reflection of the reader's familiarity with the type

of text being read and his or her capacity to attend to the appropriate details accordingly.

Scholars from the Sydney School have championed a genre-specific approach to the study of writing. Working from a functional linguistics framework, they construe genre as a configuration of meanings realized through language (Martin and Rose 2008). Written texts are approached with respect to their functional purposes in cultural activity. Such purposes operate paradigmatically – the organization of language enacts culture because it reflects the choices a writer makes among the options available for making meaning within a diverse, but ultimately bounded, system. Language realizes culture on three dimensions: interpersonal, ideational, and textual. The interpersonal dimension enacts social relations among interlocutors. The ideational dimension construes activity through discursive patterns. The textual dimension organizes the flow of information with respect to the mode of communication. Taken together, the three dimensions coalesce into patterns which thereby form integrated systems, or genres. Martin and Rose (2008) characterize the taxonomical insights gained from this approach as mapping culture. Pedagogically, the aim is to develop systematic understandings of genres so that they can be taught explicitly to primary school students to prepare them for the types of writing they will be expected to do in secondary school.

Teachers and scholars working from the general knowledge position seek to identify procedural understandings that are robust across different texts and tasks. Teachers and scholars working from a genre-specific position instead seek to identify particular strategies and structures called for by particular text types. Such analyses yield instruction designed to provide students with a repertoire of task-specific proficiencies to aid them across a range of academic settings.

The Communities of Practice View

A third approach to academic literacy across the curriculum reverses the focus from the individual

learner to the context in which learning takes place by foregrounding the nature of participation in the social activity of academic life and shifting genre-specific knowledge into the background. In this sense, genre-specific knowledge is seen as a product of social participation rather than the gateway into such participation. Literacy is not as much a matter of proficiency with specific text types as it is a matter of understanding the values, customs, and conventions of communities in which reading and writing are central activities. Such understanding develops through acculturation into communities of practice. A primary belief held by scholars working from this tradition is that knowledge is always situated in context. Whereas the general knowledge view pursues universal process that is essential to the activities of reading and writing regardless of the context in which those activities are being carried out, the communities of practice view reject the possibility of such universal processes because thought and language are fundamentally social and their origins are rooted in lived experiences rather than cognitive processes.

The term communities of practice, as it applies to literacy theory, is attributed to Lave and Wenger (1991), whose ethnographic studies of apprenticeship among tailors in West Africa highlighted the impact that participation in communities has on literate activity. They observed a kind of learning that was rooted in everyday, informal activities as opposed to the formal, decontextualized approach to learning dominant in schools. As a result, they came to understand learning as an aspect of how the nature of participation within communities of practice changed over time as participants developed mastery of the specific, ongoing, interdependent activities that comprised the communities in which they were situated. Powerful learning, they argued, resulted from legitimate peripheral participation in these day-to-day activities. Communities of practice must endow learners with positions of relevance through which they can gain access to full participation as their roles in the community change over time. Consequently, general knowledge develops as a product of situated practice, not vice versa.

Scholars associated with the New Literacy Studies have embraced a communities of practice view in their ethnographic studies of literacy across a wide range of cultures and communities (Street 2003). Literacy is understood not as a discrete phenomenon but rather as a means through which social activity is mediated by texts. Hence, the object of study is not literacy as a set of processes nor is it the nature of text types; rather, the focus is placed on *literacy events*, or social activities carried out by participants in a community of practice in which reading and writing serve as a mediational means. Street (2003) problematizes an emphasis on individual learners in literacy research by distinguishing between *autonomous* and *ideological* models of literacy. An autonomous model of literacy is analogous to a general knowledge view in that it assumes literacy is a universal set of processes which operate independent of context and promote positive cognitive outcomes. An ideological model, on the other hand, begins with an assumption that literacy is not a neutral set of skills and proficiencies but rather a social practice embedded in socially constructed ideological principles. Street (2003) introduced the term *literacies* to reflect this distinction. What constitutes being literate in a culture reflects the epistemological beliefs of the dominant forces within that culture. Literacy, in this sense, is always a contested terrain in which tensions between dominant and nondominant ideologies play out. Members of communities who hold nondominant orientations toward reading and writing must either submit to the dominant ideologies or develop inventive ways to hybridize the literate practices ushered through these dominant ideologies in response to local circumstances. For this reason, a large body of work stemming from the New Literacy Studies involves generating rich ethnographic portraits of local literacy practices in order to better understand the underlying ideological conflicts that arise from the institutional demands of formal schooling.

It is uncommon for scholars who embrace a communities of practice view to focus solely on either reading or writing, as doing so implies a putative division between those activities that

competes with an interest in literacy events as holistic occurrences through which literate practices can be inferred. Bazerman (1988) offers a notable exception in his seminal, genre-based analysis of the experimental report in science. Although he sets out to characterize the rhetorical features of the genre and the extent to which they reveal how writers of scientific reports utilize conventions of language to respond to empirical exigencies, his analysis illuminates the predominant role of communities of practice in mediating the potential for written texts to convey meaning. Within communities of practice, readers and writers carry shared values, assumptions, and epistemologies that stretch beyond the words contained within a single text. Efforts to negotiate those shared assumptions largely inform the rhetorical options available to a writer. Experimental reports in science, widely held to be objective accounts of empirical facts, are instead very much social constructions themselves, shaped by the demands set upon them by the communities in which they are imbued with socio-ideological value. Communities of practice function as activity systems, mediating the production and dissemination of knowledge through written texts so as to reinforce their own values and purposes. A writer working within a community of practice does not merely reproduce a genre – he or she extends it in order to respond to immediate circumstances using the rhetorical apparatus available within that community. Consequently, in such a view, genre-specific instruction is limited because it does not carry with it the broader social purposes involved in writing. Genuine involvement with a community of practice is necessary to fully inculcate a student writer into the values, customs, and conventions that underline the creation of a text.

A communities of practice view of academic literacy across the curriculum affords a valuable lens into the extent to which perceived differences in literate abilities are in fact differences in cultural, ideological, and economic orientations toward written texts and their importance as mediators of social activity. By rejecting an autonomous model of literacy, reading and writing are

no longer viewed as skills or proficiencies individuals either possess or do not possess. Instead, the locus of concern is understanding ideological differences in what constitutes literacy and adapting institutional practices so as to accommodate those differences. However, two notable criticisms of the communities of practice view have emerged. First, in its tendency to emphasize the local, a communities of practice view risks ignoring the relatively common features of literacy as it plays out across different contexts. Literate practices often come to communities from the outside, and they bring with them meanings that extend beyond the perspectives of participants within those communities. Communities of practice may not refute the existence of universal literacy processes; instead, they may offer insightful variations on those processes. Secondly, few practical applications of a communities of practice view to formal education have gained feasibility on a large scale. Whereas central tenets and evocative discoveries gleaned through the general knowledge and genre-specific views have found their way into curriculum and instructional practice, the communities of practice view has proven more useful for uncovering flaws than for proposing viable solutions. Many foundational assumptions of the communities of practice view are incommensurable with the institutionalized routines associated with formal schooling, and a paradigmatic shift in the way that education is structured and implemented would be necessary to fully satisfy the multiplicitous view of literacy embedded within the communities of practice approach.

Conclusion

In short, scholars investigating academic literacy across the curriculum have been informed by significantly different theoretical perspectives. These different perspectives result in different foci of study, different methods, and different approaches to instruction. General knowledge views tend to result in studies that examine the processes by which readers and writers make meaning.

Instructionally, this view promotes an emphasis on teaching robust strategies and metacognitive reasoning. Genre-specific views tend to focus more on examinations of texts themselves in order to describe the key features that allow texts to mediate discrete social activities. Instructionally, this view favors analysis of specific reading and writing tasks in order to cultivate strategies specific to those tasks. Lastly, a communities of practice view tends to rely on ethnographic accounts of how texts mediate everyday activities. Instructionally, this view favors including a broad range of literacies in school curricula and fostering an understanding of and respect for the multiplicity of ways in which people use texts in their lives.

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Adapting Pedagogy for Formative Assessment

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Introduction

Assessment for Learning is an accepted approach to pedagogy in many countries where the purpose of assessment is to provide feedback and guidance to inform future learning. Both teachers and learners are involved, but ultimately it is the

learner that needs to take action. Adapting pedagogy to make room for feedback and action is a complex process that takes time and effort to evolve.

Classroom Assessment

Black and Wiliam's (1998) survey of evidence linking assessment with improved learning has significantly influenced how educators and policymakers have conceptualized classroom assessment over the last three decades. Within classroom activities, teachers are able to collect data on student understanding from the way learners answer questions, the questions they raise, and the quality of the artifacts they produce. If this assessment information is then interpreted and used by teachers, students, and their peers, to make decisions and take action to enhance learning, the assessment is termed formative. Interpretation and decisions can drive future planning and support student learning through feedback. In a classroom where assessment is used to primarily support learning, the divide between instruction and assessment becomes increasingly blurred and can disappear (Perrenoud 1991).

The emphasis on formative assessment being informal and part of everyday classroom activity rather than an episodic event of testing is captured by Klenowski (2009):

Assessment for Learning is part of everyday practice by students, teachers and peers that seeks, reflects upon and responds to information from dialogue, demonstration and observation in ways that enhance ongoing learning. (p. 264)

This definition also emphasizes the learner as active in the assessment process through their understanding of what is being learned and how quality is judged. This moves the learner increasingly into the foreground of classroom assessment, with implications for teachers.

This entry looks at ways assessment for learning functions in classrooms and the types of development and learning teachers engage in to strengthen their formative practice. It also considers some of the challenges teachers face when they attempt to make changes in practice. As such,

this entry provides insights in support of professional learning as well as greater understanding of formative assessment.

Assessment for Learning as a Pedagogy

As Black and Wiliam (1998) reported, it is difficult to imagine how assessment for learning (AfL) implementation can be treated as a marginal change in classroom activities, because it relies on strengthening feedback loops between learners and teachers and within learning groups. Creating a classroom environment where interactions between learners dominate often requires new skills and practices for both teacher and students. The nature of these changes is a key determinant for the outcomes for students, as formative work becomes embedded in new modes of pedagogy.

Teachers when introduced to ideas on AfL tend to work on a range of strategies that strengthen classroom talk both to improve how they probe and prompt learners in discussion and to help their students respond and interact with one another with increasing confidence. We know, from working on "wait time" (Rowe 1974) between teacher questions and accepting answers, that more students volunteer to answer and elaborate on their answers than previously. In some classrooms, the change is enormous, moving from single word answers from a handful of students to a purposeful discussion driven by several students.

Common to all AfL practices is the active involvement of students, whose role changes from passive recipients of knowledge to active partners in the learning process (Swaffield 2011). Students finding out what makes sense and developing ideas through self and peer critique through discussion encourage next steps in learning. In this situation teachers have to decide which of the many diverse student ideas and experiences are productive starting points for relating and navigating between everyday forms of knowing and those accepted and used within a subject domain (Bang and Medin 2010). Given this dynamic set of assessment information, the teacher can decide how to respond to students' current conceptual understanding of that topic. Importantly through

this approach, students can use feedback to evaluate their own and others’ work, learn from their mistakes, and learn to reflect on their learning. The goal of AfL is not however to eliminate mistakes but to keep them from becoming chronic and seen as inevitable (Stiggins 2007). When students make a mistake or realize something they have done is incorrect, it is part of the teacher’s role to restore their confidence and help them address the situation. This is part of the emotional dynamic and challenge of AfL.

Implementation of AfL Practice

We know that formative assessment is difficult to achieve, even in countries like England, where considerable funding and training has been put in place to support the shifts in teacher practice required (Looney 2007). Despite the investment in training materials, time, and money (e.g., DFES 2007), a report from school inspectors in England indicated that teacher practice was inadequate in 7 of the 43 schools sampled and good to outstanding in only 16 schools. The report noted that AfL practice was better established in primary than secondary schools and also that it was more established in English and mathematics than across the curriculum in both primary and secondary schools (OfSTED 2010). Even when schools valued the training and support provided, good practice in assessment for learning did not necessarily follow with teachers implementing strategies without consideration of how they were meant to work to strengthen feedback. In some cases, schools made decisions to introduce specific AfL strategies, such as traffic lights or comment-only marking, across all classes. Implementation differed markedly from teacher to teacher and failed to ensure consistency of principle while superficially achieving uniformity of practice (Harrison and Howard 2009). In addition, senior leaders did not maintain the momentum of implementation beyond the introductory stages, often moving on to other priorities before practice was secure. Clearly, the reasons for the failure of full-scale implementation are complex, affected by individual teacher conceptualization beliefs

and practices and by school systems. In essence, bringing about large-scale change in practice requires considerable effort, determination, and time for new ways of working to be understood by the individual teachers and for new practices to be recognized as valuable and successful by all those within the school community.

Teacher Approaches to Assessment for Learning

The King’s collaborative action research project on the effect of a yearlong trial of implementing AfL in secondary science and mathematics classrooms (Wiliam et al. 2004) categorized the 24 participating teachers into four categories based on their use of key AfL strategies. These categories were triallers, static pioneers, moving pioneers, and experts. Descriptions for each group are set out in Table 1.

Subsequently, the King’s AfL team have been involved in other classroom assessment projects with hundreds of teachers in primary and secondary schools (e.g., Harrison and Howard 2009; Black et al 2011). This enabled them at firsthand to observe the ways in which teachers adopt and adapt AfL strategies into their existing practice. While the initial framing of the four categories broadly holds, the team now recognize that it is not simply what AfL strategies teachers use but also how teachers use them as part of their classroom procedures. This has led the team to consider the changes teachers make to their practice, both

Adapting Pedagogy for Formative Assessment, Table 1 Types of Assessment for Learning Teachers

AfL teacher type	Description
Trialler	Teacher tries one or more AfL strategies with one class
Static pioneer	Teacher tries a few AfL strategies and decides on those that they will retain in their practice
Moving pioneer	Teacher who experiments with a number of strategies and begins to consider which work well and which need adapting or removing after a few attempts
Expert	Teachers who have established a number of strategies and can explain and demonstrate how these increase feedback loops between students and teacher and affect teaching and/or learning

Adapting Pedagogy for Formative Assessment, Table 2 Approaches to Assessment for Learning Pedagogy

Teacher type	Description	Teacher quotes
Conformists	These teachers often relate change in practice to their interpretations of policy or practice requirements from senior colleagues. They explain what they have introduced or changed within their teaching but give little consideration to why this might be useful or how they might use the strategy to benefit learners. Statements tend to be functional, procedural, and unproblematic	“We have a policy that like tells you what you need to do and so each activity has objectives and success criteria in your planning documentation and our headteacher checks these are in place.” (Stefan – Y6 teacher)
Strategy players	These teachers select or trial a specific AfL strategy that they can describe and also attribute the benefits for teachers or learners	“We get the children to us traffic light cups, one set per group, and this helps us see how confident they are when working on group tasks.” (David – secondary science teacher)
Checkers	These teachers focus on the tasks they have planned and use strategies to help them recognize successful completion of the task and indicate shortcomings or errors. Success criteria are used as a checklist rather than ways of describing quality performance, and this is evident in the atomistic way they feedback to students	“I mark their work against the success criteria and then use what’s missing or what they have got wrong to set a target for them to do their corrections.” (Eloise – secondary language teacher) “We decide the success criteria as a class and then check each of these off as pupils move through the tasks.” (Samara – Y6 teacher)
Involvers	These teachers believe that AfL provides the students with useful feedback and encourage students to compare ideas. They are keen on group activity and use peer assessment as a regular part of classroom activity	“Getting the children to work more collectively, swapping ideas and generally sharing so that they can learn from one another or even teach their peers something. I find this really helps.” (Gina – Y6 teacher)
Formative practitioners	These teachers see learning as a collaborative endeavor with students both supporting and assessing one another’s learning. AfL is seen as more than strategies to use and more as aspects of a teaching approach designed to benefit from feedback opportunities	“It’s about getting the kids to be good learners, to be willing to have a go and make mistakes which they learn from. It involves groupwork, talk for learning and lots of feedback both to me and from me and with each other.” (Stephen – secondary science teacher)

initially and as their practice evolves. The team also focused on how teachers explained and reflected on their formative practice and the reasons they gave for selecting a specific strategy, using the strategy in a particular way and/or deciding to change the way they worked with a strategy. By sifting and analyzing the data from teacher-researcher conversations during classroom visits, recorded in field notes, and in interviews typically given toward the end of projects, the team has framed five typical AfL teacher types (see Table 2.)

While the professional learning journeys of individual teachers varied greatly, teacher developmental trajectories generally began incrementally and then often halted at various points so teachers remained consistent in that AfL approach

for a considerable time. In some cases, this was the endpoint of the development within the time frame of the project. Most of the project teachers were either conformists or strategy players in the early part of a project as they tried new ways of working. Some teachers continued to show similar classroom AfL behavior throughout the project, remaining as conformists or strategy players. The majority of teachers, however, moved to a different AfL approach as the project progressed. What was particularly noticeable were the similarities in the factors that teachers attributed to their change in practice and the reasons given for not taking forward practice further. Some conformist teachers and strategy player teachers developed a checker approach;

the conformist teachers, however, never became involver teachers or formative practitioners. This was often because they did not believe that their students could play a more active part in assessment:

They (students) find peer assessment very difficult and whenever I try it, I end up marking it myself anyway. (Stefan – Y6 teacher)

While they (students) might be able to spot mistakes, most of my class wouldn't be able to give the correct word or grammatical idea and so the feedback is better coming from me. (Simone – secondary French teacher)

What was also of interest was how the checker teachers conceptualized knowledge. While they accepted the idea of a gap (Sadler 1989) between the anticipated performance and the actual performance, their conceptualization of closing the gap was to provide instruction as though knowledge came in incremental building blocks and to use a linear and procedural model of feedback (Torrance 2015). Their approach also suggests that improvement centers on closing the gap and completing a task rather than providing feedback that opens up an idea and stimulates further thinking. Indeed, much of the feedback provided by both conformist and checker teachers was presented as corrections with either the correct words or numbers given or an example provided for the target. This approach fits with Torrance and Pryor's (2001) view of convergent assessment, where the aim of the teacher is to check that students have arrived at a predetermined endpoint for that task, such as "used the correct tense" in a language lesson or "can list all the prime numbers below 20" in mathematics. On the other hand, some of the strategy player teachers did move on to become involvers or formative practitioners because they were more willing to share the control of learning with their students. Their view of learning was much more within the socio-constructivist domain, where they considered how students might be helped to interact more with one another to find new solutions or ways of working. This approach fits with Torrance and Pryor's (2001) view of divergent assessment where the assessment approach provides feedback

to encourage students to think further and develop ideas. The following two examples demonstrate divergent assessment feedback:

How was the Pharaoh's role different to that of a citizen in ancient Egypt? How did he demonstrate to his people and his enemies that he was powerful? (Year 6 History)

Why do you like the use of alliteration in this poem? (Y9 English)

Summary

AfL has become an accepted part of pedagogy in most UK classrooms but the degree to which it supports learning differs from classroom to classroom. There remains a need to raise teacher awareness of what is involved in an effective AfL approach, what formative assessment is, the important role students play in this process, and how AfL can be incorporated into teaching. In many cases, this will require teachers to (re)consider their beliefs about learning and the intricate ways both assessment and teaching weave into this (Harrison 2013). Such changes need peer collaboration and support from the school and professional development community over time and not simply the introduction of the new ways of teaching.

The main difficulty for the teacher who wishes to develop AfL practice is that they cannot simply add new strategies to their current practice. Instead, they need to gradually make changes to their current practice to allow new ways of working to slip into class procedures and systems, while, at the same time, supporting their students in developing new ways to work with peers in the classroom. This iterative process takes sustained effort to introduce and time to implement, and so teachers need to be convinced that such changes are necessary and likely to be fruitful in future lessons.

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Adult and Continuing Education in the Nordic Countries: *Folkbildning*

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Synonyms

Adult education; Character formation; Civic education; Emancipation; Popular education; Social movements

Introducing *Folkbildning*

This entry discusses the Nordic variety of *non-formal adult education* or *popular education*. These English terms emphasize different aspects of this Nordic tradition. It is education for adults, including young adults. Unlike the formal school system, it is not bound by a set curriculum; it is therefore more flexible in its capacity to reflect changes in society. Furthermore, it is entirely elective. Although *nonformal adult education* is the term most commonly used in referring to this form of education in English, *popular education* captures a salient feature in much of this tradition; it is typically geared particularly to those with little education or low social status. It aims to be not only *for* the people but also *by* the people; it is the people taking the education of themselves and their fellow men into their own hands.

It makes sense to call this a Nordic tradition since the national varieties have common historical roots and share many key features. This is reflected in the descriptions. The Danish and

Norwegian *folkeoplysning/folkeopplysning* can be translated as “enlightenment of the people” and the Swedish *folkbildning* to “cultivation or formation of the people.” In Finnish, two names are used, *kansansivistys*, the equivalent of *folkbildning*, and *aikuiskoulutus*, meaning “adult education.” The Icelandic word *fullorðinsfræðsla* means “adult education.” Due to limitation of space, focus will be on the Swedish tradition, together with remarks on Denmark, where Nordic nonformal adult education was born. Swedish *folkbildning* is here chosen as the prime example because it is the most closely allied with the State, raising the problem regarding the autonomy of the institutions of *folkbildning*, a central issue in higher education. The Swedish description *folkbildning* will be used to refer to the Nordic tradition in general.

***Folkbildning* as Philanthropic Emancipation and as Popular Education**

In the nineteenth century, Enlightenment thought reached the people of the Nordic countries in the form of new ideas and ideals for the education of the common man. The movement can be roughly divided into two initial stages: *folkbildning* as philanthropic emancipation and *folkbildning* as popular education.

The first wave of Nordic *folkbildning* was initiated by a fraction of the bourgeoisie who, inspired by Enlightenment and Romantic thought, wanted to liberate the masses from oppression by educating them. The mission, inspired by seventeenth century philosophy, was to cultivate citizenship and civic virtues. At the heart of this Enlightenment project lays a conception of human beings influenced by British empiricism, especially by John Locke’s ideas about natural law. Locke saw certain human rights and values as inherent in human nature and as universally cognizable through human reason. According to Locke, no human being has a right given by nature or an almighty God to rule over someone else. Instead, the Law is something rooted in each

individual; thus every man should partake in and be responsible for decisions regarding society. According to this ideal, the rational and enlightened citizen ought to be capable of critically examining different alternatives and autonomously taking a stand on them. The idea of natural law underlies the English Bill of Rights, the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen, and the American Declaration of Independence. The Western conception of democracy is thus founded on the idea of natural law, in which the rights of the individual area concern for all other citizens.

Conservatives, often influenced by Romantic ideals, challenged the philanthropy of bourgeois radicalism. The first attempts at *folkbildning* in Sweden were directed at the farmers, but since they were considered archetypical Swedes, many wanted the farmer to stay simple and untainted by urban decadence, industrialism, and the Enlightenment (Gustavsson 1991, p. 55). But Romantic thought also became an inspiration for *folkbildning* to move beyond emancipatory education of the lower class by the higher. Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s *Émile* introduces an ideal for education where the young learner actively searches for knowledge guided by his own needs and motivations, while having nothing but his own previous experiences as a knowledge base. This idea, in which the search for knowledge and cultivation originates in and emanates from oneself, is the backbone of *folkbildning*; it is cardinal to the pedagogy of folk high schools and forms the core of study circles. The ideal contains an implicit critique of philanthropic projects of *folkbildning* while, as will be discussed later, cherishing the ideal of *folkbildning* as character formation.

Folkbildning as popular education begins with the education of the people – the peasants, the workers, and those without property – and aims at challenging the social order. In it the ordinary man takes education and *Bildung* into his own hands, redefining those concepts in the process (Compare Crowther 2013, p. 262). At the turn of the twentieth century, new peoples’ movements

arose and proliferated in Sweden. The most influential of these were the labor, temperance, and free church movements, all which became driving forces in the political and social democratization of Sweden. At the time, the public school system was relatively undemocratic; the majority had no access to education beyond mandatory schooling for 6 years. Within the peoples' movements, *folkbildning* was created as an alternative educational model. Among its most salient features, distinguishing it from the public school system, was that *folkbildning* was "fri och frivillig" – nonauthoritarian, unregulated, and voluntary. Moreover, *folkbildning*, particularly as it arose within the labor movement, was popular: the people should decide for themselves what to study, what to teach, and what it is to be taught.

The Folk High School and the Study Circle

The Danish humanist and pastor N. F. S. Grundtvig played a leading role in the foundation of the folk high school. He criticized traditional instruction for having failed to bring about "common sense about that which lies nearest to us: about our own nature, conditions in the fatherland, and what is best for the common interest" (Grundtvig 1838, p. 88). Grundtvig wanted the Danish citizen to receive a Nordic education. By reading Nordic authors and reading about Nordic history, he would learn to understand himself better and find an inroad to knowledge about the rest of the world. Nationalism is a distinctive trait of Danish *folkeoplysning*, due in part to the fact that Grundtvig was a strong advocate of National Romanticism and in part to the historical circumstances in which the tradition arose. The first folk high school opened in Rödning, North Schleswig, in 1844. This province had a mixed population of people with Danish and German ancestry. Around 1830, tensions between these groups arose which triggered a growing feeling of belonging with the Danes as ethnic group in the people of Danish descent. Grundtvig had ideas not only on what should be taught but also on how to teach. Teaching should be a means for spiritual as well as

historical awakening, and this ideal should permeate the planning and the pedagogy of the schools. The students should live on school premises and form good and nonhierarchical relationships with their teachers. Ideally, the school would have beautiful natural surroundings. The teachers should be free in their choice of pedagogy and materials. The folk high schools should be for young adults since, Grundtvig believed, they were best suited for learning (Holmström 1886, pp. 20–24).

The Swedish folk high schools were modeled on the Danish ones, but the Swedish tradition of *folkbildning* clearly stands apart from the Danish, as well as the Norwegian and Finnish. This seems largely due to differences between the nations in terms of political power at the time when *folkbildning* arose. Sweden was rather powerful in the nineteenth century, and the Swedes, unlike their Nordic neighbors, enjoyed national sovereignty as an ethnic group. Thus, when *folkbildning* arose in Sweden, it was not cloaked in nationalism, nor did Swedish national culture, literature, and history have the same elevated status in it as they had in Danish *folkeoplysning*. *Folkbildning* was not an ethnic issue in Sweden. There were, however, great political and social inequalities between the classes, which were slowly being acknowledged and addressed. In 1866, the Riksdag of the Estates was abolished, and the peasants won greater influence over the municipality. When *folkbildning* arose in Sweden, it was a response to this development. Holmström argued that the peasant became conscious that, from now on, he must *see* himself as a citizen and that the peasantry must be abolished as social class (Holmström 1886, p. 285). Some farmers saw the need for peasants to learn more about civic affairs, and one of the first Swedish folk high schools, Hvilan, was founded with this aim in view.

At the turn of the century, Oscar Olsson – who was later to become Social Democratic Member of Parliament – proposed a study form based on self-teaching to the Swedish Order of Good Templars. This started the extensive and widespread activity that study circles have become. A study circle is a small group of people joined by a

common interest who meet regularly to partake in an educational activity: discussing a text, learning about union rights, or developing their skills in a certain handicraft. Olsson discusses the choice of name – study circle – as perhaps misleading, since they did not primarily aim at the acquisition of knowledge but at *Bildung*, i.e., character formation and sound judgment. Since this included the development of good citizenship and insights into culture, the social aspect was important. The study circles succeeded better in bringing education to the people than did the folk high schools, since there were hardly any costs involved, and the meetings did not take much time from work. They were also to a much greater extent expressions of an increasingly influential idea that one should take education into one's own hands. Olsson rejected the idea that *folkbildning* should be objective and neutral, arguing that if one wants to accomplish something through *folkbildning*, one must start from the groups people actually make themselves, based on interest, vocation, and affinity. The study circle was a break with philanthropically influenced *folkbildning*, which was aimed at the people but over which the people had no influence. Olsson describes philanthropic *folkbildning* as a spiritual soup kitchen for those in need (Arvidsson 2005, p. 19).

In 1907, the Swedish Parliament decided to set aside government grants for the purchasing of books by study circle members. They could only be granted to national organizations, which spurred the development of the institution of study associations. The first study association, *The Workers' Educational Association*, was founded by the Social Democrats, the Swedish Trade Union Confederation, and the Cooperative Association in 1912.

***Folkbildning* as Civic Education and as Character Formation**

Social and political interests were decisive factors in the founding of folk high schools and study circles in Sweden. *Folkbildning* had an important role to play in forming new layers of educated citizens who could partake in the democratic

government of the country. However, the tradition in which *folkbildning* is primarily seen as civic education has always coexisted with a tradition that focuses on the individual and his character formation. This tradition was most strongly advocated in Sweden by the philosopher Hans Larsson and the author Ellen Key. It starts with the conviction that education should take the individual and his interests as its starting point and that it should aim at the integration of the faculties of reason, emotion, and will. In a well-integrated personality, moral cultivation is paired with the cultivation of reason to form a conscientious person. Analogously, a cultivated person is not a person who has been trained to learn specific skills or specialized knowledge and is therefore useful to others, but one who has appropriated what he has learned to form a deeper and more integrated character. Although this tradition focuses on the individual, it sees the individual as part of the greater whole – the development of the individual as part of the development of humanity – and it is permeated with the humanistic ideal that every citizen shall take equal part in society and in cultural life.

Enlightenment ideals are strong in this tradition, and Immanuel Kant's voice reverberates with particular resonance in Larsson's characterization. In Kant's philosophy, as well as in Rousseau's, activity is the basis for knowledge. Kant's epistemology was revolutionary in that it changed our view of how knowledge is attained: knowledge does not consist of sense impressions statically received by reason, nor is it a product of reason alone, but sense impressions are structured by an active categorizing and conceptualizing reason to form knowledge. *Folkbildning* is greatly influenced by the idea of knowledge formation as an active process. It promotes an active search for knowledge initiated by the knowledge-seeking subject himself and is critical of emancipatory attempts at education in which knowledge is something that one learns passively and unreflectively. Instead, and in line with Kant's call in *What is Enlightenment?* – "Have the courage to use your own understanding" – people are encouraged to select what they find worth while learning and to use and develop their reason

actively in pursuit of knowledge and judgment to become morally responsible persons and citizens.

In the study circles, the traditions of civic education and character formation came together. Some study circles had a clear political content and aim and can be seen as expressions of a quiet social and political upheaval, while most were for learning and self-development through self-study, discussion, and shared responsibility in the democratic organization of the circle. Olof Palme, former Prime Minister and Leader of the Social Democratic Party, described Sweden as “to a substantial degree a study association democracy,” saying further that it is in study associations that generations have educated themselves in critical judgment, to belief in reason without loss of idealism in formulating their goals, in cooperation with others. Social change has often been set in motion in the study circles (palme 1969, p. 299).

***Folkbildning* and Its Relation to the State**

Today Swedish *folkbildning* is strongly tied to the State, which is its main source of funding. It stands out from its Nordic counterparts in this respect. *Folkbildning* is highly regarded by the Swedish State. It is seen as a cornerstone in a well-functioning democratic society made up of educated, reflective, and capable citizens; thus, State funding has grown ever more generous. Being the main financier, the State has great influence over the activities and functions of the study associations and folk high schools. Many have regarded this economic bond as problematic, and it has been argued that it puts Swedish *folkbildning* in a paradoxical situation (von Essen and Sundgren 2012). *Folkbildning* has its roots in people’s movements, in civil society where people come together in joint activities for a common cause without interference from the State or other authorities. Civil society is thus put in a position to examine the authorities critically. Today Swedish *folkbildning* depends for its survival on State funding. How does this effect *folkbildning* as a critical body?

There is an agreement between the providers of *folkbildning* and the government that *folkbildning*

should be free from State regulation. It should, as previously mentioned, be nonauthoritarian, unregulated, and voluntary. More specifically, this means that the State should not try to influence either the activities, the form, or the intellectual content of the bodies that make up *folkbildning*. Taken together, these stipulations could allow *folkbildning* to retain some of its autonomy. The government, however, has certain expectations as to what *folkbildning* should strive for, as well as how it should respond to societal changes and needs. In collaboration with Swedish *folkbildning*, the government sets up four aims that are to form the backbone of the activities of study associations and folk high schools. When the government evaluates these institutions, these aims form the basis for the evaluations. First and foremost, *folkbildning* should support and arrange activities that contribute to the strengthening and development of democracy. It should further contribute to making it easier for people to take control over their situation in life and engender engagement for taking part in the development of society, contribute to raising the level of education and *Bildung* in society and to evening out differences in levels of education, and contribute to raising interest and increasing participation in cultural life. But Swedish *folkbildning* is given further directives by the government. For example, the study associations are now expected to expand the Internet-based study circles. When assessment of the quality of the activities of study associations and folk high schools is based on the four aims and other directives given to *folkbildning* by the government, and this is used as the basis for continued funding, one may ask: How free *folkbildning* is? What does non-authoritarian and unregulated mean under these conditions?

In 1990, the Social Democratic Government established that the providers of *folkbildning* shall define the goals for the activities, while government and Parliament shall define the goals for grant allocation (Proposition 1990/91:82, p. 6). However, the economic governance of *folkbildning* and the governance of its activities are not separable in practice. More State funding has been set aside for certain activities and

pedagogical forms than for others, and this has influenced the study associations to expand in those fields at the cost of others (Sandahl and Sjöstrand 2014, p. 93). While *folkbildning* is said to be free to determine its own activities and pedagogy, in practice, State funding and its related guidelines exert powerful influence over the content and form of these activities (Hållén 2016).

Given the ambition and reality of Swedish *folkbildning*, the form it has taken, and its extension today, it is difficult to imagine an alternative to State funding. One of the most fundamental values on which *folkbildning* is built is that it should be available to anyone. Cost should not be an obstacle. While the first folk high schools were largely paid for by private donations, this is no longer an option. Some researchers argue that, in spite of obvious difficulties, the State is a natural ally for *folkbildning* in our time since they can together challenge the market interests which threaten to undermine the State, by reinvigorating the public sphere, for example, and keeping open alternative options to the language and values of the market (Crowther 2013, p. 260).

Cross-References

- [Citizenship, Inclusion, and Education](#)
- [Curriculum as a Governing Device](#)
- [Dewey on Public Education and Democracy](#)
- [Humanistic Education](#)
- [Rancière on Radical Equality and Adult Education](#)

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Adult Education

- [Adult and Continuing Education in the Nordic Countries: Folkbildning](#)

Advanced Liberalism

- [Neoliberalism and Environmental Education](#)

Aesthetic Education

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Synonyms

[Aesthetics](#); [Beauty](#); [Complex](#) [pragmatism](#); [Transcendentalism](#)

Aesthetic education seems to be most easily defined by what it is not. It is not the teaching of logical form or matters of fact, and it is not

satisfied to remain at the level of surface text. Generally, aesthetics seems to be the defining characteristic of the arts, with which it is usually identified.

Monroe Beardsley saw the central task of aesthetic education as the improvement of taste, claiming that this required the development of two dispositions: (1) the capacity to obtain aesthetic gratification from increasingly subtle and complex objects that are characterized by various forms of unity and (2) an increasing dependence on beautiful objects as sources of aesthetic satisfaction. Beautiful objects for him were inherently beautiful. They were perfect. They adhered to the rules of good composition. They allowed people to feel pleasure when they contemplated the objects disinterestedly. They caused pleasure due to intrinsic properties such as color, line, shape, proportion, harmony, symmetry, etc. They revealed a spiritual force in the universe. They were whatever pleases people of good taste, and they had properties to which people respond with love.

Somewhat circularly, Beardsley claimed (1982, p. 81) that a person was having an aesthetic experience during a particular stretch of time “if and only if the greater part of his mental activity during that time is united and made pleasurable by being tied to the form and qualities of a sensuously presented or imaginatively intended object on which his primary attention is concentrated.”

This classically traditional definition makes explicit its assumptions of intentionality, holistic sensuous qualities, imagination, and form but it does not address the question of how or why we would want to teach it in schools, a topic which has only been considered in the last 30 years. Transferred to the arts, it requires that production of or performance in the arts is intentional rather than divinely inspired or genetically imposed. The question of taste alone is highly contentious and one would wonder whether beauty is the ideal to which students are directed these days. There seems to be an assumption that through intentionally creating artworks which “come together appropriately” (as opposed to craft), students will come to develop a disposition to experience the aesthetic moment. But in many schools this aesthetic moment is ignored. The emphasis is

given to the product *qua* product and to the documentation of the student’s learning process through production portfolios or visual diaries. The rational reflection and self-consciousness of discipline-based art education marginalize the aesthetic experience.

It is often assumed that the aesthetic experience is equally marginalized in schools by prevailing cultural pressures of accountability and pragmatism and the dominant functionalism of education. Arts are justified in the curriculum only because they pass on the cultural heritage of our society; or because they train students in skills that might lead to a worthwhile occupation as a carpenter, musician, or painter in adult life; or even because they might decrease social malaise and alienation by making leisure time more enjoyable.

Such functionalism assumes that progress is only possible if there are measurable or demonstrable outcomes. The arts become more accountable as progress is measured in the number of products or performances. They are therefore presented in a theoretical language of criticism within which they can intentionally produce works of art. Such theoretical structures provide the frame and standards through which students can be graded and against which they can evaluate other works of art or arts performances. However, whether such a theory is testable, worthwhile, or even possible has rarely been considered. On formalist assumptions of aesthetics, it is sufficient for it to be internally coherent.

Where theories are not grounded on evidence, they proliferate, and the arts world slides into a cultural relativism of movements. Curriculum reformers bypass such contextualism by requiring a more solid foundation for evaluation. Rarely is this an educational one. As Danto said, when art becomes confused about aesthetic standards or discards the guiding standards of representation or artistic skill, the guiding value will become commercial, making the arts into a commodity in which the price or audience an artwork commands becomes the criterion of its success. So education in the arts becomes accountable in terms of the employment status of its graduates, the salary they can command, even their visibility in large museums, theatres, and the press.

Most aestheticians react to this as if a fundamental category mistake has been made. One cannot reduce the aesthetic to a number, or even to its pragmatic function. Success in the arts is so contextually dependent that one could never measure it by objective standards. It would be like trying to measure love or happiness, which are felt states rather than measurable products. Artists may earn money making artworks or performing, but that is not why they do it and that is not why we teach it in schools.

To formalists like Beardsley (1982) and Dickie (1983), if arts education was to be aesthetic, it had to be “disinterested.” “Art for Art’s sake” has become something of a cliché, especially at a period where political hegemonies seem to drive all. If the arts were to be a “discipline” in a Hirstian forms of knowledge sense, they would derive their identity from their formal structures, their ability to represent transcendental values of Beauty. Many drama and visual arts teachers tacitly assume the notion that besides aesthetics, arts are defined by their representational value at least in imitating Ideal form through mimesis. Music teachers particularly refer to the aesthetic formalism of Clive Bell (2015), based almost on Pythagorean notions of divine harmony.

An attempt to bring formalist transcendentalism closer to a physical reality was made by psychologists like Arnheim (1969) and Gombrich (1963), by naturalizing form in the brain through genetic structures. In his theory of multiple intelligences, Howard Gardner (1983) has raised the status of aesthetics in music by identifying it as a biologically inherited trait. These presumptions operate still within a modernist frame, making aesthetic experiences essentialist rather than politically and culturally contingent.

The formalist position runs the risk of retreating into a sublime essentialism that has nothing to do with the sordid or ugly, the political or mundane. The discovery that aesthetic standards presented as timeless and universal are in practice neither timeless nor universal – that they largely reflect beliefs and values typical of European patriarchy – has led to a more critical, historically grounded analysis of artistic concepts, institutions, and practices in general. Dickie

(1983) and Danto (1981) particularly remind us of the institutional presence in the arts, that their values are defined within a changing social context and that in the twentieth century at least, formalism is either trite or empty. The grounding of aesthetics must take a different form in a postmodern era.

The disappearance of the grand narrative has resulted in a broader and deeper understanding of the many social and cultural variables that contribute to prevailing notions of taste, aesthetic value, and artistic genius. As such arts teachers are now involved in helping children to enter aesthetic awarenesses not only of their own cultures but those of others from the past and present. To what extent this crossing of and comparison between cultural paradigms is possible has not been much debated in teacher training institutions.

Other barriers have been rendered invisible in educational programs, especially in the seamless construction of a learning area called the arts differentiated from languages, science, social science, and maths. What is thus differentiated can vary quite dramatically, with uncritical selections made variously from the performing arts, design, music, literature, visual arts, film, painting, sculpture, drama, dance, poetry, architecture, and jewelry-making. Different theoretical assumptions drive the selection according to the weight placed on self-expression (especially by psychologists), technical skills, beauty, aesthetic performance, cultural conformity, or originality. Could the integrating quality be a notion of aesthetic response?

Beardsley (1982), Osborne (1970), Weitz (1956), and others would say yes, and a brief history of the development of the arts area indicates the aesthetic assumption that works of art are still believed to have the capacity to induce higher levels of worthwhile experience which justifies their inclusion in the curriculum. Learning in the arts is “fundamentally experiential, creative, and developmental and must involve students in perceiving, transforming, expressing and appreciating,” as if these aspects somehow contained and defined the aesthetic. No use for drama teachers to complain that creativity on stage was a different thing entirely from creativity with a violin or clay.

Such decontextualization of imagination and creativity, and even self-expression in this manner, is a mark of Beardsley's transcendentalism. Theoretical work in contemporary aesthetics by such influential academics as Goodman (1976), Cavell (1988), Danto (1981), Davidson (2001) and Gadamer (1986) has not much filtered down into schools, but it raises the questions about the possibility of an aesthetic quality separate from its expressions in the arts world.

Most of these writers recognize the aesthetic as a human convention, even where it is tied to a nominalist realism. The arts become identified as a humanity, designed to make us aware of and sensitive to the varieties of human differences as expressed through the arts. Could "aesthetics" as a categorical term be replaced by the humanities? Aesthetics has recently benefited from "an ethical turn," a revival of long-standing debates about the moral function of narrative and the social impact of the arts, drawing aestheticians into the cultural value of arts education, but it is not clear how mutually inclusive this categorization could or should be.

Environmental issues could be said to be founded in an aesthetic notion of the essential beauty and sublimity of nature. The sciences too are recognized as human artifacts based on realism. What is it that makes an aesthetic experience in the arts differ from the one in logic or science? Some educators look to the arts because they offer opportunities to move beyond consolidated texts and change human values through revitalizing symbols and artistic rituals. Art is the lie that becomes the truth. Aesthetic education helps us to understand others as humans. What it is about this form of aesthetic experience that is unique to the arts remains to be examined continuously.

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Aesthetics

- [Aesthetic Education](#)
- [Critical Pedagogy and Art](#)
- [Phenomenology of Ethics and Aesthetics](#)

Aesthetics and Sport

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Synonyms

[Drama, struggle and grace in sport; Meaning of sport for spectators, The; Sport's relation to beauty and art](#)

Introduction

People participate in sport, and also watch it. While they overlap, the attractions of playing sport are not the same as those of watching it. The field of aesthetics and sport is concerned with exploring and spelling out the kinds of interest and fulfillment sport can offer spectators. This article surveys the main themes of reflection on those issues in the last fifty years or so. During that time the focus of those reflections has changed. A tendency to separate off an interest in the competitive and ‘agonistic’ dimensions of sport from an interest in its ‘aesthetic’ dimensions of grace and beauty has given way to wider-ranging attention to ‘the whole experience of sport’ and its human meanings.

As well as benefits for participants, sport evidently provides entertainment and recreation to spectators. The field of aesthetics and sport reflects on whether sport can and does offer spectators more than is readily captured by those words “entertainment and recreation” and, if so, how that might best be described and understood.

Of course there is an important question about what benefits sports offer participants. That question has a long history. In addition to “the pleasure of physical and competitive activity,” one very common answer given to justify giving sports a prominent role in school curricula was that it was character building. Reflections on aesthetics and sport, however, focus mainly (though not exclusively) on the perspective of those witnessing sport rather than those playing it. The proliferation of spectator sports in the Western world from the second half of the nineteenth century is obviously an important factor in the growing interest in such reflections. For many decades, their main source was the writings of sports journalists. Philosophers and others outside the media entered the fray only from about the 1960s.

Aesthetics was long regarded as chiefly the study of beauty, whether beauty in nature or in works of art. When sport came into the purview of aesthetic reflection, two broad questions then became salient: whether the satisfaction of watching sports is helpfully explained in terms

of sport’s aesthetic value, understood broadly in terms of beauty, and whether sport is a form of art.

Heeding Friedrich Schiller’s description of grace as “the beauty of the freely moving figure,” it is evident that sporting performance can manifest grace and beauty. This might be the grace of specific movements – the running back’s fluid evasions, a downhill skier, Roger Federer’s backhand – or perhaps of a pattern of play, for example, a buildup of moves and passes in soccer or rugby. Much early discussion highlighted such aesthetic attractions of sport (Reid 1970; Vivas 1959, among many others). But it also seems clear that beauty and grace – even if we extend the range of aesthetic qualities beyond beauty/grace to include harmony, fluidity, balance, and elegance – far from exhaust what can compel and reward our attention to sport. Vivas speaks of watching a slow-motion film of ice hockey and focusing on “the beautiful rhythmic flow of the slow-moving men.” But that is no longer to see it *as* sport. What then is being left out in the appreciation of sport by a focus on its aesthetic attractions?

David Best (1974) undertook to locate sport’s aesthetic value in a wider context of spectator interest in sport by contrasting “aesthetic” and “purposive” sports. In purposive sports – for example, “football, climbing, athletics, orienteering, and squash” – what counts is the achievement of an end (“scoring a goal, climbing the Eiger”), and provided this is achieved within the rules, it doesn’t matter *how* it is done. Clumsy or fluky goals are still goals, and players would generally choose a clumsy goal over a graceful failure: “In sports such as these, the aesthetic aspect is subordinate to the main purpose.” In aesthetic sports, by contrast – for example, trampolining, gymnastics, figure skating, and diving – *how* one performs the relevant movements is not incidental but central: “doing it gracefully” is required for success, and the requirement is built into the judging of these sports. “Purposive” sports *can* be appreciated for their aesthetic qualities, but much of their interest for spectators lies elsewhere. This still of course leaves open the character of any further such interest. Is a spectator interest in victory, for example, an interest in sport *as sport*, or only in an

“external” feature, a consequence or outcome, of the sporting action itself?

In response to Best, Joseph Kupfer (1975) argued that “competition and the possibility for victory add to rather than detract from the aesthetic in sport.” Best and Kupfer thus seem agreed that much of the spectator value of sport cannot be captured in terms of its grace, beauty, harmony, fluidity, and elegance. But Best takes this to mean that such further value is not aesthetic, while Kupfer thinks the concept of the aesthetic is capacious enough to include these further values. Perhaps an ambiguity in the concept of the aesthetic generates some confusion here: on the one hand, “the aesthetic” is marked out by the supposedly “formal” qualities of beauty, grace, and harmony, and on the other hand, “the aesthetic” is whatever makes something (in this case sport) compelling or interesting to watch. The latter usage explains how the name of the field can still be “aesthetics and sport,” even given the recent dislodging of aesthetic value by some thinkers from the center of concern. The concept of the aesthetic needs further comment, but, first, Best’s discussion focuses another widely discussed question.

Is sport art? Best’s own version of the question is more restricted: can the aesthetic sports, undertaken with the aim of producing aesthetically pleasing movement, justifiably be considered art forms? Others though have argued more generally that sports are forms of art. Despite his more restricted question, Best’s answer to it provides a perfectly general reason that *no* sport, “aesthetic” or “purposive,” can be art. He holds that the possibility of “the artist’s comment, through his art, on life situations” is essential to an art form, while the sports performer “does not have the possibility of expressing through his particular medium his view of life situations.” Art has the capacity to be *about* war or love or suffering, while sport can only be *symptomatic* of cultural or social or moral or life issues. If the interest in the Louis versus Schmeling boxing bouts in the 1930s was a symptom of tensions between America and Nazi Germany, still the bouts themselves could not possibly be *about* those tensions. Best linked his distinction to the symbolic or representative

capacity of art. For instance, when Hamlet dies on stage, the actor playing him does not, but if the quarterback breaks his leg, then so does the man filling that position. Unlike actors, athletes appear and perform as themselves. Art’s symbolic capacity is what enables it to be “about” human life, as sport cannot.

Best’s distinction crystallized a fundamental issue. If sport is potentially meaningful in ways that exceed its capacity to offer entertainment and diversion (even if these things themselves need not be trivial), focus on sport’s grace and beauty is a first attempt to explain this further meaningfulness. When the attempt shows its limitations because it misses too much of what can compel our attention in sport, a natural next move is to suppose that other dimensions of sport’s meaningfulness owe to its sharing art’s capacity for meaning. Then whether sport really does offer something more than “mere” entertainment may seem to hang on whether sport is, or is not, an art. Playing some role in preoccupation with this question was also, perhaps, the assumption that the status of sport watching would be bumped up if sport could be given the imprimatur of art. One way of seeing developments in sport aesthetics in recent decades is as exploring a variety of ways of thinking about the meaning of sport that extend well beyond answering this specific question of whether sport is art.

One line of response to Best’s view undertakes in effect to identify things that sport is indeed “about” and so has the capacity to deepen and perhaps transform our understanding of, for example, the capacities and nature of the human body, the capacity for creative response to physical challenges (within the constitutive rules of a given sport), and the limits of effort and will in relation to chance in how things turn out. While this response has some force, it perhaps also seems rather limited in scope.

A second and somewhat different response allows that while there is something right about Best’s claim, its import may be limited because it risks over-intellectualizing art. Best himself admits that there are “difficult cases” for his view. It is hard to see how music or abstract

painting even allows for the *possibility* of “commenting on life issues.” But even with art that can and does offer such comment, its expressive power may very often not be a function of that “comment.” William Blake said that in Milton’s *Paradise Lost*, a poem intended to “justify the ways of God to man,” Milton was “of the devil’s party without knowing it.” Cordner (1988) therefore instead suggests that the deepest meaning and value works of art have for us may lie in the “life values” – including indefinitely many and complex modes of vitality, energy, and affective power – they manifest or express in and through their particular artistic medium. Lacking the capacity some (but not all) artworks have to “comment on” life issues, sports too may exemplify in their own bordered domains an indefinitely wide range of such life values.

A kindred theme is found in Andrew Edgar’s view (2013) that “sport is expressive of a world,” as art is. The “world” that a work of art is expressive of need not be most importantly shaped by the intentional or self-conscious comments of the artist. The world-expressive vitality of art is shaped by the total activity of the artist in his/her artistic “medium” – and the artist’s “comments” on life issues are but one aspect of that. Analogously, the world-expressive vitality of sport is shaped by the total activity of sports participants in *their* medium.

These alternatives to Best’s distinction suggest that the question of the identity or nonidentity of sport and art has moved from the center of discussion. Even deep connections between what art and sport have to offer the spectator need not be thought to depend on sport *being* art. More interesting and revealing is a sustained working out of similarities and differences.

Another recent theme of sport aesthetics is crystallized in Edgar’s claim (2013) that “discussion of sport in terms of its beauty tends to conceal more profound and disturbing questions as to sport’s meaning.” A focus on “traditional” aesthetic values of beauty, grace, and harmony distracts from what a “modernist aesthetic” can appreciate: the *agonistic* dimension of sport – the qualities given rise to by its elements of struggle

and striving. As examples of such qualities, Paul Davis (2015) mentions doggedness, tenacity, resourcefulness, faith, command, plenitude, repose, urgency, patience, and dignity. And he highlights some related “defining qualities of (the world of) sport, e.g., visible toil and strain, the intrinsic possibility of failure, the visibly strenuous working with materials (most obviously the body), one’s exposed vulnerability to conditions, luck, loss of form, and the injured or aging body,” crystallizing this as “the visible realization of life values (only one at most of which is beauty) in a self-enclosed domain.”

This emphasis by Edgar and Davis presses further Kupfer’s much earlier (1975) resistance to a preoccupation with beauty and harmony: “some games are tense, stingy encounters in which defense dominates and scores are hard-earned as if squeezed from a resistant world.” But where Kupfer still confined his picture within a frame of “inclusive rhythms, denouements, consummations... wholeness and finality,” Edgar and Davis open their picture up to the compelling character of the disruptive, the fragmentary, and the dithyrambic in sport. Edgar sees this bringing of sport under a modernist aesthetic as thereby linking sport’s spectator value to the affirmation and renewal of everyday life, a link he thinks is broken by a focus on sport’s “traditional” aesthetic value.

Lev Kreft’s (2012) locating of sport aesthetics under the concept of the *dramatic* advances a related line of thought. He speaks of sport as performance which, while it is “under suspension of everyday reality,” yet retains a more intimate connection with everyday life than art does. Kreft “brackets” sport, but brackets it *within* the everyday rather than *from* it, and so in a way that distinguishes sport from art in several related ways already touched on. Unlike actors in a role in the theater, athletes and sports people perform “as themselves” and so are themselves humanly present and vulnerable in what they do. Partly for that reason and partly also because sport is (again unlike theater) unscripted, as real people performing in real time, sports performers are exposed to an ever-present risk of failure in their

activity. Awareness of this vulnerability and exposure is then also a crucial element of spectator experience of sport. So is their uncertainty about the outcome: what will happen is not just unknown (as the outcome of a film or play seen for the first time may be unknown). It is also undetermined, to be actually created by these participants, and witnessed and commonly affirmed by those watching. These differences do not make sport either “better” or “less good” than art (even though Kreft himself suggests “real” sport drama is more compelling than “representational” theater). But the differences do help shape the distinctive character and possibilities of sporting drama. The “staging” of sport that gives it a distinctive space within the everyday – sports arenas and courts and stadiums – plays its role here too: any “failure,” for example, is (or should be) held within that frame, whether it is just a loss by a team that has given its all or instead a failure of nerve or of courage or of stamina, by individuals or most of a team. These are indeed *real* failures of nerve, stamina, and courage, but not all of their everyday implications are in play.

A shared theme of these (but also of some other) recent developments is the centrality of the human body to the dramatic significance of sports. Stephen Mumford (2011) says that “Sport shows us the excellences of embodied agency” – and not only the excellences of it but also, and poignantly, its limitations and vulnerabilities in the face of many challenges and strains. (This explains, in passing, why chess and scrabble are games but not sports – the excellences and vulnerabilities of the players’ embodied agency are not intrinsic to the drama of these activities.) While these excellences and vulnerabilities *can* be expressed in all sorts of other activities too – in war, perhaps, or in the performance of intricate surgery or of chopping wood, in peeling potatoes, or in rescuing a cat from a tree – in sport the activity is bracketed from the everyday purposes served by our embodied agency. Sport’s very “pointlessness” invites us just to attend wholeheartedly and whole-mindedly to the display itself.

What Edgar calls the meanings of sport, Kreft its distinctive dramatic mode, and Cordner and Davis its realization of life values can be seen as differing but related formulations of a common theme. In none of these formulations is the concept of the aesthetic salient. Indeed Edgar holds that a traditional preoccupation with the aesthetic has distracted from appreciation of the import of sport’s agonistic dimensions, for him the most important site of sport’s meaning: “while something that is beautiful has thereby intrinsic aesthetic value, it nonetheless lacks relevance to everyday life.” Edgar therefore urges a shift from an aesthetics to a hermeneutics of sport – as part of an attempt to bring out the full human range of sport’s implicit meanings. This reorientation is finding wider favor in the field. Cordner (2003) sounds one note of caution. Edgar expresses some plausible skepticism about a widespread admiration for beauty in gymnastic performance: there is perhaps less grace in the classical gymnast’s dazzling set piece than in some footballer’s marvelous intuitive negotiation of heavy defense, for example, or maybe even in her single momentary pivot. Cordner argues that the meaning of graceful movement lies in its affirming for us the possibility of finding ourselves “at home” in an uncontrollable and recalcitrant world. The wonder of the footballing moment is then this glimpse of harmony marvelously wrought from an erratic contingency of forces ever threatening our embodied agency. This is no reversion to a grace hermetically sealed from the agonistic struggle in a domain “lacking relevance to the everyday.” As enacting a transformative self-presencing out of the world’s chaotic energies, such grace is *already* the site of experienced meaning, intelligible only in intimate relation to both sport’s and life’s agon. If past discussion of aesthetics in sport has often reflected a devitalized conception of beauty, that was perhaps a limitation of the discussion rather than of beauty or grace itself.

The field of aesthetics and sport has continued to become richer. One effect of the ways it has become so is that the two questions arguably framing the field in its early days – “is the

satisfaction of watching sports best explained in terms of sport's aesthetic value," and "is sport art?" – have been not sidestepped but transcended. Better and richer ways have been found of engaging with concerns that can be seen to underlie and to have motivated those questions. Increasingly, those working in the field of aesthetics and sport have reached for, and uncovered elements of, "a language that embraces the whole experience of sport" (Edgar 2013). The exploration will undoubtedly continue to range further.

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Affect

- ▶ Emotions
- ▶ Rhizoanalysis as Educational Research

Affective Neuroscience

- ▶ Educational Leadership, the Emotions, and Neuroscience

Affects

- ▶ Deleuze's Philosophy for Education

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Agency

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Agency, Authority and Openness

- ▶ Openness and Power

Aims

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Aims of Education

- ▶ Frankena's Model for Analyzing Philosophies of Education

Ako

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Introduction

The terminology *ako* means, in Māori language and culture, to learn, teach, advise, study, and instruct. The word and meaning are shared with the languages of Tonga, Samoa, Niue, Tokelau, and the Cook Islands, among other groups of people from the island homelands (meaning South Pacific region). Principally, unlike the dominating English-speaking New Zealand Pākehā European culture, no distinction is made between learning and teaching. On this principle and in response to the problem of indigenous Māori people, in educational institutions, such as the university, passively receiving useless information to do things for the prevailing culture, a deeper philosophy and a broader theory of education will be considered in this chapter. Through teaching and learning as a whole and not as unrelated parts, people's feeling about life, of gaining experience, and our senses cooperate, and through the cooperation of senses, experience, and the body with spirits, a Māori point of view will make a practical philosophy of dialogue without end, mutual learning, and mutual enhancement.

Ako, A Māori Point of View

In Aotearoa, writers, scholars, educators, teachers, students, and parents have become used to the recorded melody, the picture, and the short-lived exploit perpetuated in multimedia and projected globally. We are less accustomed, though, to understand an ancient culture of communal ways of living like that of Māori society where wisdom or the highest form of thinking was almost exclusively oral. Significantly, the ritual and shared exchange of words, in speechmaking and song,

no less than the exchange of commodities, services, and women, upheld communication between tribes and sustained social coherence in the culture (Mitcalfe 1974).

Cowan writing in the 1930s hailed Māori as a group of people with an “original sense of artistic values in decoration and craftsmanship . . . a people of keen intellect . . . the creative faculty very highly developed . . . vast stores of folk lore and poetry accumulated in the course of untold centuries, and handed down one generation to another” (Cowan 1930, p. vii). He advised further that in spite of this beautiful tradition, Māori wisdom was passed onto others through New Zealand Pākehā European interpretive writers, rather than the Māori artists, craftsmen, and composers. Consequently, over generations, this act of oppression has separated Māori from the wisdom, beauty, and satisfaction of their culture.

To the north of Aotearoa, Beaglehole writing, in the 1940s, about Tongan people, elaborated that the most important thing wrong with the relationship between European and Tongan society was that the educational process is an effective instrument for separating the people from the satisfaction of Tongan culture and, equally, from the satisfaction of the European culture (Beaglehole and Beaglehole 1941). Similarly, Jean-Paul Sartre has conveyed to the world that “[v]iolence in the colonies does not only have for its aim the keeping of these enslaved men at arm's length; it seeks to dehumanize them. Everything will be done to wipe out their traditions, to substitute our language for theirs and to destroy their culture without giving them ours” (cited in Fanon 1990, p. 13). The danger is clear. There is a culture where part of the world lives their life doing things and part of the world makes others do things for them or, even worse, makes the world impossible for others to do anything for themselves (Yutang 1996).

Alexander writing, in the 1970s, articulated that people, who become whole, proclaim their views of the world, loud and clear for everyone to know, are not dissatisfied, not afraid to stand up for their values and place, to recognize their shortcomings, trying to change them, and still be proud and glad to be themselves. He expressed that

people, and their beautiful language and culture, customs, and values, can coexist with others with whom they share the world. Accordingly, on thinking *ako* in the South Pacific, from a Māori point of view, the problem to be worked out between two cultures, this ancient Māori philosophy of the body with spirits, and the domineering civilization of material prosperity are how should Māori organize our life so that we expect new answers to the problem of teaching that is separate from learning or what are better new methods of approach that are intellectual, complicated, heartfelt, and satisfying, through which Māori are awake to the world or, still better, a communal, oral philosophy to connect with an individualistic, written theory.

Of course, not all of the ancient Māori philosophy of the body with spirits, collectivity, oracy, judgment, and satisfaction will coexist with the technological civilization and vice versa because their surroundings, settings, and locations contain points of reference that are mutually alien. Furthermore, people who migrate, from, say, the Kingdom of Tonga to Aotearoa, may well elaborate the Māori philosophy, and, together, they may elaborate the technological, measured, uniform, passive cramming of useless information for profit (Yutang 1996). On balance, there is sufficient similarity in people's feeling and forms of expression to enable the coexistence of a communal, oral philosophy to an individualistic, written theory, without losing the original ideal of learning and teaching as coexisting (Manu'atu et al. 2014; Yutang 1996; Mitcalfe 1974).

For the moment, the dangerous issue for Māori colonized to the ideologies of global consumerism and capitalism is that education connected to material prosperity is of a magnitude transcending the spiritual vivacity of their daily living. However, the people's explication of the relationship is not to extinguish the greater strength of material prosperity; the notion of elimination is both fanciful and cruel. They should not do away with the aspiration, imposed or not, to accumulate material wealth; the idea has been so well established and is so compelling that eliminating their hope for material wealth is both capricious and malicious. The accumulation of wealth is not the issue of

importance. The worry is when Māori prosper materially beyond their spiritual wisdom to learn and live in peace and harmony (Manu'atu et al. 2014).

In the South Pacific region, many groups of people share a similar struggle to coexist with the prevailing machine society; therefore, any thinking on *ako* must start out with understanding the beauty of the pagan world, a strong feeling of the limitations of life, and a sense of dignity. In reality, ancestors of Māori were philosophers, and they thought deeply about the coexistence of the body with spirits. In the present day, Māori people would have heard the ancient story of Rātā that expresses the sacred relationship between gods and people.

Rātā, a young man, went to the forest to decide on a tree with which to build a canoe that would carry enough men to punish those who had killed his father. The young man selected a large tree and for the rest of the day he felled and trimmed. The next morning, he returned to commence making the hull of the canoe from the tree, only to become aware that the log was once again a living tree. There was no sign of the tree that he felled the previous day! Rātā, perplexed, nevertheless, selected a new tree and set to felling and trimming again. The following morning he found that the tree had been restored to life. After a third felling, Rātā hid close by, hoping to catch the culprits in the night. As the sun set, the forest came alive with the "hordes of Hakuturi, the tribes of little people" (Mitcalfe 1974, p. 22). They were heard by Rātā to chant a *karakia*, an incantation to restore life to the tree. From the Hakuturi, Rātā learned the proper ritual of appeal to Tāne, the god of the forest, for felling trees. The spirits taught him, too, that people are no match for Tāne and that they are not the masters over gods.

Karakia are the body with spirits of Māori culture; the incantations are the source of imagery, enriching the more humdrum forms of language from oratory to songs and to poetry. In their ceremonial settings, exemplified by baptismal rites of newborn children of high-ranking parents and the ritual chants of welcome and death, *karakia* interpose between the people and the gods; the sacred chants stand beyond yet within the communal

consciousness, similar to the way the subconscious serves to the conscious mind, storing and replenishing wisdom (Mitalfe 1974). The ritual chants are the way with which Māori come to grips with the impact of spiritual forces on material substance and vice versa. Karakia that accompany actions of offerings to the god of the forest, and so forth, have been passed down through Māori Antiquity, and the word is the main medium to symbolize and express tribes' relationships, not only with the spirits but also with each other and death.

Concomitantly, the story of the Israelites entering the Promised Land, in the *Book of Joshua* in the Holy Bible, has resonance for this Māori point of view of ako, in the South Pacific. Like the Israelites, Māori and migrants such as from the Kingdom of Tonga to Aotearoa have had to live and remain living underprivileged lives. Through the European culture, Māori have learned to accept that the Christian God is omnipresent and to believe that they, too, are that God's chosen people and that this God demands that they should be virtuous, moral people. For them, too, there is the experience of "crossing the Jordon" in their migration, over generations, from the tribal lands across rural Aotearoa, and the Kingdom, to the market gardens, factories, and ghettos of urban New Zealand. They live by faith and trust in this God just as the Israelites do. The narration is plain. In the South Pacific, a philosophy of the body with spirits is at home with material prosperity.

Ambitiously, ako is the principle through which to share the good in the bad and bad in the good to make a philosophy of spiritual and material prosperity. As mentioned previously, Māori shares the principal of teaching and learning without distinction between the two actions with the people of Tonga, among others. The point is that together, their words and wisdoms may well elaborate a practical philosophy. While Māori culture was produced in Aotearoa and most of what Māori believed about their changed circumstances was indigenous wisdom formed in Aotearoa, their language had no contact with other languages because these tangata whenua, the first people, remained isolated from their island homeland in the Pacific Ocean, for

centuries. The matter of importance is not the geographical distance, rather the idea that Māori and Tongans share a common linguistic ancestor, that is, their languages belong to the same subgroup of Austronesian: Polynesian. The traditional stories that Māori brought with them are the same as those told in Tonga. The idea that language changes is neither particularly remarkable nor useful to this discussion (Kēpa 2008). The satisfaction lies in the notion that ako is an ubiquitous, linguistic influence in the South Pacific.

In this philosophy of the body with spirits, consider, too, the Tongan word taulangi that refers to "reaching for the sky." Principally, the ideal will enable new approaches that coalesce around a dialogue without end to convey spiritual and material prosperity, rather than education as assimilation, colonization, and genocide. While the principal is concerned with Tongan wisdom, this spirit of passion and approach to spiritual and material prosperity is familiar to Māori. The important change is that Māori and Tongans will no longer only be instructed for manual labor in New Zealand society; rather, they will learn about spiritual and material prosperity, citizenship and wisdom, education and work, and discrimination and the economy.

In 2013, Auckland University of Technology's School of Education Te Kura Mātauranga commenced teaching the Bachelor of Pasifika Education Early Childhood Teaching (BPasifikaEdECT) (Kēpa and Manu'atu 2012). The qualification called for Tongan, Māori, Samoan, Cook Islands Māori, and Niue educationalists, among others, who are passionate enough to make a change of approach in education, knowing full well that whatever is made may be disliked by their colleagues and countrymen and rejected by politicians and administrators who organize New Zealand society. They had to be firm in their spirit to make a change in the school's individualistic curriculum and pedagogy, to resolve debates themselves, without calling on outside authority. They had to show fortitude and good sense and to proceed with these principles, rather than to react to the dominant culture mechanically and uniformly. Passion is the close

companion of creative education. For unless people in education are passionate, there is nothing to start out change of the individualistic, written theory at all. In truth, passion is the spirit of success, light in education, judgment in the economy, beauty in work, satisfaction in citizenship, and happiness in wisdom. The promise is mutual learning and enhancement.

Continuing in the spirit of hope, this approach to learning and teaching, led by Tongan and Māori educationalists, among others from the South Pacific, will shake the education culture in Aotearoa. They will articulate the spiritual and material forces that will decide the organization of the people at different times and places, thereby clarifying the changing relationships between them, the State, and education in a neoliberal era. Critically, changes will be questioned through drawing on the rise and fall of those ideas by which they are trained for manual labor in the dominant education culture, and the new philosophy will coalesce around taulangi, creative education.

Similarly, the term *ngā pae o te māramatanga* that refers, in Māori society, to many horizons of insights of wisdom is an ambitious approach to end the separation of teaching and learning (Kēpa and Manu'atu 2012). The approach is imbued in the body with spirits from the South Pacific. In fact, *Ngā Pae o te Māramatanga* (NPM) is a Centre of Research Excellence (CoRE) funded by the Tertiary Education Commission (TEC) and hosted by the University of Auckland. NPM is an important agency by which Māori society is becoming a key player in international indigenous research and affairs. Once again, the spirit is to draw on the creative faculty and ancient wisdom of Māori and to bring about change for the better, for all people, in Aotearoa, New Zealand. The CoRE is the funder of the International Indigenous Writing Retreat held twice a year in an isolated coastal village in northern New Zealand.

The writers who withdraw from the mundane world could suppose that attending the retreat is a condition demonstrating the value an employer has for an employee and vice versa. The analogy with equity or fairness elaborates on the purpose of participating in the sanctuary which is to retreat

from the invasive computerized workplace; to commit to the academic responsibility to write; to ponder on language that is full of ambiguities; to portray thoughts that are intellectual, complicated, and creative; to enjoy the freedom to debate with no sense of loss of approval, blame, and satisfaction; to confront the intellectual impoverishment of the computerized workplace; and to come to grips with issues and conditions beyond the experience of the individual. Purposively, the retreat is to support the well-being of the writers and so to support the transformation of societies and economies for the material and spiritual prosperity of their people. The purpose of education for coexistence is the light.

The program has been established for writers from the colonies to retreat from their dominant society to dialogue together. For 16 retreats writers have arrived from universities across New Zealand, Tonga, the USA, Canada, Nepal, India, Mongolia, and China. These writers come from the disciplines of education, Māori studies, indigenous studies, anthropology, psychology, sociology, public health, medicine, and so forth; they bring collective values on words and wisdoms to scholarship and dialogue. The retreat is not a *laissez-faire* gathering of preoccupied intellectuals, nor a purely egalitarian or communist state of affairs. During the day, the writers are engaged in contemplating and writing scholarly articles, chapters in books, books, submissions, research proposals, essays, reviews, technical reports, and cultural reports; discussing areas of shared research interest with one and two new colleagues; and sharing texts and ideas in a particular research area with colleagues. The retreat most closely resembles a sanctuary wherein the writers are hopeful in sharing suffering, loss, inspiration, aspiration, and satisfaction and in imagining education committed to spiritual prosperity and material prosperity. These words are the ethical principles that distinguish ako.

Ultimately, from a Māori point of view, ako is the genius handed down from one generation to another. Ako is a dialogue without end through which the people share their thinking and make a philosophy of education that is mutually creative, curious, and dignified.

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Alchemy of Love an Artist Praxis to Autonomy and Political Visibility

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Synonyms

Love; Reciprocity; Somatic knowing and intentional co-creation

Introduction

Either the world is so tiny or we are so enormous; in either case we fill it completely. . . . (Kafka, cited in Buber-Neumann 1989/1988, p. 56)

Love is an alchemic process that expands and evolves our wisdom through a mastery of awareness, attention, and intention that is single-minded in focus. I believe it is impossible to be in love and be in fear at the same time. Love opens our Imagination, is a gate to possibilities; what we believe is possible, we can create. All stories reflect the storyteller and where they are in their lives.

The truth is not in the story. The truth is in the power that creates the story. . . . When the voice of knowledge becomes the voice of integrity, you return to the truth, you return to love. (Ruiz 2004, p. 228)

What is love? “Love is a quest for truth” (Badiou and Truong 2012, p. 22); it forms and informs my epistemology, ontology, axiology and methodology of how I come to know my world(s). “Every head is a world. . . Your world is your creation, and it’s a masterpiece of art” (Ruiz 2004, p. 51). The multiple worlds we create: political, economic, cultural. . . reveal the affect of individual and collective imagination. An intentional path to being in resonance with a living world inspires a call to be attentive, a deep listening.

Stories are co-created in relational reciprocity – co-author – by the writer and the reader. We are defined by our stories of love, death, and rebirth. In the sharing of my stories I “witness a part of myself, the part that views the world as miraculous that is surprised at the chance of existence. . . , continually moving outward, gathering knowledge, and skills” (Leavy 2015, p. 110), a reflexive process of learning and experience. . . then returning inwardly to love (truth). Listening for, the titbits of knowing revealed in the daily rituals we adapt to, reject and or invite.

Remembering what we have forgotten we forgot.

LOVE Is the Golden Key to My Deserted Castle

My heart holds secret fires, sparked by a lover’s time-stopping gaze penetrating and revealing of my soul. The sensuousness of my lover’s voice across a crowded room; the tingling of skin provoked by a gentle kiss. The rupture that lingers after orgasm, amidst creased sheets, a private secret

...at last is out. In the twilight, eyes reveal not so much the past, as the future struggle ...the fear of the end. Is this love? In surrender to the impulse, the cobwebs from the mirror are removed, and my secrets revealed. The truth that lies within. . .

“Love is a quest for truth” what kind of truth? “truth in relation to something quite precise: what kind of world does one see when one experiences from the point of view of two and not one? What is the world like when it is experienced, developed and lived from the point of view of difference and not identity? That is what I believe love to be.” (Badiou 2012, p. 22)

We lived within multiple worlds, the world that plays out in our head – in memory or imagination, in speculation or interpretation – the worlds we imagine and worked to create. The heart is a marvellous muscle of memory and strength. A faithful guardian of the spirit (soul), courage is cultivated in adversity. My fear and courage are tested in those magical moments of coincidence, in the serendipitous encounters that birth new awareness.

Born to a world filled with violence, fear would not let me stand still... fearful of the unknown. I was a wanderer, clutching to my need for certainty in a world of uncertainty. I tried to convince myself that “life is what we make of it” and immersed myself in the daily rituals of subsisting, adapted to the busyness of doing, to the habit of getting by. And without warning I have become lost in the non-stop emergencies that plague the chronically poor.

To live with an open heart means that pain is no stranger, but wonder will be a constant companion. David Oldfield (cited in Badonsky 2007, p. 9)

I loved with fearful confidence that whatever the consequences love was worth the risks. There is never smoke without a fire. . . Love is the alchemy that births us into being in awareness of each other, of ourselves, of our surroundings, into awareness of this perfect. . .temporal and fragile life.

Death. . . Do I dare love life, knowing life will end?

Death

It was a perfect night to die.

The air was moist and humid inside the apartment, though the temperature outside was a comfortable 22° Celsius, the heat from the oven where

his prized Sockeye stakes bake with a light batter of dill and mayonnaise (his secret recipe) had created a savannah like environment.

“Dinner is ready” his eyes anxiously awaiting my response to the first bite. “Yum!” exclaimed our daughter capturing his attention; her brother joined the chorus of praise that ensued. He waited with an anticipating smile as I exclaimed, “Honey, this is delicious!” Love is revealed in moments, simple acts of kindness, of appreciation. . . his face was luminous with love.

Love! Not just some passing moment a glance however open but some deeper compassion radiating permanency. (Vanier 1970, p. 38)

In the kitchen a mountain of cut fries remained.

After dinner, still in disbelief of his achievement, praise for his accomplishment continue. . . “Daddy you are a good cooker” said our son with a smile. We snuggled in front of the TV. . . “Did you turn off the fire daddy?” asked our precocious 6 year old to which he replied “I am still cooking”. . . “Why” she insisted, “we don’t waste food” he said firmly, and she smiled approvingly. . .

On this summer night, with bellies full, the heat of our bodies squeezed into the sofa bed, lulled by the nice breeze, scented air, and music played softly in the kitchen, sleep crept upon us all.

Feeling thirsty, I wandered into the kitchen half asleep,
“FIRE” . . . “FIRE” . . .
What lies deeper than the moment? . . .

Standing inside the shipwrecks, inside the chaos, the golden key. . . stillness, a single-minded focus. I see myself at last, “How naturally what’s needed comes from you, always.”

I remembered the fire extinguisher we had bought only a month earlier at a garage sale. . . “it’s brand new” the woman who sold it to us said smiling. She neglected to mention it needed to be pressurized for it to work. And we did not read the fine print.

The world have us pre-gown. . . life as a continuous running and never arriving. . . missing the writing (the fine print of life) I had adapted to a self-flagellating story marking stones in my reverence of being good. Freedom had eluded me in a state of non-stop emergencies. . .

Feeding myself a daily diet of shame and guilt, of “not having done enough” . . . , running to do more. . . .

Poor people make an art of living, being alive in the moment was an artistic, existential and political act. “In politics, events are ordered by history in retrospect. But art is alone in restoring or attempting to restore completely their intense power. Only art restores the dimension of the senses to an encounter.” (Badiou and Truong 2012, p. 78).

There is always another story, beyond what meets the eyes. . . a breath, divided this gulf of life and death.

Love is an art of obstinacy, the miracle that brought us together, that scripted our lives into this particular family, and in this particular moment. Love, revealing and advancing a higher understanding of who am I, of who we are. . . what is worth saving of myself?

What is worth dying for?

“FIRE. . . .”

How can one word, inspire so much terror?

The smoke made it impossible to see 2 ft in front.

“GET OUT” he yells, our daughter was first to wake up as he picked up both children in his arms and began running towards the door. Her kindergarten teacher had conducted a fire drill only a week earlier and she seemed ready for this. . . . “CRAWL DADDY SMOKE RISES” she tells him in a matter of fact way, with intermittent coughing. He ignored her requests but she persisted “CRAWL DADDY, SMOKE RISES” as he made it out of the building with both children in his arms.

“Why is the fire alarm not working?” without notice my partner returns to the building to knock on every one of the 12 units in the 3-level walk-up apartment building. A neighbour across the street had called the fire department on his cell phone. A crowd now gathered on the street.

The Fire Fighters truck’s sirens and ambulance lights were calming to my fears.

The fire trucks arrived shortly after. It only took minutes to extinguish the fire; but the apartment and everything in it was destroyed. “The fire is out, all of you but the family where the fire

originated may return to your home” approaching us the chief said gently “The fire alarm in your building had been shut off, you are very lucky to be alive.”

No one spoke. . . .

Inside the ambulance, the oxygen masks, distorted the faces and cloaked in silence. The scene was surreal; a caricature of our family, about to be devoured by the monster, FEAR. The uncertainty of the unknown silenced the screams that would be hysterical but for the disbelief of what had just happened.

A stranger’s voice interrupted the silence. “I need to know who was exposed to the smoke the longest” said the ambulance attendant. “It was me. . . .” said my partner removing his oxygen mask “I went back to knock on my neighbors’ doors. . . .” I looked up lovingly and filled with pride, acknowledging the risks he had taken.

The ambulance attendant seemed unmoved by his heroics.

Pulling a syringe from his first aid kit, he approached him and reaching towards his arm said, “I will need a blood sample from you then. . . to check for carbon monoxide in your blood.” Afraid of needles since childhood (a secret he would rather keep to himself) his pupils grew wide but his usual wit returned with lighting speed “actually it was my son. . . .” pointing to our 5 year old being cuddle in my arms.

We burst out laughing aware of his mischief. “I guess you won’t be cooking again, hah daddy” our daughter interceded looking at him with a sweet smile and everyone joined in the laughter that was now contagious. Beneath the thorn of disappointment, a wide-awake, exhilarated, and heart-pumping feeling of sensuous awareness (as when you are in love) consumed me.

We spent the night at the hospital.

Rebirth

. . . In the morning light, the apartment seemed magical.

I remember covering the walls of our apartment with royal blue, paisley patterned wallpaper

(purchased at 80% discount) “the discolored patches add an aesthetic quality to the pattern.” I insisted trying to convince him that our purchase (which was not refundable) had been wise, “it’s beautiful” and “authentic” . . . I insisted as I tackled hand-made curtains to the wall.

Accustomed to life’s imperfections (inequality) and coincidences of fate (injustice), the ironies became epiphanies to my willing youthful heart. What is a home? . . . a sanctuary of unanswered prayers for the marginally employed (chronically poor), a co-creative hub where bill payment strategies were achieved through intentional ingenuity of living.

A home is filled with symbols that defining a shared space, the ordinary objects imbued with the essence of life in this particular family, our particular story. Even the patchy papered walls had been imperfectly beautiful. . .

A home is filled with heart secrets; the walls were faithful confidants embracing the laughter, tears, dreams, and longings shared out loud, the sounds of awe and wonder in conversations shared, and now imprinted in their smoke scented planes.

Love is revealed in daily rituals of living. . . designed by necessity and ingenuity. The deepest desire we share is that of connection, free to be fully ourselves, to risk and create. . . revealing ourselves in our stories.

“Are we poor?” our daughter asked one day as we walk home from school fixing her brown eyes upon my partner’s blue eyes, the way she looked at him when she wanted a straight answer.

He felt his heart leap to an accelerated rhythm, moved by her intensity.

Then, as if prepared for this inevitable moment he replied:

“Not at all! . . . We are Hundredners!”

and opening his wallet he produced two banking cards. . .

“look we even have two bank accounts” (he neglected to tell her, both accounts were overdrawn).

She smiled and happily skipped the rest of the way home.

He winks at me and approaches my ear as if to plant a soft kiss, then whispers. . .

“We won’t always be so poor.”

The daily habits of getting by, loving, sharing our lives, making a sacred ceremony of life itself, celebrating our infinite subjectivities, carrying the sun in a golden cup, singing, dancing. . . Inventing worlds, and words to describe our world.

Co-creating abundance by embracing simplicity of life, the lightness that comes from having few things, creating a habit of defining needs as wants and declaring them “non-essential”. Looking for the magic of life, in the daily nuanced ways of mitigating the fear of hunger, homelessness, marginal employment, and poverty enduring wages, in a wealthy nation.

We choose connection with our world when we choose the ability to respond and take action. True freedom is the ability to choose one response over another. The beauty of life experiences is that while we cannot undo what is done, we can succeed it, understanding it, learn from it, and change, so that every new moment is spent not in regret, guilt, fear, or anger but in wisdom. Standing at the cross roads of doubt (fear) or courage to surrender. Lived experience had taught me I can choose to stay prisoner of my regrets and sadness, re-living each painful detail of the fall, which only brings more suffering. . . immersed in the waters of my failed expectations.

A life is made up of promises, of dreams, and of longings and memory. The ontological beingness of my soul is my physical body; these memories captured in photographs, the objects I surround myself with allow the world to see into me, to know me.

A campfire scent permeated the air. . . announcing the death of simple things. Love is a spiritual awakening, when we love we pour ourselves over the object of our affection like water on parched earth, a freedom envelopes the lover with limitless resources and resourcefulness and no fear of running out. In love, we become the reservoir of love. . . “Love is an essential project: to construct a world from a decentred point of view other than that of my mere impulse to survive or re-affirm my own identity” (Badiou and Truong 2012, p. 25).

Amidst the ashes, we found rebirth.

In the ashes of what was, lovers risks creating again. . .

LOVE's Alchemy is LIFE

Art reduced to its simplest expression, namely, love.
 Andre Breton, (cited in Badiou 2012, p. 80)

Time takes shelter in a silent obscurity, without roadmaps we are free to wonder new worlds and when old words die out, and familiar paths are lost, new ones are revealed to the open hearted. Becoming present to our rituals of relating to ourselves, to other peoples, and to our surroundings. Love invites a new script of living that disrupt individualistic competition and power with an embodied, relational, and located subjectivity that is interdependent.

To hope is to risk despair.
 To try is to risk failure...
 The greatest hazard in life is to risk nothing.
 Only a person who risks is free.
 (Author unknown, quoted from *"The Psychology of Courage"* 2010, p. 112)

Love's nuance affect, confronting tropes of authority with a collaborative ethos of decentralized power, committed to open spaces for those silenced (by economic, political, and social exclusion...). Connection is our deepest desire and need for survival.

Love is always the possibility of being present at the birth of the world. (Badiou and Truong 2012 p. 26)

Love stories, written in moments of embodied symbolism that birth new categories: woman, mother, journalist, artist, ... each locating and displacing within geographies of power, revealing the multiple layers of objectification that must be overcome on the path to liberation from a colonial, anthropocentric, market-oriented world, mechanized way of seeing without presence.

The path of least resistance and least trouble is a mental rut already made. It requires troublesome work to undertake the alteration of old beliefs (Dewey 1966/1963).

We create the world each day, with each action we take or fail to take. The journey of self-awareness is never ending. In the fire, there is life. I am the artist of my life, as I grow in awareness of my own inner wisdom and surrender to my heart's sensuous calling: to love with earnestness and

strength. . . inviting joy, playfulness, curiosity, and wonder to each moment. Being open hearted is to be willing to risk, to embrace the unknown, and see possibilities where others see dead ends.

Artists make a small thing big, allowing expansion from the inside out. . .tapping into experiential wisdom attempting to include the nuanced beauty, love, and hardship of life into a canvas, a poem. . .a story. Weaving the Ontology, epistemology, methodology, axiology into an interdependent circular process, forming and informing each step; shaping a praxis of autonomy and political visibility. Revealing ourselves in our process of knowing and how we come to know what we know. Rather than compartmentalize each, research can be embrace as a "Ceremony of Relationality" (Wilson 2008 p. 70).

Our stories make visible the worlds we live in and within; narrative represents, constitutes, and shapes social reality (Bruner 1987, 1990, 1991), as authors of our stories we come to know ourselves and create meaning of the world (Bruner 1990). Story telling is a way of knowing, revealing "reality and knowledge as socially constructed" (Etherington 2010, p. 75), exposing the positionality of power and knowledge as situated within contexts and embedded within historical, cultural stories, beliefs, and practices.

To love is to be willing to die to our old habits of thinking and risk being in awareness of the our feelings, surrendering our private fear of failure with compassion and courage to start again. . .honouring the courage and love of self and others we are manifesting every time we get up from a fall.

Everything is relationships. The ontology (what is real) and epistemology (beliefs systems of how we come to know what we know) are grounded upon a process of relationships that form a mutual reality, each informing and forming the other. The axiology and methodology are grounded upon maintaining responsibility (ethical accountability) to these relationships.

What is truth is real.
 Love is real.

It is the supreme expression of life. Don Miguel Ruiz, a Toltec Wisdom Book "The Voice of Knowledge".

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Aletheia

► Phenomenology of Higher Education

Allegedly Conservative: Revisiting Wittgenstein's Legacy for Philosophy of Education

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Synonyms

Conservative; Epistemology; Practice; Practitioner; Researcher; Wittgensteinian legacy

In section 124 of the *Philosophical Investigations*, Wittgenstein writes: "Philosophy may in no way interfere with the actual use of language; it can in the end only describe it. For it cannot give it any foundation either. It leaves everything as it is." Given the unity of language-and-world and of what-we-say-and-do at the level of the language-game, it is easy to see how it gave occasion to the reproach of conservatism – particularly in education and philosophy of education where the rhetoric of change has always been fashionable. Philosophy is all caught up with how we think about ourselves; thinking and reflection belong to our life. Thus our life is at least *partly* correctly characterized as permeated by thinking and hence changed by thinking. How can coming to understand something *not* make a difference? According to *The New Oxford Dictionary of English*, as an adjective "conservative" means "averse to change or innovation and holding to traditional attitudes and values, typically in relation to politics or religion" and as a noun "a person who is averse to change and holds to traditional values and attitudes, typically in relation to politics" (1998, p. 391). It is doubtful that in any of these senses Wittgenstein's philosophical work is conservative. Such a justification could not be offered according to Wittgenstein's own profoundly anti-foundational stance (see further). His remark is part of his more general hostility toward "the craving for generality." This distaste for theories and explanation seems to put not only philosophy but also any social science under pressure (i.e., an eternal paralysis as far as action is concerned). So again one is pressed with the issue what Wittgenstein could have meant.

Taking # 124 out of context implies the impotence of philosophy; instead, let us consider that Wittgenstein's point had to do with language alone. Wittgenstein does not say that everything in our understanding remains the same nor that everything in the world remains the same, only the language. The latter line of interpretation may find its analogy in "Physics leaves the world as it is." The part of the *Philosophical Investigations* that deals with "philosophy" identifies the aim as "complete clarity" (PI, # 133). This result is to be reached by specific methods in specific cases.

Wittgenstein states his antitheoretical position where he starts his discussion of “philosophy”:

And we may not advance any kind of theory. There must not be anything hypothetical in our considerations. We must do away with all *explanation*, and description alone must take its place... These [philosophical problems] are, of course, not empirical problems; they are solved, rather, by looking into the workings of our language, and that in such a way as to make us recognize those workings; *in despite of* an urge to misunderstand them. The problems are solved, not by giving new information, but by arranging what we have always known. Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language. (PI, I, 109)

Elsewhere he writes, “The work of the philosopher consists in assembling reminders for a particular purpose” (PI, I, 127). A number of questions can be asked: How are descriptions related to generality? And to theories? What is their particular contribution to understanding future cases? Is there a place for the general anywhere in Wittgenstein’s work and thought at all? If the quoted remarks were supposed to describe how philosophy is in fact done by professional philosophers, the remarks are obviously false. Explaining, deducing, drawing conclusions, advancing, and debating theories are what philosophers continually do. But it is important to get clear about what counts as “theory” here. Wittgenstein characterizes a theory as something hypothetical, that explains rather than merely describes, such as causally explanatory generalizations, which are testable by experiment or experience in general. Though something can be explanatory (such as a mathematical proof) without being hypothetical, it seems impossible to do philosophy without theorizing, if something is to count as theoretical when it involves deduction or drawing conclusions rather than just description. However, if we take it that Wittgenstein wants to reserve “theory” primarily for causal explanations that permit hypotheses and testing, his investigations are theoretical in a different sense, in a way he clearly does not want to object to. In what is called the *Big Typescript*, one can find some support for this interpretation: “As I have often said, philosophy does not lead me to any renunciation, since I do not

abstain from saying something, but rather abandon a certain combination of words as senseless... Philosophizing is: rejecting false arguments” (*The Big Typescript*, # 86 and 87; Klagge and Nordmann 1993, respectively, on pp. 161–165). Wittgenstein’s antitheoretical stance is therefore first and foremost an attack on the subsumption of philosophy under science. Philosophical problems cannot be decided by experience; they are conceptual and the result of lack of understanding of the way we talk. Therefore, it has to be demonstrated of philosophical positions (“theories”) that they are flawed in more fundamental ways (that they are meaningless, nonsensical, or incoherent). By pointing out that there is an incompatibility between the use a philosopher makes of a word and the account (the reason why) he provides for its use, a philosophical position can be criticized undogmatically – teaching you “. . . to pass from a piece of disguised nonsense to something that is patent nonsense” (see PI, I, 464).

Wittgenstein’s intent was to show that the criteria of grammaticality are *not* the universal validity and necessity characteristic of the a priori. A philosophical method has to *describe* the language-game itself as the source of meaning of the terms used in it, without more ado. Therefore, *the* description that can establish *the* only possible order does not exist (PI, I, 132). It is only possible to reform language “for particular practical purposes” (PI, I, 132). For Wittgenstein, philosophy is not a set of doctrines, but an activity, and philosophical results are not found in “philosophical propositions,” but in making propositions clear. He insists always on asking whether a word is ever actually used in a particular way in the language-game that is its original home (PI, I, 116) and proclaims that what we are destroying in doing so is nothing but houses of cards, clearing up the ground of language on which they stand (PI, I, 118). Thus as *critique of language*, philosophy is not a reformative undertaking, but a descriptive one, which should show us, for instance, when language is merely idling. The solution of a philosophical problem is offered by reference to what lies open to view – once we are reminded of it (grammar). “Grammar” is lacking in perspicuity, and “perspicuity” basically means

nothing other than an understanding consisting of seeing connections (*PI*, I, 122).

It is Wittgenstein's hope that from reflection upon the very general facts of nature and the formation of different concepts, a change in attitude will emerge toward the concepts we in fact possess. This is a change of attitude in which we stop thinking of our concepts as being either "absolutely correct" or otherwise entirely arbitrary and instead light upon them as bound up with our life and so no less arbitrary or correct than it is. This is a kind of illumination that can be no less important (or urgent or necessary) than the kind that can be provided by empirical research. In philosophical inquiry what we are trying to do is not to discover something of which until now we have been ignorant, but to know better something that in one sense we knew already. Descriptions of the actual use of expressions ("grammar") provide neither a foundation nor an (causal) explanation of linguistic behavior. What lies at the basis of the language-game, and therefore is presupposed to ground it, surely includes the regularity of custom; this represents a foundation only insofar as the network of convictions inside of which we carry on must rely upon it. And the fact that one takes over forms and concepts is not itself conditioned by forms and concepts, but by modes of acting. Again, by indicating that language-games are to be understood within a practice, this should not be understood as implying that they must be justified by something else. It is merely a different way of indicating how language-games cannot be spoken of other than with or within the context of a particular human practice. Therefore, philosophy does not put us in a position to justify or to criticize what we do by showing that it meets or fails to meet requirements we lay down in our philosophizing. In this sense, as Cora Diamond argues, philosophy leaves everything as it is (Diamond 1995, p. 69).

Wittgenstein provided a conception of human life in which the idea that man is a cultural being is taken seriously. Language is, on this way of looking at the matter, a constantly expanding and shifting set of cultural practices. They are ways of behavior that grow out of natural life

through the creative efforts of human beings. "...[P]ractice has to speak for itself" (OC # 139). The concept of "practice," as Kjell Johannessen argues, points not only to the ways in which the unity of our concepts is formed; it also comprises the skills involved in *handling* the conceptualized phenomena, our pre-reflective *familiarity* with them, expressed in the sureness in our behavior toward them and the *judgmental power* exercised in applying or withholding a given concept on a particular occasion (see Johannessen 1988). These factors are all relevant to the establishment of knowledge, but they cannot themselves be fully and straightforwardly articulated by verbal means. It should be noted not only that we have taken over certain ways of judging the empirical world from earlier generations but also that, in this context, judging is a way of acting. The child's coming to act according to these beliefs cannot be learned by learning rules (see OC # 144). It has to be picked up by examples and by training, which are importantly different from conditioning in that the association is structured by a practice (which is for Wittgenstein rule governed, that is, normative: not the mere reinforced association of word and object). Training is successful if it results in the initiate learner becoming skilled and thereby an autonomous practitioner and thus hereafter performing within, and thus adding to, a practice – maybe even contributing to a partial change in it. A necessary support both logically and physically for the novice's linguistic actions is the structuring provided by the community. It is logically necessary because it provides the system of background beliefs, actions, and competencies. This complex pattern is necessary for the token utterance to have significance and so to be an utterance. This is not to say that these practices are forever fixed: they are always open to new developments. These practices are not deliberately chosen conventions, but are constituted by the harmonious "blind" agreement in words and activities of a group of people over a period of time. It is "blind" only in the sense that it does not result from the self-conscious or explicit application of rules (*PI*, I, 219), though this does not mean that people are unconscious automata.

Only within a “language-game” will we be able to justify a certain inference and a certain behavior and can we speak of (lack of) justification, evidence and proof, mistakes, and good and bad reasoning. Investigations and criticisms of the reasons and justifications are brought to an end when we come upon something that we regard as a satisfactory reason and that we do so shows itself in our actions. We are initiated into “language-games” (reference is made to “normal cases”) and thus into judgment(s). He writes: “. . . always ask yourself: How did we *learn* the meaning of this word (“good,” for instance)? From what sort of examples? In what language-games? (*PI*, I, # thus: 77). Wittgenstein argues that dealing with meaning must always come down, at some point, to a recognition that people just *do* accept this or that and just *do* agree about what actions count or do not count as following a certain procedure. Yet at the same time the inherent nature of the language-game is such that meaning cannot be spelled out in terms of essence or in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions. This “leap” however has nothing to do with deliberately looking for a different meaning (wanting to surpass or abandon a previous meaning), instead with not wanting to legislate future use.

Values, customs, and traditions cannot and should not be explained, as J.C. Nyíri argues (1992). Every “explanation” is, as it were, a judgment of reason – but reason itself, as Wittgenstein in his later philosophy sets out to prove, is in the last analysis, grounded in “our acting,” in “what we do,” which in some sense is what “tradition” amounts to. Therefore, if freedom is incompatible with being bound by real tradition, it is incompatible with “reason,” and not conforming must be seen as an anthropological folly – this, Nyíri argues, is Wittgenstein’s underlying thought. Certainly, in Wittgenstein’s work one finds a respect for what is *there*, what is historically given. This is present not only in the conception of the task of philosophy as description but also as the recurrent theme of the analyses: the acceptance of the authority of everyday language – here we reach bedrock or “the riverbed.” Moreover, Wittgenstein’s “Remarks on Frazer’s *Golden Bough*” suggests that he came to think that ethics

cannot be unitary. Taken out of context, this might appear blatantly conservative. His arguments, however, seldom address issues capable of being approached conservatively as opposed to, say, radically or liberally – it is not clear that the distinction applies, not that his work is not normative or that it is value-free. Wittgenstein is preoccupied by problems that are of a different, or more rudimentary, nature than those on which the conservative-radical distinction gains purchase. Furthermore, as Mark Cladis argues, his position endorses internal criticism. And though this may seem unduly limited, it *is* honest and, in contrast to supra-historical criticism, it is not illusory. Becoming aware of the historicity of society and all that this means can assist us in reforming society. This attitude has about it something of the humble wisdom of Socrates: the problems of life have more to do with learning *from* something than with solving a problem and then going on to the next one.

For Wittgenstein, “The child learns by believing the adult. Doubt comes *after* belief” (OC, § 160). The bedrock of our “language-games” is the “form of life.” These unjustified and unjustifiable patterns of human activities can be seen as the complicated network of rules which constitute language and social life. This “given” is a whole: it is the “language-and-the-world”; we cannot place ourselves outside of it. Our acting is embedded in a matrix of certainty that precedes our knowledge (the matrix of knowing-and-doubting and knowing-and-“making a mistake”). The ordinary certainties are the roads on which we walk without hesitation. They are not the only possible ones and not perhaps the correct ones (not even those which have worked in experience). Therefore, in general, “education” from a Wittgensteinian position can be conceived as a dynamic initiation into a “form of life”; parents are seen as the “first educators” and the responsibility of the State concerning schooling can be seen as an extension of this. Educators offer the child the truths by which they live: what moves them, what appeals to them, and what supports the idea of “human being” they offer to the child hoping that she or he will participate. Thus the child is immediately grasped in the human order, structured by certain relationships, and identified by language. If education ought to provoke new ideas, it nevertheless has

to start from somewhere. Its aim is being a personal way of dealing with “what matters”: how people have struggled in the past with what troubled them most and how they dealt with it (a process in which one gets acquainted foremost with questions rather than with answers).

Does the practitioner need a philosophy or a theory of education? There is no reason to doubt what Wittgenstein’s answer to this question would have been. As with any practice, theoretical or philosophical insights are not needed for those involved in order to be able “to go on.” And it is not as if causal explanations would be of any help. But at the same time he would not deny that if one engages in reflection upon these practices, after being involved in particular activities, this might give us a better understanding about what one is doing. Freeing us from the idea that education must have a fixed and unified meaning will change what we want to do in education. This might generate, for example, a different perspective on research concerning day care for young children (now primarily focused on the “effects” this has on the very young) and highlight the way parents see themselves. And philosophy of education might address questions that have to do with means-end reasoning or cultural pluralism. One has to bear in mind however that according to Wittgenstein we do not encounter philosophical problems in practical life. We encounter them only when we are guided not by practical purpose in forming our sentences, but when certain analogies within our language lead us astray (*The Big Typescript*, #91; Klagge and Nordmann 1993, p. 189). Careful reading in this way would not lead to the development of theoretical views, or any such thing, but it would change the *researcher*: the world would come to be looked at differently. And coming to see the world differently is changing oneself.

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Anti-colonial Education

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Introduction

Contemporary schooling and education must confront some important questions: How can educators assist learners to reimagine new futures where human lives are transformed in profound, productive, and meaningful ways? How do we begin to talk of critical anti-colonial subjects who would embark on a collective and radical imagining and imagination of new futures? How do we reimagine the school space from an institution that teaches normalized values to one that interrogates histories and addresses inequity? The politics of futurity requires that we bring a critical anti-colonial gaze to schooling and education and the possibilities for producing creative and resisting subjects for change; meaning we must interrogate teaching, learning, and the administration of education not only for their contributions to social success for all learners but also how educational sites make possible a new future. Under the idea of futurity, what becomes possible is a realization the coloniality of schooling and education continues to produce hierarchies and systemic barriers that are very consequential for educational

outcomes for learners. To understand the coloniality of education, we need more nuanced theoretical prisms that offer deeper insights into how schools and other educational sites perform as colonial and imperial agents of society.

Anti-colonialism as a Discursive Framework for Education

The anti-colonial discursive framework helps uncover such colonial relations of schooling and education. It also helps point to directions for resistance, change, and transformation. As argued in other contexts, the “anti-colonial” refers to an approach to theorizing colonial and re-colonial relations and the implications of imperial structures on (a) processes of knowledge production, interrogation, validation, and dissemination; (b) the understanding of Indigeneity as both a process and identity; and (c) the pursuit of agency, resistance, and subjective politics (see Dei 2000, Dei and Kempf 2006). (Subjective politics is the politics of the subject/body engaging questions of how identity is linked to knowledge and political practice.) The anti-colonial brings to the fore questions of colonial relations of knowledge, power, resistance, subject agency, and the place of Indigenous insurgence and resurgences in promoting new futures. In a theorization of anti-colonial, the “colonial” is understood as anything that is “imposed” and “dominating,” rather than simply “foreign” and “alien” (see also Dei and Asgharzadeh 2001). Colonial relations are seen as encounters (lived experiences, histories, resistances) shaped and defined by difference: race, gender, class, sexuality, language, culture, etc. The colonial encounter gestures to the importance of viewing colonialism as more than political domination of Indigenous and colonized peoples. Colonialism is read to imply an unending relation and practice, as something that continually challenges the sovereignty of colonized and Indigenous peoples. Indeed, today colonialism is alive in the denial of Indigenous peoples’ sovereignty and self-autonomy, dispossession of the lands, the displacement of peoples, and the denial of people’s basic humanity, as well as

imperialistic projects that continue to design other peoples futures. There are also the many recolonizing projects that manifest themselves in variegated ways and different contexts through globalism (see also Dei and Meredith 2016, Kempf 2010).

Colonialism and colonial encounters have persistently thrived on exclusive notions of belonging, difference, and superiority Fanon (1990), Grosfuguel (2007). Colonial relations have always sought to establish and sustain hierarchies and systems of power and oppression, denying the hopes, dreams, and aspirations of colonized and Indigenous peoples. Through the colonial vestiges, dominant narratives championing the colonizer's sense of rationality, reason, legitimacy, authority, and privilege are employed to define and script the colonized as the violent "other." The colonizer is pitted as just, innocent, benevolent, caring, and ethical (see Fanon's discussion on Manichaeisms). It is such extended conversations about the nature of colonialism and decolonization that ground current anti-colonial theorization. This theorization must also be taken as an affirmation of the continuing struggles for colonized peoples and communities to purge ourselves of the "psycho-existential complexes" and "psycho-affective features" battered and imprinted on us over the course of the colonial experience and through colonizing and imperial knowledges (see also Coulthard 2007, p. 450).

Dei (2006) notes that contemporary anti-colonial theorizing has roots in the decolonizing movements of colonial States that fought for independence from European countries at the end of the Second World War. The revolutionary ideas of Frantz Fanon, Mohandas Gandhi, Mao-Tse-Tung, Albert Memmi, Aime Cesaire, Kwame Nkrumah, and Che Guevara, to name a few, were instrumental in fermenting anti-colonial struggles. Most of these scholars were avowed nationalists who sought political liberation for all colonized peoples and communities using the power of knowledge. In particular, Fanon's (1967) and Gandhi's writings on the violence of colonialism and the necessity for open resistance and Albert Memmi's (1969) discursive on the relations between the colonized and the colonizer helped instill in the

minds of colonized peoples the importance of engaging in acts of resistance to oppose the violence of colonialism. In later years, particularly in the contexts of Africa, other scholars including Aime Cesaire (1972), Leopold Senghor (1996), and Cabral (1974) introduced questions of language, identity, and national culture into anti-colonial debates for political and intellectual liberation. Furthermore, liberation movements have also sprouted in the heart of empire as evidenced by the works of Malcolm X, Stokely Carmichael (2007), Garvey (2016), and Baldwin (1962) larger movements such as the Black Panthers, American Indian Movement, and the Brown Berets in the United States. These interventions have furthered anti-colonial struggles abroad and within the North American context. Later perspectives have tended to conflate the processes of neocolonialism and postcolonialism. A critical transhistorical approach allows us to work with the discursive knowledge of re-colonial relations, that is, colonialism and colonial relations as unending and ongoing, and hence a need to problematize the periodization of colonial histories Escobar (2004). While anti-colonialism may draw on postcolonial and neocolonial writings and theoretical stances, these frameworks and approaches are by no means synonymous with each other.

Contemporary Anti-colonial Theory

Contemporary radical anti-colonial theory focuses on ways colonial relations have been produced and continue to be reproduced in the present. For example, there are modern-day forms of human oppression and colonial exploitation that bring to the fore issues of colonial and human rights abuses, economic exploitation, commodification of bodies, etc. as transnational corporations and colonial States generate huge profits. Many of the colonial and colonizing practices associated through child labor, forced labor, debt bondage, or indentured servitude are incredibly violent practices that work through colonial structures in service of the empire (Walia 2013, Escobar 2004). For example, transnational corporations operate within nation

[colonial] States to maximize profits by reducing costs through uncompensated labor, low wages, etc. An overwhelming portion of this labor force is deeply racialized and gendered. The interconnectedness of global capital and exploitation of gendered and racialized labor has always been a colonial practice of State and empire building. While today the exploitation of racialized and gendered labor is mainly imagined in the global South context of sweatshops, maquiladoras, and other such mass production spaces, such exploitation is very much present in the global North. It is a feature of modern-day economics, race, and gender politics stepped in global capitalism and Western modernity. There is a powerful global reach of the problem that requires multiple tools of analysis. Anti-colonial and decolonial prisms are powerful lenses of investigation and understanding. The anti-colonial prism helps us to tease out the myriad dimensions of global exploitations by uncovering the experiences of racialized and gendered labor as exercised in numerous sectors including industrial manufacturing, technology, agricultural farm work, and other mass production sites. Throughout these locations, racialized bodies have become disposable, and within the global north deportable, workers. Compounding this is the resulting tensions between the rhetorics/advocacy of change and working politically for meaningful change.

The anti-colonial prism allows us to look at how change emerges from among the colonized and oppressed themselves. It highlights the intellectual and political agency of the local subjects while critiquing the colonial vestiges that often present oppressed, colonized, and Indigenous groups as passive (nonresisting and without agency). For example, in the interdependence of global capital and labor exploitation of racialized and gendered workers, we see how exploited labor (e.g., women) employs their agency in deciding migration and labor paths (Sharma 2005). Whether in sex work, indentured labor, arranged employment, or simply the aid or payment to move across borders, workers are in the know about the oppressive and exploitative trajectories. Yet they may decide it as personal choice with an understanding of what awaits

(a difficult life, though, hopefully, less so than the original or preceding context). The problem is that too often there is the illegalization of labor migrants in global North which constitutes a criminalization of human movement across borders stemming from ongoing colonial relations. Often, the response is to deport these labor migrants as having transgressed spatial borders, and hypocritically such deportation gets seen as saving, particularly through a Western bourgeois lens (De Genova 2005).

Anti-colonialism thus questions the effects of global capital and the ways the global North advances the violence associated with the use of racialized, gendered, and working class labor across geographical spaces Mignolo (2007), Quijano (2007), Rabaka (2011). As noted the nation State is heavily implicated in all of this. And so, as is often the case, we cannot construct the idea of transnational corporations running the world in the absence of colonial States with significant power. Current discussions about forced labor also fit State-run migrant programs. Yet, there is no call to demand nation States/governments to address these inequities. Colonialism, slavery, and racism have worked in tandem, and we are still living with the effects. It is visible, and it must be addressed at multiple individual, local and global levels. Throughout human history, and particularly within settler colonial contexts, Black and Indigenous peoples were and are still required by the project of colonialism to ensure that the nation State retains its control (i.e., control as in over the benefits of citizenship, over the way land is distributed and used, over who has access to social services and employment, over who can afford housing, over who can afford certain kinds of food, etc.). In Canada, for example, Whites did not just colonize Indigenous peoples. The colonial settler State funneled Black and other racialized groups unto Aboriginal soils, seduced *us* [immigrants] with the benefits of citizenship, and capitalized on the exploitation of Black and racialized labor to build the society we have today. Media, popular culture, school textbooks, and in fact the broad school curriculum ignore the dispossession of Black people and, simultaneously, paints a false

portrait of peaceful settlement/relationships. This portrait is a gross misrepresentation of the violence that has occurred to create the nation. All this requires an anti-colonial reading to understand the nature and extent of colonial violence. Similarly, Africans on the continent are still struggling with neocolonial practices that impact on questions of development and human rights with the role and policies of international financial bodies (e.g., IMF and the World Bank) and transnational corporations impacting negatively on African peoples' lives. In Africa, we also have the tapping and draining of local wealth, human resources, and other material resources. And, there is a connection of Africa and African peoples on the continent and in the diaspora.

Race and Anti-colonial Education

Race, colonialism, and oppression worked and continue to work in a powerful tandem, particularly in schooling and education. The problem is that colonial education has worked to erode identities, spiritualities, and sense of communities as vital ingredients of knowledge for understanding our education. Racism was and has continued to be a colonial project. The colonizer does not have to be present for the racist effects of colonization to be felt. We have colonial patriarchal structures and systems set in place to do the colonizer's bidding. The changing meanings and complexities of Whiteness and Blackness do not obscure their saliency in today's sociopolitical contexts. The absented presence of race in educational spaces and the subsequent impact on youth identity formations require that we focus some attention in anti-colonial educational practice for subversion of White colonial dominance. Anti-colonialism therefore necessitates accounting for the normalization and subsequent coloniality of race in institutional settings. In other words, anti-colonial framework rejects the idea that, since race is difficult to define, one cannot disengage from pinning down its legacy. Race is real in its consequences given the power of colonial hierarchies established along the lines of raciality and racialologies. While

schooling is a microcosm of the prevalence of racist structures in society, it also informs and guides much of what we take for granted. Schools are charged with producing "good citizens" and schooling naturalizes hegemonic ways of being and belonging. In short, anti-colonial framework theorizes how dominant schooling does not problematize or interrogate the centering of a White-settler logic. Instead, while masquerading as the space for the development of critical thought, it demands and rewards passive belonging. This process is subtractive. It actively works to remove knowledges, cultures, and pride of one's community and family in the name of civilizing subjects and, as Valenzuela (1999) points out, those who resist these processes are themselves removed from the schooling structure. We must link this to the process school push outs.

Consequently, anti-colonial education connects race and the cultural politics of schooling and education raising new questions: How do we read who is deemed worthy of education by conventional standards? Where is the "multi" in the multicultural space and diverse pluralistic contexts? How do we explain the mystification of Blackness in schooling and everyday social practices? How are discourses of respectability entrenched in schooling and educational to adversely practices affect Black, Indigenous, and other racialized learners? What particular meanings do we bring to the ways racialized, gendered, classed, sexualized identities implicate differential educational outcomes for youth? What are the ways we maintain invisibility of some forms of oppressions and racisms? What type of education should educators provide to learners, and what are learners going to do with such education? What does it mean to create an inclusive anti-colonial global future and the nature of work it requires to collectively get us there? These questions implicate the school curriculum, classroom pedagogy and instruction, and the educational practices required to bring educators, students, and local communities together to break down colonial structures of schooling. These questions are important because colonial education maintains blind spots on particular identities of learners

(e.g., race) and their connections to schooling, education, and knowledge production.

An anti-colonial analysis of education studies how failing to connect race and colonial oppression is a major problem of colonial education. The educational system has not adequately prepared learners to discuss race, let alone how race is rooted in colonization and colonial structures. Most learners are not equipped with the language [vocabulary] to speak, interrogate, and trouble race and colonizing encounters. So it is not uncommon to see even racialized learners shy away from race. When we center race and difference in education, we can also bring new questions to the neoliberal educational agenda. Educators, students, administrators, parents, guardians, community workers, and local communities can challenge our own colonial investments through mainstream educational pursuits. By highlighting democratic education, individual rights, and freedoms, liberal education agenda points to the dialectic of coloniality and modernity and the ways this dialectic informs schooling practices. The power of Euro-colonial modernity does not allow for a reimagining of new/alternative educational and social futures. Western hegemonic systems of thought, ways of knowledge production, and conventional processes of schooling and educational delivery are intertwined to maintain a colonial educational system. Colonial hierarchies and relations of schooling revolve around certain ontological, epistemological, and axiological hegemonic foundations. Conceptions of individual rights, human dignity, liberty, freedom, choice, equality, “autonomy,” justice, virtue, tolerance of dissenting viewpoints, etc., are all relevant. But we need to work politically and collectively to actualize these ideals. Anti-colonial education pays particular attention to the macro-social processes, as well as the economic, political, and psychocultural realms of domination.

Indigeneity and Anti-colonial Education

Another important dimension of contemporary anti-colonial theorizing is the engagement of

question of Indigeneity as an international category. This approach to anti-colonial framework imbricates lessons of Indigenous peoples’ struggles for sovereignty against White colonial settlerhood and other disposessions of Indigenous peoples’ lands and territories across global spaces Tuck and Yang (2012). The occupation is not solely a physical occupation. This expansive reading brings a transhistorical lens to the discussion allowing us to work with the knowledge of re-colonial relations as about loss of land, space, histories of migration, culture and memory, notion of belonging, connected spirits, and identities. In this sense the “anti-colonial” is intimately connected to decolonization and, by implication, decolonization cannot happen solely through Western science scholarship. In other words, the anti-colonial becomes decolonial resistance to the hegemony of Western knowledge and a search for new futures of mutual coexistence.

By moving Indigeneity beyond a strictly genealogical representation of relationship to land, the “Indigenous” is then defined broadly to maintain space for anti-colonial and decolonial thought embracing Latin American, mestizo, “mixed race,” Black, African, Indian, Asian, South Asian histories, and experiences as we confront the question of Indigeneity. Such approach allows for a more critical discourse and practice of Indigenous resurgences and empowers Indigenous peoples everywhere to reimagine a collective future together. It also allows us to push our understanding of decolonization to include culture, space, bodies, the psyche, the internalization of colonial relations of thought, and colonial difference, as well as the intersectionalities of struggles. This is revisioning of decolonization and anti-colonial politics differently and yet converging. Colonized bodies that move into new spaces, usually settler colonial contexts [e.g., racialized immigrants in White-settler communities], do not automatically lose their Indigeneity or Indigenouness (Dei 2016). The colonial encounter did not remove the knowledge base from mind, memory, and soul. Such knowledges can be and are being reclaimed globally as the basis for global Indigenous resurgence.

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Anti-humanism

- [Humanism, Postcolonialism, and Education](#)

Anti-normative

- [Gendered Violences and Queer of Color Critiques in Educational Spaces: Remembering Sakia, Carl, and Jaheem](#)

Arendt

- [Heidegger as Teacher](#)

Argument Mapping Software: Semiotic Foundations

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Synonyms

Computer-supported argument visualization;
CSAV; Diagrammatic reasoning; E-learning;
Graphic representation; Logic; Normativity;
Peirce; Rationality; Software

Introduction

The abilities to argue, to evaluate the quality of argumentative reasoning, and to structure reasoning by means of arguments, all these argument-related skills are crucial not only for the scientific mind but for everybody who strives for a self-determined life without external manipulation, for competent decision making about important matters of life, for self-confident interaction with others, and for participation in public deliberation. Reacting to the need to teach the skills of argument, researchers in the areas of education, philosophy, and computer science developed over the last decades a large number of software tools known as “argument mapping software” or “computer-supported argument visualization” (CSAV) tools.

Based on the fact that any argument needs to be represented in one way or another, and given the large variety of software tools that allow the visualization, mapping, or diagramming of arguments, it turned out to be helpful – especially for the design of future CSAV tools – to study the construction of arguments not only from a conceptual and empirical point of view but also from a semiotic point of view. Semiotics – the theory of signs and representations – should provide important conceptual and theoretical means to understand what happens when people visualize arguments and when they learn by studying and reconstructing arguments.

The following considerations on the semiotic foundations of CSAV tools concentrate on two questions: What can we learn from semiotics about ways to acquire the ability to construct clear and convincing arguments by means of CSAV? How can a semiotic reflection help to determine principles and requirements for the design of argument visualization software? After describing some of the challenges that CSAV attempts to address in education, this contribution differentiates several approaches to “argument” and “argument visualization” in the educational literature and discusses semiotic foundations of CSAV based on Charles S. Peirce’s work on conditions that are required for interpreting signs and for learning by experimenting with diagrams.

Why Computer-Supported Argument Visualization?

The book title *Arguing to Learn* (Andriessen et al. 2003) may be the best expression of the assumption that there is a close relationship between the construction of arguments and learning. This is convincing especially for the learning of scientific reasoning and the content taught in science education. Since in science every theory and every thesis has to be justified by evidence, learning science needs to go hand in hand with learning how to argue.

Software tools have the potential to support the construction of arguments which is especially important in settings where students collaborate on their own in small groups. CSAV can help to scaffold student argumentation by providing specific structures that guide both interaction among students and the construction and experimental manipulation of arguments.

The same functionality of CSAV – providing structure for both interaction and understanding of possible organizations of content – has been the focus of research that emphasizes that an important skill students should acquire is the ability to cope with “wicked problems.” Horst Rittel and Melvin Webber defined “wicked problems,” in contrast to “tame problems,” as those problems whose understanding depends on someone’s point

of view. “There is no definitive formulation of a wicked problem.” “The formulation of a wicked problem *is* the problem!” (Rittel and Webber 1973, p. 161). Based on a variety of different perspectives – each representing specific needs, interests, world views, beliefs, and values of people – problems and possible solutions can be “framed” in a variety of ways.

Rittel and Webber recommended that the multi-perspectivity of wicked problems should be addressed based on “an argumentative process in the course of which an image of the problem and of the solution emerges gradually among the participants, as a product of incessant judgment, subjected to critical argument” (Rittel and Webber 1973, p. 162). CSAV tools promise to support students in their collaboration on wicked problems (Kirschner et al. 2003).

Other educational uses that have been suggested for CSAV include the training of critical thinking and stimulating reflection on the quality of one’s own arguments and reasoning.

Different Approaches to “Argument” and “Argument Visualization”

Available argument mapping software addresses these educational challenges in a variety of ways which are connected to different conceptualizations of what an “argument” is. Three definitions can be distinguished. The first one originates in philosophy. It defines, in one of many similar forms, an argument as a set of one or more premise-conclusion sequences so that either one or more premises are intended to support a conclusion or a conclusion is intended to be justified by one or more premises. A second understanding of argument adds to this first one a focus on the ability to supplement any position with a counterposition (“pros and cons” or “confronting cognitions;” see Andriessen et al. 2003).

A third tradition in educational argument theory uses “argument” in a broader sense that is influenced by work on “wicked problems.” Since the focus is here on clarifying “issues,” many scholars include in the process of argument visualization also activities such as formulating

questions, ideas, pros, and cons, problem solving, the generation of hypotheses and evaluation criteria, expressing doubt and disbelief, and reifying, contrasting, criticizing, and integrating perspectives (Kirschner et al. 2003).

Semiotic Foundations

Whatever definition of argument one prefers, there are at least two areas of theory development in semiotics that can contribute to a better understanding of problems related to learning by means of CSAV on the one hand and to the determination of principles and requirements for the design of argument mapping software on the other. The first of these concerns reflections on the conditions of interpreting signs and representations adequately. Since CSAV is all about visualizing arguments, the problem of interpreting of what can be seen is fundamental. The second relevant area of semiotics discusses conditions of how we can learn and reason by means of external representations via what Charles S. Peirce called diagrammatic reasoning.

Interpreting Signs and Representations

Charles S. Peirce – who was the first in modern times to develop the fundamentals of semiotics from a philosophical point of view – always claimed that a sign fulfills its function to represent something for someone (or for something other) as “a medium” that is embedded in a triadic relation: it is determined by its object and it determines its “interpretant.” Later in his life, Peirce understood this “interpretant” in a rather formal sense as “the proper significant outcome of a sign” or its “proper significate effect” (Peirce, 1931–1958, CP 5.473 and 475). However, if we ask what it takes to interpret a sign correctly, then it seems necessary – as Hoffmann and Roth (2010) argued – to take a fourth element into account besides object, sign, and interpretant: background knowledge about the sign’s meaning that someone needs to activate in order to either interpret a sign according to what he or she already knows about it or create new meanings. Peirce described this – very late in his life – as

“collateral knowledge” and argued that “no sign can be understood... unless the interpreter has ‘collateral acquaintance’ with every object of it” (Peirce, 1931–1958, CP 8.183).

This insight is indeed crucial for teaching. When we teach the analysis or construction of arguments, we talk about “reasons,” “conclusions,” and other things we take for granted, but do we really know that students interpret these concepts in the same way we do? A case in point is Deanna Kuhn’s famous study on the skills of argument that demonstrated that 60% of participants were not able to provide “genuine evidence” for a theory they themselves formulated to explain things such as school failure and unemployment (Kuhn 1991). Looking at the transcriptions of some of the interviews her team conducted, it seems more likely that many of the participants simply didn’t have any clue what the term “evidence” really means and what the difference is between answering the question “how do you know that this is the cause” and just telling a story about a causal relation.

For the design of CSAV tools, the insight that the correct interpretation of signs and representations depends on the availability of the right collateral knowledge is particularly important for the graphical elements that are used to visualize arguments. For example, it seems obvious that the separation of reasons and conclusions into different text boxes helps students to “see” the structure of an argument. However, it might not be clear what exactly the meaning of the arrow is that connects these text boxes. Does it mean “therefore” or “because”? Even if the direction is clear, the arrow alone is not sufficient to distinguish in the case of $p \rightarrow q$ between “ p therefore q ” and “ p since q .” In the first case p is the reason, while it is the conclusion in the second case. Thus, it might be helpful to provide necessary collateral knowledge in the representation itself by naming graphical elements explicitly, for example, by adding “therefore” or “because” to arrows.

The Rules of Representational Systems

A second area of semiotics that is relevant here is informed by Peirce’s work on “diagrammatic reasoning.” It is relevant especially for a better

understanding of how students can learn how to improve the quality of their own arguments and for a better understanding of how CSAV can support them in their efforts. Diagrammatic reasoning is reasoning by means of representations which visualize, in particular, structures and relations. A central idea of diagrammatic reasoning is that an external visualization of what we think about the issue in question allows us to identify problems and gaps in our own thinking, leads to the identification of relations we were not aware of before, and stimulates thus creativity and learning (Stjernfelt 2007; Hoffmann 2011; Semetsky 2013).

A “diagram,” for Peirce, is a representation whose main function is to represent a certain group of relations, namely, those relations that are rationally comprehensible. Relations are rationally comprehensible if they can be represented in a “consistent system of representation” (Peirce, 1931–1958, CP 4.418).

The rational character of diagrams is crucial for diagrammatic reasoning. Peirce defines diagrammatic reasoning as reasoning with diagrams that are constructed by the means provided by a certain system of representation – be it a logical system, or an axiomatic system as in geometry, or simply the vocabulary and grammar of a language. Such reasoning with diagrams is realized when we experiment with a diagram according to the rules of the chosen representational system. Experimenting with diagrams, transforming them according to the rules of the system, and observing what happens are crucial for scientific discoveries and the development of new knowledge. The reason is that such experimentation can lead to the discovery of regularities and of “relations between elements which before seemed to have no necessary connection” (Peirce, 1931–1958 CP 1.383), which again can lead to the creation of new concepts and theories. Examples in the history of science are the discovery of incommensurability in geometry and irrational numbers in arithmetic, the formulation of Desargues’ theorem in projective geometry, and Maxwell’s development of the electromagnetic field concept. In all these cases, it is important that the discovery of something new is

conditioned on the rules of the chosen representational system. If there were no rules according to which experiments are performed in diagrammatic reasoning, it would never be possible to distinguish arbitrary observations from those that can be used to create new knowledge.

In the context of education, and especially considering an edusemiotic perspective taken by educational theory and pedagogical practice, the discovery of new knowledge is no less important than other significant functions of diagrammatic reasoning: to structure and organize one's reasoning and to support the evaluation and improvement of reasoning. Diagrammatic reasoning can help students to reflect on their reasoning without being constrained by the limits of their working memory, analyze a problem more thoroughly and systematically, clarify and coordinate confused ideas about a problem, clarify implicit assumptions, identify background knowledge that might be inadequate, structure a problem space, change perspectives, identify unexpected implications, play with interpretations, discover contradictions, and distinguish the essential from the peripheral (Hoffmann 2011). However, a precondition for reflecting on one's own reasoning process by means of diagrammatic reasoning is that students have clear standards at their disposal to evaluate the quality of their reasoning. There need to be criteria with respect to which reasoning can be assessed. Those criteria are given in the rules of the representational systems according to which diagrams are constructed and experiments performed. Logic, for example, provides rules that can be used to perform self-controlled reasoning. We control our reasoning by comparing it with the norms of logic.

Logic, however, is only one possible normative standard for self-controlled reasoning. The "critical questions" that Douglas Walton and his colleagues developed for each of a multitude of different argument schemes fulfill the same function (Walton et al. 2008). They provide a standard that students can use to assess – and to improve, if necessary – the arguments they encounter or create.

A major opportunity that CSAV provides in this regard is that the rules of representational systems can be implemented in the user interface

of software. This has been done, for example, in the collaborative argument visualization software AGORA-net (<http://agora.gatech.edu/>). Here, the user needs to select a logically valid argument scheme to complete the construction of an argument. This selection creates automatically a further premise which transforms the given argument into a logical argument, directing thus the attention to the question how premises and conclusion should be formulated or the structure of the argument changed, to create a more convincing argument.

What edusemiotics, and specifically the semiotics of Charles S. Peirce, can show, thus, is that a necessary condition for learning something by means of diagrammatic reasoning is knowing and accepting the rules of a chosen system of representation, a system by means of which diagrams can be constructed and experiments be performed. Such a system *constrains* reasoning in a way that our cognitive energy gets focused on points that are crucial for reflection on one's own reasoning – just like a fireman's jet of water will be the more focused the more it is constrained. Without any constraints there would be no direction for our reasoning.

Conclusion

"Everybody takes the limits of his/her own field of vision for the limits of the world," wrote Arthur Schopenhauer. Education always aimed at extending the limits of our vision and at broadening our horizon. But how can we teach the abilities to recognize and to overcome cognitive limits in a more focused way? Computer-supported argument visualization (CSAV) has been proposed as a method to support the development of these abilities. Not only does CSAV promise to support the development of argumentation skills – that is, the ability to construct clear and convincing arguments and to evaluate the quality of arguments and argumentative reasoning – it also promises to stimulate self-reflection, creativity, and cognitive or conceptual change. When we use argument mapping software to support a position on an issue or to justify a thesis, claim, or

recommendation, we can learn something about our own thinking. Every argument that we construct shows what we know, what we believe, and often also which values or ethical principles drive our reasoning. Argument mapping, thus, allows us to reflect on our knowledge, beliefs, and values and on how they are related in argumentative structures.

Additionally, graphical representations and diagrams in general, and argument mapping in particular, can help to represent scientific controversies and dilemmas and to structure planning processes and deliberation. And it can teach students the ability to cope, in collaboration with others, with wicked problems and to resolve conflicts that are determined by clashing values, ideas, and world views.

Since the “visualization” in “argument visualization” is crucial for CSAV, semiotics has been proven to be an important theoretical tool to reflect on some of the foundations of CSAV. As edusemiotics in general shows, representations have to be interpreted, and representational systems have certain cognitive effects. To understand how CSAV affects learning and how CSAV should be designed to achieve and optimize certain educational effects, semiotics can play an important role.

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Arguments

- [Socratic Dialogue in Education](#)

Artifacts

- [Children and Objects](#)

Artworks

- [Critical Pedagogy and Art](#)

Asperger and the Framing of Autism: His Legacy and Its Philosophical Commitments

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Hans Asperger (1906–1980) is credited along with Leo Kanner (1894–1981) as one of the “discoverers” of autism. Asperger’s pioneering work was published in 1944 as a Habilitation, a second dissertation at the University of Vienna. Kanner’s work, on the other hand, was published a year earlier in 1943 in America at the Johns Hopkins clinic in Baltimore. Uta Frith notes while Kanner

enjoyed wide success, Asperger remained relatively unknown, if not ignored. Indeed Asperger's path breaking dissertation "'Autistic Psychopathy' in Childhood," (Asperger 1991) was not translated into English until 1991 by Frith herself, some 50 years after the original German publication. It is a remarkable coincidence then that both described independently a type of troubled child that no one paid attention to prior to the label autistic. Both were in agreement regarding the difficulties in the children they studied: awkward social interactions, difficulties in communication, resistance to changes in routine, and a clear separation from schizophrenia patients. There is nonetheless, clear distinctions between the two. All in all Kanner's study presents stereotypical portraits of the children as a means to identify a *specific class of individuals*. While Asperger, on the other hand, accented adults and children who were described as socially awkward, highly *idiosyncratic individuals* as they could have vast interest and knowledge in specialized, esoteric fields and yet have difficulty navigating the events of daily living. While Kanner's career is well documented, Asperger's influence and hence his legacy is still very much in the making as new documents have been uncovered that were presumed lost due to the bombing of the *Heilpädagogik* Station in Vienna where Asperger worked during World War II.

Asperger's "Discovery" of Autism: Context & Legacy

Hans Asperger began his career working with children who displayed unique behaviors at the *Heilpädagogik* Station in Vienna (Silberman 2015). The *Heilpädagogik* Station was a children's health clinic founded in 1911 at the University of Vienna by Erwin Lazar. The clinic too was unique in that it brought together psychology, medicine, and progressive methods of teaching to children who were thought by their parents and teachers to be difficult to be around. The concept of "*Heilpädagogik*" means therapeutic education, and for Lazar the best therapy was of the type that fostered a community of mutual respect and appreciation between the clinic staff and the

children. Rather than focusing on individual pathology, he believed in offering the children companionship where the children could feel at home. As such, the clinic's approach was to observe the children throughout the day, when eating, at play, in class, etc., to gain a more comprehensive, holistic portrait of the child. The clinic then both observed the children in their daily interactions while offering a full schedule of courses in math, handwriting, history, geography, and field trips into the clinic's garden. There was plenty of time for rest and "free time" to do as they pleased.

Of key importance is newly found document written by Joseph Michaels (Silberman 2015) who visited the clinic in the mid-1930s. Michaels notes that the Station's staff did not use descriptive categories like "normal" and "abnormal" to describe the behaviors of the children as the staff felt they were theoretically unclear, and practically it is of no importance. He notes children were given maximum freedom of expression and the children learned at their own pace, while staff provided an assortment of toys, building block, cooking utensils, to play with. The children were free to let their imaginations track in a direction of self-interest, and while the children were activity engaged Asperger and his staff made careful qualitative descriptions of the child's behavior. As Michael noted the clinic's approach seemed, "more like art than science."

In Vienna, Asperger worked with over 200 children at the *Heilpädagogik* Station. (see also, Feinstein 2010) At the station these children were described as socially awkward, intelligent, and finding unique ways to solve problems. As such, Asperger viewed the quirkiness of his students in a positive light and as something that should be treasured, not destroyed. He is quite clear in his study that these children exhibited "special achievements" and originality in thinking, as Asperger observes that their thoughts can be unusually rich. They are good at logical thinking, and the ability to abstract is particularly good.

Asperger called this special mode of thinking, "autistic intelligence" and felt such intelligence was undervalued in society. In his study he emphasizes, "Autistic children produce able original

ideas,” inserting that they can only be original, and mechanical, rote learning is hard for them. Later in 1953 Asperger wrote, “It seems that for success in science and art a dash of autism is essential” (Silberman 2015). Indeed, for Asperger the autist’s ability to turn away from the everyday world, from the simply practical, provided them with mental space to rethink a subject with originality so as to create “new untrodden ways.”

Uta Frith (1991) points out, that he was a champion of the children he attended to, advocating for their recognition, pointing out they had much to offer society with aid from teachers who could provide a special type of education. She notes that he feared that teachers and other students often misunderstood these children and suggested that one needs a “dash of autism” to really be engaged to teach these children. Indeed, Asperger believed that the children he worked with displayed original thinking that was found in the sciences and that their introversion was due in part to their inability to learn by conventional means. While Asperger emphasized the strengths of these children, he neither romanticized nor idealized their impairments. Asperger was cautiously optimistic in his appraisal of the children as he felt that their detachment from the everyday, their capacity to get “lost in thought” resembled a scientist who becomes obsessed with a particular problem to solve, hence losing track of the time of day, or of those around him or her.

Indeed, the children Asperger described and the way in which he described the children in his study lead Lorna Wing in 1981 to suggest an “Asperger Syndrome” (Silberman 2015). Wing’s insight into Asperger’s study lead her a few years later to rethink autism reasoning that the phenomena described by Asperger was not symptomatic of an illness nor as a single, monolithic phenomena as Kanner suggested. Instead, Wing conceived of autism as being on a “spectrum,” a continuum of behaviors, dispositions, and intellectual capacity. That is, Wing argued for an incremental gradient for thinking about autism that would align with her interpretation of Asperger’s descriptions. This gradient would allow for a more nuanced notion of autism that could accommodate the idiosyncratic and eccentric child described by

Asperger. Hence opening the door, so to speak, for greater recognition, as Asperger asserted earlier that the character traits described in his study could be found in the “normal” population. Through the efforts of Wing, Frith, and others, a separate strand of thinking about autism began to emerge, a strand that has roots in Asperger’s study.

Steven Silberman (2015) documents the evolution of Asperger’s framing of autism as an elastic concept, multidimensional in its attempt to bring together the materiality of the brain with its interaction with social world. Silberman claims that Asperger’s conception of autism is representative of a unique mode of thinking: neurodiversity. The term neurodiversity appears to be coined by Judy Singer, an Australian college student in the late 1990s. As Silberman points out Singer’s hope was that by honoring diversity, “neurological pluralism,” within the disability rights community it would become a rallying cry for political activism. It was during the 1980s–1990s that autism authors appear on the literary scene, writing about their experience of autism and the challenges they faced both on the personal as well as the political levels of daily life. Works by Temple Grandin, commentaries by Oliver Sacks, Donna Williams, and others helped to establish that autism was not a disease to be cured but rather a way of living and being in the world. As autistic authors began to speak out, it was clear that they sought to reverse the dominant conception of autism as an individual aberration by shifting in emphasis in the discussion as to how society will address the challenge of neurological diversity.

Interestingly, Silberman finds the origins of this call for autistic inclusion lodged within Hans Asperger’s notion that people with autistic traits have always existed within society. From Asperger’s perspective, the autistic traits he observed were always a part of the human condition. The problem is not about autistic uniqueness, rather it is over how society will provide inclusive environments that allow for and accept neurodiversity. With neurodiversity, Asperger’s legacy moves from the idiosyncratic conception to the pluralistic notion of autism that is

highlighted by the autistic rights movements that utilize digital technology to organize and combine insights and energy to challenge ableism. One group, Wrong Planet (started by Alex Plank and Dan Glover, cited in Silberman 2015) argues that the point of their activism is to alleviate those with Asperger's the societal pressure to conform and to utilize their uniqueness as a means to take part in and find their place in the world.

Silberman ends his study with a nod to Asperger, noting that in 1938 Asperger was somewhat prescient in insisting that the traits of autism are, "not at all rare." And second, that autistic people have always been a part of human history, it is not a new phenomena – neurodiversity is an aspect of the human condition. The problem is rather that the ableist ideology continues to frame autism as an aberration, a unique disorder created within the context of contemporary capitalist society.

The challenge for autistic rights group, like Autistic Self Advocacy Network (ASAN), has been assert their presence challenging ableist assertions that autism is a contemporary aberration with their motto, "Nothing about us, without us" (Silberman 2015). Asperger would certainly agree with this motto, as he considered the children he worked with at the Station, not as patients to be cured but rather as colleagues working together. For as Silberman points out, Asperger saw them "indispensable allies" in the development of pedagogy strategies that would be most appropriate and effective for them. Asperger viewed these children as both friends and colleagues, in short as members of a community of thinkers.

Hans Asperger and Disability Studies

While Frith and Wing were amongst the first researchers to bring Asperger's study into the mainstream, social critics like Steve Silberman are filling in the gaps regarding Asperger's place in the current thinking revolving around autism. It is also important to situate his framing of autism within the context of Disability Studies. Traditionally there are two competing models that stage contemporary Disability Studies, on the one

hand the *medical model* and on the other the *social model*. The medical model focuses on the individual body and takes a biological orientation focusing on disability as an embodiment that requires medical intervention. The later, the social model is orientated towards the social and environmental factors that construct disability as a pathology, and hence requiring political interventions at the level of social justice to rectify the negative characterization of disability. The gap between these two models creates conceptually, a binary in thinking about disability: either disability resides in the biological, and medical, or the category of "disability" is a social construction constituted by and through dominant ableist ideologies. The former model frames disability as an aspect of "nature," of our genetic makeup that has become aberrant and in need of medical attention. While the latter model focuses on the ways in which our very thinking about disability is framed, articulated through ableist discourses that ultimately oppress and marginalize those labeled disabled.

In an attempt to bridge the gap between these two models, one disability theorist Tobin Siebers (2011) advocates for a "theory of complex embodiment," which draws on the feminist philosopher, Patricia Hill Collins notion of intersectionality. In his theorizing, Silbers attempts to bring into conversation the two dominant models by exploring the intersectionality of the material body with social representation. Siebers argues on the one hand that there is a need for a greater awareness of the materiality of the body, citing the chronic physical pain experienced by those with physical impairments. Simply to talk about oppressive ableist discourses does not alleviate chronic physical pain. And on the other hand, he affirms: (1) the necessity of critique as knowledge about ourselves and the assumptions held are always socially situated within a specific historic context, hence never neutral; (2) this knowledge embodies complex theories about one's identity and social reality, hence a question of human "value" needs addressing; and (3) acknowledging the political reality that those labeled "disabled" are excluded, marginalized, and oppressed by the prevailing, ableist ideology of the time. As such, the very positionality of the excluded, the marginalized, becomes the focal

point for critique of the dominant ableist ideology. For Siebers “disability” becomes an identity whereby the members of the disability community are recognized as members of society, members who have agency as they are producers of knowledge and actors for social change in their own right.

Finally, Siebers grounds his theory of complex embodiment, and hence Disability Studies, within a “realist” framework. That is, for disability theory to have teeth it must embrace both the concrete material realities of those with physical and mental impairments while actively working towards political change that advocates for a reframing of the discourse around disability that entails more inclusive social environments. Here realism is understood as neither positivistic assertion that reality can be understood unmediated by social representations (what you see is what you get) nor can reality be understood simply as a set of discursive claims unaffected by “real” objects, i.e., the materiality of the body, the brain, the physical world. Hence, Siebers proposes that both the material world and social representations push back on each other, producing the interplay of embodiment with the construction of a shared reality, whereby the materiality of the body and the social world are always in interaction with the construction of socially situated knowledge.

Thinking retrospectively, we can ask how Asperger’s framing of autism align with the realism of complex embodiment advocated by Siebers. In addressing this question we need to keep in mind, on the one hand, that Asperger never claimed to be a realist nor theorized about complex embodiment. While this is the case, it is one of the tasks of philosophy of education, on the other hand, to take the opportunity to speculate as to the conceptual moorings that hold together Asperger’s project by bringing it into conversation with a leading theorist.

Indeed, there is no easy fit between Asperger’s framing of autism and Siebers theory; however, circumstantial evidence suggests that Asperger’s framing can comfortably rest within a realist conception of disability. To suggest that Asperger was something of a realist demands, according to Siebers, that Asperger’s framing of autism satisfy

the requirement that there is an acknowledgement of the “real,” not as unmediated reality, rather as understood in and through socially constituted concepts. That is, the “real” is never seen as it is (naïve realism), rather it is understood, mediated through concepts.

On this point, Uta Frith (1991) points out that Asperger was convinced that autism had a material base, and that there were organic and constitutional factors that were the causal roots to autism. In short, Asperger would agree with neuroscientist that in thinking about autism, the brain in its materiality matters. That problem for Asperger, however, was not that brains think differently rather it was society’s injunctions that insist on there being one “normal” brain that frames any neurodiversity as “abnormal.” For Asperger, diversity was not a problem, it simply exists. And this diversity as pertains to autism has always been a part of human history. Diversity as pertaining to autistic traits is not a pathological state to be cured. Hence for Asperger, as with Siebers, the problem falls into the hands of society.

To be sure, Asperger did not romanticize the impairments he described at the Station. Utilizing the medical concepts of his day, he was acutely aware of physical and mental limitations of the children. (*Here we too need to not romanticize Asperger and keep in mind that the very terms employed were framed within the medical model, hence have a reactionary rather than liberating effect when read today.*) Yet despite this, his efforts were aimed at acknowledging autistic uniqueness, and what they can contribute to society on their own terms.

Unfortunately his plea for acceptance of these children went unheard. Steve Silberman (2015) states that the children’s hospital became the primary children’s killing ward for all of Austria. Over a 5-year period, 789 children were murdered at the facility. Most of the children were diagnosed as “feeble-minded,” “epileptic,” or “schizophrenic”—the three diagnoses that children were most likely to receive prior to Asperger’s usage of the term “autism.” Part of the Nazi eugenics program was to eliminate these children, as they were perceived as a burden on society.

And Asperger? Silberman notes that Asperger refused to report his children to the Reich committee, and twice the Gestapo came to the clinic to arrest him. Twice his superior intervened to protect him!

As such, Asperger's framing of autism was something more than a mere "discovery" of a "new illness" affecting "troubled children." In an important sense, his work sought to "interrupt" Nazi eugenics. That is, Asperger was very aware of the current medical usage of the term autism (1991). Originally coined by Eugene Bleuler in 1919, it was associated with schizophrenia. Initially Asperger sought to separate autism from schizophrenia, which he did successfully. However, with the coming of the Nazis to Austria, his work took on yet another, nonmedical dimension: the term "autism" became a political category that gave recognition and status to the children he worked with.

Asperger did see these children as "special." Yet within his context, "special" was not intended to signify a social classification; it signified uniqueness. Further, the term autism became a part of a political struggle – literally for the survival of the children at the Station – as the term "autism" sort to rename the children. In doing so, it brought them into the presence of others as valued members of their community at the Station. Indeed, prior to Asperger's and his colleague's recognition of autism as a valued trait, the children of the clinic were viewed by the Nazis as inferior, hence disposable.

In sum, when situated within Disability Studies, Asperger's study provides a realist conception of autism: one that does acknowledge the materiality of the body as well as the social construction of knowledge situated within a concrete historic context, and a tacit political awareness necessary to challenge oppressive political ideologies and their egregious practices.

regards to educator's efforts for more inclusive environments. Asperger was a realist. He framed autism from a realist orientation, affording the term with multiple, interlocking dimensions. Asperger initiates thinking about autism that can neither be reducible to the material brain nor to harmful social constructions. Instead, Asperger initiates thinking about autism as a complex embodiment that is a part of human diversity. He tacitly urges us to think of inclusiveness in Gert Biesta's terms, as allowing for the "incalculable" (Biesta 2010). That is, to include that which cannot be known in advance, hence an inclusion that has potentiality to transform the existing order. For Asperger, autistic traits were always a part of the human story, yet remained relegated to the margins of society, hence undervalued. His legacy aims at affording the children the space of plurality whereby diversity flourishes alongside our concerns for social justice. Indeed, his legacy highlights the primacy of moral responsibility and the obligation for the educator to guarantee the safety of our future generations.

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Implications for Education

Asperger's interruption of the Nazis eugenics program has pedagogical implications with

Assemblage

► [Rhizoanalysis as Educational Research](#)

Assessment and Learner Identity

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The individual in contemporary society is not so much described by tests as constructed by them. (Hanson 1994)

Synonyms

Cultural activity; Evaluation; Student identity

Introduction

Standardized assessments play an ever increasing role in modern society. They often determine the life chances of those assessed, shaping learner identities. Assessment is a social activity and is value laden, despite attempts to make it seem objective and neutral. The appeal of testing, particularly in relation to selection, is that it is fairer than other methods. However, it has sometimes made claims that are hard to support, for example, the inferences drawn from intelligence tests, which have profoundly affected learner identities. Ways in which assessment can contribute positively to learner identities are then considered.

Assessment as a Social Activity

Assessment is a social activity which has always been part of the fabric of life. Used in the broad sense of gathering information to make judgments, it has been part of decision making through the ages. Where to start a settlement or deciding who is innocent or guilty are these kinds of judgments.

While this is still the case, for example, in risk assessment or legal procedures, the focus has shifted to the deliberate gathering of information to make judgments about individuals or groups.

The most familiar of these are the tests used for selection or to determine competence. These are tests which are deliberately designed to gather specific information about individuals so a judgment can be made, for example, about whether they should be selected for progression to a particular institution or be allowed to practice in an occupation.

When used for selection, these assessments have essentially become written, standardized tests, a tradition which stretches back over a thousand years to the Chinese Civil Service selection tests. Standardized testing has seen an exponential worldwide growth over the last hundred years and has become a major industry, particularly in the United States. These tests have increasingly become assessments of achievement, how well the curriculum is known or skills mastered, though generalized ability/intelligence tests still play a powerful role in some cultures (see below). Occupational assessments for the “license to practice” generally involve practical elements as well, for example, medical practicals or making a product (a tradition which goes back to the medieval guilds).

Assessment has increasingly become a powerful social tool because of the consequences for the life chances of those assessed. Failing a selection test when 11 years old has meant for many children either no or limited secondary education, just as passing examinations at 18 may lead to a university place and better job opportunities. These are the “high-stakes” assessments which have such serious consequences for individuals and which shape their identity as learners.

Tests as Fairer and More Meritocratic

How do such assessments come to have this power? The key appeal has always been that they are the fairest way of selection as they rely on *individual merit* rather than patronage or family connections. In this way they have provided opportunities for many who would not have had access to selection by patronage. It is estimated that in the Chinese Civil Service examinations of the Ming Dynasty (1368–1662) up to 60% of the

successful candidates were not from the families of the administrative elite (a better ratio than today's administrations?).

However, just because candidates all take the same test at the same time under the same conditions does not automatically make tests fair or meritocratic. Throughout the history of such testing, certain groups have been excluded from entry. Gender is the most obvious example, with females excluded from most selection tests well into the twentieth century. There is a similar history for lower social classes (slaves, laborers, and actors could not enter the Chinese examinations) and for racial and religious groups. This sends the identity message that these groups are not capable of doing this kind of work.

This has been compounded by the neglect of differences in preparation for the test. Those who had a privileged preparation for tests as a result of elite education would put their success down to merit; they performed better than others, rather than to advantaged preparation. This in turn fed into beliefs that the privileged had more natural ability than the disadvantaged, beliefs which fed into identities of social superiority. The worldwide phenomenon of an exam preparation industry funded by more affluent parents and operating outside regular schooling is part of this. Affirmative action programs for such as university entrance have recognized this problem by allowing for imbalances in the quality of schooling, often meeting opposition from the privileged elite.

Bias. Linked to this is the issue of the fairness of test content. Tests can never be culture-free, so whose culture is being tested? This is about *bias* in testing. Does one item advantage a specific group by assuming a particular cultural knowledge, for example, a particular interpretation of a country's history or literature? There are now techniques for identifying those biases which favor one group against another, for example, Differential Item Functioning – DIF, but these may still underestimate bias within the broader curriculum. We also know that the mode of assessment will affect results, for example girls are likely to perform better than boys on open-ended writing tasks while some students will do better on practical projects rather than tests.

Assessment as a social rather than objective activity. The development of measurement techniques ("psychometrics") to improve the quality of standardized tests has led to the perception that assessment is a neutral "scientific" activity rather than a socially constructed process. This positivistic position assumes that tests are simply measuring "what's there" and are independent of it. So psychometrics is presented as a scientific and detached measurement activity.

The more sociocultural position adopted here is that any assessment is essentially a social activity, so that what is assessed, how it is assessed, and how the results are interpreted are all value-laden social activities. There is no such thing as culture-free assessment – even nonverbal tests involving abstract mental reasoning (for example Raven's Matrices) are rooted in particular cultural understandings and experiences.

Assessment Identities

Because assessment is a social activity, it shapes how individuals and groups see themselves. The philosopher of science Ian Hacking writes about how "sometimes our sciences create kinds of people that in a sense did not exist before. This is making up people" (2006, p. 2). He applies this to conditions like Multiple Personalities which was "discovered" in the 1970 and saw a dramatic increase in people with the condition. More contemporary examples might be the way in which increasing number of children are identified as "dyslexic", or having Attentional Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD), or Asperger's syndrome. This is not to say that such children do not have reading, attentional, or interactional difficulties, but the labels we choose and how we respond to these labels is a social process. Hacking identifies ten "engines of discovery" that drive this process. These are 1. Count, 2. Quantify, 3. Create Norms, 4. Correlate, 5. Medicalize, 6. Biologize, 7. Geneticize, 8. Normalize, 9. Bureaucratize, 10. Reclaim our identity. These offer a useful framework with which to understand how educational assessments can shape learner identities. They fit particularly well with

the development of intelligence testing, a form of testing that has had a powerful impact on the identities of individuals and groups for over a century.

Intelligence Testing: A Case Study in “Making up People”

In 1923 Edwin Boring defined intelligence as “what the tests test”. This is more profound than it first appears as it signals that how we understand intelligence is largely the result of how it has been tested. What is included in an intelligence test in turn involves social judgments about what the concept of intelligence represents.

The history of intelligence testing is instructive in understanding this. Intelligence testing as we know it began with the work of Alfred Binet and Theodore Simon in France at the beginning of the twentieth century. They were looking for ways of identifying children in Paris who, with the introduction of universal primary education, would not be able to cope with regular schooling and may need specialist help. Binet took a pragmatic approach to the development of his tests which focused on what was required for school-based learning. In terms of the “engines of discovery,” he used the first four processes to construct his tests and to provide a “mental age.” His social philosophy was that intelligence was “the capacity to learn and assimilate instruction” (1909, p. 104), and the task of educators was to improve pupils’ intelligence and he himself developed “mental orthopedic” exercises to help with this.

Binet’s tests became the basis for many tests in the English speaking world, the Stanford-Binet intelligence test was widely used test throughout the twentieth century. However in the hands of Anglophone psychologists and statisticians with very different social views to Binet about the nature of intelligence it was, in Hacking’s terms, medicalized, biologized and geneticized. Statisticians such as Francis Galton, Charles Spearman, and Cyril Burt in England and Louis Terman and Edward Thorndike all had strong beliefs about the inherited and fixed nature of intelligence. Intelligence was reified (it is a physical entity somewhere in the brain) to something that could be quantified and standardized, using statistical

techniques that they developed. Their philosophical beliefs underpinned these developments – intelligence was inborn and fixed, the successful, including certain races, had more of it. The poor were as they were because of limited intelligence which they then transmitted genetically to their children. While presented as objective scientific findings, they reflected deeply held cultural beliefs evidenced by the proponents’ involvement in social programs related to them. Galton coined the term “euthanasia” and wanted the breeding of the poor restricted, as did Terman in the United States who also called for restrictive immigration laws. These claims have not gone away – they are echoed in best sellers such as Herrnstein and Murray’s *The Bell Curve: Intelligence and Class Structure in American Life* (1994).

Intelligence testing became part of the social fabric in many countries (Hacking’s “normalize” and “bureaucratize”). In the UK, it was widely used for selection to secondary school; the 11+ test used the standardized scores to select the top twenty per cent or so of students for a prestigious grammar school education. It was also widely used in job selection and for identifying pupils in need of special education.

The issue here is how a single test can shape the life chances and identities of cohorts of students. To fail the 11+ sent a signal to the student that they did not have the capacity for academic study – in Patricia Broadfoot’s words “Intelligence testing, as a mechanism of social control, was unsurpassed in teaching the doomed majority that their failure was the result of their own inbuilt inadequacy” (1979, p. 44).

While the claim that intelligence was a unitary “hard-wired” capacity (Spearman’s “g”) has dominated much Anglophone culture, there have always been those who have opposed this interpretation (“reclaim our identity”). Statisticians such as Louis Thurstone used different statistical techniques that produced seven primary abilities that were independent of each other and could not be aggregated into a single scale. Also in this tradition is Howard Gardner’s *multiple intelligences* which present eight separate intelligences, for example linguistic and bodily kinaesthetic, which cannot be simply assessed

by pencil and paper tests or put on a single scale. Daniel Goleman's influential *Emotional Intelligence* (1995) attacked the notion that intelligence test score (IQ) was the critical measure as our social intelligence was more important to success.

Other cultures do not assume that intelligence is fixed at birth and are closer to Binet's more pragmatic concept of malleable intelligence. For example, Confucian heritage societies, with their emphasis on effort and motivation to improve, see intelligence as something that can be developed

Achievement Testing and Identity

In our current education systems, there has been a reduction in the reliance on intelligence testing for selection, though it has sometimes been replaced by "ability tests" which closely resemble them and which produce a less emotive reaction. There may be many reasons for this decline, not least the move to more comprehensive secondary education systems – so there is not the same need for selection for types of school. It also represents a lessening of confidence in IQ scores as their claims and predictive accuracy have been challenged.

It has increasingly been recognized that ability scores are *indicators* of general achievement rather than the cause of it, this is why they correlate well with school achievement. Robert Sternberg, a leading intelligence researcher, concludes that "what distinguishes ability tests from other kinds of assessments is how the ability tests are used (usually predictively) rather than what they measure. There is no qualitative distinction between the various kinds of assessment. All tests measure developing expertise." (1999, p. 60)

A good example of this is the shift in claims about the SAT test in the United States. This is a test taken at the end of high school which is important in the college application process. The SAT began life as the Scholastic Aptitude Test, an ability test to predict college success. In 1990 it changed to the Scholastic Assessment Test because it was recognized that it could not be accurately described as an ability test as it also

measured achievement. By 1997, even this title was thought to be unhelpful and so the letters SAT became an empty acronym – they did not stand for anything. By then the purpose of the test was more modestly defined in terms of determining how well students analyze and solve problems – skills that are learned in school that will be needed in college.

The use of achievement tests which measure the level of understanding of the given curriculum is now widespread. These typically take the form of end of school examinations, the grades or marks from which one may determine university selection. These assessments are high-stakes because of the consequences for individuals. The French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu observed that "between the last person to pass and the first person to fail, the competitive examination creates differences of all or nothing that can last a lifetime" (1991, p. 120). In some countries, a single mark in the national examination can make the difference between a university place and a year in military service.

These are dramatic examples of how test results may affect a student's identity as a learner. However, the assessments conducted in education systems and in schools may have a pervasive impact of students' identities as learners. Assessments used to set or stream students into different ability groupings will impact on their identities as learners, especially when there is little movement between groupings. Research in mathematics groupings in England, where ability grouping has been encouraged by the government, has shown that of the children in a bottom group at 5 years old around nine out of ten will still be in the bottom group at 16 years of age and will no doubt see themselves as "no good at maths". Many high-performing countries, in which the gap between high- and low-achieving students is much smaller (for example Finland and South Korea), do not permit ability grouping in primary education.

Assessment and Identity: Some Positive Steps We Can Take

Any assessments which have high-stakes consequences will impact on an individual's identity.

How can we make this impact as positive as possible? Some of the ways we can do this are:

1. *Limit assessment ambitions by focusing on achievement.* Assessment is a social activity which informs us about what has been learned. It is not culture-free nor can it tell us about any underlying ability independent of what has been experienced and learned.
2. *Ensure the assessments are as fair as possible.* Fairness is about more than standardizing test-taking conditions. It involves reducing bias in the cultural assumptions about what is required and seeking to make sure students are clear about what will be assessed and have the resources to support this. If groups or individuals are disadvantaged in these processes, it will impact as their identity as learners in a particular culture. Where there are cultural or resource disparities, allowances can be made for this in terms of affirmative action?
3. *Interpret results more cautiously.* There has been a history, particularly in relation to intelligence testing, to infer more from assessment results than they can validly support. Using a one-off IQ score to pronounce on someone's lifelong ability to learn impacts powerfully on learner identity. Imagine never being allowed to drive because you failed your first driving test. This caution also applies to achievement tests when grades are interpreted without reference to factors affecting performance.
4. *Create sustainable assessment.* David Boud has developed the concept of the *double duty* of assessment in which "any assessment act must also contribute in some way to learning beyond the immediate task. . . assessment that meets the needs of the present and prepares students to meet their own future needs" (Boud 2002, pp. 8–9). In this way, assessment can help shape positive learner identities, equipping learners with confidence to face unknown futures.

In summary, assessment is a powerful social tool in the shaping of learner identities. The labels and judgments which assessments generate through scores and grades affect how we view

our ability, attainments, and potential. Their impact has often been negative, especially as tests can never fully capture what we know, understand, and can do. We live in testing times but we need not be at the mercy of them.

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Assessment and Parents

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Synonyms

Caregivers; Classroom assessment; Evaluation; Examination; Families; Guardians; Testing

Introduction

Parents are important educational stakeholders, and their relationship with assessment is bi-directional in that they both influence their

child's results and are also influenced by those results. The term parent is used to refer to anyone fulfilling parental or guardian roles (i.e., caring for and making educational decisions on behalf of the child). Hence, in addition to or instead of a biological parent, this person could be a grandparent, step-parent, carer, foster parent, adoptive parent, other relative, guardian, or, in some cultures, a collective group of adults.

While parents do not generally have any direct say in how their child is assessed [although parent opinion does impact on assessment policy (Buckendahl 2016)], many parents actively interpret and use assessment data, whether to better understand their own child's progress or to form opinions about the quality of local schools. However, when investigating parent interpretations of such data, it is important to realize that the great majority of parents have very limited understandings of technical aspects of educational assessment, testing, and evaluation theory and statistics and instead draw on "intuitive test theory" (Braun and Mislevy 2005). Buckendahl (2016) argues that most adults are overconfident in their knowledge of assessment. Because most parents personally experienced assessment as students, they tend to overestimate their knowledge and understanding of such processes, even if reforms or advances in assessment have been introduced since they attended school. Most parents (and potentially many teachers) do not fully understand distinctions and limitations arising due to assessments' varied purposes (e.g., diagnostic, student accountability, school accountability), modes (e.g., informal observation, written assignment, standardized test), and scoring mechanisms (e.g., norm referenced, criteria referenced) (Nichols and Berliner 2007). As Braun and Mislevy (2005) point out:

Popular conceptions of how and why familiar tests work hold the same ontological status as impetus theory—dead wrong in the main, but close enough to guide everyday work in familiar settings. (pp. 491–492)

Braun and Mislevy (2005) argue that although many assumptions that nonexperts use to guide their interpretation of test or assessment data may be wrong, in low stake situations, minimal harm arises.

Intuitive Test Theory

However, parental misinterpretations are not always benign, making it important to address such incorrect understandings. For example, Braun and Mislevy (2005) identified nine common intuitive but incorrect misconceptions that nonexperts (like most parents) hold in relation to testing, most of which also apply to other forms of assessment as well. These include that:

1. An assessment measures what it says it does (e.g., a reading test measures reading rather than the student's familiarity with the test format, language proficiency, or only a narrow aspect of the domain, etc.).
2. Assessments with similar titles will tell you similar information about student achievement within a domain.
3. Scores are objective.
4. Assessments are more or less interchangeable (i.e., you could substitute one assessment for another and get essentially the same result).
5. Assessments should be scored by adding up points for each item and generating a percentage correct.
6. Traditional percentage correct cut points are appropriate measures of proficiency (i.e., an A = 90% correct, pass = 50% correct, etc.).
7. You can tell if a test item is good just by looking at it.
8. Multiple choice tests measure recall.
9. Multiple choice tests, standardized tests, and high-stakes tests are all synonymous.

Nonexperts, including most parents, often attribute far too much weight to an individual result and seldom acknowledge the presence of any form of measurement error. These assumptions help explain why parents are often reported as supporting "objective" forms of assessment like standardized testing and appear less concerned than teachers about student test anxiety and "over testing" (Brookhart 2013; Harris 2015).

Parents as Assessment Users

Neo-liberal management approaches around assessment clearly acknowledge parents as a stakeholder group entitled to assessment information. Parents are told about their child's assessment results via a range of reporting mechanisms which may include parent-teacher conferences, report cards (including narrative comments and/or grades), student work samples, informal conversations with the teacher, and student test scores. In most international jurisdictions, at least at specific grade levels, schools are required to report information in particular ways to parents in an effort to increase transparency and accurate communication of student progress (e.g., disclose scores for specific tests, report using letter grades, tie reporting to national standards). However, while there are often mandates or guidelines about how information is to be provided to parents, seldom is there any meaningful verification that parents actually understand the messages as intended (Timperley and Robinson 2004). This is potentially concerning given the intuitive assumptions that underlie many parent interpretations. Nor is there much consultation about what parents actually want to know regarding their child's progress and how that information could be best conveyed to them (Timperley and Robinson 2004).

Parents clearly have multiple uses for assessment data. Data can help parents understand how their child is progressing academically in relation to expectations. This is a major rationale for why parents seem to value the clear and "objective" data from standardized testing (Brookhart 2013; Buckendahl 2016), despite evidence that parents seldom understand the principles of test design sufficiently to interpret such data accurately or fully understand its limitations (Nichols and Berliner 2007). While norm referenced results may not shed much light on the student's specific strengths and weaknesses, parents may find it reassuring when their child compares well against their peers. Parents' personal experiences of and therefore familiarity with assessments they themselves took as students may also help explain their general preference for more traditional forms of assessment (e.g., exams, standardized tests,

essays). This means that the introduction of new or innovative assessment practices (e.g., portfolios, performance assessments, self- or peer assessments) may face resistance until parents are convinced such procedures produce valid results. Nevertheless, studies suggest that parents generally support new assessment practices if they can be educated to see that these assessments improve their child's learning and still meet their own data needs (Harris 2015).

It is vital that parents are able to accurately understand their child's progress so that they can act appropriately in response to assessment data. For example, they can provide extra homework support, enroll their child in outside tutoring, or purchase and use targeted learning resources at home. While teacher narrative comments may be more informative for parents wanting to support their child's learning, there is evidence that teachers often do not fully disclose problems with student performance to parents, particularly when students are in primary school and/or belong to minority or low socioeconomic groups (Timperley and Robinson 2004). Additionally, parents and teachers may have different understandings of what teacher grades, comments, and test scores actually mean (Timperley and Robinson 2004). Harris (2015) found that parents appeared far less concerned about potential negative impacts from standardized testing (e.g., student test anxiety, over testing) than teachers, perhaps because they viewed that the objective and "clear" information about how students performed was sufficiently valuable to compensate for any negative experiences the student might have.

The global rise of mandatory and publicly reported standardized testing has also introduced another major use parents in many jurisdictions may have for assessment data: selecting a school for their child. Parents may use publicly available assessment data to determine if a particular school is successful and therefore the kind of school they want for their child (Nichols and Berliner 2007). Parent interpretations of these data may be heavily influenced by media coverage that often misinterprets data or exaggerates the significance of score differences between schools (Buckendahl 2016).

Using assessment data rather than school reputation to inform school choice is relatively new. It can potentially “simplify” decisions for parents in that school test scores are easily compared; it is intuitively appropriate to choose the one with the highest test results. This, of course, ignores other important characteristics or services that schools have and which may be valuable to particular children. Within a school, choice can also be seen in parental decisions to request a new class or teacher for their child based on reports or tests.

Parent Impacts on Student Assessment Attitudes, Actions, and Outcomes

While demographic factors (e.g., socioeconomic status, ethnicity, language background) are correlated with student performance on assessments, parental expectations for their child’s achievement appear to be most influential (Davis-Kean 2005; Fan and Chen 2001). Student perceptions of their parents’ expectations and support impact upon their confidence, goal-orientation, and value for and interest in assessment tasks (Bong 2008). Studies suggest that while individual parent/child interactions around assessment differ, many students may be concerned about parent displeasure over poor results or hopeful of rewards or praise upon a successful performance (Bong 2008; Hall et al. 2004; Carless and Lam 2014; Peterson and Irving 2008). Parents may pressure their child to be successful on assessment tasks because they believe academic success will lead to a desirable career or other positive consequences, and this leads some to tightly monitor their child’s progress (Carless and Lam 2014). Parents may also reward or punish their child based on assessment results, using results to make decisions which impact on other aspects of the child’s life (e.g., taking privileges away from a child because of poor report card or test scores Brown and Harris 2016). Parents can also undermine student learning by completing take-home assessments for them or “overhelping” in an effort to improve the child’s academic results.

However, parental pressure does not appear to be equivalent across groups. For example,

students from high socioeconomic status schools report considerably more parental pressure than their low socioeconomic status peers (Peterson and Irving 2008) and children from some cultural groups (e.g., Confucian heritage backgrounds, Carless and Lam 2014) also appear to be under more pressure to perform. Consequences are also unlikely to be equivalent. For lower achievers, assessment data can reinforce potentially negative views of a child’s academic potential or abilities (e.g., “my child is not good at math,” “my child is not very smart,” “my child does not test well”). When these are shared with the child, they can potentially reduce the student’s self-image and efficacy as a learner.

Hence, there are likely to be significant differences in the ways parents discuss assessment and their expectations with their children, which are influenced by factors like culture, previous academic success, and socioeconomic status. However, across countries studies clearly indicate that when parents have unrealistic or overly high expectations, students tend to develop anxiety and/or negative emotions relating to assessment (Vogl and Pekrun 2016). Student actions around assessment are also clearly related to these conceptions and emotions. For example, conflict with parents around assessment results can encourage students to cheat (in an effort to artificially raise scores) or fail to seek help (to avoid looking incompetent) (Bong 2008). Hence, student assessment results can potentially impact upon relationships within their immediate and extended families and become a source of pride or shame.

Parent Impacts on Assessment Policy and Practice

While parents may have little direct say in how their child is assessed, they still collectively influence assessment policy and practice in multiple ways. Their needs and desires (or perceptions of these) often shape or are used to justify policy and practice, with policy makers often drawing on the common assumption that parents support standardized testing because they see it as objective and approve of comparative uses of such data

(Brookhart 2013; Buckendahl 2016). For example, educational authorities have often justified the public release of school assessment data in easily comparable forms (e.g., NAPLAN test results in Australia, formal league tables around Key Stage testing results in England, etc.) as being about transparency and accountability to stakeholders such as parents. Individual schools may also standardize assessment and reporting procedures to try to create consistency in reporting to parents.

However, while parents may seldom have any actual say in assessment practices, they can and do sometimes resist assessment reforms. For example, Sadler and Good (2006) reported an instance in the United States where the peer-grading assessments was legally banned in certain States after a parent instigated court case stemming from a child's experience of being bullied by peers during peer grading. Pockets of parent resistance to standardized testing, particularly when used as a school and teacher accountability mechanism, can also be seen in the growing "opt out" movements within the United States and others adopting such neoliberal approaches to accountability, with parents refusing to let their children participate in testing (Buckendahl 2016).

Conclusions

Parents, as carers of students, clearly both influence and use assessment. They may use assessment results to determine their own child's current or future academic achievement and potential or may draw on assessment data to inform school choice decisions. Their attitudes towards assessment and interpretations of their child's results can strongly influence their child's motivation and self-efficacy as a learner. Likewise, many assessment reforms are sold as being about creating better transparency and accountability to stakeholders like parents. While parents may not be able to directly dictate how their child is going to be assessed, they can and do resist some

reforms via legally challenging them or preventing their own child from participating.

What is clear is that parents are entitled to clear and accurate information about how their child is progressing academically. While it may be tempting for teachers to hide or downplay student academic weaknesses in an effort to protect student well-being, this is unlikely to be beneficial for students in the longer term as it may prevent parents from providing or seeking the additional help the student needs. It can cause considerable tension within the family and between families and schools if poor results on high-stakes assessments (e.g., a high school graduation test) arise without adequate warning. More work is clearly needed to better understand how parent interpretations of assessment grades may differ from those intended by teachers in order to ensure alignment and partnership between parents and teachers around the educational outcomes for each child.

It is also important to continue to debunk interpretations of assessment based on the intuitive assumptions most nonexpert parents would draw on when making sense of results. While parents clearly deserve access to data about the performance of their child's school, providing test data as the main indicator of school success is likely to be problematic. There is serious risk that test data will be misinterpreted (e.g., small differences in scores would be considered evidence of superior/inferior performance rather than chance). Unfortunately, as Mansell (2013) identifies, discussions about assessment results within the media are seldom helpful in correcting such misinterpretations as they tend to report data in ways which are sensationalized and/or politically charged. Hence, if public reporting of such scores is to continue, it is important that teachers and members of the psychometric community increase their efforts in supporting parents to accurately interpret data so that valid conclusions are drawn (Buckendahl 2016). This means that teachers need to develop good ways to communicate assessment limitations in language that diverse

groups of parents can understand. Assessment experts also need to work with the media to encourage accurate and thoughtful rather than sensationalized coverage of assessment data.

Parent views on assessment clearly matter because they influence national, State, and school level policy and practice as well the attitudes and efforts of their own children. Parents' own data needs must be carefully considered by classroom teachers, educational policy makers, and test designers, particularly those with responsibilities around the design of reporting mechanisms. Those responsible for designing assessments and reporting them to parents must be sure that parents understand clearly (a) the assessment mode, (b) the assessment purpose, and (c) how results can be validly interpreted. Careful work in this area will help parental interpretations of data to be based on robust grounds rather than on simplistic intuitions about assessments.

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Associations

- Dewey and Philosophy of Disability

Audit Culture

- Digital Learning, Discourse, and Ideology

Authenticity

- ▶ Existential Individual Alone Within Freire's Sociopolitical Solidarity

Authority

- ▶ Langeveld, Martinus J. (1905–1989)

Authoritarianism

- ▶ Ethics and Education

Autonomy

- ▶ Langeveld, Martinus J. (1905–1989)

B

Bachelard and Philosophy of Education

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Gaston Bachelard was born on 27 June 1884 at Bar-sur-Aube, Champagne, where his parents owned a small paper and tobacconist shop. He received his secondary education in Bar-sur-Aube and served in the First World War (including 38 months in the trenches and the award of Le Croix de Guerre). Essentially, he was an outsider to the academy, for he had taught himself chemistry while working as a postman, before teaching in secondary colleges at Bar-sur-Aube. Studying slowly he was awarded his doctorate from the Sorbonne in 1927. It is clear that the achievements in particle physics had both excited and influenced him. He was to say: “one decade in our epoch is equal to centuries in earlier epochs” (quoted in Lecourt 1975, p. 33). Having turned to philosophy of science, he was to teach for 10 years in the Faculté des Lettres de Dijon before becoming a Professor at the Sorbonne in 1940. In May 1960 he was made an Officier de la Légion d’Honneur and, dying on 16 October 1962, he was to be interred at his Bar-sur-Aube on 19 October.

Bachelard was recognized as both a philosopher and poet, but it is only his work as a philosopher which will be considered here. He is

important not only for his work in the area of philosophy of science but also for his influence upon a number of French philosophers. Jean Cavaillès, shot as a member of the Resistance to the German occupation in WWII, was an influence upon Bachelard and upon this French stream of philosophy. Within his general philosophy, this entry will concentrate on those features which were to later influence French poststructuralism.

Bachelard’s anti-positivist philosophy of science was developed in a number of texts between 1927 and 1953, anticipating some of the conclusions of Thomas Kuhn, though he was not to exert any direct influence on Anglo-Saxon philosophy of science. For Bachelard science was an autonomous activity, dependent only upon itself for its norms and practices – in spite of the intrusions of philosophers. His work involved a constant polemic against philosophers because, according to him, philosophy wanted to cover up, hide, and occlude “the real historical conditions of the production of scientific knowledges” (Lecourt 1975, p. 27). Indeed the idea that the history of science could be a fruitful source, even a source, for logical analyses was quite alien to analytic philosophy of science (Tiles 1984, p. 3). Also he believed that physical theories were not divorced from metaphysical commitments, though they might claim to be so. Bachelard then uncovers the “unthought” of philosophical discourse about science in a “recovering,” which also opens up the notions of the “unconscious” and the “unthought” and the further possibility of the “recovery” of

these by a “psychoanalysis of reason.” (Traces of this notion of a “psychoanalysis of reason” are to be found in the early work of Michel Foucault.)

But Bachelard’s scientific reputation depends also, in part, upon his studies of poetic language, day-dreaming, and phenomenology, and their application to episodes in the history of science. Thus poetic imagination, as involving an affective engagement with “things,” was seen by him as a condition of scientific productivity. But this insight is not hived off into the deflated notion of a “logic of discovery” as in the philosophy of Sir Karl Popper, for Bachelard include it in his philosophy of science. Thus Kuhn’s important *Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (1962) may have been an “old hat” for French philosophers of science.

According to Gary Gutting (1989), the account of scientific change and, accordingly, scientific progress was the focus of Bachelard’s philosophy of science. Bachelard held that reason was best exemplified in science and this was best understood, not by studying science now, but by studying its history (in philosophy of education, on the importance of the history of science, see here the Althusserian-inspired work of Michael Matthews). Reason was best discovered in science by discovering how reason was used in practice, in addressing particular problems (cf. John Dewey [1938] *The Logic of Inquiry*), as opposed to studying abstract theories. The history of science showed, he argued, how abstract philosophical and metaphysical theories in science were gradually overturned through the practical work of scientists.

Bachelard found discontinuities in the history and development of science that were not, in principle, capable of logical reconstruction, prior to Kuhn, with whose work there are some similarities. But whereas Kuhn was concerned with theories, or paradigms, Bachelard’s concern is with concepts. The key concept here for Bachelard is that of rupture, which has four epistemological aspects or categories. These he terms breaks, obstacles, profiles, and acts (Gutting 1989).

Breaks are concerned with (i) how science breaks away from common sense in formulating its concepts (see also Stephan Körner [1966] *Experience and Theory*; an essay in the philosophy of science) and with (ii) breaks between scientific concepts. An example of (i) would be the shift from common sense notions of intelligence to IQ conceived as intelligence, whereas an example of (ii) would be the changes that have occurred historically in the scientific concepts of the atom. Breaks, in turn, are opposed by obstacles, which can be construed as residues from earlier concepts which, especially if they were important in the past, tend to block changes to new concepts. Here common sense may be a major obstacle, operating as it does as an implicit assumption of the way the world is. If they operate at an implicit level, then Bachelard was to propose a set of techniques to bring these assumptions to the “surface.”

An epistemological profile is an analysis of a given person’s understanding of a particular scientific concept. This analysis would show where an individual stood in relation to the historical development of a concept or theory and the extent to which residues were retained or breaks maximized. In recent liberal political philosophy, a profile would show whether a person was a liberal or neoliberal according to how underlying concepts such as individualism, freedom, and equality were conceived. Residues are countered by breaks but this requires on behalf of the scientist the Bachelardian notion of an act. Acts are leaps but not just a leap in any old direction at all, but one in the direction of progress.

Cavaillès and Bachelard rejected the idea that scientific progress was to be determined by collating in a jigsaw type pattern the established truths of science. For Bachelard, from his work on the imagination and reverie, epistemological acts which produced these breaks were guided not by normal science but by poetry and art. (See also the philosophical work of distinguished biochemist Sir Peter Medawar [1966], *Induction and Intuition in Scientific Thought*.) Foucault was to

declare concerning Bachelard in 1954: “no one has better understood the dynamic work of the imagination.” Indeed Foucault’s early work on Binswanger (also a Bachelardian) cites Bachelard against Sartre on the topic of the imagination. Bachelard, in turn, was very complimentary to Foucault on his *Folie et Deraison*.

For Bachelard scientific progress depends therefore upon epistemological breaks. According to him, these breaks were quite distinctive – e.g., the break from Newtonian to Einsteinian physics was seen as very distinctive. Science therefore cannot be seen as progressing linearly or necessarily rationally (cf. Kuhn). But progress is conceived and measured from the present status of science, and history of science will provide a history of rationality. But this notion of progress is questionable, because Bachelard accepts that the science of the present is not only an advance (as opposed to a mere change), but that the science of the present should be invoked to both understand and assess the achievements of past science. This modern assessment is to be based then upon how past scientific endeavors contribute to the “developed” science of the present. What is sought are the effects of the past upon the present. There are of course some questions which historians would raise about the appropriateness of such moves for doing history: for example, Philippe Ariès’ *Centuries of Childhood* (1962) was criticized for his projection of a twentieth century concept of childhood backward to medieval times.

Canguilhem is to temper Bachelard’s concept of the (distinctive) epistemological break, and the influence upon Foucault is more general than specific.

The implications for education from Bachelard’s work include at least: the account of rationality, the importance of teaching the history of science and not merely science as it is now, the implications for those research methodologies which appeal to “a” philosophy of science, the importance of the imagination (in his sense) for rational thought, and the notion of conceptual discontinuity in scientific thought.

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Beauty

► Aesthetic Education

Beauvoir and Philosophy of Education

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Simone de Beauvoir (1908–1986) had been almost totally excluded from the philosophical canon until the 1980s, when a revival and reinterpretation of her work by mainly feminist philosophers began. For example, she is not mentioned in Walter Kaufmann’s *Existentialism from Dostoevsky to Sartre* (1956) (nor is Maurice Merleau-Ponty, though Albert Camus* is

mentioned). In Paul Edwards' comprehensive philosophical encyclopedia, *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (1967), the only mention is of her *Ethics of Ambiguity* (1948), which is said to be important in its own right but in relation to Jean Paul Sartre. Yet there is no further amplification or discussion in that source of what is said to be an important work and how it was related to Sartre – a crucial issue. In general her putative philosophical works are subsumed under or said to be derivative from those of Sartre, or they are recorded as “a kind of footnote to Sartre” (Kruks 1990, p. 84). In Christina Howells' (1995) *The Cambridge Companion to Sartre*, she is mentioned once only and that for providing biographical material on Sartre's reading of Husserl. Hazel Barnes, however, is a major and early exception: “De Beauvoir is more than Sartre's interpreter” (1959, p. 4). She is also more than a novelist. For biographical details see Claude Francis and Simone Gontier (1989) and Deidre Bair (1990).

It would seem that until her death in 1986, Beauvoir aided and abetted in this general interpretation and in a number of sources. Some feminists maintain that she created a myth about her own philosophical contributions to existentialism (for papers on this see the edited collection of Simons 1995). But this received position on the interpretation of her philosophical work was not reopened until the publication posthumously, by her adopted daughter Sylvie le Bon de Beauvoir in 1990, of her *Letters to Sartre*. Possibly it needed the publication of these letters to question the received position.

The issue as to whether or not she was an original philosopher seems to hinge upon whether she had identified and articulated certain key ideas which Sartre was later to present as his, especially in the opening pages of *Being and Nothingness* (1943), or whether she merely contributed to Sartre's ideas and work. Arguably this is the case on the notion of the self. This issue can be pursued initially by a careful reading of her letters to Sartre and their war diaries during the period between October 1939 and January 1941, when she was writing *L'Invitée* (translated as *She Came to Stay*). This, her first published novel, was completed in 1941 but not published until 1943. What must also

be considered is the philosophical import of the first three chapters, especially the first eight pages of *She Came to Stay*. Her second novel *Le Sang des Autres* (*The Blood of Others*) is also important here. She should be considered in her own right, not as an appendage to Sartre. We will therefore look at some of the philosophical ideas in her early novels – particularly the notions of Self and Other and freedom – and her approach to doing philosophy.

Beauvoir did not write academic philosophy. She had passed her aggregation and commenced teaching in lycées in 1929 (Latin initially and then literature, but philosophy by 1932 (Bair 1990, p. 180)), but as early as age 18, she had begun to write fiction. Some of this early fiction was to be published later (Beauvoir 1968, 1982). Unlike Sartre, whose philosophical works (though not his philosophical novels and plays) were written abstractly and who was seeking a grand totalizing philosophical system, Beauvoir did not want to write so as to present philosophical ideas in either an abstract manner or as divorced from actual or possible human experience. For her, literature presented and provided a way of relating philosophical ideas to experience (cf. Camus), particularly as it presented a way of expressing her own experiences as part of a general philosophical framework. Her novels can be seen as metaphysical novels, as presenting a fictional narrative in which her own experience is drawn heavily upon, but through a philosophical or metaphysical grill (see further, Pilardi 1999).

There can be little doubt that she did not abandon her philosophical background and grounding, for she even extended it – for example, she notes her “discovery” and extended reading of Hegel in 1940 in her letters to Sartre (e.g., 13, 14, 16, 19, 24, 29 July; 29 October) to whom she would explain Hegel in return for him reminding her of Husserl (13 July). The frontispiece of *She Came to Stay* features a quotation from Hegel (“Each consciousness pursues the death of the other.”), and she uses some of his ideas in *The Second Sex*, first published in 1949 (e.g., part I). However she expresses early doubts on Hegel, for by 8 January 1941, he “no longer consoles me,” though she begins to teach his ideas (23 January). But without

Sartre to talk to on such issues as Hegel, she says (ibid): “If I were condemned for long never to talk, I’d end up writing philosophy, from the need to express myself.” So doing philosophy was still important at a time when *She Came to Stay* was completed; philosophy in an oral dialogue was acceptable but writing it – as academic philosophy – was for her a last resort. Writing it in some other form, however, was far from being a last resort. For Beauvoir this meant insight into her own life. As Hazel Barnes says of *She Came to Stay* (1959, p. 122):

...the analysis of human relationships and personalities is more philosophical than psychological. Perhaps de Beauvoir and her fictional counterpart [Françoise] are accustomed to think in this way about themselves and their reactions, but most people are not as metaphysically acute.

Beauvoir believed then that human experience and problems of personal life should be presented to exemplify, or to show, philosophical ideas. Although she features or appears at points in her own novels, as do her close friends, confidants and lovers, her narrative is not presented from one personal viewpoint. The experiences and personal views of the major characters are seen also from each of their viewpoints. In *She Came to Stay* while her personal experiences form part of the viewpoint of Françoise (Beauvoir), she is not necessarily writing the novel from one personal viewpoint, for the viewpoint of each of the main characters is presented in the first person. In *The Blood of Others*, however, while all of the viewpoints of the main characters are presented, only the viewpoint of the main character, Jean Blomart, is presented in the first person, and this was probably for stylistic reasons. Nevertheless in both novels the viewpoints of the Others are necessary for each character to be a self or subject. The philosophical point is that the Other is necessary for the constitution of the self or subject.

Beauvoir is to reject the notion of a solipsistic isolated self. Writing just prior to the outbreak of WWII, she says:

Little by little I had abandoned the quasi-solipsism and illusionary autonomy I cherished as a girl of twenty; though I had come to recognise the fact of other people’s existence, it was still my individual

relationships with separate people that mattered most to me, and I still yearned fiercely for freedom. Then suddenly, History burst over me, and I dissolved into fragments. I woke to find myself scattered over the four corners of the globe, linked by every nerve in me to each and every other individual. (Beauvoir 1965, p. 369)

In *She Came to Stay*, the body is not a mere object or thing but always experienced reality – “my heart is beating; I am here.” Elsewhere and some years later, she is to say explicitly: “It is not the body-object described by biologists that actually exists but the body as lived in by the subject” (Beauvoir 1989, p. 38). So a human being exists not merely in a body as an object but as a body subject to human institutions and constraints so that the subject is both conscious of itself as a subject and obtains fulfillment. For her one can never be a mere biological body as there is always a dimension of meaning. Thus:

...we must view the facts of biology in the light of an ontological, economic, social and psychological context...there is no true living reality except as manifested by the conscious individual through activities and in the bosom of society. (Beauvoir 1989, p. 36 f.)

In a nightclub scene in *She Came to Stay*, she explores various possibilities for “experiencing” the body. First we can identify the notion of consciousness of the body as lived in by the subject when Xaviere does things to her arm and, while touching her eyelashes, talks to herself. Then there is the body of a young woman in feathers as perceived by her male companion who has pounced on her hand, i.e., the body as an object for the other subject. Her body is perceived by the other, the man, but she rejects this “objectification” of her body as being part of her experience of her body because it becomes a thing. And a young woman talking about flirting is perceiving the body of the man – she is staring at him – but at the same time rejecting the notion of her body as potential object for the other subjectivity. This is again the body as object for a subject. Now the reality of the subject’s lived experience must include both the experience of the lived body as part of one’s own subjectivity and the experience of the lived body as object of another subjectivity.

To dissociate or to deny this dual aspect of experience was to be in bad faith for Beauvoir. (Sartre is later to use the girl in the feather example as an illustration of bad faith, unacknowledged, in *Being and Nothingness*.)

The ideal coordination for the exemplification of good faith would take place when there was an identity between the two subjectivities – the body as lived in and as part of one's own subjectivity and the body as an object belonging to another subjectivity. The young woman in feathers presents an example of a severe disjunction between the two subjectivities. For Beauvoir the self is a fusion of mind and body and consciousness is prereflective and intentional, directed to objects in the external world, including her body. But this consciousness does not require talk between subjects. The subject is aware of the other body as object and is aware from the look of the other that her or his body is an object of the other subject. The social Other sees both subjectivity and objectivity in the other as a reciprocal relationship. This is not the Other as alienated from the self as in the early Sartre.

In *The Blood of Others*, Beauvoir develops similar themes on the self, but the situation of this novel is heightened because of the involvement of the main characters in the resistance. Beauvoir was disappointed that this, her second published novel, was to be interpreted as a resistance novel. In other words, from my reading, the philosophical content on the self and the other was not seen as important. This is a metaphysical novel but one which progresses from her first novel because the notion of identity must now include some political commitment which is not merely intellectual and inert, for there must be some active participation in accordance with that intellectual commitment.

At the end of the novel, Hélène, the lover of Jean Blomart, is dying from wounds suffered in a resistance attack upon the German forces occupying Paris. As Jean sits with her in almost total silence as she is dying, he not only recognizes his love for her but also recognizes from her, and in her silence, that in order to establish his own identity, he must commit himself to the next planned resistance operation, that is, that he must

abandon forever his own intellectual but non-participatory stance toward political matters, held because of a fatal accident caused to a friend in an earlier demonstration. In realizing that her approbation of him is so important for his own identity and for her identity too, as he recognizes both his love for her and what he has to become, Jean defines himself as both politically committed and actively involved in the resistance, even though the activities of the resistance will lead to pointless reprisals upon innocent French people. To a certain extent this represents existentialist angst, and to that extent the novel can be seen as both existentialist and philosophical. But any such restricted reading ignores the metaphysical aspects in this novel which impinge upon the definition of the self and the other.

Was it Beauvoir then who had laid out some of the crucial philosophical concepts of "Sartrean" existentialism by at least 1940, for it is in the first opening pages of her first novel that her own philosophical ideas are to be found and outlined? And these ideas are repeated and further developed in her second novel, *The Blood of Others*, and they continue into *The Mandarins* and *All Men are Mortal*. No doubt it can be countered that it was Sartre's ideas that were developed, for they had collaborated for several years by then, and Sartre had read and commented upon the drafts of her manuscript. And they were discussing Sartre's philosophical ideas (e.g., *The Prime of Life*; Beauvoir 1965, p. 434). In any case it might be argued that what Beauvoir was later to develop in *The Second Sex* was a notion of the gendered self.

This issue needs further and fuller elaboration (but see, Fullbrook and Fullbrook 1993; Simons 1995).

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Bildung: Potential and Promise in Early Childhood Education

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Synonyms

Becoming; Education; Formation

Introduction

Today increasingly pluralistic and heterogenous societies, as well as a growing awareness of children as inheritors of the earth, challenge the understanding of which pedagogical and curricular frameworks in early childhood education best meet children's interests. Experiences in the 'here-and-now' and those that are anticipated for future generations stimulate the need for new (and perhaps a return to 'old') negotiations about the content and purpose of education. As our title suggests, the German concept of *bildung* holds

great potential for early childhood education today when contemplated as a serious part of these negotiations. Indeed, *bildung* (and its various associated contemporary cultural meanings across Nordic and Australasian ECE communities) promises to resurrect attention towards the ‘good life’ for young learners in curriculum.

This entry will first summon notions of *bildung* from its Greek and German origins before contemplating its related conceptualization across other world zones. The broad concept of *bildung* orients towards a broad consideration of education. Rather than viewing learning as a means of enculturation, assimilation or, worse, indoctrination, learning connected to *bildung* is seen in terms of its potential to enhance human experience. *Bildung* outlines a history of negotiating pedagogical ideals including the humanizing nature of education, character building for responsible living and democratic participation. *Bildung* involves cultural practices, views on children’s position and their relations to families, to societies and nature and is saturated with meanings that have developed over decades and continents. In this conceptualisation views, ideology, ideas and ideals are shared at the negotiating table and may cause confusion, contradiction and dispute rather than synthesis. Here primacy is given to multi-voiced events which orient the emergence of a dialogic framework in early years’ curriculum. The article concludes by outlining the contemporary case for the centrality of dialogues as curriculum when *bildung* returns to the fore.

The Origins of *Bildung* in Education

As a concept, *bildung* is deeply rooted in European pedagogical thinking from Greek Antiquity, but over the last three hundred centuries has emerged as a key element in the broader development of Western culture and democratic societies. This renewed interest has led to a reorientation toward education as a social and cultural process through which understanding may emerge. Much of *bildung*’s recent application draws its source from German philosophy in particular. The concept historian Reinhart Koselleck (2007, p. 17)

divides this history in three ages: one theological, one pedagogical enlightened, and one modern age that is mainly self-reflexive; the latter will later be elaborated.

Bildung has no obvious English corresponding translation, although the concept of *edification* and *shaping* or *formation* have been proposed. While *edification* is associated with spiritual *bildung*, the latter are used as translations connected to a detachment from the theological understanding. Shaping or formation opens for a more reflexive understanding of what *bildung* should be directed to. The word itself derives from Latin word *formatio*, which means *shaping* or *formation* or in German *bildung*. *Bildung* contains “*bild*” that means *image*. In early historical traces, the concept signifies a process of rebuilding the image of God in humankind.

In the age of enlightenment, the relation to religion changed, and God was seen merely as the creator of nature; humans were left to realize human potentials. *Bildung* was now understood as development of man’s natural abilities, as an education of the inner states. The idea that *bildung* existed in as the split between the individual and humanity at large can be traced to von Humboldt’s scholarship (Løvlie 2003, p. 152). Influenced by Hegel, Von Humboldt’s *bildung* heralded a movement toward higher levels of thought as a dialectic between self and culture. As Brandist (2016) explains, this view led to an educational-institutional interpretation of *bildung* as transcendence into deeper inquiry and understanding.

The German *bildung* tradition(s) can also be traced as an emphasis on relational and generational aspects opposing enculturation and upbringing in the sense of conforming or obeying the older generation. Attitudes were here seen as being shaped through children’s own activities based on the view that the older generation cannot produce or secure good attitudes or habits and may even violate children’s freedom through such intervention. The formation of attitudes in children was seen as possible by processes of awakening and care. Ideas from Friedrich Fröbel, for instance, can be identified along with this view. *Bildung* is here connected to the individual child belonging to an affirmative relationship with

generations and communities. Fröbel's ideas built on the philosophies of both Comenius and Pestalozzi who introduced child-oriented learning to the educational process.

In Germany today, *bildung* is commonly used in two central ways. While the concept is often summoned to talk about education as the acquisition of certain skills and competences, it is also viewed as a means of fostering democratic citizens, or "allgemeine *bildung*." A historical perspective illuminates this distinction – for while the older generation could teach children by transmitting certain educational methods and techniques, the skills needed to live a "good life" in a community, attitudes, and beliefs could not be so easily taught. In this conceptualization, education was directed toward specific tasks and abilities to master, while *bildung* was seen as engagements that were connected to the inner drive and attitudes, in other words, who the person *is* as a subjective participant in a social community. Education to a certain occupation and profession was seen as secondary to education for humanity, or what we now might call *bildung*.

The concept of *bildung* can therefore be broadly described as both the *process* (*bildung* as a verb) as well as the *result* of learning (*bildung* as gained by education). To gain *bildung* as a result of formal (school and universities) or informal education (movements and nongovernmental organizations) raises important questions concerning what was worth learning and for whom.

Contemporary Notions of *Bildung* in Education

Learning is considered the base of education and as a human condition. Every child is a learner by nature. Exactly what a child will learn through education is however difficult to control and therefore uncertain, because it is conditioned by a wide range of social, structural, and individual dynamics. Institutionalized goals of learning will contain formulated outcomes for the individual or goals for groups to strive for. Whether learning is seen as an individual or social process, learning still implies a process where what is learnt belongs

to a futures' state. The teacher as a representative for an older generation is responsible toward the child as representative for the younger generation. Children are today worldwide by laws and regulations considered to be a person of their own rights. Contemporary education is therefore faced with a Kantian paradox – how to use a legitimate power to regulate, organize, and teach a content where freedom and responsibility (democratic citizen as participant and contributor) are large goals for education, in other words, *how to cultivate freedom by force*.

This question was taken up by John Dewey (1916) who summoned *bildung* to argue that learning and experience are two sides to the coin. In making this claim, he started an important discussion that brought the learner and the subject into dialogue with one another. Dewey's pragmatic and democratic approach to education emphasized learning on the basis of needs and interests of the child (exploring, experimentation, and "trying on") as opposed to an exclusive focus on the state. Learning was not seen as the work of something ready-made called to mind, rather than the mind itself is an organization of original capacities (Dewey 1916, p. 315). Dewey's attention to *bildung* is evident here – as an individual passes from one situation to another, the world and environment expand or contract. This is a lifelong and transformative process.

Educational institutions are implicated in this revised view of *bildung*. Not only are they nationally and transnationally regulated with curricula that are negotiated in many levels, but they are also locally oriented. Education is thus always situated within the certain individuals present: local authorities, teachers, children, and families. While the curriculum will be of a general character and expectations will be that every child is entitled to knowledge, skills, and processes of *bildung* stated in the curriculum, there is however a problem connected to given guarantees about that every child will learn what is expected. Many efforts to control what goes on in schools and early-years institutions have been made: disciplining, rules of order and behavior, segregating children with learning impairment, and individualized education and testing, to name some. The further

paradox arising here is the risk of producing children that fail according to certain criteria, completely in contradiction to the intentions of education. *Bildung* as an aspect of education and also opposed to the belief of education as controlling to enhance learning will emphasize learning for life as important as learning for occupation.

Central to this institutionally oriented interpretation of *bildung* is the role of “language as world-view” (Brandist 2016). Here, education is seen as a key engagement with multiple meanings through which the individual can become more aware of their own and other subjectivities. Neo-Kantian Paul Natorp (1920, cited in Brandist 2016) advanced this agenda in his notion of social pedagogy which set out to interpret education as a social condition that could be studied through the limits of reason. An associated phenomenological engagement is taken up by Russian philosopher Mikhail Bakhtin in his notion of heteroglossia (*raznorechie*) as a series of languages that orient the world but, in this case, turn toward the process of meaning-making rather than outcome or “truth.” Bakhtin’s 1930s essay *Bildungsroman* further explicates his ideas on *bildung* by drawing on Goethe’s famous novel – Wilhelm Meister – which mapped out an agenda for contemplating the transcendent individual within narrative. By positioning the “hero” as a character embroiled in a lifelong process of “becoming,” Goethe set in place dimensions of time in space, past, present, and future as central considerations of the human experience. Now, engagement was not considered merely as a multiplicitous language event but also an event that is located within a certain chronotopic space, with associated axiologic undercurrents and implications (White 2013).

Despite the emergence of Goethe’s *Bildungsroman* novel in the 1930s and Dewey’s parallel considerations for education, the influence of *bildung* was not fully felt in European educational discourse until the 1960s. As more dominant psychological and sociological notions like qualification, socialization, and learning took precedence, critical thinkers such as the ones belonging to the

Frankfurter school (e.g., Adorno, Benjamin, and later Wolfgang Klafki) turned to *bildung* because they saw the liberal and emancipatory potential for this concept to generate a critical potential and resistance of standards. In other parts of the world, *bildung*-related notions of emergence (e.g., *obrazovanie*, *danning*) resided within ideologies that were not (and arguably are still not) widely known to the West.

According to Biesta, a renewed interest in *bildung* did not fully emerge in school discourse in the 1980s as a result of globalization of economy and the increase of migration and mobility. Plurality was, to a large extent, seen as a problem, and in this climate, there was a tendency to look for uniting forces, as general education. The idea was to overcome differences through “universal” or “general” education, what some might call colonization. In many countries, you could see detailed national school curricula, which, according to Biesta, often revealed a narrow-minded instrumental and centralist conception of education (Biesta 2003, p. 63). *Bildung* was here signifying curricula with canons and detailed lists of what every citizen needed to know in order to be considered educated. Ideas coming from critical sociology of knowledge revisited Herbert Spencers’ question, *whose knowledge is of most worth?* Critical pedagogy took up the concept and idea of *bildung* for a redefinition where *bildung* is not merely an introduction into the existing culture, but includes the force and ability to disclose the conditions for power and for knowledge. School knowledge was in this discourse not necessarily the true knowledge, rather a certain perspective as the knowledge of value for the able, for the male gender, for the person born white, or for the upper classes.

When knowledge was made a social construction, a space was left even more open for the individual for taking agency in the formation of the self. Corresponding to the change of the view of the child, seen in many Western countries after the Second World War, was the change from a view of the child as belonging to a family who defined what was of the child’s best interest,

toward a view of the child where the child was seen also as a subject with its own rights, opinions, and as a future resource for societies. Furthermore, when the world was seen as a plurality of local practices that became interconnected, by roads, railway media, and ICT, we see that some practices were transforming by taking in elements from the world outside and blending them with existing practices. What then is considered general or universal is nothing more than an extension of historically local practices. *Bildung* is now not only a rational ability to form oneself as an individual; however, *bildung* must be considered a process where the subject operates in a field of knowledge and power constellations. To put it in Foucault's term, the subject cannot combat power by knowledge, but only uses the knowledge to take on another perspective. *Bildung* is now seen as the conditions for the individual to act, be, do, and think; *bildung* is the self-formation processes that go on within certain conditions and mechanisms.

Despite its promise, *bildung* is seldom summoned to contemporary educational discourse in general – even today. This may be partly attributed to the naivety of its neo-Kantian proponents who, as Brandist (2016) points out, failed to appreciate the relationship between “academic life and the production of scientific knowledge” (p. 10) and, in doing so, underestimated the importance of power and propaganda. To entertain the thought that a person is free to “become” (in the spirit of *bildung*), according to this view, fails to appreciate external influences that far exceed the individual learner. For this reason, *bildung* may be unsatisfying for educational academics who seek greater complexity in a world characterized by power and control. Yet, despite this naive optimism, *bildung* signals a profoundly hopeful agenda for learners. It offers a different kind of promise to the educational field, one that entails classical problems in the education of (wo)man and critical understandings for a specific time in history. Moreover, *bildung* offers scope for contemplating learning far beyond the dominant “educative” domain of contemporary schoolification because

its orientation lies in human agency. Perhaps, for this reason alone, *bildung* has taken root in early years' curriculum over recent years, where emphasis is placed on the potential of learners as they engage with and within the world. This phenomenon will now be briefly addressed as contemporary treatment of *bildung*-related concepts in Norwegian and Australasian early childhood education (ECE) curriculum contexts.

***Bildung* in the Norwegian ECE Context**

“Danning” is the Norwegian concept of *bildung*. The concept of “danning” is first seen in the Norwegian Kindergarten Framework from 2006, where it was given a dominant place in the first paragraph of the Kindergarten Act. In the revised Framework from 2011, the concept was developed. It is worth noticing that the official translation of “danning” is not *bildung*, rather *formation* as seen in the following quote from the English version (Ministry of Education and Research 2011[2012]): *The Kindergarten shall, in collaboration and close understanding with the home, safeguard the children's need for care and play, and promote learning and formation as a basis for an all-round development.*

There were two main reasons for including the concept “danning” in the national kindergarten framework. First, “danning” was considered broader than the present omitted key concept “upbringing.” Second, “danning” as a verb was considered more attuned to the child. This was aligned to the understanding of “danning” as “selvdanning” (self-*bildung*), and therefore, “danning” was seen as promising for the future of educating the child in a kindergarten context.

In the Norwegian discourse, there is a distinction between “danning” as a verb signifying a continuous process and “dannelse” signifying the result, often associated with classical intellectual or artistic exclusive knowledge, skills, and behavior and by some associated to classical *bildung*. “Danning” opposes the structure of

power lying explicitly in the teachers' domain as in the concept of "upbringing," to lift/raise a child into the standards of what is considered well-behaved, accepted, and defined by the majority or by educated groups. The Sami people, specifically, embraced the concept of "danning" for these reasons. "Danning" in the verbal form signifies both an individual and social formative process and how human subjectivity is dialogically shaped in a web of relational, cultural, and structural conditions.

Concepts of Belonging and Becoming in Australasian Discourse

In both New Zealand (Ministry of Education 1996) and Australia (Australian Government Department of Education, Employment & Workplace 2009) curricula, *bildung* is not explicitly mentioned either. However, it is hinted at strongly in the positioning of concepts such as "Belonging" and "Becoming" which describe learning as a means of "shaping who children are and who they will become" and "learning to participate fully and actively in society" (ibid, p. 7). The NZ ECE curriculum is less explicit about these concepts, describing belonging as one of five curriculum strands as a means to "build opportunities for social interaction with adults and other children. . ." (Ministry of Education 1996, p. 54), but attempts to integrate these principles within the holistic framework that is promoted. Brostrom (2013), summoning Klafki's "category *Bildung*" (p. 253), suggests that integrating personal experience with objective reality provides a better means of expanding curriculum beyond the *form* of learning (i.e., the activity which is granted prominence) toward its *substance* (i.e., its significance and utility to the learner). Taking this more interdisciplinary approach is well evidenced in the Australian curriculum where "Being, belonging and becoming" are broadly construed as ways of being that are oriented toward "the building of more socially just society" rather than discrete outcomes or goals (Sumsion and Wong 2011, p. 39). Yet it is clear that the central emphasis of

Te Whāriki also strives toward such holistic principles – often in the wake of neoliberal pressures to do otherwise. Attention toward such qualities and characteristics are best evidenced in indigenous Maori depictions of a holistic program which caters for "the mind, spirit and soul of the child. . . motivate[ing] a yearning and passion to learn" (Walker 2008).

Bildung in the Early Years

Notwithstanding the considerable challenges for curriculum construction in foregrounding *bildung*-related notions of learning within contemporary education, the concepts of both "danning" and "belonging" (as expressed in contemporary Norwegian and Australasian ECE curriculum frameworks) share many of the same educational values for learning. In common, they signify how children and teachers are closely interrelated as human beings in natural, urban, and rural landscapes and cultures, as well as with material, cognitive, and ideological artifacts and that this interrelatedness operates in a flux. While *bildung* could be understood as series of subjective processes that sophisticate the individual as a participant in society, one could also frame "danning" and "belonging" as a process where subjects are simultaneously shaped by a web of cultural and structural conditions and in turn shape the world by agency.

These depictions of curriculum strongly align with Brandist's (2016) explanation of the relationship between *bildung* and belonging by summoning Bakhtin's (2012) (re)interpretation of discourse in the novel. Here, Bakhtin suggests that engagement with other subjectivities (in his conception with other "classes" p. 70) is important to an individual or group in understanding their own becoming. By this he meant that interactions with other ways of speaking (and thus thinking) about the world have the potential to open up greater possibilities for awareness in a broader sense that might otherwise be attainable. Such a view is wholeheartedly consistent with notions of *bildung* yet poses challenges for the appropriate

realization of these related concepts when posed as a desirable curriculum goal or outcome. Since *bildung* is fundamentally concerned with formation, emphasizing the endpoint is less desirable than lingering in the educational experience – a challenge for teachers and policymakers alike. It is evident that this challenge has been wholeheartedly embraced by both Norwegian and Australasian ECE communities.

This view implies that every pedagogical event will be conditioned by a range of more or fewer dynamic aspects which shape the lifelong learner. This conception implicates both children and teachers who are simultaneously situated in time (duration and point of time) and space (place, distance, range, and landscape). Education is thus imbued with value, even though the way education is experienced will differ depending on the range of local aspects. One aspect of living as a human being is related to the issue of time, in terms of generational age in infancy, toddlerhood, early youth or school years; or the teenage years; or as a young, middle-aged, or elderly adult; or in the final stages of life. Other influential aspects are gender, ethnicity/race, ableness, social status, or country of birth. Classical problems of the individual child's relation to, belonging to, and participation with pluralistic and heterogeneous local and global contexts occur and reoccur within this landscape across both Nordic and Australasian curriculum sites. The problem of how to maneuver the eternal question of "what constitutes the best interest of the child" in diverse local settings is not an easy one. Indeed, the project of *bildung* is even more relevant under such postmodern conditions. As Lyotard points out: "The old principle that the acquisition of knowledge is dissociable from the training (Bildung) of minds, or even of individuals, is becoming obsolete. . ." (Lyotard 1984, p. 5).

However, to fulfill the promise and potential of *bildung*, pedagogical practices in our time must go beyond the dichotomy of child-centered versus teacher-centered pedagogies to embrace notions of liberation and equity – we would argue that *bildung* and its ongoing conceptualization have much to offer in this regard.

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Biliteracy

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Synonyms

First and second language literacy; Literacies

Introduction

Biliteracy has undergone definitional changes over the last two decades. Many changes in the field of biliteracy are related to theoretical shifts in how researchers view bilingualism and bilinguals. In this article, the authors define biliteracy and trace various perspectives on the literacy development of bilinguals. In particular, they present early definitions of biliteracy, examine the impact of sociocultural shift on the definition, explore the redefinition of bilingualism and biliteracy, highlight how research in psychology and neuroscience is aligned with educational discussions on biliteracy, look at research in the classroom, and call for continued expansion of research on biliteracy.

What Is Biliteracy?

The term biliteracy represents a fundamental shift from thinking about literacy as an activity that takes place strictly within a given language. Biliteracy, in the way it is being used here, represents what students are able to do with print across their languages, while recognizing that both of the students' languages are always present even when reading in one of their linguistic codes. Recent studies conducted by scholars in language education fields challenge the separation of languages during literacy instruction and support the benefits of translanguaging (i.e., bilingual education, see Baker 2011; multicultural education, see

Blackledge and Creese 2010; ESOL education, see Lindholm-Leary and Howard 2008; and foreign language education, see Fortune et al. 2008). Moreover, these studies reveal that following only monolingual instructional strategies is not always appropriate.

In the last three decades, researchers have documented students using their languages in ways that suggest an integrated language system. Students across these studies exhibited specific strategies linked to their bilingual ability, such as back translation (translating words from one language to the other), rehearse (testing out all the words they know), and postponing (using words in one language as a placeholder and returning to it at the end) (Wolfersberger 2003). Collectively, a view of students emerged as active learners who draw on linguistic features from both of their languages. Teachers who recognize and affirm students' metalinguistic knowledge consider these skills as resources to enrich students' bilingualism and biliteracy.

With regard to biliteracy specifically, the extent to which students displayed these skills depended upon their self-perceptions and confidence as readers. That is to say, students who viewed themselves as good readers used their metalinguistic skills and their understanding of cognates to navigate reading. Students who viewed themselves as less capable in reading did not see their bilingual ability as a skill set from which to draw on (Jiménez et al. 1996). Thus, bilingual programs with the most promise both affirm students' individual linguistic skills and create spaces for students to purposefully engage with each other across languages to scaffold each other's biliteracy development.

Early Definitions of Biliteracy

Bilingualism has often been described as linguistic proficiency in two separate languages. Traditional bilingualism espoused two separate linguistic systems (an L1 and an L2) with different linguistic features. This view of language development among bilinguals extended to their literacy development across the languages as well.

From this perspective, literacy development in one language mirrored literacy development in a second language thereby establishing the view of two parallel monolinguals (Grosjean 1989). Inherent in this view were a few assumptions. First, if biliteracy depended on bilingual learners' proficiency in each of their respective languages, then it was possible to compare their performance in both languages to monolingual speakers of those languages. Second, performance variations from the monolingual norm by bilinguals in either of their languages were regarded as "linguistic interference" in bilinguals' speech (Weinreich 1953). Missing from this parallel monolingual perspective is the notion that the addition of any language invariably augments students' linguistic repertoire. Moreover, academic contexts such as English-only classrooms, transitional bilingual education, or dual language classrooms impact differently how literacy is approached and subsequently developed.

Much of what is known about the literacy development of bilinguals is based on how emerging bilinguals in the USA come to read in English; thus, it is not surprising that transitional bilingual education is the most prevalent classroom structure for teaching students who are in the process of learning English. Within this framework, the learning of English is privileged over the maintenance of the home language. Although students start learning in their home language, by the second grade, they have transitioned to learning in English. This transition from home language to English often results in students viewing their first language as inferior. According to Wong-Fillmore (2000), these deficit perspectives of one's language lead to family members' inability to communicate with each other due to students' diminished home language skills. Students over time begin to marginalize their own culture because they see it through a deficit lens.

As a result, research conducted in transitional bilingual education programs provides only a limited understanding of biliteracy development. Moreover, transitional bilingual programs reify traditional beliefs that language separation is crucial for students to function similarly to monolingual speakers in two distinct languages. Such

programs implement curricula, pedagogical practices, and assessments, which focus on the school's privileged language. A monolingual approach toward bilinguals' literacy invariably limits the field's overall understanding of these students. The expectation that bilinguals transition from L1 monolingual to L2 monolingual hinders their ability to develop ethnolinguistic skills that extend beyond language acquisition and maintenance. Ethnolinguistics is a field that examines the relationship between language and culture and how different ethnic groups view themselves in relation to the world. Within this construct, biliteracy is not simply the ability to encode and decode written text; instead, it includes the ability to negotiate multiple ideologies. The flexibility inherent in translanguaging, then, is essential to bilinguals' self-expression as well as identity formation, both of which are deeply grounded in their biliteracy development.

The Impact of Sociocultural Shift

An important theoretical shift that influenced the view of bilingualism and biliteracy emerged from the work of Vygotsky (1978). Vygotsky's sociocultural theory asserts that the mind is socially constituted. Learners construct their understanding of various concepts through interactions with more knowledgeable others. Through these interactions, students are scaffolded to perform at a higher level than is possible when they work independently. Vygotsky reasoned that language and literacy represented cultural development. That is to say, the languages and literacies that students develop are a reflection of the cultural context that gave rise to them. In the case of children, more knowledgeable individuals in their lives pass on these cultural behaviors through scaffolding. Vygotsky's perspective toward development has had a strong influence on the way language and literacy is perceived in schools.

Regarding bilingualism, sociocultural theories have moved the dialogue from a strictly cognitive activity to something that is inherently social. Language is the vehicle used to navigate the social

world and therefore cannot be removed from the equation. Of equal importance, literacy itself is viewed as a social phenomenon. One comes to know and take part in literacy through social interactions. This shift in thought led some researchers to focus on the role of teacher practice, teacher ideology, and student peer interactions on literacy development. Although this theory allowed for social interactions to be considered in the development of literacy, it did not necessarily change the monolingual approach toward understanding students' languages.

Redefining Bilingualism and Biliteracy

Cummins (1979) questioned whether bilinguals' two languages were separate systems. He proposed a common underlying proficiency to explain how a cognitive interdependence allowed for transfer of linguistic practices even though the structural elements of the two languages might look differently. He argued bilinguals' understandings of literacy were not language bound and their linguistic abilities had to be understood beyond the surface. Cummins's theories of linguistic interdependence shifted the field of bilingual education and underscored the dynamic interrelationships that exist in the *linguaging* of bilinguals, that is to say, their language actions and practices in particular contexts.

Working toward a dynamic approach of bilingualism, Cen Williams, a Welsh educator, coined the term "translanguaging" for the planned and systematic use of two languages for teaching and learning during a lesson (Williams 1996). According to Williams (1996), translanguaging meant information was received through the medium of one language and used through the medium of the other language. Building upon Williams's notion of translanguaging, García (2009) proposed applying translanguaging to educate emergent bilinguals. García (2009) couched translanguaging within the frame of *dynamic bilingualism*, a form of languaging in which bilinguals draw from a *single linguistic system* with an innumerable amount of linguistic features. She argued that, unlike the view of two separate

systems that are added (or even interdependent), a dynamic conceptualization of bilingualism goes beyond the notion of two autonomous languages an L1 and an L2. Even in cases where curricular arrangements separate languages, students' translanguaging remains the most prevalent practice in bilingual education classrooms (García 2009). Students flexibly draw from their rich linguistic repertoire despite teachers' directives on when and how languages are to be used.

Researchers who use a sociolinguistics framework to support their work in translanguaging define biliteracy in ways that reveal an appreciation for the wide range of social contexts and languages with which students come into contact (e.g., school, home, community, etc.). Hopewell and Escamilla (2014) speak of global dexterity, which they define as the "ability to communicate both across and within multiple languages and cultures in a variety of ever-changing and nuanced contexts." Biliteracy is therefore, viewed as more complex than monoliteracy because students' literacy abilities have to be shown across a range of contexts and domains on a continua (Hornberger 1989; Hornberger 2004). This framing of biliteracy moves the field away from traditional dichotomous frameworks of literacy (i.e., monolingual vs. bilingual, social vs. academic language) to an understanding of the process of becoming biliterate across a variety of different settings and languages. In doing so, there is a call to better define what biliteracy means by looking more closely at the multiple contexts that give rise to biliterate students.

Psychology, Neuroscience, and Biliteracy

Research from the fields of psychology and neuroscience aligns with current notions of biliteracy and acknowledges that languages are interdependent and shape each other throughout development. In the last decade, there has been an upsurge of research on the consequences of executive function on bilingualism for language learning, language use, cognitive function, and brain development (e.g., Kroll and Bialystok 2013). These studies

have implications for literacy. It is important to note that studies using a range of methods with adults (young and old) and with children have shown that experience in using two or more languages increases the ability to be open to new learning and to adjust decision-making in light of conflicting alternatives. This presentation of the active language user is consistent with work in literacy that maintains the proposition that reading is a psychological guessing game informed by all the skills and knowledge that students bring to the task of reading. By defining reading this way, the reader is always negotiating as they read. Bilinguals, then, negotiate what they know about print-based reading across both of their languages. The effects of bilingualism are not restricted to language skills but apply more broadly to other domains of learning. The constant activity of bilinguals' negotiation between languages produces competition that requires resolution and that bilinguals effectively become expert in learning to negotiate the presence of two alternative language systems and that expertise confers a set of benefits to them across their life span.

Recent neuroscience research also shows that bilingual brains reflect the consequences of dual language experience, with increased functional efficiency in the neural networks that support cognitive control (e.g., Abutalebi et al. 2012). Even more provocative, a study by Carlson and Meltzoff (2008) reported benefits of bilingualism that can offset the impact of poverty on some cognitive tasks. They argued that low SES bilinguals were doing more with less (i.e., resources), but the benefits were evident only if students were in a dual language program for more than 6 months. The true impact of these findings still needs to be understood. The neuroscience field needs to further explore how SES and bilingualism impact cognitive functions developmentally and how the consequences of bilingualism can be used to better inform instruction for language and literacy development. The time has come to bridge psychology and neuroscience research with literacy education research (especially those focused on translanguaging). The classroom is precisely the context in which the first steps toward cross-discipline bridging might take place.

Biliteracy in the Classroom

Translanguaging allows us to understand the fluidity inherent in biliteracy. This flexible framework provides a lens and pedagogical approach through which to conceptualize biliteracy. This broader set of translingual practices, which are part of translanguaging, include language brokering (use of knowledge of more than one language to do things for others), code-switching (the practice of alternating between two or more languages or varieties of language in conversation), and metalinguistic awareness (ability to objectify language as a process as well as an artifact). By recognizing the nuances of these terms, teachers can better support students' biliteracy in their classroom.

Guided by a sociocultural framework, translanguaging allows us to view biliteracy as a set of skills that develop, in part, outside the classroom, which emergent bilinguals bring with them when they enter the school. In bilingual classrooms where students are encouraged to learn each other's languages through partnership, students shape each other's learning in ways that extend beyond the conventional Vygotskian view of a knowledgeable other scaffolding another person. In contexts where translanguaging is encouraged, students engage in organic and fluid linguistic and cultural relationships. That is to say, students who appear to be more knowledgeable and capable in one ethnolinguistic sphere are clearly learners in another and vice versa. The nature of bilingual classrooms calls on students to move along these dimensions in a continuous fashion, contributing to students' biliteracy development. In bilingual programs that provide supportive classroom conditions in which both languages are treated as legitimate languages of instruction and learning by the teacher and within the curriculum, biliterate students leverage what they know about both their written languages in order to create meaning in print. Dworin (2003) refers to this process as "bidirectionality of emergent biliteracy development" (p. 179). That is, students' knowledge about writing in one language shapes their writing across both languages.

The synchrony and flow of a co-learning relationship conceptualizes students roaming in and through languages whereby students are central to the “doing” of language (language) in the classroom. Common strategies include code-switching, the shift between two languages in context, translation, and acquiring information in one language and expressing that information in another language; however, when bilingual students perform bilingually in a classroom, translanguaging is manifested through their reading, writing, and discussion tasks, among others. Although some teachers consider translanguaging necessary for effective teaching in bilingual classrooms, many grapple with the practice and continue to look for ways to implement translanguaging to scaffold the development of literacies for emergent bilinguals in the classroom. Bridging languages in various classrooms can be seen in the work of researchers such as Velasco and García (2014) and Bauer et al. (2016), which show *how* students’ in schools are using their various, social, linguistic, and multimodal abilities to engage in biliteracy activities.

A Call to Further Expand Biliteracy Research

Much of what is known about biliteracy stems from research conducted through traditional paradigms in bilingual education, which limited the research scope to parallel monolingualism. As a result, studies focused on students attaining proficiency in the school’s language (i.e., English in the USA) and limited what could be said about biliteracy development across a variety of language pairs (such as, English-Spanish, English-Chinese). Research and teaching conducted under traditional paradigms lacked an understanding of the developmental trajectory across a variety of contexts and languages.

Although the research fields on translanguaging in education and executive function from psychology approach bilingualism and biliteracy differently, it is promising that both, in their own way, are addressing that students’ languages are always present and students’ responses

to their languages may hold the key to understanding their learning. What is less understood in education and psychology is how emerging bilinguals make use of the skills gained from being a bilingual to further enhance their academic development. It can no longer be assumed that understanding monolingual literacy is sufficient for understanding biliteracy. Although some of the above research is helping to redefine biliteracy, more research is needed to further understand how students navigate their languages and how they develop their literacies.

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Buber, Martin (1878–1965)

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Introduction

Martin Buber (1878–1965), the well-known Jewish philosopher and theologian, is considered to be one of the greatest thinkers on education of the twentieth century. He was born in Vienna to an Orthodox Jewish family and spent most of his early life with his grandfather, who was a

prominent scholar of Midrash (Rabbinic *dialogue* with the Torah, the Old Testament), in Lvov, the capital city of Galicia (today's Ukraine). He was awarded a doctorate by the University of Vienna in 1904, for a thesis on Christian mysticism during the Renaissance and Reformation, and worked at the University of Frankfurt until 1933. He resigned from his position when the Nazis came into power and all Jews were excluded from teaching or studying in mainstream educational system, becoming involved in various educational ventures supporting the Jewish community in Germany. In 1938 he left Germany and settled in Palestine, becoming Professor of Social Philosophy at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

Philosophy of Dialogue

Buber's *I and Thou* [*Ich und Du*] (1923) is a major philosophical-theological work that deals with the most profound issues of what it is to be human and of human relations. Buber argues that human beings:

- i. Are relational beings
- ii. Are always in a relation with other human beings, or the world, or God
- iii. Possess a two-fold attitude toward other human beings, the world, or God, which is indicated by the *basic words* I-It (*Ich-Es*) and I-Thou (*Ich-Du*)

The *basic words* are a “linguistic construct created by Buber as a way of pointing to the quality of the experience that this *combination of words* seeks to connote” (Avnon 1998: 39) [*my emphasis*], so that I-It and I-Thou are read as “unities” indicating one's state of Being and attitude toward the *Other*, the *World*, and *God*. This means that there is no *I* relating to a *Thou* or to an *It*; rather, what exists is a kind of relation encapsulated by the unification of these words. Avnon (1998: 40) comments insightfully that “one may summarize this point by suggesting that the difference between the I-You and the I-It relation to being is embedded in the hyphen.” The hyphen of I-Thou indicates the kind of relation that is inclusive to the Other, while

the hyphen of the I-It points to the sort of relation that is not inclusive to the Other, that in fact separates the Other. Buber (2004: 3) characterized these *basic words* succinctly as “the primary word *I-Thou* can only be spoken with the whole being. The primary word *I-It* can never be spoken with the whole being.”

The I-Thou relation, the dialogical relation, is an *inclusive* reality between individuals. Buber argues that the I-Thou relation lacks structure and content because when a human being “encounters” another through this mode of Being, an infinite number of meaningful and dynamic situations may take place in that which Buber calls “the Between.” Thus, it is important to note that any sort of preconception, expectation, or systematization about the Other prevents the I-Thou relation from arising (cf. Theunissen 1984: 274–275) because they work as a “veil” or a barrier to being *inclusive* toward the Other. Through I-Thou relations, this *inclusive* reality, one allows the Other to present himself or herself to one with the fullness of his or her being, and vice versa. Despite the fact that it is difficult to characterize this kind of relation, Buber argues that it is real and perceivable, and examples of the I-Thou relation in our day-to-day life are those of: two lovers, two friends, and a teacher and a student. It is important to emphasize that one of the reasons Buber avoids presenting a list of steps and techniques for I-Thou relations is that he views it as a situational accomplishment; “there are many ways to ‘do’ dialogue, and one cannot predict in advance exactly what it will take for this quality of contact to come into being” (cf. Stewart and Zediker 2000: 230).

While in the I-Thou relation two beings are *inclusive* to each other, in the I-It relation entities fail to do so. Instead, in the I-It relation, a being confronts another being, objectifies it, and in doing so *separates* itself from the *Other*, “turning away from the Other.” This is in direct contrast with I-Thou relations because the “‘I’ of I-It relations indicates a separation of self from what it encounters” and “[b]y emphasising difference, the ‘I’ of I-It experiences a sensation of apparent singularity – of being alive by virtue of being unique; of being unique by accentuating

difference; of being different as a welcome separation from the other present in the situation; of having a psychological distance ('I') that gives rise to a sense of being special in opposition to what is" (Avnon 1998: 39). Thus, when one engages in I-It relations, one separates oneself from the Other and gains a sense of being different, special, and, arguably, superior at the same time.

Buber understood that human existence consists of an oscillation between I-Thou and I-It relations and that the I-Thou experiences are rather few and far between. However, if I-It relations become too dominant to the point of suppressing I-Thou relations, this becomes problematic as it is as if "one diminishes oneself as a human being" because I-Thou relations are a fundamental part of the human condition. It is also important to emphasize that Buber rejects any sort of sharp dualism between the I-Thou and I-It relation. That is, for Buber there is always an *interplay between* the I-Thou and the I-It rather than an *either-or* relation between these foundational concepts. The I-Thou relation will always slip into an I-It relation because it is too intense, but the I-It relation has always the potential of becoming an I-Thou relation. This oscillation is very significant for it is the source of transformation, because through every I-Thou encounter, the I is transformed, and this affects the I's outlook of I-It relations and of future I-Thou encounters. Putnam (2008: 67) notes that "the idea is that if one achieves that mode of being in the world, however briefly ... then ideally, that mode of being ... will *transform* one's life even when one is back in the 'It world'." It is through I-Thou encounters that one realizes that one is responsible for Others. As Buber (1936/2002: 52) says: "Responsibility presupposes one who addresses me primarily, that is, from a realm independent of myself, and to whom I am answerable." Thus, in I-Thou moments, "if someone comes to you and asks for help, you shall not turn away with pious words... You shall act as if... there were only one person in all the world who could help this man – only yourself" (Buber 1991: 89).

But it is not just through engaging concretely in I-Thou relations that the I is transformed as it is

also arguable that the realization that one has failed to engage in I-Thou relations is also transformative. That is, the failure to establish a *dialogical between* leads one to experience an *existential guilt*, which prompts one to seek *reconciliation with oneself and with the world*. In connection to this, it is interesting to note a personal life turning event in Buber's life. In "A Conversion," a subsection of *Dialogue*, Buber recounts that on one occasion a young man came to see him on a Saturday afternoon after morning prayers at the synagogue in search of advice. Buber recalls that he was pleasant to the young man but that he did not "open up" to him, resulting in the young man leaving without asking for Buber's advice; however, soon after Buber learned that the young man had died. This event haunted Buber as he realized that he had missed an opportunity to engage in I-Thou relations with the Other (cf. Buber 1929/1961a). Thus, the I is not just transformed by every I-Thou encounter, it is also transformed by the I's realization that it failed to establish a dialogue with the Other.

Levinas, whose career overlapped by a few decades and who maintained contact with Buber, provides us with an important criticism of Buber's views on dialogue, that is, I-Thou relation is merely an exchange between friendly partners (cf. Levinas 1963). Buber (1967: 723) replied by saying that "Levinas errs in a strange way when he supposes that I see in the *amitié tout spirituelle* the peak of the I-Thou relation. On the contrary, this relationship seems to me to win its true greatness and powerfulness precisely there where two men without a strong spiritual ground in common, even of different kinds of spirit, yes of opposite dispositions, still stand over against each other so that each of the two knows and means, even in the severest conflict, as this particular person. In the common situation, recognizes and acknowledges, accepts and confirms the other, even in the severest of conflict, as this particular person."

Another common criticism of Buber's views on dialogue is that even if one accepts that we, as human beings, can relate to each other through dialogical and non-dialogical relations, it might be difficult for some to accept that we can relate to things in the world (i.e., natural or artificial) and

God in the same manner. That is, some would argue that there is something fundamentally different in the way human beings relate to each other, dialogically or not, and the way we relate to the rest of creation and God.

Philosophy of Education

Buber's understanding of *dialogue* is the cornerstone of his views on education, and his *The Address on Education* (1925) and *The Education of Character* (1939) are some of his most important texts. In *The Address on Education*, delivered at the Third International Educational Conference in Heidelberg, Buber argues against both teacher-centered education (top-down or as Buber says "funnelled in") and student-centered education (bottom-up or as Buber says "pumped out") which were being discussed at the time, particularly in Germany (cf. Buber 1925/1961c). In another lesser known essay, *On National Education*, which was written many years later, Buber (1963/1997) continues to criticize teacher-centered and student-centered education through the use of metaphors, demonstrating that he did not change his mind about these approaches. Buber argues that in teacher-centered education, the teacher is like a *sculptor* who seeks to shape the student in accordance to that which is considered right, while in student-centered education the teacher is like a *gardener* who prepares the environment to enable the student to develop his or her potentialities as they arise; Buber (1963/1997: 150) concluded that "the gardener has not enough confidence; the sculptor has too much."

For Buber, both teacher-centered and student-centered education remain within the realm of I-It relations because there is no real *dialogue*, I-Thou relations, between teacher and student, as well as not encouraging this between students. His critique of these approaches to education suggests that Buber is arguing for a third-way between these approaches, which is something not always easy to do. Hence, what is important in education is that it must be based on *dialogue*, on the inclusion of the Other, meaning that both teachers and students feel accepted, comfortable in being who

they are, and trusting of others; in contrast to this is the kind of relation not based on *dialogue*, on the separation of the Other, which leads to a lack of interest on both parts, and even rebellion in extreme cases.

This critique of teacher-centered and student-centered approaches leads Buber to argue that education is always the education of *character*. One of his key texts on education provides us with evidence of this. Buber (1939/1961b: 123) opened his address to the National Conference of Teachers at Tel Aviv, in 1939 (published as "The Education of Character" but also known as "An Address to the National Conference of Palestinian Teachers") with the following powerful statement: "Education worthy of the name is essentially education of character. For the genuine educator does not merely consider individual functions of his pupil, as one intending to teach him only to know or to be capable of certain definite things; but his concern is always the person as a whole, both in the actuality in which he lives before you now and in his possibilities, what he can become."

In this passage Buber is stressing the tension between that which we would call the concepts of *Bildung* and *Erziehung* in "education." In English the term "education" encompasses all aspects of the teaching-and-learning process; however, in German, Buber's native language, there is a differentiation between different features of the process. *Erziehung* stands for instruction and the learning of a skill or trade, while *Bildung* denotes the education of character. Buber understood that *Erziehung* is a relatively easy undertaking because it consists in teaching individuals to perform various tasks successfully, but *Bildung*, ethics and character formation, is not so simple (cf. Morgan and Guilherme 2013: 56–57). Buber was aware that there is a friction between these two aspects of the educational process (cf. Weinstein 1975: 47–51) as he noted in a personal anecdote: "I try to explain to my pupils that envy is despicable, and at once I feel the secret resistance of those who are poorer than their comrades. I try to explain that it is wicked to bully the weak, and at once I see a suppressed smile on the lips of the strong. I try to explain that

lying destroys life, and something frightful happens: the worst habitual liar of the class produces a brilliant essay on the destructive power of lying. I have made the fatal mistake of giving instruction in ethics, and what I said is accepted as current coin of knowledge; nothing of it is transformed into character building substance” Buber (1939/1961b: 124).

The education of character is therefore rather difficult, and it involves engaging with students through *dialogue*, I-Thou relations. Teachers and students must relate to each other by being *inclusive*, by making space to the Other to present himself or herself as he or she is. Engaging in I-Thou relations, inclusive dialogical relations, implies that the teacher must invite the student to engage with reality, with the big questions affecting the world, and not be afraid of doing so. This can be exemplified by referring to an interesting passage of “The Education of Character” (1939), where Buber imagines a teacher and students discussing events in the early part of the twentieth century when Arab terror against Jewish communities in Palestine, and Jewish reprisals against Arab communities, occurred. The central question for this debate is “Can there be a suspension of the Ten Commandments...?” (Buber 1939/1961b: 129). As the dialogue unfolds the discussion becomes tense because ethical decisions are never clear-cut, and leading to wider implications and more questions. However, without such engagements the educational process becomes pale and confined to *Erziehung*, to rote learning, to the mere memorization of facts and figures, and to the learning of particular skills, and arguably uncritical. As a consequence of this, *Erziehung* is not able to expand into *Bildung*, into character formation, into allowing one to develop oneself as an ethical and critical being. That is to say, *Erziehung* is the kind of education that is based on non-dialogical relations, on I-It relations, such as teacher-centered and student-centered, which contrasts to *Bildung*, the sort of education that encourages the rise of dialogical relations, of I-Thou relations, the third-way Buber encouraged us to take.

Further, this engagement needs to be a constant in education, it must be part and parcel of it, so that the student’s character develops and he or she

becomes fully aware of the moral weight of his or her actions upon himself or herself, his or her community, and the world. The teacher plays a crucial and central role in all of this, which goes against notions of the teacher as a mere “facilitator” in the classroom; rather, the teacher is someone who, by virtue of his expertise and through establishing dialogical relations with his students, helps students to discover things about themselves, their societies, and the world (cf. Guilherme 2014). Buber (1939/1961b: 137) comments that the educator “can awaken in young people the courage to shoulder life again... [h]e can show that even the great character is not born perfect, that the unity of his being has first to mature before expressing itself in the sequence of his actions and attitudes. But unity itself, unity of the person, unity of the lived life, has to be emphasized again and again.”

This means that Buber’s approach is fundamentally existentialist in nature. The individual, whether teacher or student, must gain a full understanding of the human condition; that is, that we as human beings are always in a relation, that we are only capable of engaging in I-Thou and I-It relations with Others, and that our choice of how to engage with the Other carry a moral weight with it. Our choices of engagement have a direct effect upon ourselves, on Others, and in the world. Weinstein (1975: 51) commented on this aspect of Buber’s philosophy by noting that “[a] great character is one who by his actions and attitudes satisfies the claim of the situation out of deep readiness to respond with his whole life, and in such a way that the sum of his actions and attitudes expresses at the time the unity of his being and his willingness to accept responsibility.”

Conclusion

For Buber dialogue, I-Thou relations, is the establishment of a mutual and inclusive relation with the Other, and this is in contrast with non-dialogical relations, I-It relations, which are based on the objectification of and separation from the Other. Further, Buber’s theory of dialogue draws our attention to the fundamental

importance of the quality of “relations” between teacher-student and student-student in education, which is something not always at the forefront of educational practices that very often tend to focus on issues of methodology, learning environment, and achievements to the detriment of relations.

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Camus, Albert (1913–1960)

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Albert Camus (1913–1960), novelist, dramatist, philosopher, essayist, was born in Algeria on 7 November 1913. His mother was Spanish and his Breton father was killed in World War I in 1914. Camus was raised and studied under difficult but reasonably happy circumstances: “though I was born poor, I was born under a happy sky in a natural setting with which one feels in union, unalienated.” Initially a journalist in Algiers, and later in Paris, he was Editor of *Combat*, the underground resistance newspaper from 1942 to 1946. Camus, like his friends Jean-Paul Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir, was then an active member of the resistance. He was but 46 when he was killed instantly in a road accident in January 1960, having been offered a lift back to Paris by a close friend (Roger Gallimard, the publisher, who later died of injuries sustained in the crash). The Nobel Prize for literature was awarded to Camus in 1957.

While his major interest was mainly in literature, he studied philosophy at Algiers University and wrote didactic texts which are certainly philosophical. In philosophical histories or dictionaries, he is usually listed under French existentialism and accorded higher status, as philosopher,

than Simone de Beauvoir. Camus rejected the category “existentialist.” For many years a friend of Jean-Paul Sartre and Beauvoir, they were to experience a massive “falling out.” But this had earlier roots, to do with jealousy, with Camus’ fierce individualism, combined with a post-political ethics, and a refusal to commit himself politically to causes at a time after WWII when Sartre, under the influence of Beauvoir, was moving away from his earlier violent and alienated notion of the individual. The final straws were probably Sartre siding with the Communists (Camus would have no truck with them), an intemperate review of *L’Homme Révolté* in *Les Temps Modernes*, and an equally intemperate reply by Camus. Sartre responded equally as badly to Camus in *Les Temps Modernes* (August, 1952): “... you may be my brother – brotherhood is cheap – you certainly aren’t my comrade” (Sartre 1952). (But they had been comrades in the resistance).

Camus had enormous consideration for others and was extremely generous, perhaps to a fault. In his early days, Beauvoir said that she liked “the hungry ardour” of their companion yet that he could become concerned that his generosity was received with ingratitude. He could become formal in discussion if not righteous and, “pen in hand, he became a rigid moralist” (Beauvoir 1968, p. 61). Perhaps the acclaim and his good luck went to his head. Nor as a moralist did he have time for the deliberations and the risks involved in translating his moralism into political

thought and action. In his later life, he was probably closer to Gaullism than socialism, refusing to denounce colonialism in Algeria in Stockholm where he was to be awarded his Nobel Prize. But in an ever-increasing modernism and performativity, Camus traces the disappearance of old Europe and the “spaces” where morals and justice are being replaced by the spaces of new technologies.

The essential philosophical thought of Camus is to be found in *Le Mythe de Sisyphe* (1943) (*The Myth of Sisyphus* [1943]) and *L'Homme Révolté* (1951) (translated into English as *The Rebel* [1969]), although there are differences and developments between the two. These ideas are of course explored in his novels. A major thesis of Camus, in both tracts, is the problematization of death. In the earlier tract it is suicide, and in the latter it is the death of others, especially murder. They do not involve studies of death but, instead, attitudes toward death. If we can have experience of “other things,” we cannot experience death; Camus argues that, at best, any “experience” is second hand and parasitic. Camus’ ongoing point is that we can have no experience of death, in the sense that we experience sense data, emotions, etc., but that death is, as human beings, our only certainty. He has been titled as the writer of the absurd which, in his thought, can be described as the confrontation between our human demands for justice and rationality with a contingent and indifferent universe. Hence, life is meaningless. Yet, we must accept the absurdity of life and we must go on living – Sisyphus accepts his futile fate. But, “Finally I come to death.”

In *Le Mythe de Sisyphe*, absurdity is a sensation or feeling, which seizes us suddenly. It is at the base of thought and action, even though it is indeterminate and confused and, if present, it is distant in time. Time is our worst enemy, causing us to place ourselves in time and live with the future in mind – we are ardent for tomorrow – even though much of life is mechanical repetition. Faced by the absurdity of life, consciousness becomes crucial to Camus’ thought – it is the only good and the real good. It permits one to discern meaning, and, as the world has no meaning, it is ultimately absurd (though it

is the relationship between consciousness and the world which is said to be absurd).

Our reaction to this experience of absurdity is pursued in *L'Homme Révolté*. Metaphysical rebellion is the answer to absurdity. It “is the means by which a man protests against his condition and against the whole of creation . . . it disputes the ends of man and creation. . . (it) protests against the human condition . . .” (*The Rebel*, p. 29). Rebellion indefatigably confronts evil. But it also sets limits, beyond which one cannot go, for rebellion without limits ends in slavery: “. . . he who dedicates himself to the duration of his life, to the house he builds, to the dignity of mankind, dedicates himself to the earth . . . and sustains the world again and again” (*ibid.*, p. 267).

There is then a message of hope in rebellion because consciousness can make the walls, or limits that could not formerly be penetrated, transparent. Consciousness is promoted by the absurd. There is a promise of a real awakening and no chance of returning to repose. But here Camus stops. There are no principles which define an appropriate rebellion. He is not so much theoretical here but practical. Each situation is new and the appropriate action determined by the analysis of that situation. Camus was against violence, but under certain conditions the rebel would choose limited and brief violence. On the eve of the liberation of Paris in WWII, he wrote in *Combat*: “. . . the barricades of freedom have once more been thrown up. Once more justice must be bought with the blood of men . . . their reasons must then have been overwhelming for them suddenly to seize the guns and shoot steadily, in the night, at those soldiers who for 2 years thought that war was easy” (Camus 1944).

There are limits then between opposites and moderation is the key. There are dualisms such as life and death, love and hatred, “tenderness” and “justice,” and justice for man against the contingencies of history. Somewhat paradoxically the rebel must at one and the same time reject and accept history and simultaneously deny and affirm. Camus always sought a middle path, an equilibrium, and moderation. But without principles for such moderate forms of rebelling, Camus seems almost anarchistic.

This concept of absurdity of the human condition is to be found in the Theatre of the Absurd which uses a variety of dramatic techniques which defy rational analysis in their presentation of the absurdity of the human condition. The term was coined by Martin Esslin in 1961, but he developed the notion of the absurd from Camus' *Le Mythe de Sisyphe*. Dramatists to whom this title might be applied include Eugene Ionesco, Samuel Beckett, and Harold Pinter.

Talking of the death of her former friend, Simone de Beauvoir was to say:

it wasn't the 50-year old man who'd just died I was mourning; not that just man without justice, so arrogant and touchy behind his stern mask ... it was the companion of our hopeful years, whose open face laughed and smiled so easily, the young ambitious writer, wild to enjoy life, its pleasures, its triumphs and comradeship, friendship, love and happiness. Death had brought him back to life; for him time no longer existed. (Beauvoir 1968, p. 497).

Sartre, in a eulogy for him in France-Observateur, on 7 January 1960 said:

He was, in this century and against history, the current heir to that long line of moralists whose works perhaps constitute that which is most original in French letters. His stubborn humanism, narrow and pure, austere and sensual, battled uncertainly against the massive and misshapen events of this our time. But, inversely, through his obstinate refusal, he reaffirmed, in the heart of our era, against the Machiavellians, against the golden calf of realism, the existence of morality. (Sartre 1960, p. 110).

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Canguilhem and Philosophy of Education

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Georges Canguilhem was born on 4 June 1904, at Castelnaudary near Toulouse, in South West France. He died on 11 September 1995 at the age of 91.

Success at Castelnaudary Lycée (where he was a boarder), and the award of a scholarship to study at the prestigious Lycée Henri-IV in Paris, enabled him to gain entrance to the École Normale Supérieure in 1924. In his cohort were Jean-Paul Sartre, Raymond Aron, and Paul Nizan. Later there were Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Jean Cavaillès. He was influenced by his teacher Alain (Emile Chartier) at Henri-IV, by Cavaillès whom he succeeded at the University of Strasbourg in 1941, and by Gaston Bachelard, whom he succeeded as Professor of History and Philosophy of Sciences at the Sorbonne and as Director of the Institut d'Histoire des Sciences and Techniques, in 1955. In addition to his qualifications in philosophy, he gained a Doctorate in Medicine at the University of Strasbourg in 1943. His doctoral thesis was to be republished several times and translated into English as the *Normal and the Pathological* in 1978 (with an introduction by Michel Foucault). He also occupied the important administrative post of Inspecteur Général de Philosophie between 1948 and 1955, having initially refused it at the time of the Liberation. In this post he was responsible for the teaching of philosophy in lycées. His writing was austere and he was noted as an exacting if not intimidating

examiner. Nor was he the typical French intellectual, pronouncing on almost anything and prepared to occupy a radical political platform. If he was on the left, he was not on the radical or revolutionary left. For full bibliographical details and accompanying biographic comments, see Camille Limoges (1994). For a fuller historic account in English of Canguilhem's life, see David Macey (1998).

His friend Jean Cavaillès, who was to be assassinated by the Nazis in January 1944, had encouraged him into the resistance (if encouragement were needed – given his “rebellious” stances at ENS and his early opposition to events in Germany). After the Gestapo raid on the *Faculté des Lettres* at the University of Strasbourg (by then in Clermont-Ferrand) in 1943 and in which two professors were killed and many students and professors deported to Germany (but which he managed to evade), he was forced underground where he took a major part as a doctor in the Auvergne Maquis (code name “Lafont”). He was awarded the Military Cross and the *Médaille de la Résistance* in 1944. Later, in 1976, he was to publish a study of his former student, colleague, and comember of the resistance Jean Cavaillès: *Vie et mort de Jean Cavaillès*.

Unlike Bachelard, who took physics and chemistry as historical examples of scientific rationality, he took as his major sources biology and medicine. It could be said that in selecting biology and medicine and in rejecting great scientific events such as the Copernican Revolution, he forged a change of course in French History of Science. Biology and medicine were not as rigorous as physics and chemistry and are inextricably intertwined with nondiscursive practices. Foucault is to extend this displacement further to the human sciences.

If Canguilhem was a historian of science rather than a philosopher of science, then he was also a historian who was extremely sensitive to philosophical issues. According to Dominique Lecourt (1975, p. 165 f.): “There is probably no better definition of the history of the sciences as it is conceived and practised by Georges Canguilhem himself...it seems completely justified to make

him Bachelard's heir.” But his history is also epistemological. For Canguilhem, “the history of science is the history of an object – discourse – that is a history and has a history, whereas science is the science of an object that is not a history, that has no history” (Canguilhem, as cited in Delaporte 1994, p. 26). Thus (ibid.):

...the object of the history of science has nothing in common with the object of science. The scientific object, constituted by methodological discourse, is secondary to, although not derived from, the initial natural object. ...The history of science applies itself to these secondary, non-natural, cultural objects. It is a discursive project about scientific objects'. But it is also concerned with “the progress of the discursive project”, a progress which may “meet with accidents, be delayed or diverted by obstacles, or be interrupted and truth.

The objects of the history of science are then very different from the objects of science. For Canguilhem science arrests time, construing its objects as nontemporal and as not having a history. The full reality of the scientific object is in principle available to the scientist in the present. It is of course true that these objects exist in time and change through time. However, the objects of history of science are regarded themselves as part of a historical development which has not yet finished. The objects of history of science are incomplete. Whereas the objects of geology can be treated as complete, as “givens” open to analysis, the objects of history of science cannot, as their value and meaning are determined first by an epistemological and normative judgement and, second, are always in principle open to reevaluation as to their value and meaning in accordance with the progress of science.

Canguilhem's epistemological concern then is with the history of concepts. The philosopher's aim is to identify “the order of conceptual progress that is visible only after the fact and of which the present notion of scientific truth is the provisional point of culmination” (Canguilhem 1988, p. 9). But this history of concepts is not the history of ideas. Nor is it a history of terms, or of phenomena, or even of theories. Perhaps the elimination of these possibilities can make clearer his view of the history of science.

If there were such a thing as a history of terms, then it might concern itself with exploring the use of a term from its historical antecedents to more modern usages. For example, the term “atom” in current use in modern science was also employed by the pre-Socratics. However, while the same term or word was used by both pre-Socratics and contemporary scientists, the referents of these terms have almost nothing in common. Such a history was not Canguilhem’s.

Nor is the history of concepts to be identified with a history of phenomena. For example, someone might produce a history of volcanic eruptions and earthquakes in, say, New Zealand. What would be crucial here for Canguilhem is not what is observed – the phenomena – but the interpretation of those phenomena. It is not enough then for someone to observe and describe phenomena no matter how new, or unexpected (perhaps as the result of a Baconian experiment), for that person to have a scientific concept, or to be doing science, or to be writing the history of science. One cannot explain in observational terms (thus for Canguilhem, Priestly did not have a concept of oxygen, whereas Lavoisier did; Gutting 1989).

But Canguilhem also insists upon the separation of concepts from any theories which may “use” those concepts. Concepts are not imbedded in theories, and they do not derive their meaning from associated theories. Instead concepts permit one to identify data in a scientifically meaningful and useful manner: theories explain the data and/or phenomena identified prior to explanation by concepts. Concepts permit scientific questions to be formulated and theory provides scientific answers to those questions. Concepts are also claimed to be “theoretically polyvalent” (Canguilhem 1988, p. 6). This means that one and the same concept can occur in different theories. Thus, Canguilhem was able to write the history of the reflex arc, a concept which occurs in several quite different theories. This is not to deny that a concept may become reformulated and transformed between theories, but if the concept retains an underlying fundamental scientific content, it is still the same concept.

Canguilhem believes that there is a close relationship between concepts and phenomena. If he is rejecting the distinction sometimes claimed between (neutral) facts and theories, he is not doing so in any simplistic fashion which claims that there are no observed facts apart from their theoretical interpretations. His position is more complex as he makes distinctions between terms, concepts, and theories. Concepts which are theoretically polyvalent identify phenomena, not necessarily or merely theories. Instead theories explain those phenomena identified prior to explanation by concepts.

Clearly Canguilhem does not view the history of science as itself possessing scientific status. Such a view of the history of science would see it in positivistic manner as presenting already constituted objects from the past of science to be scrutinized by the historian of science, just like any other data in a laboratory. What is wrong with this approach is Canguilhem’s insistence that history of science is normative. Here he would seem to be following Bachelard in believing that the historian’s judgements of the past are informed by the present. This involves a form of epistemological analysis which furnishes to the historian the principles for informed judgement of the past. Clearly there are normative notions associated with the evaluation of science’s achievements and progress.

On the Normal and the Pathological is the work for which Canguilhem is best known. Not only was it important in the area of medicine, but it was important for other areas of the human sciences. As Foucault said in the Introduction to the English version, this work was important “for those very people who were separated from, or challenged, the establishment.” It was the work of Cavaillès, Bachelard, and Canguilhem on “a philosophy of knowledge, of rationality and of concept” which was important in the crises of the universities and the status and role of knowledge in the 1960s, rather than “a philosophy of experience, of sense, and of subject,” i.e., of Sartre and Merleau-Ponty, according to Foucault (Canguilhem 1978, pp. ix–x). If that is the case, however, for Canguilhem, the events of 1968 were not easy or comfortable, as he had given

his life to the academy and may have been seen as a mandarin (Bourdieu 1998, p. 191).

This work was essentially his medical doctoral thesis. He attacked the notion that the concepts of the normal and the pathological, so essential to the thought and activity of medicine, could be interpreted in a straightforward positivistic and statistical manner. He attacked the fundamental notion that normal was a statistical mean, because that amounted to conceiving and treating a living system as if it were structured and therefore governed in a lawlike manner. If that were the case, it would have been in some preestablished harmony with the environment. Instead, Canguilhem argues, the human organism is a living vital organism which is by no means in any preestablished harmony with its environment, for “The laws of Galilean or Cartesian mechanics cannot by themselves explain the origin of coordinated organ systems, and such coordinated systems are precisely what one means by ‘life.’ In other words, mechanism is a theory that tells us how machines (living or not) work once they are built, but it tells us nothing about how to build them” (Canguilhem in Delaporte 1994, p. 78).

Thus, for Canguilhem, the normal begins instead with the living organism and an order of specific properties, arguing that medical practice must be based upon the diversity of life which in turn provides the paths for its own conceptualization and for the restoration of its normal state. “To say that ‘no doctor proposes to produce a new kind of man, with a new arrangement of eyes or limbs’, is to recognise that an organism’s norm of life is furnished by the organism itself, contained in its existence” (Canguilhem 1978, p. 159). Therefore, we must proceed from life to understanding and not from understanding to life and thus define life as a meaning inscribed in matter. Lecourt (1975, p. 184) translates this position into the form of an equation:

$$\begin{aligned} < \text{life} = \text{code} = \text{information} \\ &= \text{concept of life} = \text{concept} > . \end{aligned}$$

Essentially for Canguilhem then, normality means the ability to adapt to changing circumstances, to environments which are both various and variant.

It thus involves activity and flexibility so that the living being lives in shifting relationships with a continuously changing environment. Medical dictionaries define the normal as “that which conforms to the rule, regular.” Canguilhem extends this brief definition as follows: “(1) normal is that which is such that it ought to be; (2) normal, in the most usual sense of the word, is that which is met in the majority of cases of a determined kind, or that which constitutes either the average or standard of a measurable characteristic” (Canguilhem 1978, p. 69). For Canguilhem and his views on life and concept, there can be no such sense of a pathological normal for living organisms, and hence, there can be no purely objective pathology (Rabinow, in Delaporte 1994, p. 16).

Canguilhem’s thesis on life is known as vitalism. Gordon (1998, p. 185) states the thesis thus:

- Life is an irreducible concept and one which is necessary to science;
- Its content is given through experience as living beings as well as our observation of living beings;
- Our conceptual activity in general is a continuation and extension of our existence as living beings.

Also, for Canguilhem (1952, p. 143), machines are seen as an extension of living organisms: “Un outil, une machine ce sont des organes, et des organes sont des outils ou des machines.” His point is not that tools and machines are organisms but that they are extensions of the body (Hacking 1998, p. 207). His work here, directed as much against Cartesian dualism, has obvious implications for the philosophy of technology.

In education there are at least three broad parameters along which a Canguilhem-inspired research program might proceed. First, there is the importance for the human sciences, including education, of Canguilhem’s approach to epistemology, especially his emphasis that this must be a historical epistemology. If this is being traced in the general area of the social sciences in Anglo-American thought (see, e.g., Economy and Society, 27 [2&3], 1998), it is almost nonexistent in education (though see Marshall 1996, pp. 47–53).

What would be of concern here is the specific nature of rationality in education, especially those aspects of educational theory and research which laid claim to scientific status and the role which critical historical thought might play in relation to “the” vital form of life displayed in a living organism. Second, there is a need for a deeper exploration of the notion of “normal” in educational thought and theory. Canguilhem’s notion of the norm as not being statistical but, instead, to be associated with normativity, that is, the ability of a living organism to adapt with activity and flexibility to changing circumstances, would be more than helpful here. Finally, his views on vitalism, normativity, and the notion that tools and machines are extensions of living organisms have interesting possibilities for problematizing the educational thrust toward technology.

For “extensions” of the ideas of Canguilhem to the human sciences, see entries for Michel Foucault, particularly “Foucault on Science.” See also entries for “Bachelard, Canguilhem and Foucault on Science” and “► [Educational Change/Reform and Norms.](#)”

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Castoriadis on Autonomy and Heteronomy

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Synonyms

Democracy; Freedom; Reflexivity; Self-questioning

Introduction

Cornelius Castoriadis (1922–1977) was a Greek-French philosopher, psychoanalyst, and political thinker-activist who has contributed original insights to a wide range of fields. Autonomy – and its antithesis, heteronomy – was a central and enduring interest of Castoriadis that he explored and elaborated in various settings, including ancient and modern democracy, workers' self-management, and the living being. In most of his work, there is a sense of importance, a political urgency, which informs the reader that academic work is not a neutral or disinterested activity. However, his philosophical work is oriented toward *praxis* and not aimed at developing theoretical principles, as shown in his criticism of Marx (Castoriadis 1987) and Rawls (Castoriadis 1997a). This means that, for Castoriadis, what autonomy would look like in practical terms is not something that could be deduced and described by philosophers – theoretically, in advance – but a creative act of reflexive self-determination by the subjects in question.

The thought of Castoriadis is anti-foundationalist, not postmodernist, but sometimes dubbed post-phenomenological (Adams 2008). He developed an ontology of “magma” indicating that the world itself can only be known partially, “in fragments.” His philosophy is orientated toward notions of creation, the imaginary, and *praxis* without ever abandoning the ideals of the Enlightenment, such as the quest for truth,

freedom, democracy, and autonomy. Recently, his concept of social imaginary significations has been an important inspiration for the notion of social imaginaries in social theory, while his political thought was influential in the student revolt of May 1968.

Greek in origin, Castoriadis came to Paris in 1945 on a student scholarship and spent the rest of his life there. In France, he became a well-known political thinker-activist on the antiauthoritarian left, as leader of the group *Socialisme ou Barbarie* together with Claude Lefort. The group was influential, but had many conflicts over political orientation, not least when Castoriadis decided to break with Marxism in the 1950s. During the 1960s, he nurtured a growing interest in psychoanalysis and ontology, and in 1975 his main *oeuvre*, *The Imaginary Institution of Society*, was published in France. His late introduction to the English-speaking world is partly due to a late translation to English (1987) and partly to his status as an underground political thinker who, due to French law under de Gaulle, had to write under pseudonym for the first 25 years.

Autonomy Is a Project

In order to understand Castoriadis's notion of autonomy, we have to take the concept literally. *Autos nomos* refers to following laws or rules that are given to the self, by the self, as opposed to the laws provided from the outside or by others (*heteros nomos*). In general terms, Castoriadis conceives autonomy as “the capacity, of a society or of an individual, to act deliberately and explicitly in order to modify its law – that is to say, its form [*nomos*]” (Castoriadis 1997b, p. 340). However, this notion differs in important respects from liberal, Kantian inspired autonomy where the relevant self (*autos*) is an individual who seeks to reduce the influence of others when making their own, independent judgments. For Castoriadis, this kind of a social individual is either inconceivable or psychologically and morally unfit. For him, autonomy is something that is instituted by the social-historical, which makes it simultaneously an individual and a collective

phenomenon. Put in his own terms, autonomy refers to a special kind of imaginary signification that is (or is not) instituted by the social-historical. When instituted in a given society, autonomy plays a key role whenever individual members of that society pass their judgments, make their choices, and reflect upon their commitments in politics, education, and the full range of public affairs.

In Castoriadis's analyses the social-historical dimension is always primary. Of course, as a practicing psychoanalyst, he was not uninterested in individuals, their psychic life, and so forth, but his approach to theorizing the individual subject goes *via* the social-historical. His reasons involve several aspects. Most important is his acknowledgment of historicity: It is not possible, for Castoriadis, to theorize and understand an individual person without taking into account the sociohistorical setting that has formed this person's beliefs, desires, motifs, and so forth. Observing that the social-historical is rather poorly understood, especially in terms of how a society creates and recreates itself, Castoriadis developed his theory of the social-historical around concepts such as the social imaginary, social imaginary significations, meaning, and the instituting/instituted society. An important distinction in this connection is autonomy/heteronomy, which refers to *how* a given society has instituted itself. The difference is that a society that has instituted itself autonomously *recognizes* itself as the source of its own norms and laws (*nomos*), whereas a society that has instituted itself heteronomously regards its laws as given from the outside, frequently by an extrasocial source like a god.

While other social theorists describe societies in mechanical or structural terms, as functions, structures, institutions, group interests, etc., Castoriadis's attention goes to the creative imagination. Imagination is the capacity to create new forms and significations, which is not reserved for individuals but also characterizes the social-historical. For Castoriadis, "[s]ociety is self-creation deployed as history" (1997c, p. 13). Every society in history has created itself, its own laws, norms, individual "types," and imaginary significations.

However, not every type of society acknowledges its own creative capacity as self-foundational. In fact, through history most societies have instituted themselves heteronomously, which means that they do not take responsibility for positing their own *nomoi*.

Autonomy, in this specific sense, is first of all a *project*, a project where education, in a wide sense of the term, plays a key role. This project can be historically dated to the sixth century BCE, with the Greek co-creation of democratic politics and philosophy and, again, in early European modernity. Through this cocreation – or "twin birth" – the Greeks realized, for the first time in history, that the laws (*nomoi*) of their community, the *polis*, were created by themselves and that these laws had no other, extrasocial foundation. This realization led to the appreciation of philosophical questioning, education, and very sophisticated political arrangements, but also to the realization of democracy as essentially a *tragic* regime (Castoriadis 1997a). For in a democracy – the regime of autonomy – the people realize that they are free to do "anything" and "must know that they *ought not* to do just anything" (Castoriadis 1991, p. 115).

As implied in the term *autonomy*, freedom is accompanied by the need for self-limitation. The Greeks, like the moderns, placed great value on education (*paideia*). In fact, for Castoriadis, there can be no democracy without a democratic *paideia* or individuals for whom the ethos and values of democracy has become their *own* project (Castoriadis 1997a). Individuals, in this perspective, are the walking, talking embodiments of the social institution. Indeed, for Castoriadis, the "self-institution of society" is the creation of a human world whose foremost creation is "the human individual in which the institution of society is massively embedded" (1991, p. 84). This is why autonomy is always at the same time individual and collective autonomy (for further discussion, see Straume 2008).

Contrary to what might be thought, Castoriadis' theorization of individuals via the social institution in many ways allows for a richer conception of the individual subject than the opposite (liberal) schema, where individuals are seen as more or less opposed to the social

institution. Castoriadis further distinguishes between the individual, which for him is merely a socialized specimen of a given society, and what he terms “the subject.” A subject is someone who has integrated the project of autonomy as reflexive subjectivity. According to Castoriadis: “Subjectivity, as agent of reflection and deliberation (as thought and will) is a social-historical project; its origins, repeated twice with different modalities in Greece and in Western Europe, can be dated and located” (Castoriadis 1991, p. 144). He elaborates: “This subject, human subjectivity, is characterized by reflectiveness (which ought not to be confounded with simple “thought”) and by the will or the capacity for deliberate action, in the strong sense of this term” (Castoriadis 1997b, p. 143). Such reflective subjectivity is essentially a process, not a state “reached once and for all” (Castoriadis 1997c, p. 128).

The same is true for societies, who need to institute themselves as reflexive and open in order to resist tendencies toward closure. Castoriadis states that “I call autonomous a society that not only knows explicitly that it has created its own laws but has instituted itself so as to free its radical imaginary and enable itself to alter its institutions through collective, self-reflective, and deliberate activity” (Castoriadis 1997c, p. 132). The social imaginary – or imagination when speaking about individuals – is the mode of being through which the social-historical creates and recreates itself. As the quotation shows, autonomy is exercised by a free use of the imagination, for instance, in the arts, but also in political and philosophical questioning. Thus imagination, as a creative capacity, and autonomy as *autos nomos*, combines into the self-reflexive creation that underpins the social reality as an autonomously – explicitly and consciously – instituted reality. This state is not the normal state of things, however, but a project that needs to be kept alive and vivid, through education, political activity, and a constant mode of self-questioning.

The Drift Toward Heteronomy

Most societies through history have instituted themselves as heteronomous, according to

Castoriadis. That is, they have failed to recognize – or actively concealed – the fact that they are the sources of their own laws, for example, when authorities appeal to higher forces in order to conceal their use of power and produce legitimacy (Smith 2013). Another example, frequently used in Castoriadis’ political texts and social diagnostics was the tendency to conceive social phenomena, which are created by society *tos nomos*, as if they were natural phenomena (*te fysis*), that is, as some form of natural law. Proponents of contemporary market capitalism frequently invoke such understandings when referring to the “laws of the market, the economy” etc. in lieu of democratic politics (Castoriadis 1987).

There is, in every type of organization, a general drift toward closure. This is why heteronomy is the norm, and autonomy the historical anomaly. Castoriadis refers to autonomy as a rupture of the state of heteronomy, for example, through a radical questioning that breaks the closure. In order to nurture the project of autonomy, therefore, a permanent effort is needed.

Heteronomy, as the opposite of autonomy, is about lack of freedom and lack of reflection and appeals to the myth of being as determinacy. It refers to hierarchy, conformity, and ideological veiling, especially of notions that have to do with imagination and creation (autonomy). When Castoriadis notes that the inherited philosophical tradition is unfit to conceptualize the being society of societies, this is an example of heteronomy that for Castoriadis is supported by the myth of *being as determinacy* – a myth that covers up social *doing*:

[...] the inherited way of thinking has never been able to separate out the true object of [the question of the social-historical] and to consider it for itself. This object has almost always been split into a society, related to something other than itself and, generally, to a norm, end, or *telos* grounded in something else, and a history, considered as something that happens to this society, as a disturbance in relation to a given norm or as an organic or dialectical development towards this norm, end or *telos*. (Castoriadis 1987, p. 167)

Heteronomy, in its various forms, invokes foundations outside of the socially instituted

(created) world. But there are no such foundations, according to Castoriadis. Then in lack of norms or foundations, how is it possible to justify autonomy over heteronomy? The answer, for Castoriadis, is a tautology. We have no reasons for choosing autonomy over heteronomy other than that this is a preference or choice we have made (or not made). In a certain sense, however, autonomy is self-founding, for the very criteria we use for choosing, judging, etc. were created at a specific point in history and are part of the project of autonomy itself (Castoriadis 1997b). There can be no deeper foundation or justification for why we would want autonomy than those offered by the concept itself. In the words of Castoriadis:

To the question ‘Why autonomy? Why reflection?’ there is no foundational answer, no response ‘upstream’. There is a social-historical *condition*: the project of autonomy, reflection, deliberation, and reason have already been created, they are already there, they belong to our tradition. But this *condition* is not a *foundation*. (Castoriadis 1997b, p. 394)

Autonomy in Education

Finally, what would it mean to educate for autonomy as conceptualized by Castoriadis? In order to find some answers, we need to look to social-historical situations where autonomy has been instituted as a social imaginary signification. A good case would be classical Athens, where the project of autonomy emerged for the first time with the co-birth of philosophy, politics, and democracy. This co-birth also includes the origin of Western education (Butts 1973; Jaeger 1986) and what today is called citizenship education. Various classical sources testify to how highly the Greeks valued education, *paideia*, and self-cultivation, e.g., Thucydides and the dialogues of Plato. In the latter we find numerous examples of how the educators of the day, the sophists, had discussions with Plato’s protagonist Socrates over matters of knowledge, rationality, critical thinking, argumentation, and justification or, in more general terms, on issues of questioning and truth seeking. In the democratic *poleis*,

the ability to form and justify judgments was of central importance. Greek democracy also had a special arrangement called *parrhesia*, which refers to the – institutionally protected – obligation to speak the truth in public affairs. This type of arrangements can only be realized in a society that has instituted itself as autonomous.

Education, as a social institution, sits in a certain tension between the two aspects that Castoriadis refers to as the *instituted* and the *instituting* society. The instituted society is what we normally refer to as “institutions”: structured and organized embodiments of imaginary significations such as (in our own time) schools, curriculum, classrooms, etc. The instituting society, on the other hand, refers to the creative dimension of the social institution: the aspect of society that creates itself as instituted. Another term to denote this dimension is the social imaginary or simply the social-historical. In a heteronomous society, the *instituting* society is covered over and rendered impotent by the instituted (cf. the notion of closure). Education in a modern society relates to both aspects: it takes care social reproduction, but has also been a site for renewal and sociopolitical reform. However, as history shows, education can easily be turned into *schooling* as mere social reproduction: unreflective practices that are unable to question and transform themselves in relation to aims and purposes. Contemporary phenomena such as “learnification” (criticized by Biesta 2006) and “the entrepreneurial self” (Simons and Masschelein 2008) are clear examples of heteronomy.

In order to break the closure of heteronomy, following Castoriadis, questions about education must be put in normative terms: is the kinds of education we have the ones that we ought to have? What does it mean to educate well, and why should we do it? This problematizing questioning never stops, in the regime of autonomy, and the answers given can never be the final answers. Nevertheless, it is important, in line with the project of autonomy, to create the laws and norms that we want to regulate and orient our life together. In the words of Castoriadis: “When I say that the Greeks are for us a germ, I mean, first, that they

never stopped thinking about this question: What is it that the institution of society ought to achieve. And second, I mean that in the paradigmatic case, Athens, they gave this answer: the creation of human beings living with beauty, living with wisdom, and loving the common good” (Castoriadis 1991, p. 123).

Cross-References

- ▶ [Citizenship, Inclusion, and Education](#)
- ▶ [Social Imaginaries and Democratic Teaching and Learning](#)
- ▶ [Social Imaginaries: An Overview](#)

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Catchword

- ▶ [Quest of Educational Slogans, The](#)

Causality

- ▶ [Social Imaginaries and Econometrics for Education Policy](#)

Causation

- ▶ [Wittgenstein as Educator](#)

Cause

- ▶ [Wittgenstein, Language, and Instinct](#)

Cavell and Philosophy of Education

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Introduction

Stanley Cavell is an American philosopher who, following Wittgenstein, teaches us how to read Wittgenstein and practice philosophy in post-analytic philosophy (Mulhall 1994). He speaks directly to philosophers of education through his treatment of the figure of the child and “the scene of instruction” in Wittgenstein’s (1972) *Philosophical Investigations*, addressing “the education of grown ups” (Saito and Standish 2012) and in works like *Themes Out of School* (Cavell 1988).

Stanley Cavell is an American philosopher, who with others like Richard Rorty – though in very different ways – has deliberately attempted to

heal the epistemological rupture in the tradition of American public thought caused by a Viennese analytic strain of philosophy. Cavell has done so by returning to the origins of American philosophy represented in Emerson's transcendentalism and Thoreau's "Walden" (see Cavell 1981a, 1981b, 1989, 1990, 1994). On this reading the American intellectual tradition was fractured at the point that a group of Mitteleuropean, and mostly Jewish, thinkers (e.g., Rudolf Carnap, Herbert Feigl, Carl Hempel, Hans Reichenbach, and Otto Neurath) – who were a part of the Vienna Circle – migrated to the United States to escape persecution by the Third Reich. Willard van Quine himself, as a key figure in the second wave of analyticity and the father of American postwar philosophy, spent some time in Vienna in the early 1930s (see Borradori 1994).

As a neoromantic or neo-transcendentalist, Cavell – uncharacteristically for his generation – also revitalizes this American tradition by openly engaging with other disciplines and with the leading figures of contemporary continental philosophy. (Perhaps, he shows a greater propensity to interact with French post-structuralists and psychoanalysts than he does with members of the Frankfurt School and Jürgen Habermas or with contemporary representatives of continental hermeneutics.)

In one sense he represents the future of American philosophy: someone who is sympathetically schooled in American transcendental and pragmatist strands of thought; someone who provides a "model" of post-analytic philosophy, based upon a range of different media, compositional forms, and genres; someone who willingly acknowledges the diversity of philosophical traditions and plural readings of a text; and a philosopher who, keenly aware of his native tradition and its European influences, is prepared to speculate not only about the meaning of "American" but also the meaning of "philosophy" in new and interesting ways. Cavell's uniqueness as a philosopher is evidenced by his capacity to write across a range of topics and mediums (see his Shakespeare and film criticism: Cavell 1977, 1979, 1987a, b, 1996a) and by his approach to philosophy. Cavell is a philosopher, one of the few within the analytic

tradition (if we still regard both Austin and Wittgenstein as somehow part of that tradition), who embodies Rorty's (1991) notion of "philosophy as a kind of writing." Certainly, like Derrida in respect to philosophy itself, Cavell regards philosophy as a set of texts to be worked through rather than a set of problems to be addressed.

It is certainly for these reasons that philosophers of education ought to read Cavell. In this sense his philosophical career provides a reading of the possibilities of analytic philosophy when it is practiced creatively alongside other disciplines and traditions. This tendency became evident early on in his career beginning with his now classic "Must We Mean What We Say?" (Cavell 1969). Cavell not only provides this "model" of transition or transformation but also displays very strong understanding and commitment to ordinary language philosophy and to certain analytic texts, particularly those of Austin and Wittgenstein. In particular, his interpretation of Wittgenstein distinguishes him as a contemporary philosopher, as someone who knows how to practice or "do" philosophy in an age of uncertainty (see Peters 1999; Peters and Marshall 1999), and as someone who, through his interpretation of Wittgenstein, speaks to philosophy to education. Even though he never directly addresses such an audience or community directly, the terms and titles of his work reflect a sensitivity to and a respect for questions of pedagogy and its place in philosophy, not just the metaphor of school in "Themes Out of School: Effects and Causes" (Cavell 1988) but genuine attention to the Wittgensteinian figure of the child in philosophy and the Wittgensteinian themes of learning a language and a culture.

The reasons why he ought to be read in this way lie, at least in part, with his own appraisal of Wittgenstein's work, particularly the *Investigations*, but also on his interpretation of Wittgenstein's historical place within the so-called analytic tradition. Cavell attempts to rescue an "aesthetic-ethical" Wittgenstein, contextualized in a European intellectual milieu, located at the intersection of romanticism and skepticism, and in relation to the question of modernism in the arts. Above all, he emphasizes Wittgenstein as a man who lived his

philosophy – philosophy as a way of life – and Wittgenstein as someone whose philosophy is impossible to understand without understanding the man and whose style is aesthetically speaking central to the meaning of the Investigations.

Cavell's (1995b) "Notes and Afterthoughts on the Opening of Wittgenstein's Investigations" (referred hereafter to as notes) might be taken as a prime example of Cavell's call to philosophers of education. Cavell's reading provides a basis for a Wittgensteinian pedagogics: not only does it hold up the figure of the child as central to the Investigations, but it does so in a philosophical style that, though distinctively Cavell's own, comes closest to the spirit of philosophizing in Wittgenstein's sense. The text of the Investigations is, itself, an exemplary pedagogical text showing us how to do philosophy in a new way. Cavell's notes provide us with the rare opportunity, as Michael Payne (1995, p. 5) argues, "of witnessing Cavell in the act of teaching a philosophical text." Cavell (1995a, p. 126), himself, directly addresses this issue when he indicates that part of the reason for publishing the notes was that some who had attended his lectures suggested that they would be of pedagogical help; yet he also says "There is still, I believe, no canonical way of teaching the Investigations."

Another reason why we might focus on this text is because Cavell's notes formed the basis of a course he gave on the Investigations at Berkeley in 1960, which were later amplified and developed at Harvard where he gave lectures based upon them some half a dozen times during the 1960s and 1970s. In other words, Cavell chooses to adopt the genre of "notes" – a form which Wittgenstein favored – to explore the way in which subsequent readings he gave of Wittgenstein informed his career over a period of almost 40 years. It is an interrelated set of readings dominated by the teaching of Wittgenstein. Cavell (1996c, p. 369) writes of that period:

That first time around, I presented it [the Investigations] as what I called a modernist work, meaning to say that its incessant and explicit self-reflection struck me as unlike the self-consciousness of any other undoubted work of philosophy I knew. I did not then take the cue

to ask whether, or how, or to what extent, philosophy on the whole can escape issues of modernity.

He gave the last set of lectures based on notes, which had undergone further development, especially in light of his "The Claim of Reason," in 1984. In 1991 he had occasioned to make a presentation that included both the notes and his afterthoughts concerning them, but it was not until the spring of 1993 that he began to recall his earliest thoughts on the Investigations. The final version appears in "Philosophical Passages" (1995b) and also in Hans Sluga's (1998) "The Cambridge Companion to Wittgenstein." The notes therefore are central to Cavell's interests and his development: it is an exemplary Cavellian text.

The notes themselves appear in italics in the text and Cavell's afterthoughts appear in a standard upright font. What we are presented with is a lengthy essay of some 59 pages that comprises Cavell's reflections over at least 30 years and a text that resembles Wittgenstein's own manuscripts in the complexity of its composition: a set of remarks worked and reworked, interspersed in a variety of typefaces not only with the original notes and afterthoughts but also with extensive quotations from his earlier works, from a number of other authors (including Augustine, Hume, and Foucault) and, in addition, references to both traditions the so-called Anglo-American tradition (e.g., Emerson, Austin, Kripke) and the continental (e.g., Nietzsche, Heidegger, Derrida).

The result is a rich textual layering that presents the reader with an elaborate, labyrinthine structure echoing the process of Cavell's thinking – a kind of spatialized conceptual mapping or architecture – which at one and the same time utilizes some of the gestures of Wittgensteinian philosophizing the incessant questioning, the rhetorical flourishes, the thought experiments, the same tentativeness in suggestion and yet boldness in concept, and the poetizing interpretations. This has led some critics, including Anthony Kenny, Mary Mothersill, Anthony Palmer, and M. Glouberman, to comment negatively upon his "self-indulgent style," while others, perhaps more attuned to Cavell's project, talk of "the

philosopher as novelist” or suggest that Cavell is developing “a new kind of storytelling” unlike Michael Wood, who commenting on *The Claim of Reason* remarks “The writing is remarkable here, the philosopher as novelist gives density of detail to fleshless old questions” and suggests that Cavell’s “anecdotes, scenarios, little parables, and exemplary stories are better than most novelists” (cited in Fischer 1989, fn 6, pp. 144–145). In Cavell’s work we find a new kind of practicing philosophy that involves a textually self-conscious and narrative experimentalism.

Cavell (1996c, p. 370) suggests that, motivated by his reading of Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Derrida, it was only in his most recent rethinking did he begin “to move more systematically toward an articulation of Wittgenstein’s manner, the sheer sense of deliberateness and beauty of his writing, as internal to the sense of his philosophical aims.”

Cavell’s work as a whole is concerned with the finding or recovery of the human voice and of finding one’s own voice. In “The Melodrama of the Unknown Woman: A Reading of *Gaslight*,” he talks of “reinserting or replacing the human voice in philosophical thinking, that voice that philosophy finds itself to need to deny,” and in “The Philosopher in American Life,” he suggests that logical analysis has suppressed the human voice – the voice that ordinary language philosophy aims at recovering. Cavell (1996c, p. 381) himself writes:

Part of my sense of the Investigations as a modernist work is that its portrait of the human is recognizable as one of the modern self or, as we are given to say, the modern subject. Since we are considering a work of philosophy, this portrait will not be unrelated to a classical portrait of the subject of philosophy, say that to be found in Plato’s *Republic*, where a human soul finds itself chained in illusion, so estranged from itself and lost to reality that it attacks the one who comes to turn it around and free it by a way of speaking to it, thus inciting it to seek the pleasures of the clear light of day.

Stanley Cavell received his AB in music from the University of California, Berkeley, and his PhD, in philosophy, from Harvard. He taught at Berkeley for 6 years, before returning to Harvard

in 1963, where he became the Walter M. Cabot Professor of Aesthetics and the General Theory of Value. He became professor emeritus in 1997.

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Cavell and Postmodern Education

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Synonyms

Deliberative inquiry; Human engagement;
Post-structuralist thought; Responsible action;
Risk taking

Introduction

To make a claim that postmodern education can be associated with Stanley Cavell's (1979) work would require that one analyzes what Cavell means by education. And a Cavellian understanding of education cannot be far removed from his claims about philosophy, as the way he understands philosophy would reveal some of his thoughts on education. More specifically, Cavell (1979: 384) claims that an individual stands in relation to herself and makes herself "intelligible to others ... [in her] capacity to present ...

[herself] for acknowledgement" (Cavell, 1979: 393). So, as in a postmodern view of education, an individual acknowledges herself and engages with others in a relationship in which she and others "experience" one another "endlessly" and "continuously" (Cavell, 1979: 441). Cavell (1979: 440–441) offers two justifications for education: first, one engages "afresh" with other human beings, such as "conceiving the other from the other's point of view," and whatever one wants to know about others, "one first has to find in oneself and then read *into* the other." Such a view of education is starkly different from the view cogently criticized by Gert Biesta, by which individuals acquire "a clearly defined set of knowledge, ideas and values" (Biesta, 2003: 62) and by which an individual exclusively cultivates her own "rational autonomy" (Biesta, 2003: 64). Instead, a Cavellian understanding of education is one whereby an individual uses her autonomy in relation to others, in particular experiencing them without any precondition of finality – that is, the educative experience in itself remains incomplete and in potentiality. The very idea of looking at human engagement "afresh" is a vindication that the educative experience is always potentially in relation to some sort of "appropriateness ... without knowing everything about it" (Cavell, 1979: 442–443). Likewise, when humans engage, they remain "imperfectly known" (Cavell, 1979: 444) to one another, as there is always more to know about one another on the basis that human conscience is "not generally conclusive" (Cavell, 1979: 431). And, if they were to be perfectly known to others – a view rebuked by Cavell – their education would have come to an end.

This brings one back to the point raised earlier, namely, that understanding Cavell's use of philosophy has some bearing on his understanding of education. For Cavell, doing philosophy implies analyzing "texts" (Cavell, 1979: 5). These "texts" include written and oral texts on human lived experiences that they (humans) are engaged with/in ordinarily, such as when one identifies what is familiar and also what is strange in the texts and, by implication, also include an analysis of relational human lived experiences (Davis,

2010: 161). For Cavell, explaining human relations in terms of both strangeness and familiarity is to invoke the criterion of judgment according to which people's encounters with themselves and others are assessed. In my view, such an understanding of philosophy would not just give us knowledge of what texts mean but also insight into the human (im)possibilities that shaped the texts. And, considering that strangeness in itself points to uncertainty – that is, the possibility that we do not always know with certainty (Cavell, 1979: 46), an examination of education in relation to skepticism is necessarily educed. Put differently, a Cavellian understanding of education has to do with what it means to act with skepticism, that is, what it means to engage with the familiar and simultaneously being open to what might yet come (meaning what can be conceived as strange). The author now examines more closely the relationship between a Cavellian understanding of skepticism and education.

Education and Skepticism

Educational encounters among human beings enacted within a space of skepticism can be explained as follows: Human beings, in relation to one another, “do not know with certainty of the existence of the external world (or of other minds)” (Cavell, 1979: 45). Cavell draws on Wittgenstein to explain that human relations in the world “[are] not [relations] of knowing, where knowing construes itself as being certain” (Cavell, 1979: 45). What we know of other human beings is how they present themselves to us. In other words, skepticism brings into question the notion of “knowing” others completely, because we only know on the basis of others' behavior. And, if they do not present themselves to us in an encounter, then we cannot claim to have knowledge of them. Human beings might suffer a loss of life or some form of indignation. We would only know their affliction on the grounds of what they inform us of or present us with, as “we cannot have their sentience, say literally have a pain of theirs” (Cavell, 1979: 46). In this way, education, as an enactment of

human encounters, is inherently skeptical, because if we cannot know others completely then we invariably engage with them as “strangers” (Cavell, 1979: 443). Cavell makes the point that one can know the age, height, gender, color, and language style of a person, but this does not imply that one actually knows him or her. Put differently, educational relations, following Cavell (1979: 444), involve strangeness in the sense that one is always “imperfectly known” to others. By implication, education requires a willingness on the part of humans to be in communication with one another (Cavell, 1979: 47) and that such communication is never directed at achieving finality, for that in itself would imply that the possibility for strangeness would dissipate and therefore that humans could live in isolation from one another. If one does not remain “imperfectly known” to others, then the possibility exists that one might be “perfectly” known to them and hence strangeness would cease to exist. Similarly, if finality in human encounters is the aim of communication, then, equally, the isolation of humans from others would be possible because education would have concluded. In other words, if communication comes to an abrupt end, the possibility of engaging in human encounters would be thwarted and education would have reached conclusiveness. Instead, education requires continuous engagement with others without the possibility that human encounters would culminate in something conclusive, for that would mark the end of strangeness and, as a corollary, the expiration of education. If this happens, human encounters would attain closure and, as aptly put by David T. Hansen, a reflective “openness to the new” (Hansen, 2011: 7) would no longer be possible. Put differently, a Cavellian stance on education does not debunk an openness to what is strange or surprising, neither does it perpetuate that human encounters should be about “grasping final truths that one can trumpet to others” (Hansen, 2011: 117). Rather, in cultivating one's own truth claims in relation to others' understandings of truth, we aspire to “inhabit” or “dwell together” in the world (Hansen 2011: 113). Cavell (1979: 440) offers a succinct description of enacting our skepticism educationally:

In saying that we live our skepticism, I mean to register this ignorance about everyday position towards others – not that we positively know that we are never, or not ordinarily, in best cases for knowing of the existence of others, but that we are rather disappointed in our occasions for knowing, as though we have, or have lost, some picture of what knowing another, or being known by another, would really come to – a harmony, a concord, a union, a transparency, a governance, a power – against which our actual successes at knowing, and being known, are poor things.

Thus, education as skepticism is about leaving things “open” and inconclusive – a matter of encountering humans “in the face of doubt” (Cavell, 1979: 431). In other words, individuals in relation to other individuals are strangers who do not turn a blind eye to doubting themselves and others as if there is nothing more to deliberate about, where the “intersection of the strange and the familiar, the surprising and the unexpected” (Hansen, 2011: 86) is no longer possible. In this way, an enactment of skeptical human encounters is always in “becoming through the experience of reflective openness to the new fused with reflective loyalty to the known” (Hansen, 2011: 86). And when human encounters are grounded in a receptiveness to the new without unjustifiably negating the familiar, such encounters not only resonate with what is strange, but would be highly charged towards showing one’s skepticism towards others and, in turn, others’ skepticism towards one. As cogently put by Cavell (1979: 47), to live educationally is to do so skeptically with respect to others, which involves “to penetrate or be penetrated by another.” In other words, educational encounters are constituted by the human capacity to understand, listen to others, and learn from them – a matter of remaining open to the unexpected, surprise, and that which is not yet. Consequently, as mentioned earlier, education is not exclusively about knowing the other in relation to oneself. Rather, education involves engaging the other in relation to oneself, with the possibility that one experiences the other’s otherness without claims to getting to know the other. Such a situation is not justifiable and desirable in a Cavellian notion of education. In any case, what one comes to know of the other

depends on what the other shows. As aptly put by Cavell (1979: 443), “[a]ll anyone knows or could know is what I am able to show them of myself.” And, as Maxine Greene (1995: 43) so eloquently reminds us, showing oneself in communion with others is “always incomplete because there is always more to be discovered and more to be said.” Quite pertinently, education is about human encounters that stir people “... to wide-awakeness, to imaginative action, and to renewed consciousness of possibility” (Greene, 1995: 43). Education is not distinctly about “perfectly” knowing this or that.

Education and Answerability

Now, if education cannot be about knowing others perfectly, for that is neither possible nor desirable in a Cavellian sense, then at least human encounters between self and others still involve some form of acknowledgement. However, as has been argued for thus far, it is not an acknowledgement inspired by the intention to know others, but rather an acknowledgement of others on the basis of what is common within other human beings and ourselves. And what is common in ourselves and other humans is the humanity that lies in us. As stated by Cavell (1979: 443),

[there] is a surmise that another may be owed acknowledgement simply on the ground of his humanity, acknowledgement as a human being, for which nothing will do but my revealing myself to him as a human being, unrestrictedly, as his or her sheer other, his or her fellow, his or her *semblable*.

For Cavell (1979: 438–439), acknowledging humanity in ourselves and others involves being answerable to them through caring for others and being committed to them justly. At the core of such a Cavellian understanding of education is the practice of justice towards others – a matter of others being “owed some unrestricted revelation of my humanity” (Cavell, 1979: 440). And, in exercising one’s humanity towards others, one acknowledges and respects others’ cultural differences without being overtly dismissive of such cultural variability. Treating others justly, that is humanely, involves acknowledging others as

human beings whose differences are not reasons for exclusion, marginalization, rebuke, or hatred on the basis that others' forms of living – their values, beliefs, hopes, and aspirations – are deemed irrelevant, other, and unworthy of recognition. Rather, just or humane treatment of others involves talking with others, listening to them, interacting with them in deliberative ways, and treating them with dignity and respect – a matter of acknowledging or conceiving “the other from the other's point of view” (Cavell, 1979: 441). Thus, for Cavell, education is not concerned with which norms and practices are valid for all human beings everywhere, but rather how, in solidarity, we can reach decisions about ourselves and others that would be deemed just and an acknowledgement of our humanity. Seyla Benhabib (2011: 129) supports such a view of education, one in which “complex processes of public argument, deliberation, and exchange through which universalist claims are contested and contextualised, invoked and revoked . . .”.

Education and Risk Taking

Cavell's (2004) *Cities of words: Pedagogical letters on a register of the moral life* articulates his conception of education in relation to pedagogical encounters “in the classroom.” For him, education is the act of lodging a demand or “desire for reform or transfiguration of the world . . . [where] we feel ourselves called upon for change . . . a condition in which the good city we would inhabit cannot be constructed, since it exists only in our intelligible encounters with each other” (Cavell, 2004: 2–5). And when we act educationally upon the world, we do so with deep “suspicion,” “distrust,” and with “risking impertinence” (Cavell, 2004: 6–9). The author's interest is in Cavell's insistence that education is inherently characterized by taking risks, which he explains in relation to reading texts so as to ensure surprises for the self, as new thoughts occur and new arrangements are more suitably brought into view (Cavell, 2004: 15). The notion of education as risk taking is explained by Cavell (2004: 18) as human action, whereby

one's quarrel with the world need not be settled, nor cynically be set aside as unsettlable. It is a condition in which you can at once want the world and want it to change – even change it

In a way, education that relies on taking risks is aimed at cultivating new “rebeginnings,” what Hannah Arendt (1958: 246) refers to as starting new and unending processes of human action “in the ever-recurring cycle of becoming.” In other words, when people act upon the world, they interrupt it and begin something “unpredictably” new (Arendt, 1958: 244–246). Put differently, risk taking is one of the potentialities of human encounters, in other words educational relationships. Education constituted by risk taking shows a greater sensitivity towards, incalculability of, and unpredictability of the chaotic uncertainty of the future (Arendt, 1958: 237). Human beings who take risks are prepared to change their minds and start afresh; they are not constrained by human action that is closed to the unexpected, the lucky find. For this reason, Cavell (2004: 3) avers that practicing philosophy (and education for that matter) “is to lead the soul, imprisoned and distorted by darkness, into the freedom of the day . . . that would secure a human settlement with the world that goes beyond human sense and certainty.”

Summary

In this entry, the author has given a postmodern account of education in relation to the seminal thoughts of Cavell. In the main, the aforementioned Cavellian understanding of education breaks with enlightenment views of education as a universalist conception of education that makes assumptions that education should serve a dominant culture. Rather, a Cavellian understanding of education is sensitive and open to different cultural traditions. Likewise, it has been argued that education does not abandon autonomous human action, but rather views the autonomy of the self in relation to others' autonomy. In other words, following Cavell, understanding the self in relation to others invariably results in an enriched view of self and others, in which human encounters are

informed by a radical questioning of our deepest assumptions (Arcilla, 2003: 141). Finally, a Cavellian understanding of education encourages forms of communication by which human beings take risks to cultivate unpredictable, unimaginable, incalculable encounters through which they can justly and humanely change the world.

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Child

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This entry concerns ruptures and continuities in the modern Western child as it shifts from what is now called natural philosophy to political philosophy to psychology, a shift which enabled developmental psychology to become the dominant discipline for inscribing the child in educational discourse over the twentieth century.

In Sight and Out of Mind: Descartes' Child

And here the first and principal cause of all errors can be recognized. For in childhood, our mind was of course so closely bound to the body that it did not apply itself to any thoughts other than those by means of which it was aware of those things which affected the body: and it did not yet relate

those to something situated outside itself; but merely felt pain when something disagreeable occurred to the body; and pleasure when something agreeable occurred (Descartes 1983, p. 32, art.71).

For Descartes (1596-1650), the first and principal of all errors (in arriving at Truth) lay in a near mind-body fusion inscribed as an obviousness of childhood. Children did not move their thoughts beyond bodily sensation and could not attribute sensations to “something situated outside itself.” For there to be an analytical space called “outside” to which a child was incapable of making an appeal, there had to be a perceiver aware of such distinctions and able to patrol the borders. The Cartesian perceiver was an adult mounted on a pivot, a turnable knower who, like its early Christian counterpart, e.g., Augustine’s, could see both within and without. What is “outside” in a Cartesian epistemology is complex and perhaps best illustrated by what was no longer outside post-Scholasticism.

Unlike Platonist traditions, Descartes did not accept that the World was an ontic logos which was already meaningfully embodied in the correspondence between the form of things. He did not accept that moral order and vision of the Ideas were unavoidably synonymous because for Descartes there were no Ideas in the Platonic sense. Once cosmic order was no longer seen as embodying either the Platonic Forms or Aristotelian species and forms that which lay outside the early Christian “inner man” had to be rewritten.

This rewriting saw the external as an extended substance, “World or Universe.” The human body marked the judicial horizon between interior/exterior realms. The World as extended substance did not hold pre-existing Ideas and Goodness that one journeyed through the inner man to arrive at. Aspects of the whole were not borne into the parts and the integrity and meaning of the parts did not carry forward to become an integral part of the whole. The body and the World were quantities open to theorization as to what they did or did not hold or as to what laws structured them.

Exterior and interior realms were not homologous a priori forms although the exterior existed by virtue of what “ideas” humans could have of it in the mind. Interiors (e.g., mind and the processes of reason) and exteriors (body/World) were separately identifiable substances with different principle attributes that made them so.

One gained certainty and Truth about the exterior World only when one subjected bodily sensation or the everydayness of personal embodiment to rigorous standards for evidence. The standard or norm for Truth now lay within the procedures themselves, not on a shelf waiting for the person to turn toward it. Conformity to the method would secure the substantive Truth that would be the outcome and conformity to the correct order of thought now constituted “reason.” Reason was no longer a vision of order but the order for arriving at a different vision, a disengaged and disembodied one that took distance from bodily sensation and the immediacy of the “empirical” World as its benchmark.

The outside for Descartes did not dismiss Godly omnipotence even though humans were now admitted to constructing and deductively verifying the terms of His brilliance. God was the original divine authority and constituted the greatest certainty of all but in a crucial shift there was “in those matters about which divine faith teaches us nothing” space for a method that would establish the Truth beyond a bodily sensation. The advent of matters about which divine faith teaches us nothing was pivotal to the Cartesian cogito. Adults, i.e., humans, could make the interiority of thought present to itself without an ontic logos and yet with the continued presence of God because there were matters about which divine faith did not instruct. Discursive space for controlling the resolution of doubt (now “scientific” rather than “confessional”) had been opened to human conjecture and it was the rigorous Cartesian method toward clear and distinct ideas that indicated the uptake of that opening. Humanity could understand itself not just in terms of being a mirror of God’s image or just as an effect of a spiritual entity but as the source of its own effects as well. Conformity to the correct methods for discerning truth was necessary because other

methods had the potential to lead humans into erroneous judgments about the best choice to make. Cartesian rationalism required at a crucial juncture the failure of faith in divine matters to instruct in everything and the possibility for failure in human method. Descartes' resolution for the possibility of imperfection was the procedure for certitude that he called reason. It is in his obsession with procedures, and with the earth's motion as an inciting object of analysis, that the child and childhood were given meaning as error personified, that is, as the bodily magnified.

The rejection of Scholastic teachings saw a rejection of Aristotelian binaries of natural and unnatural Beings, of natural and unnatural motion, of celestial and terrestrial bodies. Beings were not categorized according to an innate potential to actualize as something we might understand almost as its opposite. Nature was not variegated at the level of "matter" or "essence" insofar as matter had been given a universal nature and assumed constitutive of all Beings. For Descartes and for Newton after him, this appeal to matter as universally composing all things meant that all extensions (bodies) could become subject to the same laws of motion.

The rewriting of matter and the mechanization of the cosmos enabled a different kind of wedge to be driven between "mind" and "body" than in Platonic and early Christian theology. In presenting the human body as extension and as subject to forces beyond its control, the mind was generated as a space free from the banal everydayness of particle/force interactions. The mind could become the new perceiving locus of reality and it was within this locus that reason's movement could operate and therefore operate to exclude the child from that which it helped to construct.

Reason did not just operate to divide children from humans but to divide the subject internally. To be distant from one's body via the correct procedures for coming to certainty was to establish the Cartesian process called reason, a process which made "subjective" space objective and which reorganized empirical sensation into different meaning. The mind's ability to travel beyond

the body's physicality was thus reason's requirement. And it was all the more so because what belonged to "our nature" and what one came to know first was mind. "The faculty of thinking" was "known prior to and more certainly than any corporeal things; for we have already perceived this [thinking], and yet are still doubting the rest" (Descartes 1983, p. 5, art. 8).

To rewrite reason in this way was to provide the pathway for a circular consciousness that has subsequently been rallied as the epitome of a metaphysics of presence. Human beings were considered human because we were capable of moving without running; the mind could evade what the body urged it to believe. The inscription of reason as a distance from bodily sensation secured the (analytical and physical) space necessary to view something (conceptually) as a movement, a move beyond or away from something else. It was movement to a point from which the mind could then spin back and view where it had once erroneously been as a child (i.e., close to the body) that would suggest reason's presence. Reason was no longer the uniform circular motion of the divine aspect of the universe. It was a metaphorical and analytically linear movement away from possible erroneous bodily sensation. Humanity's presence to itself was thus inscribed into a concept of mind-body distance via physics. Without distance, movement, space, and time that structured the procedures for certitude one could not become conscious of one's humanness, one was without reason, was not fully human, and was therefore a child.

Locke and Rousseau's Children

John Locke's (1632-1704) acceptance of what is now called empiricism does not generate the same textual use of the child as Descartes and nor does it indicate that he meant the same thing by reason. The Lockean child depicted in the letters comprising *Some Thoughts on Education* was intimately and analytically bound to the texts now treated as political philosophies and epistemologies, i.e., *Two Treatises of Government* and the *Essay*

Concerning Human Understanding respectively. In the *First Treatise*, the child, particularly the boy, and his place in the family relative to the patriarch are the objects on which a new kind of Utopian civil society predicated on a social contract is carved out. Arguing against Sir Robert Filmer's *Patriarcha, or on the Natural Power of Kings*, Locke recommended a form of social organization based on democratic elections in which men would give up some of their powers in order to belong to a civil society which secured their freedom (where freedom meant conformity to the laws of a civil society which protected one's life, liberty, health, and property).

Within the ideal family for Locke, the child's treatment is based on contract-like arrangements. Locke attributes the child with a Willpower that is on its inside and because the child is now given possession of its own internal powers that have Newtonian motive and resistive qualities, it is problematized as one who must be dealt with in a particular way. If the child is to become the kind of English gentleman that Locke would like to see inhabiting his ideal civil society then the question remains as to how to have a new human join in a social contract which it did not initially authorize. Parents and tutor, the sources of education for Locke, must reason with a child and use explanations pitched to its level of understanding rather than whip or beat a child into submission. This is because parents do not possess the child even though they have temporary authority over their offspring. In return, the child has a duty of obedience to the parents for protecting and feeding it – the contract writ small in the home. In order to raise a child, then, parents must first bend the child's Will early, i.e., deal with its inherent powers rather than any notion of its original sin. If an infant cries, it is expressing its Willpower and if parents give into unreasonable demands that the infant is making through such cries then they are creating the kind of man who loves dominion and who cannot sustain self-denial. Therefore, through a system of permissions and denials called health the infant is prepared early through the treatment of its body for becoming a reasoning gentleman, i.e., one who can eventually discern between those desires and

impulses that it would be gentlemanly to honor and those that it would not.

Because education makes all the difference between men for Locke, the child undergoes formal tutoring that is less concerned with what is today thought of as subject matter recall and more with a quality that Locke calls "vertue." Reason has a moral inscription and the equivalent of the curriculum is to facilitate vertue's development through gradually preparing different faculties of mind for reason's full unfoldment. Rather than rote Latin lessons, for instance, the child learns, i.e., gains a stock of Ideas which it is in a natural condition to differentiate, by "experience" which is all the interactions with things, with others, with books, and with symbols that will be encountered over time.

Unlike Descartes' child, the Lockean one was admitted to being human and to having consciousness, i.e., awareness of that humanity. This is because for Locke the child was not the bodily magnified and the human body admitted of fact. We receive Ideas through the power of objects acting on our sensory mechanisms. These are natural events and therefore outside claims to truth or error. Whereas Descartes' body was inherently sinful and could not be considered a site of knowledge, Locke's body was the first positive step to the formation of different kinds of knowledge that he explicates in the *Essay* (i.e., intuitive, demonstrative rational, and sensitive knowledge). This different orientation to human body, to powers, to learning, and to reason allowed a different inscription of the child and announced what is thought of today as its modernness (Baker 2001).

Jean-Jacques Rousseau both drew on and departed from Locke's delineation of the child. In the tradition of high romanticism, Rousseau's child is assertively modern and countermodern. Rousseau's imaginary orphaned character called Émile in the novella, *Émile, or on Education*, who is tutored through to manhood is again made legible by a wider political philosophy and prescription for Utopia (e.g., *First and Second Discourses*). As for Locke, Rousseau writes a counter-memory to human history. He does not rely on the Biblical tale in Genesis to explain from whence humans, and different kinds of

humans – natural, savage, and civil Man in Rousseau’s words – came. Rousseau’s hypothetical history of human nature as it has ended up and evidenced itself in civil society slaps present-day notions of progress in the face; the evolution of the species toward life in civil society is a form of disintegration, hence natural and savage states are held up as ideal and civil man as degraded, dependent, torn between dueling realms of spirit and matter, embroiled in unequal power relations, and therefore far removed from what was natural in the past.

This produces a different kind of child amid a different version of the social contract. Rousseau’s child is given possession of a Will, but not of power for power in what might be thought of as its social forms (including sexual and mental kinds) is a commodity and an artifact of human evolution out of a state of nature. When an infant cries for Rousseau it is expressing its Will, not its power as for Locke. It will learn social power if the adults around it give it what it wants. Just as in Rousseau’s *Social Contract* the Will of the people is distinct from the executive, the government, so, too, is the child’s Will made distinct from its ability to do anything about it. The having of Will does not mean the having of power to execute it. Rousseau’s child is therefore subjected to a different kind of education-for-reason and morality. It is a form that does not assume that the child has any initial ability to reason and rational explanations are thereby discredited. Instead the tutor, especially during childhood, must set up situations in which the young Émile must come to the realization of something for himself or so it seems for “doubtless your pupil should do only what he wants. . .but he ought to want only what it is you want him to want.” Émile is often led to believe one thing only to learn the lesson of the opposite, a lesson communicated through interactions with self, with things, and eventually with others that relies less on sermons and more on active involvement in seemingly random situations. Thus the different inscription of power as an executive tool, its separation from Will in the child, and the lack of reasoning ability attributed to the young writes its education differently.

From Mathematical to Developmental Psychology

Johann Friedrich Herbart (1776-1841) was one of the earlier theorists to depart from the Faculty Psychology reminiscent of Locke and Rousseau toward mathematical psychology. He argued, in a noticeable departure from his predecessors, that a child was not born with a Will and that there were no such things as separate “Faculties” of mind (Herbart 1804/1977a). Mind was a single entity and the Will, feelings, and desires were made via “presentations” to the child’s consciousness, preferably those organized by the family tutor. Objects in the exterior world and the interior mind possessed souls or powers. These “Reals” in the world which had their own powers clashed like Newtonian forces and each Real tried to self-preserve its soul in the process. The outcome of such perturbations was mathematically calculable; the stronger would win out and remain above the “threshold of consciousness” and be stored in memory, a threshold that unwittingly became a precondition to Freud’s future rendition of the child and its subconscious. What resulted for Herbart were ideas and a large, increasing stock of ideas called an apperceptive mass. The aim of education for Herbart was morality and amid the narrative tropes of the German *Bildungsroman*, an emergent Prussian nation-State, and a reaction against Kantian idealism, the child would be built out of systematically screened and organized presentations chosen by the tutor. In an ever-increasing upward spiral that signaled a move toward “civilization” and away from the signifier of “barbarism” the child’s five internal relations of the Will would be constructed to stand in good alignment with each other. Thus, both mind and Will would be built and the widened circle of thought that resulted, which was comported from diverse stimuli, would be the precondition to a stable, homogeneous, and consistent identity required by the intuitively moral man.

By the early 1800s, therefore, it was possible for Herbart to disarticulate philosophy from psychology, ends from means, and thereby to assert that pedagogy was a distinct science (Herbart

1806/1977b). Pedagogy was that science focused on the act of instruction and it was intimately interrelated with other sciences, specifically that branch of aesthetics he called ethics and the study of consciousness called psychology, where psychology was not experimental but calculable and related to the observation of the young and an estimation of which presentations they had already been exposed to.

By the late 1800s, psychology was raising different questions regarding the “development” of humans than those posed earlier by Herbart in Germany and was beginning to “experiment” with experimenting (Herman 1995; Taylor 1994). Psychology had begun to make use of scientific methods of observation and aggregation of data to investigate problems like Will in children, criminality in adults, delinquency in juveniles, and degeneracy in “races.” Methods drawn from physical anthropology, statistics, and medicine infused the research techniques of the first generation of self-proclaimed psychologists such as Granville Stanley Hall (1846-1924).

Education’s uptake of psychological methods for posing and answering questions was also facilitated by an appeal to science as a means for truth production. In the late nineteenth century, the New Scientific Pedagogy and the New Psychology were often synonymous terms in educational discourse and were deployed rhetorically to assert a truth claim. The interdependency of education and psychology was enabled by education’s provision of the subjects (e.g., children) necessary for data gathering and by psychology’s production of new strategies for monitoring and changing those subjects (e.g., teaching techniques). It was partly because of an institutional and intellectual interdependence that developmentalism could take hold, creating a new kind of “developing child” through techniques of study that emerged in/as a variety of public school reform efforts.

Some developmental theorists such as the radical branch of German Herbartianism emphasized the “ontology recapitulates phylogeny” argument, suggesting that children develop in stages marked by the evolution of “the race” and that this was primarily a genetic unfolding. Others, like the American Herbartianists, reinscribed the child’s

Will as inborn and not built, thereby positing development more singularly as a widening of the child’s circle of thought rather than as a form of implanting Will. Still further, Froebelians [proponents of Friedrich Froebel (1782–1852) and the kindergarten movement] focused on very young children particularly within the context of the family and preschooling and did not assume that scientific observation of a child was necessary to helping a child “develop.” In sum, development did not mean one thing, but developmentalism was a wide variety of movements which converged around a belief that the child did in fact develop through set stages (e.g., kindergarten, transition, juvenile, adolescence) that were scientifically verifiable and linked to Darwinistic, and sometimes Social Darwinistic, assumptions about the evolution of humans in the form of races.

In continental Europe, the UK, and the United States, developmentalism was a controversial description of the young that was contested in curriculum debates. In conversations surrounding public schooling and more indirectly in teacher training, the idea that schools and lessons should be built around the child’s developmental stages as opposed to the organization of classical content, such as Latin and Greek, was a radical move that had echoes of Locke’s shift within it (Hall 1901). What had become of the child in such debates was in part explicable by a new theory of and orientation to the child’s powers as in service to racial evolution and nation-building. In Child-study, for instance, only some of the young were considered to have the biophysiological powers to evolve to the next level of development. The body’s internal cellular and genetic powers were given moral and intellectual meaning, generating castes of educability and humanness that lent to racial supremacist discourses a different, but familiar, rationalization for the construction of whiteness in particular as though it was a “deserved privilege.” At the turn of the twentieth century, “the child” bore these wider relationships within its status as a noun, as one who was an exclusive and restricted site and as one who was subjected to welfare reasonings based on a belief in delivering to the young what they were thought “fit for” or “adapted to (Hall,

1904).” The rationalizations that secured both developmentalism and normalized a belief in racially sexed children (i.e., children as those who are raced and sexed prior to sex) have over the course of the twentieth century taken different, yet similar forms, mutating from the anti-recapitulation theories of Piaget which still privileged belief in the staggered development of psychobiological “powers” to the later twentieth-century Vygotskian constructivism that posits a “zone of proximal development” on the way to “becoming” the privileged and participatory adult of liberal democracies to the biologized child of brain-based learning and educational neuroscience whose form and content of Being are pinned to an organological locus (Baker, 2015).

Cross-References

- [Langeveld, Martinus J. \(1905–1989\)](#)
- [Semiosis as Relational Becoming](#)

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Child Development

- [Ethics and Significance: Insights from Welby for Meaningful Education](#)

Child-Animal Relations

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Synonyms

[Phenomenology](#); [Phenomenology](#), [Education](#), and the [More-Than-Human World](#)

Introduction

There are three distinctive schools of educational thought and research that focus upon the significance of children's relations with animals. Each engages with child-animal relations from a unique disciplinary perspective, in a unique way, and for specific purposes and ends.

The first is a breakaway school within developmental psychology. Researchers in this school insist that child-animal relations are significant to children's development because children grow up in a natural as well as a social environment. They consider the ways in which children's relations with animals enhance their social, cognitive, moral, and emotional development. Taking a critical and more ecologically attuned position within developmental psychology, this research challenges developmentalism's hitherto human-centric, or anthropocentric, focus and seeks to extend the vision of this dominant educational paradigm beyond exclusively human relations.

Within special education, developmental psychologists have a particular interest in child-animal relations. They stress the therapeutic significance of children's interactions with animals and operate from a belief that animals have a calming and a generally enabling effect upon children with disabilities, which can support their development and learning. They therefore promote the practical benefits of applying animal-assisted interventions, activities, therapies, and educational programs for children with a wide range of intellectual and psychosocial disabilities.

The third school of thought and research has emerged more recently. Like the first, it also challenges the anthropocentric premises of human developmental theory, but not from a developmental psychology perspective. It is strongly influenced by posthumanist philosophies and is part of the "animal turn" – an interdisciplinary paradigm-shifting move to decenter the human within the social sciences and humanities. Theoretical and empirical research in this field focuses upon the ethical, political, and environmental significance of children's relations with animals. It engages with child-animal relations as a philosophically and theoretically driven intervention

to decenter the human in education; to reposition the child in a multispecies, not just a human or social world; and to redefine pedagogy.

Child-Animal Relations Within Developmental Theory

Child development scholars with an interest in child-animal relations are still primarily concerned with the development of the child. However, unlike the majority of developmentalists, they insist that it is not only human relationships, and the social context in which these relationships take place, that influence this development. They challenge the anthropocentrism of developmental psychology and point out that in addition to the social context in which children grow up, the broader natural environment and specifically their relations with other species also have a formative influence upon their development.

E.O. Wilson's (1984) biophilia hypothesis has strongly influenced this biological science-based challenge to the anthropocentrism of human developmental theory. The biophilia hypothesis stresses that because of our evolutionary common ancestry, all humans are born with a biological affinity with and innate attraction to other species. Children's instinctive love of animals is often cited as evidence of this. Developmental psychologists with an interest in child-animal relations draw upon the biophilia theory to explain children's natural fascination with animals and to argue that children's development is not only enhanced through their caring relations with animals but also potentially impeded without these relations (Kahn and Kellert 2002).

In addition to the evolutionary biology argument, developmentalists in this breakaway school also point to the fact that contemporary childhoods are saturated with animal presences (Melson 2001; Myers 1998). In other words, children's innate natural affinity for nature and animals is universally recognized and culturally endorsed by the plethora of stories that feature animal characters, as well as by the multitudes of toy animals and other commercial children's

products that are adorned with animal imagery. In addition to this, the majority of children in Western cultural contexts live with family pets, and children in the rural Western and developing world grow up with domesticated farm, village, or herding animals. They argue that it is simply not feasible to deny that animals play a large part in the lives of all children and that the ubiquitous presence of animals is an integral component of all children's growth and development.

Empirical studies of child-animal relations focus upon the developmental benefits that children gain from their relations with animals (Kahn and Kellert 2002; Melson 2001; Myers 1998). These observational case studies look for evidence of the full gamut of developmental markers – cognitive, social, emotional, physical, and moral. Children's natural empathy for animals is often closely observed and evaluated. Case studies of children's free play that observe children involved in animal role-play find that children's capacity to accurately mimic animal's embodied modes of being (the way they move and hold their bodies) is evidence of their cognitive ability to put themselves in the shoes of others (Myers 1998). Other mixed-mode qualitative studies note that children often regard pets as part of their families and have sibling-like relationships with them. Children's emotional development can be witnessed when they respond with love to animals with "cute" faces and display nurturing behaviors toward them (Melson 2001).

Developmental psychologists who specialize in child-animal research are critical of the anthropocentric premises of mainstream child developmental theory. They point to the limits of only ever-casting children's interest in and relationships with animals as immature but useful rehearsals for their optimal functioning in an exclusively human (or social) world. As an alternative to the prevailing anthropocentric premises, they propose a "biocentric" or "ecocentric" approach to human development, which is built upon an acceptance of biophilia and is more in line with the animal-saturated reality of children's lives. Within such an approach, children belong to the natural world, not just to human society, and it is vital that they develop a sense of full

environmental stewardship – a responsibility to care for all forms of life, not just a sense of social responsibility (Melson 2001; Myers 1998). From this ecological child development perspective, child-animal relations are seen as significant *in their own right*, not merely as a preparatory stage for enhancing their all-important social development and human relationships.

Child-Animal Relations Within Special Education

Many developmental psychologists working in the subdisciplinary field of special education advocate for the use of animal-assisted activities, interventions, and learning-support programs for children with disabilities. The opportunity to interact with animals is seen as beneficial for children with a wide array of disabilities, including cognitive impairment, developmental delays, and psychosocial and behavioral disorders (McCardle et al. 2011).

There are a number of different kinds of animal-assisted activities, interventions, and programs within special education. These range from the daily presence of individual children's service dogs to the keeping of small pets and animals in classrooms and playgrounds, to regular visits to horse-riding schools for the disabled, and to longstanding and full-scale residential animal-assisted therapeutic and education programs in special schools such as Green Chimneys, in New York State in the USA (Ross 2011).

Those advocating for animal-assisted activities in special education share an unpinning faith in the power of the human-animal bond and a belief that children's relationship with animals is not only therapeutic but also has the potential to enhance their learning outcomes (Ross 2011). Although the integration of animals within special education programs, in one way or another, is almost a standard practice today, there have been scant empirical studies of the effects of animals upon children's learning. The emphasis remains upon the application of the best practice and upon anecdotal rather than evidence-based evaluation. Some common observations are that animals have

a calming effect upon children. They help them to relax and to feel safe, to stay focused, and to hold attention. They offer companionship without judgment, thus providing comfort for anxious children. The general consensus is that the presence of animals creates an emotionally stable environment that helps children to gain confidence and build skills (Ross 2011).

Child-Animal Relations Within the “Animal Turn”

This third school of thought is aligned with the “animal turn” – a newly emerging interdisciplinary intellectual paradigm that is premised upon an understanding that the way we think about ourselves as humans is closely connected with the way we think about other animals. It challenges the anthropocentrism of humanist philosophical traditions, including the foundational belief that humans are separate from and superior to other animals because of our exceptional capacity to reason and to exercise intentional agency. In short, the “animal turn” is an intervention associated with posthumanist philosophy, which refutes the Western divide between humans and animals and calls for new ways of thinking about human-animal relations, about subjectivity and about agency.

Many of the scholars who engage with the “animal turn” and study child-animal relations are from the subdisciplinary fields of environmental education or early childhood education, or they straddle both. They engage in interdisciplinary scholarship that is informed by environmental philosophy, science and technology studies, human geography, environmental sociology, and the environmental and indigenous humanities. They call for a regard for other species as subjects in their own right; for the recognition of the complex entanglement of human-animal relations; for an attendance to the ways that children’s past, present, and future lives are bound up with those of other species; for a repositioning of children’s lives within multispecies common worlds; and for the application of ethical, political, and environmental frameworks to child-animal common

world relations (Oakley et al. 2010; Common World Childhoods Research Collective 2015).

The philosophical shift associated with the “animal turn” has a number of implications for education. In particular, it prompts a reconceptualization of the relationship between the subjects and objects of knowledge that underpin pedagogy and research. It offers a direct challenge to the mantra of child-centered learning that prevails in early childhood and primary pedagogies. It also challenges the standard pedagogical practice of learning about the natural world (including animals) as an object of study within environmental education (Taylor and Pacini-Ketchabaw 2015; Oakley et al. 2010). Educational proponents of the “animal turn” are beginning to explore the pedagogical implications of *not* separating ourselves off from other species, of shifting the pedagogical focus from the child to the child’s relations with other species, and of considering what it might mean to learn *with* other species, not just about them (Rautio 2013; Oakley et al. 2010; Taylor and Pacini-Ketchabaw 2015).

Research that engages with the “animal turn” requires new methodological approaches that resist the interconnected human/animal and subject/object divides, decenter the human, and regard animals as agentic subjects rather than passive objects and as active partners in child-animal relationships. Multispecies ethnographies, affect-attuned observations of child-animal encounters, and narratives that trace the semiotic and material entanglements of children and animal’s lives are examples of the kinds of experimental methodologies that are being used to approach child-animal research in relational rather than dualistic ways (Rautio 2013; Taylor and Pacini-Ketchabaw 2015).

Many of these studies of child-animal relations are framed by broader ethical, political, and environmental considerations. These include the ethical and political implications of future generations (of human and other-than-human animals) inheriting an anthropogenically damaged planetary environment and the issue of how to foster multispecies belongings and convivial multispecies cohabitations in a time of mass species

extinctions (Common World Childhoods Research Collective 2015; Taylor and Pacini-Ketchabaw 2015).

Conclusion

Approaches to the study of child-animal relations vary considerably. While all three schools of thought and research discussed here promote the intrinsic value of interspecies relations and, more specifically, the pedagogical significance of children's relations with animals, they have different disciplinary perspectives, draw upon different theoretical frameworks, use different methodologies, and are differently motivated.

The developmental psychologists who study child-animal relations from within a developmentalist framework seek to replace their discipline's dominant anthropocentric focus with a biocentric approach to child development. Within this biocentric approach, children are seen as having an innate (biologically determined) connection to animals. Their motivation is to convince their colleagues that children's development and learning can only be enhanced by taking the child-animal connection seriously.

The developmental psychologists who promote animal-assisted pedagogies within special education share this belief that children have a special connection with animals. However, they are less concerned about challenging the anthropocentrism of dominant child development paradigms as they are with the business of integrating animals into special education programs in order to assist children with disabilities to thrive and learn.

The last group, more commonly affiliated with environmental and early years education, approaches child-animal relations from outside a developmental psychology framework. They are interdisciplinary scholars, who have been influenced by the more than human or "animal turn" that has spread across the social sciences and humanities over the last decade. Along with the first school of scholars, they share a desire to

challenge the anthropocentrism of the dominant child development paradigm. However, unlike them, they do this by engaging with posthumanist theory and philosophy and calling for a complete paradigm shift in the way in which we think about what it means to be human and our relations with other species. Their work is heavily theorized but also empirical, as they study the ways in which child-animal relations might shed light on the big-picture ethical and political questions of interspecies cohabitations in ecologically challenging times.

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Childhood and Difference

► Childhood and Otherness

Childhood and Diversity

► Childhood and Otherness

Childhood and Environments

► Children and Sustainability

Childhood and Foreignness

► Childhood and Otherness

Childhood and Globalization

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Synonyms

Consumer Culture and Children

Rapid shifts and trends in the economy and technology are reshaping the experience of childhood for young children throughout the world. Developmental psychologists, early childhood educators, and many parents espouse that childhood is under siege by powerful global forces with the influence to corrupt innocent and vulnerable children, destroy local cultures, and homogenize the planet. On the other hand, marketers represent the child subject as a savvy consumer with a right to resources. These competing discourses collide

dramatically in the discussion/debate surrounding corporate marketing to children. Businesses posit their marketing to children as an act of empowerment by equating freedom with the power to consume. This entry examines current discourses surrounding marketing to children within the context of a globalized consumer culture.

Globalization and Consumer Culture

Globalization is a term that is frequently used in education and policy reform. The term globalization itself is used to describe the processes that open up local societies to influences beyond their regional or national borders. These influences are economic, cultural, political, and societal and affect the everyday contexts for all of us, including young children. Educators are feeling increased pressure to adapt curriculum and rethink pedagogy to meet the needs of “today’s globalized child.” But who is this globalized child? It is important to recognize that childhood is a historical, cultural, and contextual construction.

This is not to discount the obvious changes that have occurred in recent years. Throughout history childhood was the site of social and cultural reproduction. Today, children in industrialized nations spend more time with globally produced media than they do in school, asleep or with their friends and family. Even in rural parts of the Global South, access to mobile phones and other electronic media is making international consumer culture a mainstay in the lives of children. The image of a child at play in the neighborhood park with friends may be alive and well, but it is more likely that this child is in her room with headphones watching television and simultaneously gaming on a mobile phone (Buckingham 2007). This reality is giving marketers unprecedented access to children.

These “new times have ushered in a new era of childhood” (Steinberg and Kincheloe 2004, p. 1). Currently, media use begins in infancy, with, on any given day, 29% of babies under the age of 1 watching an average of 90 min of television per day. That number jumps to 64% of children 12–24

months of age (Rideout 2011). Preschool children spend between 4.1 and 4.6 h per day using screen media. By the time children are 8 years old, they are spending more time with screen media than they do in the classroom. It stands to reason that if children are spending more time with media than in school, consumer culture has become the central curriculum of childhood (McNeal 1992).

Historically, children have been targeted as a segment of the consumer market, but today children are being groomed from birth to become super-consumers (Bakan 2011). There are several factors that have led to an increase in the levels of corporate marketing to children. The deregulation of the advertising industry in the 1980s opened up the floodgates to advertisers, putting fewer restrictions on advertising to children and creating an explosion in cable television that expanded youth programming and promoted corporate “kid culture” (McNeal 1999). This, combined with the explosion of new technologies (the Internet, home video game consoles, portable music players, DVDs, home computers, portable handheld video game systems, MP3 players, DVRs, electronic interactive toys, Internet-connected smartphones, and tablet computers) of the current era, has completely changed advertising.

From birth, children are being targeted as future customers. In his 1992 book, *Kids as Customers*, McNeal advises companies that they only have two options when it comes to creating new customers: (1) convince someone to switch to their brand from a competitor or (2) get a customer who is newly entering the market. Children fall into the second category and, as such, are highly valued and sought out by companies wanting to gain their brand loyalty as early as possible. Current estimates show that marketers will spend approximately \$15–17 billion per year to advertise to children in the United States. This is a huge increase when one considers that in 1983, advertisers were spending a mere \$100 million. This dramatic increase in advertising spending has been fueled by new technologies such as the Internet, social networking, video games, and personal smartphones. Research has estimated that children view approximately 40,000 advertisements per year (Kunkel et al. 2004).

Several studies have examined the link between children’s media use and the effects that increased exposure to consumer culture had on their well-being. Children are grown, groomed, targeted, manipulated, and made to feel insecure and anxious from birth to be more susceptible to advertising. A UNICEF report (2007) found that children in the United Kingdom scored low on a scale of quality of life in comparison to the other countries being rated. The report identified the United Kingdom’s materialistic culture, combined with its high levels of social inequality as a key reason for the lower score for children’s well-being. The survey, which was conducted with children across several European countries, concluded that:

Consumerism appears to have become inextricably enmeshed in children’s relationships with family and friends . . . families in the UK, more so than in Sweden and Spain, use the purchase of new material objects (particularly new technology) in an attempt to compensate for relationship problems and social insecurity. In the United Kingdom parents and children seemed to be locked into a compulsive consumption cycle. (2007, p. iii)

The report centered on a tug-of-war that children described as the desire for quality time with their parents and their own intense feelings of desire for electronics, brand-name clothes, and other expensive items. Children explained that they did not have as much time to spend with their parents who felt compelled to work long hours. In contrast children in Spain and Sweden felt much less pressure to purchase consumer items. The UNICEF report highlighted the differences in culture and governmental priorities between the countries. A shift in national priorities was suggested for the United Kingdom, one that moves away from a focus on consumerism at the expense of children and families.

Governmental Regulation of Advertising to Children

This UNICEF report, along with an increase in childhood obesity, revitalized the debate about who should police or regulate advertising to children. Individual countries have taken various

approaches to the regulating of broadcast advertisements aimed at children. In the United States, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) creates the guidelines and polices the advertising industry. However, pro-business lobbies have effectively convinced congress to strip away at the authority of the FTC. The FTC has all but abdicated its role as regulator and left the advertising industry to self-regulate, claiming that it is the least intrusive and most responsible way to regulate (Linn 2005).

Government regulation of advertising to children is regulated in many other nations throughout the world. For example, in 1991, Sweden banned all advertising aimed at children, and they did so with the majority of their population's consensus. The Swedish government has explained their rationale for the popularity of these regulations as based on the belief that children under the age of 12 are not able to fully understand a commercial's intent and are not fully capable of being educated consumers. In 2000, Sweden's leader took the helm of the European Union and attempted to convince fellow members to follow their lead and enact a total ban on direct advertising to children. The total ban may have passed had it not been for the intense objection of the United Kingdom. The United Kingdom's answer to the political pressure was to initiate a media literacy program in its schools to better educate children as consumers. The program, named Media Smart, was a compromise argued for by advertisers. Rather than enact a total ban on advertising aimed at children, in 2009, the European Union passed the EU Audiovisual Media Services Directive. This directive lays out regulations on advertising to children that apply to all 28 European Union members. The EU Audiovisual Media Services Directive is broad and has been adopted and enacted within the various countries in a multitude of ways. For example, Greece has a ban on children's toy advertisements during a typical child's waking hours (from 7 AM until 10 PM). They also have a complete ban on the advertising of toys that encourage or glorify war. In Sweden and Norway advertising to children under the age of 12 is completely banned. In Denmark and Belgium there are also government restrictions on advertising to children.

Constructions of Childhood Within the Debate Over Advertising to Children

Two dichotomous paradigms of childhood can be identified throughout the literature and tend to be pitted against each other within the debate about children and advertising. They are *the vulnerable child* and *the empowered child* paradigm. Although these paradigms are overlapping and related in some ways, naming and dividing them in two categories can help to define the views about childhood from which the research stems.

The Vulnerable Child Model

The assumptions that make up *the vulnerable child paradigm* are rooted in developmental psychology and are reflected within the research and advocacy surrounding marketing to children. The research on advertising to children falls into two main categories, a child's ability to watch, recognize, understand, and remember advertisement and a child's reaction to the messages within advertisements.

The first body of research found that (1) young children are unable to recognize advertisements, (2) they have difficulty differentiating between commercials and programming, (3) they do not understand the intent of advertising, and (4) advertisements are misleading. The second body of knowledge that was presented examined the messages within advertising and how children reacted to these messages. These findings are as follows: (1) the advertising of unhealthy products such as alcohol, tobacco, and junk food have contributed to a rise in youth tobacco and alcohol use and the childhood obesity epidemic; (2) the marketing of violent movies, games, and toys have led to a general desensitization of violence and the use of gender stereotyping to sell violent toys to boys; (3) marketers are using the developmental concept of gender differentiation to sell girls highly gendered and sexualized toys, clothing, and media products; and (4) there is mounting evidence that advertising to children can instill materialistic values that may harm children's physical and psychosocial well-being.

Throughout the world, coalitions of parents have joined with health and education experts to fight against what they see as the predatory

practices of advertisers. These groups argue that the commercialization of childhood is having devastating effects on children's physical, mental, emotional, and spiritual well-being. They focus on advertising's unintended, harmful effects. Interestingly these coalitions represent a broad cross section of the political spectrum. Organization such as Commercial Alert are concerned mainly with the corporate influence welded over children and are more in line with other corporate protectionist groups. On the opposite side of the political spectrum, the Motherhood Project is neo-conservative politically, but they have joined forces with this coalition because they are concerned with the messages of sexualization and glamorization of the celebrity culture that goes against wholesome "family values."

Sociologists and anthropologists have criticized the vulnerable child model for several reasons, firstly for being biologically essentialist. It fails to take into account children's individual personalities and characteristics. This model paints children as almost "zombie-like" creatures that are unable to withstand the influence of advertisers who are able to control their tastes, desires, and behaviors. They critique this model for being too simplistic. Children are seen as subjects without agency and therefore must be protected by adults.

Sociologists have pointed out that the coalition fighting the commercialization of children is simply taking part in the time-honored tradition of the older generation worrying about the younger one being corrupted by a new technology. This is often referred to as a "moral panic." They point out that comic books and radio were also protested as a corrupting influence. Furthermore, the adults who cast their gaze on the child and their explanations are often an attempt to make sense of "childhood" while at the same time dealing with their own anxieties, frustrations, and fears about the future. A final critique of the vulnerable child model is that it is elitist. Critics point out that the majority of the members of the coalition to ban advertising are educated, white middle- to upper-class parents. Some have critiqued them as classists who worry that the consumer culture is vulgar and that adult world is full of greed, violence, and sex. In

contrast, children are inherently pure, innocent, and full of wonder.

The Empowered Child Model

The empowered child model views children as active agents who are capable of contributing to their construction of their own subjectivity (Steinberg and Kincheloe 2004). Critical early childhood theorists, sociologists, advocates for media literacy and marketers tend to fall into this camp for different reasons.

Critical theorists and sociologists point to a blurring of the lines between childhood and adulthood. They posit that today's children are exposed to adult issues much earlier than those in past generations. They challenge the "positivist conception of children as voiceless passive entities that need to be controlled and regulated by adults" (Share 2009, p. 101). Instead of banning advertising to children, they promote media literacy awareness as a way to combat some of the negative effects of advertising. Media literacy curricula teach children about the television and advertising industries, discuss the intent of advertisements, and aim to provide children with the skills they need to think more critically about media. It is a field of study to itself, and as such, there is a large body of evidence that shows media literacy can be an effective intervention for teaching children to think critically about advertisements.

Curiously these are the very same arguments that are being made by marketers who want to be able to market to children. Marketers have successfully touted purchase power as synonymous with purchase power. The advertising industry has been very influential in the construction of the empowered child model. Children are seen as savvy consumers who are able to make purchasing decisions beyond influencing their parent's decisions. Children as consumers are able to shift markets and shape kid culture. Children are seen as powerful markets whose tastes and loyalties are researched and catered to by multinational companies.

The empowered child model is critiqued for believing that consumers always act in their own best interest, based on making rational decisions. This does not take into account that marketing can

and often does mislead individuals and influence their tastes and/or their self-concept. If this were not the case, corporations would not be spending billions of dollars annually on trying to influence children.

Advocates for a third way point out that it is not only children who need sole protection from the evils of corporate culture but rather everyone is playing David to their Goliath (Schor 2004). This third perspective asserts that a hyper-consumerist culture is not good for anyone. The aim within this perspective is to break down the child-adult dichotomy and examine the negative effects of advertising as a culture. Certainly, adults suffer from obesity, tobacco addiction, alcoholism, poor body image, excessive debt, and impulsive spending. By separating children from adults, the discourse centers around what is appropriate for children at what age and how children should spend their time (i.e., screen time vs. outdoor time). The discourse is about controlling and protecting the innocent child until that child is developmentally ready to enter the “adult world.”

Schor (2004) called for an *Integrated Child and Adult Critical Perspective*. Within this perspective, it is argued that aspects of consumer culture impact everyone negatively, not only children. Rather than aiming to solely protect children from the many toxic bi-products of corporate influence, people should be fighting to make the world safer and healthy for everyone.

In Conclusion

This article has presented a glimpse into the context and discourses that surround and attempt to define childhood within a global consumer culture. Children are growing up within an increasingly commercialized culture, one that supports the view of children as “profit centers.” More research is needed that moves beyond the dichotomous paradigms that currently dominate the discourses about children and consumerism. It is also important for educators to include counter-narratives that challenge the dominant messages in consumer culture. These messages would promote environmental responsibility and the value of people and experiences over material things.

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Childhood and Innocence

- [Longing for Innocence and Purity: Nature and Child-Centered Education](#)

Childhood and Motherhood

- [Longing for Innocence and Purity: Nature and Child-Centered Education](#)

Childhood and Nation Building

- [Longing for Innocence and Purity: Nature and Child-Centered Education](#)

Childhood and Otherness

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Synonyms

Childhood and difference; Childhood and diversity; Childhood and foreignness

Introduction

We wonder whether an increased focus on the ethics of difference in childhood and different manifestations, both discursive and material, . . . can help to expose the generative in childhood otherness, and sustain the generative in infinitely unnamed, unknown, scary, and unrecognizable childhood 'subjects and objects'. (Tesar and Koro-Ljungberg 2015, p. 4)

This entry theorizes perspectives on Otherness as they relate to childhoods. Grounded in seminal and contemporary theories on constructions of childhoods, it focuses specifically on conceptions of foreignness, the stranger, or the Other in relation to children and childhoods. The entry intersects a philosophical engagement with the Other with particular impacts and possibilities that arise for children as or with the Other. It raises issues associated with childhoods entangled with and generative of different manifestations of Otherness, as alluded to by Tesar and Koro-Ljungberg in the opening quote. Given the complexity of possible impacts and implications of Otherness on children and childhoods, this entry offers a consideration of possibilities, in this multifaceted, ever-more-political complication of childhood/s.

While the focus of this entry is on aspects most related to cultural Otherness, the considerations can apply in similarly complicated ways to wider notions and experiences of Otherness for children. Connections may be apparent, for example, with Otherness arising from normalizations of gender and conceptions of disability or of school achievement, behavior, or beauty and further

marginalizing phenomena that affect children and their understandings of themselves. Given the multilayered and diverse possible impacts and implications of Otherness on children and childhoods, this entry argues for an ethical approach to Otherness and to exploring and elevating, rather than knowing, or worse eliminating, Otherness. Its aim is thus to problematize rather than clarify complexities, to provoke considerations of responsible, ethical, and just engagements.

So, this entry offers no particular truth or conclusion, but rather, it suggests that there can be neither. Julia Kristeva's theory of subject formation supports a view of subjectivity as an ongoing and unknowable construction and offers a philosophical and psychoanalytical lens for this examination. The entry draws on Kristeva's (1991) theorization of the notion and experiences of the foreigner and foreignness and of the ongoing nature of subject formation, suggesting possible alternatives, conceptions and insights. It uses the example of contemporary refugee and migrant crises as a prism on childhood-Otherness realities. By emphasizing Otherness as an ethical challenge, the entry aims to provoke questioning and critically rethinking refugee and migrant children's experiences and realities of Otherness.

In the sociology of childhood, childhoods are seen as socially constructed. Childhoods thus arise as products of their time, culture, and relationships, and children are considered members of their society and as actors within it (James et al. 1998). What then does Otherness mean for these childhoods in transit? As socially constructed childhoods, how does it manifest in the everyday lives of children? Any attempt to define the notion of Otherness belies its very essence, since the revelation of such an exposure renders it familiar and no longer Other. This entry follows Tesar and Koro-Ljungberg's (2015) conception of Otherness as "difference," "both discursive and material." Otherness, then, may manifest in various degrees of difference: as merely a little bit strange, stranger, or too strange. Kristeva's (1991) narrations in her book *Strangers to Ourselves* anticipate possible impacts of Otherness through confrontations with the foreigner.

A foreigner, she states, for example, can cause “a choked up rage deep down in my throat,” and can be seen as “a black angel clouding transparency” (p. 1). Following this view, foreigners, strangers, and Others that are discursively or materially different might be seen as an unwanted disturbance, causing a state of anxiety, interrupting children’s everyday normality and routine. Otherness then is concerned with an unfamiliar, unpredictable difference, while the “choked up rage” indicates that such a difference might also be upsetting, worrying, and angering.

Conceptions of Otherness have evoked ethical commitments to tolerance in the past, for all of humanity to live together, on this earth, for example, despite, with, and across political, cultural, religious, and linguistic differences. Some philosophers such as Camus emphasize, similarly to Kristeva, that this is not so simple and that difference can cause resentment, even fear, as the Other may behave, feel, and think differently to the dominant expectations in society and in ways with which others do not agree (Camus 1946/1988). Others, yet, follow the material Otherness referred to above, to claim that Otherness exists not only in the human but in the post-human realm of new materialisms and decentralized child-nature binaries and matter, beyond romanticized and normalized visions and constructions (Malone 2016). Kristeva’s (1991) “black angel” then could metaphorically represent the Other from some of these intricately entangled perspectives, as the subject, object, thing, or matter that behaves (lives, eats, dresses, believes, plays, exists, moves, or infuses) differently, “clouding” known, expected, normal routines, rituals, beliefs, and values of the everyday mundane life of childhood. Situating normality and Otherness is more than a simple dichotomous relationship between one and the other, and engagements with the ethics of Otherness, bearing in mind all of the above aspects, are deeply intertwined and entangled.

The layers of complexity of ethical engagements with Otherness can be seen through Kristeva’s notion of foreignness. For Kristeva (1991), foreignness is fluid. It involves an Otherness that arises from a removal from one’s origins,

either from a situated or metaphorical home- (or mother-)land. She likens to a “demented whirl” (p. 6) such strangeness that can trigger dramatic highs and lows, blurring boundaries, to the point where there is no longer just one or the other, but a constant state of both, of flux between familiarity and the Other. She describes foreigners as hiding behind diverse masks, rootless, wandering, attempting to fit in, with new communities, hiding their disappointments and sadness. Following Kristeva, affirming the foreigners’ identity becomes a tenuous affair: Where do they belong? Everywhere? Nowhere? And what counts, in the new place, citizenship, passports, or geographic locality – acceptance in society, the social grouping, work, or community? Situated thus, the foreigners’ Otherness can be determined in many ways: legal, physical, contractual, emotional, and spiritual. It can be perceived as a potentially creative situation, offering new challenges and opportunities, or raise angst and guilt, the “choked up rage,” toward the future or the past that is left behind.

Similarly to Kristeva’s foreigners, children confronted with Otherness can experience it in multilayered and complicated ways. Their experiences may or may not be visible, clear, or understood by adults, as they too apply various masks, become uprooted, and seek new ways of fitting in. War and poverty are major reasons for families to flee their homelands in the contemporary global political and social climate. Childhoods in refugee situations are childhoods embroiled in Otherness. They turn the questions facing the foreigner to questions of children’s being and belonging, as members of a community, of a school or early childhood setting, belonging to a church, maybe, or to a football club, and critically, as citizens, belonging to a nation State. Current refugee crises, in Europe, for instance, have created situations for children, where very much of life that was once familiar is now not. The Otherness of life drives them and their families to risk and humiliation in major traverses across water and land that represent more of the unknown than can be imagined. With their homely, community and social landscapes often literally obliterated, these children’s childhoods themselves have become

childhoods of Otherness: unknown and unknowable, like, for Kristeva, the foreigner himself.

Understanding identity is complex, and in trying to do so, Kristeva (2000, 2008) has repeatedly raised the question of European identity and culture. Does it exist? And if it does, what is it – and what is its Other? Her response reflects her philosophy on the subject, as forever in process, as she claims that “there does exist an identity, mine, yours, but it is infinitely in construction, de-constructible, open and evolving” (Kristeva 2008, p. 2). The daily news reports of refugees escaping war and other atrocities explicate some of this evolution that Kristeva sees as “infinitely in construction” and “open and evolving.” Territorial and personal fragilities play out in many ways, along railway lines, in the cold and rain, maybe being with loved ones, and for many others now separated, and in knowing that the fence along which they walk has been erected as a specific act to ostracize and exclude.

The disruption and Othering in refugee children’s lives, then, occur on multiple levels and in multiple, intertwined ways. One element of their previous normality that becomes disturbed is their education – at least in the sense that was known, familiar, and planned for them and for their future place in their society. The experiences of exile, escape, care, and dependence with their extended families and other refugees, as they traverse foreign landscapes, through refugee corridors that have been constructed specifically for the purpose of containing the tide of people (explicitly Othering them in the process), are arguably deeply educational in many ways. Furthermore, temporary educational facilities operate on a small scale along the way. Such an example can be found in Kilis, on the Syrian/Turkish border, where Ahmed has opened a space (and his heart) for children, offering them a temporary educational setting and a hint of “normality,” as he tutors children through school- and kindergarten-like experiences. He helps them to come together, child-Others, with others on the march, to try to make some sense of their lives in their temporary alienation and Otherness. He also helps them with regaining a sense of trust in humanity, as

he smiles, teases, and seems to understand (Smalley 2015), for the moment.

Refugee crises arouse moral and ethical positionings. Strong calls for increased protection of children in refugee situations deepen concerns with/for the child Other. Removed from no-longer-safe homelands, refugee children’s childhoods can be seen as endangered, in terms of deviating from their previous normalities: their childhoods are no longer what they were and the social construct no longer fits. What does childhood mean, for child refugees? Through a Kristevan (1991) lens that sees identities as always in constant construction, the realities of these childhoods perhaps prematurely impose on children the concept that one is always also a foreigner within. Otherness in this sense may create for refugee children a disappearance of their childhood, in the blurring of lines between what are considered to be childhood concerns and those that only adults should have to deal with. When their childhood is relegated to exile in detention centers, for example, or on the march and sleeping under bridges, or in a boat, awaiting political decisions on their status, rights, and further thoroughfare to safety, refugee childhoods are prematurely thrust into adult-level Othernesses and danger. How such Otherness endangers childhoods depends on the situation, histories, culture, and citizenship of the refugees and the dominant orientations toward childhood in each situation. In addition, conceptions of ethics and of danger and Otherness are further complicated by the idea that escaping home, and risking exhaustion, humiliation, debt, and death in unknown lands, is considered a safer alternative to remaining in war-torn homelands.

Otherness in relation to children implicates rights conferred by internationally mandated declarations, such as the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNICEF n.d.). Exorbitant numbers of child refugees currently fleeing their war- and poverty-torn homelands escalate concerns related to basic humanitarian rights to eat, sleep, and wash, and already pressing issues with holding religious beliefs, practising cultural rituals and routines, having and

expressing a voice to nondiscrimination. While Ahmed might offer temporary refuge and create a minimal educational context for children Othered as refugees, long-term implications are barely imaginable, in this political, cultural, and social volatility. Where will these children be allowed to settle? What will the local constructs of childhood be in that social, natural geographic place and space, and how will children who have experiences of such turmoil be able to live there, as Kristeva (1991) further suggests, “without ostracism but also without levelling” (p. 2)? The ethical responses to childhoods and Otherness called for above, for tolerance, and for recognition of the complexities, fear, and unknown subject-object-matter and child-nature relationships thus play out in localized as well as global, social, political, and historical realities, further entangling and mirroring the in-betweenness of their situation.

A further implication of childhood Otherness in refugee situations, as hinted above, is the concern with the foreignness within. While Kristeva is clear that identities are in constant construction, childhood confrontations with Otherness evoke her assertion that the “foreigner lives within us,” that “by recognizing him within ourselves, we are spared detesting him in himself,” and, furthermore, that the foreigner only “disappears when we all acknowledge ourselves as foreigners” (Kristeva 1991, p. 1). Conceptualizing the foreigner within, in each child, adult, and perhaps even beyond, turns the conceptual lens onto the individual, child, adult, citizen, and alien. . . and thing, matter, and nature. It further affirms the ethics of Otherness, by eliminating the need to know and creating instead a state where the unknown offers an openness that allows for ambiguity, uncertainty, and generative possibilities. Kristeva’s interests in the European subject and identity provoke dialogue and possibilities for urgently rethinking Otherness and possible ways forward for child Others.

A European destiny, identity, residency, and security, is the dream that drives families with young children in the current waves of refugees from Syria. While the European Union might be seen as a “global civilizing effort” (Kristeva 2000,

p. 114), where differences must be coordinated and reconciled, this, Kristeva claims, requires a renewed establishment of subjective freedom, toward a meaningful and useful Europe. Refugee childhood experiences involve such a complicated and entangled daily evolution that embeds their forming subjectivities strongly within Othernesses caused by globalization, political identities and ideologies, freedoms, far beyond their immediate situation. The very critical concern is for a Europe that is even liveable. Through conceptualizing child refugee questions of knowing the self, the unconscious and the Otherness within, in relation to the other Othernesses, push to an extreme what Kristeva (2000) calls a crisis of the European subject.

Childhood and Otherness are enacted through refugee children fleeing across Europe. Finding temporary refuge with people like Ahmed, they briefly elude the brazen acts of extreme Othering on their journey: stun grenades, pepper spray, and teargas that impact in unknowable ways on the Otherness within themselves. For refugee children, even if they make it into a new country within Europe, they may, as Kristeva (2000) goes on to say, feel liberated; however, they will most likely remain Other. Their ontological realities, perpetuated as for Kristeva’s (1991) foreigners, through “incoherences and abysses . . . the strangenesses” (p. 2), continue to be governed by also evolving, unknown public and private political, social, and environmental spaces and places. Children’s Othernesses thus both play out and reflect many “demented whirls” of highs and lows, blurring and uncertain boundaries, of their own identities, those of the subjects, objects, matter, and energies of their surroundings. Kristeva’s ideas offer a particular framework for examining conceptions and constructions of childhoods confronted with and engulfed in Otherness. Refugee childhoods have been selected for this entry to foreground an urgent concern for their shifting and complex identities, freedom, and rights and to elevate refugee children ongoingly in the global awareness and in the daily march of their deepening, complex histories, localities, realities, and Otherness.

Cross-References

- [Childhood and Globalization](#)
- [Children and Objects](#)
- [Children's Rights](#)

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social experience” (Fass 2004, p. xi). Historically, childhood “reveals important assumptions and constraints in the larger social environment” (Stearns 2006, p. 3). Certainly this field is most pertinent to educational scholarship, and its teaching often sits squarely within education studies. Schooling and education framed more broadly both figure prominently in recent historical writing about childhood and youth. Yet the field is not restricted by this; historians of childhood and youth are to be found teaching and writing about it across many academic contexts, drawing on a rich diversity of historical and interdisciplinary perspectives. Furthermore, they do so from a wide range of global contexts, utilizing comparative studies to paint a picture that is both fine grained and richly hued; and internationally they are supported by a growing and impressive infrastructure of academic societies, conferences, journals, books, encyclopedias, and specialist readers. This article introduces the field in broad terms by outlining its development, assessing its wider significance, and considering some of the opportunities and challenges still to be faced.

Development

It is commonplace in Western scholarship to trace the historiography of childhood and youth back to the seminal work of the French *Annales*-aligned historian Phillippe Ariès (1962). Historians have used his thesis that childhood is a relatively modern concept dating from around the seventeenth century as a starting point for further research and disputation. This, however, was something of a “false start.” It did set the stage for understanding childhood in historical terms, and it has engendered keen debate in such a way as to clearly put the history of childhood on the map. However, it became overly simplified or was misrepresented by those who followed (who focused somewhat unhelpfully on contrasting “premodern” and “modern” conceptions of childhood or who erroneously tackled the idea that premodern parents held no affection for their children), and it effectively set the field within Western terms or parameters.

Childhood and Youth, History of

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Introduction

The history of childhood and youth is a lively scholarly focus, reflecting several decades of innovative pedagogy and research. It is now an “energetic field of inquiry that provides critical insights into the human past and contemporary

Ariès certainly kick-started genuine and concerted historical interest, yet the significance of his work is more broadly situated. The emergence of a focus on children and youth necessarily reflected wider changes in society and in prevailing historical discourses. In this respect Heidi Morrison provides a helpful framework for understanding how the field began and developed. She argues that there have been at least four paradigm shifts since 1960 (Morrison 2012, pp. 1–5). These shifts are not chronologically contiguous as they overlap to some extent even in the present day. Phillippe Ariès' work represents the first change, what she terms "childhood discovered"; childhood and youth were identified as an inherently important historical focus and category. Newly emerging histories of children and young people in the 1960s and 1970s were part of a larger "subaltern" approach to history, otherwise referred to as "history from below," wherein historians generally "began to probe the past for insights into lived experiences" (Fass 2004, p. xi) and worked to reclaim the histories of so-called powerless social groups (including children) hitherto missing from historical narratives. This coincided with a period of intense social and political ferment, vociferous "liberation" movements, the development of feminist thinking, and a new academic focus on hegemonic structures or institutions of control and discipline, prompted in particular by the work of Michel Foucault.

By the 1990s, reflecting the influence of cultural history and of poststructuralism, a second shift emphasized the ways in which childhood could be reconceived as a "social construct" susceptible to different interpretations, rather than as a category fixed across time, space, or cultures. Focusing on children's experiences as much as on the institutions shaping their lives, historians became interested in how such factors as culture, gender, race, class, nation, environment, and religion served to variously define different childhoods. This approach is still pervasive and has accentuated children's experiences as much as the ideas about them. At the same time, however, it has served to reinforce a problematic binary of "children" and "childhood," which some scholars argue is a distinction that has unhelpfully

"haunted" the field and which is not easily resolved (Olsen 2015, p. 13).

A third, and understandably contemporaneous, paradigm shift highlights the nature of "global childhoods." On the one hand, this means that histories of childhood in non-Western contexts are increasingly appearing, albeit at a slower rate than the production of histories of Western children and young people. There is, for example, a lively field of interest around Latin American children and childhoods; and it is customary in edited collections now to read histories across the spectrum of African, Asian, Pacific, American, and European cultural or geographical contexts and to interpret children's and young people's lives in non-Western terms. On the other hand, attention has turned to a "world" or "global" history approach to children's lives, seeking to compare the commonalities and differences in conceptions of childhood, children's experiences, and the ways in which their lives are variously shaped by the forces of globalization and modernity. Yet there is a further element to this not quite captured here. A newly emergent thread in research and writing – influenced by a mixture of postcolonial, cultural, new imperial, and religious history – is shedding light on the ways in which both colonial and colonized children have variously lived within or been influenced by imperial and transnational networks or influences. Comparative studies thus highlight the reality that "spontaneous, parallel emergences and new departures within the meaning of childhood in different parts of the world reflect a modernity only partially controlled by metropolitan authority, engaged with organically by children and filtered through or checked against local knowledge, local customs and local ways of thinking" (Olsen 2015, p. 15).

A final shift, one that is very much still in progress, is a move toward the practice of children's history becoming more "multidisciplinary" (drawing on different disciplinary perspectives to inform historical understanding) and "multi-generational" (wherein children become research participants and apply a self-reflexive hermeneutic). The first is necessary and logical, given the complex nature and settings of children's lives.

The second is perhaps more aspirational, although the predominance of oral history, as a methodology, to some extent helps to bridge the gap between researcher and subject or past and present. All of these changes in emphasis are significant and have had a demonstrable impact on scholarship. This is broadly and amply evidenced, for example, through the publication over the last decade or so of four important reference collections: the three-volume *Encyclopedia of Children and Childhood in History and Society*, the six-volume *Cultural History of Childhood and Family*, Peter Stearns' *Childhood in World History*, and *The Global History of Childhood Reader* (see References) (Foyster and Marten, 2010).

Significance

Histories of childhood and youth matter because children and young people matter. While it might be argued that this is a politically or culturally situated observation, nevertheless it is true if the histories of other people (ages, genders, races, religions, classes, etc.) also matter. Therefore, if the history of children and young people focused on nothing more than the reclamation of their spaces and stories within the historical record, then that in itself would be sufficient justification. Some reclamation history clearly amounts to little more than disconnected or inchoate accounts or indeed is another form of antiquarianism, but that is not the whole story. The sum total of childhood and youth history conducted over the last four decades has added significantly to our understanding of the who, where, when, what, and why of children's lives and experiences. There now exists, for example, a greater body of knowledge about children's lives over the *longue durée* of human history stretching from ancient origins, across a range of civilizations and cultures, and through a great many historical eras straddling so-called premodern and modern times. At the same time, historians now have a much more nuanced or differentiated understanding of what influenced conceptions and experiences of childhood in the past and how those have changed, at a

range of scales from the local to the global, and increasingly differentiated by race, gender, class, religion, and nation.

At the same time, the question "why pursue the history of children and young people?" is worth considering on a range of other levels. The "history of childhood," argues Steven Mintz, "is anything but a trivial topic. Childhood . . . is the true missing link: connecting the personal and the public, the psychological and the sociological, the domestic and the state." Thinking about the United States, for example, Mintz suggests that children and young people were "inextricably engaged" in key historical events – from "colonization and revolution to industrialization, urbanization, immigration, and war" – and that the "history of childhood is bound up with key cultural, economic, historical, psychological, and sociological themes" (Mintz 2012, p. 17). While context specific, these observations are readily transferable to a host of other national or regional historical contexts in which children have lived or participated.

With the United States also in mind, but having broader application across the Western world if not further, Mintz helpfully offers at least four reasons why histories of children and young people might be of wider significance (Mintz 2012, pp. 18–24). In the first instance, childhood history readily intersects with a number of important historical themes. Childhood, for example, is central to understanding things like: State formation (especially education and educational development, emerging bureaucratic functions, and the evolution of the welfare State), the development of consumer economies and cultures, modernization, and the rise of the therapeutic professions. Secondly, there are synergies between childhood and culture with respect to both the historical "construction of class, ethnic, gender, generational, and sexual identities" and, perhaps less easily, with "children's peer cultures" (Mintz 2012, p. 21). Thirdly, a focus on childhood helps to disrupt expected continuities between past and present; debunking, for example, golden age myths like families being more stable in the past or that in the past childhood was more carefree.

Finally, while not everything from the past is necessarily transferable to the present, there is a didactic element to be considered. This in turn prompts a key question: if childhood and youth are constructs and thus their definitions are fluid or contestable, then to what extent can modern definitions of childhood be categorically privileged, compared with those from past eras and cultures? This implies knowing more about both what children and young people once thought, and how they now think about the past. As the final section outlines, this is a critical issue for the future of the discipline.

This is not to argue that children and young people are a historically privileged group or that their histories should be considered in isolation from others. It does provide a corrective, however, to the understandable perception that history is often defined or represented in adult terms. Furthermore it suggests that childhood and youth should be treated broadly and deliberatively as integral components of any historical categories of analysis and that children and young people's historical lives are as important as any other age or group. While many examples could effectively illustrate this, one will suffice: children and migration.

Migration history is a "hot" academic topic, both pedagogically and research wise, and links directly to a groundswell of genealogical activity and interest in wider society. Until recently, however, historical experiences of migration have been represented – in print and images – largely as adult experiences. Two factors, at least, have begun to change this. One is the relatively recent scholarly emphasis on twentieth-century migration and the use of oral history as a methodology to access migration stories from this period. Adults have recounted their memories and stories of being migrants in childhood, how they experienced that process as children, and the legacies it has left in adulthood. With this comes the consequent realization that children's migration stories also exist for earlier decades and the search to find those experiences in written archives. The other factor is the series of public revelations about the various schemes of forced child migration from

Britain to new world contexts (especially Canada and Australia), from the late nineteenth through to the mid-twentieth centuries. Books, films, and museum exhibitions (physical and online) have curated both the varying experiences of forced migration and highlighted the ways in which these children have been central to prevailing discourses of class, nation, economic progress, welfare, and national consolidation. In the larger picture, children were and are integral to the experience, process, and politics of migration, forced or voluntary. Their stories of movement, dislocation, cultural negotiation, and adaptation deserve to be told, both for their own sake and because they throw a very clear spotlight on prevailing modes of thought and the consequent repercussions for people's lives.

Challenges and Opportunities

In the inaugural issue of the *Journal of the History of Childhood and Youth* in 2008, Peter Stearns argued that a "combination of exploring childhood's pasts for their own sake with an ongoing use of history to shed light on the present" could profitably "form the goal of the revitalized historical study of childhood" (Stearns 2008, p. 40). More specifically he outlined a number of key challenges: finding and hearing children's voices, addressing existing empirical gaps, and taking a more global and comparative approach. As this article shows, these challenges are now being met head on. The field is full of vitality and promise; children's and young people's historical lives are being explored in a multitude of geographical settings and in relation to a plethora of themes or issues. Even so, much of the scholarship has focused on what adults thought about or did to children rather than children's historical experiences. To move forward there are still significant challenges and opportunities for historians of childhood and youth to further consider. While these could be listed in any number of ways, there are at least two key pivot points: prevailing discourses and the nature of the field itself.

On the one hand, the emphases of and methodologies employed by historians of childhood and youth, at any one time, understandably are shaped by prevailing academic, cultural, or political discourses. This is so for all fields of historical inquiry, but perhaps more so in this instance. Hugh Cunningham notes, for example, that the field gained popularity in Western contexts due to current “anxiety about how to bring up children, about the nature of children (angels or monsters?), about the forces, primarily commercialism, impinging on them, and about the rights and responsibilities that should be accorded to them” (Cunningham 1998, p. 1195). From a global perspective, more recent depictions and narratives, for example, of children as soldiers or political refugees, along with revelations of children as forced migrants, as victims of institutional or racial abuse, and as “stolen generations,” add credence to this observation. These emphases then determine or frame to some extent where research energy is directed – albeit to address legitimate and pressing issues or gaps in the scholarship – and they serve to link academic inquiry to social discourse or to campaigns for political change.

As Heidi Morrison’s discussion of paradigm shifts indicates, however, prevailing academic discourses also influence research foci: noted here, for example, in relationship to the changing influences on childhood history of “history from below” and of feminist, gender, poststructuralist, and postcolonial approaches from the 1960s until now. Furthermore academic and cultural discourses are often interrelated. This is obvious, for example, when considering childhood and religion. Until recently secularization – as both a current social trend in Western contexts and as a consequent academic discourse – has been central to discussions about the historical relationship between Western childhood and religion in the modern era. As a historical lens or discourse, it has tended to locate religious influence more in the premodern centuries and to downplay its significance since the late nineteenth century. Once again, however, a global approach requires a different lens. Religion becomes a more dynamic element that forces a reconceptualization of how

the child-religion relationship should be considered. In this respect the “modern [Western] model of childhood does not resonate squarely with all the world’s religions, which is significant regardless of whether or not a child grows up in a secular society” (Morrison 2012, p. 117). The world has changed significantly over the last two decades, against expectations perhaps. Current trends and research all point to this continuing norm; but children are or have been central to religious practice and convictions across multiple world faiths and cultures (Browning and Bunge 2009, pp. 174–176). Here understanding the past is critical to understanding the present, and contemporary society cannot afford, perhaps, to be bound by now outmoded discourses.

On the other hand, and finally, there are both challenges and opportunities that arise from the very nature of this field, relating to the methodological and conceptual problems with respect to excavating and gaining access to children’s historical lives, in particular issues of children’s voice, agency and participation, and the types of sources that might be more or less fruitful. Stearns captures this dilemma by noting the tension between “admitting that it’s harder to get good evidence about past children than it is about past adults” and acknowledging that “most important topics can at least be approached, and overall there’s a vast amount of material available for historical work” (Stearns 2006, p. 3). This will remain a constant tension and a persistent challenge for practitioners of the field. It may be that some source types or methodologies (e.g., oral history) provide more possibilities of engagement, that some age groups (e.g., teenagers) are easier to access and understand or that different conceptual lenses (e.g., global perspectives or the history of emotions) provide new and important ways of thinking. Notwithstanding, this is a positive tension or challenge which – as the programs of conferences, the pages of journals, and ongoing blog site entries indicate – forces historians of children and young people to remain at the cutting edge of thinking and practice. If that happens, the field will remain open to methodological innovation and fresh conceptual thinking and retain its liveliness well into the foreseeable future.

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changing notions of how we understand childhood – a shift from the biological understanding of immaturity to an idea that childhood is socially constructed, and through various philosophical approaches negotiated, in any given moment in a particular society. Historical, political, economical, and geographical considerations, alongside the influences of globalization and ideology, are acknowledged as fundamental driving forces of this field. Particularly in the past 30 years, many disciplines have been claiming the right to define, shape, and provide an understanding of childhood studies and to prove that their disciplinary and methodological lens leads the way for addressing studies of childhood and children. In other words, childhood studies are so broadly defined that it can be argued that any studies of children and childhood that place children within their childhoods, in the center of the inquiry, are childhood studies. Some of the key notions that make childhood studies both important and relevant are their openness, interdisciplinary, and philosophical nature.

Childhood Studies Around 1900

► [Longing for Innocence and Purity: Nature and Child-Centered Education](#)

Childhood Studies, An Overview of

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Introduction

Childhood studies are an emblematic concept and lens incorporating a number of approaches, disciplines, theories, and ideas about children and childhoods. This field of study encompasses both scholarship and activism and includes a philosophical grounding and thinking about children and childhoods. Philosophies revolve around the

Childhood Studies

Childhood studies center ideas, research, and activism around childhood and children, without essentializing or mainstreaming. Philosophy, in particular, contributes to childhood studies, adding philosophical thinking about children and childhood. Childhood studies enable many researchers to liberate themselves from developmental and established top-down theoretical structures about children and childhoods and allow them to consider children as social actors and to research their rights, participation, and vulnerability, just to name a few, through children's lenses. This approach is thus focused on dismantling structural ideas around children and childhoods, and re-shapes the understanding of children's power and agency, and how children can perform these notions as members of society. Thinking philosophically also allows plurality and radical openness for numerous disciplines to become part of childhood studies – sociology, philosophy, anthropology, critical psychology,

literature, architecture, education, law, geography, and other disciplines and fields – that express their claim, right, and interest to childhood studies, to add to this colorful and growing mosaic. The other notion that unites childhood studies is cutting-edge thinking that allows diverse, creative ways of considering children's issues and ideas, with children and by children. Furthermore, what connects all of these disciplines and approaches that started from re-thinking traditional sociological perspectives as a "new sociology of childhood" is the turn that came with a new orientation toward childhood and children and ideas that address children as the center of enquiry (James and Prout 1997).

Children and Childhoods

The question of when childhood starts – and when it ends – is very problematic. Different societies apply different rules and policies, which in the West are mostly based on age, such as in the UNCRC, where clear designations define children as any people under the age of 18. However, in some, more traditional, societies, the idea of maturity refers to particular skills that are relevant to a given society and culture, as the anthropology of childhood has argued (Montgomery 2013). These ideas also propose different conceptions on the construct of a child and the construction and reconstruction of childhoods. Philosophical ponderings on who is a child and what is childhood, through different manifestations, are central to childhood studies research. In the past, these concepts were very much part of the thinking around generational structuring and ordering of society. The age of children as a determinant of a child's capabilities and abilities, and associated policies, placed children within a particular societal structure which shaped their childhood. Traditional developmental psychology, with its tables and clear definitions of stages and milestones, omitted the understanding of culture and society, and of individual differences, including the complex influence of ideology, globalization, and technology. And, most importantly, it omitted the ideas of

children as social actors and the importance of children's voice, participation, and decision-making about matters relevant to their childhood (James et al. 1998).

Childhood studies are firmly grounded in history and argue that childhood does not exist in and of itself, or cannot be clearly defined, as it is socially constructed. Through the course of history, childhood has been invented and re-invented, in different times, societies, and cultures, within diverse philosophical frameworks. There are different perspectives on the history of childhood, both romanticizing and seeing/viewing childhoods through perspectives of cruelty, exploitation, and the mistreatment of children. Historical analyses often pinpoint childhoods as not defined or linear but of complex interactions of individual experiences with ideologies and notions that challenge singular and easily understandable childhoods. The two main researchers of the history of childhoods – Ariès (1962) and Cunningham (2005) – explore constructions of childhoods and portray how childhoods are negotiated through various events and philosophies and how they are connected to society. For Ariès, the argument relates to the nonexistence of the concept of childhood in our understanding of history. He examined diaries, images, texts, discourses, literature, and objects that lead him to the conclusion that up to the Middle Ages childhood had not existed. For example, children's clothes and toys, and associated economical factors that determined their production, invented the category of childhood as a particular outcome, while before this turn conceptions of children as "little adults" were common.

Philosophers such as Hobbes, Rousseau, and Locke had their own visions about children, childhood, and their education, and as Cunningham (2005) argues, their influences in Western society were tremendous. These philosophies contributed to considerations of childhood and children as worthy of attention, of a separate category, and created a clear generational separation between childhood and adulthood. As Tesar et al. (2016) argue, as a seventeenth-century political scholar, Hobbes "saw children as evil or savage, arising

from the fact that all people are born in original sin. Here, the child is in need of control and regulation, notably by the mother” (p. 170). Locke’s philosophy on the other hand characterized “childhood as empty, in that children functioned as blank slates (the fabled *tabula rasa*) that required knowledge supplied by the family and the society so that they could ultimately become productive parts of the social fabric. Here, Locke produces childhood as dependent, as the child has no natural capacities and must be ever minded and directed by parents and the community” (p. 170). However, as they argue in their piece on the philosophy of childhood, “Rousseau inverted the wild state of nature (distinguished by a state of war) asserted by Hobbes and the vacuousness of the child put forth by Locke through a depiction of the child as living in a perfected state of nature and possessing essential goodness and beneficence . . . childhoods are constructively naïve, but they ultimately require protection from the very forces that purport to nurture and develop them” (p. 170).

Childhood thus became a new, modern construct, with associated demands and markets, including babyhood, childhood, and youth, as a structural concept of human subjects that is worth investing in. However, historically, there was an invisibility of children and their childhood. As Aries argues, “in medieval society the idea of childhood did not exist; this is not to suggest that children were neglected, forsaken or despised. The idea of childhood is not to be confused with affection for children: it corresponds to an awareness of the particular nature of childhood, that particular nature which distinguishes the child from the adult, even the young adult. In medieval society this awareness was lacking” (p. 128), particularly in the Western history of childhoods. The anthropology of childhoods elevated differences in developments and histories of childhoods across cultures and societies, and reveals striking, and sometimes very subtle differences.

Current thinking and discourses around childhood studies represent and outline the complexity of this field and its diverse positioning across disciplines. The UN Convention on the Rights of

the Child – UNCRC – was passed and ratified in 1990, and the struggles for its fulfillment and particularly of children’s well-being continue, with growing concerns of economic exploitation of children and the complexities of childhood constructs in the media-driven contemporary society. Moreover, there are shifts in conceptions of childhoods that can be perceived as visible and manifested in government policies, and then subsequently in the ways that adults treat children, and shape what it means to be a child. Childhood can thus be seen as a crisis, with a “moral panic” by many scholars in the contemporary Western society observing and analyzing it, through the discourses of care, safety, and protection. Furthermore, there seems to be a prevalent focus on becoming an adult rather than being a child that shapes the constructs of childhood, including the power relations that produce and allow children’s rights to be the driver for “best” policies, to protect “ideal” childhoods. Instead of being political and participating citizens who shape their own childhoods, children become seen as a resource, and their childhoods colonized through this ideology of care. Such shifts in understandings of childhoods in Western cultures are produced within particular government rationalities. Childhood studies research thus becomes located in diverse ideological sites. Some of the key thinkers whose work has significantly shaped childhood studies are Allisson James, Adrian James, Alan Prout, Pia Christensen, Berry Mayall, Anne Smith, William Corsaro, Erica Burman, Mery Kellett, Karen Malone, and many others (Smith and Green 2015).

Childhood Studies: Themes and Topics

Childhood studies critically engage with a number of topics from multiple perspectives. One of the key topics is children’s agency, through which children are perceived as independent social actors and capable of making decisions about their lives and their ability to demonstrate this capacity in their contributions to the governance of their issues. Agency is traditionally considered

to be a capacity that belongs to adults, as rational, biologically mature human subjects. However, childhood studies contest this notion and assign, and allow, children the ability to control their own development as outlined in many cross-cultural studies and in research with and by children. To balance the power that adults have over children, it is important to acknowledge how children can have agency over their life and within society as a whole. This agency cannot be simply perceived as influencing their individual being but as shaping the collective lives of all human subjects, and the planet, especially in this time of the anthropocene. In other words, children can make a difference in social relations, social life, and the world. This is the agency that a childhood studies framework perpetuates, no matter how difficult it is and how many barriers are set by the adult governance of childhoods. Through a childhood studies lens, children and adults are not seen as binary opposites but as human subjects that interact with the world in particular ways that pursue the well-being for all inhabitants of the planet, including other than human subjects and objects. Agency is important in policy implications, where adult constructs produce childhoods and children, and in understanding the importance of children's agency in narrowing the gap between adults and children, to enhance understandings of childhood and allow benefits for all subjects, including children.

Agency can be portrayed as a sociological notion in relation to the idea of a structure. In childhood studies, this means, for example, how children can behave, have influence over, act differently, challenge and contest the established generational ordering of society, or structure an ideology. Diverse sociological perspectives, such as of Marx, Weber, and Durkheim, direct how to act in a society independently from its structures, boundaries, institutions, establishments, and wider social relations. Giddens argues that agency is always related to structure – hence his agency/structure framework relates to the notion of power. From a childhood studies perspective, agency contests the traditional socialization theory that portrays and perpetuates children as

passive subjects of adults' influences and ideas. Agency is thus the capacity of social actors to act – with agency – to impact a change that has positive effects for themselves, those around them, the society, and the planet. This idea of agency is relevant both to children and to adults alike, and allows the transformative power of these actors, and their influence on their lives, or on the conditions of any structure of societal, or minority groups. The concern of how much “real” agency and capacity children have to effect change – given the conditions of surrounding structures, the reproduction of society, ideology, culture, ethnicity, and politics involved in each situation – is one of the challenges that childhood studies work with, research, and think about (Wyness 2012).

Research with children is another important feature of childhood studies research. As social actors, children are very much engaged with research processes in childhood studies. Traditionally, research has been conducted on children, where children were the passive objects to be examined, and often exploited, as research objects for adults' benefits and to satisfy their curiosity to understand, and often also mainstream, alter, and adjust, them or their childhoods. The focus was on the problem – of correcting particular irregularities or differences, from the position of established developmental frameworks or practices. Research on children often focuses on the negative – the problem – in any kind of deviation from “normality,” as established by the adult experts and researchers. Overall generalizations result in not respecting children's individuality, cultural differences, ethnicities, social inequalities, or the ideologies within which children play and grow up. This often leads to particular representations of childhoods through stories, texts, images, and media and problematic views that essentialize childhoods.

Research with children, often referred to as using a child-centered research framework, is a shift in the philosophy of methodologies of child research. A childhood studies lens considers children not only as the focus of the research but also as subjects, actors, that directly benefit from the

research process and actively construct and reconstruct the framework. Research with children, and in recent times research by children – where children are the researchers, together with adults, where they drive the aims and develop the research questions – enables children's views to be represented and their voices to be heard. This kind of research gives power to the children over their own lives and creates a new ethical framework where children's rights are paramount – with respect to partnerships, participation, and protection and where their voice is valued through participatory methodologies. One such approach is a “mosaic approach,” alongside many other methodologies and methods that enable children to engage, to interact, and to be research subjects, rather than its objects.

Children's voice is considered to be one of the key concerns of childhood studies. Across disciplines, research on childhoods involves adult's perspectives, adult's representations, and adult's voices about children. Children's voice has traditionally been subjugated and considered to be “childish,” not important or of interest in society. Often the importance of their voice is downplayed through considerations as “cute” or “irrational.” Children's voices are often lacking and not heard, or not listened to in decision-making, in public policy and in education or in any matters that concern children directly or indirectly. The decision-making process normally involves adults and traditionally excluded children's views on society, and its governance, or did not take them seriously. Childhood studies research both advocates and performs consultation with, by, and on children's perspectives in relation to the society that is shared by the children and adults (Davies 2014).

Furthermore, children are often portrayed in policy as vulnerable and innocent. These labels remove their agency, power, and decision-making. Children's rights as ratified in the UNCRC, article 12, for example, clearly state that children should be consulted and listened to and that their voices should be taken seriously. Portraying children and their childhoods as vulnerable removes their competence and makes

them easier to govern and mold, to shape them, in the interests of the governing agencies. Vulnerability thus perpetuates the notion that children are innocent and require protection through these agencies and removes the power and influence of children over their own affairs. In that sense, the statement “in the best interest of a child” is contested, and childhood studies research questions whose “best interest” is really being considered: according to whose definition and from whose perspective. The discourse of vulnerability is thus often seen as a way to normalize childhoods, and childhood studies contest, and argue, that as a concept of poverty and welfare, vulnerability is determined by ideology, history, politics, and economics. What constitutes these notions – vulnerability, protection, and innocence – when they are socially constructed as childhood itself is? Childhood studies in this sense attempt to debunk and challenge representations of childhoods that remove agency and power from children's lives and that portray children as dependent, lacking competency, and that normalize them in their development.

Further topics of childhood studies research include spaces for children and children's places. There are many discourses about children in urban and rural areas, on children's play and games, on constructions of playgrounds as oases of childhoods, and also on removing children from the streets. Urban planning is traditionally done for adults, without children's consultation or perspectives, and usually, the younger the children, the less consideration there is for their needs. The focus of urban planning is largely on protection and safety, with little participation of children and young people in urban designs. Child-friendly initiatives utilizing childhood studies discourses contest the notions, for example, of rural idyllic lives and “desperate” and “suffering” childhoods in the city, and instead portray opportunities for including children in decision-making, seeking their perspectives and ideas about life in the city and its societal structures. Needs and interests for children can be considered as such only if they are articulated by children, not by their parents and other adults.

Future of Childhood Studies

Childhood studies is a growing field of interest with much international conferences and continuous scholarship and activism. The idea of childhood studies as an interdisciplinary field is flourishing, particularly in the past 30 years, and is experiencing new, unexpected disciplines and turns, from its “new sociology of childhood” framework (Prout 2005). Philosophy is one of the disciplines that adds important scholarship to the notion of childhood, including the challenge of discursive and social constructions as the only way to understand childhoods, by including the lens of posthumanism and new materialism. Cutting-edge methodological thinking in childhood studies has its grounding in using philosophy as a method, in child/animal relations and in notions of the anthropocene and sustainability. The importance of childhood studies is that it is not dominated by one discipline. Interdisciplinary thinking and relations and philosophy – as it seems from the entries in this encyclopedia – will play an important part in the future of childhood studies.

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Children and Childhoods, Methodologies of

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Synonyms

[Research approaches](#); [Research design](#)

Introduction

Early childhood education methodologies have gone through philosophical upheaval and various ontological and research design related changes during the last decades. First epistemological and later ontological shifts have brought into attention childhoods as epistemologically instable structures, always already suspect for questioning and fertile ground for deconstruction often highlighting subject as decentered and children as connections within more than human assemblages and fields of relations. These shifts have altered the ways in which early childhood education is being theorized, studied, and researched.

Early childhood education, similar to many other fields, has gone through philosophical upheaval and various ontological and methodological changes. For example, the authors of *Reconceptualizing Early Childhood Care and Education* described how the dominant positivist theoretical perspective common in the USA and other countries began to be challenged in the late 1970s and early 1980s by critically oriented psychologists, sociologists, and cultural anthropologists (see Bloch et al. 2014). These critical scholars and many others began to question, specifically, the confirmatory or exploratory perspectives that looked at the “what ‘is’” rather than “what might or ought to be.” Through their questioning of fixed educational practices and normalizing childhood discourses, radical scholars focused on power relations, identity politics, and various forms of exclusion and inclusion using methodologies grounded in qualitative,

interpretive, and critical traditions. At that time many scholars who desired to reconceptualize early childhood education drew from critical curriculum theorists and the Frankfurt school's forms of critical theory exploring a range of issues including the content of early childhood curriculum, play, and work promoting class inequalities as well as relations among the States, economy, parenting, and education. The 1990s and beyond have brought yet another set of changes into the methodologies and theorizing of children and childhoods. First epistemological and later ontological shifts have brought into attention childhoods as epistemologically instable structures, always already suspect for questioning and fertile ground for deconstruction often highlighting subject as decentered and children as connections within more than human assemblages and fields of relations.

To reflect these ontological shifts, think beyond existing theoretical and methodological practices, and to move toward theories and methodologies of becoming, movement, and fluidity, we introduce one way to approach the question of method, methodology as an ongoing "post-project" and area of reconceptualizations within early childhood studies. We view these "methodologies" as continuous relational decisions, movements, performances, and onto-epistemological events that matter to those interacting with children and constructing different forms, copies, and differentiations of children and childhoods. These movements are especially important in light of neoliberal policies and practices that have further promoted post-inquiries and many post-perspectives (such as postmodern, poststructural, postcolonial, post critical, post human ways to conceptualize our worlds and so on) as counter measures to increasingly narrowing notions of childhood. To signal this onto-epistemological shift, we extend the label of methodology itself. The post-inquiries mark spaces and places as well as ontological systems that question the existence of fixed researchable world, validated research techniques, and systematic tools to produce scholarship.

Methodological practices as post-moves and continuously shifting reconceptualizations bring

forward various potential ways to extend dominant, rigid, and close-ended research approaches and to problematize the role of generalizable scientific method. However, it is important to acknowledge that even though we decided to use the term "methodology" to engage with broader methodological discourses, we find this term and concept increasingly problematic, and as such it calls for serious creative and practice-based departures. Extension markers in the label "methodology" speak to many possible and still unrecognizable ways to live through methodology differently without giving up the label itself or its historical presence while simultaneously resisting this label's normative linkages, associations, and doings. Our extension markers not only take the known concept and generalizable methodological practice apart, but they also generate multiple in-between spaces, lines, and connection junctures where becoming methodological differences can be lived through and possibly recognized or sensed.

Based on always already limited review of literature and current discursive formations available to us in different fields of early childhood studies, we found current and contemporary methodologies of children and childhood both dispersed and centralized. In recent years much of the innovative methodology at work has taken place in Australia, North America, New Zealand, and northern parts of Europe. For example, preschool environment outside classrooms, alternative childcare centers, bathrooms, playgrounds, forests, animals, online spaces, media, art, children literature, workplaces, policy documents, and objects such as dolls and stones have inspired many contemporary scholars to think more creatively and critically how children are constituted as subjects or performances within various material-discursive spaces.

Furthermore, we argue that ontological shifts call for creative and experimental methodologies that are not stuck in the methodological past but are capable of visioning various different methodological futures and new performative methodological linkages. Methodologies form fluid and becoming structures that extend processes of knowing and being, thus shaping experiences,

senses, and affect (see Koro-Ljungberg 2016). For example, theoretical and relational extensions push the onto-epistemological boundaries of methodologies. The methodological question is no longer how to study children and childhoods in separate, developmental, and individual contexts but how children and childhoods are constituted and positioned in the world, how childhoods function, and how children relate to the Other in a continuously changing world of relations, power, and more than human. Rau and Ritchie (2011) provided detailed examples of these complex cultural positionalities, policy documentation, and relations to power in looking at the Māori tikanga, the culturally specific ways of knowing and doing that are both culturally right and children's right. Ethics, language, tribal identities, spirituality, traditions, voices, and sacred pathways were used to transform Western trajectories for Māori children.

Instead of studying children and child "objects" through clinical and clean observational methods, some contemporary childhood scholars engage in collaborative and material activities that not only critique existing knowledges and practices but also offer and document alternative engagements and entanglements of children in their complex worlds. Methodologies function not as nouns but as verbs and continuous processes of modification and variation. For example, scholars reconceptualize, re-entangle, untangle, liberate, queer, problematize, understand, compare, sustain, relate, negotiate, clock, and guide children in their discursive material contexts. These purposeful engagements might not be carried out in teacher-led classrooms, constrained and adult-created spaces, or through predetermined research designs. Instead, data have been reconceptualized as air, assemblages, interaction between discursive and material forces, events, encounters, memory, desire, intensity, interactivity, dialogue, technologies, and animal-human relations among others.


Next we share five different potential methodological extensions that could transform current normative methods and methodologies and as such could speak to methodological assemblages yet to come. First, *theoretical extensions* will highlight various forms of theoretical and

epistemological hybridities in early childhood scholarship. Second, *spatial extensions* move scholars toward mess and nonlinear methodological spaces, whereas *ontological extensions* bring forward the material and more than human in children's lives. Third, *linguistic extensions*, in turn, trouble both methodological language and the language often taken for granted in the context of children and childhoods. Finally, *historical extensions* enable methodological assemblages that bring methodological historicity and epistemological ghosts to our everyday encounters.

Bringing different philosophies to the processes of inquiry and using existing processes to expand contemporary theories, multidirectional connections can be reestablished between theoretical concepts, ideas, and children who live in a more than human world. This relationality also recreates and reestablishes inquiries and methodologies as ethical and responsible practices. Thinking with theory (see Jackson and Mazzei 2012) and theoretical sensitivity has become a meaningful goal and useful practice for many scholars in the field of childhood studies. Thinking with theory brings methodology and philosophy together in purposeful and practical ways. This type of fluid and unanticipated zigzagging between theories and research practices is likely to open up new epistemological dimensions and proliferated encounters within the children's complex worlds. In addition, for many early childhood scholars theoretical or conceptual exercise per se is not enough but critical, Chicana feminist, new materialist, and post-human scholars call for research processes and methodologies that have potential to impact policy, change environments, illustrate and demonstrate policy's limitations and insufficiencies, and to promote change in early childhood communities and practices.

Furthermore, theoretical and conceptual hybridity enables scholars to draw and highlight multiple perspectives and approaches at once. Adaptation of a hybrid orientation also speaks to the diversification of knowledge while simultaneously avoiding traps of essentialism and foundationalism. For example, some early childhood scholars might use Foucauldian scholarship in conjunction with Deleuze and Guattari,

whereas others could utilize a set of concepts or theoretical arguments from Derrida, Havel, Giroux, and Marx or locate their work alongside Barad and Haraway. Many scholars today draw from postmodernism, poststructuralism, socialism, post-humanism, feminisms, human geography, ecology, and geography as well as from indigenous epistemologies and theories (especially Māori worldviews). These perspectives offer alternatives to the over-humanistic, developmental, and cognitive child concept and often human-centered care practices. In addition, hybridity is often accompanied by careful attention provided to various ethical issues such as autonomy, responsibility, agency, relationality, silent orders of things, ecologically sustainable living, and ethical more-than-human interaction. We see this interaction in the negotiation for ecological sustainability practices and pedagogies of place in early childhood centers in New Zealand (see Duhn 2012). Duhn framed the current discourses of critical perspectives in early childhood education situating them within “nature-culture,” material, place-based education, and teachers’ emerging pedagogies of place. Children’s sustainable care for the environment was based on ethical and carefully crafted relationship between the “local” and “global.”



Spatial extensions of more or less fixed methodologies could be accomplished through fluidity,

mess, and creating space for the unanticipated. Fluid methodological spaces and methodological multiplicity might involve the coexistence of methods, perspectives, images, theories, frames, and subjectivities all potentially present at a single moment. In fluid spaces normality is an increase in the magnitude rather than a cutoff or end point. Additionally, in fluid methodological spaces, methods and research approaches melt, transform, circumvent, infiltrate, appear, and disappear. The desirable mess in methodology has been discussed, for example, in the scholarship of John Law and Patty Lather. Both Law and Lather embrace the always already existing presence of mess, the disorganized order of mess, possibilities of the mess to prompt and stimulate difference, and risk taking associated with nondirectionality and complexity. Unsettling, upturning, and stimulating examples can be seen in the work of Nxumalo (2012) where she seeks to disturb the static representations of difference and diversity that have sprung from multicultural pedagogical approaches. She does this by using the material-discursive becomings to show relationality while exploring what micropolitical possibilities and significant everyday encounters traditional coding might miss. Interestingly, rather than cleaning up various interferences and interruptions during children’s clay-water encounters, messy processes and material methodologies produce insights and forces that pulsate and move the mass of mess to various different directions simultaneously. Nxumalo’s data vignettes illustrate relational ethics, and they portray how clay-water and girl-child-body become with and mutually transformed when children experiment with brown clay-water on skin. More generally speaking, the methodological benefits of mess might have to do with breaking boundaries, opening up new directions for research, combining methods and theories, blending human and more than human, and creating new language that materializes through and lives within and alongside the mess. These types of methodologies need to breathe, adapt, and live with and through their users.

Ontological extensions enable scholars to rethink anthropocentrism and ways to decenter the human. For many scholars in early childhood,

agency and consciousness are not uniquely human prerogatives but can also belong to matter and objects in the more than human world. Baradian space-time-mattering offers one opening to think about ontologies of children and childhoods differently. Lived and sensed materialities of childhoods counter and extend psychological childhood discourses. For example, children are no longer exclusively studied as cognitive learners or obedient students, but they are seen as multifaceted discursive, gendered, artistic, performative, spatial, bodily, sexual, intra-active, agential, and rhizomatic “subjects” constituted by and within various discursive material practices and power relations. Materialistic, artistic, and performative ways to construct and process knowledge enable scholars to construct meanings as ongoing performances of the world. Methodologies of children and childhoods can be seen as differential responses and responsiveness in the network of performances. Scholars no longer speak of isolated methods but series of intra-actions, relational fields, networks of actions, and matter, opened practices where humans and nonhumans are constituted in differentiated and continuously changing ways. Methods are conceptualized as diffractive methods, artistic and performative methods, and many other creative and expressive practices of doing and acting. Within these perspectives, methodological focus shifts to patterns of difference during entanglements, emerging of subject and object through intra-actions, differences, and expressions matter. Scholars account how matter, matter and artistic, and kinesis sensibilities guide participants’ inquiries and interactions with the world. Furthermore, artistic and performative inquiries offer flexible architecture for theory and concept building. For example, Kouri and Smith (2013) show how opening up to ontologies of wonder and creativity can make room for creative and performative methods. By asking “What’s under the dirt?” Kouri and Smith bring ontological questions and wonderings to children’s everyday encounters. Without focusing on answers wondering-with becomes a tool for inquiry and a space for critical reflection simultaneously offering possibilities to think about inquiry differently.

Linguistic extensions trouble and erase language making discursive spaces for new or alternative linguistic expressions and ways to communicate. Methodological language and labels are situated within a particular time, space, and cultural context and as time, space, and contexts morph and shift, so do linguistic extensions. Linguistic extensions can be put forward as epistemological markers, ontological reference points, and personal preferences, and they can also be used as means to legitimize one’s scholarship. For example, some interesting concepts found in recent early childhood literature included response ability, post human landscape, common world, unruling stories, cosmopolitan imaginaries, autotelic material practices, deer/settler-child figure, post human packing and packaging, and clocking practice. For example, Pacini-Ketchabaw (2012) focuses on mundane practices and stories of deer/settler-child figures. Deer/settler-child concept is used both metaphorically and materially as ways to mark specific types of postcolonial relations between a deer and children in Canadian daycare center. Furthermore, this notion of cross-species encounters might also help scholars to better understand pedagogical and ethical issues that divide and subjugate in other settings. As a result, language that defines those setting may no longer apply but needs to be rethought and recreated.

Lastly, some historical extensions can also be visible and present in methodologies of children and childhoods. For example, ghosts of the methodological past (practices) such as content analysis and comparative analysis are used and mixed with neoliberal discourses and practices. Studies are being labeled as exploratory to differentiate from large generalizable and quantifiable methodologies. Practitioner research is separated from research carried out by academics, and ethnographies are used to observe and document “foreign” and “distant” cultures. In these habituated environments, concepts like academic readiness and standardization are both used and challenged. However, rather than continuing in the vain of social reproduction, these concepts are also being explored and extended by scholars who see themselves as transformative intellectuals

and agents of change. In these cases, historical methodological ghosts do not repeat the methods from the past (as they might be designed to do), but they provide present diversifications and extensions which are never identical to the past. For example, Brown and Wright (2011) used content analysis of five media prints to investigate the role of media in the public pre-K movement. In this study political spectacle theory was used to challenge potentially linear and quantifiable insights gained from a content analysis. Political spectacle theory opened up themes, narrations, and new analytical questions to illusions, staging, and disconnections.

Derrida viewed ghosts and haunting as a necessary element in every hierarchical structure and historical systems. Haunting and ghosts of normative methodological past appear unexpectedly and their impact and influence is impossible to predict. We envision that a ghost has a virtual, absent body and thus is also absent presence. Ghosts are with us but they are not in their physicality. Past learning (memories, senses, images, texts, etc.) shapes the presence, and absences (things unlearned and lives not lived) are always present. Derrida (2006) argued that it might be always necessary to learn spirits and ghosts. He encourages us to involve ghosts in our learning, to live with ghosts and in their companionship. This learning through living with ghosts would also involve working through cultural and pedagogical inheritance and engaging with the politics of memory.

How could one envision the becoming methodological assemblages beyond these suggestions and ideas? There are no simple answers only many more unthinkable extensions beyond the ones shared here. Thus, it is not our intention to list all possible extensions or exhaust different dimensions of methodological assemblages since these moves will close up and restrict methodologies of the future and becoming. All methodological extensions are always limited and partial and yet can be dangerous since they are often in some ways tied to humanistic knowledge projects and normative ontological obsessions and desires. Through collaborative experimentation and continuous collective reflection, scholars might be able to work through voids, extensions, and

spaces of uncertainty, always moving and shifting the methodological, utilizing slow and quiet motion. Multiple worlds, contextual enactments, differentiating sites, fluid findings, shared spaces, elusive objects, slippages, nonconventional forms, mystery, resonance, imagination, creativity, and surprise could serve as proxies for methodologies to come.

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Children and Objects

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Synonyms

[Material culture](#), [Artifacts](#), [Materiality](#)

Introduction

Objects, for the purposes of this entry, are defined broadly as nonhuman, nonliving things. The significance of objects in the lives of children has been an active area of interest within childhood studies for several decades; the theoretical and practical focus of which has largely mirrored broader turns in social science. That is, as the field emerged within the cultural turn, children and objects have been understood primarily through a sociocultural, rather than a psycho-developmental, lens. This is reflected in ways in which children's relationships with objects are woven throughout well-established areas of interest within childhood studies – most notably examinations of consumerism and material culture. As the social sciences are in the midst of a material turn, children and objects are currently emerging through a new materialist framing.

Products for Children

An abundance of sociological literature (and perhaps to a greater extent popular social commentary) has focused on the relationships between children and the objects that are produced by adults specifically for their *consumption* – toys, books, video games, and other branded media. Positioning children's relationships with objects as one of consumption reveals familiar polarizing tensions between discourses that either frame children as innocent victims or as savvy participants. In the former, objects for consumption are borne out of corporate greed, and both children and childhoods are subsequently corrupted by these objects. This corporate infection of childhood brings with it a litany of negative educational, social, physical, and moral effects that are of concern to well-intentioned adults (Jones et al. 2011; Schor 2004). In the latter discourse, however, children and their specific cultural ideals drive the production of media and any associated products; corporations are simply giving in to the desires of children-as-customers and childhood-as-emerging market. A critique of these either/or discourses, tied to persistent notions of childhood

purity and fragility or childhood agency and hyper-autonomy, is that they ultimately fail to adequately capture the complexity of the ways in which the individual and collective identities of children exist in reciprocity with the objects of their consumption (see Buckingham 2011, for a thorough review of these tensions). It has been argued that more balanced conceptions of children and objects in relation to consumption might, rather than position commercial products as either inherently bad or good, work to understand the various ways in which objects are implicated within the inseparable phenomena of consumer culture and childhood – that toys, video games, and other products exist within a complicated matrix of children's peer and familial relationships, children's and their parents' desires for normalized participation within peer culture, and market forces driving creation and production of objects for children's consumption (Pugh 2009).

Artifacts of Childhoods

A material culture approach suggests that objects exist as artifacts of both childhoods-as-perceived by adults and childhoods-as-experienced by children. As noted in the previous section regarding consumption, adults produce many of the objects with which children engage (e.g., mass-produced toys). These objects may be conceptualized as artifacts representing what adults perceive children to want, enjoy, or need at moment of production. As such, objects produced by adults for children offer physical traces of childhood as an *adult* construct (Brookshaw 2009). Similarly, collections of artifacts for the purposes of “studying, preserving and representing the lives of children in the past through their material culture” (Pascoe 2013, p. 234) often present a history of childhood as constructed by adults. Once again, there are tensions present in what these artifacts represent about the particular qualities of childhood. Studies of these artifacts, typically undertaken through examinations of both private collections and curated museum exhibits, reveal a range of portrayals – from universalized and nostalgic

childhoods to more nuanced and complex accounts that aim to disrupt idea(l)s about who children were and how they experienced life in past eras (Pascoe 2013).

In terms of childhood-as-experienced, conceptualizing objects as artifacts assumes that children preserve intangible elements of their lived experiences within tangible objects. From this perspective there is an assumption that “much of children’s lives is hidden...and artifacts from that hidden life can help illuminate it” (Graue and Walsh 1998, p. 123). To this end, the “hidden” aspects of children’s lives tend to be conceptualized as experiences of play, schooling, and peer relationships, as these areas have been of particular interest when studying children’s artifacts from a material culture perspective. For example, objects that children create or construct themselves may serve instrumental purposes within the complex games and play rituals in which they participate, and objects can also serve symbolic, semiotic purposes within peer relations as children inscribe objects with sociocultural values, such as friendship or social status (e.g., Rossie 2005).

Children and Objects as Mutually Constituted

While the rejection of reductionist psycho-developmental discourses about children and childhood has been foundational to the childhood studies movement during the cultural turn, it has left childhood objects as decidedly inert recipients of sociocultural inscription (e.g., as symbols, representations, instruments, etc.). Following the more recent material turn in social science, enactments of childhood studies from new materialist perspectives have departed from strictly sociocultural framings of child-object relations and moved toward conceptualizations of childhood wherein subject-object hierarchies are flattened and boundaries between human and nonhuman are blurred (see Lenz Taguchi 2010). From this perspective, objects are not merely passive things onto which human values are inscribed, but are active agents in the production of childhoods. Children and objects do not precede their relations

with each other, but are mutually constituted. Thus, childhood is produced in the moment of child-object intra-relating *and* produced differently in each encounter, creating “spaces of open-ended and de-individualized knowing and being” (Rautio 2014, p. 274). Instead of determining the representational qualities of objects in relation to children, scholarship in this vein works to decipher what children and objects do to each other; how they are continually working upon each other through evolving encounters of invitation, exploration, transformation, and invention; and how material relations matter to children (Rautio 2014). In these ways, emerging new materialist scholarship within childhood studies is working to attend to the heretofore “excluded middle” (Prout 2011) of childhood materialities – wherein children are produced within a set of material relations and objects are produced within a set of childhood relations, neither of which can be meaningfully separated from the other.

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Children and Punishment

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In his legal model of punishment, Hart identified a number of conditions which had to be met for the correct application of the concept of punishment. For an application of the concept of punishment, these conditions had to be met (Hart 1968: 4 f.):

1. It must involve pain or other consequences normally considered unpleasant.
2. It must be for an offense against legal rules.
3. It must be of an actual or supposed offender for his offense.
4. It must be intentionally administered by human beings other than the offender.
5. It must be imposed and administered by an authority constituted by a legal system against which the offense is committed.

In considering his legal model of punishment, Hart drew a distinction between standard cases and substandard or secondary cases of the use of punishment. For the accolade of standard to be applied, all five conditions listed above had to be met. Substandard cases were illustrated by Hart by the following cases or possibilities: pain or consequences for breaching other than legal rules (here he gives, as specific examples, the family and the school); by other than authoritative officials; and unpleasantness or pain imposed deliberately by authorities but upon non-offenders. This presents something of paradox for educators

over the meaning of “punishment.” How can we talk meaningfully, in more than a substandard sense of the term “punishment” and more than metaphorically, about the punishment of children? The conclusion which must be drawn from Hart is that if we accept these conditions as part of the meaning of punishment, i.e., as necessary for its correct application, then the use of “punishment” in relation to young people in home or in school is a substandard or metaphorical use of the concept.

There are other problems with these conditions. First the punishment of children may not necessarily involve pain or unpleasantness (condition 1). For example, after an event involving thoughtlessness, a child may be punished by telling her or him to go and do something which they enjoy. If the punishment involves exclusion from the parent which, under the circumstances, may be a relief for the child, it also carries with it pleasantness. And psychologists in their approaches to punishment talk of both negative and positive rewards. This would be an example of a positive reward. In a psychological talk, this example would be a positive reward and not unpleasant.

Neither Flew (1954) nor Peters (1966) accepts Hart’s restriction of rules to legal rules and extends the notion of a rule to cover the quasi-legal status of school rules. Clearly that reduces the force of Hart’s stronger claim on rules, but there are problems with the status of such rules. Can they be just any old rule? For example, the British philosopher Mary Warnock has argued that it does not matter what school rules are but that there must be rules (Warnock 1977). Thus, the emphasis is not so much now on right behavior and being initiated into adult forms of life where there must be some form of rules. Instead the emphasis has become on rules and following rules, whether or not those rules are rational or suitable for young developing human beings. What seems to be sought is discipline per se and not necessarily discipline for the right reasons. There is little doubt that adults must follow rules, but hopefully they follow those for the right reasons and not just because they are rules. Any punishment system based upon Warnock’s

conception of school rules and which attempted to justify punishing children because it introduced them, or initiated them, into the “real world of life” (Wilson 1971, 1977) would therefore be highly suspect.

Second, if the rules are not legal rules then, for breaching such rules, adults do not get punished – scolded, verbally abused perhaps, but not punished (except in a very attenuated secondary use of the term). Therefore, adults and children seem to be treated differently. What talk then of initiation into adult life?

In condition 2 there is a talk of an actual or supposed offender. But innocent children are punished in group situations (and arguably for good reasons), and no offense may have been committed when a child is punished for a totting up of a number of “close offenses” in those “trying on” situations with teachers in which the young often indulge. Second, children who have committed offenses are sometimes not punished, because for some reason, and often properly so, they may not be considered “ripe” for punishment. But then on adult terms, questions of fairness and justice must arise – why are only some children punished for offenses? Does this mean then that whatever happens to the young in the name of punishment may really be something different? Does it mean that the real world for children is not just and fair?

The talk of self-punishment is not obviously meaningless (condition 4) as, e.g., flagellation was a common enough practice. Nor is it uncommon for us to forgo pleasant things when we have done things which we regret or which were unpleasant. For better or for worse, such practices exist and are learned and applied by children.

Finally there are problems with condition 5. In his account of the punishment of children, Peters (1966) discusses several closely related concepts, namely, “discipline,” “authority,” and “punishment,” opening his account with a discussion of authority. Peters believes that he can extend the notion of a rule in Hart’s account because he conceives rules as rule-following in Wittgenstein’s (1953) sense. But this is a serious mistake because he misunderstands Wittgenstein’s notion of rule-following.

According to Peters (1966, p. 237) “the most crucial concept for discussing social control in the school is that of authority.” But in his account of authority he is clearly drawing upon a reading of Wittgenstein on rule-governed behavior, conceding to Winch (Peters 1966, p. 246) that authority is necessarily linked with rule-governed behavior; in Wittgenstein’s sense, authority then:

presupposes some sort of normative order that has to be promulgated, maintained and perpetuated . . . (by) . . . procedural rules which give such people the right to decide, promulgate, judge, order and pronounce . . . (it) would be unintelligible unless we first had the concept of following rules with the built in notion that there are incorrect and correct ways of doing things. (loc. cit.)

Peters seems to interpret Wittgenstein as seeing rule-following behavior, as requiring submission to rules, as if rules were commands from authorities. A similar interpretation is made by John Wilson (1977). There is too much of the command sense of a rule here which, e.g., Kenny (1975) says, is a misunderstanding of Wittgenstein.

In the school then, according to Peters, authorities pronounce upon the rules (interpreted in Wittgenstein’s notion of rule-following behavior), and are the authorities which in turn administer discipline and punishment (though for Peters punishment is a necessary evil – in contrast to John Wilson who holds that it is in some sense logically necessary – see Marshall 1984a). However, Peters has smudged the notion of a rule from its legal sense in the Flew-Hart-Benn model by construing legal and school rules as rule-following in Wittgenstein’s sense. But there are further problems with authority.

If adults do not like the existing authority structures, they have legitimate grounds for redress, at the ballot box or by emigration. Authority relations presuppose then a certain independence and autonomy on the part of those who submit or accept authority. But this cannot be the case with the young. They have no option but to accept or submit to the authority of adults, though there are clearly ways in which the young can be protected from the indiscriminate use of authority or abuse by parents and teachers. Thus, the normal relationship between parent and

child is not quite that of the legal and rational notion of authority presupposed in condition 5. It is more like a power relationship which can of course be benign and positive, as opposed to negative and oppressive.

Finally however there are issues of responsibility. Adults are not punished if they are not responsible for their actions. J.S. Mill in *On Liberty* was quite clear that children lacked responsibility and should not have the freedom which Mill prescribes in this famous text. Of course there are problems of the age at which children can be held responsible for their actions, but it is quite clear that the very young are not responsible. It is also quite clear that things are done to them in the name of punishment. My case is that this is misdescribed and that there is some conceptual confusion.

In conclusion at this stage, then we can say that there are problems with all five conditions of the Flew-Benn-Hart-Peters model of punishment in trying to apply it to children. When we turn to consider how punishment of children can be justified by the traditional theories, we meet a similar raft of problems.

The retributive theory involves a paying back for a crime committed in the past. But this backward-looking justification would not be very helpful if our concerns were with morally educating children, which must be a forward-looking enterprise. Nor is it obvious that young children who look responsibility have brought evil into the world. Is unpleasantness the sort of thing which we wish to inflict upon children? Apart from moral disquiet, here the psychological "evidence" may be no.

With its forward-looking emphasis, the deterrent theory looks more hopeful. Certainly we do not want young people to continue with aberrant behavior. But, even if young children are disposed to do *X*, and it is not obvious that they are, it is even less obvious that we should be threatening them (Contrast John Wilson (1977) who sees punishment as the necessary outcome of an offence.).

Why do we wish or need to threaten children, offenders, and the innocent others in this manner? Some people believe that children are born evil, but if one believes that they are born neither good

nor evil, like Rousseau, then the need for such threats would seem to evaporate. Instead, as good or evil children are the outcomes of their environment, we should look at restructuring our social environments.

Conceiving the justification of the punishment of children as reform also has an attractive appeal.

Reform involves the "bringing back" to the path of goodness, someone who has seriously strayed and lost their way. But this serious straying from the path is not compatible with views of innocence often held about children and hence with what path they are on and other beliefs about childhood being a time for making mistakes. These views relate to other views about the understanding by the young of what they are doing and the long-term effects of their actions. In what sense then have they strayed and in what sense are we bringing them back? We may need to change or redirect the behavior of the young, but reform does not seem the appropriate term.

Finally, A.C. Ewing (1929) talks about an educative function of punishment. He emphasizes the importance of getting the young into good habits, realizing that it is often more important to get the very young to refrain from certain behavior and habits, simpliciter, than to refrain from those behaviors and habits from the best motives and the best intentions. Hopefully that can and will come later. Good habits are instilled in children, according to Ewing, by, first, fear of the consequences and, second, because of the "emphatic condemnation of a teacher or parent whose authority they respect" (Ewing 1929, p. 92). Ewing also says that in instances of punishment, the accompanying talk, in a rational manner, helps "din the words in."

It would be simplistic to dismiss Ewing's "educative role" of punishment of children by recourse to attack upon the notion of deterrence, although that would be possible. Here the arguments would focus upon the deterrent notion of punishment, which is inherent in Ewing's notion of the educative function, and upon there being merely a contingent relationship of understanding. This would make the educative justification no stronger, philosophically, than the retributive or deterrent theories. More positively, in the Ewing account, it is clear that adults can have the words "dinned in,"

more or less. But children? How can words be dinned in? How do young people conceptualize these issues and the relationships between what they “did” and more general abstract principles such as fairness or love so that the words can be “dinned in”? What sense does “dinning the words in” make without certain conceptual understandings? Therein rest many issues raised by educators such as Piaget and Kohlberg, who talk of stages of moral “development.” If their claims about the stages of development of moral understanding and, thereby, conceptual levels of possible understandings of words (and moral notions) are correct, then how can punishment and “dinning words in” work with our young at their various alleged stages? If the required understanding is not that of the conceptual level attained by the young person, then there is no possibility of “dinning.”

In general summary then, with applications of these theories to the punishment of children, we must ask: First, do we really wish to take retribution upon the young? Second, do we wish to deter, if not threaten the actions or behavior of young people, when they scarcely understand what they may be doing? Even if they did, do we really wish to pursue the general deterrence of the young? Third, do we wish to talk at all about the reform of the young when we talk about reform concentrates upon those who have willing and knowingly fallen from “grace,” which is not obvious in the case of children? And, finally, how can we talk about punishment involving the education of the young when their very capacities to understand reason are denied by the notion of reason itself – that is, children are not normally considered to be rational (at least by some philosophers, e.g., J.S. Mill)? If it is far from clear as to what being rational involves, and at what age the young are “really” rational, the law adopts a number of positions in relation to the young concerning when they may be considered to be rational before the law. These positions on age of responsibility vary considerably.

Of course a Wittgensteinian response would be that the search for “the” concept of punishment is of course misleading because “punishment” is used in a number of ways – for the cases of criminals, children, boxers, and dogs, to mention

a few. There is a family resemblance between these uses which we learn and apply in practice, and there is no one sense, or logically prior sense of “punishment.” In addition Wittgenstein would be concerned by the notion of a theory of punishment, concerned as he was by all attempts to formulate philosophical theory.

Can we justify the “punishment” of children? If what is sought is a general theory of justification, the answer which will be given is “no.” However particular cases may be justifiable. So far we have discussed concerns about the applicability of the traditional justifications of punishment to the children. But at best at this stage, it may only be to make their application to the case of children problematic. However if we are to justify punishing children then, the following points at least need to be considered:

1. Children need to acquire good “habits,” and they need to be prevented from doing certain things, the outcomes of which might involve physical or psychological harm.
2. Children, especially very young children, may not understand the reasons for and against certain behaviors.
3. Nevertheless reasons must be offered, and children encouraged to think about their behavior.
4. There are problems about the nature and status of rules which children are expected to follow and the nature of the authority relationship between adults and young children.
5. Sometimes the non-guilty may need to be imposed upon (children and group punishments).
6. The punishment of a child is essentially a discriminatory matter for that child. Only certain children may need punishment.

When we consider these features, the notion of a general justification of the punishment of children seems quite unclear. What could it look like? Children must acquire habits for their preservation, but how is the acquisition of “good” habits to be developed rationally? What counts as fairness in the punishment of children? How are the non-punishment of the guilty and the punishment of the innocent to be justified? How would it

compare with the punishment of adults? It is not only that the concept appears different but that also a new form of justification is needed.

The assumption in Western societies has been that there is a general justification, but this needs to be called into question (see further, Marshall 1984b). My position would be that there is no general justification for the punishment of children and that only particular justifications in individual cases are possible. Thus in each case of the punishment of children, the justification must be made because a general justification of the punishment of children cannot be presupposed in advance (as it is for adults in the legal system). In other words the onus of justification is on those who wish to punish children – the moral high ground should rest then with those who are opposed to the punishment of children. That is of course to reverse the general presumptions that underpin our existing practices, where in general the high ground has rested with those who do punish.

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Children and Sustainability

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Synonyms

Childhood and environments; Education for sustainability; Environmental education; Sustainability education

Introduction

Whether growing up in minority or majority world nations most children engaging with concepts of sustainability in the twenty-first century will be living in urban environments. In this highly mechanized urban world where humans have positioned themselves as exceptional or exempt to impacts of human activities, there is a considerable amount of debate and discussion on the definition of sustainability and how it will address the issues facing humanity. Measuring the acceleration of human impact including climate change, biodiversity loss, extinct and endangered species, and toxic contamination of environments has been reported as evidence of the Anthropocene. The notion of the Anthropocene coined by Noble prize-winning scientist Paul Crutzen compels us to consider humans as a new geological force, a new epoch in the history of the planet where humans have now irreversibly changed the planet. What this new epoch does is call “into question the sustainability of life on earth as we know it, including the survival of our own species” (Taylor and Pacini-Ketchbaw 2015: p. 509).

Sustainable development is often perceived to be mainly associated with the nonhuman environment. However, taking a broader focus on the issue leads to considering how communities, locally and globally, can meet the needs of humans and nonhumans, to achieve development that can be both sustainable and be sustained. This

means continuing to address issues of poverty eradication, human rights, and equity while also realizing the need for more sustainable patterns of consumption and production, calming climatic forces (UNICEF 2012, 2013), and attending to our relations with the more than human world. Urban growth and sustainable development may not seem like compatible partners, but if human populations do continue to grow at the rates predicted, then cities might be the only way the planet will support a sustainable future. That is, high-density urban environments will be the most cost-effective and sustainable way to accommodate and provide infrastructure to the billions of new human inhabitants and endeavor to provide places for nonhuman beings to also coexist (UNICEF 2012). Considering the enormity of this task, it is often easy for the role children have in sustainability to be overlooked and dismissed. This entry will focus addresses how children have had and will continue to have an essential role in issues of sustainability.

Defining Children and Sustainability

There are many definitions of sustainability, and it can be better understood as an emerging vision rather than a neatly defined concept or model. It is not a fixed notion, but rather a process of change in the relationships between social, economic, and natural systems and processes. A sustainability paradigm rejects the primacy of any one of these areas and seeks the opportunity for a shared view where quality of life for all the world's inhabitants (human and nonhuman) is not compromised by, or for, another. The vision of sustainable development emerged in the late 1980s and gained worldwide support with the publication of *Our Common Future* by the World Commission for Environment and Development (WCED) in 1987. The Commission defined sustainable development as development that meets the needs of the current generation without compromising the ability to meet the needs of future generations. This sentiment was carried forward at the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, where over 170 countries adopted Agenda 21 and the Rio

declaration on Environment and Development. After many conferences and reviews on the potential to fulfill the goals of the declaration over a 10-year period, in 2002, the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) in Johannesburg created the platform to fully develop a paradigm of sustainable development at the highest political level. The Decade of Education for Sustainable Development (DESD 2005–2014) provided an international framework for cooperation and consolidation of education for sustainable development (ESD) across the globe.

The connection between the role of children and sustainability has been formally articulated in a number of global declarations and documents emerging from these types of intergovernmental summits and meetings throughout the past two decades. Historically, some of the most significant global documents and reports for stimulating discussions on children's role in the sustainability of the planet include *The Plan for Action* that resulted from the World Summit for Children and the Rio Declaration and action plan of *Agenda 21*. Both of these documents were endorsed at the Earth Summit held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 and became landmark documents in the sustainability movement. The recent introduction by the United Nations of the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (UNDP 2015) is the stepping off point for new conversations on how the global and local communities in developed and developing nations, including children and youth, can plan and respond to the rise of global sustainability issues such as climate change and rapid urbanization while still maintaining equitable rights of the most vulnerable within our communities and the ecological sustainability of the planet. In the past, children and young people have often been seen as the recipients of development aid rather than the implementers. However, it is clear that the newly implemented SDGs are not something that any one stakeholder group can deliver alone – whether that be the government, the UN system, the civil society, or the private sector. An equity-driven approach has been identified as the means for empowering children and youth to apply the understandings of sustainability through the SDGs into positive

action for themselves, their families, their communities, and their environment.

Children and Education for Sustainable Development

ESD, like sustainability itself, is a dynamic concept with many dimensions and many interpretations. While some would argue that there is a need for a global definition and an educational plan of action, the experience of the Decade of Education for Sustainable Development illustrated that the unique cultural contexts of countries and their specific needs and aspirations meant ESD will always be interpreted and reinvented dynamically both at a global and local level. This means that often the language and naming of what counts as ESD, and its relationship to environmental education (EE), has been hotly debated.

In Australia, for example, the shift to ESD terminology has been somewhat slow and contentious. For that reason much of what is reported at a national level as ESD is also reported as Environmental Education (EE) or Education for Sustainability (EfS), interchangeably. While there are many overlaps in their purpose, ESD (and EfS) is much broader in its intent and curriculum scope than EE. Australia has adopted Education for Sustainability (EfS) rather than the UN terminology of ESD. At the beginning of the Decade of Education for Sustainable Development the Australian Government released the *Educating for a Sustainable Future framework*, where it defined the concept of ESD this way:

Environmental education for sustainability is a concept encompassing a vision of education that seeks to empower people of all ages to assume responsibility for creating a sustainable future. For many years environmental education has sought to develop knowledge about the environment and to establish an ethic of caring towards the natural world. It has also grown over time to recognise the need to engage with many different interests in society in order to address environmental issues. Environmental education for sustainability acknowledges what has always been true, 'that how people perceive and interact with their environment (their worldviews) cannot be separated from the society and the culture they live in'.

Importantly, recognition of the many values—natural and cultural—which the environment may encompass now frames the contemporary Australian understanding of the environment, including the protection of places of National Heritage Significance, based on their natural, cultural and Indigenous values. It is timely that this statement, *Educating for a Sustainable Future*, is released during the first year of the United Nations Decade of Education for Sustainable Development (2005–2014). (Australian Government 2006, p. 2)

While there is no definitive meaning of ESD, there are a number of key characteristics of what ESD supports as a program of education. ESD is transdisciplinary. “[T]ransdisciplinarity involves going between, across, and beyond different disciplines” (UNESCO 2004, p. 1). ESD is concerned with disciplines that improve our understanding of ecology but not to the detriment of engaging with studies of human culture, social sciences, geography, and the humanities. It emphasizes aspects of learning that enhance the transition to sustainability including future education, citizenship education, education for a culture of peace, gender equality and respect for human rights, health education, and population and sustainable consumption. It is about dealing with real world problems in real world settings (UNESCO 2004) with a focus on lifelong learning:

This concept of learning requires that education not only be as broad as life itself, but that it continues throughout the full span of life. Lifelong learning, including adult and community education, appropriate technical and vocational education, higher education and teacher education are all vital ingredients for capacity building for a sustainable future. ESD aims to empower everyone, young and old, to make decisions and act in culturally appropriate and locally relevant ways to redress the problems that threaten our common future. (UNESCO 2004, p. 2)

ESD also supports a pedagogy of inquiry that develops the skills needed for individual children and groups to engage successfully in a sustainable society, including critical and creative thinking; oral, written, graphic, and digital communication; collaboration and cooperation; conflict management; decision-making, problem-solving, and planning; using appropriate technology, media, and information communication technologies (ICTs); civic participation and action; and

evaluation and reflection (Malone 2009). There are a number of priority areas that need to be addressed in the global call for sustainable development. Teacher education has been a high priority in ESD since school teachers and other community educators are in a significant position to serve as agents of change in support of sustainability. Efforts have been made to develop international guidelines for reorienting teacher education; however, the frontiers between academic disciplines remain staunchly defended by professional bodies, resource allocation systems, career structures, and criteria for promotion and advancement. Experience of the last decade in majority world nations has also shown the usefulness of tailoring sustainable development to the needs of the poor, especially focused on women and girls. Investments in women's and girls' sustainability learning can translate directly into better nutrition for the whole family, better health care, declining fertility, poverty reduction, and better overall economic performance (UNICEF 2013). This adds up to the potential to make considerable on-the-ground actions for change.

Children and Sustainability Action

It has been argued that the erosion of children's freedoms both in their home life and in their schooling has limited children's capacity to expand their environmental literacy (Malone 2007; Malone and Tranter 2003) and their capacity to be active in sustainability issues. We know from research that independent experience in an environment increases environmental literacy, capabilities, and confidence. The more complex the environment becomes, the more capabilities are required, and the more it becomes an essential life skill (Malone 2004, 2009). Ironically, as the world becomes a more complex place and the sustainability issues we need to face as a global community become more extensive, the very life skills and relationships with others that we share this planet with are slowly being eroded.

Rickinson (2001, p. 220) in his review of literature on environmental and sustainability

education noted that although environmental information is easily accessible today by children from an early age in a variety of sources (mostly access to new technologies), "we seem to have produced a citizenry that is emotionally charged but woefully lacking in basic ecological knowledge" (Rickinson 2001, p. 220). Secondly, that the complexity of environmental issues and the demands for adults who will be able to deal with them "necessitates young people to be equipped with a fundamental knowledge of basic environmental concepts and processes" (Rickinson 2001, p. 220). And while young people do have considerable environmental knowledge and altruistic motives, because much of this "knowledge" is developed via media and not through direct experience or engagement in real world learning, "this knowledge is rather rigid and full of erroneous interpretation and models" (Rickinson 2001, p. 220).

Recently, Krasny and Tidball (2009) have been developing the concept of civic ecology as new spaces to consider the role of sustainability for children in urban settings. They believe that to support a growing urban environmental stewardship movement, there is a need to present a crossover between natural resource management and environmental education. According to Krasny and Tidball (2009), civic ecology's focus on active engagement with nature draws together "biophilia," "nature deficit disorder," and restorative environment theory. They argue: "...civic ecology poses questions about the role of stewardship practices *and* of environmental education programmes situated in these practices, in fostering desirable properties of social-ecological systems, including resilience or the capacity of a social-ecological system to buffer perturbances and to renew and reorganize in response to change" (Krasny and Tidball 2009, p. 467).

Nothing is more evident of this place-based sustainability focus growing in urban neighborhoods in western countries than the growing community garden movement. Community gardens integrate resource management, nature, health, and social and ecological values while providing often cross generational sustainability knowing

within the urban landscape. Educators who have also incorporated community gardening into formal sustainability programs recount that children who grow their own food are more likely to eat fresh fruits and vegetables, and when garden programs include discussions on nutrition and farming, children show greater knowledge about healthy eating, contrasts between urban and rural landscapes, and “big ideas” around biodiversity, sustainability, interdependence, and ecosystems. Due to an ongoing limiting of children’s experiences in their local neighborhood environments, school grounds and other green spaces in the city such as botanic gardens and community gardens have become one of the few places where children can interact with peers in a natural, outdoor setting with minimal adult control (Malone 2004, 2007; Malone and Tranter 2003) and have the types of encounters with the more than human world that could lead to child-initiated sustainability actions.

Conclusions

Children have a significant investment in sustainability, both in the present as activist in their own right and in the future as they come to inherit what adults have left behind. Whether composting their lunch scraps, recycling materials, cleaning up pollution, or counting the birds in the trees, sustainability for children is a mix of formal teaching in schools integrated with the experience of being and responding to the environment in their everyday lives. The introduction of smartphones, social media, and other ICT devices and programs has meant children now have the capacity to engage in children to children activist projects where schools and formal learning are no longer required. So while formal classrooms may have traditionally been viewed as location for children to exchange in sustainability, the learning environment where children engage in sustainability now incorporates all facets of a child’s life. Research around how ICT will impact on children’s role in sustainability in the future is still unsure as evidence is only just starting to be documented.

Over the past decades stimulated by global programs of action supported by campaigns and initiatives through the United Nations and other large NGOs, children through education for sustainability and in community sustainability programs throughout the world have been supported to take up roles in their local environment to consider how they can actively contribute to more sustainable ways of being with the other human and nonhuman entities they exist with on the planet. Whether we call it environmental education, education for sustainability, or just sustainability, supporting the capacity for children to situate “sustainability knowing” and “sustainability action” in authentic practices in their everyday lives is vital for the ongoing future of the planet. The age of the Anthropocene presents a number of pressing global issues; research evidence illustrates that continuing to support children’s role in addressing the challenges of sustainability will be an essential part of an ongoing process of environmental and social transformation.

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Children's Participation

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Introduction

In early 2015 three children walked to school on their own in Auckland, New Zealand. Tragically, they were hit by a car when they crossed a busy road. Officials quickly blamed the parents for the accident and lack of protection. One police officer, for example, commented that it is “unacceptable” for young children to walk to school without adult supervision. While the injuries are unquestionably heartbreaking for the children, their families, and the driver, the discourse around this tragic event – for whom is it “acceptable” to walk independently or on a more general level what are appropriate activities for children in different environments – reveals broader questions about children's place and their participation in society.

Children's status in society regulates their participation in societal matters. The dominant news coverage around this tragic accident viewed children as an object in need of care and protection based on the assumption that children lack the

capabilities to navigate the adult world of cars and traffic. The call to supervise children on their way to school then seems to align well with the picture of children as vulnerable individuals in need of safeguard. But how does the discussion change when children are viewed as subjects in their own right? When adults begin to ask questions around what children enjoy and value about walking to school? When adults ask them what should change in adult-dominated societies to enable children to walk to school safely and independent of adult supervision? How would children's participation in everyday life look if children's voice, their perceptions, needs, and desires were heard and included more widely? By asking these questions, the focus shifts from viewing children as objects to seeing children as subjects; children are viewed as valuable, active agents in shaping their lives and learning. In other words, this example highlights common tensions when discussing children's participation in society, the tension between seeing children as *beings* and children as *becomings*, and the tension between conceptualizing children as active, capable social agents or simply as future adults in need of protection (James and Prout 1997).

Children participate in everyday societal activities including political discussions, cultural events, and play activities and add to the social and economical well-being of their families and communities they live in. But to what extent and under what circumstances their participation is recognized, valued, or curtailed depends on how children's rights are enacted locally and through different institutions. This entry provides a brief overview about how children's participation is framed theoretically and practically in children's geographies. “Participation” is one of the terms researchers and practitioners frequently use but rarely engage with in any depth. Participation is an ambiguous term that can have many different meanings and connotations depending on context and circumstances. The term encompasses formal (e.g., political forums) and informal arenas of participation from family discussions about what to have for dinner to even children's active participation in research projects. Participation often carries the connotation of rights, empowerment, and

justice and describes various forms of social engagement. Hence, it is a concept that social studies of childhood scholars/children geographers can easily subscribe to for framing their studies or analyzing findings, but how participation is understood and enacted across the world varies. Although much has been written about “participation” in research and practice, participation remains a fuzzy concept that lacks a clear or unified definition and theoretical framing (Percy-Smith and Thomas 2010). This entry will work toward framing and theorizing participation as “meaningful participation.”

Why Should We Bother to Encourage Children's “Participation” in the First Place?

A common theme running through publications on children's participation is the lack of genuine opportunities and meaningful ways for children to “have a say” in matters affecting them both in research and practice. Children's silence in the coverage of the accident in the introduction to this entry is a prime example and aligns well with the common critique that children's participation in decision-making processes in their local communities or formal political arenas is absent or subject to adult scrutiny. A similar critique can be directed at the majority of research projects which still follow adult-set agendas and tasks. It is therefore not surprising to hear calls for researchers and professionals or local and governmental agencies to incorporate children's voices more explicitly in decision-making processes. As a first response, many formal participation arenas, such as youth councils or legal consultation processes (e.g., when parents divorce), have been established and many researchers follow the unquestioned moral obligation to use participatory methods in their research (Gallacher and Gallagher 2008). Participatory practices, outlined in numerous how-to guides (e.g., Driskell 2001), have the common aim of giving children opportunities to voice their experiences and perspectives on social and political matters. But what is the purpose of affording children these greater participation

rights and proving better arenas and avenues for participation?

Many reasons can be given why children's meaningful participation should be encouraged and fostered in all aspects of our society ranging from capacity building to safety and protection. This entry, focuses on rights, empowerment, and justice as this triad intersects the majority of domains in children's participation.

First, children have the right to participate. Participating in social and political matters is their right as citizens and a legal obligation outlined in the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC). Since the Convention was first ratified in 1989 by the majority of countries around the globe, a shift in thinking about children and their capabilities has emerged. The Convention refined children's status in society by putting forward their social, cultural, educational, health, economical, political, and civil rights and government responsibilities (UNICEF 1995). As a consequence, the research, sociocultural, and political arena has changed, and at least on paper, children's participatory rights have increased since the ratification of the Convention.

Second, meaningful participation empowers children and is a more democratic process. Including children as valuable members during the cycle of a research project or in policy development has positive effects for the participating child and the livability of communities on a local, national, and global scale. Incorporating children's ideas for change redirects the trajectory of research projects or policies. Outcomes are attuned to children's everyday and extraordinary experiences and their suggestions; for example, services to children, spaces for children, and children's places improve. When children's input for change is valued and addressed, they feel that they are being taken seriously. They do not only experience meaningful participation, and their self-esteem and confidence is enhanced, but they also gain practical skills along the way (e.g., speaking in public, voicing and structuring their opinion, learning about complex democratic processes). Children can then be considered by adults as active citizens and – not without critique – learn the necessary tool kits to navigate adult-driven

decision-making arenas and processes. Fostering flexible, meaningful, and realistic participatory processes in formal (e.g., councils, policy, learning) and informal everyday life settings (e.g., play) for children of all ages and abilities remains an unsolved task.

Third, it is just. Incorporating children of all ages and abilities as active citizens makes societies more equal and just. Moving beyond considering children's voice and acknowledging their agency as valuable change makers in everyday and political contexts divert existing adult-child relationships and power structures. Viewing participation then as a process of negotiation and co-learning, or in Freire's words "a dialogical encounter with people" (Freire 2001), changes the collaborations between ages, abilities, cultures, and ethnicities. It can link and improve adults and children's mundane everyday experiences and desires, their agendas, and their motives. To move beyond passive and tokenistic participation by children toward meaningful intergenerational and intercultural collaborations, children's participation should be genuine, realistic, and maybe even scaffolded to ensure a positive experience and minimize the burden for children (Ergler 2016). Existing power hierarchies and structures should not be reinforced during the process; true collaboration values the contribution of any party no matter how minimal or mundane it might be.

Evaluating and Measuring Children's Participation

Calls for key indicators are widespread to benchmark the realization, failures, and successes of children's affective and effective engagement in civic society and everyday life as individuals, groups, and citizens. To understand and shift the cultural climate in which children participate, the micro- and macro-contexts of children's participation in their everyday world (Bronfenbrenner 1979), is as important as the need to hold governments accountable for the successful and meaningful implementation of UNCRC. As such it is important to measure and evaluate the extent,

quality, and impact of children's participation on different levels. Impact in this context can mean influences on children themselves (e.g., confidence, capacities) on project, policy, and programme outcomes and on adults' (e.g., parents, professionals) attitudes toward children locally and globally. In other words, the aim is to address, benchmark, and support the realization of children's rights in all areas of their life.

An influential and widely used model to measure children's participation is Hart's ladder of participation from tokenism to citizenship (Hart 1997). Even more than 30 years after its first appearance in 1982, Hart's ladder remains an influential tool in assessing and negotiating children's participation in research and societal activities. The concept was originally developed to show the continuum of children sharing decisions affecting their life or the life of their community and was meant to foster democratic processes. Hart adapted Arnstein's (1969) model and categorized different possible modes of child-adult interactions in participatory practices.

The ladder consists of eight rungs with the first three "manipulation," "decoration," and "tokenism" representing different practices in which children's participation in different activities counters their rights. The remaining five rungs symbolize different degrees of children's active participation ranging from assigned roles in projects, but with informed roles, to activities initiated by children and less curtailed by adult scrutiny. Hart labeled these rungs as:

- Assigned and informed
- Consulted and informed
- Adult-initiated, shared decisions with children
- Child-initiated and directed
- Child-initiated, shared decision with adults

In a simplified version, Landsdown (2010) suggests classifying children's participation into three categories: consultative, collaborative, and child-led participation. Consulting children reveals their views and experiences leading to an improved understanding of children's lives, but where adults still manage knowledge and outcomes. Collaborative participation suggests a

partnership to engage in any stage of a decision, initiative, project, or service (e.g., involving children in medical, political, and educational decision-making processes). To achieve shared collaborations between children and adults, decision-making spaces need to become realistic and meaningful participation arenas for children. Child-led participation takes place when children can point out issues of concern and initiate and advocate change independently, but it remains questionable how realistic and meaningful such a form of participation is for children when adults act as a simple facilitator and children take on all responsibilities. Would child-led, collaborative participation processes speak more to children's capabilities, desires, and wishes than our current models and practices (Ergler 2016)?

Adults can have a clear vision how children's participation should look like and how they can meaningfully participate. While government agencies, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), or researchers have developed particular projects and programme for children of different ages and abilities, they are important but not sufficient. These arenas often disguise inaction, political unwillingness for change, and children's empowerment can be limited to adult scrutiny. Implementation tends to be patchy and frequently tokenistic and varies in and between institutional settings, between sectors of government, and between different cultural and political contexts. Moreover, these child-appropriate spaces for voicing opinions are often not sustainable as they mainly engage the highest or lowest achievers in a society and usually only cater for a small number of children. Further they are dependent on the goodwill of adults. But what about very young children's or children with different abilities' rights? How can their voice be empowered meaningfully and taken into account? Expressing views is not enough, putting these views into meaningful actions is similarly important, but what does meaningful participation mean for different children?

Hart and Landsdown's participation categories have unfortunately mainly been interpreted as a linear process with the highest possible

participation outcome at the top. But they both emphasize meaningful, genuine, and authentic participation that requires a shift in adult's social attitudes and behaviours toward children as their priority (Hörschelmann and Van Blerk 2012). Children should be able to choose their level of engagement appropriate to their interest, time, and capabilities. However, in reality studies, programme, and policies tend to be judged only on whether they achieve the highest possible participation outcome set out by, for example, authors like Hart (1997). Too often children's involvement has been manipulative, decorative, or tokenistic to disguise the fact that children are dominantly passive participants.

Gallacher and Gallagher (2008) refer to child-led participation as "the tyranny of child-initiated participation." They warn about the dangers of moral policing that often occurs when researchers, practitioners, or planners are not able to get to this stage or include "child-led/child-initiated" participation as their aim for their research design, programme, or decision-making process. However, is the last rung of Hart's (1997) ladder of participation the one adults always need to strive for or a utopian adultist vision? Is it more meaningful for children to climb the ladder up and down or even jump off the ladder and determine participation in their own way? Maybe a more flexible, meaningful, and realistic model that is more attuned to children's desires, capabilities, interests, and manageability could finally effectively replace the ladder of participation and open up new discussions and theorizations about meaningful participation. However, no matter how a different model looks to evaluate meaningful participation (e.g., a jungle gym with many different forms and heights of rugs as an extension of Hart's model (Ergler 2016) or "realms" as alternatives to categorize participation (Francis and Lorenzo 2002)), children's ideas about evaluation processes and the necessary indicators should be married with adults' suggestions. Meaningful participation is transparent, relevant, enabling, inclusive, and respectful. To achieve meaningful participation, a reframing and retheorization of existing practices is required.

Reframing and Retheorizing Children's Participation

The most popular models of children's participation outlined above take children's integration as a starting point for theorizing participation in practice. This dominant focus on the operationalization of participation has been critiqued as it simply *integrates* children in existing societal structures rather than to change societal practices in order to foster *inclusion* (Percy-Smith and Malone 2001). However, not only is inclusion of children important but children's *meaningful inclusion*. Theorizing and conceptualizing participation in a more meaningful and realistic way requires critical engagement with at least three of the shortfalls present in existing operational models:

1. Overestimation of children's agency
2. Underestimation of the role of intergenerational relationships
3. Shortfalls in putting participation rights and values into theory and practice

Privileging children's agency without recognizing the relationships children form with parents, government officials, or even strangers in their neighborhood disregards the everyday realities of children's life. Putting too many expectations on children's capabilities to make decisions or even, as some do, to save the planet disrespects children's agency. Valuing them as actors in their own right also requires countering some of the recent movements, for example, in research design, of turning children into mini-clone adults without really listening to children's views on participation. Rather, valuing children's agency means to address the reciprocal and relational experiences of children's participation when interacting with younger and older peers or adults. It means to move beyond the moral obligation to work with children and begin to really advocate for change from a position of mutual respect. Theories of change, such as Bourdieu's (1990) theory of social practice or Honneth (2014) and Sen's (2000) conceptualization of freedoms and

entitlements, which are able to address the structural and agential limits of existing models and theories might be a first step in the right direction.

Conclusion

The aim of this entry has been to sketch out that participation is more than simply participating in formal and informal societal activities. Participation has to be seen in a wider context. How children's participation is conceptualised and what is valued about their participation has as much to say about children's role in society as it has about the structures and processes that frame children's abilities, capabilities, and rights to participate in their communities. Participatory processes cover a wide range of arenas of children's life from creating inclusive environments conducive for walking as suggested in the introduction to political arenas and democratic decision-making spaces outlined later in the text. Whether children's voices, needs, and desires are considered legitimate and promoted in their everyday life depends on the wider circumstances under which children are viewed in society. Children are active meaning makers and agents of change who participate every day in social activities transforming them and their social, cultural, and physical environments. Viewing children's participation in this way allows adults to rethink and reframe children's participation (even the arenas no one has yet thought of) and intergenerational and intercultural dialogues in more meaningful and creative ways. Rather than demanding "integration" of children, adults should rethink what meaningful and authentic participation as "inclusion" to accommodate children's experiences and values really means.

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Children's Power Relations, Resistance, and Subject Positions

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Introduction

Children are governed by hegemonic and resistant discourses in any ideological setting. While

children live in their ordinary, everyday life experiences, whether they are positive or negative, their lives demonstrate the complex nature of power relations in the ideological context of society. Two philosophers make strong contributions to discussions on power relations in early childhood: Foucault and Havel. In childhood studies, the work of both these theorists challenges the developmental ideas that are often associated with the singular child entity. Their engagement with complex power relations allows a reconceptualization of the child as a postmodern construct with multiple and fluid subject positions, that are temporally and locally produced within early childhood settings (Tesar 2015).

Who and What Is a Child?

This section introduces complexities and tensions inherent in biologizing childhoods and in the sociology of childhoods. Stainton-Rogers and Stainton-Rogers (1992) tell the fictional tale of a girl. The girl was named Nema, by a police-woman, after she was found by security staff in a department store, naked and all alone. Her naked childlike body barely wrapped up in a blanket, Nema could not remember who she was, or how she got there. She suffered from complete memory loss; the staff of the department store called the police and took her to the police station. There, Nema was examined by a doctor, and no visible inscriptions were found on her body. The doctor could only state that Nema's age was somewhere between 14 and 20. Nema's identity remained a mystery, and she was passive while being questioned. She struggled to answer any questions, due to her amnesia, and the police officer was helpless. Finally, the police admitted her to a local hospital: to have her body further examined. Within a week there was no abnormal behavior, apart from Nema's memory of her life now spanning only 7 days. Traditional science and disciplines, through the medical doctors and clinical psychologists, were unable to offer any solutions or help to Nema. Soon it becomes clear that Nema was in perfectly healthy shape and that there was nothing "wrong" with her body. But it was her

body that became the problem. Nema needed to have an identity; however, should it be the identity of a 14-year-old or a 20-year-old? The repercussions of such a decision are of course incredibly high: sexually, medically, legally, and educationally. Is the concern about the age of Nema's body? She seemed socially competent; however, should society let her be sexually active? Should Nema be allowed to vote, drive, or drink alcohol? Should she be allowed to see R16 or R18 movies? Should the innocence of Nema's childhood be protected, constructed, produced, and decided for her; or should her body be taken as the body of an adult woman, and the choice of what she wants to do with it be handed back to her?

The concern of what to do with Nema highlights the tensions between constructions of childhood as a biological stage or as constructed, assigned, imagined, and portrayed by society. A childhood studies lens shifts these concerns, by building on the argument that childhoods are socially constructed and invented and produced within certain governing rationalities. This focus differentiates childhood studies from psychological, biological, and developmental perspectives. Such biologizing, or staged, approaches to childhoods (Morss 1996) work to classify, segregate, place, divide, and distribute childhoods into sections and schooling institutions. Through this lens the absence of certainty about the biological age of a body leads to uncertainty in decision-making about what should happen with the child, how the child should be educated, and how he or she should grow up. By giving up knowing a child's age, we lose an ideal, an image of the good child, and also control over the child and decision-making on/for/with the child becomes a much more complex concern. This thinking is in line with what Prout (1999) calls the "radical disjunction between society and biology" (p. 3), where societal discursive practices lead to a view of the body as a cultural and social construction, rather than as a natural, discernable part of biological growth and development. An examination of power relations, ideology, resistance, and subject positions advances this speculative thinking.

Power Relations, Ideology, and Society

In Foucault's (1980) work, genealogies search for unexpected relationships and nonlinear, accidental origins, while they focus on complexities and contradictory productions of citizens and through a childhood studies lens, on childhoods, through power/knowledge relationships. Foucault's reinterpretation of Nietzsche's concept of a genealogy of morals allows childhood studies to analyze the power structures. Foucault's genealogy focuses on mundane, yet very complex, nonlinear origins of histories of the present. In childhood studies, furthermore, Foucault's thinking around the concept of governmentality is often utilized, as it allows considerations of macro political and economical apparatuses and at the same time close examinations of intricate micro relations and practices that allow subjects – in this lens children – to be producers in society and to research alternative, nonlinear ways of how political rationalities govern childhood subjectivities. It leads to examinations of how governments, systems, and societal agencies govern childhoods. Foucault's thinking guides the examination of techniques and instruments that are indispensable to the way government agencies operate. The traditional model of a juridical power construct claims that power belongs to a subject or that it can be possessed by a class, people or an institution, or adults, for example. Within this concept the subject or an institution at the top of the hierarchy possesses the power, which is subsequently pushed, forced, and distributed toward the bottom. Such a distribution of power is therefore punitive, dark, and repressive and usually takes the form of orders and pressure. Foucault (1991) argues that historically the way power was utilized was to punish and to discipline subjects' bodies. He rejects this traditional model of power of the individual and group and argues for a disciplinary type of power, where power is exercised and not possessed by any particular group or institution. Foucault's key argument is that power is not only repressive but also productive by nature, and his claim that power produces knowledge and subjectivities is decisive for childhood studies.

This productive nature of power means that power cannot be studied on its own. Power thus needs to be analyzed as linked to institutions, political contexts, ideologies, and the government, as the mechanisms of visibility and connections with the macrostructures. For Foucault, power is connected with knowledge, as power/knowledge, that emphasizes that as subjects are produced, so power is constituted through discursive practices and particularly through accepted forms of truth, science, and knowledge. In childhood studies, McNaughton (2005) examines the importance of power relations and troubles the truths about the notion of the child, thinking with Foucault to empower both childhood studies scholarship and activism and, as her scholarship demonstrates, for adults to question their practices, understandings, and claims about truths on the child and childhood.

Havel (1985) also analyzes the discursive difference between the public and private domains, as central to where he locates power. Similarly to Foucault's notion of disciplinary power, Havel's concern is with a shift in power relations in changing ideological contexts. For Havel, the way power operates in the public and private domain shifts. In other words, if subjects, including children, want to live a "comfortable" life without repercussions, they have to accept living within a "lie," which means to publicly conform with the system and its requirements. Children's private lives then can remain undisturbed by the governing system, as long as they do not cross into the public sphere. So for Havel, power relations are bound by a social contract that if children support the expected and prescribed rules and commitments of the classroom and society and publicly demonstrate their support of the governing regime, ideology, and the adults who are in charge of shaping it, children will not experience any repression toward them, and their private lives will remain untouched. In Havel's work, all subjects are subjected to complex and permanent forms of surveillance and self-surveillance. These mechanisms interact within an ideological context and its anonymous, selective and calculated power relations. For children, living in such a system thus encourages, and even forces, the

withdrawal from the public sphere into the private spaces of life.

These private spaces create "parallel polis," which provides alternative experiences for citizens. Benda (1991) applies this idea of parallel polis in various contexts including parallel education systems, childhoods, and discourses of knowledges. The parallel polis presents the resistant, private sphere of children's cultures and childhood undergrounds and is a significant concept as it recognizes life outside the public domain. It contributes to theorizing the tension between private and public discourses and their complex power relations. The notion of a parallel polis creates a possibility for small groups of subjects, such as children, to act upon events in radically different ways from other children in the public domain. In Havel's philosophy these complex power relations penetrate the whole society and shape the way children live, play, and learn. Within these power relations, the focus is not on how one social group uses power over the other group but rather on how the power relations produce the dynamics between these groups. As the possibility of a parallel polis demonstrates, it is also less about the directly oppressive nature of power but about power being harnessed and exploited to create spaces of resistance through subjugated knowledges. Havel, then, isolates ideology as an essential mechanism of power, as giving it a purpose, providing its identity, and connecting the power to the ideological rules and structures. Ideology is thus experienced by all subjects, including children, and is an irremovable influence on their everyday life. The notion of ideology, for Havel, is thus the binding element in power relations.

Havel's analyses of these complex power relations point out how all subjects have access to power. He does not reject the traditional, top-down model of power, as he notes how some groups of subjects – for example, adults and children – are considered to be powerful and others powerless. These minority groups can exploit the fluid and free nature of power that they harness and have access to. Havel's "power of the powerless" creates the possibility to exert pressure, to produce an anomaly in, and to resist

the governing structures and systems. While society and ideology may channel the hegemonic discourse within society and its institutions, where childhood subjectivities are formed and produced, the resistant discourse of a childhood underground is powerful and significant in the formation of childhoods and the ways children learn and play. Children are thus not passive in these complex power relations, but they are active agents and social actors and respond to the hegemonic dominant public domain. For Havel (1985), the ideological system in which children operate is an extremely multifaceted "network of manipulatory instruments" (p. 24) which is supported by a "precise, logical, structured, generally comprehensible, and, in essence, extremely flexible ideology" (p. 25) that responds to the scientific model of society. From the perspective of childhood studies, this is the challenge that children and young people experience when contesting the structural basis of society, when they are expressing their voice, agency, and power.

Children's Subject Positions and Resistance

Under these theoretical frameworks, children in the society publicly behave as is expected of them. In Havel's work, children are central to power relations as they live their mundane, ordinary childhoods. Every child is part of this system, even if they are on the fringes of the society and are often seen and portrayed by the traditional model of power, as powerless (Havel 1985). Thus, all children are both victims and pillars of the system and wider society; they struggle with and at the same time support the policies and requirements of their structural positioning within the society. The societal ideology ensures that the system operates in ways where the children do not necessarily believe in the system but share the narratives of following orders and acquiring political childhood subjectivities, as victims and supporters of the system. However, once outside of the gaze of the public educational institutions, ideology also enables children to abandon these

expected roles of victims and supporters (Tesar 2014).

Havel (1985) speaks of an "ideological excuse" (p. 29), a notion in which the ideology bridges the gap between the system and citizens. This notion underlies the way children behave, act, and live, no matter how false or true that reasoning is. Its essence is communicated throughout children's lives and continues to be a seminal part of their growing-up. Havel is concerned, then, with ideology as a "complex machinery of units, hierarchies, transmission belts, and indirect instruments of manipulation which ensure in countless ways the integrity of the regime, leaving nothing to chance. . ." and that it "...would be quite simply unthinkable without ideology acting as its all-embracing excuse and as the excuse for each of its parts" (p. 29). This ideological excuse explains the children's decision-making and positioning of being disciplined, of not being able to engage in their favorite play, and of not being able to fulfill their desires. In Havel's philosophy, all children use the ideological excuse and learn and exercise the appropriate ideologically charged knowledge. In other words, each child's personal domain is outside of the public sphere that demands that the child adopts certain discursive positions. These positions include the self-discipline to follow orders, to be ready to conform with other children, and to uphold the same ideals as others. Children however are social actors, who are capable of making decisions and challenging power structures through a simultaneous subject positioning as rebels.

The social contract between children and adults becomes the ritual, the automatism, which is the bridging element between the individual and the public structures of the system. When children accept and support the governing ideology, their actions become part of the power relations that are absorbed into the structures that constitute the system. The ideology, according to Havel (1985), becomes an indispensable, active, power component in the system: "[i]t is a principal instrument of ritual communication *within* the system of power" (p. 31, emphasis in original). So power is shaped by the relations between

children contributing to the system and the structure, where the ideology provides a "legitimacy and an inner coherence" (p. 32). The social contract within which children participate maintains the strength of the ideology through their everyday support. Havel claims that the ideology does not serve power but that power serves the ideology as "theory itself, ritual itself, ideology itself, makes decisions that affect people, and not the other way around" (p. 33). The ideology within the system is the binding substance that lets children exist in the public discourse without disturbance. This ideological substance needs to remain untouchable, undisturbed, and unchallenged, as the system depends on its ideology to be stable and publicly visible, and to continue to operate and fulfill its function of supporting the system.

Havel considers the system as a space where the lines of power are not linear, but cross-sectioned through all, including children, who, in their own way, are responsible not only for their decisions but also for the production of the public system. So the system and its ideology are not social orders imposed by an adult on a child but a system that has permeated all power relations between adults and children. This self-constituting dimension in the system is, as Havel (1985) notes, "impossible to grasp or define (for it is in the nature of the mere principle), but which is expressed by the entire society as an important feature of its life" (p. 34). Havel argues that there is a tendency in all human subjects to accept these conditions as subject positions of victims and supports, as well as to rebel against them. Havel argues that human subjects have a capacity to respond to this system and that children cannot be seen as pure victims of the circumstances of the system, as they actively and "freely" participate in the production of the public sphere and that the disrupting element of a rebel is present in each child. When children reject the rituals and rules, they may get labeled and otherwise punished, for challenging the everyday, mundane panorama of ideology, society, and power relations. In this Havelian framework, the system must react to all "cracks" in it and to the children that cause the crack, the disturbing rebels who have unsettled the system.

In Havel's thinking, the child rebels would not commit just an individual offense. By performing their rebel subject positions, they challenge and disturb the entire balance of power structures in society, performing their roles as social actors and their agency. They expose the system and shatter the power structures of the system and the ideology of the powerful and powerless that bind it. As Havel (1985) argues, everybody that

steps out of line *denies it in principle and threatens it in its entirety* . . . it is utterly unimportant how large a space this alternative occupies: its power does not consist in its physical attributes but in the light it casts on those pillars of the system and on its unstable foundations. (p. 40, emphasis in the original)

In a society, the boundaries between who is in power and who is not can be challenged and exposed by children. Boundaries of power can dissolve to the point where it is no longer clear who is in power and who is powerless. This thinking around power relations, ideology, resistance, and subject positions portrays a landscape in which children and their childhoods are subjected to the conditions that produce their subjectivities as both victims and supporters of the society and are interwoven as they demonstrate the complexities of its power relations and ideology. Children are active agents in this process as victim and supporter subjects and engage with knowledge and information that is outside of the public domain, for example, in childhood undergrounds, and at the same time act as rebel subjects. In a Havelian sense, children can thus be victims, supporters, and rebels at the very same time. Childhood subjectivities are produced within a system by what both Havel and Foucault would perhaps identify as technologies impacting on the self to produce the self.

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Children's Rights

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Synonyms

[Benefits](#); [Claims](#); [Dues](#); [Entitlements](#); [Interests](#)

Introduction

During the course of the twentieth century, children have come to be recognized globally as human beings with rights, which, when realized, provide them with a better quality of life, opportunities for healthy development, and the fulfillment of their potential. Rights are legally or morally justified entitlements to have or to obtain

something, or to act in a certain way. Children are defined here as people between birth and 18 years of age. The recognition that children have rights has had a transformative influence on how children are thought about and treated, not only by policy and lawmakers, but by professionals and other people who interact on an everyday basis with children. Respecting rights means that rights-holders are accorded dignity, while denial of rights threatens humanity and integrity. Rights arguments provide a reasoned and moral basis for reforms to practices and policies for children.

Historical Background

Swedish feminist and humanist, Ellen Key, published a book, *The Century of the Child* in 1900, which challenged the predominant vision of children as deserving of harsh discipline and control, and suggested an alternative vision of children as social beings with spontaneous natural interests that should be stimulated, the benefits of warm adult-child relationships, and recognition of the intrinsic goodness of children.

The turbulent history of the twentieth century, including two wars, when unprecedented violence, displacement, homelessness, and deprivation had a devastating impact on children, was the context for the emergence of concerns for children's rights. Eglantyne Jebb was a British pioneer of children's rights who had wide networks across the UK and Europe, and in 1919 established the Save the Children fund to ameliorate the plight of children. She advocated for the importance of rights for all children, regardless of sex, nationality, religion, or race. She drafted the first attempt to codify children's rights under the auspices of the League of Nations – the 1924 Geneva Declaration of the Rights of the Child. This was a brief one-page statement saying that mankind had an obligation to give to the child the best it had to give and that nations had a duty to relieve and provide material resources to children and to protect them from exploitation (Veerman 1992).

There were both individual and national champions of children's rights before, during, and after

the Second World War. Janusz Korczak (1878–1942) was a Polish pediatrician who had a profound impact on children's rights thinking, suggesting a principle of respect for the child, as opposed to nagging, scolding, and punishing the child. He fought for a more active, independent role for children and their comprehensive participation in democratic processes. Sweden, along with other Nordic countries like Norway and Finland, took a proactive stance toward children's rights and engaged in significant postwar efforts for children. Sweden was closely identified with the development of UNICEF, and with Radda Barna, a humanitarian organization closely affiliated with the Save the Children Fund.

In November 1959 the UN General Assembly adopted a revised and expanded version of the 1924 Declaration of the Rights of the Child. It asserted the child's right to special protection, to be among the first to receive help, to a name and nationality, to social security, free education, freedom from neglect and exploitation, and to the love of parents. These early declarations focused on the vulnerability and susceptibility to exploitation of children (welfare rights), and were less concerned with autonomy or citizenship rights.

The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child

In 1978 Poland proposed a convention on the rights of the child to the United Nations (UN) Commission on Human Rights, and subsequently in 1979, the UN declared an International Year of the Child. This was to be the beginning of 10 years of negotiation, which culminated in the unanimous adoption of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child is generally referred to by the initials UNCRC, and this acronym is used in the rest of this entry) by the UN General Assembly in November 1989. A number of new and previously ignored issues were introduced to the debate about child rights during the drafting process, for example, issues of sexual exploitation, child labor, "street children," and children in prison. The UN Commission on

Human Rights brought together many national organizations, including a mixture of human rights organizations (such as Amnesty International) and nongovernment organizations (NGOs) that worked with children (such as Defense for Children International) to draft the treaty (Cantwell 2011). The collaboration between human rights organizations and NGOs greatly broadened the rights framework, making it very comprehensive, and reflecting a hard won consensus across the countries of the world.

The UNCRC (1989) contains 54 articles that range across three main categories of rights – provision, protection, and participation. Provision articles are concerned with children's rights to essential resources, such as education, healthcare, welfare, family life, recreation and play, and culture. Protection articles are concerned with protecting children against adversity, such as violence, abuse, discrimination, injustice, and conflict. Participation articles refer to children's civil and political rights, to a name and identity, to be consulted on matters that affect them, to be able to express opinions and take part in decisions, and to have access to information. Participation rights are an innovative part of the UNCRC, signaling a shift toward treating children like citizens and recognizing that they have human rights just as adults do.

The adoption of the UNCRC marked an important step forward in the implementation of children's rights, because conventions are considered "hard" law as opposed to declarations, which are deemed "soft" law. If countries ratify the UNCRC, this entails a formal obligation to meet its requirements, and States have to report periodically to the UN (at first after 2 years, and subsequently after 5), and receive feedback and recommendations (Concluding Observations) from the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child in Geneva. Currently 195 countries have ratified the UNCRC, including all members of the UN except South Sudan and the United States. States can ratify the UNCRC but apply reservations to particular articles. For example, the UK has a reservation opting out of rights for child migrants and asylum seekers, allowing them to be locked up for weeks or months before deportation.

There are four cardinal principles and major messages inherent in the UNCRC. The first principle is nondiscrimination and universalism: *all* children regardless of race, sex, language, religion, disability, or class are entitled to rights and should not be discriminated against (Article 2). Secondly, there is the principle of the best interests of the child being a primary consideration in all actions or decisions concerning children (Article 3). Thirdly, there is the principle of the right to survival and development (Article 6) and the right to be protected from threats to life (through abuse or conflict) and health (such as through disease). The fourth principle within the UNCRC is respect for the views of the child and an obligation to take the views of the child seriously (Article 12 and 13). Children who can form their own views freely should have these taken into account in accord with their age and maturity. Giving such prominence to children's engagement in society has been the most controversial aspect of the convention, because it challenges traditional constructions of children. It gives an alternative interpretation of children's interests, capacities, and status in society and has had a widespread impact on changing perceptions of children, from the passive objects of adults' actions toward seeing them as social actors and giving them space and support to take actions on their own behalf.

The UNCRC gives high priority to education, which was the topic of the first day of General Discussion, and General Comment Number One in 2001. Article 28 asserts the right of all children to free and compulsory primary education, and that secondary education should be accessible to all children. Article 29 says that education should be aimed at developing the child's personality, talents, and physical and mental abilities to their fullest potential. Education should be child-centered, child-friendly, and empowering and promote human rights, cultural identity, and respect for the environment. Although there was no specific mention of early childhood education in the original UNCRC document, the Committee on the Rights of the Child in its General Comment Number 7 (2006) made it clear that all of the rights in the UNCRC applied to young children (under 8 years of age) and that they are entitled to

participate in quality holistic early childhood education services that promote children's other rights, and that parents should be supported in loving and caring for their children.

Theoretical Background to Children's Rights

Childhood Studies (Initially Known as the Sociology of Childhood)

The paradigm of Childhood Studies, which takes an integrated multidisciplinary approach toward children and childhood, provides a conceptual foundation for children's rights. Childhood Studies emphasizes that childhood is socially constructed in multiple ways according to particular historical times, places, cultures, and child characteristics (such as age, gender, ethnicity). Constructions of childhood are embedded in discourses, which are ideas that are held together by a particular view of the world and imbued in language and local cultures. These persistent ideas about childhood (constructions) are seen as self-evident truths about what children can do, what should be expected of them, their value and position in society, and how they should be treated. For example, traditionally children have been marginalized, largely because they were considered to lack competence, rationality, independence, and experience. They were often treated as the passive objects of adults' socialization practices. Childhood Studies has questioned the hegemonic power of Developmental Psychology to shape our constructions of childhood, because within it children are viewed as on an inexorable pathway toward rationality, and childhood is assumed to be a relatively universal experience for all children. Instead Childhood Studies positions children as participating subjects, knowers, and social actors and as people who can make a difference through their actions (James and Prout 1997). There is an overlap between Children's Rights (especially participation rights) and Childhood Studies, since both propose that children have agency and construct their own social worlds, and that they are subjects not objects of control or concern. Another theme within

Childhood Studies is the diversity of childhood and the wide range of perspectives, knowledge, and experience that children bring. Children's experiences have to be studied within particular cultural contexts. Generalizations about children are hard to make because even children within the same family have difference experiences and views.

Sociocultural Theory

The essence of sociocultural theory is that children's participation and learning takes place in social contexts and that children gradually come to know and understand the world through shared activities and communications. Russian psychologist, Lev Vygotsky (1978) showed that children could perform more skillfully together with others and that social support and guidance helps them to acquire competence and independence. In the process of co-constructing meaning with adults (or peers) within close reciprocal relationships, children, initially spectators, become participants, grasp meanings, and become able to act independently and control their own behavior. The reason often given for not allowing children to participate is their lack of competence (often judged by age). The relevance of sociocultural theory for children's rights is that if children are provided with the support to help them understand problems and formulate their own views, they become much more able to take the initiative in solving problems and acting on their own and others' behalf. Sociocultural theory suggests that children's capacity to participate and take responsibility is highly dependent on the social and cultural context. If children have trusting and respectful relationships with adults, even very young children can communicate their intentions and views, and adults are likely to be more responsive to their voices. Sensitivity to and knowledge of children's current level of understanding allows for a gradual shift in the balance of power toward the child taking on more responsibility and control. It is therefore not a question of expecting children to be completely autonomous, but giving them opportunities and space to practice expressing their views, initiating action, and making decisions in partnership with others.

Children's Rights and Policy

There are many areas where children's rights advocates have been able to use the UNCRC to press for significant changes in policies and practices for children, and there are other areas where policies can be criticized because they do not comply with the UNCRC. Two areas where the UNCRC has had a significant positive effect on policy are presented in this section.

Physical Punishment

The Committee on the Rights of the Child (Paragraph 11, General Comment Number 8, 2006) defines physical punishment as any punishment where physical force is used to inflict pain or discomfort, however light. It is a direct assault on the rights of children and an invasion of their physical integrity. Physical punishment is the most common form of violence toward children and explicitly forbidden by Article 19 of the UNCRC, which says that children should be protected from all forms of physical or mental violence, injury or abuse, neglect, or negligent treatment through provision of appropriate measures (including legal). Progress toward the legal prohibition of physical punishment over the last 36 years has been rapid. Sweden was the first country to prohibit physical punishment in 1979, and it was a model of good practice. Not only did Swedish domestic law state that children had the right to care, security, and a good upbringing and should not be subject to corporal punishment, but the law change was accompanied by extensive measures of public education to ensure that people understood the reason for the change, as well as providing them with a comprehensive child and family welfare system to support parents in bringing up their children with positive discipline. Since 1979 progress has been fast, with 8 countries having achieved prohibition in 1999, 24 in 2007, and 46 in 2015 (at the time of writing), with a further 52 States having expressed commitment to full prohibition. Only four countries (Sweden, Finland, Norway, and Austria) had prohibited physical punishment before the adoption of the UNCRC, but since then a further 42 countries have done so. Legal prohibition has been shown

to be associated with less violent parenting and more negative attitudes toward physical punishment. Although the UNCRC was clearly not the only influence on the increasing number of prohibitions, it is hard to avoid concluding that it has been one major impetus toward reform. In its feedback to State parties on presentation of their Periodic Reports, the Committee on the Rights of the Child has been unequivocal in criticizing those States whose legislation provides a defense for some level of violence toward children (such as “reasonable chastisement” or “moderate correction”).

Family Law

Another issue that profoundly affects children's rights within their families is what happens when their parents separate or divorce. In the past children have often been the invisible and voiceless objects of their parents' actions or of legal proceedings. Their parents' separation may trigger a series of unwanted changes in children's lives, not just the separation from one parent, but moving house and school, losing friends, and having a lowered income. Children do have the right to stay in contact with both parents if they separate, according to Article 9 of the UNCRC. Children's participation rights (Articles 12 and 13), however, also affirm children's rights to information about their family situation, and to have an input and participate in decisions about their residence and contact. Even though children do not necessarily want to make a difficult choice about which parent they want to live with, they clearly value the opportunity to have a say and be informed. A rights perspective has had the effect of bringing about reforms to family law to better respect children's agency, voice, and participation. If parental disputes come to court, legal professionals have an important role in listening to children, explaining the legal processes, and helping them formulate views and wishes. But the statutory provisions of the law also have a significant impact on the realization of children's rights. In New Zealand the Care of Children Act 2004 recognized the importance of children's right to participate. Section “[Children's Rights and Policy](#)” says that children must be given

reasonable opportunities to express their views and that these must be taken into account in court proceedings. The New Zealand legislation is particularly progressive as it does not specify any age when children should be consulted, dispensing with any assumptions about children's competence to participate at different ages. There is an increasing commitments internationally to enhancing children's participation in family law decision-making, and a range of countries have modified their law to embed children's participation into decisions about families.

Cross-References

► [Social Imaginaries and Children's Rights](#)

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Citizenship Belonging

► Disability and Samoa

Citizenship, Inclusion, and Education

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Introduction

The concept of “citizenship” is a highly contested one, one which has been contested throughout its intellectual history. These competing conceptualizations are based on different philosophical understandings of what it means to be a human being and the constructed relationship between individuals and the political community or State. Inherent in conceptualizing citizenship is the notion of exclusivity, with the various theories of citizenship defining who is included and who is excluded. The domain of education is typically considered to be one of the most fundamental sites reflecting the nature of society and the State, as well as being aspirational – striving toward a vision for the future of society. There is a long history of philosophers theorizing about the role of education in society, from the ancient Greek philosophers, Plato and Aristotle, to the twentieth-century American philosopher of education, John Dewey, and the twentieth-century Brazilian educator and philosopher, Paulo Freire. The contemporary nation-State sees education as a critical site through which to exercise its various policy aims including its authority, and so education is often a domain where policy aims are contested between the State, parents, community groups, teachers, and even children and young people themselves. In diverse societies, there are often debates regarding the educational rights of children from cultural, linguistic, or religious minorities. This entry provides a succinct overview of the intellectual history of citizenship, before exploring contemporary challenges with respect

to inclusion – covering age, disability, gender, sexuality, ethnicity, “race,” religion, and socioeconomic class. Different educational approaches and policies are reviewed in comparative perspective.

What Is “Citizenship?”: Theoretical Reflections

Typically, the concept of citizenship is traced back to the times of ancient Greece, approximately around the eighth century BC. However, it is important to note that the term “citizenship” is a highly contested term and has been contested throughout its intellectual history. In ancient Greece, citizenship denoted the relationship between a person and the city-State or “polis.” Before this, a person was defined primarily in terms of his social group or family. One of the earliest great contributions can be seen in Plato’s *Republic*, where the State was based on the idea of justice, and it was argued that there is a close relationship between the just society and just individuals. This conceptualization of citizenship was not like the modern legal conception of citizenship that we have today. Plato did not conceive of individual human beings actually possessing rights in opposition to the State. Rather he conceived of human beings as inherently social.

Aristotle, like Plato, also conceived of human beings – or, rather, men – as inherently political beings and that their nature could only be fulfilled by participating actively in the affairs of the “polis” (Heater 1990). So for Aristotle, he believed that the State served an ethical purpose. But these ancient conceptions of citizenship were very exclusive – they were seen as a privilege. Only certain categories of men were included, and so women, the very young, the old, those who did not own property, and those of certain occupations were excluded.

The Roman conception of citizenship, in contrast to Plato’s and Aristotle’s conceptions, was a more legalistic conception and one which was relatively more inclusive (Heater 1990). All free male inhabitants could be citizens. In addition, the idea of multiple citizenships at different

levels – the local as well as a more “regional” level (i.e., “Latin” and “Roman”) – was introduced. In addition, there was the idea of a sub-citizenship, where individuals were entitled to private but not public rights of citizenship (Heater 1990). The similarities between the Greek and Roman conceptions of citizenship relate to the emphasis on masculinity, warriorship, and owning property, which some academics argue continue to be the key axes of citizenship even today.

In the medieval times in Europe, the feudal system was a relationship between the landowners and those who worked for them. The workers gave their loyalty to the landowner, and in return they would receive protection. The loyalty was to a person rather than to a law or concept of nation, but some scholars conceive of this system as the predecessor to the idea of the citizen’s relationship with the State.

Modern liberal conceptions of the State and citizenship are typically seen as developing in seventeenth-century Europe. This was in the context of emerging ideas of the State and its sovereignty and the need to define allegiance and rights (Held 1993). This emphasis on individual rights is essentially a legal conception of citizenship. This tradition can be traced back to philosophers such as Hobbes and Locke. Hobbes emphasized the importance of the making of a “social contract” between individuals and the ruler or “sovereign,” and he believed that it was the responsibility of the sovereign to protect individuals. This emphasis on the individual is the modern element in Hobbes that has been carried through to contemporary times. According to Locke, he argued that human beings are “free and equal” because they have “natural rights”; this means they have rights just because they are human beings, with the potential of rationality. He also believed that the State’s role is to protect citizens’ rights, and so there is a need for a social contract. However, what is fundamentally different about Locke’s position is that the sovereignty remains with the people, rather than being a transfer of subjects’ rights to the State, as proposed by Hobbes; it is this conception that has laid the foundation for the development of liberalism, in that it prepared the way for popular representative government.

In contrast to liberal discourses that focus on individual rights and the relationship of the individual to the State, there is an extensive academic literature that critiques this conception. In eighteenth-century France, liberalism’s emphasis on reason as opposed to tradition was attractive, as at this time, French society was structured very much in terms of privilege, with the clergy owning one-fifth of the land in France, and people were very frustrated with this. In this context, the philosopher, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, argued for “participatory” democracy, and an active citizenry, an idea that subsequently had an influence on ideas during the French revolution and also on Marxism (Held 1993). While Hobbes and Locke argued for State laws to be minimal so as not to limit individuals’ natural rights, Rousseau believed that laws can enhance an individual’s liberty. He also believed that liberty and virtue are related, and human beings can only really be free and develop virtue in civil society (Rousseau 1968). Rousseau proposed that when human beings are in a “state of nature,” they are independent rather than free and, in this “state of nature,” are not moral beings. He argued that only moral beings can enjoy liberty.

So for Rousseau, human beings in a state of nature are inherently good, yet their potential is not fully developed. Once human beings enter civil society, this provides them with the environment to develop their capacity, and it is only in such a context that the notion of liberty can be utilized meaningfully and also, as a consequence, that we can talk of human beings as moral beings, whose humanity is realized through active participation in civil society.

Contemporary Challenges to Exclusive Conceptions of Citizenship

There have been a wide range of challenges to exclusive conceptions of citizenship – in terms of ethnicity, “race” and religion, gender and sexuality, disability, age, and social class, with some scholars questioning the usefulness of a concept that is inherently exclusive (Nash 2009). Historically, “ethnocultural” conceptions of citizenship

which define citizenship in terms of “blood” (“*jus sanguinis*”) are where the “nation” is seen to exist before the formation of the State. Germany is taken as a typical example of a country that understands itself in these terms. In this kind of conception, “citizenship” is constructed in cultural, ethnic, and religious terms, as opposed to legal terms, and this clearly has implications with regard to who can be included in this model as a citizen. In this kind of model, it is more difficult in theoretical terms to integrate “outsiders” as “citizens,” in contrast to the “civic republican” model, where inclusion into citizenship is understood in terms of committing to shared values and participating in the community (e.g., France). The Canadian philosopher, Will Kymlicka, is best associated with the theory of “multicultural citizenship,” which aims to accommodate ethnic and religious rights into a liberal model of citizenship (Kymlicka 1995).

Feminist critiques of citizenship started in the eighteenth century with challenges to the assumed lower status of women based on the idea that women were incapable of rational thought and therefore excluded from citizenship. This became a significant movement throughout the twentieth century with women campaigning for the right to vote. Although women in many parts of the world have achieved legal citizenship status, feminists argue that women continue to be second-class citizens even in Western democracies, given that the conception of citizenship is inherently patriarchal with masculine attributes – based on a public/private sphere distinction with women associated with the private, nonrational sphere, associated with property ownership, militarism, and employment (Pateman 1988). It has also been argued that citizenship is predicated on a normalization of heterosexuality and as such is exclusive in these terms (Richardson 1998).

Other conceptions in the academic literature include postnational or cosmopolitan theories of citizenship. In these models, it is argued that the nation-State no longer has the significance that it used to have and that citizenship is being transformed by international human rights discourses and legislation, as well as by the significant increases in mobility across national borders, as

witnessed by migration flows as well as refugee crises that challenge traditional ways of thinking about citizenship. There have also been challenges questioning the translatability and universality of the concept of citizenship outside of the Western liberal democratic context, with calls for decoupling “orientalism” and “citizenship,” whereby the West assumes that those living outside of the liberal West are incapable of constituting themselves politically (Isin 2005).

Different Educational Approaches

As noted in the introduction, education is a critical site for the nation-State through which to exercise its various policy aims. Citizenship policies through education illustrate States’ different conceptions of citizenship, including policy aims relating to inclusion. There are a range of approaches to citizenship education, which can be broadly categorized into four main categories – “moral,” “legal,” “participatory,” and “identity based”; these different approaches have different implications for the accommodation of diversity (Kiwan 2008).

Moral conceptions emphasizing the importance of having a “virtuous” character and being proud to fulfill one’s responsibilities are key features of these conceptions, which can be traced back to the philosophical influences of the ancient Greek philosophers, Plato and Aristotle. This can take the form of promoting certain values, which may be religious or secular values. Such terms as “character education,” “moral education,” and “education for common values” all reflect a vision of education whereby it plays a central role in ethically shaping the individual. This moral vision is typically presented as not only good for the individual but for society as a whole, often with policy rationales invoking education as important in tackling crime, lack of cohesion between communities, youth apathy, and so on. Often, public and policy discourses on promoting the importance of “shared values” view society as being in moral decline as a result of increased ethnic, religious, and other forms of diversity. The policy solution proposed in this model is presented in

terms of identifying and promoting a set of common values for society. Policy discourses that emphasize patriotism and loyalty to the State as centrally defining features of citizenship are examples of “moral” conceptions of citizenship. Some “communitarian” conceptions of citizenship – models of citizenship that emphasize participation in the community also – have this moral conception of citizenship; these conceptions have the idea that acting or participating in the community acts as a moral force bringing people together.

Legal conceptions of citizenship frame citizenship in terms of rights, influenced by modern liberal European conceptions of the State and citizenship developed in the seventeenth century. In models of citizenship education, this can take the form of emphasizing human rights and providing awareness-raising sessions to provide learners with knowledge about human rights. Some citizenship educators advocating models of citizenship education based on human rights frameworks argue that this promotes an inclusive conception of citizenship. They draw this conclusion as they make the assumption that because human rights approaches are based on a notion of universal or common humanity, this translates into an inclusivity with respect to citizenship rights. However, others argue that such approaches do not sufficiently acknowledge the institutional and often discriminatory structures through which such rights must be claimed and may in fact lead to even greater inequality in practice, through the creation of a number of sub-statuses (Nash 2009).

Participatory models of citizenship education are framed in terms of equipping learners with skills of active participation, an increasingly prominent approach to citizenship education in a number of contemporary education systems in Europe, the United States, Canada, and other parts of the world. Here, the pedagogy emphasizes learning through active engagement, developing critical skills of civic literacy, and through civic participation in community projects. Often, the concept of democracy is linked to such participatory approaches to citizenship education, whereby attempts are made to implement some democratic

practices within the school itself – for example, school councils. Intellectually, this kind of approach can be seen to draw on ancient Greek traditions, as well as, for example, the philosophy of John Stuart Mill, in the context of encouraging voluntary and community activity; he argued that active participation enables the development of informed citizens and was also committed to the notion of representative government (Mill 1983). While participatory models of citizenship are linked to democracy, it has been argued by some scholars that this does not necessarily support the accommodation of diversity as it can favor the majority, rather than allowing for hearing a variety of voices.

Finally, identity-based conceptions of citizenship education are those models that deal explicitly with diversity, identity, antiracism, multiculturalism, nationality, and global and regional aspects of citizenship. Some forms of citizenship education take the form of constructing a civic identity, with France taken as a typical example of this approach. Here, the national identity is framed as a civic identity, whereby ethnic and religious identity is prescribed to the private sphere. In contrast, multicultural citizenship approaches advocate the explicit recognition of diversity in the public sphere. There is a long tradition of a more cosmopolitan approach to citizenship, evident in many world religions, which have emerged in contemporary thought as a reaction to liberal and communitarian theories, due to a number of influences, such as globalization, increased migration, and conflict.

Conclusion

Educational Approaches

Approaches to citizenship education in Western liberal democracies tend to focus on participatory approaches, with an emphasis on participatory transformative pedagogies. For example, women’s peace activism has been characterized as a “dialogical” process that takes account of the differential subjectivities and positionings as well as sharing a commitment to the process. Giroux

(1991) has proposed the concept of “border pedagogy,” linking educational practices with a struggle for democracy. Border pedagogy addresses the relationship between knowledge and power and how it is represented to secure authority. By challenging such representations and discourses, it reveals the interests that are produced and legitimated by these discourses and practices. In addition, it is argued that through challenging borders, “borderlands” are created where the production of knowledge by learners and the marginalized rewrites their histories and identities, challenging universalist claims to knowledge. By promoting a dialogue between the past, the present, and the future, it opens up possibilities of optimism for locating oneself historically but struggling to act and transform public life. This notion is also captured in the concept of “transformative pedagogy,” with an emphasis on the development of the whole person, focusing on personal and social connectivity and transformation, self-reflexivity, and critical literacy, rather than the transmission of information. It recognizes that knowledge is partial and incomplete and socially constructed.

Linking Education and Inclusion

Increasingly, a range of diversities are explicitly recognized as central to conceptualizing citizenship in pluralist, multicultural societies of Western liberal democracies. Policy aims include equipping young people with critical literacy skills, combatting presumed youth apathy in society and toward politics, promoting social cohesion and shared values, and promoting ideals of the “good citizen” contributing to society. Citizenship education is also increasingly seen to be important for the nation-State in other parts of the world. For example, in the Arab world, citizenship education has been used to promote loyalty to the State through primarily didactic pedagogical approaches. With the changing sociopolitical context unfolding in this part of the world, there are interests in transformative pedagogical approaches to citizenship education, also reflected in international policy discourses, as exemplified by UNESCO’s 2015 international curriculum guiding framework for global citizenship education.

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Cognitive Decolonization

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Introduction

In his keynote addressed to the attendees at the Comparative and International Education Society (CIES) Conference in March 2015 in Washington, DC, the Egyptian economist Samir Amin, who is

well known for his scathing critiques of global capitalism and Eurocentric views of history, culture, and knowledge (see Amin 2010, 2013), presented a tableau of human capacities that refuses to assign more knowledge and achievement credits to any one group or region of the world. In Amin's reading of the situation, while there may be a tiny minority of what might be described as gifted (about four percent in the world in his estimate), and about the same number of intellectually challenged individuals, over 90% of all humans, irrespective of where they reside or their origin, have the same potentialities. Looking pragmatically at the history and current realities of humanity, especially with respect to how equal opportunities can yield equal results, it is not difficult to agree with Amin's observations.

In deploying Amin's analysis at the beginning of this piece, the main intention is to say that cognitive colonization is a hegemonic attempt that goes against such human realities. The issue is also attached to colonial assumptions of cognitive inferiority about non-European populations across the globe. As has argued (see Abdi 2008, 2012), the initial depiction of colonialism as mainly political and economic misses the important epistemological onslaught that was unleashed on the colonized's reading of their social and physical realities (Nyerere 1968; Rodney 1982; Mann 2006). In essence, therefore, to colonize people's physical and mental existentialities, one need not elevate the value of their learning systems, knowledge creation possibilities, and reflective capacities. That itself also goes against Amin's above observations as it applies a horizontal scheme of lower epistemic capacity to colonized populations.

From a critical reading of the situation, therefore, the problematic fabrication of uneducated colonized natives also contained, and was also intended, to influence the thinking of Europeans. To do so successfully, the continent's most important thinkers and philosophers were front and centre in spreading unsubstantiated negative depictions of non-Europeans with many people accepting these without evidence. After all, this was a time when the writings and opinions of Europe's most important philosophers were

hardly questioned, especially when these were deployed to shabbily concoct things about unknown peoples in what was faraway lands that did not have the privilege of challenging such assumptions in continental Europe. In essence, therefore, this was the beginning of comprehensive but certainly multidirectional cognitive colonizations that affected the thinking of many people in multiple locations of the globe.

European Colonialism and Early Constructions of Cognitive Colonization

With the early plans of European colonialism in full force and pragmatically driven by economic crisis at home (Luchembe 1995), one of the most important platforms to successfully undertake such massive project was to establish a two-front attack system that first attempted and, in real terms, succeeded in justifying to European populations the importance of what was termed the “civilizing mission” of primitive peoples. Here, the most important variables in the preceding sentence are “primitive peoples” which immediately represented a new “knowledge” construction about foreign contexts that actually were not known to the major perpetrators of this epistemic crime. From the eighteenth to nineteenth century and for colonizing Europe especially, the burden of descriptive verification seems to have been annulled with some of the most important thinkers including such so-called luminaries of Western thought systems and philosophies including but not at all limited to Immanuel Kant, G.W.F. Hegel, Thomas Hobbes, Jean-Marie Arouet (nom de plume, Voltaire), and Charles de Secondat (Montesquieu), who in their writings all attributed lack of civilization and nonhuman fulsomeness to non-European populations (Abdi 2008).

Interestingly, such bashing of extra-European contexts did not start with these philosophers. It actually preceded them by about two millennia where even within his limited geographical exposure, the classical Greek philosopher Aristotle was sure around 315 B.C. of the centrality of Europe to everything else that existed in the

world. That hubristic presumptive knowledge tradition was carried into the so-called Middle Ages, which in time-space realities were not middle times for everyone, by the Roman historian Pliny, The Elder, who in his book, *Historia Naturalis* (1496), attributed what he termed natural monstrosity to those who lived in Ethiopia and India. Indeed, the way these false ideas (masquerading as printed reliable knowledge) were fabricated was not apparently that difficult as neither fieldwork, nor verification, nor even visitation of the described places was needed. From there, one can clearly see the long line of false assumptions about the to-be-colonized since the fifteenth century. So the myths about others henceforward expounded and represented some of the first fragments of two important epistemic constructions that were necessary to establish the massive and multidirectional cognitive colonization and its main tributary of *otherizing* all non-European peoples from ancient times and into the twentieth century. The long-term and eventually tempo-spatially successful, cognitive and perforce construction of the other, i.e., those constructed as outside of European modernity, was important in establishing the world current. In this world, almost all habitualized into a categorized human valuation system where, in bitter realities, some are elevated and loved, while some are despised and disliked. But for the psychosomatically colonized, i.e., those who were depicted as inferior, and then physically colonized, the fateful story gets even worse. It was indeed such continuous worsening of the situation that slowly became one important trigger of the anti-colonial schemes of historico-cultural redemption struggle and attached possibilities of cognitive decolonization that were undertaken by the colonized for their physical and mental liberation.

Cognitive Colonization and Avant-Garde Cognitive Decolonization Thinkers

Concisely and perhaps in the most simplistic way, cognitive decolonization is about the colonization of the mind which may sound simple in its descriptive and condition-based representations.

What is more complicated though is to understand and analyze how the long history of mental colonization imprinted on the minds of the colonized could be reversed to achieve mental decolonization. So while one need not miss the complexity of the needed processes to reverse cognitive imperialism, as Marie Battiste (1998) contextually called it, it is still have to limit the space allocable to a long analysis of such complicated issue. To psychoculturally ascertain the realities of the situation, one can talk about the work of what is being termed here avant-garde thinkers of cognitive decolonization. Before those are discussed though, perhaps an introduction of the seminal work of another thinker who preceded them by about 600 years, the Tunisian historian and sociological philosopher Ibn Khaldun, will be useful. From his vantage point, Ibn Khaldun understood the power and breadth of mental colonization among conquered peoples. In his important work, *The Muqaddimah* (Prolegomena or Introduction) (2015 [1377]), he spoke about the horizontal mental de-patterning which afflicts the lives of the subordinated who over time, associate power, knowledge, and achievement with their dominators. De-patterning in that it effects the problematic and more often self-depreciating results of cognitive colonization that become manifest in the thought and behavioral process of the longue durée oppressed (Abdi 2009). As time goes by in these superior-subordinate relationships, noted Ibn Khaldun, the subordinated move from believing in the superiority of the victors to actually devaluing their own histories and cultures and begin imitating the ways and customs of the conqueror.

In cognitive decolonization perspectives, the findings of Ibn Khaldun were reaffirmed many centuries later by, inter alia, Albert Memmi (1991 [1957]), who lived in French-colonized Tunisia and observed how the colonized do not just eventually accept their inferioritized status but actually partake in the maintenance of the new status quo. A very interesting observation by Memmi, in this regard, concerns how those among the subordinated who do not see themselves at the bottom of the heap do everything to keep those below them down while accepting the

superiority of the colonizer. Memmi's work can be grouped into the cluster of avant-garde decolonization thinkers who should include, among others, Frantz Fanon (1967, 1968), Aimé Césaire (1972), Chinua Achebe (2000, 2009 [1958]), Julius Nyerere (1968), Ngugi wa Thiong'o (1986, 2009), Edward Said (1978, 1993), Marie Battiste (1998, 2013), Ashis Nandy (1997), Ranajit Guha (1998), and Walter Mignolo (2011) and whose critical works emerged as a result of European colonialism in Africa, in Asia, in settler-colonized North America, and to a lesser extent in Latin America. The lesser extent point on Latin America is that while most avant-garde thinkers, labeled here as such because of the unique temp-spatiality of their work (i.e., during the intensification of anti-colonial knowledge counter-attacks at the beginning of the second half of the twentieth century and later), most Latin American countries achieved their independence from Spanish and Portuguese rule either in the nineteenth century or close to the early parts of twentieth century. In addition, the elite that took power in postcolonial Latin America was not from the indigenous population but mostly from European groups that did not change a lot within the new political power structure.

While Memmi's work is seminal, perhaps the most important avant-garde cognitive decolonization thinker and philosopher is the Martinican-French psychiatrist and social theorist/philosopher, Frantz Fanon (1967, 1968). In his introduction to Fanon's *Black Skin, White Masks* 1986 edition, later published in *New Formations* (1987, No. 1), Homi Bhabha describes reading and remembering Fanon "as a process of intense discovery and disorientation. ... [as] putting together of the dismembered past to make sense of the trauma of the present" (p. 23). Fanon understood deeply and analyzed the history and consequences of ontological inferioritization through racialization and all the oppressive assumptions and practices constructed to sustain an unlimited platform of cognitive and related colonizations. In addition, he, perhaps more than any other critic of cognitive colonization and prospects for decolonization, explicated the situation so effectively in his two best known works, *Black skin, White*

Masks (1967) and *The Wretched of the Earth* (1968). For Fanon, the negative deconstruction of self via onto-existential inferioritization (Abdi 2014) reduces the colonized entity into other than what he or she was prior to the colonized-colonizer contact. The emphasis for Fanon here is more attuned toward critical and post-facto redoing of self and society after the totalizing and problematic colonial deconstructions and reconstructions.

Beyond Fanon and especially from the African vantage point of screening the situation, Achebe and wa Thiong'o should be two heavy weights in the annals of cultural, knowledge, and cognitive colonizations and decolonizations. The two effectively engage the subjective de-historicizations (i.e., their cultures, achievements, and beings all rendered ahistorical) and possible re-historicizations of their own learning and lived experiences. With both growing up in colonial Africa, Achebe (2000, 2009 [1958]) and wa Thiong'o (1986, 2009) experientially narrate the performative cognitive colonizations imposed on people which shifted not only their ontologies but also, and perhaps even more importantly, their epistemological locations. It is this combination of the many negative deconstructive schemes in the establishment of cognitive colonizations that must be also fully considered in the project of cognitive decolonization. Indeed, as Aimé Césaire noted in his excellent *Discourse on Colonialism* (1972), people's physical freedoms and willful actions will be potentially lost when their mental dispositions are so disturbed that they become something other than what they were in their precolonial times. That becoming of something else through forced cognitive realignments is also what Achebe in his classic, widely read work *Things Fall Apart* (2009 [1958]) so subjectively and intersubjectively brings to the fore. That brings up the issue of power relations and the centrality of epistemic valuations and devaluations that rationalize what was not, as both Fanon (1968) and Césaire (1972) note, rationalizable (i.e., not reducible to measurable and where necessary detachable space-time components of life) through the pretentious scientization of enlightenment's ideologies operationalized via modernity's

experiments performed on the psyches and bodies of the colonized.

To stay more with the psychological deformations that are stealthily formulated, one need never underestimate the colonial education systems that formed some of the most important components of the so-labeled civilizing mission. Being a subset of the overall deculturation of the colonized, as Edward Said (1993) so cogently noted, the arrival of colonial education was to push the project of cognitive colonization which was already sanctioned by leading European philosophers and partially enacted via the systemic deriding of almost everything that was African, Asian, or of pre-Columbus indigenous in what is known as the Americas. In speaking about the hidden power of colonial education, Hamidou Kane, in his excellent small book, *Ambiguous Adventure* (2012 [1963]), powerfully discussed the long-term effects of colonial education, where, especially for those who were educated in the colonizing metropolis, the primordial cultural discontinuities imprinted upon their psyche partially disjunctured them from their society and its needs.

With respect to Ngũgĩ wa Thiong'o (1986, 2009), he experienced firsthand the cultural and associated learning problems of colonial education in his native Kenya. As he noted (wa Thiong'o 1986), being exposed to deculturing and de-epistemologizing colonial education was tantamount to losing the center of one's world where even the linguistic repertoire needed to express about, and explain one's physical and social surroundings, was deliberately decommissioned from the context of the learner. For wa Thiong'o, the connection of the linguistic to the cultural is so central to any cognitive decolonization possibilities that reconstructing everything that was lost, irrespective of the educational and epistemic rehabilitation efforts needed to do so, becomes the sine qua non of cognitive decolonization. As he notes, the thick, horizontal cultural and linguistic decolonization needed can slowly serve as antidote for what he terms the realities of linguicide (2009) that have shifted the way people think about, relate to, and do their world. Indeed, to achieve cognitive

decolonization, especially for those populations that have experienced *longue durée* systems of imperialism, any cognitive decolonization prospects have to be informed by connecting the cultural to the linguistic and, by extension, both to the epistemic and attachable cognitive tributaries.

Selectively moving from the situation of Africa, and looking into the cognitive colonization structures and decolonization possibilities of the settler-dominated countries with continuously subjugated aboriginal populations such as Canada, the United States, Australia, and New Zealand, it should be important to realign the way such contexts are read. Focusing specifically on the cognitive decolonization work of some indigenous Canadian scholars, a brief look at the important analyses of Marie Battiste (1998, 2013), Taiaiake Alfred (2005), Willie Ermine (2007), and Glen Coulthard (2014), among others, should be important. While all of these have contributed to indigenous people's cognitive decolonization projects in Canada, perhaps it is good to start by highlighting the work of Marie Battiste who was the first indigenous Canadian to achieve full professor status in a Canadian university and her critically intervening work which was firstly effectively conveyed in her article "Enabling the Autumn Seed: Toward a Decolonized Approach to Aboriginal Knowledge, Language, and Education" (1998). In this writing, Battiste's point that without decolonizing aboriginal epistemic and epistemological realities, the project of cognitive colonization will not be dealt with effectively. In this writing, Battiste posits that without freeing the mind, you cannot free culture, learning, or social well-being. In her more recent work, *Decolonizing Education: Nourishing the Learning Spirit* (2013), Battiste takes the project of knowledge decolonization at least one step further, that is, from freeing thought processes to liberating actual programs of learning that should contribute to tangible spiritual and eventually to educational and community well-being.

More or less in line with the need to create counter-colonization spaces, Taiaiake Alfred (2005) suggests a unique intentional detour in achieving decolonized knowledges and life systems that refuse to stay with the trap of colonial

programming and oppression. He recommends critically reading and counter-hegemonically learning from the courage and strategies of those indigenous peoples who even in the midst of colonialism refused to be either physically destroyed or mentally de-patterned. He uses the reference of *Wasáse* which in the Mohawk tradition stood for traditional war dance ceremony and determined action. Then there is the issue of ethical space (the natural or contextually constructed interactive space between groups and individuals) to all human life and interactions that Willie Ermine (2007) talks about. In his terms, by being in the human family, important to continuously practice ethics in relation to others; as such, the quality of that ethical space whether it is inclusive and constructive or exclusive and potentially destructive can majorly determine the outcomes of what is achieved or not achieved with others or among ourselves. As such, cognitive decolonization requires a constructive ethical space that can capacitate the resurgence of suppressed knowledges and systems of knowing. Perhaps as a warning about the dangers of not doing it right in the new campaigns to reestablish liberating indigenous life systems, Glen Coulthard, in a book that is at least title-wise evocative of Fanon, *Red Skin, White Masks* (2014), reconsiders half-baked reconciliations that advance the rhetoric of recognition in the usual language of liberal ideologies that have not completely liberated indigenous peoples in Canada or elsewhere. In extending his analysis, he notes how the space for historical consciousness, cultural revival, and cognitive decolonization all have to be incorporated into any mechanisms that could reverse the depth and severity of cognitive imperialism.

Educating for Cognitive Decolonization

As noted above, cognitive colonization is the most enduring parcel of European colonialism as it spread into many parts of the world. Indeed, while the effects of physical colonization could be contextualized into the past, the same should not be said about cognitive colonization as its effects endure much longer. To just briefly stay

with the works of indigenous Canadian scholars referred to above, the effects of cultural and cognitive colonization are still present in the lives of many people who were exposed to the harsh situations of residential schools where aboriginal children were to be de-indigenized. Needless to add that such de-indigenizing of the platforms and outcomes of education are still being fully felt in tangible intergenerational terms that continue to perpetuate educational and mental colonization systems. But even such heavy labeling of the condition may not be enough to talk about the longevity of cognitive colonization which can affect, not just the children of those affected but very possibly, their grandchildren and many other generations beyond those. The same should be true in other parts of the world where, for instance, using the example of India, the fateful words of the colonial British governor, Thomas Macaulay (1995 [1930]), about the creation of an Indian class who were only Indian in skin color and blood but British in their tastes, dispositions, and worldviews, actually worked so well that such culture of cognitive colonization currently perpetuates itself. As Ashis Nandy (1997) noted, the power of mental colonization shifts the thinking of individuals in unique ways where, especially in the case of India, the cultural hegemony platform was as influential, if not more influential, than anything else that took place in colonial relations (Guha 1998).

It is with this understanding that the need to strategically think about possible ways of educating for mental decolonization is so important. Apropos that the initial forcers that created the situation in the first place, Eurocentricism and colonialism, now represented by neoliberal global capitalism, are still the dominant global political and economic systems in the world. Still, educational efforts have to be made and have been made in the cognitive decolonization sphere of which among the most prominent ones should be Julius Nyerere's (1968) *Ujamaa* (familyhood or village life in Swahili) project and its learning platform of "Education for self-reliance." Such education, as it was intended, should have counterweighed the

colonial destruction of African traditional education and social development systems. Alas, that was not to be effectualized as much as it was needed and was actually successfully repulsed by global capitalist forces. So the cognitive damage that has been done to the colonized is more or less still intact and actually perpetuated by current schooling systems which even, in so-called post-colonial contexts, is continuously towing the line of European learning structure and its Eurocentric knowledge categories that do not bode well for historico-cultural well-being and cognitive liberation. This is certainly where more critical work is needed to reverse the continuing effects of cognitive colonization and achieve cognitive decolonization. Without that, the now globalized projects of de-indigenization and epistemicide will continue (Santos 2014), and the gap between world have-nots and have-lots will continue widening.

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Cognitive Imperialism

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Synonyms

Brain-washing; Cognitive assimilation; Cultural imperialism; Hierarchical invidious monoism; Hierarchical patrimonial monologue

Cognitive imperialism is a term that describes the mental, emotional, destructive, and traumatic effects of the experience of individuals and peoples forced to be educated and living under Eurocentric colonialism and imperialism (Fanon 1965, 1967; Memmi 1967, 2006). It is a form of cognitive manipulation used in social and education systems to disclaim other knowledge systems and values, known as a banking model (Freire 2004), cultural imperialism (Carnoy 1974), mental colonization or colonization of the mind (Chinweizu 1987; Hotep 2003), culturalism, cultural racism, epistemic violence, cultural genocide, or cognitive assimilation. However, cognitive imperialism's focus of the change is in the consciousness and knowledge systems, rather than in culture. It is integral to replacing one knowledge system with another knowledge system that results in various forms of nihilism, more than material, philosophical, or economic displacements attributed to political or cultural imperialism. It has had many lasting and subtle manifestations in various situations. Often those who perform cognitive imperialism are unaware of the nature of their action or the epistemic and other damaging consequences of their action. Indeed, most teachers believe they are helping the colonized, by providing them with better (i.e., informed, educated, superior, etc.) beliefs and patterns of action that improve their ability to accommodate or cope successfully with the colonial situation.

Cognitive imperialism (Battiste 1986) explores the lived experience among Indigenous peoples among others who have been forced into assimilation through their historical colonial experience with missionaries and various governments and their connections with schools, especially the federal government and the church Indian Residential School as revealed by the court order of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada. The Indian Residential School used compulsory education to kill the Indian in the child, the attempt to annihilate Indigenous knowledge systems and languages by fear, punishment, and hunger to assure compliance, thus disconnecting the child's self from the collective cultural and linguistic relationships within one's family, community, and knowledge system. Cognitive imperialism denies the child and their subsequent heirs to their heritage, knowledge, and language, to maintain the legitimacy of only one or colonial dominant knowledge system, one language, one culture, and one frame of reference – Eurocentrism.

Eurocentrism is founded within a particular constructed knowledge system created in the classics of European Greeks, Romans, and Christianity and other western European groups (actually there is no Europe, only a continent that is Asia), all of which has left some legacy of their learning, languages, and ideas. Eurocentrism is validated as a universal knowledge system and empowered through compulsory public education in the colonies and western world, which has been diffused to people at the periphery of Europe as a perceived gift of colonization. However, Eurocentrism has been the engine of cognitive imperialism. It has been the means by which whole nations and groups of people have been denied their knowledge systems, their cultural and spiritual identities, and their wealth confiscated.

Eurocentrism underlies all “Western” scholarship, opinion, and law (Blaut 1993). It is an ultra-theory of contemporary thought. It is not an opinion or attitude that can be altered by a multicultural or crosscultural training exercise. As an imaginative and institutional context, it is the dominant consciousness of contemporary lives, and all societies have been marinated in it or directly influenced by it. All educated peoples

are both the victim and beneficiaries of the Eurocentric educational systems that have taught us in the discourses of the ways of the conventional that have been prescribed as normative.

Eurocentrism provides the context for many academic disciplines and theories, which can be understood as integral parts of Eurocentric diffusionism. Eurocentric diffusionism in its classic form invents a world divided into the two categories. There is Greater Europe, which has a history, invents things, and progresses. And then there is non-Europe, which is thought to have no history, is stagnant and unchanging, and receives progressive innovations by diffusion from Europe. The theory of Eurocentric diffusionism postulates the superiority of European knowledge systems over non-Europeans knowledge systems. It asserts the distinction between these peoples lies in the superior quality of the European mind or spirit, which contains a certain intellectual or spiritual factor that leads to creativity, imagination, invention, innovation, rationality, and a sense of honor or ethics. The reason for the perceived non-Europe's non-progress is the lack of the perceived intellectual or spiritual factor that is inherent in the “European mind,” “European spirit,” or “Western man.”

Contradictions emerge in the cultural inclusions and add-on curriculum proposed to resolve cultural imperialism, the administrative resistances to or disinterest in changes in knowledge bases, knowledge keepers and holders, natural contexts for learning, and diverse demonstrations of success from education, holding firmly to scientific and culturalism in curriculum, training Aboriginal teachers in monocultural and Eurocentric contexts, diminishing the status and role of Aboriginal elders in schools, and grading quantitative practices. Affirmative action and equity of labour masks the systemic discrimination and practices of cultural imperialism, while elitist research and studies of indigenous education continue the discourse of knowing the Indigenous other, for in their uniquely different ways of being lay the answer to their marginalized and powerless position in society. This ideology is an exercise of cognitive power that seeks to change the consciousness of the non-European, not change the situation that oppressed them.

Derived from this empowered knowledge system of Eurocentrism, cognitive imperialism is constructed within non-European society as superior to other knowledge systems. It is the model of what it means to be educated, progressive, and civilized, and thus serves to legitimize its imposition as formal public education to be mandated throughout various stages of life and ages, regardless of its effects on other knowledge systems and the subsequent effect on individuals and collective psyche. Cognitive imperialism solidifies some groups with political power, and others are thus led to believe that they are lacking, inherently or naturally, because of their differences. It establishes the method and conditions to exploit, marginalize, or manipulate students and parents for the benefit of Eurocentrism, colonization, and imperialism, leaving a soul wound on the peoples (Duran and Duran 1995). Its benefits are imagined to enrich the economy of the colonizer States and the well-being of the colonized society.

Cognitive imperialism in compulsory education requires the generating of a set of beliefs in inferential, persuasive processes – a process that is cognitive in nature. Its basic constituent is the implicit acceptance by the colonized student of the superiority of Eurocentrism especially when it is compared or clashed with Indigenous knowledge. By this implicit acceptance, the student will usually tend to prefer Eurocentrism. In other words, cognitive imperialism is achieved when the colonized teacher or students adopts the epistemic principles of Eurocentrism. It is this acceptance that establishes a sort of implicit comprehension that in any matter involving cognitive abilities Indigenous knowledge system must be presumed to be inferior and irrelevant to Eurocentrism. It is important to recognize that cognitive imperialism is about the diminishment, devaluation, and marginalization of many knowledge systems of other diverse peoples around the earth, who find their knowledges, voices, experience, spiritualities, imaginations, and creativity marginalized, eroded, or erased.

Mandatory public education, supported by colonial governments, their elites, and supporting corporations, was justified and supported by monarchies, politicians, legislators, States, courts,

social systems, policing and other regulatory provisions through other forms and strategies, including official languages, normalized discourses, public and often social media, publishing companies, academic books, curricula and training of teachers, as well as of other professions, including commerce and legal education, humanities, and sciences. Though the prismatic structures of knowledge and power, cognitive imperial empowers epistemic authority into social authority to support power structures capable, by a variety of means, to ensure its enforcement. These means range from appealing to overt and covert forms of discrimination, making use of socioeconomic rewarding or punishment, establishing exclusive standards and rules of conduct, and sheer violent coercion. Over time, these means having gone through diverse iterations and changes; however, the focus on compulsory education and assimilation of the children through cognitive imperialism has lasted through at least four centuries and multiple generations. The art of cognitive imperialism in education has not always been successful, however, with the decolonization movement of Indigenous people arising over the last century as characterized by refusal, rejection, and resistance to Eurocentrism and its authority and to restoring and revaluing Indigenous knowledge systems in liberation and emancipatory struggles (Hoppers 2002; Hoppers and Richards 2012).

Despite the fact all peoples are born into languages and knowledge systems, the transformation of Eurocentrism into a cognitive power base has been built on controlling the meanings and diffusion of knowledge through schooling, scholarship, publishing companies, government standards, media, and economic privileging. It has become an ideology that has contributed to the oppression of diverse knowledges, an ideology that determines what counts as knowledge in schools and universities and which knowledge is rewarded with mass diffusion, grants, scholarships, economic or professional prestige, or other forms of research funding. It has negated the alternative processes for other knowledge systems to be acknowledged as processes of inquiry to explore new solutions and new ideologies of

being in the world. Using one knowledge system to be both the diagnosis and the solution is a form of culturalism (McConaghy 2002) that is also informed by assumptions of superiority and by historical conditions of naturalism, colonial desire, patriarchy, discourses of nationalism, and the rise of globalization. Culturalism is a form of knowing that provides both lens of analyses and filters of solutions.

Compulsory education can either maintain domination or it can liberate (Minnich 1990). Every school is either a site of reproduction or a site of change, and every administrator and teacher has a choice to make about the future of society. My awareness that the educational process in Canada supports cognitive imperialism has led me to seek a decolonized Aboriginal education. My search has been an inspiring part of my own self-education and growth. Postcolonial and Indigenous scholars and researchers have made me aware of the conditions that support colonial policy and how we, as educators, have unwittingly sustained the power of Eurocentrism. My search has also made me aware how important it is to understand the colonial foundations of the Eurocentric diffusion of knowledge in Canadian institutions and made me aware that it is not enough to change the content of curricula or the language of instruction used in schools. A personal commitment on the part of educators to unpack and understand their own positionality and location in relation to oppression and to the oppressed is required as well through an explicit critical examination of privilege, dominance, and normalized discourses of the other. Each and every one of us has a responsibility to contribute to the decolonization of education.

Today, learning and the control of education in exclusive Eurocentric or Anglocentric knowledge societies have gone hand in hand with serious inequality, exclusion, and conflict exemplified in aborted achievements among Indigenous peoples in schools, lack of self-esteem, fragmented identities and self-awareness, and underdeveloped capacities. The European settler societies that have developed the current conventional systems have disregarded, minimized, or fragmented Indigenous knowledges and their pedagogies

and teachings as core epistemologies. Through hegemony and power over relationships, the controlling elites have inferred their own privileges as signs of their superiority, respect, and integrity, while treating Indigenous peoples' poverty, lack of fluency with colonial languages, reserve living with all its patriarchal dysfunctions as a normal part of their existence as opposed to the situations and historical legacy of cognitive and cultural imperialism and colonialism which they created. Disrespect for Indigenous epistemologies and theft of knowledge and its products have alienated Indigenous learners from formal learning and Indigenous peoples from colonial research foundations, contributing to a legacy of mistrust between institutions of higher learning and Indigenous peoples, their governance bodies, and their institutions of learning.

More importantly for many Indigenous researchers is the awareness that little is known about the Indigenous knowledges and teachings that have the potential for arresting the colonial damage and ways to deal with the tragic legacy of our histories. Silence, says Elizabeth Minnich (1990), is the shield of domination. Silence to the true histories of Indigenous peoples with European settlement, to their treaties whereby their lands were taken, and to the stolen languages and stolen childhoods of the Indian Residential Schools are all of products of cognitive imperialism.

Perhaps it is too easy to point to the enduring examples of the destructive effects of colonization and cognitive imperialism. It is more difficult to understand the processes and methodologies of decolonization and how to blend together distinct and different knowledge system, which is the current task of Indigenous and non-Indigenous educators. Conscientization means becoming aware of the existing hegemonies and practices that entrench the Eurocentric social, economic, gender, cultural, and political privileges that destroy Indigenous peoples' center within their own cultural context. This requires developing a critical consciousness that activates questions and concerns about inequalities in society and that interrogates the cultural and structural outcomes of inequality and structural racism evident in public services such as education, health, and justice.

Transformative action in decolonization of cognitive imperialism means action that is both reflective and reflexive with respect to theory and practice (Smith 1999, p. 38). Rather than merely developing a critique of what has gone wrong, transformative action creates meaningful change by intervening and making a difference in everything Indigenous people do and at every site of struggle they take on. Transformative action is about thinking and reflecting and entering into dialogues with one another about work and about the struggle to decolonize. In the area of education, it is about reflecting on what the role of schooling has been, what barriers have excluded some voices from participation in schools, and what perceptions others hold that prevent them from fully benefiting from what schools can offer.

It is clear to many educators that the attempt to decolonize and actively resist colonial paradigms is a complex and daunting task. The colonial educational model offers a fragmented and distorted picture of Indigenous peoples. Understanding Eurocentric assumptions of superiority within a historical context and the continued dominance of this mode of thinking in all forms of contemporary knowledge is foundational to change. In addition, Indigenous people need to renew and reconstruct the principles underlying their own worldviews, environments, languages, and forms of communication. They need to understand how all these elements interact to construct their humanity.

Most Indigenous peoples around the world continue to suffer trauma and stress from genocide, and their lives continue to be destroyed by colonization. The work of educators, both Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal, is to heal the lasting effects of cognitive imperialism and enable the human potential of all peoples. Indigenous peoples are not just part of the dialogue. They need to advance their own postcolonial discourse about knowledge systems. This discourse must interrogate current thinking, curricula, and structures from both Eurocentric and Indigenous knowledge system. It must question who benefits from them and how. And it must work actively to transform cognitive imperialism by respecting Indigenous knowledge and ways of thinking and by helping

others, especially Indigenous students, to understand the roles they must play in effecting change. The efforts of educators need to reveal inconsistencies, challenge assumptions, and expose ills of any knowledge system. Educators need to search within themselves for meaningful principles of knowledge systems that will guide all children to lead dignified, respectful lives. Sometimes this will require patience with those who have internalized cognitive imperialism that demeans Indigenous culture and language, and that leads Indigenous people to destroy themselves. Indigenous knowledge can be a source of healing, inspiration, creativity, and opportunity. It can contribute to equality, solidarity, and tolerance in the world. Respect for Indigenous knowledge begins when Indigenous people provide the standards and protections that center this knowledge.

The final report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, the Truth and reconciliation Commission (TRC), and the global consensus of the United Nation Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous peoples and a host of other Indigenous researchers and postcolonial scholars and leaders have made it clear that Indigenous peoples see education as the hope for their future, and they are determined to see education fulfill its promise (RCAP 1996, Vol. 3, pp. 433–434). No longer can institutions excuse their reluctance to change by saying that they do not know what Indigenous people want (Havemann 1999, p. 70). The Canadian Constitution articulates the principles of respect for Aboriginal rights and treaties. It is important for educators to be aware of this. This new constitutional framework enables educators to include Aboriginal knowledge and heritage in every curriculum and educational structure.

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Collaborative Knowledge Production

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Collective Praxis: A Theoretical Vision

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Introduction

Over previous decades, cultural studies in education has begun to take seriously the idea that the political and cultural spheres maintain their own sectors separate from the economy. Agency not only is a theoretical possibility; it has become a conceptual assumption. In contemporary terms (see McCarthy 2016), the everyday artistic performances “ordinary” human beings engage in matter and performative discourses have material effects.

Following Nicos Poulantza’s (1969, 1978) work on the relative autonomy of the State, the site of schooling should not be considered a mere epiphenomenon. Rather, as both a political institution and a sector in the cultural sphere, the school is inexorably a site of cultural and ethical/moral politics. The global processes of neoliberalism and the undermining of the public square in education differentially affect public schools and their ever-shifting student bodies. Students feel simultaneously trapped in a series of never ending high-stakes testing and envision, along with their parents, “opting out” of regulatory renditions connected to recent policy frameworks such as the Common Core State Standards. This theoretical trajectory traced above renders possible political movements in the new spaces of the public school and the public square more broadly (Smith 1992). The implications for everyday cultural production and counter hegemonic social movements are, therefore, profound.

After decades of work, this remains an emerging field of study. The authors in this emerging field can be understood as writing in the generative tradition (Freire 2000a). Authors such as Cameron McCarthy (2016) and Maxine Greene (1995) are prominent. They foreground active resistance, agency, cultural and social production,

creativity, and grassroots political revolution on the grounds of everyday experience. In situating the future of cultural studies in what Freire (2000b) first described as generative discourses, it is necessary to highlight the potential freedom of agency generally and collective praxis specifically, leading to a radicalization of the institution of democracy and democratic practices as embodied in the *Occupy Wall Street* and *Black Lives Matter* movements. In consequence, scholars must heed the moral imperative to engage in the practices of countering inequalities through collective praxis.

Prior to the theoretical transformation outlined above, the theoretical assumptions in the vast field of cultural studies in education were such that structure mattered and it was given primacy in analysis. That is to say that social structure generally, and cultural norms and practices in particular, superseded human agency, be it individual or collective. The latter was often referred to as political agency.

One significant example of this can be found in the writings of neo-Marxists in the 1980s and 1990s, which placed lived, cultural experiences in the background. Here, it is important to *foreground* everyday cultural and social practices as these relate to the notion of collective praxis. A problem with previous scholarly traditions in cultural studies relying on neo-Marxism is that they do not go far enough. A perceived flaw with this theoretical traditional (see Mirón 1996) is that it all too often characterizes resistance as a rather happenstance kind of cultural epiphenomenon that, on the surface at least, appears accidental and occasionally presents actively resistant students as cultural outliers. This foundational work on the cultural politics of schools, however, serves to foreground and inform current work as well as the critical pragmatic notion of collective praxis (Maxey 1991).

Theoretical Roots of Praxis in Cultural Studies

Defined simply, *praxis* within the field of critical pedagogy and cultural studies refers to a

micropolitics of schooling grounded in macro-level social theory. It is an intersection of theoretical reflection and culturally situated agency (Kirylo 2011). It is the core idea that without theory, action is virtually meaning-less. If not altogether useless, of no practical consequence, action without theory/reflection is *undisciplined* improvisation. Taking impulsive action without a theory of social change is to move too fast toward solutions, rather than the more deliberative approach, problem posing (Freire 2000a; Kirylo 2011). These all too often result in unintended consequences that do not provide sustained solutions to complex problems.

Arguably, the field of cultural studies took a radical evolutionary turn in the late 90s and early twenty-first century when it embraced the notion of “cultural production.” This development was perhaps aided by the tradition of resistance studies, which relied on rich ethnographic data to establish that students need not succumb to the predetermined impulses and arcs of history. Simply understood, students could actively participate in cultural production as both antidote and transformative agents in opposition to the oppressive social structures and their properties of social reproduction. Moreover, one need not become a disciple of Paulo Freire (2000b) to realize that students could overcome their class limitations and abstract structures that seemed to forever relegate them to lives of oppression. Praxis – or, as others outside of cultural studies in education have characterized it, “reflection in action” – could transform their lives individually and, more importantly, collectively.

A Theoretic Riff on Praxis

Building on the originating tenets sketched above, three interrelated theoretical themes in the trajectory of cultural studies are important to understand for the state of the field today. These themes are: struggle, empowerment, and collective praxis. The third theme is a kind of amalgamation of somewhat dated concepts in radical scholarship in the field – the practice of and the need for social action.

Struggle

Beyond the notion of cultural politics, struggle refers to the endemic social conflict embedded in the compulsive drive within organizations to control their workers – be they relatively well-off academics or low-wage service employees in public schools. Despite its leanings toward everyday lived experience, work in the field of cultural studies of education has tended, for the most part, to focus on the macro level, that is, meta-theorizing and abstract concepts such as cultural production. The notable exceptions are the ethnographic studies that have looked closely and deeply, both at the K-12 and higher education levels – at what practitioners and students actually say and do. Complexly layered examinations of voice, discourse, and teacher and leader performance in educational institutions serve as a few examples of this work. This work has largely not been associated with the neo-Marxists' discourses of struggle against global capitalism. Although perhaps an overgeneralization, the resistance studies literature has tended to highlight the dominant impulses of capitalism. Paradoxically, much of these arguments at once consciously aimed at undoing the subordination of the working class while also positing totalizing narratives that allowed little room for individual transformation. Contrasting with the idea of praxis laid out above, struggle should be conceived of affirmatively, as potentially realizing societal transformation through collective praxis. Although this distinction may appear to not have material significance, language – especially theoretical nuance – matters.

These kinds of struggles are therefore human, existential conflicts over values, specifically moral-ethical dilemmas and choices over philosophical questions – what is right and who should benefit from education. These questions cross over into the study of moral-ethical leadership (Maxcy 1991) in the fields of leadership studies and theory. These struggles are also inherently political in that they are situated in bouts over power, although it is often clear that subordinate groups such as students and members of university academic departments are frequently powerless. Typical studies of the cultural politics of

education tend to focus upon political struggles against the capitalist system writ large. Approaches that give theoretical value to personal narratives (stories), though underrepresented in this literature, are also important. In this sense the battle is, on the one hand, hopelessly lost because the overarching system, be it economic or regulatory (bureaucratic), “always wins.” On the other hand, these narratives can evolve into tales of a struggle for hope. This transformation leads, naturally, to the concept of empowerment.

Community Empowerment

From this understanding of struggle, the concept of community empowerment can be understood to be contradictory. At the center of this understanding, however, is the drive to enable oppressed individuals and communities to develop power and the capacity for social change (Mirón and Elliot 1994). The ends of community empowerment are often concomitant with efforts to bolster the common good. Approaching the concept of empowerment through the lens of Foucault, mechanisms of social control simultaneously function to limit individual empowerment but open up the discursive spaces to shift understandings of social change.

Inherent in the concept of community empowerment is the characteristic of inclusivity, which connects individuals to the pursuit of the common good. From the level of the individual to the global scale of twenty-first-century economic and social relationships, the concept of community empowerment entails the unity of different individuals and social groups in the pursuit of altering the dynamics of power. How these processes play out connect to the third central concept: praxis.

Collective Praxis

For some, notably Paulo Freire, praxis connotes an inherently collective enterprise. The notion of generative themes alluded to above implies groups of actors coalescing around posing common problems situated in everyday experiences. Following Freire (2000a, b), collective praxis can be conceptualized along two dimensions. The first is as a shared knowledge and conscious awareness

of “reading the world and the word” (see Kirylo [in press](#)). The second dimension entails the practical social action aimed at the ultimate transformation of not only situated oppression, but also cultural revolution – bringing a degree of parity among unequal relations of power.

Historical examples of the latter are the inclusion of indigenous populations in the Guatemalan national assembly and the preservation of indigenous languages and culture among the Guaraní in Paraguay (Kirylo [2016](#)). In both of these examples from Latin America, native populations have overcome centuries of oppression and political subordination to gain inclusivity in each country’s cultural and political institutions. In the case of the Maya in Guatemala, they were elected to national public office; in the Guaraní case, their native language was placed on a cultural par with Spanish.

Collective praxis is a kind of politically conscious gestalt, which brings the personal awareness that the historical and contextual conditions that led to oppressed circumstances need not stop with the individual. Indeed, personal awareness is merely the starting point for a shared theoretical understanding of the conditions that wrought, among other forms of oppression, poverty, racism, the exploitation of women, and homophobia. It goes without saying that systemic disenfranchisement is not something experienced solely by individuals in isolation. By definition, this understanding of systemic suffering is *holistic*, meaning it affects entire populations of people, local communities, and in some cases, large swaths of cities, for example, Detroit and New Orleans. One data point is sufficient to drive home the fact that these forms of systemic oppression are experienced collectively, the unemployment rates in urban centers such as New Orleans whose rate among African American males exceeds 50%. This form of collective experience of oppression precisely opens space for the ultimate transformation of oppression through praxis.

Affirmatively stated, both individualized and a holistic understanding among communities of systemic oppression morally necessitates an enlightened action to change the world. This

can be understood as a global critical pedagogy that originates from a deep understanding – a theory of social circumstances including poverty, sexism, and racism – and culminates in an intense emotional revolt against a sometimes-nameless enemy, while at the same time embracing a deep, compassionate love for the downtrodden. From this understanding, it is necessary to move beyond militaristic armor to cultural weapons comprised of a sophisticated knowledge of what in a social context often involves socially constructed structures, political institutions, and social practices that embrace putative scientific conclusions.

In summary, the discussion above has sought to trace a specific theoretical and empirical literature – cultural studies in education – linking it under a broad conceptual framework that can be understood as collective praxis. Admittedly, situating this literature within a broad intellectual tent is fraught with difficulties, not the least of which are embedded contradiction and critiques of my own critiques of neo-Marxist normative biases and metanarratives which all too often have tended to dismiss the significance of marginality and subaltern subjects on the questionable assumptions that these subjects are enveloped by global capitalism. What follows below are some possible impediments to the potentially overly optimistic theoretical vision outlined above.

Critiques

The first, and most immediate, theoretical problem is that this somewhat utopian vision is simply wrong. Put differently, the rapidly consolidating processes of globalization, namely, neoliberal worship of the free market (Harvey [2005](#)) and relentless consumerism, make it extremely unlikely that even intellectual progressives and their allies on the front lines of political activism can develop a consciousness to advance practical forms of collective praxis. Globally practiced neoliberalism may morph into libertarianism worldwide. The latter privileges the autonomous, self-regulating subject.

The second, and perhaps more dangerous, obstacle is the material plight of the “99%.” The occupiers of Wall Street (mentioned above) themselves are simply too economically disadvantaged to secure the human capital and necessity of free time to form the necessary political coalitions to successfully turn back the firm trajectory of widening economic and social inequality. Given the small numbers of academics, activists, and religious leaders (including Pope Francis), people still have to earn a living. Without a critical mass of middle-income practitioners, it is a real possibility that such an idealistic vision of collective praxis is not tenable or practical. An intellectually rigorous theory of change, such as the concept of collective praxis connotes, however, still remains necessary. In some ways it may be inevitable given the human tragedies that define the current global political climate.

Concluding Reflections

Social action embedded within a theory of collective praxis as well as radical developments in social theory resulting from postmodern and post-structural thought give rise to relational conceptions of identity, making intellectually plausible theoretically grounded understandings of collectivity. By extension, cultural studies can now embrace collectivity on the grounds of everyday lived cultural experience. Taking Foucault’s criticism of the autonomous (and socially isolated) subject to its cultural implications, scholars need not take the terrifying thought of “the death of the subject” negatively. Rather it affirms possibilities in the social imaginary that, indeed, collective praxis is not only feasible. It can be convincingly argued that a social epistemological understanding of identity, and agency, renders possible globally contextualized social action.

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College

- [Phenomenology of Higher Education](#)

Colonialism

- [Gender, Postcolonialism, and Education](#)
- [Global English, Postcolonialism, and Education](#)
- [Humanism, Postcolonialism, and Education](#)
- [Poststructuralism, Postcolonialism, and Education](#)

Colored Cosmopolitanism and the Classroom: Educational Connections Between African Americans and South Asians

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Synonyms

[African Americans](#); [Cultural studies](#); [Education history](#); [India](#); [Relational](#); [Transnational](#)

Introduction

A striking photograph introduces *The United States of America: A Hindu's Impressions and a Study*, published in 1916 by the renowned Indian anticolonial nationalist Lala Lajpat Rai. After a brief preface to the book, readers encounter a portrait in profile of a pensive-looking gentleman with a meticulously shaped mustache and a salt-and-pepper goatee. As the mostly capitalized caption informs us, this man is “Dr. W. E. BURGHARDT DU BOIS.”

It is no coincidence that the first image Lajpat Rai chooses to present – the image that spearheads this entire 416-page volume – is a portrait of a famous African American educator. Matters of education were of central importance to many Indian anticolonialists, and, in seeking to imagine forms of education conducive to national liberation and national uplift, many of these Indian activists turned to African American thought. Meanwhile, African American intellectuals took an intense interest in the Indian anticolonial struggle, using news of its twists and turns to construct (in a distinctly Vygotskian sense) new understandings of power and resistance along the global color line. This interest in the Indian independence movement was most famously expressed by W. E. B. Du Bois but was also avidly taken up by countless other African American scholars, including many faculty members at historically black colleges and universities (HBCUs).

Beginning in the late nineteenth century and extending through the first half of the twentieth, networks of African American and Asian Indian intellectuals forged transnational and trans-imperial political alliances and cultural affiliations rooted in a shared opposition to global white supremacy. In the heyday of overt Anglo-Saxon racism and imperial domination stretching across the Americas, Africa, and Asia, these African American and Asian Indian scholars, writers, and activists worked to construct what Nico Slate (2012) describes as “a colored cosmopolitanism that transcended traditional racial distinctions, positioning Indians and African Americans together at the vanguard of the ‘darker races’” (p. 2). While the term “cosmopolitanism” is etymologically associated with the idea of being a “citizen of the world,” its usage within the phrase “colored cosmopolitanism” more specifically highlights the subversive nature of alliances formed outside of established borders and boundaries.

“Education” is featured prominently within the discourses of colored cosmopolitanism. Asian Indian and African American thinkers exchanged ideas not only about different educational *methods* but also about the different *meanings* embedded within the notion of education. Given today’s increasing scholarly interest in the historical alliances between African American and South Asian peoples, it is worth calling attention to the central role of education – educational ideologies, educational projects, educational processes, and educational institutions – in the solidarities of colored cosmopolitanism. At the same time, for historians of education, an attention to these shared African American and South Asian histories can provide new and important perspectives on long-standing areas of interest within the field.

“Head, Heart, and Hand”: Booker T. Washington in South Asian Translation

Mohandas Gandhi considered Booker T. Washington’s Tuskegee Institute to be an ideal educational institution, and he repeatedly encouraged Indian educators to emulate Washington’s

work. As Nico Slate (2012) notes, Gandhi's high regard for rural and agricultural life and his emphasis on the dignity of manual labor were in part shaped by his admiration for Washington. Like Washington, Gandhi prioritized vocational education – agricultural skills, trades, and village handicrafts – as a path to “self-sufficiency.” Gandhi repeatedly echoed Washington's motto of educating “head, heart, and hand” and maintained Washington's emphasis on the “hand” (manual skills) and “heart” (religious and “character” education) as more important than the “head” (academic knowledge). Gandhi's language around education, and specifically on the relationship between vocational and academic education, was – like Washington's own career – complex and contradictory, and had certainly lent itself to charges of hypocrisy. Gandhi sometimes held up Tuskegee specifically as a model for “Harijans” (his term for India's so-called Untouchables), with the problematic implication that the emphasis on vocational training over academic learning was more suitable for Harijans than for other (more privileged) populations. Gandhi's famous 1937 “Wardha plan” for national education, however, did not include such caste distinctions; it promoted the idea of crafts and trades as central to the education of all Indian students. As Uma Dhupelia-Mesthrie (2004) points out, Gandhi's elevation of rural life and manual skills over extensive academic experience was reflected in the education he designed for his own sons – sometimes resulting in resentment within the family. He twice refused offers of funding for his son Manilal to study law in England, instead preferring to have Manilal stay at his settlement in South Africa, where the young man helped with farming, gardening, and the production of Gandhi's newspaper *Indian Opinion*.

While many of Gandhi's statements about crafts and trades highlight the notion of vocational training as inherently conducive to character building and as a vehicle for developing the intellect, it is important to note Gandhi's heavy emphasis on the *remunerative* nature of manual work – its potential to make each child into an “earning unit” and to make the schools themselves “self-supporting” through their students' labor (as

cited in Shukla 1998, pp. 77–78, 115). In this regard, Gandhi's emphasis on crafts and trades was rooted not in the desire to create particular “hands-on” experiences as developmental stepping stones but in the need to fund the schools. The question of school funding was an evergreen topic of conversation among Indian anticolonialists seeking to envision and enact a transition from a British-controlled society in which few children had access to schools to an “independent” nation in which schooling was free and compulsory. For the historian of education, the idea of making children produce saleable products to support their own schooling carries echoes of the gross exploitation that characterized, for example, the abusive US settler-colonial boarding schools for Native American children – the ignominious “Indian boarding schools” to which Washington's Tuskegee Institute has in fact been compared. Many Indian nationalists, however, viewed Washington's institute as a viable model developed for a situation they perceived as similar to their own dilemma, which revolved around the question of how to immediately provide some degree of “education” to oppressed masses of poor and primarily rural people long barred from formal schooling.

Gandhi, then, was not alone in his admiration for Booker T. Washington. As Slate (2012) notes, Washington's “legacy in South Asia was substantial” (p. 21). Writings by the famed Wizard of Tuskegee – including but not limited to his autobiography *Up from Slavery* – were “translated into multiple South Asian languages, including Malayalam, Marathi, Telugu, Hindi, Urdu, Gujarati, and Nepali” (ibid, p. 23).

The Anagarika H. Dharmapala, a Sinhalese Buddhist and a leader of the Buddhist revival in India, visited Tuskegee in 1903. In response to a journalist's query regarding his presence in the United States, the Anagarika described himself as “an admirer of your Booker T. Washington” and added “I expect to visit his institution during my stay here, and if I am successful I will pattern the Indian institutions after his.” The Anagarika, whose writings “emphasized group solidarity, material advancement, self-help, and education,” was also familiar with the work of W. E. B. Du

Bois and noted that Dr. Du Bois “took a different view” from Washington. But the Anagarika’s perspective regarding these differences, as he wrote to Washington, was that “On the whole it is healthy that two parties are at work on two different lines; and there is no energy lost. The moral, political and industrial development are the three sides of a triangle” (as cited in Harlan 1983, pp. 278–279).

The Anagarika’s understanding of Washington and Du Bois as “two parties at work on two different lines,” each contributing to a balanced “triangle” of group uplift, is indicative of how the “Washington–Du Bois debate” was reworked in the translation to South Asia. Rather than understanding Washington and Du Bois simply as two men who had a “debate” with each other – necessitating that all listeners pick a side in the debate – many South Asian educators and theorists drew inspiration from *both* of these African American educational leaders. Even Gandhi, whose educational ideology was so closely patterned to Washington’s, also admired (and corresponded with) Du Bois. Gandhi favored Du Bois’ refusal to compromise with white supremacy in any form, and Du Bois – unlike Washington – was an avid supporter of all aspects of the Indian independence movement.

A Hindu’s Views: Lala Lajpat Rai and African American Education

Lala Lajpat Rai, whose *The United States of America* is largely devoted to questions of education and racial struggle (sometimes as two separate topics, sometimes intersectionally as with particular issues concerning “Negro education”), delved deeply into the questions at the heart of the “Washington–Du Bois debate.” Nevertheless, the actual expression “Washington–Du Bois debate,” so familiar to US education historians, was never used by Lajpat Rai. Rather than present his Indian readers with the image of a duel between two black men vying for the right to shape the future of their race, Rai provided a detailed and nuanced discussion of various trends within Negro education, contextualized within a historical framework

that included the criminalization of black literacy in much of the antebellum United States, the brutality of the post-Reconstruction era, and the twentieth-century reality of a separate-and-unequal racial regime in which vast numbers of African Americans were still denied access to any schooling whatsoever. In discussing the educational models developed by African Americans to deal with these conditions, Rai emphasized the potential applicability of such models to the Indian anticolonial nation-building project.

Lajpat Rai discussed Tuskegee at length and in overwhelmingly positive terms. He also quoted extensively from interviews with Washington and from written material provided by Washington. At the same time, Rai also paid much attention to African American scholars such as Kelly Miller, Dean of the College of Arts and Sciences at Howard University, who strongly critiqued the prevailing societal pattern of reducing support for African American higher education and systematically directing African American students toward vocational training. Following Kelly and others, Rai noted that much of what passed for “vocational education” was not really education but a way of keeping African Americans in menial labor. Rai did not, however, blame Booker T. Washington personally for this problem – rather, he cited the overt racism of white southern policymakers and the misguided paternalism of white northern philanthropists. Ever aware of the problem of educational funding, Rai realized that educational policy was largely determined by those who had the capital to finance that education.

Rai specifically compared African American *women’s* education to Indian women’s education, declaring that African American women’s education was superior in both quality and quantity and urging Indians to emulate African Americans in the provision of education for women. He noted that at major African American colleges like Howard and Atlanta University, half of the students were female and that almost all African American educational institutions were open to women as well as men. He was also impressed by the high quality of many all-female colleges constructed by African Americans.

Lajpat Rai's greatest admiration was reserved for his friend and colleague W. E. B. Du Bois. While Rai did advocate for more industrial education in India, along the lines of Tuskegee, he ultimately agreed with Du Bois on the pressing importance of preparing students for higher academic studies and of making university education available for those students who wished to pursue it. Further, Lajpat Rai was greatly impressed with Du Bois' political activities – his critical writings in the NAACP journal *The Crisis* and his civil rights work – which could also be regarded as forms of public education. Lajpat Rai's *The United States of America* reproduced lengthy selections from Du Bois' writings. The two men continued their friendship through written correspondence after Rai returned to India (ending a 5-year stay in the United States) in 1919. Du Bois sent Lajpat Rai copies of *The Crisis*, which Lajpat Rai both circulated among his fellow Indian anticolonialists and quoted from in his own writings. In 1928, Du Bois wrote to Rai about a novel he was working on, called *Dark Princess*. The novel was a political love story in which an African American man, Matthew Towns, marries an Indian woman, the “dark princess” Kautilya of Bwodpur. These lovers have an Afro-Indian son, Madhu, who is destined to become a unifying force leading the “darker races” to universal freedom. Du Bois mailed portions of the manuscript to Lajpat Rai for feedback. Rai sent Du Bois comments on the excerpts but may not have gotten to read the final published novel: he died in November of 1928 after being severely beaten by police during a silent march protesting British colonial policies.

Historically Black Colleges and Universities as Centers of Colored Cosmopolitanism

Historically black colleges and universities (HBCUs) played a central role in the phenomenon of colored cosmopolitanism. The HBCUs were important to these transnational solidarities for several reasons. For one thing, HBCUs were centers of African American political and intellectual

life. For South Asian anticolonial nationalists in the United States, visiting HBCUs was a way of connecting with communities of fellow “colored” people who were both supportive of Indian anticolonialism and interested in sharing information and analyses regarding their own political struggles. Lala Lajpat Rai, in conducting his extended study of African American education, relied on the intellectual collaboration, and in some cases the personal hospitality, of professors and administrators at HBCUs such as Morehouse College, Howard University, and Atlanta University (as well as at institutes such as Hampton and Tuskegee). The Indian anticolonial nationalist Krishnalal Shridharani, author of *War Without Violence* (1939) – a book regarded as a major source of inspiration for African American civil rights activists of the 1940s – had the opportunity to share his anticolonial views with a host of future educators when he was invited to deliver the commencement address at the historically black Cheyney State Teachers' College in 1942. Cedric Dover, an anticolonial activist of mixed Indian and English heritage, served as a visiting lecturer at Fisk University in 1947. Dover's friendships and collaborations with African American artists, writers, and scholars – many of whom were associated with various HBCUs – allowed him to develop nuanced and historically grounded understandings of race and resistance, which were reflected in his many published works.

The well-known anticolonial activist and social leader Ram Manohar Lohia, during his two visits to the United States (1951 and 1964), also relied upon a network of HBCUs to help him connect with African American scholars and activists. Lohia's first speaking engagement in 1951 was at Fisk University in Nashville, Tennessee, where he was a featured speaker at that institution's annual Race Relations Institute. After his speech, Lohia lunched at the home of Fisk University President Charles Johnson, a longtime ally of the Indian independence movement. During the same trip, Lohia visited Howard University, where he gave a talk dealing with race, caste, colonialism, and civil disobedience. At Howard, Lohia dined with that university's President

Mordecai Johnson, another firm ally of the Indian independence movement, who had traveled to India and met with numerous proponents of *satyagraha* (nonviolent direct action). On Lohia's 1964 trip, he visited Tougaloo College in Mississippi, where he had long conversations with members of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee and their faculty supporters. The students were preparing to launch the Mississippi Freedom Summer, and they discussed planning and strategy at length with Lohia, an experienced activist who had spent a total of 6 years in British jails for his anticolonial activities. Interestingly, Lohia's traveling companion during large segments of his two trips to the United States was the civil rights activist Harris Wofford. Wofford, though white, was also a product of an HBCU: the first white man to earn a degree from Howard University School of Law.

HBCUs provided opportunities for many South Asian activists to not only learn about African American civil rights activities but also in some cases to demonstrate their support through personal participation. Lohia, during his 1964 visit to Tougaloo, was arrested for refusing to leave a whites-only cafeteria in Jackson – an action he had discussed earlier with a group of Tougaloo students, who had assisted Lohia's action by driving him to the cafeteria. When Lohia later received an apology from the State Department for his arrest in Jackson, he responded that the point of the action was not to make a statement about his own position as an international visitor but to oppose the Jim Crow system that African Americans faced on a daily basis (and for which they certainly did not receive any apology from the federal government). Tougaloo was the academic “home” to several South Asian faculty members who similarly participated in civil rights activities alongside African American students and professors.

Since HBCUs were major intellectual and political centers where Indian and African American activists could connect and exchange ideas with each other, it is perhaps no surprise that many of the Indian independence movement's strongest supporters were professors and/or administrators at HBCUs. George Washington Carver, a

professor of botany and agriculture at Tuskegee, avidly supported Indian anticolonialism; he met with Lajpat Rai and corresponded extensively with Gandhi. Charles S. Johnson of Fisk corresponded with leaders of the Indian National Congress. Numerous professors from Howard corresponded with Indian activists; one of these professors was Benjamin Mays, Dean of Howard's School of Religion, who traveled to India and met with many leaders there, including Gandhi. Mays later wrote to members of the All-India Women's Conference and offered to make a financial donation toward that organization's efforts on behalf of Indian women's and girls' education. Howard Thurman, also of Howard University, traveled to India as well, also meeting with Gandhi. In addition to the participation of numerous professors, several schoolteachers became involved in colored cosmopolitanism. These included Mary McLeod Bethune, the elementary school teacher who founded her own school and eventually became a nationally known educational and political leader.

An Emerging Area of Study

The past 10 years have seen a rapid acceleration of scholarly investigation into the historical imbrications of South Asian and African American communities, organizations, intellectual genealogies, and political movements – a complex web of mutually constitutive relationships that both predate and extend well beyond the simple connection generally drawn between MK Gandhi and Martin Luther King (Bald 2013; Horne 2008; Slate 2012, 2014). These transnational histories represent an important area of exploration for future work in cultural studies. Pointing to the limitations of analyses that position “class and culture as a localized, nation-bound set of interests,” Cameron McCarthy and Jennifer Logue (2012) call for greater attention to the “patterns of transnational hybridities” that characterize contemporary social life (pp. 5, 41). Recent scholarship on the linkages between South Asian and African American communities demonstrates the

importance of attending to transnational circulations and hybrid formations, not only in contemporary cultural studies but in historical cultural studies as well.

Scholarship on the interconnectedness of African American and South Asian cultural and political histories should continue to unfold in multiple directions in the years to come, with important implications for the study of education. Just as explorations of colored cosmopolitanism would be incomplete without an attention to the central role of education – educational discourses, educational practices, and educational institutions – historians of education must take into account the histories of these transnational influences and solidarities. Particularly today, when national and international discourses and structures of race increasingly use the notion of “education” as a wedge to divide South Asian and African American communities and to pit these communities against each other – via a “model minority” myth and anti-black deficit discourses, both of which largely revolve around assumptions about education – it is imperative that students, teachers, policymakers, and scholars of education consider these historical linkages of colored cosmopolitanism and the classroom.

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Comenius, John Amos (1592–1670)

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Synonyms

[Didactics](#); [Humanism](#); [Imitatio](#); [Panshophy](#)

Introduction

Mentioned as bridge between premodern and modern thoughts, Comenius literally lived a life in between. Born 1592 at Nivnice (Moravia), his life was concerned with the effects of disintegration of Europe's order especially through the Thirty Years' War – moving him between European places, thoughts, and movements. Orphaned at 12 years and losing his first wife and children through pest, he was a traveling and moving person, related to important places and persons of his time. He studied at the Calvinistic Higher School in Herborn (1612–1614) where he came in touch with Ratke's proposals for language lesson and the encyclopedic endeavors of his teacher Alsted. He finished his scholastics out of money in Heidelberg, leaving home via Nuremberg where he purchased a script of the Copernican theory. Being a priest and later on the last bishop of the “Unity of Brethren” (a Moravian reformist congregation), he contacted the Swedish King in hope to arrange a settlement for the return of his congregation to Moravia and traveled to Hungary in this concern. Well discussed and often invited all over Europe, Comenius was requested to found colleges in England, France, Sweden, and Poland, what often did not take place for several reasons,

among them war and Comenius' rejections. He met Descartes and stayed in contact with the new founded Royal Society Academy in London. For a long time he lived exiled in Leszno (Poland). After the burning of the town and his library, he moved to Amsterdam, where he died in 1670.

Comenius was entangled both with the upcoming modern scientific approaches and with the theological movements which were engaged in grounding a universal Christian way of living. This, sometimes mentioned as "third force" in the seventeenth century, approach aimed at a scientific reform orientation in line with theological-based certitude (cf. Popkin 1992). In Comenius' concern, this led him to expose his philosophical, theological, and pedagogical thoughts in an integrated and overarching system called *Pansophia*. The encompassing aspect of *pan* indicates his dedication to overcome the confusion and disarray of his time by leading the human beings to their humanity founded in God's creation. Embedded in this metaphysical-theological standpoint, Comenius developed an analytical epistemology of human comprehension as *imitation*. He elaborated a holistic concept of teaching everyone, everything in respect to the general (*omnes, omnia, omnino*). With *Orbis Sensualium Pictus* (*The Visible World in Pictures* cf. Comenii 1658), he published the first illustrated book for lesson unifying language teaching and teaching the order of the world. Further his engagement for general education, public, and associated research as well as his plea for general counseling in concerns of science, politics, and religion made his work to be a source of rereads throughout the last 350 years cf. for example Zemek et al. 2008; Gouris et al. 2015; Schaller 2004; Hericks et al. 2004). He often is mentioned as a pioneer of didactical and pedagogical reflections about lesson, sometimes without considering the difference between premodern and modern notions.

Omnes, Omnia, Omnino: Comenius' Lesson on Teaching the World

Based on his pansophic (overall wisdom) scheme, Comenius argued for general education without

any limitation. His educational principles to teach everyone everything regarding the general (*omnes, omnia, omnino*) arose from the notion of equality of every human being as part of God's creation. In this regard, he started in 1623 in his exile in Poland the Czech-Latin schoolbook *Januarum porta lingua* Comenius (1631/1642) expecting his return to have the opportunity to rebuilt the "Bohemian Church" and work on the continuation of the divine order on earth. This encyclopedia, later supplemented with pictures for his most famous work, *Orbis Pictus*, aimed not only to give names and significations in a popular language but to show the whole world in its elements and their relations – this is the point of *omnia*. Complementary he claimed, addressing *omnes*, the right of education for every child, regardless of gender, as well as for poor, rich, disabled, young, and old. This claim stood in the European context of reordering the social throughout the increasing force of citizenship displacing nobility and clergy from their political and social force. Yet, the prefix *pan* in his pansophical work not only describes his philosophical-theological point of view but also his educational standpoint. It is about the trans-particular wholeness of the divine creation (*omnino*), where the human's position is one element of others. In the original edition of his famous book *Orbis Pictus*, the human being is posed neither in the beginning nor in the end. It is posed in between as one element of the whole world. Yet some of the translations and copies in later editions changed this order and put the pages showing the human being at the beginning. That was not Comenius' concern; unlike the following modern thinkers of the Enlightenment, he was not engaged in evolving the solitary position of the modern *ego*. Still his philosophy was part of the shifting move that transliterated the notion of human's nature as sinful into its similarity to God. The renaissance and humanistic concept of the *imago dei* based humanity on the active freedom of creating the world along the divine order. In this line Comenius mentioned his notion of *pan* as an encompassing view of the world. In Comenius' view the world is not divided in fields of philosophy, politics, and religion – yet those fields

are intertwined through the human collaboration with God (*collusor Dei*, cf. Buck 1984; Trembl 2001). The relating hinge between God and the human being is a certain scope of cognition – *imitatio* – including sense, speech, and faith. This trinity grounds the necessity of an analytical and both methodical system of teaching and learning. As much as this methodical reasoning about lesson associated his work with the new arising modern scientific approaches, it advanced his reputation as a classical pedagogical thinker.

Philosophical Education: *Pansophia* and *Pampaedia*

Though posing the very modern question about the special position of the human being, Comenius founded the answer in a very premodern, universally, and eschatological-orientated base of divine order. Thus the difference and the similarity between humans and God were the center of his philosophy aiming to rebuild a world where peace and solidarity are possible. Yet Comenius took his step not from the active site of the human but from the divine ordered world. The divine creation in its wholeness has to be known in a thorough way to avoid discord and war. In that way he did not center – at the threshold to modern thought – the world around the recognizing subject but posed the human being as part of a transcending order that is ruled through the relationships between the single elements and their relation to the true ideas. In Comenius' epistemology, the idea (archetype, *exemplar*) is threefold entailing the idea (*idea*), the realization (*ideatum*), and the mode or instrument of its performance (*ideans*). The ladder is read by Comenius as the senses (*sensus*), the technical modes of its production (*manus*, hand), and the language (*lingua*) of (re)producing the archetypal idea, which indicates Comenius' Neoplatonic position.

Comenius' explanation of the experienced disarray through religious wars arises from the picture of Babylonian distortion in the *Labyrinth of the World* that needs to be cleared to the *Paradise of the Heart*, as one of his earlier works reads (cf. Comenius 1631/1998). In this way he is in

line with his Renaissance contemporaries by renewing the theological-metaphysical requirement of remembering the truth of divine order. Nevertheless, the order of creation is not considered as self-fulfilling but needs to be recognized and continued by the human being. Based on his experiences of the great Thirty Years' War following the reformation of the Christian Church, Comenius aimed for a divinely ordered world where the rationality of God's harmonious creation needs to be known by everyone. This modern way of merging the individual as active part shows why Comenius' philosophy as *Pansophia* inevitably unifies epistemology, politics, and education – his educational system therefore reads *Pampaedia*.

From this point Comenius' educational aim preserves the necessity to learn to know the order of the world. His systematical proposal is in itself built up as a representation of this order. His didactical view advises to learn at first examples (*exempla*) before stepping to regulations and consolidation. The examples are – different from sensualistic and phenomenological standpoints – not only the sensed base which structures the way from the special to the general. The example itself embodies – in a mere realist position – itself the *exemplar* (idea, origin) and *exemplum* (copy, replica) and therefore enables the learner to emulate and imitate (*imitatio*). It is the *imitatio* which contains Comenius' notion of cognition. His epistemology therefore is a trinity of induction and deduction held together by the operation of *syncretis*. The syncretic mode of cognition unifies the motion from particular to general and vice versa through comparing the similarities. The axiomatic general is not a final point of abstracting through thinking. Rather it is the effect of recognizing literally seeing the example: imitating (*effigiare*), knowing (*scire*), and abstracting (*abstrahere*) coincide. In Comenius' view, there is no ontological difference between the origin (*exemplar*) and the copy (*exemplum*), as well as there is no gap between the presence and representation. To see something means to recognize its true essence – a philosophical position that draws him away from his modern scientist contemporaries which like Bacon or

Descartes supposed the cognition as stepping from the sensed particular to the axiomatic general.

Against this background education and lesson is about showing the world and its divine ordered structure. Education is a relational activity between the instructing teacher, the learner, and the wholeness of the world. Comenius conceived learning as the dual activity of rebuilding and receiving. Comenius therefore privileges the example. A particular element itself is related to the whole and Comenius' advice to step from the particular to the general stands not for proceeding to a cognitive enlargement. Rather it corresponds to his metaphysical standpoint that the divine ordered truth can be understood in its elements – which are intertwined and referring to the harmony of the whole picture. Going along with this education is in itself action and recognizing. In that sense learning the divine non-subjective (in a modern sense of subjectivity) order of the world entails all at once ethic and metaphysic aspects. Learning to know the world means at the same time to know how to live well in regard to the trans-particular. As Comenius conceives the order of the world as divine harmony, there is no reason for him to think change and human activity different from an objective teleology of fulfillment and continuation of God's work – in that way his philosophy can be characterized as subjectivism (cf. Patočka 1971).

Knowledge, Science, and the Spread of Formal Learning

There are at least three points that outline Comenius' stance at the threshold to modernity in respect of the spread of modern science and education: At first, regarding the methodological aspects of teaching and learning, Comenius' philosophy was linked to the establishing of new institutions of science. Following on the one hand the methodical mode of thinking and representing knowledge by well-ordered systems, Comenius on the other hand rejected the particularity of the modern scientific approaches. In this manner, the *omnino* plays a decisive role in

Comenius' epistemology since the particular elements of knowledge such as laws of nature for Comenius never were self-contained or grounded in human cognition but considered as part of a transcending order. Thus Comenius all at once could address and problematize the analytical and methodical approach of modern science. Unlike Descartes and later the rationalist empiricism or Kant's epistemology, Comenius' view on cognition and learning was not about gaining independence from social and natural boundaries. Rather on the contrary Comenius conceived learning and achieving knowledge *as* partaking in the world. Only in that sense learning leads to humanity and enables to emend the confusion of the world he and his contemporaries had experienced. Comenius' strong plea for public and general education has its source in this conjunction of cognition, action, and politics, where ethics are included in the process of cognition (and not an effect of it).

Secondly, Comenius could address the upcoming new order of a modern society. Signed by war, destruction, and rearranged classes, there grew diversified needs for communication and institutional ways of deliberating knowledge. Comenius' work *Orbis Pictus* and the earlier written Czech-Latin *Janua* combined the new medium book by picturing elements of the world and signifying them in Latin and in Czech. The *Orbis Pictus* was through hundreds of years the most used book for lesson and has been translated in different languages all over Europe. This mediatized mode of lesson uncoupled the medium from its author's subject to show the unique order of God's creation. Similarly, his commitment for general education outlived him as well. His *Pampaedia* mentioned the importance of early education long before Rousseau proposed the difference between childhood and adulthood. Comenius considered schools as "workshops of humanity," implying a lifelong path of eight schools from childhood to seniority. Along with this his work was associated with establishing public science, among these correspondences with other scientists, founding schools and higher schools, and his involvement with scholars across Europe.

Thirdly, Comenius' understanding of active learning advanced the modern institution of school. Yet his notion of lesson was to learn about the world's order to the core of its improvement and emendation: His major work's title is programmatic in that sense: *De rerum humanarum emendatione consultatio catholica* (General Consultation on the Improvement of Human Affairs; Comenius 1670/1966). These seven subdivisions include work which was lost over hundreds of years and rediscovered in 1934 in Halle/Saale having been stored there since the eighteenth century in the library of the Franckesche Stiftungen. It contains, i.a., the earlier published *Panorthosia* (Universal Reform), the *Pansophia* (Universal Wisdom), and the *Pampaedia* (Universal Education), and its reappearance broadened the view on Comenius' philosophy beyond his function as mentor of modern didactics.

Present Traces to Comenius' Philosophy of Education

There are some lines in Comenius' work that are – though premodern shaped – worth to be linked to contemporary topics. Comenius' question about our ways of relating to the world, to others, and to oneself makes it both easy and difficult to stick to Comenius – albeit his conclusions. According to the question about the relationship between humans and the order of the social – to put it in modern words – Comenius provided a programmatic view in stressing out a non-individual yet broader perspective regarding the relationality of worldly elements in his pansophical emphasis on the *omnino*. This kind of pre-communicative space (cf. Schaller 2004) of being related as part of the divinely created world stretches in a way forward to the modern notion of the public as a site beyond particular reasons and wills. In addition Comenius' philosophy of a relational order of particular differences entails a nearness to (post)modern themes of difference and otherness – though Comenius founded all differences in the universal order of divine truth. He conceived human affairs as taking part in the

divine order (*conscientia*), whereas the modern issue of solidarity is based on the heterogeneity of individuals. Comenius' Neoplatonic view of education and humanity presupposes participating at the general and unchangeable order of truth – alike Plato's relation between the absolute truth of ideas and the need of the human's turning move toward them for accomplishing political-practical effects. This stance allowed him to problematize the modern scientific attempt of treating knowledge without regarding its relation to the world and interdependent boundaries. Comenius' insisting on taking into consideration the relationship between particularities and transcending the particular involved his approach with the beginnings of establishing public science, e.g., the Royal Science Academy in London. Yet his educational philosophy aimed following – methodical and analytical – the path of twice transcending and relating the human being. In this way his modern use of representing media – books, language, pictures – was strictly tied to the worldly and divinely aspect of knowledge and science. Albeit Comenius' philosophy of education was constitutive founded in his theological standpoint about the human's similarity to God, Comenius' advocacy for establishing general and formal education was in the nineteenth century used as reference to advance the professionalization and academic reflections of educational practices. On the contrary to the modern notion of education by sticking to the individuality of every person, Comenius attempted to address everyone *as part* of the project of emending the human affairs (*“de rerum humanarum emendation,”* cf. Comenius 1670).

Comenius' traces were followed surpassing his interest in ordering the world and the human matters and often ignoring the background of his metaphysical standpoint in the modern ways of deliberating knowledge. This is apparent in his stance as pioneer of a media-based way of showing the world and providing the tools of comprehending the world by one's own thoughts and cognition. Further, Comenius' commitment for equal access to education sometimes is associated with the modern issue of finding a way to remove inequality. Facing Comenius' experience

of war, epidemics, and displacedness, it needs no much effort to see the requirement of worldwide solutions – discussing, debating, and emending the fields of science, religion, and politics. In this manner Comenius suggested a European and global council of yearly meeting envoys of these three fields, which turned him into a mentor of modern questions of world peace (cf. Korthaase et al. 2005; Gouris et al. 2015).

Being located in the axis between premodern and modern thoughts, there is the topic of translation that is brought up with considering Comenius as an educational thinker. Translation was one of the main topics of his work. It occurs in translating the order of the world into pictures and names in different languages, as well as in his connections to a lot of thinkers of his time spread over Europe. Against this background Comenius' work seeks a way of transcending the local and particular in order to share solidarity. In addition there has to be considered Comenius' notion of difference in unity – regarding the complexity of his work, the addressed fields, the different levels of teaching, learning, etc. Comenius' philosophy based unity on a divine and universal order by stressing the *pan* as aspect of uniting or grounding all differences.

Conclusion

Though Comenius' sketch of a metaphysical-founded world needs to be read in its context without reducing his lines to modern concepts as too familiar, it is obvious that in transferring his framework in our present, it entails some intriguing aspects. First of all there is the issue of relating to the historic frame of modern concepts like individuality and subjectivism addressing the need of translation. Secondly, despite the gap between his metaphysical-theological epistemology and the modern notion of subjectivity and contingency, Comenius' theory of a worldly and non-egological concept of humanity raises questions of relating to the world and participation. This includes the public educational system addressing the notion of equality (*omnes*), sketching the notion of general education

(*omnia*), and moreover addressing the problem of being with others (*omnino*). Thirdly, it is Comenius' scheme of cognition as *imitatio* unifying, imitating, and innovating that lays – interrupted – traces to postmodern concepts of difference, relationality, and particularity. Insofar as education and *Bildung* are shaped as transformational actions in a non-egologic manner but as partaking in the world, there are links to present concepts of the relation between human beings and the social. At last, bridging the gap between the centuries and transformations in philosophy of education, there still is to be raised Comenius' question how human affairs can be discussed and counseled in respect to the *omnino*.

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Competition and Fair Play

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Synonyms

FIFA

Introduction: Competition Is Characteristic of Sports

Competition is arguably characteristic of sports. At the least, if there are noncompetitive sports (or if the most readily translated word “sport” in some European languages applies also to some noncompetitive physical activities), a fairly clearly demarcated class of activities thought of as *sports* does centrally involve competition between individuals or teams, typified by the activities included in the Olympic Games (and similar competitive structures: the FIFA World Cup in soccer, the Super Bowl in American football). The resolution of such competition may differ in those sports where the *manner* of attaining the goal whereby one is successful is fundamental (what David Best 1978 called “aesthetic sports,” typified by gymnastic vaulting or ice skating) by contrast with those sports where the manner of achieving the “aim” is irrelevant as long as it is within the rules of the sport (and hence varied) – true of the vast majority of sports, including soccer, gridiron football, rugby, netball hockey (both ice and field), basketball, golf, tennis, and many more (Best’s “purposive sports”).

Two Metaphors for Competitive Fairness

In both cases, the rules of the sport regulate competition in that sport; the commitment to play

sports is a commitment to play by the rules. More exactly, one must play by the rules in their constitutive uses (the aspect that permits, say, try scoring in rugby by designating certain behaviors as the actions required for success in the sport) since some of the rules of sports typically also have regulative (“penalty-invoking”) uses. But although sports have been compared with warfare, the comparison is misleading precisely because sports should be played in a sporting fashion. That is, one should be a *good sport* and behave in a *sportsmanlike* manner, even if much sport is not played in this spirit; the aim should be *sportsmanship*, not *gamesmanship* – terms that seem only to exist in the masculine, no doubt reflecting the (distant) history of sports. For the behaviors involved are clearly moderated by the (broadly) voluntary character of participation in sports (except in school!) and by both the rules of the sport and the recognition that sports are governed, in two ways, by considerations of *fairness*: as typified by governing metaphors that there shall be both *fair play* and a *level playing field*. Each aspect is important, providing a justification of the concerns of the rules in typical sports so that teams start with roughly equal chances of victory, the playing field will literally be level (if some other things would give one side an advantage), or, if this cannot be managed, the advantage will be evenly distributed – say, by changing ends at half time. This also explains why some sports have divisions by weight, age, or disability: to give all competitors a roughly equal chance. Thus, the organizers in the first world championships for the laser dinghy provided new boats for all competitors to preclude anyone gaining an advantage in this way. Of course, such a strategy could not be applied to Formula One racing cars, since the teams aim precisely to produce the best car, but many of these regulations in place there are designed to set parameters within which innovations are permitted (say, as to engine size). So fairness here amounts to attempts to minimize the competitive advantage given by the situation prior to the beginning of the competition.

Although the account of *level playing field* is in this way relatively straightforward, the other metaphor, *fair play*, is somewhat more complicated to

cash out, despite many rules in a typical sport being explicitly designed to encourage *fair play* and referees or umpires often being tasked with ensuring (perhaps trying to enforce) *fair play*. While most sports permit the sketching of a commonsense notion of playing fairly (and especially of playing unfairly), typically it must be elaborated case by case. In snooker, for instance, since an advantage may be gained by touching the cue ball with the cue prior to making an actual shot, a rule precludes doing this and enjoins one to tell the referee should he/she do so accidentally. *Fair play* requires admitting to the action in this way; and the referee will penalize one if he/she fails to do this. In rugby, the referee is "... the sole judge of fact and of Law during the match" (Laws of Rugby Union [6. A. 4 (a)]) and one specific concern is with "Acts contrary to good sportsmanship." Indeed, the International Rugby Board is explicitly committed to *fair play*, explaining the contrary (*foul play*) as "... anything a player does within the playing enclosure that is against the letter or the spirit of the Laws of the Game. It includes obstruction, unfair play, repeated infringements, dangerous play, and misconduct that is prejudicial to the Game."

But what fair play requires may differ in contexts as well as between sports: for instance, reflecting the skill level of players. Thus, in cricket, any ball bowled should be "... sufficiently within ... [the striker's] reach for him to be able to hit it with his bat by means of a normal cricket stroke" (Law 25.1 {b}). If it is not, the delivery is deemed a *wide*, and then a run is awarded to the batting side and the delivery must be repeated. Here, notice two features: first, in line with a generalized "fair play," the batter must be given an opportunity to display his/her skill and second, the requirements here are specific to the player, since what delivery so-and-so is "... able to hit with his bat by means of a normal cricket stroke" may differ from what is possible for a different player. The rules permit that difference be acknowledged through what the umpire will or will not designate a *wide*. So here we have a rough idea of fair play and recognize some difficulties in applying such a notion equitably. Still, the general idea is clear: that neither side should gain

competitive advantage by contravention of the rules and that the spirit of those rules circumscribes the competition.

General Considerations of Fairness

Moreover, in many sports, general considerations of fairness are pervasive. Thus, the rule in baseball that the batter is out after three strikes implicitly recognizes, first, the need for some regulation; second, a reasonable time requirement (three hundred strikes would make games longer than the designers think desirable); and third, the idea that batters should be given the opportunity to display their skill – only one strike for an out would be unfair in not permitting this.

At the least, considerations of fairness can connect to competitive advantage. Thus, in de Coubertin's mind at least (see McFee 2015a, pp. 148–153), a concern with fairness provided the primary motivation for the amateurism rules for Olympic Games. Certainly de Coubertin (2000, p. 309) worried that "a mercantile spirit threatened to invade sporting circles" in the form of the kind of betting that might encourage match fixing. Yet this was not his primary motivation for requiring amateurism; instead, that concerned the avoidance of competitive advantage in ways he thought unfair. Two cases should be considered: the first is the man whose occupation is, say, a rower is precluded from competing as a rower. The second case, addressing the person with no occupation, has the same motivation: "... [t]he man who can devote all of his time to training is bound, nine times out of ten, to beat the man who lacks this opportunity" (de Coubertin 2000, p. 642). De Coubertin (2000, p. 650) called these "false amateurs." And the Olympics during its so-called amateur phase were dominated by precisely these "false amateurs" as professional students or members of the armed forces (as well as the children of rich parents).

Additionally, the kinds of slogan regularly applied to sporting contexts – such as "May the Best Man Win" – recognize that one team will typically (and perhaps only on that occasion) have a competitive advantage over the other. But the

outcome is not always predictable. If this were not so, we need not bother with the matches. Yet, in looking for the best team, what person knowledgeable about baseball would have voted in 2014 against the LA Angels of Anaheim? They seemed all-conquering: that was what their regular-season record suggested. Their defeat early in the play-offs illustrates the unexpected result, or upset, without unfairness.

Two Uses for Rules

That rules *prohibiting* certain behaviors mention in their formulation those very behaviors might seem to entrench those behaviors in the rule structure of the sport. Then breaking the rules, by performing such behaviors, can seem a way of adhering to the scope of those rules. Against this view, some theorists distinguish the *constitutive rules* of any sport (those that bring into being the actions of which the sport is comprised) from its *regulative rules* (those invoking penalties for rule breaking). But such a distinction is very difficult to draw, and sustain, in practice: for instance, one might think the “handball” rule fundamental to the character of soccer might make it seem a constitutive rule. But there are sets of penalties for handball, so it *seems* a regulative rule. Now the whole distinction looks suspect. However, one might better say (as above) that some rules have constitutive uses (and perhaps regulative ones too), while some rules have regulative uses. Then the specifics of the occasion must be addressed to determine whether the force of the rule on this occasion is primarily constitutive or primarily regulative.

Further, written rules are often given a particular “reading” in certain contexts; thus, the rules of basketball explain it as a noncontact sport. But contact is very much a part of the sport as one watches it in, say, the American Basketball Association. Some writers have seen this as reflecting an ethos of the sport (D’Agostino 1995), yet it is probably as easily treated as a contextually specific reading of those rules (McFee 2004, pp. 59–64); otherwise, one must ask about the normative force of the ethos.

Sportsmanship

Of course, to disregard all of the rules, or even all the rules in their regulative uses, would not be to play the game. But that is not the case here. And no doubt certain forms of cheating, if they became widespread, would affect the game. Thus, “lifting” in the rugby lineout was contrary to the rules, but it became so widespread in the game at a high level that the rule was changed; after all, if everyone was doing such and such, there was no advantage to be gained by doing it (one had already got that advantage). Permitting “lifting” in the lineout thus spoke to anyone who had not previously behaved (badly) in this respect; considerations of fairness are important in such rule changes.

The reality of sports often falls short of the standards of sportsmanship set by requirements of fairness. Inevitably, not all sports players feel equally bound by considerations of fairness, and the importance of the occasion might have a bearing in Diego Maradona’s infamous “Hand of God” goal for Argentina against England in the 1986 FIFA World Cup which should not have been awarded by the referee (since it was clearly a handball). Equally, if the referee had not noticed this fact, considerations of sportsmanship should have required acknowledging its rule contravention. The importance of the event may explain, without mitigating, Maradona’s misconduct. No doubt the economic impact of success is one key factor. But surely taking part in the sport involves at least some commitment to the rules of that sport, even in their regulative uses. Hence idealists here will ask why players play the game (i.e., join in with the sport) if they are not interested in “playing the game” – that is, in considerations of fairness in their playing.

Extent of Obligations

Yet what are the limits to one’s obligations here? The case of racquetless Josie poses this question sharply. Josie arrives at the squash tournament without her racquet. You have a spare; are you obliged to lend it to her? And does it make a

difference if "... without her, you would almost certainly win the championship" (Butcher and Schneider 1998, p. 4) while the game against her will be tough? If one thought that there was a contract implicit in our agreeing to play squash together (as above), that contract reaches only so far – I will not be breaking it in failing to lend her the racquet. On the other hand, the temptation to think that I ought to lend her the racquet (indeed, to give her my better racquet and use the spare myself) also has a basis in (general) fairness. But it is not in the same way an obligation within the sport – any "obligation" is supererogatory.

Notice, too, that obligations to the sport seem to extend beyond the playing field. No doubt there are issues concerning the doping rules in professional cycling, as manifest in Tour de France, and no doubt there were times in the history of the sport when such doping was widespread. However, misconduct here seems especially heinous when one protests loudly that one is "clean," as Lance Armstrong did, and continued doing so in the face of contrary evidence. The same idea seems to apply to Marion Jones, the Olympic athlete who (so she said) felt the pressure to win to such a degree that she slipped into doping. Here, the importance of sports players as models for behavior connects with how the rules should be interpreted. Additionally, there are often rules within sports (which players implicitly agree to play by) as well as moral concerns, say, with fairness. If Tom Brady knowingly played with a less than fully inflated football in the 2015 Super Bowl, and did so to gain competitive advantage, that would be cheating – even if, since we only discover it after the fact, we cannot correct the situation during the match. The importance of the event for some fans can seem to give the "Deflategate" case, like these others, an additional significance. But, first, there have always been such cases in sports: thus, in the so-called Pine Tar Incident (Russell 2004, pp. 94–95), a bat was ruled illegal (by virtue of pine tar on the bat) even though all sides agreed that no unfair competitive advantage was gained from this tar. Having used the illegal bat to hit an apparent home run toward the end of the game, that batter was out and his team (the Royals) had lost the game. When Lee

MacPhail, President of American League baseball, decided that, since there was no advantage, the wrong action had been taken, he ordered the home run to be reinstated and the rest of the game to be replayed from there. Whatever one thinks of his decision, it highlights graphically the difficulties that result from coming to such decisions "after the event." Second, the real problem seems not to be the importance of the event *for fans* but rather that there were perhaps two infringements of sporting *fair play*: with Armstrong and Jones, the actual transgression is compounded by the public lie. And, at least for those adopting an institutional account of sports (McFee 2015b, pp. 57–64), the second is also a sporting transgression – although here against the *spirit of sport* – manifest in one's implicit agreement to abide by this spirit in agreeing to play that sport.

Cheating, Spoiling, and Institutions

Moreover, a standard contrast for fair play is not this kind of (potentially) accidental gaining of competitive advantage, nor the kind of supererogatory action discussed for "racquetless Josie" (above), but rather is *cheating*. And that is the worry in many of the cases of unfair competitive advantage noted above. Literature is replete with interesting discussions of key issues here (see especially, Loland 2002). Still, the contextual character of the issues precludes a simple exceptionless account of cheating and especially one that applies across sports. Thus, one might imagine that all cheating involved the intention to deceive. Many cases fit such a model – tampering with one's épée so that it records hits when none have been scored (Boris Onischenko, in the modern pentathlon in the Olympics of 1976) clearly aims to avoid detection and hence the penalty. The same might be said of so-called diving in soccer, where a player acts as though he has been fouled by an innocent opponent. This kind of deception is akin to *lying*; that in turn suggests what is wrong with it. The gaining of competitive advantage by deception seems to be at the heart of some cases mentioned previously, such as the issues raised by

the allegations concerning Tom Brady's "Deflategate." But is deception always involved in gaining the competitive advantage? Some actions of cheating do not follow this sort of pattern; the "cheater" may have no expectation of the behavior avoiding notice (and the resultant penalty). Indeed, sometimes rule breaking so transparently does not seek to avoid the penalty that one wonders whether it is really best described as *cheating*; for instance, the "professional foul" in soccer where one prevents a goal with a contrary-to-rules action (Loland 2015, p. 344).

Further, we might distinguish, as *spoiling* (McFee 2004, pp. 112–117), actions that give an unfair advantage to one side or one player but are within the rules. There may not be many of these; indeed, they will typically approach varieties of gamesmanship. But they show a different transgression of *fair play*. They typically involve failing to give the opposing team or player a fair opportunity to display his/her skill; eventually what began as such spoiling may become an established tactic used by all teams, as when a master batter is "walked" in baseball by pitching beyond his reach. Here, the fact that all or most teams will employ the strategy restores fairness.

However, such cases – in testing the boundary with cheating – point to another key fact: that, at least for institutionalists of sports (McFee 2015b), the features regularly referred to in attempts to define "sport" do not actually circumscribe sport. Thus, although it is not necessarily a part of some sport (say, cricket) *as such* that its practitioners wear uniforms, it *is* part of that sport as played in certain contexts; in those contexts, there will be rules concerning uniforms – moreover, these will be rules *of cricket*, at least in some sense. Further, consideration of a level playing field explains one reason to investigate the "blades" used by runner Oscar Pistorius for the 2012 Summer Olympic Games: was the advantage thereby gained an *unfair* advantage or simply a leveling of the playing field after his amputations? Similar thoughts also prompt consideration of the technical innovation that Dick Fosbury brought to the high jump at the 1968 Olympic Games: was it a competitive

advantage? It seems clear it was (not least because all high jumpers now use his "flop" technique), but was it therefore unfair? That was the key question; now we know it was accepted. And a part of that acceptance drew on the fact that the technique was in principle open to all. Of course, some diehards at the time might have insisted that it was not "real" high jumping or that it contravened the "real" rules of the sport. But both these suggestions should be set aside. There are no *real* rules, but only the rules of here and now, understood as they are currently understood. So institutionalists recognize that sports may have different features in different contexts. Hence, the idea of "the real sport" should be rejected. Instead, we should be happy that all the occasions on which that sport is played count as instances of that sport (at least when the governing bodies are happy).

Conclusion

Finally, to return to the beginning, the rules of sports are fundamental to discussions of fairness and cheating in the sport and it is important that there are "rules all the way up": rules for changing the rules for playing, rules for changing *those* rules, and so on. The application of those rules, by contrast, is a matter for the informed judgment of sensitive and well-trained judges, such as umpires and referees. They are the ones who must decide whether, say, the gridiron football player was "in control" of the ball when he landed. So these judges recognize transgressions of the rules, as well as accordance with them, and their so recognizing this is typically just what the transgression having occurred amounts to. In that sense, the action of such judges (who will usually be called "referees" or "umpires") resembles what John Searle (2008, p. 49) calls "Declaration," commenting that "[b]y definition, Declarations change reality by representing it as being so changed." So that when the boss says "you are fired," he does not describe the situation whereby I am fired, but *makes it so*. Similarly, the baseball umpire who tells a player, "you're out of here," *makes it so* that the player is out. (And, of course,

such suitably sensitive and suitably informed judges play an even larger role in what David Best called “aesthetic sports.”)

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Competitive Education Harms Moral Growth

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Introduction

The growth of a human being has many aspects including morality among its important features. The major traditions of moral philosophy and moral education maintain that morality consists

of cultivating altruism in its different forms such as benevolence, generosity, and friendliness. The opposite of altruism, egoism, is consequently among the key problems of moral education. The human ego is an important phenomena’s of moral education and also key for understanding competitive behavior and motivation. Competition is social action by nature involving at least two subjects trying to outdo each other. The term moral subjectivity refers to individual morality emerging at the crossroad of the individual, cultural, societal, and historical. Competitive human ego is, therefore, constructed as a moral subjectivity by learning language, culture, and ways of interacting in a particular kind of society with a particular history. Egoism is among the hindrances of growing a sound moral subjectivity. This entry describes what harm competition is doing to human moral growth by fostering different features of egoism. Some perennial moral virtues are used in showing this. The benefits of competition are well known and, therefore, left outside the scope of this text.

Competition: The History of an Idea

The word competition derives from Latin “com” and “petere” and was first used in the sixteenth century. Petere means to ask, to seek, and to pursue, and com means this is done with other actors. Often competition is defined as pleading seeking or making a petition together. In economics, it is thought that competition derives from scarcity. When there are not enough resources for everyone, people have to compete against each other for acquiring it. There are problems with this definition as it is not self-evident that all things are resources for human exploit as, for example, parts of nature can be considered holy. Moreover, scarcity is not always absolute, and not all competition is therefore inevitable. Resources can also be shared and allocated with other principles (Polanyi 2001). There is also relative scarcity and a desire to feel superior to other people. This is a competition for scarce resources such as glory, esteem, social standing, and luxury consumption, used for bolstering the human ego.

So, competition is more than mere easy togetherness in making petitions but uneasy struggle for superiority (Nicolls 1989).

In the age of enlightenment and the gradual transition to egalitarian and democratic nation States, competition became to be understood in contrast with the egoistic passions of the feudal nobility and the kings (Hirschman 1982; Elias 1982). Competition, instead of vain and violent glory-seeking passions of the feudal aristocrats, was advocated as calm, peaceful, and rational interaction. Competitive thought emerged out of the need to escape the warring passions of the aristocrats and for enabling a social order based more on democratic principles. Philosophically, the role of liberalism was important in challenging the feudal regime. Freedom, individual rights, and equality without innate privileges were advocated instead of political and economic power transmitted within family relations. Competition became to be understood as a vehicle of predictable, transparent, and peaceful self-interest rather than mere aggressive passions (Elias 1982; Hirschman 1982.)

Altruism and Egoism in Human Nature and Culture: Bewildered Moral Subjectivity

There remains continuing bafflement about how competition is understood in using two of the most basic moral categories (Fromm 1986; Horney 1964; Hirschman 1982): On the one hand, it is presumed that there is (1) unpredictable and unstable emotional passions, self-sacrificing altruism, and love for others. On the other hand, there is (2) rational and stable interests with self-love and rational egoism on the basis of competition. In other words, moral subjectivity is disoriented in holding simultaneously that (1) self-love is morally wrong and love for others is morally right and (2) pursuing one's own self-interest with greed and selfishness in competition is advantageous for the economy (Fromm 1986, p. 33).

In terms of modern psychology, the old opposition of passions and interests is misleading, and according to Erich Fromm, altruism and egoism

are not contradictory or alternative concepts (1986). Competition of supposedly value-neutral interests, instead, socializes and teaches also passionately selfish behavior, not only calm pursuit of sustenance. This learning is usually disregarded for selfishness and greed are now accepted motives for economic activity. There have been few notable and outspoken theorists such as neo-liberal thinker Friedrich von Hayek favoring competition for its moral desirability. The controversy of private vices and their public benefits has been ongoing since Bernard de Mandeville (1670–1733) and Adam Smith (1723–1790), who is considered the father of modern economics. In economics, competition today is assumed as the most desirable form of social interaction. This is not usually questioned, but competitiveness, selfishness, and greed are considered as universal traits of human nature (Marglin 2009). Instead of a direct endorsement of competition, individual rights, freedom, and equality are commonly stressed thus resulting in competition.

One solution widely in use for the uneasy coexistence of opposing moral traditions of altruism and egoism has been separating the realms of (1) moral and political matters and values from (2) nonmoral, economic, and value-free matters. Using this separation of the value-laden political and the value-free economical (Polanyi 2001), moral ambiguities about egoism, greed, and pursuit for superiority are disregarded. Human wants and needs are seen insatiable in mainstream economics, so scarcity and competition that necessarily follow (Marglin 2009). The possibility of allocating resources outside competition, as done in most of human history (Polanyi 2001), is disregarded as economically inefficient and restrictive for individual freedom.

Karl Polanyi (1886–1964) has demonstrated that the separation of political and economic realms is a historical, cultural, and ideological separation, not an inevitable one (2001). The idea of competitive human nature ignores the phenomena of learning, and in anthropology, there remains little question that competition is, to a large extent, a result of history, culture, socialization, and learning (Montagu 1952). The disorientation about the role of altruistic and egoistic

motives has remained, however, a constitutive feature of contemporary moral subjectivity. Human being is seriously blocked in integrating one's personality as this moral predicament remains unsolved (Horney 1964; Fromm 1986, p. 127). In a state of bewilderment and helplessness, cultivating morality is difficult as the question of what is cultivated remains unclear.

Meritocratic Frustrations and Challenges to Moral Subjectivity

Democratic societies allocate resources according to merit, and people are assumed free and equal in participating in competitions. The capability approach to human freedom and justice by Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum has demonstrated, however, that formal freedom in terms of law does not guarantee equal starting points for life. Giving legal freedom to all does not mean everyone have the same possibilities and opportunities for success. The Sociology of Pierre Bourdieu (1930–2002) has further demonstrated how social, cultural, and economic capital is an object of reproduction and inheritance. Human capabilities are, to a large extent, inherited through upbringing, education, and socialization. “Accidents of birth” work in both nature and nurture in affecting our possibilities to compete successfully. The welfare State model and socially oriented liberalism include active educational measures and social policy for compensating these accidents of birth.

Neoliberal influences of the late twentieth century and the beginning of the twentieth-first century have made it increasingly challenging to develop a well-proportioned moral subjectivity. The belief in the fairness of competition, and thus democracy, has eroded with the “winner-take-all” reward structure in which the remuneration schemes of an elite and the majority are increasingly separated. Neoliberal ideology of free competition, unfettered markets, and minimum state with little or no compensation for the “accidents of birth” gives rise to discontent as inequality is seen economically stimulating and desirable. When considering together the winner-

take-all resource allocation scheme, the meritocratic-individualist concept of human being, the virtue of strong will, and the increased acceptance of inequality, it can be noticed how harms to moral growth emerge. While trying harder is a sound pedagogical advice to some situations, the inherent logic of competition does not enable success for everyone. Having a strong will does not change the fact that competitions produce more losers than winners.

Emphasizing strong will means overdeveloping the will at the expense of the intellect and senses. The intellect, senses, and emotions are developed for the purpose of success and for boosting the ego. This is not conclusive to moral growth. For example, learning empathy is hindered in competitions as the suffering of the loser is deemed solely one's own fault in failures of effort, will, and skill. This way empathy is crowded out and replaced with harsh attitudes accompanied by unfriendly blame and unwillingness in understanding all the effecting factors behind the defeat. A strong will, unable to achieve success, gets easily frustrated as competitions are taken as an empiric and objective truths of people's abilities. An experience of failure, taken as an objective evidence of the personal inadequacies, can be unbearable. A strong will, frustrated in defeats, can externalize its frustrated psychological energy to aggression and intolerance toward those deemed inferior. Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) already noticed that competitive pursuit for superiority is among the causes of violence and war. As the victors have proved their superiority by their success, they often avoid the disgruntled blame, which is channeled, for example, to ethnic or cultural intolerance without coming in terms the societal and economic reasons behind the disappointment.

Competitive Education and Moral Harm

Contemporary dominant narrative of good life in the twenty-first century consists of success in competitions. In containing value judgments about people superiorized and inferiorized, competition is not only a value-neutral matter. Nor it is

solely a matter of economic necessity or sustenance. As an organizing and justificatory principle, competition is a fairly recent development, which has been mostly absent in playing a major role in world economic history (Polanyi 2001). This has changed during the last two hundred years. In the twenty-first century, competition is the cornerstone of current belief system confined not only in the economy. Instead, competition radiates into all other activities and permeates love, social relations, and play also (Horney 1964, p. 188). For example, competitive sports and success have been a central part of the twenty-first century narrative of good life, and they were introduced in schools in the nineteenth-century imperial Great Britain. Sports have been taken on for building characters and national identities and, for example, military performance. Sports and other kinds of competition do include aspects of character building but a lot of unfounded beliefs and misunderstandings also.

In terms of moral development, competitions have the effect of hardening the moral subjectivity. Abstaining from helping and hindering the learning of helping are examples of this. Hardening of moral subjectivity is, however, often welcomed as a mark of strong will and capability for relentless effort and the go-getter attitude. In this case, however, the world “tough” preferred. Especially in masculine contexts, this is an adjective by which the highest respects are paid. The distance of meaning between terms such as hardened, callous, and tough can be explained by the heroic imagery attached to winning. The mixed attitudes toward hardening and toughness explain why one key harm competition is doing to moral growth is often left unattended:

Recognition and loving approval are made artificially scarce resources, an object of competition, even though everyone is in need of these. Love is a key phenomenon in becoming human being and a moral subject. Making children compete for approval hinders the growing of healthy sense of self-worth and self-respect with compassion to one self as well as to others. Everyone is as good as their latest performances, and people are judged by their competitive success. People are thus left in fear of poor judgments (Nicolls 1989).

On the other hand, love and affection regardless of merit make a person more durable in cases of traumatic experiences such as of losses accompanied by humiliation (Horney 1964, pp. 80, 211). Loving approval protects children from the harmful effects of competition and also fosters competitive success in supporting the growth of balance personalities. Denying loving recognition and affection through competition produce insecurity sometimes accompanied by neurosis and pride (Horney 1964). Loving care is the key for basic security and self-esteem.

Pride, instead, is a substitute for healthy sense of self-worth and self-respect but a poor one as it fluctuates in changing social comparisons. Instead of a deep introspection conducive to moral growth, competition turns the attention of a person outside, to superficiality of extrospection. The concept of *Das Man* or “the They” by Martin Heidegger (1889–1976) describes this kind of human being whose existence is characterized by impersonal, unspecified, and inauthentic attributes. Instead of an authentic self, the *das Man* competitor values and thinks what is generally valued and thought. This way, competition socializes people to believing that the same yardsticks for success and good life apply for all resulting in relatively homogenous system of beliefs. This system of belief fosters, unintentionally, also envy as people are inadequately encouraged to find their own authentic sources of happiness. Envy is wanting what the others have and the repulsive feeling accompanied. One reason for envy is the unrecognition of one’s existential needs, which make people want what the others have instead. Other reason for envy is the failure in recognizing the ontological difference of needs and wants in economics, which makes people endeavoring also things that do not make them genuinely content. Envy is in fact included in many practical moral problems such as conspicuous consumption (Veblen 2008). Another example is the case of envious malice accompanied by wicked joy in witnessing a failure of another person.

Competitive concept of human being consists of autonomous and self-interested people relying solely on their own performance. It is not wicked

joy or envy but the interest of the self, a rational self-interest, to deny help from others in competition. Helping others decrease one's relative standing, so it is not considered rational for the individual. Giving help is a form of altruism, and not granting help is related to egoism at least when this is not overwhelmingly demanding. Generosity is another form of altruism related to helping, and it can be defined as a propensity for kindness and friendliness and willingness to give and share one's own. Competition means acquiring more resources like social recognition, esteem, money, and respect to oneself rather than giving it away. Group competition is a different matter as help and generosity toward one's own group are encouraged.

Failures of learning empathy, generosity, helping, and mutual joy from the accomplishments of others are among the features of hardening the moral subjectivity in using competition in education. And competition, when it is practiced in society and economy, has also educative effect in socializing people to certain ways of thinking, feeling, and wanting. Hardening of moral subject means the suffering of people and destruction of nature and its living beings are disregarded, naturalized, and normalized. Moral insensitivity is crowded in, and toughness is celebrated even with its dire effect on the moral growth.

Concluding Remarks

Competition involves both benefits and harms to moral growth, and the benefits are typically exaggerated. What is known as character building is, for example, often erosive to the moral growth in hardening the moral subjectivity for competitive success. Moral education and moral growth consist of learning and teaching critical moral reasoning, good will, and moral sentiments in well-proportioned relations with each other. Inasmuch as competition is developing the will at the expense of the intellect and moral emotions, a well-proportioned human moral growth is considerably harmed. For moral growth it is more advisable to use collaborative teaching environments to

fostering friendliness, sharing, trust, and mutual help. Insofar as competition becomes an all-encompassing feature of social life, people are in fear of other people taking what is theirs. So, they learn to mistrust and fear each other. This is not conducive for learning friendly sharing, trusting, generosity, and mutual help. Avoiding competition and favoring collaborative teaching are not only morally but pedagogical grounded (Johnson and Johnson 1989).

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Conceptual Change in Science and Science Education

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
Introduction

A large body of work in science education and conceptual development research has noted that historical changes in scientific ideas display similarities to students' conceptual progressions along a novice-expert continuum. For example, researchers have noted that scientists' historical resistance to changing their pre-Newtonian ideas relating to mechanics was very similar to modern students' difficulties abandoning pre-Newtonian ideas, that there are parallels between students' ideas of chemical equilibrium and earlier scientists' conceptual models, or that students' thinking about evolution appears to parallel large-scale changes in scientific thought from essentialist to selection-based views of evolution. In contrast, other scholars have cautioned that purported similarities between students' conceptual changes and the historical development of scientific concepts are superficial and are derived from different methods and sources of knowledge (Nersessian 1989). Students' conceptions of heat and

temperature, photosynthesis, the shape of the Earth, and natural selection, for example, have all been noted to display significant discordances relative to patterns of historical development. Nersessian (1989) in particular has warned that metaphysical, epistemological, and sociological factors make comparisons between modern students' learning patterns and historical changes of scientific concepts problematic. However, it is also clear that different scientific concepts from different domains may display different degrees of cognitive-historical parallelisms and exhibit unique features that prohibit broad claims that cut across scientific disciplines, historical episodes, or cultural contexts (Ha and Nehm 2014). Therefore, the unsettled question is how the history and philosophy of science (HPS) can appropriately inform science education research and practice – specifically, research and practice relevant to conceptual change.

Conceptual Change in Science Education and in the History of Science

The topic of biological evolution serves as a useful case study for exploring putative parallelisms between conceptual change in students and the history of science (HOS). The science education and conceptual development literatures have suggested that there is a striking similarity between (1) a paradigm shift from “Lamarckian” or essentialist, pre-Darwinian views to “Darwinian” or selection-based views of evolution and (2) students' conceptual progressions from naïve to normative evolutionary understanding (see Kampourakis and Nehm 2014). Detailed empirical studies informed by HOS have raised questions about these purported parallelisms between historical change and student conceptual change. For example, students' conceptions prior to formal teaching have been found to be mostly teleological, whereas the core of Lamarck's thinking was not (Kampourakis and Zogza 2007). These empirical studies have questioned the assumed correspondence of (a) students' pre-instructional views with



Conceptual Change in Science and Science Education, Fig. 1 Illustration of the composition, structure, and coherence of student ideas

pre-Darwinian ideas and (b) students' post-instructional views with Darwinian ideas.

Given that students' conceptions only superficially resemble those of historical figures, it is not clear what is gained by labeling particular knowledge elements or conceptions with particular historical figures. Moreover, accurately linking historical figures to particular scientific concepts is not straightforward. Contrary to popular wisdom, Darwin embraced several ideas characteristic of Lamarck (e.g., use and disuse inheritance). In some sense, Darwin was perhaps more "Lamarckian" than Lamarck himself, as he accepted that the direct influence of the environment could produce variation (Burkhardt 2013; Ha and Nehm 2014).

In addition to empirical studies calling into question the parallelisms between conceptual change in science and science education and the difficulty of ascribing particular ideas to particular historical figures, Gault (1991) emphasized differences in the way that understanding is achieved in students and scientists. He noted that (1) the intuitive development of students' ideas is a different process from the conscious theory construction of a scientist and (2) students' conceptions are often developed privately and are based on everyday experience, whereas scientists' ideas are often developed in consultation and confrontation within the scientific community and are built upon empirical evidence gathered in systematic ways. For these reasons, comparing students' individual conceptual changes with large-scale paradigm shifts is not really informative.

Conceptual Composition, Structure, and Coherence: The Foundations of Conceptual Change

In order to better understand conceptual change, for several decades, science educators have empirically explored the question of whether students' conceptions about a variety of science topics display stability or coherence. On the one hand, student ideas have been conceptualized as dynamic, fragmented, and highly situated and, on the other, as stable and relatively consistent across contexts (see chapters in Vosniadou 2013). A large amount of evidence has been gathered to explore and test these perspectives, although differing interpretations of this evidence have occurred in part due to the complexity of extracting information from students and the different methodological approaches that may be used to analyze student conceptions.

The apparent diversity of student conceptions has implications for research on conceptual change. Conceptual change could involve changes in the composition of conceptions, in the structure of the same (or different) conceptions, and/or in the consistency of the use of conceptions across different problem types or across the same types within different contexts (Fig. 1). It could also involve the change in the hierarchical status of different knowledge elements in different situations.

The categorization of student conceptions may be organized in many different ways, complicating characterizations of conceptual change. Conceptions may be described as scientifically normative

(e.g., mutation as a cause of phenotypic differences) or nonnormative ideas (e.g., use-disuse inheritance). Nonnormative ideas can be further categorized into “cognitive biases” (e.g., psychological essentialism, design teleology) versus “other ideas” (e.g., use inheritance). Additional taxonomies based on cognitive composition are possible as well as taxonomies that situate ideas within deeper theoretical frames. The broader point is that the composition of student conceptions is remarkably diverse and that comprehensively capturing and classifying the diversity of ideas that a student harbors is not straightforward at all. Overall, conceptual change research often lacks comprehensive descriptions of the full diversity of student conceptions, and categorizations of these conceptions are constrained by theoretical frames of reference. Assessment of the diversity of conceptions and categorization of conceptions are needed to estimate the type and magnitude of conceptual change.

Conceptual change from a purely naïve to a purely scientific composition appears to be uncommon. In the largest empirical studies of student conceptions to date ($n > 10,000$), the majority of students built the so-called “mixed” or “synthetic” models of evolutionary change (Moharreri et al. 2014). For example, a student may combine the idea of teleology with the ideas of mutation and heredity to build a mixed model (e.g., “The plants needed a mutation in order to survive and so they developed new traits that were passed down from generation to generation”). This is important to note, as instruction aiming at conceptual change will most likely have to consider a variety of mixed conceptions as possible targets. It also suggests that categorical measures of conceptual change (naïve vs. normative) are too crude and will not elicit particular conceptual ideas during instruction.

In addition to considering the composition and structure of student conceptions, research has begun to explore the contextual nature of conceptual change and its implications for cognitive coherence (Fig. 1). Although the general idea of the situated or contextual nature of evolutionary thought was mentioned in the literature decades ago, robust empirical studies were not conducted

until more recently. The empirical work of Kampourakis and Zogza (2009) provided insights into the incoherence of evolutionary thinking, but it did not systematically control for task language and problem structure when characterizing coherence. In contrast, more recent empirical work controlling for task language, problem type, and problem features has confirmed prior work and shown that novice (e.g., secondary and university student) ideas about evolutionary change lack coherence across contexts (i.e., different knowledge elements are arranged into different structures in different scenarios).

Using such “controlled” experimental designs, generalizations about the contextuality of novice evolutionary thinking are emerging. Reasoning about evolution has been found to be (1) *lineage dependent* (e.g., plants vs. animals), (2) *polarity dependent* (e.g., gain vs. loss of a trait), (3) *familiarity dependent* (penguin vs. prosimian), and (4) *scale dependent* (within vs. between species; Nehm and Ha 2011). Evolution experts, in contrast, when answering items, *within a problem type* (e.g., a natural selection question), demonstrate coherence or consistency of ideas *across* contexts. These more fine-grained characterizations of student thinking help to illustrate the diversity of ways in which conceptual change may be described. For example, conceptual change may be achieved in relation to *scale* but not in terms of *polarity*. Thus, the context in which change is examined becomes central to studies of conceptual change.

Collectively, empirical studies of the composition, structure, and coherence of student ideas within and across problem types and contexts raise important questions about what we actually know about what changes in students’ ideas about evolution and which changes should “count” as conceptual change. Regardless of conceptual scale, several studies demonstrate that student understanding of evolutionary change lacks “coherence” in a general sense. In other words, educational interventions that change the composition and structure of student ideas relating to the evolution of trait gain in an animal lineage might not change the composition and structure of student ideas relating to the evolution of trait loss in a

plant lineage. Has conceptual change occurred in the animal case but not the plant case or has conceptual change not occurred at all because a coherent model has not been used in *both* contexts?

Our review of some of the empirical considerations relating to the study of conceptual change highlights a lack of precision in the documentation and characterization of change. Additional empirical work that takes stock of the composition, structure, and coherence of student ideas within and among problem types will be needed in order to address these questions. In summary, situating student ideas within the composition-structure-coherence framework might help to standardize empirical studies of conceptual change. It also might serve as a useful framework for looking at HOS and its relationship to conceptual change.

The Coherence of Scientific Conceptions: Disciplines and Individuals

In the previous section, we identified an important lacuna in conceptual change research: there is little empirical research on whether students' conceptions and explanations about evolution are coherent or not, as well as on their more detailed compositions and structures in different scenarios. This seems to imply that the goal of teaching for conceptual change in evolution is to build a robust and coherent conception of evolution across contexts. However, coherence is not necessarily a characteristic of past scientists. As noted by diSessa (2014), Toulmin provides a counterpoint to Kuhn's model of scientific paradigms and paradigm shifts, which has in turn served as a template for science educators' views about conceptual change.

Kuhn suggested that scientific advancement was characterized by a series of periods of "normal science" punctuated by intellectually violent revolutions in which particular conceptual worldviews, the paradigms, were replaced. According to Kuhn, scientific revolutions occurred when anomalies emerged that could not be explained by the accepted paradigm,

which was eventually replaced by a new one. This change from an old paradigm to a new one was described as a "paradigm shift," and it happened all at once, like a gestalt switch, but not necessarily in an instant. Toulmin criticized this, and the underlying assumption that paradigms are coherent wholes, by pointing out that different concepts and theories are introduced into a scientific discipline at different times and for different purposes, independently from one another. Therefore, a scientific discipline is more like a "historical population of logically independent concepts and theories" rather than a "single logical system with a single scientific purpose."

Conclusions: Cognition and Scales of Comparison in Science Education Studies

We argue that it is problematic to describe students' ideas using labels that align with large-scale changes (paradigm shifts) in the HOS. Darwin and Lamarck, for example, each possessed very detailed understandings of organisms' structures and physiologies and proposed equally detailed explanations for natural phenomena. The "funds of knowledge" that these naturalists possessed and used to create understanding were very different in form and quantity with those of modern-day students. These historical figures pieced together new models of understanding, whereas many students of today are adopting models developed by others (as part of formal or informal learning opportunities). Unlike the ideas of Lamarck and Darwin, modern-day students' ideas about evolutionary change appear to be much less coherent; large numbers of students have been shown to display diverse assemblages of concepts (normative and non-normative) deployed in diverse combinations depending on the living systems that they are asked to think about (Nehm and Ha 2011). Unless singular, robust cognitive models characterize student thinking, it is difficult to argue that their models are "Lamarckian" or "Darwinian," for example.

However, labels notwithstanding, studying the thought processes of individual scientists of the past can be very instructive. Studies of the cognitive processes of past scientists suggests that novel concepts do not emerge fully formed in the minds of scientists, but they rather are the products of lengthy and intentional cognitive activity (Nersessian 2008, p. 5). It is the latter that may be informative for science educators. If the goal is to identify students' conceptual obstacles and develop teaching approaches that will help them overcome these obstacles, then it would be most fruitful to examine the conceptual challenges that individual naturalists/scientists had to face rather than examining simplified paradigm shifts characteristic of many scientists over large time spans. This approach does not guarantee any positive outcomes, because eventually the conceptual challenges faced by students and past scientists may be different. Yet, if there really is a role for HOS in conceptual change research, it should be in making comparisons at the individual level: the challenges faced by individual scientists in the past may help researchers better understand the challenges that individual students currently face.

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Configuration

► Configured Leadership

Configured Leadership

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Synonyms

Collective; Configuration; Hybrid; Leadership; Shared

Introduction

To inquire of a phenomenon how it is configured or set up is to investigate its properties and the dynamics of their operation. Because in the case of leadership the persisting orthodoxy that there is

a leader and a plurality of followers is so deeply culturally entrenched, such an inquiry risks being dismissed as either superfluous or pointless. But what if it could be shown that there exists a plurality of leaders, so that leadership is a kind of moveable feast that migrates between individuals? This was roughly the point of recognition at which the Australian social psychologist, Cecil Gibb, arrived in the mid 1950s. Gibb's (1954) realization about plurality prompted him to distinguish between a leadership relationship that was focused on just one individual as the leader and a relationship in which leadership was distributed among a number of individuals, with the validity of the claim to being a leader grounded in his view derived from the measurements of a third party observer (or researcher) – and for later commentators (especially attribution psychologists) was grounded in the perceptions of those who were participants in the relationship. Regardless of whether normatively Gibb's distinction is viewed favorably or unfavorably, in the six decades since he published the popularity of distributed leadership, particularly in the education sector, spiked dramatically during the 2000s – as was demonstrated by Bolden's (2011) analysis of its recognition and uptake.

But suppose that the understanding arrived at by Gibb is complicated a little further. If he was right about leadership being constantly on the move, then a consequence of that migratory feature may not only be the need for a rethink about leaders but also the threatened redundancy of followers as a category. That is, if everyone might become a leader (potentially), then there is no need to have followers. To complicate matters even further, what if it could be shown in the case of this shifting array of leaders that at least some of the subjects attributed with leadership are not merely atomized individuals but also pluralities (i.e., groupings in which $N = 2$ or $2+$): where might that possibility leave the conventional and time-honored leader-follower linguistic and representational binary? This acknowledgement of plurality expresses the contemporary position presently attained by the leadership field generally and the educational leadership subfield specifically. To be able to accommodate within a revised

unit of leadership analysis varying combinations of individuals and pluralities, however – and to avoid the error of jettisoning individuals altogether by merely substituting Gibb's distributed leadership for his focused category—requires for the representation of such an ontology a more expansive term than distribution. That term is configuration.

Unit of Analysis

This claim that the unit of leadership analysis is configured need not entail the advancement of a normative commitment about the desirability or otherwise of particular configurations, but is to prioritize the contouring of the realities of leadership's practice. Moreover, to have in mind the charting of the structural and operational details of a range of leader configurations also need not commit a researcher to an epistemological claim about the existence of a distinctive and bounded form of knowledge that can be labeled "leadership." Nor does the assumption follow that leaders lack knowledge because persons who occupy a range of roles that carry with them expectations of leadership, including positions of headship, and who may embody the leadership attributions of their peers, are known to acquire working knowledge and in some instances to accumulate such knowledge to a level of cognitive codification sufficient to realize a range of capabilities. Finally, the idea of a configuration trades on one further distinction about leadership made by Gibb who, when querying its scientific value as a category, recognized its continued popularity and utility as a descriptive term in everyday usage. That is, there exists a framework of expectations of leaders and leadership (which is to some extent implicit, to some extent explicit) within the consciousness of people who inhabit a range of social formations, and who act purposefully within a variety of settings, along with an attendant willingness on their part to attribute the status of leader and the embodiment of leadership to a person or persons, grouping or groupings (for an extensive range of instances of the latter see Denis et al. 2012). If this line of reasoning is valid, then it makes sense to

research real-world exemplars (contemporary and historic) of persons and groupings that have attained leader or ruler status, with a view to ascertaining how and why within various frameworks of expectations leadership operates as it does, to track its accomplishments or lack of accomplishments, and to identify its consequences (intended and unintended).

The upshot of the foregoing discussion, then, is that a leadership configuration is a short-hand term for an objectively understood patterning or arrangement of dynamic parts that integrate to some degree to constitute an evolving whole, with such leadership wholes comprising hybrid combinations of persons and/or smallish number groupings that get to be acknowledged as leaders. Illustrations of configured leadership in spheres such as education are manifold (see the examples cited in Gronn 2011, pp. 442–444). In contexts in which individuals share a leadership space, their coordinated relationship may be institutionalized or may emerge informally Gronn 2015. An instance of the former is co-leadership, such as a deliberately designed school co-principalship, while in the latter a typical illustration is informal, unplanned temporary partnering (for, say, the duration of a project) such as between a principal and teacher colleagues who possesses specialist expertise relevant to the resolution of problems. To complicate a little further this picture of fluid practice, individuals in headship roles (such as the principalship) have been shown during the workflow to sometimes to act alone, while on other occasions they partner and on still others they operate as members of small groupings. In all expressions of both formal and informal co-leadership, this shared division of labor gives expression to a sense of conjoint agency. An advantage of such a labor division is that it permits capability pooling. That is, role robustness is made possible by the expression of differentiated although complementary specialist skills along with a duplication of skill-sets that facilitates person substitutability. Equally, what might appear to be unnecessary role redundancy (i.e., skill overlap) may in fact turn out to be a virtuous unintended consequence in that such redundancy affords a reduction in the organizational risk

exposure that might result from the temporary absence or loss of key personnel. These possibilities facilitated by a joint leadership role space occupied by at least two persons are also evident in the case of small number groupings of three, four, or even five members, with a membership size of six being the numerical ceiling beyond which the likelihood of efficient group self-organization diminishes (Gronn 2010). Everyday terms such as teams or teaming are often used to designate these $N = 2+$ units.

Evidence of such leadership hybridity, however, is by no means restricted to contemporary social formations. Accumulating data on rulership in small-scale pre-nation State and pre-kingship societies, for example, highlights the coexistence (in a number of instances) of individual chiefdoms and conciliar institutions, along with rulership regimes in which both of these types alternated over time and through many generations of leaders. In the evolution of increased complexity in societies and polities, a growing number of scholars in the disciplines of anthropology and archaeology have detected alternating or coexisting pressures of egalitarianism and stratification in social orders in which contrasting strategies of personalized power and corporate power contended, and to varying degrees became institutionalized. In hunter-gatherer foraging bands, for example, the group pressures towards the suppression of alpha-type individual band members (through a disciplining process known as reverse dominance hierarchy), along with shirking and free-riding behavior by feral individuals, ensured that hierarchical impulses were trumped by egalitarian norms. Individual leadership may have been tolerated informally but only to the extent that it was required for functional purposes (e.g., group protection and skills dependence in big game hunting). The factor that eventually strengthened the likely emergence of hierarchy was cognitive evolution in brain morphology: this development permitted human perspective-taking, along with status and role differentiation and ascription to key individuals, and also, as group memberships increased in size, relief from the constant monitoring of individuals and their behavior, that was facilitated by the

institutionalization of a division of social sanction (Gronn 2016). Provided that future research outcomes in these two scholarly disciplines confirm this trajectory of knowledge, then there is clear longitudinal evidence of historical continuity with respect to a norm of leadership being configured in a hybridized form.

Research Questions

The preceding analysis gives rise to a number of points of research significance in respect of leadership configurations. The first concerns the universe of empirical possibilities. A key question here is: to what extent is the range of types and numbers of leadership configurations likely to be so divergent that these are potentially infinite or can they be shown to narrow around a convergent mean that encompasses a small range of preferred types? If the answer lies in the latter direction, why might that be? What factors, for example, in the decision-making realms within which leaders typically operate, select for such purposes as utility and efficiency certain configurational options and reject others (a phenomenon that is sometimes referred to as environmental fit)? It is surely noteworthy (and also well documented) that for an extended period of time school principals, particularly in England, have been adopting the practice of assembling small cohorts of colleagues, labeled variously senior leadership or management teams, in recognition of the fact that the pedagogical and curriculum information spaces within which they operate are increasingly vast and so never-endingly expanding that they defy monopoly control and processing by one (leader) brain alone. A second and closely allied area of research interest is the connection between configurations and organizational outcomes. Causal links between structural and processual relations and their effects tend to be notoriously difficult to measure, but if in the interests of the effectiveness of workflow operations it might be shown, for example, that within a converging range of configurational leadership types certain options provide a more likely guarantee of economy of workplace energy, then such knowledge offers a firm

foundation for choice. A third point of significance concerns the implications for the recruitment, selection, and development of leaders who may be required to function in shared role space configurational arrangements that simultaneously require solo, partnering, and team operations. Here, capability frameworks assume importance. Existing leadership capability frameworks tend to vary in the degree to which they are framed normatively around statements of performance desirability and the extent to which they draw on an evidence-base grounded in the documented realities of practice. If such frameworks are to remain credible, as the pressures for the professional recognition of leaders' accomplishments build in favor of research-based performance standards, then they will need to articulate both individual and collective leadership capabilities. Currently in the leadership field, however, compilation of the evidence-base in respect of knowledge of the former, let alone the latter, remains in its infancy.

Unfinished Business

The final point about the wider significance of leader configurations is to do with continued inertia or resistance to the possibility of leadership plurality, notwithstanding the recent developments summarized above, and the iron-like grip that common sense understandings have concerning the individual agency of leaders. In political science, for example, Brown (2014) has attacked the dominance of so-called strong leadership and its attribution to individual heads of government, in both democracies and authoritarian States, as not only exaggerated, but as lacking a factual basis and therefore as illusory. Moreover, "far more desirable than the model of the political leader as master," from a normative perspective, "is *collective leadership*" (Brown 2014, p. 3, original emphasis). Leadership biographers may be complicit in the fostering of such misperceptions, and yet when examined closely biographies manifest evidence of leadership spaces that are simultaneously occupied by a number of key players. The problem here is partly a failure or an unwillingness to confront issues concerned with

leadership ontology (such as those considered above) and partly the discursive misrepresentation of ontological realities arising from a dependence on traditional leadership language. Roberts' (2014) recent biography of Napoleon Bonaparte – which, with its title, *Napoleon the Great*, appears at face value to be a study in the great man leader tradition – illustrates how even in studies of dictators (extreme instances of Gibb's focused leaders) multiple leadership, although not explicitly acknowledged as such, plays a central role. Here, to take but one instance, is an unequivocal illustration of what I instanced earlier as partnering (Roberts 2014, p. 80):

Napoleon was the first commander to employ a chief-of-staff in its modern sense, and he couldn't have chosen a more efficient one. With a memory second only to his own, [Alexandre] Berthier could keep his head clear after twelve hours of taking dictation; on one occasion in 1809 he was summoned no fewer than seventeen times in a single night. The Archives Nationales, Bibliothèque Nationale and the Archives of the Grande Armée at Vincennes teem with orders in the neat secretarial script and short concise sentences that Berthier used to communicate with his colleagues, conveying Napoleon's wishes in polite but firm terms, invariably starting 'The Emperor requests, general, that on receipt of this order you will. . .'

And here is how the Bonaparte–Berthier partnership and the collective leadership machinery headed up by Berthier gave it practical expression (Roberts 2014, p. 81):

He [Berthier] rarely opposed Napoleon's ideas directly except on strict logistical grounds, and built up a team that ensured the commander-in-chief's wishes were quickly put into action. His special ability, amounting to something approaching genius, was to translate the sketchiest of general commands into precise written orders for every demi-brigade. Staff work was rarely less than superbly efficient. To process Napoleon's rapid-fire orders required a skilled team of clerks, orderlies, adjutants and aides-de-camp, and a very advanced filing system, and he often worked through the night. On one of the few occasions when Napoleon spotted an error in the troop numbers for a demi-brigade, he wrote to correct Berthier, adding: 'I read these position statements with as much relish as a novel.'

By contrast, in another recent analysis of a dictatorial regime – Fitzpatrick's (2015) account

of Joseph Stalin in *On Stalin's Team* – collective leadership is not only documented in extensive detail, but its (ontological) significance is explicitly acknowledged. In the wake of the importance attached to such collective leadership by the then recently deceased V.I. Lenin, the team of about a dozen men formed in the 1920s by Stalin persisted until a few years after his death (1953) before it disbanded. As a collective entity that met regularly as a group its members exercised individual responsibilities, and were united in their loyalty to Stalin and to one another. Analogous to a sporting team, Fitzpatrick characterizes Stalin as captain and playing coach. While he defined the team, and its practice was to attribute “all initiative” to Stalin, it continued (unexpectedly) to function as a team without him following his death, having worked around him in the lead-up period of his mental decline and eventual demise (Fitzpatrick 2015, p. 2, original emphasis). Team members acted throughout the period with varying independence in their spheres and were conscious of themselves as being part of a collective unit (as well as being individual rivals), and whenever Stalin sensed that backing for what he wanted to do was “lacking or lukewarm,” he retreated (Fitzpatrick 2015, p. 3). Notwithstanding these collective dynamics, earlier Stalin and Soviet scholars had mostly focused on “the man alone, emphasizing his charisma, cult, and omnipotence,” and had disregarded or played down the activities of official (State and party) institutions. What changed that perceptual misattribution was the opening of the Russian archives in the 1990s, following which “previously invisible aspects of the political process came into sight, and scholars' interests started to shift to the relationships of Stalin and the men around him, variously referred to as his ‘entourage’ or the ‘inner circle’” (Fitzpatrick 2015, p. 271).

Conclusion

With leadership continuing to be taken seriously by scholarly and nonscholarly audiences alike, these two powerful examples along with the earlier summaries of developments in the field's

literature highlight the need to accord closer attention to the unit of analysis than previously has occurred, and how leadership is, and comes to be, configured in the particular ways that it is. Taken together, scaled down expectations of individual leaders along with an increased recognition of pluralities and collective units promise not only to inject into leadership a welcome note of realism but also an informed awareness of the complexities entailed when humans strive cooperatively to achieve coordinated plans, an outcome which, surely, offers a potential win-win for everyone concerned.

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Confucian

► Confucian Values and Vietnamese School Leadership

Confucian Values and Vietnamese School Leadership

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Synonyms

Confucian; Culture; School leadership; Values; Vietnam

Introduction

School leaders in contemporary Vietnam are affected by a number of forces, including globalization and integration, changing government policy, and Western-centric ideas about democratic leadership, in addition to traditional cultural influences. Of these forces, *traditional values* are believed to exert the strongest influence on school leadership. This chapter discussed how Vietnamese school leadership is influenced and shaped by traditional Confucian values. Although the imprint of Chinese civilization and Confucian thought has waned in recent years, the core values of Confucianism remain deeply rooted in Vietnamese society, influencing the country's philosophy, culture, society, economy, and politics (Ashwill and Diep 2005; Jamieson 1993). These traditional values in fact constitute the underpinnings of Vietnamese culture. Jamieson (1993) used two words to describe Vietnamese culture in modern times: “change” and “continuity.” Change refers to the process of accepting and developing new cultural values imported into Vietnamese society, whereas continuity is the process of preserving and maintaining Confucian-inflected traditional values. Confucian values continue to exert a powerful influence:

For more than two thousand years, Confucianism has existed in China and in our society [Vietnamese society] without changing, and thus from the past to

now, all through society, not only the ranks of Confucian scholars, but the common people as well became imbued with the Confucian spirit. We can say that throughout one's life, whether in Chinese society or in Vietnamese society, one breathed a Confucian atmosphere, fed on the milk of Confucianism, ate Confucianism, and even died with Confucian rites. From thought, language, and the actions of individuals to learning and the social system, nothing escaped the control of Confucian philosophy and ritual teaching. ("Dao Duy Anh," as cited in McHale 2002, p. 422)

In today's Vietnam, although a number of forces are imposing tensions on school leadership, among them such processes of modernization as a globalizing policy environment and the need to move from a highly centralized to a decentralized system of educational management (Walker and Dimmock 2002), Confucian values remain a potent force in leadership practice. The aim of this entry is to describe the basic Confucian values at work in contemporary Vietnamese society and the way in which those values influence school leadership practice. It considers the way in which educational leaders exercise power within schools and the leadership styles they adopt within the influential discourse of traditional Confucian values.

Confucianism in Vietnam

Confucianism can be defined as a worldview, an ethical system, a political ideology, and a scholarly tradition developed from the teachings of the ancient Chinese philosopher Confucius. Confucianism conceives of the individual not as a detached entity, but as part and parcel of a series of human relationships (Goldin 2011). Fulfilling one's roles within these relationships is considered essential to creating harmony and stability within a society. According to Confucianism, the enactment of interpersonal relationships always implies a hierarchy based on various status criteria. Modernization and globalization have rendered Vietnam more open to the outside world, thereby introducing new social values, norms, beliefs, and ways of life. Nevertheless, elements of the country's

Confucian heritage have persisted to the present day and can be seen in the hidden values of Nationalist and Communist doctrines, principles, and ethics and in public opinions. The values of hierarchy remain a particularly energetic force.

Hierarchical Values from the Vietnamese Perspective

The strength and durability of hierarchical values in Confucian cultures influence the guiding societal philosophy in ways that encourage stability and order, avoid instability and chaos, and ultimately protect the *status quo*. Hierarchical values are embedded in Confucian beliefs about social order in which such factors as patriarchy, gender and age roles, and social status are strongly emphasized. In this respect, the Vietnamese perception of the world arising from Confucian values and beliefs rationalizes and legitimizes the hierarchical order of society, making hierarchy itself part of the intrinsic structure, a state of affairs that is both natural and unalterable. The Vietnamese have inherited Confucian teachings on the proper structure of society and education, which places heavy emphasis on absolute obedience to one's parent, elder, teacher, and/or superior. The authority of the parent, elder, teacher, and superior is thus unquestioned, and the obedience owed him or her is absolute (Slote 1998). As in other Confucian societies, this hierarchical pattern has over time become deeply imprinted on familial, organizational, and societal structures. Knowing one's place and proper role in the family, school, workplace, and society is vitally important and takes precedence over any individual considerations and desires. The Vietnamese expect those younger and of a lower social status than themselves to respect them and those further up the hierarchy. Within the discourse of hierarchy, a senior or elder's criticism of a junior is taken for granted, whereas the other way around is not morally convincing, even if legally permissible. Older people rarely accept younger people's initiatives, opinions, or critiques but expect instead to be respected by virtue of their experience, knowledge, and wisdom (Ashwill and Diep 2005).

Hierarchical Values in Harmony and Relationships

At the heart of Confucian discourse lies the notion of “right” relationships. Every person is entwined in a web of relationships and defined by such roles as ruler, minister, father, husband, wife, son, and brother or sister. In the matrix of these relationships, an individual’s position defines his or her responsibilities and obligations and determines the “right” speech, behavior, and actions that he or she must produce to build a harmonious family, organization, or society. Everyone is required to adhere to the responsibilities inherent in the five basic relationships: that between ruler/superior and ruled/subordinate, father and son, husband and wife, elder and younger brother, and friend and friend (Young 1998). These relationships are built upon a hierarchal mechanism by which one person is in charge of another. With the exception of the fifth relationship (friend to friend), all involve the authority of one person over another. The power and the right to rule belong to those in superior positions.

Social order is maintained by strict principles of human relations, both within the family and within society. Relationships are based on the position and role of the parties concerned and bound by the discourse of respect and obedience. In sum, Confucian principles enforce absolute respect and obedience to parents by children, to husbands by wives, to superiors by subordinates, and to teachers by students.

Hierarchical Values in Terms of Change

Change involves risk and thus is not always readily accepted even when acknowledged as necessary for development (Ashwill and Diep 2005). Given the promotion of the *status quo* inherent in Confucian societies such as Vietnam, reform or change is particularly problematic. The “reform of [Confucian] society begins at the top, among the rulers, and then reaches down to the lower orders of society” (Noss 1974, p. 280). It thus comes from seniors, and if they do not initiate change, juniors will accept the *status quo* without question. Change in terms of learning and teaching attitudes is also an issue. Confucian teachings place heavy emphasis on absolute obedience to

teachers. Ferguson (2001) makes this analogy: “If Confucianism is a religion, then the teacher is the minister or priest” (p. 20). Vietnamese students consider their teacher to be a living knowledge resource and a person who knows all. They expect their teachers to know everything there is to know about a given subject and accept what they are taught without criticism or question. This learning attitude is so prevalent that many educators and policymakers state that although Vietnamese students are intelligent, they lack self-reliance and creativity.

Hierarchical Values in Terms of Self-Cultivation and Role Models

Confucianism values self-cultivation, which can be seen as lifelong learning. Great significance is placed on the ability of each individual to learn, to become educated, and eventually to become a moral and upstanding person. Self-cultivation involves not only educating oneself, but also picking up on the good traits of others and then imitating and modeling oneself on them. According to Confucius, if you want to be the king of the world, you must first become the king of yourself. You have to undergo self-cultivation to become a model of integrity, ethics, honor, and propriety. You cannot transform the world without first transforming yourself. Each person (each man in Confucius’s day) must continually improve himself by learning to become a “gentleman.” Confucius described the importance of being a gentleman, or noble man, as follows: “The character of the noble man is like [the] wind; the character of the petty man is like [the] grass. When the wind blows over the grass, [the grass] must bend” (*Analects* 12.19, as cited in Goldin 2011, p. 24).

Confucian Values Reflected in School Leadership

Reflection of the Hierarchy-Penetrated Mind in Exercising Power

The hierarchical values of Confucianism are emphasized in leadership practice in Vietnamese schools. They are embedded in types of leadership

and management behavior that are traditionally associated with “power over,” which emphasizes hierarchical traits, i.e., controlling, coercing, obedience, and domination. The concept of power is reflected in both teachers’ and school leaders’ perceptions and in school leadership practice, with all school members accepting the unequal distribution of power. School leaders generally work according to managerial instructions and directives from senior education officials and are unwilling to openly question the reasoning behind them even if they are found to work poorly in practice. Within the school, they expect obedience and compliance from teachers and staff and consider such obedience and compliance to be indispensable features of effectiveness in the process of exercising power. Demonstrating obedience and compliance is a fundamental obligation of subordinates, and seeking and reinforcing them a fundamental right and managerial duty of school leaders. Hence, there is a high degree of acceptance of unequal power distributions in Vietnamese schools, with teachers and leaders alike highly tolerant of hierarchical and authoritative leadership styles.

The acceptance of unequal power distributions within schools also stems from the belief that individuals play different roles and hold different positions in their families, organizations, and society at large. Accordingly, in the Vietnamese mind, power is intimately connected to one’s roles and position to others, and thus leaders and teachers alike believe that those in a superior position have the right to exercise absolute authority over and demand absolute obedience from those in an inferior position. Managerial order is established to facilitate the management process, and school leaders must be ready to use the power at their disposal to enforce policies and demonstrate and maintain their superiority.

Unequal power distributions exist in all Confucian societies in which hierarchical structures and values are prevalent in families, groups, organizations, and society at large. In other words, the Vietnamese perceive a hierarchy in every aspect of life. One of the main characteristics of the power distribution in Vietnamese schools is ingrained respect for seniority (in terms of

working position and age), which means that leaders are considered superior and deserving of respect by virtue of their high-ranking position rather than their expertise or managerial ability. Similarly, older teachers are granted respect because of their age, regardless of their position. Such hierarchical values promote unequal power distributions in many Vietnamese contexts, including the school, and encourage the practice of “power over” leadership.

Hierarchy-Oriented Relationships

Hierarchical relationships are common in Vietnamese schools, for example, leader-teacher relationships and older teacher-younger teacher relationships. Although these relationships are perceived as based on mutual respect, position and status are emphasized. The value of harmony is believed to be very important and is thus carefully cultivated, although the preservation of harmony in practice is hierarchy oriented. The concept of equality exists in relationships between colleagues of the same position and age, but not in relationships between leaders and teachers or between school members of different generations. The school culture is thus bound by traditional norms of hierarchy. Teachers, regardless of their age, generally believe that school leaders should be respected by all school members solely by virtue of their leadership position. Although leaders generally earn respect by demonstrating such leadership traits as morality, expertise, managerial competence, and charisma, respect is also believed to automatically adhere to the leadership position. Respect for authority is understood to be compulsory. It is subordinates’ duty toward their superiors.

Teachers in Vietnam are very reluctant to challenge school leaders. They often exhibit a humble attitude toward leaders and avoid giving direct feedback on their managerial decisions or performance. Such behavior is a reflection of the hierarchical values governing human relations in Vietnamese society. Relationships are built on obligatory roles and individuals’ positions relative to others and are bound by the discourse of respect and obedience. Hence, the behavior of teachers and school leaders generally differs from that

found in Western societies, which place less value on hierarchical values and tend to feature low degrees of power distance. In Australia, for example, Dimmock and Walker (2002) found that respect for the school leader is not automatic. It has to be earned rather than attained simply by virtue of enjoying leadership status or holding a position of authority. Australian school leaders' perception of harmony is quite different from that of their Vietnamese counterparts. Australian school leaders believe that "sometimes [there is a] need to challenge harmony to change things" (Dimmock and Walker 2005, p. 139), whereas "challenging harmony" in Vietnam is believed to lead to conflict and disorder.

Hierarchical values also exist in relationships between leaders and older teachers, although they differ from those with younger teachers. Leaders are granted respect by virtue of their higher organizational position and authority, whereas older teachers are granted respect by virtue of their age, regardless of their position. Such values shape relationship-building strategies and influence the choice of conflict management approaches. Leaders are willing to criticize younger teachers directly and to use their positional power to force them to follow instructions. However, they may feel uncomfortable about criticizing older teachers. Doing so in public would be considered an insult, leading to a loss of face and possibly a broken relationship. Accordingly, leaders often exercise power over older teachers via a persuasive rather than coercive approach.

Large bureaucratic educational systems with a high degree of centralized control also reinforce the traditional value of respecting authority. The Vietnamese educational system has traditionally been centralized. Schools are told what to do, and the principal's job generally involves implementing decisions made by the Ministry of Education or its offices. The pyramidal structure inherent to traditional bureaucracy affords school leaders little opportunity to review government policies or refuse to comply with senior administrators' decisions. Such leadership practices are "power concentrated," that is, characterized by top-down leadership, respect for seniority, top management goal setting, and the acceptance of

a large power and status differential between school leaders and teachers.

Leaders as Role Models in Exercising Leadership

"Leader as role model" is a significant concept in the Vietnamese school context. Setting a good example or serving as a good role model is an important part of exercising leadership. Leaders are expected to set a good example in their leadership practices and to set the moral standards and working rules that their subordinates follow. The idea is that subordinates will be inspired and motivated by a leader who models appropriate behavior, performs his or her duties in a responsible manner, and avoids improper actions. To encourage subordinates to exhibit strong performance, leaders must prove their leadership qualities by demonstrating strong performance themselves. In this way, they can inspire subordinates to emulate and place their trust in them.

Conclusion

In summary, traditional hierarchical values influence the behavioral patterns that shape leadership practices in Vietnamese schools, with school members entwined in a web of hierarchical relationships and defined by their roles as leader, older teacher, younger teacher, or student. These distinctive roles define the responsibilities and obligations that are expected, as well as the "right speech" and "right behavior" needed to build and maintain harmonious relationships with others.

Despite having been exposed to Western values of leadership, concerns about the need to promote democracy and empowerment, and decentralization in school administration, Vietnamese school leaders' views and practices of leadership and management remain driven by the country's Confucianism-inflected national culture and hierarchical leadership discourse. Traditional management values such as respect for seniority and authority are maintained and reinforced by a combination of politics and a cultural emphasis on hierarchy.

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Connected Learning

► Networked Learning

Conscientization

- [Existential Individual Alone Within Freire's Sociopolitical Solidarity](#)
- [Freire's Philosophy and Pedagogy: Humanization and Education](#)

Conscientization, Conscience, and Education

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Introduction

Freire's conscientization has offered not only the language of critique but also the language of possibility. This entry investigates what it would mean to incorporate the cultivation of conscience into conscientization. It focuses on exploring the concept of conscientization and its development, the concept of conscience and its cultivation, and the incorporation of the cultivation of conscience into conscientization. It concludes with a number of concerns of how to apply conscientization with its new light in today's educational settings.

Conscientization and Its Development

The original word for conscientization is *conscientizacao* in Portuguese; its essential elements are well elucidated in Freire's two essays in *Harvard Educational Review* in 1970: "Cultural Action and Conscientization" and "The Literacy Process as Cultural Action for Freedom" or the book, *Education for Critical Consciousness* first published in 1973. At the beginning, conscientization referred to the critically transitive consciousness that might overcome the semi-intransitive and naïve transitive state of consciousness, a process in which people become knowing subjects rather than mechanical recipients to achieve a deepening awareness of social, political, and economic contradictions, and of their capacity to transform the oppressive elements (Freire 1973).

The concept of conscientization has been enriched through its commentators, from both positive and negative sides, such as Harris, Giroux, McLaren, Berger, Bowers, and others (see Liu 2014). Roberts' and Torres' studies of conscientization merit particular attention.

According to Roberts (1996), dialogue, a key element in conscientization, is the movement of consciousnesses, socially and culturally constituted and reconstituted through meaningful communication rather than merely a mechanical collection of individual consciousnesses. Hence, knowing the self is often provoked and deepened by knowing others, and the conscientized self is always embedded in a dialogical relation. If this character of dialogue is ignored, conscientization is no longer itself. After a comparative study of both Hegel's and Freire's dialectics of consciousness, Torres (1994, p. 443) noted: while Hegel analyzed "the originating intersubjective genesis of oppression," Freire examined "the social development of the mechanism of oppression as the forms of subordination of consciousness," in a word: "thingification." Hence, through restoring the loss of humanity for both the oppressed and the oppressor, conscientization is a humanizing pedagogy.

Therefore, deeply rooted in transformative praxis of humanization, conscientization is a cultural practice of freedom through purposeful dialogue. It encourages teachers to become cultural workers to engage in a kind of historical, cultural, and political psychoanalysis to decode the limit situations in social reality and the internalization and sedimentation of domination in the mind. However, conscientization was redefined posthumously by Freire (2004, p. 66) as "the building of critical awareness and conscience." Admittedly, there is extensive coverage regarding the importance of developing critical consciousness within Freire's work and that of Freirean scholars, but there is a lack of investigation into the cultivation of conscience and why the latter is crucial to conscientization as a distinctive process of human development. The question of the cultivation of conscience thus arises.

The Cultivation of Conscience

The notion synonymous to conscience can be found in ancient Greek philosophers such as Stoics, yet the word itself is believed to be first coined by Cicero (Liu 2014). Conscience saw its

full religious development in the medieval age, its full philosophical development in the eighteenth century, and its decline in the nineteenth century because of the domination of empiricism and positivism. However, the exploration of its meaning never stops even in this current age. May's (1983) phenomenological study is more compelling. According to him, the basic components of conscience are a righteous person's active and reflexive consciousness of honoring and preserving humanity in her own person and dignity, and she cannot tolerate seeing herself unworthy of life through her inner scrutiny of self-examination if she does something against humanity. This Kantian interpretation of conscience, according to May, maintains not only inner harmony for the self individually but also social justice for community collectively. This kind of understanding of conscience, essentially compatible with Freire's ethical ideal of humanization, will justify the *raison d'être* of cultivating conscience and make the cultivation of conscience an integral part of conscientization.

The study of how to cultivate conscience starts with two pivotal issues. One is what motivates conscience to work; the other is how to make conscience function habitually. For a better investigation, the notion of "four spheres of living" (see Liu 2014) in Chinese philosophy is drawn on. It can be concisely put as follows. According to Chinese philosophy, humans are different from animals in that when they do something, they are usually conscious of and understand what they are doing. This understanding and self-consciousness give significance to human actions. Thus, the various significances that attach to one's various acts, in their totality, constitute the sphere of living. There can be four spheres of living: the innocent, the utilitarian, the moral, and the transcendent. While the innocent and utilitarian spheres are a natural gift, the moral and the transcendent spheres a spiritual creation.

To live in the moral sphere means to become moral. In this sphere, a person with strong social awareness understands that an individual is merely a member in a whole society, and hence to act for the benefit of the community is taken as the meaning of life. However, as utilitarianism

maintains, in human beings' public relationships, the preference would often be given to selfish over social interests; and in their private morality, a lesser good would be frequently preferred to a greater good because the former is present and easy to obtain while the latter is distant and hard to reach. In other words, the gravity of human desire or selfish indulgence will easily pull human beings down from the moral sphere to the utilitarian sphere.

Moreover, the moral sphere is likely to stick to high principles mechanically or become caged in them. By contrast, the transcendent sphere is the highest level of freedom without negating life fundamentally as an un-self person. It is a kind of spiritual intentionality of overcoming the utilitarian sphere of living. Rather, the utilitarian concern, selfish desire, daily life's mediocrity, and the nausea of moral hypocrisy are expected to be transcended but not to be destroyed. Thereby, transcendence enables a person to achieve a state of enlightenment, in which she may find herself a harmonious union with the self being, the community, and even the universe. In this sphere, to live conscientiously is an integral part of living freely as a citizen of the universe. Only in this sphere can conscience serve as a unifying moral agent to help an individual develop a moral character; and in turn an individual can follow her conscience consistently and assume moral responsibility in any life situations, good or bad. In this sense, transcendence is not only the means but also the highest goal of cultivating conscience. In the end, what it all boils down to is to look for a spirit-inspiring tool of approaching transcendence.

The Kantian rational approach is the most influential: as a universal human faculty in the intelligible human character, reason by itself has a transcendental nature. It is not limited by causal necessity but gives human beings freedom to think and will innately and freely. Equally, the use of practical reason by following the moral law in one's conscience can also make people in the empirical world achieve transcendence. Nevertheless, social psychologists will provide a solid empirical foundation for the Kantian rational approach. According to their experiments with

neurological patients affected by brain damage, the power of reason cannot be appropriated without the motivation of emotion. Therefore, the separation between the body and the mind, particularly the Cartesian way, is an egregious error; and the study of the human mind should take an organismic approach (see further, Liu 2014). Likewise, achieving transcendence also demands a holistic way of combining reason and emotion as an organismic whole. In fact, the noble and sublime human spirit is often inspired by the effulgence out of both high understanding and benevolent feeling. Love and dialogue are thus identified as a powerful transcendent instrument, which is able to draw energetic power out of both reason and emotion. They form the bulk of cultivating conscience.

As Murdoch's (2001) pointed out, because love keeps returning surreptitiously to self-indulgence, the object of love should be fixed on the good, the sovereignty of the spiritual world. Her following remark is compelling:

When true good is loved, even impurely or by accident, the quality of the love is automatically refined, and when the soul is turned towards Good the highest part of soul is enlivened. Love is the tension between the imperfect soul and the magnetic perfection which is conceived of as lying beyond it. And when we try perfectly to love what is imperfect our love goes to its object via the Good to be thus purified and made unselfish and just. (Murdoch 2001, p. 100)

True vision generates right conducts. Love of the good is fundamental to approaching true transcendence.

However, as Fromm (1957) argued, if people are indifferent to life, there is no hope to love the good; thus, love of the good should be embodied in *biophilia*, love of life. Since human beings are seriously alienated in the market society and commercialized culture, love, "the ultimate and real need in every human being," should never be alienated or objectified through pursuing pleasure-giving commodities as a plaything including human beings themselves (p.95). Accordingly, love must be understood as ability, and the development of the power of love is conducive to creating happiness and thereby breaking through the boredom, mediocrity, and absurdity of human existence.

Moreover, communication lies at the center of human existence. It not only forms the basis of love but also helps people break away from the objectification of love. As Buber (1959) noted, the significance of dialogue is not in dialogue itself but in what sort of dialogical relationship is carried out, either I-Thou or I-It. The I-Thou relationship is a mutual subject-subject relationship, in which the I is willing and ready to listen to the Thou based on love and respect; by contrast, the I-It relationship is a possessive subject-object relationship, in which the I knows or uses other persons as things. Providing a human being, irreplaceable, is a creature living in the “between,” dialogue is human existential and ontological reality. Only through dialogue in the I-Thou relation can the self fulfill itself, authenticates itself, and become a whole being.

As Levinas (1969) commented, the Western history of philosophy is a totality of the I without the Thou; it is Buber who filled this blank, but he failed to answer who is this Thou and where is this Thou. After a phenomenological study of the infinity of the other, Levinas (1969) pointed out: “the interlocutor is not a Thou, he [or she] is a You” (p.101). That is, any other in the world I encounter is the Thou. According to him, transcendence is made as pluralism, which “is accomplished in goodness proceeding from me to the other,” herein grows the root of peace (pp. 305–306).

Ontologically, love and dialogue are always bound up together as an enduring marriage in human relations and realities, which closely interrelates with goodness or transcendence. The cultivation of conscience ultimately is a practice-oriented pedagogy of love and dialogue.

The Incorporation of the Cultivation of Conscience into Conscientization

The cultivation of conscience is forever needed to help people build moral character to resist the pressure of a bad situation. However, this resistance might bend in front of armed injustice. If class oppression prevails in a social system, the

talk of morality such as conscience and compassion will turn out to be a spiritual oppression of the oppressed. This is undoubtedly to add insult to the injury of them. Hence, the cultivation of conscience alone cannot go any further if it is not integrated into the revolutionary and social track of conscientization.

To incorporate the cultivation of conscience into conscientization is fundamentally possible. First of all, the cultivation of conscience and the cultivation of critical consciousness are ontologically compatible. As an etymological study shows, conscience and consciousness are close relatives, the word consciousness was originally evolved from the word conscience, and finally the word conscience became increasingly associated with its moral sense of good or bad (Liu 2014). Although the development of consciousness is not equal to the development of conscience, yet one must have consciousness even to define the state of possessing conscience, without which one cannot know or become conscious of conscience. Therefore, consciousness is a permanent home for conscience to reside. Furthermore, in a Hegelian interpretation, conscience marks the highest state of the development of consciousness and acts as a unifying moral agent of consciousness (Liu 2014). Hence, the cultivation of conscience and the cultivation of critical consciousness do complement with each other. More importantly, because cultivating critical consciousness is deeply rooted in social justice and humanization, any social critique and cultural criticism of the problematic system in the Freirean tradition of conscientization are also powerful manifestations of moral courage and ongoing aliveness of conscience. Accordingly, the development of critical consciousness by itself is the development of conscience.

The significance of incorporating the cultivation of conscience into conscientization is remarkable. Retrospectively, the root causes of unnecessary human suffering have been broadly interpreted in two ways: the metaphysical study of human beings that equates human suffering with human nature and the historical study of human

society and the sociological study of human beings that locate a dominant social system and its hegemonic ideology at a particular time as the source of human ills. In terms of the former, human beings possess “selfish genes” from which emerge different moral dilemmas; for the latter, human beings are by nature “good,” and it is the state of societal conditions that determines whether or not this disposition remains or is reconfigured.

It seems that one explanation of the origins of human suffering exaggerates human self-interest and ignores the influence of social factors, while the other acts in the reverse. The enigma, nevertheless, is that human need and biological desire are simultaneously bound up together in and by social, political, and economic systems and ideology as much as they are by each other. This reality demands a holistic approach that is able to address social system problems and human nature problems at the same time. Freire’s redefinition of conscientization, an integration of political pedagogy with moral education, offers a possible breakthrough by mediating this dynamic in a particular way. While the cultivation of critical consciousness is employed to tackle oppression and hegemonic ideology as an integral part of social change, the cultivation of conscience through transcendence can be used to attend egoism, ambition, lust, greed, and other forms of insatiable human desire, which cannot be erased through social change (see further, Liu 2014).

Conclusion: Application Concerns

In terms of applying conscientization, it is vital to realize that the social condition for Freire’s adult education in Brazil is very different from that of this contemporary era. Particularly in the developed countries, owing to the growth of the middle class and the improvement of the living condition for the working class, the social structure has changed, and the explanation of history is no longer dominated by the Marxist class struggle. This does not mean that social classes and

oppression have disappeared but that they take more subtle forms. Accordingly, antialienation or anti-oppression becomes a war of position for genuine democracy through communicative actions and cultural work, of which education is forever the backbone.

As an empowering educational initiative, conscientization for political pedagogy should forever be attuned to sociocultural realities and never be reduced to a fixed method or model for developing individual consciousness or cognition. At this globalization age, the generation of dialogical themes should focus on the concrete dehumanizing operations of power out of and in classroom, dominated by neoliberalism and consumer culture. In this context, radical political education in a classroom setting should never be carried out in a class-struggle manner as what happened during the Chinese Culture Revolution. That kind of political education is another kind of alienation caused by an exaggeration of class struggle, which finally becomes an act of hatred rather than love.

Therefore, considering the complexity and specificity of educating critical consciousness and especially conscience, it is essential to understand that students’ critical consciousness and conscience can only be authenticated by the authenticity of teachers’ critical consciousness and conscience. That is, conscientization encourages every teacher to become alert to any form of discrimination and exclusion and to act responsibly in her own initiative to create more learning opportunities for those most disadvantaged students. Or rather, reading the word and the world in an empowering, sometimes painful, process of conscientization must result in a loving, caring, and dialogical human relationship. This kind of empathetic and equal relationship per se is educative, transformative, and transcendental. It not only inspires those disadvantaged students to break away from poverty and explore a new world ahead of them but also shows them how to love the other in a caring and supportive way. This tradition of conscientization is an invaluable legacy that Freire has left for the world to make both students’ and teachers’ life more meaningful.

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Constructing Spaces for Diverse Black Masculinities in All-Male Public Urban Schools

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Synonyms

[Black males](#); [Masculinities](#); [Sexualities](#); [Single gender schools](#)

Introduction

In American public schools, academic mislabeling and stereotyping of young Black boys has led to them being routinely perceived as threats (Kunjufu 2005a; Ladson-Billings 2011; Noguera 2008; Steele and Aronson 1995). The results include parents and concerned advocates in favor of the education of Black male students calling for the development of alternative educational options such as home schooling, charter schools, or all-male public schools. As regards single-gender public schools, Williams (2010) noted:

[T]he modern movement for single-sex education has its origins in the late 1980s when sex-education first garnered national attention to the widespread reported epidemic of violence... [and] academic underachievement reported to be afflicting a generation of boys and young men. (p. 556)

Giving attention to the educational needs of boys, particularly Black males, has led to initiatives for all-male schools that have found unique ways to address the specific needs of male students. Furthermore, given the state of education for boys at present, single-gender schools are

Article Note The title of this paper is adopted in part from McCready, L. (2010). *Making space for diverse masculinities*. New York: Peter Lang

being “promoted to educators, policymakers, and parents on the grounds that boys and girls learn differently due to underlying biological factors, including hormones” (Williams 2010, p. 557). However, there have been debates regarding single-gender schools set up exclusively for Black male students. District courts throughout the United States have debated the constitutionality of majority-Black male schools; the earliest pivotal case was *Garrett v. Board of Education* (1991). In this case, the plaintiffs alleged that the Detroit Board of Education’s pending decision to open all-male academies in Detroit violated US Constitutional Amendment XIV, Michigan Constitutional Articles 1 & 2, the Equal Educational Opportunities Act, Title IX of the Education Act Amendments of 1972, Michigan’s Elliott-Larsen Act, and Michigan’s School Code through its approval of several male-only academies. On August 26, 1992, a settlement was reached that resulted in the allotment of 136 seats out of 560 to girls. However, “Out of 453 students [who would eventually enroll], 39 were girls, including 1 white student” (Pratt 1997, p. 5).

Advocates of majority-Black male schools state that these schools are in a unique position to help Black male youth, whatever their socioeconomic status, academic level, or cultural background. These schools can push past stereotypes and obstacles that are exceedingly common in traditional public schools, instead helping Black males achieve academic and personal success. Critics point out that within these schools “there is no solid empirical support for this view, and there are little data on the effects and efficacy of single-sex public schools, particularly for students of color” (Goodkind 2013, p. 3). With this information in mind, Fergus and Noguera (2010) used theory of change to introduce two theoretical frameworks to guide the design and implementation of single-sex schools. They note that (1) single-gender schools understand the social and emotional needs of boys and (2) single-gender schools can address the academic needs of boys.

To fully understand the social and emotional needs of Black boys, Fergus and Noguera (2010) outline three objectives: (a) the need to change boys’ ideas of what constitutes a man and a Black

male, (b) the need for an academic identity as part of social identities, (c) and the need for future leadership opportunities that can transform Black boys into leaders. As regard addressing the academic needs of boys, Fergus and Noguera share four objectives: (1) address gaps in academic skills, (2) prepare the boys for college, (3) develop high academic expectations, and (4) make the curriculum and instruction relevant to the lives of the boys.

Single-gender schools have been in existence since the inception of the common school in the United States (Boston Latin 2009). The Boston Latin School, located in Massachusetts, opened in 1635 was the first single-gender school for boys and remained all-male until 1972, when it became coeducational. At present, the number of single-gender schools (in addition to those reserved for Black males) has grown throughout the United States. The National Association for Single-Sex Public Education (NASSPE) reported that, during the 2012 school year, 116 public schools in the United States were single-sex and an additional 390 offered single-sex educational opportunities; in 2002, only 12 provided such opportunities (NASSPE 2012). The proliferation of such schools was made possible by the 2001 reauthorization of the 1965 Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA). The reauthorization of ESEA – also known as the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB) – allowed for the establishment of both single-gender schools and single-gender classes within coeducational schools.

Regulations passed in 2006 clarified the legal status of single-gender education but also encouraged school districts to establish single-gender schools rather than simply offer girls-only or boys-only classrooms within coeducational schools. (Three types of single-gender public schools exist: (1) public schools that have separate boys’ and girls’ schools located within the same facility; (2) public schools that are entirely female or males; and (3) schools for select grade levels that are entirely single-sex (Nappen 2005, p. 3).) One clarification in these regulations is that the Equal Educational Opportunities Act prohibits the involuntary assignment of students to separate-gender schools. Its inclusion in NCLB revealed that single-sex public schools are believed to

improve the educational experiences and performances of low-income students of color. Many public schools offering single-gender education have high proportions of such youth.

In addition to single-gender public schools, there are single-gender charter schools. The charter school movement is an outgrowth of the economic fears in the United States, exemplified in *A Nation at Risk* which explained the mediocrity in American schools, exacerbated by poor test scores of students in math and science. “Since the inception of the charter school movement in the 1990s three major goals have been set out for them: equity for students, innovation in education programs and competition. These goals are not exclusive; nor should they be presented in isolation” (Lubienski and Weitzel 2010, p. 15).

Like traditional all-male public schools, single-gender charter schools have both critics and proponents. Critics state that students are grouped by academic abilities because these schools are expected to be elite institutions. Specifically, they tend to enroll academically talented students to the detriment of academically disadvantaged students left behind in districts (a practice known as cream-skimming students). (Research has shown that charter schools are serving academically disadvantaged students in proportions comparable to district schools (Garcia 2008).) They contend that single-gender school environments constitute a reversal of the educational gains made since the Civil Rights Movement (Nappan 2005). They also contend that these schools represent a return to segregated schools (Rich 2012) and fail to educate Black males. Some have strict admission requirements that may discourage certain types of students from applying (see Islas 2012).

In making the case for single-gender charter schools, Meyer (2008) argued that single-gender charter schools improve students’ academic performance through three mechanisms: minimizing distractions and harassment from the other sex, addressing gender differences in learning, and remedying past inequities by providing low-income youth of color with opportunities previously afforded only to more privileged youths. However, as Fergus and colleagues (2010) note, this advocacy seems to be based more on

assumptions regarding the needs of low-income youth of color than on empirical research.

One of the primary arguments in favor of single-sex education, particularly for low-income youths of color, is that it minimizes or eliminates distractions originating with the other sex and reduces boys’ sexual harassment of girls, “claims for which there is some supportive evidence” (Goodkind 2013, p. 397). Another argument for single-sex public schools for low-income youth of color is that “they are more prone to sexual distraction than their white and more affluent counterparts, who, it is implied, do not need to be separated in order to concentrate on their work” (p. 398). This argument, Goodkind (2013) further contends, invokes stereotypes about Black hypersexuality. Drury et al. (2012) point out “pressure to conform to gendered ideals is heightened in the single-sex school” (p. 21).

Collectively, single-gender schools allow young men, regardless of their cultural backgrounds, to be nurtured in spaces where their unique challenges, as “stereotyped threats” (Steele and Aronson 1995), are understood. Yet, some of these schools foster exclusivity practices that silence the experiences of male students with diverse sexual orientations, or they do very little to “constructing spaces for diverse Black masculinities” that recognizes differences in sexual orientation.

Contextualizing Single-Gender Experience

R.W. Connell’s theory of hegemonic masculinity refers to the dominant form of masculinity within the gender hierarchy that subordinates other masculinities (Connell 2005). Hegemonic White masculinity is situated at the top of this hierarchy and refers to the power and subordination of both women and non-white masculine men. According to Laing (2014), single-gender schools are not a one-stop solution to the persistent educational problems that routinely cast Black males as being deviant, criminal, “uneducated,” and bound for prison. (In 2013, Ivory Toldson corrected data used in 2013 in “More Black Men in College than Prison? Wrong”. For more

information visit http://www.theroot.com/articles/culture/2013/02/more_black_men_in_jail_than_college_myth_rose_from_questionable_report/).

In fact, some of these all-male spaces perpetuate the same gender-stereotypes that routinely call into questions regarding sexual orientation that are found in coeducational spaces. For example, Bracey (2007) notes that school labels, such as being identified as gay, are significantly more common for an all-boys' school and often creates a variety of disruptions to learning because the students must resort to defending their identity. Some even fear that single-gender schools would actually increase the number of boys considering same-gender-loving relationships due to their attendance in these schools.

Data collection was conducted by two researchers (The research procedure for the high school included eight one-on-one (1 h) interviews with Eddy, Lex, Max, Franky, Kevin, Henry, Samuel, and Kyle; a (30-min) focus group (comprised half of the sample); field observations; and one researcher-volunteer tutoring activity (1 h) across six classes, as part of the data collection process. The research procedure for the middle school included three one-on-one interviews with three students and two one-on-one interviews with three teachers, as well as field observations during two academic school years.), at two different single-gender schools (one public middle school and the other a charter high school) and indicated that students must continually defend their choice to attend an all-boys' school to peers who do not attend these schools and to family members (Brown 2012; Laing 2014). Each of the interviewees discussed how they consistently answered questions to determine whether the school catered to gay students. In addition, through observations, the boys readily insulted one another with "gay" and "fag" epithets (The use of such an epithet denotes the questioning of masculinity often by males who have a gender performance that is considered feminine. Such findings are reflected in McCready, L. (2010). *Making space for diverse masculinities*. New York: Peter Lang.) to which the students who were insulted had a strong reaction. More specifically, some boys acted out in school in the hope

that they would eventually be removed from the school. This behavior was indicative of the insults that some of the students receive from peers and others who did not fully embrace the mission of single-gender schools. Peers outside of the schools questioned the boy's sexuality, which led to the development of a hyper-masculine persona on the part of some, and a generalized resistance to the educational environment scrutinized the boys, by others. One middle school teacher in particular noted that, "it's okay for girls to go to an all-girls' school; that's appropriate. But boys [if] they do, are going to turn gay. It's a school for gay boys. We fight that every day." When asked whether this idea contributes to some of the boys' behavioral issues, the teacher posits the following:

You know, having to defend your sexuality at age eleven, or your gender identity, because someone in your family doesn't know any better. Yeah, that would upset me.

That would certainly make me not do anything I could to get good attention. They put them on guard to have to defend who they are may be for the first time in their lives and that's something [significant] for an eleven year old.

A student who noted that he "tells people that it is not a gay school" further reinforced the teacher's point.

In the other school, one interviewee readily admits that he is homophobic, but also can respect "other people's sexual orientations" provided that they do not "bring that touchy, touchy towards me." Some students mentioned that some of their teachers foster mostly traditional definitions and discussions of masculinity in the classroom and through one-on-one-conversations. Although the boys mentioned that they had teachers who understood the importance of diversity, some did not publicly affirm all non-heteronormative forms of masculinity, such as same-gender-loving individuals. This identity marker is not regularly discussed publicly at school-wide events. Avoidance on the part of some personnel of discussions of same-gender-loving individuals defined queer identities as a taboo subject at the school (Laing 2014).

The aforementioned point is significant to the function of single-gender learning spaces for Black males, in particular. Teachers must receive

adequate preparation to address conversations (and avoidance) concerning different sexual orientations, homophobia, and bullying tactics steeped in heteronormative discourse at the school that in turn silences students' voices or promotes the presence of hypermasculinity. If students cannot rely on teachers and administrators to provide an environment that addresses homophobia and sexual inclusiveness, these single-gender schools have not fully accomplished their goals of providing unique learning spaces for Black males to help them overcome societal labels that impede academic excellence.

Curricular Changes in Single-Gender Spaces

In general, a great deal of single-gender schooling relies heavily on brain-based learning strategies that outline various methods to offer optimal pedagogical approaches to teaching. For instance, brain-based strategists note that boys prefer to learn in an environment that is more aggressive and that includes such activities as throwing a ball to a boy as opposed to the having them raise their hand to answer questions or spending time with normal males playing sports (Sax 2005). Conversely, brain-based strategists Gurian and Stevens (2011) and Sax (2005) note that physical discipline would be more appropriate for boys. They have detailed a variety of differences in brain components, such as the hippocampus, hypothalamus, and cerebral cortex, and how boys differ from girls. The failure of their approach is the notion that all boys are the same and want an environment that is generalized to heteronormative standards that define what it means to be a man (Brown 2012).

While Gurian, Stevens, and Sax received validation for their work on brain-based brain functions, including the cognitive development of boys, from educators, policymakers, and parents, their work has also been scrutinized as being heavily exaggerated. Eliot (2009) notes that many of the aforementioned notions, regarding brain science expressed by Gurian, Stevens, and Sax, have not been supported by neurological research and some are

blatantly false. Eliot (2009) specifically states that much of their research is "extrapolated" from single research studies or research conducted on rodents (p. 8). The American Civil Liberties Union (2009) has likewise concluded their research promotes gender stereotypes in schools. Eliot (2012) further notes that how a child develops and how adults enforce gender roles may determine how they function, which thereby suggests cultural inferences.

Fergus and Noguera (2010) note a disconnection between what it means to be a man and what it means to be a learner. The focus of this notion of differences specifically centers on the feminization of schooling. This is a divisive political issue debated by scholars regarding whether feminization has led to a softer curriculum less suitable for boys than for girls. If single-gender schools are to enhance the learning experience of boys who attend such schools, they must be prepared to dismantle what it means to be a man and address sexuality as something that does not define masculinity. Additionally, curricula needs to be designed to present diverse perspectives, written by men and women of all cultural backgrounds to ensure that no student feels that his identity is silenced by teachers and administrators who do not have the skills, knowledge, or patience to address differences.

Concluding Thoughts

"Constructing spaces for diverse Black masculinities" is a call for single gender all-male schools to revamp some institutional practices that routinely silences the experiences of same-gender-loving males. This paper shared some consequences related to how Black male students thought about and define their respective masculinities. Their understandings of the pressures to openly define to their peers, who did not attend all-male schools, whether heterosexual or same-gender-loving, were a direct result of repeated questioning about their sexual orientation because they attended all-male schools. Same-gender-loving males were for the most part completely overlooked as male by some of their peers inside and outside of the schools. In addition, avoidance of discussions regarding the life experiences of same-gender-loving males by some

teachers and male students themselves posed challenges to the types of male circles formed. Theories regarding brain-based research do little to explain how oftentimes these all-male spaces may perpetuate the same stereotypical norms related to gender norms as in coeducational schools. Single-gender all-male schools occupy unique positions for reintroducing more diverse masculinities that recognize diversity. However, this will mean the introduction and recruitment of various types of males at such schools. “Constructing spaces” is the redefinition of “What it means to be male” – more inclusive of differences. Understanding gender identities is a major issue in the lives of young men, in relationship to their peers, family members, and older adult male teachers alike. These social factors combine to explain how some young Black men view themselves and their peer relationships with other males.

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Constructivism

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Constructivism refers to the notion according to which knowledge results from a process based on mental operations, or judgments, or the capacity of judgment. Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) proposed that the theoretic or pure capacity of judgment be based on a priori synthetic judgements of space and time. Since then there is a controversy about the reality of those judgements and about its explicative power. In this controversy two antagonistic positions are found: the one that supports the innatism of those judgements and the one that denies it. Between these two positions there is a third one, due to Jean Piaget, that considers that space and time are not a priori, and that the innate aspects are the instinctive acts, from which reasoning is constituted.

The constructivism proposed by Jean Piaget (1896–1980) considers that “the formal obligation of transcending endlessly the systems already constructed in order to assure non-contradiction is convergent with the genetic tendency of surpassing, endlessly, the constructions already finished in order to fulfill lacunas” (*Études d’epistemologie génétique*, vol. 14, p. 324). Genetic, here, has the proper sense of geneses of cognitive forms, but not of heredity. Thus, the schemes and cognitive structures proper of the subject of knowledge [community of scientists and/or community of laymen] are permanently questioned in the process of knowing. This process, essentially constructive, is similar to the Kantian position, but diverges from it in a central aspect: the cognitive construction does not refer exclusively to logical-mathematical beings; it also refers to the process of assimilation of the obstacles, or objects, faced by the subjects of knowledge.

The constructivism proposed by Piaget is, then, a genetic constructivism, that is, for him the cognitive function is the same in any human being and is characterized by the cognitive activities of assimilation and accommodation which make the cognitive

adaptation of the objects [cognitive obstacles]. This adaptation is made through schemes and/or structures constructed by the subject of knowledge when confronted by social and historical needs. In this sense, there is no functional difference between common sense and scientific sense, but only a structural differentiation, since the latter requires the rigor historically developed in a given science. This rigor, by its turn, expresses itself in the methodology of scientific investigation, which is characterized as an applied logic and epistemology (Piaget et al. 1967, p. 3 and Piaget and Beth 1961 followings).

The genetic constructivist point of view has many defenders, among them, Raymond Boudon. This author criticizes several trends found in the sciences of man (French nomenclature), especially in sociology, and proposes a genetic constructivist theory of the knowledge. For Boudon there is no essential difference – functional or of mechanisms – between common sense and scientific sense, but only a diversity regarding the rigor of the argumentation. For him, “the mechanisms responsible for the formation of collective normative beliefs are not different, in principle, from the mechanisms that generate collective ‘positive’ beliefs” [those of science] (Boudon 1998, p. 31). As in the theory proposed by Piaget, the “‘positive’ beliefs,” those that reach some level of validation, differ from the others by their argumentative consistency. Beliefs are justified by arguments either more socio-centered, in the case of the common sense, or less socio-centered, in the case of the sciences. It is important to point out that the fallacies and other argumentative mistakes occur in both conditions (cf. Boudon 1990, 1998).

To constructivism, in the perspective presented, the fact that knowledge is constructed does not imply neither solipsism nor radical relativism, since the problem of its truth is open to the public, that is, to the community of knowers – be them laymen or scientists. Thus, the argumentative correction developed along the history of philosophy and the history of science, through the exposition and criticism of fallacies and sophisms, is relevant to the construction of the scientific knowledge, as well as to police and judicial investigation and, in a way, to the disputes of the

daily life. This fact allows us to say that there is a certain progress or improvements in common sense argumentation. In any case, the rigor required is specific to the social situation in which the argumentation is developed, as noted by Aristotle (*Ethica Nicomachea* 1098a).

The trend known as social constructivism – which has many followers among educational researchers – takes phenomenology as a basis to state that research should consider the meanings and intentions held by the social actors, and, in order to accomplish this goal, the researcher should approach the social groups putting “in parenthesis” his/her beliefs and values. This procedure is necessary because reality is multiple and the researcher, Lincoln and Guba say, “wants to begin his transactions with the respondents in a most neutral way” (apud Alves-Mazzotti and Gewandsznajder 1998, p. 133). For the social constructivists, the multiplicity of possible interpretations about an “object,” all socially justifiable, prevents objectivity, because “realities exist in the form of multiple mental constructions, socially and experientially based, local and specific, dependent, for their form and content, on the persons who hold them” (idem, ibidem). The social constructivism adopts, therefore, the radical relativism, or skepticism, or yet Pyrrhonism, of long tradition in philosophy.

Genetic constructivism is incompatible with social constructivism, since it considers objective knowledge of the world feasible. This knowledge, however, is not a specular representation of the real, but the best approximation in a given moment. For genetic constructivism, one of the main evidences of the quality of a theory is its effectiveness, that is, the fact that it is able to orient the actions of the knowers in order to establish some transformation, or change, in the real. Besides, we have to consider that theories, as formalizations, are possible of argumentative and logic analysis, which show or demonstrate the quality of its statements, which are forms of inference (anticipations). Thus, evaluations that demonstrate errors or mistakes in the arguments should eliminate false or nonvalid arguments. For example, if a petition of principle or sophism occurs in the theoretical argumentation, it should

be put under suspicion, since those errors imply improper or false relations. As mentioned, for social constructivism, arguments and statements about reality are not liable of evaluation neither by criteria proper of the theory of argumentation nor by the various logics, because they are the expression of a perception of the actors involved in the research. In fact, for social constructivism, reality can only be expressed through a personal interpretation, with which the others can agree or not, but this is irrelevant since there is no foundational criteria that allow us to say which interpretation is the correct. Thus, although explicitly opposing empiricism (in general called “positivism”), social constructivism assumes, implicitly, the empiricist thesis of the identity between statements and reality as the only criterion for the establishment of valid theories. As, in fact, the empiricist thesis is improper, then there is no possibility of valid knowledge, say the social constructivists, disregarding any other constructive alternative (cf., among others, Boudon 1990, 1998).

For genetic constructivism the relation between theory, or models, and reality is one of approximation. Its validity can be demonstrated in several ways, among which those of argumentative strength and efficacy (efficiency and effectiveness). Nevertheless, for that theory there is no reason for claims neither of absolute truth nor of impossibility of significant knowledge. It rejects, therefore, both Pyrrhonism and idealism (Kantian and Hegelian).

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Convergence of Inclusive Education and Disability Studies: A Critical Framework

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Disability studies is an academic field of study that emerged alongside the Disability Rights Movement. Disability studies is an interdisciplinary field which acknowledges that disability “sits at the intersection of many overlapping disciplines in the humanities, sciences, and social sciences” (“What is Disability Studies?”). Goals of disability studies scholars and programs include: challenging the view of disability as an individual deficit that can be fixed through medical intervention or rehabilitation; exploring models and theories that examine economic, political, cultural, and social factors that define disability; working to destigmatize disease, illness, and impairment; and interrogating the connections between medical practices of disability and stigma (“What is Disability Studies?”). Disability studies has numerous philosophical foundations that relate to the various political, social, and economic aspects of disability and society as a whole.

One such philosophical and interdisciplinary foundation is Disability Studies in Education (DSE) which emerged out of the recognition of a need for serious inquiry in the field of education using a disability studies framework. DSE questions constructions of disability and challenges assumptions and practices of special education (Taylor 2008).

Special education services only came about after legislation was passed requiring public education for students with disabilities. In 1975, a landmark piece of legislation changed access and equity to schooling for students with disabilities: The Education for All Handicapped Children Act (EHA), later renamed the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). The EHA established the right for all children to a free public education regardless of disability, and later, IDEA, requires schools to provide special educational services to students who qualify based on disability. The

IDEA established the philosophy of least restrictive environment (LRE), where children with disabilities are to be educated in environments with the least number of restrictions (Villa and Thousand 2005). The law states that:

To the maximum extent appropriate, children with disabilities, including children in public or private institutions or other care facilities, are educated with children who are not disabled, and special classes, separate schooling, or other removal of children with disabilities from the regular educational environment occurs only when the nature or severity of the disability of a child is such that education in regular classes with the use of supplementary aids and services cannot be achieved satisfactorily. (Individuals With Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1400, 300.1 (2004))

The philosophy of inclusion purported by the LRE is supposed to ensure equity in education, particularly for students with disabilities while benefitting all students. However, as Taylor (2008) points out, for there to be a least restrictive environment there also is a most restrictive one – special education settings happen on a continuum. Critiques of special education suggest that there is a continual “re-emergence of the kind of thinking which leads to ever newer forms of segregative and exclusionary practice” (Thomas and Loxley 2001, p. 5). Special education practices rely on the ability to separate and exclude students despite the philosophies of inclusion practiced at times. Special education and inclusive education are sometimes used interchangeably, but there are differences between the two.

Inclusive education strives for all students with disabilities to be full members of their school communities, with educational settings the same as their nondisabled peers. The philosophy of inclusion was developed as a response to special education that moves away from the charitable and technical views of the role of special education. Inclusive education at its core was to be radical, and it arose from emancipatory ideals that looked forward to a new education system (Armstrong et al. 2010). Inclusive education, from a DSE framework, includes three main guiding principles: (1) inclusive education is fundamentally about all learners; (2) inclusive education strives to make all learners’ experiences at school inclusive and participatory; (3) inclusive education aspires to a

socially just and democratic education and, as such, actively interrogates the cultural practices of schooling (Baglieri et al. 2011). The philosophy of inclusion is less focused on disability and more focused on equity of achievement for all learners.

Philosophical Foundations of Disability Studies

The field of disability studies examines disability as a social, cultural, and political phenomenon. This grounding philosophy leads to the rejection of deficit models of disability, including medical and rehabilitative models. Deficit models of disability assert that people with disabilities have deficits that must be corrected; this is the dominant philosophy of disability (Pfeiffer 2002). While disability studies scholars reject these models, they still pervade society today. In deficit models, disability is always situated within the individual, and this belief influences medicine, rehabilitation, and education. The deficit model in the medical field points to a health deficit; the deficit model in rehabilitation points to an employment deficit; and the deficit model in education points to a learning deficit. In each of these cases, the disability is a fault within the individual (Pfeiffer 2002). In deficit models, disability is understood as physical or mental impairment that has personal consequences for the individual (Wasserman et al. 2015). These deficit models fail to address the social and cultural barriers that people with disabilities face in our society.

Disability studies scholars instead highlight the social, economic, and political barriers that construct people as disabled to rebuff the deficit paradigm and reject the idea that people with disabilities are abnormal. Constructions of normal and abnormal are the basis for deficit models: “normal and abnormal are social judgments of what are and what are not acceptable biological variations and functioning. By classifying people with disabilities as abnormal, these value judgments are used to justify the disadvantages which confront people with disabilities” (Pfeiffer 2002). These value judgments lead to the understanding in deficit models that any limitation a person faces is due to their impairment (Wasserman et al. 2015). Disability studies scholars understand

this stigma through value judgments to be a reflection of the deficit medical models of disability and reject these understandings for a social model of disability that understands impairment and disability as socially constructed.

The foundation of disability studies, however, is not a simple rejection of deficit models of disability. Disability studies is grounded in varied interdisciplinary scholarship that recognizes the complexities of disability. Some critics within disability studies of both social and deficit models of disability say the models present a false dichotomy between biological impairment and social limitation which are present in the disability paradigm (Corker 1999; Hughes and Paterson 1997; Shakespeare and Watson 2001). Further complicating this understanding, biologic classifications of impairments are not objective because such classifications are part of the social process of disablement (Wasserman et al. 2015). While social models of disability may provide more insight into the social, cultural, and political implications of disability than deficit models, critics argue this model is still based in a dichotomy which posits impairment as natural defect and disability as a social characterization of impairment. However, disability studies allows scholars to practice a more political/structural analysis that uncovers exclusionary social practices that are not dependent on the dichotomy of impairment or disability. Often, “social organization according to able-bodied norms is just taken as natural, normal, inevitable, necessary, even progress. . . . The resulting exclusion of those who do not fit able-bodied norms may not be noticeable or even intelligible” (Delvin and Pothier 2006, p. 7). The work of disability studies is to expose the ways in which society defines and interacts with disability that results in oppression, stigmatization, and exclusion, particularly when the grounding philosophies of a society are those that characterize disability as deficit.

The philosophical foundation of disability studies rejects deficit models and instead offers a social model of disability that creates space for critical societal transformations in understanding disability through interdisciplinary work. This

interdisciplinary nature of disability studies can be used as a framework for critiquing specific approaches to disability (Linton 1998). The social model of disability confronts the stigma, discrimination, and assertions of difference and inferiority that are part of the social experience of disability (Pfeiffer 2002). The social model is more critical of social norms than the deficit model and suggests that a moral societal response to disability is to reshape exclusive practices to be inclusive and maximize social participation for people with disabilities (Silvers 2000). The disability paradigm has implications not just for people with disabilities but for society as a whole. People with disabilities must be involved in creating any research using the disability paradigm, and furthermore, a social change must occur, not for people with disabilities, but society must change (Pfeiffer 2002). Disability studies is one academic field that emerged to critique and explore changes in society related to disability.

Philosophical Foundations of Special Education and Barriers to Inclusion

The philosophies underlying special education are in tension with those of inclusive education, and this results in barriers to inclusion for students with disabilities. Two laws were passed in the 1970s which require public schools to provide educational services to children with disabilities – Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and what is now called the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act is civil rights legislation while the IDEA is education law (deBettencourt 2002). In each of the laws, the focus is on the individual and the disability which perpetuates deficit modes of understanding the impact of disability.

The IDEA is the law most commonly cited when referring to special education. Before special education services can be provided for a student, an evaluation team consisting of qualified personnel at the school district must assess the

student. The evaluation team must answer yes to the following questions:

1. Does the student have a disability?
2. Does the disability cause an educational impact to the student's education?
3. Is the student in need of special education or specially designed instruction?

Only when the evaluation team answers yes to all three questions will a student be considered eligible to receive services through special education (Katz 2013). If students must have a documented disability, the medical record or a doctor's note is required by the evaluation team. This documentation usually comes in the form of a diagnosis, a reliance on the medical model of disability. There are 13 different categories of disability under IDEA that qualify students for special educational accommodations: autism, deaf-blindness, blindness, emotional disturbance, hearing impairment, intellectual disabilities, multiple disabilities, orthopedic impairment, other health impairments, specific learning disability, speech or language impairment, traumatic brain injury, and visual impairment (Katz 2013). Often the evaluation team must rely on the use of psychometric testing of students before providing additional services (Zaretsky 2005). For a child to receive special education services, an intervention must occur to identify a problem, or disability. Special education is viewed as rehabilitation for students whose deficits prevent them from learning in general education settings without supports. This philosophy and paradigm results in practices that pathologize disability through the appropriate interventions and cures (Zaretsky 2005). The process of identification and diagnosis of disability situates special education services within the medical realm. Special education's reliance on a medical discourse of disability prevents the field from promoting full inclusion of students with disabilities and is the source of barriers to inclusion.

An alternative philosophy in the education of students with disabilities is one that advocates for a social model that treats disability as natural

difference with the goal of full inclusion and is referred to as inclusive education (Zaretsky 2005). This philosophical foundation is hard to find in schools because special education knowledge continually emphasizes a deficit model that comes from professional scientific knowledge, like diagnostic processes, and paraprofessionals, such as speech and occupational therapists (Slee 2001). A social model would encourage critical reflection of the organizational features and barriers that may interfere with the learning of students with disabilities (Thomas and Loxley 2001). This reflection indicates a shift in focus from the individual to the institution. Similarly, an inclusive model in special education would critique value judgments used to determine what is right or desirable in programs and placements. In educational programs, constructs of difference may replace the current constructs of deviance (in regards to a norm), and this would put greater focus on changing structures that are disabling rather than focusing on the individual (Zaretsky 2005). True inclusive education requires that schools "create and provide whatever is necessary to ensure that all students have access to meaningful learning" and never requires students to possess a set of specific "skills or abilities as a prerequisite to belonging" (Villa and Thousand 2005, p. 3). An inclusive education model is different from a special education model because the foundational beliefs of inclusive education create a disposition based on equity for all students, not just one focused on accommodations and supports for students with labels of disability.

The LRE Principle: Progress and Tensions with Disability Studies

A major tenet of special education is the least restrictive environment clause of the IDEA. Services and settings for students with disabilities are provided on a continuum that goes from the least restrictive to homebound instruction or residential schools (Taylor 2008). The least restrictive environment clause of special education law was influenced by thinking that emerged in the 1960s

advocating for a range of placement options in special education services for students with developmental disabilities. Reynolds (1962) called for a “continuum” of placements for children with disabilities ranging from the “least restrictive” to the “most restrictive” setting. While at the time this was an improvement from the outright exclusion of students with disabilities from schools, it has maintained a philosophy of approved exclusion in special education to this day. The continuum framework creates barriers to inclusion because it legitimizes segregation of students with disabilities.

Oberti v. Clementon (1993) was a landmark case for interpreting the least restrictive environment clause of IDEA. Judge Edward R. Becker wrote, “We construe IDEA’s mainstreaming requirement to prohibit a school from placing a child with disabilities outside of a regular classroom if education of the child in the regular classroom, with supplementary aids and support services, can be achieved satisfactorily” (Villa and Thousand 2005, p. 20). Mandates like this one move special education models toward a philosophy that aligns with that of disability studies by emphasizing the environmental barriers and institutional responsibility, but it still falls short of the mark because exclusion based on individual disability is still allowed. Under the LRE clause, students with disabilities must meet prescribed expectations in order to spend time with their nondisabled peers, an expectation that is contingent on their ability to conform to classroom environments (Mutua and Smith 2008). The allowance of and provision for separate settings in the LRE clause demonstrates that special education is fundamentally designed to segregate, be it physical or instructional, and therefore devalue students with disabilities (Abberley 1987). Despite the progress that has been made in special education toward including more students with disabilities in general education classrooms, the philosophy of segregation found in the LRE clause will continue to create barriers to full inclusion.

Full inclusion asks us to consider the question, “What do you believe should be the goals of public education?” (Villa and Thousand 2005). When special education scholars approach disability as a social construction, they move toward

a space where the philosophy of disability studies philosophies informs and changes special education. The core conflict is between the modernist perspective found in special education, in which knowledge is constructed through the scientific method and results in adherence to a medical model of disability, and the post-modernist perspective, in which disability is seen as socially constructed (Zaretsky 2005). Disability studies in education scholars has begun to deconstruct how exclusion takes place in inclusive school structures (Ferguson and Nusbaum 2012). Inclusive educational practices view disability as a social construction and critique institutional barriers, seeking to include students with disabilities in general education settings regardless of the severity or number of disabilities (Villa and Thousand 2005). By choosing to include students in all aspects of school life, regardless of disability, inclusive schools create a foundation for equity. Not just students with labels of disability benefit from a philosophy of inclusion, but students from all backgrounds benefit from the desired outcomes of inclusive schools.

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Creativity, Openness, and User-Generated Cultures

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Creativity and the Global Knowledge Economy

The global knowledge economy comprised of increasingly integrated cross-border distributed knowledge and learning systems represents a new stage of development that is characterized by a fundamental sociality – knowledge and the value of knowledge is rooted in social relations (This entry draws on my Introduction to *Creativity in the Global Knowledge Economy* (Peters et al. 2009)). More than any time in the past, the global economy and society are undergoing a massive transformation from the industrial era to the knowledge economy. This is a shift from an age dominated by the logic of standardized mass production epitomized by the assembly-line in the auto-industry to a logic of decentralized networked communications and communities. In the knowledge economy “intellectual capital”, and a range of information-service industries driven by brain-power are driven by the constant demand for innovation. This does not mean the demise of the industrial economy but rather the development of a new relation between manufacturing and information services that permit the sharing of knowledge through open source models and the continuous redesign of flexible production regimes. It also means the rapid development of “mind-intensive” industries especially in the software, media, healthcare, education, and other “mind-intensive” industries. Increasingly, the move to the “knowledge economy” redefines the value creation process, alters the organization and pattern of work, and creates new forms of borderless cooperation and intercultural exchange. This has led many national government and international organization to plan for a restructuring of economy that increasingly focuses on knowledge, education, and creativity. The “New Club of Rome”, for instance, calls

Course of Study

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this new era the paradigm of an “economy of the intangibles” and predicts “Third Phase Industries”, “sustainable development” and development of “intellectual capital”:

- This means that the intellectual, social, and cultural issues require much higher attention. They are the determinants of “Third Phase Industries” based on creativity, software, media, finance, services, and more generally combined intelligence, which are more representative of today’s developed economies and which produce more value than traditional manufacturing per se. They are of decisive importance to the development of all sectors, including traditional ones. Only through careful and sustainable utilization of the new, non-material resources we will be in a position to better organize material and energy resources which are increasingly in short supply.
- In a word: the ‘Ever More’ of the current economic model of the Western industrial society has outlived its legitimacy. What matters are not mere survival strategies or linear expansion but rather sustainable preservation and development of our prosperity. In order to master the future, we need more intelligent modes of cultivation and exploitation, and a new balance between material and non-material resources.
- Intellectual capital (comprising assets such as human abilities, structural, relational, and innovation capital, as well as social capital) founded on clear, practiced values such as integrity, transparency, cooperative ability, and social responsibility constitute the basic substance from which our future society will nurture itself. (These statements are taken from the New Club of Rome’s 2006 Manifesto.)

The postindustrial society, a term invented by Arthur Pentty, a British Guild Socialist and follower of William Morris, at the turn of the century, was based on craft workshop and decentralized units of government. The post-industrial society is marked by the change from a goods-producing to a service economy and the

widespread diffusion of “intellectual technologies.” For Daniel Bell (1973), the concept of postindustrialism dealt primarily with changes *in the social structure* including the shift from a goods-producing economy to a service economy, the centrality of theoretical knowledge for innovation, the change in the character of work, and the shift from a game against nature to a game among persons. His early account given in the 1970s before the Internet and the spread of communications networks did not foresee the phenomenon of virtualization or the emergence of personalization as a 24/7 totally person-centered, unique learning environment.

Although there are different readings and accounts of the knowledge economy, it was only when the OECD (1996) used the label in the mid-1990s and it was adopted as a major policy description/prescription and strategy by the United Kingdom in 1999 that the term passed into the policy literature and became acceptable and increasingly widely used. The “creative economy” is an adjunct policy term based on many of the same economic arguments – and especially the centrality of theoretical knowledge and the significance of innovation. Most definitions highlight the growing relative significance of knowledge compared with traditional factors of production – natural resources, physical capital, and low-skill labor – in wealth creation and the importance of knowledge creation as a source of competitive advantage to all sectors of the economy, with a special emphasis on R&D, higher education, and knowledge-intensive industries such as the media and entertainment. At least two sets of principles distinguish knowledge goods, in terms of their behavior, from other goods or commodities or services; the first set concern knowledge as a global public good; the second concern the digitalization of knowledge goods.

These features have led a number of economists to hypothesize the “knowledge economy” and to picture it as different from the traditional industrial economy, leading to a structural transformation. In *The Economics of Knowledge* (2004) Dominique Foray argues:

Some, who had thought that the concepts of a new economy and a knowledge-based economy related to more or less the same phenomenon, logically concluded that the bursting of the speculative high-tech bubble sealed the fate of a short-lived knowledge-based economy. My conception is different. I think that the term ‘knowledge-based economy’ is still valid insofar as it characterizes a *possible scenario of structural transformations of our economies*. This is, moreover, the conception of major international organizations such as the World Bank and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (p. ix, my emphasis).

In this scenario “the rapid creation of new knowledge and the improvement of access to the knowledge bases thus constituted, in every possible way (education, training, transfer of technological knowledge, diffusion of innovations), are factors increasing economic efficiency, innovation, the quality of goods and services, and equity between individuals, social categories, and generations.” He goes on to argue that there is a collision between two phenomena – “a long-standing trend, reflected in the expansion of “knowledge-related” investments” and “a unique technological revolution.”

Knowledge As a Global Public Good

The first set of principles concerning knowledge as an economic good indicate that knowledge defies traditional understandings of property and principles of exchange and closely conforms to the criteria for a public good:

1. Knowledge is *non-rivalrous*: the stock of knowledge is not depleted by use, and in this sense knowledge is not consumable; sharing with others, use, reuse, and modification may indeed add rather than deplete value.
2. Knowledge is barely *excludable*: it is difficult to exclude users and to force them to become buyers; it is difficult, if not impossible, to restrict distribution of goods that can be reproduced with no or little cost.
3. Knowledge is not *transparent*: knowledge requires some experience of it before one discovers whether it is worthwhile, relevant, or suited to a particular purpose.

Thus, knowledge at the *ideation* or *immaterial* stage considered as pure ideas operates expansively to defy the law of scarcity. It does not conform to the traditional criteria for an economic good, and the economics of knowledge is therefore not based on an understanding of those features that characterize property or exchange and cannot be based on economics as the science of the allocation of scarce public goods. Of course, as soon as knowledge becomes codified or written down or physically embedded in a system or process, it can be made subject to copyright or patent and then may be treated and behave like other commodities (Stiglitz 1999).

Digital Information Goods Approximating Pure Thought

The second set of principles apply to digital information goods insofar as they approximate pure thought or the ideational stage of knowledge, insofar as data and information through experimentation and hypothesis testing (the traditional methods of science) can be turned into justified true belief. In other words, digital information goods also undermine traditional economic assumptions of rivalry, excludability, and transparency, as the knowledge economy is about creating intellectual capital rather than accumulating physical capital. Digital information goods differ from traditional goods in a number of ways:

1. Information goods, especially in digital forms, can be copied cheaply, so there is little or no cost in adding new users. Although production costs for information have been high, developments in desktop and just-in-time publishing, together with new forms of copying, archiving, and content creation, have substantially lowered fixed costs.
2. Information and knowledge goods typically have an experiential and participatory element that increasingly requires the active coproduction of the reader/writer, listener, and viewer.
3. Digital information goods can be transported, broadcast or shared at low cost, which may

approach free transmission across bulk communication networks.

4. Since digital information can be copied exactly and easily shared, it is never consumed (see Shapiro and Varian 1998; Morris-Suzuki 1997; Davis and Stack 1997; Kelly 1998).

The implication of this brief analysis is that the laws of supply and demand that depend on the scarcity of products do not apply to digital information goods.

Creating the Creative Economy

Today there is a strong renewal of interest by politicians and policy-makers worldwide in the related notions of creativity and innovation, especially in relation to terms like “the creative economy,” “knowledge economy,” “enterprise society,” “entrepreneurship,” and “national systems of innovation” (Baumol 2002; Cowen 2002; Lash and Urry 1994). In its most obvious form, the notion of the creative economy emerges from a set of claims that suggests that the industrial economy is giving way to the creative economy based on the growing power of ideas and virtual values – the turn from steel and hamburgers to software and intellectual property (Florida 2002; Howkins 2001; Landry 2000). In this context, increasingly policy latches onto the issues of copyright as an aspect of IP, piracy, distribution systems, network literacy, public service content, the creative industries, new interoperability standards, the WIPO and the development agenda, WTO and trade, and means to bring creativity and commerce together (Cowen 2002; Shapiro and Varian 1998; Davenport and Beck 2001; Hughes 1988; Netanel 1996, 1998; Gordon 1993; Lemley 2005; Wagner 2003). At the same time, this focus on creativity has exercised strong appeal to policy-makers who wish to link education more firmly to new forms of capitalism emphasizing how creativity must be taught, how educational theory and research can be used to improve student learning in mathematics, reading, and science, and how different models of intelligence and creativity can inform educational

practice (Blythe 2000). Under the spell of the creative economy discourse there has been a flourishing of new accelerated learning methodologies together with a focus on giftedness in the design of learning programs for exceptional children. (See The Center for Accelerated learning; see e.g., The Framework for Gifted Education.) One strand of the emerging literature highlights the role of the creative and expressive arts, of performance, of aesthetics in general, and the significant role of design as an underlying infrastructure for the creative economy (Caves 2000; Frey 2000; Frey and Pommerehne 1989; Ginsburgh and Menger 1996; Heilbrun and Gray 2001; Hesmondhalgh 2002). There is now widespread agreement among economists, sociologists, and policy analysts that creativity, design, and innovation are at the heart of the global knowledge economy: together creativity, design, and innovation define knowledge capitalism and its ability to continuously reinvent itself. For innovation theory, see the Danish economist Bengt-Ake Lundvall’s webpage and especially his concept of “the learning economy” (Lundvall and Archibugi 2001; Lundvall and Johnson 1994; Lorenz and Lundvall 2004); see also Globelics, The Global Network For The Economics Of Learning, Innovation, And Competence Building Systems). The notion of knowledge, learning and creative economies has a diverse, critical and seminal literature from a range of different disciplines including contributions from sociologists, philosophers, economists, media and education, for example: Bourdieu (1986), Cardoso and Castells (2006), Castells (1996/2000), Coleman (1988), DeLong and Summers (2002), Drucker (1969, 1993), Granovetter (1973, 1983), Harvey (1989), Hayek (1937, 1945), Hearn and Rooney (2008), Lessig (2006), Lyotard (1984), Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995), Peters and Besley (2006), Porat (1977), Powell and Snellman (2004), Prusak (1997), Putnam (2000), Quah (2003a, b), Romer (1990), Rooney et al. (2003), Soderberg (2002), Tapscott and Williams (2007), Toffler (1980), Touraine (1971). Together and in conjunction with new communication technologies they give expression to the essence of digital capitalism – the “economy of ideas” – and to new

architectures of mass collaboration that distinguish it as a new generic form of economy different in nature from industrial capitalism. The fact is that knowledge in its immaterial digitized informational form as sequences and value chains of 1 s and 0 s – ideas, concepts, functions, and abstractions – approaches the status of pure thought. Unlike other commodities, it operates expansively to defy the law of scarcity that is fundamental to classical and neoclassical economics and to the traditional understanding of markets. As mentioned above, a generation of economists has expressed this truth by emphasizing that knowledge is (almost) a global public good: it is non-rivalrous and barely excludable (Stiglitz 1999; Verschraegen and Schiltz 2007). It is non-rivalrous in the sense that there is little or marginal cost to adding new users. In other words, knowledge and information, especially in digital form, cannot be consumed. The use of knowledge or information as digital goods can be distributed and shared at no extra cost and the distribution and sharing is likely to add to its value rather than to deplete it or use it up. This is the essence of the economics of file-sharing education; it is also the essence of new forms of distributed creativity, intelligence, and innovation in an age of mass participation and collaboration (Brown and Duguid 2000; Tapscott and Williams 2006; Surowiecki 2004).

Openness and Creativity

There is a long established literature on openness and creativity in the field of personality psychology emphasizing the uniqueness of the individual. Prabhu et al. (2008, p. 53), for instance, report that four decades of work have generated more than 9,000 published studies. They also report that in the five factor model of personality – based on openness to experience, conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness, and neuroticism – “openness to experience has the most empirical support as being closely related to creativity.” In this context, openness is correlated with the appreciation for art, emotionality, sense of adventure, new ideas, imagination, curiosity, and variety of

experience. On this psychological reading, open people prefer novelty and change, and tend to be more aware of their feelings with a corresponding will to tolerate diversity and entertain new ideas. Those people with “closed” personality, by contrast, tend to exhibit more traditional and conventional interests and prefer familiarity over novelty and change. The five factor personality psychology is purely descriptive rather than being theory driven and current research is testing the cross-cultural and social validity of the program. While it is still in progress, this research at least raises the strong possibility of the close correlation of openness with creativity at the level of individual personalities emphasizing the relation to concepts of measured intelligence, achievement, and political attitudes (Simonton 2000; Aitken Harris 2004; Dollinger 2007).

Individualist approaches to the relation of openness to creativity can only take us so far. The National Academy of Sciences’ (2003) report *Beyond Productivity: Information Technology, Innovation and Creativity* began by recognizing the crucial role that creativity plays in culture and the way in which at the beginning of the twenty-first century, “information technology (IT) is forming a powerful alliance with creative practices in the arts and design to establish the exciting new domain of information technology and creative practices.” Others such as Richard Florida (2004) have emphasized that the USA needs to invest more in the development of its creative sector as a basis to sustain its competitiveness from the rate of technological innovation and economic growth. Florida (2002, p. 21) argues “human creativity as the defining feature of economic life. [New] technologies, new industries, new wealth, and all other good economic things flow from it” and he goes on to write “[Human] creativity is multifaceted and multidimensional. It is not limited to technological innovation or new business models. It is not something that can be kept in a box and trotted out when one arrives at the office. Creativity involves distinct kinds of thinking and habits that must be cultivated both in the individual and in the surrounding society” (p. 22). Rutten and Gelissen (2008) test Florida’s creativity and diversity hypothesis for European

regions indicating that results indicate that regional differences in diversity are directly related to differences in regional wealth.

The relations between openness and creativity are brought out even more forcefully through the concept and practice of open innovation. Peter Teirlinck and Andre Spithoven (2008) indicate that the increasing complexity of innovation has encouraged companies to use external knowledge sources to complement in-house activities, attempting to substitute a nonlinear feedback model for the old linear model, capturing the benefits of the learning process within, and between, firms and other organizations. As innovation networks grew even more complex, firms adopted the “new imperative” for creating and profiting from technology in the model of open innovation where innovation becomes increasingly distributed among various partners (Von Hippel 1988). They write:

The notion of open innovation is the result of the increasing complexity of innovation and how innovation management should cope with this complexity. It reflects an ever changing research environment (Chesbrough 2003): the increasing mobility of knowledge workers; the applicability of research results of universities to enterprises; more widely distributed knowledge; erosion of oligopoly market positions; more deregulation and an increase in venture capital. This resulted in an open stage gate process with the following features: (1) the centralized inhouse R&D laboratory is no longer the main source of ideas or knowledge and is being complemented by other enterprises, new technology based start-ups, universities, and public research centres; (2) commercialization also occurs outside the traditional markets of the enterprise through licensing, spin-offs, and research joint ventures; (3) the role of the first mover advantage becomes more important than the development of a defensively orientated system of knowledge and technology protection (p. 689).

This model of open innovation is made possible through “creativity support tools” which help to accelerate discovery and innovation. Ben Shneiderman (2007) notes that new “generations of programming, simulation, information visualization, and other tools are empowering engineers and scientists just as animation and music composition tools have invigorated filmmakers and musicians”. He goes on to write:

These and many other creativity support tools enable discovery and innovation on a broader scale than ever before; eager novices are performing like seasoned masters and the grandmasters are producing startling results. The accelerating pace of academic research, engineering innovation, and consumer product design is amply documented in journal publications, patents, and customer purchases. Creativity support tools extend users’ capability to make discoveries or inventions from early stages of gathering information, hypothesis generation, and initial production, through the later stages of refinement, validation, and dissemination.

The sustainability of “social creativity” depends upon a greater recognition of the importance of social and material surroundings. As Fischer and Giaccardi (2007) argue “Individual and social creativity can and must complement each other.” They suggest:

Environments supporting mass collaboration and social production such as annotated collections (GenBank), media sharing (Flickr, YouTube), wikis (Wikipedia), folksonomies (del.icio.us), and virtual worlds (Second Life) are other examples of social creativity. The diverse and collective stock of scientific content and artistic or stylistic ideas that individuals and communities share, reinterpret, and use as a basis for new ideas and visions constitutes the vital source of invention and creativity.

They argue that creativity needs the “synergy of many” which can be facilitated by meta-design – “a sociotechnical approach that characterizes objectives, techniques, and processes that allow users to act as designers and be creative in personally meaningful activities” and they note a tension between creativity and organization. Organizational environments must be kept open to users’ modifications and adaptations by technical and social means that empower participation to serve the double purpose: “to provide a potential source for new insights, new knowledge, and new understandings; and to provide a higher degree of synergy and self-organization.”

The relationship between creativity and open systems especially in computing is growing in significance. Colin G. Johnson (2005) draws a strong set of connection between openness, creativity, and search processes. He begins by noting that “One characteristic of systems in which creativity can occur is that they are open. That is, the space being explored appears to be (theoretically

or pragmatically) unbounded, and there is no easy way in which the structure of the space can be simply summarized.” He suggests that evolutionary search processes (moving from one-to-point, using the information from previously visited sites) are seen as creative for one of three reasons:

Firstly because the criteria for evaluation are not easy to capture in a rulebound fashion. An example of this is searching a space of melodies for ‘interesting’ or ‘tuneful’ melodies. Secondly because the search space is seen as having some complexity which belies ‘easy’ search. Examples of this [sic] ideas include the use of search to explore the space of designs for mechanical devices or electrical circuits. Even though an exhaustive search would turn up the same result as a ‘creative’ search, both the size of the search space and the complex structure thereof (e.g. it is not possible for a ‘naïve’ thinker to conceive of how to specify and order the ‘all possible’ designs). Thirdly, because the search space is seen as being extensible. Consider the idea of searching a space of melodies as discussed above. In order to search this space, we will need to give a description of what a ‘melody’ is[e.g. a sequence of notes in a particular key. However this definition has limitations: what about a melody that changes key half way through? So we expand the search space to include such melodies, then The search space can always be extended. It is these latter two characteristics which seem particularly to capture the idea of ‘openness’ in creativity (Colin G. Johnson).

Open source in computing developed around Linux as an operating system where in such open systems intellectual property is seen as “open” and is made freely available, allowing people to use ideas and code without locking them up as proprietary intellectual property. It is based on three essential features (Tippett 2007), updated from Weber (2004):

...

- source code is distributed with the software, or made available at no more cost than distribution (this means that users can see and change the actual mechanisms that makes the software work);
- anyone may distribute the software for free (there is not obligation for other users of the software to pay royalties or licensing fees to the originator);
- anyone may modify the software, or develop new software from the original product, and the modified software is then distributed under the same terms as the original software (e.g., it remains open).

As Weber comments, these concepts represent a fundamentally different concept of property, typically seen as:

a regime built around a set of assumptions and goals that are different from those of mainstream intellectual property rights thinking. The principal goal of the open source intellectual property regime is to maximize the ongoing use, growth, development, and distribution of free software. To achieve that goal, this regime shifts the fundamental optic of intellectual property rights away from protecting the prerogatives of an author towards protecting the prerogatives of generations of users (Weber 2004, p. 84)

The idea of open source still retains concepts of copyright and the rights of the author or creator over their original work. As Tippet (2007) remarks:

It does thus not negate the concept of property within intellectual products, but rather shifts the view of the rights conferred by the property, so that the “concept of property [is] configured around the right and responsibility to distribute, not to exclude”. (Weber 2004, p. 86)

Tippet also usefully documents the emerging field that applies open source to areas of scholarship and creative endeavor outside software:

For example, open source has been explored as a valuable approach in scientific endeavour and making scientific information available (Jones 2001; Mulgan 2005; Schweik et al. 2005). Keats (2003) has explored open source in terms of developing teaching and learning resources for African universities’. In a series of articles looking at the ‘Adaptive State’, the potential value of open source ideas for public policy delivery are explored (Bentley and Wilsdon 2003; Leadbeater 2003; Mulgan et al. 2005). The ideas have been developed in product design, linked to ideas of open innovation, as companies engage with user communities (Goldman and Gabriel 2005), one example being user-led innovation in sports gear. (Fuller et al. 2007)

Digital technologies have become engines of cultural innovation, and user-centered content production has become a sign of the general transformation of organizational forms. But the transformation of digital culture also transforms “what it means to be a creator within a vast and growing reservoir of media, data, computational power, and communicative possibilities.” We are only now beginning to devise understandings of the power of databases, network representations,

filtering techniques, digital rights management, and the other new architectures of agency and control and “how these new capacities transform our shared cultures, our understanding of them, and our capacities to act within them” (Karaganis 2008).

As Jean Burgess (2007) comments in *Vernacular Creativity and the New Media*

The manufacturers of content-creating tools, who relentlessly push us to unleash that creativity, using—of course—their ever cheaper, ever more powerful gadgets and gizmos. Instead of asking consumers to watch, to listen, to play, to passively consume, the race is on to get them to create, to produce, and to participate (p. 7).

She goes on to register the development of a new vocabulary that speaks of a participatory culture based on creation and user-generated content.

In game environments particularly, terms like “cocreators” (Banks 2002) and “productive players” (Humphreys 2005) are increasingly gaining purchase as replacements for “consumers,” “players,” or even “participants.” These reconfigurations force us to consider the “texts” of new media to be emergent – always in the process of being “made”; further, “cocreation” is built around network sociality and the dynamics of community, prompting a reconsideration of the idea of the individual producer or consumer of culture – even as corporate content “owners” continue, in varying degrees, to assert rights that have their basis in the romantic notion of the individual creative author. It is not only the “who” of production that is transformed in contemporary digital culture, but the *how* (pp. 7–8).

And Burgess details three important structural transformations from the point of view of cultural participation implied by the Web 2.0 model. I summarize from Burgess as follows:

1. The shift from content “production,” “distribution,” and “consumption” to a convergence of all three, resulting in a hybrid mode of engagement called “produsage,” defined as “the collaborative and continuous building and extending of existing content in pursuit of further improvement” (Bruns 2005).

2. A shift from “user-generated content” to “user-led” content creation, editing, repurposing, and distribution; whereby the users of a given web service increasingly take on leadership roles, and where designers and developers to some extent allow the emergence of communities of practice to shape the culture of the network – even to determine what the web service or online community is “for.” This represents a convergence of the “value chain” where users are simultaneously the producers, users, editors, and consumers of the content, leading to “network effects.”
3. The convergence of user-generated content and social software to produce hybrid spaces, examples of which are sometimes described as “social media” – most clearly represented by MySpace, YouTube, and Flickr (Burgess 2007, pp. 10–11).

Burgess (2007, p. 11) argues:

It is this third feature of the new networks of cultural production that has the most profound implications for cultural participation, at least in potential, because this shift opens up new and diverse spaces for individuals to engage with a variety of aesthetic experiences at the same time as their participation contributes to the creation of communities. That is, the significance of ‘Web 2.0’, from a cultural studies point of view, lies in its potential for a new configuration of the relations between the *aesthetic* and the *social* aspects of culture, developed at a grass-roots level.

As many scholars and commentators have suggested since the “change merchants” of the 1970s – Marshall McLuhan, Drucker, and Alvin Toffler—first raised the issue we are in the middle of a long-term cultural evolutionary shift based on the digitization and the logic of open systems that has the capacity to profoundly change all aspects of our daily lives – work, home, school – and existing systems of culture and economy. A wide range of scholars from different disciplines and new media organizations have speculated on the nature of the shift: Richard Stallman established the Free Software Movement and the GNU project (see the GNU site, a 2006 lecture by Stallman entitled “The Free Software Movement and the Future of Freedom” and Aaron Renn’s (1998) “Free”, “Open Source”, and Philosophies of Software Ownership); Yochai Benkler (2006),

the Yale law professor, has commented on the wealth of networks and the way that social production transforms freedom and markets; his colleague, Larry Lessig (2004, 2007), also a law professor, has written convincingly on code, copyright, and the creative commons (see his bestseller *Free Culture*) and launched the Free Culture Movement designed to promote the freedom to distribute and modify creative works through the new social media (see the videoblog Free Culture, Free Software, Free Infrastructures! Openness and Freedom in every Layer of the Network Free Culture, Free Software, Free Infrastructures! Openness and Freedom in every Layer of the Network but see also Pasquinelli's (2008) "The Ideology of Free Culture and the Grammar of Sabotage" at "The Ideology of Free Culture and the Grammar of Sabotage"); Students for Free Culture, (see the website) launched in 2004, "is a diverse, non-partisan group of students and young people who are working to get their peers involved in the free culture movement"; Michel Bauwens (2005) has written about the political economy of peer production and established the P-2-P Foundation (see the foundation and the associated blog); Creative Commons (see Creative Commons) was founded in 2001 by experts in cyberlaw and intellectual property; Wikipedia (see Wikipedia) the world's largest and open-content encyclopedia was established in 2001 by Jimmy Wales, an American Internet entrepreneur, whose blog is subtitled Free Knowledge for Free Minds (see Jimmy Wales' blog at <http://jimmywales.com/>).

One influential definition suggests

Social and technological advances make it possible for a growing part of humanity to *access, create, modify, publish and distribute* various kinds of works - artworks, scientific and educational materials, software, articles - in short: *anything that can be represented in digital form*. Many communities have formed to exercise those new possibilities and create a wealth of collectively re-usable works.

...

- the **freedom to use** the work and enjoy the benefits of using it,
- the **freedom to study** the work and to apply knowledge acquired from it,

- the **freedom to make and redistribute copies**, in whole or in part, of the information or expression,
- the **freedom to make changes and improvements**, and to distribute derivative works (see Definition)

This is how the Open Cultures Working Group—an open group of artists, researchers, and cultural activists—describe the situation in their Vienna Document subtitled *Xnational Net Culture and "The Need to Know" of Information Societies*:

Information technologies are setting the global stage for economic and cultural change. More than ever, involvement in shaping the future calls for a wide understanding and reflection on the ecology and politics of information cultures. So called globalization not only signifies a worldwide network of exchange but new forms of hierarchies and fragmentation, producing deep transformations in both physical spaces and immaterial information domains... global communication technologies still hold a significant potential for empowerment, cultural expression, and transnational collaboration. To fully realize the potential of life in global information societies we need to acknowledge the plurality of agents in the information landscape and the heterogeneity of collaborative cultural practice. The exploration of alternative futures is linked to a living cultural commons and social practice based on networks of open exchange and communication. (See <http://world-information.org/wio/readme/992003309/1134396702>)

Every aspect of culture and economy is becoming transformed through the process of digitization that creates new systems of archives, representation, and reproduction technologies that portend Web 3.0 and Web 4.0 where all production, material and immaterial, is digitally designed and coordinated through distributed information systems. As Felix Stalder (2004) remarks

information can be infinitely copied, easily distributed, and endlessly transformed. Contrary to analog culture, other people's work is not just referenced, but directly incorporated through copying and pasting, remixing, and other standard digital procedures.

Digitization transforms all aspects of cultural production and consumption favoring the networked peer community over the individual author and blurring the distinction between artists and their audiences. These new digital logics alter

the logic of the organization of knowledge, education, and culture spawning new technologies as a condition of the openness of the system. Now the production of texts, sounds, and images are open to new rounds of experimentation and development providing what Staler calls “a new grammar of digital culture” and transforming the processes of creativity which are no longer controlled by traditional knowledge institutions and organizations but rather permitted by enabling platforms and infrastructures that encourage large-scale participation and challenge old hierarchies.

The shift to networked media cultures based on the ethics of participation, sharing and collaboration, involving a volunteer, peer-to-peer gift economy has its early beginnings in the right to freedom of speech that depended upon the flow and exchange of ideas essential to political democracy, including the notion of a “free press,” the market, and the academy. Perhaps, even more fundamentally free speech is a significant personal, psychological, and educational good that promotes self-expression and creativity and also the autonomy and development of the self necessary for representation in a linguistic and political sense and the formation of identity.

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Credit System

► [Mathematics Education as a Matter of Economy](#)

Créolité Movement and Education in Haiti-Post-colonialism and Education in Haiti, The

► [Language and Identity in Haiti: Central Issues in Education](#)

Critical and Social Justice Pedagogies in Practice

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Synonyms

[Critical pedagogy](#); [Educational practice](#); [Social justice pedagogy](#)

Introduction

While pedagogy is most simply conceived of as the study of teaching and learning, the term critical pedagogy embodies notions of how one teaches, what is being taught, and how one learns. Critical pedagogy is a way of thinking about, negotiating, and transforming the relationship among classroom teachings, the production of knowledge, the institutional structures of the school, and the social and material relation of the wider community and society. Critical pedagogy is historically rooted in the critical theory of the Frankfurt School and was greatly influenced by the work of Karl Marx, particularly his views about labor. According to Marx, the essential societal problem was one of socioeconomic inequality, believing that social justice is essentially dependent upon economic conditions. The “New Left scholars” in North America, including Henry Giroux, Roger Simon, Michael Apple, and Peter McLaren (among others), focused their efforts on examining and better understanding the role that schools play in transmitting certain messages about political, social, and economic life. Postmodern currents associated with Derrida, Foucault, Lyotard, Ebert, and others have also problematized the social, cultural, and economic contexts of sources of knowledge and pedagogy. Critical feminist pedagogues argue that education should challenge the structure of the traditional canon and develop and offer alternative classroom practices. Feminist pedagogy reinforces the idea that both the content of the curriculum and the methods of pedagogy employed teach lessons (Breunig 2011).

Critical social theorists, neo-Marxists, liberatory pedagogues, pedagogies of hope and possibility, New Left scholars, educating the Democratic citizen, globalization, and social justice education all offer multiple, (sometimes) overlapping, (sometimes) contested, and varied terminologies to describe critical pedagogy. Despite the varied meanings and approaches, the core of critical pedagogy remains focused on education as a means to bring about a more socially just world (Malott and Porfilio 2011). As Boyles, Carusi, and Attick assert, “The term *social justice*

seems to be in the ears and on the lips” of many educators these days (Ayers et al. 2009, p. 30).

There is a rather extensive body of literature that considers the theory of critical and social justice pedagogies, but significantly less literature that specifically addresses the ways in which professors attempt to apply these theories in practice. How do professors who teach critical and social justice theories practice it within the postsecondary classroom? The academic separation of theory from practice is a manifestation of the ways in which knowledge has become fragmented from lived experience. There have been numerous calls for critical pedagogues to move beyond theory and focus on the formulation of a praxis that acts on the possibilities of critical pedagogy, including within the postsecondary classroom. Paulo Freire (1970) argued that people need to develop critical conscientization and engage educative praxes that incorporate theory, action, and reflection as a means to work toward social change and justice. Malott and Porfilio (2011) assert that there are far too many “theoretical one trick ponies that have an impulsive urge to tear down the work of others” (p. 37). They impel critical pedagogues to move beyond endless critique, deconstruction, and deferral, shifting their energies toward real-world struggles guided by radical love, social justice, and hope. Gramsci (and others) believed that individuals should seek places for counter-hegemonic resistance and solidarity and that the university can serve as one site for the exercise of these practices. The purpose of this entry is thus to consider and convey how scholars might meaningfully and collaboratively engage in social justice praxes with/within postsecondary spaces.

Social Justice Pedagogy in Practice

Gloria Ladson-Billings (2013), a pedagogical theorist and teacher educator, impels educators to consider social justice pedagogy for new century children. These new century students have a deep connection to hip-hop culture, receive their news from the “Daily Show,” and tweet and instant message, viewing email as antiquated. They are “shape-shifters” (p. 108), according to Ladson-

Billings. They do not fit neatly into the rigid categories of race, class, gender, sexuality, or national origin that have been used to make distinctions, create hierarchy, and use as comparators. Talk of “safe space” in the classroom, genuine dialogue, disrupting hierarchies, and encouraging student voice may be simultaneously relevant for critical pedagogues and outdated for these new century students. Paulo Freire (1970) writes about praxis, involving theory and practice, reflection, and action as activism. In this sense, action is not just an activity for the sake of doing something but an activity that is purposeful, social justice oriented, and relevant to a changing society.

Getting Started (or a Bit Further Along)

Schools themselves are constructed through linguistic, cultural, social, and pedagogical specific interactions which both shape and are shaped by social, political, economic, and cultural dynamics and norms. From this perspective, “societies, communities, schools, teachers and even students engage in oppressive practices” (Ayers et al. 2009, p. 569). Building upon the aforementioned concepts of Gramscian counter-hegemonic praxis and Freire’s critical conscientization, how might a social justice pedagogue engage in schools in a manner that offers a counter-narrative to this dominant/normative (potentially oppressive) institutional one?

Something as seemingly basic as trying to schedule a room with movable chairs in it can be a challenge. Trying to combine theory with meaningful praxis and ample reflection in 3 h time blocks can be a restraint within these “fixed” classroom spaces. In many ways, critical/social justice pedagogy is a slow pedagogy. Originating in principles from the slow food movement, slow pedagogy offers a “slow living” perspective which challenges the dominant narratives of institutional norms. Slow is therefore a counter-hegemonic concept, which strikes at the core of neoliberal rationality. Environmental educators Philip Payne and Brian Wattchow (2009) have devised an experiential learning program that draws upon aspects of the principles and practices of the slow movement in order to provide students with a learning experience that does not fit

“neatly” into traditional time blocks. This kind of critical, experiential praxis challenges the orthodoxies of speedy pedagogy and points the way toward an educational alternative that might create the kinds of citizens that social justice pedagogues desire.

How might new century students and pedagogues think beyond the bounds of classroom spaces and time? Certainly online courses, flipped classrooms, and using university-based technology systems provide some means for engagement beyond the “traditional” concept of classroom. But how might we improve upon the design of a learning environment even more – one that encourages students to think and act beyond the bounds of the classroom walls and time/frame? How do we increase our focus on contemporary literacies (digital, media, community, and global) and ways to engage (social production, social networks, media grids, semantic web, nonlinear learning) and integrate students into the very design of our courses and instructional practices (Zmuda et al. 2015)? Equally important to ask ourselves is, “Is collaborative design and engaging new medias an aspect of course development that best ‘fits’ with the class purpose and intent?” Too often, there is an appeal in engaging in the “new” with too little regard for the additive aspect of what this may offer.

“Can you please lecture more often?” is a query that professors may often hear when they collaborate with students on course syllabus and classroom design. “You hold the relevant expertise” is an adage that students may invoke, in large part because their previous preparation has most often “trained” them to believe that the teacher is the one who delivers the knowledge and the student is the one who accepts whatever gets “deposited” (Freire 1970). The neoliberal argument that schools must align their policies and practices with the notion of knowledge as a tradable commodity, one based on efficiency and accountability, offers little to the counter-hegemonic social justice pedagogue and student. “What value does this ‘academic’ exercise of collaboration offer?” is often the resultant query. With many students going on to think (if not articulate) that this kind of educational approach is certainly out of sync

with the neoliberal discourse that predominates the work/world, is it worth it then or not?

A Slippery Slope

“Will you be marking us on APA for this assignment and do you want it double-spaced Times New Roman font size 12? I am really hoping to put effort into this and get an A, so knowing this would really be helpful!” These questions and expressions frustrate many critical pedagogues. Not only does it speak to the institutional norms that students have clearly learned well, but it speaks to their focus on good grades and “pleasing” the professor that is so much a part of “traditional” education. Bell Hooks (1994) discusses how learning emphasizes silent, passive obedience, even in postsecondary schools. As the mystic poet and philosopher, Rumi, wrote long ago in a poem entitled *Two Kinds of Intelligence*,

There are two kinds of intelligence: one acquired,
as a child in school memorizes facts and concepts

from books and from what the teacher says,
collecting information from the traditional sciences

as well as from the new sciences.

With such intelligence you rise in the world.

You get ranked ahead or behind others
in regard to your competence in retaining
information. You stroll with this intelligence
in and out of fields of knowledge, getting always

more

marks on your preserving tablets.

There is another kind of tablet, one
already completed and preserved inside you.

A spring overflowing its springbox. A freshness
in the center of the chest. This other intelligence
does not turn yellow or stagnate. It's fluid,
and it doesn't move from outside to inside
through conduits of plumbing-learning.

This second knowing is a fountainhead
from within you, moving out. (Rumi 2004,

p. 178)

How do intelligences get honored? How do students succeed in a counter-hegemonic social justice classroom and what is the measure of success? Because, for them, as we know, the letter grade on their transcript matters, and it would be naïve for critical pedagogues to not acknowledge this. Consider this from a Marxist perspective. Grades are often the equivalent of money. A student in a typical

Canadian university does not even have the opportunity to apply for most grants and bursaries without a certain average grade on her transcript. How then might critical pedagogues, many of whom reject having to reduce and deduce learning to a letter grade, engage this reality?

Or conversely how might a critical pedagogue manage an incident whereby the students protest the veracity of collaborative learning environments and course design if at the end of the semester, the professor still has control over the grades? There is an inevitable push/pull tension and slippery slope aspect to all of this that merits consideration. How does a social justice pedagogue collaborate in a manner that goes beyond “offering” student agency in the form of dialogue and the development of a classroom community in ways that are truly counter-hegemonic and meaningful? Is codesigning course syllabi and assignments sufficient? Is peer-marking an equitable approach to “power sharing”?

Students may start to “capitalize” on what they perceive as the lax or less structured approach to teaching and learning. Formal grievances, low teaching evaluations, assertive resistance, expressions of professor incompetency, and declarations of the teacher being a “fraud” are not uncommon in the counter-hegemonic classroom. In turn, professors often (over)react with “taking back” control, becoming martyred or disengaged, or reverting back to the very same traditional practices that they are attempting to disrupt and problematize.

What Now (and How)?

Social justice pedagogy is distinctly political and needs to be acknowledged as such. Teachers serve as agents of social change as do students. The hope is to alter current inequalities in society by equipping marginalized communities with strong future leaders who are able to succeed (Ayers et al. 2009). “The teacher’s role is to equip students with the knowledge, behavior, and skills needed to transform society into a place where social justice *can* exist” (p. 590). Social justice education shifts the focus from issues of cultural diversity (i.e., multicultural education) to issues of social justice, making social change and activism central to the vision of teaching and learning.

Social justice efforts must join with other levels of the educational system as an organization in the public and private sector and with the community to improve the educational opportunities and to address the current realities of students (Ayers et al. 2009; Malott and Porfilio 2011).

Positive mentorship, teacher training programs with a social justice focus, and participating in supportive communities of practice of like-minded social justice pedagogues can provide a platform for success. “I am surprised that you are doing all this pedagogical risk-taking given the current university administration” is a common utterance shared with social justice pedagogues. This kind of comment positions the scholar as a radical “other,” which on some level may be welcomed but on another level may leave her feeling quite alienated. Identifying all the “others” in your faculty or university and establishing communities of practice can help allay feelings of solidarity. Establishing transdisciplinary scholarship groups with a social justice bent and activist orientation can provide sources of support and new inspiration.

Enacting Social Justice in the Classroom

A social justice classroom should demonstrate a curriculum and classroom practice that is grounded in the lives of students, critical in its approach to the world and itself, hopeful, joyful, kind, and visionary, pro-justice, activist, academically engaging and rigorous, and culturally competent (Ayers et al. 2009). This next section will take a brief look at each of these core foci.

Know thy students first. Classroom practices need to be shaped around the lives of students, the classroom context, the educative aims of the practice, and the institution to construct learning experiences that articulate these (Breunig 2011). Writing exercises such as “I am” or “Dear (insert professor’s name here)” letters provide students with an early opportunity to share details about who they are, what they value, how they learn, and why they are there. Professors can begin the semester with this baseline knowledge and create lessons that align with students’ learning styles and needs. The social justice classroom and pedagogue need to be critical of the world and itself (including the institution and its constraints).

Professors need to acknowledge that the university as the contested site of critique is itself a space that reflects traditional norms of power and dominance and is also a site of privilege. There are many environments that are more conducive to counter-hegemonic resistance than the university (i.e., Greenpeace and Doctors Without Borders). In choosing the university, for both students and professors, you are choosing an environment that privileges the very concept of critical thinking, a privilege that is not afforded to everyone given the time and resource commitment. Approaching critique from what Kevin Kumashiro refers to as a pedagogy of “hope” and what Henry Giroux refers to as a pedagogy of “possibility” helps frame these conversations in the positive potential of social justice pedagogy, one that the above authors refer to as pro-justice. Patti Lather discusses her experiences with *getting lost* and being in a stuck place and then *getting found* in a cycle, falling in and out of hope (with moments of despair) in practicing social justice pedagogy in the postsecondary classroom.

Linda Keesing-Styles cautions against establishing a set of recipes for praxis. “Why do students leave the classroom in large lectures when the professor introduces an experiential activity to complement the content and to address the various learning styles of the students in the room?” Media literacy, experiential activities, case studies, guest lectures, creative writing exercises, performing curriculum, group work, “unpacking” bias and privilege activities, student-led initiatives, community-based service learning, self- and peer-marking, and hegemony treasure hunts are often met with student skepticism and resistance. “I left the room because you stopped teaching content. You were done with the powerpoint lecture” is a refrain often heard in the experiential social justice classroom. How do social justice pedagogues maintain engagement and reinforce that experiential activity is content? As mentioned above, attention to purposeful and intentional activities rather than just an activity for its own sake is important. Given students’ previous preparation as silent, passive, seated recipients of knowledge, what can professors convey about the importance of connecting meaningful

activities to theory? How can professors adopt praxes that are relevant, engaging, additive, and rigorous? “Will we be marked on this?” is something that is often heard in response to embodied activity engagement? Students have been trained to write down the powerpoint text and to memorize and convey understanding of that key content, but what should they do with these movement-oriented, group praxes? The professor holds a responsibility to convey the what, how, and why of purposeful social justice activities and also needs to be aware when too much activity is too much activity. Students may begin to rote act and respond, “Are we reflecting and journaling again? I am so tired of all this ‘think-pair-share’ activity but at least I now know what the teacher is looking for and how to deliver it.”

Most cultural competency initiatives focus on developing the interpersonal skills needed to understand, work with, and serve culturally diverse students. The term social justice competency provides a more expansive view of this construct, focusing on competencies beyond cultural ones, including socioeconomic class, sexual orientation, gender identity, ability, religion, and national origin, among others. Developing social justice competency starts with the professor identifying the ways in which positionality, biases, preconceived notions about pedagogy, previous training, the university “climate,” and student composition impact how the professor herself approaches social justice classroom praxis. “What is taught?” “How is it taught?” and “What is left out?” are some preliminary questions that merit exploration. It is naïve to assume that the social justice classroom is an objective or safe space. Just naming it as such does not make it so. Social justice pedagogy is pedagogical risk-taking and involves some personal exposure and vulnerability to enact.

Conclusion

There will forever be institutional constraints and student resistance when enacting social justice pedagogies in the postsecondary classroom. “Dancing” on the periphery of the institution

involves acknowledging the restraints and sometimes even embracing them while simultaneously engaging in praxes that offer counter-hegemonic possibilities of hope. Students have ample classroom experiences with being submissive, silent, passive, and dismissed. They also have ample messages that convey despair, bullying, and activist aggression. Students have classroom experiences that leave them feeling “stupid” or “impostors” of the very environment that is meant to be a site for learning and growth. The positive potential of the pro-justice postsecondary classroom, one that demonstrates in praxis, the very concepts that it theoretically purports, offers professors and students with a unique opportunity to engage the theory of the course with their experiences in the course, helping to bridge the gap between *what* is taught and *how* it is taught. The effort is worth it in the end.

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Critical Discourse Analysis

► Digital Learning, Discourse, and Ideology

Critical Distance

► Praxis

Critical Education

- Critical Pedagogy and Art
 - Critical Pedagogy, Historical Origins of
 - Dewey and Critical Pedagogy
 - Freire's Christian Faith
 - Marcuse and Critical Education
-

Critical Education and Digital Cultures

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Introduction

With the increasing uptake of digital technologies in many facets of education, perspectives from the study of technology and culture have proved to be rich and productive ways of understanding the qualities and trajectories of this emerging area. Nevertheless, such cultural concerns remain largely on the fringes of educational practice and research, which has tended to focus exclusively on the idea of a developing human subject (Usher and Edwards 1994). This grounding in humanism has tended to overlook the influence of culture and technology on education, privileging instead orthodox ideas such as universalism (that all humans are essentially the same), autonomy (that we are capable of independent thought and action), and rational progress (that reasoned thinking, as the goal of education, drives human development). This deep-seated relationship to humanism has structured the contemporary project of education around the idea of largely uniform individuals, who are essentially separated

from the world around them. In such an arrangement, cultural diversities are rendered subordinate to a universal human commonality, and technologies are framed in the simplistic role of “tools,” merely enhancing, or not, the intentions of their human users.

The perspectives of digital culture offer two principal and interrelated ways of thinking differently about education: the diversity, nuance, and strangeness of culture, as opposed to the rational universalism of education, combined with useful perspectives from the philosophy and theory of technology, which are able to account for more complex notions of our relationships with the digital. Where education has adhered to its humanist foundations, technology tends to be framed in terms of the benefits or disadvantages it brings to teaching and learning practices, rather than attempting to explore *how* technologies might be used, valued, imagined, or represented by those involved. This is the significance of cultural studies' approaches: to bring other disciplinary insights to bear on education that are motivated less by agendas of improvement and are more concerned with understanding how social life is constructed and lived. This cultural concern draws from a rich history of social and political theory and philosophy, no less the *critical theory*, associated with “The Frankfurt School,” which emphasizes the analysis and critique of dominant ideologies and understandings. This shifts educational concerns away from the habitual fixation on the growth and development of the individual, toward a richer engagement with the ways education is shaped and practiced with and through the digital.

The other crucial aspect of cultural perspectives outlined here is the decentering of the individual as the exclusive source and end of educational concerns, a perspective often associated with poststructuralism. The humanist foundation of education severely limits our understanding of technology, precisely because the essence of the human *subject* is preserved as a bounded entity, entirely separate from the outside world of *objects*: technologies, environments, and other “nonhuman” things. Within this framework, technology tends to be understood in terms of an

outside intervention, something that “impacts” on a preexisting, non-digital, and “natural” kind of education. Where “human” and “technology” are positioned as separate and distinct, with their own inherent characteristics, their interaction can only be understood along *determinist* lines. In other words, either human agency drives technological change as “social determinism” or “uses determinism” or digital devices define and govern how people use them, termed “technological determinism” (Dahlberg 2004).

The first position surfaces in the widespread claim that technology is “simply a tool” for pre-determined educational aims (either of the individual or society), while the second tends to manifest in pessimistic narratives of the degradation of authentic education, driven and defined by the increasing pervasion of digital technologies. While neither position provides the conceptual means to understand the complex relations at play, a digital cultures’ perspective looks beyond the orthodox domains of education to ideas of technology’s entrenched and co-constitutive connections with human life. The following will account for *education and digital cultures* in three interrelated phases: cybercultures, community cultures, and algorithmic cultures. These phases are suggested to be chronological, but not in the sense that any one of them necessarily concludes, rather that particular ideas become dominant, and less so, over time.

Cybercultures

This phase is associated with an increased interest in and awareness of ideas developed in cybernetics and diffused through science fiction literature and film. Key here is the figure of the cyborg, an augmented human being that represents both a cybernetic arrangement of the blurred boundaries between the living and the machinic and a disturbing sci-fi vision of the consequences of increasing technological development. Donna Haraway’s cyborg manifesto (1991) and N. Katherine Hayles’s study of posthumanism (1999) are seminal works in this area, shaping a variety of feminist, sociological, and cultural studies of science and technology. The burgeoning discipline of Internet Studies made influential

connections between this theory and the technologies of the web, perhaps demonstrated most overtly in the *Cybercultures Reader* (Bell and Kennedy 2000).

A key term at this time was cyberspace, a term coined by William Gibson in the cult sci-fi novel *Neuromancer* (1984), which encapsulated a specifically spatial understanding of ideas from cybernetics, often framing web technologies and services in terms of “other worldly” and “virtual” domains. These ideas were also a product of the counterculture origins of many web communities, most notably the Whole Earth ‘Lectronic Link (known as “the WELL”), associated with utopian visions of alternative and emancipatory online spaces. Significant research in this area foregrounded issues of presence, identity, and sexuality, often studying multiuser domains (MUDs), and later virtual worlds like Second Life, proposing the digital as a fertile social space, within which alternative, often unconventional, “selves” could be fostered. This work emphasized “sociocultural” perspectives on technology, as opposed to a dominant “technical” understanding, that merely sought to understand technology by understanding how it worked. In order to study the social uses of technology, more established anthropological approaches were rearticulated, perhaps most notably as “virtual ethnography” (Hine 2000), signaling a need for methodological means appropriate to the exploration of these new cultural domains.

It is through the lens of such work that the broader influences and practices of educational research, under the banner of labels like “e-learning” and “online education,” can be understood critically. Cybercultures thus frame the early enthusiasm for digital education as the promise of the “virtual,” both in terms of space and identity. Advocacy of the “virtual environment” is often grounded in the idea of an alternative domain, capable of fostering individual aptitudes and characteristics, unfettered by the constraints of the physical body or the restrictions of the institution. Correspondingly, the avatars and other virtual personae adopted for such educational pursuits are sometimes considered to imbue the student user with tangible possibilities to escape the

limitations and barriers of physical copresence and embodiment.

These underlying ideas can be traced to the counterculture perspectives of the early web, positioning online spaces as foundationally radical and noninstitutional, and online presence as problematically “of the mind” as opposed to the body, redolent of a Cartesian dualism long dismissed in education. A cybercultures’ perspective thus highlights the need for robust critical approaches in order to counter tendencies for the kind of utopic and emancipatory accounts that often pervade the field of e-learning. This work traces the nuances and actualities of space and place, movement, and stasis in educational uses of the web (Bayne 2004a) and attests to the persistence of the body, and the way it is reconfigured through the digital, rather than simply negated or denied (Bayne 2004b).

The trend for the cyber-prefix has declined, in the wake of a decreasing fascination with the digital as radically other, particularly where technology has become more pervasive. Digital Education has largely shifted away from the phase of cybercultures, toward the view of an educational world in which technology is more firmly embedded, but importantly also more subservient to its human users. In other words, where the cyborg signaled a frightening oscillation between the determinist stances of enhancement on the one hand and a loss of control on the other, the next phase of education and digital cultures reveals a pacification and instrumentalization of technology for predefined social ends.

Community Cultures

The growing social dimensions of virtual worlds were aligned with a broader increase in the capacity for communication and interaction on the web. It is this trajectory that ushers in the phase of *community cultures*. Following seminal works such as Howard Rheingold’s *The Virtual Community* (2000), inspired by experiences of the WELL, work in Internet Studies has strived to make the case for rich and complex social phenomena enacted through the web. Countering more established views of the paucity of online

interaction, and a lack of the intensity and depth assumed in so-called “face-to-face” communication, this research tended to emphasize the dialogue, sharing, exchange, and kinship practices taking place between members of online discussion groups and gatherings. Rather than otherworldly or strange, here the online is warm, friendly, and communal. However, importantly, this stance nudged web technology into the role of instrument, a passive device that serves the aims of its users, and simply facilitates the enhancement of an exclusively human drive for social interaction.

The idea of technical capacity was captured in the notion of “Web 2.0,” a term often used to refer to an increasing emphasis on user-generated content and interactivity found on the web. Thus, in this phase of more mainstream use of the Internet, the technologies of the web tended to be framed in more productive and beneficial terms, as services which acted to support and enhance conventional social life, as opposed to the narratives of alternative “otherworldliness.” Here the concept of the “network” comes to the fore, replacing the spatial inflections of “virtuality” with a much more functional idea of web technology: the invisible means to connect people. Social networks such as MySpace, Facebook, and Twitter were identified as intense sites of contemporary community culture and became the focus of dedicated research, primarily on the grounds of the propensity for public interaction rather than the features of the technology itself.

This privileging of participation over consumption neatly reflected the long-standing educational grounding in dialogue, as well as more recent trends that shifted emphasis away from teachers and toward students, and which sought to understand learning as the social construction of knowledge, rather than individual internalization. Mirroring the mainstreaming of the web, educational institutions were also adopting more digital and networked technologies, which began to move from the fringes of educational provision to more typical institutional offerings. The idea that technology simply provided resource artifacts for teaching and

learning began to be replaced by the idea that technology provided the means for dialogue and communication.

The field of education and technology is often recast around these changing perspectives, perhaps most strikingly in “networked learning,” signaling both the instrumentalism of technology and the reorganization of education around the learning of the individual. In these ways, the communicative potentials of the network are frequently positioned as the solution to the hierarchies, inequalities, and inaccessibilities of the institution. Thus, rather than “virtual” or “otherworldly space,” technology becomes anti-institutional and emancipatory in its capacity to *facilitate* and *enhance* those traits already present in society.

However, bound up in this shift has been a naturalization of “social learning” and a concealment of technology itself, such that learning through communicative networks is often positioned as synonymous with our innate being. The notion of networked learning reaches its zenith in the proposed learning theory of connectivism, which frames the processes of learning as quite literally those of the network. The value of a digital cultures’ perspective is to reveal the broader influences, assumptions, and trajectories bound up in the drive for participative and networked e-learning communities. Such perspectives can account for how the ideas of “socially networked learning” have been constructed, rather than assuming them to be the unquestionable facts of our contemporary educational project.

Ultimately, the centering of community in education problematically positions web technology as the passive instrument of our predetermined educational aims. This overlooks the powerful economic and ideological forces that underpin and shape the technology industry. The drive for technologies that facilitate our “community learning” has simultaneously embroiled education in a Silicon Valley culture, motivated by data acquisition and profit. In this sense, “community learning” can be understood, not simply as the baseline of our natural educational disposition, but rather as a particular construction of the educational

project that has been significantly influenced by both cultural and industrial facets of the web.

Algorithmic Cultures

In response to an exclusive focus on community and culture that renders technology passive and invisible, emerging areas of research are attempting to account for the influence of technology itself and also more nuanced understandings of the co-constitutive relations between humans and nonhumans in education. *Algorithmic cultures* in education can be understood as one such area, focusing specifically on the operation of web algorithms, and the ways these automated, non-human agents influence contemporary educational practices.

This phase draws from a growing interest in the field of Internet Studies, which is concerned with tracing the ways culture is not only being shaped by its human constituents but also by the pervasive algorithms of the web that are increasingly involved in the arranging, cataloging, and ranking of people, places, and knowledge. Well-known examples include the Google search algorithm, which has become hugely influential in prioritizing and privileging certain knowledge, and the Amazon recommendation algorithm, which has significant sway over our buying habits. Alongside such everyday examples, and intentionally hidden from our gaze and attention, algorithms are becoming increasingly ubiquitous actors in the global economy, as well as our social and material worlds.

Critical research, sometimes associated with the burgeoning field of Software Studies, has sought to examine and question such algorithms as guarantors of objectivity, authority, and efficiency. This work is focused on highlighting the assumptions and rules already encoded into algorithmic operation, such that they are considered always political and always biased. From this perspective, algorithms *produce* worlds rather than objectively account for them and are considered as manifestations of power. Questions around what kind of individuals and societies are advantaged or excluded through algorithms become crucial here.

Moreover, because these systems often enmesh automated, individual, and communal decision making in highly complex and usually hidden ways, the results cannot easily be reduced to the intentional agency of any one identifiable human person (whether user or programmer) or non-human algorithm. It is precisely this orientation that has sometimes drawn researchers to theories of distributed and relational agency, such as actor-network theory, or sociomaterial theory, in order to account for the complex layers of activity involved.

Where education has embraced digital networks, the practice of teaching and learning can be understood to be increasingly entangled in algorithmic operations. Such automated processes are highly appealing to education, which viewed from the perspective of neoliberalism tends to privilege objective logic, precision, and transparency as routes to further efficiency, productivity, and accountability. It is notable that algorithms, assumed to provide objectivity and exactitude, are frequently used in areas of high risk and security, and this is precisely where the most prominent example can be found in education: the use of the Turnitin plagiarism detection service at the point of assessment.

However, a digital cultures' perspective provides the means to critically engage with this developing educational trend, rather than assume the transparency and necessity of automation. This critical lens has the capacity to reveal not only the range of assumptions and limitations that are built-in to the algorithmic operations of plagiarism detection but also the broader cultural and political tendencies that are enfolded in the drive for efficiency that pervades institutional education. Looking to the future of education and digital cultures, work is turning to the ways that algorithms not only censor educational content but also work to construct learning subjects, academic practices, and institutional strategies. Perhaps most importantly, this signals a shift away from the centrality of individual or social concerns in education and toward the complex relations between the human and nonhuman

agencies that proliferate in our digitally networked educational activities.

Conclusion

This entry has described three interrelated phases of digital cultures in education, with a view to highlighting some of the key critical themes revealed through the radically interdisciplinary perspectives of cultural studies. *Cybercultures* described how early understandings of the web, often influenced by cybernetic theory and sci-fi literature and film, shaped the ways educational possibilities were presented, often in the form of "virtual worlds." Critical perspectives highlighted the need for nuanced understandings of space, place, and embodiment as digital technology increasingly pervades educational provision. *Community cultures* described the shift toward mainstream Internet use, and the rise of social networks, as well as communicative and participatory online spaces in education. Critical considerations highlighted the political and economic forces enfolded in the rise of networked learning and the broader issues of data acquisition and profit underpinning the technology industry. *Algorithmic cultures* described a current phase in which automated computer operations process data in such a way as to significantly shape the contemporary categorizing and privileging of knowledge, places, and people. Critical perspectives on this "cultural work" included the questioning of objectivity and authority assumed of algorithms and sought to emphasize the ways that educational institutions, practices, and subjects are constructed through these highly complex computational routines.

Each of these phases reveals a particular view of the relationship between human beings and technology, and these orientations are central to understanding the critical dimensions involved. *Cybercultures* tended to emphasize a radical otherness to technology, whether foreign or fetish, such that educational possibilities shifted from utopic promises of virtual worlds to dystopic renditions of human development under threat from machines. *Community cultures* mark a shift in the

framing of technology, replacing strangeness and “virtuality” with the functionality of the social network, reflecting “social determinism.” Here technology becomes subservient to the communicative needs of education (and society), becoming more invisible itself as the mere channels and conduits of socially constructed knowledge. In the third phase, *algorithmic cultures* signal a shift away from exclusively social and human concerns and the attempt to account for the non-human agency of technology in educational practices. Rather than technology being framed as simply the passive instrument of predefined educational aims, here the algorithm represents a much more complex relationship between humans and nonhumans in education, pointing toward an increased entanglement of agencies in the production of knowledge and culture.

Cross-References

- Cultural Studies and Education in the Digital Age
- Digital Learning and the Changing Role of the Teacher
- Digital Learning, Discourse, and Ideology
- Digital Literacies
- Education and Big Data
- Foucault and Educational Theory
- Humanism, Postcolonialism, and Education
- Humanistic Education
- Labor in the Digital Age
- Learning and Media Literacy
- Neoliberal Globalization and Educational Administration: Western and Developing Nation Perspectives
- Neoliberalism and Education Policy
- Neoliberalism and Power in Education
- Networked Learning
- New Media Literacies
- Open Digital Practices, An Overview of
- Resurgence of Freirean Pedagogy in the New Media Age
- Service-Learning
- Technofeminist Lens on Schooling in the Digital Age

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Critical Education and Postcolonialism

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Introduction

Educators and scholars use the phrase “critical education” to refer to many different forms of critique that may be similar to or incommensurable with each other. Even when referring to postcolonial orientations to critical education, there are still a variety of perspectives grounded on

different interpretations of criticality and of postcolonialism itself. Part of the problem with trying to disentangle similarities and incommensurabilities of perspectives is that the dominant academic culture creates aspirations for universal forms of consensus on definitions and “ways forward.” When these aspirations are at work, differences are perceived as obstacles to what is perceived as “progress.” However, from a different perspective, working through incommensurabilities, paradoxes, complexities, and contradictions – working with and through difference – can also be seen as essential and generative in terms of intellectual depth and accountability. This is already an illustration of a form of postcolonial critical orientation that works against the grain of naturalized Enlightenment desires for mastery and intellectual normativity that ground the dominant academic culture.

In this entry, different types of critique, of postcolonial studies, and of critical education and implications for educational research, policy, and practice are outlined. Strategic and performative distinctions are established that aim to amplify differences and nuances between intellectual communities that are generally glossed over. This is done in order to create vocabularies that illuminate both what is visible and what has been absent in recurrent discussions. The distinctions presented here are informed by postcolonial analyses; however, they are educational and performative, rather than normative or representational: they do not aim to dictate what really exists, what one should believe in or the correct path one should take. The distinctions are instead created to displace normalized discussions and imaginaries, provoke new responses, and prompt further critiques (including critiques of the distinctions themselves).

Different Types of Critique

When establishing strategic distinctions, it is useful to use analogies to decontextualize the dominant ways in which a topic is usually approached. Taking art as an analogy for critique can help in

developing new vocabularies to talk about the relationship between knowledge, reality, and representation. In this entry, a strategic distinction between three types of art is proposed: “decorative art,” “naming art,” and “vomiting art.” Decorative art aims to affirm existing imaginaries and discourses by creating something that fits the definition, chains of affect, images, and social scripts around the concept of beauty that is normalized within a particular community (e.g., Rembrandt, Remer, and Ibsen). Naming art aims to expose what a particular normalization leaves out, what is foreclosed, taking people to the edge of what is familiar (e.g., Escher, Velazquez, and Boal). Vomiting art aims to explode and externalize the debris of established/familiar frames of reference in an attempt to liberate its audience for something new, but undefined – aiming to push spectators over the edge, into an abyss beyond the securities of representation (e.g., Kantor, Duchamp, and Schechner).

Reading critique through these analogies, a few different types of critique emerge within and between the intersections of the distinctions. For example, there are decorative critiques that aim to identify and solve problems through established and naturalized parameters of what is possible and desirable, without going beyond these parameters. These types of critique do not problematize the relationship between representation and reality, assuming that, for example, the concept of beauty is universal, but only a selected few are educated to appreciate it or that everyone wants inclusion into a dominant system. A neutral and universal position of the critic is assumed as a point of departure.

There are naming critiques that trace the construction of what is perceived as normal and natural, showing the “aporias” (the hidden metaphysical choices) of (dominant) discourses and practices. They show that dominant notions of beauty, of reality, of goodness, and of the way forward are socially, culturally, and historically situated and that their social production and mobilization are mediated by relations of power and the erasure of alternatives. These critiques problematize the relationship between representation

and reality; however they do it to different extents and with different purposes.

For example, there are types of critique that selectively choose what needs to be deconstructed and often propose ways forward that substitute dominant assumptions about what is real and ideal with assumptions that do not problematize the relationship between representation and reality. Some aim to emancipate subjects by affording agency to representation, often relying on a fixed conceptualization of subjectivity as conscious, transparent, and stable. Other types of naming critique propose that deconstruction should be applied not only to the critique of dominant discourses but to all discourses, particularly discourses proposing alternatives to what is taken to be dominant. This type of naming critique questions the centrality of agency, the stability of subjectivities, and the possibility of representation. Naming critiques do not assume the neutrality of the critic, but do not necessarily open themselves to self-reflexive criticism either.

There are questions as to whether vomiting critiques can actually be performed through logic alone. This kind of critique works beyond the realm of consciousness and logical and rational intelligibility; therefore, if its purpose is to shatter existing frames of reference and not to substitute them with alternatives, it cannot simply work through established referents. In this sense, it shows that naming critiques that rely on logic alone are generally circular: critics have to use the very referents they criticize to make the points they want to make (working within the realm of what is intelligible). However, this limitation is extremely important as it invites readers beyond it, by showing the insufficiency and indispensability of both art and logic, as is illustrated in the next sections.

Different Types of Postcolonial Studies

Postcolonial studies are an interdisciplinary field that originally emerged in literary, cultural, and area studies. It focuses on analyses of and resistance to different past and ongoing forms of colonialism and imperialism deeply embedded in

normalized imaginaries and modern institutions. The field does not offer a unified and coherent theory as such, but a set of questions (Gandhi 1998) formulated to constantly unsettle systemic processes that create and sustain cultural hierarchies, racialized borders, unequal divisions of resources and labor, as well as the definitions of value and merit of cultures and forms of identities and subjectivities. Postcolonialism challenges discourses of assimilation and the ethics of care and responsibility “for the Other” at work in liberal humanist discourses, proposing, instead an ethic of answerability that emphasizes the importance of keeping past and present injustices firmly in view. However, analyses and proposals for how that should happen take different forms. A distinction between two different orientations within postcolonial studies is useful for identifying different types of naming critique in practice.

A Marxist/neo-Marxist orientation deconstructs the production of subjectivities by dominant/hegemonic colonial discourses perceived as a form of false consciousness that affect both colonizers (who believe in the illusion of their supremacy and use it to justify unequal power and distribution) and the colonized (who internalize their oppression by believing in their inferiority). Through structural analyses, power is conceptualized as something that is exercised as force and coercion over less powerful and exploited populations. Liberation (from false consciousness) is equated with historical agency, self-representation, and decolonization as the right to have one’s voice heard in democratic processes. Therefore, through human rational agency, and the pursuit of truth, the oppressed should be able to counter and transcend oppressive forces and achieve a larger and decolonized humanist utopia of freedom and expression through the resistance to and subversion of colonial forces, discourses, and institutions. In this sense, this orientation aims to transform the Eurocentrism of Western humanism to include the marginalized, oppressed, and excluded through their emancipation, empowerment, voice, and agency. The role of the critic is to launch an intellectually normative analysis that reveals the structural injustices of the dominant

system that can be corrected through a commitment to creating spaces where the oppressed can speak and be heard in order to be genuinely included in the dominant system. The works of Young (2003), Guha (1997), and Parry (2015) take this direction.

The orientation informed by poststructuralism and (Lacanian) psychoanalysis complexifies the relationship between the colonizers and the colonized by focusing on the intricate relationship between knowledge, power, representation, and claims of truth. Its starting point is the impossibility of decolonizing humanism, as humanist tenets are traced back to a modern grammar that cannot be disentangled from the ongoing violences of colonialism and imperialism. This orientation exposes aporias at work in any discourse, including hegemonic and counter-hegemonic discourses, emphasizing the impossibility of launching a critique without being implicated in it. This emphasis on the complicity of the critic in that which is critiqued forces the critic to create other languages and subject positions to work with paradoxical relations. As emancipation, agency, and essentialism are problematized and an uncontaminated resistance becomes impossible in this orientation, the imagined way forward is the opening of new possibilities toward what is unimaginable from the “edge” of normalized imaginaries. An illustration of this is the idea of “an uncoercive relationship towards the Other of Western humanism” (Gandhi 1998) that requires an ethical stance of (not) knowing for an ethical imperative toward the Other to emerge, before will (Spivak 2004). This implies a willingness to work through double binds and a hyper-self-reflexive deconstructive stance of learning to learn/work without guarantees or the affirmation of one’s innocence (*ibid*) and the opening of the imagination to a form of ethical imperative that precedes rational thought and intellectual choice. This orientation emphasizes the difficulties of transforming inequalities while inhabiting and being conditioned by modern systems, discourses, and institutions that conceal the violences that subsidize their very existence. Authors that take this direction, like Spivak (1999), Bhabha (1994), and

Said (1993), also contingently make use of Marxist critiques while being critical of aspects of it.

Different Types of Critical Education

The way one defines critical education depends on the way one defines the problem to be critiqued. The fact that “critical thinking” has become an all-encompassing term also complicates discussions, as educators may believe that because they are using similar terms, they are talking about the same thing. In order to clarify different uses, a distinction between three problem spaces of critique is proposed in this entry: soft reform of modernity, radical reform of modernity, and modernity beyond reform.

The “soft reform of modernity” problem space sees modernity as inherently benevolent and sustainable in its overall direction of engineering a world grounded on science and technology that can work for everyone’s well-being. Problems of inequality are perceived as emerging from a lack of modernity found in social groups considered to be behind in terms of human evolution, national progress, or international development. Therefore more modernity is prescribed, often through education, as a cure for these perceived problems. Since modernity is portrayed as a universal critical project that is constantly moving forward, when critical education is evoked as a prescribed strategy within this problem space, it often refers to problem-solving geared toward liberal humanist ideals of assimilation and social mobility/insertion within modern societies perceived as inherently benevolent and desirable.

The “radical reform of modernity” problem space sees modernity as severely limited in its capacity to fulfill its promise of universal well-being, but still recuperable/fixable if more voices are included in deliberations and if excluded people can exercise their agency in democratic processes. Problems of inequality are perceived as emerging in the imperialistic and colonial historical roots of modernity and in ongoing Eurocentric practices of modern institutions and relationships. Therefore, a radical transformation of modernity is necessary to counter historical

legacies and persistent hegemonic tendencies. Critical education is perceived as the means through which this transformation is to be achieved. Criticality is conceptualized as an awareness of the social and historical mechanisms that create inequalities in power, representation, voice, participation, and access to social mobility. Humanism, grounded on a Eurocentric notion of the human, is perceived to be unjust and may be corrected through the inclusion of previously excluded humans. Critical self-reflection and the notion of praxis are used to emphasize the need for self-transformation and the dynamic complementarity of theory and practice.

The “modernity beyond reform” problem space characterizes modernity as inherently harmful, unsustainable, and irresponsible in its illusionary promises as its expansion is inevitably subsidized by “outsourced” violence and exploitation, e.g., having most people in the planet join the middle class would exceed the capacity of the planet to sustain already stretched levels of consumption and pollution. From this analysis of the problem, a few competing possibilities emerge. Some of these possibilities include walking out from dominant systems and institutions (e.g., the deschooling movement), investing in the creation of alternatives (e.g., Gaia education), hacking the system from within, or hospicing the system in order to learn from its mistakes and make only different mistakes in the future (see Andreotti et al. 2015). Critical education within this problem space generally focuses either on delinking from modernity and creating/finding more sustainable alternatives and/or learning from modernity’s mistakes. Criticality is associated with challenging overconsumption, exploitation, environmental destruction, and the quest for status, prestige, identity, influence, and affluence as a universal goal for existence.

Soft reform attributes positivity and universality to the dominant knowledge system, and the same positivity is denied to anything deemed to be outside of this system. Radical reform attributes a level of negativity to the dominant system and positivity to what was excluded and proposes to replace the system’s negativity with the positivity of what was previously excluded. Beyond reform either attributes negativity to the dominant system and

positivity to what is Other to it or refuses to work with the positive/negative binary attributing positivity to this refusal and seeing it as a productive space. In this sense, soft reform sustains a form of hope for the continuation of the current system as it is. Radical reform sustains a form of hope for the expansion and adjustment of the current system. Finally, beyond reform sustains either paralyzing hopelessness, evangelical hope placed in an articulated solution, messianic hope of something inevitable to come, or hope beyond hope of something new that cannot be defined a priori.

While soft reform critical education can be associated with decorative types of art/critique, radical and beyond reform forms of critical education require “naming” things that the soft reform problem space tends to erase. However, while radical reform naming critiques have epistemological dominance as a priority, and beyond reform critiques have ontological dominance as a priority, it is only “vomiting art” that most effectively exposes pre-ontological/metaphysical dominance (where “ontological” refers to beings that exist, metaphysical refers to what brings beings into existence). Marxist/neo-Marxist orientation of postcolonial studies can be mapped onto radical reform, while the poststructuralist orientation operates at the limits between radical reform and beyond reform.

Implications for Educational Research, Policy, and Practice

The distinctions presented so far have deep implications for research policy and practice. To conclude this entry, an outline of some of the implications of different types of critical education is presented, as seen through a (general) postcolonial critique.

Typical soft reform research questions tend to see the status quo as inherently benevolent and universally desirable, while seeing the Other as deficient or lacking. Questions are formulated in instrumental ways with a view to support modern institutions to provide the Other with access to the dominant system as a remedy for his/her lack. The

general orientation for questions is: how can education strategies for the marginalized or excluded be more effective in bringing them up to our standards? In terms of policy, “Education for All” and OECD’s initiatives toward a global standardized curriculum are clear illustrations of the attempt to address deficiencies by affirming an unquestioned and unexamined universal norm. As far as practice is concerned, the search for greater efficiency and (economic and entrepreneurial) innovation through the application of (problem-solving) “critical competencies” also attest to the perceived need to prescribe more modernity to the problems that modernity has created.

Typical radical reform research questions aim to bridge the gap between dominant knowledge systems and the knowledge of the excluded. Empowerment is conceptualized as access to dominant modes of education, knowledge production, and participation. Expanding access is also perceived as an opportunity to transform dominant institutions from within. Therefore, the general orientation includes research questions such as: How does the existing system exclude and marginalize Others? How can we transform the existing system to accommodate the marginalized and excluded? Policies aim to question the universality of Eurocentric knowledges and integrate formerly excluded knowledges and perspectives into the mainstream system. In terms of practice, in different ways, ideology critique is prioritized in exposing the injustice of the dominant system and revealing the correction that the system needs to undergo in order to become fairer.

Typical beyond reform research questions aim to experiment with different systems of knowledge production and ways of being. The search for and experimentation with alternatives is perceived as an urgent educational task, including alternative ways to approach alternatives (Sousa Santos 2007). The general orientation includes research questions like: How have our imaginaries been limited by modernity? How can we imagine knowing and being beyond the rationality, logocentrism, and anthropocentrism of modernity? Policies are perceived precisely as a manifestation of modernistic rationality essential to modern institutions; therefore alternatives to

policy are also a priority in terms of imagining other forms of relationships, collective organizing, and knowledge production and distribution. Drawing on postcolonial analyses, one way of imagining critical education is to conceptualize it as involving two processes that are necessary to open up the imagination to something new and undefined. The first process involves constantly provoking ourselves to perceive the limitations of modernist forms of knowing and being, while not rejecting them wholesale. The second process, which happens in parallel to the first, involves decentering and disarming the Western subject and displacing the obsessive need for rationality and control in order to reignite a pre-ontological visceral (hence prerational) sense of horizontal entanglement with everything and everyone in the world that may, existentially, rearrange desires away from the violences of modernity.

In conclusion, there are two different perceptions of the problem that critical education needs to solve. In soft and radical reform orientations, the problem is perceived as ignorance (as a deficit) that can be addressed and compensated with more knowledge of universal worth (however it is defined). In the beyond reform orientation presented here (and this is only one interpretation), the problem is perceived as one of denial of the contradictions and violences of modernity, expressed as an unexamined attachment to its promises, comforts, and perceived securities. From this perspective, critical education needs to bypass ego-logical defenses in order to support an uncoercive reorganization of affect away from the modernist tenets of separability between elements, bodies, and modes of existence.

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Critical Education Theories

- [Critical Pedagogy, Historical Origins of](#)

Critical Education, American, Canadian

- [North American Critical Pedagogy](#)

Critical Gender Studies as a Lens on Education and Schooling

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Synonyms

[Gender](#); [Postfeminism](#); [Schooling](#)

Introduction

According to *US News and World Report* (2014), women in the USA are surpassing men in earning bachelor's degrees as well as graduate degrees. Women are also making gains in fields traditionally dominated by men. The same report notes that,

"Today, women in their early 30s are just as likely to be doctors or lawyers as they are to be teachers or secretaries" (U.S. News 2014). This phenomenon is not just found in the USA. The *Sydney Morning Herald* (2013) reports that, in Australia, women get more bachelors' and graduate degrees than men. *The Guardian* (2013) reports that, within the UK, not only do women receive more degrees – at all levels – than men, but there are some universities where women outnumber the men 2/1. The MacMillan Center, at Yale University, shows that, *globally*, women are more educated than men MacMillan Center Report (2014). What these reports also reveal is that women still make less than men in general, and they get paid less for doing the same job with the same skill level. Still, one can see how it would be easy to decide that feminism was not needed any more. These statistics validate postfeminist discourses where, supposedly, women are now empowered – maybe even too empowered vis-a-vis men – and any disparity is down to personal choice. Postfeminist discourses prompt the question: Does gender matter anymore?

This entry is a resounding "yes" to that question. Gender still matters; it still matters in schools and other educational spaces. This entry acts as both a survey of remarkable current research that draws on gender as a lens to understand experiences of schooling and education and an argument that gender is still important in education and that postfeminist discourses need to be critiqued and examined more closely. In this entry, critical gender studies is used as a lens for exploring and analyzing the ways that gender is meaningful and shapes experience in schools and other educational spaces.

Critical gender studies, as a theoretical framework, foreground the ways that gender is meaningful for understanding ideology, history, practice, forms of intervention, and oppression, for making the world intelligible, and for informing policy. This entry draws on critical gender studies as a frame for understanding school and education. The school overlaps with, but is also distinct from, education. Critical gender studies illuminate the ways that gender matters in school: the practices of schooling, the curriculum, pedagogy, and interactions between teachers, staff, administrators, parents, and students.

Critical gender studies also invigorates discussions on education as a practice that happens both inside and outside of schooling spaces; as something that is consciously taught by parents, mentors, teachers, politicians, the media, and also something that is subtly coerced by society. This entry highlights some of the new and invigorating scholarship in critical gender studies and explores the ways this scholarship guides toward thinking and practicing differently in regard to schooling spaces, praxis, curriculum, education, and identity-making.

In order to explore research that focuses on gender and educative experiences that happen outside of the school building, this entry first delves into some of the research on gender and informal educative spaces. Next, the entry highlights research on the formal schooling experience in general. Finally, the entry takes a more discrete look at research on gender and the profession of education: teachers and principals. The entry concludes with a brief analysis of the ways this current scholarship pushes against postfeminist discourses.

Informal Educative Spaces

A critical gender studies lens reveals the importance of gender in all places with educative value. Even in more informal learning spaces, gender matters, and a gendered lens reveals the ways that gender shapes identity, beliefs, policies, and practices. For example, Ford (2013) talks about using digital spaces to teach citizenship and organize citizenship activities. She focuses on bringing a black queer lens to citizenship teaching and activism. Ford foregrounds the ways that thinking through citizenship using a black queer lens for exploration allows her to reveal heteronormative and traditional hierarchies, even in activist places that are aiming for inclusivity. Even though Ford's research does not take place in a formal schooling environment, she writes about the educative experiences that happen online. These online experiences teach about the ways that race and gender still shape one's access to power, resources, and a sense of belonging.

Like Ford, other scholars also study the importance of gender in informal learning spaces.

Hughes et al. (2013), for example, study the importance of gender and the experience of summer STEM learning camps. Hughes et al. examined how these camps influenced girls and their sense of efficacy in and desire toward STEM careers. Some of the camps were single-sex and others were co-ed. The single-sex experience was not important for girls' sense of efficacy or identification with STEM careers. What proved to be meaningful was the type of pedagogy that was involved. Pedagogy that focused on identity, empowerment, and normalizing participation among both girls and boys was most meaningful. The type of pedagogy, and the aim to normalize STEM as part of a female as well as male identity, was more important for girls than for boys. Students' reaction to pedagogy was shaped by gender.

A critical gendered lens also becomes powerful when analyzing the issue of climate change and environmental damage. As I have noted elsewhere, climate change and environmental damage have a disproportionate effect on women (Greenhalgh-Spencer 2015). In addition to using gender as a lens to think about the effects of climate change, gender – or gender studies – can also be used to prompt critical analysis of ways to combat climate change and environmental damage. Kaijser and Kronsell (2014) draw on the critical feminist philosophy and practice of intersectionality as a lens for educating toward greater climate change awareness and eco-interventions. Kaijser and Kronsell (2014) argue that it is the feminist practice of understanding intersectionality that guides their focus on localness: local change, local awareness, local education, and local activism. This focus on localness is contra a more patriarchal focus on a top-down development of policies on environmental damage and climate change. Embeddedness in the local pushes against patriarchal notions of capitalism.

Current research not only focuses on the importance of gender or a gendered lens in informal learning spaces but also highlights the importance of gender and a critical gender lens on the site of the school. Gender shapes access to resources, power, and the general experience of school.

Experiences of Schooling: Postfeminist Discourses

The experience of schooling, particularly in the West but also in other regions of the world, is influenced by a growing discourse of a postfeminist world. This postfeminist discourse links in with discourses validating neoliberal ideologies and practices to create a skepticism around the need to think about gender, and women's equality, any more. For example, Ringrose argues that a postfeminist discourse links into a discourse of the "failing boy." Ringrose argues that hysteria over "the failing boy" has supplanted any care for equality for women. She examines the ways these discourses re-center maleness, de-radicalize feminism, and re-center traditional notions of femininity in the schools – particularly in regard to STEM education but also in regard to narratives around test performance in schools. Ringrose argues that postfeminist discourses enable a validation of the lack of women in STEM, as well as a redirection of funding in schools away from women and in support of men. Postfeminist politics of schooling are recreating binaries and influencing schooling policies.

Dosekun (2015) furthers the argument that postfeminist discourses are harming girls and societies throughout the world by focusing on the deployment of postfeminist discourses in developing countries. Dosekun argues that postfeminist discourses are not just discourses in the West. They have infiltrated countries in the Global South. They have interpolated women outside of the "Western" context. The discourse of a postfeminist world influences policies around schooling as well as policies toward economic parity. Dosekun also makes the case that – as a larger concern of educating a global public – we need to critique postfeminist discourses on a global level. We need to push against postfeminist discourse that undermines pathways for girls and women to go to school and have access to equal resources.

Harris and Dobson (2015) make similar claims. Post-girl-power narratives and politics are reinstating patriarchy in countries both inside and outside of the G20. This discourse is infiltrating areas of schooling, media, and economic

policy and has real consequences for identity-making at all stages of life – but particularly in formative stages in school. In videos and textbooks, the idea that we have now reached parity and that gender no longer matters is validated and normalized. When girls fail to have opportunities, fail to have equal access to resources, and fail to "choose" STEM careers, this postfeminist narrative equates any such failures as the fault of individuals (usually the individual girls) rather than a failure of policy, ideology, and practice. Postfeminist discourses connect with neoliberalism to discount any need for policy intervention and activism, instead centering the idea of choice and individual responsibility for access to and enjoyment of resources and an equity of pathways toward learning and fulfillment in life.

Discourses around the STEM gap as an issue of "choice" become particularly problematic when we consider research by Archer et al. (2014) which shows that the STEM gap is a problem of discursive identity. Archer et al. show that there is an entrenched narrative of what a "STEM person" looks like. Discourses of masculinity link in with discourses of whiteness, ability, and middle-class social grouping in order to articulate the STEM practitioner as someone who is male, white, able-bodied, and middle class. If one does not fit into this nexus of categories, then one does not fit into STEM. Archer et al. convincingly argue that STEM pathways are not a matter of choice so much as a matter of identity connected with already established norms that favor white middle-class males. Their research pushes against postfeminist discourses that re-center maleness and validate the idea that disparity and inequality are a matter of personal responsibility.

A critical gender studies lens not only counters postfeminist discourses, it also reveals the shaping power of gender on the experience of individuals in the school.

Experiences of Schooling: The Shaping Power of Gender

Gender contours how one experiences the world and particularly how one experiences the school.

Often, gender links in with other identity-markers such as race, language, geography, religion, etc., to configure how one accesses schooling, how one is seen in schools, and the pathways one takes through schools.

The special issue of *Gender and Education* (V.26, I. 5) is replete with articles on the ways that gender is meaningful particularly as it intersects with a rural context, within the site of the school. Multiple articles in this issue focus on the myriad ways that gender looks different – is practiced in a different way – in rural locations. This is true whether students are in countries in the West or in the Global South. Gender matters for getting to school, for access to curriculum, and for identity-making. Gender matters within the particularities of geography and location. The articles in this issue argue that it is this nexus – of location, culture, and gender – that is most meaningful for exploring practices toward equity and empowerment in education.

There are many other scholars who also highlight the importance of gender and a critical gender lens at the site of the school. Birkett and Espelage (2015) note that heteronormative discourses of masculinity lead to an increase in homophobic bullying in schools. When students identify with traditional notions of masculinity, they are more likely to call names and bully students; these students will bully others by using homophobic slurs.

Traditional notions of masculinity, and the ways these notions influence gender, can also be seen in the physical education classroom. Cameron et al. (2013) use a critical gender lens to examine biopedagogies; that is, they use gender as a way to explore how schools teach about bodies. These authors provide a Canadian-based look at the ways that discourses on what counts as healthy bodies translate into curriculum for both physical education and health classes. Traditional discourses of femininity and masculinity normalize certain body types, sexualities, and practices, and this has gendered implications. In many ways, these discourses reinforce idealized and heteronormative versions of embodiment and indoctrinate students toward this end.

Gender frames the experiences of the school. Traditional notions of gender articulate what counts as masculine, feminine, and normal. Gender contours the pathways one takes, whether they are pathways to STEM fields or other pathways. Gender formats access points: access to schools, access to safe spaces, access to careers, access to help, and access to guidance toward empowerment. A critical gender lens not only allows the excavation of the ways that gender shapes experience of the school in general, it also opens explorations into the professions of the school – of teaching and administration. Gender shapes what it means to be a teacher or a principal.

Schooling Spaces: Teachers and Principals

Multiple scholars have done recent work on the ways that gender configures practices of teaching and school leadership. Gender influences how teachers and principals behave toward each other and to students. Gender also becomes meaningful as a point of intelligibility. That is to say, gender issues and inequities are more easily seen when one pays attention to gender.

This truth can be seen in the work of O'Malley and Capper (2014) who argue that there is a lack of focus on LGBTQ issues and identities on the part of most principals. In O'Malley and Capper's study, principals were more aware of and more prepared to intervene in homophobia in the school when they went through a preparation program or professional development that focused on gender awareness and critical gender studies. O'Malley and Capper (2014) argue that there needs to be a greater focus on preparing principals to understand LGBTQ issues, identities, and policy complications and interventions. The focus on gender is part of advancing causes of social justice and creating a more equitable schooling environment.

Gender also makes a difference in leadership styles, according to Kochan et al. (2014). Principals have different leadership styles and ways of understanding their roles based on gender.

According to Kochan et al., women are more globally integrated with the community. They also have more of a macro-focus when it comes to problems within the school. Women tend to search for ways to bring voices together in order to solve problems. Men have more of a micro-focus when it comes to problems in the school. Men are more focused on discrete tasks and the completion of those tasks. Kochan et al. argue that male and female principals have different ways of interacting with staff, faculty, parents, and students. Gender differences contour how a school is run and the goals of each school.

Gender influences not only principals but also teachers. Gender differences can be seen even in teacher preparation programs. For example, Monaghan (2014) conducted a study on the perceptions of preservice teachers about the importance of gender. Monaghan found that while many preservice teachers believed that gender didn't matter anymore in the workplace, they simultaneously believed that their gender influenced their teaching style and student responses to their teaching style. These same preservice teachers believed that gender influenced interactions with parents and administrators. Many of these teachers have come of age in postfeminist times – and this experience colors their responses. These teachers articulated the postfeminist discourse that discounted gender as meaningful, even as they also articulated ways that gender made a difference in their own lives within the teaching profession.

The beliefs of these preservice teachers – that gender makes a difference in how you run a classroom and respond to students and parents and also that gender makes a difference for how others respond to you – are validated by the work of Sak et al. (2015). Sak et al. argue that there are gender differences in how teachers – and even preservice teachers – deal with feelings of confidence while interacting with others as a professional. Sak et al. were studying whether or not there were differences between males' and females' behavior management plans. While the researchers found that the plans had no significant differences based on gender, there were significant differences in the confidence to carry out

those plans. Particularly when it comes to dealing with parents, it makes a difference if you are male or female.

Conclusion

In the time of Aung San Suu Kyi, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, Angela Merkel, and Hillary Clinton, it is easy to see why postfeminist discourses have so much commonsense appeal. Postfeminism also easily links in with neoliberal discourses that trumpet personal choice as the marker of all difference and access to resources. These discourses, together, aim to re-center traditional heteronormative modes of being and understanding the world. This comes at the expense of equity for all. Postfeminism invokes a sort of gender blindness. This discourse argues that we have already reached equality, and so difference no longer matters and should not be seen or noticed. The above examples of scholarship clearly push against postfeminism and show that gender has an incredible power to shape human experience. Gender still matters, and a critical gender lens allows deeper exploration into the ways that gender contours experience and equity.

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Critical Intersectionality

- [Decolonial Education at Its Intersections](#)

Critical Pedagogy

- [Critical and Social Justice Pedagogies in Practice](#)
- [Critical Theory as Metatheory of Education](#)
- [Feminist Pedagogy](#)
- [Marcuse and Critical Education](#)

Critical Pedagogy and Art

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Synonyms

[Aesthetics](#); [Artworks](#); [Critical education](#); [Visual literacy](#)

Introduction: Critical Pedagogy and Visual Art Discourse

Critical pedagogy has a rich history in the fields of education and curriculum studies. Paulo Freire's seminal text, *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* (1968), is grounded in a Marxist class analysis. It posits education's purpose as mobilizing students to question their social conditions and to assert agency or the capacity to self-manage individually and collectively. Freire's concept of *praxis*, or the combination of critical reflection and action in service of a democratic and emancipatory project, reflects his conviction that education is inseparable from ethical and political concerns. His work set the stage for subsequent, more explicit explorations of race, sexuality, and gender. Drawing on Freire's work and the progressive education movement championed by John Dewey – in which he asserted the centrality of schools in producing a democratic citizenry – North America in the 1980s saw a development in critical pedagogy. This development manifested in the reconceptualist movement among others that incorporated critical pedagogy into curriculum

studies. This integration increased the demand for critical education, a shift that contested the sociopolitical turn to privatization, market-based logics, and austerity measures under Ronald Reagan (USA) and Margaret Thatcher (UK). The reconceptualists and what Henry Giroux identified as the “new sociology of education” (Giroux 1981) consolidated a connection between learning, politics, and the social condition. With its view of teaching as a moral, political, and intellectual practice, critical pedagogy unsettles common sense and highlights the struggle over agency.

Critical pedagogy shares with cultural studies and critical theory its analysis of power dynamics and its resulting social conditions. Beyond merely serving as a technical practice of transmitting knowledge or mastering skills, critical pedagogy transforms knowledge in the context of an ongoing struggle for social justice.

Similarly, art and politics have a long, entwined history. For centuries, visual art has functioned as aesthetic, formal, and sociopolitical critique, challenging dominant structures and conventions. The cyclical nature of the avant-garde, working at the periphery of prevailing discourses and eventually transforming them, illustrates how art at its most political can be defined as intervention. However, art discourses still largely fail to engage pedagogy as a central concern. This critical absence in the study of art in contemporary contexts, particularly as it relates to politics, agency, and social justice, must be addressed because art functions by mimicking or rupturing the dominant regimes of meaning making, power, and the production of subjectivities. The challenge artists and educators face today extends beyond fostering a critical engagement with the structural and ideological forces that shape social conditions; they must also cultivate a space in which critique is tied to action and the possibility of agency in altering those conditions.

The Neoliberal Conjuncture

Contemporary art discourse fails to recognize that pedagogy is central to art as a sociopolitical

process and how it can work to mediate and resist the neoliberal conjuncture. Neoliberalism manifests not only as an economic project but as a political one that normalizes modes of agency, desires, and institutional forms of power that mimic the privatized values and relations of a market-driven society. As Wendy Brown explains, neoliberal “rationality, while foregrounding the market, is not only or even primarily focused on the economy; rather it involves *extending and disseminating market values to all institutions and social action*, even as the market itself remains a distinctive player” (2003, par. 7). A critical investigation of the pedagogical dimension of art begins by looking at socioeconomic and political conditions and how they impact creative production culturally and structurally. An assessment of cultural production scrutinizes what is visible and communicable in the precarious social formations that have arisen since the 1980s under neoliberal structures and institutions. Political and economic formations legitimize creative labor within the parameters of individualism, the accumulation of capital, an economy of affect, and a retreat from an understanding of the common good. Under such circumstances, creative labor is funneled toward private wealth and commercial spheres that threaten those public spaces that promote critical thought.

Art is thereby in its own crisis, because it is depoliticized by marketization and profit-based goals. Simultaneously, digital platforms shift access to media in unprecedented ways, resulting in a massive swell in amateur participation (particularly in photography-based media). While technophilic and technophobic attitudes ascribe positive or negative value to this expansion, the implications are more nuanced: contemporaneity presents a new set of conditions that can either mimic or rupture the underlying sociopolitical inequalities that already exist. By exploring the relationship between critical pedagogy and art, it becomes possible to understand what such shifts imply for economic, technological, and social conditions. Although critical pedagogy is not foreign to academic and activist circles in its application to teaching institutions, it also must be

considered as a public issue, one that functions through cultural processes.

Art as Public Pedagogy

Culture and its production are characterized by "...a dialectical interplay between the class-specific behavior and circumstances of a particular social group and the powerful ideological and structural determinants in the wider society" (Giroux 2001, p. 101). Thus, we must approach visual culture and art by looking carefully at how they are used in constructing subjectivities. By recognizing visual culture as didactic, traditional education expands to include visual practices as part of its repertoire in examining emancipatory political dimensions.

In contemporary Western society, dominance and repression are largely leveraged through the manufacture of consent rather than through violent coercion. The struggle for consent plays out across culture, through the texts, images, and materials consumed and in the practices that construct identities. The so-called culture wars of the 1990s, or the battles waged between conservative and progressive values in education, climate change, reproductive rights, immigration, etc., were conflicts that relied on ideological consent and self-identification. As such, they permeated all aspects of cultural consumption and practice, not only the political realm. This didactically influential role of culture is not new. However, positioning art as central to political education extends beyond critique and becomes participatory when the public engages to effect social change. "Upon artists and cultural workers rests the important job of encouraging and facilitating forms of citizen-based cultural production. This task will necessarily entail the dismantling of old forms of art, arts institutions, and art patronage. For this reason we must contest at every opportunity pedagogies that deny the very real ways that we all both consume and *produce* culture" (Trend 1992, p. 5). Artistic production as a cultural process that depends on context is educative, and so, following the

premises of critical pedagogy, inextricable from questions of ethics and politics.

Every cultural decision is "an educational enterprise" (Williams 1967, p. 15). Raymond Williams's insight is central to understanding that culture comprises the most important educational body, influencing how people learn to negotiate their world and make sense of information to construct meaning. Williams calls this enterprise "permanent education," referring to the educative power "of our whole social and cultural experience. [Permanent education] is therefore concerned, not only with continuing education, of a formal or informal kind, but with what the whole environment, its institutions and relationships actively and profoundly teaches" (1967, p. 15). Cultural communication and consumption are pedagogical; teaching is "financed and distributed in a much larger way than is formal education" (1967, p. 15). Sites of extra-institutional education are where power is negotiated and contested, which Giroux refers to as "public pedagogy" (2011, p. 7). The educative force of culture challenges the assumption that traditional schools are the only locations where education takes place.

Both Williams and Giroux consider the ways in which the pedagogical dimension of cultural practices integrate with social and political forces, how they function as components of sociopolitical hegemony, and how consent is solicited and subjectivities formed. Williams warns that we are seeing "an integration of this teaching with the priorities and interests of a capitalist society... which necessarily retains as its central principle... the idea of a few governing, communicating with and teaching the many" (Williams 1967, p. 15). This integration expands and complicates the field of culture (thought to be inert in traditional Marxist models) and illustrates how cultural practices, institutions, and individuals influence one another. Public pedagogy – and education generally – is never neutral as it is socially located and produced from within systems of power and ethics. Therefore, it must also be understood as political, shaping practices, desires, identities, and struggles.

“Socially engaged” or “resistant” art is generally framed as art as symptomatic of larger cultural concerns, rather than as a central component in the production of our subjectivities and frameworks. Art making functions in a number of mutually reinforcing ways to inform social participation as a pedagogical and political practice. For example, highlighting the pedagogical and political in the production and staging of visual art raises questions as to why some representations have more power than others, how some modes of artistic practice are legitimized and others not, and how some sites of cultural display are valued and others not. By establishing the pedagogical and directive power of visual culture, we can begin to articulate how art is a socially pedagogical process. Art is central to public critique and can illuminate inequalities and oppressive political, social, and economic issues that critical pedagogy is poised to address. Art, however, is not a simply a vehicle for critique; rather, it may be that the current crisis necessitates creative approaches.

Art as Intervention

Jacques Rancière’s *Distribution of the Sensible* helps us understand how engagement with visual art is political. He examines what is included or excluded and heard or unheard, how the visible or invisible is formed through common modes of perception or the sensible, and how they are hierarchically prioritized. What we perceive informs how we structure political relationships, and they change as our perceptions change. How we perceive, order, and use images, for example, changes what we privilege or allow to emerge from the unseen. Aesthetic intervention becomes a political act because it reorders these hierarchies. Rancière’s caution, however, is to abandon any attempt to outline a causal relationship between aesthetics and politics: “We no longer think of art as one independent sphere and politics as another, necessitating a privileged mediation between the two – a ‘critical awakening’ or ‘raised consciousness.’ Instead, an artistic intervention can be political by modifying the visible, the ways of perceiving it and

expressing it, of experiencing it as tolerable or intolerable. . . . Now we must examine the very terrain of the sensible on which artistic gestures shake up our modes of perception and on which political gestures redefine our capacities for action” (Rancière 2007, p. 260). Art as political intervention must be understood as such because it is a cultural practice, determined by social location, history, and participants.

Such rupture provides a space in which alternative social and political configurations become possible. Expanding upon critique, which is only the first half of the equation, art as intervention has the ability to extend the parameters of social organization within which a literate and engaged citizenry can evolve. For example, New York-based artist and activist Caroline Woolard has not only dedicated scholarship to the project of a more equitable socioeconomic structure of exchange but positions artists as central to that project. Founder of Trade School and a creative community barter network OurGoods, Woolard reimagines what kind of exchange might function to rehabilitate public and social networks within an age of privatized services, the commodification of public goods, and ever-increasing socioeconomic precarity. Both OurGoods and Trade School bring together artists and community members to participate in alternative economies that champion civic exchange and mutual responsibility rendered from an ethic of social care. They resist neoliberal configurations that individualize social ills and prioritize market profits. Such artistic interventions can eventually shape the fabric of public values: in 2012, Argentina instated a writers’ pension program, providing support to authors and, more significantly, asserting the importance of creative labor to the civic, political, psychic, and ethical well-being of the country. While other countries champion austerity measures and the evisceration of public infrastructure that includes funding for the arts, programs such as this resist profit-based logics that prioritize quantifiable financial returns, insisting instead on the role of artists as public intellectuals. The writers’ pension is a system for acknowledging the role that artists as intellectuals play in shaping a society and forming its culture,

a way to recognize the public and civic contribution their work makes.

Artists as Public Intellectuals

The public intellectual's work is to provide new skills, expand the ethical imagination, broaden the possibilities of civic life, and engage people in ways that confront them with difficult questions, inviting them to consider new perspectives. Artists' critical interpretations can help us with reflexive analysis – to view the social condition and broaden perspectives. They help us to re-envision what is and what is possible by being “the sensitive point of [their] community,” (Achebe 1988, p. 30). Carol Becker asserts that “[I]n denying artists their rightful place in the public consciousness, we are in fact negating the most creative part of ourselves individually and collectively and in so doing are also damning our future to one without experimentation and the vision needed to give it meaning” (Becker 2001, p. 20). This experimentation and vision are precisely what a democratic citizenry demands: it supports the commitment and the responsibility to question and ultimately to hope.

A central role of the artist is to make the connection between private troubles and larger social concerns, resisting the neoliberal ethic of placing the responsibility for social ills squarely on the shoulders of the individual. It is this act of connecting private and public – this movement between individual perceptions and desires and the world of ideas, events, and everyday life – that begins to reconstitute the public sphere through visual work.

The struggle to do this requires an awareness of artists as public intellectuals who contribute critiques and alternative approaches to political and social issues. Their work factors into public pedagogy in a way that stresses the educative nature of representations, power, and politics. Such work has the potential to politicize public discourses. The sensibilities of artists are “distinctive and important to the well-being of society” (Becker 2001, p. 13), so their artistic interventions and

pedagogical work become a question of social and public good, as recognized, for example, through the Argentinean writers' pension. Critical art that addresses political and ethical concerns has the potential to function pedagogically in service of critical and civic literacy and not merely a source of news or entertainment.

Cuban artist Carlos Martiel engages questions of race as embodied and inscribed by using his own body as the site of art. His performances locate sites of racial violence and struggle on his own body, connecting this intimacy to its structural and ideological basis. His performances are sensitive to the sociopolitical and geopolitical contexts in which they take place. In his work *Ruins* (2015), in Dallas, Texas, he lies naked in a fetal position, while two white men cover him with stones until his body is rendered invisible. In *Ciudad* (2015), performed in Los Angeles, he lies under stones and sediment gathered from different L.A. neighborhoods where people have been killed by police (Fig. 1). At a time in the USA where racialized violence is legitimized by a neoliberal police State and politic of disposability in which people of color are targeted, work such as Martiel's reconfigures the channels through which the public is confronted by and is compelled to confront difficult knowledge. As an artist, he assumes a particular responsibility to take seriously the ethical implications of his own production. Though critical work need not be overtly political, it functions within a didactic relationship that is inherently political (Fig. 1).

This didactic potential of visual art is central to critical pedagogy, which in no way suggests that teachers renounce their authority. In fact, the disavowal of power only serves to obscure it, not change, challenge, or shift it. While critical pedagogy is dialogical, it is also directive, meaning that the exchange between students and teachers (or the public and public intellectuals) is one of guidance: soliciting responses and making the material meaningful by being attentive to the lived realities of the students.

Authority is identified and examined rather than renounced: authority presents itself as the



Critical Pedagogy and Art, Fig. 1 Carlos Martiel. *Ciudad*, 2015. Steve Turner, Los Angeles, USA. © Carlos Martiel, courtesy Steve Turner

possibility to intervene, to teach skills, and to encourage development of agency. The authority of artists is one of intervention as well – to publicly present alternative perspectives that encourage critical engagement and agency. Authority also implies responsibility: the commitment to speak as a public intellectual is to be responsible for one's opinions and actions as an educator. That responsibility is political because it necessitates naming and intervening in power structures that shape the social condition.

The critique of authority in art discourse raises questions of subjectivity, of audience reception, and of participation. While it is important to recognize what the audience brings to a work of art, the danger of an orthodox attachment to reception – the insistence that meaning and significance are open and dependent solely on viewer perspective and taste – is that it degenerates into relativism. Suggesting that people can interpret things any possible way ignores the structuring of options that are available to them; viewer response is not infinite nor is it arbitrary – it depends on the structural conditions and ideological forces that determine those perspectives. A relativist view is abstracted from power; it

ignores why some meanings are more dominant than others. The most potent forms of domination are not only structural and economic but also ideological and pedagogical and rely on elements of belief, affect, modes of identification, and the symbolic dimensions of struggle. Public intellectuals are responsible for contesting this particular form of domination, and artists are particularly poised to address the myriad ways that ideology shapes our social condition.

Conclusion: Critical Visual Literacy

Art as a pedagogical practice establishes connections between discourses previously held separate from traditional pedagogical concerns such as race, gender, and sexuality. Art-making is an intersectional endeavor, with artists connecting and translating between not just public and private issues but ones that span diverse yet entrenchedly connected discourses and subjectivities. Visual culture – and by extension the use, mediation, distribution, and social effects of art – forms an important component of the pedagogical dimension. How we understand our visual world as well

as our role within it must be informed by critical visual literacy. Literacy in this sense is not just about competency but also about interpretation as intervention in the world. It comprehends the pedagogical practice of engagement in a culture of challenging common sense assumptions that are reinforced by apparatuses of power and representation. This means the struggle over agency, not just over images or objects. If art is understood as intervention, then it addresses the educative nature of politics.

The pedagogical work that art does is present in what it communicates through its content and in how it communicates narratives or concerns about the nature of art itself. Visual art inserts itself in the public as a mode of production that is directive; it seeks to mobilize and alter forms of perception and one's relationship to the object, the self, and to others. At best, it connects the issue of visual literacy not only to the possibility of interpretation as an intervention in the world but also to matters of political agency, democracy, and public life.

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Critical Pedagogy and Digital Technology: Postmodernist and Marxist Perspectives

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Introduction

Human learning cannot be thought of without technologies. Yet, while the movement of critical pedagogy has always been interested in educational usage of mass media, in the second part of the twentieth century “there has arguably been less interest in the fourth major platform of the Freirean program – economic development through technological modernization processes” (Kahn and Kellner 2007: 434). At the brink of the new millennium, human society has rapidly become saturated with information and communication technologies. In order to make sense of education in the age of emerging digital cultures, mainstream critical pedagogy has employed two major philosophical traditions: postmodernism and Marxism. Marxism is a social theory that emerges from the late nineteenth century and the works of Karl Marx. (There is also a term “Marxian theory” which stresses the fact that emerged studies follow the work of Karl Marx but not necessarily follow Marx’s teachings in full.) Postmodernism is a late twentieth-century philosophical tradition and broader social movement that criticizes universalism and emphasizes social constructivist understanding of reality. Postmodernism and Marxism are centered around the importance of power relationships; they believe in fundamental importance of progress in scientific and technological achievements; and they share a common goal of overcoming social and epistemic dualisms.

Critical pedagogy is firmly based in the Marxist tradition of the Frankfurt School of Social Science. During 1980s and 1990s, however, postmodernism has attracted significant attention from

critical theorists such as Peter McLaren, Henry Giroux, Michael Peters, Douglas Kellner, and others. With time, their theories developed in various directions. For instance, Peter McLaren leads the way in abandoning postmodern approaches by returning to “the Marxist-humanist trajectory” and the original works of Marx, while Michael Peters’s work is usually associated to postmodernism and poststructuralism (Lăzăroiu 2014: 3916). While Marxism and postmodernism can in many ways be seen as complementary, differences between the two traditions are particularly prominent in relation to the nature of modernity and the relationships between digital technologies and human learning. On that basis, this entry locates the main issues pertaining to the relationships between critical pedagogy and digital technologies in the traditions of Marxism and postmodernism.

Postmodernism, Technology, and Critical Pedagogy

Postmodern societies are typically defined in relation to new ways of production that emerge from technological inventions. Sometimes, “postmodernism” refers to broader cultural and political contexts, while “postindustrial society” (Bell 1973/1999; Touraine 1971) defines more specific political and economic contexts of production in late capitalism. The term “postindustrial” stresses the three phases and the three ways of production. For many centuries, the humankind lived in the preindustrial society dominated by manufacturing. In late nineteenth century, the preindustrial society was superseded by industrial societies based on steam engine. Finally, after World War II, postindustrial societies emerged and brought about new ways of production interrelated with progress in communication technologies and computerization. By and large, postmodernists list information technology as a crucial element of the historical shift towards the postindustrial, network society.

Yet, this period is also defined by other important features. Bell outlines three crucial components of the period: a shift from manufacturing to

services, the centrality of the new science-based industries with the rise of new technical elites, and the advent of a new principle of stratification (Bell 1973/1999). In this new technologically oriented society, claims Bell, technology and science helped in installing instrumental rationality not only as way of production but also as a political form and a ruling model. Such interpretation of history, known as the “endism,” was taken to its extreme by Francis Fukuyama. As opposed to Bell and Fukuyama, Touraine agrees on the importance of the new spheres of life where knowledge, consummation, and culture play a major role in the society. Yet, he sees no agreement between opposed forces in the society and describes new forms of dominance carried by technocratic elites. Clash between workers and capitalists have only become institutionalized and de-politicized, while alienated work remains the foundation of social stability (Touraine 1971). Jameson opposes the very notion of disappearing industrial production and claims that theories of postindustrial society have the ideological mission – to denounce the primacy of industrial production and the omnipresence of class struggle (Jameson 1991, p. 2). He suggests that the postindustrial society is not a new, but a purer stage of capitalism and that the disappearing of traditional social classes is an illusion. This conviction has an immediate effects on political praxis, while reassuring emergence of postpolitical practices (1991, p. 53).

On the fringes of the two mainstream ideological camps, there is a prominent group of theorists and practitioners who claim that digital technology opens new possibilities for implementation of revolutionary ideas. Brought by nonhierarchical distribution of information, the scope of distribution of information is greater than ever. It has become technically possible to open archives, libraries, and repositories of books, audio, and video materials. Such development is related to ubiquitous digitalization of analog information and its decentralized distribution, which reflects to all social strata – including human learning and institutionalized education. Yet, critics point that digital technologies are far from neutral and, moreover, that digital technologies are

dialectically intertwined with the so-called Californian ideology – which essentially reflects, and perpetuates, core values of capitalism (Barbrook 1999).

In regard to the above discussions, critical pedagogy movement is far from coherent. However, based on the rich legacy of its most prominent members such as Paulo Freire and Ivan Illich, critical pedagogy movement approaches digital technologies and the postindustrial society both with positive curiosity and caution. In late twentieth century, an important aspect of accounting for this complexity was through the postmodernist route. At a time, McLaren claims “that the current revolution in social theory demands a new set of critical paradigms within educational theory that can account for the heterogeneity of pedagogical and curricular discourses and complexity of meaning production in postmodern cultures” (1995, p. 188). Similarly, Giroux and Aaronowitz argue that “postmodernism provides educators with a more complex and insightful view of the relationships of culture, power, and knowledge” (1991, p. 133). While recent works by McLaren and other critical educators have significantly developed from hard postmodernism characteristic for late twentieth century, postmodern approaches have significantly informed contemporary critical pedagogy and its relationships to digital technology.

Marxism, Technology, and Critical Pedagogy

Marx’s standpoint on technology is elaborated in his well-known concept of base and superstructure. Marx stresses the central role of technology in the progress of history and describes economic base as the material foundation of the society that includes forces of production and relations in production. Forces of production are technologies, machines, and raw materials; relations in production are class relations between the ruling class and the powerless class (i.e., between slave-owner and slave, feudal lord and peasant, factory owner, and wage-worker). Superstructure, which includes legal, political, religious, artistic, and

philosophic ideological forms of social consciousness, is determined by the base (Marx). This topological concept of the society is linked to historical materialism, which postulates technology as one of the most important elements in society. In the Marxian perspective, material base of the society must be accounted as the starting point of social analyses.

For Marx, the main problem with the capitalist society remains in the base, since the machinery and large-scale industry are in the hands of the powerful elite. “In no way does the machine appear as the individual worker’s means of labour” (Marx 1993, p. 692). Forces of production are therefore closely linked to class struggle. “It would be possible,” he observes, “to write a whole history of the inventions made since 1830 for the sole purpose of providing capital with weapons against working class revolt” (Marx 1976, p. 563). This is simultaneously a limitation, and a progressive force. “At a certain stage of their development, the material forces of production in society come in conflict with the existing relations of production” (Marx 1904, p. 12) – and this conflict causes social revolutions. As a corollary, the social base is the powerful force of social change.

Marx notices an important contradiction within the capitalist mode of production. As capital continuously aims at maximization of productivity, it invests in general intellect, which is responsible for progress in scientific knowledge. Capital allows for an increase in the free time necessary for the growth of the general intellect. But capital allows such growth only in order to maximize profit. Capital is the moving contradiction, since it presses to “reduce labour time for the whole society to a diminishing minimum, and thus to free everyone’s time for their own development” (Marx 1993, p. 708). In the crucial moment, capital is forced to create disposable time: nonlabor time, free time for all. On the one hand, the tendency is always to create disposable time; on the other hand, this time needs to be converted into surplus labor. Capital depends on appropriation of surplus labor. Yet, it must reduce labor time for personal development, which creates opportunities for new inventions. The more this contradiction develops, the more it becomes evident that

the growth of the forces of production can no longer be bound up with the appropriation of alien labor. Instead, workers must themselves appropriate their own surplus labor (Marx 1993, p. 708).

Critical pedagogy has always been based on class analysis. In his later works, McLaren analyses the postmodern turn characteristic for late twentieth-century critical pedagogy, takes a firm stand against “the ironic distantiation and self-indulgent detachment of the vulgar divas of the academy who clearly chose identity politics over class politics (and in so doing became complicitous in the very relations of inequality they officially rejected),” and seeks solution in “a close reading of Marx and Marxist theorists” (McLaren and Jandrić 2014, pp. 806–807). During the first decades of the twenty-first century, many critical educators have embraced similar views. Based on contemporary Marxian thinkers such as Antonio Negri, Michael Hardt, Raniero Panzieri, Mario Tronti, Sergio Bologna, Miorosia Dalla Costa, and Francois Beradi, and classical Marxist critiques of Mas’ud Zavarzadeh, Teresa Ebert, the Marxist humanism of Peter Hudis, Kevin Anderson, and Raya Dunayevskaya, Marxism has entered the works of British educators such as Paula Allman, Mike Cole, Dave Hill, and Glenn Rikowski and then, once again, spread throughout the critical pedagogy movement (McLaren and Jandrić 2014, p. 807). In regard to technology, Marxist thought in contemporary critical pedagogy is still fairly underdeveloped. However, as critical pedagogy has started to blend with more technology-oriented fields such as media studies, Marxist views are slowly but surely shaping the relationships between critical pedagogy and digital technology.

Digital Technologies, Postmodernism, and Marxism

The self-contradictions of capitalism that inevitably bring social and economic revolutions result in Marx’s famous anticipation of a transition from capitalism to communism. While this unfulfilled prophecy has always been under heavy attack,

many believe that Marx merely mispredicted the duration of the transitional historical period – and that digital technologies are an important step towards communism (Barbrook 1999). This creates new utopian visions of digital technologies, which are seen as a melting pot of postmodernism, technologies, and Marxism. Postmodern era is understood as a period of historical transition, where forces of production come into a conflict with relations in production – and this conflict may lead to social revolution. As the only media that allows direct connection of two users without hierarchical mediator, the Internet has radically decentralized production and distribution of information. Based on decentralized media structure, new digital tools have created an initial gap in the capitalist production, especially within extrapolating the surplus value.

Distributive horizontal technologies are extensively discussed within the Marxian notion of general intellect. In order to appropriate Marx’s elaboration of general intellect within the contemporary context, and the concept of public good in particular, Virno, Hardt, Negri, and others have introduced the concept of the “multitude.” Hardt and Negri describe creative forces of the multitude as capable of autonomously constructing “an alternative political organization of global flows” (Hardt and Negri 2000, p. xv). Nick Dyer-Witheford, Johan Söderberg, Christian Fuchs, and others start from similar presumptions and relate digital technologies with long-standing social struggles.

Barbrook directly relates postmodern technologies, and peer-to-peer networks in particular, to the development of “cyber-communism” (Barbrook 1999). Drawing from Marx, he describes the era of *digerati* – the new innovative generation of technology-worshippers. Paradoxically, the advent of the Internet – caused by the Cold War – introduced a form of Stalinism on the West, as Californian ideologists were obsessed with the progress of technologies. The standard teaching of *digerati* – “the ruling of the few will free us all” – heavily resembles the Stalinist ideology and Soviet leadership. Yet, Barbrook also identifies counter-forces in the mechanisms similar to Marx’s general intellect.

He describes the initial conflict within digital technology as the opposition between various gift economies and “market competition at the cutting-edge of modernity” (Barbrook 1999).

The practice of gift economy, sometimes also called “the potlatch,” can be traced from Polynesian tribes. In these societies, instead of accumulating surpluses, individuals gain prestige by giving away their wealth at public celebrations. The main force working against the gift economy in digital media is in defining digital products outside of surplus value. However, that is exactly what happened within the academic community, where – in spite of increasing commercialization and commodification – scientists freely share their findings, as such practices happen to be the most efficient method of progress. Paradoxically, it is the very practice of academic open sharing that created digital technologies as we know them. Upon entering the marketplace, however, these practices have created the conflict within capitalist mode of production – and this conflict is one of the main defining features of the contemporary Internet.

This conflict can be illustrated using three examples. The first example is peer-to-peer networks. Radical democratization of distribution of information, presents on these platforms, initiates one of the greatest conflicts within capitalist mode of production. Development of bourgeois society is accompanied with the logic of industrial production and the logic of production of standardized, unified copies, protected by copyright. Peer-to-peer networks clearly endanger copyright and create the initial contradiction in the capitalist mode of production and extrapolation of surplus value within the postindustrial society. The second example of the digital technologies as novel forms of Marx’s general intellect is within the commons. In a broad sense, “commons” are all goods that (should) belong to everyone – however, capitalist mode of production tends to privatize all commons. Taking information as commons, therefore, another contradiction of late capitalism is that “information wants to be free but is everywhere in chains” (Wark 2004, p. 126). The third example is the free/libre/open source software. Usually distributed under so-called copyleft licenses, such

software promotes free usage and modification for as long as it is distributed under the same conditions.

The identified conflict is highly relevant for critical pedagogy. In order to capture its full complexity, postmodern understandings of digital technologies are dialectically intertwined with Marxist concepts. Radical democratization of distribution of information is directly linked to critical emancipation; understanding of information as a commons is prerequisite for equal opportunity; the free/libre/open source software is a convivial tool which removes the differences between producers and consumers of technology (McLaren and Jandrić 2014, pp. 814, 815) – and these examples are just the tip of the iceberg. The self-contradictions of capitalism continue to transform various social practices such as the traditional industrial notion of copyright. However, at present, they still seem to avoid direct large-scale conflict with the capitalist mode of production.

Conclusion

Postmodernism and Marxism arrive in diverse forms and traditions that have continually informed each other in the context of contemporary critical pedagogy and its relationships to digital technology. Therefore, postmodernist and Marxist insights cannot be viewed separately from each other. In words of Michael Peters,

These labels ‘revolutionary Marxism’, ‘postmodernism’ and ‘poststructuralism’ should be not taken too literally in my view. The process of identification by association can be scary but like any stereotyping mechanism we can and should reject these broad descriptions as being definitive of philosophical identity and work instead with what scholars say — we should follow the arguments. (In Lăzăroiu 2014)

Certainly, there are many tensions between (various forms of) postmodernism and Marxism. Postmodernists may look down to Marxist belief into the inevitable arrival of communism; Marxists may struggle against postmodern primacy of identity politics over class politics. However, problems of contemporary capitalism require theoretical

engagement with alternative futures, while class politics cannot be thought of without identity politics – and vice versa. In the age of digital cultures, postmodernism and Marxism should be understood as inherent parts of critical pedagogy and its relations to digital technology – and the ones that might be instrumental in the never-ending process of its reinvention.

Cross-References

- [Digital Learning, Discourse, and Ideology](#)
- [Educational Theory: Herbart, Dewey, Freire, and Postmodernists](#)

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Critical Pedagogy, Historical Origins of

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Synonyms

[Critical education](#); [Critical education theories](#); [Social change](#)

Introduction

Not all of the core ideas of critical pedagogy are brand new. Like any other new perspective, critical pedagogy is built on previous theories and ideas. For example, the idea of constructing knowledge *with* students was already present more than 100 years ago in John Dewey's idea of "experience" (1902) and more recently in constructivism (Vygotsky 1978). The idea of schools-as-change agents is not new either. In the early twentieth century, social reconstructionism was based precisely on the idea that schools can and should effect social change (Counts 1932). More recently, we can find the same idea in the civil rights movement and multicultural education. True, one may say that critical pedagogy is more overtly political than the progressive education movement, constructivism, or multicultural education. Yet it is undeniable that there are some similarities among these educational theories. Besides, there were individual teachers who were actually practicing critical pedagogy in their classrooms well before the term critical pedagogy was invented! Why then was this new name critical pedagogy coined? What were the historical contexts that gave birth to critical pedagogy? If many of its ideas are not new, where can we draw the boundaries for critical pedagogy? This entry explores the historical context for the origin of critical pedagogy. The origin is important to understand, because it has shaped what critical pedagogy is and has become – its identities, its foci, its agendas, its politics, and its projects.

The Foe: Mainstream Education Paradigm

One good way to understand what critical pedagogy is *for* is to figure out what it is *against*. It is apparent that critical pedagogy is against the mainstream education paradigm. By and large, critical pedagogy rejects two major premises of the mainstream education paradigm. The first premise is the idea of schools as the “great equalizer.” In the mainstream education paradigm, schools have largely been considered meritocratic institutions, which provide equal and fair opportunities to all students. Critical education theories point out that schools have never provided equal opportunities to all, and although educational opportunities have expanded over time, there are various mechanisms in schools which discriminate against some students who are considered to be the “others.” Furthermore, they argue, schools play the function of reproducing the existing inequalities and of legitimizing this reproduction. That said, there are different positions among critical pedagogues. Some critical pedagogues agree with the liberal’s position, which sees the outcome of inequalities in school as the exception (due to an imperfection of the school system). However, there are other critical pedagogues who see that schools are set up to re/produce unequal outcomes, and therefore, inequalities are not “unintended” outcomes. To put in another way, there is a more liberal version of critical pedagogy and a more radical version of critical pedagogy.

The second idea to which critical pedagogy objects is instrumental reasoning. One essential perspective in the mainstream education paradigm is seeing schooling as a means to an end, both for individuals (such as, for getting a better job) and for the society (such as, for economic development or nation building). Critical pedagogy criticizes this instrumental rationality and reification, which leads to dehumanization and oppression. Instead, the critical education paradigm tries to transform schools for humanization and for social change. While the mainstream perspective views schools basically as institutions to maintain the existing social system (via improvements and reforms), critical pedagogy views schools as

social institutions that should seek to change the society. This difference on the role of schools is ultimately due to how each paradigm views the society at large. If one views the society as equal and just, the role of schools would be to socialize its members in order to maintain and reproduce the society. But if one sees the society as unequal and unjust, then the role of schools would not be to reproduce the existing unstable social system, but to change it for the better. Because of its opposition to a technocratic framework of the mainstream paradigm (focusing on the how’s), critical education/pedagogy is fundamentally and inevitably a “political” paradigm which focuses on power and its relations to education.

The Counterpart: Neo-Marxist Education Theories

As Wallerstein (2004) points out, new perspectives are better understood if we think of them as “a protest against older perspectives” (p. 1). The counterpart for critical pedagogy is the earlier critical theories, especially neo-Marxist education theories. So, what is it about neo-Marxist education theories that critical pedagogy is protesting against? During the post-civil rights era, a renewed interest in critically examining the larger roles of schools in the capitalist society emerged. Contrary to the liberal belief that schools reduce inequalities, Bowles and Gintis (1976) maintain that education in a capitalist society (in the USA in this case) reproduces fundamental economic inequalities. Subsequent critical education theories have tried to elaborate Bowles and Gintis’ work, by venturing to explain how the reproduction process occurs through schools. They have employed the works of Gramsci, Althusser, and Stuart Hall and have introduced new concepts, such as cultural capital, hidden curriculum, and ideology/hegemony (Bourdieu and Passeron 1977; Apple 1979; Carnoy and Levin 1985). The main claim of these works is that the school, as a part of the culture/superstructure, plays a significant role in re/producing and legitimizing the hegemony of a capitalist society.

Neo-Marxist theories have been very successful in providing powerful critiques of schooling. However, what they have not been very successful at, and thus have been frequently criticized for, is presenting feasible alternatives of schools-for-social change. If education and politics are primarily determined by the economy as argued by Bowles and Gintis (1976), many educators lament that there would be little that could be done in schools to change society in any fundamental way (except, of course, an economic revolution of sorts). It is this lack of alternatives that prompted the emergence of critical pedagogy in the 1980s. Critical pedagogy attempts to correct the deterministic and pessimistic conclusions of neo-Marxist theories and to transform a “language of critique” into a “language of possibility” (Giroux 1997, p. 108).

The very identity of critical pedagogy was formulated as reactions to neo-Marxist theories. However, the reactions vary from critiques, to further elaborations, to rejections. In some respects, critical pedagogy has been about the elaboration and extension (thus, continuation) of earlier critical education theories, and in other ways, it has been about differentiating itself from neo-Marxist theories. As critical pedagogy emerged in order to counteract the structural and economic determinism of earlier critical educational theories, it is only logical that critical pedagogy has turned to *agency* (against structural determinism) and to *culture* (against economic determinism). These redirections have led critical pedagogy more toward microlevel politics (individuals, classrooms, and teachings), where educators supposedly have direct impact. This is not to say that critical pedagogy theorists have promoted only microcentered pedagogy and politics. However, as it stands today, much of the critical pedagogy literature and praxis tends to focus on classroom pedagogy and agency.

The Savior: Paulo Freire

From where, then, did critical pedagogy find the “language of possibility”? Critical pedagogues turned to various theories; however, many would

agree that it was from Paulo Freire that critical pedagogues ultimately found the language of hope. Why did critical pedagogy turn to Freire? The obvious reason is because he offered the elements of hope and possibility. Rather than viewing schools as a mechanism of social control and reproduction, Freire argued that education could be liberatory even within the most limiting circumstances. He saw education as the practice of developing a critical perception of reality among learners/participants, which could effectively lead to what he called “conscientization.” Freire appealed to critical pedagogy because he offered “not just a narrative but also a methodology of liberation” (Lissovoy 2008, p. 11), with steps to follow, which he called “a methodology of conscientização” (Freire 1997, p. 85).

While Freire offered a pedagogy of hope and transformation, there are some challenges and problems in adopting Freire in critical pedagogy. One challenge is that Freire’s key concepts – history, humanization, critical (dialectical) perception of reality, and the relationship between the object and the subject – cannot be correctly comprehended without background knowledge and understanding of Marxism. However, the Marxist basis in Freire’s thinking often eludes readers, and this is why, as Allman (1999) argues, Freire has been so often misunderstood and misapplied as just a teaching method. Unfortunately, this misunderstanding and misuse of Freire still can be seen in some critical pedagogy literature.

There are other issues with how the utilization of Freire directed critical pedagogy into certain directions. Since Freire’s main focus was on transforming the consciousness of individuals, critical pedagogy tends to focus on individualized projects. Also, his emphasis on cultural action and cultural revolution influenced and directed critical pedagogy towards cultural politics. That said, it should be noted that the dominance of cultural politics in critical pedagogy is not exclusively due to the influence of Freire (more on this below). Rather, this “cultural turn” was a general trend which influenced both Left politics and academics since the 1970s. In addition, there is an issue regarding the relationship between pedagogical projects and political projects. Freire sees pedagogical projects

as an essential part of political projects, yet he also makes clear that pedagogical projects (critical perception of reality) do not necessarily lead to political transformation. However, because Freire's works largely focus on pedagogical projects, it is easy to neglect other conditions for liberation in critical pedagogy, which in turn can thwart the discussion of how pedagogical projects could actually lead to political projects.

The Contour: Postmodernism

At the time when critical pedagogy theorists were trying to find an alternative education (language of possibility) apart from and beyond neo-Marxist education theories, a sea of change was surging. Since the late 1970s, critical theories have been moving away from Marxism (or a version of Marxism, called by various names such as, structural Marxism, material Marxism, orthodox Marxism, or vulgar Marxism), and a new kind of critical theories began to get more circulation. This was the rise of posttheories: poststructuralism, postmodernism, and postcolonialism. Critical pedagogy was heavily influenced and shaped by this wave of change.

One key influence of postmodernism is to position culture at the center of critical pedagogy. For instance, McLaren (1995) defines critical pedagogy "as a form of cultural politics" (p. 42). While the approach to culture in critical pedagogy is diverse, from as a medium of discipline and social control to as a site of resistance and possibility, the current use of culture in critical pedagogy sways more towards the resistance/contradiction/rupture approach (Cho 2013). This is partly due to their attempt to overcome the seemingly pessimistic position of earlier Marxist theories of education. In a way, culture has rescued the critical theories of education from a no-solution alternative. However, the problem is that these studies tend to glorify the power of culture in transforming society. Overresistance and overcontradiction are not the same as the crumbling of social system.

The other contribution of postmodernism is a new understanding of subject formation. Contrary to

Marxist theories, poststructuralists see subject formation as much more complex, indeterminate, and loose. According to poststructuralism, subject formation involves more than and beyond ideology and consciousness (ideas and beliefs), which includes feelings and desires. Therefore, subjects are not only more complex, but also more fragmented, floating, and indeterminate. Poststructuralist's keen attention to subject formation – infusing concepts from psychoanalysis – provided a sensibility to other forces (more than class) that shape our subjects. This was a much welcomed idea particularly for feminists and antiracism scholars.

As critical pedagogy is deeply couched in postmodernism, there exists an irony. At its core, postmodernism is a discourse of incredulity or impossibility (Lyotard 1984). Postmodernism rejects the Enlightenment projects of modernism, and at the same time it is a skeptic and critique of the revolutionary projects of Marxism (they call Marxism a "high" modernism). So, it is an interesting twist that the quest of critical pedagogy (language of possibility) ended up with and at postmodernism (discourse of suspicion). There are two positions on how to combine these two seemingly contradictory discourses. On one side, the so-called critical/resistant postmodernists incorporate postmodernism without giving up "possibility" as its ultimate objective. On the other side, other poststructuralists and postmodernists in critical pedagogy object to the very idea of possibility as "totalizing" and "moralizing" (Sidorkin 1997; Gur-Ze'ev 1998; Biesta 1998).

The Challengers: Feminism and Postcolonialism

Almost immediately after critical pedagogy emerged and its ideas were circulated, feminists (that is, white feminists) began to challenge critical pedagogy as being based on liberalism/modernism, which is a male-oriented theoretical construct (Ellsworth 1989; Luke 1992). Based on this critique, they have presented "feminist poststructuralist theories" as a better direction for critical pedagogy. The emphasis on multiplicity and the subject formation in the poststructuralism/

postmodernism is a right fit for feminists who have been looking to carve out space for their assertion. Thus, Michel Foucault has become their favorite, competing against or dethroning the old symbol, Karl Marx. While feminists have been successful in pioneering the introduction of poststructuralism and postmodernism into critical pedagogy, they have not been as successful in presenting alternatives. It is not clear where critical pedagogy would go in the end, if it rejects, as these feminists have promoted to do, basic conceptions that underlie critical theories, such as social justice, equality, and democracy. For instance, if we acknowledge that social justice is a modernist/liberal concept and thus to be abandoned, then what would and should be the guiding concepts for critical pedagogy? Or ought we not to search for guiding principles?

Along with feminists, there is another challenger of critical pedagogy, and they are antirace theorists. Many have already pointed out that critical education and critical pedagogy do not adequately address the issue of race (Hooks 1994; Leonardo 2002; Allen 2004). However, they argue that the class-based political foundations of critical pedagogy have remained intact, and thus the question of race has played a secondary role in the development of critical pedagogy. Similar to feminism's entry into critical pedagogy with poststructuralism, race has also entered critical pedagogy with postcolonial theories. To simplify to the core, poststructuralism is a study of the relationship between power and knowledge. Recent race studies took poststructuralism in their theoretical frames and inserted race and colonialism into the equation. Thus, postcolonialism is, in essence, a study of the relationship between *colonial* power and *colonial* knowledge (Loomba 1998). Because of its focus on knowledge, postcolonial studies gear heavily towards discourse, culture, and superstructure (as with postmodernism in general). We can see this in the fact that the three masters of postcoloniality (Said, Bhabha, and Spivak) are all literary theorists, which is by no means a coincidence. While postcolonial theories have introduced and guided critical studies to a much needed deeper understanding of race, the lop-sided focus of the culturalist approach has

been criticized for neglecting the structural and materialist understanding of race.

Countering the class-centered approach of Marxist theories, feminists and postcolonialists argue that there is no one center, but multiple marginalities, and the significance of any marginality is contextual, not predetermined. Acknowledgment of heterogeneity can be a sensible antidote against sexism, racism, and Eurocentrism. However, cultural/identity politics of postmodern feminism and postcolonialism tends to lead to fragmented and single issue-based praxis, and they generally takes the form of anti-State strategies (as has happened in the New Social Movements). And these politics, as some critics warn, may not be a proper position to fight against powerful global capitalism.

Concluding Remarks: The Boundary Issue

What was described above is historical origins of critical pedagogy as a *field of study*, not of critical pedagogy as an *idea*. As stated earlier, the idea of critical pedagogy existed long before the emergence of critical pedagogy as a field of study in the 1980s. This leads us to the questions of critical pedagogy's boundaries. How do we decide which are critical pedagogy and which are not? Who are critical pedagogues and who are not? Some people see critical pedagogy as mainly about teaching (pedagogy in the narrow sense) and thus focus on the microlevel. On the other hand, there are those who see critical pedagogy more on a macrolevel, focusing on the broader power relationships between schooling and society. To put it differently, the microposition gives its credence to critical *pedagogy*, while the macroposition emphasizes *critical* pedagogy.

Regardless of where one sees the boundaries of critical pedagogy to be, there have been some crucial changes in critical education, with the emergence of critical pedagogy. The search for alternatives/possibility and the influence of postmodernism have directed critical pedagogy into more on the microlevel (individuals, classrooms, and teaching). This is not to say that critical

pedagogues have only promoted microcentered pedagogy and politics. Many critical pedagogues are aware of the extant systematic problems and desire more fundamental changes to the system. However, critical educators are overwhelmed by the amount of work required for such systematic change. How do we change the system? Is it feasible to abolish capitalism? This all seems simply too much to even begin to imagine. Thus, critical pedagogy has ended up concentrating on schools and classrooms and emphasizing the “process” (how to do critical pedagogy). In its emphasis on the process, the process itself becomes the goal of critical pedagogy. In other words, a microlevel focus tends to lose track of the prize, which is social change; however, one defines it.

Critical pedagogy has thrown the necessary question to critically minded educators: What are our alternatives? Isn't it time for critical educators to present alternative/counter-hegemonic visions of education? Of course, this is not a new question. For a long time, critically minded educators have been working on this very question. Yet critical pedagogy has pushed us more forcefully to rethink and refocus our energy for “alternatives.” Due to the discourse field and theoretical trends at the time of its birth, critical pedagogy has ended up with a lop-sided focus. However, despite its flows, the question that critical pedagogy has thrown to us remains the right one: “What is our alternative education?”

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Critical Perspectives on Postfeminist Discourses

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Synonyms

Class; Feminism; Gender; Intersectionality; Postfeminism; Race

Introduction

Postfeminist discourses emerging in the political economic sphere in the early twenty-first century frame gender equality as nonthreatening to the status quo. Such discourses appeal to the next generation of young people by making requirements for enhancing gender equality seem simple, practical, and typically noncombative. In the political domain, the United Nations He-For-She initiative (UN Women 2016) asks people to take basic individual actions to promote and express personal commitment to gender equality around the world, for the benefit of both men and women. Sheryl Sandberg's *Lean In: Women, Work, and the Will to Lead* (2013) encourages women to succeed more equally with men in workplaces, by literally and figuratively leaning forward, at the meeting table and within the larger workplace community. Such perspectives have provided fertile ground in the new feminist or postfeminist landscape, gaining much international attention and reverberating in discourses of the nonprofit sector and other spheres, particularly education. However critical perspectives have accompanied this rise in new or post-feminism. Critics contend such discourses offer a deficiency model of gender equality that partly blames women by focusing on their internal change. They also observe in the new landscape tendencies of gender binary essentialism and universalization of women's experiences. Such critical views promote attention to structural and postcolonial contributions to discussions of equity and gender in diverse educational contexts.

Leaning in Versus Structural Gender Inequity

Lean In represents a key text (or texts, as it is expanding in scope and volumes) that exemplifies the emerging postfeminist discourse, becoming a main reference point for addressing gender equity particularly (but not exclusively) in Western societies. *Lean In* has as its main focus the inner world and habits of women and girls. Leaning in as energetic, assertive action is symbolically and

literally recommended by Sandberg. While women can tend to be shy and hesitant while at work, Sandberg argues women must be more proactive in demonstrating commitment and teamwork in order to not be seen as unresponsive, less committed, or less valuable than more vocal and assertive male counterparts. Though Sandberg concedes that external factors also play a role in gender inequity at work, such as sexism or other bias or prejudice, changing larger structures is not emphasized in the text.

In not challenging the status quo or environment, responsibility thus lies with individuals. Women are encouraged to think and be more like men to get ahead. However, critics note that this is at best a partial solution. Successful and assertive men are better liked in workplaces than woman counterparts, as Sandberg acknowledges. Meanwhile women are observed widely to walk a tightrope line to be ambitious without being perceived as pushy, selfish, or bossy, as they are still judged against gendered expectations of nurturance, softness, and sensitivity in work environments. Similar findings have emerged in education, where women continue to be seen as "other" as academics and intellectuals, by both students in teaching evaluations and by colleagues, and face competing pressures to be likable and engage extensively in service and teaching work, while also being assertive and authoritative in order to succeed (Aiston 2011). Such pressures impact employment and promotion in education, reflecting institutional bias rather than personal deficiency of women as individuals. From this perspective, women cannot win simply by acting like men, and women should not be held responsible for gender inequality challenges they cannot resolve single-handedly.

In contrast, He-For-She emphasizes men's roles in gender equity, in higher education, and other spheres, recognizing that women cannot resolve inequality alone. It suggests that it is in everyone's interest to reject a gender binary, in personal interactions and public and professional engagements: through personal pledges and condemnations of gender-based bullying, for example. This reflects an emerging view that the individualistic, masculine-associated traits

associated with Western workplaces and Western education, such as competitiveness, assertiveness, argumentativeness, independence, and rationality, have often been promoted to the neglect of what are seen as feminine traits that should also be seen as valuable in men and throughout diverse organizations. *Quiet* (Cain 2013) acknowledges how the neglect and underestimation of reflective, subtle, introverted, caring, and/or communitarian traits in Western societies (particularly the United States) can harm communities, including professional organizations. Relational approaches to education and policy emphasize how caring for others is essential to well-being despite its irrelevancy to capitalist production or raising scores on standardized tests. Such caring approaches to ethics, often cast as “feminine,” emphasize being attentive, responsive, and respectful to others, interpersonally and globally, as vital practices for aiding others to flourish and for relieving suffering (Noddings 1984). Such views raise awareness that gender equity is not simply a matter of changing women to be like men, as the social conditions of society should be problematized, which enable the unequal status quo.

What Kind of Woman?

In asking women to be confident like men to get ahead, *Lean In* and related discourses also promote gender essentialism, which treats women as naturally more nurturing, generous, and sensitive, and men as more strong, brave, powerful, and shrewd. Yet as Judith Butler (1990) elaborated, we *perform* gender rather than being born with it. Individuals with gender dysmorphia, or who undergo sex or gender changes, vividly demonstrate how gendered traits exist on a spectrum rather than as a binary set of “male” and “female” traits (Feinberg 1993). Their experiences also reflect how men and women face very distinct expectations in the contemporary period, with women experiencing in particular resistance to their expertise and authority based on gender (Feinberg 1993).

Furthermore, postfeminist discourses like *Lean In* reflect white, Western, elite cultural

expectations. Sandberg does not discuss race or class substantively (though she acknowledges that women of color face worse conditions than white women in her home country, the United States), but her knowledge clearly stems from contexts dominated by wealthy white men. Postcolonial thinkers likewise critique feminism, past and present, as primarily a field of white women who conflate their experiences with those of all women globally. Such gender essentialization produces a status of victimhood upon women, without considering the experiences of non-Western women. At the same time, historical relations have framed “Western” as powerful over the colonial subject. Women of color thus face forms of racial and ethnic oppression that distance them from Western women and unite them more with men in their communities. Though girls and women doubtlessly face challenges across societies and communities, their struggles are not homogeneous worldwide.

Within societies, gender expectations are different across races and ethnicities. Racism and ethnocentrism can play a role in the structure of gender norms and expectations. This gives pause to women of color in joining a universalist, essentializing white feminism, like *Lean In* (hooks 1990). Such assimilatory discourses neglect how women of color are impacted and harmed by expectations based on race and racialized notions of gender. Presumptions of sameness across race and neglect of racialized gender identities are critiqued in postcolonial discussions of voice, wherein women academics of color report pressures to share themselves with white women, educating white women about themselves, instead of engaging in more vital work (Lugones and Spelman 1983). In educational contexts, women of color may also experience a double bind of guilt and pressure from their home communities or families, for changing their culture, if they assimilate to be accepted according to white (or white woman) norms. For instance in higher education, they may face pressure to not appear “too” emotional, passionate, or angry, while acting appropriately assertive and authoritative. Distinctly from white women, women of color are caught between appearing overly passionate or

incompetent. In this context, “leaning in” is less helpful advice and reflects not just expectations to support a male-dominated workplace but also a white-dominated one.

Social class is another factor related to inequity in society and education that intersects with gender (and race). The significance of class is often overlooked in liberal democratic societies and contexts that idealize meritocracy as having eliminated oppressive material inequality. Additionally, class is less visible and more fluid, as education can move one from working class to middle class (Jackson 2014). However, family socioeconomic background correlates with educational attainment, employment in education and other fields, and with the prestige of one’s institutional affiliation and position. First-generation and working-class academics, including white women and women of color, also must adapt to cultural expectations in ways that can stifle their sense of personal identity. One may have to decrease passionate, emotional communication and change their sense of humor. Vocabulary, accent, and dialect become markers of deficiency to hide. As working-class students and academics acquire cultural capital, they can face inferiority complexes or imposter syndrome, recognizing the wealth of knowledge on how to succeed differentially provided to better-off peers and colleagues. As with racialized identity, women academics from disadvantaged economic backgrounds can feel a sense of loss and pressure from family who do not understand the norms and realities of higher education.

Many other factors beyond gender, race, and class impact success in society and education, including sexual orientation, size, age, ability, language, and religion, and so on. Though space does not allow for a comprehensive analysis of such factors, each makes a difference for one’s overall identity and gendered identity, including the way one is expected to communicate verbally and nonverbally and interact with diverse others. However, *Lean In* and related discourses which promote personal responsibility-taking inequality and assimilation to the status quo emphasize traits desired or most effective for white, able, heteronormative, culturally (linguistically and religiously) mainstream, thin, middle-class and

elite-class women, in Western, white, male dominated professional settings. Instead of encouraging women to assimilate within such contexts to get ahead, critics charge that educational and organizational leaders should understand intersectionality of identity (intersecting and inter-related norms and expectations related to social markers like race, class, and gender) and recognize the challenges minorities face.

International Perspectives

Postfeminist discourses such as *Lean In* are also difficult to meaningfully translate across national contexts, despite their increasing global influence and appeal. In the first place, *Lean In* reflects an optimistic, positive psychology-influenced view that is particularly embraced and promoted in the United States. The values associated with this view are not unproblematic, as they can be seen to exaggerate individual responsibility over more balanced views of one’s potential and the possibilities at hand. Realism can be eschewed in favor of idealism despite structural obstacles to enhanced equity for all (Ehrenreich 2010). Such positive thinking can thus lead to neglect of complexity and structural challenges, particularly in aspects of social life such as the economy. Evidence about the power of positive thinking in areas of life like medicine and employment (i.e., staying optimistic in order to enhance health or get a job) remains inadequate, while motivational speakers and coaches sell guidebooks and seminars to capitalize on positive psychology’s claims (Ehrenreich 2010).

Furthermore, regardless of the merits and demerits of American values and virtues, smiling, projecting confidence in times of uncertainty, and boasting of oneself are less vital to individual success in international contexts (Gudykunst 2003). First, while a deficiency mentality regarding gender equality reigns in the United States, expectations about gender at work differ across countries. Women in different countries in Africa or Asia may be rewarded less for acting like male counterparts and more for having “feminine” characteristics while at work. Additionally, hierarchy can matter more in non-American contexts

to perceptions of competence and excellence. In many Asian and African contexts, the need for senior colleagues to “save face,” for instance, can limit the value of a junior colleague, regardless of gender, providing feedback casually, with optimism or direct ambition. Such expressions may be a liability in various high-context cultures. Thus, as social relations and identities vary across cultural contexts, leaning in could be a liability in some international environments.

Finally, norms around smiling, emotional expressions, and behaviors representing confidence, such as making eye contact and physically leaning in, also vary internationally (Gudykunst 2003). Productive communication and professional development across cultures should not be reduced to that of the American corporate world, as there are contrasting legitimate and culturally appropriate ways of expressing authority, commitment, responsibility, and other workplace virtues worldwide. Thus, *Lean In* cannot be used prescriptively to enhance gender equity across international contexts. Rather, it should be viewed as an artifact of the white, middle-class and elite corporate United States in the early-twentieth century. Given internationalization of education, it may be useful and productive across educational contexts to examine and explore *Lean In* discursively. Yet, as educational practice must reflect local needs rather than global values to benefit communities, leaning in and embracing American culture should not be endorsed wholesale, to the exclusion of more potentially effective and appropriate programs for enhancing gender equality in specific contexts.

Conclusion

This essay has used the *Lean In* gender equality discourse or movement as an example of the new nonthreatening feminism of the early twenty-first century. It has critically scrutinized its utility in education from an international and postcolonial perspective, considering women across identities and experiences worldwide. Three critiques were explored. The first was that *Lean In* relies on a deficiency model to be unthreatening to the status

quo, wherein women must assimilate to contemporary norms. I argued against such an orientation that women cannot merely assimilate to public norms effectively to achieve equity, because women still face different expectations than men. Furthermore, the value of so-called masculine traits is questionable. A more balanced prioritization of communal values and virtues should be supported, while gender expectations based on a binary view should be problematized. Leaning in is therefore problematic advice, even for white, wealthy women in Western societies, whose challenges to success go beyond their personal attitudes, by a structuralist analysis of the situation.

The second and third critiques focused on the perspectives of women of color and other women facing forms of social stigma and marginalization, as well as women in international environments. For women of color and from disadvantaged family backgrounds (among others), adapting to cultural norms of white middle-class and elite society may carry risks to personal and professional well-being beyond those faced by their white, wealthy counterparts. These include alienation from one's communities and families and the neglect of a more holistic view of their distinctive struggles for equity in society. Women of color are often expected to act differently from white women in the United States, while an intersectional understanding of identity implies we must see all identities as nuanced and dialogically constructed across categories of race, class, gender, language, religion, age, ability, and so on. From an international perspective, norms are also different across countries, with regard to cross-gender professional relations and more broadly understood communication values. This implies that leaning in is in some important ways a cultural and American phenomenon, and should not be held as a universalistic requirement for enhancing gender equity across diverse societies, despite its contemporary resonance in education environments around the world. Instead, educators and women in different societies will profit from considering their own communities and contexts' values and norms in a balanced, more holistic and structural way, in order to develop woman professionals and enhance gender equality and equity in the future.

In sum, leaning in may sound easy – but whether it is worth doing for many women in the world is questionable.

Educational actors, including both men and women, thus might consider *leaning out* away from discourses of individualization, assimilationism, and acceptance of structurally inequitable status quos. Instead of framing difference as deficiency in historically (and contemporarily) male-dominated and white-dominated spaces, diverse professional skills and characteristics should be explored as possible assets that different individuals, groups, and communities may bring to educational and other social environments, in a variety of ways. Rather than expect those victimized by external inequities and biased social norms to adapt, “leaning out” can enable actors and communities to further develop to enhance conditions for greater inclusivity. By leaning out educational and other public leaders can raise awareness of pitfalls of individualization and recognize the potential of alternative models for development not marked primarily by aggression, competition, and individualism but by other important social values, of diversity, pluralism, toleration, and open-mindedness. Thus *Lean In* can be instructive not just as a how-to guide but as a how-not-to guide, as education leaders can explore ways to change conditions to enable equity, rather than blame disadvantaged players for unequal outcomes.

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Critical Philosophy

► Deleuze and Learning

Critical Place Pedagogies

► Place

Critical Practice

► Educational Leadership as Critical Practice

Critical Race Theory

► Critical Race Theory: A Marxist Critique

Critical Race Theory: A Marxist Critique

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Synonyms

Critical race theory; (Neo-) marxism; “Race” over class; Racialization; White supremacy

Two central tenets of Critical Race Theory (CRT) are its advocacy of “white supremacy” as an accurate description of everyday racism and its primacy of “race” over class¹.

“White Supremacy”

Rather than its limited usage to describe only extremist groups today, such as the Ku Klux Klan or hate groups, or realities of antebellum USA, or apartheid South Africa, Critical Race Theory (CRT) employs the concept of “white supremacy” as a descriptor of reality for everyday experiences of racism now. “White supremacy” is seen as a more useful term than racism alone in certain contexts, for example, in the United States and in other specified countries, including the United Kingdom and Australia². This is problematic, both through history and in the present. There are at least seven reasons for this. “White supremacy”:

- Directs attention away from capitalist economics and politics
- Homogenizes all white people
- Inadequately explains non-color-coded racism
- Does not explain newer hybridist racism
- Does not explain racism that is “not white” against “not white”
- Is historically and contemporaneously associated with beliefs and values which are not necessarily associated with “everyday racism,” and historically and contemporaneously connects to fascism, whereas racism and fascism need to be differentiated
- Is counterproductive in rallying against racism

Directing Attention Away from Capitalist Economics and Politics

While, for Marxists, it is certainly the case that there has been a continuity of racism for hundreds of years, the concept of “white supremacy” does

not in itself explain this continuity, since it does not need to connect to modes of production and developments in capitalism. It is true that Critical Race Theorist Charles Mills (1997), for example, provides a wide-ranging discussion of the history of economic exploitation, and that John Preston (e.g., Preston 2007, 2010), writing from within a CRT framework, argues that CRT needs to be considered alongside Marxism. However, unlike Marxism, there is no inherent need to connect with capitalist modes of production or to make links to patterns of migration that are themselves strongly influenced by economic and political dynamics. Thus Gillborn (2008, pp. 34–36) is able to make the case for CRT and “white supremacy” without providing a discussion of the relationship of racism to capitalism. For a full understanding of racism at any given geographical location and/or historical conjuncture, the neo-Marxist concept of racialization is a useful tool.

The Neo-Marxist Concept of Racialization and Institutional Racism

Racialization refers to the categorization of people (falsely) into distinct “races.” The neo-Marxist concept of racialization is distinct from other interpretations of racialization in that it purports that in order to understand and combat racism, we must relate racism and racialization to historical, economic, and political factors.

Specifically, the neo-Marxist concept of racialization makes the connection between racism and capitalist modes of production, as well as making links to patterns of migration that are in themselves determined by economic and political dynamics. Thus the concept is able to relate to these factors, which are the real material contexts of struggle.

Robert Miles, a leading theorist of the neo-Marxist concept of racialization, has defined it as an ideological process, where people are categorized falsely into the scientifically defunct notion of distinct “races” (Miles 1993). Racialization, like “race,” is socially constructed. In Miles’s words racialization refers to “those instances where social relations between people have been structured by the signification of human biological characteristics [elsewhere in the

¹For a more general critique and an appraisal of some aspects of CRT, see Cole 2016a, b, c.

²This entry draws heavily on the Introduction to Cole 2016a, pp. 13–22.

same book, Miles (1989) added cultural characteristics] in such a way as to define and *construct* [my emphasis] differentiated social collectivities” (Miles 1989, p. 75). “[T]he process of racialization,” Miles states, “cannot be adequately understood without a conception of, and explanation for the complex interplay of different modes of production and, in particular, of the social relations necessarily established in the course of material production.” (Miles 1989, p. 7). It is this articulation with modes of production and with the ideological and the cultural that makes Miles’s concept of racialization inherently (neo-) Marxist.

Maria Papapolydorou (2010) has reminded us that for Miles (1989), racism is associated with modes of production but not limited to capitalist modes of production, and that, according to Miles, racialization and racism predate capitalist societies. As Miles puts it, neither are “exclusive ‘products’ of capitalism but have origins in European societies prior to the development of the capitalist mode of production” (1989, p. 99). While this is true, and the Crusades are but one obvious example, the focus here is specifically on the way in which racialization connects to capitalist modes of production (and to patterns of migration). This is not to say, of course, that all instances of racism in capitalist societies are directly or even indirectly linked to capitalism, economics, and politics. In racialized societies, racism is experienced with massive and constant frequency in countless situations, an insistence for which CRT can be credited. The point is that without the neo-Marxist concept of racialization, it is impossible to have a full understanding of racism under capitalism, both historically and contemporaneously. For a discussion of different uses of the concept of racialization, both (neo-)Marxist and non-Marxist, see Murji and Solomos (2005).

Miles insists that we employ the concept of “racialization” rather than “race” to analyze and understand why different groups are racialized in different locations in different historical and contemporary periods and how this all relates to capitalist economic and political processes (Miles 1982, 1989, 1993; Ashe and McGeever 2011).

The UK and the USA are institutionally racist societies. This was recognized officially in the United Kingdom as long ago as 1999 by the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry Report (Macpherson 1999) which followed a lengthy public campaign initiated by the parents of black teenager Stephen Lawrence, after his racist murder in 1993. It needs to be stressed, however, that the resonances in institutional practices of this recognition have now in the United Kingdom virtually disappeared. Institutional racism is defined in the report as:

The collective failure of an organisation to provide an appropriate and professional service to people because of their colour, culture, or ethnic origin. It can be seen or detected in processes, attitudes and behaviour which amount to discrimination through unwitting prejudice, ignorance, thoughtlessness and racist stereotyping which disadvantage minority ethnic people (Macpherson 1999, 6.34).

From a Marxist viewpoint, the nebulous and ahistorical definition of institutional racism provided by Macpherson needs to have historical, economic, and political foci. The definition also requires enhancement by the neo-Marxist concept of racialization. Last but not least, it needs to incorporate intentional as well as unintentional or unwitting racism. Institutional racism can thus be reformulated as follows:

Collective acts and/or procedures in an institution or institutions (locally, nationwide, continent-wide or globally) that intentionally or unintentionally have the effect of racializing, via “common sense,” certain populations or groups of people, through a process of interpellation³. This racialization process cannot be understood without reference to economic and political factors related to developments and changes, historically and contemporaneously, in national, continent-wide and global capitalism. Hegemony describes the ongoing attempts by the ruling class to consolidate a racist consensus. Counter-hegemony refers to continuing resistance to these endeavours.

It should be stressed that the interests of pro-capitalist politicians and capitalists do not always correspond or coalesce around racialization. For

³(Althusser, 1971, pp. 174-175) makes us think that ruling class capitalist values are actually congruent with our values as *individuals* as we are interpellated or “hailed” to think that capitalist values are natural.

example, it is often in the interests of establishment politicians to racialize certain groups of workers, for electoral gain, for example, while capitalists may prefer not to, in their pursuit of cheap labor power and greater surplus value and hence profits. Marxist political economist Gareth Dale maintains that migrant workers are a perfect solution in times of intensified labor market flexibility, but also stresses the contradiction between capital's need for (cheap) flexible labor and the need for hegemonic control of the workforce by racializing potential foreign workers:

On the one hand, intensified competition spurs employers' requirements for enhanced labour market flexibility—for which immigrant labour is ideal. On the other, in such periods questions of social control tend to become more pressing. Governments strive to uphold the ideology of "social contract" even as its content is eroded through unemployment and austerity. The logic, commonly, is for less political capital to be derived from the [social contract's] content, while greater emphasis is placed upon its exclusivity, on demarcation from those who enter from or lie outside—immigrants and foreigners (Dale 1999, p. 308)

The Homogenization of All White People

Mills acknowledges that not "all whites are better off than all nonwhites, but ... as a statistical generalization, the objective life chances of whites are significantly better" (Mills 1997, p. 37). To take poverty as one example, poverty for white people is consistently less than that of racialized peoples. Nevertheless, we should not lose sight of the life chances of millions of working-class white people who, along with racialized groups, are part of the 99%, not the 1%.⁴

Moreover, the term "white supremacy" at least *implicates* all white people as part of some hegemonic bloc of "whiteness." For Mills (1997, p. 1), "white supremacy" is "the basic political system that has shaped the world for the past several hundred years" and "the most important political system of recent global history," while the racial

contract⁵ "designates Europeans as the privileged race" (p. 33). To underline the point that he sees "white supremacy" as a political system in its own right, and that the racial contract is both "real" and "global" (p. 20), Mills asserts:

Global white supremacy ... is *itself* a political system, a particular power structure of formal or informal rule, socioeconomic privilege, and norms for the differential distribution of material wealth and opportunities, benefits and burdens, rights and duties (p. 3).

Some critical race theorists argue that "white supremacy" does not necessarily refer to skin color, "rather to structures of subordination and domination." However, "white supremacy" is generally perceived as referring to skin color.

Inadequate Explanation of Non-Color-Coded Racism

Mills acknowledges that there were/are what he refers to as "'borderline' Europeans" – "the Irish, Slavs, Mediterraneans, and above all, of course, Jews," and that there also existed "intra-European varieties of 'racism'" (Mills 1997, pp. 78–79). However, he argues that, while there remain "some recognition of such distinctions in popular culture" – he gives examples of an "Italian" waitress in the television series *Cheers* calling a WASP character "Whitey" and a discussion in a 1992 movie about whether Italians are really white (p. 79) – he relegates such distinctions primarily to history. While Mills is prepared to "fuzzify" racial categories (p. 79) with respect to "shifting criteria prescribed by the evolving Racial Contract" (p. 81) and to acknowledge the existence of "off-White" people at certain historical periods (p. 80), he maintains that his categorization – "white/nonwhite, person/subperson" – "seems to me to map the essential

⁴"We are the 99%" is a widely used political slogan, first coined by the Occupy movement (www.occupytogether.org/aboutoccupy/).

⁵Mills's "racial contract" refers to his belief that racism is at the core of the "social contract," rather than being an unintended result, because of human failing. Social contract theory, which is nearly as old as philosophy itself, is the view that people's moral and/or political obligations are dependent on a contract or agreement among them to form the society in which they live (Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (IEP), www.iep.utm.edu/soc-cont/).

features of the racial polity accurately, to carve the social reality at its ontological joints” (p. 78).

Mills is, of course, writing about the United States, and his analysis does not provide an explanation for non-color-coded racism in the United Kingdom, where there are well-documented analyses of such racism both historically and contemporaneously (see Cole 2016a, chapter 1).

Robert Miles *is* aware of non-color-coded racism. He stresses that racialization is a process and recognition that “opens the door to history” which subsequently “opens the door to understanding the complexities of who gets racialized when and for what purpose, and how that changes through time” (in Ashe and McGeever 2011, p. 2019). Miles warns against avoiding the “fundamental mistake” of drawing clear lines between what happens to white immigrants and black immigrants, adding that the “black–white” dichotomy leads you into a “huge cul-de-sac” (in Ashe and McGeever 2011, p. 2019). “White supremacy” provides no basis for an understanding of racism in the UK directed at the Irish people, at Jewish people, at Gypsy, Roma, and Traveller communities, or of the widespread xeno-racism directed at Eastern European migrant workers since Poland joined the European Union (see Cole 2016a, chapter 1). This racism has all the hallmarks of traditional racism, such as that directed at Asian, black, and other minority ethnic workers following mass immigration after the Second World War, but impacts on recently arrived groups of people.

No Explanation of Newer Hybridist Racism

Under this heading, anti-asylum-seeker racism and Islamophobia are included. “Newer hybridist racism” is used because, unlike the forms of racism that are either essentially color-coded or essentially non-color-coded, anti-asylum-seeker racism and Islamophobia can be either color-coded or non-color-coded. These forms of racism can also encompass a combination of color-coded and non-color-coded racism. For example, racism directed at asylum seekers from “sub-Saharan Africa” (itself a term with color-coded racist implications) will be color-coded but may also be Islamophobic, which is not necessarily color-

coded, or it may be a combination of color-coded (anti-black) racism and non-color-coded racism (Islamophobia). That form of racism, experienced by Afghan and Iraqi asylum seekers, for example, is also ambiguous and may or may not be more Islamophobic than color-coded.

Lack of Explanation of Racism That Is “Not White” Against “Non-White”

Charles Mills acknowledges that “white supremacy” does not explain “varieties of racial domination . . . that are not white-over-non-white,” and “that is a weakness of the term that should be conceded” (Mills 2009, p. 275). He gives the example of “certain Asian nations.” In late 2015, Islamophobia in Myanmar (Burma) is an obvious example, and anti-Vietnamese racism is rife in Cambodia. Not-white over non-white racism is also a reality in South Africa. However, it has to be said that interethnic racism is also a reality in the “developed world.” For example, in the overtly xeno-racist UK Independence Party (UKIP) there are black and Asian members and supporters.

Historical Context, Historical and Contemporary Association with Other Beliefs and Values, and Connections with Fascism

First of all, it needs to be pointed out that in certain periods of history “white supremacy”, conventionally defined, was the norm. Second, white supremacist groups, conventionally defined, have tended to embrace a number of other beliefs and values which are not necessarily associated with everyday racism. These can include homophobia, Holocaust denial or claims that the Holocaust was exaggerated, antisemitic conspiracy theories (that Jewish people conspire to control the world), and engagement in military-type activity.

Some of these associated beliefs and values were epitomized by the now almost defunct white supremacist and fascist British National Party (BNP). When its then leader Nick Griffin appeared on the popular BBC discussion program, *Question Time* in October 2009, he stated that Islam was incompatible with life in Britain, admitted sharing a platform with the Ku Klux

Klan, and described gay men kissing in public as “really creepy.” He said that “legal reasons” prevented him from explaining why he had previously sought to play down the Holocaust, and that he had now changed his mind. He was challenged by fellow panelist Jack Straw, the then Justice Secretary, who said there was no law preventing him from giving an explanation.

It is important to distinguish between racism on the one hand and “white supremacy” and fascism on the other. Aninda Bhattacharyya (2009) succinctly explains the relationship between capitalism and fascism. As he puts it, “fascist organisations offer themselves to the ruling class as a deadly weapon to use against the left. But the use of this weapon comes at a price – stripping away any pretence that capitalism is a fair or progressive system.” This is because fascism means that the ruling class has to use the full force of the repressive apparatuses of the State (RSAs) rather than just rely on the ideological State apparatuses (ISAs) (Althusser 1971). Thus fascism is “a weapon of last resort for our rulers, one that they turn to in periods of acute crisis but keep their distance from at other times” (Bhattacharyya 2009). In other words, while the ruling class is quite happy to up the barometer of racism, it tries hard not to admit to doing that:

The contradictory political relationship between the ruling class and fascism manifests itself as a contradictory ideological attitude and contradictory action. So the *Daily Mail* [a right-wing tabloid, aimed at the UK middle class] attacks Muslims, but also attacks the BNP for attacking Muslims. The mainstream parties denounce the BNP, but play to its agenda on issues like immigration (Bhattacharyya 2009)⁶.

Fascism tends to have both a parliamentary and a street presence. This is typical of fascist complementarity and dates back to Benito Mussolini, fascist dictator in Italy in the 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s (he had the *squadre d'azione*), and Adolf Hitler, who had the “Brownshirts” who played a major role in his rise to power in the 1920s and

1930s (Smith 2010, p. 13). Antiracists, including Marxists, need of course to “oppose both fascism and the racism that feeds it, both politically and on the streets, while understanding the distinctions and relationships between them” (Bhattacharyya 2009). Bhattacharyya concludes:

That means understanding that the “right wing anti-fascism” of [sections of the media] isn’t simply a matter of hypocrisy. There are material political motives for why the ruling class is ordinarily opposed to fascism ... [but we] cannot ever rely on this right wing anti-fascism that can rapidly reverse into support for the Nazis (Bhattacharyya 2009).

CRT obfuscation of “white supremacy” and its collapse into the realm of “everyday racism” critically undermines a serious analysis of “white supremacy” in the conventional use of the term, and its connections to other obnoxious beliefs, values, and actions, and to fascism.

“White Supremacy” as Counterproductive in Rallying Against Racism

As the crisis in capitalism deepens, it is absolutely essential for unity among the working class as a whole. Advocating “white supremacy” as a descriptor of “everyday racism” is useless as a unifier and counterproductive as a political rallying point. While the prospect of social revolution and socialism in the UK and the USA is off the agenda for the foreseeable future, it is inconceivable, in my view, that workers, racialized or not, could productively unite around anti-“white supremacy.” More constructive, from a Marxist perspective, is to demand an end to racialized capitalism.

Critical Race Theory and the Primacy of “Race” Over Class

Mills rejects both what he refers to as the “original white radical orthodoxy (Marxist)” for arguing that social class is the primary contradiction in capitalist society and the “present white radical orthodoxy (post-Marxist/postmodernist)” for its rejection of any primary contradiction. Instead, for Mills, “there is a primary contradiction, and ... it’s race”

⁶This was also the case with the xeno-racist political party UKIP in the run-up to the 2015 UK general election (see Cole 2016a, pp. 67–83 for a discussion).

(Mills 2003, p. 156). For Kimberlé Crenshaw and colleagues (1995, p. xxvi), “subsuming race under class” is “the typical Marxist error.”

Mills states that “[r]ace [is] the central identity around which people close ranks” and that there is “no transracial class bloc” (Mills 2003, p. 157). Given the way in which neoliberal global capitalism unites capitalists throughout the world on lines that are not necessarily color-coded, this statement seems quite extraordinary.

“Race,” Mills goes on, is “the stable reference point for identifying the ‘them’ and ‘us’ which override all other ‘them’ and ‘us’ (identities are multiple, but some are more central than others)” (p. 157), while for Crenshaw and colleagues (1995, p. xxvi), although they acknowledge that “race” is socially constructed (an issue addressed earlier in this entry), with which Marxists would fully concur, “race” is “real” since “there is a material dimension and weight to being ‘raced’ in American society.” It is the case, of course, that racism has real material effects on racialized peoples. “Race,” Mills (2003, p. 157) concludes, is “what ties the system together, and blocks progressive change.” For Marxists, it is capitalism that does this.

Mills invites readers to:

Imagine you’re a white male Marxist in the happy prefeminist, pre-postmodernist world of a quarter-century ago. You read Marcuse, Miliband, Poulantzas, Althusser. You believe in a theory of group domination involving something like the following: The United States is a *class* society in which class, defined by *relationship to the means of production*, is the *fundamental* division, the bourgeoisie being the *ruling* class, the workers being *exploited* and *alienated*, with the state and the juridical system *not* being neutral but part of a superstructure to maintain the existing order, while the *dominant ideology* naturalizes, and renders invisible and unobjectionable, class domination (Mills 2003, p. 158).

This all seems a pretty accurate description of the United States in the twenty-first century, but for Mills it is “a set of highly controversial propositions” (p. 158). He justifies this assertion by stating that all of the above “would be disputed by mainstream political philosophy (liberalism), political science (pluralism), economics (neoclassical marginal utility theory), and sociology (Parsonian structural-functionalism and its

heirs)” (p. 158). While this is true, my response to this would be, well, of course it would be disputed by mainstream philosophers, pluralist political scientists, neoclassical economists, and functionalist sociologists, all of whom are, unlike Marxists, at one level or another apologists for capitalism.

Social class, albeit massively racialized⁷, is the system upon which the maintenance of capitalism depends. It is possible, though extremely difficult, because of the multiple benefits accruing to capital of racializing workers (not least forcing down labor costs) and the unpaid and underpaid labor of women as a whole, to imagine a capitalist world of “racial” (and gender) equality. It is not logically possible for capitalism to exhibit social class equality. Without the extraction of surplus value from the labor of workers, capitalism cannot exist.

Capitalism is dependent on racism both as a source of profiteering (in general appropriating more surplus value from racialized workers) and as a means of “divide and rule,” driving a wedge between nonracialized and racialized workers. These processes of “divide and rule” were recognized by Marx, some 145 years ago:

In all the big industrial centres in England there is profound antagonism between the Irish proletariat and the English proletariat. The average English worker hates the Irish worker as a competitor who lowers wages and the standard of life. He feels national and religious antipathies for him. He regards him somewhat like the poor whites of the Southern states regard their black slaves. *This antagonism among the proletarians of England is artificially nourished and supported by the bourgeoisie. It knows that this scission is the true secret of maintaining its power* (my emphasis) (Marx 1870 [1978], p. 254).

That is one of the reasons why combating racism is so crucial for Marxists. As Keenga-Yamahtta Taylor puts it, without “a commitment by revolutionary organizations in the here and now to the fight against racism, working-class

⁷Social class is of course also gendered, and there is a substantial and substantive literature on Marxism and feminism, the latest of which is Mojab (2015). Many feminists have rejected Marxist feminism in favor of intersectionality (see Cole 2016a, pp. 22–23).

unity will never be achieved and the revolutionary potential of the working class will never be realized.”

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Critical Reflection

► Praxis

Critical Scholarship

► Educational Leadership as Critical Practice

Critical Self-Learning and Organizational Learning: A Popperian Perspective

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Introduction

People who are interested in teaching and learning are also interested in professional growth and development (Swann 2012). These people, often referred to as “educators,” frequently assume that learning occurs when information is received by the learner (Popper 1994; Swann 2012). Debates about learning center mostly on how information received by the learner is processed. Even constructivists are of the view that learning takes place when the learner is actively constructing meaning from the information received, based on his or her previous experience (Dewey 1938; Vygotsky 1978). If educators assume that learning is a process that begins with the

internalization of information received, they are more inclined, then, to discuss learning from a psychological perspective rather than from a philosophical one (Vygotsky 1962).

The intention, here, is not to underplay the importance of psychology when it comes to the factors that affect individual or group learning but, rather, to emphasize the danger of overlooking important philosophical assumptions about learning. Expectations of learners are linked to assumptions about learning, that is, to philosophical assumptions about the nature of learning. For example, what factors contribute to learning when learning takes place (Swann 2012)?

The purpose of this entry is to discuss the term “learning” from a philosophical perspective. Learning, in this sense, refers to a subjective process where individuals learn in a social context rather than through the accrual of knowledge and information in its broader sense. The argument presented in this entry is based on Sir Karl Popper’s evolutionary analysis of learning (Popper 1974, 1979, 1994, 1999 and also Popper and Eccles 1977).

This entry begins with a discussion on competing theories of learning. It features Popper’s evolutionary analysis of learning and the nature of learning. The paper ends with an illustration of how learning through trial and error provides teachers with opportunities to challenge, discuss, and question their assumptions or theories, as well as to experiment with solutions to problems they encounters in their teaching practices.

Two Competing Learning Theories

There are two major competing learning theories. One states that “learning never involves the absorption of informational elements from outside the learner,” while the other states that “some learning involves the absorption of informational elements from outside the learner.” Popperian selectionism is closely aligned with the first statement and is also consistent with the work of psychobiologist Friemuth Petersen (1988, 1992, 2000) and neuroscientists such as Edelman (1992) in regard to brain functioning. However, the work of Petersen and Edelman does not refute the notion that “some

learning involves the absorption of informational elements from outside the learner.” This is due to the fact that – as with the statement, “Learning never involves the absorption of informational elements from outside the learner” – neither the theory nor the statement can be refuted or falsified. This is because, even though there is potential for some observable outcomes – which is learning – one cannot observe the core process to which these statements refer (Swann 2012). However, this does not mean that the unfalsifiable theory is either accepted as fact or is considered to be weak. Some theories are intrinsically unfalsifiable, but they can still be discussed and defended (Popper 1979).

Popper’s Evolutionary Analysis of Learning

Popper’s evolutionary analysis of learning states that not all informational elements are transferable from the environment to the learner. He further states that, “We do not discover new facts or new effects by instruction or by the environment” (Popper 1994, p. 47). In other words, Popper claims that there is no transfer of information from one individual to the next or from the physical environment. However, this does not mean that learning does *not* take place in response to instruction. Learning can take place when learners are instructed, as can be observed in schools where teachers give instruction and student are expected to learn. Learning in response to instruction and learning by instruction are not synonymous (Swann 2012). Learning, in response to instruction, does not create knowledge; rather, learning takes place by means of the activity of the learner. That is, *we learn by instruction only insofar as we instruct ourselves – we learn by instruction from within*. In fact, numerous empirical studies support this view (Gray 2004; Norretranders 1998).

To facilitate a common understanding of the meaning of the evolutionary analytical sense, the term “learning” denotes “expectation, problem, knowledge, and criticism” (Swann 2012). The use of the term “expectation” is not restricted to situations where a person is expecting or anticipating something. Expectation can have the

negative connotation of disappointment in one's expectation of something or someone. When one is disappointed, only then can the expectation come to one's attention. As Popper (1979) puts it:

We become conscious of many of our expectations only when they are disappointed, owing to their being unfulfilled. An example would be the encountering of an unexpected step in one's path: it is the unexpectedness of the step which may make us conscious of the fact that we expected to encounter an even surface. (p. 344)

Also, for the purpose of this paper, the term learning is used to mean "corrections or elimination of certain expectations" or errors (Popper 1979).

The Nature of Learning

According to Popper's evolution of learning, the difference between an organism that learns and one that does not is that the former develops within his or her context of experience or dispositions. Dispositions are not to be taken to mean an outcome of genetic inheritance or haphazard organic change (Popper 1979). Rather, in this paper, dispositions refer to teachers' dispositions to react to their unfulfilled expectations of some sort, such as the expectation that, by grouping students homogenously, stronger students would be able to take a leadership role in helping weaker students. When teachers adopt this strategy, they may find that not all students work cooperatively and effectively, which may result in some disappointment or errors in their expectation. Thus, one may note a change in learning by way of teachers' expectations. It is the disappointment of expectations, in this case, the results from homogenous grouping that drives teachers' learning.

A teacher's ability to learn is a specific form of adaptability. This ability to adapt has a potential evolutionary advantage. One may argue that the more experience one has, the fewer errors or mistakes one makes. However, based on Popper's evolutionary analysis of learning, learning does not depend totally on maturation; a learning organism will continue to develop new expectations, preferences, and capabilities that enables her to function more effectively in whatever situation she finds

herself (Swann 2012). For example, a teacher who achieved mastery of how to use assessment of learning to inform parents and administrators as to whether her students have learned, and whether the standards have been met, may find that she needs to focus her attention on selecting, identifying, or grouping students for certain educational paths or evaluating the effectiveness of her instructional methods (O'Connor 2009).

From an evolutionary learning perspective, this does not mean that what the teacher is learning is a desirable goal for the system. It is useful to distinguish between progress and progression (Munz 2001). Progression involves moving from one state of affairs to another, whereas progress involves moving from one state of affairs to a better one (Swann 2012). Learning involves progression in that the learner moves from one expectation to another, as in the case of the teacher who decides to focus on evaluating the effectiveness of her instructional skills once she has a good understanding of the curriculum content. However, not all learning is desirable or "good" in the sense that the more one learns, the better it is. For example, a new teacher learns from a veteran teacher that using grades as a weapon to make students comply with her requests to either behave appropriately in class or to turn in their assignments on time, or suffer the consequences of receiving a failing grade, is detrimental to the student-teacher relationship (Guskey 1996). This case further illustrates that the students in question may start out in school believing that they are capable of learning. However, as a result of how the teacher has used a punitive measure (grading) to enforce compliance in submitting assignments on time, students may learn to see themselves as not being able to learn. Although the students may still have the potential to learn, their belief in that potential is diminished as a result. While there may be development in expectations, there is no progress. In fact, what is observed is an impediment to future learning (Chitpin 2013; Swann 2012).

Social constructivists strongly believe that learning is inherently social, as learners engage in dialogue with others (Bruner 1994). There is little argument that individuals learn in a social context and engage with linguistically formulated

problems, theories, hypotheses, arguments, etc. (Swann 2012). However, one cannot deny that learning is an activity that takes place at the individual rather than at the group level.

Learning takes place “when our knowledge bumps up against our ignorance” (Burgess 2000, p. 54). When an expectation, as in the case of the teacher who expects her students to post online the analysis on their weekly readings, is faced with the challenge that not all of her students are following the assessment criteria she has set, the teacher may realize that something is not working well. Learning takes place when she decides to either modify her expectations or replace them with new ones. She is entirely responsible for modifying and replacing the expectations.

One can also say that the medium or the context (online) has acted as an eliminatory control and a resource for the teacher. Although the context cannot transfer data to the teacher, the “quality” of the context is very important, as it provides scope by which the teacher can learn. Regardless of what the teacher does to promote learning – that is, by having her students post their critical analysis on Blackboard Learn – it does not mean that any informational elements of the readings (theories, concepts, preferences) have been transmitted to all students. Instead, the teacher must do something to engage her students in trial and error elimination to provoke change. For example, the teacher may say that her colleague told her that asking students to do a weekly critical analysis is an effective way to ensure that all students are doing their readings and that, consequently, they understand the materials. But, when the teacher implements the strategy, she finds out that not only are some students not posting their critical analyses but that they are not, in fact, understanding the material. Much of what is happening with the students will remain unexplained, as one does not know why they are not posting their critical analysis – is it because of lack of time or lack of interests? By means of instruction, some of the students may learn what the teacher has intended, but it is a very hit-and-miss affair, and, thus, it is important that educators explore the method of learning through error elimination.

Learning Through Error Elimination

According to Popper’s evolutionary analysis of learning, all learning embodies the same process of error elimination. The process of error elimination is summed up in the following schema: $P1 \rightarrow TS \rightarrow EE \rightarrow P2$.

P1 represents an initial problem and TS is a tentative solution that is applied to solve the problem. EE stands for error elimination, the means by which some tentative solutions are eliminated through criticism, which, in turn, gives rise to a new problem, P2. Popper’s schema is useful in providing an explanation of what happens whenever learning takes place.

To illustrate how this schema works, a problem needs to be created; for example, a teacher teaching an online course may wish to work on increasing her students’ online participation. Her initial problem (P1) may be formulated as: How does one increase student participation online? Her tentative solution (TS): students are required to post their analysis of the course weekly reading as part of the participation mark (Chitpin 2015). The students may not have behaved the way she expected; that is, instead of posting their analysis, some of them provided short comments on the analysis of others. This behavior can be formulated as a problem of “how to get all students to post their weekly analysis.” The above example illustrates the mismatch between expectation and experience, and, granted that not all mismatches are equals, some turn into problems and others do not. For a teacher to have a problem, she needs to be dissatisfied implicitly or explicitly with a state of affairs in which she finds herself, as in the above example. If she is sufficiently dissatisfied with this state of affairs – how does she grade those students who did not post a critical analysis? Her problem of overcoming this dilemma does not come automatically from her observation that not all students are posting a critical analysis. She might make a note and do nothing about it or she might choose to focus on the problem.

There are many possible solutions or ways she could respond to her problem, even though she can only adopt one tentative solution at a time. For example, she might solve this problem by

changing the criteria of her participation mark to allow students to either post their analysis or comment on the analysis or analyses of others or by assigning a zero for those not meeting the criteria of the assessment procedure stated in the course syllabus. She could choose the former or the latter, and one of these solutions may be more successful than the other one, depending on the context.

Each of her tentative solutions is also laden with expectations about what it can do to solve the problem. These expectations may be false or inadequate in solving the problem. One of the tentative solutions may be better or more progressive than the others. Better or progressive is judged according to whether or to what extent the problem is solved and what additional consequences ensue. For example, the teacher may change the criteria of the participation mark to responding to comments *or* posting critical analysis only to find that the comments posted are short and imprecise. A solution is always a trial, and there is no way for the teacher to know in advance whether changing the criteria to accommodate the students is the best solution to her problem.

Popper (1992) says that all trials “are blind to the solution to the problem” (p. 46). There is no secure way of knowing what the consequences of choosing one action over the others will be (Miller 2006), but a disposition to react in one way may be the best survival strategy for that situation or circumstance. Error elimination (EE) is the elimination or the modification of an expectation, theory, solution, behavior, or hypothesis, as in the case of the teacher who needs to change her participation mark criteria to deal with her problem, that of “how to get students to post their critical analysis.” Popper (1979) defines error elimination as:

New reactions, new forms, new organs, new modes of behavior, new hypotheses, are tentatively put forward and controlled by error-elimination... Error-elimination may proceed either by the complete elimination of unsuccessful forms (the killing-off of unsuccessful forms by natural selection) or by the (tentative) evolution of controls which modify or suppress unsuccessful organs, or forms of behavior, or hypotheses. (p. 242)

The process of error elimination functions as a feedback loop and also acts as problem-solving tool. It is continuous and often unconscious (Swann 2012). Problem (P2) emerges from a process of trial and error elimination, which is different from the initial problem (P1). Once the teacher attempts to solve her problem of “how to get her students to post their critical analysis,” the tentative solution exists in the history of the situation, and whether or not the teacher has learned, a new state of affairs has been brought about. This new state of affairs will present further challenges for the teacher, which may lead to a series of new problem and new tentative solutions. The process continues until a reasonably satisfactory resolution is achieved.

Conclusion

Throughout this entry, Popper’s evolutionary analysis of learning has been described, and examples that “learning never involves the absorption of informational elements from outside the learner” have been evidenced. If one is committed to advancing learning, one must search for errors and limitations in one’s solutions to practical problems. Efforts need to be made to develop practices and ideas that are new and, as Popper (1979) says:

The process of learning, of growth of subjective knowledge, is always fundamentally the same. It is imaginative criticism. This is how we transcend our local and temporal environment by trying to think of circumstances beyond our experience: by criticizing the universality, or the structural necessity, of what may, to us, appear (or what philosophers may describe) as the ‘given’ or as ‘habit’; by trying to find, construct, invent, new situations – that is, test situations, critical situations, and by trying to locate, detect, and challenge our prejudices and habitual assumptions. (p. 148)

Society views criticisms or mistakes as being wrong, and these often come with explicit statements of disapproval or rejection. However, this is a narrow and inappropriate view, as each offers an opportunity for improvement. If one begins viewing criticisms as something that lead an individual to improve the situation, then there are benefits. No matter how

valid a criticism is, it should not stifle individual creativity nor inhibit subsequent error elimination.

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Critical Special Education

- [Disability Studies in Education \(DSE\) and the Epistemology of Special Education](#)

Critical Theory

- [Marcuse and Critical Education](#)

Critical Theory as Metatheory of Education

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Synonyms

[Critical pedagogy](#); [Cultural theory](#); [Frankfurt School](#); [Marxism](#)

Introduction

Critical theory of education can be understood as essentially a specific kind of philosophical project, in which the question of the conditions of the possibility of knowledge is taken as at once conceptual and social. Whereas pedagogy or educational theory focuses on the actual acquisition of knowledge and inculcation of certain desired or desirable dispositions (i.e., the conditions for teaching and learning), a philosophical or “critical” project is to examine the conditions of possibility for such a systematic knowledge as that which educational theories claim for themselves. In other words, the aim is to examine the very premises upon which educational theory and practice are based. While educational theories, however abstract, belong broadly to the empirical sciences and, more specifically, the social sciences, the critical project is “metatheoretical,” to the extent that it addresses the very principles that constitute any theory of education as a science or program of systematic study. Critical theory of education goes beyond the practical disciplines concerned with methods for achieving particular aims (such as psychological theories, for instance) and seeks theoretical grounding in a thorough critique of the tacit assumptions, aims, and methods of all educational ideals and practices. This tradition of ideology critique, stemming from the critical theory of the Frankfurt School, addresses the function of teaching and learning as consequent upon the social nature of the ostensible knowledge, understanding, and/or dispositions that are to be attained. All the data assembled and interpreted in empirical social science must be critically theorized. The strict methodologies and regulated experiments of empirical study of social phenomena can never replace critical reflection, for the simple reason that all observation already assumes a theoretical framework, itself the result of certain historical conditions, which can and ought to be made explicit, critiqued, and normatively assessed, that is, evaluated from the perspective of human agency and emancipation. In this respect, “critical theory” is always already “metatheoretical” in the sense that it is theorizing about theory as much as of practice. Behaviorist

theoretical frameworks for the study of education, for instance, and the models issuing from them, which have long exercised a powerful influence on the curriculum field, were in part adapted from Taylorism (the scientific management movement of the 1920s). The task of critical theory here then would be to subject behaviorism as both theory and a practice to critical reflective analysis.

Education, Ideology and Autonomy

One of the characteristic features of critical theory is its recognition of the emancipatory potential of Enlightenment ideas and ideals, even as it analyzes the destructive force of its militant objectivity. From this perspective, in the guise of liberal notions of economic growth and scientific progress, the memory of the subjective experience of intrinsic value as distinct from exchange values is obliterated, and noninstrumental relations between people as well as between human beings and nature (the subjective, the transcendent) are eradicated (“For enlightenment, anything which does not conform to the standard of calculability and utility must be viewed with suspicion” Adorno and Horkheimer, 2002). The Frankfurt School, following Marx, stressed culture as a tool of class and social reproduction and therewith also tended to focus on the power of capital over and above human agency. Adorno and Marcuse saw the advent of mass culture as a function of the accumulation and expansion of capital into the minutiae of everyday life, that is, of the colonization of the private sphere by the marketplace. For Marcuse, modern liberal society is characterized by “democratic unfreedom,” an historical situation in which the forces of domination go unrecognized and therefore uncriticized (Marcuse 1964). In that respect, capitalism is totalitarian in much the same way as communism and fascism. In the case of late capitalism, the tendency is to “industrialize the mind,” just as the production of goods was industrialized during the heyday of capitalism. In Adorno’s view, following Weber, rationalization has led to human thinking becoming increasingly automated (Weber 1946): a mechanized, segmented, and debased instrument that has lost its capacity for critical thought, that is, to confront

and evaluate its immediate circumstance (to recognize the contradictions in its way of life). In this respect, the all-encompassing ideology of the market constitutes a “prohibition on thinking itself” (Adorno, as cited in Giroux 2001).

In educational theory, thinkers taking their bearings at least in part from the Frankfurt School (Freire, Giroux, *inter alia*) try to negotiate between the recognition of the Marxist distinction between the economic base and the superstructure, where the latter is often the umbrella term for all cultural expressions and artifacts (law, religion, art), and the desire for the realization of the possibility of genuine autonomy as something more than liberal romanticism or utopianism. While they will grant that material social practices sustain capitalist relations, those who work within the tradition of critical educational theory want to retain what is instructive and constructive in the Kantian ideal of Enlightenment and the centrality of the spontaneous activity of the thinking and perceiving subject (Kant 1965), that is, the thought that education, by cultivating genuine autonomy in the individual, develops his capacity to see beyond the socially given and beyond his own immediate situation, and thus to contribute to a happier future for humanity. For Kant, education is simply sowing the seeds of Enlightenment: an ongoing and unending projection into the future. But while Kant sees the possibility for a common future in the activity of the autonomous subject, critical theorists tend to side with Marx in viewing subjectivity as first and foremost a product of social relations. Education, in the sense of formal schooling, on this view, needs to be analyzed in terms of the assumptions built into mainstream curricula, where the latter are often taken as ideologically neutral attempts at social engineering to produce desired discrete behaviors. From the point of view of critical theory, however, school curricula ought to be studied as agencies of socialization (Giroux 2001). Along with providing pupils with definite goals and teachers with explicit objectives for instruction, the curriculum transmits and generates beliefs and values tacitly through the routines and language of everyday experience in school. Thus, on the one hand, there is the structural question concerning the material and organizational conditions for education, and, on the other,

the concrete, subjective experience of those conditions in actual cases of teaching and learning. A critical analysis has therefore to distinguish between educational ideologies and institutional reality, that is, how those ideologies come to expression and use in actual practice.

Education is part and parcel of existing social, economic, and political regimes, and its institutions are involved in the production and reproduction of determinate forms of subjective experience (through covert as well as overt socialization with regard to values and beliefs). The commonsense assumption that there is some sort of neutral position from which various technologies of education can and ought to be derived is itself thus based on certain ideological assumptions that can be subjected to critique, since what is at stake are not merely different responses to the demands placed on educational institutions and practices, but the value-laden language governing what questions are possible to ask and what sorts of answers are conceivable in that language, *i.e.* ideology. A conservative position on education embraces the fundamental role of schooling in the acquisition and appropriation of societal norms and values as a positive function (by engendering and maintaining consensus, cohesion, and stability). A liberal view focuses on the importance of the role of intentionality and interpersonal relations and stresses reform of individual practices, without regard for the material base of education, that is, it ignores the way in which structural constraints in society are reproduced in the activities of educational institutions, students, and teachers. The responsibility for deficiencies is placed on the individuals acting in the concrete situation, rather than on the conditions that create the situation in the first place. Critical theories of education tend to focus on the manner in which social and class divisions necessary for the production and legitimation of capital and its institutions are reproduced in the educational institutions and practices in which students are prepared for different positions in a stratified labor force. At the same time, certain versions of critical theory question the monolithic picture of totalitarian structures in which agency, both individual and collective, is portrayed as impossible, not merely in fact, but almost in principle (Giroux 2001).

A philosophical theory, a philosophical theory of dialectical critique in this context would begin with a thorough interrogation of unquestioned received truths and social practices that masquerade as the discourse of objectivity and neutrality: the recognition of the non-identity of one's reason and existent social reality. Critique would then uncover the incongruence in certain forms of discourse, action, and experience and reveal their social function (e.g., how they can both be forms of resistance to hegemonic modes of behavior, and as such expressions of freedom, while at the same time work to further limit one's own agency or the self-activity of others). Education can be ideological indoctrination in the sense of the production and effectuation of distorted meaning, but it can also, in a Kantian vein, promote critical thought and action. According to Adorno, the truth in the concept of subjective experience is the acknowledgement of the subject as an inalienable moment in cognition. Ideology critique is concerned with more than showing how certain ideologies function; it is about discerning the contents of those ideologies and making judgments. Marcuse points to how human relations are subjected to forms of calculability and control and made to appear as objectified relations between objects instead of as social relations between subjects. The historical connections and contingencies leading up to the status quo are forgotten, and surface phenomena (habits, routines) are perceived and treated as immutable social or even natural facts. This is related to what Adorno refers to as the "mythical" quality of Enlightenment. In Marcuse's view, since even individual needs are historically conditioned, they are alterable. In fact, certain kinds of needs (such as meaningful social relations) are even liberating, insofar as they contradict the conditions that inhibit their fulfillment.

The concept of ideology critique at work in the thought of the Frankfurt School thus provides a general framework for educational theory insofar as it promotes an agenda of demystification by uncovering the genealogy of certain patterns of speaking and thinking with regard to the form and content of instruction, the interests motivating them, and the logic of the practices informed by them, as well as tracing these patterns in the

processes of subjectification involved in any program of education (Giroux 2001). (While the issue cannot be adequately addressed here, it may be noted that certain formulations of this agenda raise a philosophical problem as to the rationale for treating all thought and action as results of sedimented history amenable to the methods of ideology critique except the method of tracing itself, which is treated as historically self-conscious and unassailable). Ideology critique monitors the relationship between hegemonic ideologies and unreflective human language and behavior and thus has implications for educational theory to the extent that it brings to light the emancipatory or repressive interests served by the sedimented routines and protocols, as well as the automated language, involved in institutionalized teaching and learning.

An important component in the dismantling of the ostensible neutrality and necessity of the given, as something fundamentally separate from the processes and conditions of its production, is to notice that this notion of neutrality shares the form of the logic of commodification. What are in fact practices developed under specific conditions to serve certain interests appear objectified in the immediacy of everyday discourse and "common sense." For the Frankfurt School, it will be recalled, the task of theory is to identify the socio-historical interests involved in common sense, or unreflective awareness and automated speech, and identify the functions served by the obvious "truths" emanating therefrom. Such a move highlights the intimate relationship between language and knowledge, fact and value. The presumption that such distinctions are themselves universally valid is, on this view, itself a piece of distorting ideology or mystification, since it conceals the human agency involved in the production of knowledge or facticity (which is not to say that the distinction is universally false or always and everywhere a distortion). Rather, for the Frankfurt School, the task is to puncture reification, to unmask mystifying forms of ideology and the interests that they serve (which, again, is not to say that all ideology is necessarily a distortion. Were that the case, it would not be possible even in principle to assess the true function of

mystifications. There would be nothing to reveal behind the mask. But to the extent that the idea of truth is preserved in ideology critique, the hidden elements in any object of analysis – such as a curriculum, for instance – can be revealed for what they are). Following Marx' thesis 11 in his "Theses on Feuerbach" – "Philosophers have hitherto only interpreted the world in various ways; the point is to change it" (Marx 1975) – Max Horkheimer and the Frankfurt School understood the task of critical theory as at once explanatory, practical, and normative. This means that an adequate analysis must reveal the contradictions inherent in present social reality in such a way as to see what real possibility different actors have to change it, while at the same time providing an account of the criteria for distinguishing truth from falsity and practical possibility from idealistic utopianism (Benhabib 1992). Habermas, for instance, thinks that we can salvage the unfinished project of modernity or Enlightenment from the domination of instrumental-rationality by providing criteria for identifying and assessing claims within a conception of broader human interests: an emancipatory reason (Habermas 1971). Similarly, Giroux argues that a critical theory of pedagogy should not only analyze how educational institutions promote and sustain ideologies but also how these ideologies are in practice resisted, accepted, and negotiated by the actors involved (students and teachers, especially) in concrete situations; that is, in critical pedagogical theory, the analysis aims not only at explanation, but in identifying practicable goals and means for transformative action (Giroux 2001).

According to a more orthodox Marxist analysis of culture, capital always works to reproduce the ideological conditions necessary to reproduce itself and the social conditions that serve the interests of the elites. Among the essential features of this ideology is the general capitalization of modern social life. It achieves this through the illusion of transaction, of a neutral, transparent, equal, and free exchange, where in fact there abides a subterranean but specifiable relationship of dependency perpetuated by the constant renewal of the institutions and forms of the market (i.e., exchange value

is regarded as a neutral fact and not itself as "value laden"). In this respect, while education in reading and writing is surely emancipatory, the capacity for imagining another value system and the ability to see beyond one's own immediate situation are all the more so. Thus, consciousness raising is, for a critical theorist of education such as Paolo Freire, fundamental to the project of education. For Freire, theory cannot be separated from praxis and action, for which reason education must take the concrete lived situation of the learner as its starting point. To reproduce the hierarchical structure of society in which the teacher is the mouthpiece of established truth of which the student is passive recipient is to inculcate the values of unequal value in the youth (Freire 1973). In what Freire criticizes as the "banking" paradigm, to learn is to be managed, that is, to be trained to store a deposit of "learning" the value of which is decided once and for all as given without regard to its use for the learner or the conditions of his learning. In contrast, he proposes a method of teaching in which alphabetization, and language acquisition and development more generally, goes hand in hand with critical thinking, through active generation rather than passive consumption, where the concrete lived situation (say, the political and economic conditions that give rise to the slum) becomes the starting point for a discussion of the word and its constituent parts, which generate new words and thus the mastery of reading and writing. The decision to learn to read and write is born together with the decision to change one's life situation.

Inspired by the Frankfurt School, advocates of critical pedagogy are deeply influenced by the early Marx' analyses of alienated labor in which the laborer in modern capitalist society is not only alienated from the product of his work, but ultimately from himself. In critical theory of education, the analyses are broadened to include the labor of learning in the modern educational system of first-world capitalist society. Just as the means of production and the social relations in which they are embedded must be changed for the laborer to become free, the very character of educational institutions and their instruments are antithetical to genuine autonomy, on this analysis. Instead of reproducing the stratified social relations of

production and the values they embody, they ought to strive toward emancipatory or “empowerment” education. In this sense, they not only retain but also emphasize the Kantian element in critical theory, that is, the idea that the aim of critique is to examine the limits of the validity of a body of knowledge if it is to be established as genuine knowledge (which, in the case of critical theory, means knowledge that is of use to the knower). For critical theory, this involves the disestablishment of false, mystifying or repressive philosophical, social, and political assumptions. Kant’s critique of dogmatic metaphysics was connected to the enhancement of ethical autonomy as a cornerstone of pedagogics in the respect that he saw the cultivating of the capacity for self-liberation from arbitrary authority as one of the most important aims of education (Kant 2003). The connection between self-reflection and emancipation (from one’s own irrational self-limitation as well as that of external domination) as the central goals of education is also emphasized in critical theory, with the Marxian twist that the self to be reflected on and liberated is essentially social. Consciousness raising, as a desedimentation of layers of socialization, becomes nearly synonymous with education, since all empowerment (such as acquiring or enhancing literacy) is potentially a form of resistance.

Cross-References

- ▶ [Freire’s Philosophy and Pedagogy: Humanization and Education](#)
- ▶ [Overview of Metatheory of Educational Knowledge](#)

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Critical Thinking

- ▶ [Deleuze and Learning](#)
- ▶ [Indoctrination and the Un-growth of Morality](#)
- ▶ [Philosophical Education, An Overview of](#)

Critically: Analytically

- ▶ [Teaching and Critically Reflective Practice in Freire](#)

Critique of Capitalism

- ▶ [Unmaking the Work of Pedagogy Through Deleuze and Guattari](#)

CSAV

- ▶ [Argument Mapping Software: Semiotic Foundations](#)

Cult Figures

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Cultural Activity

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Cultural Difference

- [Humanism, Postcolonialism, and Education](#)

Cultural Imperialism

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Cultural Politics of Education

- [Cultural Studies and New Student Resistance](#)

Cultural Relevance

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Cultural Studies

- [Colored Cosmopolitanism and the Classroom: Educational Connections Between African Americans and South Asians](#)

Cultural Studies and Education in the Digital Age

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Synonyms

[Culture and education at the active intersection of technology-mediated learning in online communities](#); [Educational culture in the era of digital communication](#)

Introduction

If there is one issue that has seen general consensus in the United States over the years, it is the idea that education is the path to ensuring individual advancement and overall human progress. How to ensure that education stays abreast of the passing times is, however, a much-debated, hard-fought ground. This entry approaches the central topic – cultural studies and education in the era of digital communication – in the hope of capturing the excitement of groundbreaking developments in educative practices, student engagement, educational policy, research, and practice in educational trends. In doing so, it focuses not merely on major shifts but also the nuances of a deeply contested ground.

Educational theorists have rightly pointed out: “We live in an extraordinary moment of socio-technical change. . . . The shifts we are experiencing today implicate our most fundamental relationships of representation and communication. . . .” (Cope et al. 2011, p. 91). In these dynamic times, what must be highlighted are moments and intersections that define the current conjuncture as communication and information technologies (C&ITs) transform the world and are well-poised to revolutionize educational theory, communication, and practice. Drawing upon Walter Benjamin’s proposal that “the way human perception is organized – the medium in which it occurs – is conditioned not only by nature but by history” (Benjamin 2008, p. 23), this entry focuses on contemporary educational practices as they evolve from an inexorable blending of digital communication in all areas of human life on one hand and developments in educational policy and burgeoning educational technology on the other. Specifically, the spotlight is on key stakeholders within the field of *education in the digital era*: students, educators, practitioners, policymakers, and parents. Taking from Bourdieu’s (1993, pp. 162–164) description of the “field” as a separate social universe having its own laws of functioning, independent of those of politics and the economy, here the reading of “field” is not as an area entirely independent of the historical conditions of its production but rather that which refracts every external determination and retranslates it according to its own specific

logic. The field particularly referred to here involves the culture of digital educational practices in the twenty-first century. While everything from educational technologies and instructional methods to assessment software or curriculum innovations are in the process of profound revision, the focus here is on emerging intersections between educational policymaking, practices, and innovations in educational technology.

In the United States, the national push for Common Core State Standards emphasizes the mastery of certain proficiencies “essential for college and career readiness in a twenty-first century, globally competitive society.” This means that the digital age and attendant global connectivities have driven educational agenda with an accelerated speed. Such push is manifested in the consideration of media technologies within the Common Core in which they reason, “students need the ability to gather, comprehend, evaluate, synthesize, and report on information and ideas, to conduct original research in order to answer questions or solve problems, and to analyze and create a high volume and extensive range of print and nonprint texts in media forms old and new” (English Language Arts Standards, Common Core State Standards Initiative, 2010). While media and technology have never been out of the spotlight of education and cultural studies, being written in a nation’s educational standards calls for a rethinking of the nexus between educational policymaking, a technology-enabled competitive marketplace, and “market-style institutional arrangements” (Lubienski 2005, p. 467).

It is undeniable that rapid changes in the field of higher education crucially affect K-12 education and what it is expected to yield toward college populations. Therefore, irrespective of the levels, for cultural studies, it is increasingly relevant to review how paradigmatic revisions in overall educational systems come to bear upon the most important stakeholder – the student, by nature a digital native and an expert in computer-mediated communication (CMC). The synergy between the student and the environment, even as he/she is placed within an increasingly demanding, unconventional, yet promising educational milieu, gains centrality. The critical question on what is the status of the digital in educational reform discourse

potentially sharpens attention on the conjunctural moment in which young people seem to have seized hold of the affordances of digital technologies and the establishment curriculum actors are somehow traveling behind.

Policy, Educators, and the Student

What is the role of policymaking and how does it address the needs of the hour especially from the perspective of the student? How does it reconfigure attendant power relationships? These pressing questions have been at the forefront of debates in curriculum studies and in the broader field of education. Notably, the power constructs that regulate social and cultural contexts make their way into student lives in the form of curriculum, classrooms, and school practices (Giroux and Aronowitz 1993). While the issue of K-12 curriculum, education standards, and measures to strengthen primary and secondary education in the United States has been in wide discussion, proliferating the media over several years, the common thread in these debates has often placed the matter within the domain of politicians and K-12 educators and also been affected by a disconnect between higher education researchers and school teachers (Hess 2015). However, the situation is not only “ripe for change,” but “in tandem with the rapid evolution of higher education, primary and secondary education are undergoing a transformation of their own” (Hess et al. 2015, p. 241). Drawing on Foucault, Popkewitz and Brennan argued that it is essential to consider how power/knowledge dynamics inform educational spaces because “knowledge (defined by power relationships) has a material element in social life” (1997, p. 288). This is no different in the digital educational spaces.

Casting a quick glance at the historical context, the Common Core, finalized and released in June 2010 and subsequently adopted by 43 States in the United States, had the objective of enabling “students to be ready to succeed in credit bearing, college entry courses and in workforce training programs” (Common Core State Standards Initiative, 2006, as cited in Taft, in Hess et al. 2015, p. 245). Building upon recommendations from education policies

such as No Child Left Behind and Race to the Top, the Common Core's mandate was reinforced by an educational environment where testing and standardization have been encouraged and rewarded (Bills 2004). The introduction of the Common Core is by no means an uncontested or insignificant development for the US educational system. Public opinion has been divided, with strong criticism coming from researchers, teachers, and school districts, particularly about the amount of time spent in testing, the need for instructors to teach to the test as opposed to enhancing learning, as well as the lack of evidence to show connections between testing and learning. Educators are pointing to the fact that it seems to be built around the idea of uniformity, whereas to be effective, the future of education should be in promoting diversity in learning environments. More to the point, the speaking and listening components introduced in the English Language Arts Standards in response to "greater demands for knowledge workers with highly-developed communication skills" (Bodary, in Hess et al. 2015, p. 246) need to be problematized. While policymakers acknowledge that this does not imply simple public-speaking skills but must aim to incorporate strategic use of digital media technologies, researchers emphasize on the need for "application of technology and new media informed by communication research" (Beebe, in Hess et al. 2015, p. 254) in effecting outcome-based educational standards.

For cultural studies, this is an active intersection of policy and student experience. For the new-generation student, mobile phones, tablets, and handheld computing devices are household terms. Handhelds are seen not so much as technology but as extensions of their own faculties. They have developed innate abilities to live their lives at their fingertips and on the screens of their computers, laptops, and, even more often, their mobile handhelds and tablets, such as iPads. Entire conversations are held through various forms of text messaging, communities and friendships are built and maintained over Facebook, and their life possessions – now more often digital than material – are archived on media spaces like YouTube and Facebook. How will this recent emphasis on speaking and listening reconfigure the power dynamics within the learning

environment, especially for the student already possessing a high degree of digital literacy and more geared to computer-mediated communication, is a question that must be engaged in the near future. The student's agency and also their increasingly proactive engagement with digital learning environment form a substantial part of such consideration. After all, Paul Willis has brilliantly argued in his essay "Foot Soldiers of Modernity" (in McCarthy et al. 2005, p. 468) that as policy planners become fixated on the internal logics of their "top-down" initiatives, they fail to dwell on the unintended consequences of their policies. Thus, the school often becomes the principal site for playing out various social contradictions and tensions and students find themselves at the frontline of these conflicts, often called upon to challenge not only its "underlying individualistic and meritocratic ideologies" but also the practical inability of the school to connect the young to meaningful prospects in the job world. Policies are meaningful when they incorporate provisions not only for incorporating proficiencies already maturing in its stakeholders but also in being open to innovations arriving from an increasingly diverse field of technology-mediated learning (TML). The next section attends to several such innovative strides that are revolutionizing online learning.

Theory, Technology, and Practice

Earlier research on educational technologies had suggested that they were deployed in "support of" face-to-face teaching, distance learning, and self-learning (Chaves 1999). Contemporary flows indicate that TML has undergone a sea change with digital technologies and platforms often operating "in the place of" conventional classroom teaching and learning. We see this in experimental environments of massive open online courses (MOOCs) offered by big universities, social networking sites for education, online lectures and video learning (TED, YT EDU, @GoogleTalks, Reddit lectures), open education resources (Open Textbooks, Scribd, Creative Commons Education), and innumerable other online learning options. Scholars rightly

noted that educational technologies had earlier implied more focus on stand-alone techniques, systems, and devices (Cope et al. 2011; Bruce 1999). Current implications of the term have shifted considerably to accommodate new communication and information technologies (C&ITs) being deployed to optimize strategies of outcome-based education. Research that predicted the “*mediational* function” of new media where new technologies provide “affordances of learning” and “*mediate* between students, between student and teacher, and among task, resources, situation, and students” (Bruce 1999) has found its mark when one considers that conventional models of education and tutoring are not merely being challenged but also replaced by online learning practices. According to educational policy theorists, “evolving technologies, applied to the discursive and social relations of new writing spaces on the Internet, provide us for the first time with a paradigm-changing opportunity” (Cope et al. 2011, p. 81) in providing tools to transform assessment and thereon to transform learning itself.

On the other hand, educational technology practitioners from ventures like EdSurge and Project Tomorrow are insistent that innovative educational technologies and business models from the Silicon Valley are the trajectories to the future of the US educational system. That innovation and entrepreneurship is steadily and not so slowly taking the field by storm is not to be debated. The Speak Up Survey (2013) of 400,000 respondents from 9000 schools in 2700 districts across the country showed the magnitude of this approaching transformation (Riedel, 2015). A staggering 89% of high school students and 50% of 3rd to 5th grade students were shown to have access to Internet-connected smartphones, with comparable degrees of access to tablets and laptops. Sixty-four percent of the respondents identified 3-G- or 4-G-enabled devices as their primary means of connecting to the Internet. Not all of them are playing games online, when we note that one third of the students are accessing online videos to get help with their homework. It is not surprising, since 46% of the teachers use videos in their classroom teaching and 23% of the students access videos uploaded by their teachers.

The versatility of such technology usage in education is in the fact that majority of the students surveyed leveraged mobile devices to not merely transform their learning processes but integrate anytime research work, peer collaboration, and educational games into leisure activities, efficiency measures, and daily tasks – establishing C&ITs as integral parts of their lives and culture. Such rising trends as use of videos and online learning networks are being called the “Khan Academy effect,” after a controversial digital learning organization called Khan Academy which hosts a series of videos offering step-by-step instructions on how to solve Math problems. While Khan Academy’s popularity is hard to understand considering charges of low-resolution videos, erroneous presentations, and lack of pedagogical intentionality, it still remains important and impactful because its informal online learning platforms represent a shift in the culture of the educational environment with a DIY attitude becoming the norm. Khan Academy’s webpage proudly displays the message: “Watch. Practice. Learn almost anything – for free” (Bingham 2011). Research shows that the Khan Academy had 10 million unique users in 2014, of which 65% were from the United States alone (Research on use of Khan Academy in Schools, 2014).

From the C&IT practitioner’s perspective, the most interesting problem to solve in strengthening education is not actually in using technology per se to improve teaching. Instead, it is in finding a way to create better incentives and competition so that better ideas and approaches win out over time. This is how technology improves – there is constant competition with strong incentives for individuals or companies to come up with new ideas to improve on the status quo (and typically to make a profit if successful). Extensive research on market-style mechanisms and competition-based educational reforms, however, points to different dynamics in the field of education. Scholars argue that educational organizations, in order to succeed in the marketplace, often respond to competitive pressures by developing marketing and promotional strategies “having to do with symbolic management of a school’s image rather than substantive changes in its educational processes” (Lubienski 2005, p. 465).

How the digital era will reconfigure educational practices, considering the fact that TML services like *Instapundit* or *Mathalicious* have become remarkably prolific within education sector, still remains to be seen. However, in noting the advances by MOOC networks like *Coursera*, *MIT OpenCourseWare*, and *Udacity*, many of them geared as substitutes to classroom learning, major upcoming shifts in educational culture are inevitable. While there is not much doubt about the fact that this already marks a historical juncture “with momentous changes in the availability of what can be easily accessed and learned online,” scholars also point to the debates on the evolving role of teachers (Bingham 2011). The next section looks at the changing roles of educators and also how teachers and parents are assuming positions within the drastically changing educational environment.

Parental Academic Support and the Teacher

When knowledge is easily and quickly accessible by all people, what, then, is the role of the educator? With the easy accessibility of information on the Internet, discussions have emerged on the need for teachers’ “intensified progressivism.” The trend is toward a demand for the teacher to be more knowledgeable than ever before by staying abreast with advances through intense engagement with technology. In this regard, educational theorists have argued that “relationality” is at the core of the educational endeavor and “education is primarily about human beings who need to meet together as a group of people if learning is to take place” (Bingham 2011).

Hence, social relations between parents and teachers evolve as another significant area. Education is considered a “public good” in the United States, as in most developed countries, and this sector is heavily regulated. It is also extremely fragmented. Schools operate under strict oversight by local communities and various levels of government. An important component within this oversight is the parent’s involvement in academic support and parent-teacher communication. Digital communication and C&ITs like smartphones and social networking systems are shaping these social relations.

While extensive scholarship is emerging using the media richness theory (MRT) to test patterns in this respect, here, of interest is a 2015 study that reports that in contrary to the basic thesis of MRT, parents increasingly prefer lean media communication like e-mails and texting over richer media modes like FTF and phone or more advanced digital platforms like Skype or FaceTime. However, it identifies the smartphone as a key component of higher level of parental academic support (PAS) and connection between these two stakeholders (Thompson et al. 2015). With two thirds of consumers using smartphones within the United States, this mobile device has taken PAS to a new level as parents rely heavily on e-mails and text messages to keep abreast. This is of great value, considering that the ease of usage also boosts frequency of communication. Even though teacher’s involvement, self-disclosure, and engagement in Facebook have showed positive influence in student motivation and learning, as well as teacher-student relations, it is the handheld mobile that creates a surge in PAS, a longtime constant in student welfare. Parents’ increased entry into the social networking system also bodes well for parent-teacher communication and, consequently, parental academic support.

Conclusion

One of the celebrated notions of technology in cultural studies from Raymond Williams (2003) is that new technology is not merely an outgrowth of social needs but it was also foreseen by people through lived experiences. If this is true, then certain important consequences follow from this view. It follows, for instance, that cultural studies of education in the digital age should not only focus on new technologies themselves (e.g., C&ITs, MOOCs) but also pay close attention to “players” from where the clues about the future development in educative practices can be furnished. For this reason, this entry looked into the lived experiences of key stakeholders. Rejecting technological determinism that C&ITs alone have made a new generation of students, we highlighted the power relations embedded in the processes of policymaking, proliferation of new

educational platforms, marketing promotion, and parental academic support among different actors. We demonstrated that the reconstruction of the power relations is the product of the educational space in the digital age on the one hand and producing new meanings for the reconfiguration of education on the other.

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Cultural Studies and New Student Resistance

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Synonyms

Cultural politics of education; Higher student movements; Subcultures; Youth movements; Education and youth protests; Media and youth movements

Introduction

Youth and resistance are two concepts closely linked to the development of Cultural Studies. Both contain the elements of topics of interest for Cultural Studies: power, historicity, categorization, and social structure. Youth and resistance seem to refer directly to the claims of social change, to those practices that subvert the inherited order and challenge the traditional patterns of the order of society. To amalgamate these concepts, the notion of subcultures has been widely employed. In fact, one of the primary texts on the subject and one of the most important works about youth in the tradition of Cultural Studies associated youth and resistance with a configuration of differentiated structures within broader cultural networks. This is how “subculture” was defined in *Resistance Through Rituals: Youth Subcultures in Post-war Britain* (Hall and Jefferson 1993), which was the study done by the first generation of graduates from the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies of Birmingham, originally published in 1975 with the goal to explain the phenomenon of “youth culture” in Britain after the war. Dick Hebdige followed this line of research with *Subculture: The Meaning of Style* (1979), a key text in the study of youth and subculture. From these works, youth have been of particular interest to those who use Cultural Studies as the main

reference in the fields of communication, education, sociology, anthropology, history, and literature.

Youth is a conceptual category that allows for the organization of a social group within a given set of features. Thus, youths, when using a more conservative lens, would primarily be seen as incomplete adults, prone to disorder and to disrupting the harmony of society. Therefore, the early works that considered this subject of study were especially dedicated to juvenile delinquency (Baker 2012). In a more romantic vision of youth, on the other hand, youth would be the only possibility of overcoming the mistakes of the present and leading society towards a more prosperous and just horizon. Cultural Studies subverts both viewpoints and stresses the analysis of the categories of youth, which cannot be conceived as a homogeneous group or even as a single age group. Youth as a social category is influenced by race, class, and power, as well as in other ways, as we have been taught in Cultural Studies.

Today in education, this complex framework of analysis proposed by Cultural Studies might be usefully applied in examining the current younger generation that is attending higher education in such large numbers in many countries. To reflect on this point, this entry will explore the case of the Chilean student movement of 2011, which has been one of the most important expressions of youth resistance in the recent history of Chile and that inspired other social movements in different countries. As such an educational-cultural approach will be used to analyze the Chilean student movement.

Youth and Educational Credentials

Chile has a massive higher education system where more than 30% of the population who are of age attend a college or career school. In 1986, the higher education system had 240,000 students, where now 1,200,000 students are enrolled. It is also important to note that 7 out of 10 youths are the first generation of his/her family to attend university. These two facts are key to understanding the student movement: never before in the history of Chile have youth been so educated with higher academic credentials. However, this

massive result, among others, of the neoliberal reforms of the Pinochet dictatorship in the 1980s does not necessarily imply that the higher education system is working effectively in terms of social equality. The fact that 70% of youths are the first generation to go to college does not mean that there has been a rearrangement in the social structure in Chile; on the contrary, scarce upward social mobility and the educational system reproduce inherited privileges.

Chilean students took to the streets en masse for 7 months in 2011, because the neoliberal promise of social mobility has been a failure in the country. Here, Cultural Studies, as an area of research, is relevant because if we apply the historical thinking that its exponents proposed in *Resistance through Rituals*, it is possible to note that these changes to the massiveness of the educational system have produced social breakdowns in all countries with the same uneasiness. In the 1950s and 1960s, in Great Britain, the meritocratic ideology, as it is illustrated in *Resistance through Rituals*, led us to believe that education would be the springboard for an extended number of children of the working class to jump into the ruling classes. The result, rather, was a devaluation of academic credentials and the generation of a uniform middle class with limited mobility.

This meritocratic ideology has also been a dominant discourse in countries such as Chile, which is considered, from a colonial perspective, as “developing.” Education has been the bet for many youth and their families. Students take out expensive loans to pay for college and have hope for a better future than their parents had; but for a third of them, this step up to education is not profitable and students end up unemployed, or working on something that they did not study, and completely indebted.

This debt and frustration is accompanied by underemployment or subpar work opportunities. Underemployment is another consequence of the higher education system, which has promoted a direct relationship between jobs and academic credentials (Cunningham 2015) and has simply turned many students into the “enlightened unemployed.” Faced with this reality, Chilean students rebelled in 2011, demonstrating that youth resistance is

possible if innovative strategies are combined with a wide range of political and educational resources.

Youth as Media Savvy Political Actors: A Case of Resistance

One of the characteristics of students mobilized in 2011 was its close relationship with the new communication platforms. Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube were the main tools for dissemination and massification of messages to students. Social movements require strong communication tools because the traditional media tend to focus on the status quo and generally criminalize resistance movements. In Chile, during the transition from dictatorship to democracy in the 1990s, the student movements failed to break through the information barrier. However, in 2011 and after a long process of accumulation of political experiences that began with the demonstrations of high school students in 2001 and 2006, students became protagonists in the debate about education in Chile.

Cultural Studies has rightly sought to understand the relationship that people establish with the media from a sociocultural point of view and not merely a cognitive one (effects of the media on the mind of the subject). If we use this sociocultural point of view to look at the 2011 Chilean student movement, it is possible to notice the importance of the media in its success. According to various surveys, the students got 80% support of the population who agreed with their principle demands (free education and an end to profit in education) (Bellei et al. 2014). Moreover, they changed the agenda of educational policies, and their leaders were widely known public figures that succeeded in attracting the attention of thousands of citizens in each march or street demonstration. This was possible, among other reasons, due to the systematic presence in traditional media (radio, newspapers, and television) and the intensive use of online social networks.

The first march of students in April of 2011 brought together more than 10,000 people, but the following street demonstrations between May and November always exceeded 80,000 people, with maximum number of 200,000 people in some

marches in Santiago during the Chilean winter (June-July-August, 2011). These adherents were told of the movement's activities mainly through television and Facebook. On both platforms, students displayed their communicative actions. Their leaders attended all news and political programs on Chilean television; on morning and entertainment programs, these leaders spoke of the students' demands and video digital social networks called for protests and student proposals were broadcast.

The students considered communication as an essential dimension of their movement and the media as platforms for common sense debates. The greatest triumph of the students is seen in the changes in the subjectivity of Chileans. In a recent report of the United Nations Program for Development (UNDP), it is concluded that since 2011, Chile is undergoing a process of politicization (PNUD 2015). The report indicated that a constant tension exists between the real, the possible and the legitimate in Chilean society, where people are much more critical of the institutions and traditional forms of political representation. In addition, during this process of politicization, youth resistance movements have played a key role, because they challenge the elite and, in turn, help the creation of new frameworks for interpreting the reality of people.

The Chilean student movement of 2011 conjugated massive criticism of the neoliberal education system and against the technocratic design of education policies. Education became a field of ideological dispute, as never known before in the country.

To produce this result, students used different communication platforms with discourses focused on social justice, equality, and education as a social right. They developed strong political content and effectively communicated a message containing the main discomforts of students: high debt, low quality of education, precarious jobs after graduation, and irregular business aspects in education. This message was sophisticatedly prepared and disseminated in all possible news programs and in the street.

For the success of the movement, the students applied the knowledge acquired in their own way through the higher education system: economics students filled the documents of the student organization with facts and figures to argue with

evidence against the government's proposals, medical students and nursing tended to the wounded during street protests, engineering students developed smartphone applications in order to inform the participants of the march as well as the itinerary, and communication students produced television programs transmitted by the Internet to disseminate the students' message.

The latter two cases are the most relevant for Cultural Studies in education, because both combine a reflection on technology and society, as described in the classic *Television: Technology and Cultural Form* (1974) by Raymond Williams, one of the great intellectuals of British Cultural Studies. Engineering students developed apps to inform other students about marches, and communication students conducted programs via streaming to spread the message of the movement, combining the high knowledge in both disciplines, but emphasizing, above all, the political use of knowledge and technology. Students used their cognitive skills formed in internships in college to support the movement, thus subverting the traditional notion of higher education as a simple step into the labor market. Students realized that their skills were not functional to the labor market but were essential to establish themselves as political actors in society.

This notion of the political actor alters the conventional way of conceiving a student in a neoliberal education system, which considers him/her as a simple consumer of an educational service. The student as a political actor demands a higher requirement: his/her understanding as a subject of rights. This is a radical change in the governance of institutions. In Chile, governance in the public sphere has been given to a group of professionals who were deemed "ideologically neutral" and "politically disinterested" for several decades, who were "serving their country" with the expertise they acquired in the best universities around the world. In a neoliberal context, the State does not disappear, but loses ground in this area to a new community of "intellectuals" who acquire sufficient power to determine educational policies. The 2011, student movement seriously challenged this hegemonic technique.

Student marches demonstrated the strength of student demands and their ability to articulate a

discourse on education that has permeated the cultural and political structures. This is a new generation of youth with an enormous capacity to convert their justified complaints against the educational system in a political way of transformation. The movement shook the prevailing order and system of governance within these educational institutions. The demand for more democracy was not only within the political system but also for discussions within communities. Verticality in decision-making is no longer possible in the current political climate. In Chile, universities are exposed to more critical and demanding students, who want to participate and who do not accept a secondary role so easily.

Thus it is possible to argue that since 2011, the Chilean educational field has been repoliticized by political actors and not by policy specialists. This is not just a semantic change; it is also a new approach to educational problems. For a long time, experts, who were deemed as such by the elite and by the media, were the protagonists of educational policies. Students have recovered this place for the educational community, expanding the areas of action in education. Thus, they materialize their resistance to neoliberal policies implemented in Chilean education since the market reforms of the dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet (1973–1990). In fact, one of the leaders of the Chilean movement points out: "Our action was intended to realize that the collusion between politics and money was the structural axis and stabilizer of neoliberal education, not an accident" (Figueroa 2013, p. 69).

The Chilean student movement of 2011, in this way, constituted a paradigmatic case study of youth resistance against neoliberal hegemony. To understand resistance, from a Cultural Studies point of view, Barker's (2012) definition of resistance states that resistance is a "category of normative judgment acts. Resistance issues from relationship of power and subordination in the forms of challenges to and negotiations of the ascendant order. Resistance is relational and conjunctural" (p. 509). To reach this definition of resistance, Barker based this idea on the reading of Stuart Hall and Tony Jefferson's edited volume, *Resistance through Rituals*, which conceives of resistance "as challenges to and negotiations of dominant order which could not be assimilated to the traditional categories of

revolutionary class struggle” (Hall 1996, p. 294, cited in Baker 2012, p. 455).

If the youth resistance has its peculiarities and is temporary, how is it possible to understand the student movement? One possible answer lies in the work of Gill and DeFronzo (2009) who point out that a student movement can be considered as:

a relatively organized effort on the part of a large number of students to either bring about or prevent change in any one of the following: policies, institutional personnel, social structure (institutions), or cultural aspects of society involving either institutionalized or non-institutionalized collective actions or both simultaneously. (p. 208)

These authors establish four types of student movements, and the combination of political and sociocultural factors determine the type of movement: reformist, radical identity, structural revolutionary, and social revolutionary (Gill and DeFronzo 2009, pp. 209–214). It could be hypothesized that the 2011 Chilean student movement evolved from a reformist movement to a social revolutionary one, because in the end the students proposed to change the educational system, political representation, and culture.

Because resistance is relational, it is necessary to frame the Chilean student movement within the conditions that allowed for its development. At this point, four dimensions can be identified that explain the circumstances that made the resistance possible: (1) the students had cause for complaint (grievance) due to the advancement of educational coverage, but also in turn the extent of educational inequality, high indebtedness, and future unemployment. In this assumption, the movements would be an unintended consequence of neoliberalism applied in Chile; (2) they were able to successfully communicate and frame (cultural framing) their demands to connect with people, mobilize supporters, and intervene in the political system; (3) they took advantage of their political opportunities during the presidential periods of Michelle Bachelet (2006–2010) – for her promise of a citizen government – and of Sebastián Piñera (2010–2014) following his announcement of a higher education reform; and (4) the disposition and the intensive use of intellectual, human, technological, and political

resources in innovative ways (Bellei et al. 2014). This is, undoubtedly, the most educated and best prepared generation in the history of Chile.

Conclusion: “The Generation Without Fear”

This new and active Chilean generation is not marked by the trauma of the generation that suffered and fought the dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet. It is a “generation without fear” that has altered the educational field to a new level of relations. Another leader of the movement, Giorgio Jackson (2013) sums it up by saying: “We are a generation that was not born under the trauma of dictatorship, a generation with less fear, raised in the post-dictatorship” (p. 110). This new generation, as expressed in the student movement of 2011, has extended the limits of Chilean democracy and shaken the foundations of the Chilean education system. These students have also become actors who define educational policies. In addition, the students have allowed for the expansion of the understanding of social movements and the value of new technologies for citizen participation. For a long time, in Chile, youth were seen as apathetic and disinterested. But this point of view only replicated the classic framework of citizens, who were reduced to participating politically only through voting in the regular elections of the political system.

In 2011, university students took to the streets to counter the current dynamics and contradictions of the Chilean neoliberal system. Therefore, we cannot describe this movement as a “typical” expression of youthful rebellion. On the contrary, this new generation of mobilized students demonstrated a kind of political astuteness and level of investment in structural change that we have not seen in the depiction of youth resistance in the British Cultural Studies tradition, where youth were presented rejecting adult authority more than calling for fundamental social change. In so doing, the 2011 Chilean student movement has effectively contributed to an expanded conversation on the urgent topic of youth and resistance in the Cultural Studies in education.

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Cultural Studies and Public Pedagogy

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Introduction

My own interest in cultural studies emerges out of an ongoing project that attempts to theorize the regulatory and emancipatory relationship among culture, power, and politics as expressed through the dynamics of what I call public pedagogy, particularly as the latter is played out around the construction of youth within the broader terrain of schooling and popular culture. I have also been particularly concerned with challenging conservative, liberal, and left approaches that both abstract culture from the dynamics of power and politics and dismiss educators who engage pedagogy as a moral and political practice rather than as a rigid methodology. In the latter case, the conservative

script is a familiar one, but it has taken on a new urgency given the current backlash against women, urban youth, minorities of color, progressive academics, and the underlying fabric of the welfare State itself. Within this discourse, cultural politics is dismissed as a corrupting influence on the universal claims of truth, beauty, and reason. Even more surprising is the rejection of cultural politics shared by a growing number of progressives who narrowly define politics and pedagogy within a dichotomy that pits the alleged “real” material issues of class and labor against a fragmenting and marginalizing concern with the politics of culture, textuality, and difference. Caught between the modalities of a timeless universal aesthetic or a narrowly defined politics, culture in both instances is removed from power and viewed as either untainted by politics or simply a weak or secondary version of politics. Lost here is the attempt to develop a notion of culture that explores how learning is linked to social change, how authority makes it difficult for subaltern groups to speak in an way that carries any legitimacy, or how the pedagogical struggle over identities, meaning, affect, values, and desires takes place across a spectrum of public spheres in society.

In opposition to these positions, I think it is imperative that critical educators both recover and rethink the ways in which culture is related to power and how and where it functions both symbolically and institutionally as an educational, political, and economic force. Culture is constitutive rather than reflexive. That is, it not only reflects larger forces, it also shapes them. It is the ground of both contestation and accommodation; moreover, it is the terrain where young people and others imagine their relationship to the world; As Stuart Hall points out, “culture is the terrain where representations organize regulate and give meaning to social practices through the distribution of symbolic and material resources between different groups.” Culture provides the conditions for putting subject positions and identities in place, and it has become a major force for global historical changes. Moreover, it is increasingly characterized by the rise of institutions and technologies which are transforming the traditional spheres of the economy, industry, society, and everyday life. Culture

now plays a central role in producing narratives, metaphors, and images that exercise a powerful pedagogical force over how people think of themselves and their relationship to others.

Cultural Studies and Public Pedagogy

I want to argue that central to any viable notion of cultural studies is the assumption that culture and power must be organized through an understanding of how the political becomes pedagogical; that is, how the very processes of learning constitute the political mechanisms through which identities are shaped, desires mobilized, and experiences take on form and meaning. Pedagogy in this instance is not only central to cultural studies and cultural politics, it also can no longer be confined to the site of schooling, which as Raymond Williams reminds us signals how youth are constructed as subjects and subject to relations of power within and across a variety of public spaces. With this said, I want to comment on some very schematic and incomplete elements of cultural studies that I think are useful for thinking about the interface of some of the most insightful work being done in cultural studies and critical pedagogy.

First, in the face of contemporary forms of political and epistemological relativism, cultural studies makes a claim through an appeal to highly disciplined, theoretical work to find better forms of knowledge and authority in order to engage the problem as Stuart Hall puts it of addressing and understanding “what keeps making the lives we live and the societies we live in profoundly and deeply antihumane.” In this instance, cultural studies links its different projects with ethical and political referents that offer the possibility for defining and providing the institutional space and practice for educating teachers, students, and others to play a vital role in renewing civic life, redefining their role as public intellectuals, and addressing through their work some of the most urgent and pressing social problems facing us at the present time. Former CUNY chancellor Joe Murphy has captured the spirit of what it means for educators to address such a project. He argues that educators should “give students [the critical]

sensibility to understand economic, political, and historical forces so they’re not just victims of these forces but can act on them with effect. Giving [students, especially the poor] this power is a threatening idea to many. But it is essential to the health of a democratic society.”

Second, cultural studies is radically contextual in that the very questions that it ask change in every context. Pedagogy in this instance is always a response to particular contexts, questions, and social relations and its practices are judged in part by their ability to provide a better understanding of how power works in and through such contexts while simultaneously opening up imagined possibilities for changing them. Larry Grossberg puts it well in arguing that cultural studies must be grounded in an act of doing, what critical theorist Doug Kellner has aptly called “Doing Cultural Studies” which in this case means intervening into contexts and power in order to enable people to act more strategically in ways that change their context for the better. For educators, this suggests that pedagogy is not a priori set of methods that simply needs to be uncovered and then applied regardless of the contexts in which one teaches but is the outcome of numerous struggles between different groups over how contexts are made and unmade, often within unequal relations of power. In short, the historical, cultural, social, and economic forces at work in defining particular contexts will offer the limits and possibilities for developing the pedagogical strategies we undertake in schools and other cultural sites.

The notion that pedagogy is always contextual also suggests linking the curriculums we teach to the experiences that students bring to their encounter with schools and their institutionally legitimated knowledge and social relations. One implication for such work is that future and existing teachers be educated about the viability of developing context-dependent learning that takes account of student experiences and their relationships to popular culture and the terrain of pleasure, including those cultural industries that are often dismissed as producing mere entertainment. Despite the growing diversity of students in both public schools and higher education, there are few examples of curriculum sensitivity to the multiplicity of economic,

social, and cultural factors bearing on students' educational lives. Even where there is a proliferation of programs such as ethnic and black studies in higher education, these are often marginalized in small programs far removed from the courses organized around history, science, and the humanities majors. Cultural studies at least provides the theoretical tools for allowing teachers and other cultural workers to recognize the cultural resources that students bring to school and other educational sites and the need to honor them by both affirming and engaging them critically as forms of knowledge crucial to the production of their sense of place, history, and how they envision their relationship to others. Equally important, the knowledge produced by students offers educators an opportunity to learn from young people and to incorporate such knowledge as an integral part of their own teaching.

Third, the cultural studies emphasis on interdisciplinarity is important because it provides a rationale for challenging and questioning not only how knowledge has been historically produced, hierarchized, and used to sanction particular form of authority and exclusions but also because it operates at the frontiers of knowledge and prompts teachers and students to raise new questions and models of analysis outside of the already officially sanctioned boundaries of knowledge, while at the same time activating student involvement in gaining ownership over different aspects of their learning. The point here is that educators question and work across academic disciplines but at the same time they value disciplinary work rather than simply dismiss it. In part, this suggests reformulating the value and implications of established disciplines and those areas of study that constitute mass culture, popular culture, youth culture, and other aspects of student knowledge and the contested terrain of common sense. This is not a matter of abandoning high culture or simply substituting it for popular culture. It is rather an attempt to refigure the boundaries of what constitutes culture and really useful knowledge in order to study it in new and critical ways.

Fourth, in a somewhat related way, the emphasis on the part of cultural studies theorists to study the full range of cultural practices as they circulate throughout society opens the possibility for

understanding the educational force of a whole range of new cultural forms within media culture that have become the primary educational forces in advanced industrial societies. Educators must become more reflective about engaging and studying the production, reception, and situated use of varied popular texts, and how they structure social relations, values, particular notions of community, the future, and diverse definitions of the self. Texts in this sense do not merely refer to the culture of print or the technology of the book but to all those audio, visual, and electronically mediated forms of knowledge that have prompted a radical shift in the construction of knowledge and the ways in which knowledge is produced, received, and consumed. Recently, my own work has focused on the ways in which the Disney's corporate culture, particularly through its animated films, radio programs, theme parks, and Hollywood blockbusters, functions as a expansive teaching machine in which it appropriates media and popular culture to rewrite public memory and offer students an almost entirely privatized and commercialized notion of citizenship. One could equally imagine using a popular magazine such as National Geographic to study the history of colonial representations in the popular imagination.

As Benjamin Barber noted in a recent issue of *The Nation*, "It is time to recognize that the true tutors of our children are not [only] the schoolteachers or university professors but [also] film makers, advertising executives and pop culture purveyors. Disney does more than Duke (University), Spielberg outweighs Stanford, (and) MTV trumps MIT." Barber is partly correct in noting that contemporary youth do not simply rely on the technology and culture of the book to construct and affirm their identities; instead, they are faced with the task of finding their way through a decentered cultural landscape no longer caught in the grip of a technology of print or closed narrative structures. I do not believe that educators and other cultural workers can critically understand and engage the shifting attitudes, representations, and desires of this new generation of youth within the dominant disciplinary configurations of knowledge and practice. A more critical and oppositional

pedagogical practice must be aimed at providing the conditions for young people and adults to engage in popular media and mass culture seriously as objects of social analysis and to learn how to read them critically through specific strategies of understanding, engagement, and transformation. At stake here is a view of literacy that is multiple and plural rather than singular and fixed. The modernist emphasis on literacy must be reconfigured in order for students to learn multiple literacies rooted in a mastery of diverse symbolic domains. At the same time, it is not enough to educate students to be simply critical readers across a variety of cultural domains, they must also become cultural producers. That is, they must learn how to utilize the new electronic technologies and how to think about the dynamics of cultural power and how it works on and through them so that they can learn how to build alternative cultural spheres in which such power is shared and is used to promote non-commodified values rather than simply mimic corporate culture and its underlying transactions.

Fifth, cultural studies also rightly argues for the importance of analyzing history not as a totalizing narrative unproblematically linked to progress but as a series of ruptures and displacements. History in this sense becomes decentered, more complex, and diffuse. Rather than taking up history within the confines of a rigid and narrowly defined Western tradition, teachers can name and address the multiple traditions and narratives that constitute the complex and multilayered constructions, deployments, and uses of national and global identities and public memories. The pedagogical benefit of such an approach is that it makes available to students those narratives, local histories, and subjugated memories that have been excluded and marginalized in dominant renditions of history. Through the lens of cultural studies, history can be read from a transnational and intercultural perspective. In part, history becomes a critical reading focused on the local and global relations that the United States has constructed over time with other countries. Historical learning in this sense is not about constructing a linear narrative but about blasting history open, rupturing its silences, highlighting its detours, and organizing

its limits within an open and honest concern with human suffering, values, and the legacy of the often unrepresentable or misrepresented.

History is not an artifact but a struggle over the relationship between representation and agency. James Clifford is insightful in arguing that history should “force a sense of location on those who engage with it.” In other words, history is not merely about looking at facts, dates, and events. It is also about critically examining one’s own historical location amid relations of power, privilege, or subordination. Similarly, cultural studies strongly supports the notion that the work of theory, research, and practice must, in part, be approached through historical undertakings and struggles around nationhood, ethnicity, race, gender, class, youth cultures, and other contestations over culture and politics.

Sixth, the issue of pedagogy is increasingly becoming one of the defining principles of cultural studies. Pedagogy represents forms of cultural production and struggle implicated in and critically attentive to how power and meaning are employed in the construction and organization of knowledge, desires, values, and identities. Pedagogy in this sense is not reduced to the mastering of skills or techniques. Rather, it is defined as a cultural practice that must be accountable ethically and politically for the stories it produces, the claims it makes on social memories, and the images of the future it deems legitimate. As both an object of critique and a method of cultural production, critical pedagogical practices should refuse to hide behind claims of objectivity and must work, in part, to link theory and practice in the service of expanding the possibilities for democratic life. In the broadest sense, critical pedagogy offers students and others – outside of an officially sanctioned script – the historically and contextually specific knowledge, skills, and tools they need to engage in what the philosopher and Czech president Vaclav Havel calls “the richest possible participation in public life.” Needless to say, such tools are not pre-given but are the outcome of struggles, debate, dialogue, and engagement across a variety of public spheres.

Havel’s comments suggest that progressive educators must address the task of defending schools

as essential to the life of the nation because they are one of the few public spaces left where students can both learn about and engage in the experience of democracy. In the face of ongoing corporate takeovers, the increasing commodification of the curriculum, and the growing interest in students as consumers rather than critical citizens, educators must consider mounting a collective struggle to reassert the crucial importance of public education as a public good as opposed to being merely a private good. At issue here is providing students with the educational opportunities to recognize the dream and promise of a substantive democracy, particularly the idea that as citizens they are entitled to decent public services, such as housing, health care, health insurance, security, financial support during hard times, and most importantly, some power over decision making.

While this list is both schematic and incomplete, it points to a core of theoretical considerations that offer a beginning for advancing a more public vision for schools and colleges of education. Hopefully, it suggests theoretical tools for constructing new forms of collaboration among faculty, a broadening of the terms of learning for teachers, and new approaches toward interdisciplinary research that address local, national, and international concerns. The potential that cultural studies has for developing forms of collaboration that cut across national boundaries is worth taking up.

But like any other field or area, cultural studies is marked by a number of weaknesses that need to be addressed by educators drawn to some of its more critical assumptions. There is a tendency in some cultural studies work to be simply deconstructive, that is, it refuses to ask questions about the insertion of symbolic processes into societal contexts and their imbrication with power. Any viable form of cultural studies cannot insist on the primacy of signification over power, and in doing so reduce its purview to questions of meaning and texts. Within this discourse, material organization and institutional power disappear into culture. In opposition to this position, cultural studies needs to foreground the ways in which culture and power are related through the study of symbolic forms and meanings with the study of institutional power.

Moreover, cultural studies is still largely an academic discourse and as such is too far removed from other cultural and political sites where the work of public pedagogy goes on. In order to become a public discourse of any importance, it will have to focus its work on problems that are more public and pressing in terms of their relevance to address important social issues, whether they be drug policy legislation, the widespread attack by corporate culture on public schools, the ongoing attack on the welfare system, or a host of other issues.

In addition, cultural studies theorists have to examine their own formative histories and political and cultural ideologies in order to determine how they might be locked into the very systems of power they are attempting to get out of given that they often exercise power in and through the very institutions, cultural relations, and practices of the systems of which they are critical. This suggests registering and making visible our own subjective involvement in what we teach, how we interact in the classroom and other cultural sites, and how we locate, mediate, and defend the nature of the authority we exercise as teachers and cultural workers. Authority in this instance should become not simply the subject of social critique but also part of an auto critique of our own location and pedagogical practices within institutions that make us both complicitous and at the same time offer opportunities to push against the grain, undue the authority of the academy and other dominant institutions, while simultaneously opening up spaces of resistance and possibility.

Finally, if cultural studies theorists are truly concerned about how culture operates as a crucial site of power in the modern world, they will have to take seriously how pedagogy functions to secure and challenge the ways in which such power is deployed and resisted both within and outside traditional discourses and machineries of power, and as such suggests taking seriously the role that educators and other cultural workers might play as public intellectuals. Unlike traditional vanguardist or elitist notions of the intellectual, cultural studies should embrace the notion that the vocation of intellectuals be rooted in pedagogical and political work tempered by humility, a moral focus on suffering, and the need to produce alternative visions

and policies that go beyond a language of critique. On one level this means that cultural studies is important because it takes on the task of establishing and struggling over institutional spaces and practices that might produce public intellectuals. What critical educators need to stress is the need for cultural workers to struggle not only for the institutional space necessary for public intellectuals to have a voice but also for a cautious pedagogical regard for striking a critical balance between producing rigorous intellectual work, on the one hand, and exercising authority that is firm rather than rigid, self-critical and concretely utopian rather than repressive and doctrinaire, on the other. Rather than denouncing authority, those who engage in cultural studies must use it to organize and defend their cultural work, but at the same time they must avoid committing forms of pedagogical terrorism by allowing the authority they use and legitimate to be held up to critical scrutiny.

If cultural studies is to address its role as a public pedagogy, it will have to provide a new language for educating teachers, students, administrators, and others around the issue of civic leadership and public service. In this perspective, making the pedagogical more political as a central dynamic of cultural studies is fashioned not around a particular dogma, but through pedagogical practices which promote the conditions for teachers, students, and others to be critically attentive to the historical and socially constructed nature of the locations they occupy within a shifting world of representations and values. At the same time, such a pedagogy is about more than cultivating the capacity for critical understanding and engagement; it should also be about encouraging students to undertake strategies of transformation, strategies that locate students as the subject rather than the object of history, strategies that affirm forms of education that provide the conditions for students to learn how to govern rather than be merely governed.

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Cultural Studies in Science Education

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Introduction

The fundamental nature of modern science and, consequently, the proper methods of teaching science, have been extensively critiqued by theorists in the field of Cultural Studies of Science Education (CSSE). The launch of the journal *Cultural Studies of Science Education* in 2006 marks a key point in the history of the CSSE field. This journal focuses on research that understands modern science and science education to be particular cultural forms of establishing belief, embedded in, responsive to, and determined by larger cultural contexts. Holding that modern “western” science is a but an outgrowth of a western and/or European culture, the privileging of the methods and the resultant knowledge of western science is to be challenged, critiqued, and ended. The cultural positions of non-western peoples, and in particular the endemic, local sciences of each such population, are to be recognized as worthy of the same intellectual respect accorded to western modern science. The CSSE body of literature includes: pedagogical research about ways to teach science that eliminate the domination of school science by the newly de-privileged western modern science; qualitative research into forms of cultural oppression considered pervasive in the teaching of western modern science; and theoretical/philosophical research that sets out the commitment of the field to the coequal valuing of distinctive locally dominant cultural ontologies, epistemologies, and inquiry methods. Conceptualizations of science, and of science education, its purposes, and practices, must change accordingly.

CSSE scholarship has been and currently is strongly influential in the field of science education. But, it is also true that the fundamental intellectual commitments of CSSE are controversial. It is necessary to examine both aspects of the field to provide a thorough account of the CSSE field. Representative examples of the work in the field of cultural studies of science can be found

in Roth, W. (Ed.) (2009) *Science Education from People for People: Taking a Stand(point)*, in Roth, W. (Ed) (2010) *Re/structuring science education: Reuniting sociological and psychological perspectives*, and in Roth, W., and Barton, A.C. (2004) *Rethinking Scientific Literacy*.

Cultural Studies: The Broad Field

The cultural studies of science and science education constitute a subdivision of the broader field of cultural studies and must be understood in that context. Gilbert Rodman (2015), in *Why Cultural Studies?*, examines the purposes, methods, and social necessity of cultural studies investigations. Rodman argues that the field of Cultural Studies provides a much needed critique of elements of currently dominant cultural beliefs, norms, and practices.

Rodman applies the methods of cultural studies to the cultural studies field itself. He identifies problems in the field, and considers that the field in need of critique (Rodman, p. 4). Rodman believes that a regimen of “self-reflexivity” is essential if the field of cultural studies is to remain intact and able to serve its social critical function.

Cultural Studies is a well-established research field which was developed in its early years at the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies (CCCS) at the University of Birmingham (Rodman, p. 12). But it is difficult to clearly delineate the field or to give a descriptive account of its characteristic research focus and of its methods of inquiries. This is because the field has grown so precipitously and has garnered so many adherents that an exceedingly broad range of research topics and methods have come to gather under the heading of “cultural studies.”

This leads Rodman to identify that one of the problems the field must face is the fact of its own excessively diffuse and porous conceptual borders. According to Rodman, “the range of projects that currently travel under the ‘cultural studies’ banner is too diffuse — and too mutually incompatible — for most of the people claiming the term for themselves to actually be speaking about the same [general] project” (p. 35). Rodman sets out to formulate a prescriptive definition of what sort

of activities should properly count as cultural studies work, “to build a definition around a vision of what cultural studies is supposed to be.” (p. 37).

The principal criterion Rodman arrives at is that genuine cultural studies work must actively engage with a social-political issue of pressing cultural concern. The work must have a political purpose and a distinctive political stance. While the political stance of cultural studies work varies, it never strays far from its original affiliation with the political left (p. 43). Problems should be related to “real-life” social injustice; particular problems must be understood in their broader context (the criterion of breadth); and inquiries must have the aim of resulting in genuine knowledge of the social and nonhuman dynamics of the situation that lead to the problem (the criterion of depth).

The analysis must itself be, at the same time, intellectually genuine, that is, its findings must be undetermined by the leftist political commitments of the cultural theorist. The object is to gain genuine knowledge of the dynamics of the situation being studied, so that actions may be undertaken, with some hope of success, in reforming the situation in accord with a positive, leftist ideal end State.

The cultural studies ideal, on this interpretation, would seem to require the investigation of the dynamics of a social situation which is considered to be problematic, by means of the best modern scientific methods available, so that the dynamics may be known, and the knowledge may be used in guiding action toward the achievement of a desirable, and leftist, future state of affairs. The value of the tentative new knowledge is tested in practical activity, and revised and refined to more accurately correspond to the cultural dynamics that caused the initial situation of social concern.

This, one should note, appears to be the very model of a western modern scientific inquiry. Rodman, however, does not see the matter in this way and speaks of cultural studies as differing from other academic disciplines in that it is “an agenda driven project” (p. 52).

Rodman ruefully acknowledges that the cultural studies field has largely failed to meet this practical criterion for success. Cultural studies “has ‘failed’ to bring about an end to racism, patriarchy, heterosexism, colonialism, or

capitalism. . . even on a local level, even for a short period of time” (p. 52).

Cultural Studies of Science Education

Given Rodman’s analysis, one is moved to ask, why cultural studies of science and science education? Does this subfield meet the criteria of cultural studies at large? In what respects does it, and does it not, count as cultural studies?

It seems clear in reviewing the work published in the flagship journal that cultural studies of science and science education does largely take up what are considered to be social problem situations of injustice and cultural domination related to science and science education. Work in the field is thus purpose-driven, and it draws on the moral force of leftist political commitments. Given the wide scope of the issues taken up, from the practical problems of pedagogy, to the nature of science, to the nature of knowledge, truth, and reality, the CSSE field meets the criterion Rodman sets out for breadth of inquiry. But, does it meet Rodman’s demand for depth?

This is the point at which critics of CSSE tend to find problems with the field. The problem alleged is that cultural studies of science and of science education fail to properly understand the nature of modern science, the cultural conditions required for its occurrence, the intellectual and social dynamics of its production of knowledge, and the relations of economic and political power that form its social context, in the relation of modern science to social injustice (see McCarthy 2014).

Cultural studies’ purpose, as explicated by Rodman (2014), is to serve the interests of social justice, as that is understood from a politically leftist perspective. To do that effectively, what is required is knowledge of the problem, i.e., knowledge of the social dynamics of inequitable power relations and the political and economic causal factors operative in the situation. Each particular case must be understood in the social and material contexts that condition the occurrence and persistence of the social problem.

When modern scientific knowledge itself is taken to be one of the chief causal factors leading to global social injustice, as it is in the CSSE literature,

paradoxes emerge. Knowledge (western modern, wm) is initially considered necessary to successfully address cultural problems of injustice, but knowledge (wm) is rejected on grounds of cultural injustice. A new conception of knowledge, knowledge (cultural studies, cs), is developed. But it is unknown whether knowledge (cs) will serve as well as knowledge (wm) in reforming cultural relations. Critics argue that knowledge (cs) is deeply flawed and cannot adequately serve the purposes of cultural reform. CSSE, through this reasoning, appears to be vulnerable to the charge that its substantive conclusions regarding the nature of scientific knowledge with respect to cultural origin are not only philosophically misguided but also such as to be inimical to actually achieving the fundamental social justice purposes of legitimate cultural studies work.

Cultural studies of science and science education sets out, not with a critique of the practices of modern science and the negative cultural effects of the current social context on the practice and use of modern science, but with a wholesale rejection of the value of modern science as a cultural phenomenon. The cultural problems related to modern science are addressed only dialectically, with a creative re-envisioning of the nature of science. This requires revision of the set of interrelated philosophical concepts that are fundamentally related to modern science. When modern science is reconceptualized, conceptions of scientific knowledge, criteria for the justification of scientific knowledge claims, the methods of acquiring scientific knowledge, and even the fundamental concepts of truth and reality must all change accordingly. But, though the dialectical erasure of modern science might succeed in the academy, in fact modern science remains, and so do the genuine cultural, social, political, and economic problems associated with it. The field of cultural studies of science, in tackling these questions, moves beyond the politically oriented study of cultural conditions, to support the social activism of Cultural Studies *simpliciter*, and into the domain of philosophical work. This is in keeping with the Cultural Studies commitment to interdisciplinarity and “border-crossing.” The correlative risk in multidisciplinary work is that the work will suffer, to varying degrees, from superficiality of treatment (see Rouse 1999).

The Multiscience Thesis in the CSSE literature

Multiscience goes by many names in the CSSE literature – one finds multicultural science, ethno-science, pluralistic science, indigenous knowledge (IK), and traditional ecological knowledge (TEK), among others. Indigenous peoples are generally considered to have been culturally isolated to a significant degree from western culture.

The multiscience thesis, in its various permutations, is endorsed without exception in the cultural studies of science and science education movement. Clearly, it involves the repudiation of the concepts that the early sociologist of science, Robert Merton, in 1938, found to be fundamentally characteristic of modern science (see McCarthy 2014).

What are the conceptual changes in the nature of science that are required? First, the conception of knowledge is revised. The conceptual distinction between knowledge, on the one hand, and long-standing belief systems of cultural groups, on the other, is collapsed. “Knowledge” loses its distinction as an especially useful subset of beliefs, beliefs that have been tested most rigorously for accurate statement of recurring dynamic interrelations in the world, via active practices specifically designed as tests of the putative knowledge. With this conceptual collapse, every long-standing belief system is counted as fully legitimate knowledge.

Constraints on the methods of production of the belief systems that currently distinguish modern science from mere belief are radically loosened, so that even belief systems originating in revelations, visions, and dreams can be counted as scientific knowledge. Persistence over time is taken as a legitimate test of the claims of belief systems to count as knowledge. Every long-sustained culture has cultural beliefs and practices which have persisted over time – and so every such culture has its own fully legitimate form of scientific knowledge. All cultures, thus, by (re)definition, have culturally based scientific methods and bodies of scientific knowledge, and all are held to be worthy of equal epistemic respect. Problems of social injustice arise when the indigenous science of a culture is disrespected or considered to be of inferior quality to that of the western modern science and scientific knowledge. That science, distinguished only by having originated in western cultures, becomes just one of any

number of local culturally based sciences. Dialectically, all cultures, even those whose belief sets conflict with the knowledge of western modern science, can be considered to be possessed equally of legitimate scientific knowledge.

A particularly well-developed example of the multiscience thesis can be found in Peat’s 2005 treatise, *Blackfoot Physics*. Peat, himself a theoretical physicist, describes indigenous science as “a science of harmony and compassion, of dream and vision, of earth and cosmos, of hunting and growing, of technology and spirit, of song and dance, of color and number, of cycle and balance, of death and renewal” (p.8) and presents an account of indigenous physics, its content, and methods that is in important respects different from western modern physics. Vine DeLoria, Jr.’s *Red Earth, White Lies: Native Americans and the Myth of Scientific Fact* (1997) provides another example, stating that “The non-Western, tribal equivalent of science is the oral tradition, the teachings that have been passed down from one generation to the next over uncounted centuries. . .[it] explains the nature of the physical world. . .” (p. 360). Deloria (1997) draws a sharp contrast between the traditional knowledge possessed by Native American peoples, developed over eons of successful living, and the knowledge developed via western modern science, and rejects the latter. “Validity and verification in science primarily consist of a willing conspiracy among scientists not to challenge the authorities in the field and to take the sincerity of colleagues as insight” (p. 35).

Cognitive/Affective Essentialism in the CSSE Literature

Another problematic thesis arises in feminist epistemology and theories of distinctive women’s ways of knowing. These ways of knowing are claimed to fit poorly with the “male ways of knowing” that have shaped the development and nature of western modern science. This mismatch is thought to account for the cultural phenomenon of low participation of women in the fields of western modern science, and in the difficulty and/or lack of interest of female students in the study of modern science. This is often presented as a thesis of biological essentialism, though it is also interpreted as in part a culturally generated and maintained phenomenon.

This situation is a cultural-political pedagogical problem worthy of investigation by cultural studies theorists. It is addressed in much of the feminist cultural studies work, first, by accepting the thesis of an essential female cognitive difference, and second, by attempting to develop a new conception of science that would be better suited to women. Brickhouse (2001) states that “Science cannot produce culture-free, gender-neutral knowledge because Enlightenment epistemology of science is imbued with cultural meanings of gender” (p.283). Further, “culturally defined values associated with masculinity (i.e., objectivity, reason, mind) are also those values most closely aligned with science. . .scientific was also defined in opposition to feminine.”(p. 283).

Having accepted the theory of essential gender-based differences in cognition, resolution of the cultural problem of equitable access to scientific knowledge and professional access to careers in science has been deflected from the path of political activism into the intellectual project of developing a new conception of science that would be more congenial to women’s ways of knowing. The acceptance of feminist epistemologies, ways of knowing, of learning, of teaching, and of doing science, has become a consistent, and perhaps required, theme in the cultural studies of science and science education literature.

A similar analysis is made with respect to nonwhite persons. The assumption is adopted that western modern science is, in a deep sense, foreign to those not of European ancestry. This is often understood as a phenomenon of cultural difference but at times verges toward a biological essentialism. A prominent theme in the literature is the ill-fit between the assumptions and norms of western modern science with indigenous persons.

Conclusion

The theses of the cultural studies of science have had a considerable effect on the theory and practice of contemporary science education. Work in this area of science education is serving to radically reform science education and thus affects the apprehension of the nature of science in the larger society. An implicit theoretical commitment of Cultural Studies at large is the radical reformation

of the cultural conditions that promote social injustice, as seen from a leftist perspective. But successful reform requires an accurate understanding of the extant operative cultural conditions. Whether the cultural studies of science’s philosophical analysis of science, and the revisions in the concept that are promoted, will be adequate to the task remains an open question.

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Culture and Education at the Active Intersection of Technology-Mediated Learning in Online Communities

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Curriculum as a Governing Device

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Synonyms

Canon; Course of study; Learning outcomes; School programs; Syllabi; Textbooks

Introduction

Curriculum

The meaning of the concept of a curriculum is elusive. It is used to establish goals, often their content and, in some cases, methods for teaching. There are, therefore, three types of curricula: those that state goals, those that state goals and content, and those that state goals, content, and methods for teaching. Since the 1990s there has been a fourth type – measurable outcomes that function as curriculum stating what is measurable knowledge. The very meaning of a curriculum as a governing instrument has changed. Once a plan for the intended content, curricula are now more of assessment requirements. Hence, the concept of a curriculum once meant the intended outcomes

that are supposed to govern the teacher's work. The curriculum was “translated” by teachers into strategies for teaching. This was the professional core. The instruments for measuring outcomes have now been given the role of intended outcomes themselves, and the teachers have to administer tests created outside their control.

Background

The term *curriculum* was used already in early Anglo-Saxon times. The word stems from the Latin word “currere” (to drive, move on), and was related to the word “cursus,” meaning a “track.” Petrus Ramus (1515–1572) was probably the first to use the word curriculum to signify goals and content for teaching. If we consider the meaning of the word *curriculum*, what it includes and how it is used, we can see how the history of its meaning reflects fundamental lines of the history of public education and schooling. In medieval times, the terms “stadium” or “ordo” dominated, and later “ratio,” “formula,” and “institution” were used.

During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the word curriculum was used more and more to indicate the sequential arrangement of material in time; this usage is returning into fashion. At the University of Glasgow, the term curriculum was used during the seventeenth century to designate a course. Within the Jesuit order, a special organization of studies was formed, for which Ignatius of Loyola (Íñigo López Oñaz y Loyola, 1491–1556) constructed a curriculum for the education of servants of the Jesuit order (*Ratio atque Institutio Studiorum*). This was composed as a plan/scheme (*ratio*) for selection (*institutio*) that had to be composed from a set, or canon, of knowledge (*studiorum*). During the nineteenth century, the word curriculum was used in many universities around Europe. During the Enlightenment, however, the word curriculum came, to be replaced in Germany by “Lehrplan” (Blankertz 1982). In the Nordic countries, the term shifted, partly depending on which juridical context the goals and content of public education were regulated. In Sweden, for example, during the Catholic era, there was a decree regulating what each

citizen was required to learn by heart – Ave Maria, Pater Noster, and Credo. With the Reformation, public education became important for nation building and the establishment of the Lutheran State church. Demands on reading ability were paramount. In Luther's words: "Reading is a way directly connect with the words of God." The curriculum was the textbook *Luther's Small Catechism*. The duty of controlling how well people could read and how well they had learned the catechism fell to the Church. It was not possible to marry in Sweden if the would-be parents did not pass an examination in reading. The regulation of public education was a chapter in the Church Act. In the Act of 1686, the work of the parish clerk as a teacher was regulated, and the parish priest duty monitored the level of literacy in the parish. With time, more and more control and supervision was taken over by the State. In 1723, a law was passed placing responsibility for the education of children on their parents. Compulsory schooling was introduced in Europe during the eighteenth and nineteenth century. In Portugal, the law came into force in 1759, in Prussia 1763, in Denmark 1814, and in Sweden 1842 – just to give a few examples.

In most European nations, the curriculum is a national document and has a legal status. In the United States, curricula vary between and even within States. In Europe – mainly in the Nordic countries and in Germany – the word "curriculum" refers to content, while the term didactics covers instruction, methods for teaching, and the scientific rationale behind choices of instructional methods. Here the concept of a curriculum will be used to cover goals and content. Curriculum theory is therefore an explanation of how goals and contents are selected, formed, and distributed.

The Development of Curricula

There are four instruments for political governing (Lundgren 1981). This is simply the juridical regulation. The other three instruments are curricula, economy, and evaluation/control.

The construction of curricula (selection of goals and content, and the ideas behind structuring the content) for a public school system mirrors

national history and what, in a national context, is considered to be knowledge. Ancient Greek education had an impact on the ultimate goal of education of free men (wisdom: Paideia) and the organization of subjects in the curriculum of the medieval university (trivium, grammar, logic, and rhetoric, and quadrivium, arithmetic, geometry, music, and astronomy). The later division of curricula into humanities and science is a classification that is still in use. With the development of printing techniques, textbooks were commonly used to teach the curriculum. During the seventeenth century, the textbook, as a pedagogical text, was developed. The work of Johan Amos Comenius (1592–1670) was influential in the formation of the school systems of Europe after the 30-year war. He used texts in combination with pictures. Important textbooks included the book *Orbis sensualium pictus* (*The Visible World in Pictures*). In *Didactica Magna*, he presented a plan for the organization of a school system.

A change in how education was perceived and the rationale behind the organization of content in curricula began in the nineteenth century. There was a change from seeing education as reproduction of classic canon in which the mastery of Latin and ancient Greek was both a prerequisite for access to classic texts and for the formation of the intellect. New subjects, such as modern languages and the empirical sciences, were introduced into curricula. The founder of Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Wilhelm von Humboldt (1767–1835), formulated a program for a free university based on research built on the principle of autonomy for teachers and students (*Lehrfreiheit und Lernfreiheit*). This program of education for *Bildung* was a type of curriculum. The idea also came to influence the content and direction of upper secondary education.

Since the nineteenth century, curriculum construction has been increasingly international. The progressivist movement in Europe and the United States at the beginning of the twentieth century is one example. Influential thinkers included John Dewey in the United States, Georg Kerschensteiner in Germany, Jan Ligthart in Holland, Elsa Köhler in Austria, and Ellen Key in Sweden.

Especially after the Second World War, the rationale behind curriculum construction became

more and more internationally oriented. Today, the outcomes of the national public schools are related to international results. In the 1950s, studies of economic growth and investments in education showed that investments in education were related to growth in GNP, which in turn strengthened efforts to find new ways to improve education and make it more effective. The Human Capital Theory was established, which resulted in two main outcomes. The first was the tendency to focus on cognitive processes to create curriculum guidelines and didactic principles. The second outcome was the formation of effective teaching technology. The Woods Hole conference at the end of the 1950s became the starting point for a period of curriculum development in which the work of Piaget had an important influence (Bruner 1960).

An International Curriculum?

An increased awareness and knowledge of the economics of education sharpened arguments about the importance of education as an economic investment both for the individual and for society. More global markets called for competitive national systems. The launching of Sputnik in 1957 had an impact not only on the American education system and curricula. It also changed the discourse about curriculum content and its efficiency and evaluation. It is interesting to note that similar discussions were held in the Soviet Union, where researchers such as Vygotskij had similar opinions, which were used as a basis for research that was of relevance for curriculum development.

The year after the first Sputnik was launched, the International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement (IEA) was founded. The idea was to build a network of researchers that developed tests designed to be used in comparative studies. The IEA was, in the beginning, a research endeavor, but with time educational administrations became involved.

Hence, the Cold War produced an interest in comparative international testing. The international comparisons of results were easy to fit into the political agenda at a time where opinion in support of competitive educational systems was strong.

These curriculum reforms emanating from the United States had an impact in most industrialized

nations. The work of the IEA strengthened the internationalization of curriculum development. The results of international assessments influenced political ideas about how to govern goals and content in relation to measurable outcomes. Within education, the idea of governing by goals and results was central to reform long before the New Public Management was coined. Education and teaching is always a process formed by goals, content, and results. During periods of change, this is more evident than in periods of stability.

When governing of education relies on measured outcomes, the validity of the tests is crucial. The Dutch mathematician Hans Freudenthal pointed out in the mid-1970s that the content validity of the international tests in mathematics was problematic (Freudenthal 1975). The construction of the items was adjusted to the Bloom taxonomy (Bloom et al. 1956) and not the actual content. Later, this criticism had an impact on discussions of the construction of tests in the PISA program.

During the 1970s, the industrial world faced changing economic conditions. The oil crises in 1973 and again in 1979, together with the increased international competition that resulted from them, put further pressure on educational systems to become more efficient and productive. With diminishing economic growth, the space for reforms was limited and new reforms had to be financed by increased efficiency. International assessments became more important, and national policies were broadened in scope and in the number of countries participating in them.

The 1970s was also a period of criticism of quantitative methods. It was pointed out that too little research had been directed toward teaching processes and too much attention had been paid to student behaviors. New models and methods were the solution to this state of affairs. During the 1970s, the educational systems were also under attack for failing in terms of efficiency and productivity, and educational research was thought to focus too much on statistics and psychometric analysis.

International tests and comparative studies have provided reference points. There was a shift in production in many countries in the 1970s. These changes had a clear impact on curricula. Largely to due to the increasing globalization of the economy

and the labor market, there was a change in how curricula were formulated. Nongovernment organizations, especially the OECD, played an influential role. With publications such as "Education at a Glance," the OECD delivered basic statistical data for comparisons between the member countries. In the beginning, the method used to report the results from various countries built on the IEA test – PISA (Program for International Student Assessment). Combined with neoliberalism, particularly ideas associated with New Public Management, measurability and comparability gained, and continue to gain, traction. Even if curricula are still national steering documents, it is measurable and comparable competencies that will count. The circle is to some extent closed. The curriculum is once again the answer to the question: what content is monitored and controlled?

The Curriculum and the Knowledge Society

Changes in production, economic developments, globalization, and other factors changed the external conditions for public education. The power of capital shifted to control of knowledge resources.

The transformation from a labor market structured by industrial production to a labor market structured by service production, circulation of products, reproduction, and above all the new information technology created new demands on education. It can be argued that the traditional organizations constructed to handle the economy and the political economy of modern industrialized society were no longer suited to handle a late modern society. They could not mobilize support for action. Accordingly, State institutions such as schools could not attract and build upon the interests of the clients or users. Political governance had to take other paths. One way out of the dilemma is to focus on outcomes and accountability in order to make education more transparent.

The expectations of increased efficiency and productivity called for concrete well-articulated goals and a steady direction. But what could be discerned was that the government and administration became weaker and fragmented. One explanation for this was the division into smaller political party fractions,

thereby forcing fragile coalitions. This, in turn, created an increasing sensitivity to lobbying and power pressure, which led to an overload of demands on decision-makers. These forces were contradictory to what was necessary for reforms in a new political context: that is, well-articulated goals and a steady direction. And here we can see the context to the variations in direction of curriculum discussions and suggestions. Two solutions to the weakening of political ability to govern can be discerned. One was to decentralize and another was to create pseudo-markets. To reform by decentralization through markets created a paradox. Decentralization and privatization demand clear rules and control. Within the administration, there were conflicts and competition. A consequence of this competition was, in some places, that goals for education were broadened in order to make the educational sector look as important or even more important than other sectors. Goals became more abstract when more clearly stated goals were needed. The arena for policy formulation could not get support for clear goals; instead goals became abstract and hard to realize. Ultimately the control increased, reinforced by the idea of national competition.

To meet these challenges meant that new ways of political governing had to be found. The two earlier mentioned solutions were to decentralize and/or open up for private education. This entailed deregulation which, in turn, requires re-regulation. What remains for the political center to do, if the educational system is to serve the purpose of promoting equality and reproducing a common value base, is to strengthen the curriculum and the evaluation system, i.e., to govern by goals and results.

With the new and rapidly changing economy and production, as well as globalization, and the rather dramatic changes in the volume and structure of knowledge, it has become more and more difficult to plan the selection and organization of content centrally. Higher levels of decentralization and more private schools mean that the central authorities have to govern content in new ways. The move from centralized to more local governance raises the question of where to place responsibility. Thus, a movement toward decentralization and marketization impacts upon the professional identity and capacity of teachers.

Access to information is rapidly increasing. Schools as institutions were created in a society with poor access to information. The way curricula and syllabi had been constructed reflects that. In this information-dense society, the gravitation point in curricula can no longer focus on the organization and order of content. We are approaching a Copernican turning point, in which curricula must be based on how knowledge is structured and articulated in basic concepts, theories, models, and competencies, which in turn must be expressed in terms of goals. To realize such transformation, curriculum construction and processes for curriculum construction must also change. This means new forms of specialization within the administrative bodies that represent interests other than the ones linked to specific content and thus specific school subjects.

There is one fundamental argument for governing by other types of goals and outcomes than before. Resources and rules can govern areas or sectors within which we have a profound knowledge or belief about the relationship between goals and methods. If we know that there is a clear relationship between – to take a simple example from traffic policy – speed, road conditions, and car accidents, we can execute governance by resources and rules. On the other hand, the less general knowledge there is of the relationship between goals and methods, the more governing by goals is applicable. This is also true when the competencies for future working life are hard to predict. However, this, in turn, demands that qualified personnel have the skills and knowledge to apply methods to specific circumstances.

Up to this point, I have tried to highlight the main changes in education during the 1970s and the 1980s. These changes and this discourse about education is the background to the OECD project INES.

PISA: An International Curriculum

In 1968, OECD established a specific center for Educational Research and Innovation – CERI Papadopoulos (2006). CERI became an important policy institute. In the late 1980s, CERI initiated the *Indicators of Education System* (INES). It is

an ambitious program to establish a system for education statistics in order to enable comparisons between countries within the OECD. Such a statistical system has an impact on national policies. International indicators deliver support for arguments on competitive strength. The background was the emerging knowledge society and the renewal of human capital theory. The statistics delivered from INES were published annually in *Education at a Glance*.

One problem that followed the project from the beginning was how to compare learning outcomes. The available international data that existed were those collected by the IEA. These data were used and presented in *Education at a Glance*. When INES got the data, they had been published in other forms and had lost their novelty. It was not possible to use the IEA data over time as the test varied between collections. The number of participating countries varied also, which gave the comparative analysis various reference points depending on the various data collections. The decision was taken to run an OECD assessment program – Program for International Student Assessment (PISA).

The test was to be “curriculum independent,” which means they were to measure the mastery of general principles and concepts and not a specific content. The criticism of the test used within the IEA program was thus avoided. On the other hand, the validity of the PISA test is still unclear. The design is built on measuring mathematics, reading, and science every third year and having items that make the results comparable over time. The tests are either short or extended. Every third year, one of the areas is tested with the extended test and the other two areas are tested with the shorter version.

The PISA program has had a tremendous impact on the politics of education. Countries that have not performed well have had “PISA-checks” and more or less every minister of education has declared that their country will be the future winner concerning measurements. The tests have influenced the discourse about education in general and about the curriculum and evaluation in particular. Curricula are now a governing device for what is measurable in tests.

The circle is closed. This article has highlighted how the meaning of the word curriculum has

changed over time, from being the road to wisdom (Paideia) to being a system for control (catechism), to being of use for work and society, to being an international system for control.

Cross-References

- [Citizenship, Inclusion, and Education](#)
- [Critical Theory as Metatheory of Education](#)
- [Juridification and Education](#)
- [Theorizing Curriculum Implementation and Evaluation in Early Childhood Education](#)

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Debt, Education, and Decolonization

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Introduction

Financial debt has had a major role in defining colonial and neocolonial world history. Likewise, it has historically influenced education and plays a central role in shaping education theory, policy, and practice in the contemporary global neoliberal economy. Linda Martín Alcoff (Alcoff 2014) has written that “Decolonizing education requires first and foremost a thorough and comprehensive critical analysis of colonialism itself, in all its subtle guises” (p. 92). With these words in mind, and with a focus on the Americas, the first section of this short piece selectively highlights debt’s role in colonial conquest. Combining historical evidence and contemporary critical theory, the second section of this article traces how debt

influences educational experience. Finally, building on the work of Walter D. Mignolo (2011) and other decolonial theorists, it is suggested that “decolonial thinking and doing” within education, and as educational praxis, emboldens resistance against the colonizing forces of debt.

It is important not to omit a significant detail about the debt-education matrix that will be discussed below. W.E.B. Du Bois (2008) famously remarked that “the problem of the Twentieth Century is the problem of the color-line” (p. 3). In the twenty-first century, there exists a debt color-line. Debt, in the realm of education, is incontrovertibly *not* colorblind. Traditionally and fervently, debt has been used worldwide by colonial powers, e.g., European and North American States, and financial capitalist institutions like vulture hedge funds to subjugate marginalized groups. Today, it most severely impacts the educational experiences of these same groups of people.

Colonial Dispossession by Debt and Debt’s Influence on the *Ego Conquiro*

The story of debt’s role in shaping the darker side of colonial modernity (Mignolo 2011) often remains in the shadows. To cite one example of debt’s highly influential but largely unknown part in affecting colonial modernity, consider the following. Some of modernity’s most famous

conquistadors like Balboa, Pizarro, Francisco de Montejo, Pedro de Alvarado, and Hernán Cortés share a crucial commonality: They were all heavily indebted. An examination of the indebted history of Cortés demonstrates just one of the ways in which debt was a key factor in provoking and enabling accumulation by dispossession in the Americas. Colonial historical evidence also licenses the claim that debt should be given deeper deliberation in the analysis of the constitution of what Enrique Dussel (2000) has termed the *ego conquiro*.

Cortés arrived on the American mainland in severe debt. As Bernal Díaz de Castillo, who accompanied him, wrote, “(Cortés) was very poor and much in debt, despite the fact that he had a good estate of Indians and was getting gold from the mines” (Díaz in Graeber 2012, p. 316). As the anthropologist David Graeber (2012) has shown, Cortés’ marauding and butchering of indigenous peoples was motivated not only by a hunger for fame, certain perceived obligations to the Spanish Crown and God, but also by a deep desire to be free of debt.

Of course no one person can instigate genocide alone. Cortés enlisted the help of 600 men to launch his expedition on the mainland. Much like their captain, these soldiers coveted fame, fortune, and the desire to liberate themselves from debt, debt they owed to Cortés himself. By the time the Aztec capital Tenochtitlan had fallen, Díaz could state, “We were all very deeply in debt” (Díaz in Graeber 2012, p. 317). To make matters worse, for the indigenous population that is, in order to free himself of the men that most complained of their indebted status, Cortés, according to Díaz, “determined at once to get rid of the most troublesome fellows, by forming settlements in those provinces which appeared most eligible for this purpose” (Díaz in Graeber 2012, p. 318). Lamentably, Graeber (2012) reminds his readers, “these were the men who ended up in control of the provinces and who established local administration, taxes, and labor regimes” (p. 318). What must be taken account of here, and what Graeber exposes so well, is that “the frantic urgency (to pay back) debts” (p. 318), which were interest bearing and thus compounding, played no small role in influencing

the unheard of amounts of dispossession and destruction of indigenous peoples by early conquistadors like Cortés.

Limited space does not allow for extensive rumination on the degree to which the subjectivity of *ego conquiro* (I conquer therefore I am), which Dussel (2007) has argued predates Descartes’ *Cogito ergo sum* (I think therefore I am), and is an ontological category fundamental for understanding colonial modernity, is influenced by debt. But Graeber’s recounting of Cortés’ conquest, coupled with his analysis of the effects of debt on subjectivity and human relations, should at least cause a speculative pause. It very well could be that the *ego conquiro*, which according to Dussel is a self-expanding subjectivity that imposes its will to power primarily on those of the so-called Global South, is at least in part constituted by the force of debt.

Education as a Process of Shaping Indebted Subjectivity

Traditionally marginalized groups are disproportionately familiar with the ways which both debt and education can be used to impose ways of being and acting in the world on people. The historical record of education efforts aimed at postbellum African Americans, mainly in the southern United States, exemplifies this point. In her analysis of the ways in which emancipated slaves were fashioned into indebted subjects, Saidiya Hartman (1997) masterfully demonstrates how the convergence of debt and education has been and remains a central means of fabricating indebted subjectivity. Hartman describes how emancipation for slaves did not mark the end of bondage; rather, it marked the beginning of an era of “indebted servitude” (pp. 125–126). Moreover, according to Hartman, former slave owners, northern industrialists, and liberal reformers in the postbellum United States worked to guarantee that ex-slaves be “transformed into a rational, docile, and productive working class – that is, fully normalized in accordance with standards of productivity, sobriety, rationality, prudence, cleanliness, (and) responsibility” (p. 127).

To accomplish this task, a debt-education matrix was utilized. Postbellum education initiatives aimed at freed slaves were a medium for constructing indebted subjects and contributed to what Du Bois (2008) described as the “pall of debt” (p. 87) that hung over the American south. After the American Civil War thousands of ex-slaves were forced into debt peonage. Additionally, through a variety of pedagogical techniques, chief of which involved conduct books like Jared Bell Waterbury’s *Friendly Counsels for Freedmen* (1864) or Reverend Issac W. Brinckerhoff’s *Advice to Freedmen* (1864), they were taught, according to Hartman (1997), to responsibly honor financial obligations meant to entrap them, and supposed debts of freedom towards benefactors and the nation, that at once freed, and indebted them (p. 130).

Debt as a Neoliberal Apparatus in Education

Debt’s influence on education is not merely a phenomenon of the past. Maurizio Lazzarato (2012) has decisively demonstrated that the neoliberal era in which we currently live “has been founded on the logic of debt” (p. 25). Debt, Lazzarato maintains, is at the “strategic heart” of neoliberalism and “represents the economic and subjective engine” of the modern-day political economy (Ibid). It is important to understand, therefore, that education projects organized in accordance with neoliberal ideology are projects substantially saturated with the logic and force of debt. Today, debt is used with efficient intensity to produce twenty-first century versions of accumulation by dispossession in education. Furthermore, education experiences cultivated within a debt paradigm contribute mightily to the fabrication of contemporary indebted subjectivity.

By now it is widely known that past and present university students in the United States and elsewhere face a serious debt dilemma. Andrew Ross (2013) has reported that US university students graduate with debt loads averaging \$27,000. The total student debt load in the USA has reached an astronomical \$1.2 trillion dollars.

In his provocative essay on the current US student debt crisis in higher education, “The Pedagogy of Debt,” critical theorist Jeffrey Williams (2006) argues that “debt is not just a mode of financing but a mode of pedagogy” (p. 162). Williams highlights six specific lessons that debt imposes. Taken together, they advance the argument that the contemporary debt-education matrix has the ability to fabricate indebted subjectivity.

Williams (2006) contends that first, “*debt teaches that higher education is a consumer service*,” (p. 163, all italics in original) and that second, “*debt teaches career choices*” (p.164). The three lessons, that “*debt teaches a world-view*,” that it “*teaches civic lessons*,” and that it “*teaches the worth of a person*” (pp. 164–165), are most directly related to the ways in which debt plays a pedagogical role in forming the neoliberal indebted subject. Finally, debt teaches not only cognitive lessons but also emotional ones. This fact is clarified in what Williams states is the final debt lesson: “*debt teaches a sensibility or feeling*” (p. 165).

Missing from Williams’ persuasive analysis of debt are two key features. The first is attention to the fact that students of color are disproportionately beleaguered within the US student debt crisis. Research conducted by the social justice advocacy group *Demos* (2015) has clearly demonstrated the existence (Huelsman 2015) of debt-color lines. According to *Demos*, black and low-income students borrow more, and more often, to receive a bachelor’s degree, Latino/a and black students are dropping out of university with debt at higher rates than white students, and Associate’s degree borrowing has spiked particularly among black students over the past decade. Debt burdens are compounded for these students. Not only must they struggle to overcome inequalities at least in part created by debt in the past, but also their efforts to overcome said inequalities are weighed down by the fact that they must go into further debt for an education in the present. This education may, or may not, grant them greater opportunities for social-economic equality in the future, a future, it bears mentioning, that is already colonized by accrued education debts.

Secondly, when seen through a decolonial lens, the “pedagogy of debt” takes on important added dimensions. Debt structures, in part because of its ability to colonize the future, epistemic frameworks and ways of being in the world. It demands the rationalization and instrumentalization of ways of thinking and being. As such, debt contributes to the production, distribution, and organization of knowledge, and in doing so, it suppresses alternative knowledge, as well as alternative ways of being in the world. In sum, debt plays a role in reproducing what Alejandro A. Vallega (2014) has called the “Western modern instrumental, rationalist, productive, and subjectivist thought” (p. 219).

A decolonial perspective on the bonds between debt and education also illuminates the large-scale social consequences produced by debt coloniality. Puerto Rico provides a classic example of how debt today functions as a tool of accumulation by dispossession practices in education. The island’s current debt crisis highlights some of the ways that debt works as an apparatus of neocolonial economic pressure to transfer education resources from the public to private sectors. The journal, “The Progressive” (2015), has reported that since 2014, the Puerto Rican government, under pressure from creditors, hedge funds, and the US government, has closed 135 schools – about 10% of the schools on the island. Additionally, “Project 1456,” a new law pushed by neoliberal “reformers” to ameliorate the debt crisis, requires the closure of 400 more public schools – 30% of the remaining public schools in Puerto Rico. “Project 1456” also stipulates that the Puerto Rican government turn at least 15% of the island’s schools into *Lider* charter schools every 3 years.

Towards Decolonial Debt Resistance in Education

María Lugones (2010) has emphasized that decolonial resistance is neither an end nor goal, but rather a beginning. Most immediately, it reminds us that “we are also other than what the hegemon makes us be” (p. 746). For the rest of

this article, I consider a variety of decolonial possibilities that disable the force of debt at work in education and that aim to inspire the conceptualization of education as a liberatory process capable of decolonizing indebted subjectivity.

Three brief comments on the options to be discussed are warranted. The first is that decolonial theory teaches that decolonial debt resistance must engage in a range of different but interrelated struggles simultaneously. A multiplicity of logics and strategies, rather than a totalizing theory or praxis, must be developed. For example, while it is of obvious importance to wage political and economic struggle against indebted life, it is of equal importance to concomitantly strive for epistemic debt decolonization.

The second point is that divesting education from the undue impacts of debt necessarily entails the coupling of decolonial theory and praxis. Eve Tuck and K. Wayne Yang (2012) have astutely critiqued discourse in which colonization and decolonization are treated metaphorically. Both decolonial thinking *and* doing need to be continuously experimented with in the realm of education, and it is only during and after such experimentation takes place that the efficacy of these theories and direct actions can be fully evaluated.

Finally, one does not resist indebted life alone. Individuals must realize, as the activist groups *Strike Debt* and *The Debt Collective* have proclaimed, that they are not only not *a-loan* but also not *alone*, in their efforts of opposing the logics of indebted life and in their practices of being someone other than indebted subjects. One decolonizes “with someone else, not in individualist isolation,” Lugones (2010) reminds us, and despite the greatest efforts to vanquish decolonial collective ways of being, “these ways of being, valuing, and believing have persisted in the resistant response to coloniality.” (p. 754).

With the above in mind, and in an attempt to circumvent what Tuck and Yang (2012) have critiqued as decolonial equivocation, several concrete decolonial demands in education warrant consideration. The demands below are

purposefully “utopian,” utopian understood here in accordance with the Martinican philosopher Edouard Glissant’s (2005) conceptualization of utopia: “Utopia is not a dream. It is what we are missing in the world” (p. 16).

Decolonial utopian demands to address education debt burdens include, but are not limited to:

- Immediate and indefinite moratoriums on all municipal, State, and national government debt payments to education debt bondholders. Moratoriums on debt payments would be coupled with moratoriums on school closings related to debt. During these moratoriums, bond agreements need to be renegotiated, and terms for eventual education debt jubilee must be established. George Caffentzis (2013) highlights the successes of related demands in his analysis of the debt resistance movement “El Barzón” of the 1990s in Mexico. El Barzón, Caffentzis recounts, “is a mass organization of debtors that, at its height, had half a million members and chapters all over Mexico. It provided to its members both legal aid and ‘muscle’ to resist foreclosures and repossessions due to debt default.”
- A critical engagement with the problematic of settler colonialism with respect to debt. Debt has historically had a fundamental role in settler colonialism. Throughout history, indigenous groups have had their lands taken from them because of contractual debt agreements. Furthermore, it is on these lands that many schools and universities were built. There exists a moral obligation for communities worldwide to engage in discussions with sovereign indigenous nations on reparations for territories, especially discussions that address the occupation of lands by schools and universities. Contesting debt coloniality in this context would require the adoption of indigenous concepts and terms related to debt and reparations.
- The abolition of debt in countries like the United States, Canada, and others where university student debt burdens many. The said debt must be immediately *abolished*, not

forgiven. As Andrew Ross (2013), activists groups like the *Debt Collective*, and others (See the excellent collection of essays edited by David Palumbo-Liu on debt activism in the journal “Occasion” Vol. 7, 2014) have argued, the majority of indebted university students had no other choice than to go into debt to receive a college education. In other words, they did absolutely nothing wrong by going into debt, therefore why beg for forgiveness. Instead, demand debt abolishment.

Drawing on Mignolo (2007, 2011), it could be said that the above demands would be a part of broader efforts at “delinking” education from the forces of financial debt. Mignolo has described delinking as the decolonial process of inventing “decolonial visions and horizons, concepts and discourses” (2011, p. 312). Delinking opens up the possibility for the creation of decolonial knowledge, institutions, and subjects (Mignolo 2011 p. 9). In this way, we might think delinking together with the invaluable decolonial dictum “*Inventamos o erramos*” or “We invent or we error” from nineteenth-century philosopher and educator Simón Rodríguez. Significantly, delinking education from debt depends heavily on the ability to delink education from debt’s temporalities and pedagogies. This piece concludes with summaries of decolonial theories that might stimulate this.

Mignolo (2011) has asserted that colonization of the concept of time enables the control of subjectivity. Debt’s ability to colonize our notions of time, and its capacity to shape the rhythms of our everyday lives, is central to its power to shape indebted subjectivity. Lazzarato’s (2012, pp. 44–49) analysis enables us to briefly highlight several key characteristics of the temporal dimensions of indebted life. The temporality of debt is nonlinear. Debt creates a memory in a person of a future-to-come. This indebted future-to-come constantly travels back in time to haunt the present of the indebted subject. With a memory of debt ever hovering (like a specter), the indebted person ends up shaping one’s self and daily activities so that she will be

able to service her debt. The pace of life is set to the rhythm of debts owed; rational and calculative thinking determined by debt becomes the reductive norm.

Contemporary considerations on the decolonization of time must therefore take into account ways in which debt's temporality can be countered. And it is here where there is cause for optimism in education. Education can serve as a type of counterconduct to the production of indebted subjectivity; it is a privileged realm in which to counter the rhythms of indebted life *if* (admittedly a big one) educators and students cultivate education experiences composed of rhythms counter to those that debt demands. It is true that today debt's force in education shapes education rhythms in such a way that education is increasingly reduced to a process of shaping indebted subjects. But in very concrete ways this force can be resisted; it can be removed from educational experiences. Just as importantly, educators can, and often do, rethink pedagogies so that education experiences which cultivate temporalities exterior to the temporality of debt are brought into being.

Decolonial debt resistance in and through education with an emphasis on time and rhythm is further warranted if one considers the following. Mignolo (2011) configures decolonial thinking and doing as a process that involves the decolonization of time, remarking that, "decolonial thinking shall build arguments for the revival of the 'the de-acceleration of time'" (p. 179). In a similar vein, Nassim Noroozi (2016) has recently developed a notion of the "pedagogy of time" that as an "ethico-decolonial undertaking is committed to a different pace," a pace which "provide(s) enough time to generate space for the 'whats' and 'whos' that were excluded or relegated (and thus have been subjected to epistemic violence)." There is decolonial precedence for the move that Noroozi suggests. Simón Rodríguez maintained that "studying needs tranquility," a belief that, Argentine philosopher of education, Walter Kohan (2015) argues, represents Rodríguez's lifework of democratizing free-time for study for the most marginalized populations of nineteenth-century newly liberated Latin America. Frantz Fanon

(1968) explicitly linked rhythm with decolonization and the cultivation of decolonial subjectivity:

Decolonization never takes place unnoticed, for it influences individuals and modifies them fundamentally. . . . It brings a natural rhythm into existence, introduced by new men, and with it a new language and a new humanity. Decolonization is the veritable creation of new men. (p. 36)

Importantly, these theories help us think subjectivity, time, and pedagogy together in a way that allows us to reconceive education as a process of opening up ways of being in a globalized debt economy. They also share a commonality in that they avoid reinscribing colonial temporal practices in education by implying that a single dominant temporality cannot be forced on education experience. Rather, they point to the fact that heterochronic and polyrhythmic education experiences are fertile ground for a plethora of subjectivities to take root and be cultivated in.

Ultimately, what deserves contemplation is whether or not it is possible to conceive of and to cultivate education logics and practices which are exterior to the logic and force of education paradigms constructed by, existing within, and serving the contemporary neoliberal debt economy. Asymmetrical creditor-debtor relations sustain this economy. Such creditor-debtor relations entail, it could be argued from a decolonial perspective, what Enrique Dussel (In press) calls, a "pedagogics of domination." A decolonial option which counters this pedagogics is a Dusselian "pedagogics of liberation."

Enrique Dussel's immensely complex philosophy of education, most fully developed in his *La Pedagogica Latinoamericana* (1973), but only hastily referred to here, stimulates both the critique of pedagogies/pedagogics of debt/domination and the conceptualization of education theory and praxis exterior to said pedagogies/pedagogics. His philosophy of education opposes a dominating dia-lectic with a liberatory ana-lectic. Dussel (In press) has developed a philosophy of education in which "the educative process, by definition, negates the introjection of the system (de-struction) and affirmatively constructs exteriority through ana-lectic praxis of liberation, in

the permanent creative-innovative unity of teacher-student.”

More specifically, for Dussel (In press, italics in original), a “*praxis of a pedagogics of domination*” is based on the postulate that there is no other possible speech than that which expresses the meaning of the established world” and is contra to a “*praxis of a pedagogics of liberation*,” which is “based on the postulate that I myself never pronounce the revelatory word of the Other.” At the heart of liberatory pedagogics for Dussel is “mutual listening,” reception of, and responsibility to, rather than domination of, the Other. Dussel’s elaboration on this point deserves to be quoted at length:

Pedagogics demands *listening to the voice of the Other*. In pedagogics the Other’s voice signifies content revealing itself, and liberatory education can only begin with the revelation of the Other. The student reveals himself to the teacher; the teacher reveals himself to the disciple. If the child’s voice, the voice of the youth and the people, is not heard by the father, the teacher, and the State, then liberatory education is impossible. Mutual listening sends, and essentially, the other receives (though clearly with diverse meanings for one party). This sending and receiving is the *conditio sine qua non* of pedagogical love (*agape*) as extreme gratitude (Italics in original).

In sum, a Dusselian pedagogics of liberation counters the *ego conquirro* logic of debt pedagogies with the logic of the decolonial gift. If the pedagogies of debt can be said to seek to dominate and give shape to the Other, the pedagogics of liberation do the opposite by receiving the Other as a gift. Thus, a pedagogics of liberation offers the potential for a paradigm shift in education away from debt, and towards a paradigm of the gift, which, if we concur with Nelson Maldonado-Torres (2007), is essential to decolonial projects. “This is the precise meaning of decolonization,” Maldonado-Torres tells us, “restoration of the logic of the gift” (p. 260).

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Decision-Making

► [Educational Leadership, the Emotions, and Neuroscience](#)

Decolonial Education

► [Decolonial Methodologies in Education](#)

Decolonial Education at Its Intersections

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Synonyms

[Border Theory](#); [Critical Intersectionality](#); [Decolonial Feminisms](#)

Introduction

This entry has three central aims. The first aim is to briefly outline the historical and contemporary use of the term “decolonial” and its related monikers of decoloniality, decolonization, decolonizing methodologies, postcolonialism, and indigeneity. The second aim is to highlight how the decolonial scholarship addresses the

relations between colonization, capitalism, and the production of difference through onto-epistemological frameworks of racism, heteropatriarchy, and (Western) schooling as a site of epistemic, linguistic, and cultural violence. In other words, I explore how colonial and decolonial logics of difference, hierarchy and violence shape macro and micro-level modes of existence. The third and final aim is to provide illustrations of contemporary efforts of decolonial education at its intersections in multiple spaces and places through a discussion of Anzaldúa’s border thinking.

At heart, decolonization works against the dehumanization and disposability of indigenous peoples; recovers and reinforces indigenous knowledges; protects indigenous jurisdiction over land, water, and agricultural rights; complicates border thinking; and explores hybridity or *mestizaje* as ways of knowing.

Notes on Decoloniality

Decoloniality refers to the everyday and ongoing efforts to challenge various forms of colonialism or coloniality in the past, present, and future. Leading contemporary scholar Walter D. Mignolo makes a distinction between decoloniality and decolonization. According to Mignolo, decoloniality refers to the active struggle against spiritual, social, political, and psychological colonization of indigenous peoples and their descendants by France, Spain, Italy, the Netherlands, and the United States (Smith 2000, p. 121). Like post-colonialism (see Tarc’s entry), decolonial scholars do not believe that the time of coloniality is over, even in nation-States or spaces that have so-called independence. While the praxis of decoloniality is made possible through historical anticolonial efforts, Mignolo and others argue that the concept of decolonization is tied to Cold War (post WWII) movements by indigenous peoples and their descendants across the Americas, Africa, and Asia. While some of these efforts towards decolonization created new real and symbolic sociocultural changes, many nation-States formerly ruled by external colonialism (vs. settler colonialism)

has left many countries in ceaseless states of conflict and crisis. In fact, some decolonial writers note that political, economic, and environmental issues may be worse after becoming formally independent from formerly sixteenth to twentieth century imperial rule. However, decolonial scholars contend that indigenous, enslaved, and colonized peoples have resisted and survived despite 400 years of extraction, exploitation, and dehumanization.

Decoloniality rejects the universalism of Western philosophy and instead argues that knowledge production is tied to local and concrete struggles against various forms of coloniality. Thus, decoloniality or what Mignolo calls “the decolonial option” favors analyses, art forms, and actions that are particular and begin from the ground up. There are many ties between decoloniality and indigeneity, specifically the emphasis on local knowledge, self-determination, and sovereignty. However, there are other areas of debate and discrepancy. For example, indigeneity reflects a commitment to the sustainability of culturally specific ways of knowing and being as reflected in epistemology, cosmology, spirituality, language, kinship, education, place-based knowledge, and tribal governance. Indigeneity also reflects the historical and contemporary need to emphasize tribal sovereignty, especially as a strategy to maintain legal and economic ties to treaty rights. In contrast, most decolonial efforts operate from the epistemological assumptions of cultural hybridity as well as the conditions of transnational politics of globalization. In addition, the latter group suggests that the role of nation-States has diminished due to the rise of transnational corporations and mass geopolitical migration (Spivak). Here, decoloniality and indigeneity (as well as postcolonialism) may be thought of as interrelated, complementary, or alternative perspectives but not synonymous in focus or methods.

Decoloniality assumes that social categories such as race, gender, and sexuality are inventions of colonial capitalism (Alexander 2006). As social categories linked to colonial capitalism, they hold symbolic and material significance for how individuals and groups experience the social world. Decolonial writers are interested in illustrating

how individuals, companies, and governments have mobilized these differences into sedimented hierarchies exploitable for conflict and profit. Scholars of decolonial theory at its intersections investigate how colonialism operates in tandem with race, gender, and sexuality to construct notions of the human (Lugones 2010), difference (Anzaldúa 1987 and Perez 1999), and citizenship (Alexander 2006).

Similarly, scholars/thinkers/activists involved in various decolonial options seek to intervene in efforts to render particular bodies *dehumanized and disposable*. Writing about the coloniality of gender, Argentinean philosopher Maria Lugones notes that women of color have been denied the status of human being since Columbian contact in two specific ways. First, European colonial capitalist ontologies imposed a categorical and hierarchical system of racialization and sexual difference. Though recycled through “moralistic” and “scientific” forms, these modes of invented difference and hierarchy have served as the basis for State sanctioned forms of violence, disposability, and lack of legal recourse from physical and economic injury. Second, the racialized colonial logic of human/nonhuman allowed European trespassers to sexually violate and dismember the bodies of indigenous women as primitive not-White, not-women likened to beasts. These practices of dehumanization carry on as women of color have been particularly subject to sexual and gender-based harm, violence, and even death. From the forced sterilization of Puerto Rican women by the US government to the police violence against Black and Latina women to the missing and murdered First Nations women across Turtle Island, women of color have been used and abused. Moreover the logics and structures of coloniality render women of color illegible as valued members of society and denied full citizenship and protection by the law. Thus, one of the strands or “options” of decoloniality specifically addresses the need for women of color to gain self-determination, reprojustice, and gender sovereignty.

Decoloniality works against *extraction and destruction* of local knowledges, cultural practices, and natural resources. Colonized groups

across the Americas, Africa, and Asia have witnessed the violent extraction and careless destruction of natural resources from water to land including sacred sites and precious metals. Furthermore, forced displacement as a result of the Indian Removal Act of 1830 (such as the Trail of Tears and The Long Walk in the United States) and compulsory residential schooling have literally cut off indigenous persons and communities from the place-based knowledge and created generational trauma. As Maori scholar and activist Linda Tuhiwai Smith (2012) notes, colonialism created a particular “disorder” to existing indigenous belief systems including relations between the self, the collective, and land. This disordering of native belief systems, also referred to as epistemic violence or epistemicide, particularly affected the role of women (and Two-Spirit persons) as knowledge producers, spiritual guides, and leaders in medicinal and reproductive activities. Thus, another decolonial option is to provide recovery and healing and growth to regenerate the creative, cultural and political resources necessary for survival in next 400 years. Here recovery not only refers to psychological healing and growth; it is also “that specific lands and designated areas become a priority because the bulldozers are due to start destruction any day now.” (121) The 2016 mass protection demonstration by the Standing Rock Sioux at the Sacred Stone Campground against the Dakota Access Pipeline (NoDAPL) is a good example of decolonization efforts in action. Termed as the largest indigenous uprising in the United States (sic) natives and allies have joined together to protect sacred tribal burial grounds, protect the sacred nature of water in general and more concretely to stop the possibility of myriad environmental, biological, and human disasters due to accidental spillage. Like indigenous efforts of decolonization by First Nations in Canada (sic), NoDAPL contends that installation of the pipeline allows corporations to violate treaty agreements.

In addition to land reclamation, decolonial praxis works for *language reclamation*. This effort takes a variety of shapes. First, as with many indigenous histories, native languages were systematically and literally beaten out of

tribal youth as they came in contact with and were forced to assimilate to British, French, Spanish, or Dutch language and culture within and outside of residential or other colonial schools. For nearly four centuries, youth and adults were punished for speaking native languages – thus creating many indigenous languages to perish along with the public displays of cultural and spiritual practices. Thus, one strand of language reclamation is at the very grassroots level to record and revitalize tribal language and education with the assistance of contemporary sociolinguistic and culturally sensitive pedagogical practices (Lomawaima and McCarty 2006).

Another strand of decolonial practice follows from mid-twentieth century postcolonial scholars such as Kenyan writer Ngugi wa Thiong'o, who argued that rejecting the hegemonic languages of English and French were necessary to the process of decolonizing the mind. For Ngugi, writing in the colonial languages was tantamount to alienation in the Marxist sense of the word. Thus, he chose to publish much of his work in his native Gikuyu. Fellow postcolonial scholar Gayatri Spivak praised Ngugi's stance on English as an imperialist tongue and the deleterious effects it would have for personal and collective struggles for freedom. However, she also noted how English became the language of globalization after World War II, and as such argued for the strategic use of English to reach a larger audience in transnational efforts of anticolonial mobilization. Consistent with a poststructural framework of the noninnocence of all power, Spivak stressed the complicity of all academic efforts to speak for and represent “the Other.” She writes, “Elite ‘postcolonialism’ seems to be as much a strategy of differentiating oneself from the racial underclass as it is to speak in its name.” (1999, p. 358) Here Spivak suggests that the failure of decolonization has resulted in the gendered postcolonial acting as a native informant of “those distant objects of oppression” (ibid, p. 360) of colonial, patriarchal, and class-based rule. Thus, one of the central claims in *A Critique of Postcolonial Reason* is the need for vigilant and responsible knowledge production among “those of us who become the globe-trotting postcolonials, ready for entanglements in new global

complicities.” (Ibid, p. 363). To do so, Spivak regularly insisted that English speakers, members of the metropole, and the ivory tower challenge themselves to be responsible to their subaltern counterparts by learning local languages, aesthetic, and cultural productions and securing the subaltern’s authority (jurisdiction) over native land, agricultural, and water rights.

Remapping the World: Decolonial Perspectives on Language and Space

While Ngugi, Spivak, and other scholars from the 1950s to early 1980s focused on the need for postcolonial scholars to read, write, and speak in their native language, much of decolonial scholarship during the 1990s and afterword began to think and talk about *language and space* in theoretical and symbolic terms. Specifically, authors such as Gloria Anzaldua (1987) shifted the discussion of language to incorporate questions of hybridity, difference, and ambiguity. In contrast to Ngugi’s claim that a rejection of the master’s tongue would lead to decolonization of the mind, Anzaldua’s framework of decoloniality began with the assumption that the lines between colonizer/colonized, master/native, native/Other are neither binary nor discrete due to the specific histories of colonization in the Americas. As Anzaldua notes, many Latin American territories (including the contested borders and boundaries between Mexico, Texas, and the southwest United States) consist of descendants of Spanish, African, Caribbean, and a wide variety of indigenous communities and citizens. Thus, the image of the “mestizo” serves as an organizing myth and national symbol for this population. “La malinche” (an enslaved indigenous female give to Conquistador Cortes) is considered to be the producer of the first “mestizo” – e.g., the Mother of a nation in which cultural hybridity is the norm. But as Anzaldua’s Latina feminist critique reminds us, the sexual and colonial violence of this history is often either erased or disappeared and leaves Mexicanas, Tejanas, and Chicanas living in the “borderlands” of multiple colonized territories (cultural, spatial, national, linguistic,

psychic, etc.). According to Anzaldua, what remains are the three mothers of la gente Chicana who serve as icons of ambiguity. She writes, “All three are mediators: Guadalupe, the virgin mother who has not abandoned us, la Chingada (Malinche) and la Llorona, the mother who seeks her lost children and is a combination of the other two.” (p. 30). Anzaldua suggests that a deluge of affective scapegoating (mostly misogynist hostility and ethnic shame) has led to a dichotomous framing of Latinas as trapped within the colonial matrix of virgin/mother/whore. Instead, she argues that argues for a more tolerant attitude of ambiguity that embraces of mestizo identity, difference, and cultural hybridity. Specifically, Anzaldua calls for “a new mestiza consciousness” or a “consciousness of the Borderlands (1987, p. 77).” Anzaldua notes that the Eurocentric way is to treat difference and multiplicity as adversarial because of the entrenchment of authoritarianism within hierarchical onto-epistemologies. Because of her culturally hybrid identity, the mestizo has to negotiate multiple and often conflicting belief systems, affective positions, and political stances. This framing of difference and hybridity as duality and opposition has left minoritized subjects with cognitive, emotional, and spiritual wounds. Rather than see these contradictions as deficit, Anzaldua contends that the mestizo develops a “tolerance for ambivalence.” (p. 79). She posits that the new mestiza consciousness requires the decolonial subject to wrestle with her embodied knowledge in a kind of “soul work” (including creativity and intense pain). Out of this struggle emerges a new sensibility, a tolerance for vulnerability, ambiguity, movement, and perpetual construction and deconstruction of ideas and capacity to form new alliances for personal and social transformation. This space, the Borderlands, is both real and imaginary. It serves as symbol of hope and possibility for education as a project of love.

Decolonial Education: The Borderlands Are a Metaphor, a Place, and a Praxis

Educational philosopher Troy Richardson (2012) calls to disrupt the coloniality of being in US

education that positions African, Latinx, and Native American youth as “primitive” or “enigmas” through the logics, practices, and structures of categorical subordination such as standardized testing, discipline policies, and even classrooms that antiassimilation pedagogies. In contrast, Richardson advocates for educators to consider “decolonial trans-ontologies” that reject colonial models of categorical subordination towards a “border thinking” that

entails a shift towards those physical borders where the complex forms and languages of being continuously emerge. . . . Through radical dialogues in these shifted locations we learn the pre-situations of such youth. Learning with minoritized youth in this way entails forms of bilanguaging wherein European ontologies lose something of their habitability. In those, perhaps, fleeting moments, decolonial trans-ontologies are more clearly recognized as the future which denies the colonial of being. (550)

Richardson’s call for philosophers of education and teachers to *learn with minoritized youth in the ways, forms, languages, and spaces they inhabit* reiterates the point that decolonial education not only affirms the “diversity of diversity” – but challenges the colonial model of education of philosopher/teacher/expert versus youth/ignorance/student-to- be classified, sorted, diagnosed, and evaluated.

Decolonial education employs critical and culturally relevant curriculum and pedagogy that incorporates the wisdom of elders and community members. Moreover, life histories are considered intellectual “gifts” (Lomawaima and McCarty, p. 12). An important part of decolonial education is the recognition that struggles against colonial struggles have a long history across the world and to allow people to see themselves as part of that legacy. Thus, learning the life histories of both the named “leaders” as well as the unnamed people whose specific contributions may have not been recorded in colonial accounts were just as important in historical struggles against decolonization. This is important for two reasons. First, decolonial education emphasizes the retrieval and distribution of subjugated knowledges and histories. Given the longstanding tradition of Western education to promote colonial perspectives as official

accounts of Being, Truth, History, Culture/Civilization, and Freedom, it is essential to actively disrupt the “un-coercive re-arrangement of desires” (Spivak 2004, p. 526).

Second, the praxis of remembrance, ceremony, and creative expression, or what Alexander (2006) calls “pedagogies of crossing,” all illustrate “the decolonial imaginary” in action (Perez 1999). Storytellers, artists, musicians, dancers, and poets have the potential to express embodied representations of how the matrix of colonial power is lived and felt differently by through technologies of anti-Black racism, settler colonialism, heteropatriarchy, sexual violence, and global capitalism. As African American poet June Jordan (2007) so eloquently enunciates, “I am not Wrong: Wrong is not my Name.” The call and response of decolonial education is to grapple with the devastating afterlife of coloniality.

Cross-References

- [Decoloniality, Pedagogy, and Praxis](#)
- [Gender, Postcolonialism, and Education](#)
- [Poststructuralism, Postcolonialism, and Education](#)

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Decolonial Feminisms

► Decolonial Education at Its Intersections

Decolonial Latin American Philosophies of Education

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Introduction

The following entry explores the historical context that has given rise to the opening for and engagement with decolonial thought. The entry specifically explores the connection between critical educational thought in the region and decolonial philosophies, to portray the favoring of the holistic approach to teaching and learning throughout the Americas and beyond.

Historical Context

Since its inception, Latin America has been characterized by waves of tumultuous conquest, independence movements, democracy building, and challenges to the historical legacy of colonization and capitalist exploitation. Of particular significance, throughout the 1970s and 1980s, a number

of countries in the Latin American region were gravely affected by campaigns of political oppression that led to dictatorships and their attendant repressive regimes. To a significant extent, the era of dictatorial regimes was a direct response to progressive social movements that sought to redistribute wealth, offer education to the dispossessed, and establish socially just principles and practices. Progressive movements threatened the survivability and growth of capitalism and economic injustice in the Latin American region and were swiftly and violently suppressed. This climate led to the exile of key educational and political thinkers and activists, such as Paulo Freire, considered one of the founding fathers of the critical pedagogical tradition in education. In exile, Freire wrote the first of many texts on the pedagogy and praxis of liberation. *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* (1970) went on to become one of the most highly read educational works throughout the world, one of the first key interventions in critical educational thought.

In *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, Freire demonstrated the influence of a number of thinkers on his theorizing, such as Frantz Fanon, Amil Cabral, and Karl Marx. He also relied heavily on his Christian upbringing and faith in his articulation of humanity, and the values associated with teaching and learning, such as humility, lovingness, and tolerance. Freire engaged in a *dialectical* form of reasoning and proposed a transcendental form of teaching and learning that could enable students and communities to move beyond oppressive social structures and into creating socially just human relations. The basis of oppression, within a Freirean optic, was class exploitation. To move beyond the stronghold of the naturalization of poverty and the disempowerment of the poor, Freire called upon educators to recognize pedagogy as a political act, one which would create the conditions for students to acquire the critical skills needed to read the word and the world simultaneously. The movement toward fulfilling the people's collective humanity necessitated *conscientização*, consciousness raising. Freire firmly believed in a people's inherent capacity to recognize, contest, and transform oppressive social structures.

In short, Freire demonstrated that the pedagogical is political and the political is pedagogical. Though one can identify the impact that anti-colonial and decolonizing thinkers of the time had on Freire (specifically in terms of his discussion on how the oppressed identify with their oppressor), his writing on the pedagogy of freedom and liberation relied heavily on Western and Eurocentric paradigms. That is, Freire did not consider the centrality of other ways of knowing and being in the creation of another world order or in his definition of humanity. Nor did he consider the multiple forms that oppression takes. For Freire, there was oppression and there was liberation. Both were intricately connected to a class-based analysis of social hierarchies, which intentional or not did not immediately create the space for understanding and challenging interlocking forms of oppression. Freire, a revolutionary thinker and pedagogue, spoke from his geopolitical location. While his contributions have been vast, they also reflect a silence on indigenous epistemologies and rationalities that provide other pathways to create social, economic, political, intergenerational, gendered, and ecological justice. Such pathways acknowledge, but also transcend, the impact of capitalism and economic injustice on wide-scale dispossession in Latin America.

For the most marginalized groups in Latin America, namely, indigenous and Afro-descendants, oppression was indeed felt from their brute exclusion from economic wealth and justice, but it was also epistemological, racial and ethnic, gendered, and anthropocentric. The subjugation of their identities and ways of knowing did not begin with modern capitalism and the gross inequality that plagued the Latin American region; it preceded that era by hundreds of years, with the conquest and colonization of Americas. The colonization of the Americas planted the seeds for capitalism of the twenty-first century and was accompanied by a social system of differentiation that hierarchically ordered individuals and communities along multiple forms of identity (see Grosfoguel 2011).

The Decolonial Turn

Following the collapse of various dictatorial regimes in Latin America, and the beginnings of movements toward democratization, a different sociological and philosophical approach to social theory began to take root. The work of sociologists, namely, Anibal Quijano, broke away from predominantly Western and Eurocentric modes of analysis, specifically, world systems theory, which articulated the economic dependency between Latin America and the USA and its global allies. Quijano, among others, theorized economic injustice according to the multiple and overlapping systems of differentiation that accompanied global class exploitation. Termed the *coloniality of power*, Quijano articulated the centrality of race in modern Eurocentered capitalism (Quijano 2000) and traced the mental and social construction of race to the conquest and colonization of the Americas. As opposed to a class-specific analysis, the coloniality of power draws attention to the experience of colonial domination, its enduring logic, and its specific rationality, Eurocentricity. Within this theoretical optic, it is important to understand that coloniality is a model of power that is globally hegemonic (Quijano 2000).

In education, the decolonial turn was accompanied by a number of indigenous political movements that challenged the historical legacy of coloniality in education. The colonial model of education led to teaching that was highly individualistic, anthropocentric, competitive, and fragmented. Such practices reflected the cognitive dimensions of conquest, where the human is considered the king of civilization, while all that is not human is considered inferior. Within the coloniality of power, the categorization of the unhuman relied upon the systems of social stratification that accompanied conquest. That is, those whose belief systems and ways of life fell outside the Christian, European, male dominant, and humancentric paradigm were considered less than human and in dire need of salvation, civilization, and education (Mamani 2010).

Buen vivir

As a counterpoint to the colonial model of education, indigenous groups mobilized to recuperate their ways of knowing and being in education. Sumak Kawsay and Sumak Qamaña, Quechua and Aymara terms, respectively, translate into the general concept of *buen vivir* or living well. Conceptually and philosophically, *buenvivir* moves well beyond the critical tradition in education in Latin America, which relied upon the strengthening of class consciousness in the construction of collective knowledge, as discussed in the works of Freire, among others. *Buen vivir* is a decolonial and decolonizing philosophical approach to teaching and learning that offers a critique of capitalist exploitation but does so with a radical questioning outside of developmentalist paradigms. As noted by Enrique Dussel (2000), the tropes of Eurocentrism and modernity are accompanied by a developmentalist fallacy; that is, that progress and humanization begin and must progress with the traits of the modern world, which, by definition, exclude indigenous knowledge and ways of being.

Radical questioning within the indigenous traditions of *buen vivir* was made possible by a culture that lacked concepts like development or progress. *Buen vivir* ultimately strives for a post-capitalist alternative by way of two interrelated constructs. On the one hand, dialogue ushers a critique of brute capitalism and subjectivity. And on the other axis of dialogue, an emancipatory politics emerges from the ethicalmoral commitments of indigenous, nondevelopmentalist epistemology. Constructing collective knowledge through dialogue strengthens political identities and sets forward a liberatory practice based upon the rubric of living well as opposed to living better at the expense of others and nature. Thus, the vision is transcendental. In negating the logic of growth as development, individualism as freedom, and self activity as the organizing principle of change, the pedagogy of *buen vivir* prioritizes life.

The pedagogical model of *buen vivir* derives from a concept of reciprocity that precedes

capitalist formations. It was key to social organization prequest, connected to an ethical value system based on giving and receiving. Reciprocity is a sociocultural form of praxis and an ideological construction evidenced in the mantra *dar, recibir y devolver* (give, return, and give back) (Quispe 2012). Reciprocity underscores a set of practices that requires the other or others to make an equivalent response, and it is meant to be a permanent relation inclusive of all members of the community. Reciprocity is a model constructed from below and is based on territorial and educational control, self sustainable development, care of the environment, reciprocity and solidarity, and the strengthening of communal organizations, languages, and cultures. Here, educators are reminded that activism must be embedded within, and never separate itself from, the multivoiced hemispheric conversation on resistance, hope, and renewal.

As communitarian praxis, reciprocity considers woman and man not solely as a work force but principally as being with knowledge, beliefs, and thinking. Put plainly, reciprocity advances an integral subject. Notions of individual freedom, will, and choice are replaced by a holistic rendering of social life that emphasizes interdependence and interconnectedness.

Both Sumak Qamaña and Sumak Kawsay establish collective well-being as a centerpiece to social transformation. They emphasize the plurality and diversity of social life without being reduced to a philosophical relativism or groundless subject characteristic of postmodern social theory. They are also distinguished from mainstream postcolonial approaches in that coloniality is understood as an ongoing process, continuously reproduced through capitalist social relations. To speak in terms of postcolonialism does not adequately capture or recognize the multileveled and deeply engrained modalities that govern people's ways of being and interacting in a seemingly "postcolonial" social universe. In recognizing the relationship between the economic structure of society and all other forms of human sociability, indigenous epistemologies disrupt conventional

theoretical dichotomies (i.e., class struggle versus ethnic, gendered, sexual, racial, or environmental struggle) and advance a holistic rendering of social life.

As a philosophy of praxis, *buen vivir* establishes a communitarian educational experience, where learning takes place not only inside a classroom but in direct relationship with ancestral knowledge, intergenerational teachings, and a recognition that everything is connected. More specifically, that learning is connected to nature. The nature-learning connection in *buenvivir* is based upon a model of complementarity, harmony, and equilibrium. *Buen vivir* promotes a natural methodology of teaching and learning that moves beyond the modernist tropes of rationality and into an affective perception of the multiverse that surrounds communities. Put differently, *buen vivir* proposes a productive pedagogy, where teachers and students alike are encouraged to generate action, connect praxis to civil life, and recognize their origin and role in the complementarity of life (See Mamani 2010).

Buen vivir is a multilayered approach to recognize and address the entanglement of social realities. It represents a way of understanding the world as the configuration of an array of relationships, a way of life, and addresses the capacity we have to participate and alter the course of history (Macas 2010). *Buen vivir* transcends the ways that the “subject” of Western reason reproduces difference and polarities, with a focus on complementarity and the convergence of strengths between women and men. In doing so, indigenous led struggles are simultaneously acts for direct restitution from colonial capitalism and also represent efforts to contest the coloniality of power that has shaped racial, epistemic, cultural, sexual, gendered, and anthropocentric relations within the onset of capitalism as a colonizing process. Within the coloniality of power asymmetrical relations of power are recognized as both byproducts and the active constitution of a global capitalist society that began with the fifteenth-century conquest of the Americas.

Decolonial Philosophies for the Americas and Beyond

Decolonial philosophies of education in Latin America grapple with the complexity of social life and encourage educators to recognize that class exploitation is entangled with multiple forms of social differentiation. They extend the important contributions of critical educators, such as Freire, who identified and actively theorized the misery and affliction waged against the dispossessed by a global capitalist system and the internal practices within nations that continuously denied communities the opportunity to develop their full humanity. The point here is not to place decolonial philosophies in contradiction with critical pedagogies and theories but rather to bring them into conversation with one another. The critical tradition brought into central focus the impact of capitalism on people’s subjectivities and the reproductive and authoritarian models of education that serviced the needs of colonialism and capitalism. The decolonial turn highlights the overlapping and interconnected nexus of social life, one in which ways of knowing, spirituality, nature, race, ethnicity, culture, language, and gender interpolate. Decolonial philosophies in education propose new concepts grounded in a cosmovision of the totality of social life and offer a praxis predicated upon the principles of reciprocity and complementarity. They extend education into the community and nature and propose a praxis based in harmony and equilibrium with all forms of life. Taken together, educators are encouraged to recognize the entangled web of social, political, economic, historical, and cultural relations that shape educational practices. Practically speaking, educators must question the leitmotifs that organize the schooling encounter, the epistemic provisions that shape curriculum and teaching, and the social relations that inform relationships between social actors. The vision is utopic but also concrete. Through an active listening of other forms of knowledge, an understanding of the interrelationship between colonialism and capitalism, and a recognition that

the colonial legacy is enduring, teachers, students, and communities are better positioned to make learning meaningful and perhaps more importantly transformative for a just society and future. As such, decolonial philosophies are not only relevant to the indigenous groups who have struggled assiduously to recuperate their ways of knowing and transform educational praxis; they offer peoples from the Americas and beyond with an alternative conceptual register to enact pedagogies and practices predicated on an ethos of mutuality, recognition, and respect.

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Decolonial Methodologies in Education

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Synonyms

Decolonial education; Decolonial methodologies; Indigenizing projects

Introduction

Rooted in a geographically specific Latin American standpoint that critically reframes colonialism and capitalism as Western/modern historical and geographical systems, the *decolonial* project is an emergent framework that not only challenges the epistemological foundations of colonialism (termed *coloniality of power*) but is a project of de-linking (Mignolo 2007) from Eurocentric thought, toward reclaiming and developing “The enunciation and expression of non-Western cosmologies and for the expression of different cultural, political and social memories” (Mignolo 2000).

For the purposes of this entry, *decolonial methodologies in education* encompasses a series of methods/strategies as they take place within education projects. Here, education is defined broadly to include both formal and nonformal educational spaces. Education is not used loosely as decolonial scholars have conflated the terms *educational* and *pedagogical* when theorizing decolonial strategies more broadly. Education is a site of struggle and rupture: It comes into being as people engage in dialogue and in response to the coloniality of power. Decolonial education has materialized throughout the world, primarily as place-based pedagogies in grass roots and institutional sites, yet the examples from Latin America discussed below have manifest at the level of the nation-State. This entry does not take into account decolonial methodologies in research and other

Decolonial Methodologies

► Decolonial Methodologies in Education

practices. While education intersects with participatory forms of research, this entry is specific to projects that are defined primarily as educational.

Finally, decolonial methodologies in education need to be repositioned and situated within broader geographic-historical processes. Specifically, a broader framework for community development and the self-determination of colonized peoples ensures that decolonial practices are defined relationally rather than by a set of essential qualities. Decolonial education is a process for community self-determination, at moments materializing in spaces of survival and at other times in the spaces of recovery. What decolonial education means and what it looks like will be defined by the particular colonialisms and sets of contradictions that make it possible. Decolonial education by and for Chicana/Chicano peoples in the United States Southwest will look different than colonized African peoples of postapartheid Africa or the *indigenous* Aymara in Bolivia. Yet, because these projects both grow in response to coloniality and deliberately seek to recover *indigenous* knowledge systems as alternatives, the struggles in these and other sites can be characterized as *decolonial* education.

The Decolonial Project

The decolonial project can be characterized as encompassing three major strategies: first, to deconstruct our very understanding of Modernity, which is traditionally conceptualized as a historically advanced expression of (Western) rationality. Decolonial thought therefore makes visible that which is concealed by Modernity, namely, the cultural logic of colonialism (and capitalism as an extension of colonialism). In their critique of Modernity, decolonial thought is marked by a different strategy than that developed by postmodernists: Modernity (and its colonial and capitalist inventions) is primarily a historical-geographical project and secondarily a discursive ordering of the world. The discourse of the Other (Dussel 1983) has served as a justification for the colonization of the Americas during the sixteenth to nineteenth centuries and formal European colonial rule

of Africa and parts of the Pacific beginning in the eighteenth century and ending with World War II. In particular, this discourse of the Other has played a dual function in settler societies: First, it served to legitimate colonial expropriation of lands and resources and the eventual deculturalization of “native” peoples by settler societies; and it helped constitute the geographic and cultural centering of Europe within an emerging global world political, cultural, economic system. A geo-historically structured epistemological project, the discourse of the Other, provided the ideological groundwork for colonial violence and expansion. This epistemological project is, nevertheless, inextricably tied to the geopolitical project of European, and later United States, world domination.


Second, the decolonial is marked by particular kind of *border thinking*, a reenvisioning from the margins. Major decolonial scholars write and theorize as intellectuals and scholar-activists from Latin America, Africa, and as First Peoples. Metaphors such as *fissures/cracks* and *rupture* signal their outsider-within as scholars but also as members of geographically marginalized communities. This kind of border thinking grows out of a decolonization of coloniality that entails not just naming the world and the colonial matrix of power that is deeply embedded in everyday life, but is also an embodied/situated praxis.

Third, the decolonial is a project for epistemological diversity. What this means is that its deconstructive moment is dialectically tied to a praxis that re-envisions and develops knowledges and knowledge systems (epistemologies) that have been silenced and colonized. Thus, the decolonial attempts to recover repressed and latent knowledges while at the same time generating new ways of seeing and being in the world. Hence, the decolonial project is strategically positioned as a struggle for an-other world beyond colonialism and capitalism.

Decolonial Methodologies/Strategies in Education

Three major methodologies or strategies in decolonial education projects include *counter/*

Decolonial Methodologies in Education,
Fig. 1 Decolonial methodologies/strategies in education



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storytelling, healing, and reclaiming. Figure 1 below is a visual representation of these three strategies and their interlocking nature. By interlocking is meant that they interweave yet their relationship to each other is dynamic rather than linear and developmental rather than foundational. Each is dimension of the other. For example, the process of counter/storytelling in decolonial education is itself tied to the process of healing, which is also a part of the process of reclaiming.

Each strategy is defined by particular practices. Counter/storytelling involves the practices of *naming* and *remembering*. Healing involves two major practices: *social/collective* and *spiritual/psychological* healing. Reclaiming encompasses *practices, identities, and spaces*.

Counter/Storytelling

Decolonial education comes into being as people engage in dialogue and reflection (see Freirean traditions of liberatory education). This dialogue and reflection involves *naming* their social worlds. Given the fact of coloniality in everyday life, naming entails a deliberate attempt to develop

a language of critique that enables colonized peoples to understand their present situation as encircled by colonialism and its structural arrangements and cultural logics. Hence, this naming is often framed as a *counter-storytelling* that challenges the master storylines of Modernity, Eurocentrism, and coloniality. The field of critical race theory (CRT) has used *testimonio* and collective voicing as counter-storytelling methodologies. Unlike CRT which centers the lived experiences of people, decolonial education projects reposition these narratives in the context of coloniality. Further, naming is a situated practice not a rational exercise in decontextualized dialogue. Naming is mediated by dialogue, yet this dialogue is made possible by reflection upon the lived experiences of and with colonialism in all its forms. Social theory has played an important role in facilitating dialogue among decolonial scholars, yet social theory will look differently when articulated by nonacademics. At the grassroots level, naming intersects with other linguistic registers and modes that are as legitimate if not more grounded in understanding what colonialism means.

Moreover, counter/storytelling is intimately tied with particular forms of *remembering*

within/against coloniality. Colonialism is an imposition of language and knowledge systems; it is the erasure of the colonial past and subjugation of *indigenous* peoples as colonial subjects that reemerge as new liberal subjects or whose cultural histories are negated by virtue of subsuming them as “working class” by Left scholars. Drawing from *indigenous* traditions, “restorying” is a form of collective remembering that has taken place within spaces of family and community (see Cornassel 2009). This remembering is integral to reclaiming languages, spaces, and identities. Remembering as decolonizing strategy has become a powerful vehicle for *indigenous* and colonized peoples to understand not just the violence of colonialism (storytelling as “witnessing”) but to root themselves in place and where they come from. The current movement for Ethnic Studies in the United States Southwest, while contested and not unitary, includes deliberate approaches to curriculum development with the goal of understanding the present in relation to a colonial past but also to enable Chicana/Chicano students to “restory” and remember who they are as *indigenous* peoples.

Public and community arts projects have integrated naming and remembering as counter-storytelling. While not labeling the project as decolonial, the Community Arts and Cultural Development (CACD) project is an exemplar of the decolonial methodology of remembering as counter-storytelling (see Quayle et al. 2015). Drawing upon portraits of *indigenous* Aboriginal elders and through the recorded narratives that tell their stories, Aboriginal youth engaged in digital projects that brought these stories to life. The educational spaces of classrooms and public exhibits that came together to celebrate the lives of community elders were also sites of counter-storytelling, challenging settler narratives and how Aboriginal peoples have been rendered invisible in all aspects of everyday life in Australia.

Healing

A decolonial methodology in education that is often overlooked is *healing*. While naming as a

practice of counter-storytelling may be characterized as a rational, reflexive process, the practice of remembering includes aspects of healing for *indigenous* and colonized peoples. Healing involves two clearly defined practices, i.e., *social/collective healing* and *spiritual/psychological healing*. If decolonial education is a project that denounces colonialism, if it is a situated pedagogical praxis that grows out of the lived experiences of colonized peoples, then it must include a decolonization of the self in relation to community and the broader social world. Precisely, because colonialism deculturalizes people and separates them from who they are, their communities, languages, practices, and land, there is ample room and need for healing as a strategy for community self-determination.

Healing as praxis challenges dominant, Western notions of education as cognitive activity. Even in critical education traditions, such as Dewey and Freire, a general neglect of the spiritual aspects of education is manifest. Rooted in *indigenous* epistemologies, the psychological cannot be separated from the physical and all other domains. In these traditions, spiritual practices (ceremonies) have played a fundamental role in cultural learning and community (see Iseke 2013). Healing in decolonial education projects entails a particular form of recovering from the historical trauma (physical, social, cultural, psychological) experienced by colonized peoples. Healing is a (re)connectedness with each other (community) and land/Mother Earth. *indigenous* scholars have characterized healing as coming into being at the interstices of survival and development, marked by the spaces of recovery, when *indigenous* and colonized peoples come together through ceremony and education to rebuild themselves.

A clear articulation of healing in the context of decolonial education includes Villanueva's (2013) self-reflexive journey of coming to healing practices and their relevance for Chicana/Chicano-*indigenous* youth who have been detribalized and de-Indigenized. A core precept is the idea that recovery and healing be rooted in ancestral knowledges. This general precept is congruent with the broader goals of decolonial projects that

seek to restore epistemological diversity. Naming in this context includes naming one's pain, i.e., providing a language that accounts for experiences of oppression that are often internalized as self-hate and characterized by living in an imbalanced social and spiritual world. Because coloniality is so deeply rooted in peoples' lives, embodied everyday language, thinking, and bodies, people are seeking alternative knowledge systems as sources of survival, recovery, and development. The knowledge systems and ceremonial practices that have made healing central for thousands of years are becoming important sites for the envisioning and development of alternatives to capitalism and colonialism.

Reclaiming (Identities and Spaces)

Reclaiming is a strategy in decolonial education projects that involves recovering who people are (their cultural identities), their practices, and their relation to place (land, cosmos). It is a generative praxis that brings ancestral knowledges together with local, endogenous knowledges in the development of decolonial spaces. The Raza Studies program that was recently outlawed in the State of Arizona has been seminal to the emerging movement for Ethnic Studies in the United States Southwest (see Najera 2014; Rodríguez 2012). An important decolonial strategy has been the reclaiming of cultural identities. Working primarily with Chicana/Chicano-Raza-*indigenous* youth, the project, before its dismantling, was rooted in Mesoamerican knowledge systems that replace Greco-Roman and Eurocentric knowledge systems that permeate the traditional, State-sponsored curriculum.

Decolonial approaches to land-based education involve strategies that reclaim colonized peoples' relation to the land. Decolonial education in this context involves the strategy of rethinking the very concepts inherited from Western science about people and nature. Drawing from African-centered frameworks and epistemologies, for example, presents a clear challenge to the capitalist and colonialist practices that objectify/commodify natural resources and that subjugate

ecosystems to economic systems (see DiMauro and Carroll 2014). Other scholars have sought *indigenous* frameworks for rethinking global capitalism, yet what makes a decolonial education possible in this situation is more than resorting to alternative knowledge systems. Rather reclaiming is intimately tied to peoples' identities. In the process of reclaiming alternative/ancestral knowledge systems that allow colonized peoples to rethink their relation to nature and land, they are also engaged in a process of reclaiming who they are. These education strategies intersect with healing and counter/storytelling in the sense that master narratives about nature and science are challenged, while at the same time students come to decolonize their understanding of how they have been transformed as people.

Decolonial education has also emerged in projects taken up by nation-States. In Latin America, for instance, the revitalization of *indigenous* movements has led to interesting, yet contradictory struggles. While framed as socialist movements, the countries of Bolivia and Ecuador have been deliberate in rethinking formal education systems from decolonizing frameworks. Moreover, other institutions, such as the economic, legal, and political, are being rethought through the *indigenous* concept of *buen vivir* (harmonious coexistence) (see Gudynas and Acosta 2011). The fusion of modernist ideas with *indigenous* concepts has introduced a decolonial strategy for education that decenters development, capitalism, and Western ideas about nature, a valuation of nature and natural resources as life, and proposes a general anticolonial standpoint. These projects are also about the reclaiming of practices, identities, and spaces; what distinguishes them from other decolonial projects is both their grounding in decolonizing frameworks and their scale.

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Decoloniality, Pedagogy, and Praxis

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Introduction

Decoloniality, its pedagogy, and praxis have a history and “herstory” of more than 500 years that began in the territory to be called the Americas by the conquerors and subsequently traveled to most, if not all, corners of the world. In what follows, I endeavor to give some understanding to the social, political, epistemic, ethical and existence-based significance of these terms, and to the ongoing project they mark and construct.

On (De)Coloniality

Decoloniality necessarily evokes coloniality. Both began with the “discovery and conquest” of the Americas and the formation, with this invasion, of a model of Eurocentered global power based on capitalism, the control of labor, subjectivity, knowledge, and nature, and the use of the ideas of “race” and “gender” as mechanisms of social classification and domination. The Peruvian sociologist Anibal Quijano (2000) named this model the “coloniality of power.”

Coloniality is not the same as colonialism. While colonialism most often refers to the political and economic relation that nations have exerted over the sovereignty of other nations, coloniality denotes the long-standing and ongoing patterns of power that persist beyond colonial rule. Here the reference is not only to the patterns of power, domination, subordination, and control that continue within so-called sovereign nations themselves (what the Mexican thinker Pablo Gonzalez Casanova called “internal colonialism”). It is also, and more broadly, to the ways these patterns constitute, maintain, reproduce, and construct a world system of power.

The coloniality of power took root in the Americas (Central America, South America, and the Caribbean). It was in the particular social and historical context of this massive colonial endeavor that capitalism solidified its project of economic and of social, cultural, epistemic, ontological-existential domination. It was also here in 1492, as the Argentinian-Mexican philosopher Enrique Dussel (2000) argues that modernity as a global (and not simply intra-European) phenomenon began and the dominion of the West over the rest took hold. Latin America is crucial in this sense; a “local” history that fed and led to global designs.

Central to these designs was the establishment of a fixed, persistent, and constitutive notion of difference. This difference – hierarchical, cultural, and colonial all at the same time – played a foundational role in structuring the ideas, geopolitics, and institutions of civilization and development, of humanity and humanness, and of modernity, rationality, and knowledge. White European men

and European knowledge and historical experience came to be the epicenter of reason, authority, and power (*Eurocentrism*). Native peoples were re-named as “*indios*” or Indians, and peoples of African origin were renamed as “black,” both considered “non-human” or “less human” as compared to Europeans. Enslavement was naturalized, as was the control of labor for economic gain. The classification as “barbaric” of native languages, knowledges, spiritualities, life philosophies and visions, and millennial civilizations (conceived in harmony and coexistence with nature, territory, and the other beings of Mother Earth) became standard practice. In this scheme, the organization also began of what Maria Lugones (2010) has called the modern/colonial gender system. All of this, of course, enabled the hegemony of the West and its master paradigm and abstract “universal” of modernity and rationality, a hegemony that continues to exert power, judgment, and control over the non-Wests and Souths of the world, including the non-Wests and Souths within the Global North.

There is no modernity without coloniality, and there is no coloniality without modernity. Both are co-constitutive. Both were built on and from the racial, gendered, epistemic, and existential violence of Eurocentered conquest and colonization. For this reason, modernity/coloniality is increasingly the preferred term, expression, and analytical unit in current non-Eurocentric thought. Its use is especially associated with what has been referred to as the modernity/coloniality/decoloniality group, collective, or project (see the collection edited by Mignolo and Escobar, and especially Escobar 2010).

Decoloniality has its roots and reason in modernity/coloniality, in the struggles against coloniality (as modernity’s underside or other face), and for it otherwise. The action and project of decoloniality are, in this way, simultaneously outside coloniality and within. Decoloniality thus calls to the fore social, political, cultural, epistemological, and existence-based strategies, processes, and practices that reveal, resist, confront, and challenge the modern/colonial matrix of power. It marks and makes present struggles that work to open decolonial fissures or cracks in the

modern-colonial and capitalist-patriarchal system. Furthermore, it indicates that which occurs in the exterior and borders of this system; that is, the “otherwise” of being, thinking, knowing, and living that exists and has existed since the coloniality of power began.

Decoloniality, in this sense, is not an abstract theoretical concept or a purely academic invention. Decoloniality is signified and constructed in the collective memory and the 500+ years of lived struggles of Indigenous Nations and African-descended men and women. Similarly, the efforts, past and present, by social movements, communities, collectives, and critical intellectuals, among others and throughout the world, to defy and disengage from the logics and violences of racialization, heteropatriarchy, dehumanization, anthropocentrism, and global capitalism give decoloniality substance, meaning, and form. Decoloniality’s concept and significance are likewise made in the ongoing creation and construction of other-modes and other-practices of knowledge, thought, sentiment, being, and living. As such, decoloniality is neither a static or fixed term; its significance derives from concrete contexts and unending processes and practices of sociopolitical, epistemic, and existential struggle and creation.

Implicit or explicit references to decoloniality, its concept and practice, can be found in the work of a number of militant intellectuals, including (and from the mid-twentieth century on) Frantz Fanon and Aimé Césaire (Martinique), Sylvia Wynter (Jamaica), the Chicana feminists Gloria Anzaldúa, Chela Sandoval, Emma Pérez, Manuel Zapata Olivella (Colombia), and Fausta Reinaga (Bolivia) among others. Beginning in 2004, the concept and term came to reorient the writings, thought, and practice of the group of intellectuals associated with the modernity/coloniality project. It is in reference to the work of this group that the term is often associated today. However, the interest of this collective is not to establish or promote an authoritative (or authorized) understanding, nor is it to make decoloniality an object of study. Rather, for those associated and aligned with this work and perspective, decoloniality is an analytic tool and task. It is a political, epistemic, and

ethical option and standpoint to critically read, reveal, respond to, unsettle, act against, and intervene in the colonial matrix of power and to think from, with, and alongside racialized, genderized, and colonized subjects and struggles. This option and standpoint open up other sources, other forms, and other perspectives of knowledge, thought, and action essential in forging what some in this group refer to as the de-colonial turn.

In sum, decoloniality can best be understood as a political, epistemic, and existence-based process and project. It is not a condition to be achieved in a linear sense, nor is it an end-result. As modernity/coloniality continues to weave its web of power, decoloniality continues to put at the center of debate both the lived experience of coloniality as a constitutive component of modernity, and the initiatives, strategies, and contestatory forms that endeavor to unravel and transform the present day hegemonic forms of power, knowledge, being, and existence, and to build something else. Decoloniality is an attitude, posture, wager, and prospective way of thinking and doing, of unlearning and relearning that challenges, disrupts, transgresses, and moves beyond the logics, confines, and intertwines of modernity/coloniality, global capitalism, racism, patriarchy, heteronormativity, and the myriad of other systemic patterns of power that continue to subalternize, oppress, dominate, and exercise control and power over peoples, knowledges, land-territory, nature, worldviews, and existence, that is, over life itself.

Decolonial Pedagogy and Praxis

Decoloniality implies praxis. Similarly, it posits pedagogies, understood as methodologies, processes, and paths of struggle, practice, and praxis, that are embodied and situated; that push historical, political, ethical, and strategic learnings; and that oblige epistemic, political, ethical, and strategic ruptures and displacements, as well as recreations.

Together, pedagogy and praxis bring to the fore questions of decoloniality's "how." That is the pedagogical-praxistal questions of not only

how to rebel and resist but more crucially of how to construct, reconstruct, engender, maintain, and sustain the decolonial otherwise in struggle, practice, and life. Such questions necessarily push deeper analyses, theorizations, actions, and reflections on, with, and from struggles past, present, and yet-to-come. And they also urge consideration of our own agency and engagement, of our own thinking and doing.

The understandings of pedagogy and praxis here have their roots, at least in part, in the work, philosophy, and thought of Paulo Freire. Pedagogy, for Freire, transcends schooling and the teaching and transmission of knowledge. This Brazilian educator understood pedagogy as an essential and indispensable methodology, grounded in peoples' realities, subjectivities, histories, and struggles. Social struggles, he argued, are pedagogical settings of learning, unlearning, relearning, reflection and action. As such, the educational nature of struggle is what interested him most, along with the pedagogical practice and political praxis of individual and collective liberation.

For Freire, pedagogy and praxis are intricately intertwined. Praxis, in a Freirian sense, is an act of knowing, a dialogical movement from action to reflection, and from reflection upon action to new action. It is reflexive and not merely reflective. It is political, critical, and theoretical, and not merely pragmatic. And it is intentional and inventive; hopeful in its inquiry, acting, and doing; and continuous in movement, contention, consciousness, and formation.

Understood in this way and as an analytic perspective, sociopolitical standpoint, and pedagogical-methodological stance, praxis is what gives decoloniality movement. Said differently, praxis is the act and reflective-reflexive action that makes decoloniality a "verbality" (to use Rolando Vázquez's (2010) expression). Decolonial praxis is part and parcel of processes, practices, and actions of thinking and doing that endeavor to interrupt, transgress, and transcend the modern/colonial logic and frame, including the linear precepts, binary-based suppositions, and outcome-oriented views of Western education, knowledge, and thought. Decolonial praxis

helps give presence to relation, the relation of action-reflection-action, but also the relation of present-past. This later relation is especially important from a decolonial perspective. It refers to the inter-relationality that grounds non-Western knowledges, worldviews, and life practices and that orient a perspective, prospect, and proposition of struggle for a different model of life, living, knowing, and being in and with the world. This struggle and praxis constitute decolonial pedagogy.

Of course, decolonial praxis and decolonial pedagogy were not the specific purviews of Freire. While Freire offered much for understanding praxis as pedagogy and pedagogy as struggle, method, and praxis, his limitations from a decolonial perspective cannot be overlooked. Certainly he was a product of the post World War II Latin American Left and of Marxist and humanist emancipatory paradigms, postures, and worldviews. Although Freire began to recognize and address these limitations in his later texts (e.g., *Pedagogy of Hope* and *Pedagogy of Indignation*) and to think more critically with and from the colonial condition (and with and from Frantz Fanon), the foundation (and foundational use) of his pedagogy, methodology, and thought remained framed within the confines of Western modernity and reason (see Walsh 2015).

The problem, as the Maori anthropologist Linda Tuhiwai Smith (1999) clearly explains, is that all too frequently paradigms, postures, and views regarded as deriving from Freirian approaches negate and obscure the methodological standpoints, practices, processes, and approaches of feminist theorists of color, ethnic minorities, and indigenous peoples. Seldom do such approaches take into account the methodologies and/as pedagogies that derive from the lived experience of colonialism, racism, and the struggles for self-determination and decolonization. Similar critiques have been made of critical pedagogy.

Although Freire remains as a guide, the idea, project, and praxis of decolonial pedagogy necessarily traverse other realms, practices, and ground. Here the decolonial and pedagogical contribution of Fanon, particularly in *Black Skin, White Masks*, but also in *Wretched of the Earth* is key, most especially for its analysis of dehumanization and

its formation of a praxis of liberation and a decolonizing pedagogy for humanity. In her powerful book *Pedagogies of Crossing*, the Caribbean feminist M. Jacqui Alexander (2005) engages the material and psychic fragmentation and dismemberment produced by colonization. Her pedagogies and practice of “pedagogization” cross the inherited divides of sacred and secular, embodied and disembodied, as they fashion and configure new ways of being, of knowing, and of wholeness. Certainly Alexander and Fanon are not alone in giving credence, substance, and force to decolonizing pedagogical thought and practice. Yet the crucial difference that they (and other decolonial thinkers) mark is in the place of enunciation. Thinking from and with the lived experience of the colonial wound and its matrix of power, marks a specificity of perspective – a decolonial perspective – noticeably absent in Freire and many of his followers.

In Latin America, as in other regions of the “Souths” of the globe, decolonial pedagogies are rising. The emergence and presence of what some community-based and militant intellectuals call pedagogies of resistance and reexistence, signal affirmation, hope, and life in the midst of conditions of negation, violence, death, destruction, and despair (see the collective text edited and compiled by Walsh and published in 2016, as well as the earlier volume published in 2013). In a region (not unlike others) where the war of capitalism, the politics of extractivism, and the reorganization of modernity/coloniality/heteropatriarchy are in full swing, the struggles for an otherwise of being, thinking, and living are about life itself. It is this struggle of and for life that guides and gives substance, reason, and force to decoloniality as pedagogy and praxis.

The fact that pedagogies and/of praxis happen and are fashioned, shaped, and built mostly outside the formal institution of education is significant; lest we forget the central role of the institution of education in the development, maintenance, and reproduction of the modern/colonial matrix of power. For this very reason, schools and universities are necessary sites of decolonial pedagogy and praxis as well. They are the sites where many of us struggle day-to-day to transgress, disrupt, and displace modern/

colonial logics, rationalities, and world-visions as the only possibilities of humanity, humanness, existence, knowledge, and thought. They are the sites, but not the only sites of course, where the doing of decoloniality, pedagogy, and praxis need to happen.

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Decolonization and Higher Education

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Introduction

Given the central role of universities in social reproduction, and in the creation and legitimization of knowledge, decolonization and its place in higher education are a subject of significant

interest in both social movements and scholarly critique across the globe. Decolonization can be broadly understood as an umbrella term for diverse efforts to resist the distinct but intertwined processes of colonization and racialization, to enact transformation and redress in reference to the historical and ongoing effects of these processes, and to create and keep alive modes of knowing, being, and relating that these processes seek to eradicate. Colonization and racialization have both material and epistemic dimensions, which together shape social relations and enshrine categories that are then used to justify: occupation of Indigenous land; expropriation and expendability of Black life; the binary, heteropatriarchal gender system; claims about the universality of modern Western reason; objectification and exploitation of “nature”; capitalist property relations and modes of production; militarism; possessive individualism; and the very concept of race.

Under the broad umbrella of decolonization, there exist a number of paradoxes, disagreements, and diverse visions for decolonial futures and possible means of arriving at these different futures. These competing visions may even be held by a single individual. As well, there is significant discussion around whether decolonization projects overlap with, are reducible to, or are incommensurable with other justice projects. Thus, any effort to address decolonization and higher education necessarily contends with diverse understandings of “decolonization” itself. This entry reviews the general contours of decolonization and explores contrasting assumptions, desires, and concerns that orient different interpretations of decolonization in the current context of higher education.

Decolonization Efforts and Demands

There is no single genealogy of decolonization, particularly as racial and colonial violence have been resisted since the fifteenth century when Europe first initiated its modern project of global domination and dispossession through Black enslavement and Indigenous colonization. However, many trace the term decolonization to the mid-twentieth-century anticolonial movements in

Africa and Asia that sought to dismantle European colonial rule, as well as Indigenous self-determination and antiracist social movements in European and settler colonial nations during the 1960s and 1970s. While decolonization efforts have been punctuated by several notable moments or eras, it may also be understood as a set of diverse, ongoing processes, rather than a distinct event or set of events.

Today, varied demands for decolonization may be summarized in three primary concerns: (1) the continued colonization of Indigenous peoples in settler colonial countries, as well as the ongoing legacies of Black enslavement, and the violent policing of national borders; (2) the highly uneven accumulated social, economic, and epistemic effects of centuries of colonialism and slavery for populations throughout the globe; and (3) the continued colonial architectures of global governance, such as the loan policies of the IMF and World Bank, strict immigration control in Europe, and the ongoing assertion of Western nations' right to police the world (militarily and otherwise), all of which favor the maintenance of Western dominance and extend the reaches of global capitalism.

Collectively these and other decolonizing critiques signal recognition of the continuation of a "Modern/Colonial Capitalist/Patriarchal Western-centric/Christian-centric World-System" (Grosfoguel 2012, p. 82) and point to the need for decolonization to be a global project, even as it manifests across time and place in distinct ways. For instance, a significant development around decolonization and higher education in Latin America has been the growth in State-sponsored and autonomous intercultural universities that emphasize Indigenous epistemologies and the importance of horizontal engagements in collaboration with local communities. However, this entry emphasizes decolonization and higher education in the US and Canadian context.

Historicizing Decolonization and Higher Education

Scholars have identified many ways in which modern universities, from their very beginnings,

were complicit in and benefited from colonization and racialization. The expropriation of Indigenous lands was and remains a necessary condition of possibility for US and Canadian institutions of higher education, and many early institutions forced slaves to labor in their construction and/or were founded and funded through wealth accumulated through slavery and colonialism (Wilder 2013). Many Western institutions were also deeply involved in the colonial cataloguing of non-Western knowledges and the production of knowledge in support of scientific racism and other racialized and colonial classifications used to justify forcible assimilation, military occupation, and even annihilation of nonwhite populations (Said 1978; Smith 2012). As a result, some have suggested that the emergence and eventual dominance of the modern, Western, secularized, and supposedly universal episteme (mode of knowledge) was only made possible in the context of Europe's projects of conquest and enslavement (Spivak 1988; Wynter 2003).

A constitutive paradox of the colonial construction of knowledge therefore haunts any effort to decolonize existing institutions: claims about the universality of Western knowledge can only be sustained in contrast to the particularity and partiality of non-Western knowledges. Today higher education institutions continue to reproduce an epistemological hierarchy wherein Western knowledges are presumed to be universally relevant and valuable, while non-Western knowledges are either patronizingly celebrated as "local culture," commodified or appropriated for Western gain, or else not recognized as knowledge at all. Curricula remain dominated by Western epistemologies, especially Western sciences and technologies, and research in these areas also tends to be the most heavily rewarded through grants and other forms of institutional support and validation.

Western epistemological dominance occurs not only in colleges and universities within the West itself but also in the non-West, where Western institutions are often viewed as the model for the ideal university (Nandy 2000). This has led many to emphasize the importance of "decolonizing the mind" (Thiong'o 1986) and the pursuit of cognitive justice in higher education

research and curricula (Sousa Santos 2007). Others note the potential danger of emphasizing the epistemic dimensions of decolonization at the expense of more material struggles over land and other restitutions (Tuck and Yang 2012). However, these are not mutually exclusive, and demands for decolonization from both of these perspectives and more are increasingly being articulated by students, faculty, and activists around the globe in both Western and Westernized universities, within former imperial metropolises, settler colonial nations, and formerly colonized countries.

These recent efforts cannot be delinked from earlier movements in the 1950s that led to the desegregation of historically white institutions and later student movements in the 1960s and 1970s that demanded more wholesale institutional transformation through the de-Westernization of curricula and knowledge production and more significant redistribution of material resources. Specifically, these movements contested the framing of racialized and Indigenous peoples as objects of knowledge and sought institutional recognition and support of themselves as subjects of knowledge. Such movements did not have all their demands met, but in many cases achieved the institutionalization of ethnic and women's studies programs, as well as the creation of student cultural centers and culturally specific programming on campuses (Ferguson 2012). Around the same time, Indigenous controlled colleges and universities were founded in the USA and Canada.

However, today many of these departments, programs, and institutions struggle to receive adequate funding. In fact, more recent demands for decolonization have come from a growing dissatisfaction with what are understood to be weak, tokenistic, and conditional commitments to the inclusion of nonwhite/Western perspectives, peoples, and modes of knowledge production in historically white and otherwise white-dominated mainstream institutions (Ahmed 2012; Nandy 2000). There is further frustration with the fact that nonwhite students and faculty continue to be underrepresented in higher education, particularly in the most prestigious positions and institutions.

This dissatisfaction has also been fed by the increasing privatization of public higher education, the weakening of affirmative action commitments, and the institutional cooptation of the very demands that were made decades earlier for radical transformation.

Decolonial Possibilities in Higher Education Today

In the current conjuncture, many questions have arisen around the possibilities for institutional transformation, as well as around the desired horizon of change. In this, there is significant tension around the purportedly universal nature of institutions like colleges and universities and the demand for inclusion within them by those that are consistently deemed categorically particular, such that their inclusion remains conditional and premised on degrees of difference in reference to a universal standard. In response, some have advocated for the need to reimagine the *uni*-versity as a *pluri*-versity (Boidin et al. 2012).

More generally, questions have arisen around to what extent it is possible to decolonize institutions that are supported by the nation-State and capital and/or whether these institutions can serve as spaces in which decolonization projects are imagined and enacted. For instance, if universities were created and adapted to support a colonial order of knowledge and tend to reproduce our existing social system, to what extent can these institutions be transformed without larger social transformations? What approaches to knowledge might neither reproduce the colonial order of knowledge nor contest it using colonial terms? Is it even possible or desirable to produce alternative knowledges within existing educational institutions, given that they would likely be unintelligible according to existing modes of knowledge production?

The remainder of this entry reviews responses to these and other questions around decolonization and higher education by offering a summary of three different critical approaches to colonial and racial violence in the context of contemporary

colleges and universities; not included are those who do not recognize this violence as a problem.

Three Sets of Responses

The first category of responses emphasizes individual and institutional interventions focusing on proportional representation, advocating primarily for increased numbers of Indigenous, racialized, and low-income students and faculty, and the supplementation of existing curricula with non-Western perspectives. Rather than decolonization, the goal is enhanced diversity, which manifests as selective recognition and inclusion of difference into existing institutions in ways that do not significantly challenge existing measures of success or structures of power. Within this position, the problems of racism and colonialism are identified largely at the individual level. Thus, emphasis is on addressing the ignorance or bias of individuals from dominant groups through more knowledge or the right institutional policies. Meanwhile, for individuals from marginalized groups, emphasis is on enhancing their capacity and social capital so as to better prepare them to successfully compete for mobility within the existing system. Due to the lack of structural analysis, the uneven distribution of power, wealth, and opportunity across race is not problematized. As a result, there is no redistributive impulse, and the desirability of social relations premised on competition for scarce resources goes unquestioned. Further, inclusion is often framed as a benevolent gift, such that nonwhite individuals are expected to perform their gratitude and refrain from further dissent. More radical demands or critiques may be dismissed as ungrateful, unproductive, or uncivil. Thus, the boundaries of the institution and of acceptable modes of knowledge production and critique are still firmly policed by white and capitalist power structures. The majority of institutional actions around colonialism and race fall within this category.

The next set of responses focuses on systemic analyses of the creation of inequalities and is

characterized by its recognition of epistemological hegemony within higher education. These analyses emphasize the ways that the harms of racialization and colonization are enacted through institutional structures and logics that consistently reproduce existing racial and economic hierarchies, distribute resources in highly uneven ways, and exploitatively extract labor and symbolic resources from marginalized groups to accumulate wealth for those in power. Critiques from this perspective tend to emphasize one or perhaps two dimensions of social violence, such as capitalism, racism, patriarchy, heteronormativity, nationalism, or colonialism, but may not link them all together. Demands for significant institutional transformation are focused on the redistribution of material and epistemic resources and the centering and empowering oppressed students and faculty. Significant demands are also made for institutional redress for historical and ongoing participation in violence, for instance, demands to rename buildings named after slave-owning alumni, divest from fossil fuel or prison companies, or grant free tuition to Black and Indigenous students. Approaches to change in this category may be framed as “speaking truth to power” through critique as well as direct action and/or may enact a principled refusal to engage. Efforts in this vein have historically led to significant institutional transformation, including *de jure* desegregation and the establishment of ethnic studies departments, even as institutional cooptation consistently threatens to undermine the radicalism of the demands. Responses in this category may also reproduce at least some parts of the system they critique, as it is difficult to disrupt all colonial elements at once, particularly if there is a desire to remain intelligible so as to have one’s demands heard by those in power.

The final set of responses emphasize the ontological hegemony that structures and orients the existing university and identify the fundamentally violent and unsustainable system within which it is embedded. These approaches suggest that modern existence is dependent on colonization and racialization for its continuation, and therefore consider the limits of the kinds of transformations

that are possible within higher education “as we know it,” especially as long as it is funded and regulated by the nation-State and capital. Because current crises of the university are linked to the *longue durée* of modernity and its racial and colonial conditions of possibility, ultimately it is thought that reform is not possible and what is needed is to imagine and create radically different, unknown futures for higher education and beyond. Thus, for example, this position critiques the fact that expanded access to higher education is conditional on a willingness to adhere to existing institutional norms but also points out that expanding access to a harmful (capitalist) system does not necessarily make that system any less harmful. From here there are different emphases as to what should be done in the short term, including hacking the university, i.e., appropriating its resources for use in radical projects; experimenting with alternative modes of organizing education, for instance, the creation of autonomous “eco-versities”; or “hospicing” the university by learning from past mistakes and preparing for the transition into different decolonial futures. This position emphasizes the double binds and contradictory complicities that result from conflicting desires for decolonization *and* for fulfillment of the promises that colonial system offers. Further this position also recognizes the need for immediate harm reduction efforts within higher education, including those outlined by the other two positions, though in general these are thought to address the symptoms rather than the root causes of harm and thus are not understood to be the final horizon of decolonial possibility. This is illustrated in the following quote:

[T]here is no way we are going to intellectually reason our way out of coloniality, in any conventional academic sense. There is no way we are going to publish our way out of modernity. There is no way we are going to read our way out of epistemological hegemony. (Burman 2012, p. 117)

While often these three approaches are theorized as distinct and potentially incommensurable, in practice people tend to strategically and incoherently make use of different approaches, often at the same time, depending on what is possible

and desirable within any given situation. Enacting decolonization in the context of existing higher education institutions is an ongoing, challenging, messy, and often contradictory process.

Conclusion

Decolonization is often evoked as an event of interruption of a specific process or characteristic deemed “colonial” and therefore undesirable. However, this conceptualization is grounded on a very selective analysis of coloniality and colonization. An alternative mobilization of decolonization in education, taking account of the force, pervasiveness, and complexity of colonial perceptions and relations, would frame decolonization as a lifelong, life-wide process, fraught with difficulties, competing demands, and uncertain outcomes. As part of this process, higher education may be one of the many spaces in which to denaturalize the modern/colonial world, reach the limits of what is possible within it, and experiment with the apparently impossible, without assuming that such work can ever be free from complicity in colonial harm.

Cross-References

- [Cognitive Decolonization](#)
- [Cognitive Imperialism](#)
- [Decoloniality, Pedagogy, and Praxis](#)
- [Decolonizing Knowledge Production](#)
- [Poststructuralism, Postcolonialism, and Education](#)
- [Wynter and Decolonization](#)

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Decolonizing Knowledge Production

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The Decolonial Movement

Around the globe today, there are countless groups that raise the banner of decolonizing knowledge, power, and the mind. Books, articles, conferences, summer school programs, research

projects, websites, Facebook groups, and international networks have been formed under the flag of “decolonization.” It has become a catchphrase in new social movements around the world and in the academia. “Decolonizing knowledge and power,” “decolonizing the mind,” “decolonizing the city,” “decolonizing the diet,” “decolonizing architecture,” “decolonizing knowledge production,” and many more expressions that begin with “decolonizing . . .” are part of a broader movement that aims to contest the continued influence of colonialism on knowledge, understanding, and contemporary society.

Across the academia decolonizing knowledge has challenged colonial ideas labeled as racism, postcolonialism, or Orientalism and has advanced frameworks such as critical race studies, postcolonial studies, and decolonizing the mind. Departments like African-American Studies, Asian and Asian-American Studies, Chicano/a Studies, and Native American Studies are at the vanguard of such analysis. Outside the academia, in community groups and social movements, decolonizing knowledge can be traced to resistance against colonialism from the very start in 1492.

The central premise of the decolonial movement is the idea that there is a third narrative of liberation of mankind besides Liberalism and Marxism: a decolonial narrative.

Liberalism grew out of Western Enlightenment with the narrative of the liberation of the mind from the authority of the church and the liberation of the individual from the constraint of society. Marxism is an offshoot of Western Enlightenment that offered a critique of Liberalism from a class perspective. In the anti-colonial movements of the Third World, Marxism was adopted as a narrative of liberation. The decolonial movement tries to articulate a philosophy of liberation outside the framework of Western Enlightenment.

The decolonial movement arose in a complex set of circumstances in the late twentieth century. This entry goes into with five factors explaining the rise of this movement and the creation of decolonial knowledge.

The decolonial knowledge production covers many themes, from decolonizing mathematics

and physics to epistemology, history of science, and basis categories in the social science. This entry is limited to epistemology, the concept of class and a theory of racism, and knowledge production.

The Rise of the Decolonial Movement

Several factors explain the rise of the decolonial movement in recent decades.

The first factor is the collapse of the socialist bloc and the accompanying demise of Marxism. Within 3 years – between 1989 and 1992 – 20 of the 24 countries dissolved their socialist system including the first socialist country, the USSR. In the remaining four countries – China, Vietnam, Cuba, and Laos – ongoing experiments seek to combine central planning with some kind of modified market economy. The downfall of the socialist bloc contributed to the downfall of Marxism as a discourse of liberation (Kramer 2012).

The second is the fall of the West and the rise of the rest (Zakaria 2009). Colonized countries in Africa, Asia, the Middle East, Latin America, and the Caribbean are rising as regional and global power: economically, politically, and militarily. Their rise strengthens their self-confidence culturally and opens up a space for probing other paths of knowledge production that goes against Western cultural hegemony. A remarkable case is China. During the *Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution* (1966–1976), the ancient Chinese philosopher Confucius (551–479 BCE) was denounced by Mao Zedong as reflecting a semi-feudal culture. He criticized those who advocated the study of Confucius, for promoting backward ideas. In 2014 President Xi Jinping praised Confucius and the ancient Chinese philosophers for their rational thinking and cultural achievements of China and currently looks to them as a source of ideas for running China (Xi Jinping 2015).

The third is the struggle of social movements for dignity and recognition based on ancient civilizations. In large parts of the Americas, the indigenous population has been largely wiped out by colonial genocide. But some countries still have sizable communities left, including

Peru (45%), Bolivia (44%), Guatemala (41%), Mexico (28%), Belize (17%), Ecuador (14%), and Panama (12%). Five hundred years of colonialism did not crush their spirit. In 2005, Evo Morales was chosen as the first indigenous president in a general election in Bolivia. In 2009 a new constitution was adopted in a referendum with 91% attendance and 61% approval. The preamble opens with a statement of acknowledgment of the ancient history of its people and defines as one of the functions of the State as to construct a just and harmonious society built on decolonization (see Bolivia 2014).

The fourth factor has to do with the rise of social movements in multicultural societies across the West. Communities of color in Western Europe and North America continued the struggle to establish, defend, and sustain their identity in the face of a hegemonic Western culture. Their encounter with racism has forced them to seek narratives of liberation that affirm their identity, including narratives outside of Marxism that use class as the basic unit of social and political analysis. In France decolonial activists have even invented the term “white left” to insist that racism is also virulent in the socialist movement that have expressed support for banning the veil (Bouteldja 2014).

The fifth determinant is the unfinished business of the classical liberation movements. In South Africa the promise of a rainbow nation that would overcome the legacy of apartheid has fallen short. The disappointment with the transformation to a new society has led black South Africans to question the old narrative of liberation and search for a new one. In 2015 students from the University of Cape Town mobilized so that the statue of Cecil Rhodes, a leading colonialist and advocate of apartheid, must be brought down. In 2002 the Rhodes Trust and President Nelson Mandela formed the Mandela Rhodes Foundation with an endowment of £10 million to provide scholarships to train a new generation of future African leaders. It was an attempt to reconcile a troublesome past. The “Rhodes Must Fall” movement spread to other parts of South Africa and carried the slogan of decolonizing the university. It was also a critique of the attempt to reconcile Rhodes with the new future of South Africa (Mandela 2003, UCT RMF 2015).

Some Themes of Decolonial Knowledge Production

There is a wide variety of themes in decolonial knowledge production. Some are related to the specific factors behind the rise of the decolonial movement. The decline of socialism and Marxism brought to the fore the relevance of the concept of class. The rise of China as a superpower comes with a reappraisal of knowledge produced by ancient Chinese philosophers. The social movements in Latin America that is based on ancient indigenous civilizations brought competing concepts of the relationship between nature and society in the field of sustainable development. The social movements in the multicultural societies in the West brought the question of race to prominence in debates about identity formation of the West. In South Africa the failure of the ANC to realize the dreams of social justice and prosperity opened new debates on race relations in Africa.

Here are a few examples of themes that are developed in the decolonial movement.

Epistemology

Western science was based on the idea of René Descartes “I think, therefore I am.” A decolonial critique centers on five aspects.

First, there is the question of the location from which you speak. Imagine an enslaved African running from his enslavers who will torture him if they catch him. If there would be anyone in the world to doubt his existence, then it would be this man running for his life in a reality that looks like a horror dream. Yet, the idea that during his flight he might consider philosophizing about the concept “I think therefore I am” would sound like a sketch from a stand-up comedy. So if you situate the discussion not in the house of Descartes in The Hague where he sits at his warm fireplace with a wine in his hand, but, in the Caribbean during slavery, the nonsense becomes apparent (Descartes 2002, p. 7).

Second, Western philosophy looks at knowledge production as the result of an individual activity of thinking. If we were to do that consistently, we could not ever know if we are dreaming, because if you were the only person in the world,

there would be nobody to tell you if you are awake or if you are dreaming. That knowledge cannot come from you. Somebody else has to tell you that. It is impossible to say “I think, therefore I am not dreaming.” You can also think in your dream, as we know from experience and common sense. African scholars present the alternative concept of Ubuntu that argues that knowledge production is realized through communities. They paraphrase Descartes in the slogan “I am because we are.” Knowledge is not only acquired by an individual that conducts research, but is transmitted via social relations from generation to generation and is ingrained in the collective mind of a community. An individual does not need to go through the process of accumulating knowledge (Gade 2012).

Third, even in his dream, Descartes separates object from subject. His imagination is so limited that can only think of the subject that is dreaming. What about the object that is dreaming? In Chinese philosophy there is a famous tale about the Taoist philosopher, Zhuang Zhou (369–286 BCE), that goes as follows. Once, Zhuang Zhou dreamed he was a butterfly, a butterfly flitting and fluttering about, happy with himself, and doing as he pleased. He did not know that he was Zhuang Zhou. Suddenly he woke up and there he was, solid and unmistakable Zhuang Zhou. But he did not know if he was Zhuang Zhou who had dreamt he was a butterfly or a butterfly dreaming that he was Zhuang Zhou. Descartes’ imagination was limited in his conceptualization of life, which was limited to human life (Lee 2015).

Fourth, there is something fundamentally wrong with the concept of doubt and common sense in Descartes. No sane person doubts his or her existence. You can have doubts about the absurdity of life – am I really going through this experience – but it is impossible to doubt your existence. Because no one can image his “nonexistence.” You can imagine not being at a certain location, but what does it mean to say “I don’t exist?” There are many human needs and actions that assure your existence, not only the process of thinking, but any other human activity. It is matter of common sense. If you doubt your existence, put your hand in a fire, let yourself experience hyperbolic doubt, and that will bring common sense

into you. Or starve yourself to death and see how long it takes to come to the conclusion “I am hungry, therefore I am.” There is a saying in Indian philosophy that distinguishes between common sense and nonsense: “we can mistake a rope for a snake, but we don’t mistake a snake for an elephant.”

Classes and Oppressed Groups

Marxist analysis is based on the concepts of class and the ownership of the means of production. A class is defined by its relationship to the ownership of means of production and the control of labor power (Marx and Engels 1847, pp. 14–15). Decolonial thinkers question the Marxist concept of class as a central tool in analyzing social relations.

Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci shifted this notion by introducing the rather vague concept of the “subaltern,” which he defines as groups of people who are subjected to the initiatives of the dominant class, even when they rebel. Peasants, who own the means of production (land), also belong to the subaltern groups (Gramsci 1999, pp. 202–203). The concept was taken up by South Asian historians in the Subaltern Studies Group who articulated new narratives of the colonial history of India and South Asia on the basis of this concept (Guha 1982).

Aimé Césaire introduced the concept of race and the colonial subject into the Marxist discussion on class in his letter of resignation from the French Communist Party in 1956: “It is clear that our struggle – the struggle of colonial peoples against colonialism, the struggle of peoples of color against racism – is more complex, or better yet, of a completely different nature than the fight of the French worker against French capitalism, and it cannot in any way be considered a part, a fragment, of that struggle” (Césaire 1956).

Marcus Garvey elaborated on the concept of race and explained the struggle in the world as a struggle of white Europeans seeking to dominate black people and people of color across the world. His narrative resonated in North America, the Caribbean, and Africa, and he succeeded at that time in building the largest black organization in the world (Universal Negro Improvement

Association) with up to one million members. Race thus became a central concept in decolonial thinking. It laid the foundation of Pan-Africanism as a movement to unite all people of African descent against colonialism.

Outside the Afro experience, similar narratives were developed based more on culture than race. In academia Edward Said used the concept of Orientalism to characterize Western attitude of superiority toward Eastern cultures that they regarded as inferior (Said 1977). The response to Orientalism was the rise of Pan-Islamist movements in the nineteenth century that sought to unite Muslims to resist colonial occupation of Muslim lands. The Pan-Islamists took Islam as the basis for organization (Sever 2010). Pan-Arabism in the twentieth century sought to organize colonized people in North Africa and West Asia on the basis of Arab culture (Lungu and Gokcel 2014). Pan-Asianism was a movement that aimed at uniting all Asian people against colonialism (Duara 2001). The decolonial narrative did not take class but the colonial subject as the central unit of its analysis.

There is a complex relationship between the factors determining social relations such as class, race, ethnicity, gender, and nation. Decolonial analysis brings in the way colonialism has impacted these factors in such a way that ethnicity became a core factor in the global colonial system.

Theory of Racism

As race and ethnicity play a crucial role in the decolonial analysis, a theory of racism is a crucial part of decolonial thinking. A decolonial theory of racism as developed by Ramon Grosfoguel (Grosfoguel 2013) and the author (Hira 2015) has two dimensions. One dimension tackles the ways in which racism is embedded in knowledge production. The other confronts the ways in which racism is embedded in society in general.

In knowledge production racism is defined as a concept that articulates that superiority/inferiority of social groups is related to characteristics such as soul, biology, and culture. The articulation of racism is intertwined with the authority of knowledge production. Ramon Grosfoguel (Grosfoguel 2013, pp. 81–83) explains that there are three

forms to this articulation of racism in knowledge production. The first form is the articulation of superiority/inferiority in terms of creatures having a soul. In the debate of Valladolid of 1550 between theologians Batolomé de Las Casas and Juan Jinés de Sepúlveda, the first argued that the indigenous people of the Americas had a soul, and therefore they were humans – although like children – while the latter sustained that they had no soul, and therefore they were animals that could be sold. The authority of knowledge production was Christian theology. This is called theological racism in knowledge production and was developed between 1492 and 1650 when the Spaniards colonized the Americas.

The second form is the articulation of superiority/inferiority in terms of biological characteristics. Between 1650 and 1850, superiority/inferiority was articulated in terms of biological traits (Hira 2015, pp. 138–140). Africans (and their descendants) – who previously were regarded as civilized Moors in Europe – were now seen as cattle that could be traded in the era of the transatlantic slave trade. The authorities of knowledge production were philosophers and natural scientists, the founders of science in Europe. This is what we called biological racism.

The third form is the articulation of superiority/inferiority in terms of culture and social formations. Some cultures and social formations are viewed as backward. Western society and culture is regarded as the highest stage in the evolution of human civilization. The authority of knowledge production is the rising social sciences from the second half of the nineteenth century. This is called cultural racism (Grosfoguel 2010, p. 38).

The second dimension in the theory of racism is related to how racism is embedded in the economic, social, political, and cultural institutions of society. The concept of institutional racism is used to explain that racism is not about the interaction between human beings that is deformed by feelings of superiority and inferiority but about institutions that promote and maintain the relationship of superiority/inferiority based on theology, biology, or culture. This approach rejects the simplistic and narrow notion that racism is simply the

prejudice of individuals, instead focuses on the institutional ramparts of racialization, including laws, organizational operations, religion, and ideologies of individual freedom.

The Perspective for Decolonizing Knowledge Production

There are many themes that have been explored by decolonial thinkers around the world, among them mental slavery and decolonizing the mind, feminism, decolonizing mathematics and the natural sciences, the need for a decolonial terminology, and new concepts of world history.

Within these themes the initial approach centered on the nature and extent of bias in Western knowledge production, including its rejection of and hostility to knowledge production in non-Western civilizations. Currently the prevailing tendency seeks to develop alternatives to Western knowledge production: the production of concepts and theories that are based on a critique of Western knowledge production and on contributions by ancient civilizations. Islamic and Buddhist economic theories are being developed based on different moral values in competition to economic theories of the West that are based on profit maximization which has greed as its moral base (Baqir as-Sadr 1994 and 1982, Prayukvong 2005). Indian mathematician C.J. Raju – who works on decolonizing mathematics – criticizes the metaphysical foundation of Western mathematics and proposes to return to Indian mathematicians that based their work on an empirical foundation (Raju 2007).

The five factors behind the rise of the decolonial movement in recent decades as explained above indicate that decolonizing knowledge production is not a new trend that will disappear and be replaced by a new trend. Since the five factors are results of deeply embedded patterns of colonial knowledge production, it is hard to see them as trendy discourses that will, as time goes by, be replaced with other ones. Therefore, they will continue to push the need for decolonizing knowledge production. They will continue to develop new basic categories

and concepts in the different disciplines of science both as a critique of Western categories and concepts and as an alternative to Western knowledge production.

Organizations

Decolonial Universities

There are a few universities in the world that take on “decolonization of knowledge” or decolonization in general as a central task. Bolivian universities are an example. Bolivia is the only country where the concept of decolonizing society is enshrined in the constitution. The 2009 constitution defines one of the functions of the State: “To construct a just and harmonious society, built on decolonization, without discrimination or exploitation, with full social justice, in order to strengthen the Pluri-National identities.” It also defines the purpose of institutes for higher education: “Education is unitary, public, universal, democratic, participatory, communitarian, decolonizing and of quality.” (Bolivia 2009)

The government has established three universities named after indigenous leader of the resistance against colonialism: Tupac Katari, Apiaguaiki Tupa, and Casimiro Huanca. The universities are Tupac Katari Aymara University, Apiaguaiki Tupa Guarani University, and Casimiro Huanca Quechua University. They provide a decolonial curriculum in higher education. The description of one subject in a curriculum (agronomic technique) explains that the curriculum aims to train professionals to implement business ventures under the community and family model. Science and technology should be put at the service of communal own (not State-owned) companies. In organizational terms, the university is structured under the community democracy, which means that the decision is exercised by the community through collective deliberation and constitutes the highest authority and power, which is contrary to the elitist form of a decision as it happens in the liberal way. University officials are not elected through party competition or composition of fronts but directly through rotation and shift system (Universidad 2008).

In 1991 Canada established a Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples to address the struggle of the indigenous people (called First Nation in Canada). In 1996 the commission presented a 4,000-page report: The commission acknowledged the destructive and Western legacy on the First Nation people and the need to decolonize the universities. It came up with 440 recommendations, among them the establishment of an aboriginal people’s university. In 2003 the First Nations University of Canada was opened. It is embedded in the experiences of the First Nation communities and has an annual enrollment of 3,000 students. They base their university on collective values of wisdom, respect, humility, sharing, harmony, beauty, strength, and spirituality. The students learn in the context of their own traditions, languages, and values and in an environment of First Nation cultures and values that recognizes the spiritual power of knowledge (First Nation 2003).

Networks

The production of decolonial knowledge is achieved inside and outside academia. Inside academia there are individual researchers and research centers conducting research. There are academic networks that aim to unite researchers on specific subjects. One example is the Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL) that originated from a group of Harvard Law School graduate students in 1996. They study the mechanisms of how international law perpetuates the subordination of non-Europeans to Europeans through international legal norms and propose alternative mechanism of international law. They organize conferences on a regular basis to share and further develop this knowledge. Other networks exist outside TWAIL on international politics such as the Colonial/Postcolonial/Decolonial Working Group which is sponsored by the British International Studies Association. There are also regional networks that organize activists and thinkers on a regional basis. For example, in Africa there is the Africa Decolonial Research Network based at the University of South Africa. The Alaska Native Knowledge Network compiles information about knowledge systems among Alaska natives. Decoloniality Europe

is a network of knowledge institutions, activists, and human rights organizations.

There are international networks such as *Multiversity* based in Malaysia that organizes biannual conferences that brings together scholars and activists from around the world to work on decolonizing the educational system.

Journals

Many journals devote articles on decolonizing knowledge production. Here are two examples of journals devoted to this subject. For example, *AlterNative: An International Journal of Indigenous Peoples* was launched in 2005 by New Zealand's Māori Centre of Research Excellence based at the University of Auckland in Aotearoa New Zealand. It presents scholarly research on Indigenous worldviews and experiences of decolonization from Indigenous perspectives from around the world.

Another journal along the similar vein is "Bandung: Journal of the Global South," which is published by the Springer, and it is considered a cross-disciplinary human and social sciences. It aims at developing new theoretical perspectives that should be grounded on the complex post-colonial landscapes of the African, Asian, and Latin-American peoples, for identifying their own ways and strategies of development and decolonization.

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Deconstruction

► Derrida and the Ethics of Reading

Deconstruction, Philosophy, Education

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How is it possible to untangle, demystify, and transgress the limits and limitations of the aporia of the death of philosophy and resolve the question of its question, and of its right, and of its institution, as well as who has the right and responsibility to respond to it. Three points are worth further elaboration:

1. The first concerns the post-metaphysical horizons of community, both public and academic. It is not a simple matter of *fighting*

against the pronouncement of the death of philosophy, even though it may be a premature burial. Or so we would like to, and have to, think. To try to resist what is posed as the end of metaphysics by mounting arguments against the finality of this perspective in the tradition of a “critique” or negative determination that seeks its own affirmation through the violence of opposition is a wasted effort. “A philosopher is always someone for whom philosophy is not given, someone who in essence must question himself or herself about the essence and destination of philosophy (Derrida 1994).” Which is to say that the alterity of metaphysics as well as the power of its teleology is always close at hand, whether or not a transcendence of its logic *ever takes place or can even happen*, essentially, whether or not it is *possible*. Questions about the end of philosophy, and thus of the end of the historicity of history, still abound. Some pose more productive challenges to the thinking of “what, if anything, comes next?” than others do. Nevertheless, a sense of community is (oddly enough, some may say) formed around the asking of the question of the end or the death of philosophy. And this is to be expected, when the point is just to a Heideggerian *overcoming* (*Überwindung*) of metaphysics. It is the responsibility of each individual to interrogate the limits of “a sort of axiomatic, a system of values, norms and regulating principles” (Derrida, 1994, p. 2.) that justify “the existence then of a properly philosophical space like UNESCO.” (Derrida, 1994, p. 2.) “For,” Jacques Derrida warns, “such a situation and such a duty are more particular than it seems. And this can lead to fearsome practical consequences.” (Derrida, 1994, p. 3.) Such as the temptation to take a stance on one side or the other of philosophy, *with or against* those who desire to remember and keep alive its memory or those who choose to forget the historicity of metaphysics and forswear the finality of its death. “A community of the question about the possibility of the question” is what Derrida calls the publicly academic space of a more productive ground of inquiry into the right to

philosophy than one of either support or diffidence. (Derrida, "Violence and Metaphysics," p. 80.) It would neither reject nor embrace the Eurocentric historicity of the Western thinking and its epistemic-cultural specificity that is articulated via humanism as the infinite perfectability of subjective being: the finding of the *nature of the self* and its center at the cost of losing affinity with the other. It could not, because it is a "community of the question" – a community wrought of dissensus and not of consensus. Its potential lies in the openness of its capacity to honor and respect the value of difference, to welcome the impossibility of alterity, but not to dismiss or celebrate the ground of *au courant* memory for its own sake, over the unfamiliar archive of another. So, rather than dismantling the arguments of those who would like to see the demise of the right to philosophy and its Eurocentric historicity, Derrida has attempted to answer and is continuing to address the larger question of the death of metaphysics, its future, both directly and obliquely, because none of the answers posited are as yet satisfying enough to do justice to the persistent problem of *finding a way out of philosophy*. Certainly, there is an *aporia* at work here that seeks refuge in its displacement. And Derrida construes its difficulty in the following way:

This Eurocentric discourse forces us to ask ourselves . . . whether today [referring both to the context of the lecture and to the epochal dimension of empirical time] our reflection concerning the unlimited extension and the reaffirmation of a right to philosophy should not both *take into account and de-limit* the assignation of philosophy to its Greco-European origin or memory. At stake is neither contenting oneself with reaffirming a certain history, a certain memory of origins or of the Western history (Mediterranean or Central European, Greco-Roman-Arab or Germanic) of philosophy, nor contenting oneself with being opposed to, or opposing denial to, this memory and to these languages, but rather trying to displace the fundamental schema of this problematic by going beyond the old, tiresome, worn-out and wearisome opposition between Eurocentrism and anti-Eurocentrism. One of the conditions for getting there – and one won't get there all of a sudden in one try, it will be the effect of a long and slow historical labor that is under way – is the active becoming-aware that

philosophy is no longer determined by a program, an originary language or tongue whose memory it would suffice to recover so as to discover its destination, that philosophy is no more assigned to its origin or by its origin, than it is simply, spontaneously or abstractly cosmopolitical or universal. What we have lived and what we are more and more aiming for are modes of appropriation and transformation of the philosophical in non-European languages and cultures. Such modes of appropriation and transformation amount neither to the classical mode of appropriation that consists in making one's own what belongs to the other (here, in interiorizing the Western memory of philosophy and assimilating it in one's own language) nor to the invention of new modes of thought which, as alien to all appropriation, would no longer have any relation to what one believes one recognizes under the name of philosophy. Derrida, 1994, p. 3

No discourse "disciplined" body of knowledge claiming epistemic status, such as philosophy is and does, *self-consciously* undermines its grounding conceits in both methodology and content. The principle of noncontradiction forbids it. What governs the institutional legitimacy of philosophy as a *scientific endeavor* is its ability to render the logic of its conclusions accountable *to* and *for* the provisions of episteme laid out by the historicity of its own doctrines of self-evident truth and the generalizability of conclusions regarding the study of empirical phenomena: what its discourse says and reveals, confirms and proves by way of an experiential facticity, about *being-in-the-world*. In this respect, an ethical moment attends the academic pursuit of knowledge. It occurs when thinking becomes *like a science*, becomes "philosophy," is conceived as a universal project, inaugurates a discipline replete with models of practice to be guarded, and is not defined idiosyncratically as the general process of thought. This distinction, besides giving credence to the institutional and pedagogical formalization and formulizability of the human intellect for and within the structures of the modern university, remains highly problematic. The division between "philosophy and *Denken*, thinking," reenforces the ethico-epistemic specificity of academic responsibility in this manner by setting down

the template for marking out the limits of the paragon of a community (to be) instituted, whereby the laws it creates ultimately support and mobilize a divining line that distinguishes those “who belong” to it from those “who do not” and, in all probability, never will. (The “Roundtable Discussion” on Jacques Derrida’s “Des humanités et de la discipline philosophiques”/“Of the Humanities and Philosophical Disciplines” in *Surfaces* Vol. VI.108 (v.1.0A-16/08/1996), p. 2.) The partisanship of discipline and disciplinarity plays upon the need for philosophy to be affiliated with the historicity of a “culture.” Here we must give way to caution, though, not to presume to know too much. “There are cultural aspects of philosophy,” Derrida maintains, “but philosophy is not a cultural phenomenon.” What does this mean, exactly, in both the narrow and broader sense of a community of shared and differing interests?

2. This brings us to the second point. To say that philosophy is a cultural phenomenon would be to universalize it and to deny “the relationship between philosophy and natural languages, European languages,” (Derrida, 1994, p. 2.) living and breathing languages, that are proper to and establish the propriety of philosophy as a Western invention of the consciousness of the West and the articulation of its archive. And Derrida is sufficiently clear about this undeniable linguistic historicity, while attempting “to avoid the opposition between two symmetrical temptations, one being to say that philosophy is universal”: (Derrida, 1994, p. 2.)

Today it’s a well-known phenomenon – there is a Chinese philosophy, a Japanese philosophy, and so on and so forth. That’s a contention I would resist. I think there is something specifically European, specifically Greek in philosophy to say that philosophy is something universal. . . . Philosophy is a way of thinking. It’s not science. It’s not thinking in general. So when I say, well, philosophy has some privileged relationship with Europe, I don’t say this European-centrally but to take seriously history. That’s one temptation, to say philosophy is universal. (Derrida, 1994, p. 2)

The closure of philosophy does not mean a gathering together of the Greco-European

reality of its roots and forcefully bringing them to an end that would, for all intents and purposes, lack any semblance of historicity and is then without a future. The breakthrough of *what-is-to-come* must always arise out of the resources of a past thinking that cannot be effectively renounced. The trace of Greco-European cultural memory in philosophy will neither allow itself to be eradicated nor to be abandoned at the limit of the archive of knowledge it *is* and *represents* in method, form, and content. The first “temptation” leads to the second, both contrary and complementary, one Derrida warns us about – the desire to say:

well philosophy has only one origin, a single pure origin that is its foundation, its institution, through a number of grounding concepts which are linked to Greek language, and we have to keep this in memory and constantly go back to Greece and back to this Greek origin, European, through anamnesis, through memory, to what philosophy is. This is a symmetrical temptation which I would like to avoid. Derrida, “Des humanités,” p. 2.

The Eurocentric myopia of this monocultural view of the archive of the Western episteme is another peril of taking sides without actualizing sufficient precautions against the irresponsibility of academic solipsism. Magnifying the question of the historicity of philosophy and of the purity of its Greek origins, the example foreshadows the necessity of moving beyond the concept of a universal thought and recognizing the rise of the cosmopolitical condition that Kant predicted as a moment in the infinite process of eternal becoming, or the point in history where a giant step in the progress of humanity can be seen resulting from an outgrowth of the global self-awareness and situatedness of human being. Derrida stresses the virtues of “another model” (Derrida, 1994, p. 2.) whose approach to truth cannot be distilled quite so easily into a program of “Eurocentrism and a simple-minded anti-Eurocentrism.”: (Derrida, 1994, p. 2.)

that is, while keeping in memory this European, Greek origin of philosophy, and the European history of philosophy, take into account that there are

events, philosophical events, which cannot be reduced to this single origin, and which meant that the origin itself was not simple, that the phenomena of hybridization, of graft, or translation, was there from the beginning, so we have to analyze the different philosophical events today, in Europe and outside of Europe. (Derrida, 1994, p. 2.)

In essence, the attempt to make philosophy live out its future after the historicity of its Greco-European past requires the space of an *aporia* “that cannot be locked into this fundamentally cultural, colonial, or neo-colonial dialect of appropriation and alienation.” (Derrida, 1994, p. 4.) There must be more. “There are other ways for philosophy than those of appropriation as expropriation (to lose one’s memory by assimilating the memory of the other, the one being opposed to the other, as if an *ex-appropriation* was not possible, indeed the only possible chance).”³ Derrida is right. The testimony of memory and its reaffirming of an ethical response and responsibility to the historicity of the past are important for inscribing and building the “horizon of a new community.” (Derrida, 1994, p. 3.) It is not a matter of reasonable speculation: as the “speculative moment within the academy”⁸ will not do justice to rethinking the new situation of nations and States, of peoples, that must “transform their assumptions” (Derrida, 1994, p. 3.) (discussion 3) in relation to what we now know is the urgent necessity of “displacing some concepts which are absolutely essential to th[e] constitutions” (Derrida, 1994, p. 3.) of international institutions like the United Nations and UNESCO. The cosmopolitical hybridization of empirical and epistemic identity Derrida speaks of does not involve trying to erase the history of one’s own memory by working (in vain) to appropriate the effects and affectivity of another archive – the archive of the “other” – whose expropriation would be causally determined via the need for a political maneuvering or strategically motivated as the willful adoption of its tenets would just happen to jibe with the dominant ideology of the day. Nor does it imply making an attempt to start over without history by pursuing misguided

efforts to efface the contextual and institutional specificity of subjectivity through a haphazard rejection of the philosophical grounding of one’s sense of *being-in-the-world*. On the one hand, a rethinking of “Eurocentrism and anti-colonialism” (Derrida, 1994, p. 4.) as “symptoms of a colonial and missionary culture” (Derrida, 1994, p. 4.) would facilitate other beginnings and other directions for the infinite progress of human being. On the other hand, “a concept of the cosmopolitical that would still be determined by such opposition would not only still concretely limit the development of the right to philosophy but also would not even account for what happens in philosophy.” (Derrida, 1994, p. 4.) Do we have any chance of surpassing the hindrances and obstacles of respecting a desire to promote and protect the call for either the appropriation (expropriation) or ex-appropriation of Western metaphysics on a global and international scale?

If philosophy could ever hope to overcome the impossible dream of achieving its own end, it would be precisely from a curious rupturing of the idea of its historicity, the memory of its *being-past*, which, of course, could and would never happen. And we should not want an expunging of the history of philosophy to occur, if it were even possible. Metaphysics does not have to be forcefully sedated, sanitized, and subdued. Also, we do not have to issue a proclamation that would render it alive or sentence it to death. Derrida explains, “Not only are there other ways for philosophy, but philosophy, if there is any such thing, is the *other way*. And it has always been the *other way* (Derrida, 1994, p. 4.) To be unequivocal, philosophy “has always been bastard, hybrid, grafted, multilinear, and polyglot.” (Derrida, 1994, p. 4.) The teaching body of the discipline has always known this fact to be true. Pedagogical systems highlighting methods of recitation and repetition in the delivery of its curriculum were designed as a defense against a mnemonic underdetermination of the totality and authenticity of philosophical archive. By this I mean the competing models and systems

of the reason of Western episteme that explicate the ontico-ontological sources of human consciousness and being. What signals the “crisis of philosophy” and leads to a questioning of the value of its teaching and learning – thereby feeding the naive illusion of its untimely demise – are the meta-conditional links of possibility, to be more specific, the *conditions of impossibility* within its complex lineage that work to destabilize the history of philosophy and, consequently, open up the concept of philosophy to what is not “philosophy proper” or “proper to philosophy.” It is this realization of an originary difference always already present within the writing of its archive that displaces and dislocates the authority of its power to signify and *speak for* the truth of itself. The violence of alterity as the immutable trace of the difference of another thoroughly permeates the historicity of Western knowledge. For “philosophy has never been the unfolding responsible for a unique, originary assignation linked to a unique language or to the place of a sole people. *Philosophy does not have a sole memory.*”

3. We will now consider the third point. The working within and against a tradition of canonical associations wrought by the instauration of memory and the limitations of its capacity exemplified in the act of forgetting (*lethe*) brings out the tensions of disassociation and dissonance that redefine the path of metaphysics. To achieve a spatial and temporal closure of “first philosophy” involves a segue to something *other than philosophy, a thinking of philosophy lacking philosophy*, where “we must adjust our practice of the history of philosophy, our practice of history and of philosophy, to this reality which was also a chance and which more than ever remains a chance” (Derrida, 1994, p. 4.) for the impossibility of realizing the headings of a philosophy is yet to come. Derrida anticipates the future after metaphysics taking place along these lines of a debt and duty to the tradition of the past traced out by the limitations of memory and its openness

to an expansion of the difference of itself as the *khora* of the other. It is not only a matter of affirming the existence of philosophy, but of recognizing and acknowledging its natural right to determine the grounds for asking the questions about its sources, its limits (*peras, linea*), and its future, if only to establish the boundaries of debt and duty that would serve to prepare us for a thinking of what comes next from what came before. Derrida is quite clear on this: “Philosophy has always insisted upon this: thinking its other. Its other: that which limits it, and from which it derives its essence, its definition, its production.” (Derrida, 1982) One cannot beat the anti-metaphysical drum (*tympan*) too loudly and still expect to hear the echoes of a timelessness that reserved the task of thinking. Indeed, it would be unwise to “philosophize with a hammer”, (Derrida, 1982, p. xiii.) like Friedrich Nietzsche’s Zarathustra, and ponder on how best to go about the mobilization of a “noisy pedagogy” that would displace the internal sound of seeming truth in the ears of those who enjoin a claim to knowledge with the light of a sagacity drawn from the premises of what is a risky (re)visioning of epistemology poised “to transform what one decries” (Derrida, 1982, p. xiii.) in metaphysics. The danger is that, as Derrida has warned, “in taking this risk, one risks nothing at all,” for what is *unthought* and therefore *untaught* always already opens the future of a history of thinking and directions of teaching that are “yet to come” (*à-venir, Zu-kunft*).

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Defining Openness in Education

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Synonyms

Anarchic education; Education for all; Educational commons; Edupunk; Humanistic education; Massive open online courses (MOOCs); Open education (OE); Open educational resources (OER); Open learning; Transformative learning

Introduction

Characteristics of openness can be found in many respects throughout the history of education. For thousands of years, children educated themselves for a large part through more or less free play, exploration, sharing, and exchange. Although children's play for its own sake might seem a prototypical example for openness in education at first sight, dynamic interrelationships of dimensions of opening and closure are essential for a differentiated understanding of the various aspects of free play, open education, and its conditions and constraints.

This argument can be further illustrated by contrasting educational ideals in transition from closed to more open societies. On the one hand, philosophers like Protagoras, Democritus, or Socrates who called for comprehensive education for "free citizens" in ancient Greece set a basis for public education and contributed to transitional processes from tribalism to humanitarianism or, in other words, from closed to open forms of society where, at least ideally, rules, values, customs, and also taboos could be questioned and criticized. On the other hand, opening up education was meant

for some and not for all. In Plato's model of an educational State, for example, it is only male adult philosophers who can obtain the highest level of education by way of stepping out of the cave with its shadows and false images.

Ambivalences, polarities, and contradictions between freedom and open space for development, on the one hand, and constraints and enforcement on the other, have been discussed in various educational contexts. The spectrum extends from calls for openness to fulfilling one's moral obligations as an element of Confucian ethics in order to foster a harmonious authoritarian society and Kant's view of humans who in contrast to animals need education in terms of nurturing, disciplining, instruction, and moral training, to calls for reform pedagogies – aimed at opening up rigid educational systems, at the same time privileging bourgeoisie – as well as to subsequent calls for open learning and a pedagogy of liberation or freedom (P. Freire) and related praxis oriented and activist movements.

Today, we find a variety of initiatives aimed at opening up education by the use of digital media technologies, open educational resources (OER), and creative commons (CC) licenses. Notions of open education are often linked to notions of open source and free/libre open source software (F/LOSS), open access, open society and free culture, open science and knowledge commons, open government and open innovation as well as further related notions. For the most part, recent debates about education for all, enabling universal education, or free educational infrastructures can be characterized by a kind of historical amnesia – calls for education for all are anything but new, they can be traced back at least to the work of Johann Amos Comenius (1592–1670).

Different Approaches to "Openness" and "Education"

Although terms like "open education" (OE) have become increasingly a matter of course – especially in the context of educational

policies – many different meanings of “openness” and “education” are being used in everyday life as well as in pedagogical, political, economic, aesthetic, and scientific discourses. Depending on linguistic and performative aspects and personal and discursive contexts, we find a manifold of partly interchangeable, complementary or conflicting conceptions. The terms “openness” and “education” are often used metaphorically or by means of implicit or applicative definitions and less frequently on the basis of explicit and clear definitions.

To give a few examples, openness in education can refer to pedagogical attitudes towards fostering and maintaining processes of dialogue, reflection, and a climate of mutual learning, listening, and recognition; openness in the process of self-formation (*Selbstbildung*) may refer to approaches for enabling personal growth, for successfully dealing with shifting societal challenges, or to a more relaxed relation to oneself; crossing borders in terms of cognitive, affective or physical mobility in the context of debates, (in-)human encounters, traveling, or migration can be called educational whereby openness may refer to enhanced cognitive skills, emotional or communicative competencies, or to a more skillful performance through embodiment; opening up education can be defined as an indispensable condition for the development of democratic orientations, as an initiative to establish open plan classrooms, as a measure to increase learners’ choices and options for access to education, as a transnational educational policy aimed at innovative teaching and learning, as a new edition in the history of promises of education for all, as an imperialistic or neocolonialist endeavor, etc.

Different understandings refer to different kinds of things, subject areas or phenomenal domains, such as aims, attitudes, intentions, endeavors, group processes, methods, measures, self-perceptions, conditions, relations, policies, initiatives, institutions, and personality characteristics. Furthermore, it is obvious that different approaches correspond with different goals and purposes including notions of education for its own ends.

Pedagogical Approaches

In a pedagogical context, an open approach to openness in education might start by asking for synonyms of “open” and “education” or closely related terms. Spontaneous associations and individual interpretations can be depicted, for example, in the form of a matrix by listing basic meanings and synonyms in the first line or column. Of course, other terms than those mentioned in Table 1 may arise, such as “uncovered,” “unprotected,” “free from concealment,” or “not restricted to members of a particular group” for “open” and “schooling,” “instructional principles,” “learning to learn,” “distribution of content,” “transmission of knowledge,” “pedagogical interaction,” “touching events,” or “biographical upheavals” for “education.” For one thing, understandings and conceptions of “open education” can be considered in the fields of an emerging matrix as shown by way of example in Table 1; for another thing, existing notions of “open education” or “openness in education” can be positioned tentatively in one or more of the fields. By means of such an iterative process and with preliminary results multiple kinds of definitions and metaphorical uses of key concepts as well as possible related goals can be discussed. In a further step, contexts of use, language games, and discursive relationships can be opened to debate with reference to both the ideas of learners and educators involved and the relevant literature available (cf. for example, Nyquist and Hawes 1972; Nyberg 2010 [1975]; Peters 2010; Deimann and Peters 2015). Moreover, alternative approaches, procedural steps, and modes of visualization as well as meta-reflexive and evaluative methods can be considered.

Modes of meta-reflexive considerations including self-reflection on the level of individuals, groups, institutions, and organizations can act as an important indicator for the analysis of different forms and limitations of openness in education. This counts for earlier forms of open learning, self-organized study-groups, open plan classrooms, or open schooling, just like for more recent developments associated with open universities, open courseware, and open education. In a

Defining Openness in Education, Table 1 Example for an OE-matrix – at the crossroads of interpretations of . . .

Education	Open				
	Without barriers	Allowing for passage	Broad minded	Free	Permeable
Training	Easy to access	Eligibility certificates	Free choice of material	No or low monetary costs	Coming and going
Learning in formal contexts	No eligibility assessments	Authorization	Transformative learning	Self-organized learning	Revising and reusing OER
Self-learning	Self-empowerment	Crediting open learning, self-improvement	Critical literacy	Educational commons, edupunk	Sharing, redistributing content
Teaching	Teaching as learning	Professional growth	Democratic orientation	(Re-)use of OER	Team-teaching
Lesson, class	Low-threshold access	Skippping classes	Global education	Lessons at no (obvious) charge	Flipped classroom
Formation (<i>Bildung, dannelse</i>)	Free choice of educational material, rhizomatic education	Social mobility	Enabling self-determined processes	Personal enrichment, education for its own sake	Choices for individuals in the course of education
Upbringing (<i>Erziehung</i>)	Anarchic education	Adequate bonding	Personal maturation	Liberal education	Intercultural education

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broad sense, claims for open education are always dealing with tensions between conceptual and performative dimensions as well as with differences between self-determined and self-directed learning. In that sense, open education should be considered as a never-ending process dealing with limitations and limited resources so far, opening up new horizons, and encountering new limitations from now on. Further, educators are well advised to take into account that life itself is educating, too. It is not only intentional forms of initiating and guiding or accompanying educational processes that are relevant here – it is also ongoing implicit education in everyday life and mediated life-worlds.

Educational Policies

Open education is widely perceived as a political or social project, sometimes as a grassroots movement or as an economic and technological opportunity to make money. In the twentieth century there were various initiatives aimed at opening up education. In Europe and the USA, open plan classrooms became popular from the late 1950s to the 1970s. In Austria, for example, free school books, free use of public transport for students,

and democratic structures in university legislation were introduced in the early 1970s, while at the same time tuition fees were abandoned. In the postcolonial area also in many African countries, free access, free textbooks, and free feeding were strengthened.

An international effort for education for all (EFA) bringing together governments, multilateral agencies, and non-governmental organizations was launched in Thailand in 1990. Respective goals have been taken up by the United Nations in its Millennium Development Goals in 2000, followed up by a fast track initiative by development banks and government funders in 2002. In the same year, the first public mention of the term “open educational resources” (OER) occurred at the UNESCO forum on the Impact of Open Courseware for Higher Education in Developing Countries (UNESCO 2002). The discussions focused on open courseware and possibilities of improving access to open teaching and learning resources mostly in what the United Nations regarded as developing countries.

At the same time, the first 50 courses in the opencourseware (OCW) project at Massachusetts Institute of Technology (Cambridge/MA, USA)

have been published online (Iiyoshi and Kumar 2010). This project and its institutional commitment to openly share educational resources have been further developed up to the present day.

Among the most recent prominent initiatives are UNESCO's "Paris OER Declaration" from the year 2012 aimed at the promotion and use of OER to expand access to education at all levels, the Nordic Open Education Alliance founded in 2013, and the initiative of the European Commission dedicated to opening up education from 2013.

Theoretical Considerations

So far, a comprehensive and widely recognized theory of openness in education has not been presented. However, conceptual details are being discussed in blog posts and essays as well as in academic research papers. Accordingly, various forms of discourse, degrees of differentiation, and scopes of claims are being considered. In addition, there are translation problems with key terms in education, and territories and responsibilities for educational issues are not as clear-cut as, for example, in sociology or mathematics.

Definitions of conceptual key issues regarding openness in education depend upon the perspective of the definer and his or her basic assumptions concerning the question of what exactly educational studies and research are. Those who represent educational studies as a distinct discipline in the tradition of humanist philosophy and the enlightenment might refer to the development of open-minded reasoning, to enhanced ways of thinking (H. Arendt), or to flexible and thoughtful building on educationability (*Bildsamkeit*) – a term originally coined by Johann Friedrich Herbart (1776–1841) as an endemic key term in pedagogy. Whereas those who conceptualize educational systems as operating mainly as agencies of the State might aim at "opening up" those systems in terms of reforms or revolution. Moreover, those who are questioning schooling as to indoctrination might follow ideas of deschooling (I. Illich). Others, who prefer an interdisciplinary approach as regards educational economics, for example, might focus on free access to massive open online courses (MOOCs) and largely

scalable "useful" educational content in order to optimize employability. Those who associate education in the first place with "biopolitical control" of populations and especially legitimized, organized practices, in a Foucauldian sense, might call for opening up education in relation to degovernmentalization and the search for alternative subjectivities. Meanwhile, those who conceptualize education in the context of post-, trans-, or para-humanist discourses might vote for the development and intense use of educational applications based on the most recent achievements in biotechnology and artificial intelligence.

The list could be continued easily by reference to all kinds of (inter-)disciplinary approaches and -isms in educational research. There are many definitions of openness in education if any. In view of the paradigmatic relevance of basic assumptions for the conceptualization of openness in education and in order to avoid the unintended promotion of paradigmatic perspectives, it seems crucial to foster meta-critical perspectives at least in the following respects:

- Open, opening up, and openness as relevant to education tend to have positive connotations. However, this should not keep us from remembering that these terms do not *per se* represent values. Whether we can appropriately speak of positive or problematic values will depend on contextual and situational conditions, on the constellation of actors, on study requirements and educational objectives as well as on desired or undesired outcomes and secondary effects. Just as in some group processes, trust can only emerge when the group members are able, at least temporarily, to rely on a closed structure, advocating unlimited openness may be counterproductive. Or the other way round: opening up education as a means of rejection and criticism of institutional structures may go hand in hand with the incorporation of favored tools and structures into the educational system which only serve certain interests. Thus, it is important to consider limitations as well as paradoxes and ambivalences that correspond with particular forms of openness. This especially applies to debates about options for the

monetization of educational mass events and business models in keeping with the motto “for-profit education for all” providing access and calling for openness and sharing and at the same time using proprietary software and “all rights reserved” approaches.

- Sharing is a concept that has come to characterize digital media cultures. It emerged as significant theme in media studies, educational research, political theory, and economics, in general, and, in particular, in open education and open content strategies. However, notions of sharing often remain undertheorized in the open educational resources movement if they are not mixed up with notions of exchange and/or gift. There are weak and strong forms of sharing to be distinguished (cf. Hug 2014), and there is a need for a deeper understanding of expanding structures as well as subjectivities and (im-)materialities of sharing, if we want to meet the requirements of the development of knowledge commons, educational commons, and open archives in networked media cultures (cf. Missomelius et al. 2014). Understanding grammars of sharing and cultural-economic alternatives requires rethinking the public-private nexus beyond the dichotomy of capitalist markets and public economies.
- As for open standards, quality criteria, and didactical aspects, the question remains whether “open educational resources will in future define a *sui generis* (media) pedagogical standard of education” (Bergamin and Filk 2009, p. 11; bold in orig.). On the one hand, issues of consumer cultures “in which everything may be consumed for free” (Bergamin and Filk 2009, p. 26) should be taken seriously if open education aims at formation (*Bildung, dannelse*). On the other hand, educationalists often underestimate the educational potentials of popular media cultures and the creative power of design theory or the theory of medial forms (R. Leschke).
- Regarding the anthropological and normative aspects of openness in education, there is a demand for conceptual clarifications between Scylla of media-phobic tendencies in

education or radical normativity towards a specific conception of human beings and Charybdis of media-philic claims for radical openness which hardly allow for critical perspectives. Among the multiple uncertainties we are facing in education, there are manifold socio-technical connections between machines, algorithms, and human actors; demands for action in view of unknowing and little knowledge; multiplex entanglements of cultural, social, biological, and technical dimensions of information processing; multiple identities of individuals enabling openness towards others; and polymorphous medial selves (M. Faßler) dealing with the sensory enormousness of the world. Addressing these complexities and post- or trans-humanist challenges require thoughtful consideration rather than undercomplex statements prevailing in the OER movement.

- Researching openness in education should involve a commitment to opening up meta-critical perspectives for more general reasons too. Critical reflections on problematic forms of monopolization of critical positions or the usurpation of the power of critique are rejected rather than welcomed in academia. Then again, we find problematic turning-points such as criticism of ideology turning into an ideological endeavor, critique of the culture industry as part of the arts and entertainment industry, regovernmentalization in the name of degovernmentalization, or involution of democratic achievements in the name of democracy. Without meta-critical thinking and self-application of critique, notions and practices of openness in education might manifest as (self-) delusion or collective strategy primarily sustaining today’s work and world orders rather than as future-oriented forms of education and knowledge for all.

Conclusion

Openness in education can be regarded as an operative fiction and as an educationalization formula (sensu H. Veith) that has been interpreted in

many ways throughout the history of education. As far as interpretations are related to the achievements of the enlightenment, education for openness remains an ambiguous endeavor including openness to criticism, intellectuality, freedom of expression, reasonable and sober-minded acting, bureaucratization of society as well as Eurocentric thinking and European colonialism. Today, openness is “at a crucial stage regarding its future direction” (Weller 2014, p. 202). If we consider education as both a public and a private good and if we take it seriously that all knowledge is contextually bound, context-sensitive concepts and practices open to the future, as well as polylogical approaches, are needed in order to enable critical mediation between individual and cultural memories and between human agency and the ongoing work of algorithms. Closely examined, it can be said that education remains open in two respects: within a limited lifetime and from phylogenetic perspectives of human development.

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Deleuze

- Edusemiotics, Subjectivity, and New Materialism
- Deleuze's Philosophy for Education
- Ontology and Semiotics: Educating in Values

Deleuze and Guattari

- Deleuze and Guattari: Politics and Education

Deleuze and Guattari and Curriculum

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Introduction

During the nineteenth century, cultural historian Jacob Burckhardt presciently asserted that “the essence of tyranny is the denial of complexity,” a denial manifested in much contemporary curriculum theory, policy, and practice. Teaching, learning, and curriculum making have been redefined by reference to a culture of accountability,

performance, and measurability that ignores complex processes and outcomes, which are not readily apprehended or comprehended by conventional measurement technologies.

In the late 1960s, Gilles Deleuze began to formulate some of the philosophical significances of what is now known as “complexity” (and/or “complexity theory”) and many of the concepts he created (often in collaboration with Félix Guattari) have assisted curriculum scholars in acknowledging complexity and resisting the toxic politics of complexity reduction. This entry draws on selected examples of curriculum scholarship that play productively with Deleuze and Guattari’s (henceforth Deleuzoguattarian) concepts such as assemblage, becoming, intensities, line of flight, machinic, nomad, order-words, rhizome, and multiplicity.

Early Sightings of Deleuze and Guattari in Curriculum Literature

William Pinar and his coauthors provide a comprehensive overview of the earliest appearances of Deleuzoguattarian concepts in Anglophone curriculum theorizing in a chapter titled “Understanding curriculum as poststructuralist, deconstructed, postmodern text” (Pinar et al. 1995). They identify Peter Taubman as the “first curriculum theorist in North America to introduce poststructuralism to the curriculum field” (p. 476) via his 1979 doctoral dissertation, *Gender and Curriculum: Discourse and the Politics Of Sexuality*. Pinar et al. (1995) note that one of the strategies Taubman offers for resolving what would be “rephrased in later debates conducted by feminist theorists over essentialism versus constructionism” deploys a “Derridean-Deleuzian deconstruction of totalities” in which “sexuality emerges as ‘intensities, dispersed whisperings, connections, cominglings, communions and juxtapositions of de-gendered bodies and pleasures’” (pp. 477–478). The significance of *intensities* as a generative concept for curriculum work is portrayed in Marg Sellers’ (2013) reconceptualization of young children’s play as “intensities of becoming”:

play is not so much thing or event but movement, with/in/through which change occurs continually... This sense of play... generates an openness as the movement of the play becomes somewhat indescribable, indefinable – an elusive mo(ve)ment [which] may go some way towards explaining difficulties in defining the play that children do... In Deleuzo-Guattarian understandings, children’s play(ing) happens in [a] kind of potential space as a machinic assemblage. In such potential, liminal spaces an intensity of forces operates... it is the play in-between that generates movement – if there is insufficient play, things seize, nothing happens (p. 116).

Pinar et al. (1995) summarize the contributions of four other North American curriculum theorists who foreground Deleuzoguattarian concepts, namely, Jacques Daignault, Clermont Gauthier, Jan Jagodzinski, and Wen-Song Hwu (note that Daignault and Gauthier are Francophone Canadians and few of their publications are readily available in English). Pinar et al. (1995) point out that Daignault’s writing, “relying as it does on allusions to the work of other poststructuralist theorists, on references to musical theory, on anagrams, puns, linguistic arabesques, and neologisms, can prove difficult for the beginning student” (p. 480), but that it is worth persevering because “Daignault brilliantly explores the spaces, the gaps, the ‘in-betweens’ and the differences within language, thought, the subject, and our ways and modes of conceiving ourselves and curriculum” (p. 480).

[Daignault] follows Deleuze’s move to liberate difference and to combat totalizing modes of thought... Thinking is not representational, Daignault insists... Rather, he wishes to articulate the space between words and concepts... He wishes to think the middle... By phrasing curriculum as thinking Daignault implies his opposition to any reification or belief in representational thought, for curriculum as thinking is always moving, diversifying, or to use Deleuzian terms, is ‘nomadic’ (Pinar et al. 1995, pp. 482–483).

To “think the middle” gestures toward another Deleuzoguattarian concept, *rhizome*. Rhizomes have no beginnings or ends but are always in the middle: beginnings and ends imply a linear movement, whereas working in the middle is about coming and going rather than starting and finishing. Sellers and Gough (2010) quote

semiotician Umberto Eco's assertion that "the space of conjecture is a rhizome space" (p. 594) and posit rhizome as a tool for "thinking differently" in curriculum inquiry:

Deleuze and Guattari's rhizome. . . is presented as a way to disrupt the hegemony of the popular arboreal metaphor for knowledge organization. In one swift move, from the singularity of the tree of knowledge to multiplicities of rhizomes for knowing, it is possible to imagine other organizing ways that perturb a predominant worldview – ways that are not unlike those involved in decentering the Earth within the then known universe. It is worth remembering how difficult this was. . . (p. 606).

A rhizome space is also more hospitable to nomadic than to sedentary thought. Whereas much Western philosophy, history, and science adopts a sedentary standpoint, nomadic subjectivity allows thought to move across conventional categories and disturb "settled" concepts, signs, and theories.

Pinar et al. (1995) note that Jan Jagodzinski's work "exemplifies several poststructuralist characteristics, including imagistic reorderings of words intended to challenge taken-for-granted decodings" (p. 490). They do not refer directly to Jan Jagodzinski's deployment of Deleuzoguattarian concepts, but this can be inferred from their discussion of the six "aesthetic layers" (line, color, texture, size, mass, and space) "through which the curriculum is felt" (p. 490). This is evident in Jan Jagodzinski's discussion of line, in which he asserts: "Educationally, we must recognize that all lines are bridges to new directions" (quoted in Pinar et al. 1995, p. 490). This echoes the Deleuzoguattarian concept of *line of flight* or *detrterritorialisation*, which Kaustuv Roy (2003) explains as "a movement by which we leave the territory, or move away from spaces regulated by dominant systems of signification that keep us confined to old patterns, in order to make new connections" (p. 21; italics in original). Roy (2003) continues:

To proceed in this manner of detrterritorializing, we make small ruptures in our everyday habits of thought and start minor dissident flows and not grand 'signifying breaks,' for grand gestures start their own totalizing movement, and are easily captured. Instead, small ruptures are often imperceptible, and allow

flows that are not easily detected or captured by majoritarian discourses (p. 31).

Ruptures and flows are also invoked in Pinar et al.'s (1995) quotation from Gauthier who conceives education "as a *machinic* production formed of meetings and breaks and of flow" (p. 491, emphasis in original; cf. Marg Sellers' interpretation, quoted above, of children's play as a "machinic assemblage"). They also note Gauthier's "explosion" of taken-for-granted conceptions of action research, which includes "the quintessential poststructuralist assertion: 'action research is above all a matter of language'" (p. 49) and conclude that Daignault's, Jan Jagodzinski's, and Gauthier's curriculum theorizing "disturbs the usual linear logic we have come to accept as being synonymous with rationalistic curriculum theory" (p. 491).

Pinar et al. (1995) describe Hwu's curriculum theorizing as drawing on Daignault's work to sketch "possible links among poststructuralism, Chinese Taoism and Zen," noting that, like poststructuralism, Taoism and Zen are "paradoxical" and "employ language in ways that are not dependent upon extra-linguistic referents" (p. 492).

Hwu notes that in poststructuralism the notion of identity is displaced by that of difference, undermining that autobiographical scholarship which rests on a foundation of an authentic self. Such an idea is simply a story one tells oneself. . . Hwu argues that while psychoanalysis is false and narratives about the self are illusory, still we live as if our experience were true. The point is. . . to be playful about the stories we tell, recalling their illusory character and mystifying functions. He quotes Deleuze: "No longer are there acts to explain, dreams or fantasies to interpret, childhood memories to recall, words to signify; instead there are colors and sounds, becoming and intensities" (pp. 492–493)

Hwu concludes that "the role of curriculum theorizing [after poststructuralism] is not to formulate a global analysis of the ideologically coded. . . Curriculum functions to displace discursive practices, such as self-formation, sense-making, historical awareness. . . [and explore] the possible connections among those fragmentations and differences" (quoted in Pinar et al. 1995, p. 493).

Growing Deleuzoguattarian Curriculum Scholarship

Although Pinar et al., writing in the mid-1990s, could identify only a handful of curriculum scholars informed by Deleuze (or Deleuze and Guattari), during the mid- to late 2000s more than a dozen came to light. These (and the curriculum aspects they explore) include Ronald Bogue (literature, cinema, and other arts), David R. Cole (English and pedagogy), Claire Colebrook (gender, literary theory), Gary Genosko (technoculture, popular pedagogy), Noel Gough (environmental and science education, internationalization, globalization), Zelia Gregoriou (ethics, multiculturalism, identity), Eileen Honan (English and literacy), David Lines (music and other performing arts), Inna Semetsky (philosophy, semiotics), Kaustuv Roy (political and social theory), Marg Sellers (early childhood education), and Elizabeth St. Pierre (language and literacy education). All the aforementioned contribute to Semetsky's (2008) *Nomadic Education: Variations on a Theme by Deleuze and Guattari* (some of them, like Bogue and Colebrook, were already established Deleuzeans in fields other than education, and others, like St. Pierre and Semetsky, were working with Deleuzean concepts in education during the preceding decade; more than half of these scholars had previously published on Deleuze and education in a special issue of *Educational Philosophy and Theory* [vol. 36, no. 3, 2004]). Other curriculum scholars who actively pursued Deleuzoguattarian themes during this decade include Diana Masny (multiple literacies; see Masny and Cole 2009) and Warren Sellers (e-Learning, higher education learning environments; see Sellers and Gough 2010).

In *Teachers in Nomadic Spaces: Deleuze and Curriculum*, Roy's (2003) purpose is "to demonstrate that Deleuzian pragmatism can be appropriated and then reconstituted through educational experience to form an important conceptual matrix for advancing thinking in curriculum" (p. 16). Roy's study addresses perennial practical problems in the stressful lives of newly inducted and in-service teachers in urban schools, while at the same time affirming the "generative

possibilities of the situation" (p. 2). He seeks "to introduce a 'swerve' or a deviation in the plane of taken-for-granted assumptions by means of which a new experiment in thought could be inserted in the interstices" (p. 2). Roy does not offer any recipes for curriculum practice, but as a quotation from Deleuze at the end of his book suggests, his "fieldwork in theory" (p. 1) can be understood as an electric circuit:

There are . . . two ways of reading a book: you either see it as a box with something inside and start looking for what it signifies. . . Or there's the other way: you see the book as a little nonsignifying machine. This second way of reading is intensive: something comes through or it doesn't. There's nothing to explain, nothing to understand, nothing to interpret. *It's like plugging into an electric circuit* (Deleuze, 1990, as quoted in Roy 2003, pp. 177–178; Roy's emphasis).

Roy concludes by affirming the generativity of Deleuzoguattarian experimentation in curriculum inquiry:

Deleuzian concepts are 'little nonsignifying machines'; it is a mistake to try to see them in terms of mere signification, for the signifier leads us back to Oedipalized or controlled territory. Instead, what we must do is plug into these concepts or tiny 'circuits' that have a destratifying charge of their own in any encounter, and see what they do mutually, if they do anything. We must experiment with them incessantly, and find out how, and if, they operate on our intensities and how the intensities operate on them. For Deleuze, a book is a tool box. . . where the tools become, one by one, the very parts they were supposed to be working on, not as in an assimilation but a disjunctive synthesis, for they produce a difference and never the Same (p. 178).

St. Pierre (2013) has similar advice for beginning researchers: "My advice to my students who read Deleuze and find his work exhilarating is to 'read everything you can by and about Deleuze and plug his machine into yours. Then tell us what happened'" (p. 226).

Roy borrows and deploys a number of Deleuzean concepts to theorize and address the stress-ridden lives of teachers, with particular reference to *nomad* and *rhizome*, both of which center around the notion of *becoming*. Sellers and Gough (2010) also put these concepts to work in their performance of "an assemblage of empathetic

responses to thinking (differently) with Deleuze in educational philosophy and curriculum inquiry” (p. 589). They demonstrate how Deleuze and Guattari have inspired them (individually and collaboratively) in distinctive ways:

One of us (Gough) has produced a series of narrative experiments that foregrounds the generativity of ‘rhizosemiotic play’ (catalyzed by intertextual readings of selected fictions) in writing educational philosophy and theory, and the other (Sellers) has produced a doctoral thesis through processes of ‘rhizo-imaginary’ ‘picturing’ towards immanent and emergent curriculum theorizing. . . [Our] collaborations have resulted in co-authored works [. . .] but what we value in sharing our individual thinking ~ writing is not so much what brings us together but what sends us out-ontowards as we each see the ordinary extra-ordinarily.

In this essay we inter-picture-and-text-ually extemporise our genealogical and generative work with Deleuzian conceptual creations. . . with a view to moving readers beyond merely using select metaphors. . . (e.g., nomadism, rhizome, lines of flight, smooth and striated spaces). We deliberately distance ourselves from those who ‘use’ Deleuze by appropriating metaphors that were never intended as metaphors, preferring to work towards generating discourses ~ practices that challenge such a deployment of complexity-reducing Deleuzian figurations. Rather, we. . . demonstrate how thinking with Deleuze produces previously unthought questions, practices and knowledges that, we propose, are resonant with those of *art brut*, the term Deleuze uses to characterize what he calls his kind of philosophy: ‘more naïve . . . not the most profound but the most innocent’ (pp. 589–590; these authors frequently use the ~ [tilde] to signal a conjoining of co-implicated notions in what they call complicity – thinking that is complicit with writing and vice versa).

Deleuzoguattarian Deconstruction (and Reinvigoration) of *Currere*

When the North American curriculum field underwent its so-called reconceptualization in the late 1960s and early 1970s (comprehensively documented by Pinar et al. 1995) its salient features included exploring curriculum via eclectic traditions, such as psychoanalysis, phenomenology, and existentialism. One form of curriculum inquiry popularized by William Pinar and Madeleine Grumet (influential leaders of the reconceptualist movement), became known as

currere, a form of autobiographical curriculum theory informed by phenomenology:

Grumet cited *currere* as a method and theory of curriculum which escapes the epistemological traps of mainstream social science and educational research. *Currere* focuses on the educational experience of the individual, as reported by the individual. Rather than working to quantify behaviors to describe their surface interaction or to establish causality, *currere* seeks to describe what the individual subject him or herself makes of these behaviors (Pinar et al. 1995, p. 414).

During the 1990s, Gough subjected *currere* to poststructuralist critique by deploying science fiction texts to “diffract” stories of educational inquiry generated by *currere*. During the 2000s he drew more heavily on Deleuze and Guattari to deconstruct a wider range of educational questions, problems, and issues in areas such as cyborg pedagogy, science and environmental education, and the internationalization of curriculum studies, coining the term “rhizosemiotic play” to name his approach to Deleuzoguattarian imaginative inquiry. One of Gough’s students, Warren Sellers, advanced this approach in a thesis that foregrounds Sellers’ proclivity and talent for expressing himself through “picturing” rather than words (the works referred to in this paragraph are cited in Sellers and Gough 2010).

Recent Affirmations of Deleuzoguattarian Scholarship

Scholars such as Jason Wallin (2011) and Alistair Stewart (2015) are taking *currere* in new directions informed by Deleuzoguattarian thinking. Wallin deploys the concept of *currere* to mark a departure from Pinar and Grumet’s autobiographical method:

This book is not autobiographical, nor is it oriented toward reflection. It is however, a work that approaches *currere* as a concept for pedagogical thinking. It is a work that departs, not merely from quantitative fetters, but from phenomenology, structuralism, and the dominant image of life that Deleuze and Guattari call ‘Oesdipal’ (p. ix).

As with Gough’s tactical uses of science fiction, and Sellers’ uses of visual art, Wallin is

interested in “explicating the power of the arts to liberate productive desires and potentials” (p. x). He draws from numerous artistic innovations (including improvisational jazz, graphic novels, video games, and the films of Todd Haynes, Jim Jarmusch, and Quentin Tarantino) “to consider the material ways in which the ‘arts’ have opposed power, affirmed difference, and dehabituated normalized discourses” (pp. x-xi).

Stewart (2015) creates the concept *rhizocurrere* to chart his efforts to develop place-responsive outdoor environmental education. As the term implies, *rhizocurrere* brings *currere* together with the Deleuzoguattarian *rhizome*. Stewart responds to invitations from Deleuze, Guattari, and Pinar to experiment by adapting their ideas to create a concept that draws attention to relationships between his pedagogical and curriculum research and the contexts that have shaped his life and work. In keeping with the Deleuzoguattarian concept of order-words, Stewart’s central question is not “what is *rhizocurrere*?” but rather “how does/could *rhizocurrere* work?” and “what does/might *rhizocurrere* allow me to do?” (p. 1169).

David R. Cole’s (2011) *Educational Life-forms: Deleuzian Teaching and Learning Practice* offers another recent affirmation of Deleuzoguattarian scholarship. Gough’s foreword to this text commends Cole for writing “in the spirit of Deleuze’s encouragement for ‘writing to bring something to life, to free life from where it’s trapped, to trace lines of flight.’ This is evident in Cole’s deployment of the Deleuze-inspired figuration of ‘educational life-forms’ in contrast to the more conventional academic tactic of arguing through metaphor” (p. x). Gough’s foreword emphasizes that “the notion of figurations, in contrast to the representational function of metaphors, is crucial to Deleuze’s notion of a conceptually charged use of the imagination” and that “figurations are performative images that can be inhabited, condensed maps of contestable worlds and bumps that make us swerve from literal-mindedness” (Cole 2011, p. xi; the quoted passages here are contractions of quotations from other authors cited in the foreword). Cole (2011) introduces educational life-forms as follows:

What is an educational life-form? The first section of the title is an example of conceptual creativity that has been derived from Deleuze. Of course, in schools, colleges and universities, there is an abundance of life. However, this isn’t the point of the life-forms. The primary implication of the life-forms and their use in this book is that one should think through the questions about life with respect to education. For example, the ways in which teacher training happens can be a matter of machinic functioning in terms of responding to the demands of government and schools for teachers. . . . The second implication of the educational life-forms is that one may perform conjunctive synthesis. This is a type of experimentation with form, which also encourages one to think (about life). . . . The heterogeneity of potential educational life-forms is parallel to the diversity one finds in the natural world, and involves bringing concrete examples to bear on learning styles and education (pp. 2–3).

Cole then assembles two highly diverse systems (bacteria and hurricanes) as an incitement to imagine a new educational life form, the bacteria-hurricane machine:

This machine may give rise to pedagogy that explores the facts and mechanisms of bacteria and hurricanes, and a resulting wealth of mathematical and scientific ideas. On the other side of knowledge work, the bacteria-hurricane machine could be an inspiration for artistic, musical and written work. What would a bacteria-hurricane machine look like? What would it sound like? How could we describe its action? What would happen if a bacteria-hurricane machine appears in the world? The conjunctive synthesis of the bacteria-hurricane machine therefore stimulates the educational unconscious and the desire of the learners to explore this new realm of knowledge. Deleuzian teaching and learning practice encourages inter and crossdisciplinary work, knowledge structures are opened up, and systems are analysed with the prospect of sustained thought and developing competency in virtual manipulation (pp. 7–8).

It is hoped that the works cited and sampled above demonstrate and affirm that Deleuze and Guattari’s concepts constitute a durable life-form in curriculum inquiry.

Cross-References

- [Deleuze and Guattari in Early Childhood Education](#)
- [Deleuze and Learning](#)

- [Deleuze's Philosophy for Education](#)
- [Rhizoanalysis as Educational Research](#)
- [Unmaking the Work of Pedagogy Through Deleuze and Guattari](#)

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Deleuze and Guattari in Early Childhood Education

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Introduction: A Thought Created Through Encounters in ECE

Deleuze and Guattari were at their most active during the 1970s and 1980s in France, and they

were part of a generation of thinkers that also included Michel Foucault (1926–1984), Jacques Derrida (1930–2004), and Jean-François Lyotard (1924–1998) among others. The intellectual milieu in France was at this time dominated by structuralist thought, but Deleuze and Guattari challenged structuralism as it was expressed in linguistics, anthropology, and psychoanalysis through redefining structures as open ended and unstable. For them, a first condition of any structure is something that always deviates and escapes from it. This concerns linguistic structures but also society as a whole and even the history of philosophy (Deleuze and Guattari 1984, 2004). The Western history of philosophy has always been preoccupied with defining conditions for thought and organizing a place for systematic thinking (Spindler 2006). For Deleuze and Guattari, this equals not thinking at all, as thought conditioned in that way is marked by recognition and representation and obeys the laws of that which we already know:

“Everybody” knows very well that in fact men think rarely, and more often under the impulse of a shock than in the excitement of a taste for thinking. (Deleuze 1994, p. 132)

Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy breaks with this tradition of thought in that it transfers the status of thought as superior, interior, and grounded in pre-given conditions to a thought that lays out its ground as it proceeds and that is continuously created through encounters with the outside:

Something in the world forces us to think. This something is an object not of recognition but of a fundamental *encounter*. (Deleuze 1994, p. 139; original emphasis)

This reworking of philosophy and thought presents a number of philosophical problems that connect to the contemporary context in ECE, of which three will be mentioned in this introduction:

Structure and the Social Field

One important connection between Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy and the field of ECE

concerns how structure is conceived of and worked with in the social field:

I would say for my own part: a society, a social field does not contradict itself, but what is primary is, that it is leaking. (Deleuze 1994, p. 61; my translation)

If a first condition of any structure is that it is leaking, it is possible to study and work in the social field beyond predetermined positions and habitual ways of thinking, talking, and doing. This makes it difficult to talk about Deleuze and Guattari as “poststructuralists” as they consider also the linguistic system as leaking and do not give the linguistic sign the status as bearer of signification (Deleuze and Guattari 2004). The sign here has the status as *a-signifying*, and signification has been replaced by function, the only important thing being how linguistic signs work. Rather than identifying (linguistic) discourses, research here needs to focus on the nondiscursive, non-interpretative potentialities inherent in any structure.

Thought Created Through Encounters and the Relation of Research and Practice

A second connection with the field of ECE concerns the relation of research and practice and the role of the researcher. When the conditions for thinking are changed in the way described above, research and the researcher can no longer be considered as distanced from practice. Rather, they are immediately part of that which is studied and contribute in *creating* the empirical material. This is where “transcendental empiricism” gets its sense, as it indicates a certain devaluation of the already conditioned thought and promotes a new relation between research and practice. There is an important difference between the words “transcendence” and “transcendental.” Transcendence refers to the highest organizing principle, i.e., thought that organizes empirical experiences, but transcendental is that which comes before the consciously thinking subject, expressed in the quote below as “a-subjective consciousness”:

What is a transcendental field? It can be distinguished from experience in that it doesn’t refer to an object or belong to a subject (empirical representation). It appears therefore as a pure stream of a-subjective consciousness, a pre-reflexive

impersonal consciousness, a qualitative duration of consciousness without a self. (Deleuze 2001, p. 25)

Transcendental empiricism is a “wilder kind of empiricism” that does not let consciousness designate the subject as capable of thinking of itself and the world as objects. Researchers that are normally accustomed to delivering consciousness-raising critique of practice from a distance are here invited to fully admit science’s productiveness and inventiveness and to engage in the co-creation and coproduction in, of, and with “the empirical.”

Becoming and the Image of the Child

This conceiving of the subject also leads to a third connection concerning the image of the child in ECE research and practice. The field has during later decades developed into paying more attention to children’s voices and rights. For instance, through the rise of the new sociology of childhood (Qvortrup 1994) where children’s participation was an important question as well as the child’s right to “being” rather than “becoming adult,” Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy invites to a slightly different image of the child. Following their thinking, it is exactly “being” that is contested in favor of “becoming.” However, and most importantly, this is a becoming that is different than the becoming-same of a child becoming adult. The becoming of a child is here a becoming without a purpose and goal (Deleuze and Guattari 2004). This is where the notion of a “neomaterial” philosophy gets its sense. In fact, reality and being are within this philosophy closer to a realist than an idealist perspective, although and importantly realist with a twist. *Neomaterial* here indicates that physical and material reality harbors more than one dimension. A virtual dimension continuously actualizes itself into the actual dimension that we hold for real:

A life contains only virtuals. It is made up of virtualities, events, singularities. What we call virtual is not something that lacks reality but something that is engaged in a process of actualization following the plane that gives it its particular reality. (Deleuze 2001, p. 31)

For research and practice in ECE, this line of thinking brings the possibility of multiple and transforming images of the child. The child that we see every day is obviously a real child, but through the idea of a virtual dimension perpetually actualizing itself, the child is also a continuously becoming child.

According to Zourabichvili (2003), since Deleuze and Guattari's thinking and concepts create a rupture with the history of philosophy, they need to be approached through their own grammar and logic. Otherwise, their particular logical consistency will be misinterpreted, and the potential of the philosophical work will be overlooked. It is also important to remind of the context where it was created: the aftermaths of May 1968, a context of political activism where intellectual work was intimately connected to social and political everyday life. The use of Deleuze and Guattari needs to take this political activism into account. Otherwise, it runs this risk of depoliticizing this body of work or maybe even uncritically runs the errands of contemporary political governing that also claims "creativity" and "thinking outside the box." There is great need for further research here that tentatively and with carefulness explores this thinking in ECE. Below follows the tracing of a trajectory – from *Anti-Oedipus* (1984) to *A Thousand Plateaus* (2004), via *The Logic of Sense* (2004) and over to *What Is Philosophy?* (1994) – that makes visible some possible connections with political activist work in ECE.

Desire as Production of Real – The Turn of the Gaze of Lack in ECE

The book *Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia* was originally published in French in 1972. The book can be understood as a long and meticulous critique of psychoanalysis' structural overinterpretation of the subject. Psychoanalysis is in the book credited with the creative move of having invented the psyche, the unconscious, and desire as driving force, but the critique delivered by Deleuze and Guattari concerns desire and the subject being read and understood through the features of lack of a fantasized object:

To a certain degree, the traditional logic of desire is all wrong from the very outset: from the very first step that the Platonic logic of desire forces us to take, making us choose between *production* and *acquisition*. From the moment that we place desire on the side of acquisition, we make desire an idealistic (...) conception, which causes us to look upon it as primarily a lack: a lack of an object, a lack of the real object. (Deleuze and Guattari 1984, p. 25; original emphasis)

Even though the field of early childhood education is a different field than the field of psychoanalysis, the features of lack and acquisition are quite prevalent within these practices, not the least through the way that the field has picked up theories coming from developmental psychology, where the child has got its position and predetermined development and where everything that does not fit in to this predefined scheme is considered in need of being redressed. Even within so-called "child-centered pedagogies" desiring-repression is evident, as they talk about departing from children's "needs." When desire is equaled with "need," it inevitably takes on the features of lack and acquisition: you need to acquire something because you do not have it. As an alternative, Deleuze and Guattari propose to see desire as "pure production of real" (1984, pp. 26–49). They try to turn around the logic that says that institutions, such as preschools, respond to preexisting needs embedded within children. From their perspective, desire must be politicized: children become "needy" since institutions capture, reduce, and tame their desires. Moreover, the alternative definition of desire as "pure production of real" proposes that institutions also have the choice to reverse this gaze of lack and instead become curious of and "latch onto" children's desires, making it possible for them to influence and produce real life in preschool in new ways.

In *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia* (2004), desire is given a more complex setting. In an interview with Claire Parnet (Boutang 2004), Deleuze talks about how *Anti-Oedipus* was poorly received and how desire was misunderstood as "spontanéisme." The sequel *A Thousand Plateaus* can therefore be understood as an attempt to deal with this misunderstanding through connecting desire with language.

Language is here treated in a different way than within linguistics; in fact, this book is possible to read as a long battle with linguistics. Linguistics accord language nonspatial and temporal features that make it seemingly independent of materiality. This lack of materiality creates somewhat imperialist pretensions of language as encompassing all other strata. But at the same time language is underestimated in that it also contains a pragmatic and becoming dimension (Deleuze and Guattari 2004, p. 70).

In *A Thousand Plateaus*, desire is connected to language through describing how it works in assemblages where bodies and language go through a rhythmic act of re- and deterritorialization and breaking out of and settling into territories, the contours and frames of a particular assemblage (Grosz 2008).

It seems important for the field of ECE to take this move into account. A “spontanéiste” idea of desire might lead to a romanticized image of the child, promoting an “anything goes” pedagogy consisting in simply following children’s desires and interests, as if they were purely “emotional” and disconnected from the territory offered to them through the educational setting.

Today, the situation is even more complex as contemporary governing has changed face into neo-liberal attempts to govern, no longer only through externally imposed rules but through the very modulation of desire and internal self-regulation (Massumi 2003). There is a great risk, then, that the trying to “latch onto” children’s desires uncritically joins this movement. Here is opened a great potential for further research that tries to simultaneously navigate critique and creation of alternatives.

Production of Sense: A Tool for Dealing with Learning and Knowledge in ECE

In contemporary educational contexts, young children’s learning is highlighted, but as Deleuze says, it seems that this is only said “because it is the fashion” (Deleuze 1994, p. 166). Education has developed from being considered the key to well-being of nations and individuals into a global and result-oriented competition between nations

within an economic logic. Knowledge is treated in a simplified way where truth is taken for granted and questions and problems taken as givens with equally given, “correct,” and true answers and solutions. Or knowledge is being treated in the abovementioned “spontanéiste” and relativist way through a romanticized image of the child and the proposal of an “anything goes pedagogy.” The writings in *The Logic of Sense* (2004) might here be useful for navigating questions of learning and knowledge in ECE. In this book, as well as in the book *Difference and Repetition* (1994), Deleuze proposes a notion of sense as *continuously produced* in everyday events. Truth is here seen not as given but as a deserved effect of the sense being produced. This is expressed in how solutions to problems come forward in a proportional relation to the sense of the problem:

A solution always has the truth it deserves according to the problem to which it is a response, and the problem always has the solution it deserves in proportion to its sense. (Deleuze 1994, p. 159)

This has got implications for the way learning and knowledge is conceived in ECE. If truth is seen as an effect of sense and if a solution is proportional in relation to sense, children’s answers and solutions no longer need to be judged from the point of view of truth or falseness. Instead, there can be engagement in how children – departing from the very sense-production at stake – will *construct* problems and *formulate* questions. Here, there is great potential for developing more research. This alternative way of conceiving of sense-production might help educationalists to approach content in pedagogical practice in a stringent and still open way. This might also make possible – in a time and place where focus is only on results and questions of what and how – the opening up for and the reclaiming of questions of *why*, that is, questions of the sense and meaningfulness of ECE research and practice.

Plane of Immanence: Transdisciplinary Political Experimentation in ECE

The sense and meaningfulness of ECE need to be continuously rethought maybe today more than

ever as the force and immediate workings of neo-liberal governing invade and hijack efforts in the field. Here, the notion of “a plane of immanence” might be of help in order to make possible a transdisciplinary political experimentation in ECE. The plane of immanence is not to be understood as a concept. Rather, it is on the plane of immanence where concepts are created. The plane of immanence is the equivalence of the earlier mentioned transcendental field where consciousness no longer functions:

The transcendent is not the transcendental. Were it not for consciousness, the transcendental field would be defined as a pure plane of immanence, because it eludes all transcendence of the subject and of the object. (Deleuze 2001, p. 26)

In *What Is Philosophy?* (1994), Deleuze and Guattari show how this plane is in itself transforming and connective and how it is on this plane that continuous actualizations of the virtual dimension of reality are taking place. In this book, the authors claim that society is threatened by an increasingly poor and uncreative thought. As an answer to this threat of a thought with low vitality, leading only to the expression of fashion-like opinions, Deleuze and Guattari draw up the contours of the three disciplines, philosophy, science, and art, as originally and equally creative disciplines with the common task to experiment together and work against simple opinion and for a creative thought. Philosophy, science, and art harbor the possibility to do this through their respective and complementing ways of relating to the virtual. The virtual is, as earlier said by Deleuze and Guattari, defined as an added dimension to reality where things “spring up only to disappear immediately (...) an infinite speed of birth and disappearance” (1994, p. 118). In order to reach a creative thought, philosophy tries to retain this speed and give to the virtual a consistency specific to it through *creating concepts*. Science tries to slow down this speed in order to gain a reference that will actualize the virtual through incessantly *creating functions*. Finally, art tries to gain compositions where finite speed never stops restoring infinite speed within the virtual by *creating sensations*. The *continuous creation* of concepts, functions, and sensations

binds the three disciplines together and makes them capable of working against simple opinion and for a creative thought. Even though each discipline has its proper means to do this, they also sometimes exchange roles and functions, such as when artists create sensations of concepts or functions. Furthermore, in order for concepts, functions, and sensations to not fall back into simple opinions, the disciplines need to find themselves in a constant reinvention of themselves. This is where they all need the confrontation with a non-philosophy, a nonscience, and a non-art, not as negation or opposition, but as a producer of disciplines in continuous becoming. This might present one of the greatest challenges for ECE and for education in general today: to approach educational questions in a transdisciplinary way in order to reclaim a vital and creative thought and to become forceful political actors. Here, there are great possibilities for future ECE research in the intersection of philosophy, science, and art.

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Deleuze and Guattari: Politics and Education

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Synonyms

Capture; Control; Deleuze and Guattari; Education; Neoliberalism; Politics; state, The; War machine, The

Introduction

The collaboration between French academic philosopher Gilles Deleuze and psychoanalyst/activist Felix Guattari resulted in the production of a wealth of material beginning in the 1970s and lasting until the early 1990s. Although their collaboration produced a synergy that would result in the proliferation of a range of powerful concepts that continue to resonate with architects, painters, writers, philosophers, social scientists, activists, and psychoanalysts, and educators, among others, their initial meeting and subsequent collaboration was the result of fortuitous circumstances in

France during the late 1960s. It was the kind of political singularity that marked 1968 in Paris, France, where diverse sectors of society began to collaborate and work together in previously unforeseen ways that provided the opening in which Deleuze's academic and Guattari's clinical/political paths were first to cross. Furthermore, it was the events of 1968 political in Paris, France, that served as the fuel for their first theoretical collaboration resulting in the publication of *Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia* (1983) – a book that is, more than anything else, a work of political philosophy. Together, with Anti-Oedipus, they would write four books in total including *Kafka: A Minor Literature* (1986), *A Thousand Plateaus: Volume II of Capitalism and Schizophrenia* (1987), and *What is Philosophy* (1994). Although these books deal with a number of different topics, what unifies them as a collaborative project while also setting them apart from Deleuze's previous philosophical works is their overt political intentions.

Although the subject of education is rarely directly discussed in any of their work, there is a vast untapped potential to utilize the work of Deleuze and Guattari to help politicize the subject of education for teachers, students, and educational theorists and researchers in new ways (Carlin and Wallin 2014). To speak of education in the work of Deleuze and Guattari is necessarily to consider it within the context of the political spirit that brought them together. Consequently, a politics of education conceived alongside the work of Deleuze and Guattari emerges out of a consideration of pedagogy within the prevailing political themes found throughout their collaborations: the concepts of *capture* and *control* that describe how contemporary forms of exploitation operate within the context of neoliberal capitalism and a corresponding conceptual invention in the form of the *war machine* that they mobilize against such exploitation.

Capture and Control

For Deleuze and Guattari, it is act of capture that composes the primary function of State societies

and the corresponding concept of control that describes how the expanded presence of the State makes its way into the interior of the socius to work in the service of new forms of capitalist accumulation. For Deleuze and Guattari, the State operates by way of the dual workings of the ruler who binds, serving as the source through which the multitude become adherent to the One, and the jurist who codifies through the imposition of treaties, laws, and contracts (1987, p. 351). This dual aspect of the State is brought to bear on labor power and the conditions for the creation of labor power in order to produce surplus value. The State, in this case, becomes “the sole and transcendent public-property owner, the master of surplus or stock, the organiser of large-scale works (surplus labour), the source of public functions and bureaucracy” (1987, p. 428).

In its neoliberal form, capitalism has become informalized, making its way into all aspects of everyday life and disengaging itself from its previous reliance on governmental institutions to orchestrate the accumulation of surplus value. What this indicates for Deleuze and Guattari is that the State is no longer solely oriented toward capturing those territories existing externally to the socius – in the form of what Marx famously called primitive accumulation – but it is now oriented toward the capture of internal territories (where primitive accumulation is also now directed inward). As capital has become social capital, the extraction of surplus value no longer pertains to the work place, but to the entire interior of the socius, including the capture of affects, desires, and emotional energies. In other words, instead of conceiving of these changes as an indication that the State has become superfluous, Deleuze and Guattari argue that the new expansive properties of capitalist accumulation simply make the State indistinguishable from society. In the face of the construction of new pathways to extract profit from previously unforeseen internal territories, the State has not been abolished, but merely internalized.

As the State has been internalized in contemporary capitalism, and forms of potential accumulation have expanded, social control for Deleuze

and Guattari has taken on new importance. As a result both schooling and education have also assumed new roles. No longer does the institution of schooling serve as the specific sites from which one goes to complete the necessary training to be a productive citizen, but an institution that has completely adopted the corporate model. Under these circumstances, students are no longer confined to fulfill their necessary training, but set “free” to actively and continuously participate in consumption, the production of surplus value, and never ending forms of training and education necessary for both. Put differently, a person does not go through life being molded in different institutional arenas at different times of their life. They are no longer solely expected to be in school from ages 5 to 22, but now must be a part of constant modulation and, in the case of schooling, in education mode at all times. Education ceases to exist as a specific and separate institution where one goes and finally finishes to move onto other disciplinary spheres. Instead, educational training begins to meld into the home and workplace – all places that are conceived as potential sites for the extraction of surplus value. This corporate model of education demands a subject that is always already in a process of seeking out new tastes, sensibilities, and images (Carlin and Wallin, p. xxii).

Consider one of the dominant mantras found in educational rhetoric today, that of “life-long learning.” This mantra not only saturates educational institutions, but serves a crucial role in opening up the possibility for the advancement of continuing education. Such education is oriented toward the creation of flexible entrepreneurs who are not only prepared to move from one job to the next, but also to participate in the kinds of never-ending training necessary to effectively seek out new means and pathways to extract profit from the internal territories now being opened up through the State/society/capital nexus and the full adoption of the corporate model into every sphere of life (Carlin and Wallin 2014). In accordance with advancement of continual education and lifelong learning, increasing forms of testing are utilized to create statistical and representative formulations

of students as a way to measure their current and potential to become such entrepreneurs. Within this kind of conception of schooling, students are also being prepared to participate in educational training for the rest of their lives – where their success as students becomes increasingly dependent upon the maintenance of their own educational incompleteness. To be a completed subject in education – where one would formally finish schooling and education – would stand in direct confrontation with the neoliberal requisite of lifelong training to ensure that students are a continual source and generator of surplus value for their entire lives.

The internalization of the State not only affects the contemporary model and conceptualization of schooling but also the way that students think. It is what Deleuze and Guattari (1987) refer to as “State thought” that describes an authoritarian, arboreal model of thinking tied to rationality and foundationalism that serves to tether all thought expression to previous categories and concepts. Such thought does not act to defend the State, but “. . . is already in conformity with a model that it borrows from the State apparatus, and which defines for it goals and paths, conduits, channels, organs, an entire organon” (1987, p. 374). In other words, State thought is the acceptable form of thought that is constituent of the kind of transcendent, binary forms of thought that eliminate multiplicity and difference in favor of the One. Opposed to the authoritarianism of State thought, Deleuze and Guattari propose rhizomatic thought that eschews arboreal essences and growth in favor of the wildness and unpredictability of the root system of grass.

This neoliberal context requires a kind of political intervention that is up to the task of trying to escape the impasses of the regulation, cliché, and predetermination of how one can and should be educated, as well as how one can think. For Deleuze and Guattari, what needs to be done is the creation of new tools – both conceptual and otherwise – that might allow us to extricate a genuine form of education, schooling, and thought from the State of education today.

The War Machine

One of the key concepts that they mobilized in their political philosophy against such exploitation was that of “the war machine” – an idea indebted to the work of French anthropologist and anarchist Pierre Clastres who spent years working with the Guayaki, Guarani, and Yanomami tribes in Paraguay, Venezuela, and Brazil in the 1960s and 1970s. As a result of his ethnographic work, Clastres famously proclaimed that “primitive societies” are essentially societies without a State (1987, 2010). This was not the result of situating these tribes on the bottom rung of some teleological rendering of world history. By contrast, Clastres recognized that “primitive” peoples had created the kind of sociocultural mechanisms necessary in order to avoid the emergence and imposition of the State.

When the State is perfected, power resides in the hands of the few, society is organized hierarchically, the “legitimate” use of violence is monopolized, and those with power have the ability to forcibly extract profit/riches from the rest of the populace. Such perfection culminates in the emergence of the despot. While this ideal State has been enacted to varying degrees of success, despotism has served as the “horizon” of all that the State desires to be. Those who have managed to avoid such Ur-aspects of stateliness did so not as a result of an accident, luck, or an “undeveloped” form of socioeconomic organization that predated the advent of capitalism and the formation of the nation State but rather through a form of sociocultural organization intentionally designed to prohibit, or limit the possibility of, the formation of the State. Why have “primitive” peoples organized themselves around deterring the formation of the State? It is precisely because they are well aware of the consequences of its emergence.

For Clastres, the way that primitive societies avoid the State and the kind of capture and control imminent to *Stateliness* is through the enactment of war – sometimes real and sometimes symbolic in nature. This may seem counterintuitive. However, for Clastres war stands against sovereignty

and the associated consolidation of wealth and power in the way that it acts as a form of rupture and flight from such capture. It is not as if primitive societies do not have leaders. Only that war enacted by warriors is on the side of the *socius* in order that leaders, while granted great respect and prestige, lack any ability to consolidate power in the hands of the few. Specifically, it was the mechanism of war that served this function, ensuring both the “dispersal” and “segmentarity” of groups so that neither the consolidation of power in the hands of the few nor the reification of institutional life was possible (1987, p. 357).

For Deleuze and Guattari, Clastres’ work and inherent critique of the teleological advancement of the world that culminates in the formation of the State and its associated institutions allowed them to consider the concept of war as a source from which to avoid capture. Similarly, it was through the work of Clastres that Deleuze and Guattari advanced the argument that the State is not a recent invention nor a product of a particular form of economic development as many Marxists have advocated, but rather a social formation that has always been in existence. Like Clastres, Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of the *war machine* is not a reference to an armed and militarized group that engages in acts of violence. In other words, the primary object of the war machine is never war but another kind of violence that allows for escape, or what Deleuze and Guattari refer to as “lines of flight” from the kinds of capture and control that define the State’s influence over the social field. Only when the State appropriates the war machine does it come to exist as a military institution – incorporated into the administrative and bureaucratic spatiotemporal formation that pertains to the State. Set against such control over the social field, the war machine for Deleuze and Guattari is that which mutates and defines all forms of creativity. Such mutations can be found individually or through group formations and can refer to either material practices or acts of thought: to art, education, ecology, economy, philosophy, or politics. It is a concept that refers to variable relations to war itself, innumerable creative potentialities, and as such to multiple meanings (1987, p. 422).

Deleuze and Guattari develop this concept through a reference to spatiality and movement. In terms of space, it is the *smooth* space of the war machine that enables lines of flight from the grooved, predetermined, *striated* space of the State that dictates how one is to live a life, think, and be educated. In terms of movement, the war machine is always intimately connected to what they call the nomad. However, the nomad is not necessarily a reference to movement but a reference to escape from the sedentarism engendered by striated space that allows for the formation of the State in all of its variants. Ultimately, for Deleuze and Guattari, the war machine is “irreducible to the State apparatus. . . outside its sovereignty and prior to its law: it comes from elsewhere” (1987, p. 352) and as such the nomad is always, in movement or in stillness, that which is able to remain external to the apparatus of the State.

An Education of the Outside

As always external to the State, the war machine stands in opposition to the coded plane that functions alongside the State/society/capital nexus. To participate in a war machine is to participate in an uncoded radical form of difference that evades the establishment of any kind of stable identities. The State can appear in an unlimited number of ways within the context of schools including hierarchical centralized authority inherent in administrative, teacher, student, and parent/teacher group formation, as well as the kinds of transcendent, identitarian, and representative forms of thought that constitute legitimate knowledge throughout all levels of schooling. However, the war machine can similarly appear in unlimited social formations, but is always oriented toward undermining and/or escaping from the bureaucratic, administrative, and spatiotemporal formations of control that dominate any level of education where the State has become internalized. The war machine is the absolute outside to the State. For Deleuze and Guattari, “(T)he State’s pretension to be a world order, and to root man. The war machine’s relation to an outside is not another ‘model’; it is an

assemblage that makes thought itself nomadic” (1987, p. 24).

As a result, to enact the war machine in education is to subvert the consolidation of power in any of its forms while creating the eventual (sociocultural, organizational, and political) mechanisms that will inhibit its appearance again. To create an education of the outside is to extract a genuine form of education, schooling, and thought from the State of things as it pertains to the corporate model in operation today. An education inspired by the war machine would coincide with a kind of combat that would help us to evade the known through problematizing our habitual comportment and thought as it relates to how one is to teach, how one is to learn, and how an education is to proceed. Education inspired by the war machine would instigate a kind of “unlearning” that would work to disrupt common sense and constituted knowledge, as well as the methods currently in operation in schools today that determine the ways that bodies are organized and groups are formed.

Conclusion

For Deleuze and Guattari, concepts such as “the war machine” should be conceived of as tools. In this sense, the conceptual tool should not be mobilized in order to label our experiences in education so that multiplicity of difference is obscured through the application of the concept, but to create new connectivities that illuminate difference and complexity in previously unforeseen ways. In other words, we should not consider the use of a concept such as the *war machine* in terms of the way that we can bring it to bear on pedagogical or educational environments. To utilize concepts as Deleuze and Guattari intended is not to use concepts in a representative manner – and here we should think of the term *representative* in its full political significance where the multitude is represented by and subsequently falls under the control of the One. We can utilize terms such as “the war machine” and others found in the work of Deleuze and Guattari as ways to create new connections within and between fields, ideas, and situations, so that we

might open up the potential to extract a genuine form of education from the preestablished realm of pedagogy in operation today. In the politics of education inherent in the work of Deleuze and Guattari, we are reminded that education bound to prior categories of expression is antithetical to the promise of pedagogy itself. In other words, by containing pedagogical experiences within a series of predetermined conceptual formations – by always confining pedagogy to what has already been determined – the possibility of learning itself becomes foreclosed. As such, an engagement with Deleuze and Guattari would generate a politics of education oriented toward the disruption of the State in all of its forms.

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Deleuze and Learning

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Synonyms

Critical philosophy; Critical thinking; Learning; Poststructuralism; Postulates

Introduction

Gilles Deleuze (1925–1995) provides an integrated theorization of learning without having written specifically on education. He was a philosopher who worked for the majority of his life as an intellectual and university academic. Deleuze was propelled into the public eye in 1972, after the success of his first collaborative work with Félix Guattari, called *Anti-Oedipus*. He did not write a book on learning, so one must piece together his ideas on learning from comments interspersed from within the oeuvre. Despite this apparent lack of direct information and analysis of learning, Deleuze's ideas have gained traction in many educational and creative circles (Cole 2011). Perhaps this is because Deleuze provides what he described as “a conceptual toolbox” (Deleuze 1980, p. 17), which can be readily applied to education in terms of a philosophical framing and as a theoretical base that resists dogmatism and encourages the novel and imaginative (re) creation of theory and practice. In this entry, this conceptual toolbox does not represent a *free-for-all* in terms of an *anything-goes* learning and educational theory, but, on the contrary, the Deleuzian toolbox is in many ways deliberately hard to accept and necessarily challenging to put into action.

Deleuze and Learning

Deleuze's most direct statements with respect to learning come in his book on *Difference and Repetition*. In it, he says: “. . . ‘learning’ always takes place in and through the unconscious, thereby establishing the bond of a profound complicity between nature and mind” (Deleuze 1994, p. 165). This is the last sentence of a paragraph on problematic ideas and an explanation of how one learns to swim with respect to the idea of the sea. Deleuze's argument is that one learns to swim in the sea not by opposing the sea in dialectical fashion, nor by deconstructing it, still less by imposing a person's will upon the waves in a

mythological, Cnut style. Following the philosophy of Deleuze, one learns through an “apprenticeship with signs.” Further, education is “amorous yet fatal” (Deleuze 1994, p. 23); in the case of swimming in the sea, the swimmer is able to cope with the waves and the currents of the seas, not by copying or repeating their existence and forms or through any processes of familiarization or thoughts about being a “natural sea swimmer,” but by becoming attuned over time to the way in which one has to swim in the seas in order to survive and to stay afloat. Deleuze (1994, p. 23) states that one learns from teachers who say “do with me” and not from teachers who say “do as I do”; in other words, learning is a necessarily reciprocating and relational process – and includes elements of non-relation, which makes questioning of accepted knowledge an imperative and working together communally around knowledge problems essential. Inna Semetsky (2009) has suggested that Deleuze's approach to learning solves Plato's paradox in *Meno* about learning, in that the production of new knowledge according to Socrates is merely the function of memory or recollection. Plato surmised that all knowledge is locked in the unconscious, so that one doesn't learn at all, but recollects what one already knows through the recognition of truths through argumentation and Socratic dialogue. Deleuze (1994) turns this formulation around in *Difference and Repetition*, in that the unconscious is no longer a passive receiver of knowledge and the memory the active disseminator of knowledge. Contrariwise, the unconscious does profoundly synthetic and positive, i.e., paradoxically conscious, work according to Deleuze, through the clashing of affect and the playing with chaotic material processes through, for example, creative experimentation. The unconscious is in the Deleuzian frame a creative and vital cauldron of new thought. However, to get to this new vision of the unconscious as the place where learning fundamentally happens, one has to first attend to issues concerning philosophy and the image of thought that it has projected over time.

Philosophy and Learning

Deleuze executed a number of philosophical studies during his career, specifically focusing on the philosophies of David Hume, Friedrich Nietzsche, Henri Bergson, Benedictus de Spinoza, Immanuel Kant, Michel Foucault, and Gottfried Leibniz. These works by Deleuze on other philosophers do not constitute a history of philosophy, nor do they provide straightforward commentaries on the philosophy of these named thinkers. Rather, Deleuze executed these studies to come up with “new thought,” in order to question the classical or accepted image of thought and to ultimately produce a philosophical system that promotes learning through the unconscious and nature and questions knowledge as given. In some ways, every philosophy produces an “image of thought,” even Deleuze’s project to come up with a new image of thought and to return the thought of the philosophers to learning. In this context, Deleuze’s project is to enable an image of thought that may be infinitely divisible or possible to be differentiated *in itself*, until thought and learning themselves become apparent to the thinker and learner. In terms of Western metaphysics, the dominant and most far-reaching “image of thought” comes from Plato in terms of what constitutes metaphysics. Deleuze (1994) could be positioned as one of many thinkers who have tried to overcome Plato’s image of thought, yet the approach that he takes in *Difference and Repetition* is distinguished from many others in that the eight postulates that are proposed in order to question the philosophically dogmatic image of thought suggest an ultimate escape route from representation as the basis for metaphysics in general into learning per se and not only with reference to Plato.

The eight postulates from *Difference and Repetition* (see below) constitute a framing of the dogmatic image of thought that specifically attempts to dismantle the manner in which thought has been created and recreated more recently through thinkers such as Kant and Heidegger. According to Deleuze, Kant and

Heidegger create dogmatic images of thought because their systems for thought must be understood before any new thought can happen. The eight postulates signify a means to fully examine such images of thoughts and to allow for unthoughts, non-thoughts, and, importantly given the context of this entry, learning through the unconscious and nature to make its way into a *new arena for thought*. One could argue that everything that Deleuze writes after the “Image of Thought” section of *Difference and Repetition* during his career relates to these postulates in some way and is an attempt to create thought without an image that makes philosophy more democratic and fully open to novel reinterpretation. One could argue that this proposition is perhaps most fully realized in the rhizomatics of *A Thousand Plateaus*, because the “rhizomic text” and multiple conceptual elements of *A Thousand Plateaus* attempt to fully engage with the notion of immanence, including how immanence relates to time, power, and the fluctuations of everyday life (e.g., Cole 2013). Immanence is for Deleuze the great leveling concept, which makes new thought accessible beyond the philosophical specialism, seen, for example, in Kant or Heidegger, and learning in the moment becomes apparent. The eight Deleuzian postulates that a new image of thought and any consequent learning from Deleuze rest upon are as follows.

The eight postulates: from Difference and Repetition (Deleuze 1994, p. 167):

1. The Postulate of the Principle or the *Cogitatio Natural Universalis*: the good will of the thinker and the good nature of thought.
2. The Postulate of the Ideal or Common Sense: common sense as the *concordia facultatum* and good sense as the distribution that guarantees this accord.
3. The Postulate of the Model or of Recognition: recognition presupposes the harmonious exercise of the faculties on an object that is supposedly *identical* for each of these faculties and the consequent possibility of *error* in the distribution when one faculty confuses one of its

objects with a different object of another faculty.

4. The Postulate of the Element or Representation: difference is subordinated to the complementary dimensions of the *same* and the *similar* and the *analogous* and the *opposed*.
5. The Postulate of the Negative or of Error: error expresses everything that can go *wrong* in thought, but only as a product of *external* mechanisms.
6. The Postulate of the Logical Function or the Proposition: designation or denotation [theory of reference] is taken to be the locus of truth, sense of being no more than a neutralized double or the infinite doubling of the proposition.
7. The Postulate of the Modality or Solutions: problems are materially traced from propositions or are formally defined by the possibility of them being solved.
8. The Postulate of the End or the Result or the Postulate of Knowledge: the subordination of learning to knowledge and of culture [or *paideia*] to method.

These eight postulates from *Difference and Repetition* work on the level of problematizing and questioning the image of thought. The first two postulates refer to the ways in which philosophers have made implicit agreements between themselves about what thought is and what thought should be. These agreements might jeopardize learning according to Deleuze. Likewise, postulates three and four refer to the ways in which philosophical systems have produced models and represented the image of thought as the “self-same.” The philosophical systems of Kant and Heidegger are good examples of these types of thinking models or modes of representation that require thinking through their tenets before any new thought or learning can happen. Postulate five is a reference to the Hegelian system of thought that prioritizes negation in thought to create difference (Somers-Hall 2012), therefore making learning dependent on the negation of, for example, the thought of nature and the unconscious, which is exactly what Deleuze wants learning to connect with. Postulates six and

seven refer to propositional logic and how the definition of the image of thought in these terms can produce thought that excludes problems that do not fit with the strictures of propositional logic, i.e., irrational and illogical thought. Learning itself would also be trammled along the lines of propositional logic according to these postulates. Postulate eight refers to the ways in which knowledge can dominate learning and create methods that intercede and take away from the force of culture. Deleuze wants to return thought to learning and culture and not to a set of predefined methods or sets of instructions that can take away from the impact and veracity of new thought.

One needs to systematically go through the postulates from *Difference and Repetition* to arrive at the last postulate, number eight, that directly relates to learning and is the starting point for a new metaphysics of learning from Deleuze that disavows representation in thought, i.e., gets back to learning *qua* learning and not the thought of learning. Deleuze (1994, p. 167) in *Difference and Repetition* immediately qualifies and questions the eight postulates and says that they function best in silence. How can one make sense of the notion that the thought that escapes the dogmatic image of thought through the eight postulates returns one to a state of learning, and helps to reverse the traditionally philosophical or classical “image of thought” and its accompanying dogmas, and yet is born “in thought” (Deleuze 1994, p. 167)? In terms of philosophical analysis, the genesis of “the image of thought” and the consequent critique of the image of thought through the eight postulates come from Deleuze’s earlier (1983) book *Nietzsche and Philosophy*.

Here, Deleuze begins his sustained move away from the tenets of representative thought and looks to understand how Nietzschean forces may power thought, such as the contrast between reactive (moral) forces and life-affirming forces. One could argue that according to Nietzsche, paramount among the forces of reaction and affirmation is the force of now, which congeals everyday forces from a contemporary perspective that may work to corrupt and subjugate the mobility of

thought. In Nietzschean terms, the power of the philosopher is derived from the ability to think (and learn) outside of the prejudices, clichés, and banalities contained in the social forces of the contemporary situation. This is why Nietzsche refined his writing technique to such an extent in order to come up with a new form of aphoristic writing that attempted to pierce the bubble of contemporary values and thought and that could execute a powerful critique on the image of thought connected to “now” and to reconnect thinking with learning. In consequence, Nietzsche teaches us to be wary of contemporary fashion and to exercise critical and affective energies when approaching thought, which might turn out to be merely reactive or responding to moral, narrow-minded, reproductive, or power-based dictates. This is one of the reasons why Deleuze qualifies his eight postulates with silence and with their birth “in thought,” which means they are precisely designed to escape the clamor of the contemporary moment and in order to connect to learning, to the unconscious, and to nature. The concern to make Deleuze’s postulates receptive to and part of an exploration of the unconscious predominantly comes from his examination of the formulation of the drives for thinking in Nietzsche and in the writing processes of Proust in *Proust and Signs*.

In *Proust and Signs*, the section on “the image of thought” concerns the ways in which the thinking of the philosopher can miss out on specific types of knowledge, aesthetic sensitivities, the learning that comes from the heart, and the thought processes contained in Proust’s writing style. Proust’s *In Search of Lost Time* sets up a wholly different image of thought to the philosophical image of thought, and it is through understanding the processes contained in the writing of this book that one is able to go beyond the rational, historic, and communal assumptions of the philosophers as listed by the eight postulates. Deleuze’s argument in *Proust and Signs* is that the writing of Proust adds to the endeavors and insights of the philosophers and that Proust’s work is philosophical, precisely because it out-manuevers what Plato calls “simultaneously contrary perceptions” (Deleuze 2000, p. 101). In

other words, Proust has the ability to write around such perceptions, and to make art of them, or to touch upon “sensations common to 2 places, to 2 moments” (ibid.). Proust is a Deleuzian exemplar of a writer able to deal with involuntary signs in a creative way and in a manner which forces us to think and learn.

Parallel to Nietzsche, who is a thinker out of time (as exemplified by Zarathustra), Proust is a thinker of time. Proust creates an image of thought that does not represent the tropes of now, but gets inside the mechanisms of time to encounter the fleeting effects, an apprenticeship in signs, and the delayed action in thought and learning. In Proust’s writing, obvious and scenic or exterior imagery is substituted for the time dimension to produce what Deleuze and Guattari (1988, p. 380) describe in *A Thousand Plateaus* in a parallel manner and with reference to nomadism, as “(a)ll of thought is a becoming, a double becoming, rather than the attribute of a Subject and the representation of a whole.” Deleuze, Proust, and Nietzsche allow for and give mobility to thought through their art and hence show what the image of thought is through learning, the unconscious, and nature. As has been noted above and in contrast to, for example, Kant and Heidegger, whose intellectual comprehension requires steadfast study of the structural aspects of *their* thought before new thought can happen, i.e., with respect to being, the faculties of thought and the possibility of experience, according to the approach of Deleuze, Proust and Nietzsche, have injected freedom into the construction of thought and into the consequent image of thought with respect to how new thought and learning happen.

However, if one accepts Deleuze’s notion of thinking and learning and how it proceeds empirically, one should be able to configure these processes in the world in some way. This point comes about not because Deleuze’s transcendental empiricism as he names this approach in *Difference and Repetition* requires any extrasensory or universal validity, but because the ways in which one can make sense of the eight postulates, the learning, and the image of thought that they refer to must relate in some way to practice. This is because it is in practice that the Deleuzian

postulates can reach their tipping points and any breakthrough in the image of thought toward learning can be realized, i.e., immanently and in tandem with a concern for power.

Conclusion

If one compares Deleuze's ideas on learning with, for example, John Hattie's (2009) book called *Visible Learning*, which is widely cited in education, one could state that in contrast, Deleuze's thoughts on learning describe a form of "invisible learning." Deleuze designates pre-personal, fluctuating grounds for learning that can seem to be very different from the systematic analysis of the factors and strategies of/for learning as analyzed statistically by Hattie (2009). However, if one digs deeper into the two approaches to learning represented by Deleuze and Hattie, one can realize that the two positions are not so far removed. Deleuze is not adverse to scientific and mathematical explanation of phenomena; in fact he deploys such means frequently in his writing with respect to, for example, "singularities" and "the virtual," yet Deleuze always brings back such explanations to thinking, creativity, and social problems.

The difference in the two approaches to learning is that Hattie (2009) stops at the "effect size" of every strategy or factor in learning from the 800 meta-analyses that are appropriated, which enables a ranking of the effect sizes. In contrast, Deleuze has latterly analyzed philosophy, literature, cinema, capitalism, science, and history to come up with an extended notion of learning as questioning the image of thought in these contexts. Certainly, one could argue that Deleuze's notion of learning requires evidence-based studies of the type that Hattie (2009) has used in his ranking of the effect sizes of factors and strategies to enhance learning. This is perhaps a task for future educators and future education researchers that have been influenced by the philosophy of Deleuze to attend to, as they work together to change mainstream educational provision. Deleuze's philosophical and intellectual approach to learning has the capacity to radically alter the course of educational practice beyond the short term and to make a difference

in terms of the measurable "effect sizes" as calculated by Hattie (2009).

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Deleuze, Ontology, and Mathematics

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Synonyms

Chance; Difference; Fractal; Intensity; Number; Ordinality; Problematics; Singularity

Introduction

Deleuze argued that we should look to the *practice* of mathematics for how to think about life

more generally, advocating for a “problematics” that was strongly modeled on particular kinds of mathematical activity (Duffy 2013). The differential calculus and other kinds of mathematics are used by Deleuze to develop a philosophy of difference and repetition. He takes up mathematical concepts from analysis, topology, and algebra, citing the work of mathematicians Gottfried Leibniz, Joseph-Louis Lagrange, Richard Dedekind, Emile Galois, Henri Poincaré, Józef Wroński, and post-Kantian philosophers who wrote about mathematics, such as Salomon Maimon, Jean Bordas-Demoulin, Albert Lautman, and Jean Cavaillès.

In this entry, I focus on the role that mathematics plays in his political ontology, as developed in *Difference and Repetition* (1994) and show how these ideas were further elaborated in later work, including *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia* (1987), coauthored with Felix Guattari.

Problematics

Following Albert Lautman, Deleuze (1994) suggests that mathematics operates according to a problematics where “a problem has three aspects: its difference in kind from solutions; its transcendence in relation to the solutions that it engenders on the basis of its own determinant conditions; and its immanence in solutions which cover it, the problem being the better resolved the more *it is* determined.” (Deleuze 1994, p. 179). Mathematical theories – like the differential calculus – are solutions to these generative problems. Thus specific mathematical theories – whatever they may be – belong to mathematics, but they are also *examples* of a “mathesis universalis” insofar as there is a universal problematics (Deleuze 1994, p. 181).

In other words, mathematics is not metaphorical for Deleuze, but is rather an excellent example for studying how this generative problematics is at work in the world (Duffy 2006). The differential calculus is *one* example of a problematics, and Deleuze also points to other areas of mathematics as perhaps even better examples, in particular the group theory of Abel and Galois. Indeed, the

development of abstract algebra in the nineteenth century, based on the work of Abel and Galois, is declared by Deleuze to be “a radical reversal in the problem-solution relation, a more considerable revolution than the Copernican . . . For as Georges Verriest remarks, the group of an equation does not characterize at a given moment what we know about its roots, but the objectivity of what we do not know about them” (Deleuze 1994, p. 180).

But despite this gesture toward algebra, it is the differential calculus that Deleuze revisits again and again in various texts, suggesting that it gets as close as we have ever been to a differential ontology of the virtual. He synthesizes three previous commentaries on the significance of the calculus, combining them into a comprehensive theory of how the virtual and the actual are enmeshed. First, Bordas-Demoulin suggests that dx is the “problematic idea” and the “undetermined,” second Maimon stresses how there is a reciprocal determination dy/dx at work rather than an individual determination, and third Wroński emphasizes the “complete determination” that is achieved in mathematical integration, where integration entails the creation of a function that is not *entailed* in the summation and thus captures the *genetic power* of differentiation. These three key aspects of Deleuze’s philosophy of difference (the undetermined, reciprocal determination, the potential) are derived from the calculus and are crucial for how Deleuze moves away from Kant’s “conditions” of experience, toward a theory of how the new comes into the world.

Deleuze (1994) aligns the threesome of the “undetermined, the determinable, and the determined” with “quantitability, qualitability, and potentiality” (p. 176). Of note is the fact that these are all “abilities” or capacities that inhere in the world and that “quantitability” describes not the standard use of quantity (as that which counts and measures) but a virtual dimension of matter. The differential calculus synthesizes this three-pronged approach and becomes a powerful problematics, and by studying this problematics, we can begin to imagine how problematics might flourish elsewhere in other fields, and we can seek the “differential and genetic element” that

fuels all of becoming (Deleuze 1999, p. 51). In *The Fold*, Deleuze (1993) will draw extensively on Leibniz and “Baroque mathematics” to argue for a differential folding universe, bringing together the differential calculus with a monadology. The differential relation (dy/dx) is the “quantitative determination” of this relational ontology of forces, be they molecular or affective, which fold the fabric of life in varying ways (de Freitas 2016). We must, says Deleuze, follow the *intrinsic quantitative relationships* that are within the qualitative “unity” of becoming. The mathematical concept of the differential is that indeterminate vibration or virtual dimension that always troubles the fixity of any quantity or object ($x + dx$).

Axiomatics

In a mathematical problematics, concepts quiver with indeterminacy. The square, for instance, *is* the material process of quadrature; the circle *is* the differential forces that sustain or produce or determine it. Any curve determined by an equation or static definition can be reconsidered as a dynamic machine – comprising the differential threesome of “undetermined, the determinable, and the determined.” The visible circle drawn on a blackboard is simply the effect of a series of differentials of higher and higher degree. Deleuze will compare the general equation of a circle $x^2 + y^2 - R = 0$ with the differential equation $ydy + xdx = 0$ which captures “the universal of the circumference or of the corresponding function.” (Deleuze 1988, p. 171). This differential equation quivers with its universality and its indeterminacy. A problematics is thus an approach to mathematics that reanimates the figures and equations of mathematics and sets them in motion, embracing the event nature of concepts, so that we might resist the tendency to imagine transcendent references for them.

Deleuze and Guattari (1987) develop this idea further and show how there has always been at least two currents in the history of mathematics, on the one hand problematics and on the other axiomatics. They compare State-sanctioned or

“royal” or “major” mathematics with other lineages of mathematics, which they call “nomadic” or “minor.” They describe how influential State-sanctioned traditions like the Bourbaki were intent on eliminating the dynamic and “less rigorous” mathematics of the infinitesimal calculus. Historians often describe this period as the “rigorization of mathematics,” but Deleuze and Guattari (1987) will counter this narrative with an account of how state mathematics became a kind of *axiomatics* (versus *problematics*) that denied the event nature of mathematical activity (Smith 2005, 2006). State mathematics, according to this account, imposed static rules on notions such as “becoming, heterogeneity, infinitesimal, passage to the limit, [and] continuous variation” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, p. 363).

In the context of education, this contrast between axiomatics and problematics finds a parallel in the mathematics curriculum, in the tension between the logical and ontological dimensions of mathematical activity. Mathematics curriculum is built around an axiomatic image of mathematics. That image rests on a logicist bias that crept into the curriculum and came to dominate our understanding of mathematics. Here the term *logicism* refers to the philosophical position that mathematics can and should be reduced to logic. Of course mathematics entails (or can entail) some degree of logical deduction, but there is more to the activity of mathematics than logic and axiomatic deduction. Proof is never only deductive or inductive, but is also generative and constructive. The history of mathematics shows us how particular mathematical practices have been silenced and demoted and how the coupling of mathematics with logic became entrenched in the State-sanctioned discipline (see Hacking 2014, for excellent insights on this historical development).

Deleuze and Guattari (1987) will define state mathematics as the axiomatic deduction of properties from a set of given concepts. In contrast, minor mathematics refers to a more speculative and “less rigorous” mathematical practice that is always tamed by the epsilon-delta police of state mathematics. (Minor mathematics also refers to that side of mathematics that entails making

monsters and paradoxes, a topic to which I return at the end of this entry.) In pragmatic terms, this means that minor or nomadic mathematics dwells in the mathematical concept *as an event*, while state mathematics treats the concept as a representation of essence.

Intensity and Number

Deleuze draws extensively on the French philosopher Henri Bergson to develop his ideas on differentiation: “We will see that one of Bergson’s most curious ideas is that difference itself has a number, a virtual number, a sort of numbering number.” (Deleuze 1999, p. 44). The numbering number refers to the virtual intensity of number – that is, it refers to number before it is tamed by extension. Although we associate quantity with the act of measuring and partitioning extension, Deleuze uses the concept of the numbering number to get at the “intensive” source by which number mutates and resists current measures. Reclaiming number as implicated in his ontology is crucial if Deleuze, following Bergson, is to develop a radically new philosophy of difference. For if quantity is conceived within the usual quantitative paradigm, then it is always *external* to difference – an external metric or count imposed on the qualitative. But why should quantity be the one concept that escapes potentiality? Why shouldn’t quantity also have an unscripted future and virtual dimension? This is precisely why Deleuze (1994) suggests that there is a “quantitability” that inheres in the virtual, a kind of inexact calculation whereby “the real in the world [is] understood in terms of fractional or even incommensurable numbers” (p. 222).

Deleuze (1994) argues that there is a virtual and actual side to number and that these two “sides” correspond to intensive and extensive relations: “every number is originally *intensive and vectorial* in so far as it implies a difference of quantity which cannot properly be cancelled, but *extensive and scalar* in so far as it cancels this difference on another plane that it creates and on which it is explicated” (p. 322, *my emphasis*). A number that cannot be “properly canceled” is

a number that escapes the operators that operate on it – a number for which one cannot find an inverse that might cancel it. This is an ontological claim about the potentiality of number, a claim that forces us to rethink what terms like scalar, vectorial, and dynamic might mean in this case. According to Deleuze, number partakes in an *intensive* quantity before it is tamed and encapsulated in an *extensive* quantity. This first intensive number is not yet calibrated in terms of a fixed unit and not yet a number we can use as a counter, *and yet this virtual number is as much a part of matter as extensive magnitude*. Intensity is a crucial concept for Deleuze precisely because it points to how quantity or quanta cannot be reduced to the concept of extension, but none the less inheres in matter. Note that this is not a platonic philosophy of mathematics (in which number is an abstract ideal that transcends matter), but a philosophy of immanence, where *number is implicated in a vibrant and indeterminate matter*. De Freitas (2013) and de Freitas and Sinclair (2014) explore the implications of this ontology in relation to mathematical activity of all kinds, from recreational to expert.

Ordinality

For Deleuze (1994), the concept of ordinality, rather than cardinality, is associated with the intensity of number: “Even the simplest type of number displays this duality: natural numbers are first ordinal, in other words, originally intensive. Cardinal numbers result from these and are presented as the explication of the ordinal” (Deleuze 1994, p. 322). He aims to rescue and reuse the concept of ordinality from being only the repetition of the same unit or the fixed ordering of a set. The ordinal for Deleuze taps into the genetic differential that is the engine of his intensive ontology. Ordinality is thus a broad concept, more complex than what we tend to assume, because it plugs into the virtual depth of the “intensive spatium” (Deleuze 1994, p. 323).

Deleuze and Guattari (1987) will further develop this idea of ordinality and link it to Bergson’s notion of the “numbering number”:

The Numbering Number, in other words, autonomous, arithmetic, organization, implies neither a superior degree of abstraction nor very large quantities . . . These numbers appear as soon as one distributes something in space, instead of dividing up space or distributing space itself . . . *The number is no longer a means of counting or measuring but of moving: it is the number itself that moves through space . . . The numbering number is rhythmic, not harmonic* (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, pp. 389–390, *our emphasis*).

When number becomes “the numbering number,” it becomes a “mobile occupant,” “ambulant fire,” and the “directional number” all of which are different ways to think differently about *ordinality*. Deleuze and Guattari (1987) suggest that if we grasp or pursue the intensive nature of ordinality, we can begin to imagine how number might not only serve the control state, but instead achieve a *mobile occupying* without *whole* number counting or striating of space. It would be this other kind of smooth space where creativity (and anarchy!) can thrive. State striation will be an approach to number that is “exclusively cardinal in character,” while the “ordinal, directional, nomadic, articulated number, the numbering number” produces degrees of freedom in an unstriated (or non-partitioned) space (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, p. 535). This number is ordinal in terms of how it brings forth the unscripted new, with each “count,” rather than establishing the size or metric of a set.

Deleuze and Guattari (1987) use the distinction between ordinal and cardinal to discuss the political mis/uses of number, showing how different uses of number reflect very different kinds of politics. Their work looks for how State-sanctioned mathematics loses touch with the dynamism and intensity of the ordinal number. Ordinality comes to be associated with a nomadic arithmetic that mobilizes the unruly power of number to bring forth the new and to curl number into itself in varying ways. In other words, nomadic arithmetic has an ambulant, mobile dimension that contrasts with “geometry,” where geometry is the practice of measuring or *striating* a static space. If the ordinal can tap into its power and plug into the intensive potentiality of the spatium (and not simply the repetition of the same), then there is possibility of creative counter-uses of number.

Revolutionary Arithmetic

Geometry and arithmetic reflect very different political relationships with territory and the distribution of power. Arithmetic always marks a certain nomadic relation to territory, because “algebra and arithmetic arise in a strongly nomad influenced world” (p. 388). They argue that arithmetic has a revolutionary potential precisely because it troubles the striating line of enclosure and control, the geometric line that measures and contains. While geometric measurement lends itself to the control of space, there is also an “independence or autonomy of the [arithmetic] Number” that subverts this kind of spatial striation (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, p. 389).

One might – quite legitimately – ask how on earth it is possible to pursue an arithmetic in this mad revolutionary way. It’s hard to imagine what sort of “revolutionary” arithmetic Deleuze and Guattari have in mind, since arithmetic seems like arithmetic, no matter how you slice it. But it is possible to look into the history of mathematics and find revolutionary kinds of numbers that shook the foundation of society. In particular, the infinitesimal played such a role, being banned by the Jesuits in the 1600s for its “blasphemous” nature and outlawed in schools across Europe (de Freitas [in press](#)). For Deleuze and Guattari, the infinitesimal was one example of a radical new way of calculating, a new kind of number that produced a rich array of new mathematical ideas and techniques. But most importantly, the early use of the infinitesimal was *paradoxical*, and it was these various paradoxes that Torricelli would deploy so brilliantly in all his calculations.

The point is that the history of number supplies examples of how number can, on occasion, plug into its intensive dimension and become paradoxical (rather than orthodox). But what about today? What might the “numbering number” be today? It would have to be something that was fought over, contested, debated, denied existence, and something that seemed to shake the very foundations of mathematics. And it has to, in some way, leverage the paradoxical and the intensity of the virtual. It would have to delve into the depth of ordinal intensity and plug into the virtual potentiality of

number more generally. Although such ground-moving moments in mathematics are rare, the ramifications are world changing (Alexander 2014). But perhaps there is always a volcanic rumbling in even the simplest use of number. Might there be a way to sense this rumbling in recreational mathematics, or everyday mathematics, be it practical and accurate or off-the-wall and incoherent? Might we wish to encourage more mad paradoxical arithmetic in classrooms so that the numbering number might erupt in new revolutionary garb? For Deleuze and Guattari (1987), ordinality is a generative force, a zigzagging line of flight that can furnish paradoxical but creative misuses of number. By breaking up the orthodoxy around number sense and revealing the bias toward the cardinality concept, we can begin to imagine otherwise.

Chance and Dynamic Systems

Not only does Deleuze's work help us think differently about the spatiotemporal materiality of mathematical concepts like number, it also puts forward a new commingling of chance and algorithm well suited to our digital times. Deleuze turns to the mathematics of chance and dynamic systems in order to propose new ways of thinking interaction and sociality. He also turns to topology as a powerful way of reconceiving political relationships of proximity and circulation, building on the foundation of the differential calculus. He uses key topological concepts – manifolds, curvature, inflection points, and singularities – to discuss the way that socioeconomic forces move across an event, contracting into singular points of power (singularities) that structure the behavior of those around them (see especially Deleuze 1993 and later work with Guattari).

Deleuze (1988) claims that counting is not only an act of determination, but must actually entail a kind of dice throw. For instance, as I lean in to count the faces on a polyhedron, I move from face to face (one, two, three, etc.) and this activity entails my affirming not just the individuated number of faces, but *all of numeracy*, because numeracy is continuously thread into the folding

fabric of life. Counting is both a blocking of that continuity (performing a particular count and number) and an affirmation of it (feeling the flow of an absolute infinite count – all of indeterminate number) (Deleuze 1988). Deleuze inserts chance and multiplicity into each and every individual count, but also, and perhaps more controversially, he claims that number is precisely how chance thrives:

The thrown dice form the number which brings the dice throw back. Bringing the dice throw back the number puts chance back into the fire, it maintains the fire which reheats chance. This is because number is being, unity and necessity, but unity affirmed of multiplicity as such, being which is affirmed of becoming as such. Number is present in chance in the same way as being and law are present in becoming (Deleuze 2006, pp. 29–30).

There is a reciprocity between number and chance, insofar as the “thrown dice” forms or determines a number, but the number sustains the element of chance within it. This is what subverts statistical prediction and at the same time invites new speculative methods that deploy the quantitative. Deleuze is offering us a new vision of the relationship between the qualitative and the quantitative, a new way of thinking about the role of chance in our lives. He suggests that this new relationship demands a “qualitative probabilism” (Deleuze 1988).

This suggestion may sound too well suited to our new digital culture of probabilistic reasoning and calculated publics. But this idea of the count as that which *affirms all of chance at once* is precisely why his theory is so relevant to our computational times. We need to ask how one might think the quantitative in research methods and social theory without it being just a statistical striating of space (de Freitas et al, [in press](#)). Can we imagine a future where the quantitative in education research would offer creative and ethical adventures in thought? Could such a future reconfigure the relationship between the qualitative and the quantitative? How can social theory put the quantitative to work without it simply serving the control society? The numbering number is a kind of arithmetic that is “distributing number in space, instead of dividing up space,”

and thus it evokes a moving number, a number that is scattered and demolished, reassembled with chance, and thrown back into the fire. It is in this way that number becomes the “mobile occupant,” “directional number,” and “the ambulant fire.” This emphasis on number as *ambulant fire* in Deleuze’s books with Guattari raises the specter of a fractal geometry of singularities.

Singularities and Fractal Monsters

In *A thousand Plateaus*, in the chapter on smooth and striated space, Deleuze and Guattari (1987) mention the Koch snowflake and the Sierpensky sponge as examples of smooth spaces insofar as these kinds of figures pursue a fractional dimension, somewhere between line and plane or between plane and solid. Any space with a fractional dimension escapes conventional measures and is “the index of a properly directional space.” In other words, the dimensionality of a smooth space is determined by that which moves through it, rather than by some magnitude of containment. These fractal examples show how ordinality becomes inflected by chance, recursion, and singularity. They also point to a new kind of computational becoming, for it is through the iterative mobile calculating of a space-filling fractal that a line can fill a plane without ceasing to be a line.

For Deleuze and Guattari (1987), this is a crucial aspect of creative and dynamic spaces – that they do not have “a dimension higher than that which moves through it or is inscribed in it.” (p. 488). This is how number resists the containment of the cardinal, which is always the count of *how many* rather than the *flow* of the ordinal. Indeed, a condition for smooth space will be a mobile ordinal numbering, *occupying* without whole number counting. Fractals pursue this recursive directional number – indeed, monstrous calculations of this kind are another example of how calculation becomes monstrous and revolutionary (de Freitas 2015). Massumi (1992) declares “The plane of life itself . . . is a space-filling fractal of infinite dimension.” (p. 23). The

monstrous nondifferentiable but continuous Koch snowflake fractal, for example, proliferates singularities as it repeats and expands. Deleuze and Guattari use this example to describe a fractal image of life, to show how calculation can be *machinic but non-axiomatic*. They use fractals as monstrous calculating devices that transform the concept of measure and multiplicity.

The concept of the fractal became increasingly important in Guattari’s writing on chaosmosis, where various processes of fractalization figure prominently in thinking the sociopolitical subject. Fractals occupy fractional dimensional spaces and thereby break with conventions regarding space and embodiment. A fractal recombinant subject no longer abides by the dominant image of the organism and phenomenological subjectivity. Chance and algorithm commingle in the fractal subject, mutating and folding universe in new ways. A fractal subjectivity will find very different ways of becoming in the contemporary world. We can see that the differential calculus remains pivotal in the later work of Deleuze and Guattari, but it is the concept of the singularity that takes on more significance, doing the *structuring* work that is needed for fractal folding and recombinant becoming. Deleuze and Guattari (1987) tap into the infinitesimal as the calculating engine of their ontology, a means of differentiating the mathematical continuum (achieving the necessary “reciprocal presupposition” of our “common matter” (pp. 108–109)). This later work with Guattari builds on the early work of Deleuze, further developing the mathematical concept of singularity – as the generative and immanent dark precursor to life itself – to address the fractal folds of computational culture and post-quantum subjectivity.

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Deleuze, Religion, and Education

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Synonyms

[Deleuze, theology and learning](#)

Background

Deleuze was one of the most important French philosophers in the second half of the twentieth century. Deleuze saw his overall philosophical project in terms of overcoming transcendence and dogmatic images of thought that serves to reduce life to sad passions and *ressentiment* and in constructing an ontology of immanence and a thinking from the “outside.” Although Deleuze did not write specifically on a philosophy of religions, his critique of religious ideas makes it clear that he is in general critical of philosophy (Goodchild 2011, p. 139). However, unlike other thinkers who held an oppositional stance in relation to religions, he did not abandon religions but adopted a strategy of assimilating religious ideas that are positive and affirmative. This is why there is a continuous engagement with religious ideas in Deleuze's thought. Deleuze's approach toward religions is to be relevant in contemporary educational settings to the extent that it is marked by transcendence and dogmatic images of thought.

Deleuze and Religion

Deleuze is in general critical of religions. As early as in his first book on Hume, *Empiricism and Subjectivity*, he argued that religions are nothing but a fanciful, illegitimate, and extensive use of the rules of association (Deleuze 1991, p. 76). This attitude toward religions is extended in his

later works such as his last book with Felix Guattari *What is Philosophy?* where he states that religion introduces a form of transcendence that brings sadness (Deleuze and Guattari 1994, p. 43). It is clear that this transcendence did not depart but continues to work in modern institutions. In *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, for example, he lamented the fact that modern philosophy possesses a “theological character” that serves to enslave thought to *ressentiment* and sadness (Deleuze 1983). Just as modern institutions may carry this transcendent structure, modern education may likewise also possess elements of this transcendence. This is the reason why Deleuze warns us against the evolution of educational institutions into forms of continuous control and instantaneous communication, made possible via the introduction of “corporate thinking” into education (Deleuze 1995).

Deleuze’s philosophical project can be regarded in general as a “destructive” one in the sense that it combats against psychological, social, and priestly representations that turn life into a tragedy. In *Anti-Oedipus*, he argues against psychoanalysis’ attempt to resolve the Oedipal complex, because it actually only reinforces the mommy-daddy-me structure, which only serves the colonizing function of capitalism. In *Anti-Oedipus*, Deleuze also calls his philosophical project “schizoanalysis,” thus leaving us no doubt as to the destructive function of their philosophy, that is, to destroy the Oedipal as a dogmatic image of thought which has been imposed on our unconscious (Deleuze and Guattari 2004a, p. 342). This critique of Freud can be extended to the much broader sense of representations, or dogmatic images, that inscribe a regulative law or significance into desire. Deleuze calls this the priestly curse on desire (Deleuze and Guattari 2004b, p. 171).

Although Deleuze was critical of religions in general, it would be a mistake to think that his attitude was simply a negative one. There are also places where he seemed to hold a positive or at least a neutral evaluation with regard to religious ideas. In Deleuze’s engagement with Kant’s thought, for instance, he introduced the possibility of an “atheistic metaphysics” arriving from within

religions itself. Here Deleuze placed an importance on Kant’s theory of God not as an object of belief but as the transcendental ideal of pure reason that makes belief possible in the first place (Kant 1929, pp. 487–495). Kant’s theory is significant because here the idea of God no longer regarded as an object of belief but as a transcendental principle for the constitution of belief as such (Deleuze and Guattari 1984, p. 13). In Deleuze’s study of Bergson’s philosophy in Bergsonism, for instance, Deleuze also utilized Bergson’s theory to point beyond mere philosophical thought to a form of mystical thinking. According to Deleuze, it is the mystic who plays the whole of the universe as its “mystical soul” where philosophers can only consider such a soul “from the outside” (Deleuze 1988, p. 112).

Unlike other thinkers who adopted a more or less oppositional stance toward religions, like Nietzsche, Deleuze adopted a more moderate stance of adapting and modifying religious ideas for his purposes, because he believes that religious concepts, despite their “dogmatic” structures, can also offer us something of value. Thus, many of Deleuze’s philosophical concepts did not ignore but are built on the basis of philosophical ideas that are derived from religious debates in one way or other. For example, Deleuze’s use of the idea of univocity is derived from the philosophy of the thirteenth-century scholastic theologian Duns Scotus (Smith 2012, p. 169). In *Expressionism and Philosophy*, Deleuze also referred to Spinoza’s idea of “infinite substance” which is but a revaluation of the concept of God (Smith 2012, p. 174). In fact, some scholars even go to the extent of saying that the very chipping away at the repressive dimensions of religions produced something of value in thought. Accordingly, Shults has argued that hammering away at theism secretes “atheism” from the very structure of theism itself (Shults 2015, p. 1).

This suggests that for Deleuze the decisive philosophical divide is not simply between religious and the secular spheres but between immanence and transcendence. In the history of Western philosophy, the terms immanence and transcendence can have a number of the different registers depending on the contexts within which

they are placed. In metaphysics, transcendence refers to the belief that there is a transcendent One or Being that stands over and above the Many or beings. This sets up a duality and a hierarchy in which beings become lesser in relation to the One, thus reducing their power to “act.” Deleuze pitted his philosophy against this dualistic and transcendent form of thinking by constructing a philosophy of immanence. In fact, Daniel Smith would even go the extent of saying that Deleuze hunted down transcendence and sought to establish an ontology of immanence throughout his philosophical career (Smith 2003, p. 46). Thus, even though schizoanalysis has a negative function of smashing dogmatic images of thought, it is also important to realize that it possesses a positive function in the sense of mobilizing the “schizzes” of desiring production and the assembling of revolutionary “machines.” Deleuze and Guattari’s project is thus one of destruction and yet also one of affirmation.

Religions and Education

There are a number of works that focus on the significance of Deleuzian thought for education. Some of the most notable ones are Kaustav Roy’s *Teachers in Nomadic Spaces* (2008), Inna Semetsky’s *Nomadic Education* (2008), and William Reynolds and Julie Weaver’s *Expanding Curriculum Theory* (2002) (Carlin and Walin 2015: xxi). This emerging line of scholarship has provoked us to think and act in the sense of creating concepts that for escaping impasses of thought. However, while these works are important, there is a relatively lack of works that focus on the relationship between education and religions. If modern philosophy continues to be pervaded by its “theological” shadow, then likewise modern education can also be possessed by a traditional image of education. This is one where Paolo Freire (1984) might refer to as the “banking” method of education. This is a model in which the teacher occupies a central position in the classroom, in which the teacher occupies a privileged position with regard to the relay of knowledge to unsuspecting and unknowing

students who lack such knowledge. In such an educational model, there is created a situation of transcendence that is reenacted in the classroom, which reproduces the purported knowledge without any real explorations. In such situations, the teacher is placed in a privileged position, while his students are placed in a subordinate position. While this model has proven to be effective in relaying information, it reduces students into a passive position as it encourages absorption of information and not active thinking and learning. There is also much less opportunity when classes are about accepting information rather than explorations which reduces the chances for creativity.

One strategy of overcoming the inherent tendency of education to reduce students to passivity is by reducing the traditional hierarchical relationship between teachers and students in the classroom. Although this structural relationship has come to be accepted to be the norm in education, it is important to make the process of learning more democratic in order to facilitate the learning process and make it more active. The move toward a more student-centered and self-directed learning model in education rather than teacher centered and other directed is reflective of this change. This promises to return the students to their power to “act” and make learning more initiative. In recent years, Semetsky (2005) has called for self-organizing classroom where the hierarchical structure is dissolved, deterritorialization becomes a shared endeavor, and communication becomes transversal (Bonta 2013, p. 66). Cole has already discussed this concept where messages are broadcast to “concurrent independent objects” (Cole 2008, p. 24).

In addition to reducing the hierarchical structure in the classroom which has become prevalent in the educational system, it is also important to look into the motivations of students. Just as there are hierarchical structures in the educational system, there can also be a hierarchical structure in the students’ reliance on extrinsic and “transcendent” goals. Just putting students together in a classroom setting, and reducing the hierarchical position in class, may not necessarily lead to an improvement of learning behaviors. It may lead to some situations where learning becomes

problematic when students lack the necessary motivation to learn. Thus, in terms of motivation, Deleuze's critique of transcendence offers us a warning against an over reliance on extrinsic goals because this is a way of reinstalling transcendence. More importantly, it is about reemphasizing the learning process in education, making it affirmative and positive. Thus, the educational task in question is not in selecting between different extrinsic goals for learning but in affirmation of learning itself. From this perspective, the dominant neoliberal capitalist intrusion into university education obviously presents issues for a form of educational setting in which learning returns to a more privileged position. The drive to produce workers that respond to job training mentality and corporate thinking in fact poses an obstacle to learning itself which is characterized necessarily by a certain degree of creativity and uncertainty.

An important development in terms of a Deleuzian approach to learning and teaching would be the idea of "educational life-forms" (Cole 2011, p. 32). From this perspective, one of education's central aims is about making life stronger and more affirmative. This idea of education life-forms gives educators more options in teaching as it helps to steer them away from merely following the structured programs that enter into our unconscious. With regard to this, there is also a need for a "philosophy of life" that attends to our unconscious. As Cole has stated, Deleuze and Guattari's construction of the unconscious is one that is full of life – the multitude of signs flows, and territories in our minds are able to motivate and discourage us from behaving in certain ways. In this regard, we can no longer imagine that we can abstract ourselves from multitudes of signs that assail us, but with a "semiotics of life," we are able to track and use the energy of the movement of signs in everyday life. This, according to Cole, is what Deleuze and Guattari would call a "schizoanalysis"; this is whereby we learn the semiotics of life so that it enables us to engage in a reading of psychosomatic energies and their dispersal into the social in an affirmative way. This suggests that we are not

to seek to escape the madness of capitalist signs but to harness that madness to our advantage, by expanding the unconscious and then accelerating the consequent imaginative powers. We can use the semiotics of life as educational life-forms in that schizoanalysis and abstract machines are methods for not merely turning away from transcendence but in using the unconscious as a creative and regenerating force. Thus, Deleuzian philosopher offers us a way of harnessing the play of forces in the creative unconscious and using this force to make change happen in the world (Cole 2011, pp. 31–33).

An important element in terms of a Deleuzian approach to education, then, would involve inquiries into religious forms of thinking. Just as Deleuze did not abandon religions but extracted from these religious ideas a form of thought that is affirmative and positive, it is also important for us not to avoid religious ideas as a thing of the past but to examine it carefully and learn from its positive and affirmative aspects. If the main divide is between immanence and transcendence and not between the religious and the secular from a Deleuzian perspective, then an important aspect of education involves examining religious thinking, if only because they continue to pervade our thinking and exercise a hold over us, even over our educational thinking. More importantly, as some scholars such as Shults and Goodchild might say, when we turn toward religious ideas, we may find a core that is either "atheistic" and yet close to the divine (Goodchild 2011, p. 163). Hence, although Deleuze is in general dismissive and critical of religions, we must note that he is not against religions per se but against its transcendental structure, and this structure has continued to operate in modern institutions. Given that this is so, then the task at hand is to hunt down *the transcendental structure in both religions and secular institutions, and that includes the educational system as well*. The question then becomes clear. The problem is not in making education secular or in excluding religions from education but in finding and hunting down the theological and transcendental structures in religions and in our structures of thought. *This suggests that it is also possible to*

find in the religious, elements that are not transcendent but immanent. If this is correct, then turning away from religious thinking runs the risk of dismissing a crucial dimension of thought itself. This is perhaps the reason why although Deleuze has consistently been dismissive of religious ideas, criticizing also the theological ideas that reduce life to sad passions in his more critical studies, he never turns away from the religious.

In terms of resources, there are a number of studies on the intersections between Deleuze's philosophy and religions which may help us review the structures of education. The late Mary Bryden's edited volume of *Deleuze and Religion* (2001) is an important contribution to Deleuzian scholarship in this respect as it contains a number of articles by different scholars reflecting on Deleuze's religious connections. In addition to this volume, there are also others such as Joshua Ramey's *The Hermetic Deleuze* (2012), Christopher Ben Simpson's *Deleuze and Theology* (2012), and Kristien Justaert's *Theology After Deleuze* (2012). More recently, the publication of F. LeRon Shults' *Iconoclastic Theology: Gilles Deleuze and the Secretion of Atheism* (2014) also presents an interesting perspective on Deleuze's attitude toward religions. Deleuze's approach to religious ideas promises to offer us a model for reintroducing critical religious studies as a necessary component in today's secular educational system today. While there are obvious issues in reintroducing religious studies in secular education, the answer does not seem to be to view religious education with suspicion or to abandon it altogether but to extract its affirmative and positive elements for the sake of diversity. Using Deleuzian terminology, the real challenge is in avoiding "dogmatic image of thought" and not abandoning thought altogether.

Conclusion: Education and Neoliberalism

One of the more dominant themes in contemporary educational theory that relate Deleuze's work to education concerns the radical transformation

that educational institutions are undergoing in the age of neoliberalism. Some of the main transformations concern the introduction of new educational technologies and pedagogies, teaching analytics and online MOOCs, etc. which require seemingly endless repetitive administrative tasks which seem to have little to do with education. These constitute new developments in education that together frame and inhabit our educational institutions. In fact, what has become quite controversial in recent years is the way in which university education has become increasingly restrictive, demanding professors track, measure, and report on exactly how their students are learning. This expansion of the teacher's role from mere teaching and research to one of tracking and surveillance is but one of the many changes facing university education in the age of neoliberalism (Bonta 2013, p. 71). Deleuze himself decried the colonization of public post-secondary education in France by the business model that attempted to align curricula to the workplace, essentially transforming universities into training schools (Deleuze and Guattari 1994; Bonta 2013, p. 57). This accounts for Gough's recent statement that university education should be rhizomatic and challenge arborescent models of thought (Gough 2006). While traditional forms of resistance advocated by Paulo Freire now seem outdated, a consideration of Deleuze's approach to religions offers us at least two new insights as to the correct methods of engaging the phenomenon of corporatizing of higher education today. Namely, what is significant in Deleuze and Guattari's works is that these are in some ways expressions of the people's desire (Savat and Thompson 2015) and that it is not always necessary to oppose them because their energies could be recuperated for transformation of the educational landscape (Cole 2011).

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Deleuze, Theology and Learning

► Deleuze, Religion, and Education

Deleuze's Philosophy for Education

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Synonyms

Affects; Concepts; Deleuze; Edusemiotics; Ethics; Experience; Logic; Pragmatism; Subjectivity

Introduction

Gilles Deleuze's philosophy has an enormous potential for educational theory, pedagogical practice, and educational research methods and policy. The questions asked by Deleuze (and Deleuze & Guattari in their combined works) address important areas for education such as human subjectivity, experience, logic, language, ethics, creativity, and desire. Deleuze's philosophy is pragmatic and has a surprising affinity with Dewey's educational philosophy with its attention to problematic situations and learning from experience. Deleuze's is the pedagogy of concepts: practical, experimental pedagogy oriented to focusing on problems that defy univocal solutions but represent experimentation with the world and ourselves leading to the creation of new meanings and values. Deleuze's philosophy defies static “being” in lieu of dynamic “becoming” made possible by relations and connections. Rational thought is complemented by non-thought, or unthought and affective, dimension. Philosophical thinking demands the creation of the new. It has strong political implications, reflecting Deleuze's ontology of the virtual, and as such is future oriented, addressing the people yet to come.

Education as inspired by Deleuze's philosophy is untimely: it can transcend the physical present and allows us to envisage multiple opportunities in the open future.

Philosophy as Geography

Within the Continental tradition, Deleuze is an odd figure. His thinking has a surprising affinity with American pragmatic tradition, especially with such figures as Charles S. Peirce and John Dewey (Semetsky 2006). Deleuze's philosophical method has important implications for philosophy of education (and, significantly, in the context of the recently developed new direction, *edusemiotics*). Deleuze and Guattari described philosophy as a geography of reason (geophilosophy) using the metaphors of maps, diagrams, lines, and planes for expressing the nuances of such experiential and experimental thinking that does not reject logic (Semetsky 2013) while denying binary codes. It is linked to the logic of multiplicities which are relational rather than substantial entities; hence, they defy direct representation in conscious thought or by verbal language. Being signs, they indirectly and enigmatically, like hieroglyphs to be deciphered and interpreted, portend and point to something other than themselves. Any given multiplicity always has a middle element as the included third "located" in-between presupposed binary opposites. Such logic (or semiotics) deals a fatal blow to the two terms in a relation that are usually presented as opposing each other in the framework of Cartesian dualism or analytic reason alike.

Deleuze's logic is a-signifying and represents an innovative mix of Peirce's triadic logic of relations and Hjelmslev's linguistics; both perspectives surpassing Saussurean semiology where the unit of analysis is represented by a signifier-signified dyad. Deleuze and Guattari employ Peirce's notion of diagram as a constructive part of relational dynamics. A diagram acts as a semi-otic bridge that functions as a transversal connection crossing over an a-signifying gap by virtue of conjunction "and." Thus, meanings are conferred not by reference to some external object but via

mediation in the relational, or rhizomatic, network whose contours are always changing. Rhizome is a biological metaphor that underscores the living character of signs situated in life and in experience and points to their impending growth and transformation. Deleuze's philosophy makes accent on problematic instances in human experiences, not unlike Dewey's attention to problematic situations, transactions, and revaluations of experience rather than finite solutions.

Rhizome

As embedded in the perplexity of the real-life problematic event, rhizome goes in diverse directions instead of a single path, multiplying its own lines and establishing the plurality of unpredictable connections in the open-ended space of its growth. In short, it lives. It does not represent exactly, but only maps our tentative ways, paths, and movements. Rhizome belongs to the new image of thought that differs from the dogmatic Cartesian paradigm and whose central concept is dynamic *becoming* in contrast to static *being*. As a symbol for unlimited becoming through the multitude of its own inter-connections, rhizome is contrasted with a tree, the latter symbolizing the linear and direct reasoning that establishes a striated model of dichotomous divisions (the tree of Porphyry – *arbor Porphyrii*) as an example of the classificatory system, a hierarchical structure based on discrete definitions that serve as the foundation for rational – demonstrable and certain – knowledge. Yet, modern emphasis on the knowledge economy tends to restrict the process of becoming. Deleuze warns: "One can envisage education . . . giving way to frightful continual training, to continual monitoring of worker-schoolkids or bureaucrat-students. They try to present it as a reform of the school system, but it's really its dismantling" (Deleuze 1995, p. 175).

Experience, Virtual, and Actual

Deleuze's ontology posits the virtual field of becoming that can produce practical effects.

The virtual contains differences, while the actual contains identities; both planes however are real. The virtual expresses itself in different regimes of extralinguistic signs, sometimes at the level of silent, unconscious, discourse (Semetsky 2010) such as involuntary memories or images. Human experience is an extended milieu populated with affective becomings as sign relations. Relations are ontologically prior and external to their terms, thereby invalidating the whole dualistic split expressed in the logical copula "is." Instead, it is the conjunction "and" itself an in-between relation that is ontologically basic. Experience is a-subjective, impersonal, and irreducible to an individual property of the egocentric *Cogito*; rather subjects are constituted in relations by means of intensive individuations via becoming-other within experiential events as folds. Experience is enfolded in the public world and spills over the boundaries of the private Cartesian subject with its isolated instrumental rationality grounded in "I think therefore I am." Experience needs to be transcended – freed from the constraints of common sense – hence infusing empiricism with its transcendental dimension. Deleuze's empiricism is radically transcendental! *Transcendental empiricism* enables an interpretation of signs, signals, and symptoms in practice, thus making sense for the singularity of events. The French word *sens* means at once sense or meaning, and a direction of the course of action that we take in our practical lives depending on the circumstances and contexts of problematic experiences.

Affects and Becomings

The dynamic subject's complex process of formation is described by the intensive capacity to affect and be affected. The production of subjectivity is based on the autonomy of affect as if it were a real being, a force. The forceful, as if physical, intensity of an encounter with an affect marks the passage between the experiential states of the body, which is defined by Deleuze, borrowing from Spinoza, as both physical and mental. Accordingly, the body's power is being changed.

Deleuze specifies the body's power as a capacity to multiply and intensify connections. Conflicting real-life experiences are characterized by their difference; philosophical thinking, then, is conceptualized as the quasi-empirical, practical, mapping of such a difference. By constituting the very content of the movable and moving concepts, the affective dimension is complemented by percepts: "Percepts aren't perceptions, they're packets of sensations and relations that live on independently of whoever experiences them. Affects aren't feelings, they are becomings that spill over beyond whoever lives through them (thereby becoming someone else)" (Deleuze 1995, p. 137). The Deleuzian subject, in a process of becoming-other, is open to an interference of those dynamic affective forces as experiential signs. The transformational pragmatics of experience begins amidst of a "broken chain of affects" (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, p. 9) that reside in life, not just in one's mind.

Pedagogy of Concepts

For Deleuze, the theory of signs is meaningless without the relation between signs and the corresponding apprenticeship in practice. The word *apprendre* in French means to learn, hence apprenticeship. Fixed facts and linguistic truths are not all there is, and we are wrong to believe in truth; rather, there are interpretations: reading the signs of experience. The existential meanings are created as a function of an encounter in the here and now that always already elicits new and differently distributed contexts for which new concepts are to be created. This is what Deleuze called the *pedagogy of concepts*: it is practical learning from experience oriented to real-life problems that defy univocal solutions but represent experimentation with the world and ourselves. Concepts are invented in practice and cannot be reduced to any a priori theoretical judgment. Concepts are not limited to linking the propositions in consciousness: they are (in)corporeal and always express an event as an experiential singularity rather than universal and eternal essence.

The relevance for education is paramount: as Deleuze and Guattari said, “If the three ages of the concept are the encyclopedia, pedagogy, and commercial professional training, only the second can safeguard us from falling from the heights of the first into the disaster of the third” (1994, p. 12). Learning cannot take place as representation: this would be the reproduction of the same, denounced by Deleuze. A novel conceptual understanding of a particular event is not a prerogative of consciousness: mind is extended to the level of the body within nature that embodies the unconscious dimension of experience. It is due to a bond between ourselves and the world that new meanings are created. The unconscious surpasses the Freudian personal unconscious and is “a productive machine ... at once social and desiring” (Deleuze 1995, p. 144). The unconscious is a collective assemblage situated in the material world, usually studied exclusively by physics. Still physics gives way to biology in Deleuze’s corpus, to all matter as radically alive while just manifesting the different degrees of intensity: the frequency of its expression on different planes. Deleuze shares the ancient Hermetic, esoteric, philosophical worldview in this regard.

The Production of Subjectivity

The creation of concepts is impossible without unconscious affects as non-thoughts. As an unconscious *desire* in contrast to one’s conscious *will*, such unthought dimension of experience borders on bodily, as yet a-conceptual, affect. In his move against the Cartesian method, Deleuze speaks of *paideia*, stating that for the Greeks thought was not based on a premeditated decision to think: thinking is motivated by specific – and often shocking – conditions in real experience that will have deterritorialized our habitual patterns of thought and actions. The subtle language of the unconscious, in the process of individuation as the transformation of our habitual attitudes, is to be perceived. Deleuze wants to achieve the means so as to be able to show the imperceptible “hiding” in affects – that is, become capable of bridging the eternal gap, haunting us since Antiquity, between

the sensible and the intelligible. The task of transversal communication is indeed “to bring [the] assemblage of the unconscious to the light of the day, to select the whispering voices, to gather ... secret idioms from which I extract something I call my Self” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, p. 84): human subjectivity can be (re)created.

Subjectivity of this sort has little to do with a preexisting, fully fledged, and a priori constituted subject. There is no return to the old self, but invention and creation of new possibilities of life by means of unfolding experiential signs. The world is folded – im-plied with possibilities (*le pli* in French means *the fold* in English) that need to be ex-plied. Deleuze points out (citing Henri Michaux, the author of *The Space Within*) that children are born with 22-folds which need to be unfolded in life. In this respect, there cannot be a priori subject; rather, it is a process of the production of subjectivity through work that forces us to frame a new question, to posit a new problem as a function of experience from which we learn. It is life that is our school! Deleuze’s philosophy problematizes the Enlightenment project with its perception of children being blank slates or *tabula rasa*. This perception is a suspect in the philosophy of material encounters, which affect the body’s very power expressed by means of multiplying and intensifying connections as if producing a complex rhizome rather than planting a simple root and, accordingly, raising the degree to which human capacities may be increased. There is no beginning or end. There is no *tabula rasa*: we enter the process in the very middle, in the *intermezzo* laying down rhythms that constitute experiential folds.

The solely rational intentionality as the mark of human consciousness is surpassed by the fold of being as populated by what Deleuze called little, or micro-, perceptions; philosophical thinking is reconceptualized as a cartographic microanalysis devoted to establishing an unconscious psychic mechanism that engenders the perceived in consciousness. It is impossible to achieve new conceptual understanding or to create new meanings and values without becoming aware of the unconscious in our embodied practice. Deleuze’s pedagogy of concepts is inseparable from the

pedagogy of values, the task of which (in contrast to the traditional model of character education focusing on inculcating values if not on direct indoctrination) is *to create* new values oriented to singular modes of existence rather than any absolute commandments. Instead of conforming to fixed moral criteria, the process of subject formation is affective and esthetic, and the system of affects replaces rigid moral codes.

Education as Critical, Clinical, and Creative

Deleuze's philosophical method is nomadic (Semetsky 2008) and implies the reversal of traditional moral education that often reduces values to atomistic facts while forgetting that even Socrates doubted whether virtues could be directly taught. Deleuze (1995) used to identify teaching and learning with the research laboratory as the epitome of novelty, creativity, and multiple becomings that challenge the necessity of some superior educational aims or technical objectives imposed from without and accordingly demanding some transcendent accountability. Rather, it is a developed sense of immanent responsibility oriented first of all to oneself while simultaneously becoming-other. The pedagogy of values is irreducible to instruction and is not just a question of intellectual understanding. It involves intensity, resonance, and musical harmony. Its rationale is pragmatic and exists in the essential and positive relation to non-philosophy as a form of art that encompasses, in addition to critical thought, also clinical and creative dimensions located in experience and leading to new modes of existence as embodying new concepts, meanings, and values created in practice. It is an interdependence of thought and life and of mind and world that leads to Deleuze's philosophy encompassing both critical and clinical aspects. The critical dimension is compatible with Dewey's assigning to philosophy the function of criticism of criticisms. Yet his logic as a theory of practical, experiential inquiry necessarily includes affective thought. As for clinical, it is not derived from some discourse on pathology; instead, its model

is vitality, wholeness, and immanence aiming toward joy and devoted to the intensification of life.

An element of creativity is expressed in Deleuze's neologism *transcoding* that defies a habitual transmission of facts from a teacher to a student; instead, education becomes a transcoded passage between experiential milieus that leads to the construction of a new plane, as if of surplus value or the excess of potential meanings that were "dormant" in the unconscious. Deleuze uses musical metaphors of melodies in counterpoint serving as a motif for another. Thus, education informed by Deleuze's ingenious non-philosophy becomes possible only providing a teacher and a student serve as a motif for each other: they both, acting as a multiplicity, create a novel meaning that demonstrates *what the body can do* in accord with the logic of sense (Deleuze 1990) that defies direct (unmediated), logical or ideological alike, representations.

Conclusion

The role of a philosopher of education, if Deleuze's philosophy is used as a model, becomes the one of a clinician or physician of culture described as an inventor of new immanent modes of existence as making a difference in real life with regard to the ethico-political spectrum of experience. Such ethics is strongly opposed to morality. Morality presupposes rigid codes and norms embedded in the hierarchical structure of schooling or society at large, but ethics discards the existing norms in favor of new values created in experience, in life per se via the heterogeneous, multileveled, rhizomatic structures of multiple becomings. Indeed, Deleuze and Guattari designate the people of politics who can create real changes as a *people to come*. Because subjectivity has to be produced, these people may find themselves to be the uncanny products of untimely experimentations. They belong to "an oppressed, bastard, lower, anarchical, nomadic, irremediably minor race [and] have resistance in common – their resistance to death, to servitude, to the intolerable, to shame, and to

the present” (Deleuze and Guattari 1994, pp. 109–110). Resistance to the present means becoming aware of the future. This aspect of Deleuze’s practical and immanent philosophy is extremely important for educational futures. Education as inspired by Deleuze’s philosophy can transcend the physical present allowing to envisage multiple opportunities in the open future as a field of multiple becomings. We don’t have to generalize the politics of Deleuze’s philosophy, but rather posit a question, as Hardt (1993) does in his study: “What can Deleuze’s thought afford us? What can we make of Deleuze? In other words, what are the useful tools we find in his philosophy for furthering our own political endeavors?” (Hardt 1993, p. 119) or, for that matter, advancing and broadening the field of educational theory and philosophy.

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Deliberative Inquiry

► [Cavell and Postmodern Education](#)

Deligny, Fernand (1913–1996)

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Introduction

Since the past couple of years, the life and works of the French educator Fernand Deligny (1913–1996) increasingly have attracted the attention of artists, professionals, and academic scholars coming from divergent backgrounds. This current interest in Deligny’s work partly seems to be triggered by the 2007 publication of Deligny’s collected works and recently has led, among other things, to the publication of the first volume of texts translated from French into English, namely, *The arachnean and other texts*. Current interest in Deligny’s work, however, also needs to be framed within contemporary discussions about what it means to be human. Amplified by the societal challenges posed to both European as well as non-European countries in the past few years – one, for example, can think about the ongoing refugee crisis and the rise of ecological concerns – the question, for example, of how we can live together seems to address itself anew. As it becomes more and more unclear on the basis of what we can define what being human is about, how one should shape education in order to bring it about, and how we can continue to live together in our rapid changing societies; the radical ideals about language, subjectivity and education to be found in the work of Deligny will undoubtedly end up in thought-provoking debates and refreshing experiments.

Deliberative Democracy

► [Dewey on Public Education and Democracy](#)

The Art of Evading Language

Who was Fernand Deligny? This time, to pose the question is not to answer it. Drifting around on

that huge ocean of twentieth-century intellectual thought, Deligny's work cannot be fixed or turned into a system. It excels in its resistance toward all kinds of classification. Drifting around on the words, sentences, paragraphs, and images he produced throughout his life; the raft that consists of his actions, ideas, and dreams both departed from and floated upon the different (educational) theories and practices that alternated one another. There are of course things that can be said like the fact that Deligny was born in the city of Bergues in the North of France, that he started but did not finish his psychological studies at the university of Lille, that he lost his father during the First World War, and that he died at the age of 83 in the Cevennes, the region where he arrived in the night of the 13th on the 14th of July 1967. If this information can be said to provide the framework of his life, Deligny would time and again paint the canvas of his life anew, never to end up in a fixed state of mind, to produce a system or become institutionalized. Together with his aversion to institutions and becoming domesticated by some kind of symbol, Deligny's continuous attempts to live together with people who were dismissed as incurable, unlivable, and insupportable run as a red thread throughout his life. In the existing overviews of his life and work in general, four phases are distinguished. Not satisfied with his studies in psychology at the University of Lille, Deligny, first of all, started to work in the nearby psychiatric hospital of Armentières in the beginnings of the 1930s. Secondly, one refers to his work as an educator in some of the special schools for 'feble-minded' children in Paris around 1936. In the third phase, Deligny devotes himself to the development of a huge network for young delinquents called *La Grande Cordée*. And finally, one refers to Deligny's experiences with autistic individuals from 1967 onward. Two anecdotes taken from the first two phases might help to set the stage for which Deligny wrote innumerable scripts – some of which have not yet been explored as they are archived in some 38 boxes in the Institut Mémoires de l'édition Contemporaine (IMEC, Abbaye d'Ardenne, Saint-Germain-la-Blanche-Herbe, France).

The first example is taken from Deligny's passage at the psychiatric institute of Armentières. Besides the adult psychiatric patients, the walls of that institute also contained some children who were said to be "idiots" or "imbeciles." As at that time no special educational initiatives were deployed for these children, Deligny started a kind of sheltered workshop in the basement for these children. In order to run the workshop, Deligny needed some additional personnel. Instead of looking out for trained and certified educators or psychologists, however, Deligny deliberately only wanted to recruit his personnel from the large number of unemployed laborers that populated the North of France at that time. Not being plunged in and convinced by the contemporary pedagogical and psychological theories about human development and learning already at that time seemed to have been for Deligny a *conditio sine qua non* for the creation of opportunities where the self and the other could meet in a non-domesticating way. Not trying to frame the gestures and appearances of the other in some kind of preestablished order or structure also seems to have been central to his work as a special educator in the special school and classes in Paris toward the end of the 1930s. What does it mean to educate, Deligny asks himself in the preface to the 1976 reedition of a 1949 collection of stories entitled *Les enfants ont des oreilles*. When answering this question by saying that it is all about telling stories, Deligny refers to a particular experience he had with one of his pupils in the special class he was responsible for. All of a sudden, Deligny states, the boy found himself to his own surprise in front of the blackboard on which he had drawn something that appeared to be a rectangle. The boy probably had done so because he once had seen someone drawing a similar shape. Deligny, however, instead of asking the boy what precisely he had been drawing, what he was doing there in front of the blackboard, started to tell his class a story: "Once there was a table that had lost its legs. . . ." Together with the previous anecdote, this story about the boy in front of the blackboard demonstrates Deligny's continuous preoccupation not to end up in systems that consequently would form the basis in

order to represent the other. On the contrary, representation in general and language in particular seemed to stand for everything that Deligny tried to avoid. According to Deligny, our language did not differ much from the iron grids that were to be encountered when one opened the window of, for example, the psychiatric institute of Armentières. It was our words themselves who imprisoned the other and denied him or her the necessary time and space to develop a lifestyle of its own. Education, for Deligny, therefore should not be focused on the other – be it based on emotions of love or hatred. Education, first of all, should be directed to oneself and should consist in looking out for ways to evade one's own norms and values, deep-seated presuppositions, and jammed way of speaking. In a letter written to the communist Louis Althusser in 1976, he formulated this very clearly: "In our practice, what is the object? This or that child, 'psychotic' subject? For sure it is not. The real object one should transform, is ourselves, us there, close to those 'subjects', who, when we speak clearly, are hardly there and it is therefore, that THEY are, there."

Deligny refers to his initiatives as *tentatives* or attempts. In order to make clear what he considered to be a tentative, he at one point refers to the pearl divers. Intrigued as he was by some of the anthropological research conducted by, for example, Victor Turner and Daniel Fabre, Deligny came across this peaceful population whose main activity consisted in diving for pearls. In Deligny's account of the pearl divers' history, the fishermen in the beginning were confronted with a major problem. Time and again, when they wanted to locate the pearls on the bottom of the ocean, the men were confronted by their own image and thus not able to look through the ocean's surface. What they saw was the reflection of themselves. This, according to Deligny, is also what happens when we are confronted with another person. We are not capable of perceiving or making sense of the otherness of the other as this otherness is always hidden behind the reflections of ourselves. In order to counter the problem they were confronted with, the pearl divers needed to invent something that would enable them to look through their own reflection and thus beyond

the surface of the ocean. The simple technique they invented consisted of an old metal cookie box whose metal bottom was replaced by a piece of glass. It was this simple instrument that enabled the pearl divers to evade their own reflection and find the precious pearls on the bottom of the ocean.

Deligny's aversion toward language, however, did not end up in a kind of radical silence. Deligny continued to use words, to write and to speak. What he looked for were cracks and abysses where it would become clear that "water" – to mention just one example – was not only made for drinking. Applied to the question mentioned in the introduction, Deligny attempted to create spaces where subjects could again become individuals and show their humanity in ways that could neither be predicted nor restrained. The transformation Deligny was looking for was a transformation from a way of speaking that started from ONE to a way of speaking that originated from WE. The French word "on" (as in "on parle" or "one speaks") represented for Deligny everything that he wanted to stay away from as far as possible. The "on" referred to the innumerable ideologies that tried to mold the lives of individuals into particular shapes and to frame these by particular names.

The importance of this conspicuous attitude toward language again became clear to Deligny when he was confronted with the mother of a boy who was diagnosed by contemporary psychiatry as severely autistic and therefore intolerable, unbearable, and incurable. The boy's mother did not know what to do anymore as time and again psychiatric institutions and other organizations had refused to offer help. After being introduced to the mother and her son, Deligny decided to go to the Cevennes where he at first stayed in a house owned by Guattari. Confronted with the many negative reactions of students and intellectuals that frequented the same house – some of them simply could not handle the presence of the individuals Deligny decided to live with – Deligny moved to a neighboring commune where he continued his attempt to live close to those individuals contemporary psychiatry had abandoned. Besides the fact that Deligny had contacts with

Guattari – due to his stay in the psychiatric institution of *La Borde* – the Cevennes also attracted Deligny for some other reasons. Apparently the Cevennes played an important role in the French resistance during World War II. On top of that the Southern region was well-known for its bygone silk industry that matched perfectly well with the idea of wandering lines Deligny developed while living in the presence of people like Janmari, the teenage boy with whom Deligny arrived in the Cevennes in the year 1967.

People like Janmari constituted and still constitute a real problem for phonocentric societies structured around the primacy of the spoken language. In a 2007 video autism activist Amanda Baggs has offered the spectator a translation of her criticism toward this phonocentrism: “I find it very interesting by the way that failure to learn your language is seen as a deficit but failure to learn my language is seen as so natural that people like me are officially described as mysterious and puzzling rather than anyone admitting that it is themselves who are confused . . . We (autistic persons, PV) are even viewed as non-communicative if we don’t speak the standard language but other people are not considered non-communicative if they are so oblivious to our language as to believe they don’t exist.” Baggs’ plea for accepting the manifold forms language can take on – rather than to reduce these to one or two accepted ones – can be found back in Deligny’s attempt to create a communal space where the people with whom he lived could demonstrate their humanity on their own terms. Instead of normalizing the behavior and the communication between the “autists” and Deligny and his collaborators, a silence was looked for that would enable both to hear new sounds. It’s important to note, however, that in order to speak of an attempt, all intentionality should be out of the question. Attempts cannot and could never for Deligny be considered a kind of project that already knew where it would land. Attempts rather emerge from mere activities, actions, and gestures that for no reason in particular are repeated and after a while seem to contain some

meaning that could not have been foreseen. That for instance was the case with the drawings Deligny and his collaborators started to make from the end of the 1960s onward. While living in small communities in the mountainous area of the Cevennes, life consisted mainly of some daily activities (“coutumier” or “customary” in English) and daily walks. At some point one of the collaborators started to keep track of the wanderings of the boys and also those of the collaborators who lived together with them. After some days, weeks, or years of drawing, the practice consisted of drawings made on regular paper and drawings made on transparent wax paper, the former presenting the wanderings of the collaborators and the latter those of the boys. While the drawings nowadays increasingly seem to attract a lot of interest from art galleries, for Deligny they consisted of a technique that tried to avoid his own reflection, the domesticating nature of the language, and the symbols that we use when speaking about and with the other. After being put on top of one another, the regular and the transparent wax paper seemed to draw the attention of the collaborators to something they were not aware of, points of contact that both the collaborators and the boys/girls frequented. In between the gaze of the collaborators and the gestures/movements of the boys/girls, a space seemed to become visible where the other could show him-/herself in a way that was not predefined. For Deligny, as stated in his *Le groupe et la demande*: “il serait peut-être temps de repenser l’éducation en fonction de notre monde à plusieurs profondeurs.” The practice of drawing is only one of the attempts Deligny created throughout his life. Other examples of his eagerness to find cracks in the language we use and be able to reach new and unheard territories of humanity consisted in making use of the camera, for instance, something he reflected upon in one of his publications entitled *Le caméra, outil pédagogique*.

Up till today people are working and living in the Cevennes in the presence of one another/the other along the lines of what Deligny had called tentatives. Among others the French Jacques Lin

who published numerous publications on his experiences like *Le droit au silence* or *La vie de radeau*. As a trembling line of flight, Deligny's thoughts, actions, words, and gestures seem to inspire aesthetical as well as intellectual searches for new grounds where humanity can reinvent itself. Among other things one, for example, can refer to the work of the Belgian choreographer Alain Platel who already several times based one of his performances on the intangible heritage of Fernand Deligny. But Deligny also seems to have attracted the attention of philosophers like Giorgio Agamben in order to rethink the ways we can think about community. In a world that is hesitantly thinking about leaving the primacy of the individual in such a way that it will be able to avoid the pitfalls of nationalism and communism, the work of Deligny might become a simple empty, metal cookie box.

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Dennett, Daniel (1942–)

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Introduction

Daniell C. Dennett, American philosopher, is Distinguished Arts and Sciences Professor, Professor of Philosophy, and Director of the Center for Cognitive Studies at Tufts University (USA). His main concern is the philosophy of mind. He intends to give a mechanical explanation of the functioning of consciousness, harmonizing ideas from Wittgenstein, Ryle, Quine, and current results from experimental psychology. For this reason, he may be described as a thinker who advocates a certain type of Behaviorism by means of: (i) a skeptical attitude towards traditional philosophical discourse; (ii) a

thoroughgoing nominalism which rejects essences and ultimate truths; (iii) an optimistic scientism which includes the belief that the best explanation of the functioning of consciousness will be provided by an account of human beings qua biological organisms under evolutionary constraints. Dennett's approach is not only naturalistic, but also functionalist, in the sense that human organisms are biological machines whose behavior is controlled by their brains. Such a functionalism is connected with a prevailing interest in relations rather than in properties. This means that the "properties" of objects tend to be treated as relations and that objects are viewed not in themselves, but holistically, that is, in their connections with other objects. In many ways, Dennett's thinking is close to Rorty's, Nietzsche's, and Derrida's thinking. Dennett's style is very much fascinating. He is strikingly able to offer new ideas in a way which is accessible not only to professional philosophers, but also to the great public in general. This is usually done through his method of telling very imaginative elucidative stories, which he calls "intuition pumps," in order to make his ideas clear.

Dennett was born in 1942 in Boston. In 1963 he got his B.A. in philosophy from the University of Harvard. He got his Ph.D. in 1965, having worked under the supervision of Gilbert Ryle (University of Oxford – UK). From 1965 to 1971, he taught at U.C. Irvine. Since then he is teaching at Tufts University.

His main books are: *Content and Consciousness* (1969), *Brainstorms: Philosophical Essays on Mind and Psychology* (1978), *The Mind's I: Fantasies and Reflections on Self and Soul* (co-edited with D. Hofstadter, 1981), *Elbow Room: The Varieties of Free Will Worth Wanting* (1984), *The Intentional Stance* (1987), *Consciousness Explained* (1991), *Darwin's Dangerous Idea* (1995), *Kinds of Minds: Towards an Understanding of Consciousness* (1996), and *Brainchildren: Essays on Designing Minds* (1998).

Dennett's philosophy is full of theoretical innovations, of which Bo Dahlbom, in his Editor's Introduction to the book *Dennett and his Critics – Demystifying Mind* (1995), makes the

following list: the taxonomy of stances, the intentional systems theory, the consciousness of time, elbow room, hoping for hieroglyphics, free-floating rationales, abstracta and illata, centers of narrative gravity, virtual machines, real patterns, multiple drafts, heterophenomenology, the Baldwin effect, etc. For reasons of space, only some of these aspects will be treated here. In order to make a more comprehensive although brief exposition of Dennett's Philosophy, we shall develop in a more detailed way the main ideas in his method of heterophenomenology, his characterization of the "intentional stance," his Multiple Drafts model to explain consciousness, and his Darwinian perspective in philosophy.

Heterophenomenology

In Dennett's sense, "phenomenology" involves the description of anything that belongs to our conscious experience. The usual perspective adopted by traditional phenomenologists is Descartes' first-person perspective, in which I describe my internal experience in a monologue which I let other people overhear, counting on everybody to agree. This is based on what Dennett calls "the first-person-plural presumption": we (another person and I) may speak comfortably together about the things we both find in our streams of consciousness. But the first-person perspective is misleading and generates errors. In fact, we know that most reports made under such conditions are subject to controversy. We may be mistaken either about the extent to which we persons are all basically alike or about the reliability of introspection (instead of merely observing internal phenomena, we might be theorizing about them). Dennett appeals to an interesting "visit to the phenomenological garden," in order to show that we do have some privileged access to our conscious experience, but that we also do tend to think that we are much immune to error in this field than we really are. For this reason, he suggests that we should use the behaviorists' third-person perspective, according to which only facts gathered "from the outside" will count as data. Now mental events do not

seem to be among the data of science. But this does not mean we cannot study them in a scientific way. The challenge is to construct a theory of mental events, using only the data allowed by scientific method.

For accomplishing this task, Dennett offers the method he calls “heterophenomenology.” The method is neutral for investigating and describing the phenomena belonging to our conscious experience. It involves a cluster of experiments and observations in order to extract and purify texts from speaking subjects. Such texts are further used to generate a theoretical hypothesis, the subject’s heterophenomenological world, which is populated with all the images, sensations, events, and feelings that the subject apparently believes sincerely to exist in his or her stream of consciousness. This world is a neutral portrayal, in the subject’s own terms, of what it is like to be that subject. The data collected in this way correspond to “intentional objects” which must be seen from the “intentional stance.”

The Intentional Stance

Inspired by Ryle’s methods, Dennett attempts to dissolve the traditional approach to “intentionality.” This concept involves the idea that consciousness is always consciousness of something. Thus, the main feature of our mental states is the fact that they have a special type of “content.” In this sense, whenever we think, we think about such a “content,” which may be expressed by our beliefs and desires. And we govern the choice of our actions by considering such beliefs and desires. This is what makes our thinking rational. For this reason, intentionality is conceived as an essential property of the consciousness in human beings.

In a Rylean spirit, Dennett suggests that intentionality is not such a thing, but only a way to look at human beings. Whenever we look at them this way, we are taking what he calls the “intentional stance.” The latter may be defined as the strategy of interpreting the behavior of an entity as if it were a rational agent whose “choice” of a “line of

action” is determined by the “consideration” of its “beliefs” and “desires.” The “entity” in question may be either a person, or an animal, or a machine, etc. So, if we say that a certain moving robot chose to alter the course of its trajectory in order to avoid being shocked against an obstacle and being damaged, we are taking the intentional stance concerning the robot.

According to Dennett, there are three different ways by which we can look at an entity in order to understand its behavior. First, there is the physical stance, which consists in considering the behavior of the entity on the basis of the principles of physics. In this case, the entity is treated as an object that reacts in accordance with its physical properties (for example, when we predict that a stone released from someone’s hand will fall to the ground). Second, there is the design stance, which consists in considering the behavior of the entity on the basis of its general design. In this case, the entity is treated as an object that reacts in accordance with the way it was designed to react. We do not need to be acquainted with the physical laws involved (for example, we know that a certain alarm clock of which the buttons have been pressed in a determinate way will make a noise after some hours, although we do not need to know the physical laws involved by the clock in order to perform this action). Third, there is the intentional stance, which consists in considering the behavior of the entity on the basis of its rational choices. In this case, the entity is treated as an intentional system that chooses a particular line of action in function of its goals (for example, we might consider the alarm clock as our servant that has been given the command to wake us up at a certain time; we would then rely on its ability to understand our command and recognize the precise time of awakening). We may predict the behavior of the alarm as if it were a rational agent. The intentional stance is a useful linguistic shortcut in such case and reveals all its usefulness when the entity involved is more complex than an alarm clock, say, a computer or a person. If this is true, then “intentionality” is not to be taken too much seriously. It should be treated as a useful fiction and not as a real property of consciousness.

The Multiple Drafts Model for Consciousness

According to Dennett, although materialism is now an opinion approaching unanimity, even the most sophisticated materialists often forget that discarding the Cartesian *res cogitans* involves rejecting the need for a functional center to the brain. Thus, some materialists discard Descartes' dualism while preserving the idea of a central Theater where everything is somehow put together and the stream of consciousness occurs. This approach, which is still based on the idea that the brain has a centered locus, may be called "Cartesian Theater model." This is a very useful metaphor and seems the natural way to explain, for example, the sequence in which events may be observed when macroscopic time intervals are involved. But when it comes to microscopic time intervals, the model faces so many difficulties that it should be abandoned.

As a matter of fact, suppose the study made by Kolers and Grünau on the phi phenomenon (1976). This phenomenon was first studied by Wertheimer (1912) and consisted of two small spots separated by a small visual angle which were briefly lit in rapid succession and which were perceived as a single spot moving back and forth. In an analogous experiment, Kolers and Grünau used two spots differing in color and unexpectedly observed that the first spot seemed to begin moving and then changed its color abruptly in the middle of its passage toward the second location. Suppose the first spot is red and the second is green. In this case, our consciousness would have the following order of experiences: first red, then red-turning-to-green, and finally green. Now this raises a problem: how is the brain able to fill in the spot red-turning-to-green before the green spot is seen? The illusory content, red-turning-to-green, can only be created after some identification of the green spot occurs in the brain. So, we must conclude that our consciousness of the whole event must be delayed until after the green spot is perceived. But Dennett argues that this explanation is still based on the Cartesian Theater.

In order to explain this, he appeals to a thought experiment. Suppose someone watches a woman walking with no glasses, but he or she remembers her as wearing glasses. The Cartesian Theater offers two competing explanations for this: (i) the Orwellian revision, according to which the subject actually saw the woman with no glasses, but an instant later his or her memory is revised and then he or she firmly believes that she wore glasses; (ii) Stalinesque revision, according to which the subject actually hallucinated that the woman was wearing glasses from the moment he or she saw her. The expressions "Orwellian" and "Stalinesque" were used under the inspiration, respectively, of George Orwell's novel 1984, in which the past was revised in conformity with political interests, and Joseph Stalin's dictatorship, in which the present was revised by means of show trials, involving false testimonies and bogus confessions. At this point, Dennett argues that these are not distinct possibilities no matter how finely we divide up time. When the intervals of time are sufficiently tiny, the distinction between memory revisions (Orwellian) and perceptual revisions (Stalinesque) fades away. We cannot decide what really happened on the basis of the subjects own testimony. Now if the Cartesian Theater model were true, this question would have an answer at any point. For the model requires that there must be a content that reaches consciousness first: either walking woman or walking woman with glasses. We must realize here that the experiment implies that there is no privileged "reaching consciousness." Thus, the question about which explanation, Orwellian or Stalinesque, is the correct one is mistaken and has no answer, since the onset of consciousness does not occur at a precise point located in time.

The alternative Dennett offers is the Multiple Drafts model, according to which all varieties of mental activity are accomplished in the brain by parallel, multitrack processes of interpretation and elaboration of sensorial data. All information that enters the nervous system is under continuous "editorial revision." Dennett illustrates this by recalling that our eyes movements consist of quick fixations, about five a second. This means

that they move much more than our heads. So, the images in our retinas should be trembling all the time, just like the images in some home movies taken by inexperienced people. But this is not what we see. The motions of our heads and of our eyes are edited before they reach consciousness. The editorial processes occur over large fractions of a second, in different orders, and during this time several additions, emendations, and overwritings can occur. We experience directly the results of our brains' editing out our sensory inputs, and not what happens at the edges of our sensory windows (retinas, tympanic membranes, skin surfaces, etc.). And a particular editorial process is made only once by a specialized portion of the brain. There is no need of further edition which would be made by a "master" editor (the Cartesian Theater). Besides, it is an open question whether any edited content will eventually appear as a constitutive element of our conscious experience. It would be a mistake to ask when such a content becomes conscious, because the functioning of the brain involves many sequences of edited contents which are simultaneously distributed around in different portions of the brain. All these sequences are subject to continual editing processes and they yield, over the course of time, something rather like a narrative stream: "at any point in time there are multiple 'drafts' of narrative fragments at various stages of editing in various places in the brain" (*Consciousness Explained*, p. 113). Some of the contents in these drafts will make no contribution at all, some will make only a brief contribution and fade out, some will persist to play a variety of roles in the further modulation of internal states and behavior, and some will even persist to the point of revealing their presence through verbal behavior. The Multiple Drafts model unveils the mistake of supposing that there is a "final" narrative or "published draft," which would correspond to the actual stream of consciousness within the subject. But how is it that we seem to be singular conscious agents to ourselves and to other people? Dennett argues that the idea of a "self" results from our fundamental tactic of self-protection, self-control, and self-definition, which

consists in telling stories about who we are. We do not consciously and deliberately figure out what narratives to tell and how to tell them. But we do not spin our stories: rather, they spin us. Our human consciousness is their product, not their source. These narratives appear as if they came from a single source, encouraging the audience to posit a unified agent as such a source. In doing this, the audience is positing a center of narrative gravity. Physicists take great advantage in positing a center of gravity for an object, a single point relative to which all gravitational forces may be calculated. In the same way, heterophenomenologists take great advantage in positing a center of narrative gravity for a narrative-spinning human body. In this way, human consciousness is explained in terms of the operations of a "virtual machine," a kind of evolved and evolving software that shapes the activities of the brain. According to Dennett's model, the role of an inner center is played by the brain's networks. For a mental content to become conscious, it has to win a battle against other mental contents. And that is all there is to consciousness.

The Theory of Evolution and Its Consequences

The Theory of Evolution through constant change and selection is another tool Dennett uses for explaining the emergence of complex phenomena, such as consciousness. As a matter of fact, he thinks we descend from self-replicating macromolecules of which the "impersonal, unreflective, robotic, mindless little scraps of molecular machinery are the ultimate basis of all the agency, and hence meaning, and hence consciousness, in the world" (*Kinds of Minds*, p. 22). In this perspective, each cell is as mindless as a virus, but whenever we put together a sufficient amount of cells, we obtain a conscious person, with a genuine mind.

The book *Darwin's Dangerous Idea* evaluates the consequences of the Theory of Evolution in biology, cognitive science, and linguistics, locating all the previous aspects of Dennett's

philosophy within a more general framework. According to Dennett, Darwin's theory implies that the various processes of natural selection, although basically irrational, are powerful enough to have made manifest the whole planning work in our world. Darwin's dangerous idea lies in the fact that all things resulting from evolution may be explained as by-products of an algorithmic process. There is a single unified design space in which all creative processes, biological and human, follow their tracks, using similar methods. In this perspective, biology and engineering are the same thing. Both study functional mechanisms, their design, their construction, and their operation. Once we adopt the perspective of engineering, we are able to explain and unite the central biological concept of "function" with the basic philosophical concept of "meaning." Human species differs from all other species in virtue of our confidence in the cultural transmission of information, therefore in cultural evolution. Dawkins' meme, the unit of cultural evolution, plays a powerful role in Dennett's analysis of the human sphere. Memes are units of cultural transmission, or of imitation, such as tunes, ideas, catch-phrases, clothes fashions, etc. Genes propagate themselves by leaping from body to body via sperms or eggs, and memes propagate themselves by leaping from brain to brain via imitation (Dawkins (1978), *The Selfish Gene*, p. 206). Dennett thinks that human brains are invaded by culture, under the form of memes. This has created human minds. It is the molding of our minds by memes which gives us the power to transcend our selfish genes. One of the memes, the process of generate-and-test, which is much more refined than the mere trial-and-error process, leads to more powerful kinds of minds, culminating in intentional generating-and-testing of theories by human beings. In this process, the role played by language is fundamental. The meanings of our words result from originally irrational processes, that is, the algorithmic processes which created the whole biosphere. In this perspective, Dennett thinks that even ethics may be redesigned in a

Darwinian sense, steering successfully between the traps of Utilitarianism and Kantianism.

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Derrida and the Ethics of Reading

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Synonyms

Deconstruction; Derrida; Difference; Edusemiotics; Ethics; Language; Meaning; Poststructuralism; Reading; Relation(s); Semiotics; Structuralism; Subject; Textuality

Introduction

Jacques Derrida attacks the claim that writing is a progressive extenuation of presence. This notion

of presence is derived from a classical, metaphysical necessity, a logocentric ideal, and it is this idea of a stable presence in communication that Derrida deconstructs. Indeed, logocentrism and exclusively verbal communication are argued against in edusemiotics. Derrida refers to how writing is assumed to be a means of communication extending the possibilities of locutionary and gestural communication. The issues concerning the hierarchy of speech over writing play a major part in Derrida’s writing. This entry outlines the movement away from Saussure’s structuralism and toward difference and arbitrariness to unveil a greater uncertainty and undecidability in language and subject through the notion of trace as all signs bear the traces of other signs from which they are differentiated so that be meaningful. The idea of the trace points toward a kind of ambiguity and uncertainty in the origin of meaning as the production of difference. The text becomes a chain of signs. By tracing and exploring Derrida’s idea of difference and *différance* in a

Derrida and the Ethics of Reading, Table 1

Derrida intimates on deconstruction as a possible offspring of structuralism at the end of his famous lecture at Yale University, “Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences” (1966). What is it that play does to the sign that is evident in the semiotics of signification: the structural necessity of its repeatability, or reiteration, beyond a single, unitary point of expression. The broader and more radical conceptualization that encompasses every kind of expression, communication, and coding (phonic, graphic, artistic) leading to a poststructural ethic of reading “can be called *gram* or *différance*” (Derrida 1981, p. 26). A sign can signify only through the force of repetition, the consequences of *différance* rendering signs *relational* rather than being a priori identical entities, and bringing indication in line with expression to undo the Husserlian idea of a “pre-expressive intentionality” of pure consciousness and the reading of signs. The subject thus is decentered as brought out of the shell of self-centered Cartesian *Cogito*. The Other is effaced to the point where an inner monologue with one’s “Self” is not really an instance of transmissibility, but the self-deceptive verification of the desire for auto-affection or an attempt at the reduction of *différance*. In order to ascertain the existence of itself and read the empiricism of consciousness, a subject must refer

Derrida asserts that if the signifier is uncoupled from the signified and the word is released from its precise definition or a preexistent concept, the signifier would move freely while the signified becomes yet another signifier. Any attempt at mapping discourse to a preceding codified framework of interpretive intensions and extensions represents an act of power. The poststructuralist dissemination of meaning, its splitting open, undermines the fundamental hermeneutics of semiological assumptions. First, dispersal considers the linguistic determination of a sign value in relation to, and in difference from, other signs. However, when the production of meaning is traced in this way, the act of interpretation presents itself only through recourse to yet another series of signs, each again defined by its relation to, and difference from, existing and generated signs. This chain of attempts to make meaning of the writing of signs continues indefinitely through reading; thus, a teleological end or precise definition is never reached. Meaning is never fixed outside of its relation to the process of sign production within a written text or spoken discourse. It is always uncertain while remaining determined in the textual concatenation of signifiers and the deferral of meaning from the repetition and difference of signs.

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Derrida and the Ethics of Reading, Table 1 (continued)

outside of itself to the world of signs using the resources of what does not begin within itself, therefore striving to refrain from obliterating itself just as it seems to have authenticated the uniqueness of its (own) existence. It is this *relational* aspect that brings an ethical grounding of reading the signs of the other in *différance* by referring to the constitutive function of the sign trace of the Other in reading the Other: the deferring difference between presence and repetition, self and nonself, reveals itself as uncertainty and ambiguity at the proliferative core of identity.

Returning to the text of the lecture, Derrida suggests that *différance* is, or can stand for, “the juncture – rather than the summation – of what has been most decisively inscribed in the thought of what is conveniently called our ‘epoch’” (Derrida 1973, p. 130). A poststructural age of the irreducible play of the sign marks the delimitation of onto-theology, the decline of the inherited metaphysics of presence (phono-logocentrism), and the possibility of an ethical opening of the subject toward the difference of the Other. But we must remember, however, the role of tradition in the formation of new thought. The following philosophical notions are given by Derrida as examples of difference that led to *différance*: “the difference of forces in Nietzsche, Saussure’s principle of semiological difference, differing as the possibility of [neuron] facilitation, impression and delayed effect in Freud, difference as the irreducibility of the trace of the other in Levinas, and the ontic-ontological difference in Heidegger” (Derrida 1973, p. 130). All of these individuals have no doubt figured greatly in the elaboration of the *working of deconstruction*, but more importantly the list displays the “discoveries” or “inventions” of varying fields from the history of philosophy to theology, linguistics, and psychoanalysis, that have changed or altered perceptions of the ethics according to Western metaphysics, the cognizing subject, and pedagogy in their refusal to be subdued or dominated by the dizzying substitutions of master signs within its self-enclosed system of truth and meaning. As such, *différance* is not only “irreducible to every ontological or theological – onto-theological – reappropriation, but it opens up the very space in which onto-theology – philosophy – produces its system and its history. It thus encompasses and irrevocably surpasses onto-theology and philosophy” (Derrida 1973, p. 135) and, importantly, elicits a new ethics of reading the signs of the other. The elocality of its structure also prevents an afore-planned linearity within the reading of the writing of signs, for example, the ordering of a “reason” of strategy or of finality of purpose, a tacticality toward teleology, “philosophical-logical discourse” (Derrida 1973, p. 135), and its symmetrical opposite, “logico-empirical speech” (1973, p. 135). The alternative to these more or less traditional discourses of epistemological fortitude and the basis of a theory of reading and the Other is the semiotics of the play of difference as *différance*.

Indeed, the pragmatological plane of philosophy, the

Second, deferral of meaning relates closely to dispersal. Following the chain of dispersed meaning through the production of signs composed of words and semantic units of sense and so on defers interpretive teleology in semiotic multiplicity. It is not until a representational endpoint of reading is reached that the possibilities of meaning in signification can be adduced. The deferral of meaning then is infinite because there is always a wait for prerequisite meanings. And so, meaning is both dispersed along endless chains of signifiers and deferred until the ends of these chains are reached and open up the possibility of interpretation. Meaning then is forever caught within the infinite play between signifiers.

Derrida’s arguments for dispersal and deferral make it impossible for a definitive meaning to be reached with certainty. The meaning of a signifier, the signified, is always referred to its prior usage in previous discourses, and this meaning is always deferred. It is therefore not feasible to speak of a transcendental signified or transcendental semantic meaning as meaning is not centered or fixed but, as Derrida (1974) reminds us, is caught up in a play of relations and difference between signifiers and signifieds. It is this denial of a fixed center that ultimately undermines meaning in a structural sense and gives rise to the term poststructuralism. Meaning is never present but comes from what the sign is *not*, from what is absent, and from relations to other signs. Present too exists in relation to the past and to the future: thus paradoxically stays present in its absence. The subject too is not present but is a consequence of language via this fluid and undecidable play that is the power of *différance*. *Différance* reflects Derrida’s arguments of dispersal and deferral as it encompasses both the meanings of *to differ* and *to defer* allowing for deconstruction to work.

Deconstruction provides a way of reading texts and discourses that allows for themes and assumptions which appear to be “at war” with each other to be realized and recognized; it “liberates the repressed contradictions *always already* present within the constitution of the texts on the subject referred to, using the selected terms of their expressions and expressivity to interrogate” (Trifonas 2000, p. 274). Derrida notes that within traditional philosophy, binary oppositions (e.g., culture and nature, man and woman, etc.) are situated within “a violent hierarchy. One of the terms dominates the other (axiologically, logically, etc.), occupies the commanding position. To deconstruct the opposition is above all, at a particular moment, to reverse the hierarchy” (Derrida 2004, p. 39). Derrida asserts that deconstruction “must, by means of a double gesture, a double science, a double writing, practice an *overturning* of the classical opposition and a general *displacement* of the system” (Derrida 1982, p. 329). This action of deconstruction within discourse identifies the operations in the text that form arguments, concepts, or premises, in turn illuminating how hierarchical oppositions as well as stable philosophical foundations can undermine themselves.

By carefully opening texts and discourses to release the

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Derrida and the Ethics of Reading, Table 1 (continued)

reading of the signs of the Other and its constitution, is of keen interest to Derrida especially in relation to the problem of the ethics of reading stemming from deconstruction and the reconfiguration of writing. “What links writing to violence?” (Derrida 1974, p. 101): it is the radical materiality or exteriority of the sign (that as such partakes of the radical rationality of edusemiotics). In its expansion or reduction, writing is the stuff of violence itself, but so is the reading of signs. Language is customarily an oriented structuring, a principal manifestation of hierarchization that ranks, classifies, and separates according to a system of differences or polarities by the subjective placing of value to objectify entities according to binary coding. Writing is a deconstructive metaphor for violence performed in reading. This dyad is a hermeneutic expression of supplementarity for the attribution of cultural value that creates hierarchies perpetuating all forms of social inequality or reinforcing situations of power and domination. Writing is the means for a system of representation that makes the attempt at the community of speech and logocentric communication impossible for the reason of the ordering of “the space of its possibility, the violence of the arche-writing, [and] the violence of difference” (Derrida 1974, p. 110). The desire to escape violence and repression of meaning by examining the edusemiotic dimension of reading is to endeavor to think the unthinkable outside of the sign of writing. For what comes before language and representation, speech and phenomena are always already unreachable. It is a hermeneutical violence that permits the only ethical possibility of deconstruction as the recognition of *différance*.

As such, the “text” and “textuality” of writing is a chaining of signs, not simply sign functions standing in for a cultural center of mediated meaning but “everywhere, differences and traces of traces” (Derrida 1981, p. 26), within which the *gram* would come to be the most general sign and semiology would be therefore reconstituted as *grammatology* and a new ethics of reading.

It is as *différance* that the grammatological transformation of semiology takes place via deconstruction. But, there are some crucial sticking points: on the basis of the above function, *différance* is incompatible “with the static, synchronic, taxonomic, ahistorical motifs in the concept of structure” (Derrida 1981, p. 27), and yet, contrastingly, it is *not* “astructural” because the “systematic and regulated transformations” (p. 28) in the specificity of its general workings are able to develop “the most legitimate principled exigencies of ‘structuralism’” (p. 27). It cannot be said that some “present and in-different being” (Derrida 1981, p. 28) in any shape or form “precedes *différance* or spacing” (Derrida 1981, p. 28), for example, a subject “who would be the agent, author, and master of *différance*” (Derrida 1981, p. 28), or upon whom *différance* would impose itself. To Derrida, “Subjectivity – like objectivity – is an effect of *différance*, an effect inscribed within a system of *différance*” (Derrida

voice of the Other and freeing meanings from rigid and unquestioned boundaries of Western metaphysics, deconstruction also becomes, importantly, an ethical action. It requires a close and mindful understanding and also a respect for the subtleties of the text or discourse: To “deconstruct” philosophy, thus, would be to think – in the most faithful, interior way – the structured genealogy of philosophy’s concepts, but at the same time to determine – from a certain exterior that is unqualifiable or unnameable by philosophy – what this history has been able to dissimulate or forbid, making itself into a history by means of this somewhere motivated repression (Derrida 2004, p. 5).

Deconstruction makes possible the opening of an inclusive space “without barriers or boundaries, though not without obligation and the danger of failure” (Trifonas 2000, p. 279). It does not take down the existing structure of a text or discourse but rather locates within it a more neutral site from which to question and reverse oppositions:

... it is [this] non-ground between presence and absence [that] deconstruction breaks-into, slowly making it possible to imaginatively empathize or ‘fill-up’ the openness of the abyss of this excluded space, the space of the writing/teaching of the Other, to re-approach the responsibility of the horizon of inter-subjective violence, and the teleologicality of the cultural politics of the sign (Trifonas 2000, p. 276).

Deconstruction refuses to anchor epistemology in any authoritative foundation, and it does not propose a “better” theory of truth but instead allows for the illumination of those impassables that surface in our attempts to reveal truth. As a way of reading and writing and of analysis and criticism, deconstruction focuses its critique upon the text. It does so not by attempting to escape the metaphysics of language but by highlighting and subverting its very character (Peters and Trifonas 2005). Deconstruction fills the void where “‘a change of style’ is needed, one that will ‘speak several languages and produce several texts at once’” (Peters and Trifonas 2005, p. 6). Thus, it is not possible to reduce deconstruction to a method that is distinct from the political and institutional; it always interrogates the structures and discourses upon which it stands. Because of this, deconstruction holds destabilization as a central theme. Deconstruction “signifies not the demolition of what is constructing itself, but rather what remains to be thought beyond the constructivist or deconstructionist scheme” (Derrida 1988, p. 147). Deconstruction, though, does not lead to indeterminacy but rather undecidability as “always a *determinate* oscillation between possibilities . . . These possibilities are themselves highly *determined* in strictly *defined* situations” (Derrida 1988, p. 148). For Derrida, undecidability allows for the examination of relations, differences of force made possible by play, nonidentity, and *différance*. Indecision exists “between determined (semantic, ethical, political) poles, which are upon occasion terribly necessary and always irreplaceably

(continued)

Derrida and the Ethics of Reading, Table 1 (continued)

<p>1981, p. 28). The grammatological reconstitution of Saussure's semiology enables the rethinking of reading and draws attention to the historicity of the deferred traces of writing the difference of the Other. Deconstruction contends for an ethics of reading that is beyond the cognitive limits of the teleological trajectory of the subject of metaphysics. "How do we conceive of the outside of a text?" (Derrida 1973, p. 158). We can reply to this essentially unanswerable question with another: how do we conceive of the inside of a text? And to some extent, the thinking of <i>différance</i> broaches an impossible answer to the radical opening of the ethics of both of these aporias of reading and writing all along.</p>	<p>singular" (Derrida 1988, p. 148); for this reason, deconstruction must not result in extreme relativism or any indeterminacy. It displays a subtle radical, even if paradoxical, rationality – such as the one displayed by edusemiotics (Semetsky 2013; Stables and Semetsky 2015) as the educational theory inseparable from the ethical practice of reading signs that suspend the presupposed centrality of the a priori conscious and certain of itself subject and defy logocentrism.</p>
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dialogue with his important texts, the entry engages the parameters of how an overall sense of ambiguity, arbitrariness, a definite uncertainty, or undecidability is intrinsic, even necessary, for language to function as an ethics of reading and textuality. This uncertainty strikes at the heart of logocentric Western metaphysics and enables Derrida to ground deconstruction in relation to the exclusion of writing in the history of philosophy and a new ethics of reading so important for education.

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Derrida and the Philosophy of Education

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Philosophy consists of offering reassurance to children. That is, if one prefers, of taking them out of childhood, of forgetting about the child, or, inversely, but by the same token, of speaking first and foremost for that little boy within us, of teaching him to speak—to dialogue—by displacing his fear or his desire. Jacques Derrida, *Dissemination* (1981)

Jacques Derrida is indeed a most profound thinker of matters educational, addressing in highly provocative and original ways through, more or less, “unconventional” readings of the history of Western metaphysics, some of the most basic philosophical questions of teaching and of learning. Michel Foucault and Edward Said have suggested – albeit in derisive ways – that deconstruction is perhaps nothing else but the elaborate

expression of a new didactics, a poststructural pedagogy of the text. (See Said 1978; Foucault 1965. In an appendix to the 1972 edition (the original was published in the form of a Thèse d'Etat in 1961), Foucault responds to what he perceived to be an "attack" on his work by Derrida in the "lecture" "Cogito and the History of Madness," trans. Alan Bass, in *Writing and Difference*, 31–63 by describing deconstruction as nothing more than a conservative and well-entrenched "pedagogy of the text.") And yet, on the one hand, to say Derrida presents the means to a "method" of teaching, and this only would be wrong, for there are no directives to educational practice prescribed, no rules imposed upon the right to a "freedom of thinking" or responsiveness, and no apriority of absolute truths to be found as could suffice to constitute the operational basis of an ideal model or mode of instruction. But, on the other hand, the "philosophemes of deconstruction" carry on the "contradictory and conflictual" *polemos* of a theoretical backdrop that looks forward to the real necessity of informed action transcribed across the poststructural, post-phenomenological passage from "thetic" to "athetic" rationality.

The "movement" of deconstruction is away from an obstinate stance of single-minded opposition ready to tear down the existing "system" and toward an economy of reflective matriculation within the structurality of the institution to a working out of the essential trials of its undecidability at the expense of the metaphysical grounding of its architectonics. Due to the awareness of the stretched parameters of the dilemma of this "double-sided" stratagem, the tensions of its aporias open up the ethics of deconstruction with respect to the politics of education, and there is no need to enact the finality of the last word on the subject, especially in the form of a statement, "of positional or oppositional logic, [overdetermined in] the idea of position, of *Setzung* or *Stellung*" (Derrida 1983). This would be both problematic and irresponsible given the non-adequation of the "critical demonstrativity" of Derrida's texts with the desire for settling upon an undisputable and self-revealing truth. The metaphysico-theoretical fidelity of such a standard closing of

argumentation seeking to culminate in a full stop of studied silence would most surely contravene the unpredictable interspaces of the risk of writing that opens signification up to an insertion of the alterity of the Other and invites the creation of the difference of meaning as the disseminative interruption of a stable conditionality of the sign. There is therefore a canceling out, in advance, of the possibility of any coming to resistance an examination of the ethico-political exigencies of deconstruction could run against in relation to a "thinking of the end" as the telos of philosophy by being contrapuntal to the curricularization of pedagogy oriented from the "historico-topologico-sociocultural" regulation of its implementational styles. Still, we must proffer reasons and bestow "sound reasons" in good faith for the sake of the institutional reason of deconstruction as a just way of thinking and knowing. It is necessary to justify, in principle and by practice, the tendency of a hesitation to simply conclude that Derrida is a "philosopher of education," thus accepting responsibility for the lack of *clôture* to those unread or underread texts of Derrida's the "educational texts," as I have described them, writings that will always already be open before us.

And yet while attempting to summarize the importance of Derrida to educational thought, I would like to follow the path of a certain non-repetition of form and formality which does not mean it is necessary to abdicate rigor or the demands of a scholarly obligation, "to substitute for what exist[s] some type of non-thesis, non-legitimacy or incompetence" (Ibid., p. 42) but rather requires the assumption that an even greater accountability be demanded of the critical invention of the transformative gesture to explain itself both now and later. The beginnings of a path breaking cannot take place without a careful knowledge and an immense respect or keen observance for the most ever subtle nuances of "academic tradition." And in this way of unpromising justness surpassing the minimal responsibility of the protocol of "good conscience," this trail blazing is what deconstruction does above all else or makes possible regarding the most fundamental of educational themes, "what it means to know." Derrida has articulated

as much through a prolific body of texts sometimes taken to be anathema to the history of knowledge and knowing after the legacy of the ancient Greeks. Deconstruction traverses the ethics and the politics of the logic of the Same to introduce from beyond the horizon of its impossibility the transcendence of a teaching/writing of the Other. It upsets the surety of the “phenomeno-semiological” foundation of the institutional history of Western epistemology at the level of its theorizing about the value of the sign, reproducibility, and representation or what is the heart of the educational future of all philosophy and science as indicative of the empirical foundation of the certainty of truth:

- *For nothing can be taught or learned other than what is believed to be known and understood.*

From the above premise follows the “theoretical matrix” of deconstruction. Derrida has developed its principles most conspicuously in *Of Grammatology*. The point is that it is indeed feasible to intervene at the base of the institutional monolith amidst the play of the forces of the particular implications and effects, leading to and resulting from the exclusion of writing by metaphysics. Through the imperious dismissal of exteriority, the ethnocentric terms of the limits of signification and meaning creation are posited in the immediate (tonal) substantiality of the voice or speech for the reduction of difference within the ideal determination of the self-presence of the logos. In this sense, it is the nonethical beginnings of the “ethnicity” of the teachings of metaphysics and the “living reason” of the spoken word that warrant, because it underwrites the closing off of the trace of otherness. The unique importance of the “grammatological” focus when juxtaposed against the anteriority of its semiological influences is remarkably suitable here. Its consequences for education resonate when the confrontation of writing and voice within the Derridean conception of a “poststructural” version of “understanding” or “meaning making” surpasses the nomothetics of speech; a reinterpretation of philosophy through the cultural politics of the sign is necessary.

An analytical “breaking down” of the constituent features of the reason of its prejudice concerning consciousness and language delegitimizes the onto-theological groundedness of the voice feeding a pedagogy of *mimesis*, an imitativeness of the example or a clarifying of explainability required for the sake of perpetuating the illusion of truth from the demands of an altogether “natural” or “good usage.” The problem of negotiating the arbitrary objectification of the semantic values of the cognitive and affective results comprises the interpretative bandwidth of the episteme framework that constructs the institutionalization of theory as praxis. I would contend that this realization brings to the fore the importance of the question of ethics for deconstruction relative to the theme of education, teaching, and learning. And this is where we will already have begun to examine and articulate the pedagogical ramifications of deconstruction so prominent in the radical specificity of the scope of Derrida’s engagement with the genealogy of philosophical concepts. By enabling an investigation of the semiologicality of the metaphysical model of cognition crucial to the scene of a “classical pedagogy” that posits the flawless transmission of signs between the relational formulizability of a “sender-receiver” dyad and, hence, the possibility of the inter-exchanging of well-received meanings, deconstruction reveals how the privileging of speech over writing is the ethnocentric outcome of comprehending the representationality of language formations or their potential for expressivity solely as an “economy of signification” involving the immediate and auto-affective substantiality of the spirit of the voice. This skepticism of the teleology of the predication of the desire to communicate can lead to a pushing beyond the “vulgar” notion of a teaching and learning directed, without doubt, as the transference and implantation of the truth of knowledge from “above” and “outside” the psychico-experiential realm of an intersubjective violence. For example, it permits a renouncing of the tabula rasa theory of the inscriptibility of a malleable consciousness of unblemished wax to be shaped or given image by the artful engraving of a master teacher operating at the critical points

of a “weakness to know” where the clean slate of subjective being is at the mercy of the probing intentionality of the deep etching of signs.

Derrida characterizes the conventional or classical act of teaching and learning to be the pragmatic reproduction of the “metaphysics of presence” as cultivated from the premises of the interchangeable chain linking of its orienting function at the fabulaic center of the syntagm of the Western mythos of “pure origins,” uncorrupted beginnings. As the *arche-thememe* of logocentrism defining the effluence of the voice, it stands in symbolic difference and non-difference to itself, a *mise en abîme* of an archetypal thinking of the plenitude of the sign that guides the conceptual immanence of an archive of cultural knowledge, be it scientific, aesthetic, philosophical, religious, and so on, to render it replicable without a hint of doubt. For example, Derrida’s reading of Jean-Jacques Rousseau regarding the origins of language “before the letter” concentrates on the foundational and corollary arguments detailing the elements of a pedagogical method relying on the phonocentrism of an image of the natural piety of humanity to bring out the extent of the incoherence of the utopianism of an idyllic vision of a “community of speech.”

Deconstruction exposes the blindness of the figural identification of innocence prior to the exteriority of the voice as the mark of writing – e.g., the worldliness of delimited contextuality and the predictable consequence of sign-meaning correlations – through which a resistance to the difference of supplementation is operationalized by the romantic appeal of the rhetoric used to secure the nostalgic call for the elimination of the violence of culture from the organismic whole of a society capable of pure spirited, unaffected relations of genuinely filial obligation. Derrida “turns back” upon Rousseau the question of the social construction of concepts such as “immediacy,” “propriety,” “nature,” and so on. The point is to show the ways in which the applicability of deconstruction for the general problem of education extends from its ability to liberate the repressed contradictions always already present within the constitution of the texts on the subject referred to, using the selected

terms of their expressions and expressivity to interrogate the deeper facets lamenting the catastrophic passing of naive simplicity to learned experience. The nonethical postscript of the irreversible transformation of the child is represented by the inculcated ability for the apprehension of the metaphysics of the sign and the debility of representation, (de)contextualization, removedness, and supplementarity, honing the displacement of the truth of the Being of being in the moment of the reversal of self-identity through teaching and learning. Deconstruction, however, if we are to believe Derrida, does not, cannot, nor does it wish to exact the death of logocentrism and to eliminate it, despite troubling the epistemic validity of a phonological prototype of signification that linearizes the relation of signans and signatum. It inhibits the reduction of the play of difference in an effort to counteract and counterbalance for the mitigation or repression of the presence of the Other within the expression of the Same.

Behind the improbable terms of the educational connection of semiology as an “old science of signs” and deconstruction as a “new way of reading” lies the presupposition that “there has never been anything but writing” (Derrida 1974), a circumspection bringing to fruition the contextual overdrift or grafting on of the grammatological to the pragmatico-theoretical field of (philosophical) anthropology. To keep within the “age” of Rousseau and a certain “autobiographical temporality” of a self-present *écriture* is not difficult for Derrida, when considering the structural ethnology of Claude Lévi-Strauss. For it is through the teaching of one, the former, who excludes the supplementarity of writing yet, nevertheless, wants to add to a supposedly ideal state of human nature and provides an educational manual to do so, that another, the latter, transforms the discipline of anthropology as a science of difference wanting “to decipher, dreams of deciphering a truth or an origin that transcends play and the order of the sign, and for it the necessity of interpretation is lived as a kind of exile” (Derrida 1978). The ethical aspects of the deconstruction of the ethnocentrism of the description of the Nambikwara in “The Writing

Lesson” of *Tristes Tropiques* illustrate the ramifications of the intersubjective violence Lévi-Strauss exacts upon this group of people in light of the cultural politics of a structuralist agenda dismissive of script, but still using the distinction of the graphie to hierarchize, categorize, and exoticize the Other by Western criteria of belief, knowledge, or education.

The logocentrism of semiology encompasses a theory of language and representation that reduces the elements of teaching and learning to the preserving of (self-)presence; in fact, it precludes, on a more significantly ethical plane, the possibility of the recognition of difference outside of a closed system of an authenticating set of limits, the opposite extremes for inclusion and exclusion. The cultural politics of the sign works through these opposite extremes by reinforcing the objectification of value toward the “practical” purpose of the inclusion and exclusion of entities. To say, and Lévi-Strauss does, that the Nambikwara lack the mark of “writing” and are therefore closer to nature than to culture is not only to be wrong but also unethical, because the judgment recuperates the stereotypical image of the “primitive mind” as diachronically untaught and technologically undernourished, in other words, as the animate presence of “being lacking.” It is an ethnocentric caricature of “prescientific genius” supporting the *mytheme* of the *bricoleur* and not a depiction of the empirical reality or the truth of the situation. With the deconstruction of the phonocentric normativity of the laws governing the intersubjective violence of the unspeakable trace of the writing of the Other, the possibility, the hope, through which we can and must learn to reflect upon the ethnicity of our own thinking and practices of representation is situated in the in(deter)minable unfolding of *différance*.

Derrida elaborates a grammatological overhauling of semiology to rethink the differential and deferred relations of the iterativity of the sign, its spatiotemporal imprint, and the excesses of which manifest themselves in an alterity that the teleological perspective of an “ego-logical” philosophizing cannot comprehend or care to admit. The irreducibility of *différance* “shows up” the infinite exteriority of the arche-trace of

the Other through the *symploke*, or a weaving together of the diverse strands, of deconstruction, e.g., the yoking of undecidability with the heterology of its transcendental preconditions. The “unthought” difference between identity and difference, which is the exteriority of writing, hinges the turning point of the reversal and then displacement of the nature/culture dichotomy of metaphysics, the primary pragmatico-epistemic focus of its teaching we have been concerned with. Exposing how the teleo-phone of the logos is postponed in the self-irradiating trace of the fullness of presence, *différance* complicates the desire of the archive madness of the ancient thinking of the West that does not grant standing to the idea of the Other, its infusing in the idea of perpetuity, stasis, and fixed order the semblance of an outside, exteriority, to a pedagogy of the Same. Deconstruction contends, Derrida says:

... as always, [with] the institution of limits declared to be insurmountable, whether they involve family or state law, the relations between the secret and the non-secret, or, and this is not the same thing, between the private and the public, whether they involve property or access rights, publication or reproduction rights, whether they involve classification and putting into order: What comes under theory or under private correspondence, for example? What comes under system? under biography or autobiography? under personal or intellectual anamnesis? In works said to be theoretical, what is worthy of this name and what is not? (Derrida 1996)

We would include with this proliferation of questions the need to address the consequences of theory for the “topo-nomological” archive of the educational institution and the classification of knowledge in accordance with the historicity of the sign, and the means of consignment, the construction of a gathering place of domiciliation before and after the letter (see *ibid*). A deconstruction of the normative rendering of what it means to think, to learn, to teach, and to know begins to take root in the earliest of Derrida’s “texts” before *Of Grammatology*, where the nonnatural ethics of speech informing the socio-theologico-philosophical violence of metaphysics are put into doubt. It would not be hyperbole to suggest that from the start this

poststructural, post-phenomenological mode of intervention plays upon the thematic variability of the most fundamental and essential versions of the educational problematic of supplementarity discerning the continual transitivity of the human subject, for example, the heterogeneity of origins and the paradoxes of mimetology, childhood, reason, subjectivity, and so on as problems of mediacy and mediation. In short, it is the non-ground between presence and absence deconstruction “breaks into,” slowly making it possible to imaginatively empathize or “fill up” the openness of the abyss of this excluded space, the space of the writing/teaching of the Other, to reapproach the responsibility of the horizon of intersubjective violence and the ethnocentric teleologicality of the cultural politics of the sign.

In taking the pedagogical impetus of the grammatological reevaluation of the ethnocentrism of the sign further afield to the Hegelian era of speculative dialectics and the Absolute Idea, Derrida has pondered the birth and death of the philosopher and, thus, the thinking and teaching of the child through life that he considers to be associated with the themes of writing and memory. (This is evident in Jacques Derrida, *Dissemination*.) In *Glas*, we read a quite startling answer to a familiar, but difficult, question:

What is education? The death of the parents, the formation of the child's consciousness, the *Aufhebung* of its consciousness in(to) the form of ideality. (Derrida 1986a)

Using this quotation as a heuristic tool to approach some final comments on the question of the contradiction, Derrida finds in the proposal for a speculative didactics of infinitizing and hyperstatic memory G. W. F. Hegel lays out for a solicited “report” on philosophy curricula which would seem to be appropriate and somewhat precarious at the same time. But, nevertheless, for us, it will have already been necessary, if not essential, given its direct relation to any consideration of the topic of deconstruction and pedagogy at hand. The ideological symmetry between the text and the context of the report Derrida puts into question reinforces the need for the autobiographical projection of the image of the child,

before the end of philosophy and after the beginning of schooling, that Hegel submits to an eager State ministry ready to support an “instruction of memory.” A questioning and critical consciousness is not what a good citizen always makes from the perspective of the powers-that-be. And yet, the symbolic death here is not only of the parents but the decrease of their ability to have influence over the thinking of their dependent and powerless offspring. It is also the passing away of “the child” as such, a being of “non-knowledge” whose rebirth is achieved by the Hegelian propaedeutic through the retranslation or return of the essence of subjective formativity to a safekeeping of the “mobility” of consciousness within the bounds of the dialectical sublation of the idealizing moment of absolute insight or the Idea of Reason, the faculty represented most by the eternal logic and “Right” of the State. For Derrida, the fundamental problem is that of the acceptability of such provocatively generalizing recollections put forward as the result of a self-fulfilling prophecy of a vision of the truth of a past connected to a present/future that is all too removed from a time of reflection far gone and well lost. Because the auto-affective nature of the image of the pre-philosophical “child Hegel” cannot but regather the presence of the sign of the Self toward an inwardly reflecting point of imaginative centration reconciling elements of fact with those of fiction to comprise the temporal bridge between the “then” and the “now,” to resurrect in the annals of memory the gathering power of an ideal re-creativity is to more or less pursue the path to the teaching of false example, an exemplary teaching of falsehood coveting a *prosopopoeia* of the wishful apostrophe. So, the difference of consciousness and self-consciousness builds the symptomatic tensions of a hidden economy of loss that becomes evident in the rewriting of anamnesis after the deconstructive rereading of the report Hegel signs. The problematic synthesis of these antinomies of the *relève* of subjective identity comments on the theoretical validity of the example of the unsupplemented age of childhood, where the speculative schematism connecting empirical being to its “past being” – a being past (*Gewesenheit*) – is framed

according to the productive representation of a dialectical modality of circularly coherent reflexivity closed unto the reason of itself. The exteriorization of memory, its removal from the interiority of self-absorbing thought, “stays with traces, in order to ‘preserve’ them, but traces of a past that has never been present, traces which themselves never occupy the form of presence and always remain, as it were, to come – come from the future, from the to come” (Derrida 1986b). And the signature of the proper name of Hegel as a life writing of “the Self,” in this sense of the autogenetic reproduction of the metaphorical singularity of subjective identity, is an attempt to secure control over the hermeneutic effects of the aftermath of the ends of inscription by concretizing in the otherwise plain and customary mark of referential authority the pedagogical truth of the figure of the child prior to the experience of philosophy and the difficulty of thinking. Its belatedly teleologizing function of identifying difference that serves to “fill in the spaces” of the sociocultural puzzle of the categorical status of beings is a symbolic sanctioning of the logic to institute and implement a speculative curriculum of rote memorization for the teaching and learning of philosophy. The Hegelian model of pedagogy so defined within the possibility of the repeatability of the proper name, as such, is a progression of delay and derivation following the semantic after-effect of the originating source of the truth of the sign. And the time lag of its already-not-yet (*déjà-pas-encore*) structure authenticates the pragmatic working out of the educational configuration of speculative dialectics by sustaining, in its formal processes of dictation and memorization, the means to a looking back toward the generation of a “first” and “correct” meaning of a signifier to confirm its accuracy through the unmediated transmissibility of its proof. It should be clear considering what we have stated about the ethics of deconstruction up to now that Derrida could not support a mnemotechnical pedagogy favoring the passing of knowledge from the “expert teacher” to the “obedient student” or an institution that encourages the (re)playing and perpetuation of these monodimensional roles. Having become important as the interactive site

of competing interests and differential forces, the scene of teaching is the territorial mainstay of the political struggle its participants wage for the right of opportunity to intervene in the planning or actualization of curricular possibilities. Derrida, it would seem from reflections made about the commitment of his involvement with the GREPH (since 1974) (see Jacques Derrida, “The Time of a Thesis.”), has taken this activist role very seriously for the sake of saving the discipline of philosophy from those elected powers that have considered it an esoteric and dangerous subject, a part of the French educational system not worth the trouble of dealing with or keeping at bay, to the point where it was decided not to write a “thesis” because:

...it was neither consistent nor desirable to be a candidate for any new academic title or responsibility. Not consistent given the work of political criticism in which [he] was participating, not desirable with regard to a little forum that was more internal, more private and upon which, through a whole endless scenography of symbols, representations, phantasies, traps and strategies, a self-image recounts all sorts of interminable and incredible stories to itself. (Derrida, “The Time of a Thesis,” p. 48)

A dissertation would most certainly have been a chance to secure an eminent position suitable for a scholar of such international stature. Indeed, it was the reason Derrida was persuaded to submit his candidacy for a doctorate based on published texts, as he was encouraged to do so in order to be elected to the Collège de France, in succession of Paul Ricœur. The chair was eventually suppressed by the Ministry of Education. And those colleagues who had extended to Derrida the “invitation” to apply for the post eventually voted against him and he was given another position, the one he currently holds, on certain conditions). But as regards the type of interference, deconstruction can provide to alter the onto-encyclopedic reason of the educational institution to make its charity more equitable to acknowledging and accepting the logic of the Other; Derrida has never promoted the general dismantling of the architectonics of the pedagogical system. Rather, the focus of attention has been on finding a more “neutral” and less contentious site from which to

interrogate the axiomatics of the apparatuses of teaching and learning, one that effaces the tensions of the historico-political codification of the academic/bureaucratic dualism tranquilizing the cooperative processes of reflective transformation. Derrida explains:

It is this complementarity, this configuration [“often scarcely readable, but solid, between the most immobilized, contracted academicism and all that, outside the school and the university, in the mode of representation and spectacle, taps almost immediately into the channels of the greatest receivability” (Derrida 1979)]—everywhere that it appears—that we must, it seems to me, combat. Combat simultaneously, and joyously, without accusation, without trial, without nostalgia, with an intractable gaiety. Without nostalgia for more discreet forms, sometimes (sometimes only) more distinguished, less noisy, that in large part will yesterday have prepared the way for what we inherit today. (Ibid., p. 43. Derrida here explains what deconstruction ought to inspire in remarks made to the *États Généraux de la Philosophie*, a meeting of approximately twelve hundred participants who congregated at the Sorbonne on June 16–17 of 1979 to find common ground through which to combat the deteriorating situation of the discipline of Philosophy)

Deconstruction has been misrepresented by many critics, theorists, and philosophers unable or unwilling to take an account of and provide an accounting for its ethical and political implications, preferring instead to eschew or disregard both its effectivity in responsabilizing the principles of action and its informing of the reason of pragmatic utility. Attenuating the thematic scope of the analysis on the Derridean call to rethink the grounds of academic responsibility, e.g., the motivational imperative to respond according to a principle of “Right,” any reading of deconstruction in relation to educational philosophy must attend to the *aporia* of what is beyond the rationality of the institution of the university. There is a bridge to be built between the double-sided precipice of deconstruction, on the one hand, and the self-effacing void of metaphysics, on the other. This, of course, involves the question of responsibility and what is “proper” and “right,” of “the law” and “the political”: not to raise fears about the unjustifiable eradication of the university, an institution old and dear, as ancient as philosophy itself, a traditional knowledge structure, which is

very much in need of painstaking reconstitution, but to allay them in the well-meaning desire to rejuvenate serious exchange on the reason for its being. What Derrida does through deconstruction is to set up the positive parameters within which we can discourse on the subject ethically without barriers or boundaries, though not without obligation and the danger of failure. “The Principle of Reason: The University in the Eyes of its Pupils” shows how its discourse works on the figural play of the tropic framework circumscribing the living and metaphorical dimensions of these negative perimeters to broach the educational question of foundation and of ground, of principle and of law, and of departure and destination. Essentially, by relating the foci of these complementary pairings Derrida introduces – that are very different and yet also thematical the same – to the topological formativity of the structure of the institution itself, it has been possible to reread the ethico-political undertext of this instance of deconstruction through the metaphorical register of the text on the theme of the historicity of reason. We cannot dismiss, in this case, the use of the example of Cornell University, with its bridges stretching the campus across an abyss, as the living symbol or animate example of the parable being retold while its speaker is taking the first steps through the ordeal of this inaugural lecture toward the expressing of gratitude, returning its gift-counter-gift for the honor of being selected to a prestigious appointment. The specific conditions of the discourse – demanding a specific type of rhetorical demeanor appealing to an axiology of symbolic exchanges – generate the opportunity Derrida takes to comment on the interstices of text-context relations that construct the epistemic and empirical values of the constative and performative aspects of the academic responsibility Derrida culls after the “double science” of deconstruction. And this, more, than less, translates the emphatic urgency of the topic or theme of this lecture and the timeliness of its message for a sustained reappraisal of the ethics of academic responsibility patterned after the principle of reason. What Derrida shows is that there is no overcoming (*Überwindung*) of the technophilosophical grounding of intellectual freedom

or action within the speculum of an all-seeing, all-knowing university, the otoscopic-biographic sensibility of an instrumental and poietic landscape of the idea of the modern mind. And deconstruction does not – it cannot – claim to “come down” upon the reason of the institution with a full-forced vengeance in search of justice for it has no grudge to vindicate and no end to finagle and it is not outside the law. But this is not altogether true. It is outside the law. Rather, Derrida would say, and he has:

Deconstruction is justice. It is perhaps because law (*droit*) (which I will consistently try to distinguish from justice) is constructible, in a sense that goes beyond the opposition between convention and nature, it is perhaps insofar as it goes beyond this opposition that it is constructible and so deconstructible and, what's more, that it makes deconstruction possible, or at least the practice of a deconstruction that, fundamentally, always proceeds to questions of *droit* and to the subject of *droit*. (1) The deconstructibility of law (*droit*), of legality, legitimacy or legitimation (for example) makes deconstruction possible. (2) The undeconstructibility of justice also makes deconstruction possible, indeed inseparable from it. (3) The result: deconstruction takes place in the interval that separates the undeconstructibility of justice from the deconstructibility of *droit* (authority, legitimacy, and so on). It is possible as an experience of the impossible, there where, even if it does not exist (or does not yet exist, or never does exist), there is justice. (Derrida 1992)

The “real-as-absent” ground deconstruction covers, on both sides, as it were, how one should not speak of the university and the situation of its repositioning of ethics toward the possibility and impossibility of justice, that is, the undecidable responsibility symptomatic of the irreducible difference of an academic community in extension. This “double-edged” programmatology Derrida endorses, a metacontextual metadiscursivity critical of the sign of reason embedded within and exemplified by the regulatory principles of the institution, does not refer to a predestined plan of action, demands no disciples or followers, and concedes to the direction of no political program. Instead, it invites interpretation and invention that will produce a performative intelligibility or an inkling of purpose “yet-to-come” (*avenir*) out of the non-projection of a justification. The

notion is terrifying for some and self-mockingly illogical for others, especially concerning issues of institutionalized practice and pedagogical or techno-scientific, for example, and other research areas we have delineated pertaining to the disciplinary system of the university. But considering the outcome of reason once rendered for a future action is a moment of insurance or assurance already finite and past, there is no immanence of aspirations left other than a feigning of presence suffered as a remote controlling of praxis toward the unconditionality of what is the certainty of a non-end, the non-end of certainty.

To end, I would like to cite Derrida himself, for what he has admitted with respect to the risk and necessity of his own educational journey of/through deconstruction as a curiously convoluted and arduous path that eventually lead him to his post of Directeur d'Études: Institutions de Philosophie which traces the openings of deconstruction unto the horizons of the future and the possibility of an authentic pedagogy without boundaries or margins. When asked by Jean Hyppolite to explain the direction of his thinking, Derrida replied, “If I clearly saw ahead of time where I was going, I really don't believe that I should take another step to get there” (Derrida, “The Time of a Thesis,” p. 36). I will leave you to fill in the rest.

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Derrida: Language, Text, and Possibilities

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The documentary film *Derrida* (Dick and Kofman 2002) opens with camera shots of the waters of the river Seine in Paris, traffic on flyovers and bridges, cement mixers and industrial cranes, and the backs of apartment blocks. Over these shots Derrida tells us that he makes a distinction between the future and *l'avenir*, the “to come.” The future is “tomorrow, later, and the next century”: it is foreseeable and predictable. It is part of the ordinary, even mundane, dimension of things that the camera has shown us. We know that there will be a tomorrow or the year 2050, even if we do not know what will occur then. To think of *l'avenir*, on the other hand, is to imagine the arrival of something or somebody radically unpredictable and unexpected, the coming of the wholly Other. This sense of a Beyond, of what transcends conventional knowledge and prediction, is the sense of a kind of specter: of what is not real in any common or usual meaning of the word but is powerful enough “to haunt us with uncanny possibilities, above all, the haunting possibility of the impossible” (Caputo 1997).

The writings of Jacques Derrida (1930–2004) are haunted by this possibility of the impossible. Later in the film, he talks about the impossibility of real forgiveness. Often when we say we forgive someone, it is more a way of trying to rid ourselves of our anger and resentment, or perhaps it is, consciously or not, a strategic move to put someone who has done us harm at a disadvantage. Something would have to be unforgivable in these false ways of forgiving if it could be the possibility of our truly forgiving it. Derrida embraces the paradox: we can only (only *really*, we might say) forgive the unforgivable. Elsewhere Derrida writes in similar terms of giving and the gift (*The Gift of Death*, 1995) and of hospitality (*Of Hospitality*, 2000). Most of our giving is colored by barely suppressed thoughts of reciprocity: what shall I give her for her birthday, bearing in mind what she gave me for mine? How good a bottle of wine should we take to their dinner party, in view of what they brought to ours? This is not the true making of a gift, since it involves calculation that is essentially focused on self-interest and avoiding embarrassment. Real hospitality in turn could not occur if our guests have power over us: we would be acting not out of hospitality but out of obligation. In fact hospitality seems to imply that we have some power over them: the power to offer food and shelter, say, or to refuse it. Yet this turns “hospitality” into an act of condescension, as it were to refugees whom we might as easily turn away from our door as admit through it. And this is not what we supposed we had in mind when we thought of hospitality.

This is to introduce some common themes in Derrida’s writings. At their heart is the constant reminder that concepts we normally treat as stable and take for granted may be far from fixed or secure and that the attempt to fix them tends to distort them and sell them short. There is a paradox here and Derrida’s readiness to relish paradox rather than resolve it. There is a hint of mysticism, most obviously in openness to the Beyond or *l'avenir*, to what cannot be known or named. At the same time, we might remind ourselves that some of these ideas are quite familiar to us and have a good deal of practical relevance. We might, for instance, worry about the way that schools and

universities these days are more and more being regarded primarily as places where young people acquire qualifications that will help them find jobs. What has become of them as essentially places where education, and not just preparation for examinations, takes place? Yet the project of making a university a distinctively and fully educational place is not like the project of traveling to Tokyo or climbing a particular mountain. The latter can be ticked off our list of things done, but there could never be a point where we sat back, satisfied that we had built the university of our educational dreams. This will always lie beyond anything that the most enlightened reforms could bring about.

I will return to these points later. Something must be said first, however, about the paradoxical nature of this chapter itself. I hope to explain some of Derrida's principal ideas as clearly as I can: to place them firmly for the reader, so to speak. Thus I risk fixing, as if they were doctrines, the complex thought of a writer who is the least doctrinaire of all, who asks us to get over our habit of trying to fix, to nail down, what is by its nature fluid, slippery, labile, protean. I can only acknowledge the contradiction. There are various ways around it, including attempts to imitate Derrida's elusive and complex prose style – attempts that do no service to the reader who is, reasonably, hoping for a readable introduction. Perhaps I may at least observe that this chapter is hardly intended to be the last word on the subject and this not just in the spirit of proper diffidence but because the concept of a "last word" is peculiarly inappropriate to any text that takes Derrida as its subject.

Jacques Derrida is usually described as a "post-structuralist." This is to trace a significant line of intellectual descent from the Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure (1857–1913), who is generally thought of as the founder of structuralism. Saussure was interested in just how language has meaning. It is natural to think that the meaning of a word is given by what it labels: the meaning of "table" is given by the physical object, in this case the table on which my laptop rests. This is often called the Augustinian picture of language, after some remarks by St. Augustine in his autobiography:

When grown-ups named some object, perhaps gesturing towards it, I noticed it and grasped that the object was named by the sound they made when they deliberately called it to my attention . . . Thus I gradually realised what objects were signified by the words I heard when they were regularly used appropriately in various sentences. (*Confessions* I. 8, my translation)

Wittgenstein quotes a slightly longer version of this passage at the very beginning of his *Philosophical Investigations* (1972). He comments that Augustine gives us here a "particular picture" of the essential nature of human language. In this picture "the individual words in language name objects – sentences are combinations of such names." Thus the general idea is that "Every word has a meaning. This meaning is correlated with the word. It is the object for which the word stands" (§ 1). Wittgenstein, Saussure, and Derrida all find the Augustinian picture inadequate. Wittgenstein notes that often language does not so much refer to or picture reality as constitute it. For instance, to say to someone "I promise to pay this money back to you next week" is not to refer to something but to do something, that is, to promise. The same is true when we ask someone to pass the salt, invite them to a party, warn them about the patch of ice ahead, or apologize for standing in their way. None of these uses of language label, refer to, or picture reality: they perform an action. They are sometimes called "performative" uses of language.

For a structuralist like Saussure, the crucial point is that while it is natural to think that the meaning of "laptop" or "refrigerator" is given by the object which the word labels, the same does not apply to an extensive range of other words such as "and," "the," "nevertheless," or "Sunday." If in one of my lectures I ask the students what "laptop" means, they will very reasonably point to the object in front of them and say "It's one of these." They have difficulty on the other hand in finding howevers or Sundays that they can point to. Saussure tells us not only that language does not always mirror the world but also that in general language has meaning via relations of difference. Language is a system of signs and of differences. The meaning of "man" lies in its differentiation from "woman." "Sunday" has

meaning by virtue of being neither Saturday nor Monday nor any other day of the week. There is no such thing as a Sunday for it to reflect and derive its meaning from.

Furthermore, the connection between words and what we think of them as naming is arbitrary. We might like to think of the word “Sunday” as distilling the essence of that particular day of the week (going to church, watching a football match, spending time in the garden, eating an unusually large lunch), but “Sunday” has no inner Sundayness to which it can refer, not least because millions of people spend their Sundays without doing any of these things. We might like to think of the word “rose” as somehow capturing the very nature of that beautiful and scented flower but, to quote Shakespeare, “That which we call a rose / By any other name would smell as sweet” (*Romeo and Juliet* II. ii 1–2). We like to think that some words at least display that essential relation in the form of onomatopoeia: we represent a dog’s bark as “woof woof” because that is, as a matter of fact it might seem, the sound that a dog makes. While in Britain dogs say “woof woof,” however, in France they say “ouah ouah,” and in China “mung mung.” Or we might like to imagine there is some other kind of intrinsic relationship between a word and what it indicates. We write “giraffe” on the board and, for the children’s benefit, we turn the two letters “f” into tall animals side by side. Look, children! And the very word “look” – doesn’t it seem to have two eyes at its center? We can write that on the board as well, and dots in each letter “o” make everything clear.

The central feature of poststructuralism is that it takes Saussure’s ideas much further. For Derrida meaning is not just arbitrary: it is unstable. This too is a feature of language that should be familiar enough to us. The word “wicked” supplies a good current example; where it once simply indicated a high degree of nastiness or evil, it is now often used for emphasis, as an alternative to “really” or “very”: the online Urban Dictionary offers as an example “This car is wicked cool.” The word “fit” is at present in the process of shifting from its old meaning of “in good physical condition” to its new sense of “sexually attractive.” The instability of language can be illustrated by further examples.

What is the meaning of “Stalin”? Does it denote a great leader who saved Europe from the tyranny of fascism or a psychopathic, paranoid dictator who was responsible for the deaths of millions of his fellow Soviet citizens? What are we to make of the French Revolution of the late eighteenth century, which brought to France greater social equality but also the “Reign of Terror” in which tens of thousands of innocent people were murdered?

Thus the full and final meaning of a word or a text is never conclusively reached. Caputo (1997), in the best discussion of Derrida that I know, notes that the very idea of letters, of rereading, opposes closing things down. He writes that “the letter, by its very structure, is repeatable, disseminative, public, uncontainable, unfettered to any *fixed* meaning, destination or context” (p. 59). There are some kinds of writing where this is clearly the case. A play by Shakespeare – *Hamlet*, say – is constantly being interpreted and reinterpreted. There are interpretations that offer a feminist reading, for example, or a Freudian one, and naturally there are poststructuralist readings. Every generation comes to the play with new interests and perspectives, and being a rich and complex text, there will always be new interpretations (and interpretations of these interpretations, as when we reevaluate the work of a particular literary critic). The process is endless, and it makes no sense to suppose that 1 day we shall reach the correct and ultimate interpretation, after which all further work on the play can cease. Not even the writer of the play (or poem or novel) can be authoritative about the meaning of her text. There is no anterior meaning which Keats grasped in its entirety before embodying it in a poem. Otherwise a plain statement of the meaning would be as good as, or perhaps better than, the poem itself. (This is not to say that every interpretation is as good as every other: some may be rich and productive and others crude and sterile.) The meaning of Keats’s poem, or of *Hamlet* or of every text, is thus deferred, as Derrida puts it. The ideal interpretation is always to come.

The instability of language is further emphasized by Derrida’s treatment of binary thinking. When we note differences between two terms, we

are inclined to think of one of the pair – of the binary – as somehow superior to the other. “Man” is different from “woman,” but it is easy to slip into the assumption that man is not just different but superior here. The phrase “the history of mankind,” for instance, suggests that any history worth writing will be the history of the lives and deeds of men, not of women. The talk of “manning the fire engine” implies that women cannot be firefighters (whom in Britain we have only recently stopped calling “firemen”). Consider other binaries: reality/appearance, presence/absence, adult/child, and literal/metaphorical. We readily conceive the first term as prior and the second as derivative or secondary. Derrida offers us readings of texts where, at the touch of a careful reading, these binaries turn through a hundred and eighty degrees or fall apart altogether. These readings are the kind of criticism that he calls “deconstruction.”

Derrida (1981) offers an example of deconstruction in a reading of Plato’s *Phaedrus*. Plato’s text is written as a dialogue between Socrates and the young man, Phaedrus, from which it takes its name. Here, in the very form of the text, is the assumption of the supremacy of speech over writing (another binary: speech/writing). It is easy to imagine that the spoken (and heard) word is somehow prior to the written word and that writing is an attempt (necessarily inadequate: how, for example, could it catch the speaker’s exact tone?) to capture its immediacy. Speech, Socrates tells Phaedrus, bears a closer relation to thought than writing. When you write something down, you often have a sense of “that’s not what I meant to say”; you cannot question writing in the way that you can ask a speaker what he meant. And of course this is why the *Phaedrus* is written, as virtually all of Plato’s texts are, as a dialogue. But it is *written* as a dialogue, as Plato would hardly not have noticed. It is full of literary tropes: metaphor, figurative language, and rhetorical devices. At the point where we thought we were establishing the supremacy of speech over writing, the writing that appeared to be persuading us of the strength of the case shows the precise opposite. The speech/writing binary is turned, dizzyingly, upside down.

Derrida coins the word *différance* to capture the nature of language both as a system of differences and as the endless deferral of meaning. The French verb *différer* means both to differ and to defer, and the noun derived from it is *différence*, spelled with an *e*. By spelling the new word with an *a*, Derrida not only highlights the two meanings of *différer* but plays something of a joke. In our binary thinking, we give speech priority over writing, but the difference between *différance* and *difference* can only be registered in writing: the two words sound exactly the same in speech. Thus again the speech/writing binary is problematized, since the normal order of priority is inverted: only in writing, and not in speech, is justice done to the nature of language.

These ideas are disconcerting, especially in the face of the widespread desire to find something secure and reliable to guarantee the meaning of language and put an end to the disseminating play of signifiers. Derrida calls this desire for something indubitably *there* behind the language the “metaphysics of presence.” The phrase recalls Descartes, who hoped to base certain knowledge of indubitable truths in his own presence: in thinking and doubting, at least he could be sure that he was real. In another of its forms, the desire appears in the appeal to reality, as when people are told that their academic qualifications will not impress anybody in “the real world.” In another, “what works” is called on to do the job, as when it is proclaimed that the only educational research worth the name is the kind that reveals “what works” in the classroom: as if what counts as “working” (short term or long term? Resulting in next week’s test scores or the development of deep understanding?) was not itself contestable. Divine sponsorship is sometimes seen as the answer: “In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God” (John 1. 1, Authorized Version). This is a natural temptation for Muslims, Jews, and Christians, who variously regard themselves or each other as People of the Book, of the text of the Qur’an, Torah, or Bible. Whether turning from words to the Book and the Word demonstrates a fine consistency or a deep irony is beyond the scope of this chapter.

Derrida writes that interpreting text takes place in “the absence of the referent or the transcendental signified,” that is, something secure that refers to what language refers to or goes beyond it. Reading, in one of his most well-known formulations,

cannot legitimately transgress the text toward something other than it, toward a referent (a reality that is metaphysical, historical, psychobiographical, etc.) or toward a signified outside the text whose content could take place, could have taken place outside of language, that is to say, in the sense that we give here to that word, outside of writing in general ... There is no outside-text. Derrida (1997/1967), p. 158.

The phrase translated above as “there is no outside-text” is *il n’y a pas de hors-texte*. This is sometimes mistranslated as “there is nothing outside of text,” as if Derrida was, absurdly, claiming that nothing existed but text. We might rather use the analogy of a Möbius strip, which is made by giving a strip of paper a half-twist and joining the ends together so that the strip forms a continuous loop. If we think of one side as being for writing, there is no other side for anything else. Derrida is criticizing “the tranquil assurance that leaps over the text toward its presumed content, in the direction of the pure signified” (*ibid.*, p. 159).

That assurance, it should be noted, whether tranquil or not, is much in evidence in our own time. It is displayed by the numerous attempts to fix the meaning, to declare that there is one true meaning and no other. There is space for only one example. UK universities are now the responsibility of the Department of Business, Innovation and Skills, and its official publications hammer home the message that the purpose of going to university is simply to become the kind of graduate that “employers want” (this phrase occurs 35 times in a recent government document: see Collini 2016), as if no other possibilities and no different ideas of the university had ever been entertained. The search for secure foundations leads to fixed fundamentals, and from there the road leads to Fundamentalisms of all kinds, not least the neoliberalism that currently claims to speak the one true language of the real world. Derrida shows us that we do not have to take this road.

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Derrida's Deconstruction Contra Habermas's Communicative Reason

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Introduction

In 1985, Jürgen Habermas (1929–) published a number of very critical comments on Jacques Derrida (1930–2004) in his book *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity*. Derrida reacted by saying that Habermas had either misread him or perhaps not even read him at all. In 1988, Derrida replied briefly yet informatively in an interview published by Autrement 102 (Derrida 2006), after which both parties remained silent until the end of the 1990s. (Derrida also wrote two lengthy footnotes in the 2nd English edition of *Memoires for Paul de Man*, note 44 and, in *Limited Inc*, note 9. See Derrida 1988, 1989.) It was then that Derrida and Habermas met at a party and Habermas proposed a friendly discussion. Derrida and Habermas actually set aside their differences and concentrated on themes upon which they both agreed. Before Derrida died, they jointly published one book and several articles.

In spite of temporarily finding common ground, Habermas and Derrida never did achieve a common understanding on the nature of modernity and the relationship between “rational reconstruction” and deconstruction. Habermas never did really understand the idea of deconstruction and considered it irrational and antimodern. Derrida intentionally misunderstood Habermas's reconstruction of the speech act theory, which presupposes that “misunderstanding” and the strategic use of language are abnormal situations in linguistic interaction. This reciprocal misunderstanding between Habermas and Derrida is actually a good thing for those interested in philosophizing on the tension between deconstruction and communicative rationality and the consequences of that tension for the educational science and education. How should education as a science and a practice – which is a product of Enlightenment – understand Derrida's demand for deconstruction? What kind of education is possible after destruction? Or should education rely solely on Habermasian communicative reason as a reconstructed version of Enlightenment?

Jürgen Habermas

Jürgen Habermas is without no doubt the greatest living German philosopher and he has become famous because of his grand theory called the communicative theory of action. At the heart of Habermas's theory of communicative action is the vision that the modern worldview is differentiated into three parts. Following Immanuel Kant and Karl Popper, Habermas distinguishes the objective world, the social world, and the subjective world. A communicatively competent speaker can independently present differentiated statements concerning any of these three worlds. She can independently evaluate any statement about the world with proper validity claims. There are three validity claims for these three worlds:

1. Truth (*Wahrheit*). A claim that refers to the objective world is valid if it is true, i.e., if it corresponds to the reality.

2. Truthfulness (*Wahrhaftigkeit*). A claim that refers to the subjective world is valid if it is honest, i.e., if it has an authentic relationship with the subjective world.
3. Rightness (*Richtigkeit*). A claim that refers to the social world is valid if it does not contradict commonly agreed social norms (Habermas 1984, p. 440).

Let us examine the example of the claim “Teachers have right to practise indoctrination in schools.” This validity claim is refers to the social world, and its proper validity claim is rightness (justice). A communicatively competent opponent could challenge this validity claim is by stating that it contradicts that which is commonly considered as morally correct behavior (or it would be commonly considered as such in a free and critical discourse). If an opponent merely says that “My inner self told me that indoctrination is wrong” (truthfulness or authenticity) or “It is scientifically proven that indoctrination is wrong” (truth), she is using an incorrect validity claim and she is not a communicatively competent speaker. So, in this case, the proper validity claim is that of rightness or justice.

Habermas theory of language is connected to his division of human action. Habermas divides ideal (pure) types of action into the categories of social and nonsocial action. An object of nonsocial action is nature, and the objects of social action are other people. According to Habermas, nonsocial action is always purposive-rational instrumental action: the actor makes use of specific objects for his or her own benefit. Social action can be either success-oriented strategic action or understanding-oriented communicative action. Strategic action is purposive-rational action oriented towards other persons from a utilitarian point of view. The actor does not treat others as genuine persons, rather as natural objects. Strategic action means calculative exploitation, or manipulation, of others. An actor who acts strategically is primarily seeking her own ends and manipulates other people either openly or tacitly. Communicative action is the opposite of strategic action. Communicative action – or its pure type – means interpersonal communication, which is oriented towards mutual understanding

Derrida’s Deconstruction Contra Habermas’s Communicative Reason, Table 1 Pure types of action (Habermas 1984, p. 285)

		Action orientation	
		Oriented to Success	Oriented to reaching understanding
Action situation	Nonsocial	Instrumental action	–
Action situation	Social	Strategic action	Communicative action

and in which other participants are treated as genuine persons, not as objects of manipulation (Table 1). Actors do not primarily aim at attaining their own success but want to harmonize their plans of action with the other participants (Habermas 1984, p. 285; see also p. 333). Following Austin and Searle Habermas claims that the use of language with an orientation of understanding is the original mode of language use and strategic use of language is “parasitic” (Habermas 1984, p. 288).

Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno (1972), in their book *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, maintain that the rationalization of society means above all the growth and expansion of instrumental reason. Habermas’s view is more optimistic. He states that modernization promotes both strategic and communicative rationalization. Communicative rationalization means spreading of communicative reason and it is possible because of differentiation of the “worlds” and validity claims. Habermas puts high hopes to communicative rationalization. That is why Habermas is the heritor of Enlightenment and Enlightened Reason.

Like Wittgenstein, Heidegger, Popper and Derrida also Habermas wants to overcome traditional metaphysics. Habermas calls traditional philosophy as philosophy of consciousness. According to Habermas, paradigm of philosophy of consciousness is exhausted and the symptoms of exhaustion should be dissolved with the transition to the paradigm of mutual understanding (Habermas 1990a, pp. 296–298). Put shortly, Habermas wants to resolve transcendental philosophy with his reconstructive project which includes post-Wittgensteinian philosophy of language, Piaget’s

structuralism, Kohlberg’s Kantianism, reconstruction of Weber’s and Horkheimer’s theory of rationality, reconstruction of Parson’s functionalism, reconstruction of Schütz’s phenomenological sociology of knowledge, etc. This project is called as the communicative theory of action. Habermas also widens his theory of communicative action to the areas of ethics (discourse theory of ethics) and justice (discourse theory of justice) creating the encyclopedic system of knowledge in the spirit of Enlightenment.

When Habermas started his academic career, he was ultra-left-wing Marxist in the spirit of Herbert Marcuse. Nowadays, his political commitments lies somewhere, between social democracy and political liberalism. He strongly promotes so-called The United States of Europe, which has its own foreign minister, a directly elected president and its own financial basis (Habermas 2006, 2007; Habermas and Derrida 2006). This might imply also Europe’s own educational policy and the ministry of education.

Jacques Derrida

Jacques Derrida (1930–2004) is probably the best known French philosopher ever. He is linked to the postmodern movement, although he never explicitly uses the term postmodern. He refers to his project as deconstruction. His aim is to deconstruct (re-write, re-signify, re-value, etc.) the entire history of metaphysics and phonologistic, phallo- and logocentric Western thought, which prefer speech over writing, male over female, and reason over everything. For Derrida, as for Heidegger, the main issue in Western thinking is the so-called metaphysics of presence (ontotheology), which presuppose some deeper “presence” in the world (Derrida 2003):

The history of metaphysics, like the history of the West, is the history of these metaphors and metonymies. Its matrix (...) is the determination of Being as presence in all senses of this word. It could be shown that all the names related to fundamentals, to principles, or to the centre have always designated an invariable presence – eidos, archē, telos, energeia, ousia (essence, existence, substance, subject) alētheia, transcendentality, consciousness, God, man, and so forth.

One can consider Derrida as either a post-structuralist or a neostructuralist, as he relied heavily on Ferdinand de Saussure's theory of language (see Frank 1984, pp. 88–115; Heiskala 1997, pp. 218–221; Peters and Burbules 2004, pp. 17–21). According to Saussure, the sign is a relation between the signifier (the acoustic image of a human voice – image vocale) and the signified (the concept or mental idea). The difference between them is one of the basic principles of Saussure's theory, because a sign only signifies insofar as it differs from others signs. The example signs of “dog,” “hund” (German), and “koira” (Finnish) have the same signified but a signifier differed. For Saussure, the meaning of the sign is intralinguistic and language is a system of difference. Nevertheless, Derrida accuses Saussure of leaving the door open for the possibility that meaning could be located outside of language, outside the system of difference. Saussure leaves the door open for the so-called transcendental signified (Derrida 1981, p. 19). Derrida remains to his conviction that a sign is a linguistic trace – neither wholly present nor wholly absent – which refers to other traces and that there is no ultimate transcendental signified located outside of language or text. For Derrida, language is text and thus: “There is nothing outside of the text” (Derrida 1997, p. 158). When the transcendental signified is questioned, the distinction between signified and signifier becomes problematic (Derrida 1981, p. 20):

... from the moment that one questions the possibility of such a transcendental signified, and that one recognizes that every signified is also in the position of a signifier, the distinction between signified and signifier becomes problematic at its root. Of course this is an operation that must be undertaken with prudence for: it must pass through the difficult deconstruction of entire history of metaphysics which imposes, and never will cease to impose upon semiological science in its entirety this fundamental quest for a ‘transcendental signified’ and a concept independent of language.

Combining Heidegger's ontological difference and Saussure's concept of difference – and also keeping in mind Nietzsche's and Freud's *Aufschieben* and *Aufschub* – Derrida created a new concept, which he named *différance*. Signs

are traces which have no other foundation than the movement of *différance*. *Différance* and the structure of the trace are simply the conditions of meaning (Standish 2007, p. 4). Derrida's neologism *différance* refers both to a differing (i.e., that a sign differs from other signs and *Sein* differs from *seiende*) and a deffering (the endless chain of signs). (The Office Word 2003 word processor automatically tries to correct the word *différance* to “difference”. Office Word accepts the new word invented by Derrida if the language is set to French. *Différance*, however, is not a French word. It is Derrida's neologism from the French word *différence*. Both *différance* and *différence* are pronounced in a same way. With this neologism, Derrida makes the absent phoneme “A” visible. See Derrida 1996, p. 444.) *Différance* is an unstructural structure, which is neither present nor absent. *Différance* “is.” It is the unlikely origin and postponement of all difference (Derrida 1996, p. 444). It is both movement and structure, diachronic and synchronic. With this basic concept Derrida attempts to overcome the Western metaphysics of presence and shake all the powers of discourse.

In this context, Derrida introduces an entirely new brand of science called *grammatology*, which studies written signs (graphemes) and the play of *différance*. Writing is a system of *différance*. There is no deep meaning in any text – just the play of *différance*. *Différance* is a concatenation of traces in which a sing can only refer to other sings *ad infinitum* (Derrida 1981, p. 26):

Whether in the order of spoken or written discourse, no element can function as a sign without referring to another element which itself is not simply present. This interweaving results in each ‘element’ – phoneme or grapheme – being constituted on the basis of the trace within it of the other elements of the chain or system. This interweaving, this textile, is the text produced only in the transformation of another text. Nothing, neither among the elements nor within the system, is anywhere ever simply present or absent. There are only, everywhere, differences and traces of traces. The gram, then, is the most general concept of semiology – which thus becomes *grammatology*...

Politically, Derrida remained ultra-left-wing until his death. In 1993, he dedicated his book

Specters of Marx to the South-African communist leader Chris Hani (see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chris_Hani). In it, Derrida makes no secret of his own political views and affiliations (Derrida 1993, p. 52):

This dominating discourse ... proclaims: Marx is dead, communism is dead, very dead, and along with it its hopes, its discourse, its theories, and its practices. It says: long live capitalism, long live the market, here's to the survival of economic and political liberalism! If this hegemony is attempting to install its dogmatic orchestration in suspect and paradoxical conditions, it is first of all because this triumphant conjuration is striving in truth to disavow, and therefore to hide from, the fact that never in history, has the horizon of the thing whose survival is being celebrated (namely, all the old models of the capitalist and liberal world) been as dark, threatening, and threatened.

There is, of course, no direct link between Derrida's political commitments and his program of deconstruction. Deconstruction does not require any kind of political commitment. Rather, deconstruction calls for the deconstruction of any project which is standardized by the principle of reason, including both Marxism and psychoanalysis (Derrida 1983, p. 16). Derrida has said that he was never able to successfully link deconstruction to any existing political programs and added that indeed all political codes are metaphysical, whether they originate from the right or left (Derrida 1984, pp. 119–120). It is precisely this kind of political metaphysics that Derrida and Habermas practice in their jointly written articles (Habermas and Derrida 2003, 2006).

The Confrontation Between Derrida and Habermas

The confrontation which ultimately occurred between Derrida and Habermas was inevitable. By the 1980s, Habermas had become a leading German intellectual, and Derrida, for his own part, had been a major figure in the poststructuralist movement since the 1960s. When Jean-François Lyotard introduced the term postmodern in the context of philosophy in 1979 (Lyotard 1985), Derrida was quickly characterized within. (Christopher Norris emphatically claims that

Derrida and his deconstruction do not belong to the postmodernist movement, see Norris 1990.) According to John Caputo many considered Derrida “as the devil himself, a street-corner anarchist, a relativist, or subjectivist, or nihilist, out to destroy traditions and institutions, our beliefs and values, to mock philosophy and truth itself, to undo everything the Enlightenment has done – and to replace all this with wild nonsense and irresponsible play” (Caputo 1997, p. 36). Habermas shared this common and unfair impression. Habermas made his first critical comments about Derrida in the newspaper *Die Zeit* on 19 September 1980 (*Die Moderne – unvollendetes Projekt*), when he named Derrida as belonging to the group of young conservative antimodernists. Habermas claimed that intellectuals like Georg Bataille, Michel Foucault, and Jacques Derrida embodied the Nietzschean spirit of antimodernism (Habermas 1981). This paints a rather unscholarly portrait of Derrida, which can perhaps be explained by the fact that Habermas did not have a very comprehensive grasp of Derrida's philosophy at the time. (Before Manfred Frank's book *Was ist Neostukturalismus* (Frank 1984) was published, German philosophers did not know very much about French poststructuralism.)

In an interview in the *New Left Review*, Perry Anderson and Peter Dews ask Habermas to explain his rather rude verdict of Derrida's poststructuralism. In doing so, Habermas (1985) proves that he has indeed read Derrida. In the interview, Habermas modifies his earlier opinion and says that “verdict” is not the right word to describe his relationship to poststructuralism. Habermas even goes so far as to identify certain similarities between Derrida's deconstruction and Theodor Adorno's negative dialectics and deconstruction. He also identifies similarities between the critical theory's critique of instrumental reason and Derrida's critique of discursive powers. Adorno's and Derrida's work shared many aspects of Nietzschean thought. Habermas, however, claims that, despite certain similarities, there are still a number of striking differences between Adorno and Derrida. Adorno still adheres to the Hegelian notion of determinate negation and

applies it to the Enlightenment, claiming that the Enlightenment can be healed by radicalizing itself Enlightenment. Habermas's statement implies that Derrida is completely against Enlightenment. Habermas also accuses poststructuralism of causing a pessimistic and apocalyptic ambiance in German universities at the time (1985, pp. 222–223; see also Habermas 1990a, pp. 185–186).

That same year (1985), Habermas published two long chapters on Derrida in his book, *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity – Twelve Lectures* (Habermas 1990a, pp. 161–210; see Norris 1990, pp. 49–76). In them, Habermas accuses Derrida of taking the literary character of Nietzsche's writing too seriously and attempting to transform philosophical discourse into a form of literary criticism in which rhetorical success supersedes logical consistency (Habermas 1985, p. 188):

Such a critique (which is more adequate to its object) is not immediately directed towards the network of discursive relationships of which arguments are built, but towards the figures that shape style and are decisive for the literary rhetorical power of a text. A literary criticism that in a certain sense merely *continues* the literary process of its objects cannot end up in science. Similarly, the deconstruction of great philosophical texts, carried out as literary criticism in this broader sense, is not subject to the criteria of problem-solving, purely cognitive undertaking.

Furthermore, Habermas states that Derrida's literary style presupposes the following three propositions (Habermas 1990a, p. 190):

1. Literary criticism is not primarily a scientific practice but observes the same rhetorical criteria as its literary objects.
2. There is no genre like the distinction between philosophy and literature. Philosophical text can be examined by applying the methods of literary criticism.
3. Because of the primacy of rhetoric over logic, all genre distinctions are ultimately dissolved. Philosophy and science are not able to assert their autonomy.

Derrida's critique of Austin's and Searle's speech act theories also touches on Habermas's communicative theory of action. Derrida criticizes

Searle's division of normal (the serious, literal, and binding use of sentences) and deviant uses of language (the fictive, simulated, or indirect use of sentences). The normal use of language is the kind of linguistic interaction which aims at reaching an understanding. (Richard Rorty highlights a similar division between normal and abnormal discourse in conversation, although he prefers abnormal discourse, because it challenges the metanarratives of normal discourse. The outcome of abnormal discourse can range anywhere from nonsense to intellectual revolution. See Rorty 1979, pp. 320, 377.) Derrida does not subscribe to this view. According to Habermas, for Derrida, every understanding is a misunderstanding and every reading is a misreading. Habermas states that language works only if language users use it in the "normal way" and presuppose agreement and understanding as the main goal of communication (Habermas 1990a, pp. 198–199).

In his brief reply Derrida, referring to Habermas's (1987) book, *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity*, says that those who accuse him of reducing philosophy to literature and logic to rhetoric have clearly not read his work. Derrida claims that his own texts are neither purely literary nor purely philosophical, and that the same holds true for such major philosophers as Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Hegel, Marx, Bergson, Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty. This does not, however, mean that these philosophers do not adhere to the rules of demonstration. The range of linguistic styles and types of logic and rhetoric used by various philosophers is so inherently diverse that it is impossible to speak of the existence of one main philosophical discourse (Derrida 2006, p. 37):

To analyze 'philosophical discourse' in its form, its modes of composition, its rhetoric, its metaphors, its language, its fiction, everything that resists translation, and so forth, is not to reduce it to literature. It is even a largely philosophical task (even if it does not remain philosophical throughout) to study these 'forms' that are no longer just forms, as well as the modalities according to which, by interpreting poetry and literature, assigning the latter a social and political status, and seeking to exclude them from its own body, the academic institution of philosophy has claimed its own autonomy, and practiced a disavowal with relation to its own language,

what you call 'literality' and writing in general. . . Those who protest against all these questions mean to protect a certain institutional authority of philosophy, in the form at a given moment.

Derrida does not believe in the existence of "a specifically philosophical writing which could be characterized as a pure from all sorts of contaminations (Derrida 2006, pp. 36–37). There is no solid ensemble of philosophy which remains the same in every epoch. Philosophy is written and spoken in a natural language whose modes are multiple and conflictual (Derrida 2006, p. 38).

This brief response from Derrida was followed by a decade long silence, which finally ended when Habermas and Derrida found a common enemy; an enemy they shared with German critical theory and French deconstruction. That enemy was US foreign policy. Habermas and Derrida embarked on a political crusade to reinforce the political status of the European Union as a counterforce against the US and its military campaigns. This common project has also had numerous educational ramifications, although I will limit my focus in this presentation to the first encounter between Derrida and Habermas.

Some of the Educational Ramifications of the Habermas-Derrida Abyss

There are a number of ongoing projects in the field of educational science which rely on Habermasian communicative reason. They include, just to name a few examples, Jack Mezirow's (1991) theory of emancipator learning, Robert Young's (1989, 1992) theory of ideal pedagogical speech situation (IPSS), Detmar Hans Tschöfen's (1990) critical sociology of education, Thomas Englund's (2006a, b, 2007) deliberative communication in schools, Raymond Allen Morrow's & Carlos Alberto Torres's (2002) critical pedagogy and Rauno Huttunen's (2003a, b) communicative theory of indoctrination. And there are at least as many research programs which are philosophically based on Derrida's deconstruction. Some examples include Gregory Ulmer (1985a, b), Robin Usher and Richard Edwards (1994), Peter Trifonas (2000, 2001), Michael Peters (2001) and

Nicholas Burbules (2004), and Paul Standish (2001). One common feature of these two approaches is that they are both somewhat critical of the existing educational institutions and wish to promote dialogue and multiculturalism. What is different about them is precisely what came between Derrida and Habermas in their first encounter – namely, the difference between the deconstructive critique of reason and the communicative critique of instrumental reason. To further clarify the differences and similarities between the deconstructive and communicative approaches in the philosophy of education, I would like to compare the two following educational research projects: (A) Ulmer's post(e)-pedagogy (applied grammatology) and (B) Huttunen's communicative theory of indoctrination.

(A) Gregory Ulmer based his academic post(e)-pedagogy on Derrida's writings, Bourdieu's & Passeron's (1977) sociology of education and Joseph Beuys's avant-garde art (Ulmer 1985a, b; see Gallagher 1992, pp. 300–301). Some might say that Derrida does not have a pedagogical theory, but Ulmer states that Derrida has nothing but a pedagogy. (Ulmer found the following quotation, which paints a clear picture of Derrida's pedagogy (Derrida according to Ulmer 1985a, p. 163): "Teaching delivers signs, the teaching body produces (shows and puts forth) proofs, more precisely signifiers supposing knowledge of a previous signified. Referred to this knowledge, the signifier is structurally second. Every university puts language in this position of delay or derivation in relation to meaning or truth. . . the professor is the faithful transmitter of tradition and not the worker of a philosophy in the process of formation.") The political nature of Derrida's thought leads to the belief that teachers in State-run institutions have a special responsibility to understand the educational system in which they work, whose ideas are mechanically passed on from teacher to student and back again. Ulmer claims that both Derrida's deconstructive technique and his own counterconcepts can be more easily applied

to the field of education than, for example, Foucault's archeology of knowledge (Ulmer 1985a, pp. 157–158). In order to break the reproductive nature of university, Ulmer wants to understand the academic lecture – which he calls *lecriture* – as a text in the Derridaian sense. The *lecriture* is a playful discourse whose content always remains open (Ulmer 1985b, p. 43):

... the lecture as text is a certain kind of placing or spacing, the point being to refocus our attention, as composers or auditors, to the taking place of this place. At issue in these lectures is the extent to which the performance aspect of the lectures (the scene of lecturing, rather than the referential scene, the 'diegesis' of the lecture) is foregrounded, violating the students' expectation of information as message or content. There always is content, of course (*lecriture* is not nonobjective in that sense), but the matter of that content is left open

Ulmer's deconstructive lecture a.k.a. *lecriture* aims to minimize reproduction and maximize students' productivity. A *lecriture* should not just transmit its content from lecturer to student. The *lecriture* is a text that can be productively interpreted. It is an invention as opposed to a copy of an original (Ulmer 1985a, pp. 163–164). The aim is to achieve a love of learning in which the student is a participant rather than a consumer. The lecturer tries to create a "writerly" classroom. The classroom should be conceived as a place of invention rather than reproduction (Ulmer 1985a, pp. 162–163). Referring to Gerald Holton, Ulmer writes the following (Ulmer 1985b, p. 47): "Chief among the stimulating devices that are meant to provoke the student into writerly attitude is the use of experiments that the students manipulate themselves and models supplement discourse and aid memory."

Relying on Derrida (see 2003), Ulmer claims that both *paidia* (play) and *paideia* (culture, education) have been the victims of logocentric repression. Both words refer to the activity of the child (*pais*). Aristotle was the first to disassociate *paidia* from *paideia*. The Aristotelean notion of *paideia* (culture) was a scientific leisure activity opposed to pure play.

With the deconstruction of the academic lecture, Ulmer attempts to break this division between play and education (Ulmer 1985b, p. 55). For Ulmer, post(e)-pedagogy is a vacation from oppressive rationalism. It aims at meeting the needs of students working within the postmodern condition of information overload. Ulmer's preferred method of teaching is the textshop (synonymous to workshop), because it allows students to write with the mass of data that already exists. The textshop is kind of bricolage. Ulmer's post(e)-pedagogy has no strict discipline base but instead uses art and autography to decipher the relationship between student and knowledge (Ulmer 1985a, p. 61).

- (B) Huttunen defines communicative teaching as including value orientations in which the teacher commits herself to the "universal" presuppositions of argumentation and acts in accordance with these maxims as to the best of her ability ("normative minimum"; Mollenhauer 1972, p. 42). (2.1. Every speaker may assert only what he really believes. 2.2. A person who disputes a proposition or norm under discussion must provide a reason for wanting to do so. 3.1. Every subject with the competence to speak and act is allowed to take part in a discourse. 3.2 a) Everyone is allowed to question any assertion whatsoever. b) Everyone is allowed to introduce any assertion whatsoever into the discourse. c) Everyone is allowed to express his own attitudes, desires and needs. 3.3. No speaker may be prevented, by internal or external coercion, from exercising his rights as laid down in (3.1.) and (3.2.) See Habermas 1990b, pp. 88–89.) In this respect, pedagogical communication is a kind of simulated communicative action and is more simulated in the early stage of education. When communicative teaching is conceived in this way, as an exceptional form of communicative action, the concept of communicative teaching is looser than the concept of communicative action itself. Huttunen claims that communicative teaching – as the exceptional application of communicative

action – still remains within the realm of communicative action, although teachers sometimes make use of perlocutive speech acts (use language strategically). When the aim of education is to produce mature and communicatively competent individuals and the content of teaching provides the tools necessary for independent and critical thinking, the teacher may use methods that, when taken out of context, may resemble strategic action and the perlocutive use of language (or may de facto be some form of strategic action, depending on how one defines strategic and communicative action).

In his theory of indoctrination, Huttunen presents the communicative method and intention criterion for indoctrinative teaching. He defines strategic teaching as the kind of teaching in which the teacher treats her students solely as objects, as objects of a series of didactical maneuvers. This strategic teaching is a form of indoctrination (strategic teaching is not the same as indoctrination), in which a teacher attempts to transfer the content of her lessons to her students' minds, treating them merely as passive objects, not as active co-subjects of the learning process. Huttunen defines communicative teaching as contradictory to strategic teaching. The aim of communicative teaching is a communicatively competent student who does not need to rely on the teacher, or any other authority figure for that matter. In communicative teaching, students are not treated as passive objects but as active learners. The teacher and her students cooperatively participate in the formation of meanings and new perspectives. The teacher does not impose her ideas on her students, rather they make a joint effort to gain some kind of meaningful insight into the issues at hand. What Huttunen refers to as communicative teaching very closely corresponds with Gert Biesta's idea of practical intersubjectivity in teaching (Biesta 1994, p. 312). Communicative teaching comes as close as one can possibly come to the ideal of communicative action in an actual teaching situation. Communicative teaching is the simulation of communicative action (Masschelein 1991, p. 145) and free

and equal discourse. (2.1. Every speaker may assert only what he really believes. 2.2. A person who disputes a proposition or norm under discussion must provide a reason for wanting to do so. 3.1. Every subject with the competence to speak and act is allowed to take part in a discourse. 3.2 a) Everyone is allowed to question any assertion whatsoever. b) Everyone is allowed to introduce any assertion whatsoever into the discourse. c) Everyone is allowed to express his own attitudes, desires, and needs. 3.3. No speaker may be prevented, by internal or external coercion, from exercising his rights as laid down in (3.1.) and (3.2.) See Habermas 1990b, pp. 88–89.) On rare occasions, it breaks the limits of simulation and achieves the level of proper discourse.

Ulmer's deconstructive lecture and Huttunen's communicative teaching have the same ultimate goal: to avoid indoctrination and awaken students' own productivity. The goal is an educated individual who is able to speak and write independently. Both approaches correspond with Biesta's idea of the practical intersubjectivity in teaching. In fact, the practical application in actual teaching situations might be the same in both approaches. I have tried in my own teaching to follow the maxims of communicative teaching and have used methods which are reminiscent of Ulmer's deconstructive textshops. In practice, Ulmer's lecriture and Huttunen's communicative teaching are actually quite similar. The most significant difference lies in the foundation upon which each is based. Huttunen's communicative teaching relies on the Kantian notion of an autonomous subject – which in Habermas's terminology is referred to as a communicatively competent subject – and Leibniz's Enlightened idea of the principle of reason. (Even Huttunen's communicative version of the method and intention criterion does not recognize unintentionally or structurally caused indoctrination. It is for this reason that he also outlines the content and consequence criterion of empowerment. This criterion also utilizes some poststructuralist approaches in education. See Huttunen 2003b.) The principle of reason requires that every statement must be grounded on something and every theory must have a foundation. Derrida's

deconstruction attacks both of these assumptions. Educational science as a field relies on these two assumptions and deconstruction attempts to refute them. How is this possible? How could there be any education and educational science after Enlightenment? In Pink Floyd's song, *Another Brick in the Wall*, the chorus sings:

We don't need no education.
We don't need no thought control.
No dark sarcasm in the classroom.

One might say that *Another Brick in the Wall* marked the beginning of an era in which education – in the sense of Enlightenment – is no longer possible.

Nevertheless, the deconstructive and communicative approaches in educational practice and educational research share many common features, which should allow them to be critically friendly with one another (critical friendship) and help each other to keep in shape.

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Description

- [Phenomenological Theory of Bildung and Education](#)

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- [Edusemiotics, Subjectivity, and New Materialism](#)
- [Ontology and Semiotics: Educating in Values](#)
- [Philosophical Education, An Overview of](#)

Dewey and Critical Pedagogy

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Synonyms

[Critical education](#); [Democratic education](#); [Pragmatism](#); [Progressive education](#)

Introduction

This entry explores the relationship between key points in John Dewey's philosophy of education and that of Critical Pedagogy. Throughout the entry, pertinent similarities and differences are highlighted. More specifically, a foundational theme within this exploration is underscoring education as a social function and process through which it becomes a political enterprise and cultural project. Education is contextualized within the latter frameworks as a cultural project without end. However, as Dewey and critical pedagogues, alike, point out, this project is fraught with complexity, struggle, resistance, rigid parameters, and injustice. The rich prospect of such a successful cultural project also ignites a deep sense of hope, meaning, change, and promise for future generations. Through this analysis, both philosophies will be seen as complimentary and connected sets of ideas that strengthen one's understanding of education as a agent of social transformation.

Context

The struggle between the traditional and progressive thoughts on education is always present and continues to this day. It is important to contextualize this struggle in relation to many of the educational themes in this article and the challenges that face education today. The crux of the struggle revolves around a challenging issue for most, change – specifically social change by way of education. These two extreme opposites (traditionalists and progressives) espouse different educational methods for pedagogy and learning. Dewey, of course, faced these struggles and was criticized for being progressive. Dewey found, as modern educationists and critical pedagogues have, that traditional teaching and learning styles are less successful given contemporary diverse learning styles. The various ways in which people learn have changed, and because of that the pedagogy must also adapt and improve to meet those new challenges. The notions that the teacher is the authoritative figure in the classroom and that all students learn by rote memorization have gone out the window. Those traditional notions have been replaced by experiential learning, the teacher being seen also as a student, teaching not just subjects but people and Critical Pedagogy. The very idea of the “classroom” or learning environment has been extended to the schoolyard, the family, the street, the workplace, and within everyday social interactions. Individuals in the society are all teachers and students. Education is a crucial part of experience, and experience is a crucial part of education.

The word “progress” in progressive education is important here. Progress implies change or development, or movement. Tradition implies something that is set, static, accepted custom or habit or something that is not changed or something that is clung to. In modern society, people are becoming more critical of knowledge, ideas, policies, identity, and authority. They are very interested in “progress” and knowing what things are made of. The cultural context of education in everyday life shapes and informs individual’s notions of social change, freedom, power, and knowledge. Briefly examining Critical

Pedagogy’s relationship to Dewey presents an opportunity to continue redefining and critiquing the social role of education and the social institutions that threaten progress toward a critical cultural pedagogy and social transformation.

Critical Pedagogy

The development of Critical Pedagogy as a movement, field of scholarship, and practice is informed by a long history of progressive thought on education. Although it is somewhat disputed, Henry Giroux is credited with being the first scholar to recognize and use the terminology, Critical Pedagogy, in his book *Theory and Resistance in Education* (Giroux, 1993). Critical Pedagogy means various things to various people. There is widespread agreement that it is an ongoing, evolutionary movement that is concerned with schooling’s (education’s) relationship to social structure, power, knowledge, authority, political interest, social control, and oppression. There is no single, fixed, authoritative definition of Critical Pedagogy for it would undermine its open and flexible nature. Specifically, Critical Pedagogy is concerned with how, why, and what kind of knowledge should be taught and learned and who has the power and control to make those decisions. For critical pedagogues, critically examining knowledge’s social utility is paramount. critical pedagogues concern themselves with questions like “Who controls the means of control for the production of knowledge?” “How is knowledge made and by whom?” “Why do students learn what they do in school?” “Who creates the curriculum?” “Does schooling serve to liberate, or oppress students, and teachers?” and “What is the purpose of school?”

At root, Critical Pedagogy is the study of oppression in education. The leading figure and founding father for Critical Pedagogy was Paulo Freire. In some way, it is the study of how gender, race, class, colonialism, power, and sexuality mold the nature of education, its purpose, and its transmission. Also central to its mission, Critical Pedagogy promotes both teacher and student scrutinizing and questioning why certain knowledge is

being learned or taught. With this, the accent on liberation and freedom of inquiry is extremely important. Critical Pedagogy strongly resists assumptions that education is objective and value free.

Through the Critical Pedagogy lense, education is seen as factory through which people become enslaved because of what they have or have not learned through being manufactured on the educational assembly line. Within Critical Pedagogy, both teacher and student are key agents in social change. It requires that people realize that learning is fundamental to the notion of agency and agency is essential to the notion of politics.

Critical Pedagogy's philosophical lineage is rich and interdisciplinary. While it could be argued that the idea that learning is tied to agency dates back to Plato's cave, Critical Pedagogy has developed most directly from critical social theory of the twentieth century. Of course, key to the development of Critical Theory was the Frankfurt School. The Frankfurt School theorists were concerned with the critique of social structure and institutions. Largely, these theorists built upon the work of Karl Marx dealing with sub- and superstructures of society. Key figures in the early years of Critical Theory and the Frankfurt School were Theodor Adorno, Max Horkheimer, Erich Fromm, and more recently, Jürgen Habermas.

Critical Theory has a keystone concern for social change through democratic means and social inquiry. However, the qualitative outcome depends upon the knowledge and education of a given people. This is where Critical Pedagogy is very important to Critical Theory's goals for social transformation. Freire outlined how cultural domination drives education and serves to oppress and alienate. Other very important figures in Critical Pedagogy such as Peter McLaren, Henry Giroux, and bell hooks have taken Freire's work even further.

Critical Pedagogy's major values are liberation, social justice, consciousness, discourse, praxis, critique, reflection, Democracy, and social change. In order to do Critical Pedagogy, one must accept a couple of notions. The first is that oppression does exist. The other is that the

transformation of the oppressed is possible, i.e., those oppressed are able to free themselves from their oppression. Critical Pedagogy points to how the standard way in which people learn is undemocratic. They learn undemocratically because the means through which they have been taught are undemocratic. It is unengaging, and students do not have a voice. Freire refers to this as the banking concept of education whereby a teacher is at the front of room, keeper of all the knowledge, and the students have no say or voice in raising questions. Social change must occur through what critical pedagogues call "praxis." Praxis is a cyclical, pedagogical marriage of critical reflection and action. Through praxis, then, agents can transform reality and liberate themselves from oppression. This dialectical process is without end and paramounts to Critical Pedagogy's success and ongoing development.

John Dewey

John Dewey was a prolific writer and thinker. He is widely known among many other things as the father of progressive education. His philosophical investigations ranged from art and aesthetics to science and logic to social and political critiques to education and learning how we learn. He has been called the father of progressive education. Dewey, however, was also extremely interested in the social life of the human. Social philosophers consider him to be a key figure as well. Dewey was excellent at connecting concepts in order to understand them more fully, i.e., seeing how one idea spawned from another. He was as much a naturalist as he was a pragmatist. Academic disciplines did not concern Dewey. He was writing in a time when there were no such disciplines as Sociology, Psychology, etc. Everything was fair game.

On the whole, Dewey is applauded for his efforts and thoughts on education, yet his philosophy of education needed a social philosophy. What he had to do was to tie education to far-reaching social and political concerns of the day. Some have said that the only comparable philosophy of education to Dewey's is located

with Plato. Plato, like Dewey, tied education to political leadership and social process. Plato, unlike Dewey, was not a fan of Democracy, and neither was Aristotle. The main reason for this is because both Plato and Aristotle felt that in a Democracy freedom is given to a people who do not have the education or understanding of how to use their freedom wisely. The result of the uneducated masses will be abuse of their freedom and shall be followed by tyranny. Dewey, in a way, was responding to the ancient's concern for Democracy. He believed that Democracy was the most promising of all forms of government because of the freedom it afforded the masses. However, he understood that the ideal form of education needed Democracy and Democracy needed education. One cannot exist without the other. He fully understood that education was linked, by its very nature, to the political and social life of any community.

One of Dewey's most revered works is *Democracy and Education* (Hickman, 1996). Dewey once alluded to the fact that no other single work of his captured the entirety of his position quite like *Democracy and Education* (Hickman, 1996). In that work, Dewey makes a very important statement that is radical. He states that "with each generation Democracy must be born anew, and education is its midwife" (Hickman, 1996). Taking this notion further, then, Democracy is characterized by constant change with each new generation. However, this presupposes the fact that the old generations have imparted or transmitted the appropriate set of intellectual habits to the new generations so that not only Democracy can be born anew, but also, preceding that, education has been born anew. The reconstruction of education must take place prior to the Democracy's new birth.

Dewey applied pragmatism in a special way by using a scientific approach to solve problems in education. Education is an instrument for Dewey, and an important feature of this instrument must be the use of intelligence. The main tool used for the clarification of new ideas, for problem solving, is human intelligence. One of the central goals of education, for Dewey, is the development and maturation of human intelligence, creative

Democracy, and living "Democracy as a way of life" (Hickman, 1996). Intelligence, then, calls for special ways in which one organizes responses to certain impulses; at the elemental level, intelligence is discernment in recognition. Thus, intelligence must be critical. Intelligence arises when one is in the face of conflict. It is the mediating faculty because there is no mediating faculty in the push of an impulse. Reaching a resolution through intelligence is not enough; one needs to proceed to act upon the resolution. So, for Dewey, intelligence, by its nature, *must be* critical. An important point to understand here is that intelligence for Dewey was not individual. It was social. So, any form of intelligence is social in nature for Dewey. The nature of knowledge for Dewey, as it is with Critical Pedagogy, is social.

Intersections and Conclusions

As can be seen, there are many points of agreement and overlap between Dewey's thoughts on the social function of education and Critical Pedagogy's. The shared values between these two schools of thought include but certainly are not limited to: Democracy, freedom, schooling, experience, communication, community, construction, deconstruction, reconstruction of knowledge, ideology, hegemony (Dewey might say "social control" instead), critique of social institutions, critique of social custom and habits of thinking, and change. Both perspectives understand that society is a function of education and education is a function of a society. Furthermore, it is understood in each case that pedagogy is central to politics.

Both viewpoints work from the position that education and teaching is always political and teachers and students are political operatives. Thus, freedom and liberation are extremely central to both agendas. It is understood in both philosophical contexts that freedom is something that must always be sought, cultivated, but also something that does not come without ongoing struggle and resistance.

While Dewey is often regarded as instrumentalist, he knew that knowledge was more than just

an instrument. One cannot arrive at any knowledge (whatever that is or means) without understanding. Understanding is a prerequisite of knowledge for Dewey, as well as Critical Pedagogy. The schools are responsible for guiding the understanding of cultural forces at work and the commensurate direction these forces are aimed at. But sometimes schools translate what knowledge is into merely information. Understanding, especially in this case, is not the same thing as knowledge. Understanding, in this context, should be taken to be a continual development, whereas knowledge could be taken to mean “information.” Guiding that understanding is crucial to both perspectives. The method for guiding understanding in both cases should be critical of the source of where the “information/knowledge” is coming from, why it is important, and if it is accurate based on realities of social life. Information is one thing; doing something with the information is another. This critically intelligent conduct or action is at the heart of both perspectives. Specifically, the connection between Dewey’s Pragmatism and Freire’s “praxis” is evident here.

In the vein of understanding, the concern in both cases goes beyond mere critical thinking and goes to what critical pedagogues call “critical consciousness” (Freire, 1998). Dewey won’t use that language but does use terms like consciousness, awareness, and attentiveness. Through this notion of critical consciousness, which Dewey promotes but uses different terms, is a way to get individuals to learn about themselves, their world, their relationship to others, and how to change the world through changing themselves. This goes to the point that both camps *understand* that knowledge is socially constructed and transmitted. In that way, then, knowledge should be deconstructed and reconstructed and by so doing creates the opportunity for social reconstruction, i.e., new ways of understanding what was understood and identifying what has yet to be understood.

Dewey and Critical Pedagogy take that stance that one must be critical of everything, including one’s own ideas, beliefs, and knowledge. More broadly, both perspectives felt an educational

system that promoted an ongoing critique of social institutions and self to be necessary. Key to the success of this ongoing critique is the important notion of inquiry. Dewey, like Charles Sanders Peirce, felt that the road to inquiry must never be blocked; it must always be wide open. Critical Pedagogy also supports this. Paramount to promoting, cultivating, and growing this sense of critical, open inquiry is an education and pedagogy that fosters this in students and to-be teachers.

In Dewey’s way of thinking, an ongoing, critical social transformation is needed with each new generation. What Dewey calls for is very radical for his time. He calls for a constant re-evaluation of one’s habits, customs, values, social institutions, and knowledge. critical pedagogues agree with this and recognize that it requires free inquiry, unlearning, a plasticity of habit, and a cultural yearning for transformation and change. Without this, one of Dewey’s greatest fears could be realized, “social arterial sclerosis” (Hickman, 1996). Thus, with the sclerotic condition of social institutions comes the inevitable and ongoing oppression that will only serve to render progress impossible.

Although the similarities between both viewpoints, on the whole, outweigh the differences, there are points of departure and weakness within each. One obvious difference is language and vocabulary. Another difference is scope as well. While Dewey was a true holistic philosopher, he was but one human being whereas Critical Pedagogy is a broad school of thought on a very broad topic – education. Critical Pedagogy also has its critiques ranging from feminist critiques, to post-structuralist concerns, to the problem of language. It should be expected that Critical Pedagogy be critiqued by critical pedagogues, other disciplinary scholars, and society, in general.

Dewey has also been deemed to be not radical enough for some critical pedagogues. He has been criticized for not focusing more on gender, race, class, educational access, oppression, economic status, and power relations in education and social structure. The latter point has especially been acknowledged by pointing to how far Michel Foucault takes the notion of power. Some scholars

within Critical Theory feel that Dewey's position overly paternalistic, which could perpetuate issues of social justice.

While Dewey is in no way bulletproof, he did treat many topics such as prejudice, justice, pluralism, political control, and even poverty in many of his writings. However, he did not treat the topics to the level of refinement that modern critical theorists do. Key to understanding Dewey's position on creative Democracy and Democracy as a way of life is noting that the both notions are built upon and flourish from unique individual differences within a society. Individuals, for Dewey, are only able to realize their potential through others. Learning comes through difference and is directly linked to social change.

Dewey has much richness still to offer Critical Pedagogy. One, of many examples of this, is Dewey's understanding philosophy of human nature. The paramount importance of progressive educational ideas focused on social reconstruction, transformation, or change depends upon changing one's human nature. Among many other benefits, Dewey offers Critical Pedagogy a deeper understanding of human nature, experience, social reconstruction, and the "social continuity of life" (Hickman, 1996). Concurrently, Critical Pedagogy has much to offer Dewey scholars in terms of refining and rethinking education's relationship to human suffering, power, oppression, privilege, gender, race, and class. Integrating the intellectual fruit of each viewpoint will serve to further expand, liberate, and progress one's conception of the scope and bottomlessness of education as a cultural project.

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Dewey and Philosophy of Disability

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Synonyms

Associations; Democracy; Equality; Growth; Inclusive education; Individuality; Participation; Pragmatism.

Introduction

The democratic faith in human equality is belief that every human being, independent of the quantity or range of his personal endowment, has the right to equal opportunity with every other person for development of whatever gifts he has. (Dewey 1939/1981, pp. 227–228)

In recent years, humanities scholars, social scientists, and educators have turned to what is often called the social model of disability, an orientation that begins with an intense appreciation for the lived experiences of disabled persons and culminates with a barrage of critical questions about the construction of ethical communities. Scholars have toiled to craft new theories that replace oppressive traditions of stigma and exclusion with fresh intellectual and practical pathways

seeking dignity and participation. Although John Dewey never wrote about disability, it is not surprising that scholars are now looking to his philosophy for resources to inform efforts to develop inclusive schools that accept and value students of all bodies and minds. His naturalistic understanding of human growth, pragmatic and pluralistic orientation to knowledge, and devotion to egalitarian democracy offer rich resources to educational philosophers examining issues of disability in contemporary education.

Education and Growth

Individual growth, a gradual expansion of capacities and competencies, is both social and biological, cultural and physiological. Dewey strongly opposed the hereditarian strand in psychology that reduced human learning and growth to physiology and genetics. The development of the concept of individual intelligence, in Dewey's view, was an illogical attempt to consolidate and calcify the widest variety of human activity across time and context into a single entity stripped of the actual content and processes of human living. The common notion that some essential aspect of human nature stands prior to development and continues as a static force over the course of individual growth denies the actual experience of learning and change over many lived situations and contexts. Dewey held that there is no such thing as an original essence of an individual's thought or actions that can be distinguished from all that a person acquires and learns during the course of living.

Rather than viewing biology as fixed factuality that precasts the limitations and potentials of human activity, Dewey observed biology as motion and change itself, as continuous unfolding such that "it is fruitless to try to distinguish between the native and the acquired, the original and the derived" (Dewey 1932a/1981, p. 32). At any point in the development of an individual, one can speak of what was original by explaining some feature of the current moment as an artifact of a prior essence. Yet this proposal is always an artifice that denies both the constancy of change in

living organisms and the modifying influence of the continuous interactions of the individual with his or her surroundings. What is natural, by Dewey's analysis, is not a fixed nature but the constant process of change that we customarily call growth, learning, and development.

The current preoccupation in the American education system with objectified types of disabilities demonstrates the failure of psychology and education to appreciate the forms of idiosyncratic and context-focused growth occurring in specific individuals. Educators have become distracted by assumptions about what young people should be and should become in reference to comparative timetables of normality. What is undeniable, in Dewey's philosophy, is not the existence of a nosology of defective types but a wide variability in how and when individuals grow. The human capacity to grow, taking on a multitude of situational, novel, and surprising forms, progresses in each unique life course. It is misleading to accumulate instances of failed learning or into an overall portrait of incompetence that denies the reality of human growth (Dewey 1916).

Dewey (1916) considered *growth* the end aim of an education which is ideally a "constant reorganizing or reconstructing of experience" (p. 76). Growth occurs along an "experiential continuum" that proceeds with – and is guided by – education (Dewey 1938). Dewey defined growth as an essentially natural human process which is simultaneously biological and social (Danforth 2008). This contrasted significantly from views of biology as scientific fact, framing human potential as fixed and devoid of context. Dewey (1916) specifically identified two conditions which foster growth: the need for social interaction and "plasticity," or the ability to learn from experience and thus develop habits of mind and behavior. Specifically, Dewey appreciated growth in habits and capacities that promote social integration, which further enhances learning. The goal of education is the growth of the whole child, including "adaptation to group relations" (Mayhew and Edwards 1965, p. 20), a fundamental skill for democratic community life. To support this goal, Dewey felt that curriculum

should be interactive, dynamic, and responsive to the changing needs and interests of students (Mayhew and Edwards 1965). His conception of growth is intrinsically based and not via comparisons as measured between individuals or groups. Growth is viewed strictly on an individual basis, based upon one's unique attributes and capacities.

Critics of Dewey's approach might argue that growth is something that happens *to* us and is not self-directed. However, Dewey is clear in stating that growth occurs individually when we participate in meaningful experiences. Growth is also manifested as self-realization achieved by successfully exercising capacities and realizing one's potential. Therefore, growth is not quantifiable through, for example, standardized testing. Instead, Dewey advocates that growth is first based upon personal experience from the student's perspective. Growth can also be appraised through individual contributions in communities where each unique social context determines what counts as growth. Echoing Dewey, Lekan (2009) sees growth as an element of well-being and an entirely individual concept, impossible to measure through comparisons. In this view, though individually defined, growth is best attained by developing capacities and potential through participation in communities. Growth, like many concepts in a Deweyan philosophy of disability, is viewed in regard to two aspects – the individual and society – seemingly distinct, for which Dewey takes great care to illustrate the relationships and connections. Growth as individuals facilitates growth of communities, while individual growth itself is supported by the “modifying influence of the continuous interactions of the individual with his or her surroundings” (Danforth 2008, p. 53). This idea of growth as concurrently biological and social frames disability as but one natural aspect of individuality. Education should be responsive enough to support and guide all students in the growth of social skills, communication, and competence in decision-making. Beyond these skills, even more critical is providing a social context in schools which nurtures growth through participation in shared learning activities.

Supporting Democracy Through Education

For Dewey, the formulation of a philosophy of education lies in his broad conceptualization of democracy and the challenges and opportunities inherent in building democratic communities. Although Dewey never wrote specifically about disability, his philosophy is sympathetic to special education programs and supplies theoretical and practical support for inclusive, democratic schooling that actively values all students of all backgrounds and abilities. Rather than envisioning individuality and community as opposing forces, Dewey framed individual growth as seeking fulfillment within positive contributions to a diverse, changing society. Throughout his writings, specific themes consistently emerge as foundations for a democratic way of life, including participation, communication, associations, individuality, growth, and equality. According to Dewey, participation is a form of collective action in which all who take part have a stake (Biesta 2013). All contribute from whatever interests and talents they have, seeking satisfaction and fulfillment in those preferred activities and all are supported as equal collaborators within the ongoing, practical decisions and deliberations that solve community problems and enrich community life. Education provides opportunities to experience community through mutual participation in shared activities that have personal meaning for participants and facilitate intellectual and practical growth for all students. Education involves collaborative participation in a common activity. These shared activities simultaneously allow each individual to contribute to the practical well-being of the group while also supporting the development of each student forward in her own talents, skills, and knowledge.

Instruction, in this light, is not done *to* or *for* students but *with* them, as a mode of interaction and experience that engages students intellectually and emotionally, tapping into and extending individual desires and interests (Westbrook 1991). Common understanding is not a prerequisite for cooperative activity. Rather, Dewey suggests the opposite; cooperation in action leads to common

understanding. This runs counter to traditional thoughts on teaching and learning. It is not merely participation in an activity; it is the quality of the participation that takes priority. Traditional education has concentrated on individuals revising schemas as evidence of learning, not the construction of new and shared perspectives.

Communication, as reciprocal and interactive, is the basis of human community and knowledge. Dewey understood communication not as transmission of information from person to person but rather as transactional meaning-generation, “a process of sharing experience until it becomes a common possession” (Dewey 1916, p. 14). For Dewey, communication through action results in meaning-making that is commonly understood by all, a critical aspect which supports growth and, on a larger scale, democracy. Communication then is action-oriented; it is something people *do*. More importantly, it is something people *do together* (Biesta 2013). The concept of communicative and relational participation is central to Dewey’s view of education and a philosophy of disability. Education does not simply occur through mere presence in a social environment. Rather, students must participate in the “embryonic community” (Dewey 1899, p. 19), the social relationships of growth and friendship which are the developing micro-society. Here education occurs through participation in shared activities which transform ideas, habits of conduct, and moral reflection.

For students with disabilities, inclusion defined narrowly by place alone cannot offer the opportunity for participation from a Deweyan perspective. What is required is an unabridged opportunity to be immersed within experiential fullness and richness of the social life of the school as a developmental microcosm of the larger society.

When the school introduces and trains each child of society into membership within such a little community, saturating him with the spirit of service, and providing him with the instruments of effective self-direction, we shall have the deepest and best guarantee of a larger society which is worthy, lovely, and harmonious. (Dewey 1899, p. 20)

The goal of the school is to develop each child’s intelligent and purposeful command over

their own actions within a context of cooperation and social support. Individuality and community, in this light, are built through the shared activities of investigation, learning, and action.

Communicative and relational participation takes place within common, shared activity and is a natural consequence of human association (Westbrook 1991). Human potential is not strictly an individual endeavor; rather, it is only reached through associations, or common interactions, with others. In this perspective, the chief goal of the school is to support all students in reaching their fullest potential, to “secure a free and informal community life in which each child will feel that he has a share and his own work to do” (Mayhew and Edwards 1965, p. 32). The educative *process* itself – comprised of participation and its subsequent transformation of thought and practices – is the end goal of education and requires various modes of human association.

For Dewey (1916), separation of students during the educative process denies the valuable “interchange of varying modes of life experience” (p. 84), diminishing the opportunities for relationships, interactions, and learning. For example, segregating students with disabilities into isolated classrooms or schools creates a situation characterized by a “lack of the free and equitable intercourse which springs from a variety of shared interests” (Dewey 1916, p. 84). Heterogeneous interactions enrich intellectual development for every student; “Diversity of stimulation means novelty, and novelty means challenge to thought” (Dewey 1916, p. 85). Dewey therefore viewed schools as places where modes of associated living among diverse learners developed the practical capacities necessary for building and furthering democratic communities (Westbrook 1991).

In a democratic model, teachers support (and schools are structured to facilitate) students so that everyone makes unique contributions that benefit the community. A shared education prompts development of “social sympathy” and results in “collateral learning,” which is more important in many respects than the content matter itself. In order to accomplish this, educators must “presume competence,” where they bracket out

preconceived stereotypes and stigma of disabled students in order to open up to the contributions those students can make (Biklen and Burke 2006). Dewey believed that a democratic design and perspective in education could *transform* society. Historically, however, the case has been that schools are not designed for that purpose but rather to *reproduce* society according to homogenized and standardized norms, or “mediocrities” (Dewey 1922a). The task for education, therefore, would appear to be to work within the existing structure of the educational system writ large but strive to create collaborative, democratic communities on a local scale.

Equality in Education and Society

Dewey (1922b) viewed equality as a precondition for freedom and used the concept of “moral equality” to frame student differences in more democratic ways that dispense with hierarchies. Moral equality therefore requires we accept humans as incomparable and that standardized measures (such as intelligence testing) which strive for comparison are decontextualized, ineffective, and even detrimental to the educative process. For Dewey, equality does not equate with sameness but with an equity of social valuing, an assumption that all persons are necessary to the community. To each student must be provided the resources and opportunities for each to fully develop his or her own capacities to contribute to a democratic society, in other words, *equality of opportunity* (Westbrook 1991). Equality is constructed in the everyday doing of living and not as an a priori philosophical or political ideal. Humans and their life’s activities are not comparable; instead equality is expressed by viewing a person’s unique qualities and capacities. In this sense, equality is not composed of hierarchies or any metric of comparison; it is about individual learning and growth within each unique life context where one is considered “morally equal to others when he has the same opportunity for developing his capacities and playing his part that others have, although his capacities are quite

unlike theirs” (Dewey 1932b, p. 346). In this way, equality can be expressed as a collective equation, a reciprocal interaction wherein what each person provides the group in terms of unique contribution is returned to every individual through richness and quality of experience.

Dewey’s stance on equality was based on values and differs from the typical definitions of societal comparison based upon a variety of attributes (socioeconomic status, opportunity, intelligence, social capital). Dewey, however, was very aware of social groups and problems of hierarchies in society. His response was to focus on supporting idiosyncratic growth of each student while creating social processes whereby students work together, accept and value one another, and collaborate to solve concrete human problems. Public education, historically and currently, operates systems that classify and segregate students with disabilities into one-dimensional learning communities. In Dewey’s view, such isolating, marginalizing, and classifying run counter to the democratic values of associated living and moral equality. At its core, Dewey’s notion of equality depended upon an education that afforded *all* students the opportunity to “make the best of themselves as active participants in the life of their community” (Westbrook 1991, p. 94).

Individuality as Educational and Social Attribute

In Dewey’s view, democracy itself depends upon the realization of individualized capacities. “Democracy will not be democracy until education makes it its chief concern to release distinctive aptitudes in art, thought, and companionship” (Dewey 1922b, p. 300). Dewey (1922a) denounced the “classificatory submergence of individuals in averaged aggregates” (p. 292) as represented by intelligence testing and other standardized assessments of ability or achievement. Education of students with disabilities has been characterized by standardized diagnostic testing and curricula based upon an array of needs that

represent actions a particular disability category might exhibit, both of which negate the value of individual capacities. The mindset of focusing on measured deficits instead of valuing the wholeness of complex individualities has implications far beyond the educational setting in terms of the vision for a truly democratic society. Therefore, education's great task is to discover and encourage the "unique service" (Dewey 1922b, p. 300) of individuals by asking questions involving real human problems that confront society, uniting young minds to be creative, collaborative, scientific, and practical.

Dewey cautioned that individuality should not to be confused with individualism, the valuing of detached independence or self-reliance. In contrast, individuality recognizes and celebrates the unique capabilities and contributions offered by individuals as part of a reciprocal interaction within a social situation. Indeed, Dewey (1916) stresses that:

every individual has grown up...in a social medium. His responses grow intelligent, or gain meaning, simply because he lives and acts in a medium of accepted meanings and values...the self *achieves* mind in the degree in which knowledge of things is incarnate in the life about him; the self is not a separate mind building up knowledge anew on its own account. (p. 295)

Not only do individual minds grow within a social milieu; consequently so does society insofar as it "counts individual variations as precious" (Dewey 1916, p. 305). Certainly, the value of individual differences in education and society is a common thread throughout Dewey's writings, one that also frequently connects to his conception of moral equality as incommensurability. As played out in the school setting, individual students, regardless of ability, grow through assuming their own unique roles within the collaborative experiences of the class (Danforth 2008). For schools to succeed in their task of developing social and democratic values, they must be organized as cooperative communities where each student feels as if he or she contributes and can achieve their full and unique potential.

Conclusion

Dewey clearly supported the potential of education to allow every individual to contribute to the democratic ideal in unique ways. Dewey's concepts of growth, democracy, equality, and individuality are interconnected elements of an overarching, egalitarian perspective. The educational implications of these concepts are best represented through an examination of strategies to create and sustain schools, classrooms, and other learning environments which recognize, affirm, and involve individual voices of students with disabilities as equal contributors in shared communities. Democratic modes of education which promote communication, participation, and human association include removing barriers to shared participation, providing opportunities for students to be socially integrated and contribute to the shared work of the classroom and creating social environments that are mutually enriching. A focus on growth as individuals in a Deweyan perspective requires working on incorporating individual ways of communicating, thinking, and learning actively into educational communities and assessment based upon growth within each individual, not according to an extrinsic or predetermined grading scale. Equality can be fostered through cultivating interpersonal relationships within classrooms which focus on respect, the value of individual contributions, and an inclusive community of caring (Danforth and Naraian 2015). As viewed through a democratic lens, Dewey's educational philosophy of disability contrasts markedly from a charity-based approach and stresses doing well *with*, rather than *for*, diverse others.

Cross-References

- [Dewey and Critical Pedagogy](#)
- [Dewey and Philosophy of Disability](#)
- [Dewey and the Self](#)
- [Dewey Lab School at the University of Chicago](#)
- [Dewey on Democracy](#)
- [Dewey on Educational Aims](#)

- Dewey on Educational Research and the Science of Education
- Dewey on Ethics and Moral Education
- Dewey on History and Geography in Education
- Dewey on public education and democracy
- Dewey on Science and Science Education
- Dewey on Teaching and Teacher Education
- Dewey on the Concept of Education as Growth
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Dewey and the Self

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Introduction

The self, for Dewey, is an entity that emerges out of a biological and social milieu, growing and changing over time in transaction with the world. Thus, the self is “not something given once and for all at the beginning which then proceeds to unroll as a ball of yarn may be unwound” (Dewey 1940/1991, 103). Each individual self has a unique past, “a background of experiences long ago funded into capacities and likes” (Dewey 1934/2008c, 93) a present, which at its best becomes an art that manifests “what actual existence actually becomes when its possibilities are fully expressed” (Dewey 1934/2008c, 285), and an ever-unfolding future to be shaped through choices made in conjunction with environing conditions.

This discussion is organized into three main concepts that are essential for understanding Dewey's account of the self. The first is “impulse,” which helps to clarify how the realms of the individual and social interrelate in constituting the self. The second is “habit,” which is arguably the concept most central to Dewey's account of self. Finally, the concept of “art” is essential for understating the full richness Dewey's account of self, as for Dewey the creation of art is integrally linked to the creation of self.

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Impulse

Impulse is essentially a release of energy that arises within an individual when his or her habits are not in tune with surrounding conditions. Impulse is chaotic, tumultuous, and “of itself [does not] engage in reflection or contemplation. It just lets go” (Dewey 1922/2008a, p. 124). Examples of impulse could be as basic as a biological need for food or something much more complex such as a gripping sensation experienced in the chest when a loved one lets us down. Crucially, neither the initial pangs of hunger nor the feeling of despair experienced with a broken heart are meaningful until they meet the social realm. Indeed, as impulses, they are merely blind discharges of energy that are yet to have a name. As such, “Gestures and cries [of this sort] are not primarily expressive and communicative. They are modes of organic behavior” (Dewey 1925/2008b, pp. 138–139).

Perhaps the most transparent example of impulse can be found in considering an infant’s initial gestures and cries. Dewey offers that rather than being communicative, such release in energy is essentially “over-flow” and “by-product.” However, in meeting the social environment impulse becomes transformed into something meaningful, as “the story of language is the story of *use* made of these occurrences” (Dewey 1925/2008b, p. 139). In other words, the initial pangs from an empty stomach become something more than merely raw sensation when they are interpreted and responded to as *hunger*. Thus, in this initial “establishment of cooperation in an activity in which there are partners” – what Dewey names as the *sufficient* condition for language – impulse becomes meaningful (Dewey 1925/2008b, p. 143). “In short, the meaning of native activities is not native; it is acquired. It depends on interaction with a matured social medium” (Dewey 1922/2008a, p. 65). And it is for this reason that babies “owe to adults the opportunity to express their native activities in ways which have meaning” (Dewey 1922/2008a, p. 65).

So, while impulse is native and arises within the individual, in meeting the social environment

impulse becomes transformed. In this, impulse gains a meaningful, social end. Accordingly, impulse provides the initial spark that can eventually lead to the creation (and continual recreation) of a self in the meeting of the social realm. “[I]mpulsive action becomes an adventure in discovery of a self which is possible but as yet unrealized, an experiment in creating a self which shall be more inclusive than the one which exists” (Dewey 1922/2008a, p. 97). Thus, “Personality, selfhood, subjectivity are eventual functions that emerge with complexly organized interactions, organic and social” (Dewey 1925/2008b, p. 162). Understanding the role of impulse in this complex organization is key for reconciling the interrelationship between the individual and social aspects of Dewey’s account of the self.

Habit

While Dewey’s account of habit is most fully elaborated in *Human Nature and Conduct* (1922), habit plays a significant role throughout Dewey’s philosophy and is particularly significant in his educational philosophy. Dewey’s discussion of habit describes both the stable aspects of self as well as the possibility for reorganizing the self through forming new habits that in some degree allow for the creation of a new self. Dewey’s conception of habit is much more encompassing than we typically afford the notion, as we often only become aware of habits when they are perceived negatively – as in the case of a bad habit we wish to break. But “When we are honest with ourselves we acknowledge that a habit has this [negative] power because it is so intimately a part of ourselves. It has a hold upon us because we are the habit” (Dewey 1925/2008b, p. 21). In this way, so-called bad habits allow us to recognize how central habits are to the self.

But habits are not always (or even mostly) bad. A habit is a form of intellectual efficiency that we retain from past interactions. Habits are helpful to thought in that they restrict its reach, fixing certain boundaries, preventing thought from straying too far off course (Dewey 1922/2008a, p. 121). By successfully narrowing thought’s focus and

keeping it on a productive, or at the very least, a proven, trajectory, habits are vital to our everyday functioning. Although it can be difficult to fully appreciate the extent to which we rely on habits, in reflection we can recognize that even seemingly straightforward acts of perception, such as seeing or hearing, are laden with habits of observation, recollection, foresight, and judgment. In this way, habits are constantly mediating all of our interactions with the world. “Outside the scope of habits, thought works gropingly, fumbling in confused uncertainty” (Dewey 1922/2008a, p. 121).

Habits are primarily objective in the sense that they are formed in conjunction with the world. In this, habits “incorporate an environment within themselves” and become “an ability, an art, formed through past experience” (Dewey 1922/2008a, pp. 38, 48). Once a habit is established, it has a projective, dynamic quality – always functioning on some level, even if only in a subdued and subordinate form, waiting for the right conditions to arise in order to emerge and guide thought and conduct.

For Dewey, what distinguishes a good habit from a bad habit is not whether it is somehow annoying or distressing, but rather how it functions in helping us to respond to a present environment. “[W]hat makes a habit bad is enslavement to old ruts” (Dewey 1922/2008a, p. 48). Thus, whether a habit “is limited to repetition of past acts adopted to past conditions or is available for new emergencies” is key for ultimately determining if a habit is good or bad, as the “goodness of conduct” “lies in effective mastery of the conditions which *now* enter into action” (Dewey 1922/2008a, p. 48).

The importance of recognizing habit’s connection to present conditions is pivotal for Dewey’s discussion of habit because it is upon this axis that habit’s function turns. Thus, as much as habit accounts for the stable aspects of self, Dewey’s discussion of habit at the same time posits the self as an ever-changing, regenerative entity. What distinguishes habit as stable or changing is its relation to a present environment. When habit is not in harmony with present conditions, impulse emerges, creating an opportunity for habit to become reorganized. In this, Dewey’s discussion

of the formation and reorganization of habit names a fundamental process that allows for life to grow and thus to qualify as a life at all (Dewey 1916/1980, p. 56).

Dewey’s commitment to fostering a life of growth is the reason he advocates that we cultivate impulse, the stirring of which is the initial first step in the reorganization of habit. Dewey asserts, “More ‘passions,’ not fewer,” as “the man who would intelligently cultivate intelligence will widen, not narrow, his life of strong impulses while aiming at their happy coincidence in operation” (Dewey 1922/2008a, pp. 136–137). But while impulse is vital and necessary for reorganizing habit, it is not nearly sufficient. “Impulse does not know what it is after. . . . It rushes blindly into any opening it chances to find” (Dewey 1922/2008a, p. 175). While “impulse is needed to arouse thought [and] incite reflection,” “only thought notes obstructions, invents tools, conceives aims, directs technique, and thus converts impulse into an art which lives in objects” (Dewey 1922/2008a, p. 118). And in converting impulse into an art, we form a new habit – we grow – and we become in some sense a new self.

The work of intelligence is critical in allowing for impulse to be converted in this way, forming a new habit. Intelligence clarifies and liberates restless impulse through a process of deliberation, “a dramatic rehearsal (in imagination) of various competing possible lines of action” (Dewey 1922/2008a, p. 132). In this rehearsal, potential action is tried out based on what is known from the past via habits in conjunction with impulse and the present environment. The rehearsal continues until a course of action is hit upon. Notably, this is not a progression of moving from indifference to preference, but rather a move from multiple competing preferences to the emergence of a unified preference that satisfies the situation. “We want things that are incompatible with one another; therefore we have to make a choice of what we *really* want, of the course of action, that is, which most fully releases activities” (Dewey 1922/2008a, p. 134). In making a choice, the existing self is revealed and simultaneously the future self is being formed. “Every choice is at the

forking of the roads, and the path chosen shuts off certain opportunities and opens others. In committing oneself to a particular course, a person gives a lasting set to his own being.” Dewey continues, describing this as “a process of discovering what sort of being a person most wants to become” (Dewey 1922/2008a, p. 287).

The choices we make can be reasonable or unreasonable. The distinction between the two, however, rests not on a guaranteed outcome of perfect success, but rather whether “justice” has been done to “every shade of imagined circumstances” (Dewey 1922/2008a, p. 135). In the case of an unreasonable choice, a particular object of thought becomes irresistible and overrides the others, but in so doing does not satisfy all facets of the present situation. By contrast, a reasonable decision requires the working (and wrestling) with competing impulses and habits in relation to a present situation in order to hit upon a projected resolution that will satisfy all aspects of a present circumstance. In this, deliberation is as much an operation of intellect as it is the working of art.

Art

The title alone of Dewey’s major aesthetic text, *Art as Experience*, says a great deal about Dewey’s approach to art. Contrary to conceptions of art as objects, Dewey maintains, “there is a difference between the art product (statue, painting or whatever), and the *work* of art. The first is physical and potential; the latter is active and experienced. It is what the product does, its working” (Dewey 1934/2008c, p. 167). Thus, Dewey conceives of art as an experience of “active alert commerce with the world; at its height [art] signifies complete interpenetration of self and the world of objects and events” (Dewey 1934/2008c, p. 64). Such commerce with the world is critical for this discussion of self because within the experiences Dewey puts forth as art, the self grows through “an adjustment of our whole being with the conditions of existence” (Dewey 1934/2008c, p. 23). In this, the process of reorganizing habit becomes synonymous with Dewey’s conception of art.

Although Dewey’s discussion of habit is presented most fully in *Human Nature and Conduct* (1922), it is in 1934 with the publication of *Art as Experience* that the notion of habit comes to fruition. Both of these texts consider the “turmoil” marking “the place where inner impulse [makes] contact with [the] environment” and in *Art as Experience* deliberation is further developed, revealing it to be a fundamentally aesthetic process (Dewey 1934/2008c, p. 72).

Although by 1934 Dewey preferred the term “impulsion” to “impulse” in order to designate “a movement outward and forward of the whole organism to which special impulses are auxiliary” (Dewey 1934/2008c, p. 64), Dewey’s 1922 description is clearly at work in a recast version in Dewey’s 1934 discussion of the act of expression. In this, Dewey suggests that every complete experience begins with impulsion – an instance of need, a lack of harmony between organism and environment. Initially, the experience does not know where it is going, as it must contend with resistance from the environment in what Dewey now refers to as reflection. This process of reflection is the same as deliberation in that it relates the impulsion stirred by a present “hindering of conditions to what the self possesses as working capital in virtue of prior experiences” – that is, to habit. Thus, Dewey continues, expression involves a “transformation of energy into thoughtful action, through assimilation of meanings from the background of past experiences.” The act of expression is thus “a re-creation in which the present impulsion gets form and solidity while the old, the ‘stored,’ material is literally revived, given new life and soul through having to meet a new situation” (Dewey 1934/2008c, p. 66).

A reorganization of habit is thus inherent in Dewey’s conception of art. With this, art becomes key for understanding the full richness of Dewey’s account of self. Indeed, the creation of art involves self-creation as well. “From the first manifestation by a child of an impulse to draw up to the creations of a Rembrandt, *the self is created in the creation of objects*” (Dewey 1934/2008c, 286, emphasis added). And whether this self be a Rembrandt or someone else, the process of self becoming is in itself inherently a working of art. Thus, in

overcoming resistances encountered through interaction with the environment, we transform objects external to us just as we transform internal objects as well – our habits and, by extension, our selves.

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Dewey Lab School at the University of Chicago

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John Dewey established an experimental school in 1896 at the University of Chicago. He and his wife Alice were involved with the school until 1904 when they left Chicago. Dewey wanted to put into practice his ideas about education, test these ideas, and encourage what we now call action research, as well as provide schooling for his own children. Dewey's writings at the time about the school include brief descriptive articles (e.g., 1896) as well as his well-known book *School and Society* (1899).

Two principal accounts of the school other than Dewey's own reflect different views and help

provide here a holistic account of the Laboratory School: *The Dewey School* (1936/1966) and *Dewey's Laboratory School: Lessons for Today* (1997). The first account is by Katherine Camp Mayhew and Anna Camp Edwards, two teachers at the school, with an introduction by Dewey himself. They note that Dewey's purpose was "to discover in administration, selection of subject matter, methods of learning, teaching, [a way of] developing in individuals their own capacities and identifying their own needs" (pp. xv–xvi). The second account comes much later, from the curriculum theorist Laurel N. Tanner (1997), as she assesses Dewey's school in light of the dissemination of his pedagogy and thought and compares current educational practices to what Dewey proposed and enacted. Tanner is concerned that there are lessons about the school that have not been learned. In the final part of the entry, we discuss more fully the lessons learned from Dewey's Laboratory School and how Dewey's ideas have fared in today's schools.

Dewey brought developments in the new field of psychology to bear upon the conceptualization of the school and its teaching and learning. He was particularly interested in what we would call developmental and social psychology, particularly George Herbert Mead's social nature of the self. Dewey drew heavily from the Harvard philosopher and psychologist William James, a pioneer in contributing to developmental and educational psychology. Like James, Dewey was a pioneer in the philosophical movement called pragmatism. Pragmatism insists that ideas be tested for their consequences in the everyday world. This way of thinking deeply influenced Dewey's conception of the Laboratory School as a place where teachers would test ideas about teaching. These ideas would be developed into learning activities, where students would observe, learn, experiment, and reflect upon projects and problems offered by teachers but also ones they encountered themselves in the multiple factors and considerations a problem or project may present.

For instance, Dewey thought everyday activities such as cooking, carpentry, and art all presented engaging problems that would require

certain skills to learn and to understand fully. Students learning how to bake would see how numeracy and literacy came alive in the transformation of the ingredients such as flour, eggs, milk, and cocoa into the finished product of a chocolate cake. Students creating paintings would learn techniques that allowed imagination to fashion works of art from the materials of paint and canvas.

Although the school was theorized based upon Dewey's philosophy and psychology, it also owed its genesis in part to Dewey's memories of childhood learning, especially what Tanner calls "the never-ending memory of boredom" (1997, p. 13) of the classroom, particularly rote learning common in nineteenth-century schools in his native Vermont. Dewey recalled good memories of learning outside the walls of the classroom, in the vibrant city of Burlington but also out in nature, and he wanted to infuse the Laboratory School with that kind of active, interesting learning.

Dewey was brought to the new University of Chicago by President William Rainey Harper, to not only chair its department of philosophy, psychology, and pedagogy but to enact the ideas of the new science of psychology with young learners. The school was founded by Dewey and Harper in 1894 and opened in 1896. It fulfilled a dream that Harper had for his new university, where learning would be paramount from early years through graduate study. Harper had enticed Dewey to his new university in part by elevating pedagogy to a university discipline, as part of the department Dewey headed. The new school was finally called the Laboratory School in 1901 to differentiate it from other schools at the university and to stress its experimental purpose. Dewey appointed his wife Alice as principal of the school in 1901, a position she held until 1904 when she was asked to resign by President Harper, an event which prompted Dewey to resign from oversight of the school as well as from the University of Chicago, for a professorship at Columbia University in New York City.

Dewey wanted a school to be like a scientific "laboratory," where theories about education and development could be tested, by teachers devoted

to learning about research and innovation. He saw the most important work of the university discipline of pedagogy as the advancement of ideas about education through conceptualization, trying out, and applying, as he states in *The School and Society*, in a "laboratory of applied psychology. That is, it has a place for the study of mind as manifested and developed in the child, and for the search after materials and agencies that seem most likely to fulfill and further the condition of normal growth" (Dewey 1899, p. 96, as cited in Tanner 1997, p. 19). These teachers would then work collaboratively to develop and enact a curriculum based on problems that would not only engage students with materials and ideas but would prompt and enable these students to take charge of their own learning. Dewey's aim was an active and involved learning experience for all that would serve as a nascent democracy. Thus, the hands-on activities the children did were not only to learn skills and information in a holistic way but to enliven the child's incipient moral and social character.

Learning in the Laboratory School was based upon a simple idea: The natural interests of the child would be shaped and guided by a collaborative teacher attentive to that particular child's learning needs. The well-known epithet about active learning of a teacher being a "guide on the side rather than a sage on the stage" was apt for what Dewey wanted teachers to be and do. He objected to the lifeless rote learning common in his day that he recalled from childhood because it removed learning from life's ever-changing concerns. Dewey stressed the importance of a living, woven-in, psychological connection to learning about matters of interest that stood in contrast to a static, analytic, logical presentation of subject matter in text books.

Dewey privileged the psychological over the logical in education. That is, a child's interest and curiosity would determine if in fact the child wanted to learn in the first place, and the topics, pedagogy, and curricular structure followed. This contrasts to a logical organization of subject matter, where the rationale for a particular subject is described and analyzed in a sensible, logical, linear fashion as is typical in textbook, an object of knowledge that is not intrinsically attached to any

one person's interest in learning. A textbook by itself does not interest us, Dewey might say, as the material has not been psychologized and thus made living and momentous. A simple example will suffice: A child may or may not be interested in a textbook presentation of sedimentation evident in a riverbed, but this topic can be described adequately in a geology textbook. The textbook is logical, descriptive, and static, while the child's interest or disinterest in sedimentation is psychological, developmental, and active. The child, if interested, may ask or be prompted to ask by a teacher why the sedimentation occurred in this fashion. Thus, the topic becomes a problem that invites imaginative and often collaborative thinking to understand, which may include investigation of an actual riverbed, the posing of hypotheses about sedimentation, further library investigation, testing with models of riverbeds, water flow, sedimentation, and so forth.

The English empiricist philosopher John Locke envisioned the mind as a blank slate upon which sense impressions are made. All we perceive etches its particular properties upon the mind. Thus, for Locke education was paramount, as it provided the material content to inscribe meaning and significance on a blank slate. Dewey thought such abstract empiricism was nonsensical and believed we always start learning in the middle of things. Children come into a family and a society already endowed with rich strata of history, lore, and custom. Even the environment is humanized, fashioned as buildings and roads, but also the natural world, what we suppose is wild nature, has been altered by humans, most fundamentally as a creation of cognition, as a human creation.

Thus, since we enter into a world already fashioned and constructed, school learning should be continuous with that world and with the learning developed in family and home and with one's own incipient sense of self and actualization. In the Laboratory School, teachers were more like facilitative leaders who constructed an inviting environment replete with challenging activities in everyday environments such as a garden, kitchen, workshop, or studio. Students encountered puzzling or problematic situations in these

environments, and what they learned through the "occupations" of these settings mimicked everyday life. Skills such as numeracy and literacy were learned as part of holistic topics and the means to meet basic human needs of dress, shelter, and sustenance. Building a small shed utilized numeracy (measurement and calculation in construction), literacy (reading instructions), and social or cultural literacy (learning where the wood was harvested and milled, how the construction of sheds evolved over time and in different places and cultures, and so forth).

As the student and curriculum were reconceived in the Laboratory School, so too was the role of the teacher. Rather than the familiar "egg crate" of isolated instruction behind closed classroom doors common in many schools even today, the Laboratory School teacher taught collaboratively, engaging in close dialogue with colleagues and fostering an incipient democracy through modeling collaborative and dialogic practices among each other, with students and with the community at large. Teachers were to be researchers of their own practice. This is a difficult work, and there is evidence that the Laboratory School teachers were not entirely successful in keeping up the intensity and effort required of such pedagogy. Closer to our time, Vivian Gussin Paley, teaching in the Laboratory School well after Dewey's departure, enacted this aspect of Deweyan pedagogy in her own classroom by working closely with individual students and recording her teaching for analysis and reflection after class each evening, which she then turned into a series of well-known books.

The approach to curriculum and instruction was one of experimentation in which students were encouraged to learn through "first-hand" experience (Mayhew and Edwards 1936/1966, pp. 22, 25), investigation, experimentation, and exploration. The Laboratory School was a progenitor of what became the student-centered approach to teaching and learning that featured small-scale simulations. For example, science classes tended to be structured on the basis of creating meaning through simulations or experiments such as understanding the water cycle by using a sand table and making a river in the sand

table to see how water, elevation, and water speed affect each other. Students would experiment with how much water would affect the ways in which a river formed and changed over time. Another example of using the first-hand experience approach to learning was in the teaching of environmental science. Students would, for example, create physiographic maps using sand and clay to place geological features in proportion. These maps could be used to better understand geological processes in the region.

Dewey's Laboratory School and its practices were not without its critics. The school experienced a crisis in 1901–1902 when its enrollment decreased by 40% (Knoll 2015, p. 23). Some parents and teachers found it difficult to deal with the principal, Alice Dewey, whom they considered “cold, arrogant, and offensive” (Knoll 2015, p. 24). But more than the administration of the school, some parents found the curricular emphasis not to their liking. The core of the active learning in the school was built upon acquainting students with “occupations,” and out of this supposed real-life experience, students would master numeracy, literacy, and other important skills taught more didactically in traditional schools. The emphasis on learning seemingly simple tasks such as cooking, knitting, and weaving at the expense of traditional subjects such as reading, writing, and arithmetic was criticized by some parents and visitors (Knoll 2015, p. 24). Many of these parents who took their children out of the Dewey School enrolled their children at another progressive school:

The children switched to the nearby Parker School where the number of applications surged in 1 year by almost 70%. . . while the Dewey School experienced a decrease of about 60 students, the enrollment of the Parker School rose by 71 students. It seemed safe to say that, in October 1902, most of the Laboratory School parents and students opted for an alternative that they considered equally progressive, but financially less burdensome, curricularly less specific, and emotionally less exhausting. (Knoll 2015, p. 25)

Dewey's Laboratory School only existed for a short period of time, though the school still exists today with its name intact as a private day school. What lasting effect can an educational experiment

have if it lasted for less than 10 years and ended with both Alice Dewey, as principal, and John Dewey resigning and leaving Chicago? Dewey's short-lived experiment has value for what he tried to enact and as a model from which others can learn. On the other hand, we can ask why the Laboratory School as Dewey conceived it existed for only a short period of time and why its practices were not more widely adopted. This is a larger question too regarding Dewey's influence in educational thought.

Laurel N. Tanner gives a summary of three reasons why Dewey's ideas and the practices of the Laboratory School were not and are not more widely applied. All three reasons have to do with classroom teaching: class size, connection between interest and motivation to learn, and the focus on assessment, measurement, and standards of achievement. The Laboratory School was small, and teachers had the opportunity to work closely with students and to collaborate with other teachers to understand and enact best practice. Most public schools do not have the luxury of such small classes. In these larger classes, the teacher simply does not have the time to devote to each student in the way done in the Laboratory School. The second reason Tanner cites is the connection between interest and motivation to learn. Dewey saw this connection and built his theory and practice upon its necessity. However, particularly around the time of Dewey's death in 1952, study of motivation and interest gave way to behavioral modification, where motivation and interest are irrelevant (Tanner 1997, p. 159). The third reason is related to the previous two: Educational policies and goals at the State and national level are focused on assessment, measurement, and standards of achievement, not in fostering interest in learning or learning itself. Teachers are not rewarded for encouraging interest and motivating students to learn; rather, the focus has been on what Tanner aptly calls the “automatic learner” (1997, p. 160), a fiction wished for by many proponents of testing and accountability. Thus, Dewey's belief about the importance of interest and motivation in the psychology of learning may be given lip service by current reform initiatives, but are not important aspects of

educational reform in the last 40 years in the United States.

Even though Dewey had to resort to a departmental administrative organization of the school after an earlier more open arrangement, the curriculum and teaching did not become compartmentalized (Tanner 1997, p. xi). In Dewey's Laboratory School, what was taught, how to teach it, and how to improve both were central activities of all the teachers. Dewey believed that the skills of classroom routine, typified by the oft-cited desideratum of inexperienced preservice teacher education students to know "what to do on Monday morning," would only come in classroom practice and thus after the hard work of thinking through the logic, opportunities, and shortfalls of a particular curriculum. This is how learning occurs in a laboratory, where scientists observe and analyze and reflect upon behaviors and activities of animals, chemicals, or other sources of data, and similarly, in a laboratory school like what Dewey envisioned, teachers would become aware of their own data sources, such as the students, classroom dynamics, and the teacher's own practice and reflection upon it, among other factors at play.

What characterized Dewey's Laboratory School most was its focus upon the teacher as an intellectual leader by the example of analysis and reflection upon curriculum. The work of a teacher is first and foremost that of a curriculum theorist and practitioner. Dewey put the teacher front and center in his Laboratory School, not only as an intellectual but as a moral leader. The teacher communicated with students, parents, and other teachers, in a shared enterprise characterized by active learning and reflection.

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Dewey on Democracy

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Synonyms

[Democratic pluralism](#); [Naturalism](#); [Political philosophy](#); [Pragmatism](#); [Public](#)

Introduction

John Dewey is not known primarily as a political philosopher, but democracy was a backbone of his thinking and his philosophy of education. It is across his lifetime and his considerable body of work that Dewey articulated the entire scope of his unique democratic theory as it related to education and growth, public life and politics, and aesthetic experiences.

The earliest window into Deweyan democracy is through the now classic 1896 article "The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology" where he dismantled the stimulus-response theory dominating the then-new science of psychology (Dewey 1896/2003). This article does not mention democracy or political life, but its import to Dewey's emerging democratic concept is now clear. In this article, Dewey is starting to deconstruct the body-mind dualisms and the individualism that has plagued western philosophy and social sciences. Dewey "conceived mind from a biological standpoint as interactive minding: exploring, navigating, reaching, grasping, making" (Fesmire 2015, 49, emphasis in original). If mind is an

embodiment of experiential inquiry rather than a machinery of internal responses to external stimuli, then “we achieve integration and coordination *through* the feedback loop of our relationships, not *despite* our relationships through exertions emanating from the spectral inner space of mind” (Ibid., emphasis in original). Dewey’s early work in deconstructing the metaphysics of western dualisms in epistemology pave the way for *Democracy and Education*, where he situates the democratic concept within processes of individual and social growth.

Democracy and Education (1916) was published after his involvement in Chicago reform movements and in the founding of University of Chicago Laboratory School. The book articulates his philosophy of education, developed after reflection on those experiences in this context of his developing pragmatism. The organization of the text itself is illustrative of how Dewey situates and envisions the democratic ideal. Dewey begins the book with the idea of learner as living organism, and education as a natural process; he explains, in subsequent chapters, the indelibly social characteristic of education, as well as the roles of communication, community, and growth. The concept of democracy grows out of this organic beginning.

Democracy is a social process. All education socializes its members, he writes, but the “quality and value of the socialization depends upon the habits and aims of the group” (MW 3, p. 77). Thus, Dewey advises, we should consider what kinds of habits and aims we should cultivate in education. We should develop criteria for these habits and aims which both aspire to “the desirable traits of forms of community life which actually exist, and employ them to criticize undesirable features and suggest improvement” (Ibid., 89).

The Criteria for a Good (Democratic) Society

In any social group, there are interests held in common, and there is interplay and cooperation between individuals. From this description of

social life Dewey derives the twin criteria, presented as questions, for the associational life in which education should be formed and fostered: “How numerous and varied are the interests which are consciously shared? How full and free is the interplay with other forms of association?” (Ibid.) Dewey has not yet uttered the word “democracy,” but is building an argument for the democratic ideal grounded in forms of associational life that he believes best promote individual and social growth. This kind of society represents a particular type of democratic ideal, one that prizes experience, participation, experimentation, and pluralistic organizational forms.

The first of two social criteria refer to shared interests among group members. Dewey uses the example of a despotic State to illustrate the importance of this criterion. In a State run by a tyrannical ruler or government, shared interests are not organically created because there is a little or no “back and forth among members of the social group,” and people are united in a common interest of avoiding the backlash of their coercive rule or government. Fear indeed unites people in the society, but only in developing their capacity to hide, stay safe, and keep silent. In a free society, however, “all members of the group must have an equitable opportunity to receive and to take from others” (Ibid., 90). These shared communications are especially essential for groups with cleavages such as distinct social classes serving to arrest individual and social growth through isolation. Isolation of individuals or groups leads to isolation of thought and communication, and as a result, stifles growth. Interaction among diverse individuals is essential to growth, adaptation, and flexible responses to life’s changing circumstances. These communications among diverse individuals create shared interests; common interests are discovered and constructed through free and equitable intercourse among members; these common interests will alter or shift over time as contexts change. Dewey’s ideal has within it Darwinian evolutionary roots, after all. And social criteria that are adaptive and flexible need not be chaotic or uncontrolled. Shared interests achieved through free associational exchange are a source of more flexible and humane social control, far

more lasting than those achieved through despotic forms of government.

The second criterion concerns the freer interaction between social groups, which allows for changes in social habits as “continuous readjustment through meeting the new situations produced by varied intercourse”. This criterion, concerned with freedom of individuals and groups, is the flip side of the first, which is concerned with discovering and communicating the common interests of the group. Groups can become antisocial, closed off, and isolated from larger society. Social classes, families, schools, or other kinds of associations quite easily lead to exclusiveness among members. It is this tendency that Dewey wishes to call out and remedy with the second social criterion of his democratic ideal. Isolation makes for “rigidity” and for “static and selfish ideals within the group” (Ibid.). Individuals must freely associate within and across groups; groups achieve growth when our associations are wide, and when our social groups are porous in boundary rather than sealed off.

It is only after establishing the two criteria for social improvement and growth that Dewey defines democracy. The “democratic ideal” here is not set up as a *telos* or ideal end derived from the wisdom of ancient Greek philosophers, or from an Enlightenment metaphysical ideal of individual rights, but from a criterion of what kind of social life is needed to create conditions for individual and social growth. Dewey’s democracy is an extension of his organic experimentalist view of nature, humanity, and social life. It has no grand epistemological or political foundations. In part this is because *Democracy and Education* is a work of educational rather than political theory, but also because Dewey’s political theory was, like his educational theory, arising from his observations of how human beings are constituted and exist in the world as living, changing, growing organisms.

A Way of Living Rather Than Processes of Governance

Dewey defines democracy here more holistically than most: “as more than a form of government;

... a mode of associated living, of conjoint communicated experience” (Ibid., 93). Dewey’s concept of democracy does not refer to any particular organizational or structural forms; that is, there is no prescription as how an organization, system, or society is to be set up or works, so long as the two criterion of common interest and free interplay of individuals and groups are met.

Deweyan democracy is not simply a political ideal but a broadly social one perfectly designed to promote growth in a diverse, changing society. Dewey saw, in his time, the “development of modes of manufacture and commerce, travel, migration, and intercommunication” (Ibid.) rapidly changing the ways in which the previously agrarian United States had functioned. Add to this description forces of social change, such as labor and civil rights movements, the rapid rise of scientific discovery, and the great expansion of State educational systems, all of which led Dewey to articulate a democratic ideal as an open, flexible criterion rather than set social standard, or organizational form. The democratic ideal is served by increasing the “number of individuals who participate in an interest” so that “each has to refer his own action to that of others, and to consider the action of others to give point and direction to his own, is equivalent to the breaking down of those barriers of class, race, and national territory which keep men from perceiving the full import of their activity” (Ibid.). Varied points of contact give a greater diversity of stimuli; they “secure a liberation of powers which remain suppressed so long as the inclinations to action are partial, as they must be in a group which in its exclusiveness shuts out many interests” (Ibid.).

Dewey’s notion of democracy is bound up in his view of how individual and social growth are best produced in a society comprised of a great diversity of individuals, classes, and groups. “After greater individualization on one hand, and a broader community of interest on the other have come into existence [in this era], it is a matter of deliberate effort to sustain them” (Ibid.). The challenge of education is to create the deliberate social effort to sustain communities of interest that can respond to challenges and grow, and adapt accordingly. As Dewey goes on in this chapter to contrast

his democratic concept with the idealism of Plato or the individualism of Rousseau, he continues to criticize the mind-body and individual-social dualisms that characterized his early work in the groundbreaking “The Reflex Arc” article. His own concept of democracy would emerge from this antidualistic thinking, and from his educational starting point of experience, growth, communication, and community life.

Democracy at Work in a Pluralistic, Evolving Political Landscape

Dewey would expand his democratic concept in *The Public and its Problems* (1927). His only book devoted to political theory was written between the Great Wars as an exploration of how the American democratic system was evolving and changing in the face of the enormous challenges: industrialization, urbanization, workers and human rights movements, world war, and growing fascism in Europe; and massive growth of capitalistic structures, producing increased production, consumption, and transit.

The context for this work was the “grave doubts about the possibilities of American democracy,” articulated in part by Walter Lippmann, “who suggested that matters of political concern had become *expert* matters” (Campbell 2008, p. 20). For Lippmann, normal citizens did not have the intelligence to decide upon the increasingly complex problems of the twentieth century. In response to this historical moment, Dewey produced *The Public and Its Problems* (1927), a book in which Dewey makes several important distinctions and expansions of the democratic ideal described in *Democracy and Education* (1916): the notion of the democratic public, the State, and the important distinctions between the two. Dewey also discusses the challenges of democratic problem-solving and association in the modern age, analysis which still largely rings true today.

Instead of beginning with such standard topics of political theory as the citizen or individual rights, Dewey starts with the primacy of the political community over the individual in public life

(Campbell 2008). Dewey defines a public by looking at the facts of human activity and their consequences. There are direct and indirect consequences to our actions. The difference between public and private is not that one is social and the other is not; many private activities are social and a conversation between two people can be public. The public also cannot be equated with “socially useful” because there are plenty of things that are public which are not useful, such as war. Instead, for Dewey “the public consists of all those who are affected by the indirect consequences of transactions to such an extent that it is deemed necessary to have those consequences systematically cared for” (LW 2, pp. 245–246).

The associational view of the citizen, and democracy itself, is central here. “Man is not merely *de facto* associated, but he *becomes* a social animal in the make-up of his ideas, sentiments and deliberate behavior. *What* he believes, hopes for and aims at is the outcome of association and intercourse” (Ibid., p. 283). There are many associational forms of our lives (family, community, etc.) but the public is unique in that it forms in light of consequences that need systematic attention; those that need “special agencies and measures [which] must be formed if they are to be attended to; or else some existing group must take on new functions” (Ibid., p. 253). “Take the education of children: the consequences of irregular, uneven, or unavailable provision of education for all children are socially negative and thus education is a process requiring some special agencies that attend to its quality and distribution.”

Dewey’s distinction between a State and a public is pragmatic. The “State is the organization of the public effected through officials for the protection of the interests shared by its members” (Ibid., p. 256). He elaborates the relationship between State and public:

The lasting, extensive and serious consequences of associated activity bring into existence a public. In itself it is unorganized and formless. By means of officials and their special powers it becomes a state. A public articulated and operating through representative officers is the state; there is not state without a government, but also there is none without the public. The officers are still singular beings, but

they exercise new and special powers. These may be turned to their private account. Then government is corrupt and arbitrary. (Ibid., p. 277)

To return to the example of education, a useful distinction between publics, State, and government can be drawn. Many western democracies began attending to the public consequences of haphazard educational provision for the young more than a century ago. Publics had emerged comprised of citizens who wished for the State to attend to those consequences through means of government-provided education. But even now, publics are still emerging to point out the shared, indirect consequences, perhaps unintended, of some schooling processes and outcomes.

One example is the standardized testing policies in the U.S. public schools; parents, students, and teachers are forming publics around the consequences of so much high-stakes testing, including the Opt-Out Movement comprised of various groups throughout many States. Through inquiry and communication over networks, these citizens communicate around their shared interests related to curriculum and assessment; they work to effectively communicate those interests to government officials responsible for testing policy in hopes that State authorizes government to administer a change to current practices.

Dewey can be seen as a forerunner to associational, participatory, and deliberative democratic theories that have gained popularity in recent decades. Though not all of these are influenced by pragmatist democratic theory, the idea that democratic governance ought to be based in the influence and evolution of citizens' associations is a common Deweyan thread running through deliberative and participatory democratic models.

Challenges and Strategies for Formation of Publics

The Opt-Out movement example shows how the relationship between publics, State, and government changes over time, and associational democracy inquiry and communication are an ever-present part of a democracy society. It is "only through constant watchfulness and criticism of

public officials by citizens can a state be maintained in integrity and usefulness" (Ibid., p. 69). The scope and function of government changes over time. A pragmatic conception of democracy is evolutionary; good government is "defined primarily through its adaptive *function* rather than through some (presumed) *essence*" (Campbell 2008, p. 22). Government must stay flexible in order to respond to the shifting times and problems faced by citizens. Publics will form around erupting problems and conditions, as the opt-out testing public has done in recent years.

But mature publics are difficult achievements, in Dewey's time and in our own. "Thus we come upon the primary problem of the public: to achieve such recognition of itself as will give it weight in the selection of official representatives" (P&P, p. 283). Dewey believed that publics were only embryonic in most places, rarely advancing to politically potent forms. Because publics were largely "inchoate" and "unorganized" in form (Ibid., p. 254), the functions of government seem further and further removed from citizens' concerns or accountability. It is a difficult challenge for citizens to communicate effectively across difference, distance, and extremely divisive political discourses to inquire into a shared problem and develop new ways of thinking about it. The development of a mature public is a democratic achievement.

One remedy for the "lost" public is the wide cultivation of shared aesthetic experiences in a democratic society. Dewey wrote *Art as Experience* (1934) as his treatise on aesthetics. Coming not long after *Public and Its Problems* (1927), the book begins with an analysis of the human experiences of art-making and art appreciation; Dewey argues in the text that these very foundational human experiences are part of communal formation. Waks (2014) takes the example of the literary arts as providing a significant communicative experience in a democratic society, connecting the aesthetic with the democratic. Following Dewey, Waks points out that the unconscious, emotional, holistic immersion into an aesthetic experience of a novel, poem, or story is a powerful part of a diverse community coming together. Art thus can help citizens reimagine and reconstruct

their societies as conditions changes and new problems surface.

All art, Dewey says, “is a process of making the world a different place in which to live, and involves a phase of protest” (LW 1, p. 272). Art grows out of the sense that existing conditions at the very least no longer excite and inspire, and involves experimentation and the search for new forms of expression, for salvation from moral arrest, and the discovery of new possibilities. Works of art both contain new worlds of experience and point forward to future social possibilities through concerted action. (Waks 2014, p. 41).

The literary arts in particular help create expressions where citizens’ individual boundaries and interests can become imagined as having intersections and common spaces. The habits of imagination and empathy created through a powerful play or oral performance can help us identify with others who are otherwise strangers; aesthetic experiences help us imagine and create the communal forms so necessary to public formation, without which State and government cannot adapt and adjust to the times of the moment.

Dewey’s democracy is a theory of adaptive reconstruction to present conditions, requiring a faith in citizens above all to imagine, inquire, and agitate. This view of democracy as a way of life, as a form of civic action in association with diverse others, has never been more relevant. The kinds of political problems we currently face demand the creative, inquiry-based responses of citizens, informed by experts, working across diverse classes, nationalities, and other identities. Deweyan faith in citizens’ abilities to associate, think, inquire, and act with intelligence – the heart of his democratic ideal – continues to inspire and challenge.

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Dewey on Educational Aims

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Synonyms

[Aims](#); [Educational ideals](#); [Purpose of education](#)

Introduction

Throughout his oeuvre, John Dewey tackled broad questions about the purposes of education. What does education provide for society? How might education best serve individuals? Dewey’s answers to these questions about educational aims sometimes varied. In 1916, in *Democracy and Education*, Dewey wrote that “the aim of education is to enable individuals to continue their education. . . the object and reward of learning is continued capacity for growth” (Dewey 1916/1980, p. 107). In 1921, in an essay on “Aims and Ideals in Education” contributed to the *Encyclopaedia and Dictionary of Education*, Dewey again defended “growth as aim and ideal” in education (Dewey 1921/1983). In 1930, in the essay “Philosophy and Education,” Dewey wrote that “the ultimate aim of education is nothing other than the creation of human beings in the fullness

of their capacities” (Dewey 1930/1984, p. 289). And in 1938 in *Experience and Education*, Dewey wrote that the “ideal aim of education is creation of power of self-control” (Dewey 1938/1998, p. 41).

To many of Dewey’s supporters and critics, his formulations of ideal educational aims were enigmatic. In the day-to-day life of schooling, what might aiming at “growth” look like? Dewey did not present his educational ideal as an oracle, with the hope that others would revel in and work through the ambiguities of his account. He rather endeavored to explain at length the criteria for good aims generally, and good educational aims specifically, particularly in his most comprehensive work on educational philosophy, *Democracy and Education*. When Dewey was writing in the early part of the twentieth century, others were defending a variety of concrete aims of education – that schooling ought to foster discipline, or cultivate students’ personalities, or serve the State. Dewey prominently critiqued three aims in particular – nature, social efficiency, and culture (discussed below) – in order to elucidate his own conception of valuable educational aims. Before turning to his critique of those aims, Dewey’s own aims and his criteria for good aims must be considered. And his conception of educational aims was rooted in his ideas about the role of education and citizenship in a democracy, so that shall be considered next.

The Democratic Citizen and the Education Necessary for Democracy

Dewey famously argued that “democracy is more than a form of government; it is primarily a mode of associated living” (1916/1980, p. 93). For Dewey, education for democratic citizenship does not merely serve to help people acquire the literacy necessary to cast an informed vote, nor should it be training for one to advance or defend one’s narrow interests, nor should it emphasize how to submit to the rule of the majority. Rather, the democratic mode of associated living is one in which “the interests of a group are shared by all its

members, and the fullness and freedom with which it interacts with other groups” (p. 105). Education for democratic citizenship must prepare people to live well with one another, developing each person’s capacities and simultaneously laying the foundation for mutually beneficial social interaction.

Since Dewey viewed mutually enriching social interactions among the diverse groups in society as critical to the quality of life in a democracy, rigid segregation along socio-economic, religious, ethno-racial, or other lines was an obstacle to genuine democracy. Hence an education that can help develop “shared interests” among citizens will help to weaken divisions in society. Individuals, or a community of people, who view their interests as unique or in conflict with the interests of others, will exacerbate social divisions. They will also be less inclined to seek out opportunities for social interaction with other groups, and those interactions are, for Dewey, one of the best ways for a group’s interests to evolve in light of new experiences. Social interaction is necessary but not sufficient for a flourishing democracy – its citizens must additionally be inclined to observe, investigate, and inquire; in short, they must desire throughout their experiences and their lives to grow, to continue their education.

If one recognizes that the Deweyan conception of democratic citizenship requires a fundamental openness to others as a means for enabling the evolution of interest and ideals, it becomes clearer why his educational aims are somewhat obscure. For Dewey, education must not aim at any fixed, rigid end because society should not aim at any fixed end. Each individual and society as a whole must be responsive to changing circumstances. If education aims at “growth” or “to enable people to continue their education” alone – rather than some fixed end – it might create the kind of citizens who readily accommodate and adapt to new experiences and information, improving their own lives and their society. Developing the fullness of people’s capacities is, in this Deweyan framework, the ultimate ideal of education because those capacities enable people to engage intelligently with one another and with their environment. And intelligence entails a fundamental

willingness to reconsider one's beliefs and ideals in light of changes in the world. Dewey's statement that the "ideal aim of education is creation of power of self-control" is no radical departure from the aim of education as growth. Self-control is essential for intelligent engagement with others and the world – the ability to pursue some particular goal via observation and testing, in the face of distraction or obstacles. As Dewey wrote in *Democracy and Education*, "aims mean acceptance of responsibility for the observations, anticipations, and arrangements required in carrying on a function" (p. 114). A person requires self-control because, in its absence, one merely indulges impulses rather than developing capacities through the power of thinking, reasoning, and investigating. Self-control is necessary to empower people to follow through with their plans. Good intentions alone will not improve the individual or society – one needs the ability to work tirelessly, and intelligently, to achieve one's objectives.

The Criteria for Good Aims in Education

Dewey's conception of an educated person and a democratic society aligned with the criteria for good aims that he outlined in *Democracy and Education*. Dewey wrote that good aims must be (a) an outgrowth of existing conditions, (b) flexible, and (c) an "end-in-view." A good aim in education is sought because it presents some kind of resolution to a difficulty or a question that one faces. A good aim is one that is rooted in a genuine problem confronting a person; it is "founded upon the intrinsic activities and needs (including original instincts and acquired habits) of the given individual to be educated" (p. 114). The educational implication of such an aim is that it is preferable and more pedagogically effective if students are occupied with problems that relate to their lives, particularly so if students come to recognize the problem on their own and then seek its resolution. Consider the following example. Two teachers share an aim – to introduce students to fractions. One approaches the lesson by drawing a circle on the board and dividing it into eight parts. The second purchases pies for the

class, divides the class into groups, and then tasks them with dividing the pies. Both teachers have an aim: introducing fractions. To the students who find themselves in these two classes, both these aims are, to some degree, external, foreign, and therefore not good aims. Yet the pies possess the potential to appeal to students in a way that the circle on the board does not. Dewey was quite concerned about the damage of externally supplied ends which "limit intelligence because, given ready-made, they must be imposed by some authority external to intelligence, leaving to the latter nothing but a mechanical choice of means" (p. 111). However, Dewey does not require that students discover all of their aims on their own (more on that below in the discussion of "nature as aim"). Rather, teachers have, and ought to have, educational aims (in addition to the students' aims). So the question becomes, how well can a teacher connect her aims to students' aims? Doing so would require that the subject matter is actually meaningful to students (as dessert tends to be). Additionally, a good educational aim requires an environment that can be used to "liberate and to organize [students'] capacities" (p. 115) – and dividing pies might help cultivate powers of observation and investigation. Yet even better than the teacher who provides pies would be one who observes students and anchors the lesson in an object or idea in which they are interested. Perhaps the children are not preoccupied with desserts but regularly jostle over marbles. A bag of marbles can easily be substituted for pies, better aligning the teacher's aim and the students'.

The second criterion of a good aim is flexibility. At times in the pursuit of an aim, new information may arise that might cause one to alter the aim. If an aim is the outgrowth of one's conditions, the aim should be responsive to changing circumstances. If I found myself in a colder climate, I might aim to purchase a new winter coat, hat, and gloves. The aim is responsive to my needs and my environment. If I happened to receive a coat as a gift, I would revise my aim to purchase or knit only the hat and gloves. Dewey counsels that all aims are initially a "mere tentative sketch." Teachers' aims for students and students' own aims should be flexible because in the process of

working towards an aim, new information might lead one to refine or revise the aim. Furthermore, the aim must be flexible not only in that it may be revised due to changing circumstances, it must also be experimental in that it is “constantly growing as it is tested in action” (p. 112).

Dewey’s third criterion emphasizes that no aim ought to be final or complete. Indeed, Dewey suggests that we would better think of an aim as an “end in view.” There is no final resting point when we achieve an aim. We are always faced with new information, new ideas, and new challenges because interaction with other people and the world at large will always present us with infinite variety. The student who successfully achieves the aim of learning about combustion in a science class, for example, is not finished. Her goal was “but a phase of the active end. . . a ‘freeing activity’” that better enables her to pursue further goals (p. 112). Dewey argued that “an end which grows up within an activity as plan for its direction is always both ends and means. . . Every mean is a temporary end until we have attained it. Every end becomes a means of carrying activity further as soon as it is achieved” (p. 113).

Dewey’s articulation of the aim of “growth” or further learning meets this criterion because it is not “general” or “ultimate” in that it entails no final accomplishment. Growth and further learning are aims *in* education because they arise out of the students’ and teachers’ activities and are responsive to those activities. He pointed out that education itself, an abstract concept, has no aims; rather teachers, parents, and other people have aims. “Final” aims *of* education, imposed externally on students or schools, will be less likely to connect meaningfully to the students’ and teachers’ experiences. Dewey dwells on his contemporaries’ rival aims *of* education to demonstrate how, when pursued exclusively, they cultivate only a limited range of capacities. Those final aims, however, are not fundamentally misguided, but rather simply too exclusive, too narrow: “One statement of an end may suggest certain questions and observations, and another statement another set of questions, calling for other observations. Then the more general ends we have, the better” (p. 117). Thus, for Dewey, the

aims *of* education that others defend are really compatible. Each aim *of* education – articulated by a particular person or community – is a response to a real or perceived need in a situation. Such aims, therefore, are valuable, as long as they are not conceived of and sought exclusively, at the expense of neglecting other worthwhile aims. Dewey’s critique of nature, social efficiency, and culture as aims helps to make this point clear.

Nature, Social Efficiency, and Culture as Aims of Education

Dewey’s emphasis on “growth” as an educational aim, and the importance of students cultivating the kind of disposition in which they seek to further their education, in school and outside of school, led some of his readers to interpret him as saying that what students learn is unimportant. These readers thought Dewey proposed that teachers should allow students to grow, to become lifelong learners, by discovering their passions and following their interests. Indeed, some of the child-centered, progressive educators whom critics associated with Dewey did believe that teachers must allow students the room to pursue whatever ideas arose out of their circumstances and activities. They believed that students were naturally curious and that students learned naturally and effortlessly in whatever environments they found themselves. Provide students with a rich, stimulating environment and teachers could, to some degree, simply get out of the way and let students’ natures guide them.

“Nature” as an educational aim, for Dewey, captures many important facts about the process of education. Education indeed ought to make the most of students’ natural capacities and interests. But Dewey finds that this educational aim limits the student: “merely to leave everything to nature was, after all, but to negate the very idea of education” (p. 99). There is indeed a strong role for the Deweyan teacher and the curriculum, both of which prepare students for productive engagement with others and their world. Dewey dismisses the idea that the kind of citizen he envisages could arise out of a fundamentally

individualistic education as defended by the “nature” as aim advocates. Dewey’s conception of democratic citizenship emphasizes social interactions and developing shared interests. “Nature” as aim is helpful in that it encourages educators to focus on the capacities of the child, but limited in that nature does not supply the ends of children’s development (pp. 120–121).

Social efficiency as aim errs on the other extreme. Rather than failing to consider how education ought to prepare a student for their broader contribution to and interaction with society, social efficiency as an aim prioritized the State over the individual – that is, the efficient State is one in which schools primarily prepare people for their role in society. The social efficiency advocates of Dewey’s day called for vocational education, among other things. Dewey thought that social efficiency was indeed valuable in that every person who maximizes their potential and finds a place to contribute to their society generates greater social efficiency. But social efficiency as an exclusive educational aim denies the student an opportunity to develop her capacities and interests and would limit the contact between different groups in society.

The proponents of “culture” as aim argued that an individual flourishes via an encounter with the preeminent products of human civilization – great literature, art, and history, for example. Dewey appreciated the recognition that schools should very much introduce students to the great products of human civilization and that these encounters could help students develop their own capacities and interests. However, he worried that culture as an aim *of* education implied a remote curriculum, one that failed to engage students’ interests adequately. Failing to engage their interests, it would fail to expand their interests, and fail to cultivate their capacities for inquiry.

Yet “culture” understood more robustly was indeed worthwhile. A person who productively makes use of the vast riches of culture in her encounters with others is cultured. Culture is fully compatible with nature as aim, because only when a person draws on her interests will she make the best use of a community’s cultural inheritance, and encounters with that cultural inheritance expand her interests. And this sort of

person will utilize her skills and interests to secure social efficiency in that she will be a productive citizen. Thus nature, social efficiency, and culture (and other aims *of* education) are all theoretically compatible, as long as they respond to students’ genuine concerns and are not treated as exclusive.

Conclusion

Dewey’s educational ideal – whether he formulated it in terms of growth, further learning, or self-control – is rooted in a conception of democratic citizenship in which every person has the opportunity to reach her potential and develop varied interests. Each person contributes to society by finding and making use of her unique talents. And she continues to expand her interests and capacities through meaningful interactions with other citizens. The pedagogical implications of such an ideal entail rich experiences in which the student never simply indulges interests but rather observes, inquires, and questions – always growing, always learning.

Cross-References

- [Dewey on Public Education and Democracy](#)
- [Dewey on the Concept of Education as Growth](#)

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Dewey on Educational Research and the Science of Education

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Synonyms

Epistemology; Inquiry; Knowledge-in-practice; Method; Pedagogy; Praxis; Teaching

Introduction

Dewey's philosophy of education reflected his belief that schools could be progressively reorganized through the use of science. For Dewey, education and science are united by the centrality of experience and the importance of inquiry. While education must incorporate and reconstruct human ends and values, science can contribute knowledge of the relations between means and ends and thereby afford greater precision and control in the planning and execution of curriculum, instruction, and school administration. Science can also furnish, in its generalized method, one of the most important goals for teaching and learning.

Dewey's Pragmatic Conception of Science

Science, for Dewey, exemplifies a general trust in experience as the source of knowledge combined with technologies of observation and the control of parameters. "The distinctively intellectual attitude which marks scientific inquiry was generated in efforts at controlling persons and things so that consequences, issues, outcomes would be more stable and assured" (LW 1, p. 105). In Dewey's conception, science is participatory and democratic, reflecting a commitment to inquiry in the service of securing human values and desired ends. It goes beyond any particular scientific discipline or content, but instead represents a general

method or approach to thinking. The "scientific method . . . represents the only method of thinking that has proved fruitful in any subject. . . . It *is* thinking so far as thought has become conscious of its proper ends and of the equipment indispensable for success in their pursuit" (MW 6, p. 78). Because of this general utility across the wide variety of problematic situations, the general method of science is used whether or not the knowledge generated by the disciplines of science is applied or not.

Dewey's conception of commonsense inquiry is a broader application of the methods of science to human problem solving. Inquiry begins when an obstacle in ongoing routines is encountered. Action is interrupted and reflection ensues. The situation is examined and the problem or problems are defined. The situation's "inner active distraction, its elements at odds with each other, in tension against each other, each contending for its proper placing and relationship" (MW 2, p. 328) is identified, thus defining a problematic situation. Inquiry is the process of working toward "the restoration of a deliberately integrated experience from the inherent conflict into which it has fallen" (MW 2, p. 336). In this process, facts are identified and knowledge of the possible consequences of these facts – taken from prior experiences – is used to make inferences about what must be done in order to resolve the conflict. The validity of those inferences is determined by whether the problem is solved (and the situation harmonized) when these actions are implemented.

Science follows the very same structure, except it typically aims to produce scientific knowledge rather than merely solving a particular problem. This knowledge has a particular role in human affairs. Scientific "knowledge contributes. . . the possibility of intelligent administration of the elements of doing and suffering. . . . When there is possibility of control, knowledge is the sole agency of its realization" (LW 1, p. 29). Science is "a search for those relations upon which the *occurrence* of real qualities and values depends, by means of which we can regulate their occurrence" (LW 4, p. 83). Science is able to reveal the connections or relations between things by stripping away the qualities of immediate

experience and abstracting things in their general or idealized nature as objects of thought, as signs and indicators of those relations and the consequences that may ensue.

When they are found to be stable correlations, relations between facts and consequences may be considered the *laws* of science. “These are the formulations of the regularities upon which intellectual and other regulation of things . . . depends” (LW 1, p. 117). Such regularities are also *methods* which represent “power to use a given fact as a sign of something not yet given” and they extend the “ability systematically to enlarge control of the future” (MW 10, p. 15). Through science, “otherwise disconnected” events are connected “into a consecutive history” (LW 1, pp. 112–113) of meaning. These histories allow causes to be inferred (LW 2, p. 361). With such inferences, generalizations taken from past experiences can be applied to the systematic understanding of the possibilities of present and future experience.

Science improves “our capacity to apply intelligence successfully: to produce, adapt, adjust, accommodate, achieve, institute, identify, order, discriminate, and to ‘resolve’ problems in many other sorts of ways” (Manicas 1998, p. 50). Science can also help us avoid the unpredictable effects of self-interest, passion, laziness, and the biases of tradition or false expectations – which may be especially likely in situations that are social, such as education.

Towards a Science of Education

Dewey brooked no sharp divisions between different arenas of human endeavor, so his conception of science applies both in arenas clearly demarcated as “scientific” (such as the physical sciences) and also in areas of life that seem remote from science. Science as an experimental method, for Dewey, provides the surest way toward solving problems no matter the situation (LW 1, pp. 351, 372). “If the pragmatic idea of truth has itself any pragmatic worth,” he wrote, “it is because it stands for carrying the experimental notion of truth that reigns among the sciences, technically viewed, over into political and moral

practices, humanly viewed” (MW 6, p. 31). Thus, science surely has a role in education, as well.

Dewey defines education as “that reconstruction or reorganization of experience which adds to the meaning of experience, and which increases ability to direct subsequent experience” (MW 9, p. 76). Experience is educative if it results in an expansion of meaning and deepened capacity to grow. Teachers and others who work in schools are consciously working to expand the meanings and contribute to the growth of students. In this effort, they need to use all of the resources available to them, including the findings and methods of science, especially the “human sciences that are sources of the scientific content of education.” But “biology, psychology, and sociology . . . are relatively backward” when compared with the physical sciences (LW 5, p. 20), due in part to what Dewey saw as a “retarded knowledge of human nature” (LW 2, p. 358). Despite this – and while advocating increased attention to social science research – Dewey believed that the application of the human sciences in education can result in better control of educational situations, promote improvements in school functioning, and allow for a greater variety of approaches to teaching and learning in different situations (Seals 2004). This possibility motivated Dewey’s attention to what he called “educational science.”

The primary difference between education as an arena of human endeavor and something like physics is sheer complexity. “There is no educational practice whatever which is not highly complex; that is to say, which does not contain many other conditions and factors” beyond just the immediate situation of teaching or learning (LW 5, p. 9). This can be contrasted especially with laboratory experiments, where it is possible to create an idealized situation controlling extraneous variables so as to isolate specific parameters for close study. Educational contexts, on the other hand, potentially involve the influence of all of the students’ prior experiences and everything in his or her environment. For this reason, “educational science cannot be constructed simply by borrowing the techniques of experiment and measurement found in physical science” (LW 5, p. 13).

In the physical and experimental sciences,

The control of conditions demanded by laboratory work leads to a maximum of isolation of a few factors from other conditions. The scientific result is rigidly limited to what is established with these other conditions excluded. In educating individualities, no such exclusion can be had. The number of variables that enter is enormous. The intelligence of the teacher is dependent upon the extent in which he takes into account the variables that are not obviously involved in his immediate special task. Judgment in such matter is of qualitative situations and must itself be qualitative (LW 5, p. 33).

As qualitative, educational situations cannot ever be completely standardized. Thus there can be no simple rules of educational practice derived from the findings of science.

But this doesn't make scientific findings irrelevant. "Material drawn from *other* sciences furnishes the content of educational science when it is focused on the problems that arise in education" (LW 5, p. 18). In sum, "the sources of educational science are any portions of ascertained knowledge that enter into the heart, head and hands of educators, and which, by entering in, render the performance of the educational function more enlightened, more humane, more truly educational than it was before" (LW 5, p. 39).

Of course, just because a finding is "ascertained" or deemed "scientific" does not make it necessarily relevant to education. Scientific investigations made outside of the educational situation *may* provide guidance to the educator, or may not. "Practice alone can test, verify, modify and develop the conclusions of these investigations" (LW 5, p. 17). Dewey emphasized that the educator, in his or her role as practitioner working in the context of ongoing education, is in the best position to gauge the value of any given scientific finding. "To suppose that scientific findings decide the value of educational undertakings is to reverse the real case. Actual activities in *educating* test the worth of the results of scientific results. They may be scientific in some other field, but not in education until they serve educational purposes, and whether they really serve or not can be found out only in practice" (LW 5, pp. 16–17).

Scientific results play their primary role in directing the educator's "*attention*, in both observation and reflection, to conditions and relationships which would otherwise" be missed (LW 5, p. 15). The value "resides in the enlightenment and guidance [science] supplies to observation and judgment of actual situations as they arise" (LW 5, p. 15). Its "value for educational practice – and *all education* is a mode of practice, intelligent or accidental and routine – is indirect; it consists in provision of *intellectual instrumentalities* to be used by the educator" (LW 5, p. 14). Elsewhere, Dewey specifies these intellectual instrumentalities as "those concepts, general principles, theories and dialectical developments which are indispensable to any systematic knowledge [and are] shaped and tested as tools of inquiry" (LW 2, p. 362).

Research in Practice

Scientific knowledge is the best protection available against the dangers to knowledge mentioned above, including laziness and bias. By offering "a patient and prolonged apprenticeship to fact in its infinite variety and particularity" (MW 12, p. 99), science can counter bias and other enemies of truth. Of particular concern to Dewey was bias that was social or traditional in origin. To defend against that, he applauded Francis Bacon's call for "the organization of cooperative research, whereby men attack nature collectively and the work of inquiry is carried on continuously from generation to generation." Bacon's "great positive prophecy of a combined and cooperative pursuit of science...characterizes our present day" (MW 12, p. 100).

Dewey also supported more localized research, and is often cited as an originator of the concept of action research, in which a practitioner studies his or her own practice in order to "change practices, people's understandings of their practices, and the conditions under which they practice" (Kemmis 2009, p. 2; see also Greenwood and Levin 1998). Dewey wrote about "the method of intelligence," which is the application of the scientific method (or, more broadly, reflective thinking) to practice.

A man is intelligent not in virtue of having reason which grasps first and indemonstrable truths about fixed principles, in order to reason deductively from them to the particulars which they govern, but in virtue of his capacity to estimate the possibilities of a situation and to act in accordance with his estimate. In the large sense of the term, intelligence is as practical as reason is theoretical (LW 4, p. 170).

Through apprehending educational possibilities and estimating them in the light of shared values, the educator can apply his or her intelligence, judgment, and knowledge to setting up “conditions favorable to learning” (LW 3, p. 267). When observation of the consequences of these conditions is reflected back into the ongoing practice, research and practice become joined. The knowledge generated in practice is then applied to practice and thereby tested and further refined in a process that Schön (1983) referred to as an “epistemology of practice.”

As knowledge relevant to educational practice is generated in an ongoing cycle of action and reflection, it begins to cohere into a system of facts and laws. This is so-called educational science. It is important to understand that this emerges from practice and isn’t just imposed from outside. In Dewey’s view of education as growth, attention to both the general conditions in favor of learning *and* the particular needs and interests of each individual student must determine the educator’s actions. “Operating under the auspices of Dewey’s ideas, both researchers and teachers contribute materially to the logic or methodology of the science of education: the former formulating universal ways of acting on which teachers can depend, the latter fashioning methods by which those universal ways of acting may be applied to particular instances of instruction” (Seals 2004, p. 24). Science helps render “those who engage in the act more intelligent, more thoughtful, more aware of what they are about, and thus rectify and enrich in the future what they have been doing in the past.” But the science has to take account of the educator’s “own ideas, plans, observations, judgments. Otherwise it is not *educational* science at all, but merely so much . . . information” (LW 5, p. 39).

The Teacher as Investigator

On this conception of educational science, the classroom teacher is both a “connoisseur” of research (Seals 2004) and a researcher (Grumet 1990). “If teachers are sufficiently alert and intelligent, they go on to notice conditions of the same general nature, but more subtle, and set a problem for further more refined inquiry” (LW 5, p. 19). One of the sections of Dewey’s *Sources of a Science of Education* is labeled “The Teacher as Investigator” (LW 5, p. 23). This role is critical, as teachers are “the ones in direct contact with pupils and hence the ones through whom the results of scientific findings finally reach students. They are the channels through which the consequences of educational theory come into the lives of those at school” (LW 5, p. 24). Without their assessments of what these consequences are, there can be no improvement in educational science.

Also of central importance to Dewey was his belief that one of the most valuable outcomes of inquiry is the discovery of “what values are worth while and are to be pursued as objectives” (LW 5, p. 38). This applies especially to educational inquiry. Dewey was particularly bothered by the setting up of “a fixed and final set of objectives, even for the time being or temporarily. Each day of teaching ought to enable a teacher to revise and better in some respect the objectives aimed at in previous work” (LW 5, p. 39). Dewey is concerned that if teachers are seen merely as “channels of reception and transmission” for subject matter objectives that are determined outside of the actual educational situation, teaching itself will be conceived as following predefined procedures or rules, with standardized goals or methods formed without regard for “personal potentialities” (LW 2, p. 360). Such a limited conception of teaching misses the opportunity to address the actual students in any given educational situation, or to resolve their actual problems.

Readymade objectives reduce the teacher to technician rather than investigator/researcher. They ignore the teacher’s intimate knowledge of the actual situation and devalue his or her capacity for “constructive imagination and invention”

(LW 5, p. 29) and the possibility of “suggesting new ends, new methods, new materials” (LW 5, p. 30). Allowing for objectives to be worked out – or at least modified – in the context of practice respects the capabilities not only of the teacher, but of the student as well. It also ensures that teachers and students can respond to whatever factors in the situation are relevant, whether they can be predicted in advance or not.

Of particular worry to Dewey was the tendency of people outside of the classroom to believe that what goes on within the classroom could be adequately assessed and thereby controlled by the standardized measurement of prespecified outcomes (Seltzer-Kelly 2008). For him, that which is measured can *never* be taken as the whole of the outcome of education. More important than “forming specific skills and acquiring special bodies of information” were the “*other* things in the way of desires, tastes, aversions, abilities and disabilities [that the student] is learning along with his specific acquisitions” (LW 5, p. 33). Only an observant teacher who knows his or her particular students is in a position to assess these collateral outcomes and make adjustments for the benefit of the students.

The parent and educator deal with situations that never repeat each other. Exact quantitative determinations are far from meeting the demands of such situations, for they presuppose repetitions and exact uniformities. Exaggeration of their importance tends to cramp judgment, to substitute uniform rules for the free play of thought, and to emphasize the mechanical factors that also exist in schools. They contribute at most to the more efficient working of present practices in some subjects. . . . But they do not give any help in larger questions of reconstruction of curriculum and methods. What is worse, they divert attention and energy from the need of reconstructions due to change of social conditions and the inertia of the school system (LW 5, pp. 33–34).

In the final analysis, Dewey’s conception of the science of education is rooted in his democratic faith in the intelligence and resourcefulness of all persons, especially teachers who are entrusted with the education and care of the next generation. By granting these teachers the autonomy as well as the responsibility of research-practitioners,

education can be continuously improved for the benefit of all.

Cross-References

- ▶ [Dewey on Educational Aims](#)
- ▶ [Dewey on Science and Science Education](#)
- ▶ [Dewey on Teaching and Teacher Education](#)
- ▶ [Dewey on the Concept of Education as Growth](#)
- ▶ [Dewey on Thinking in Education](#)
- ▶ [Epistemology and Educational Administration](#)
- ▶ [Inquiry Learning and Teaching in Science Education](#)
- ▶ [Intellectual Virtues and Educational Practice](#)
- ▶ [Dewey, John \(1859–1952\)](#)
- ▶ [Neo-Pragmatist Philosophy of Education](#)
- ▶ [Overview of Metatheory of Educational Knowledge](#)
- ▶ [Praxis](#)
- ▶ [Teacher Education at the Intersection of Educational Sciences](#)

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Dewey on Ethics and Moral Education

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Introduction

John Dewey's views of ethics and moral education, like his democratic ideals, arise in part from his naturalistic and pragmatic philosophy. In turn, he integrates these ideas with his political and educational philosophy, creating a picture of the means to and the nucleus of a good life. This life is tied to what he (1937/1987, p. 298) deems "the fundamental principle of democracy": "the ends of freedom and individuality for all can be attained only by means that accord with those ends." His (1916/1980, p. 370) idea of a good life is marked by an intensified and expanding consciousness that enjoys "a continual beginning afresh." Likewise, this life involves a deep-seated interest in the common good that entails addressing a web of interconnected philosophical, scientific, economic, social, political, and educational concerns. More than, perhaps, most pragmatists, he offers the advantages and challenges of a nuanced system of thought as he reconstructs the meanings of many philosophical and educational questions and concepts (Menand 2001; Pappas 2008). Because his ideas regarding ethics and moral education overlap, they are discussed, sometimes simultaneously, under the headings: Broad Fields of Inquiry, A Moral Science, Educators and Learners and Problematic Ethical Situations.

Broad Fields of Inquiry

Dewey (1916 1980, 356–357; 1922 1983, 220–222) thinks ethics is a broad field of inquiry that may examine any question that bears upon human interactions, not a narrow inquiry that focuses on identifying and justifying

transcendental moral standards. Hence, there is hardly any human relationship that is outside the scope of ethics and moral education, because each is concerned with questions regarding the wellbeing of individuals and groups (Dewey and Tufts 1932 1985, pp. 230–231). The scope he gives ethics and, thereby, moral education is rooted in his belief that human nature includes social propensities and, therefore, moral experiences with others. Ethics and moral education, as well, are concerned with warranted or merited knowledge claims. Therefore, the regulative or normative force of statements is a focal point for him. Recommending standards – whether epistemically or behaviorally – ought to be based on cogent data and reasons that emerge from open inquiries. Free inquiry and its allied values are key elements of a liberal democratic society and its educational institutions are primary safeguards of reflective moral theory, moral education, and an ethical life (Dewey 1916/1980, pp. 343–355).

Building on ethical inquiry and the science of education (Dewey 1929/1984b, pp. 1, 40), moral education is a wide-ranging area of both research and practice which includes formal moral education and everyday interactions (Dewey 1916/1980, pp. 356, 370). As a field of inquiry, moral education is concerned with identifying and fostering effective and ethical ways of promoting moral growth. As a field of practice, moral education is interested in providing the conditions for teaching and learning, including but going beyond the personal qualities of open-mindedness, tolerance, fairness, and cooperation (Dewey 1916/1980, p. 366). Any normative value claim that emerges from ethics and moral education is an instrument that informs efforts to make worthwhile differences in the lives of individuals and groups. Stated differently, ethical prescriptions and prohibitions that emerge from research and deliberation ought to promote the betterment of individuals and society. He thinks anyone – e.g., educators, politicians, social workers, and economists – who contributes to the theoretical development of ethics and moral education is at least partially responsible for the differences her ideas and interventions generate (Dewey 1933/1986, pp. 137–138).

Theory, inquiry, and education, consequently, are not merely manifestations of reflection; they are instruments to be employed for social justice (Dewey 1922/1983, pp. 15–20). Those involved in the development and implementation of policies and practices concerning education ought to identify and evaluate their contributions to a good life. They should evaluate outcomes to determine how laws and policies impact the lives and experiences of children and families, which ideas and practices work for the common good and when and how ideas and their applications influence equitable opportunities. To do less, Dewey indicates, is irresponsible, because such indicates that the common good is not really a matter of public interest (Dewey 1922/1983, pp. 155, 170).

A Moral Science

For Dewey, the field of ethical inquiry constitutes a moral science that emerges from transdisciplinary investigations, e.g., philosophical, psychological, sociological, biological, and educational. Inquiry should be characterized by rigorous or scientific practices: observation, exploration, reflection, experimentation, evaluation, modification, and reapplication (Dewey and Tufts 1932/1985, pp. 179–185). The warranted knowledge claims that become apparent during these investigative processes may gain greater security (Dewey 1929/1984b, pp. 106–107) and, thereby, applicability as the bodies of knowledge expand. Knowledge claims that are repeatedly tested and confirmed over decades or generations may yield empirical generalizations, relational universals, and widespread epistemic agreement (Dewey 1920/1982b, pp. 256, 277). A very high degree of warrant for knowledge claims may result in certainty and truth statements, but all assertions are qualified and revisable since all knowledge is partial and fallible (Dewey 1925/1984a, pp. 11, 13).

The connection of scientific knowledge development to ethics, education, and moral education is pivotal. The evolutionary nature of schools and communities, Dewey thinks, indicates the need for ongoing inquiry into the multiple conditions, changes, and continuities that relate to moral

theory, applied ethics, and moral education. An understanding of the dynamic nature of society and the growth of knowledge, however, requires more than a traditional understanding of ethics and moral education. The scope of these fields also encompasses, for instance, a need for growing bodies of understanding about human diversity, desires, and collaboration; familial development; economic planning; and political integrity (Dewey 1916/1980, pp. 310, 315). Democracy demands, if Dewey is correct, that the rigorous reflections, inquiry, and experiments that go into this transdisciplinary research be open to public scrutiny and evaluation and that the discoveries be communicated effectively to all segments of society. Parents, educators, coaches, religious leaders, and health care professionals should be recipients of and contributors to accessible and relevant research (Dewey 1933/1986, pp. 157–158).

Ethics, then, involves exploring and critiquing past, present, and prospective associations of individuals and groups to determine how social-moral interactions have been, are and may be used for personal and social enhancement. In addition to the discoveries and the clarifications of other fields, history enlightens ethical development and education too: it allows researchers to look back through more impartial lens, ask questions, and suggest hypotheses for study (Dewey 1901/1990, p. 318). Historical inquiry may also draw more of the general public – a critical aspect of democratic engagement – into disputes. But studying ethics is more than seeking to gain an intellectual grasp of logical arguments, scientific data, and associated theories. Learning also involves attitudinal and behavioral change and, thereby, affects a person's reflections, affections, and actions (Dewey and Tufts 1932/1985, pp. 269, 271).

Educators and Learners

Moral educators, whether in educational institutions or community entities, may wish to make learners aware of at least three educational expectations. First, the fact that learners will examine

issues and have experiences that could result in a reconsideration of their beliefs and behaviors is important. Education is deeply and intrinsically interested in change that adds value to life. Second, making clear that moral growth entails more than mere change is necessary. Educative growth is both immediate and prospective and involves growth experiences that open windows of seeing and doors of doing in the present and create abilities and habits that enable continued growth in the future (Dewey 1916/1980, pp. 46–58). Third, understanding that democracy, education, and morality are largely inconceivable without open inquiry and that it is the ethical lynchpin that cultivates freedom of thought underlines the importance of everyone being a reflective learner (Dewey 1903/1977, pp. 230, 228–239). Hence, “respect for freedom of intelligence” must be defended as well as utilized (Dewey 1946/1990, p. 473).

An understanding of the complexities of ethics and moral education also necessitates a rethinking of antiquated and counterproductive beliefs and practices (Dewey 1922/1983, pp. 43, 59). First, for instance, custom should carry little if any epistemic weight when one decides on the merits of moral assertions or practices, such as when dualistic beliefs lead to bifurcations in understanding the student and moral education (Dewey 1916/1980, pp. 357, 370). Second, traditional moral theory – like any field – is mistaken at times. Identifying supreme ethical principles or ends (e.g., good, right, or virtue) that are supposed to drive all ethical thinking and decision-making is an example. Also, precise ethical principles (e.g., respect and honesty) may need reconstruction or rejection in particular circumstances (Dewey and Tufts 1932/1985, pp. 232, 275–283). Third, the idea that moral development is merely a natural phenomenon is simplistically wrongheaded. Likewise, development is not a lockstep set of cognitive stages (Dewey 1916/1980, pp. 59–74, 118–130). Fourth, questions concerning human nature go beyond issues related to reasonableness, intention, choice, and self-control and extend to how, why, and in what conditions some people learn and others do not. Moral education, finally, is distorted and

ineffective if it concentrates principally on teaching concepts, communicating information, instilling rules, and implanting values (Dewey and Tufts 1932/1985, pp. 132–145).

Dewey (1938/1988a, pp. 31–47), therefore, thinks that understanding ethics both intellectually and experientially is an ideal worth pursuing. Understanding the import of human impulses, desires, plans, and purposes is also a crucial aspect of ethical and educational theory and practice. Otherwise, neither learners nor educators will understand the importance or the process of converting impulses into desires and transforming desires into considered purposes and plans. More pointedly, the person who fails to appreciate the robust role played by human impulses and desires will fail to comprehend the process of effectively teaching others. Guiding instinctive tendencies and cultivating informed desires into personally and socially productive purposes and activities entails elements of both moral development and education. Yet, educating a person morally has particular characteristics that nurturing, fostering, guiding, and developing may or may not incorporate.

A person may develop through casual enculturation; a guide may lead without giving attention to habit formation; a coach may focus almost exclusively on fostering abilities and skills; a parent may nurture caring while employing contradictory means. An educator, however, has responsibilities that are distinctively educational (Simpson et al. 2005). She, while developing, nurturing and guiding, is concerned with educational methods and aims; she has ends in view that are frequently different from casual acquaintances and parents. If she concurs with Dewey, she understands that student characteristics (including their impulses and desires, strengths and weaknesses) are connected to her educational effectiveness. She also knows which existing classroom conditions (e.g., technological, material, procedural, social, human) inhibit moral understanding and growth and which new conditions need to be added to expedite moral growth. She constructs classroom activities and conditions that facilitate educative experiences. She gains student participation so that they become engaged

in thinking ethically and making ethical decisions about live situations, not about artificially designed problems. She promotes an understanding and utilization of ethical problem solving skills so that students learn transferable attitudes, methods, questions, and habits. She embeds educative experiences in her democratic learning communities; and she demonstrates that each person's opinion is worth hearing and enhancing. By the same token, she provides information and provocations as she engages students about the application of ethical principles, the importance of developing virtues, and the values of a reflective democracy. She stretches student understanding by introducing ideas and controversies, previously outside of but on the cusp of most students' experiences, and incorporates their knowledge into the informal curricula to enrich the formal epistemic, aesthetic, ecological, and pedagogical curricula (Simpson 2011).

Dewey adds another pedagogical task: facilitating learners' change in attitudes, dispositions, and behaviors. This task reconnects with an earlier point about the cycle of learning (Dewey 1901/1990, pp. 213–225). In short, the educator is obligated to see that intellectual understanding is supplemented by experiential understanding, which may be secured by actual experiences and simulated ones by means of dramatic rehearsal, a hypothetical examination, and deliberation of an impending decision (Fesmire 2003, pp. 69, 91). Educators can foster holistic change by acting on the knowledge that most students are immediately sympathetic to the practical problems and pains of others and that they can easily become empathetic with others, seeing into their experiences as they feel for them (Simpson and Sacken 2014). Sympathy, then, can begin a reaction that adds empathetic insights and, thereby, helps transform itself into intelligent sympathy. Educators can nourish sympathy and empathy as they guide students' everyday interactions. According to Dewey (Dewey and Tufts 1932/1985, pp. 297–303), the flow of moral education is intrinsically a part of formal and informal education, and all social and educational experience and is potentially moral education. Thus, three

complementary sciences – ethics, moral education, and education – can collaboratively contribute to the moral growth of students and societies.

Problematic Ethical Situations

Another aspect of moral education is students' learning how to analyze and evaluate problematic ethical situations (Dewey and Tufts 1932/1985, pp. 280, 291). Dewey rejects the idea that ethical problem solving is largely or exclusively a matter of (a) intuiting a higher good, (b) using ethical principles to conclude moral thinking, (c) collecting data which lead to the identification of persons who exhibit virtues, (d) ascertaining the satisfaction level of concerned parties, or (e) examining data to uncover good or bad consequences. Dewey notes that each problematic ethical situation is unique and that its good is determined by the situation as a whole (Dewey and Tufts 1932/1985, pp. 275, 280–281). The perception of virtuous behavior, application of ethical principles, collection of relevant facts, maximization of satisfaction, and identification of particular consequences usually provide significant insights, but inquiry into a particular situation is necessary too. The desires and intentions, actions and reactions, conditions and contexts, and disvalues and goods in the situation need to be understood too. Questions may include: What exactly are the problems to be addressed? Who disclosed an attitude of disregard for the interests of others? Were there voices for the common good? Which interactions revealed the greatest tensions? Who were the primary influencers of behavior? Was there a dominant quality in the situation? How do these considerations promote problem-solving abilities?

Because each problematic ethical situation is unique, it requires a fresh analysis and evaluation, not a reflexive judgment. Because there are important epistemic and ethical continuities in each situation, ethical analyses are informed to some degree by existing bodies of experimental and experiential understanding. Reflectively using these continuities to analyze unique situations better enables educators and learners to address

new experiences and, ideally, to modify thinking and behavior (Dewey 1916/1980, pp. 4–5, 335–336; Dewey 1938/1988a, pp. 13, 20, 25, 31). Even though problematic ethical situations produce tensions and anxieties, moral growth would be less likely without disconcerting factors. Disequilibrium nurses reflection, decision-making, and moral growth. Thus, those examining problematic situations should investigate contributing conditions and subtilize their conclusions regarding particular situations. Among the assorted conditions that ideally contribute to particular situations are democratic beliefs, methods, and practices (Dewey 1938/1988b, pp. 136–155).

Democratic conditions encompass but are not limited to means that promote, sustain, and appraise civil freedoms, social justice, fraternity, and peace (Dewey 1916/1980). Likewise, conditions that cultivate government impartiality and accountability, corporate openness and social responsibility, personal curiosity and open-mindedness, political and economic intelligence, and institutional equity are educative means that help answer the questions: What kind of person do I wish to become? What kind of society and world do I want to help construct? The kind of self or person Dewey hopes will inherit and advance democratic means, ends, and qualities needs both the conditions that facilitate a dynamic and deep democracy and the dispositions and habits that promote democratic thought and action (Dewey 1920/1982, pp. 172, 186; Dewey and Tufts 1932/1985). An initiation into reflective democratic thought and practice, therefore, is a part of moral education and may occur in nearly any problematic ethical situation, whether found in the home, school, theatre, museum, park, alley, or stadium. Each person and entity is inescapably a moral educator. The ecological moral curricula include ordinary as well as extraordinary interactions. A challenge of society is to plan, create, and evaluate educative experiences so that informal and formal and unintentional and intentional activities and endeavors more readily result in an intensified consciousness that fosters personal and social-moral growth.

Conclusion

Dewey's approach to ethics and moral education – and the science of education – is comprehensive in the sense that these fields may engage any ethical question that has a bearing on the promotion of individual betterment and the common good. Each is a broad transdisciplinary field of inquiry or science that stimulates deliberation on both theoretical and practical problems. Ethics is often, perhaps, somewhat more theoretical while moral education is frequently somewhat more practical. But researchers and educators in each field should seek to influence the reflections, affections, and actions of people who benefit from and contribute to the wellbeing of one another. Correspondingly, researchers and practitioners should shape laws, policies, structures, and processes that foster ethical reflection, moral education, and educative experiences. More inclusively, Dewey (1938/1988b, p. 155) asserts that the duty of everyone who believes in “the intrinsic moral nature of democracy” and in democracy as “a way of life” is to realize experientially that democracy is “a way of personal life” that “provides a moral standard for personal conduct.” In this way, the cycle of learning and living will be completed, episodically and continually.

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Dewey on History and Geography in Education

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Introduction

In this 1897 pamphlet, *Ethical Principles of Education*, the subject areas of geography and history are introduced as examples of how the aims of education intersect with the division of the “facts” to be taught. In contrast with the received conception of geography as “a description of the Earth’s surface,” Dewey proposed that geography had “to do with all those aspects of social life which are concerned with the interaction of the life of man and nature.” History, he declared, was valuable to the extent that it affords “insight into what makes up the structure and working of society.” By 1916, in *Democracy and Education*, Dewey’s account of the value of geography and history appears to have transformed from a school-based study of social interactions relevant to local concerns to an instrument in service of education’s progressive “civilizing” mission. In the years following, geography disappeared as a topic in Dewey’s discussions of education. History, however, continued to be an important theoretical concern and became an essential part of Dewey’s theory of inquiry.

Maps, Narratives and the Importance of Boundaries

Geography and history were of central importance in Dewey’s vision of school curricula. Geography, in his view, was the study of human environments, the material connections that sustain human life and culture, while history was the study of human connections. Despite their differences, however, “these are only emphases in a common topic, namely, the associated life of men” (MW 9, p. 218) (Citations of Dewey’s works are to his 38-volume collected works: *The Early Works*

(EW), *The Middle Works* (MW), and *The Later Works* (LW), published as Dewey 1969–1990). Together the subjects served as the link between individual experience in the context of local, experienced problems and the abstract, problem-solving resources of the sciences.

In *Ethical Principles Underlying Education* (1897), Dewey identifies four subfields of geography: commercial, political, physical, and mathematical. The first marks the study of daily life and the ways in which human beings concretely flourish, how they support themselves, and by what means. Commercial geography, he claimed, is “the beginning” because it attends to “the consciousness of two persons, or two groups of persons, who are at once separated and connected by the physical environment” and “includes whatever relates to human intercourse and intercommunication as affected by natural forms and properties” (EW 5, p. 69). Political geography, by contrast, is the study of connections between people in their places as they have developed, “as temporarily crystalized and fixed in certain forms” (EW 5, 69). Later, in *The Public and Its Problems* (1926), “publics” can be seen as a term of political geography in that it marks the formation of groups with shared concerns in order to solve problems in common. Physical geography is the study of “conditions which determine human action,” that is, of what is taken as common among the publics. Shared climates, soil types, water resources, and so on all affect what is required in order to carry out conjoint action across diverse locales. Finally, mathematical geography (detailed measurements of topographical features, generalizations about climate and ecosystems, standardized systems of measurement, and so on) are both abstract and useful as tools in understanding physical geography, planning and assessing conjoint actions, and solving local problems. Mathematical geography shows “that the physical conditions themselves are not ultimate, but depend upon the place which the world occupies in a larger system” (EW 5, pp. 69–70).

In the context of schools, as Dewey points out in *Democracy and Education*, geography begins with the study of the students’ hometowns, “the familiar fences that mark the limits of the village

proprietors” (MW 9, p. 220), the boundaries of their communities, the topographical features of the neighborhood, and the stories of local people. However, if such local “facts” are presented as all that is necessary to know in geography, or that the facts in each subfield are presented as disconnected facts to be memorized, then geography becomes an obstacle to student learning. When, however, such “facts” are presented as part of an integrated system of relations – relating local places and people to larger events, events in the past, and to events in the present – geography becomes a transitional subject matter alongside history. Rather than reifying the boundaries that mark students’ local communities, the subject matters (properly taught) become openings to larger connections. In this sense, geography and the complementary study of history become essential to what is good in education – the promotion of growth, that is, the widening of human experience (LW 13, pp. 11, 28). Geography and the other school subjects are, for Dewey, tools for framing educative experience that begins with the students’ own. As he explains in *Experience and Education*, his conception of education is, “to paraphrase the saying of Lincoln about democracy, one of education *of, by, and for* experience” (LW 13, p. 14).

Dewey presented significant discussions of geography and history on two occasions: *Ethical Principles Underlying Education* and Chapter 16 in *Democracy and Education* (MW 9, p. 1916). (There is also a third discussion in “Educational Lectures at Brigham Young Academy” in 1901 (LW 17) that follows the same lines as his 1897 discussion.) *Ethical Principles*, in many ways lays the foundation for Dewey’s more fully developed theories of education, ethics, and politics in *Democracy and Education*. The general claim of the essay was that contemporary education was framed by divisions between ethical principles (those for inside and those for outside the school), between form and content, and between intellect and emotion. As a result of these divisions, schools failed in the central function of teaching: bringing about “conclusive moral content” in the lives of its students, that is, of serving as a “character-making agency” (EW 5, p. 75). The division of ethical principles marked the failure

of educators to understand that continuity between schools and the communities of which they are a part. "Society is a society of individuals and the individual is always a social individual. He has no existence by himself. He lives in, for, and by society, just as society has no existence excepting in and through the individuals who constitute it" (EW 5, p. 55).

Dewey offers geography, history, and science to illustrate the "abstract" point that information, discipline, and culture are continuous: information is "educative only in so far as it effects definite images and conceptions of material places in social life;" while "discipline" is "educative only as it represents a reaction of the information into the individual's own powers;" and culture is educative only as it "represents the vital union of information and discipline" (EW 5, p. 68). Geography, history, and science "have all to do with the same ultimate reality, namely, the conscious experience of man" (EW 5, p. 68).

While geography "has to do with all those aspects of social life which are concerned with the interaction of the life of man and nature," history "reveals" "the main instruments in the way of discoveries, inventions, new modes of life, etc., which have initiated the great epochs of social advance," that is, "the *methods* of social progress" (EW 5, p. 71). Together, the subject matters support the "formation of habits of social imagination and conception," and make it possible for students to form "the habit of interpreting the special incidents that occur and the particular situations that present themselves in terms of the whole social life" (EW 5, p. 72). On this account, what constitutes good in a community is first the process of understanding complex social situations, identifying problems, and seeking solutions. In this sense, "history rightly taught is the chief instrumentality for accomplishing this, it has an ultimate ethical value" (EW 5, p. 73).

Moral content beyond the value of moral imagination, however, is not found outside the situation present in the schools, but rather in the students' own experiences: "the subject matter of the curriculum, however important, however judiciously selected, is empty of conclusive moral

content until it is made over into terms of the individual's own activities, habits, and desires" (EW 5, pp. 77–78). Although this aspect of Dewey's ethical theory is often cited as a weakness (by making moral deliberation an instrument by which to realize the moral prejudices of a community), it is central to Dewey's wider notion of social intelligence (LW 13, p. 47): "Ultimate moral motives and forces are nothing more nor less than social intelligence – the power of observing and comprehending social situations – and social power – trained capacities of control – at work in the service of social interests and aims" (EW 5, p. 75). Schools, then, are charged with fostering the social intelligence that identifies the values that organize the community through the subject matters of geography and history. But schools also necessarily challenge and undermine those values when they are found to block the potential for wider experience that is central to the process of growth.

Geography was a relatively new school subject when Dewey presented it in 1897. The divisions of geography he presented owed much to the new scholarship of the day. Kant had introduced six divisions of geography in his work: commercial, political, physical, mathematical, moral, and theological. These had been reduced in the mid nineteenth-century to three: political, physical, and mathematical, though commercial geography was also recognized as a distinct field of study that was then recombined with the other subfields to form the four divisions described by Dewey and others (see Maury 1907). Dewey's citations of geography texts in 1897 includes some standard textbooks and several critical accounts of the field including one by J. C. Redway (1894), who argued that although the field was becoming a standard school subject, it was rarely taught by teachers with knowledge of the field. In at least some cases, Redway observed, geography was used to reinforce views that were actively dismissed by geographers (including simple mistakes in defining geological features and the use of geography to validate theological claims).

Dewey's discussion of geography in *Democracy and Education* expands the function of

geography as presented in *Ethical Principles*. Properly taught, geography begins in the local community but aims to connect such local knowledge to wider contexts. “When the familiar fences” are taken as “signs that introduce an understanding of boundaries of great nations, even fences are lighted with meaning” (MW 9, p. 220). This process of meaning-making “measures just the difference of civilization from savagery” (p. 215). “To ‘learn geography,’” he argues, “is to gain in power to perceive the spatial, the *natural*, connections of an ordinary act; to ‘learn history’ is essentially to gain in power to recognize its human connections” (p. 217). Nature, in this sense, “is the medium of social occurrences” and civilization is “the progression of its varied energies” (p. 219). Geography is no longer a subject matter just dedicated to fostering social intelligence, but an engine of human evolution, a means of fostering progress. Limits – boundaries – are only potentially productive obstacles to be overcome in the quest for an expanded, unified future. “Geography and history are the two great school resources for bringing about the enlargement of the significance of a direct personal experience,” they are the “most direct and interesting roads out into the larger world” (p. 226).

The treatment of history in Dewey extended past his discussions of history as a school subject. It also marked a theoretical contribution to the development of his general conceptions of metaphysics and epistemology. In *The School and Society* (1900), Dewey reemphasized the purpose of history as a study “to enable the child to appreciate the values of social life, to see in imagination the forces which favor and let men’s effective cooperation with one another, to understand the sorts of character that help on and that hold back . . . History must be presented not as an accumulation of results or effects, a mere statement of what happened, but as a forceful and acting thing” (MW 1, p. 104). This notion of history as “a forceful and acting thing” reemerges indirectly in several discussions in the 1900s. In 1902, in the essay “The Evolutionary Method as Applied to Morality,” Dewey proposes that “History, as

viewed from the evolutionary standpoint, is not a mere collection of incidents or external changes, which something fixed (whether spiritual or physical) has passed through, but is a process that reveals to us the conditions under which moral practices and ideas have originated. This enables us to place, to relate them. In seeing where they came from, in what situations they arose, we see their significance” (MW 2, p. 9). History, in this case, is not a recounting of “facts,” but the practical construction of future significance and the “truth” of history that warrants its teaching is found in how it leads students to new experience.

In 1909, Dewey presented a pragmatist “catechism” at a meeting of the Philosophy Club at Smith College in the form of a dialogue between a student and a teacher (later published in *The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy* in 1910). After a preliminary presentation of pragmatism, the student worries that since the truth of historical claims relies on what happens in the future, “you commit yourself to the most fantastic of philosophies” (MW 6, p. 6). The teacher responds that such things as “the Carboniferous age, the discovery of America by Columbus are not truths; they are events.” Some judgment about them is needed before there is a question of truth or falsity, and once that question is raised it is something to be resolved, that is, it becomes matter of some next or future event and not of the event long past (p. 6).

Arthur Lovejoy responded to this conception of historical knowledge in a 1920 essay attacking pragmatism (and Dewey in particular). Referring to an example in Dewey’s catechism, Lovejoy objects that when we talk about “yesterday’s rain,” “It is yesterday that I ‘mean,’ not to-morrow, and no logical hocus-pocus can transubstantiate the meaning of ‘yesterday’ into the meaning ‘to-morrow’” (1920, p. 67). A correct understanding of historical knowledge, Lovejoy argued, requires a distinction between the event or object in the past and the claim that is made about it. The claim is true just in case it relates properly to the real past event. Dewey rejects the distinction: “The past by itself and the present by itself are both arbitrary selections which mutilate the complete object of judgment” (MW 13, p. 46).

Dewey instead asserted that “mere presence in experience is quite a different matter from knowledge or judgment, which always involves a connection, and, where time enters in, a connection between the past and future” (MW 13, p. 47). History, as a subject matter, is not the acquisition of facts about the past but rather the development of the ability to interpret a selected past in order to “go forward,” to seek a future that affords “more” and richer experience than would otherwise occur by chance or by focusing on a disconnected past.

Dewey’s conception of geography can be read in a similar way. Learning the facts of the physical and human environments in isolation undermines the aims of education. It risks collecting isolated and arbitrary facts as though they provide some objective or accurate picture of the world in which students live. Following Dewey’s theory of historical knowledge, geographical knowledge will likewise be arbitrary and isolated unless they too are connected to a larger context that will afford wider experience. Geography and history are at the center of Dewey’s conception of the school because they together provide the transformative method that allows students to come to understand their own experience in order to change and widen it. Knowledge, to the extent it is part of what is taught in school, is not merely an epistemic project bound to the acquisition of facts; it is also an ontological project that, at its best, will transform the world. This is both the promise and the danger of education.

The danger is especially apparent in the tension that emerges in Dewey’s treatment of geography and history in *Democracy and Education*. On one hand, geography and history are essential to a civilizing project understood primarily as the transformation of inquiry from one framed by local concerns to a process that encounters no boundaries that cannot be crossed. On the other, they are part of a conception of inquiry that is constrained by the situation at hand. The former seems problematically connected to the practices of what has come to be called settler colonialism which may be defined (in at least one sense) as practices that recognize all boundaries (geographic, political, cultural, and epistemic) as regions that can be crossed. The latter notion of

inquiry, by contrast, recognizes the necessity of at least some boundaries. In order to make sense of knowledge claims, problems to be solved, values, and so on – that is, ends in view in the context of problems to be addressed – some boundaries must be recognized and respected. One cannot, for example, address the problems of racism without recognizing the lived boundaries of race. One cannot recognize the problems of climate change without recognizing the boundaries of diverse ecosystems. It is this latter notion of inquiry that provides the framework for Dewey’s 1938 *Logic: The Theory of Inquiry* (LW 12) and sets the stage for Dewey’s importance in twenty-first-century education. Where geography and history are part of a civilizing project in *Democracy and Education*, the theory of inquiry as it develops in Dewey’s work has the potential to make them part of a critical practice that begins with the recognition of the value and necessity of diversity among students, subject matters, communities, and educational ends in view.

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Dewey on Public Education and Democracy

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Synonyms

[Character education](#); [Deliberative democracy](#); [Multiculturalism](#); [Progressive education](#)

Introduction

The American philosopher John Dewey influenced the educational sector of many countries around the world apart from the USA, notably Japan, China, Australia, Germany, Austria, both pre- and postrevolutionary Russia, and Turkey. In Sweden, which will be discussed as an example below, his influence is still palpable in the national curricula. An important part of Dewey's work concerns the role of education in societal reform and progress: more specifically, in the progress toward a more democratic society. Thus, the formation of democratic character lay at the heart of Dewey's philosophy of education. For Dewey, this is far more important than teaching children how a democracy works, since the development of a democratic character entails more than knowing a set of facts or rules; it is rather about fostering a sociable and intelligent (receptive and open-minded) individual, someone who can learn not only to vote at certain intervals but to change and shape society in the best possible way for every one of its members. On this view, which still has relevance today, one aspect of democracy is not just as a form of government but an ethos, a culture, and a way of living in a society where people work together for the common good.

Forming a Democratic Character

Dewey is commonly associated with the progressive education movement that started in the USA at the turn of the last century as a protest against pedagogical narrowness and one-sidedness. The movement was pluralistic and related to broader currents of social and political progressivism resulting from societal changes such as urbanization, industrialization, and large-scale immigration. One of the social currents underlying this movement was the changing perception of children and the growing interest in children's rights. Part of the progressive movement was strongly child centered, maintaining that school should provide children with the freedom to express their true human nature rather than create citizens.

Another fraction, which has been called social reconstructionism, emphasized community and society rather than the individual and saw school as central to creating a more just social order, whereas the so-called social engineering strand (or "administrative progressives") focused on social efficiency and teaching the students to earn a living. It is difficult to place Dewey in any of these categories: for the child-centered educators, Dewey was too academically and socially oriented, whereas the social constructivists thought that he lacked a sense of direction when he refused to blueprint a new social order (Karier 1986). For Dewey, it was enough that school should foster alert, sensitive, and socially competent adults, capable of making sound decisions about the future. These decisions could not be dictated by school or by authorities, since we live in a changing world: "a world which is not all in, and never will be, a world which in some respect is incomplete and in the making, and which in these respects may be made this way or that according as men judge, prize, love and labor" (Dewey 1993). The importance Dewey placed on individual growth was also at odds with the social engineering strand that advocated separate vocational education. For Dewey, manual training was not mere trade training but an important step in elucidating the practical and the theoretical aspects of every subject, and he thought that everyone should have the chance to grow intellectually – not just those destined for an academic career.

Dewey's philosophy of education has mostly been misunderstood and misapplied. Learning through experience has become mere vocational education, and Dewey's emphasis on the interest of the child has come to be synonymous with permissiveness. But it is important to remember that many of the practices that Dewey introduced have become more or less mainstream: the practices today called "problem solving" or "inquiry method," for example. Furthermore, many of Dewey's concerns still retain their resonance today, as the website of the Progressive Education Network testifies. The principles listed include preparing students "for active participation in a democratic society," and the principles drafted by

the steering committee in 1990 includes the school as “a model of democracy and humane relationships, confronting issues of racism, classism and sexism.” Even if most of the child-centered progressive schools in the first half of the twentieth century comprised private schools, of late these reforms have centered mainly on public schools. But questions concerning the meaning of “democratic” education have been raised, as the progressive schools often are set in homogenous, white neighborhoods. Critics have ascribed the success of progressive schools to the new middle class rather than the model itself, and doubts have been raised whether disadvantaged children are helped by progressive education or rather disadvantaged further (Semel and Sadovnik 1999).

However, in the USA, there remain some successful examples of progressive schools, or as they are called today, “alternative” or “critical” schools, notably Central Park East Secondary School (CPESS) in New York, which enjoyed high levels of success with low-income and minority students. CPESS has been called a critical small school, which attempts to connect with oppressed students and create productive and democratic citizens. One of the obstacles these kinds of schools face is the difficulty to measure dispositions and habits of mind through traditional metrics, for example, the ability to think critically and to form strong personal and professional relationships, something Dewey thought essential for the ability to fully participate in a democratic society. Therefore, it might seem easier to foster a democratic spirit and at the same time meet the politics’ demand of effectiveness with the kind of teacher-led programs that have recently been integrated into school curricula across the country, such as Character Counts!, 11 Principles of Effective Character Education, and KIPP’s Teaching Character and Creating Positive Classrooms. In Character Counts!, for example, students are taught the Six Pillars of Character, i.e., trustworthiness, respect, responsibility, fairness, caring, and citizenship. Trustworthiness means here to “stand by your family, friends, and country”; responsibility means to “do what you are supposed to do”; citizenship

means to “obey laws and rules,” and so forth (Spector and Prendergast 2015).

Without a doubt, this kind of approach is antithetical to Dewey, for whom the ideal aim of education is the power of self-control. This entails what Dewey calls freedom of intelligence, what we today would call critical thinking, rather than blindly obeying rules or doing what you are supposed to do. The formation of democratic character involves learning how to think, how to form one’s own opinions, and how to fully partake in society. For Dewey, this does not mean that the teacher is less important or that the children should not be required to learn what is on the curriculum; to the contrary, rational freedom and rational intelligence are itself the fruit of objective knowledge and understanding (Karier 1986). For Dewey, there was no opposition between student activity and interest, on the one hand, and the teacher’s authority, on the other. He emphasized the importance of the role of the teacher in identifying the interests and needs of the pupils, as well as imparting to them new learning and objective knowledge. In this process, the child is indeed taught discipline, but the discipline, as well as the interest, is internal to the subject: “To satisfy an impulse or interest means to work it out, and working it out involves running up against obstacles, becoming acquainted with materials, exercising ingenuity, patience, persistence, alertness, it of necessity involves discipline – ordering of power – and supplies of knowledge” (Dewey 1959). This kind of discipline is the source of freedom, since real freedom presupposes the faculties of judgment and self-expression. Since, according to Dewey, learning is an active undertaking, children should be initiated from the beginning into the “mode of associated living” characteristic of a democracy, in which social sympathy and deliberative moral reasoning can develop. Thus, classrooms in a democracy had to be not only communities of inquiry but *democratic* communities of inquiry (Westbrook 1991).

In Sweden, the Deweyan ideal of democratic education has guided school authorities ever since the Second World War. Dewey can be said to have influenced all Swedish school reforms up until at least the 1970s, and even if the emphasis on

democratic education has diminished as a result of more recent school reforms, his ideal of education as a way of imparting democratic values through participation is still manifested, as in a formulation from the national grammar school curriculum guidelines which stipulate that it is not enough that education imparts knowledge of democratic values but should also be conducted with democratic methods and prepare the pupils for active participation in society. The pupils should thus take part in planning and evaluating their education and choose courses, subjects, themes, and activities, so as to develop their capacity to exert influence and take responsibility. The importance of discussion about society's base values is also emphasized. The Swedish National Agency for Education stresses the importance of discussion where there are conflicts of values, and the efforts of the individual and the collective to listen, reflect, seek, and evaluate arguments, and a collective effort to find the values and standards that everyone can agree on.

This consensus-based model has been criticized for making teachers apprehensive about disagreements. In classrooms with pupils from many different cultural backgrounds, it can be difficult to find agreement. And since the curriculum requires that the teacher should instill democratic values in the pupils "in accordance with the ethics borne by Christian tradition and Western humanism" and emphasizes the Swedish-based values, the ideal of an open discussion can easily turn into a directed one with a right and a wrong outcome.

The idea that there should be a fixed end to deliberation is antithetical to Dewey's views, since for him education should cultivate a spirit of criticism and the habit of inquiry, rather than conventional idealizations. Because of our need for ongoing evaluation and criticism, we need to foster ongoing inquiry, to harness the potential of lived experience rather than appeal to a singular common good. So a democratic character is not formed by learning a set of truths or even learning how to reason but through practical activities that require listening to others, confronting our own prejudices, and expanding our viewpoints.

Multicultural Society: Broadening Horizons

Opinions about Dewey's relation to the different values embodied in multiculturalism vary, often due to the usual interpretative problems posed by the complexity of, and transitions in, Dewey's thought over a long career. But even if Dewey thought that there was an inherent tendency to conflict in multiculturalism, he identified himself as a multiculturalist and rejected the idea of America as a "melting pot." In a letter to Horace Kellen, the author of the term "cultural pluralism," Dewey wrote that he wanted to see his country as American, which meant reducing the English strain to "one along with others." He likened the USA to a symphony, where any assimilation is to and between the different instruments playing with each other, not to some prior Anglo-Saxon orchestration (Eisle 1992). For Dewey, it is essential that communication and openness are mutual, so that no group can force its conception on another. Agreement, on the other hand, does not seem to have any intrinsic value for Dewey; rather, it is the process of communication and learning from others that is important.

Dewey saw schooling as an important tool in counteracting segregation and in promoting communication between different groups, since he saw democracy as grounded in practical concerns and social ties, rather than in abstract ideals or reasoned arguments. Dewey contends that ultimate moral motives and forces are nothing more than "social intelligence," i.e., the capacity to observe and comprehend social situations, tempered by trained self-control, in the service of social interest and aims. Morality, as well as democracy, is not a *thing* as much as a *way*, something that we *do*. Dewey makes the case that the formation of the desired attitudes and dispositions cannot be achieved through the direct inculcation of beliefs, emotions, and knowledge. Just as children learn through participation in the affairs of the family, school is a place where children learn valuable social skills through interaction. At school they can learn to take different perspectives into consideration and thus acquire greater knowledge than they could achieve at

home or in isolation (Dewey 1966). This is why one important educational task is to bring children from different backgrounds together.

The Democratic Practice of Life

Working together, “breaking down the barriers of class, race, and nationality which keeps men from seeing the full import of their activity,” can therefore help us to understand not only the consequences of our own actions better but also to *perceive* other people, in the pregnant sense Dewey gives the term. Through conjoint activity, we develop the sensitivity that Dewey called “intelligent sympathy,” which he describes as not merely a feeling but a cultivated imagination for what we have in common with others (Dewey 1966). It could be described as a sensitive responsiveness to the interests, sufferings, and rights of others. Dewey thinks that duties and loyalties will naturally grow from these kinds of personal ties and stable relationships.

The idea seems to be that the virtues of the democratic character can be fostered, not necessarily by talking about values but by cultivating friendship and respect through doing things together. As we work together, we create social ties, develop sympathy, and learn to respect each others’ strengths and weaknesses. Genuine cooperation entails listening to others and making compromises in order to find a solution that satisfies everyone – skills that are important in the “mode of associated living” called democratic society. For Dewey, moral knowledge is what is learned and employed in any occupation that has an aim involving cooperation. Shared aims build up social interest and “confers the intelligence needed to make that interest effective in practice” (Dewey 1966). Democracy thus grows from within: from what is local, spontaneous, voluntary, and direct. The sort of communal loyalty and civic-mindedness needed in a democracy can emerge as a natural outgrowth of strengthening and nurturing local ties (Pappas 2008).

This “ethics of democratic relationships” (Pappas 2008) or “democratic practice of life”

(Dewey 1993) is what school should foster. If democracy and our choice of how to live were primarily a question of rationally accepting certain principles, then we should indeed primarily address the values that we think underlie our way of life. But Dewey does not assume that there is a specific set of underlying values that cause or direct our behavior; rather, he thinks that important democratic values such as tolerance, sympathy, and openness *grow out of* an environment in which we work together toward a common goal. For Dewey, lived experience is the only reliable avenue by which to pursue the development of social intelligence and meaningful democracy. Therefore, it would seem that in Dewey’s view, democratic education is better pursued through making pupils from different backgrounds cooperate in different tasks, giving them a chance to get to know each other as they work together, rather than having them sit down to discuss abstract ideals.

Democracy as an Ethical Ideal

A crucial difference between Dewey and other models of deliberative democracy such as that of, e.g., Rawls, is that Dewey does not aim to generate final principles or once and for all overcome the impediments of democracy. For Dewey, democracy should be created anew by each generation, and the kind of democracy he envisions entails difference and an openness for different alternatives. This is why Dewey can perhaps better accommodate Chantal Mouffe’s critique of the deliberative democracy model, which she considers too focused on consensus. Such models, in her view, ignore the positive potential of difference and disagreement. Similarly, Dewey’s ideal would seem to resist Iris Marion Young’s criticism of deliberative democracy models as excluding emotional-imaginative methods and reasons from political discourse.

In Dewey’s view, the good can never be demonstrated to the senses but always involves the will and an interest in what is unseen and incalculable. On this understanding, democracy is an

ethical ideal. As an idea, democracy is the idea of community life itself. Such an idea is not, and cannot ever be, a matter of fact (Dewey 1954). Democracy, for Dewey, necessarily entails freedom, fraternity, and equality (Dewey 1993), ideals that may never become facts and that are difficult to justify on a merely rational basis, and even more difficult to measure with standardized tests, but which most would agree are indispensable aims for any ethical society and thus vital for our children to learn.

Cross-References

- [Dewey on Democracy](#)
- [Dewey on Educational Aims](#)
- [Dewey on Ethics and Moral Education](#)
- [Dewey on Teaching and Teacher Education](#)
- [Dewey on the Concept of Education as Growth](#)
- [Dewey on Thinking in Education](#)

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Dewey on Science and Science Education

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Introduction

The term "science," for Dewey, can refer either: (a) to the particular inquiry process by which one can achieve genuine *knowledge of nature* or (b) to the body of genuine knowledge produced by that inquiry process. I will disambiguate the term by referring always to "scientific inquiry" or to "scientific knowledge."

Dewey holds that the method of inquiry is the only means of coming to have knowledge about real thing/events and that scientific inquiry is the most highly developed form of inquiry. Dewey conceives knowledge to be a set of beliefs well warranted to be true about the dynamic interactive events that constitute the natural world. Knowledge with respect to any subject matter can be developed through the process of inquiry.

Scientific inquiry is a natural investigative activity that developed as an elaboration of practical common-sense inquiry, the process by which certain complex organisms act in response to their environment. The aim of practical inquiry is the survival and well-being of the organism; the aim of scientific inquiry is the same, via intellectual action to develop a body of knowledge. Dewey uses the general term "inquiry" to refer to scientific inquiry and to ordinary practical inquiry.

Inquiry

Dewey sets out his position on the relation of ideas, facts, and knowledge, first, in 1902, in *Studies in Logical Theory*, then in 1907, in *"The Control of Ideas by Facts,"* in 1916, in *Essays in Experimental Logic*, in 1925, *Experience and Nature*, and, most thoroughly, in *"Logic: the Theory of Inquiry"* (1938). In both 1939, in *"Experience, Knowledge and Value: A Rejoinder,"* and in

1941, in "*Propositions, Warranted Assertibility, and Truth*," Dewey responds at length to his critics, who often misinterpret his position, rather than engage in criticism of it.

Dewey explains inquiry in this way: inquiry "begins in doubt, [and] terminates in the institution of conditions which remove need for doubt." (1938, p. 15). The conditions of doubt that call forth inquiry occur when one finds oneself in a situation in which one intends to act to achieve a desired end but finds that one's existing knowledge and habits of action are inadequate to the current situation, that is, they have proven unable to effectively guide one's actions in pursuit of the desired end.

Having noticed that one's actions have become ineffectual, or counterproductive, one should temporarily stop action in pursuit of the desired end, and act instead to determine the nature of the situation, to understand the dynamic interrelationships that constitute it. Only by acquiring such knowledge will one be enabled to act effectively in the situation.

The current situation is indeterminate, in that one does not know what actions to take in that situation to effectively pursue the desired end. Dewey uses the term "indeterminate" to refer to a situation that is "disturbed, troubled, ambiguous, confused, full of conflicting tendencies, obscure, etc." (1938, p. 109). It is the situation itself that is indeterminate, and thus, full of doubt, or "doubtful." The indeterminacy of the situation is an objective state of affairs, inhering in the situation; the subjective state of "doubt" of the person in the situation is only secondary, in response to the indeterminateness of the situation. Dewey further explains: "Even were the existential conditions unqualifiedly determinate in and of themselves, they are indeterminate in *significance*: that is, in what they import and portend in their interaction with the organism" (1938, p. 110).

Having recognized the current situation as doubtful, one begins the inquiry process. Dewey gives a formal definition of inquiry: "Inquiry is the controlled or directed transformation of an indeterminate situation into one that is so determinate in its constituent distinctions and relations as to

convert the elements of the original situation into a unified whole" (1938, p. 108). Inquiry is competent to the extent that the initial indeterminate situation actually becomes, at the end of inquiry, determinate, a situation which is well understood.

In the inquiry process the person is required to *act* in the situation, in his or her current environment. It is only by physical action, by becoming a factor in the set of dynamic interactions that is the situation, that the objective environing conditions can be transformed. Inquiry is not an "inner mental" process; it is an overt activity. Dewey writes "[t]he organic responses [of the person] that enter into the production of the state of affairs that is temporally later and sequential are just as existential as are the environing conditions" (1938, p. 110). As the person acts in the indeterminate situation and observes the results of his or her actions, the situation gradually becomes more determinate.

Dewey refers to the temporally developing indeterminate situation as a "problem situation"; the "first result of the evocation of inquiry is that the situation is taken, adjudged, to be problematic" (1938, p. 111). Making this judgment is the preliminary step in inquiry. Subsequent steps must then be taken. "The first step. . . is to search out the *constituents* of a given situation which, as constituents, are settled" (1938, p. 112). The active process of observation of the existential conditions is begun. The observed conditions "taken together constitute 'the facts of the case'. . . they are conditions that must be reckoned with or taken account of in any relevant solution that is proposed" (1938, p. 113). These conditions, as they are observed, suggest possible solutions to the problem, plans of action that if taken might resolve the situation, and effect the desired determinate and nonproblematic situation.

Ideas, in Dewey's sense, are plans of potential action. "Ideas are anticipated consequences (forecasts) of what will happen when certain operations are executed under and with respect to observed conditions" (1938, p. 113). With continued observation of the situation's features and the corresponding suggestion of ideas about the dynamics of the situation, the ideas entertained

become better grounded and more precise. The best of the entertained ideas is then used to direct one's active intervention in the problem situation, and the newly resulting existential conditions are again observed. Action, and observation of the results of action, constitutes the test of the idea.

It is through the use of the ideas that the meanings of the ideas begin to be understood. A reasoning process is undertaken, to clarify more fully the meanings and to discover their conceptual relations to other meanings in one's existing knowledge. For this examination, the new meanings must be formulated in propositions and compared to other formulated meanings. The goal is to discover the logical relationships of the various meanings. Without this examination of meanings and their interrelationships, the inquiry process is not properly completed.

Scientific inquiry takes exactly this form. Dewey writes: "An hypothesis, once suggested and entertained, is developed in relation to other conceptual structures until it receives a form in which it can instigate and direct an experiment that will disclose precisely those conditions which have the maximum possible force in determining whether the hypothesis should be accepted or rejected" (1938, pp. 115–116).

How are the observed facts of the situation, which are existential, to be related to the ideational content, the meanings, which are non-existential? Dewey's response is that both the existential facts and the nonexistential meanings are operative factors in the developing situation. "Ideas are operational in that they instigate and direct further operations of observation" (1938, p. 116). Facts are also operational. The relevant facts are selected for their capacity to serve as evidence: "their evidential quality is judged on the basis of their capacity to form an ordered whole. . ." (1938, p. 117).

Observed facts suggest ideas; the ideas when used to direct action generate new observations of fact; these new facts suggest other ideas, leading to new observations, and so on. The inquirer, throughout, attempts to find the ordered whole that would link together the facts and the suggested meanings. The provisional facts are tested, just as the provisional ideas are tested.

Science

Adherence to this general process of active experimental inquiry, leading to highly tested meanings and determinations of facts, is the definitive criterion for science, in Dewey's philosophy. In scientific inquiry, as opposed to common-sense practical inquiry, the intellectual focus is on the development of an always growing and continuously tested body of interrelated meanings. "In science, since meanings are determined on the ground of their relation as meanings to one another, *relations* become the objects of inquiry. . . scientific objects are strictly relational" (1938, p. 119).

In the system of relations that constitute scientific knowledge, the relations discovered to obtain are generalized and are highly abstract; given this, the propositions that set out symbolically the patterns of interrelations that constitute nature are widely applicable to many different qualitative contexts. "The generality of *all* scientific subject-matter as such means that it is freed from restriction to conditions which present themselves at particular times and places" (1938, p. 120).

The method of science, in Dewey's words, "is but the systematic, extensive and carefully controlled use of alert and unprejudiced observation and experimentation in collecting, arranging and testing facts to serve as evidence. . ." (1938, p. 57).

Knowledge

Dewey calls his theory of knowledge "instrumentalism." This name is intended to direct attention to the instrumental nature of propositions in the process of inquiry. In *Logic: The Theory of Inquiry* (1938) and in 1941, in "Propositions, Warranted Assertibility and Truth," Dewey draws a conceptual distinction between "propositions" and "judgments." The term "judgment" refers to the thoroughly tested belief that emerges as the conclusion of inquiry. A judgment is asserted to be true, and that assertion is warranted by the inquiry process.

Propositions, in contrast, are among the tools of inquiry; propositions are affirmed, but they are

not asserted to be true. Propositions are used to advance the inquiry, but it is acknowledged explicitly that those propositions may turn out to be less than useful, perhaps completely irrelevant to the problem situation at hand. Some propositions will likely need revision or replacement with other propositions that do advance the inquiry. This is what it means to say that propositions are instrumental in the process of inquiry. The propositions that are affirmed, provisionally, are the results, the judgments, of prior inquiry processes or of observation of the features of the problem situation. In scientific inquiry, detailed and quantified observations about the problem situation may be set out in propositions. Dewey writes: "Propositions, then, on this view, are what are affirmed but not asserted. They are means, instrumentalities, since they are the operational agencies by which *beliefs* that have adequate grounds for acceptance are reached as the *end* of inquiry" (1941, p. 175).

Scientific knowledge is the product of the operations of experimental inquiry. "The very conception of cognitive meaning, intellectual significance, is that things in their immediacy are subordinated to what they portend and give evidence of. . . the character of intellectual meaning is instrumental" (1925, p. 105).

Meanings and the Objects of Science

Dewey uses the term "objects" in a distinctive way. Objects are "events *with* meanings" (1925, p. 240, emphasis in original). Objects, in this sense, "are precisely what we are aware of" (Ibid) whenever we are conscious of something. We are conscious of thing/events only when the *meanings* of the thing/event, the meanings currently accepted as true meanings, have become doubtful, and one is in the process of revising one's beliefs about those meanings. It is not events themselves that occur in consciousness. It is the *meanings* of events that are in consciousness. Dewey specifies that his thesis is "the common-sense belief that universals, relations, meanings, are of and about existences, not their exhaustive ingredients" (1925, p. 241). It is the human being

that actively seeks for the meanings of events, and, in an attenuated sense, can be said to "construct," i.e., to form, beliefs about meanings. But in no way, except through physical interaction, does the human being "construct" the existences that he or she thinks about. The actual meanings of thing/events are objective; they are determined by the interactivities of the existent thing/event in question with other thing/events (including human thing/events). Because of this, the beliefs that humans might have about the dynamic relations obtaining, or potentially obtaining, among existences, beliefs about the meanings of thing/events, can be false, incorrect, or untrue. "The ownership of meanings or mind thus vests in nature; meanings are meanings *of*. The existence of error is proof, not disproof, of the fact that all meanings intrinsically have reference to natural events. . . . Error involves a possibility of detection and corrections because it refers to things, but the possibility has an eventual, not a backward reference" (1925, p. 219).

Knowledge as Warranted Assertibility, Truth as Correspondence

In 1941, in "*Propositions, Warranted Assertibility, and Truth*," Dewey states his conceptions of knowledge and truth very clearly. Dewey is responding to misinterpretations of his position set out by Bertrand Russell. He begins by stating: "my analysis of "warranted assertibility" is offered as a *definition* of the nature of knowledge in the honorific sense according to which only *true* beliefs are knowledge" (1941, p. 169). For Dewey, the warrant for any assertion made about the world comes from the process of inquiry. Since inquiry is most highly developed in scientific inquiry, the strongest warrants for the judgments about the world result from scientific inquiry. The "warrant" in question is the epistemic right to accept the judgment as true.

There is no guarantee possible, and so no complete certainty, about the truth of the scientific judgment. But a judgment is *well warranted to be true* by the quality of the inquiry process that led to the judgment. Persons asserting that

judgment to be true are well warranted in their assertion. To “know” is to have a body of belief that is well warranted by the inquiry leading to the body of belief. And knowledge in the abstract is, by definition, warranted assertibility, in Dewey’s view. Dewey’s view of the inquiry process requires both thought and activity, which are intimately linked. Dewey states that his position “holds that the presence of an *idea* – defined as a possible significance of an existent something – is required for any assertion entitled to rank as knowledge or as true” (1941, p. 170). The required idea is present in the form of a hypothesis, which is used to direct the existential activities by which the hypothesis is tested.

The question remaining is what is Dewey’s conception of truth? Dewey, again in response to Russell’s misinterpretation of the position of “instrumentalists,” is very clear.

In a footnote, Dewey sets out a categorical statement of his conception of truth: Instrumentalists “do *not* believe the test of truth is coherence; in the operational sense, stated later in this paper, they hold a correspondence view” (1941, p. 172, fn 7; emphasis in original). This key point is often misunderstood in the secondary literature on Dewey’s conception of knowledge. Dewey’s position is that the assertions warranted at the end of inquiry are to be accepted as true, in the correspondence sense of truth. “. . . the pragmatist holds that the relation in question is one of correspondence between existence and thought; but he holds that correspondence instead of being an ultimate and unanalyzable mystery, to be defined by iteration, is precisely a matter of cor-respondence in its plain, familiar sense . . .”. The agreement, or correspondence, between thought and existence is like that of agreement “between purpose, plan, and its own execution, fulfillment; between a map of a course constructed for the sake of guiding behavior and the result attained in acting upon the indications of the map” (1907, p. 84).

How does one test for this correspondence? Dewey holds that there is only one way. “What kind of comparison is possible or desirable then, save to treat the mental layout of the whole situation as a working hypothesis, as a plan of action, and proceed to act upon it, to use it as a director

and controller of one’s divagations. . . one uses the idea – that is to say, the present facts projected into a whole in the light of absent facts – as a guide of action”. If the anticipated interactions do in fact occur, and the new situation is as it was predicted to be, then “one may say, my idea was right, it was in accord with facts; it agrees with reality. That is, acted upon sincerely, it has led to the desired conclusion; it has, through action, worked out the state of things which it contemplated or intended” (1907, p. 84).

The Social Need for Scientific Knowledge

All living organisms, humans no less than others, must act in the context of their environing conditions, to maintain life and to secure a desired quality of life. The interactions of organism-in-environment are determined by the objective nature of reality, the world. Error in belief and in action, a mistaking of the nature of the dynamic interactions of oneself and others in the environment, is eminently possible and is regularly found to occur. In order to act effectively in the world, in the short term and in the long run, the organism that can acquire knowledge of the interactive dynamics constituting nature, can organically embed that knowledge and use it to guide its actions, will be far better off, more successful, in dealing with the problem situations that regularly arise. But, human beings collectively have acquired a great deal of scientific knowledge that is not put into use to guide social action. To teach persons to understand, value, add to, and use scientific knowledge in problem-solving is the proper aim of science education.

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Dewey on Teaching and Teacher Education

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Introduction

This entry describes the relationship between Dewey's thoughts on *teaching* and *teacher education*. Because teachers are committed to the growth and development of learners, a discussion of *learning* must also necessarily be brought into play. This entry therefore describes how Dewey sought to conjoin the topics of learning, teaching, and teacher education under the common heading of the human potential for growth.

The entry starts with a discussion of Dewey's view of teaching and learning, particularly as it relates to the teacher's ability to intelligently direct the stream of unfolding experience of the learner. The entry then extends Dewey's views on teaching through a discussion of his views on initial teacher preparation. In particular, the entry focuses on how Dewey described the preparation needed for initial teacher candidates to be able to awaken and sustain inner attention among learners. In this way, the place of the school curriculum, instructional methods, and classroom management are located within Dewey's thought.

The entry concludes by emphasizing the role of coordination and integration in Dewey's thought.

Dewey on Teaching

For Dewey, all education has as its proper aim the promotion of growth and development. Growth happens through the experiences of the learner. Teaching is the ability to assist learners in organizing, directing, and maximizing the stream of developing life experiences. As Dewey stated, teaching relies upon "the educational significance of social arrangements [as] means used to educate the young" (1916/Dewey 1997a, p. 89).

Dewey's view of teaching and learning are firmly grounded in his naturalism. For Dewey, education-as-growth is continuous across the lifespan and there is no absolute sense in which anyone ever becomes fully educated. Dewey therefore rejected both absolute distinctions between teachers and students and viewing children as lesser adults. As he noted, "a living creature lives as truly and positively at one stage as another, with the same intrinsic fullness and the same absolute claims" (1916/Dewey 1997a, p. 51). The recognition of such "absolute claims" demonstrates the degree to which Dewey respected not only children as learners but also adults as learners in their own right – indeed, Dewey's naturalism committed him to respecting the integrity and sanctity of all people, cultures, and life forms. All are capable of growth. Therefore, the goal of any educational project is "the enterprise of supplying the conditions which insure growth" (1916/Dewey 1997a, p. 51).

Dewey asserted that such growth happens through experiences which are properly educative. If growth is the aim, then experiences are its means, and the criterion by which any experience is judged runs along a continuum that moves from educative to miseducative (1938/Dewey 1997b, p. 25). On the negative side, Dewey noted that some experiences may "engender callousness," "produce lack of sensitivity," or "may increase a person's automatic skill in a particular direction and yet tend to land him in a groove or rut" (1938/Dewey 1997b, pp. 25–26). On the

positive side, due to the plasticity of the living creature, experience can engender newer, richer, more profound future experience (1916/Dewey 1997a, p. 44). An experiential path of growth can be laid out on which the living creature journeys.

In more conventional terms, educative experiences are those that allow the learner to go on learning in the future: to become both more open to the world and more responsible in shaping and directing it. When education is viewed in this way, the job of the teacher is to assist in the process of the learner's growth through the progressive development and expansion of experience. Dewey summarized this task for the teacher when he stated that "the central problem of an education based upon experience is to select the kind of present experiences that live fruitfully and creatively in subsequent experiences" (1938/Dewey 1997b, p. 28).

Dewey's teacher can be characterized as the master of the timely intervention. Dewey was certainly concerned about teachers imposing upon learners, but he was equally concerned about a tendency in progressive educational circles for teachers to make themselves absent.

For Dewey, the only aims worth pursuing were those that grew out of the conditions that learners find themselves in. Aims – or more properly, the act of taking aim – is something that only the individual learner can provide. He or she must use aim to assist "observation, choice, and planning in carrying on activity from moment to moment and hour to hour" (1916/Dewey 1997a, p. 107).

On the other hand, teachers play a vital and essential role in helping learners select, organize, and choose among aspects of the environment that increase and broaden aims. Teachers are a force for suggestion. Their power resides in their ability to suggest tactfully and fruitfully. As Dewey stated, "it thus becomes the office of the educator to select those things within the range of existing experience that have the promise and potentiality of presenting new problems" – new problems that can lead the learner to new ways of looking, new ways of thinking, and new ways of acting (1938/Dewey 1997b, p. 75). "Connectedness in

growth," says Dewey, must be the educator's "constant watchword" (1938/Dewey 1997b, p. 75).

Dewey on Teacher Education

Given this characterization of teaching and learning, what type of professional formation will give teachers the ability to inspire and direct learning? How should the time of initial teacher preparation be spent?

Dewey argued that, "the wise employ of this short time [of initial teacher preparation] is in laying scientific foundations" (1904/1965, p. 316). The goal should be to assist the teacher candidate in becoming a "thoughtful and alert student of education" (1904/1965, p. 320). Initial teacher education seeks to assist teacher candidates in the experimental development of a set of educational principles that will clarify the aims and means of their work.

Dewey argued that all teacher education courses should have a practical component and that the practice had in such courses should be "typical and intensive, rather than extensive and detailed" (1904/1965, p. 315). By "typical and intensive," Dewey meant that practical work should serve a laboratory purpose. It should enliven and awaken teacher candidates to the meaning and vitality of educational principles. Rather than equipping a candidate who is immediately ready to enter a classroom and teach with a great deal of technical proficiency, Dewey aimed to *ultimately* build the technically proficient educator by *first* building knowledge of the method of intelligence.

Dewey was therefore not concerned that teacher candidates quickly achieve technical mastery over all aspects of the profession. His notion of what it means to be ready to teach did not involve immediate displays of technical proficiency. Dewey worried about teacher candidates that "seem to strike twelve at the start" (1904/1965, p. 321), but that did not go on growing over the course of their entire careers.

Dewey thought that teacher candidates need to solve two main problems. On the one hand, they

need to figure out how to teach subject-matter to students; on the other hand, they need to figure out how to manage a classroom. Both of these are important for the success of any teacher. Yet in terms of the education a teacher candidate receives, Dewey thought it important that teacher candidates direct their attention toward the former: “mastery of subject-matter from the standpoint of its educational value and use” (1904/1965, p. 318).

Dewey stated that conformity of outward attention is no mark of learning. Therefore, teacher candidates must concern themselves with a form of inward attention that signals the “giving of the mind without reserve or qualification to the subject at hand” (1904/1965, p. 318). Indeed, the ability to induce, sustain, and recognize such inward attention in the learner is the truest and most genuine mark of the teacher:

To be able to keep track of this mental play, to recognize the signs of its presence or absence, to know how it is initiated and maintained, how to test it by results attained, and to test *apparent* results by it, is the supreme mark and criterion of a teacher. It means insight into soul-action, ability to discriminate the genuine from the sham, and capacity to further one and discourage the other. (1904/1965, pp. 318–319)

Initial teacher preparation has no other purpose than this: the ability to recognize, inspire, and direct mental activity.

For Dewey, knowledge of subject-matter is knowledge of teaching. For subject-matter is what induces and gives meaning to mental activity. There is no method without material nor anything for mind to attend to without subject-matter. Subject-matter is, by definition, organized – it is matter that has been *subjected* to a controlling intellectual principle, a method. This method, the scientific method, is the very workings of the mind itself: “the classifications, interpretations, explanations, and generalizations which make subject-matter a branch of study do not lie externally in facts apart from the mind” (1904/1965, p. 328). Mind, method, and matter in this way are different aspects of a single relationship. It is the teacher’s business to understand and put this insight to work.

Dewey expected from teachers expansive and profound knowledge of subject-matter. Only then would the teacher have the tools to identify the potential and tendency of the intellectual stirrings of learners. Only then would the teacher be able to provide materials and learning conditions that assist learners in developing their knowledge, skill, and character. Only then would the teacher be able to assess the nature of learners’ past educational experiences when contemplating directions for their future growth. “Only a teacher thoroughly trained in the higher levels of intellectual method . . . will be likely, in deed, not in mere word, to respect the mental integrity and force of children” (1904/1965, pp. 328–329).

In this way, the practical work that Dewey expected teacher candidates to engage in was premised upon inquiry into how organized subject-matter (i.e., the curriculum) may result in sustained, organized, and systematic growth among learners. For Dewey, this meant avoiding the sporadic teaching of individual lessons in favor of practice work that resulted in the ability to see how progression and development may instead be promoted.

On the one hand, this practice work might simply involve deep reflection upon the scope and sequence of the school curriculum across multiple years. It is not enough to consider a single lesson or even a single unit in the social studies or in the math curriculum; rather, teacher candidates should think about the possibilities inherent in the curriculum for mental development across several grade levels. “What is needed is the habit of viewing the entire curriculum as a continuous growth, reflecting the growth of mind itself” (1904/1965, p. 332). In this way, subject-matter itself provides rich lessons in learning how to teach.

On the other hand, actual practice teaching before students, in classrooms, is an important part of what Dewey envisioned for the education of teachers. Such teaching – both in early practicum experiences as well as during a phase of traditional student teaching – should itself be intensive and continuous rather than spread out and haphazard. Only in this way, Dewey thought, would teacher candidates “get a body of funded experience” that would allow them to in turn “get a feeling for the movement” of learners and

subject-matter in their joint coordination of mental growth (1904/1965, p. 335). Such practice teaching would also, Dewey thought, help develop the type of technical expertise that all teachers must eventually obtain.

All phases of initial teacher preparation should be sustained by, and fully directed at, the need to awaken the teacher candidate to the realization that what truly matters is “how mind answers to mind” (1904/1965, p. 324). If the early stages of the education of teacher candidates are successful, the student teaching experience should ultimately happen with a minimum of interference and criticism from supervisors. Student teaching under these ideal circumstances, Dewey suggested, might have very modest aims indeed: to find “persons who are unfit for teaching” so that they “may be detected and eliminated more quickly than might otherwise be the case” (1904/1965, p. 336).

Teaching and learning are processes founded upon convergence, concentration, and coordination. Initial teacher preparation works by a proper coordination of theory and practice in the unfolding experiences of the teacher candidate. It seeks to bring practical and theoretical study, of both school subject-matter and the psychology of the learner, into communion. In this way, Dewey claimed, teacher candidates grow in their ability to carry all knowledge back “to its common psychical roots” (1904/1965, p. 329). They can see in the stirrings and graspings of the young child the potential for the highest forms of human achievement:

The subject-matter of science and history and art serves to reveal the real child to us. We do not know the meaning either of his tendencies or of his performances excepting as we take them as germinating seed, or opening bud, of some fruit to be borne . . . The art of Raphael or of Corot is none too much to enable us to value the impulses stirring in the child when he draws and daubs. (1902/2001, pp. 112–113)

Teachers are masters at seeing the present in light of the past and in hope for the future.

Conclusion

Dewey’s work on the nature of teaching and teacher education are vitally relevant to those

engaged in the work of teacher education today, in that they present a profound challenge to much conventional wisdom about how new teachers are best prepared to enter classrooms across the globe.

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Dewey on the Concept of Education as Growth

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Introduction

To be educated, especially in particular ways, such as for a vocation or citizenship, is often seen as the end of schooling, a terminus of classroom learning. Likewise, growth is often seen as having an end, as having some final point of termination, like reaching adulthood, or of achieving some aim, like mastering a skill. Intriguingly, Dewey disrupts these common understandings to suggest that growth itself is an end and education should be understood as growth.

Growth as an End

Most people understand ends to be fixed points that can be reached through an orderly progression with certainty and clarity. They have a

specific mark in mind that they hold as a goal or see as an outcome of a process. For Dewey, however, trajectories tend to be more complicated and precarious. The complexities of life are such that marching toward a specific fixed end can be challenging and even achieving such an end unlikely, especially as one's environment shifts and changes. Moreover, doing so may be undesirable because holding such a fixed end may entail a limited or even a foreclosed vision of the future. As changes occur in the world, Dewey believes people must continually inquire into their shifting circumstances, develop new hypotheses about them, and revise their aims. For Dewey, this "educative process can be identified with growth when that is understood in terms of the active participle, *growing*" (1938, p. 19, emphasis in original).

Dewey believes some people wrongly hold "a false idea of growth or development – that is a movement toward a fixed goal. Growth is regarded as *having* an end, instead of *being* an end" (1916, p. 55, emphasis in original). For example, when we think of children as reaching a final end of growth, a terminus, in adulthood, we place a static end on growth rather than focusing on the process of growing as itself educative. Dewey's notion of growth is not linear, and it lacks a narrowly defined teleology. Growth describes how continuous experiences and reconstructions of them can develop one's physical, intellectual, and moral capacities, actualizing them and helping them inform one another so that they continue in a chain of continuity that enables one to live satisfactorily. For Dewey, "when and *only* when development in a particular line conduces to continuing growth does it answer to the criterion of education as growing" (1938, p. 20, emphasis in original). Education as growth, then, entails an ongoing succession of educative experiences that shape and develop a person, igniting curiosity and inquiry, and carry him over future struggles, leading into new opportunities for reflection and learning. Education as growth cultivates one's capacities to meet new and unpredictable situations.

In chapter four of *Democracy and Education*, Dewey offers his most extended discussion of education as growth. There he claims:

Our net conclusion is that life is development, and that developing, growing, is life. Translated into its educational equivalents, that means (i) that the educational process has no end beyond itself; it is its own end; and that (ii) the educational process is one of continual reorganizing, reconstructing, and transforming. (Dewey 1916, p. 54)

Education, then, is the ongoing reconstruction of experience where we learn by inquiring into our circumstances, coming to understand them better, and employing that understanding to shape our future experiences. This is the process of growth, one to be celebrated in and of itself, not for some exterior or fixed goal.

We grow as learning, inquiry, and reconstruction create opportunities for ongoing development and education. Educative experiences produce growth because they carry people from one situation to the next, expanding their understanding and their connections, opening them up to opportunities. Or, in Dewey's words, they "prepare a person for later experiences of a deeper and more expansive quality" (1938, p. 28). Good and authentic growth, then, is that which provides conditions for ongoing growth, rather than foreclosing opportunities that would enable a person to further flourish. It enables a person to respond flexibly and intelligently to novel future situations so that those situations can be transformed into further educative experiences. Again, in Dewey's own words, "If education is growth, it must progressively realize present possibilities, and thus make individuals better fitted to cope with later requirements. Growth is not something which is completed in odd moments; it is a continuous leading into the future" (1916, p. 60).

This definition of education as growth is admittedly rather cryptic, especially as it appears in one of his most famous accounts: "Since in reality there is nothing to which growth is relative save more growth, there is nothing to which education is subordinate save more education" (Dewey 1916, p. 56). Situated within his rather counterintuitive discussion of ends and the conditions for growth, statements like these may contribute to some of the criticisms that the notion of education as growth has received. Dewey is criticized for not providing specific ends for education or criteria

for assessing growth, which can be malignant – a criticism echoed in the significant work of Richard Hofstadter (1963). He is also criticized for operating under the assumption that growth is ultimately geared toward democratic problem-solving, even though Dewey’s actual depiction of it is open to much broader and conflicting interpretations of growth without normative guidelines as to whether that development might be good (Callan 1982). Such criticisms may reveal a lack of understanding his notion of education as growth or the criteria he provides for determining whether education as growth is effectively occurring. Or such criticisms may be uncovering inconsistencies and problems in Dewey’s account. To better understand how education as growth works and to clarify the foundations related to these criticisms, let us turn to the counterintuitive conditions for growth that Dewey offers.

The Conditions for Education as Growth

Dewey suggests that education as growth is initiated and sustained through immaturity, plasticity, habits, and inquiry. He details the first two primarily in *Democracy and Education* and expands greatly upon the third in *Human Nature and Conduct* and the fourth in *Experience and Education*.

Immaturity

Dewey begins by claiming, “The primary condition of growth is immaturity” (1916, p. 46). Whereas immaturity is commonly understood negatively, as an absence or lack, Dewey surprisingly emphasizes the positive element of immaturity as a capacity for growth. Immaturity entails “the *ability* to develop” and “the *power* to grow” (p. 46–47, emphasis in original). It is immaturity that goads us to come to understand our surroundings and increasingly develop control over them. It is immaturity that supplies the inquisitive drive to explore the world and to cultivate skills for living within it.

Dewey similarly argues that while children are typically thought of as being dependent – another negative connotation – dependence actually

provides the conditions that urge children to develop new abilities. Children constructively build new proficiencies and acquire new knowledge through a process of interdependence, whereby children employ social skills that elicit cooperative help from others despite and, importantly, because of, their physical dependence on adults. Immaturity and dependence force children to engage in interdependent transactions with those around them, initiating learning and ultimately helping them to become better members of a community. In this regard, rather than seeing children as lacking or as “not yet adults,” Dewey locates great potential within their unique position.

Plasticity

Dewey goes on to explain “The specific adaptability of an immature creature for growth constitutes his *plasticity*” (1916, p. 49, emphasis in original). Plasticity enables us to learn from our experiences, change our activities and our environments to meet our needs, and develop habits that allow us to function well. It is plasticity that allows children to adapt to their world and ushers growth from one educative experience to the next. When we adapt to the changing world as we try things out in varied situations, we cultivate a habit of learning – we learn how to learn (p. 50).

Habits

This discussion of learning how to learn leads Dewey into describing another condition of growth: habits. Habits begin as impulses, located in the nexus of immaturity and plasticity in children. Impulses are natural activities that are shaped and collected into habits as children interact with and inquire into their surroundings, including cultural norms that dictate typical and accepted ways of behaving. Habits are dispositions and ways of acting that are performed largely without effort or conscious attention.

Significantly for Dewey, a habit should be understood as a predisposition to act or as sensitivity to ways of being, rather than as merely an inclination to repeat identical acts, as many people more commonly understand habits. Dewey explains:

Any habit marks an inclination—an active preference and choice for the conditions involved in its exercise. A habit does not wait, Micawber-like, for a stimulus to turn up so that it may get busy; it actively seeks for occasions to pass into full operation. (1916, p. 53, emphasis in original)

Habits are active, projecting themselves into the world to pursue desires and to continue the chain of educative experiences. This is partially enabled because habits “do all the perceiving, recognizing, imagining, recalling, judging, conceiving and reasoning that is done” (Dewey 1922, p. 124). Habits are the mechanisms that enable us to inquire into our world and provide the working capacities that help us to know how to act in the world.

Inquiry

Habits and thought are closely related insofar as habits enable us to implement thought – to test it out. In return, reflecting on one’s actions and experiments allows for the development of new and better habits. We employ intelligent reflection and inquiry not only to reconstruct our world and our experiences but also to reconsider and reshape our habits when problematic conditions or novel situations arise. It is the intellectual aspect of habits that gives them meaning and keeps a person elastic and growing. Or, in Dewey’s words:

The habits of mind involved in habits of the eye and hand supply the latter with their significance. Above all, the intellectual element in a habit fixes the relation of the habit to varied and elastic use, and hence to continued growth. (1916, p. 53)

Good habits are intelligent and flexible, enabling us to appropriately respond to our changing world and carrying us over from one experience to the next, thereby enabling growth. By the same token, bad habits are those that become fixed and disconnected from intelligence. They are restrictive, having a hold on us, rather than us on them. Bad habits stop plasticity, disabling the conditions for growth. Dewey explains:

the acquiring of habits is due to an original plasticity of our natures: to our ability to vary responses till we find an appropriate and efficient way of acting. Routine habits, and habits that possess us instead of our possessing them, are habits which put an end to

plasticity. They mark the close of power to vary. (1916, p. 54)

Here Dewey brings together immaturity, plasticity, and habit, which leads into his discussion of inquiry as guiding these three elements in the process of growth.

It is inquiry that helps us understand, control, and reconstruct our environments and our experiences. We grow when we learn from our experiences and cultivate better, more flexible and more intelligent, habits because of them. Forming hypotheses and testing them out are central steps in Dewey’s process of inquiry. When habits themselves are formed tentatively as hypotheses in light of intelligent consideration of the present and informed predictions into an admittedly uncertain future, habits can be flexible agents of change whose form emerges as situations unfold. In this way, habits, facilitated through intelligent inquiry, are projective and sites of agency. They can be changed in ways that develop the person as a part of educative growth while effecting change on the world as well.

The Communal Nature of Growth

Importantly for Dewey, habits, inquiry, and the growth they enable should not be understood merely in terms of individuals. Rather, they are located within communities, the practices of democracy, and collective inquiry. Habits develop as individuals transact with their surroundings, including other people, laws, and traditions. Although each person acquires a unique set of habits and ways of enacting them, our shared experiences and similar transactions with our world lead many people’s habits to be alike. These similar habits may then become customs because they are typical ways of behaving within a social group and often they come to be seen as good or appropriate ways to act, which we intentionally pass on to children. Habits are most overtly cultivated in schools, where children watch, imitate, and interact with others as they learn through both direct and indirect teaching. Teachers there oversee the inquiry process, helping children to best use the relationship between

thought and habit to improve themselves and to learn. Reflecting upon habits and inquiring into surroundings often entail interacting with others to test out different ways of acting in order to determine which secure satisfactory living for oneself and flourishing for one's community. One element of growth is that of becoming part of the human tradition that is continually being reshaped anew. The growth of individuals is sought alongside growth of the community.

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Dewey on Thinking in Education

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Introduction

The concept of thinking plays an important role throughout Dewey's work, yet his educational theory is commonly associated with the idea of "doing." This association comes about for at least two reasons. For one, Dewey is part of the philosophical tradition of pragmatism, a term derived from the Greek root *pragma* (πράγμα), which

refers to the "deed." For another, Dewey has become connected to child-centered notions of education, which, in their more radical iterations, equate learning with activity and thus on the surface can appear to be aligned with his notion of "learning by doing." However, too much emphasis on these ideas gives us a one-sided picture of Dewey's understanding of education; it causes readers to overlook the significance of his concept of thinking. For Dewey, thinking is both the aim and the condition for the possibility of education. But, what is thinking? This entry discusses Dewey's concept of thinking in its relation to three other concepts: "experience," "learning," and "teaching."

Thinking and Experience

Dewey's central statement on the connection between "thinking and experience" is found in his chapter by the same name in *Democracy and Education*. A claim that permeates Dewey's work is that all experience involves both "doing" and "undergoing." "Doing" expresses the active side of our experience, in which "we act upon something" (1916/2008, p. 147). Undergoing expresses the passive side of experience, in which we "undergo the consequences of our actions" (1916/2008, p. 147). But, as Dewey notes, we do not always make connections between these two sides of experience. That is a problem, because without making this connection, we limit the extent to which we can learn from experience. In order to learn from experience, thinking has to come into play. Thinking is what connects what we do with what happens to us in return; by making this connection, thinking adds value to the experience (1916/2008, pp. 147, 152).

Dewey differentiates between two types of experience, "trial and error" and "reflective experience." Both involve thinking, but to differing degrees (1916/2008, pp. 147 ff.). In trial and error forms of experience, we try something and on the basis of this trial, we learn whether or not we were successful in meeting our aims; we continue trying until we meet our aims. Dewey views this method of experience as limited, because it primarily helps us learn *that* we failed to meet a particular aim, but it does not fully help us to learn *why* we failed. The thinking involved in trial and

error forms of experience is minimal; it helps us grasp that there is a connection between what we did in the world (doing) and what happened in consequence (the perceptible response we receive from the world). However, trial and error thinking processes do not extend to inquiring further into the nature of this connection between doing and undergoing.

Thinking comes into play in experience in a more extensive sense when we seek out the reasons for the connections between what we do and what we undergo. When thinking is incorporated into our experience in this way, our experience becomes what Dewey calls “reflective.” The method of reflective experience, in contrast to the method of trial and error, involves trying to understand how activity and consequence are connected, that is, how what one does is connected to the world in which one is acting. Reflection, on Dewey’s account, is a particular type of thinking. All thinking begins in situations which are “incomplete” (1916/2008, p. 153). The situation is incomplete because we do not know how best to move forward; we have reached a limit to our knowledge and ability, and thus we find ourselves in a state of “doubt,” “confusion,” or “perplexity” (1916/2008, p. 157). For Dewey, “reflection” is an inquisitive form of thinking that holds us in “suspense” in order to analyze the limits of our given knowledge and ability. To reflect is to ask ourselves why we are perplexed or in doubt: “The perplexities of the situation suggest certain ways out. We try these ways and either push our way out, in which case we know we have found what we are looking for, or the situation gets darker and more confused, in which case we know we are still ignorant” (1916/2008, p. 155f.; see English 2013).

Dewey contends that by cultivating this phase of thought – analyzing our given perplexity or difficulty – thinking itself becomes an *experience* (1916/2008, p. 152 and p. 159ff.). Dewey proposes a general structure of reflective experience that follows that experimental method of science (1916/2008; see also 1933/2008; and, 1938a/2008). A reflective experience begins with a basic form of experience, in which we are actively trying something in the world and encounter a

difficulty or stopping point in our activity. We then consider all the “data” or resources and knowledge at hand that can help us deal with the difficulty. Following this, we formulate hypotheses and develop new “ideas” that may help explain what has happened. We can then formulate a plan of action and test our hypothesis, either imaginatively in thought, or in action, to verify its validity.

Thinking that follows this general structure is itself “an experience” because we learn something new. In such processes of thinking we are making a “back and forth” motion, looking “back” or reflecting on what we have done and what we know, and looking “forward” to what might be true, that is, to valid ideas that can help us in future attempts at interacting with the world. Thinking is thus what Dewey calls a “method,” from the Greek μέθοδος, meaning, “way of proceeding.” While all thinking involves having certain aims or ends in mind when assessing new situations, reflective experiences enrich our ability to identify what is significant in new situations so that we can either find the right means to meet our established aims, or potentially decide that our aims need to be modified. Thinking processes that follow the method of reflective experience allow us to gain foresight, such that we gain the ability to make judgments about what is possible or necessary to do in a particular situation. Thinking is involved in both determining the means to meet previously established aims and in creating new aims; it allows us to act with “an end in view” (DE, 152, see also pp. 107–117). The more foresight we have, the better we can formulate our aims to meet the expectations of the situation. For Dewey, thinking “*is* the method of intelligent learning” (1916/2008, p. 159); it instructs us.

Thinking and Learning

For Dewey, how human beings learn is based in how they experience the world, and our experience of the world is based on a reciprocal relationship between mind and body. Dewey’s discussion of the connection between thinking and experience is part of his general epistemology that shifts focus from knowledge toward inquiry, or “coming to know,” which he equates with the

process of learning (see e.g., 1938a/2008). Dewey's view of reflective experience, which he also calls "reflective activity" (1933/2008), inquiry (1938a/2008) and "the experimental method of intelligence" (Dewey and Childs, 1933/2008), connects his work to that of other pragmatists. A central tenant of pragmatism is that it is important not only to find out that we are in doubt, but to inquire into why we are in doubt. For example, well-known pragmatists such as, Charles Sanders Peirce, emphasized the importance of "real and living doubt," as a starting point for inquiry. Real and living doubt, as opposed to Cartesian doubt, arises from our interactions within the world around us (Peirce 1994, §3, 374 and 375). William James developed the concept of "leading ideas" which are ideas that guide us out of moments of doubt and difficulty (James 1907/2008, p. 102). Also, George Herbert Mead, discusses what he terms "problems for thought" as starting points for inquiry and underscored the social nature of such problems. As human beings we have shared experiences, and thus we may develop similar problems that are in need of solutions that can help us as a group, not just as individuals (Mead 1964, p. 341). In the pragmatist tradition, doubt, difficulty, and the like are signs that we have arrived at the limits of our existing knowledge and ability, and in order to learn, we have to understand these limits (English 2013).

Dewey's notion of "learning by doing" understood in the context of pragmatism takes on new meaning. "Doing" becomes the starting point for learning and therefore the starting point for thinking, when thinking is considered an experience. But "doing" alone is not an experience according to Dewey, and just the same it does not comprise the whole of learning. By doing something, we can find out what does not meet our expectations. But, unless we actively think about why the reaction from an object or another person did not meet our expectations, we do not transform the activity into a learning process. Dewey makes this point on several different occasions using a simple example. He writes, if a child touches a hot object, and does not connect what he did with the resulting pain of a burn, then he did not learn (e.g., 1916/2008, pp. 83, 146). Learning by

doing thus describes neither the aim of learning nor its general method, but rather a starting point for those types of learning processes that can initiate reflective experiences (English 2013).

A further significant concept connected to Dewey's learning theory is that of "plasticity" (1916/2008, p. 49ff.), which he also calls "educability" (1916/2008, p. 81). The idea that human beings are "educable" connects Dewey's thinking to a long tradition of educational philosophy, e.g., Rousseau discusses *perfectibilité* in *Emile* (1762/1979) and Herbart discusses *Bildsamkeit* [educability] in his *Allgemeine Pädagogik* (1806/1887). These terms refer to the fact that human beings are capable of learning. Dewey connects human plasticity to the idea of "growth." Growth for Dewey is ateleological; it has no predetermined end (1916/2008). Plasticity or educability is possible on both an individual and social level. Accordingly, each human being can change and grow as an individual, and groups of people can transform their ideas and forms of interaction in ways which better serve the group. For Dewey, a central characteristic of democratic societies is that they offer human beings this possibility for individual, and social, change and growth.

Thinking and Teaching

Thinking and teaching are connected in important ways for Dewey, two of which I will discuss here. First, Dewey contends that the task of teaching and formal education on the whole is to initiate processes of thinking in learners: "The sole direct path to enduring improvement in the methods of instruction and learning consists in centering upon the conditions which exact, promote and test thinking" (1916/2008, p. 159). Dewey is known to be critical of transmission style methods of instruction. He believes these do not initiate reflective thinking, rather overload the minds of learners with facts to be memorized and this dulls the mind (e.g., 1916/2008, p. 159). On such models of teaching, learners are viewed as passive recipients of prepackaged knowledge and the classroom is made into a space for such passive reception, which is seen for example, when learners are placed in rows of desks designed to focus their attention on listening to the teacher

(see e.g., 1916/2008 and 1899/2008). Dewey contends that this model of teaching largely results from educational theorists' and psychologists' problematic attempts to translate John Locke's theory of the mind as a blank slate (*tabula rasa*) into educational practice.

Dewey describes the teacher's responsibility in the classroom as one of creating opportunities for "educative experiences," which he contrasts with "miseducative experiences" (1938b/2008). Miseducative experiences are those types of experiences that have the effect of "arresting or distorting" a person's chance at further growth. Educative experiences support one's chances for further growth. These follow two principles: continuity (experiential continuum) and interaction (1938b/2008, pp. 10, 17). To have continuity in our experience means that a person has reflectively examined the connections between what one did and what happened in consequence, in order to expand one's framework of anticipations. Creating such a continuum presupposes that one has interacted with one's environment and located something that was discontinuous with one's expectations (English 2013, pp. 93ff.).

Aiming to avoid miseducative experiences and help create educative ones does not entail that the teacher make everything easier for the child. Rather, as Dewey writes, the "art of instruction" is to find the appropriate challenges for learners that initiate reflective thinking and learning processes, that is, to neither over challenge or under challenge learners (1916/2008, p. 164). Dewey also emphasizes that learners must engage with problems they find within their own process of reflective inquiry, which he calls "genuine problems," in contrast to prepackaged problems handed to them by the teacher. Genuine problems engender learners' thinking processes, in which they have the opportunity to come to analyze their difficulties and learn to find solutions to these. Teaching does not become easier on this model. Rather, Dewey seeks to make clear that teaching in this way is more difficult than teaching to a script, because the teacher cannot always know in advance what kinds of questions, assignments or activities will properly challenge the learners; many of the learners' needs and capacities become known to

the teacher within the moments of interaction and the teacher has to respond to these needs and capacities. In this way, on Dewey's model, the learner co-constructs the situations of education. For these reasons, Dewey writes "the teacher becomes a learner, and the learner, without knowing it, a teacher" (1916/2008, p. 167).

This brings us to the second important connection in Dewey's work between thinking and teaching. Thinking is involved in teaching during the process of designing the lesson plan and developing possible aims for the learners to meet, but also during the teacher-learner interactions which require the teacher to reflectively shift the aims of the lesson, and thus the challenges and questions designed for the learners, in the moment that learners' needs becomes apparent. The teacher has to not only properly plan for learning but also engage with learners in ways that require the teacher's own thoughtful reflection on the learning situations that come about. This notion of teaching as involving reflective thinking that is guided by principles of teaching practice connects to Aristotle's (2000) notion of *phronesis*, that is, the art of making wise decisions in-the-moment, and to the notion of "pedagogical tact" found in the work of Herbart (1806/1887). The idea that teaching is a profession that demands thoughtful interactions and decision-making guided by principles, as discussed in Dewey's work, has influenced contemporary notions of teaching as a reflective practice (e.g., Schön 2005).

Thinking and Education

Dewey's notion of education takes up the ideas of thinking, experience, and learning discussed above. His definition of education contrasts with what he considers the standard or common sense notion of education as transmission of knowledge. On his view, education means the "reconstruction and reorganization of experience," which both "adds meaning" to our present experience and "increases" our ability to direct future experiences, that is, to make choices about how we want to proceed in subsequent actions, which includes choices in the moral realm concerning how we treat others (1916/2008, p. 82, see also 1938b/2008). Meaning is added to our experience when we genuinely seek to take in

and understand the ways our environment (i.e., objects and other people around us) has affected us. In *Art as Experience*, Dewey emphasizes, the reconstruction of our experiences in this way can be “painful”; it involves changes made in us and in the world around us (1934/2008, p. 47; see also, Dewey 1938b/2008, p. 18).

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Dewey, John (1859–1952)

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John Dewey (1859–1952) was a pragmatic philosopher, psychologist, and educator commonly regarded as the founder of the progressive education movement. Dewey was born in Burlington, Vermont, on October 20, 1859. His father was a grocer and Civil War Veteran, his mother a strong-willed evangelical Congregationalist noted for her work with the city's poor. John was a shy and self-conscious boy, and as a man, he never entirely lost these qualities. In 1875, he enrolled in the University of Vermont where he took his BA degree. Although his interest in philosophy emerged as an undergraduate, he was uncertain about his future. He taught high school for 2 years in Oil City, Pennsylvania, and then 1 more year back in his hometown of Burlington where he arranged for private tutorials in philosophy with his former teacher H. A. P. Torrey.

Doubtful of his own ability, Dewey sent two essays to W. T. Harris, editor of the *Journal of Speculative Philosophy*, asking if they showed any talent. Encouraged by Harris's acceptance of these papers, Dewey applied to the graduate program in philosophy at the newly established and innovative Johns Hopkins University. His acceptance did not include a fellowship, so he had to borrow \$500 from an aunt to pay tuition.

At the time, the Johns Hopkins philosophy department was not highly regarded. Three young lecturers carried out the teaching duties. The first was G. Stanley Hall, who became a distinguished child psychologist. The second

was Charles Sanders Peirce, the brilliant, if eccentric, originator of philosophical pragmatism. The third was George Sylvester Morris, a Hegelian. Dewey did not seem particularly interested in the work of Peirce, and the psychology of Hall did not greatly attract him at the time. His passionate desire for organic unity led him to study with Morris, and he completed a dissertation on Kantian psychology under Morris's direction.

Eventually Hall received the only available professorship in philosophy, so Morris left for a position in the philosophy department at the University of Michigan. After several difficult months of unemployment, Dewey joined his mentor in 1884 at Michigan as an instructor. He spent the next decade there, except for 1 year at the University of Minnesota. During these years, Dewey wrote, although with decaying conviction, in the Hegelian tradition of idealism as he found it expressed by British Idealists such as Thomas Hill Green.

At Michigan, Dewey was active in the Student Christian Association and was a member of the First Congregational Church where he taught Bible classes. Dewey's interests in social, political, and economic issues grew increasingly radical as he continued to struggle with issues of unity and religion. He also formed a close personal friendship with the young sociologist George Herbert Mead after Dewey hired him in 1891. Collaborating with Mead further piqued Dewey's interest in the social nature of the mind and the self. In his eulogy for Mead decades later, Dewey would call their friendship "one of the most precious possessions of my life" (LW 6, p. 22) (see Dewey date for abbreviations EW, MW and LW). He married the self-reliant and politically progressive Alice Chipman in 1886. She seems to have awakened Dewey's deeply ingrained sense of social justice and encouraged his entrance into the world of public affairs. Many years later Dewey would say, "the forces that have influenced me have come from persons and from situations more than from books" (LW 5, p. 155). He even agreed to edit a weekly magazine with a socialist orientation called *Thought News*, though it never reached publication. During this time, Dewey's interest in education found stimulation through his membership on a committee that evaluated the State's high schools.

In 1894, Dewey moved to the University of Chicago to head the department of philosophy, psychology, and pedagogy. Mead joined him shortly afterward. Significantly, Dewey did not join a church in Chicago. It was at this time that Dewey began to consider the philosophy of education in a serious and systematic way. In 1896, he founded the University Laboratory School now better known as the "Dewey School." The latter title is unfortunate given all of those that were influential in contributing not only to the running of the school but the ideas developed there. Foremost among these were Ella Flagg Young, the first woman president of the National Education Association. Dewey freely acknowledged her influence on his educational thinking, especially "the translation of philosophic conceptions into their empirical equivalents." The Laboratory School was not a model institution; rather, it truly lived up to its name. It was a place for educational experiments in the genuine etymological sense of experiment, that is, to make a trial of something. Theories and practices were developed, tested, criticized, refined, and tried again. Experimentalism became increasingly important as Dewey's philosophy matured. For him, not only were these experiments falsifiable, but in a contingent evolving world, their generalizability was always subject to revision. There is no end of inquiry for Dewey; nonetheless, he believed it the best way to render human experience intelligent.

The Laboratory School was not the only site for educational research in Chicago at that time. Jane Addams and her work at Hull House, for which she eventually received the Nobel Prize, greatly influenced Dewey. Rosalind Rosenberg writes, "for Dewey, Hull House was a laboratory and an example of what he was trying to accomplish in education" (1982, p. 34). Dewey visited Hull House even before moving to Chicago. Upon his arrival there, Dewey actively participated in the life of Hull House. There he met some of the most influential early feminists whose involvement in the political issues of the day caused by massive immigration, the social and economic effects of urbanization, and rapid technological advance exercised considerable influence. He

also mixed with workers, trade unionists, and political radicals. Some of his most influential educational works emerged out of these laboratories including “My Pedagogic Creed” (EW 5, pp. 84–95), *The School and Society* (MW 1, pp. 1–109), and *The Child and the Curriculum* (MW, pp. 271–291). These works not only set out Dewey’s practical pedagogy, but they also outlined the psychological and philosophical principles upon which it relied. These principles devolved from the trial-and-error experiments that occurred within and without the walls of the Laboratory School.

Dewey left Chicago for Columbia in 1904 because of a controversy over the administration of the Laboratory School. By then, he was a nationally prominent philosopher and educator. *The Journal of Philosophy*, then newly founded at Columbia by F. J. E. Woodbridge, soon became a frequent forum for the discussion of Dewey’s ideas. Teachers College, Columbia, was a magnet for educators around the world. Dewey’s affiliation with this institution contributed to his continuing interest in educational issues and helped assure the dissemination of his theories throughout the world. *Democracy and Education* appeared in 1916 and quickly became a classic work in the philosophy of education.

Dewey never cared for rote memorization of facts, formulas, or mere job training. He did not, however, think educators should ignore issues of social control and classroom discipline or the control implicitly contained in the academic disciplines and skilled practices. He recognized that freedom implies both negative freedom, or freedom from constraint, as well as positive freedom, or freedom for something, some value, some goal. Freedom for requires personal discipline. His 1938 *Experience and Education* was written to correct the excesses of those progressive educators who seemed to think “almost any kind of spontaneous activity inevitably secures the desired or desirable training of mental power” (LW 8, p. 153).

Ensnared in the journalistic capital of the nation, Dewey began to write for influential popular magazines such as the *New Republic* and *The Nation*. Constantly before the public eye for

decades, Dewey was the most public university-based philosopher of the twentieth century. This uncloistered scholarship is consistent with both his personal commitments and his educational philosophy.

Dewey soon gained an international reputation. In the years 1919 to 1921, he lectured in Japan and China. His reception in China was stunning; having survived Maoist communism, his educational theories remain influential there today. He also visited schools, carried out educational studies, or made educational reports in Turkey, Mexico, South Africa, and Russia. In 1937 at the age of 78, Dewey presided over a commission in Mexico that found Leon Trotsky “not guilty” of the crimes alleged by Stalin in the Moscow trials. Dewey voted several times for the Socialist party in the 1930s. Nonetheless, he clearly recognized that orthodox communism as practiced in the Soviet Union was inconsistent with his commitment to fully participatory democracy. For him, the dictatorship of the proletariat was simply dictatorship. Dewey officially retired in 1930, although he continued as professor emeritus until 1939; thereafter, he remained amazingly active until his death in his New York home on June 1, 1952.

Dewey’s philosophy of education is extraordinarily comprehensive. In *Democracy and Education*, Dewey wrote,

If we are willing to conceive education as the process of forming fundamental disposition, intellectual and emotional, toward nature and fellow-men, philosophy may even be defined as the general theory of education. Unless a philosophy is to remain symbolic—or verbal—or a sentimental indulgence for a few, or else mere arbitrary dogma, its auditing of past experience and its program of values must take effect in conduct (MW 9, p. 338).

At first, this may seem nonsense. How can the general theory of education possibly encompass the entirety of philosophy? Dewey’s answer would go something like the following. Societies reproduce themselves in only two ways, biologically and culturally. Education is the site of cultural reproduction. One’s general theory of education is her theory of what is culturally valuable enough in thought, feeling, and action as to

deserve transmission to the next generation. What Dewey offers is philosophy as education.

In Dewey's philosophy, loving and creating surpass mere knowing. "Philosophy" means "love of wisdom"; it derives from the Greek *philein* (to love) and *sophia* (wisdom). Dewey insisted that wisdom is not "systematic and proved knowledge of fact and truth, but a conviction about moral values . . . [It] refers not to the constitution of things already in existence . . . but to a desired future which our desires, when translated into articulate conviction, may help bring into existence" (MW 11, p. 44). It is our fundamental disposition, intellectual and emotional, that, through action, brings into existence future values. That is why philosophy in its etymological sense is the general theory of education.

Dewey is a philosopher of reconstruction who reconstructed his own thinking several times in the course of his life. Dewey would want his readers to approach his philosophy with the same critical and creative attitude. Rather than attempting to state exactly what that philosophy is, and how the orthodox should follow it, it is better to introduce some of the central themes of Dewey's philosophy. This approach allows the reader to decide how to construct, or better still, reconstruct Dewey's educational philosophy into an edifice that satisfies the needs of the reader's time and place.

Dewey was a very private man; however much he may have explored what was surely a spacious psychological interior, he shared little of it with others. One of the few places Dewey did discuss some of the personal as well as intellectual influences on his philosophy was in the essay "From Absolutism to Experimentalism" (LW 5, pp. 147–160). We will draw on this essay to help us trace the influences on Dewey's development. One of the earliest influences was that of T. H. Huxley who Dewey read during his undergraduate days at the University of Vermont. Huxley was Dewey's introduction to Darwinian thinking. Dewey remembered deriving "a sense of interdependence and interrelated unity that gave form to intellectual stirring that had been previously inchoate" (p. 147). Dewey dated the awakening of a distinctive philosophical interest

from this time. The theme of dynamic, open, evolving unity, ranging from the unity of the organism to the unity of a work of art, remained a guiding principle of his philosophy as education. In some important sense, Dewey was an organic holist from the beginning. The influence of Darwin eventually led Dewey to embrace an experimental naturalism wherein human nature is perceived as a part of nature. Dewey's antidualism went very deep.

Darwinian thinking greatly influenced Dewey's philosophy. It was where he first acquired the notion that a human being or community is like a highly complex natural organism that must function within its environment. Successful functioning requires the organism to adapt itself either passively to an existing environment to meet its needs and desires or actively to transform the environment. Indeed, Dewey thought, "The entire process of education may properly be regarded as a process of securing the conditions that make for the most complete and effective adaptation of individuals to their physical and moral environment" (see MW 6, pp. 364–365). In an ever-evolving universe, education is an endless experiment wherein educators aid students in creating ways of actively transforming themselves to secure the most complete and effective adaptation possible. There are no fixed and final laws of education; things are different in different nations and localities or the same place at different times. An educational generalization that holds in one place or for one group of people at one time may not hold for another at another place or another time.

Dewey explicitly rejected "Social Darwinism" with its self-serving and antidemocratic rhetoric about the survival of the fittest. The question is always, fit for what? Dewey learned from Huxley that even laissez-faire economists must weed their garden if they want lovely flowers. Reflective creatures such as we can come to know the environmental contingencies that determine conduct. Through creative inquiry, we can transform the world according to our desires. We can create a world where everyone is fit to survive and thrive, not just those who excel at crude capitalism. Human beings often determine the conditions of

selection, and there need not be any single scale of success.

The community needs individuals to perform a large array of vital functions if it is to thrive. That a given community elects to reward only a small number of those functions, say, entrepreneurial success, is a condemnation of that society. As a neo-Darwinian, Dewey knows the key to survival is diversity, not homogeneity; he knows the racist is simply scientifically wrong. Dewey acknowledged individual differences and inequality in the physical and cognitive performance of various tasks, but a democratic community is primarily concerned with moral equality. Dewey remarks, “moral equality means incommensurability, the inapplicability of common and quantitative standards” (MW 13, p. 299). For Dewey, every individual has a unique potential, regardless of any given physical or psychological inequality. The goal of education is to aid every individual to achieve their unique potential that they may make their unique contribution to society. The result is an aristocracy of everyone:

Democracy in this sense denotes, one may say, aristocracy carried to its limit. It is a claim that every human being as an individual may be the best for some particular purpose and hence the most fitted to rule, to lead, in that specific respect. The habit of fixed and numerically limited classifications is the enemy alike of true aristocracy and true democracy (MW 13, pp. 297–298).

The only way Social Darwinism can gain a foothold is by convincing the community that there are only a very few hierarchies. Social Darwinism has remained influential in the political lives of almost all capitalistic nations. It fails to understand the community as a functionally complex organism in a complex, diverse, and ever-changing environment.

Many overlook the effect of the Romantic poets on Dewey; that is a mistake (see Goodman 1990). In “From Absolutism to Experimentalism,” Dewey recalled that the University of Vermont prided itself on its philosophical tradition, especially that of “the speculative and dubiously orthodox seas of German thinking—that of Kant, Schelling, and Hegel,” though the venture “was largely by way of [Samuel Taylor] Coleridge”

(LW 5, pp. 147). In another reflection on philosophy at the University of Vermont, Dewey notes, “Coleridge in common with the German school which he represented conceived social institutions as essentially educative in nature and function” (LW 5, p. 190). A nation’s schools were, for Dewey, the most obviously important of the educative institutions. Broadly speaking, he embraced Hegel’s thesis of the primacy of *Sittlichkeit* (etymologically related to the German *Sitten*, or custom), the idea that the practices and institutions of the community express the most important norms central to the construction of its members’ identity, over Kant’s *Moralität* (related to the Latin *mores*, or general moral principles). *Sittlichkeit* revolves around our moral obligations to the healthy functioning of a community of which we are a part. On the other hand, in *Moralität* we have an abstract, principled obligation to actualize something that ought to exist not because of participation in a community but because of our individual, fully decontextualized, and rational will. Dewey, though, was wary of too great an identification between a culture’s social institutions and the State. He rejects Hegel’s identification of the community and the State along with the idea that the central role of the community is to express the Idea of Spirit as a manifestation of absolute rational necessity connecting humankind to the world. Dewey entirely naturalizes Hegel, but it is an emergent naturalism and not a reductive materialism. He thought the “subordination of the state to the community” essential in a democracy (p. 193).

Dewey gratefully acknowledges the influence of George Sylvester Morris and the British Hegelians. Dewey never cared much for Kant, his dualisms, or his devotion to the a priori. Dewey thought it important that Morris “came to Kant through Hegel instead of to Hegel by way of Kant” (LW 5, p. 152). The appeal of Hegelianism, for Dewey, lay in its demand for unity. In spite of the artificiality of Hegel’s dialectic Dewey thought, “Hegel’s synthesis of subject and object, matter and spirit, the divine and the human, was, however, no mere intellectual formula; it operated as an immense release, a liberation” (LW 5, p. 153).

Dewey makes much of the fact that Morris “used to make merry over those who thought the existence of this world and of matter were things to be proved by philosophy. To him the only philosophical question was as to the meaning of this existence” (LW 5, p. 152). This wry observation holds as well for Dewey himself. In a certain sense, Dewey was a naïve realist who thought we cannot fail to experience reality, if we are experiencing at all. Where we could go wrong is in our interpretations about its meaning, or our inferences regarding the connections among our experiences of reality. From the very real experience of flying by flapping our arms in a dream, we must not foolishly infer that we can do the same in other situations.

In “From Absolutism to Experimentalism,” Dewey identified “four points that seem to stand out” in his “intellectual development” (p. 156). The first one he mentions is “the importance that the practice and theory of education have had for me” (p. 156). Education holds a central and synthetic place in Dewey’s philosophy. According to him, “This interest fused with and brought together what might otherwise have been separate interests—that in psychology and that in social institutions and social life” (p. 156). Dewey steadfastly asserts his philosophy as education by proclaiming that “philosophizing should focus about education as the supreme human interest in which, moreover, other problems, cosmological, moral, logical, come to a head” (p. 156). Let us examine the fusion of psychology and social life here while taking up some of the many other interests later.

Early in his career, Dewey articulated what he calls “The ethical postulate.” It reads,

In the realization of individuality there is found also the needed realization of some community of persons of which the individual is a member; and, conversely, the agent who duly satisfies the community in which he shares, by the same conduct satisfies himself. (EW 3, p. 322)

Note this is a postulate. It is not a postulate in the sense of a taken-for-granted truth as the basis for reasoning but as a condition necessary for further operations and requiring further experimental inquiry to determine its consequences. It is a contingent and falsifiable statement that

Dewey thought well warranted throughout his career. It is a statement of his reconstructed understanding of Hegel’s *Sittlichkeit*. Dewey thought that the best kind of community for social self-realization was a participatory democracy, which we will take up later. Here, our task is to connect this early statement about social life with Dewey’s later psychology.

For Dewey, to have a mind is to participate in the sociolinguistic practices and institutions of the community that express the most important norms, ideas, and actions central to the construction of a mind. Language is crucial to Dewey’s naturalized account of the emergence of mind: “Through speech a person dramatically identifies himself with potential acts and deeds; he plays many roles, not in successive stages of life but in a contemporaneously enacted drama. Thus mind emerges” (LW 1, p. 135). One acquires a mind by entering the social drama of society, recognizing the roles others play, and playing roles others can recognize. Dewey makes a distinction between “individual minds” and “just individuals with minds” (p. 169). The latter are simply docile and conforming reproductions of the existing social order. Because of conformity to existing social institutions, they have failed to recognize their unique individual potential. Hence, they are unable to make their unique contribution to the realization of some community as indicated by the ethical postulate.

Dewey, as we have seen, is concerned with both negative and positive freedom in the relation between the individual and the community. Educators are responsible for disciplining the individual to understand and appreciate the existing norms and practices of a culture. However, they should do so in such a way as to realize unique individual potential. This implies educating the individual’s creative and artistic ability as well as their ability to engage in critical inquiry and, if necessary, carry out the reconstruction of the existing social order to evolve a better society in the future.

The second influence on his intellectual development that Dewey acknowledges is his concern over “the intellectual scandal of dualism in logical standpoint and method between something called

‘science’ on the one hand and something called ‘morals’ on the other” (LW 5, p. 156). This concern led to his elaborating a position he called “instrumentalism.” Educators usually acquire their familiarity with Dewey’s instrumentalism from his *How We Think* (MW 6, pp. 177–356); revised version (LW 5, pp. 105–352), although a far more complete and detailed account is offered in *Logic: The Theory of Inquiry*. That Dewey’s *How We Think* does not provide his entire theory of inquiry is understandable since he wrote both versions specifically with the needs of educators in mind (see LW 12, p. 3).

The first version acknowledges, “My fundamental indebtedness is to my wife, by whom the ideas of this book were inspired, and through whose work in connection with the Laboratory School, existing in Chicago between 1896 and 1903, the ideas attained such concreteness as comes from embodiment and testing in practice . . . [A]nd to Mrs. Ella Flagg Young, then a colleague in the University, and now Superintendent of the Schools of Chicago” (MW 6, p. 179). This acknowledgment underscores the fact that the Laboratory School really was a site of practical experimentation carried out in collaboration with other researchers with whom Dewey exchanged ideas.

In *How We Think*, Dewey presents a version of his logic, or theory of inquiry, for educators. Dewey did not separate thinking and feeling from acting. In *How We Think*, Dewey presents a five-step analysis of effective inquiry.

1. The first step involves the occurrence of a problem. Like other pragmatists, Dewey thought all inquiry began with a genuine doubt. Peirce showed that Cartesian doubt was insincere; we cannot place ourselves in doubt at will, we are thrust into doubt when our habitual ways of acting fail us in some situation. The initiation of inquiry occurs when we feel a disruption in activity and do not know how to go on. Actually, Dewey is quite clear that the “unsettled or indeterminate situation might have been called a problematic situation. This name would have been, however, proleptic and anticipatory” (LW 12,
2. Next comes the specification of the problem. Dewey remarks, “It is a familiar and significant saying that a problem well put is half-solved. To find out what the problem and problems are which a problematic situation presents to be inquired into, is to be well along in inquiry” (LW 12, 112). To achieve this, data is selected (it is never “given,” for Dewey), structured, its conditions specified, operations carried out, and consequences noted. In most cases there are no rules governing the selection of data or the determination of conditions and consequences. This does not mean that students cannot refine their selectivity or sharpen their intuitions through reflective practice. Among the good habits of inquiry that Dewey thought we could teach, or at least reinforce, are curiosity, orderliness, alertness, and flexibility.
3. The third step involves introducing a supposition, a hypothesis, or a suggestion that, if correct, would solve the problem. The construction of hypotheses involves the creative use of imagination to develop possible solutions. It also requires careful analysis of data. Further, the hypothesis must be testable. Formulating a hypothesis is not an entirely rule-governed activity, but it does require self-control, skill, and precision. Students must learn to distinguish between carefully constructed hypothesis and wild guessing based on uncontrolled emotions, whimsical imagination, and wishful thinking.

p. 111). Elsewhere, in “Qualitative Thought,” the most crucial single essay for understanding Dewey’s aesthetics, he observes that “intuition precedes conception and goes deeper” (LW 5, p. 249). Earlier, in “Affective Thought,” Dewey wrote that “reasoning is a phase of the generic function of bringing about a new relationship between organisms and the conditions of life, and like other phases of the function is controlled by need, desire and progressive satisfaction” (p. 106). For Dewey, reason, or better still the “general method of intelligence,” was practical reasoning, and practical reasoning is always reasoning for some value, some desired object, some “end-in-view” that arises in some specific context.

4. Fourth, the hypothesis requires elaboration as to possible consequences. It must be compared to other hypotheses to determine its relative value among them. Inferences and implications need drawing out. Is the data quantifiable? If so, how? Does quantification help or hinder? Measurement and quantification is never an end in itself, only a means to solving the problem. Inquirers should ask if qualitative techniques might work better. Is it possible to generalize the hypothesis? All this calls for finesse as much as technique.
5. Having elaborated the hypothesis by a course of reasoning it is time to test it experimentally. The inquirer must carry out operations that establish conditions in accordance with the dictates of the hypothesis to see if the idea actually works out and the consequences intended occur. If they do, then there is warrant for believing that the idea or course of action is true, or as Dewey preferred to put it, has “warranted assertibility” (LW 12, p. 15). Elsewhere, Dewey states, “[T]his is the meaning of truth: processes of change so directed that they achieve an intended consummation. Instrumentalities are actually such only in operation” (LW 1, p. 128). Dewey emphasized not only the falsifiability of scientific claims to truth, he allowed for their complete contingency.

Because Dewey praises the achievements of scientific methodology and experimentalism in both versions of *How We Think* and other works, many have mistakenly critiqued him for being scientific. One such critic was Laurence Buermeyer, himself an instrumentalist and a pragmatist. Buermeyer thought Dewey five “steps” too linear and simple to capture the true complexity of inquiry. Dewey agreed and suggests that Buermeyer “was handicapped by the fact that the analysis which he takes as the subject of his criticism was written for pedagogical purposes rather than for strictly logical ends” (MW 13, 61). In his response, Dewey makes it clear that the “steps” are not “chronological” or even absolutely distinguished. The “steps” are just useful distinctions within one body of inquiry; we separate them as we may the heart, lungs, and circulatory system.

The distinctions are useful only for analysis, explication, and pedagogy. That does not mean the pedagogical distinction is not important.

In *Democracy and Education*, Dewey is clear that method is not separable from subject matter. For him, method, or structure, is structure for a purpose: “Method means that arrangement of subject matter which makes it most effective in use. Never is method something outside of the material” (MW 9, 172). When the use is pedagogical, we should arrange the subject matter to make it most effective for teaching others. Dewey clearly states, “The subject matter of the learner is not . . . identical with the formulated, the crystallized, and systematized subject matter of the adult” (p. 190). The same holds for any pedagogical situation. That is, “the teacher should be occupied not with subject matter in itself but in its interaction with the pupils present needs and capacities. Hence simple scholarship is not enough” (p. 191). Subject matter knowledge alone does not make a good teacher. Teachers teach subject matter to students. It is a triangle enclosing a pedagogical space. Just teaching the subject matter does not mean one is teaching well. To teach well, the teacher must connect the subject matter to the needs, desires, interests, stage of cognitive development, etc. of the student, within the physical, social, and political context that the students and teachers find themselves. Good teaching requires moral as well as cognitive perception of the needs and abilities of the student. It also requires a complete and confident command of the subject matter to reconfigure it to meet the needs of every individual student. When Dewey wrote *How We Think* he repeated a strategy he used often; he wrote pedagogically. That is, he adapted his subject matter for his audience to meet their needs and interests. Ignoring the pedagogical component that pervades much of Dewey’s work leads many to misunderstand it terribly. They misunderstand it because they misperceive the audience a given work addresses.

Recall that Dewey thought his instrumentalist logic could bridge science with morals. Dewey insisted that “rationality is an affair of the relation of means and consequences, not of fixed first principles as ultimate premises” (p. 17). The

consequences that most concern us are values, including moral values. A complete discussion of the relation between science and morals is beyond the confines of an encyclopedia entry. Dewey explicates most of the connections in his *Theory of Valuation* (LW 13, pp. 189–251) where he explicates the role of inquiry in distinguishing immediate, unreflective values from those values worth retaining upon reflection because their consequences contribute to human flourishing. Students who learn to use the five steps found in *How We Think* are better able to distinguish objects of immediate desire from the truly desirable. For Dewey, the key to freedom is intelligence. If we can become aware of the contingencies of our environment that control our conduct, then we can alter those contingencies, thereby altering ourselves. The most important contingencies derive from the community in which we live and actualize ourselves.

In his 1938 *Logic*, Dewey gave his most complete definition of inquiry:

Inquiry is the controlled or directed transformation of an indeterminate situation into one that is so determinate in its constituents distinctions and relations as to convert the elements of the original situation into a unified whole. (p. 108)

Individuals or societies are not in a situation like flies in a jar. Situations are an intimate, interconnected functional relation involving the inquirer and the environment. The resolution of a problematic situation may involve transforming the inquirer, the environment, and often both. The emphasis is on transformation. Dewey insisted that “science itself is but a central art auxiliary to the generation and utilization of other arts” (LW 10, 33).

The third influence identified by Dewey in “From Absolutism to Experimentalism” is the “biological conception of the psyche” as found in the *Psychology* of William James (LW 5, 157). Combined with his neo-Darwinianism, James confirmed Dewey’s naturalism while appealing to his desire for organic unity. Dewey observes, “Many philosophers have had much to say about the idea of organism; but they have taken it structurally and hence statically. It was reserved for James to think of life in terms of life

in action” (p. 158). The etymology of pragmatism flows from the ancient Greek *pragma*, meaning act, deed, affair, although pragmatists are most interested in intelligent action. The crucial idea connecting biological functioning with mental functioning, for James, is habit. This continuity breaks down the modern dualism between mind and body. James borrows this idea from his close friend Charles Sanders Peirce. Peirce (1992) thought that “learning, which is the preeminent ingredient and quintessence of reason, has its physiological basis quite evidently in the most characteristic property of the nervous system, the power of taking habits” (p. 264). From his reflections on habit, James (1890/1950) draws a valuable pedagogical principle:

The great thing, then, in all education, is to make our nervous system our ally instead of our enemy . . . For this we must make automatic and habitual, as early as possible as many useful actions as we can . . . The more of the details of our daily life we can hand over to the effortless custody of automatism [habit], the more our higher powers of mind will be set free for their own proper work. (Vol. I, p. 122)

Purely cognitive psychologists who separate mind from body and thought from feeling can never arrive at such a powerful conclusion. One only has to look at the almost exclusively cognitive curriculum in most schools to realize James’s immensely powerful, though simple, principle is still underappreciated. Usually we confine the body to gym class; elsewhere emotions are the source of disciplinary problems teachers must suppress. The result often destroys the desire to learn. We may understand much of Dewey’s educational philosophy as the result of experimenting with the conditions and consequences of applying James’s principle.

Dewey’s understanding of the functioning of habit is not mechanical and rationalistic. He writes, “Rationality . . . is not a force to evoke against impulse and habit. It is the attainment of a working harmony among diverse desires. ‘Reason’ as a noun signifies the happy cooperation of a multitude of dispositions” (MW 14, p. 136). For Dewey, ‘Reason’ is not an antecedent force which serves as a panacea. It is a laborious achievement of habit needing to be continually worked over”

(p. 136). The laborious achievement of a working harmony among diverse desires is an aesthetic comprehension of rationality.

James succeeded in developing a functional psychology that overcame the dominant idea of the mind as a substance. As James V. Wertsch (1985) has observed, “much of [Lev] Vygotsky’s admiration of William James stemmed from the fact that the latter had rejected substantialism” (p. 200). It is here that Russian and North American psychology, including recent developments in educational psychology, meet. Dewey (1911a/1978) provides the following definition of a function: “Any process sufficiently complex to involve an arrangement or coordination of minor processes which fulfills a specific end in such a way as to conserve itself is called a function” (MW 6, p. 466). He continues, “The sum total of functions, in their reciprocal adjustment to one another constitute life, which accordingly, is defined in the same way as a function” (p. 467). These functionally coordinated living processes develop naturally from and with the rest of nature. At the University of Chicago, Dewey and his colleagues succeeded in developing this biologically based functional psychology to the point that today it is the most prominent presupposition in most kinds of North American psychology.

Besides habit, Dewey’s biologically based functional psychology emphasizes action, need, desire, and interest. Again, the relation of the individual to her or his world is functional, we may separate them for methodological purposes, but we cannot understand what motivates someone without understanding them as an active functional unity of organism and environment. That is the clue to understanding Dewey’s definition of interest: “Any concrete case of the union of the self in action with an object and end is called an interest” (LW 7, p. 290). Organic, functional interdependence is also the key to understanding Dewey’s theory of internal motivation:

Because an interest or motive is the union in action of a need, desire of a self, with a chosen object, the object itself may, in a secondary and derived sense, be said to be the motive of action . . . It is true enough when we take the whole situation into account that an object moves a person; for that

objet as a moving force includes the self within it. Error arises when we think of the object as if it were something wholly external to the make-up of the self, when it operates to move the foreign self (LW 7, pp. 291–292).

The transactional functional unity of the self (organism, knower, subject, and mind) and the world (environment, known, object, and body) is Dewey’s full solution to Cartesian dualism. It is also an original contribution to understanding educational motivation.

Development, including educational development, for Dewey did not involve an unfolding of latent potential. Indeed, Dewey rejected the very notion of latent potential:

To say that an apple has the potentiality of decay does not mean that it has latent or implicit within it a causal principle which will some time inevitably display itself in producing decay, but that its existing changes (in interaction with its surroundings) will take the form of decay, if they are exposed to certain conditions not now operating. (MW 8, p. 11)

For the apple to realize its potential it must engage in definite interactions, or better still, transformative transactions, with its surroundings. This viewpoint has immense implications for physical, psychological, and moral development. Acorns do not become oak trees because that is their latent potential, their immanent telos. Rather, what acorns become depends on the transactions they engage in. Acorns often become food for squirrels that need and desire them to survive. For acorns to become oak trees, they must engage in many harmonious transactions with air, water, soil, and sunshine. The same holds for a human being. If they are to grow healthy and strong, they too need to engage in harmonious transactions, especially with other human beings.

Regarding the fourth influence on him, Dewey notes, “The objective biological approach of the Jamesian psychology led stright to the perception of the importance of distinctive social categories, especially communication and participation (LW 5, 159).” The connection is easy to see; James (1890/1950) writes, “Habit is thus the enormous fly-wheel of society, its most precious conservative agent” (p. 122). We acquire our habits from our habitat, especially our social habitat.

Significantly, the first chapter of Dewey's *Human Nature and Conduct* is titled "Habits as Social Functions" (p. 15).

We have already seen that, for Dewey, to have a mind is to participate in the discourse practices of a community. Together, Dewey and Mead worked out the notion that to have a self is to take the role of others in interpreting one's acts. Both the mind and self are entirely social, although, as noted earlier, one may come to have an "individual mind" if they do the hard work of critical reflection on, caring connection with, and creative transformation of their culture.

On such a philosophy, the "other" is always already present within our "selves." One way to understand freedom is to think of it as being open to the possibility of telling an original story of our lives. We will never acquire the vocabulary, grammar, spelling, or plot lines necessary for telling an original story from those who are just like us. Pluralism and difference is the key to becoming an individual mind, not just an individual with a mind. We need others to become free. A pluralistic democratic community that encourages dialogues across differences best meets this need. Dewey's ideal of a participatory community is one of pluralistic community. This position is different from that of Habermas. There are no transcendental ideals of "rational" communication, only the meliorist hope in a value that may function as an "end-in-view" to guide inquiry in the quest to realize desirable consequences in the particular situation we find ourselves.

For Dewey, education is a social function. Until we know what sort of society is best, we do not know what sort of education is best. Dewey develops two criteria for evaluating any society. They are "How numerous and varied are the interests which are consciously shared? How full and free is the interplay with other forms of association?" (LW 9, p. 89). Oppressive societies, such as those devoted to Social Darwinism, eliminate diverse interests in favor of the special interests of the powerful few. Such societies are maladaptive because they are unable to respond agilely to environmental change. Diversity provides alternatives, thereby funding freedom. We should deliberate upon all modes of life intelligently, even if

ultimately we reject them as unable to satisfy our needs and dreams. The danger in a society having narrow interests is that instead of attending to the interests of others and the possibilities they express, the prevailing purpose becomes, as Dewey puts it, "the protection of what it has got, instead of reorganization and progress through wider relationships" (MW 9, p. 91). Isolationism reduces freedom because it reduces our capacity to imagine the alternative possibilities that aid free choice and action. Isolationism is self-oppression. Dewey concludes,

The two elements in our criterion both point to democracy. The first signifies not only more numerous and more varied points of shared common interest, but greater reliance upon the recognition of mutual interests as a factor in social control. The second means not only freer interaction between social groups . . . But change in social habit — its continuous readjustment through meeting the new situations produced by varied intercourse. (MW 9, p. 92)

By the standards of freedom, creativity, and dialogue, pluralistic democracy is, for Dewey, the best possible society we know of for sustaining growth. We may wonder what Dewey means when he says that the first element signifies mutual interests as a factor in social control. These lines should clarify:

The reasonable act and the generous act lie close together. A person of narrow sympathy is of necessity a person of confined outlook upon the scene of human good. The only truly general thought is the generous thought. (LW 7, p. 270)

It is worth noting that sympathy for Dewey has a logical function. It limits universal generalizations in the social and moral sciences. This logical limitation may also serve to encourage democratic and pluralistic dialogue at the limits.

Dewey understood democracy as moral, economic, and educational, not just political. His pluralistic conception of democracy leads him to the following definition of democracy:

A democracy is more than a form of government; it is primarily a mode of associated living, of conjoint communicated experience. The extension in space of the number of individuals who participate in an interest so that each has to refer his own action to that of others, and to consider the action of others to

give point and direction to his own, is equivalent to breaking down barriers of class, race, and national territory which kept men from perceiving the full import of their activity. (MW 9, p. 93)

The governmental structure assumed by a democracy is of secondary concern. It does not matter as long as it promotes communication. Conversation for Dewey is about creating and sharing meaning; it is about growth. We may secure and continue the conversation in many diverse ways, and diversity is the key to creative conversation; it is also the key to good classrooms.

For Dewey, democracy is the most logical form of government. Further, he asserts that democracy is the best way to pursue logic. Dewey affirms that for logic, “The final actuality is accomplished in face-to-face relationships by means of direct give and take. Logic in its fulfilment recurs to the primitive sense of the word: dialogue. Ideas which are not communicated, shared, and reborn in expression are but [monological] soliloquy, and soliloquy is but broken and imperfect thought” (LW 2, p. 371)). Dewey’s etymology here is correct: *Logos* derives from the ancient Greek for speech or word. He believes that “Logic is a social discipline . . . Man is naturally a being that lives in association with others in communities possessing language, and therefore enjoying a transmitted culture. Inquiry is a mode of activity that is socially conditioned and that has cultural consequences” (LW 12, pp. 26–7) By adding different voices to a conversation, we may alter the conditions of rational inquiry; we may also reconstruct social conditions. So, also, will the canons of rationality. Dewey holds a communicative theory of rationality and democratic social action.

The goal of Dewey’s philosophy as education is to release the human potential for growth. Growth through freedom, creativity, and dialogue is, for him, the all-inclusive ideal, the greatest good. For example, in *Democracy and Education* he asserts, “Since growth is the characteristic of life, education is all one with growing; it has no end beyond itself” (MW 9, p. 58). For Dewey, the capacity to cultivate growth is the criterion for evaluating the quality of all social institutions.

Dewey believes that democracy is the social structure that contributes most to freeing intelligence to grow, and, therefore, education should be democratic. He writes,

The aim of education is to enable individuals to continue their education . . . the object and reward of learning is continued capacity for growth. Now this idea cannot be applied to all the members of a society except where intercourse of man with man is mutual, and except where there is adequate provision for the reconstruction of social habits and institutions by means of wide stimulation arising from equitably distributed interests. And this means a democratic society. (p. 107)

Dewey favors a planned over a planning society. He thought an education that emphasizes community, communication, intelligent inquiry, and a reconstructive attitude can best serve the citizens of an ever-evolving world. For him, it is clear that a democratic society is the best choice in the long haul.

Dewey’s philosophy is far from exhausted. In the last 20 years, there has been a great renewal of interest in his philosophy as education. Richard Rorty’s (1979) reliance on Dewey in *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* is a landmark. The publication of an authoritative biography by Robert B. Westbrook (1991) has greatly aided this renaissance. Steven C. Rockefeller (1991) also provides an in-depth study of the more personal side of Dewey, one which concentrates on Dewey’s religious thought.

We may conveniently divide the new scholarship on Dewey into two kinds. The first identifies and develops themes already present in Dewey’s work, though previously overlooked. Examples include: Larry Hickman’s (1990) *John Dewey’s Pragmatic Technology* shows that there is an implicit philosophy of technology in Dewey’s work that plays a central role in his entire philosophy, including his philosophy of education. Hickman is the director of the Center for Dewey Studies at Carbondale. Thomas M. Alexander (1987) did the groundbreaking work on Dewey’s struggle in the last decades of his life to develop an aesthetics that would unify his entire philosophy. There are many direct applications of Dewey’s aesthetic to education in Jim Garrison’s (1995) *The New Scholarship on Dewey* and

Phillip W. Jackson's (1998) *The Lessons of Art*. Jim Garrison's (1997) *Dewey and Eros* has identified the crucial role played in Dewey's educational philosophy by the classical Greek concept of educating eros, or passionate desire, to desire the good in Dewey's theory of education.

The second kind of work constituting the new scholarship involves creative extensions and reconstructions of Dewey's philosophy. The development of a transactional theory of literary interpretation by Louise M. Rosenblatt (1978) is a fine instance. Another good example is Charlene Haddock Seigfried's (1996) criticism and creative reconstruction of Dewey in initiating her program of feminist pragmatism. Finally, Hans Joas (1996) has used Deweyan pragmatism to develop a theory of creative action that he claims unifies communicative, interpretive, and instrumental action, thereby going beyond the work of Habermas.

It will require an entire generation of research to integrate this new scholarship into a practical philosophy of education. That, however, seems appropriate given that Dewey is a philosopher of endless reconstruction in an ever-evolving, never-ending world. There is no rest for those who live by means of creative action.

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Dewey's Social Philosophy

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Introduction

John Dewey was known as America's quintessential philosopher of the early twentieth century. Along with William James and Charles Sanders Peirce, he was one of the founders of the philosophical tradition known as pragmatism. This tradition grew out of a distinct US context; it rose and fell in prominence across the century. A late-century renaissance in Dewey and pragmatism especially demonstrates its significance as a social theory. Across the same decades, Dewey's importance spread worldwide as an educational reformer. This is ironic as he was first and foremost a philosopher and not an educator.

Dewey and his first wife Alice were heavily involved in the practice and theorizing of

schooling at the turn of the twentieth century when their own children were young. The laboratory school that they founded at the University of Chicago and Dewey's talks to parents and public essays for educators remain significant today. Across his writings, Dewey's focus in education shifted; however, he paid much less attention to schooling and much more attention to a broad social conception of a society in which education in and for a democracy is paramount. It is this conception, from Dewey as social philosopher, that is the focus of this entry. Given a twenty-first century mentality seemingly worldwide on a narrow view of schooling on measurable achievement and competitive credentialing (and turbulent global times), this socially focused theorizing may be the best educational vision for a better world.

A Philosophical Context

In 1979 a publishing event occurred that changed the face of philosophy although some scholars in the discipline continue today to refuse to face its significance. Analytically trained, Richard Rorty's *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* appeared. Therein he takes on the leading American philosophers of his generation, pointing to fissures in the paradigm of logical positivism by the works of Willard Van Orman Quine, Nelson Goodman, and Wilfrid Sellars. Rorty's project overall undermines philosophy's traditional search for certainty and foundations (Rorty 1979; West 1985). A multi-genre discipline emerges post-analytic, neo-pragmatist, and post-structuralist blurrings that redefine philosophy by inserting influences from literary culture, science, and moral theory (Rajchman and West 1985). This new tradition is best described as social theory. It is social because, as becomes obvious across the twentieth century and as described by neo-pragmatist Cornel West, knowledge originates in the use of language that is public and intersubjective.

The contributions of Rorty and others produce a sea change beyond philosophy that is known as the linguistic turn. In *Mirror* Rorty joins Dewey to Heidegger and Wittgenstein as the most

significant philosophers of the twentieth century. This entry on Dewey's philosophy is premised on the historicist belief that one cannot read him today without taking the linguistic turn into account. Moreover, the thesis is that Dewey's philosophy is social philosophy that presages more contemporary developments. Dewey is not a social theorist in today's terms but his work has strong affinity. A basis for this thesis is a conception of social context that actually can be found throughout his writings. The entry is organized as a set of descriptive social contexts, biographical, philosophical, and democratic. While education does not appear until the end, the underlying purpose of the entry is expressed by philosopher Steven Cahn: "For Dewey, all social philosophy was at bottom philosophy of education implicitly or explicitly" (Cahn 1991, p. xvii). Understanding Dewey's social philosophy locates education within a broader vision of a social order and of democracy. As indicated in the introduction, this vision may indeed offer insights for educators that extend beyond but can reform schools and the lives of teachers and students.

There are other ways to interpret Dewey and his place in the history of philosophy and for education. After all his speculative writings are very comprehensive, incorporating modern sub-topics such as epistemology, ethics, and aesthetics. For example, interrogating his writings on knowledge has led to one neoclassical characterization for educational research based in Dewey's psychology and focused on science, inquiry, and action (Biesta and Burbules 2003). Additionally, the change introduced above also has had different broad interpretations such as a Deweyan "post-postmodernism" (Hickman 2007).

As part of the history of philosophy, Dewey responds to writings that come before his time. Not quite in Rorty's later idiom, his view is anti-systemic, anti-absolutist, and anti-dualist. One way to see his position is precisely what Dewey writes about when and how a philosopher and his theory comes to be written; these are historical – and thus social – conditions. Rather than immutable knowledge, Dewey posits that philosophers such as Plato and Locke write in their own times of strife and conflict. Ironically

each proposal for a system for all time has been superseded by another (Dewey 1988b). Dewey comes to see the seriousness of history in his own work most clearly in a reintroduction to his programmatic essay, *Reconstruction in Philosophy* (Dewey 1988e). He writes,

the distinctive office, problems, and subjectmatter of philosophy grows out of the stresses and strains in the community life in which a given form of philosophy arises... and vary with the changes in human life that are always going on and that at times constitute a crisis and a turning point in human history (p. 256).

Dewey means here that all philosophy is historically contextualized and so must his own that does include the significance of World War I in his life (Ryan 1995). A first social category in his philosophy is thus biographical.

Biography

Dewey lived a long fruitful life as professor, public intellectual, and philosopher, born in 1859 and dying in 1952 at the age of 93. Raised in New England's Vermont, Dewey attended public schools, elementary through college – the University of Vermont in his hometown of Burlington. His first unsatisfying occupation was school teacher. Receiving some encouragement about philosophical acumen, he then attended the first US graduate school, the Johns Hopkins University, and it is noted with a virtual lack of personal financial backing. Graduating, his first professorial positions were at the new public universities at Michigan and Minnesota. His excellent early productivity led to his appointment also at a new institution, the University of Chicago. As the university gained prestige so did Dewey and following a tumultuous event involving the leadership of the laboratory school, he moved to Columbia University in 1904. New York City was to be his home for nearly 50 years. While he did have an appointment in pedagogy at Chicago and was associated with Teachers College at Columbia, he is best recognized as a philosophy professor.

Dewey's writings reflect dominant American values even as he most often reinterprets them.

They include rewritings of individualism, community, and democracy. He was a man of his time, what is known as the Progressive Era, roughly 1870–1920 (McGeer 2003). Life in these decades was complex, of great societal inequalities arising from vast changes in American immigration, urbanization, and industrialization. Dewey's own reform efforts were local as well as international: for example, from working at the Hull House settlement of Jane Addams in Chicago to joining President Woodrow Wilson in advocating America's entry into World War I. He belonged to many social groups. Indeed he helped found the American Federation of Teachers and the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People. In later life he considered himself an American socialist. Dewey was a well-intentioned radical of his day even as the era and the man were not without fault. Of note, the most important and comprehensive intellectual biography is Robert Westbrook's *John Dewey and American Democracy* (Westbrook 1991).

Contemporary historian Louis Menand offers a useful characterization of pragmatism that focuses on the founders, Peirce, James, and Dewey, and adds the contributions of several others. Of note, Dewey recounts his vital debt to James in his only autobiographical essay, "From Absolutism to Experimentalism" (Dewey 1988c). Significantly different from traditional philosophy, each theorist poses a singular philosophy. Logic, religion, science, law, and societal conditions are all topics written about by classical pragmatists. Pragmatism, according to Menand (1997), is an account of the way people think in actually coping with the world. Dismissed are abstractions or formulas of rationality and truth. There is no absolute truth, no absolutes of any kind upon which to base everyday life. Coping entails action, and all action is to be judged by its consequences, its effects by what it "dictates or inspires," Menand writes (p. xiii). A final point, given an American culture with all of its integral and enduring diversity, pragmatic action exhibits a down-to-earth quality, a practicality and utility, and a tenacity in working with problems. In its less than best actions, it is anti-intellectual and crassly utilitarian – settling for "what works" as short-sighted solutions.

Social Philosophy

Following an early interest in absolute idealism influenced by mentor neo-Hegelian scholar George Sylvester Morris, Dewey became increasingly interested in thinking about and responding to what he termed “the social subjects” as the focus of his pragmatism. Across his career, a set of concepts emerged to characterize his philosophy in both the abstract, disciplinary sense, and in the concrete, everyday problem-solving sense. Some are more directly contextual and some more indirect, and both, as they overlap in his writings, can be understood as integral to his social philosophy (see Toulmin 1988).

Dewey's first published article appeared in 1882 and the last posthumously in 1953. His collected works comprise 37 volumes brought together in three chronological series, Early, Middle, and Late Works (1969–1991). In recent years, American philosophers have subdivided his writings into traditional categories, such as moral philosophy and political philosophy. For them a “social” category may be too broad, too unfamiliar in the times of analytic dominance, or implied but lacking significance. From above, Rorty does support a social interpretation with his statement that “‘justification’... for Dewey’s conception of knowledge... [is] a social phenomenon rather than a transaction between ‘the knowing subject’ and ‘reality’” (Rorty 1979, p. 9). Westbrook offers his own rendering of Dewey’s “social philosophy,” although demurring that his text “is not quite... [a] full intellectual biography” (Westbrook 1991, p. 9).

Dewey’s biography, especially in its historic times, forms an external context for this social philosophy. A second context internally organizes his philosophy and is constituted of a set of “social” concepts that make his philosophy like no other. Of significance, Dewey does write about context, primarily with regard to language and its use. It is the background that is taken for granted in understanding words, symbols, and the like (Ratner 1989, p. xi). In the essay, *Context and Thought*, published in 1931, he first critiques analytic philosophy for ignoring context and then turns to a general discussion of “selective

interest.” It extends from spatial and temporal background to existential and theoretical interest (Dewey 1989). Of special importance is Dewey’s beginning attention in this essay to culture: thus culture for him prefigures language and not the other way around.

In an initial internal category, Dewey’s philosophical intent is problem resolving, practical, provisional, and especially skeptical. Foremost in this category is a premise that life is inquiry, a flow of constant meaning making. This flow is dynamic, moving within bounded problematic situations that are indeterminate, confusing, and conflictual even. These brief or protracted moments require resolution that is provisional since within the flow a next situation “always” arises. Moreover since flow is life, situations are always potentially practical, requiring action as part of what Dewey identifies as the denial of any a priori model of knowledge in favor of “the actual reasoning practices of human thinkers” (Toulmin 1988, p. xxii).

Next, Dewey’s philosophical form is organic, holist, and isomorphic. Organic for Dewey means natural from nature, with all life and thought arising in a Darwin-inspired context portending a modernist progress. In Dewey’s holism types of thought processes or domains of intellectualism are not distinguished. His stance is that philosophy is always fully funded and value-laden in which, for instance, a particular moral import cannot be separated from thought and action. Isomorphism refers to a repetition of basic organization of social processes and forms; the problem-solving of an individual is replicated in that of any larger group.

Lastly, Dewey’s philosophical process is, first, in thought that is abstract and reconstructive and, second, in the concrete that is experiential, experimental, and consequentialist. Perhaps reconstruction is Dewey’s singular methodological contribution. Appearing across selected writings, he delves into philosophical pasts for positions and proposes a reconfiguring of one contemporary – reminiscent of a dialectic. Most characteristic of the pragmatism of Dewey’s time and influenced by James, experience is Dewey’s basic process unit. Experimentalism takes

experience into the realm of problem-solving; in Dewey this reflects an idea in how human thought and action function and from that in science. Finally consequentialism is the means and ends of problem-solving: it is only in the carrying out of action that effects can be recognized and, at the utmost, serve as warrants for truth claims.

At this point, one might say that Dewey's philosophy is social "all the way down." Elaborating on the central idea of experience, this is manifest in a basic organic process of interaction, of organism and environment: the social enters when the organism is a human being interacting with all sorts of environments and typically with other humans. Dewey takes this process into discussions of human organization. Differing and responding to an emphasis on the personal psychology of his day, Dewey's writings do refer to the individual but increasingly focus on active groups. The individual is always in interaction with others; contemporary debate concerns whether interaction or transaction best conceptualizes this process.

Democracy

The final context in Dewey's social philosophy is democracy, often described as his overall project (Westbrook 1991; Bernstein 2010). This commitment surely has roots in his middle class, Vermont background. His writings begin with an essay "book review" in 1888 in which democracy is characterized as a social and ethical unity and not just political. Dewey continues the latter idea in his most renowned work, *Democracy and Education* (Dewey 1985). Therein he offers this definition: "democracy is more than a form of government; it is primarily a mode of associated living, of conjoint communicated experience" (p. 93). Further, association is created by voluntary disposition and interest and itself furthered democratically by the action of social groups. Participation that is democratic is in depth in one's own group and by extension in contact with groups that are different. Beyond this textbook presentation, Dewey elaborates on association with other works especially in the 1927

volume, *The Public and Its Problems* (Dewey 1988a). For him association is organic; it is social and societal in modes of organization and conduct, and importantly it contributes to other, more intentionally, moral forms of human life. *Public* is acknowledged as Dewey's most political work; reconstructions of the public, the State, and the community – for him a search for the great community – are central.

It is in this context of democracy that Dewey most clearly identifies his philosophy as social. Two addresses from different but "similar" times are exemplary. First from 1918 he asks if there is a philosophy that is "distinctive of a social order, of democracy" (Dewey 1988d, p. 43). His answer, interestingly, differs from other modern philosophers in "returning" to a classical root, to emphasize desire and wisdom herein rather than knowledge and science. Discussing in his own way liberal values of liberty, equality, and fraternity, he restates his basic definition of associated individuals in intercourse with others that "makes the life of each unique" (p. 53). "Creative Democracy – The Task Before Us" (Dewey 1991b) is the better-known second address read in his absence at an eightieth birthday party in his honor.

Dewey's writings on democracy, it should be clear, appear at various historic moments but perhaps exhibit special urgency during international crisis; in these two pieces, one cannot help but recall the historical contexts of 1918 and 1939! In the second, short essay, Dewey does call for deliberate attention to democratic institutions and duties that, once again, are more than political. What is especially significant is the need for individual commitment through expression of character and attitude especially across differences and conflicts. One emblematic statement is this:

The heart and final guarantee of democracy is in free gatherings of neighbors on the street corners to discuss back and forth what is read in uncensored news of the day. . . . Intolerance, abuse, calling of names because of differences of opinion about religion or politics or business bars [sic] freedom (p. 227).

In this essay, Dewey also turns to education: for him such experiences are educative and are

part of the “knowledge of conditions” that foster free and full communication.

Education connects to democracy as integral to this social context. Education is the vehicle for democracy and democracy ensures the appropriate conditions for education. Education appears in writings across most decades; there is the shift of emphasis mentioned in the introduction. What is significant might also be the belief that schools could not be the vehicle for democracy that he initially envisioned. His most direct writings about schooling concern life at the laboratory school. In them, Dewey's organization, curriculum, and pedagogy are primarily social. The most famous statement from the talks to parents describes the school as a community. He says, “What the best and wisest parent wants for his own child, that must the community want for all of its children. Any other ideal... is narrow and unlovely; acted upon it destroys our democracy” (Dewey 1900, 1915, 1976, 1990, p. 7). An accessible redux about schooling, *Experience and Education*, in the late 1930s, builds on the social contexts and philosophical concepts overviewed above and fundamentally incorporates individuals in social groups (Dewey 1991a). Concepts that educators have found inspirational and one hopes applicable include the following inexhaustive list: educative as the value for learning that contributes to the social order, continuity that refers to the connections and indeed broadening of educational experiences, and social control that describes the socializing effect of such experiences in which a social group and its participants “order” itself. It is important to note that the lab school was to be a pragmatist educational experiment and not a model for others or for all time. The two texts from 1916 and 1938 were invitational endeavors and exceptions to his general stance toward schools.

Conclusion

Today educators as well as philosophers and other social theorists read Dewey for insights into living in a different context than was his. Central to intellectual life and social practices that “result”

a new conception of making sense of the world has emerged following from the linguistic turn. A more flexible and more open conception – denial of the need for certainty – fits a twenty-first century complex world. Dewey's philosophy conceived as social philosophy can be seen as presaging contemporary intellectual and social life. This entry has offered an interpretation based in a series of social contexts found in Dewey's writings: biographical, philosophical, and democratic. In the latter education is central since democracy and education are integral to each other. Reformers, in education and elsewhere, can gain insights from Dewey. Conceptualizing his philosophy in a social light can actually suggest new directions, so needed in these complex tumultuous times.

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Dialogic Education

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Dialogue occupies a place of honor in educational tradition. The most renowned context is Plato's philosophy, which was written in dialogic form and offers dialogue as Socrates' principal educational and teaching method. The second distinct context brings us into the heart of the twentieth century and includes the existential philosophy of Martin Buber and the critical counterhegemonic pedagogy of Paulo Freire. Other forms of dialogue that are held to be inspirational and relevant to education include the following: of the classical models, most notable are the Confucian and Talmudic dialogues; and in the modern age, the existentialist Nietzschean dialogue, the pedagogic dialogue of Janusz Korczak, the therapeutic dialogue of Carl Rogers, the hermeneutic dialogue of Hans-Georg Gadamer, the care dialogue of Nel Noddings, the Habermasian deliberative dialogue of communicative action, the ethical dialogue of Emmanuel Levinas, as well as the dialogic practices that developed in the context of democratic education, environmental education, and education for a culture of peace and shared life.

Dialogue is a form of speech – distinguished in various aspects from other forms such as conversation, discussion, and discourse – and commonly associated with positive and pleasant qualities of

intimacy, trust, respect, and reciprocity. Etymologically, the word comes from ancient Greek and is made up of *dia* – which means between – and *logos* – which means speech. This explains the accepted meaning and “feel” of dialogue as a pleasant, meaningful, respectful, and constructive conversation.

In order for us to achieve good understanding of the nature of Dialogic Education – of dialogues in education as much as of educational dialogue – let us first posit the distinguishing marks of educational processes and practices. It is my contention that in the beginning of the twenty-first century and in light of the formally accepted ideals of humanistic and democratic culture (embedded in the UN’s universal declaration of human rights and of the rights of the child), the practice of education should be identified with facilitating people to lead autonomous, full, worthy, and flourishing lives. More specifically and informed by the normative tenets of humanism and democracy, educational practices are characterized by the following elements: (a) cultivation of one’s innate powers; (b) providing a social atmosphere of intellectual freedom and human dignity; (c) initiation into worthwhile modes of thought and action (including virtues of intellect and character); and (d) empowering one’s autonomous and authentic self-realization as much as one’s meaningful and responsible participation in the natural, social, and cultural spheres of life.

On the bases of the above notions of dialogue and education, let us move now into consideration of the distinguishing marks of educational dialogue. Our examination begins by pointing, by means of negation, at those features that are alien and offensive to educational dialogue, namely, **what educational dialogue is not**:

1. Educational dialogue is not small talk or a casual conversation held in a cafeteria or in the street. It always involves significant content or statements.
2. Educational dialogue is not a shouting match or a confrontational and vocal argument, in which each side tries to call attention to itself at the expense of the other. It is pleasant and

respectful, open to hearing different views and conceptually flexible.

3. Educational dialogue is not authoritative, such as the speech between a master and a subject or a commander and a subordinate. It evinces a nonhierarchical approach and a spirit of democracy, reciprocity, and solidarity.
4. Educational dialogue is not the giving of instructions or delivery of a lecture between a teacher and student, or the impartation of some form of knowledge and the testing of the extent to which the students have internalized it. It is a form of shared learning, both about the world of the other and of new content.
5. Educational dialogue is not a functional or technocratic performance-oriented speech, the entire purpose of which is to produce results. It is a process and does not necessarily produce clear, obvious results toward which the speech is oriented.

Let us now move from the negative to the positive – to what educational dialogue is and focus on *educational dialogue’s chief characteristics*:

1. Respect for the other by virtue of his or her humanity.
2. Interest in their personality and world by virtue of their singularity or otherness.
3. A point of departure based on mutual trust and openness (not power games or competitions involving status and prestige).
4. Debate or exchange of ideas among the speakers that invites joint thought and a mutually beneficial exchange of ideas.
5. It aims at mutual enrichment and inspiration through the widening of the capacities to better understand one’s own life, the lived reality of the other, and the circumstances that they share.

In light of these features, I would like to adopt the following “working definition” of dialogue: *Dialogue is a conversation in which those involved are attentive to one another and exhibit a mutual interest on the basis of their shared humanity and individual personalities; out of a*

shared sense of trust, respect and openness, they jointly advance to a more comprehensive understanding of themselves, others and the circumstances they share.

As I noted in the opening paragraph, dialogue occupies a place of honor in educational tradition and in recent years it has become significantly more dominant due to the growing frustration at the dehumanizing effects of the “standardization and achievements” approach. The large repertoire and manifold forms of dialogue have naturally challenged educational theorists to analytically and critically scrutinize them and to introduce various typologies of educational dialogues. One can look, for example, to Burbules’s typology which covers four kinds of dialogue in the practice of teaching: as Conversation, as Inquiry, as Debate, and as Instruction. Haroutunian-Gordon focuses on what she calls Interpretive Discussion, and Skidmore uses the typology of Dialogic Instruction, Dialogic Enquiry, and Dialogic Teaching. It is widely agreed, however, among educationists, that no one typology is final and exhaustive and that it is best to judge them by their edifying and pragmatic value. Along this line, not siding with any one typology of dialogues yet stressing the existing and growing diversity, I have listed in the following fifteen different types of dialogue on a largely chronological continuum, some of which are quintessentially pedagogic in nature, while others have some relevance to education and are implemented in various and sundry ways in the educational discourse and practice.

The Confucian dialogue: Named for the sixth century BCE Chinese philosopher, it represents a moral humanistic stance that considers the highest form of human good to be *altruism*: a benevolent, caring, amiable, respectful, and fair attitude toward others and the intent to live a higher life that includes “loyalty to oneself and reciprocity to others.” The Confucian stance also stresses “seeing everything in its proper context,” moral rigor and the establishment of practices and arrangements that contribute to harmony in personal behavior and in the social circles of life. The dialogue figures as a major means through which

the teacher and pupil pave and broaden the path to a full and proper life.

The Socratic dialogue: Named for the fifth century BCE Athenian philosopher, this is an educational dialogue that arose from the pursuit of dialectics: the art of the discourse, directed at attaining conceptual clarity and consistency, and ultimately progress toward a truer perception of reality and wisdom in the art of living. The Socratic dialogue stimulates the interlocutors to practice reflective and critical thinking, and “births” truths conceived within them. It is a dialogue of intellectual and moral empowerment to promote a life of moral rigor and self-reflection, a rationalist pursuit “to make yourself as best as you can.”

The Talmudic dialogue: The central method used in Jewish tradition, this is a communal discussion and learning method through which the students acquire knowledge and shape their characters by means of written texts as well as living texts – who are of course flesh-and-blood teachers – in everything they say and how they live their lives. Among the basic assumptions of the Talmudic dialogue, one can find approaches relating to human dignity and equality as well as to the tension between personal autonomy and conformity to norms of the community and the precepts of tradition. Another major feature that arises here is the recognition that the educational act has no boundaries: it exists in the study partnerships, but no less so in the intimate expanse between the teacher and student in the context of being a role model in the practice of proper living.

The Nietzschean dialogue: Named for the nineteenth-century German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche, this dialogue emanates from the rich personality, creative drives, and generous spirit of the educator, who seeks out “fellow creators” – those that add meaning and value to life through their creative self-perfection and self-affirmation. The continuation and aim of the dialogue is to expand the students’ cultural richness as well as their intellectual and creative powers, to enable them to reject herd conformity and conceptual dogmatism, so that they can instead take their own path, accept responsibility for their

lives, and shape their personalities and paths as a demanding act of art and morality.

The Buberian dialogue: Named for the German–Israeli philosopher Martin Buber, it is derived from the “I-Thou” concept in Buber’s philosophy and based on interpersonal encounters in which the dialoguers are present with the full force of their personalities and existence: on the one hand, without the armor or closed shutters of prejudice, conceptual fixations, and selfish interests; and on the other, with full psychological and spiritual attention to the other. The “I-Thou” relationship that Buber offers serves as a genuine means to protect our own human dignity and that of others, especially in view of utilitarian and technocratic trends, and power-driven and manipulative relationships.

The Korczakian dialogue: Named for the Jewish–Polish educator Janusz Korczak, who more than any other educator actually lived among his pupils, and when their fate was sealed during the Holocaust of the Jews of Europe, chose to die with them. This dialogue refuses to embellish the nature of the child or idealize his characteristics and tendencies, but at the same time, emphatically underscores a love of childhood and respect-based esteem for the child and his rights as a whole human being. The Korczakian dialogue is not guided by theoretical doctrines and teachings but rather by a commitment to address concrete needs: On the one hand, stands the adult educator, who has a unique personality, possesses pedagogical skills, and has mastered the art of fostering his pupils’ growth, while on the other are children with strengths and weaknesses, whose psyches are complex and vulnerable. In the educational matrix designed as a microcosm of an egalitarian and respectful society, each child has his own place, suited to his own singular nature, within an educational climate of unconditional acceptance, social solidarity, and mutual forgiveness.

The Rogerian dialogue: This dialogue originated in the “client-centered therapy” typical of the practice of humanistic psychology, especially that of Carl Rogers. The dialogue is founded on

certain basic propositions regarding the intrinsic goodness of humanity and the basic drive of all humans to realize their full potential – to develop one’s capabilities, realize one’s inclinations, and widen one’s repertoire of knowledge and behaviors. To these should be added characteristics of reliability and authenticity, mutual respect, trust, acceptance, and empathy, with an emphasis on meaningful experiential learning – all these are conditions that enable and empower the students to believe in themselves, achieve healthy self-esteem, and find the strength to plan and lead full and satisfying lives.

The Freirean dialogue: Named for the Brazilian educator Paulo Freire and also known as a dialogue of empowerment and liberation. This counterhegemonic dialogue is directed at helping students that belong to weakened and oppressed populations to develop critical and political literacies that would facilitate their emancipation from oppressive and disempowering factors that prevent them from actualizing a complete and dignified life. The Freirean dialogue is based on the humanistic elements of love and respect for humanity, mutual trust and hope for change, together with neo-Marxist elements of political action to pave the way for social justice and true participatory democracy. It encourages the students to establish a sense of self-worth, develop a “personal voice” and community narrative, social solidarity, critical literacy, and political action – all this in order to free the world from oppression, which includes the desire to control and subjugate any other person or group.

The Gadamerian dialogue: Named for the German philosopher Hans-Georg Gadamer, this dialogue seeks to rehabilitate the fabric of human discourse and partnership by means of shifting the emphasis from the scientific method – which is oriented toward acquiring facts and revealing the laws of nature – to a hermeneutic method that widens the student’s ability to understand and appreciate fellow individuals, diverse cultures, and great works of art and intellect. This dialogue’s point of departure is that we are all the products of our history and culture and we all have

preexisting perspectives that have been shaped by social and cultural conditioning and structuring. In a society in which different groups seek recognition for their own unique cultural narratives, an approach that emphasizes the hermeneutical dialogue between the student's cultural horizon and the other horizons is especially important as a key to complex understanding and the creation of a shared normative consciousness.

Habermassian dialogue: Named for the German philosopher and key figure in Critical Theory, Jorgen Habermas, this deliberative dialogue aims to reconstruct the trust and competencies required for rational, open, and fair public discourse. Contrary to postmodern tendencies to give up the ideals of enlightened worldview, moral conduct, and just social order, the Habermassian dialogue insists on creating the conditions of the ideal or most fruitful speech situations out of which truth, goodness, and justice have the best chances to emerge and be accepted by rational consensus (equity, freedom, pluralism, tolerance, reasoned arguments, critical reflectiveness, good will, and multiculturalism).

The Noddingsian dialogue: Named for the American educationist Nel Noddings, this dialogue occupies a central position in the ethics and pedagogy of caring – an area that Noddings developed and which in recent years has gained recognition and appreciation in the field of education. The point of departure of this kind of dialogue is that of “maternal caring” – as a moral feminist category – characterized by sensitive and supportive caring toward people, care for the welfare and respect of others, and a willingness to help them fulfill themselves and realize their full potential. This educational dialogue seeks to shift the emphasis from the disciplinary pursuit of acquiring knowledge, from the obsession with the cognitive skills evinced in scientific discoveries and the presentation of compelling arguments, as well as from the ethics of virtue. The alternative is the pursuit of real life issues and urgent problems – all based on interpersonal relations that advance the welfare, dignity, well-being, and development of people.

The Levinasian dialogue: Named for the French philosopher Emmanuel Levinas, its point of departure is the primacy that Levinas assigns to ethics above any other philosophical or scientific investigation, and certainly above any self-indulgence or utilitarian action. According to this moral approach, at the heart of the human encounter lies not human rights and individual freedoms – as important but also alienating and distancing elements – but the duty of the individual to be responsible for preserving the human dignity of other individuals, and especially to defend their otherness and unique nature. In this context, the commandment “Thou shalt not murder” refers rather to refraining from taking a functional approach based on personal interest or an educational-paternalistic approach to others, since in both the singular nature of the other is eclipsed and obscured, and the other's humanity and identity are erased and nullified.

The ecological dialogue: This dialogue seeks to “cross the species barrier” and renew the covenant between humanity and nature. Out of an awareness of mistakes and the heavy toll exacted by humanity's alienation from nature, including the ecological catastrophes we have brought upon ourselves, a dialogic and ecological position is presented that exhibits empathetic care for our natural environment. This approach views humanity as an integral and essential part of nature, and couples awareness of human and individual conditions for growth with an attentive and caring awareness for the thirsty tree, withered leaf, the turtle that has found itself on its back, the beached whale, extinct or captive species, the cleanliness of the oceans and rivers, and the preservation of primordial natural landscapes.

The dialogue in democratic education: This dialogue arose and developed as a result of a tradition of progressive education and in the context of child-centered concepts, self-realization, active and experiential learning, inner motivation, self-direction, and a democratic culture. The basic assumption of this dialogue is that since knowledge is analogous to a huge ocean, and since learning best occurs when it is associated with

the students' strengths and is motivated by their own inner curiosity, a curriculum should be constructed around these strengths to help the students aspire to broaden knowledge, rather than subjugate them to subject-oriented "knowledge islands" of one kind or another. Further features of this dialogue include a social climate of acceptance and safeness, in addition to democratic participation involving all decisions that are related to the personal fate of the students and the shape that the educational institution will take.

A dialogue of peace at times of conflict: Although this dialogue can teach us about education toward good neighborly relations and coexistence, it is specifically oriented toward the resolution of prolonged and intractable conflicts between enemies and rivals: between communities, peoples, and States. Conflicts such as these develop and escalate by means of processes involving the demonization of the other, denial of his arguments and logic, and alienation toward his heritage and culture. The alternative posed by the dialogue of peace includes processes of learning about the world of the other through academic study and interpersonal communication, the granting of legitimacy to the other's perspective and collective narrative, acceptance of partial responsibility for the source of the conflict, empathy for the predicament and suffering of the other, and the rejection of prejudices and stereotyping.

By means of concluding, relevant to all the various forms of educational dialogue and adhering to the contemporary notions of humanism and humanistic education, I wish to propose four principles or regulative ideals which could serve well present day teachers in their employment of the manifold forms of educational dialogues.

- **The first principle** affirms that speech is the principal medium through which human beings present their humanity, and that educational dialogue is the best forging ground for the emergence and growth of humanity – especially in the case of the most marginalized, neglected, and unconventional children.
- **The second** holds that **humanistic morality** and in particular interpersonal caring, social responsibility, and human solidarity lie at the

core motivation and guiding principle of educational dialogue.

- **The third** contends that an important goal of empowering dialogues in education is to create bridges between others and build common denominators, but this should be carried out while avoiding the dangers of flattening cultural differences or effacement of identity.
- **The fourth** and last regulative ideal offered here is that in order for dialogical pedagogy to be both humanistic, holistic, and effective – reaching all children, providing them with relevant and meaningful educative experiences, and influencing them in edifying, empowering, and liberating manners – our educational practices should involve multiple forms of empowering educational dialogues: creating avenues to the souls and minds of all our students and introducing them to varied educational experiences in the emotional, intellectual, moral, social, cultural, and political spheres of their lives.

Dialogic Teaching

- [Philosophy with Children: The Lipman-Sharp Approach to Philosophy for Children](#)

Dialogical Education

- [Rancière on Radical Equality and Adult Education](#)

Dialogue

- [Existential Individual Alone Within Freire's Sociopolitical Solidarity](#)
- [Freire's Philosophy and Pedagogy: Humanization and Education](#)

Dialogue and Critical Pedagogy

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Introduction

Ever since Plato's dialogues, and the focus on a "Socratic method," dialogue has come to hold a central place in Western views of education. Under the Socratic approach, dialogue teaches how to think in a way that produces an autonomous, skeptical learner. More recently, the Brazilian educator Paulo Freire added a further dimension to this tradition: for Freire, dialogical teaching is more democratic, egalitarian, and liberating (compared with didactic, and for Freire oppressive, "monological" modes of teaching). For Freire, a teacher committed to liberatory, progressive values *must* rely on dialogical methods or something like them. Through Freire's work, dialogue has become a central theme in the *praxis* of critical pedagogy.

Questioning the Tradition

However, the Freirean tradition of critical pedagogy, with its emphasis on dialogue, has come under criticism from feminist, post-structural, and post-colonial perspectives. Perhaps the most important of these criticisms is from Elizabeth Ellsworth, beginning with her essay "Why Doesn't This Feel Empowering? Working Through the Repressive Myths of Critical Pedagogy," and then elaborated more fully in her book *Teaching Positions*. The central issue raised by Ellsworth can be described as interrogating the *unconscious* of dialogue: to look beneath the surface of overt meanings and expressed intentions to examine what is *not* being acknowledged or talked about. The problem with the idealized conception of dialogue, which represents itself as an open conversation in which anyone can speak and

any topic can be broached, is not only that certain people may in fact not be speaking, certain things may not be spoken (and may not even be speakable under the implicit terms of a dialogue), but that, precisely because the surface level of the engagement *is* so apparently reasonable, inclusive, and well-intentioned, what gets left out, or who gets left out, remains not only hidden but is subtly denigrated. If you cannot (or will not) express yourself in this manner, the fault lies with you. Yet, as in other sorts of communicative struggle, if one is forced to express one's objections in a vocabulary or manner that are not of one's choosing, the effect may be either to suppress some of those objections or to force them through a semantic filter that changes their meaning. Ellsworth and other critics draw from a wider body of literature that wants to look at the reserve side of ostensibly "inclusive" educational practices, such as dialogue, to examine what is, in practice, *exclusive* about them. Critical pedagogy, it appears, is not sufficiently critical about itself.

Alison Jones highlights a related problem of dialogue in contexts of cultural difference. The *desire for dialogue*, as she puts it, can carry its own kinds of coercive influence. When people from different backgrounds try to discuss their experiences and differences – as often happens in multicultural classrooms – they are put in asymmetrical positions of risk and self-disclosure. Who are these conversations for, and who do they benefit? When critical educators talk about the virtues of cross-cultural understanding, this is tilted almost always in the direction of the supposed benefits for dominant groups of coming to better understand or empathize with members of non-dominant groups. Jones challenges this aspiration: because groups are nondominant, they often have to expend much more time and effort explaining themselves to the dominant groups than vice versa. The benefits of assuaging liberal guilt or reassuring members of dominant groups of their open-mindedness and good intent are reinforced by such conversations – benefits not necessarily extended to the members of nondominant groups themselves. One could even call this a kind of voyeurism: "Dialogue and recognition of difference turn out to be access for dominant groups to

the thoughts, cultures, lives of others” (Jones 2004, p. 65). For Jones, “the desire for the embodied other. . . may also be a desire for redemption, or forgiveness, on behalf of the white students. . . [T]he dominant group seeks its *own* inclusion by being rescued from its inability to hear the voices of the marginalized” (Jones 2004, pp. 64, 65). In such cases, Jones says, members of nondominant groups may choose to hold back from participating in the conversation, remaining silent as a strategy of self-protection – or even seeking to withdraw from the common classroom space entirely. A question raised here for the critical pedagogue is: Whose side are you on?

Megan Boler, along with Jones and other contributors to Boler’s *Democratic Dialogue in Education: Troubling Speech, Disturbing Silence*, examine some pedagogical responses to these difficulties. Two are especially pertinent here. One is the creation of separate spaces in the classroom, where members of nondominant groups can withdraw and speak safely with others who share their experiences and backgrounds, where they do not have to explain themselves to others or re-educate them at the cost of their own effort and trouble. The other response involves requiring some participants to refrain from speaking in a discussion in order to create a space for others, who may have been silent, to feel encouraged to speak. (In some cases, this may be joined with the intention to make dominant group members “see what it feels like” to be in a silenced position.) Both of these approaches can be viewed as constraints on fully open dialogue of the idealized type, in which participants ought to be able to participate in any way and to any extent that they choose, but these also can be viewed as provisional compromises made *in order* to encourage more and better dialogue, albeit dialogue of a different sort than the fully open, participatory ideal. It is the inability of that idealized mode of dialogue to accommodate the involvement of diverse others that has made some progressive teachers adopt strategies that identify different rules of engagement for different participants. Boler terms this “affirmative action pedagogy.”

This issue can be viewed in another way. An underlying ethos of the idealized conception of dialogue is that while problems certainly can crop

up during an exchange (misunderstanding, conflict, hard feelings, disagreement about the purpose of the discussion, and so on), these can and should be redeemed *within* the framework of dialogue itself. The solution to problems encountered in dialogue should be pursued through. . . more dialogue. Jones, in her essay in Boler’s book, and Suzanne de Castell, in her contribution, both term this approach “the Talking Cure,” as if all problems should be talked through until a solution presents itself. Yet such a valorization of dialogue expresses a number of culturally bounded assumptions about how people ought to communicate and express themselves. Instead, Jones and others want to examine when withdrawal from dialogue and/or silence may be the more appropriate response.

Huey-li Li, in another chapter of Boler’s book, explores the issue of silence from a different cultural orientation. Many critics regard the issue of silence either through the lens of asymmetrical power (groups or individuals are “silenced”) or as a pointed refusal to participate, an active or passive withdrawal from participation. Li wants to argue instead for the *expressive* possibilities of silence. Silence is not the opposite of speech; rather, there are different kinds of silence, and those truly interested in cross-cultural understanding need to take on the burden of hearing what these different kinds of silence might mean. Forcing others to speak, to articulate what they think and feel in explicit words, is in Li’s phrase “silencing silence,” and she means this as a rebuke to well-intended pedagogues who believe they are serving the interests of those groups by “privileging their voices” or continually pressing them to speak up and “contribute.” For Li, the socially committed classroom is often too preoccupied with verbal dialogue to listen to its silences. In the rush to fill empty discursive spaces with more talk, real if subtle connotations are missed, and cultures that *privilege silence* (she mentions Navaho, Zen, and Indian yoga as examples) are effectively “silenced” themselves by an ethos that says, In order for you to be heard, you must speak in our way.

Li places the responsibility squarely on dominant groups to spend more time cultivating in

themselves the capacity for listening (including listening to silences) and less on trying to “give voice” to those who may not want it under the terms on which it is offered. Silence can be of many sorts; and if one takes silence as an indication of a problem, something to be remedied or compensated for, this depends greatly on what type of silence one takes it to be. Silence can be voluntary and self-imposed, or it can be the result of external pressures and constraints; silence can be expressive, or it can be empty, unreadable; silence can be temporary, situational, or it can represent a consistent, problematic pattern; silence can signify active withdrawal from a conversation, or it can be an indicator of attentive, thoughtful listening; and so on. As Li makes clear, assaying silence and deciding whether it is educationally pernicious or beneficial requires attention to cultural and situational specifics and cannot be diagnosed with broad, dichotomous categories (either one “has voice” or one “is silenced”). How can a teacher know what kind of silence she or he is dealing with? Whose silence is a cause for concern, and why? Li’s central point is that our tendency to denigrate silence, or to see it automatically as a sign of some deeper problem, overly valorizes the chatty dimensions of participation; this poses a substantial challenge to the ways we think about dialogue.

Rethinking Dialogue

Standing back from these particular criticisms, what has shifted in the educational literature is a move away from an idealized conception of dialogue to a cultural politics of dialogue: dialogue is neither a good nor a bad thing, in itself, and the decision about whether to teach with dialogue, when, how, and with whom – or, on the other side, the decision to participate in it, or not (whether, when, how, and with whom) – needs to be made within a broader political analysis of identity, interest, and purpose. We think of the educational context as a generally altruistic one, given to the promotion of freedom, the open expression and exploration of ideas, and personal as well as group or community development and

advancement, for all participants. In critical pedagogy, these values are embedded in a larger vision of social liberation and teaching as an expression of political commitment; here it can be particularly difficult – and threatening – to explore the possibility that one’s own teaching and good intentions can be part of the problem of exclusion and oppression.

But when these questions get resituated in recognition of diverse styles of communication, diverse identities, and diverse political interests and purposes, good intentions derived from even the most liberatory sentiments no longer suffice. Suddenly dialogue reappears as a potentially restrictive, possibly even hegemonic norm and constraint. The educational purposes of promoting mutual understanding, tolerance, and empathy, while clearly of value, may not be the overriding values in all circumstances.

This way of reframing the question regards the development of dialogical relations as itself a political project, one in which there may be necessary reasons to resist or challenge even the terms and conditions of dialogue itself. But at the same time politics is always *for* something, and it is difficult to imagine any conception of social justice that does not at some level seek dialogue and more open, responsive communicative relations as an end point. Hence even challenges to dialogue must entail, at some level, a commitment to dialogue itself. The question, then, becomes dialogues of what *kind*?

One of these potential outcomes, whether implicit or explicit, is captured in expressions like “dialogue *across* difference.” Such bridging metaphors express two key assumptions that need to be re-examined. The first is that a goal of dialogue is to achieve connections of understanding and agreement – which may not be unworthy goals, especially in many educational settings, but which cannot be taken as unproblematic even when they spring from good intentions. Alison Jones’ work, discussed earlier, provides several reasons for this suspicion. Apart from issues of good intention, certain kinds of difference may simply be of an order that cannot be bridged. Some differences resist exploration and reconciliation; they cannot be explained in terms that

“bridge” misunderstanding and agreement. Other differences are overtly oppositional and refuse the very aim of bridging itself. By encompassing all sorts of difference within the norms of communicative interaction, dialogue can have a tendency to *domesticate difference*, which, in the case of certain kinds of difference, is to fail fundamentally to come to grips with the challenges they represent.

Critical pedagogy tends to view differences as constituted within relations of power, and usually power of a dyadic sort: oppressor and oppressed, ruling class and working class, hegemon and victim of false consciousness, and so on. This framework may have some advantages from a political standpoint, identifying clear enemies and clear victims, clear lines for organizing a movement of solidarity against the powerful. But ever since Foucault, this theory of power has proven less and less satisfactory. For Foucault, power is not something one group has and another group lacks: it is a system that catches up all social participants in a network of relations of complicity and compliance. Nor is there just one polarity of power acting at one time: in a social situation, gender may constitute one dimension of power, but race and class may cross-hatch those relations in complex and contradictory ways. Power is not unidimensional and does not always flow in one direction. All of this is commonplace now; but what is important for this discussion is how these understandings of power underlie conceptions of difference. Critical pedagogy generally continues to frame difference in the context of dyadic relations of power: a difference is a difference *between* contending individuals and groups. Hence the challenge of maintaining dialogue *across* difference. A more multidimensional conception of power yields, in consequence, a more multifaceted (and often contradictory) conception of differences: differences are constituted *against* certain normalizing expectations; they operate *within* nonunitary identities; they press *beyond* dyadic choices. From this perspective, critical pedagogy of a Freirean variety suffers from a limited theoretical framework from which to understand the complexities of differences and how they work within and against structures of

power, and its idealized conception of dialogue is insufficiently attuned to how these differences play out in communicative norms and practices.

When one begins with a dyadic view, when dialogue “succeeds” in drawing radical or oppositional differences into the norms of communicative interaction, certain beneficial compacts may be forged, new knowledge and understandings may be established – but at the risk of cooptation and normalization. By being drawn into working within those communicative norms, some differences may have to be given up or compromised, so that, while *within* the dialogue a measure of tolerance and inclusivity might obtain, the *framework* of the dialogue has its own biased and exclusionary effects. Ironically, it may be that those very communicative relations which try to be most open and inclusive *for that very reason* are more difficult to diagnose in terms of their blind spots and, hence, more difficult to resist. Who can be against openness, tolerance, and inclusivity? But for that reason these modes of dialogue may be the most subtly co-opting and normalizing. Dialogue is never simply, then, operating *across* a divide between two persons or groups; it comprises internal tensions and contradictions as well.

These criticisms raise further questions about the typical aims of dialogue: understanding, consensus, shared knowledge, mutual recognition, learning, and inquiry. They raise questions about the form of dialogue and its implicit norms about how reasonable, polite, and respectful discourse ought to proceed. They raise questions about the asymmetrical positions between the participants in dialogue: not just relations of unequal power but relations of unequal risk, unequal effort, and unequal benefit gained from the “successful” results of such dialogue. As I have argued previously, there are different types of dialogue, with different purposes and different norms attached to them. But who decides what kind of dialogue a present dialogue will be? Once implicated in a dialogue, who gets to decide to change it, to redirect it, or to leave it? Critical pedagogical dialogues are often pursued within contexts where the authority (and patent good intentions)

of the pedagogue, the expectations of other participants, and the broader norms of the educational setting all can place coercion on resistant partners to participate and to participate in a particular manner and spirit. In this way, the benign expressed purposes of critical pedagogical dialogue can put resistant partners in a defensive, reactive position: the burden is on them to explain why they will not participate in the appropriate manner and spirit, in a process that someone else thinks is directed to their benefit. When critical pedagogical dialogue is invested not only with the benign purpose of educational exploration and discovery but also with the aim of political solidarity and liberation, resistance to these benign objectives sometimes gets framed as recalcitrance, false consciousness, or obstructionism. What happens when an emancipatory endeavor comes to understand itself as potentially impositional and exclusionary?

Conclusion

It may be uncomfortable to hear words like “coercion” attached to the polite, respectful conventions that govern participation in dialogue. But the criticisms I have reviewed here challenge advocates of dialogue to view these norms from the outside, from the perspective of those to whom they are neither neutral nor benign. For them, the gentle invitation into dialogue can sound like this: “Speak up! Participate. Talk this way. When things become difficult, keep talking. Expose yourself. Explain yourself. Justify yourself. Stick to the subject (a subject chosen and decided by someone else). Answer all questions. Be polite and respectful, even to those who may despise or miscomprehend you — this is your chance to change their minds. Listen to all points of view — we’re all here to learn from each other.” A truly critical pedagogy, therefore, has to go deeper in interrogating how its aims and methods are actually felt and experienced by participants. Subjecting these to questioning and criticism *within* the pedagogical space requires a willingness to abandon certain a priori assumptions and

aims about whose “liberation” one is seeking to promote and what that liberation means. Promoting dialogue is not irrelevant to that critical process, but sometimes such criticism needs to encompass the form, the tacit rules, and the aims and purposes of dialogue itself.

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Dialogue that We Are, The

- [Gadamer and the Philosophy of Education](#)

Didactics

- [Comenius, John Amos \(1592–1670\)](#)

Difference

- Deleuze, Ontology, and Mathematics
- Derrida and the Ethics of Reading
- Gender, Postcolonialism, and Education
- Gendered Violences and Queer of Color Critiques in Educational Spaces: Remembering Sakia, Carl, and Jaheem

Difference/Différance

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For Jacques Derrida, Claude Lévi-Strauss – like Ferdinand de Saussure, Plato, Aristotle, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau – among others, excluded writing “as a phenomenon of exterior representation, both useless and dangerous” (Derrida 1981). This, of course, was a metaphysical judgment safeguarding the reduction of the exteriority of the sign and difference for the sake of the sameness of voice. To Saussure, for example, the logocentric favoring of the seeming presence of one (the *phone*) over the absence of the other (the *graphie*) must have been justified by the model of “phonetic-alphabetic” script used to delimit language, a “type” sustaining the impression of *presenting speech* while simultaneously erasing “itself before speech” (Ibid., p. 25). Conversely, Derrida has tried to show “there is no purely phonetic writing, and that phonologism is less a consequence of the practice of the alphabet in a given culture than a certain ethical or axiological *experience* of this practice” (Ibid., p. 25) that posits the resistance of difference. Within this practicability of metaphysics, its pedagogy of the cultural politics of the sign, the implication is clearly as follows:

Writing should erase itself before the plenitude of living speech, perfectly represented in the transparency of its notation, immediately present for the

subject who speaks it, and for the subject who receives its meaning, content, value. (Ibid., p. 25)

The most significant point for Derrida is “not only not to privilege one substance – here the phonic, so called temporal, substance – while excluding another – for example, the graphic, so called spatial, substance – but even to consider every process of signification as a formal play of differences” (Ibid., p. 26).

The enigmatic modification deconstituting and dislocating the “linear expressivity” of the sign reinforces the need to ask the question, How does “grammatology” incite a rethinking of difference and destabilize the traditional boundaries of “writing” and “text” or “textuality” in the deconstructive sense of the articulation of a “non-” or “anti-disciplinary object,” when there seems to have been a neutralization of “every substance, be it phonic, graphic, or otherwise?” (Ibid., p. 26). We may possibly receive the following answer from Derrida: “Of course it is not a question of resorting to the same concept of writing and of simply inverting the dissymmetry that now has become problematical” (Ibid., p. 26). And, to be more specific, the broader and more radical redefining of the concept of writing that is proposed to encompass every kind of expression, communication, and coding (phonic, graphic, artistic) “can be called *gram* or *différance*” (Ibid., p. 26). The distinguishing characteristic of this “semio-scriptology” would be the “play of differences” and meaning deferrals involving the interweaving of syntheses and references, but not to the extent that a “simple element” of its signification-psyche generation would be “present in and of itself, referring only to itself” (Ibid., p. 26) as the auto-affective arbiter of complete, unmitigating and unrelenting, sense.

As such, the “text” or “textuality” of this writing is a *chaining of signs*, not simply sign functions standing in for a (cultural) center of mediated meaning, but “only, everywhere, differences and traces of traces,” (Ibid., p. 26) within which the “gram” would come to be *the most general sign and semiology would be therefore reconstituted as grammatology*. This is the clarification of the outline Derrida has presented for the *science of a new*

writing. Since the gram “is a structure and a movement no longer conceivable on the basis of the opposition presence/absence” (Ibid., p. 27) and flourishes within the codic play of differences, it is as *différance* that the grammatological conversion of semiology takes place via deconstruction. There are some crucial sticking points however that we must address.

On the basis of the above function, *différance* is incompatible “with the static, synchronic, taxonomic, ahistorical motifs in the concept of structure” (Ibid., p. 27), and yet, contrastingly, it is *not* “astructural.” Derrida insists on this, because the “systematic and regulated transformations” (Ibid., p. 28) in the specificity of its general workings are able to develop, in certain cases, “the most legitimate principled exigencies of ‘structuralism’” (Ibid., p. 28). That would be, for example, in the extended concatenation of syntagmatic units of expression whose traces are *deferred* and *multiplied* to some degree within the *differential* or *fragmented* proportionality of discursive or narrative structures. And here we come to the crux of the matter we must next follow to gauge the ethicity of the sign in this mode of an always already immanently refracted referentiality, as Derrida defines it. It cannot be said, from this vantage, that some “present and in-different being” (Ibid., p. 28) in any shape or form “precedes *différance* or spacing” (Ibid., p. 28), for example, a subject “who would be the agent, author, and master of *différance*,” (Ibid., p. 28) or upon whom *différance* would impose itself. Why? Because, to Derrida, “Subjectivity – like objectivity – is an effect of *différance*, an effect inscribed within a system of *différance*” (Ibid., p. 28). We can now begin to evaluate the implications of this claim – the effectivity of why and how it is made – for the phenomenality of the writing of Being, the being written, all that relates deconstruction and the institution of pedagogy in the cultural politics of the sign and its ethicity. Since, it would seem, at least for the moment, that the ethico-axiological agency of the “being present” of the sign, *its being as presence*, is forever undercut as such, and with it is summarily extinguished the metaphysical light of both the educational edifice

of a valuation of truth and the psychological comfort of a sense of origin.

The most affable text for engaging the complexity of these ramifications is “Différance,” the lecture Derrida addressed to the *Société Française de Philosophie* on January 27, 1968. (Although the text of this discourse has appeared in many different places, the version of “Différance” I will be using is found in Derrida (1973).) As is noted in the preamble to the discourse “proper,” the French verb *différer*, like the Latin *differre*, suggests two meanings of association, “to differentiate” and “to delay,” thus relating the idea of difference in two unsimilar ways:

On the one hand, it indicates difference as distinction, inequality, or discernability; on the other, it expresses the interposition of delay, the interval of a spacing and temporalizing that puts off until “later” what is presently denied, the possible that is presently impossible. Sometimes the *different* and sometimes the *deferred* correspond [in French] to the verb “to differ.” This correlation, however, is not simply one between act and object, cause and effect, or primordial and derived.

In the one case “to differ” signifies non-identity; in the other case it signifies the order of the same. Yet there must be a common, although entirely *différente*, root within the sphere that relates the two movements of differing to one another. We provisionally give the name *différance* to this sameness which is not identical. (Ibid., p. 129)

Using the letter “a” from the present participle of the verb *différer*, e.g., “*différente*,” Derrida constructs the noun *différance*, a new word, a “nonword” that is, in his estimation, a “non-concept” – profoundly ametaphysical – precisely because it cannot be either “narrowed down” or “fixed” to a single part of both of its meanings. It is perhaps the “penultimate” of deconstructive terms, if that were possible in this *poststructural* sense, given that the difference of *différance* is only perceptible *in writing*, since the change of spelling is inaudible – the “e” for which the “a” is substituted being silent to the (French) ear. Thus, the “semanteme” that is “neither a *word* nor a *concept*” (Ibid., p. 130) expresses both meanings of differentiation as spatiotemporality and as the movement that structures each kind of dissociation in the “middle voice” between passivity and activity like the penumbra of an irreducible origin

of production. It is perhaps the offspring of the monstrosity Derrida predicts at the end of his famous lecture at Yale University, "Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences" (1966), deconstruction already having given form in itself to a *species of non-species marking the unnameable in the alterity of a philosophical subject metaphysics cannot stomach or mouth*. And here it would be tempting – yes it is – to consider *différance* an operating principle, to criticize it as the ambivalent counterpart to a philosophy of origin upon which the Other must rely or fall. But this would also be to misunderstand, not to do justice to the interpretative formativity of a "doubling commentary" Derrida has said is possible at some minimal parameters of signification (see Derrida 1988. The chapter entitled "Afterword: Toward an Ethic of Discussion" is most clear about the misrepresentation of Derridean undecidability and the play of the sign), by representing *différance* as external to identity instead of it being always already within the non-indicative self-relation of the being written of Being, modifying the here and now "at the zero point of the subjective origin" (Derrida, *Speech and Phenomena*, p. 94). What it is that it does to the sign – for our purposes *the trace of the writing of the Self as Other* – is evident in the semiological prospectus of signification: the structural necessity of its repeatability or reiteration, beyond a single, unitary point of expression. If we acknowledge, as we should, a "sign" can signify *only through the force of repetition*, the consequences of *différance* render the sign relational rather than identical (e.g., not the selfsame, or "iconic," possessing the properties of its "referent"), thus bringing indication into line with expression to undo the Husserlian idea of a "pre-expressive intentionality" of pure consciousness. This line of argument decenters the subject, which brings it out of the shell of the Cartesian cogito that shelters its attempt at realizing the security of a self-discourse with itself – what Derrida shows to be an instance of noncommunication, because in the equating of self-hood with self-presence, the Other is effaced to the point where an inner

monologue with one's "Self" is not really an instance of transmissibility at all, but the self-deceptive verification of the desire for auto-affection or an attempt at the reduction of *différance*. In order to ascertain the existence of itself, a subject must refer outside of itself to the *world of the signs of the Other* using the resources of what does not begin "within" itself, therefore striving to refrain from obliterating itself just as it seems to have authenticated the uniqueness of its (own) existence. It is this relational aspect that Derrida makes us aware of about the ethical grounding of *différance* by referring to the constitutive function of the *sign trace* of the Other, the deferring difference between presence and repetition, self and nonself, which reveals itself as undecidability at the proliferative core of identity.

Derrida suggests that *différance* is or can stand for "the juncture – rather than the summation – of what has been most decisively inscribed in the thought of what is conveniently called our 'epoch'" ("Différance," p. 130). A poststructural age – that of the irreducible play of the sign – marks the delimitation of onto-theology, the decline of the metaphysics of presence (phono-logocentrism), and the possibility of an ethical opening of the subject toward the difference of the Other. But we must remember however the role of tradition in the formation of new thought. The following are given by Derrida as examples of the turns of difference within the reason of the prototypical thinkers that led to *différance*: "the difference of forces in Nietzsche, Saussure's principle of semiological difference, differing as the possibility of [neurone] facilitation, impression and delayed effect in Freud, difference as the irreducibility of the trace of the other in Levinas, and the ontic-ontological difference in Heidegger" (Ibid., p. 130). All of these individuals have no doubt figured greatly in the elaboration of the *working of deconstruction*, but more importantly the list displays the "discoveries" or "inventions" of varying fields from the history of philosophy to theology, linguistics, and psychoanalysis that have changed or altered perceptions of the ethics of Western metaphysics

in their refusal to be subdued or dominated by the dizzying substitutions of master signs within its self-enclosed system of truth and meaning. The exposition of the breadth of the contributions to the theory of *différance* makes a previous point quite clear: *différance* is not only “irreducible to every ontological or theological – onto-theological – reappropriation, but it opens up the very space in which onto-theology – philosophy – produces its system and its history. It thus encompasses and irrevocably surpasses onto-theology and philosophy” (Ibid., p. 135). The alogicality of its structure also prevents an afore-planned linearity within the reading of the writing of signs, for example, the ordering of a “reason” of strategy or of finality of purpose, a tacticality toward teleology, “philosophical-logical discourse,” and its symmetrical opposite “logico-empirical speech” (Ibid., p. 135). The alternative to these more or less traditional discourses of epistemological fortitude and forbearance is a “semiotics” of the play of difference as *différance*, a subject Derrida favors and has little difficulty in handling regarding the elements of difference in the teachings of Friedrich Nietzsche, Sigmund Freud, Saussure, Martin Heidegger, and Emmanuel Levinas.

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Differentiation

► [Fairness in Educational Assessment](#)

Diffusionist Model of Adoption of Digital Learning, The

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Introduction

In the contemporary network society, human learning is dialectically intertwined with digital technologies. Instead of talking about adopting computers in education (and formal educational systems, in particular) therefore, theorists of the early twenty-first century are increasingly using the integral perspective of digital culture which provides “a richer engagement with the ways education is shaped and practiced with and through the digital” (Knox 2015, pp. 1–2). Yet, as newer versions of technologies continuously replace their older counterparts, and as conceptually new kinds of gadgets (such as tablet computers or smartphones) and web products (such as various sharing platforms) enter the scene, it is still important to understand the dynamics of digital innovation within educational systems. Historically, the first digital technologies have been invented within institutions of education and research – for instance, the first e-mail in history was exchanged between computers at UCLA and Stanford. Immediately after their public release, however, digital technologies have been taken up by the marketplace and then returned to educational institutions as vehicles of progress. It is within this dialectic that schools and universities have become recipients of digital technologies, including but not limited to specialized products developed for teaching and learning.

The adoption of digital technologies within educational systems can be described by several models and theories including the Gartner Hype Cycle, the Technology Acceptance Model, domestication theory, etc. Arguably, however, the oldest and the most influential model is the

theory of diffusion of innovations developed in early 1960s by Everett Rogers (1986, 1962/1995). Based on Rogers's theory, Zemsky and Massy developed the e-learning adoption cycle (2004, pp. 9–12), which has quickly been taken up by worldwide educational community (Duan et al. 2010; Zhang et al. 2010; Soffer et al. 2010). This article consists of three main parts. In the first part, it uses the diffusionist model developed by Zemsky and Massy to describe the history of adoption of digital learning into educational systems. In order to account for complexity and diversity of the relationships between digital technologies and human learning, it replaces the term e-learning originally used by Zemsky and Massy with the broader concept of digital learning (in the Encyclopaedia of Educational Philosophy and Theory, Hayes (2015) analyzes these differences in more depth). The second part of the article analyzes theoretical issues associated with the diffusionist model of adoption of digital learning, and the third part of the article analyzes its practical applications.


The Diffusionist Model of Adoption of Digital Learning

Zemsky and Massy's cycle of adoption of digital learning statistically distributes populations according to the Gauss curve into the following

categories: innovators, early adopters, early majority, late majority, and diehards (2004, pp. 9–12). Figure 1 represents the cycle of adoption of digital learning according to cumulative percentage of population, while Fig. 2 represents the cycle of adoption of digital learning according to relative percentage of population. This section applies Zemsky and Massy's model to the history of development of digital learning in formal educational systems such as schools and universities.


Human learning has had a prominent position in works of the early innovators of the computer industry (the so-called "digerati") such as Sherry Turkle, Howard Rheingold, Stewart Brand, Kevin Kelly, John Markoff, Jaron Lanier, Richard Stallman, and others. However, following fast penetration of broadband Internet in western homes during 1990s, the convergence between digital technologies and learning had been rapidly gaining importance in wide formal educational settings. The cycle of adoption of digital learning starts with *innovators*. In worldwide schools and universities, typical innovators were computer experts and enthusiasts who simultaneously developed and used digital technologies for learning. The stage of innovators is abundant with fresh ideas and small individual projects started mostly in technical schools, research laboratories, and private enterprises. Larger-scale projects for development of digital learning had mostly been conducted in computer laboratories of a few elite

Diffusionist Model of Adoption of Digital Learning, The,
Fig. 1 Adoption of digital learning according to cumulative percentage of population (based on Zemsky and Massy 2004, p. 9)



Diffusionist Model of Adoption of Digital Learning, The

Fig. 2 Adoption of digital learning according to relative percentage of population (based on Rogers 1962/1995, p. 262)



D

research institutions such as MIT and Stanford. Following such lack of institutional opportunities, worldwide innovators adopted “the lone-ranger approach” (Anderson and Elloumi 2004). The community of practitioners of digital learning was in its infancy, and research results were (if at all) published on the fringes of conferences and journals oriented to traditional research areas. Consequently, the stage of innovators is marked by significant overlapping between various development projects. For instance, during the early 1990s, almost every progressive educational institution had been developing its own virtual learning environment. For all those reasons, early research in digital learning was predominantly focused on technologies.

Moving on to the stage of *early adopters*, the population of digital learning practitioners had slowly shifted from technology experts toward teachers with special interest in information and communication technologies. Development had still been strongly technologically oriented. However, specialist licensed and open source tools for digital learning had slowly but surely flooded the technology marketplace. Classroom implementations of digital technologies had increased in size and scope. Research focus slowly had shifted from technology toward pedagogy, thus creating a widening gap between technology-oriented and pedagogy-oriented communities. Development and maintenance of learning technologies had still been dominated by the lone-ranger approach. However, there had been an

increasing number of larger interdisciplinary collaborative projects between individuals and institutions in specialized fields such as pedagogy and technology.

The stage of *early majority* had strongly reinforced these trends. The gap between technology and pedagogy had become deeper and wider. Specialized software companies and open source projects had rapidly grown in number and size, causing professionalization of technological development and support. Consequently, most educational institutions had discontinued their own production of learning technologies and switched to ready-made market products. Teachers and institutions had rapidly embraced digital learning: near the end of the phase of early majority, total penetration of digital learning in traditional educational systems had reached 50%. Development of digital learning had switched from small lone-ranger projects to large (r) collaborative projects. Consequently, the scope and extent of the supporting activities had exponentially increased. In order to fulfil the growing demands for labor, educational institutions had created new types of jobs such as e-learning managers, administrators of e-learning systems, and learning technologists. The new positions require specialist skills and knowledge: in order to satisfy the increasing demand for experts, educational institutions had introduced appropriate degrees.

By the beginning of 2016, arguably, the majority of educational institutions in the First World have entered the stage of *late majority*. In this

stage, trends identified in the stage of early majority have stabilized. Digital learning has a firm position in educational administration, teaching, and research. There are specialized conferences, journals, schools, departments, and communities of practitioners and researchers. The fields of learning technology and digital pedagogy have become highly developed. Research in digital learning has grown beyond issues related to school settings – at the beginning of 2016, new research frontiers are in the fields of digital cultures, critical theory, epistemology, and social studies of technology. According to Knox, these developments have brought about two main developments: “the diversity, nuance, and strangeness of culture, as opposed to the rational universalism of education, combined with useful perspectives from the philosophy and theory of technology, which are able to account for more complex notions of our relationships with the digital” (Knox 2015, p. 1).

The last population in the diffusionist model of adoption of digital learning are *diehards* (sometimes also pejoratively called *laggards*). For one reason or another, diehards will never adopt digital learning in their practice or will adopt the necessary minimum for normal functioning in the workplace. While Zemsky, Massy, and other early theorists of development of digital learning have sported slightly negative attitudes toward diehards, the perspective of digital cultures offers a more cautious approach. In saturated digital environments, it is the balance between the offline and online that matters, and diehards do have an important contribution to achieving that balance.

Theoretical Issues

The diffusionist model is overly simplified in several important ways. Firstly, the diffusionist model was developed in mid-twentieth century for analyzing the introduction of relatively simple agricultural techniques into farming (Rogers 1986, p. 117). In the context of digital cultures, however, digital learning is much more complex than any particular (agricultural) technique.

Secondly, people and institutions may belong to different categories in the context of two or more innovations. For instance, an innovator who took up using e-mails decades ago might be a diehard in the context of virtual learning environments – either by his or her orientation to technology or because of technological affordances or because of any combination of these factors. Thirdly, the diffusionist model does not recognize the objective obstacles to adoption of digital learning such as the Digital Divide.

The diffusionist model classifies past and present events. It places human adoption of digital learning into a proverbial Gauss curve, thus reapproving the universality of simple abstract mathematical laws in the context of various human activities. However, the diffusionist model is unable to predict whether yesterday's and today's trends will remain for the future. While it is easy enough, and often seducing, to extrapolate abstract mathematical curves, such extrapolations do not have theoretical grounding and result in mere speculations. Furthermore, it is impossible to predict the viable extent of digital learning in the future. In spite of continuous efforts, learning in areas such as painting, dancing, or music has proved more resistant to digitalization than fields such as languages and sciences.

Information and communication technologies constantly evolve. Today's computers bear little resemblance to dishwasher-sized machines of the 1970s or simple home entertainment tools of the 1980s. However, such mutations are not included in the diffusionist model. Recent history is full of examples where more advanced technologies, such as virtual learning environments, disrupted development of less advanced technologies, such as CD-ROM-based courses. However, the diffusionist model does not include disruptive technologies within an adoption cycle. In later works, Rogers tried to resolve the first problem by describing technology development using several diffusion curves and the latter by connecting several successive adoption curves (Rogers 1986, pp. 116–125). Such remedies improve accuracy of the diffusionist model, yet the inherent tension

between evolutionary and diffusionist models remains.

Ontologically, the concept of diffusion implies penetration of one medium into another (in biology and physical sciences, it usually refers to penetration of denser into less dense liquids during the process of osmosis). Therefore, the main prerequisite for diffusion is the ability to make a clear distinction between the two media, which, in the process of osmosis, is represented by a semipermeable membrane. In the age of digital cultures, however, it is impossible to divorce pre-digital learning from its digital counterpart. At the ontological level, therefore, the diffusionist model does not correspond to the reality.

Practical Applications

In spite of theoretical limitations, the diffusionist model of adoption of digital learning has many successful practical applications. In order to illustrate the main bases for such success, this section shows three applications of the diffusionist model of adoption of digital learning and analyzes reasons for their success. In the first study, Duan et al. (2010) successfully utilize an innovation adoption perspective in order to examine Chinese students' intention of taking up e-learning degrees at UK institutions. In the second study, Zhang et al. (2010) investigate "people's perceptions and attitudes toward adopting e-learning to explore the key factors affecting the e-learning adoption behavior in China. Based on Rogers' innovation adoption theory," they identify 33 factors of the perceived innovative attributes of e-learning and analyze them using advanced statistical methods. In the third study, Soffer et al. (2010) look deeper into the past and explore "long-term web-supported learning diffusion among lecturers at Tel Aviv University (TAU), from an organizational point of view" within the period of 8 years.

Duan et al. (2010) focus on the very specific group of Chinese students who consider taking up online degrees provided by UK universities. Zhang et al. (2010) ignore the temporal dimension and horizontally investigate 33 factors relevant for the adoption of e-learning here and now. On the

opposite side of the spectrum, Soffer et al. (2010) investigate the few factors relevant for the adoption of digital learning through the period of 8 years. These studies have been designed to minimize the impact of theoretical restrictions. For instance, it is reasonable to expect that students who seriously consider taking up an expensive overseas online degree possess elementary access to computer and the Internet – thus, in their research, Duan et al. (2010) could safely eliminate concerns related to the Digital Divide. Similarly, Zhang et al. (2010) can safely hedge the model's inability to make predictions, because their research question is firmly situated in the present. Applied to narrow questions, where theoretical restrictions have minor impact to studied phenomena, the diffusionist model of adoption of digital learning provides useful results. More generally, the usefulness of the diffusionist model of adoption of digital learning decreases in inverse proportion with size and complexity of the researched phenomenon.

The diffusionist model is phenomenological and unable to provide prediction of the future. However, formal educational institutions are traditionally inert. Therefore, as can easily be seen from Soffer, Nachmias, and Ram's analysis of 8 years of e-learning at Tel Aviv University (2010), the diffusionist model of adoption of digital learning enables sound short-term and mid-term educated guesses. A similar line of argument can be applied to the remaining theoretical restrictions, such as the model's failure to account for technological evolution and, more specifically, to account for disruptive technologies. Information and communication technologies do not evolve overnight; even the most disruptive technologies take few years for a complete market takeover. For instance, long after virtual learning environments powered by broadband Internet have disrupted their adoption curve, CD-ROM-based courses could still be found in various educational institutions. Theoretically, accuracy of the diffusionist model of adoption of digital learning decreases in inverse proportion with timescale. In practice, however, there is a fairly long "safe period" where the model provides accurate or near-accurate results. Therefore, the diffusionist model of adoption of digital

learning has proved instrumental in short-term to mid-term strategic and managerial decisions (Zemsky and Massy 2004; Bates 2000; Anderson and Elloumi 2004).

Conclusion

The diffusionist model of adoption of digital learning is instrumental in describing small-scale and time-restricted phenomena such as the implementation of this or that technology to a school or university. Theoretically unable to make predictions, the model does offer fairly accurate small-scale and mid-scale educated guesses. Therefore, the diffusionist model of adoption of digital learning is widely used in technology-related change management in worldwide educational institutions. However, the model does not offer an insight into the evolution of digital learning and the emotional work of teachers in adopting digital tools in their practices. It cannot explain why people take up one technology and abandon another; it does not provide a window into the future. The diffusionist model of adoption of digital learning is based on a simple statistical method – the Gauss curve – which merely distributes populations according to certain criteria. For as long as the research problem is framed in ways that avoid the main theoretical restrictions, and for as long as results returned by the model are interpreted phenomenologically, the diffusionist model will yield accurate and useful results. The praxis of education equally consists of everyday practical improvements and grand theoretical achievements. Firmly situated in the first domain, the diffusionist model of adoption of digital learning provides an important tool for managing technological change in educational institutions.

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Digital Gaming

- Videogaming and Literacies

Digital Learning

- Digital Learning, Discourse, and Ideology

Digital Learning and the Changing Role of the Teacher

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Introduction

Even though educational institutions have been key to the development of digital practices, teachers are sometimes regarded as late adopters,

often with good reason (Cuban and Jandric 2015). At the start of the twenty-first century, there was little direct use of digital technology for teaching in schools or universities. However, teachers worked within cultures and societies already becoming reliant on digital technologies and increasingly defined by them.

Contemporary writing traces shifting relationships across teaching practices, digital mediation, and the influence of globalization. There are debates about the resulting impact on who teachers are, and what they (are able to) do, in the era of digital learning. The emergence of newer forms of technology to support and mediate the processes of teaching and learning has also led to a reexamination of the theoretical underpinnings of those practices – educational purposes, values, and structures – and the forms of literacy associated with these. Several strands of critical research literature highlight changes in the society's relationship with teachers and pedagogy. Historical analyses of the repressive impact of the print era, political inquiries into the effects of neoliberalism on universities, and pedagogical calls for emancipatory approaches to teaching and learning all present evidence of the teacher's changing role.

An initial broad look at the context sets the scene for considering definitions around digital teaching, mediation effects, and cultural and political influences.

The Changing Context for Learning

Educational systems have always been dependent on the prevailing technological affordances of recording, transmission, reproduction, and communication of their era. Biological, mechanical, and electrical means of achieving these basic functions have all made their mark on the practices of teaching and learning, although when changes in these are gradual, they may go unnoticed. However, “the digital” is regarded by many commentators as different in kind, with the impact of the technological change comparable to that from the oral tradition to literacy, or from written communication to mass dissemination

through print. As in previous eras, the newer forms of technology retain features of those which they supplant; in addition, older forms find new avenues, as exemplified by Walter Ong (2012/1982) who refers to the “secondary orality” as demonstrated, for example, in television, which would not have existed without writing and print. Digital technologies have brought even more oral culture than television, including changes to television that have rendered it interactive, asynchronous (and differently synchronous), remixable, and ultimately unrecognizable from its original form.

As education in the twenty-first century has begun to emerge from the 500-year dominance of the printed word, some commentators have identified a restoration of more democratic and dialogical approaches to teaching and learning. This fits with Pettit's (2012) notion of the “Gutenberg Parenthesis” – the relatively short period of modernity where the printed book was the source of authority and control – creating a digression from the former and now renewed oral communication mode. At the heart of the escape from the print era are issues of voice, agency, and connection – not new ideas in themselves but given new opportunities to flourish – not least in education (Wegerif 2013). Less optimistically, some writers suggest that neoliberal policies and practices in educational institutions and beyond are stifling debate about teaching and privileging an economic and utilitarian perspective on education over a pedagogical or intellectual one. Technology might be a mediating factor in either case: digital technology has the capacity to support communication and openness, as in the open source movement; it also supports automation, which might lead to commodification and closure. While these examples illustrate potential contradictions and tensions about the role of technology, they do not represent a simple binary: technology does not only promote communication and automation. Support functions for education from digital technology include, *inter alia*, acceleration, administration, automation, calculation, communication, design, display, learning analytics, simulation, surveillance/observation, and storage/

retrieval. These inevitably affect a teacher's role and status, as do social changes that have accompanied such technological functions.

Defining the Teacher and Teaching Practices

The advent of the expression "student-centered learning" suggested a shift in focus from "traditional" subject-based curricula. It emerged in the 1980s, peaking around 1999–2003, but fitted well into the narratives around digital learning that followed soon after. In 1993, the title of a short article entitled "From Sage on the Stage to Guide on the Side" (King 1993) prompted many citations and adaptations even two decades later. Thus the teacher's role was already being questioned by writers on educational development, and by educational policy makers, just before the arrival of popular awareness of the Internet through the World Wide Web. As digital learning became possible, then, there was already a mood to move from transmission of knowledge to construction of knowledge – from instructivism to constructivism. While either or both of these might be enhanced by digital technology, some teachers saw technology as a potential "Trojan horse" to introduce more progressive teaching methods.

Metaphors and other tropes around teaching bring out competing understandings at a time of change. The simplest conceptualization is that teaching involves the transmission of knowledge. The teacher possesses knowledge in a particular domain, works to structure it in an accessible way, and transmits that knowledge to the learners. A radical constructivist position would suggest that knowledge cannot be simply transmitted from one individual to another, but must be constructed anew in the mind of every learner. The debate between instructivism and constructivism raises questions about the teacher's role as a repository of domain knowledge, especially when there are digital alternatives to this. The implication might be that what is important in the teacher is the generic skill in supporting learning – and perhaps the cultivation of generic

scholarship in the student – as opposed to disseminating high levels of domain specific knowledge.

"Guide on the side" has not, however, become a job title. "Facilitator" sometimes has, though it is more likely to refer to the role in a very specific context, such as in resource- or problem-based learning. The education sector globally has had some difficulties with terminology, and these increased with new roles emerging with the use of technology. Differences could be local, or they may reflect changes in emphasis. For example, "tuition" might be something that a teacher gives you (UK) or something that you pay (USA). Some countries refer to course or curriculum design, others to instructional design, an expression that was widely used in the USA from the 1980s. Early in the twenty-first century, the notion of "learning design" began to gain momentum. The person who does that design might be a teacher, but might instead have the title "instructional designer" and be considered not to be a teacher or instructor but someone who supports the teacher, especially if digital technology has an impact on the complexity of the design of educational activities. Another title that has developed with digital technology has been "learning technologist," which has raised a number of discussions, not least among learning technologists themselves, about what the expression really means and thus what the role encompasses. In some contexts, learning technologists will be directly involved in teaching; in others, not at all.

Other titles related to the teaching role are facilitator, demonstrator, tutor, faculty, lecturer, and professor – all words that can have different connotations in different times, places, and contexts. The definitions relate to what people do, but also to their status, both of which are significant to their role at a time of change. Just as the word "lecturer" has evolved from its original application to a person who reads a text, before the printing press rendered that unnecessary, it may be that some words will change their reference and other new words may be required to describe teaching in the age of digital learning. This may have implications for individuals' career and professional development and remuneration.

Phrases saying “what people do” in education might hint at tools used for mediation, though they can be more subtle than that. While *e-learning*, *technology-enhanced learning*, and *digital learning* emphasize that the teacher and/or the student is using technology, another terminology perhaps offers a greater indication of how the learning is to be done. The shift from transmission to construction clearly involves a change of metaphor, and constructivism, especially social constructivism, is seen as particularly appropriate for digital learning. Technologies have also offered metaphors for the way in which educational engagements should proceed. Ideas such as *networked learning* and *connectivism* have called upon notions of nodes, linkages, and communication as a way to understand, and to provide prescriptions for, pedagogic design and action in a highly connected world. However, it is interesting that in their continuing emphasis on student-centered learning, these expressions do not explicitly say anything about what the teacher does. For more details on what the online teacher actually does, see Sinclair and Macleod (2015).

These debates suggest potential confusion about expectations of teachers, especially in relation to subject knowledge, which is now readily available digitally and no longer needs to be transmitted. This should not be seen to imply that subject knowledge in teachers is not required; in the more dialogical context, it is still essential for diagnosing conceptual problems to enable the teacher to steer conversations or structure learner experience in a coherent way. Indeed initial and sustained learner motivation comes through the manifest enthusiasm that is displayed for the subject by those influential others – frequently teachers – in the student’s world. The teacher might thus be positioned as a model of academic values and behavior. Those values and associated actions now take place in digital academic environments as well as in physical locations.

There are other concerns about teachers’ roles, such as long-running arguments over whether what the teacher wants to achieve will be the same irrespective of medium. From a wider political perspective, there is also the question of

whose business it is to define the role the teacher should play and whether that is changing through digital technology. Definitions of teachers and teaching will inevitably be filtered through perspectives on these questions. A person who thinks that technology is a neutral tool to deliver a standardized curriculum will see the teacher’s role very differently from one who thinks that a digital environment offers a new opportunity for intensive critical dialogue in which the teacher plays the role of senior colleague.

Effects of (Digital) Mediation on Teaching

A teacher looking for guidance on “what to do” in digital learning might then be influenced by the idea of giving instruction online to students or of creating an activity for students within a network – or by any other theories that relate to student learning, such as the promotion of emancipatory learning through technology. There are a number of possible frameworks stemming both from the pre-digital era and from the wish to develop practices that exploit the potential of digital technology, such as the ability to scale or to “flip” the classroom by having the students engage with transmitted material in their own time, followed up by a more discursive session where knowledge is more fully constructed and assimilated.

New forms of mediation have led to a reexamination of processes of teaching and learning. This is nowhere more evident than in the debates surrounding the rise of the massive open online course (MOOC) and its associated and derivative practices, as this rise was so rapid and widespread. The speed of change has made it more obvious just which parameters have been changing. As a consequence, technologically supported (and other innovative) practices in education are debated and critiqued in a way that is rarely faced by traditional and established practices. Participation in such debates can serve to revitalize education as a whole, and it has done so as much in the public domain as in more abstract academic (printed) publications.

The variation in MOOCs brought out further arguments about instruction versus construction and connection – it soon became clear that this discussion had not disappeared with the advent of digital learning. As already suggested, a conception of teaching as transmitting information can be well served by technology. The potential of the MOOC reignited debates about the role of the teacher, including a perennial one about whether teachers are necessary at all. However, most notably for our purposes here, it has highlighted the role of teacher presence and its relation to learner motivation, particularly how it can be sustained both at scale and at a distance. By “presence,” we mean the sense in which people feel that they and others are in a shared context.

Presence, in the educational context, is most fully developed in the “community of inquiry” theoretical framework of Anderson and colleagues (Garrison and Anderson 2003). This framework considers social presence, cognitive presence, and teaching presence, mapping onto a social constructivist understanding of learning, and accounting for the role of the teacher in designing, initiating, focusing, and sustaining discourse directed toward a learning outcome or outcomes. Particularly significant here is the role of the teacher in orchestrating the experience of the learners such that learning is motivated by the emergence of some “triggering event” in the student(s)’ experience.

Presence is an important topic because it relates to what teachers do, how they do it, and how this is perceived by students, employers, and other stakeholders in education. Lack of teacher presence was seen as likely to be one of the biggest barriers to the acceptance of digital learning; as a difficult concept to quantify, metrics such as “contact hours” have been offered in lieu.

This is at least in part a result of the broader political, social, and cultural environments in which education takes place. As with education, effects on these are partly constituted by digital technology, but also in part predate that technology, bringing in effects from earlier times, which continually merge. Teachers have to teach within a technology-saturated context as well as through using the tools that it has to offer.

Teaching in a Technology-Saturated Context

Continuing to focus on the idea of teacher presence – and indeed student presence – allows illustration of some of the emergent dilemmas of digital learning already alluded to. When digital technology enables fully online courses, and blended learning with a mix of classroom and online activity, it draws attention to the problems of providing equivalence between these activities for purposes of measurement and quality assurance. In fact, some have argued that it illustrates the futility of measurement of activities of teaching and learning in this way at all. Some writers such as Chickering and Gamson (1991) prefer to emphasize the importance of relationship with faculty as a key dimension of quality educational experience.

The notion of “contact hours” is complex, in a setting in which access to a period of “video lecture” might be equated with the student’s participation in an equivalent period in a “live” lecture room. It has an impact not only on what is fair for students but also for how lecturers are performing within their contract of employment. Graham Gibbs (2014) has pointed to students’ and their representatives’ flawed reasoning about the value of contact hours, suggesting association with a commercial neoliberal approach that regards the student as a customer.

Technologies supporting access to resources, and communications between actors in the pedagogic process, inevitably bring with them opportunities for surveillance and monitoring. Such monitoring may be neutral, or even benign, in its intent, as in the development of the domain of learning analytics which seeks better to understand the processes of learning, and the behavior of students in networked spaces, and thus to improve and support the student experience. The same data may, of course, also be used to call students and teachers to account.

Learning analytics may be directed to provide information about the behavior of cohorts of students as a whole or to generate information about individual learners. This could help to identify students who are “at risk” in some important way, perhaps of academic underperformance, or of

withdrawal from study altogether. There have been associated questions about data protection and rights to access to the information held about students. Thus legal rights and ethical considerations can affect the way information might be supportively interpreted through the lens of the teacher's experience.

The teacher as employee of the institution or the State is open to the pressures of monitoring of performance and productivity. In the past teaching has been seen as a profession, implying a high degree of autonomy and discretion in the conduct of one's duties. The early twenty-first century saw a rhetoric of regulation, audit, and accountability, by which other interests dictated to the teacher how they should conduct themselves. This situation has not been "caused" by digital technology, but it may well have made it easier for it to occur.

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Digital Learning, Discourse, and Ideology

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Synonyms

Audit culture; CDA; Critical discourse analysis; Digital learning; Ideology; KBE, antihumanist, humanist, posthumanist; Knowledge based economy; Policy

Introduction

In recent decades, digital technologies have seen widespread use across global society and adoption at all levels of education. *Digital learning* might therefore simply be described as learning that is facilitated by digital technologies, but to discuss digital learning *only* in this way obscures important complexities linked to language, culture, politics, and the economy. To talk or write about learning as if it were directly facilitated by technology of any kind, places a strong focus on what technology has, or seems to be, achieving. At the same time, this marginalizes, or reduces the visibility of, human roles within the academia and beyond (Hayes and Jandrić 2014). Digital technologies are often introduced into educational institutions amid simple assumptions, or *ideologies*. Related policy *discourse* may suggest there will be economic improvements, such as educational performance and efficiency. This is linked to what sociologists and anthropologists have referred to as an "audit culture," (Shore & Wright 1999) where, since the late 1980s in both education and wider society: "the techniques and values of accountancy have become a central organizing principle in the governance and management of human conduct – and the new kinds of relationships, habits and practices that this is creating" (Shore 2008, p. 279). These new principles of organization are said to be serving a "Knowledge Based Economy" (KBE), which is a widely used

metaphor, without precise definition. It suggests that knowledge and related digital technologies have now overtaken human physical labor, to drive productivity and global economic growth. A KBE discourse, which assumes economic enhancement from technology, is very different to one that existed prior to the mid-nineteenth century, when technology was closely associated with the Greek concept of “*techne*,” referring to broader human interaction and knowledge, related to arts or craft.

A discourse of a KBE (Jessop et al. 2008) that treats technology *only* as a simple tool to drive and enhance economic productivity is described here as an example of: (1) an *antihumanist*, or a *technologically* deterministic viewpoint. It focuses on what *technology* is doing, to impact positively on digital learners, as if this were a simple, “outside intervention” (Knox, Education and Digital Cultures). A discourse that places more emphasis on *human* practices with technology in society is described as (2) a *humanist* perspective, which is *socially* deterministic, because it discusses humans as separate from the technology, objects, and other nonhuman things they use in practice (Knox, Education and Digital Cultures). Alternatively, a discourse where technology and humans are considered to be mutually shaping of each other is described as (3) a *posthumanist* position (Matthewman 2011). This entry treats these three categories as distinct, but overlapping, ideological stances that can be found in discourse about digital learning.

Discourse and Ideology

Critical linguistic studies suggest discourse carries particular values or ideologies that together with other elements in society may reinforce or disrupt a current state of affairs. A *humanist* perspective on education has links with poststructuralism, but this limits our understanding of the agency of technology, because poststructuralists treat the human *subject* as a bounded entity whose actions are completely separate from the outside world of objects, technologies, and other “nonhuman” things (Knox,

Education and Digital Cultures). In an *anti-humanist* perspective though, digital learners are treated as passive beings, and technology simply impacts upon them, so this conceals human agency to act. Norman Fairclough suggests that by approaching technology, ideology, and social practice through *Cultural Political Economy* (CPE), semiotic, or “meaning-making” relations between these elements might be understood as “dialectical,” (Fairclough 2007). In other words, not as entirely separate from each other, as in either a humanist or antihumanist perspective, but shaping of each other culturally, politically, and economically in a manner that moves closer towards a *posthumanist* position. This acknowledges that there are cultural dimensions to any economic crisis, economic dimensions within culture, and a political character to both in related discourse (Castells 2011).

Discourse then might be understood as written or spoken language, dialectically linked with human practices, in real contexts of use, where cultural, political, and economic elements affect each other. In this entry, discourse covers the meanings, effects, and strategies people use, as well as production and interpretation of actual texts that describe the role of technology and humans in digital learning. *Ideology* in this context refers to ways that people’s beliefs and values come to intersect with technology and human practices through discourse. Ideology may lead to forms of knowledge that appear to be freed of political interests to construct certain meanings that are presented as “common sense.” As with ideological claims generally, unquestioned assertions can have powerful and significant social and political implications (Friesen 2008). Choices made in discourse, to express ideologies about technology, or human practice, in digital learning contexts are often framed as if they were self-evident facts, or objectively “true.”

Varied terms are used to describe digital learning including: *e-learning*, *networked learning*, and *Technology Enhanced Learning (TEL)*. While e-learning is short for electronic forms of learning, and networked learning suggests learning that takes place across digital networks, the term Technology Enhanced Learning (TEL) has

recently become widely adopted in policy, and also critiqued. Criticisms of TEL question an inbuilt assumption of a direct economic connection between bringing technology into education and automatically “enhanced” learning, or productivity. Critically examining how digital learning is framed in discursive constructions that link technology with ideologies about learning is one way to confront such arguments (Fairclough 2007). Approached via critical social theory about technology and language, *discourse* and *ideology* are key concepts in linguistic study of how human understandings of *digital learning* are shaped.

Antihumanist, Humanist, and Posthumanist Reasoning About Technology

In the broadest sense, technology (including digital technology adopted in education) might be said to encompass everything, to affect human history and learning, and can be basically defined as: *objects, activities, and knowledge* (Matthewman 2011, p. 2). A body of literature that acknowledges technology in this way (Winner 1980, p. 122; MacKenzie and Wajcman 1999) is distinguished from more dominant antihumanist or humanist reasoning that suggests either technology, as a neutral entity, simply drives history to determine what humans *know*, or that human agency drives technological change.

Langdon Winner undermined both of these forms of logic by arguing that technologies *themselves* carry design choices that either open or close social options. Therefore taking a CPE approach, when adopting technology, people also make cultural, political, and economic, as well as technological, decisions (Winner 1980). These decisions can then manifest as ideologies too in discourse about digital learning, to alter how certain qualities are attributed to either technology, or to humans. As technology contributes to the economy, recognizing that related values are expressed culturally and politically in written policy discourse about education aids a linguistic

exploration of digital learning, as a “scene of struggle,” rather than as a *fait accompli* (Friesen 2008).

Arguments about the role of technology can be examined then through the three broad categories already mentioned (*antihumanist, humanist, and posthumanist*) to notice what values are emphasized in discourse. Already applied by Matthewman to critically theorize technology more generally (Matthewman 2011, p. 15), firstly, antihumanist views would suggest digital devices *themselves* define how people use these to learn. This very common way of thinking is a form of technological determinism and contains a partial truth (MacKenzie and Wajcman 1999). Secondly, the humanist concept is a form of social determinism, which also presents a partial truth by treating technologies as “neutral” entities but placing emphasis on ways that *society* chooses to use them. Prior to the mid-nineteenth century, technology was associated with the Greek concept of “*techne*,” referring to broader human interaction and knowledge related to arts or craft. In this understanding there is room for varied and individual human interpretations of what people come to know through using technologies, and how in turn, human actions might shape changes to technologies and society. This approach to theorizing technology is closer to the third category (posthumanist), which does not choose to privilege either the role of technology or society. Instead, each might shape the other, in a manner that is “mutually constitutive” (MacKenzie and Wajcman 1999). In a posthumanist discourse about digital learning, technology is treated as an “ongoing encounter” (Matthewman 2011, p. 8). Humans coevolve with technology (Matthewman 2011, p. 176) in individual, material, and discursive encounters, where human and nonhuman actors shape and alter each other.

A Knowledge-Based Economy and Critical Theory About Knowledge

Having established three broad forms of discourse through which to examine ideologies about digital learning, these can be explored with reference to

critical theory about knowledge. Buzz phrases such as *Knowledge Based Economy* (KBE) and *Technology Enhanced Learning* (TEL) might be interrogated linguistically.

Deterministic arguments tend to attribute technology with inherent and unquestionable “value” to improve human contexts (including learning). Examples can be noticed where discourse suggests technology enhances “student engagement” or “employability.” These phrases are things that might then be “audited,” evaluated, or scrutinized institutionally, or by government agencies. A phrase like “the student experience” when mentioned often in the media becomes treated as a social “problem,” discussed publically, with judgments made about the performance of teachers in relation to these “issues.” However, these forms of reasoning also frame students as passive consumers in a competitive market, rather than active participants experiencing technology in diverse contexts of learning.

In policy texts we may find “presuppositions,” where understandings about technology and what it does are discussed as “given.” This then enables further arguments to be constructed from this “given” position and treated as if it were a generally held “truth.” Particular relationships between technology and people may be represented through grammatical constructions that become hard to question but which obscure alternative understandings (Hayes 2015). Digital learning as a concept can be productively explored through a critical analysis of reasoning about technology in any surrounding discourse. This enables certain ideologies to be noticed and categorized. Without a close analysis, common sense arguments that become generally accepted to shape a particular view, for example, a logic that technology (rather than the human labor of teaching) enhances learning (Hayes 2015) may simply go unnoticed.

Findings from linguistic analysis can be articulated with reference to critical social theory. Firstly, in a macro overview, literature from critical theory applied to knowledge is examined. This builds on the body of work of the Frankfurt School, where all knowledge is considered to be political in nature and shaped by human interests (Habermas 1968). The widely referenced

“knowledge-constitutive interests” of Habermas suggest human interests are “instrumental,” “practical,” and “emancipatory” in nature.

Instrumental knowledge relates to technical human interests that are associated with work, labor, production, or the natural sciences. *Practical knowledge* is more about interpretive ways of knowing, through which everyday and social human activities are coordinated and given meaning. *Emancipatory knowledge* is the kind of knowledge that critical theory itself seeks to generate, and it is articulated in terms of power, control, and emancipation (Friesen 2008). In critical theory these three forms of knowledge and interest are never entirely separate, and emancipatory or political knowledge is considered to be all pervasive and central to the critical theoretical concept of *ideology*. Therefore, ideology is *any* kind of knowledge (whether technical, practical, or emancipatory) that *appears* to be freed of political interests (Friesen 2008).

Secondly, in exploring assertions about a KBE, social change since the Industrial Revolution has seen rapid mechanical developments, alongside changes to political and organizational structures, and the emergence of digital technologies across global society. Where “capital” from physical labor had once been the dominant factor of production in industrial societies, in postindustrial societies, a focus has emerged on the role of “knowledge” (Bell 1999). Bell identifies four trends: (1) a shift from manufacturing to services, (2) an increase in the general importance of education, (3) the increased importance of technological infrastructure as a foundation for an electronically mediated global economy, and (4) the theory that knowledge now creates value-added and increasing returns. In this last point, Bell shifts the focus from Marx's, “labor theory of value,” where human physical labor in capitalist economies adds value to commodities and products that can then be sold at a profit, to a “knowledge theory of value,” where the exchange of knowledge in educational and research contexts now plays a value-adding, profit-making function (Friesen 2008).

This has implications that can be noticed in policy literature for educational technology.

Schools, universities and teaching staff can find themselves being discussed as following outdated principles and methods, with reform and enhancement recommended, for greater efficiency in a KBE is recommended. In a knowledge theory of value, certain ideologies are spread through discourse (language-in-use) (Fairclough 2007) and these tend to privilege some characteristics of knowledge over others. Knowledge becomes characterized as a kind of service or utility to be bought and sold, used, enhanced, and reused as a “super commodity,” a thing that has market value like physical commodities but that also transcends even the products of physical labor (Friesen 2008). Consequently in government policy and in university strategy discourse, there is discussion of learning objects and learning outcomes, as knowledge that has been broken down into exchangeable packets within contemporary capitalism.

A further consequence is that the complex, contestable nature of knowledge emerging from varied human constitutive interests (Habermas 1968) becomes suppressed, as knowledge gets linked simply with “performance” within a culture that audits only the elements deemed to be useful, to support a KBE. New media enables the logic that we are now in a KBE and as humans must quickly adapt, to travel swiftly via technology, as well as discourse, spreading persistent values. Therefore, how digital learning is routinely discussed, in spoken and written discourse, can quickly reinforce powerful ideologies about learning through technology.

Ways to Critique How People Are Positioned in Discourse About Digital Learning

Economic, technical, cultural, and historical conditions surrounding digital learning are complex. A student or a teacher (online or in a classroom) is an individual who is cast into predefined relationships and structures, which are reproduced and reinforced through even the most trivial statements and actions (Friesen 2008). In order to examine these values as they play out in

discourse, the following basic steps might be followed for an ideology critique:

1. Identify ideas or claims that are presented as obvious, common sense or inevitable, sources of knowledge.
2. Scrutinize these ideas or claims in the context in which they arise.
3. Reveal where behind dominant claims there are politically charged and often contradictory ways of understanding an issue or phenomenon.
4. Use this underlying conflict as the basis for developing alternative forms of understanding and point to concrete possibilities for action (Friesen 2008).

If claims of ideology in discourse about digital learning are to be supported, and not simply suspected, then under (2) a detailed linguistic analysis can help to demonstrate where particular patterns of discourse are often repeated. One approach is to build a large corpus, or bank of words, and to use software to reveal what quantitative patterns emerge. From here, one might undertake a more qualitative analysis to look more closely at patterns to suggest what might be happening, with reference to critical theory.

An example of this is to undertake Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), which is best understood as an interdisciplinary approach, where researchers choose from a range of linguistic tools some ways to shed light on what is happening in the discourse. Through CDA techniques some researchers have found that there are strong repetitions of nominalization in policy texts about digital learning. Nominalization is noticeable where nouns stand in for verbal processes in texts. A common effect is a reduction in human agency. It becomes hard to detect who a proposition refers to, or who has declared it to be so. This then can lead to human labor being attributed to technologies and strategies, or to terms such as Technology Enhanced Learning (TEL), or e-learning, rather than to the actual people who are really enacting tasks, such as teachers and students (Hayes and Jandrić 2014; Hayes 2015). Therefore, if claims are to be made about ideology

then empirical inquiry of this kind can help to pinpoint oversimplified presuppositions about digital learning in discourse (Fairclough 2007; Hayes 2015).

Conclusion

This entry has discussed how critical theory around discourse and ideology has emerged to challenge a dominant “marketized” view of how digital learning takes place in a KBE where “taken-for-granted” economic narratives (Jessop et al. 2008) can spread rapidly through digital media. Shifts in master economic narratives such as the KBE need to be understood at the macro level of capitalist markets, to notice where a culture of audit has arisen Shore (2008), leading to subordination of teaching and research to economic imperatives (Jessop et al. 2008). Policy discourse might then be examined at the micro level, in close linguistic analysis. CDA is just one approach that might be taken to confront contradictions and suggest alternative forms of discourse. This section classified three ways human practice in digital learning might be discussed and constituted through discourse. Some forms of close linguistic analysis were described as ways researchers might disrupt the more simplistic accounts, given the complexity around those learning through digital technologies.

Cross-References

- Educational Technology
- Neoliberalism and Education Policy
- Neoliberalism and Power in Education
- Networked Learning
- On Heidegger on Education and Questioning

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Digital Literacies

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Synonyms

Digital literacy; Digital literacy practices; Multi-media literacies; Multimodal literacies; Techno-literacies; Technoliteracy

Introduction

The notion of what constitutes digital literacies in the present knowledge economy is debated. Some view digital literacies as the set of skills needed to

successfully engage with digital technologies. Others would argue they are the skills required to code software and the computational thinking skills of programming, designing, collecting, and analyzing data and the system-based literacy practices needed to communicate with simulations and games. New voices argue digital literacies encapsulate the proficiency to use digital technologies, as well as the soft skills needed to engage in co-creative endeavors, with humans and machines in creative, wise, and ethical ways. Regardless, Bill Green's "3D" (dimensional) model of literacy remains a salient point of reference to think about and understand the operational, cultural, and critical dimensions of digital literacies. The aim of this entry is to present an overview of the complexity of digital literacies in a future characterized by rapid and uncertain socio-technical change. It also explores how digital literacies, when viewed as anticipatory, can be leveraged to ensure children, young people, and adults engage in co-creative endeavors with each other and machine to maximize their potential for lifelong learning in ethically sound ways.

Digital Literacy Origins

Before the term digital literacies was embraced across educational contexts, Paul Gilster introduced the singular form, digital literacy, in 1997 to describe students' or learners' abilities to understand and use information presented via computers in multiple formats from a diversity of sources (Gilster and Glistler 1997). Yet digital technologies, particularly Web 2.0., have and continue to extend understandings of digital literacy, calling for a much broader view. The New London Group (1996) highlighted this idea more than 20 years ago when they introduced the term "multiliteracies" to describe the multiple literacies children, young people, and adults need to access, negotiate, and communicate across their working, public, and private lives. Multiliteracies as a new approach to literacy pedagogy at the time highlighted individuals' competencies to critically, confidently, and creatively use print and nonprint literacy practices to achieve

their own goals and participate in society. At that time, proponents of multiliteracies argued meaning making requires becoming proficient in using different semiotic modes to communicate across a diversity of technological devices, but they did not explicitly refer to these as digital literacies.

The term digital literacies, in the plural, was first introduced by Linda Labbo, David Reinking, and Michael McKenna in 1998 to describe workplace abilities where individuals collaborate to access information, manage and manipulate data, purposefully navigate through multimedia, and critically read and write digital texts (Labbo et al. 1998). A year earlier, Colin Lankshear coined the term "technological literacies," essentially the same as digital literacies, to highlight the social practices in which a multiplicity of texts are designed, modified, and shared digitally (Lankshear 1997). Later, Lankshear and Knobel (2003) furthered the plural use of the term digital literacies to highlight the diversity of social and cultural practices and ways of knowing required to successfully use digital technologies. Most literacy scholars still adhere to this definition of the term where they view digital literacies not as individual skills but as social practices embedded within a given sociocultural context regardless of whether it is face-to-face or virtual.

Thinking About Digital Literacies in 3D

In 1988, Bill Green put forth a 3D (dimensional) model of literacy that has become extremely influential when thinking about literacy and digital literacies. From a sociocultural perspective, Green's 3D model contends that literacy needs to be seen as having three interlocking dimensions: the operational, the cultural, and the critical. Importantly, these dimensions bring together language, meaning, and context where no one dimension dominates the others. How digital literacies might be described using Green's 3D model is outlined below, with the understanding that digital literacy practices are always in flux, much like technology-driven transformational changes taking place across society.

The *operational* dimension of digital literacies includes how to use technologies in the basic sense. This includes the functions of turning devices on, installing and configuring software, wirelessly networking devices to each other, downloading apps for use on mobile devices, and using search engines. This dimension also includes the abilities of sending emails, using authoring software, managing data, and supporting new ways of learning, collaborating, and communicating across devices, interfaces, time, and space (e.g., through virtual reality and augmented reality). For many children, young people, and adults, this could also include using social networking; designing systems; coding, modifying, and/or hacking systems, prototyping digital solutions, cloud computing, and software and web development. In many ways, the operational dimension of digital literacies is skill oriented with a ranging understanding of the major concepts that support the functionality of digital technologies and software or how they work.

The *cultural* dimension of digital literacies requires understanding and competence of how to operate digital technologies and also how to use digital literacies to consume, design, or produce and interact with a variety of digital technologies to make meaning in particular contexts. This can be either real time or virtual. By making meaning, users understand that digital technologies assist them in gathering unlimited knowledge and intelligence in real time to predict, prevent, and solve their problems. Users also recognize that the use of digital technologies is not neutral and that humans have an increasingly complex relationship with machines. For example, users understand digital technologies are designed and networked in particular ways to create new services and products. They also understand how digital technologies do things in the world and how they can either promote a user's or users' agency to engage in beneficial or harmful practices using their digital literacies. Whether users learn, communicate, experience pleasure (increased dopamine release in the brain triggered by playing, interacting, and communicating in virtual worlds), or engage in active learning through simulations alone or with others, they

are aware of what they are using digital technology for. Socioculturally, their digital literacy practices are working to shape their digital identities and are largely reflective of their lifeworlds. More simply, the cultural dimension of digital literacies is understanding that digital technologies are used to make meaning but, more importantly, do something in the world within a particular context.

The *critical* dimension of digital literacies includes being able to assess and critique software, hardware, and other digital technologies, knowing they are designed to be used for particular purposes across diverse contexts. Here users draw on their digital literacies to make sense of complex ideas and engage in design and computational thinking to solve problems they identify. Users also understand they can redesign, modify, or appropriate digital technologies for purposes they articulate themselves. By doing so, they understand how to anticipate, develop, and exploit digital solutions and knowledge to solve problems in the present and into the future. From this critical perspective, they are aware of their digital literacies and the implications of their use as they design, redesign, or modify current and emerging systems and practices. Understanding this critical dimension situates children, young people, and adults well to solve problems or dilemmas and use strategic foresight and anticipatory digital literacies to meet future challenges. This is because an anticipatory stance allows them to acquire new digital literacies to serve their own interests. Paramount to the critical dimension is highlighting that users learn soft skills, particularly the ability to learn and engage in emergent leadership through problem solving, being flexible and adaptable, and possessing a degree of foresightedness. Because many children and young people are now socialized into digital literacy skills and practices outside of school, they understand they must play an active role in learning new digital literacies to adapt and innovate to work, live, and predict in "smarter" ways outside of school.

Thinking about digital literacies in 3D emphasizes that digital literacy proficiency is achieved as people individually, collaboratively, and communally participate in the social and cultural practices of making meaning and using digital

technologies to take action for “real” purposes. But thinking about literacy in 3D highlights critical ethical issues. This is because humans are facing serious global challenges explicitly linked to advances in digital technologies. The question “digital literacies for whose ‘real’ purposes and to what end?” is imperative. When making meaning and taking action is increasingly about having the anticipatory digital literacies to use digital technologies, it is equally important to consider how digital literacies can be used productively to improve life on Earth for all living things, as well as to do harm.

Rethinking Digital Literacy Proficiency

It is difficult to predict what digital literacies will be needed in the future when all things or physical objects are assigned an IP address, and sensors have the ability to transfer data over the Internet of Things (IoT). The IoT is characterized, in part, by objects such as washing machines and fridges using the Internet to collect and exchange data, self-driving cars that rely on sensors, and implanted chips that can monitor body functions and report them directly to doctors. Also known as the Internet of Everything (IoE), the IoT represents a transformational shift to society and understandings of digital literacy proficiencies as literally *everything* becomes “smart.” The IoT is important for all educators, especially literacy educators. As more people and “everything” is connected to the network and harvesting more data from the network, individuals need increasingly sophisticated digital literacies to harness that data to improve decision-making at the school, in their daily lives, and in future workplaces. The IoT highlights that much of the world’s knowledge is already at users’ fingertips and accessible from mobile devices. The implications for literacy education are immense. The IoT highlights what is important to teach is not the retention of knowledge, coding skills, or simply operational skills. What is more important is being able to rethink digital literacy proficiency to understand how technologies and coding languages work, what they are most useful for, whose interests they

likely serve, and how to use new and emerging technologies with ethical foresight.

It is disconcerting how many digital literacy practices, some of which require users to engage in complex meaning-making activities, remain largely ignored in educational institutions that still focus on learning discrete skills that will likely *not* be needed in the yet-to-be imagined educational institutions, industries, and professions of the future. This presents a serious dilemma in regard to children, young people, and adults’ digital literacies because they are often not using their digital literacies to manage uncertainty. Rather they are still taking exams, writing essays, and giving presentations where they essentially regurgitate knowledge. They are less likely to be using their digital literacies to apply available knowledge in real-world settings where they are required to use critical thinking and written and oral communication skills to engage in entrepreneurial, sustainable, or ethical pursuits.

As educational institutions begin to catch up and transform their teaching and learning spaces to more closely mirror the spaces individuals in the real world use to solve pressing problems (e.g., sandboxes and makerspaces also known as DIY spaces where individuals can gather to cocreate, coinvent, and co-learn), students will need robust anticipatory digital literacies to share, collaborate, and experiment with each other, their teachers, and machines’ artificial intelligence (AI). As classrooms become more participatory – where participation is largely mediated by technology – educators need to rethink literacy instruction. This means new spaces must be designed to foster individuals’ digital literacy skills, practices, and proficiencies on a daily basis. This calls for strategic foresight when (re)conceptualizing literacy education in complex, changing, and ambiguous times.

Strategic Foresight to Separate Hard and Soft Digital Literacy Trends

Strategic foresight is needed to separate hard digital literacy trends from soft trends. A hard trend is

based on measurable and concrete information or events. This means it is something that will almost certainly happen (e.g., the increasing use of mobile apps, the announcement of new government regulations, strategies or action plans, etc.). Applying strategic foresight based on the certainty of hard trends is strategic because it is low risk. Hard trends allow individuals, organizations, and governments to predict what digital literacies they need to capitalize on to access emerging opportunities and avoid *disruption* as they cocreate and coexist with ever-smarter machines. A soft trend is a less certain prediction based on statistics that might happen. To only focus on these without separating them from hard trends increases risk and the potential for disruption. Importantly, when individuals, organizations, and governments use strategic foresight to identify soft trends, they can use their digital literacies to influence and change these trends as they work for a preferable future over a probable one. In times characterized by uncertainty, educational leadership needs to actively separate hard trends from soft trends to accurately appropriate ongoing rapid technological advances so that students of all ages recognize their capacity to use their digital literacies to act as a force of change in their communities, nations, and the world.

In many ways, strategic foresight is akin to what Anna Craft calls (2014) “possibility thinking,” where individuals – drawing on their “little c creativity” – ask “what if?” and “as if?” questions to solve the challenges they face in their everyday lives. She views this kind of strategic foresight or way of thinking as critical to fostering a wise, humanizing creativity (WHC). This is creativity guided by ethical action that is mindful of its consequences and pushes individuals to vision, scan, map, forecast, and plan their future. When individuals use strategic foresight to analyze, perceive, and separate hard digital trends from soft trends, they can articulate what digital literacies they need to become proficient with to tap into their individual, collaborative, and communal creativity to prepare for and cope with change toward a common good.

Anticipatory Digital Literacies

A digital literacy proficiency that is anticipatory is fundamental to successfully navigate technological advances that are bringing about hyperchange. Anticipation can be viewed as a literacy practice or an essential competency when it comes to thinking about the digital literacies needed to use digital technologies to adapt to new realities in working, public, and private lives. One could even argue that anticipatory digital literacies are currently needed by individuals, organizations, and governments to adapt to new realities just to survive in the world characterized by risk and uncertainty where humanity faces serious transnational global challenges.

As machines, clothing and body parts become “smarter,” humans’ digital literacies need to be anticipatory. This means they need to learn how to engage in strategic foresight exercises to anticipate and incorporate new digital literacy practices into their present literacy practices. They also need to understand this anticipatory stance will help them learn, design, and work smarter – not harder – individually, collaboratively, and communally. If digital literacy proficiency is predicated on anticipation and being open to uncertainty, individuals can use their digital literacies to make plans, test ideas, and enthusiastically engage in strategic foresight activities to identify hard digital literacy trends.

Such an anticipatory stance toward digital literacies is desperately needed to address the global challenges all living things face as they witness and participate – intentionally or unintentionally – in the destruction of the Earth (e.g., climate change, sustainable development, clean water, violence against women, global ethics, terrorism, etc.). With computers gathering information from overlapping data sets on just about everything in real time, anticipatory digital literacies are needed to successfully use new and emerging analytic methodologies to make disparate information and data useful. Such an anticipatory stance better prepares individuals to simultaneously manage change and address global challenges as they collectively march into an uncertain future where threats to equality, democracy, peace, and survival are certain.

The Ethical Dimension of Digital Literacies

Humans have a complicated relationship with digital technologies because of the unforeseen way they can complicate or improve life on Earth. This highlights why Green's critical dimension of digital literacies now needs more attention than ever. The critical dimension is also, to some extent, an ethical dimension where users of digital technologies need to understand their digital literacies can be used for good or evil. And that behavior, including which occurs digitally, and not necessarily in the physical realm, always has impacts and consequences on the welfare of self and others as users are both making and being made. Yet, this is much easier said than done. It could even be argued that for a future characterized by uncertainty, what is actually needed is a 4D (dimensional) model of literacies that also includes an ethical dimension. This is because ethics is about behaving and living properly. Increasingly ethics involves not only relationships with people but also machines' AI. An ethical dimension includes individuals, organizations, communities, and countries using anticipatory digital literacies to adapt to new realities in wise and humanizing ways. This would be characterized by children, young people, and adults using their anticipatory digital literacies toward a common good where they balance their own interests, other individuals' interests, and larger communal and global interests over both the short and long term to transform the world they share into a better place.

While Green's critical dimension highlights the need for individuals to be able to assess and critique new technologies, knowing they are designed to be used for particular purposes in the present, a critical stance is not usually anticipatory. Thus, individuals do not know, or likely even think about, whether they are leveraging their digital literacies to design solutions that have the potential to be equally beneficial or destructive into the future. One example is the rapid and encompassing pervasiveness of social media that is not only used to boost motivation in classrooms and students' proficiency with technologies but is also quickly eroding citizens' privacy as they are

constantly coming under 24 h surveillance. Another could be the use of drones that make military action and bombing more acceptable and routine because a machine is taking action. But who or what is responsible for the devastation or loss of life? More importantly how are they/it responsible? These examples highlight why the ethical dimension of anticipatory digital literacies is both timely and paramount. Students, regardless of their age, need to be taught to think in anticipatory ways about how their use of digital literacies can positively or negatively affect each others' and the Earth's well-being.

Conclusion

A new increasingly seamless interaction between humans and machines is unfolding at an astounding pace. Unprecedented uncertainty characterizes the kinds of digital literacies that are, and will be, needed to participate not only in the workforce but also in education across primary, secondary, and tertiary settings. That is, schools in these settings need to offer a different kind of education that is no longer largely reflective of the old industrial model and not preparing them for the jobs of the future. New technologies are continuing to disrupt all aspects of lived existence in most parts of the world. As a result, many businesses and organizations are adapting and transforming to meet the needs of diverse individuals. Conversely, most educational institutions continue to resist any transformational change as well as new technologies. Instead they focus on reforms that aim to raise standards through standardized testing and increased accountability rather than provide students (regardless of their age) a personalized, supportive, and nurturing education. Rarely do schools encourage students to actively scrutinize socio-technical trends with the goal of behaving in responsible, sustainable, and ethical ways to tackle the interdependent global issues humanity faces. The time has come to be more intentional about the ethical dimension of digital literacies and how they are fostered (or not) in educational institutions. Paramount is

also considering how they work and whether what digital literacies can do or achieve is something an individual should strive for. The ethical dimension of digital literacies has been relatively ignored until recently, and what scholarly discussion that has occurred mostly revolves around using digital games to teach ethics and ethical thinking.

At a time when young people are increasingly mobilizing technology and peer-to-peer networks for their own purposes, the ethical dimension of digital literacies becomes more important than the operational, cultural, and critical dimensions. When individuals use strategic foresight and view their digital literacies as anticipatory, then business as usual in educational institutions, businesses, and organizations will have to change. This is because anticipatory digital literacies will help them understand the myriad ways present institutions and systems – including schools – are not serving their essential needs (education, employment, access to clean water, free Internet, etc.). This will likely push them to acquire the digital literacies they believe they need, whether it is to find work, solve pressing problems, foster collaboration by promoting collaborative goals, or just survive. This is already happening. But it is important to remember that the forces of globalization, interdependence, and disruption are forcing people to manage risk, uncertainty, and change in very different ways. The growth of disruptive technologies that are changing life on Earth forces one to recognize what could be termed the dark or harmful side of digital literacies. Because digital literacies can be used for either unequivocally good or deliberately harmful ends, a new global challenge emerges. Education must help individuals understand the ethical dimension of their anticipatory digital literacies so they use them thoughtfully and with respect for others and the Earth, recognizing the interconnections between all human things and machines. Such a disposition is crucial for the greater good.

Cross-References

- [Multiliteracies](#)
- [Multimodal Literacies](#)
- [new literacies, New Literacies](#)

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Digital Scholarship: Recognizing New Practices in Academia

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Introduction

More often than not, novelty is met with suspicion. The status of “newness” is very rarely given a particularly high value not only because of the unfamiliarity it carries but also because of the threat it poses to established norms. Digital technologies in the context of a global knowledge society may no longer be news, but the transformation of scholarly practices with the support of the web still is.

Digital scholarship practices encompass a wide range of knowledge activities and approaches online which ultimately encourage practices that diverge from established academic norms. More precisely, through the affordances provided by the web, agents are slowly challenging the canons of knowledge production and distribution with practices of open content, self-publication, and public discussion. Although the adoption of digital scholarship practices by academics is increasing, its acknowledgment as a legitimate academic contribution is still minimal.

The lack of support and acknowledgment of digital scholarship practices is problematic, given their role in transforming academic practice,

professional identity, and forms of public engagement. In this entry the authors turn to theories of *recognition* to explain the politics surrounding digital scholarship practices, in particular the work of Pierre Bourdieu and Axel Honneth. Bourdieu’s understanding of (mis)recognition provides us with a structural and institutional (field) concept of the role that symbolic capital, especially in the form of reputation, plays in the reproduction and transformation of academic life, whereas the recognition theory of Honneth – built on the assumption that the drive toward personal autonomy, self-esteem, and respect can only be achieved intersubjectively through a process of recognition from significant others – invites us to rethink the role of affect and social capital with regard to professional recognition. The paper looks to explore the interplay between this “recognition turn” of Honneth and Bourdieu’s emphasis on distinction, in effect examining the intersection of intrapsychic and social locational understandings of recognition. It is argued that, combined, Bourdieu’s and Honneth’s concepts can be used to develop new understandings of digital scholarship practices and its relation to concerns over reputation, prestige, and respect which are core to the recognition of academic practices.

Digital Scholarship: Landscapes of Change and Conflict

Scholarly activities are gradually being changed through the inevitable process of digitization. Yet, the greatest differentiation digital scholarly activities present in comparison to more conventional ones lies in the almost ubiquitous accessibility academics have to distributed knowledge networks and the practices of openness that derive from participating in such social systems. The encounter of academics with the web can thus result in scholarly activities that are supported and enhanced by the use of the web and the ideas and movements associated with it. Digital scholarship practices, in this context, are heavily influenced by a growing culture of participation and sharing, openness, and transparency, of which

the open access movement is one of the most prominent outcomes (Jenkins 2009). Another aspect associated with the participatory culture, and which is key to understanding the recognition dilemma digital scholars face, is related to the gatekeeping of ideas and knowledge production. The web with its read and write features weakens the power of established gatekeepers – for example, publishers and academic journals of great renown and long-standing tradition – as it gives its users the autonomy to circumvent publishing conventions through self-publication practices. This “do it yourself” (DIY) approach disturbs the canons of academic publishing while raising questions about intellectual authority, ownership, and recognition.

Looking at the web beyond its functional use as a tool and interpreting it simultaneously as a field of practice and a space of empowerment lead to new understandings of digital practices. From a digital scholarship perspective, the web thus represents a new, alternative space where intellectual work can be discussed, published, and made openly available to a wider range of communities. Yet, such practices do not come without challenges, given that they mark a departure from the conventions with which higher education institutions are often associated.

This is especially the case with research, a field in which digital practices can be viewed as a threat (Costa 2013). Digital scholarship practices associated with research activity are held in less regard because they tend to represent a break with the rules of the institution and with what is at stake (Costa 2014a), i.e., the reputation of the academic institution with regard to how institutions expect research outputs to be assessed and recognized formally by its funders. The potential for conflict, therefore, is immense.

In exploring the roots of this conflict over digital scholarship, one can borrow Bourdieu’s concepts to understand the impact of the web (as an emergent social field) on academic practices (habitus) and explore how it changes or conflicts with academia as the structure where scholarly work achieves formal recognition (see, e.g., Bourdieu 1977, 1990). Bourdieu’s work represents a well-founded interpretation of social (re)

production and change, with his key concepts offering “... an ideal framework for theorizing about the ways in which social, cultural, and material forces intersect to produce particular types of social action” (Elam 2008, p. 18). This requires an understanding of the social spaces (its written and unwritten rules) where practices take place, and which Bourdieu designates of fields. It also requires an appreciation of the different forms of capital (economic, social, cultural, and symbolic) that engender a set of dispositions toward practice, the habitus. In the context of digital scholarship practices, this set of dispositions can be defined as a commitment to openness and innovation of academic knowledge work (see Costa 2014b), an emergent feature in the academic habitus that is trying to find its place in academia.

The field of scholarly practice encompasses at least three distinctive activities: teaching, knowledge exchange, and research. Although not completely dissociated from each other, each sub-field of academic practice features different rules with the former two being less regulated than the latter. This has to do mainly with economic and symbolic interests that are at play in the academic game with academic institutions – especially in the UK – being mainly subsidized and recognized for their contribution to research, a contribution that is mainly recognized by publication of research in long-established, high-ranking journals.

The particular approach to academia’s contribution to research thus results in a tighter regulatory approach as to how such activity should be conducted, ultimately stifling innovative approaches to knowledge production and distorting the strategies of what and where to publish instead of supporting the use of alternative channels available via the web to extend the reach of academic research to different audiences.

Understanding digital scholarship practices from a research perspective then requires one to interpret the interplay between these two fields and the practices developed on each one of them, and its relation to what is at stake, i.e., the reputation and status academic institutions will win or lose for supporting digital research

practices. With publications in high-ranking journals – because of its long-standing tradition – still being one of the main mechanisms through which the quality of research is judged, digital scholarship practices are not seen as a priority but rather as a risk at the eyes of the institution. The misalignment of digital habitus with the rules of long-established academic norms leads to the understanding of the web as a mechanism of deviance from the norm rather than a tool of innovation (see Costa 2015).

This misalignment, or misrecognition as Bourdieu would put it, suggests that the intersubjective world is a key battleground when it comes to the struggle over digital scholarship. And why wouldn't it be, given the importance placed in academia on status, reputation, and prestige, in other words, forms of distinction? In order to flesh out the importance of this world for understanding digital scholarship, it is necessary to develop Bourdieu's buried intersubjective analysis as a second and parallel strand to his more well-known and adopted "social location" approach to relational sociology. The work of Axel Honneth can prove extremely useful in this regard, allowing us to further explore Bourdieu's contention that the "real is relational."

Digital Scholarship: Honneth and Recognition

Through publications such as *Disrespect: The Normative Foundations of Critical Theory* (2007), the work of Axel Honneth has gained prominence in fields such as sociology, political science, and philosophy. The current interest in Honneth's work revolves primarily around his contribution to this praxis-oriented version of social science and social philosophy. This takes the form of a theory of *recognition*, a comprehensive and paradigm-shifting approach to reconnecting the micro and macro, agency and structural levels of social thought. Developed over at least two decades, the work of Honneth on recognition finds strong connections to previous theories of recognition, particularly that of Hegel. In summary, recognition theorists such as

Honneth argue that the drive toward personal autonomy and self-realization can only be achieved intersubjectively – through the process of recognition from significant others.

This shift away from the atomistic tradition in philosophy allows Honneth to explore traditional Frankfurt School themes like individual freedom within a relational context, leading him to develop an elaborate theory of social justice and freedom. Most importantly it provides him with a normative grounding upon which to build a distinctive version of critical theory, one which connects everyday human concerns about identity and respect to broader struggles over power and inequality.

Honneth on Recognition and Intersubjectivity

Honneth has gone back to the thought of Hegel, especially his early ideas, in order to build his overarching concept of recognition. Crucially, within Honneth's theoretical model, there are three types of relation to self, all of which are crucial to the development of identity and self-realization. These are:

- Self-confidence: elementary level, context of family and love
- Self-respect: level of rights and solidarity
- Self-esteem: context of labor and societal recognition

Distortion to these forms of recognition leads to three forms of *disrespect*, the term "disrespect" importantly signifying the "denial of recognition" for Honneth (1995, p. 131). In this regard, Honneth (1995, p. 13) argues that "negative concepts" such as "insult" and "humiliation" are used to designate behavior that represents an injustice not simply because it harms subjects or restricts their freedom to act "but because it injures them with regard to the positive understanding of themselves that they have acquired intersubjectively." He goes on to suggest (1995, pp. 131–132) that the experience of being disrespected "carries with it the danger of an injury that can bring the identity of the

person as a whole to the point of collapse.” The key societal problem, then, according to Honneth, is the experience of various forms of disrespect, based on various forms of misrecognition.

By acknowledging the affective domain and its significance to a relational analysis of social processes, Honneth legitimizes existing strands of research that take the intersubjective domain as their starting point (Murphy 2011). This emphasis on intersubjective recognition as a worthy subject of academic study in its own right has had an increasingly strong influence on a variety of research areas, including education, although it has not made great inroads into theories of digital scholarship. This is a shame as such an affective take on recognition has much to offer when it comes to understandings of the academy and the conflicts associated with technology-related change. Specifically his theory of social struggle is ready made to complement that of Bourdieu, his horizontalized understanding of relations of recognition offering a useful counterpoint to Bourdieu’s more verticalized analysis of power and recognition. On this point, it is interesting to note that Honneth himself saw much of value in Bourdieu’s *The Weight of the World* (Bourdieu 1999), particularly as a source of empirical evidence to support his diagnosis that the modern world is imbued with struggles over recognition.

So what, specifically, can a theory such as Honneth’s offer Bourdieuan analyses of power in the academy? By aligning these two thinkers, one is also aligning two different basic conceptions of power – i.e., “one which construes power as a patterned structural inequality of resource and another which construes it as an interpersonal phenomenon” (Dennis and Martin 2005, p. 205). Although Dennis and Smith were referring to symbolic interactionism when it came to the latter conception, it also works for Honneth, as his intersubjective take on social pathology is also very much a theory of power. The ability to view the struggle over digital scholarship as the intersection of these different conceptions of power and recognition allows researchers to situate changing academic identities within both forms of structural transformation and emotionally charged workplaces and professional contexts.

The symbolic violence resulting from forms of misrecognition to use Bourdieu’s language have so far been explained through recourse to the language of capital, fields, and cleft habitus – conceptual tools that go some way to helping one understand the power of reputation and status in institutional life. But they only go so far in this regard: reputation and status are prized commodities not only at an interinstitutional level but also at an intersubjective one; as forms of control, their sources of power emanate from emotional contexts, as reputation and status at a professional level constitute respect. And following Honneth, without respect, recognition is denied.

Digital scholars are not immune from the need for this form of recognition and are as much at the mercy of peer review, if not more so, than traditional scholars. Investing time and effort in digital forms of scholarly activity is a precarious game to play for academics, given that such activity offers little reward and legitimation in the court of academic judgment. Indeed, the jury is out on whether such forms of scholarship such as microblogging will ever gain acceptance in a notoriously conservative professional culture. The risks, at a recognitional level, are potentially great, while also difficult to quantify.

It is fair to say that institutional life in the academy operates on the basis of a prestige economy, but the task of maintaining and protecting this economy does not fall solely on the shoulder of locational forms of recognition; the engine of growth here finds its fuel in an emotional terrain that is impossible for academics to avoid and yet remains invisible to those that see power through a locational lens only.

Theoretical Contribution and Conclusions

As is the case with digital scholarship, the understanding of recognition is dependent both on the way it is conceptualized and on the context to which it is applied. The Bourdieuan tradition arrives at understandings of recognition from a perspective of legitimized distinction. Academia

as a social field operates as a site of legitimation of scholarly practices, with agents “fighting” for symbols of reputation and power which ultimately endow them with a given social status (or lack of). From a Bourdieuan perspective, the (mis)recognition of digital scholarly practices occurs at a vertical level, given that academia, as a normative field of intellectual work, establishes the properties of distinction that are adopted (or not) by the agents in and of the field. The higher the incorporation of these distinctive dispositions by the individual, the higher his/her distinctive position and the stronger her/his sense of belonging with regard to the site where their practices achieve the highest acknowledgment, i.e., the academy itself. Although useful, Bourdieu’s conceptualization of (mis)recognition accounts mainly for spatial distinction between the place of legitimation and the place of practice, i.e., recognized places of academic work. This explains the need of individuals in deliberately aligning their dispositions with the rules of the academic game in order to acquire symbolic capital.

However, Bourdieu’s theory is less effective in accounting for a horizontal and symmetrical perspective of recognition. Honneth’s work offers a much needed complementary approach to Bourdieu’s theory by exploring the concept and practices of recognition relationally. Recognition, in Honneth’s perspective, is social and consists of a mutual appreciation among individuals and for the rules they establish for themselves. With digital scholarship practices being a more complex phenomenon than one that is merely regarded or disregarded by academia this perspective provides a new dimension to the understanding of digital scholarly practices as one that goes beyond the binary explanation of digital scholarship practices being “powered” or “neglected” by the rules of the institution or “strengthened” or “weakened” by the respect and appreciation individuals show toward the work of their peers. From a Honnethian point of view, this conception of mutual recognition results in a type of social freedom which allows for the development of (digital) dispositions that may lie outside or at least at the periphery of academic legitimation. Yet, such practices are increasingly acquiring a place within

knowledge and intellectual networks precisely because there is a mutual respect for the practices of digital scholars. Mutual recognition thus introduces a different pattern of legitimation of practices which is less formal and more democratic.

Both the vertical and horizontal axes of recognition are important when exploring the different aspects that drive or hinder individuals’ engagement with digital scholarship practices, because they both provide insights into the social realities of which academics are part. Ultimately, legitimate authority, as exercised by the institution, may have greater power. Yet, we cannot overlook the influence social and mutual recognition has on individuals that are fighting to establish new practices. Both approaches provide a more informed understanding of digital scholarship activities as this part seems a bit stretched out space wise acknowledgment.

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Dine (Navajo) Philosophy of Community as K'é

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Synonyms

Indigenous community; Indigenous philosophy; communal existence; Indigenous philosophy of relationships; Indigenous epistemology

Introduction

Indigenous methodologies have emerged in response to an old order of Western research practices. Stuart Hall (as cited in Smith 1999) identified four functions of an old order of Western research that show how the positivist research paradigm has guided research in the name of science. These functions have:

- 1) Allowed researchers to characterize and classify societies into categories; 2) condensed complex images of other societies through a system of representation; 3) provided a standard model of comparison, and; 4) provided criteria of evaluation against which other societies can be ranked. (Smith 1999, p. 42)

These functions reflect a Western value system and underpinned theories of research on indigenous

populations in which categories have already been identified as common sense and by which representations and evaluations of indigenous peoples have been created (Deloria 1969; Smith 1999). Ultimately, Western research was utilized to dominate, restructure, and have authority over indigenous people without any regard for the indigenous communities' goals of self-determination and control over their own resources (Smith 1999).

Researchers who employ indigenous methodologies center the needs of the indigenous communities and nations within research and value their knowledges and ideas as they contribute to the process of sovereignty and nation building. From this paradigm and through these processes, indigenous researchers have resisted contributing to the colonizing ways of Western research and continue to work towards retrieving and remaking themselves and their communities. Philosophies and theories of indigenous communities are alive and intact, found in the collective knowledge contained within the languages, stories, songs, and ceremonies of the people. As these philosophies and theories of the indigenous communities are used as the frameworks throughout the research process, deeper understandings are achievable because of the ontological and epistemological alignment within the process and to the goals of self-determination. As an example of how indigenous knowledge can be centered within the philosophies and theoretical frameworks of research, a Diné *philosophy of community* was articulated to investigate what community meant from a Diné (also known as Navajo of the Southwestern USA) perspective for one research study (See Kulago 2012).

The Diné, just like other indigenous communities, have philosophies that have guided and sustained them throughout their existence. The philosophy of community for the Diné has been established as the concept of k'é (Kulago 2012). *K'é*, simply translated as a term meaning *family* in English, is a concept that also means compassion, cooperation, love, kinship, claniship, friendliness, kindness, unselfishness, peacefulness, thoughtfulness, and all those positive virtues that constitute intense, diffuse, and enduring solidarity through respectful relations with nature and humans.

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In what follows, first, the qualities of k'é are explained as a Diné philosophy of community. Then, the ontology and epistemology of the Diné philosophy of community is contextualized through the Diné Kinaaldá ceremony. It is within the ceremonies that Diné people are able to honor, interact with, and be engaged in the teachings of their deities and ancestors. Within the description of the Kinaaldá that the qualities of k'é are highlighted.

Framing K'é as Community

A definition of k'é for the purposes here is summed up by a Diné grandmother describing what "good thinking" means when she states, "Good thinking means teaching our children that we must know one another in the family. We must maintain harmonious relations. We must share with one another. We must be able to depend on one another" (McCloskey 2007, p. 51). Pulling from the statement made by the Diné grandmother, the definition of k'é is made up of four qualities that a Diné community should embody (Kulago 2012). The first quality in the framework of k'é is the basic knowledge of each other in the family. Recognizing kinship through clans demonstrates knowledge of who you are, how you should relate to people, and how other people relate to you. Also, we recognize relationships with certain natural and spiritual elements. The second quality is that of maintaining harmonious relationships by expressing respect, love, compassion, friendliness, kindness, and peacefulness as one would to family members. The third quality is sharing with one another and being generous, unselfish, and thoughtful of others. The fourth quality is being able to depend on one another and being able to be depended on.

The Kinaaldá ceremony expresses the emphasis of these teachings. The description of the ceremony was not broken apart to fit nicely into the specific qualities of k'é because the teachings are ongoing throughout the entire process. To take them apart would make the ceremony incoherent. As one reads the description through the framework of k'é, parts of the ceremony will speak

directly to certain qualities of k'é and emphasize a philosophy of community; however, there are multiple interpretations.

Ontological and Epistemological Contextualization of K'é

To investigate what community means from a Diné perspective, the Diné ontology and epistemology needs to be understood. The description of the Kinaaldá ceremony exemplifies the concept of k'é by identifying what is possible to know (ontology) and how knowledge is known and demonstrated (epistemology). What can and should be known within this philosophy are the relationships and interconnectedness between multiple entities of the natural and spiritual worlds. These entities are interconnected at various points throughout the four components that make up a person: mental, emotional, spiritual, and physical. To contextualize the ontology within this philosophy, the following description of the Kinaaldá ceremony is framed as an educational experience with knowledge and understandings of relationships and interconnectedness as the overarching goals.

Epistemologically speaking, a person is knowledgeable and considered a good, beautiful, and "educated" person when she or he can consistently keep all relationships and interconnections harmonious. Everyday situations require various types of knowledge and can change due to age, gender, clan, place, or other characteristics. The way one acts within those situations indicate what kind of person she or he is. Furthermore, when one is educated and virtuously embodies k'é, she or he is able to recognize others who are educated in k'é. If k'é exists, then the Diné community exists.

Conception of the Kinaaldá

In the Diné creation story, the first man and the first woman found a female baby who became known as *Aszdaanáádlehi* (Changing Woman), a deity who represents the Earth and motherhood and is identified with reproduction, sustenance, and nurturance. The Holy People (deities)

performed the first Kinaaldá ceremony for her to celebrate her ability to bear children and to mold her into the ideal woman and mother (Frisbie 1967; McCloskey 2007). After her Kinaaldá, Aszdaanáádlehí became the mother of two sons whom she taught to take responsibility, maintain a strong sense of identity, and be independent, resourceful adults who ultimately made life on earth safe and possible for human beings (Frisbie 1967; McCloskey 2007). Because of the mothering that Aszdaanáádlehí achieved, she is the ideal woman that Diné women should grow up to emulate. It has been stated that “Motherhood is defined by the acts of giving and sustaining life to create strong bonds of solidarity. The strong and close mother-child bond serves as a model for the enduring relations of kinship” (McCloskey 2007, p. 18). In other words, the relationship between a mother and child is considered the prime model of how people should relate to others, including nature. For both daughters and sons, their mothers were their first teachers of k'é, and the ceremony is the educational experience that sustains the community.

Kinaaldá as an Educational Experience

The Kinaaldá is a ceremony that is an educational experience that calls attention to the importance of k'é. It is a puberty ceremony that is held for a Diné girl when she first starts menstruating. This 4-day ceremony focuses on the girl's mental, emotional, spiritual, and physical endurance as she undergoes an intense course on the responsibilities of being a Diné woman. This ceremony includes major events within the 4 days: running to the east three times a day; ritual washing of the girl's hair; baking ceremonial corn cake; and all night singing conducted by a medicine man on the final night. This ceremony and the teachings within it have been passed down from Diné ancestors for generations.

The Kinaaldá ceremony is a crucial time in any female's life because the ceremony is the ultimate educational experience that will shape the girl's adult life and those of her children. The 4-day ceremony traditionally starts and ends inside a Diné hogan. The hogan is a significant site because it is the traditional dwelling that opens

to the east to allow the first sunlight and all good things to enter in the morning and has a dirt floor to allow offerings to be made to Mother Earth and all of the elements such as the sun, water, mountains, etc. Songs are sung and offerings are made to show respect for the hogan. The hogan is considered alive. Additionally, the Diné incorporate many sacred places into the teachings during the Kinaaldá. Multiple offerings are made during this ceremony in many different ways to continue the relationship in a reciprocal way, meaning that the universe will offer the things the people need to exist, and the people will continue with their offerings to the universe.

The girl, who is called “Kinaaldá,” is dressed in traditional Diné attire and adorned with silver and turquoise jewelry, which symbolizes a prosperous future. People often offer their jewelry for her to wear so that it acquires good blessings for the girl and themselves. Her hair is ceremoniously tied by an older woman who will mentor the girl during these 4 days and who should mentor her throughout the rest of her life. This woman also massages the girl, so as to “mold” her into a physically healthy woman. The woman, whom the parents choose, is usually a respected elder based on the kind of woman she is and the life experiences she has had by which the parents of the girl determine as “good.” This woman is the person they want their daughter to emulate. It is believed that the girl will inherit this elder's traits and characteristics, so it is a very important decision, and it is an honor to be chosen.

Throughout the 4-day ceremony, the girl is taught many lessons, by many different people. The girl is the most important person in the ceremony, and the lessons revolve around the goals of keeping respectful relationships. First and foremost, through spiritual belief, the girl is considered “holy” as she is surrounded by the Holy People who are believed to be with her during the 4 days. She must remember her relationship to the Holy People as she should exhibit the kind of person she wants them to see her as. She is also told that her actions affect all of the contributors so she must do things correctly. She is told to be gentle, grateful, generous, caring, and kind. She is told not to be mean, jealous, mad, or stingy.

Through her actions, she demonstrates her knowledge of and respect for the Holy People and her family's wellbeing.

Physically, the girl is told to have a healthy relationship with her body. She should eat as naturally healthy as possible, without any unnatural sugars found in such junk foods as candy or soda. She also runs out of the hogan, to the east, then back into the hogan, three times a day. Each time she is tested to push herself to run farther. She also must keep busy throughout the 4 days. She should be hard working, strong, and not lazy. As one Diné grandfather stated, she cannot help others if she is not healthy and strong (McCarty and Bia 2002).

Intellectually, she is taught the "how to" of many tasks such as cooking, weaving, and sewing, and she is also taught lessons through stories shared by people who attend. Emotionally, she is told to be happy, positive, and strong. She should be motivated, disciplined, and supportive. She is told to think positively towards others, all throughout the ceremony. She is even told to think positively as she prepares food because she feeds those thoughts to the people. These are just some of the basic teachings that are specifically taught during the ceremony through basic everyday activities. Through observation and involvement in all the activities related to the home, the herds, and the fields, she gradually assumes the responsibilities of an adult (McCarty and Bia 2002). The woman who has tied her hair is primarily in charge of these teachings, but other women and men also offer teachings from their experiences.

The greatest emphasis is on k'é. The girl gains and strengthens relationships with all who have contributed to her ceremony as they demonstrate their concern for her future. Respectful relationships that are cooperative, generous, and appreciative are demonstrated through the support offered to her from relatives, family friends, and other community members. During the 4 days, she should be experiencing and internalizing the positive qualities she must adhere to because she is told it will affect all who are involved. Part of the sacredness of the ceremony is the feeling of family closeness and cooperation and the

ceremony could not be possible or successful without these attributes.

Support for her wellbeing can be demonstrated in many ways. People are appreciated for anything that they can contribute. No one is required to do anything, but because it is for the wellbeing of the girl and her future contributions to the people, the people participate. People donate their labor by butchering sheep, cooking, cleaning, chopping wood, grinding corn, sewing, etc. People also donate goods such as treats to giveaway, sheep for meat, groceries to feed people, cloth for the girl's clothing, money, firewood, corn, corn husks, pots and pans, and other items specific to the ceremony. People also sing their songs of prosperity, health, and strength during the final night of the ceremony. Some people show their support by just being present and talking to her. From lectures, storytelling, and participation in the socialization of the ceremony, she can experience the roles, relationships, and ideals of a good and full life (McCarty and Bia 2002).

If present at the time when the girl runs, people physically show support as they run behind her and encourage her to stay strong. The distance, endurance, and perseverance she demonstrates during the run are symbolic of her approach to her life's goals as her support system is always behind her. They do not pass her because at that point she is setting the pace. The phrase, "to run after them" is a phrase Diné use when talking about helping each other and is considered a paraphrase for "helping or giving aid" (Lamphere 1977).

There is a final giveaway at the completion of the ceremony when the Kinaaldá gives away the ceremonial corn cake and other treats as a way to give thanks and blessings of prosperity to all who contributed. A piece of the cake is offered to Mother Earth to ensure that the relationship between humans and the earth continues in a reciprocal way. All the people helped in their own way, demonstrating that the ideal is to contribute what you can for the success of others. As she becomes an adult and able to contribute to the community, she will be able to contribute what she can. The girl is able to feel the responsibility of her family and although many people helped,

the success of the ceremony depended upon her. From this ceremony, she officially becomes a part of the social relationships of reciprocity in the community and prepared to teach the next generation.

To Be a Good, Beautiful, and Educated Person

The Kinaaldá ceremony is meant to mold girls into beautiful, educated women. To be beautiful in the Diné society is to be good and useful which implies friendliness, unselfishness, kindness, strength, ambition, and capability of enduring much (Frisbie 1967). Most importantly, she will be a kind mother. To be educated is to know how to act in every situation in a positive way. People often conclude that one is uneducated if she does not know how to respond in various situations in a good and useful way. To be good, or have good thinking, as a Diné has also been described as “helping” and living under the moral obligation to give aid when requested or when it appears to be needed.

After a girl has her Kinaaldá, the ultimate test of the knowledge she gained from this educational experience is demonstrated by her actions from then on. In any situation she enters into, her knowledge and understandings of the relationships and interconnections will be demonstrated by the way she proceeds through relationships with all entities and people that are around her. Most significantly, when she becomes a mother and/or wife she will demonstrate her knowledge by nurturing and sustaining her family and teaching them k'é. Thus, mothers who have experienced the teachings of the Kinaaldá are the most essential determinants of the existence of k'é and consequently of the Diné community.

Conclusion

Although k'é, the Diné philosophy of community, is present within Diné communities, its presence within educational theory and research is minimal. As with the Diné community, it can be argued that all indigenous communities have their own philosophies of community as well that set protocol of relationships. This exact

example should not be attributed to all indigenous communities but should demonstrate the complexities and deeply rooted understandings that guide the everyday protocol of such communities. The complexities and nuances that emerge from an articulation of this philosophy invalidate the generalized theories of research on and about indigenous peoples that have operated through the four colonizing functions of Western research.

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Dionysian

- [Nietzsche and Morality](#)

Dis/Ability and Education

- [Intersections of Gender and Ability/Disability in Education](#)

Disability

- [Disability, Diversity, and Higher Education](#)

Disability and Samoa

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Synonyms

Citizenship belonging; Global disability; Health; Illness; Schools

Introduction

Certainly not all disabilities are the same, and societal reactions vary greatly from one disability to another. Likewise, disability is defined in various ways, depending on who is defining the term and for what purpose (Taylor 2001). In the US context, it is only since the last century that society used disability to socially construct or refer to a distinct class of people. Historically, disability has been used as a cover for inability and as a reference to legally impose limitations on rights and power dynamics. The genealogies of understanding bodies with disabilities as “broken” are greatly influenced by the medical approach to disability. Such approach holds that disability results from an individual person’s physical or mental limitations and is largely unconnected to the social or geographical environments. Whereas, the social model views disability as a consequence of environmental, social, and attitudinal barriers that prevent people with impairments from participating in society.

Disability is constructed in a similar way in Samoa, an independent State in the Pacific, where it is understood as *ma’i*, or sickness. *Ma’i* is a term that describes all sicknesses, as well as someone with a disability or impairment. This approach to disability is also influenced by the medical model, which understands disability as a physical or mental impairment of the individual and its personal and social consequences. The medical model places the source of the problem within a single impaired person and concludes

that solutions are found by focusing on the individual. The medical model assumes that the first step solution is to find a cure by making disabled people more “normal.” In contrast, the social model of disability is understood as a relation between an individual and her social environment. Accounting for the geographical, social, and political views, which consider the locations and positionality of disabilities, can expand our constructions of differences. As Erevelles (2011) suggests, the need to link disability to discussions of the economic and social transformations occurring at the global framework is affected by colonialism, postcolonialism, and neoliberalism and the impacts of these transformations on disabled bodies. Hence, connecting such complex understandings of disability and sickness to Samoa’s historical relations as a nation to other Western countries is a crucial part of the conversation. Noting unequal colonial relations between the Pacific Islands and Western countries are critical in the dialogue of abilities and disabilities. Moreover, understanding disability from a Samoan context can be a potential model for thinking about various cultural meanings and interpretations of disability in society.

Samoan History

Samoa’s long history is interwoven in oral traditions, legends, songs, recorded writings, and dances traced to certain gods. Samoa’s indigenous institutions of governance are associated with certain paramount titles and traditional political districts. Even with Samoa’s contact with the non-Polynesian world in the eighteenth century, the *matai* (chiefly) system of governance continues to maintain authority throughout the districts. This section briefly addresses the indigenous reference points and colonial histories that influence Samoan understandings *ma’i* or sickness and disability.

In the 1800s, the German, American, and British commissions were economically invested in copra, cacao plantations, and shipping ports. As a tripartite government, these governments existed over a group of small islands. The three powers of government generally allied with opposing chiefly

factions, which often fueled civil unrest (Meleisea 1987). The disputes among the three governing powers and the local Samoans never seemed to end. Consequently, the Treaty of Berlin in 1889 divided the Samoan islands into two halves: the eastern and western islands. The Samoan archipelago was split into two regions by the United States and Germany, each of which formed separate political systems. The eastern islands were placed under the US rule, which is currently known as American Samoa, an unincorporated territory of the USA. For the western islands, they were placed under separate German and New Zealand administrations. The German colonial administration ruled Western Samoa from 1900 to 1914. New Zealand ruled Western Samoa under five different military administrators from 1914 to 1962. At the outbreak of World War I in 1914, military forces occupied Samoa and instituted a military administration. A League of Nations mandate placed the country officially under New Zealand administration in 1920. On January 1, 1962, Western Samoa, today called Samoa, became an independent State and the first UN trust territory in the Pacific to decolonize and become sovereign (Meleisea 1987).

Ma'i or Sickness

To understand disability in the Samoan context of sickness, one must examine the area's dominant medical institutions: indigenous medicine as explained in the fa'a Samoa (Samoan way of life) and Western medicine. Thus, analyzing how these longstanding institutions inform ableist, hegemonic, and economic policies that define normalcy (Davis 2006) and/or productive citizenry (Campbell 2009) reveal how ma'i (sickness) is underscored by ableism, nondisabled bodies as the normal human condition. Issues of translation and linguistic nuances between English and Samoan are central to conversations about disability and sickness. Ma'i can also allude to someone's illness because of misdoing. For example, some Samoans believe that a spirit or an ancestor possesses people when social convention has been violated. Traditional social

conventions such as changing dress codes, changing attitudes by young people, challenges to the role of the elders and chiefs, and diminishing adherence to family duties can result in frustration and confusion, and, at times, possession. Although there is no direct translation of the word disability in Samoan, the word ma'i (sickness) is one term used to refer to people with disabilities. Sickness does not fully capture the complexities of disability, but the ideologies behind calling a disabled person "sick" are very much linked to medical understandings of disability.

Systems of Healthcare

Samoans use two systems of healthcare services: Western and local medicine. Most people in Samoa use the services of a local taulasea (healer) to remedy their illness. The taulasea believe that Samoan culture dictates humans to live within three worlds: a natural world, social world, and spiritual world. The human condition and healing is at any one time influenced by relations between individuals and the natural, social, and spiritual realms. The desired state is that of harmonious relations between humans and each of these worlds (Macpherson and Macpherson 1990). Many Samoans believe that when such equilibrium exists (among the natural, social, and spiritual world), so too, will Samoans experience a feeling of wellbeing. However, when such logic is applied to people with disabilities, they are often represented as subhuman, shameful, special, holy, and pitiful. These dehumanizing ideas can also pertain to medical care as normative institutions in which marginalized communities are forced to abide by in order to restore the standard of normal communities. For Samoa's case, indigenous and Western philosophies of healing are institutions with different set of beliefs and practices that have coexisted despite geopolitical, social-political, and postcolonial histories. Most Samoans believe that indigenous medicine is not a single unified body of belief and practice. In addition, Samoans share a set of beliefs about the nature and causes of sickness according to their beliefs about their environment. Another set

of beliefs about the nature and causes of particular illnesses also differs significantly, in both depth and content, from one healer to the next (Macpherson and Macpherson 1990). The coexistence of western and indigenous beliefs, despite both being built on different epistemological foundations and practices, continues to inform how Samoans understand *ma'i* (sickness). Historically, western medicine and health programs were implemented in Samoa in limited ways and in a manner where Samoans controlled some degree of their practices. For instance, in order for public health programs to be implemented into villages, the permission of the *mata'i* (chief) must first be obtained. Thus, the making of western medicine depended heavily on the cooperation of Samoans. In fact, this gave some control over the form of these practices and the terms on which they were offered within villages (Macpherson and Macpherson 1990).

Indigenous Care

Herbal medicine and *fofo* (massage) were used to assess the illness or spiritual mishap (Whistler 1992). Even when Samoans leave their homelands, they maintain these attitudes towards disability as a sickness. For Samoans living in the Los Angeles, California area, *ma'i aitu* (spiritual sickness) and *ma'i valea* (mental illness) are common "sicknesses" in which remedies are sought (Lazar 1985, p. 163). The *taulasea* also specialize in illnesses caused by the *aitu* (spirits), supernatural powers, and *fofo* (Lazar 1985). The notion of "fixing" or "curing" an illness came with the introduction of Christian notions of healing and prayers, many of which added to the practices of the *taulasea*. In short, the *taulasea* attempts to make right whatever was making the spirits restless or angry, thereby helping the sick and bringing balance to the Samoan worlds of the living and nonliving. This organizing of spiritual healing and social structures again reiterates the idea that there is a standard to maintain with those outside of these boundaries taking up the category of the other. People with disabilities continue to occupy the category of the "other" in this structural organization because their condition appears

"incurable." Or as some elders in the community convey, "It is God's will" that one is disabled, reflecting histories of Christian missionary influence on suppressing traditional religious beliefs. Today, Samoa is politically and religiously independent, and churches such as the Congregational and Methodist are more inclined to acknowledge the role of *taulasea's* pre-Christian views and practices. Likewise, active members of various churches are now openly recognizing that they visit traditional spiritual healers. *Taulaseas* are also active church members while simultaneously acting as mediums for pre-Christian divinities and familial ancestors. Most of the healing for illnesses was traditionally done by a *taulasea*. What is noteworthy is that most healers do not consider their models as less effective than those of Western medicine. From a *taulasea's* view, each exists to understand and manage different types of illness. For healers, the favorable outcome of their healing practices is their success in restoring harmony among the worlds we live, not in how they are integrated or structured (Macpherson and Macpherson 1990).

From a Western view, however, the medical model has historically represented people with disabilities as "broken" and in need of "fixing" or "curing." Medicine has often relied on the deficit-model of disability. The historical goal has been to make the human race perfect by eliminating people with undesirable characteristics from the population (Kluth 2006). The challenge with such medical practices is that it fosters overt and covert eugenic ideologies that seek to control and eliminate certain undesirable populations. The importance placed on the *taulasea* healing practices was initially questionable with the arrival of Christian missionaries, who often equated a *taulasea's* work to witchcraft or "savage" practices. From a *taulasea's* view, Western medicine practices have coexisted in Samoa since colonization. From a Western medicine perspective, most medical professionals consider *taulasea* healing practices as "primitive" or unscientific. Therefore, understanding indigenous causality concepts, including the distinctions between supernatural and natural etiological categories of disease, is so important when talking

about disability in Samoa. As disability studies scholars Paul Longmore and Lauri Umansky (2001) astutely points out, a sociopolitical or minority-group model approach to disabilities, which investigate the relationships between meanings, attributed to bodies and the organization of power in society is an important focus. This means that an investigation of the body can illuminate its complexities, its politics, its lived experience, and its relation to subjectivity and identity (Wendell 1996). It is possible that this claim of understanding the body and the institutions, which define and redefine it, can bear light on a more inclusive understanding of disability.

Global Realms of Disability

In addition to cultural understandings of disability in Samoa, geopolitical, sociopolitical, and post-colonial components play a role in disability notions. Here, I point to Helen Meekosha's (2011) work on situating disability in a global context, which requires an analysis of power relations between the global North and global South. She relates that based on geographical location, such relations and power dynamics also produce, sustain, and profit out of disability (p. 668). Meekosha argues that there has been a one-way transfer of ideas and knowledge from the global North in the field of disability studies, thus constituting a form of scholarly colonialism that reinforces a production of impairment in the global South. Work in disability studies fails to mention the imperialistic, militaristic, and colonial processes responsible for disabling millions of people across the globe. Disability and poverty are inter-related, as the fundamental business of colonization involved structured, cultural, economic, and political domination. People from northern European metropolises usually impose such colonial structures over peoples from the south. Likewise, Nirmala Erevelles (2011) suggests the analysis of disability be framed within political economy located in a Marxist claim of historical materialist concept of labor – central to the shaping of social production of life. Besides, the historical materialism seeks to expose the concrete material

conditions that have produced these attitudes and meanings systems about disability. In addition, a materialist analysis suggests the (re)inserting of the category of disability into social history which tends to mark the shifts, the changes, and the movements that coincide with historic construction and economic structures. Hence, understandings of disability and *ma'i* (sickness) in Samoa are not straight forward, and factors such as colonization, indigenous and western medicines must always be interrogated based on these contexts and historical and cultural legacies.

Normalcy

Thus, Samoan understandings of sickness or disability are also influenced by ideologies of ableism and normalcy. Fiona Campbell (2009) defines ableism as a form of discrimination based on the perception that being able-bodied is the normal human condition. Hence, the production of ableism and the sites of resistance to norms and practices are essential to discussing disability in these contexts. Disability is a social construct with relations between physical and intellectual impairment that is neither fixed nor a permanent status. These statuses are closely interconnected with social, cultural, and economical milieu. Hence, the relationship between impairment and disability are fluid and rethinking how disability is measured or counted must be accounted for. More aptly, understanding the disabled body forces one to return to the concept of the norm, the normal body, or compulsory able-bodiedness as having a body free from disability and assuming able-bodied as natural or a desired identity (McRuer 2006). Since most writings about disability have focused on the disabled person and construction of disability, another focus by disability studies scholar has shifted to focus on the construction of normalcy. A common assumption is that the concept of the norm has always existed and, but the idea of the norm is less a condition of human nature than it is a feature of a certain society. As the social process of disabling arrived with industrialization in the USA and with the set of practices and discourses that are linked to the

eighteenth and nineteenth century notions of race, gender, criminality, nationality, and sexual orientations (Davis 1995). The term “normal” continues to filter into various aspects of our lives and a configuration that arises in a particular historical moment.

Drawing on the analytical framework of taulasea medical beliefs (Macpherson and Macpherson 1990), historical materialism of disability (Erevelles 2011), the concept of ableism (Campbell 2009), and compulsory able-bodiedness (McRuer 2006) to explore how the body, particularly the disabled body from the global South, is constituted within the social relations of production and consumption of transnational capitalism. These frames situate how concepts of ableism, sickness, and oral histories move across borders and cultures as a means of reinforcing normative structures that are perceived as orderly and appropriate. Lastly, understanding the translations of disability and sickness across communities can foster reciprocal conversations and learning.

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Disability as Psycho-Emotional Disablism: A Theoretical and Philosophical Review of Education Theory and Practice

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Synonyms

[Ableism](#); [Disability Oppression](#); [Disability Studies](#); [Disability Studies in Education](#); [Psycho-emotional dimensions of disability](#)

Introduction

Disability oppression is well documented in the extensive body of literature of disability studies (DS). Common debates include definitional arguments about what counts as disability from purely medical models of disability to social models of disability. The medical models are usually institutionalized within society's major institutions both ideologically (e.g., the problem lies in people's neurology) and materially (e.g., inaccessible buildings and the speed at which lectures are presented by educational agents such as teachers to students with disabilities). The social models are traditionally lauded antithetical to the medical ones that situate disability, and hence disability oppression, originating from the social

environment (e.g., social relationships and/or physical environment). From a DS lens, both the medical and social models of disability point to sources of disability oppression, however, to the direct opposite sources. Nevertheless, both the medical and social models, according to the DS scholar Carol Thomas (1999), fail to theorize the psycho-emotional aspects of disability oppression.

This entry will summarize the literature on this gap that Thomas (1999) has pointed out as it relates to the educational philosophical and theoretical writings about the psycho-emotional aspects of disability oppression coming from the most recent field of Disability Studies in Education (DSE), an outgrowth of the interdisciplinary field of DS that shares its characteristics. Although DSE scholars' foci are within the field of education, and the related field of inclusive education, both DS and DSE scholars are interdisciplinary in nature at their approach toward their scholarship. Taylor (2006) pointed out "like the area of inquiry on which it is based—Disability Studies—Disability Studies in Education existed before it had a name" (p. xiii). Here Taylor dates the historical intellectual roots of DSE beyond professional and institutional effort to give it such a name, but to the historical-material realities of people living with disabilities that he continued to foreground as being socially constructed in society, "if one prefers, [a] creation" (Taylor 2006, p. xiii). In other words, "disability" is epistemologically, ontologically, and axiologically a creation of social, historical, and cultural construction. This premise sets the philosophical and theoretical platform that the past, current, and, most likely, future DS and DSE scholars will begin to grapple with the meanings of disability oppression.

Similarly, distinctions between the concepts of disability and impairment are critiqued when the former is usually characterized as a condition resulting from a social construction (i.e., a person becomes disabled by society's views and/or physical structures) and the latter as an "organic" disabling aspect of the body (a part of the body or mind that does not function as typically expected). For example, Shakespeare (2006) asserts that

even impairment is a function of judgment, expectations, and arrangements given a sociocultural context of meaning as it relates to the individual and the "values and attitudes of the wider society" (p. 35). Some scholars within the DS community, like Shakespeare, reject the distinction between disability and impairment on (a) philosophical grounds to squarely undergird both from a social constructionist perspective and (b) avoid the medical model of impairment as existing within and on the body. Nevertheless, even though the historical roots of DS and DSE are in foregrounding a social constructionist approach to disability or a social model of disability, taking into account the psycho-emotional as it relates to disability has been a tenuous relationship at best (Thomas 1999). Again, said differently, this entry summarizes this tenuous relationship by unpacking the study of disability oppression and its psycho-emotional aspects philosophically and theoretically.

Within this entry, both the terms "people with disabilities" and "disabled people" to refer to people with impairments and disabilities are used. Person-first language, such as people with disabilities, has traditionally been associated with the field of special education, and it indicates that they are a person, first, and not the disability per se. The norm within DS, on the other hand, is placing "disability" first, such as "disabled people," to indicate that disability is a social identity and something to be celebrated (Linton 1998), akin to being gay and feeling proud of one's sexual orientation or to being Black and feeling proud of one's racial orientation. Lastly, in this entry, the terms disability, dis/ability, and disability and ability are used interchangeably to signify the socially constructed nature of the term and phenomena of "disability." Disability and ability denote that both are ideologically contested terms and socially and culturally value-laden phenomena.

Disability Studies Versus Disability Studies in Education: A Short Synopsis

As suggested above, within DS and DSE, given the central assumption of the social models of

disability versus the medical models, the psychology and well-being of disabled people have been under-theorized since the disability rights movement (DRM) of the 1970s Civil Rights Movement. While the academic field of DS grew from the inspiration and activism for human rights and dignity for disabled people, DSE is a more recent development that specifically seeks to focus on the educational contexts of students with disabilities from K-16 and beyond.

Both the academic and political activisms coming from DS and DSE adhere to similar tenets:

- (a) Claiming to social models of disability as opposed to medical models, where negative ideological (e.g., stereotypes) and physical (e.g., inaccessible architectural environments) material barriers of society are the cause of the “disability,” distinct from disabled people’s impairments, nevertheless within both DS and DSE, there are scholars who view impairment as a social construction as well.
- (b) Values interdisciplinarity in approaches to theory, research, policy, practice, and action about dis/ability.
- (c) Honors the voices and experiences of disabled people themselves as epistemologically valid forms of evidence, encourages disabled people to be researchers and/or co-researchers, and has disabled people theorize about disability – characteristics that reflect the epitome of the DRM’s slogan: “Nothing About Us Without Us” (Charlton 1998).
- (d) Documents, critiques, and subverts instances of ableism (Linton 1998), recognizing it as a form of dehumanization and violence that stem from a medical-psychological model of disability that situates the problem within individuals and their neurology.
- (e) Acknowledges the experiences of disabled people themselves as part of interlocking systems of oppression with other markers of socially constructed identities such as race, gender, sexual orientation, and class. Also, within DSE, the history and culture of disabled people are seen as an integral part of the school curriculum.

The Psychological Turn Toward Disability Oppression

Academically and historically, the psychological dimensions of disability oppression have been written within DS, and they have increasingly been included in writings within DSE. However, for DS, due to its focus on the social nature of disability oppression, disabled people’s psychological effects have been largely framed as resulting from the social processes that both DS and DSE interrogate. Reeve (2012) speaks to this historical omission:

Although early disability writers such as Paul Hunt (1966) documented the impact of stigma and internalized oppression on the psyche of disabled people, these problems have largely remained a difficulty for the individual to manage whilst the disabled people’s movement addressed the more material forms of disadvantage such as exclusion from employment, education and the built environment. It was the naming of these personal experiences as psycho-emotional disablism which has allowed for a sociological analysis of these aspects of social oppression, rather than leaving them in the hands of psychologists and other professionals ‘who would not hesitate to apply the individualistic/personal tragedy model to these issues’. (Thomas 1999, p. 74; Reeve 2012, p. 78)

In her 1999 book, *Female Forms*, Carol Thomas introduced the concept of psycho-emotional disablism. However, Thomas (1999) was inspired by Tom Shakespeare’s observation that “few have raised the issue of individual psychology” within DS (1996, p. 103, as cited in Thomas 1999). The term that was usually used before psycho-emotional disablism was “psycho-emotional dimensions of disability,” designed “to make connections with other forms of social oppression such as hetero/sexism, ageism, and racism” (Reeve 2012, p. 79). From a feminist perspective, Thomas (1999) critiqued the Union of the Physically Impaired Against Disability’s (UPIAS) definition of disability (UPIAS 1976) by seeking to move away from a purely materialist and environmental critique of the phenomena of disability with the crying call of *the personal is political*. Thomas (1999) foregrounded the psychological aspects of disability oppression or disablism by defining disability as “a form of social oppression involving the social imposition

of restrictions of activity on people with impairments and the socially engendered undermining of their psycho-emotional well-being” (p. 3). Thomas undergirds the psychological as the fallout of the insidious social processes of disability oppression, acknowledging disability as disablism as being *both* an individual and structural phenomenon. The structural aspect of disability as disablism regards the environment as the source of disability oppression. The structural aspects of disability as disablism, then, are well identified, documented, and critiqued by adherents to the social model of disability. In other words, Thomas reframes the structural phenomena of disability as disablism as having an impact on the individual psyche and well-being of disabled people. This reframing of disability oppression or disability as disablism that foregrounds the psychological has also been understood as a *social relational definition of disability* (Reeve 2006).

Accounting for External and Internal Forces for Disability Oppression

This social relational definition of disability, hence, takes into account the external and the internal aspects of disability oppression (Reeve 2006). Reeves (2006) contends that this dialectical relationship of social oppression due to disability has helped illuminate the economic and social disadvantage disabled people confronted. Reeves (2006) reminds us of the feminist tradition that has influenced our understanding of disability oppression and their critique of the social model of disability because it focused on the “public” experiences of oppression as opposed to the more “personal” experiences of oppression. Reeves (2006) underscores that these more “personal” experiences of oppression “operate at the emotional level” (p. 95). Reeves (2006) states: “consequently, an extended social relational definition of disability has been proposed which attempts to address this criticism by explicitly including both barriers ‘out there’ and those that operate ‘in here’” (Reeve 2006, p. 95). The “out there”/public

social forces do not exist in isolation to the “in here”/private forces – the personal is political – of disability oppression. A flight of stairs is the environmental mechanism in which a person in a wheelchair is disabled by, while, being stared at or bullied due to one’s physical or ability differences “can leave disabled people feeling worthless and ashamed, and may end up preventing them from participating in society as effectively as physically inaccessible environments” or classroom spaces (Reeve 2006, pp. 95–96). Both the “out there” and “in here” dimensions of disability oppression are enveloped by the “cultural representations and disabling images” in society about people with disabilities. The dialectic between the internal and external disabling mechanisms has resulted in internalized oppression by people with disabilities.

Internalized Oppression, Language, and Self: *The Case of Labels*

People with disabilities, hence, are not only oppressed by external/“out there”/public social environments and others, but disability oppression includes the internal/“in here”/private dimensions. This latter domain of disability oppression can be understood as internalized oppression. Language, specifically the language of the dominant cultural representations and images of who counts as disabled and what counts as a disability, is one major reason internalized disability oppression exists. From a Marxist historical-materialist perspective, Charlton (1998) writes about the consciousness of disabled people as they experience internalized oppression through their alienation by the hegemonic and dominant worldview of the status quo that “naturalizes superiority and inferiority, power and powerlessness” that he argues characterizes “the internalization of oppression that creates an emasculation of the self” (p. 69). Charlton (1998) continues by defining this latter social process as disabled people incorporating a false consciousness due to their internalized oppression that results in a sense of powerlessness. Incorporating the hegemonic

perceptions of institutions, such as the educational system, into one's self-concept or perceptions is an example of the power of labeling and the language of the label to define children and youth as "disabled" (Baglieri and Shapiro 2012). For example, the labeling of children and youth as "emotionally disturbed" or "learning disabled" or any other more "subjective" category within Special Education is a case in point to illustrate the power of labels about disability and their psycho-emotional impact on the lived experiences of children and youth labeled. In the next section, we further this discussion and turn to DSE regarding the psycho-emotional aspects of disability oppression through the case study of learning disabilities (LD).

The Psycho-Emotional Oppression of LD Labeling

According to Vehmas (2012), philosophy has much to teach us about disability and disability oppression. Vehmas (2012) describes philosophy as a tool that investigates the "conceptual boundaries of human thought by means of examples and counter-examples. This means that 'it is done just by asking questions, arguing, trying out ideas and thinking of possible arguments against them, and wondering how our concepts really work'" (p. 298). For example, Vehmas (2012) juxtaposes how disability scholars and activists might approach disability oppression versus what a philosophical interrogation would be. Vehmas (2012) notes that a philosophical perspective on disability as disablism or disability oppression would ask what count as oppression or disability, "people with disabilities," and what makes them such a group or identify as "disabled" – thus examining the ideas that are taken for granted, philosophy stretches the boundaries of one's understanding of the world. Vehmas (2012) argues that "the basic use of philosophy for disability studies is to question and examine carefully its essential concepts and conceptions, their rational credibility, logical tenability and normative soundness" (Vehmas 2012, pp. 298–299). This philosophical

interrogation of disability as disablism is compatible to how DS and DSE scholars have resisted medical-psychological models of disability that reproduce a false consciousness about the nature of disability. Within DS and DSE, scholars have put forward indirect philosophical arguments in deconstructing what counts as ability and disability within society; however, they might not have framed it from a direct and explicit philosophical tradition and perspectives such as what Vehmas (2012) asks us to consider. There are exceptions to this, however, such as the critical special education and DSE scholar Deborah Gallagher.

Historically, the nature of LD has been from a quantitative positivist philosophical worldview, where the traditional field of LD and the dominant master narratives within it, due to its epistemological, ontological, and axiological beliefs, adhere to a medical-psychological model of disability (Gallagher 2007). Nevertheless, there has been a growing body of work from critical special education, DS, and DSE scholars who question the positivist worldview about the nature of LD. For example, these scholars also adhere to pluralistic and interdisciplinary perspectives that interrogate the philosophical underpinnings of not only the nature of LD but also the field of LD and the larger field of Special Education. For example, Ferri et al. (2011) ask the following critical philosophical questions about the academic side of LD: *"What is considered acceptable knowledge about learning disabilities? Who decides? What are the origins of this knowledge? Who uses it, and toward what ends? Who, in the end, benefits?"* (p. 229). Less so has there been a critique of similar positivist world view and lack of pluralistic methodologies within the subfield and literature of the social and emotional dimensions of LD. This latter literature has found that students with LD have not only academic deficits but also social and emotional ones such as lower self-concept and suffer from anxiety, depression, suicidal thoughts, and difficulty making friends which leads to loneliness (Bryan et al. 2004). This body of work has documented the social and emotional dimensions of LD, which has

contributed to what we know about the nature of the social and emotional aspects of LD, that is, its etiology, *its cause*, and ontology, *its being*.

However, just like critical scholars who have critiqued the field of LD for not taking into account culture and sociocultural contexts (Artiles et al. 2011), there is a lack of scholarship as it relates to the social and emotional dimensions of LD from a DS and DSE lens – hence a psycho-emotional disablism perspective. For example, these sociocultural contexts include disability, race, ethnicity, gender, social class, immigration status, and language to interrogate the hegemonic norms of white-male middle-class, English-speaking, Judeo-Christian, citizen and able-bodied identity group(s). However, the budding field of DSE has begun to produce a body of literature on the practical implications of DSE perspectives about the nature of disability and, hence, disability oppression.

Disrupting Psycho-Emotional Disablism in Schools

Troublesome Ideologies Within Schooling Policies and Practices. Historically within DSE the dominant ideologies of sociocultural markers of difference as it relates to disability have been critiqued and advocated to be subverted in order to engage in a politics of education and disability that leads toward freedom, liberation, and more inclusive schools and society (Gabel and Connor 2014). For example, from a philosophical and DSE perspective, Gallagher (2006) notes the following as it relates to educational debates and what she terms the “natural hierarchy” that undergirds the social construction of sociocultural contexts that schooling policies and practices do not take as the root causes of inequity and injustice in education as it relates to disability and ability difference:

Education debates over tracking/inclusion, testing, and “accountability,” curriculum, pedagogy, and so on, are essentially debates over two opposing ideals of what constitutes a “good” society. On the one

side are those who view social hierarchy as natural and therefore, if not good, then certainly inevitable. On the opposing side are those who not only see nothing natural about social hierarchy but also view it as inimical to the ideals of social justice and equality. From the latter perspective, the concept of the natural hierarchy has provided the crucial leverage necessary for those in powerful positions to decide through schooling who would be afforded advantages and privileges and who would not. As Brantlinger (2004) cogently points out, “in our present educational and economic ranking systems, some have to be subnormal for the seemingly desirable hierarchies to survive” (p. 491). The concept of natural is important because...its power stems in large measure from the authority of science, which, in turn, derives its power from epistemic assumptions immersed so deeply into western culture that the questioning of them strikes many people as either benignly delusional or overly inflammatory. Thus, the idea of a natural hierarchy is situated at the gravitational center of debates in education and special education, serving as an invisible hand that defends, exonerates, and affirms social/educational inequality. (pp. 65–66)

Gallagher (2006) exposes the common sense of the “natural hierarchy” by firmly placing it in the epistemological matrix within schooling and education that marginalizes and excludes any difference from the norms within schools and society. These ideological exclusions, as Gallagher (2006) notes, often times go unquestioned or untroubled. As framed by Ferri (2006), DSE is about *teaching to trouble* (p. 303), that is, *teaching to trouble* the common sense assumptions as it relates to the dominant representations, images, and policies and practices in both school and society about disabled people and students. These former assumptions are institutionalized by the direct opposite epistemological, ontological, and axiological assumptions and tenets that undergird both DS and DSE (see “[Disability Studies Versus Disability Studies in Education: A Short Synopsis](#)” section for those tenets). In addition to troubling the historical and ongoing paradigms within schooling policies and practices as it relates to education debates, there is a growing literature and mobilization as it relates to the tenuous relationship between disability, psychology, and the psycho-emotional aspects of

disablism or what Dan Goodley and his colleagues also write as disablement (e.g., Goodley and Lawthom 2006).

Toward a Psycho-Emotional Inclusive Praxis. Disability can no longer be considered in isolation from the psycho-emotional aspects of disability oppression. Structural, hegemonic forces in society and schooling, directly and indirectly, influence how individuals and students with disabilities, such as students with LD, experience disablement. In turn, the relationship they have with their disability and how they might conceptualize their “disability identity” or not does not exist in isolation from how they make sense of the macro circulating narratives about what counts as disability.

Inside and outside of the DS and DSE literature, there are narrative and discursive-based approaches toward addressing the psycho-emotional dimensions that persons with disabilities, such as students with LD, have experienced and suffer from (e.g., Lambie and Milsom 2010). Further, Goodley and Lawthom (2006) call for an alliance between DS and psychology through the following 11 objectives: (a) rethink impairment, (b) recognize and resist the exclusive psychological elements of disablement, (c) promote socially valued understanding of disabled identities, (d) assume an active/activist vision of people with disabilities, (e) acknowledge the complex relationship between individual and social worlds, (f) work toward enabling psychological practices, (g) transform institutions, (h) promote a psychology of inclusion, (i) critique therapeutic assumptions, (j) seek radical psychological theories, and (k) develop emancipatory research practices (see Goodley and Lawthom (2006) for an extended discussion on each objective). Overall, taking a DS and DSE lens and honoring the local contexts of people as they enact their agency on the ground – within their cultural-historical conditions – and using what Artiles (2011) has called an interdisciplinary prism to addressing the intersectional nature of disabled people’s multi-dimensional identity markers and their psycho-emotional disablism can enable a praxis, the

coupling of reflection and action, by all stakeholders, disabled people, and students with disabilities toward deconstructing disability as psycho-emotional disablism for liberation, freedom, and social justice.

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Disability Studies in Education (DSE) and the Epistemology of Special Education

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Synonyms

[Critical special education](#); [Debates in special education](#); [Disability studies](#); [Philosophy of disability](#); [Sociology of disability](#)

Introduction: Disability Studies in Education as Critical Special Education

Disability Studies in Education (DSE) is an international academic research field that is a sub-discipline of the larger field of Disability Studies. DSE was formalized as an independent field in the United States in 1999, when a group of Disability Studies scholars formed a special interest group in the American Education Research Association. Although there is no singular theoretical framework used in DSE, a theme undergirding the scholarship is to critically examine practices at the intersection of disability and schooling (Baglieri et al. 2010).

This focus on disability and schooling aligns DSE scholars with the existing research field of Special Education. While there is overlap between the fields, the critical orientation of DSE is a key element that distinguishes the field from Special Education; DSE scholars are critical of many school practices promoted by the field of Special Education as well as of the knowledge base of the

research field. DSE can therefore be understood as a form of *critical special education* in that researchers in the field are highly critical of the theoretical frameworks and practices used in Special Education, yet many still locate themselves within the field of Special Education (Ware 2005; Connor 2013).

Epistemological Critiques of the Ontology of Disability

The rise of DSE over the past two decades is a direct response to long-standing ways of producing knowledge in the field of Special Education. Accordingly, many of the theoretical contributions of DSE scholars are *epistemological critiques* of the field of Special Education. Epistemology refers to the study of knowledge. Epistemological critiques question the knowledge base of disciplines, asking how we know and what we know about a given topic or what the assumptions are that underpin legitimate knowledge within a given field. DSE scholars have critiqued several aspects of the knowledge base of Special Education, including how disability is conceptualized and the effort to establish best practices that are linked to specific disability labels (Connor et al. 2011; Gallagher 1998, 2004).

A key impetus for such critiques is the perception of DSE researchers that the field of Special Education holds an epistemological monopoly on the intersection of disability and schooling (Connor 2013). This is of critical concern given the *institutionalized knowledge* that is produced in Special Education. To varying degrees, the research field of Special Education influences, and is influenced by, the institution of Special Education – governmental mandates regarding the provision of services to children identified as having a disability. Because legislation leaves many of the specific aspects of implementing Special Education up to local schools (in collaboration with parents and children), the knowledge and beliefs of trained professionals situated in the culture of schools largely dictate the meaning of disability and associated practices. Special Education researchers are thus uniquely

situated to produce knowledge that impacts everyday school practices via the actions of these trained professionals.

Concerned about the history of Special Education dictating knowledge about disability and schooling, critiques by DSE researchers begin at the very foundation of Special Education knowledge: the ontology of disability. In the field of Special Education, the existence of disability is generally understood to emerge from deficits on or within the body. From this perspective, disability is an individual problem that exists in some students and not others. The task of researchers in Special Education is therefore to understand the nature of the deficit and to promote practices that will ameliorate it through remediation or treatment. Establishing this knowledge base involves a slow accumulation of scientific knowledge about what are presumed to be discrete conditions, coupled with a base of accepted “best practices” aimed at remediation. In this paradigm, disability is viewed as an unwanted and undesirable characteristic of certain schoolchildren.

Often referring to this conceptualization as the medical model, researchers in DSE generally reject the understanding of disability as a deficit within individuals that must be fixed or cured by professionals. Instead, many acknowledge physiological differences in students but view disability as primarily the result of the interaction of an individual student and an inaccessible or inflexible schooling environment. From this perspective, the disability is not something that exists on or within certain students; the existence of disability is a social phenomenon. Different physical or learning characteristics among children are often reframed as neutral differences that reflect diversity, not inherent disability.

Social Constructionism as a Response to Positivism

Differences in conceptualizing disability are indicative of the stark contrast of epistemological orientations between the fields of Special Education and DSE. The knowledge base of Special Education has long been rooted in a *positivist*

empirical framework. Positivism refers to an epistemological orientation that posits that all claims about what is true (legitimate knowledge) can be scientifically verified. Empiricism refers to the belief that all knowledge can be discovered through sensory experience. Truth, in a positivist empirical framework, is therefore objective and singular. Determining what is true is a matter of refinement of a gradually accumulated base of knowledge using the scientific method.

The use of positivist empirical orientation in Special Education is owed to the influence of other disciplines on the field. As an independent field in the United States, Special Education only emerged in the 1960s, rising to prominence in the 1970s when specialized education and related services were mandated through federal legislation for all students identified as having a disability. Since its inception, Special Education has been particularly influenced by the fields of behavioral psychology and various branches of medicine. The influence of behavioral psychology explains the tendency of Special Education researchers to frame behaviors of students as a finite set of skills (e.g., social, academic) that can be altered through behavioral modification. Special Education overlaps with medicine in its aim to discover the etiology of certain disability labels as well as methods of treatment or remediation. In turn, the fields of medical science and psychology also largely influence Special Education as a system in countries around the world; by defining and setting the parameters of disability, these fields influence which children fall under the purview of Special Education professionals and researchers.

Psychometrics is another discipline that has significantly influenced the epistemological orientation of Special Education. Psychometric tools are used in Special Education research in an attempt to both objectively define the criteria for disability labels and to determine evidence-based instructional strategies for remediating deficits. In attempts to define disability, the influence of psychometrics can be seen in the use of the normal curve in Special Education. The existence of disability is predicated on identifying deviation from a set of normative criteria that are expected from

school children at a given age. For example, deviation from expected social behaviors (framed as “skills”) serves as justification for the use of a number of deficit-based labels (such as Autism Spectrum Disorder [ASD] or Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder [ADHD]) and in turn justifies the use of interventions aimed at modifying a child’s behavior.

Psychometrics is essential to the ontology of these disability labels and others in the field of Special Education because there is no definitive test to determine that these differences exist as discrete disorders. Rating scales and other psychometric tools are used as a way to establish differences as deficits. This approach also reflects *developmentalism* – a worldview based on developmental psychology that establishes normative criteria for how a child should develop. Children who exhibit behavior outside this trajectory are therefore apt to fall under the purview of Special Education professionals for the purposes of remediation.

Both DSE and Special Education researchers have acknowledged that despite its theoretical commitments, the field of Special Education has been unsuccessful in achieving its goals through a positivist empirical framework (Kauffman 1994; Gallagher 1998). Researchers have been largely unable to create the type of scientific knowledge that can serve as a basis for lawlike generalizations about the existence of disability. Furthermore, the field has been unable to establish a set of evidence-based practices that are linked to effectively remediating certain disability labels. Researchers in the field have responded with calls for incremental changes, including a stricter and more consistent adherence to a positivist empirical framework in research (Kauffman 1994).

DSE researchers have responded differently to the failure of Special Education in building a positivist knowledge base. They have questioned whether building such a knowledge base is desirable or even possible (Gallagher 1998). This critique stems from DSE’s rejection of the positivist epistemological orientation of Special Education. Rather, DSE researchers take a *social constructionist* approach to theorizing knowledge about

disability and schooling. Social constructionism refers to a framework rooted in sociology, in which knowledge about a given topic is contingent on certain shared and evolving understandings that are specific to the cultural and political contexts of a society. From this perspective, disability is framed as a social construct. Following Hacking (1999), claims about disability as a social construction can be understood as a reaction to claims about its inevitability. More specifically, DSE's use of social constructionism is a response to the idea that the *meanings* and *practices* associated with disability are inevitable. A social constructionist framework for defining disability takes a sociocultural view, highlighting the ever-shifting social, cultural, historical, and political contexts that give meaning to the existence of disability as a social phenomenon. As with social constructionist theories of gender and race, viewing disability through a sociocultural lens illustrates that disability, as it is currently known, is anything but inevitable.

As evidence of this, DSE researchers point to the many disability categories whose definitions and methods of diagnosis are highly subjective and have been altered in accordance with cultural and political factors (Baglieri and Shapiro 2012). These socially constructed categories of disability include labels such as Emotionally Disturbed, Learning Disability, and Intellectual Disability. Often referred to as “soft” disability categories, DSE researchers have attempted to show how the emergence and maintenance of these labels over time primarily reflect changes in sociocultural factors, rather than discrete physiological differences. For example, race, class, and gender discrimination have long been documented in the use of certain disability categories. In several States around the United States, students of color and of low socioeconomic status have been found to be overrepresented in categories such as Learning Disability and Emotionally Disturbed (Harry and Klingner 2014). Critiques have not been limited to these “soft” disabilities. Disability labels that are based on more consistent, discrete, physiological differences (e.g., deafness, Down syndrome) have also been the focus of criticism that examines the types of knowledge and cultural meanings that are

promoted by scientific research (e.g., Kliever 1998). A key theme undergirding DSE critiques of the scientific knowledge of disability is the idea that science exists *within* culture, rather than in a vacuum. Thus, the knowledge produced by researchers in Special Education (and related fields) through framing differences and organizing research protocols to come to scientific conclusions is seen as a cultural by product, rather than as objective observations. Special Educators are becoming increasingly aware of these critiques and have responded, defending the use of a positivist empirical framework and critiquing the sociocultural approach to the ontology of disability (e.g., Anastasiou and Kauffman 2012).

A social constructionist epistemological orientation thus serves as the jumping-off point for reconceptualizing the epistemology of Special Education. In other words, if the goal of Special Education is incremental progress while maintaining the same epistemological framework, then the goal of DSE is to recreate the framework that guides the production of knowledge in Special Education. This effort is motivated by a belief that a positivist empirical framework is a self-imposed limitation that unnecessarily and detrimentally narrows what counts as legitimate knowledge regarding disability and schooling and limits how educators might respond to the diversity of abilities in children. The later issue – responding to the diversity of children – has been a chief concern of DSE researchers, who (along with other Special Educators) have largely advocated *inclusive education* as an approach to support diversity of all students in general education. DSE researchers have recently suggested that the knowledge base of Special Education – with its roots and ongoing orientation in psychometrics and behavioral psychology – is not suitable for the further development of inclusive education practices, in part because it was never intended to foster inclusive practices. Despite an increase in research and practices aimed at supporting all students in general education classrooms, the theoretical underpinnings of Special Education still ground the discipline in discourses of deficit and remediation and provide a scientific rationale to justify more

restrictive learning environments for certain students (Danforth and Naraian 2015).

More broadly, DSE researchers have expressed at least two central concerns about the self-imposed limitations of a strict adherence to a positivist empirical framework in Special Education. First, a positivist empirical framework attempts to make claims about the objective and absolute truth about the existence of disabilities. The concern for DSE researchers is that in the search for this truth, Special Education researchers are apt to overlook the sociocultural influence on disability because it is incongruent with claims about the absolute existence of disability on or within certain individuals. DSE researchers have therefore framed the unwillingness of Special Educators to address sociocultural elements of disability as a form of self-imposed ignorance (Poplin 1987). Special Education researchers have rebuked this idea, arguing that a narrow epistemological framework is the best means to achieve the type of scientific rigor in the field that they believe will produce knowledge sufficient to remediate disability in students.

Secondly, DSE researchers have critiqued the epistemological orientation of Special Education for imposing unnecessary limitations on acceptable research methodologies. Research in the field of Special Education is rooted in a philosophical framework that is modeled on physical and behavioral science. As such, acceptable research methodologies in the field are those that reflect a positivist empirical approach, in which the research maintains neutrality and produces objective knowledge. DSE researchers have concurred with other scientific philosophers who argue that such a value-free research process is a fallacy. Instead, they argue that all research is value laden and influenced by the researcher, from the framing of research questions, to methodological choices, to interpretation of data (e.g., Gallagher 2004).

Accordingly, DSE researchers have called for broadening the parameters of acceptable research methodologies in the field. They have argued for a plurality of methodologies that will diversify highly quantitative state of the research field (e.g., Connor et al. 2011). These include the use

of qualitative and mixed-methods studies that bring forth the lived experiences of individuals labeled as having disabilities. Additionally, DSE researchers point to the need to depart from the focus on strictly defining disability labels, which are often used as a departure point for research studies that make claims about the reality of a specific disability. They argue that if disability labels are shifting sociocultural constructs, then beginning a research study by framing a disability label as an objective, static characteristic of certain individuals avoids the cultural influence and value-laden nature of the research. Therefore, useful as disability categories may be in organizing research protocols for positivist science, DSE researchers argue that such methodological tendencies do little to produce valuable knowledge, nor do they illustrate the complex truths about lives of the populations under study. Broadening the parameters of methodologies in Special Education therefore involves both expanding how research is done (e.g., quantitative, mixed-method, single-subject research) but also altering the framework of research such that it acknowledges and embraces the value-laden nature of research and the sociopolitical realities of disability.

Learning Disabilities as an Example

The phenomenon of *Learning Disabilities (LD)* provides perhaps the most comprehensive example of the epistemological differences described thus far. LD is first and foremost a political category. In several countries, LD (or some variation) is a label that provides students access to specialized instruction and services. In the United States, LD is the largest of all disability categories in K-12 public schools, representing approximately 41% of all students who receive Special Education services (Learning Disabilities Association of America 2015). LD is also a disorder within the psy-sciences, though under different names and which differs to varying degrees with the institutionalized definition and criteria of LD in schools. The research field of Special Education draws in part from the research of these behavioral and

medical sciences, as well as from the field's own traditions and research base, to build knowledge about LD.

For decades, researchers in Special Education have attempted to prove that LD exists as a discrete disability, which manifests itself in a minority of schoolchildren. Stemming from a long-held presumption that LD is a disorder of the central nervous system, this effort has involved an ongoing hunt to locate LD inside the brain. Such an effort focuses on the deficits of certain children (i.e., what they are presumed to be unable to learn) and has been proposed as an attractive explanation for the “unexpected” or “unexplained” failure of children to learn. Over time, Special Education researchers have used a positivist empirical framework to frequently redefine the definition of LD and the criteria determining who does and does not have LD. In the absence of a test of “hard” proof about the discrete presence of LD, the parameters of LD have been a moving target. Nevertheless, this has not dissuaded Special Education researchers from attempting to develop a scientific knowledge base that will uphold the existence of LD. In fact, several researchers have argued that despite a lack of clear understanding about what exactly LD is, it is best to agree on some criteria in order to disseminate information about detection and remediation, which can support teachers, parents, and children (e.g., Hammill 1990; Scanlon 2013). This perspective is reflective of the aforementioned “medical model” in which learning differences are understood through the lens of pathology; LD is viewed as a deficit that must be remediated.

While acknowledging differences in learners, DSE scholars have been highly critical of the medical model of LD, as well as efforts to build a scientific knowledge base about LD. Many DSE researchers view LD as a sociocultural and political category (e.g., Gallagher 2010; Skrtic 2005; Sleeter 1987). They understand the birth of LD and its evolution over time as more of a reflection of the cultural practices on how schools respond to differences, rather than about differences within children. For example, the economic reality of limited resources in schools may encourage teachers to use a one-size-fits-all approach,

rather than cater to differences in their students. DSE researchers further argue that the very concept of LD is based on invented concepts about how children should learn, relative to their supposedly non-disabled peers. Thus, LD is seen as a category that upholds a mythical normal child, while pathologizing differences among children. DSE researchers seek to disrupt the concept of normalcy and reduce its influence in school practices, rather than support school practices that uphold it.

Conclusion

LD is but one example of many that illustrates the stark epistemological chasm between Special Education and Disability Studies in Education. In the past quarter-century, there have been increasing critiques of special education, cementing the emergence of a vocal minority of “critical special educators” who find serious faults in the positivist empirical framework employed in Special Education research. Ultimately, however, the tradition that has been the knowledge base of the field – rooted in a medical model of disability – continues to be the dominant epistemological orientation espoused by the vast majority of Special Educators.

Cross-References

- [Convergence of Inclusive Education and Disability Studies: A Critical Framework](#)
- [Marxism and Disability Studies](#)

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Disability, Diversity, and Higher Education

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Synonyms

Ableism; Civil Rights; Disability; Diversity; Higher Education; Social Groups

Introduction

The discourse of diversity is frequently used in higher education and is today “Embraced as a holy mantra across different sites” (Puwar 2004, p. 1). Yet, disagreement persists in how diversity is defined, what it represents, and what it is supposed to accomplish. For some, diversity refers to the social categories of race, gender, ethnicity, socioeconomic status, and sexuality, while others assume diversity denotes all differences. Others believe that the term is a remedy for social injustice and the basis for affirmative action policies. There is also the view that diversity is a means to prepare students for life in a pluralistic society without any reference to social justice. Across these debates, the question of whether or not disability is considered part of what is referred to as diversity is hardly mentioned. Some scholars argue this is reflective of disability’s position as the last civil rights movement, citing better known groups have long(er) established legal statues, fields of study, scholarship, and histories of activism. The field of disability studies contends, however, that “Rather than an issue of timing, the issue is in fact structural” (Davis 2015, p. 42). Movements for racial and gender justice moved from a focus on antidiscrimination to incorporate the examination of cultures and practices that addressed heritage, diverse bodies of knowledge, standpoint theory, structural inequality, and intersectionality. The framing of disability in higher education, by contrast, has largely been

one of legally mandated, individualized, biomedical interpretation.

One argument for this difference is that scholars, practitioners, faculty, and administrators do not identify those labeled as disabled as a social group. In Iris Marion Young's *Five Faces of Oppression* (1990), a social group is defined as a "special kind of collectivity" whose affinity is shaped by similar experiences. Difference from a privileged norm constitutes association rather than any inherent feature of the individuals who make up the collective. Members thereby affiliate with one another because of this shared experience more than with those who do not identify as such. Guldvik and Helge (2014) argued that disability should be considered a social collective given that persons with disability are defined not by any inherent feature but rather their difference from able-bodied and able-minded norms. Studies find that professionals in higher education do not see disability constructed this way and diversity and disability thereby remain separate concerns.

Entrenched preferences for normativity also serve as one reason for this division. Siebers (2011) argued "Disability marks the last frontier of unquestioned inferiority because the preference for able-bodiedness makes it extremely difficult to embrace disabled people and to recognize their unnecessary and violent exclusion from society" (p. 6). These entrenched practices of exclusion are upheld by ableism, an institutionalized system of discrimination and exclusion that oppresses people who have mental, emotional, and physical disabilities (Hehir 2002). Ableism also constructs the status of other identities as inferior by assigning the label of disability to justify discrimination anew: "When categories of citizenship [are] questioned, challenged, and disrupted, disability [is] called on to clarify and define who deserve[s], and who was deservedly excluded from, citizenship" (Baynton 2013, p. 33). Therefore nondominant groups are framed as biologically inferior and intellectually substandard while the construct of normalcy upholds white, middle-class, European, able-bodied standards (Davis 2015). Even as biological characteristics of inferior intelligence and embodiment for racial, ethnic, sexual, and gendered minorities have been

disproven, disability is still tethered to this concept. Civil rights movements dismantled the false applications of normalcy but many remnants of scientific interpretations of ability continue to be used to segregate people with disabilities.

A second argument for the existing division between disability and diversity is the singular focus on legal interpretation. By in large, colleges and universities maintain a strict focus on compliance with Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990. The dominant view of disability as interpreted by case law is one of an individualized, biomedical condition. There is little sense that disability-related accommodations would "benefit more than the individual who requests them" (Emens 2013, p. 43). In higher education, there is the added requirement of confidentiality, student initiated disclosure, and letters of accommodation, which are not mandated requirements for other social groups. This hyper-individualization moves the construction of disability away from a social group status and outside of the purview of diversity work.

The institutional shifts resulting from changing demographics of college-going students, faculty, and staff fostered identity centers, fields of study, resources, admissions and recruitment practices, and scholarships for social groups connect at race, gender, sexual orientation, ethnicity, religion, and nationality. Disability, however, is not regarded as a similar cultural or social identity due to the highly individualized, biomedical, legal framework. This is not to say that legal protection is entirely purposeless knowing that disability civil rights statutes have made important inroads for the world's largest minority group. However, an institution's singular focus on legal interpretation reinforces constructs of ability difference that have proven unhelpful, and compound the exclusion of disability from diversity work.

Diversity and Higher Education

Efforts to achieve greater diversity in higher education largely began in the mid-nineteenth century. The Morrill Acts of 1862 and 1890 allocated

land so colleges and universities could serve African Americans students in Southern States where they were not allowed to enroll in State institutions. Diversity, predominately understood as access, was dominated by race for centuries but this shifted dramatically after World War II with the introduction of the GI Bill of 1944, making higher education accessible to wider demographics. The federal regulations and social movements that followed challenged institutionalized discrimination and opened pathways for marginalized groups. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 provided federally mandated anti-discrimination statutes, Title IX provided protections on the basis of sex, an applicant's race could be considered in the college admissions process, and executive orders for affirmative action worked to redress past discrimination in admissions, employment, and hiring. There was also parallel growth in different types of postsecondary institutions including minority serving institutions (MSIs), women's colleges, community colleges, and historically black colleges and universities (HBCUs).

Diversity, specifically in terms of race and the black/white binary, was also shaped by Supreme Court rulings on affirmative action. Affirmative action endeavored to at least partially remedy racial inequality, first as a presidential executive order. The evolution of court cases from the 1970s to present day debated the use of quotas, strict scrutiny, and compelling government interests as they pertained to establishing more representative college-going populations. The argument that diversity benefited all students became the leading claim for the continuation of affirmative action, even as the procedures by which it was enacted continue to be contested in the courts of legal and public opinion. Throughout this trajectory and in court cases on school desegregation, social science research underscored the value of affirmative action by demonstrating how the benefits of diversity had the potential to positively influence societal culture and practice (Orfield 2001). In his ruling in *University of California v. Bakke* (1978), US Supreme Court Justice Lewis Powell wrote "The atmosphere of speculation, experiment and creation – so essential to the quality of

higher education – is widely believed to be promoted by a diverse student body. . . It is not too much to say that the nation's future depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure to the ideas and more of students as diverse as this nation of many peoples" (p. 2760).

Yet the 1990s brought a surge of backlash against affirmative action even as college populations began to reflect the economic and racial demographics of society. Affirmative action was enacted with the hope of redressing past racial inequality but has since evolved into two camps who believe college admissions should be based on merit and another who acknowledge the benchmarks of merit cannot be achieved equally based on structural injustices in the United States (Gosh 2012). Scholarship on demographic and enrollment changes initially described diverse student backgrounds as "risk" factors. This has since moved to an understanding of ecological perspectives about inhospitable campus climates and academic departments. The social and academic integration of students has been the recent focus of efforts to address retention and persistence. Part of bridging academic success and social supports included the establishment of cultural or identity centers, learning communities, and academic fields of study. The interactions fostered by these arrangements have been found to promote positive attitudes toward literacy, critical thinking, socially responsible leadership, intercultural effectiveness, and psychological well-being. Such outcomes were further maximized by positive campus climate features involving the inclusion of diverse students, faculty, and administrators, a curriculum reflecting historical and contemporary experiences of underrepresented groups, programs that supported the retention of diverse students, and a mission that reinforced institutional commitments.

Altogether postsecondary diversity efforts intended to dismantle colorblind policies, acknowledge widespread discrimination of women and people of color, and disrupt the status quo of institutions that worked to maintain social inequality. As this trajectory of diversity work demonstrated, disability was largely omitted from these frameworks. There is little sense that the

inclusion of disability provides any “larger benefit,” for example, While ecological perspectives have been employed to address academic and cocurricular supports for historically underrepresented groups, persons labeled with a disability are all too often addressed on a case-by-case basis by an office that administers services and accommodations in accordance with disability law.

Disability and Higher Education

Prior to 1973, the only federal law that granted extensive protection for persons with disability was the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. This required equal protection of citizens in life, liberty, and property, yet failed to administer specific protection for persons with disabilities in legislation that addressed discrimination on race and gender. Before the civil rights movements of the 1960s and 1970s, colleges and universities could legally deny admission and hiring based on a person’s race, gender, sexual orientation, and ability. Repeated efforts in the 1970s attempted to include the category of disability in the Civil Rights Act of 1964 but disability-specific regulations were eventually established in Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) of 1990.

The protections established by Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 made institutions that received federal funding accountable for providing equal access and opportunity for persons with disabilities. This was later extended to all public and private educational institutions in Title II and Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA). The ADA of 1990 incorporated verbatim regulations of Section 504 and went even further to establish reasonable accommodations in such areas as academic programming, examinations and evaluations, housing, and recreational facilities on college campuses. Together Section 504 and the ADA granted students, faculty, and staff who qualified as disabled the right of equal access to participation, essential information, and avenues of communication in public and private sectors.

In legal terms, disconnects between the spirit of antidiscrimination law and social and cultural acceptance are not unfamiliar to other groups. As such, scholars have asked if Section 504 and the ADA attempt to do something different from the rest of antidiscrimination law: Emens (2013) argued that “United States antidiscrimination statutes covering classifications like race and sex – such as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 – involved costs to the employer and changes to policies and practices that operated *like* an accommodation (e.g., putting women’s restrooms in a formerly all-male work place may cost money)” (p. 45). In this sense, both Title VII and the ADA required employers to “absorb costs and make structural changes” (Emens 2013, p. 45). On the other hand, “The ADA obliges employers to respond to *individual* requests, supported by medical documentation, initiated by the students and employees themselves, thereby requiring a different kind of interaction” (Emens 2013, p. 45). Here, situated among the landscape of diversity work, antidiscrimination statutes, and identity-based programming, the requirement of medical documentation to secure an accommodation makes the category of disability stand apart from other group identities who are more commonly understood as collective social, cultural, and political groups. Even as scholars challenged wholesale assumptions about identity and essentialism in higher education, disability remains constructed as an individual request with generalized beliefs about capability attached to one’s label.

For persons with disabilities to access rights afforded by Section 504 and the ADA, they must first meet the legal definition of disability as defined in the statutes. This requires proof of a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities. The reliance on individualized inquiry and medical documentation constructs categories of disability apart from those employed in diversity work and affirmative action policies. This medical model is especially influential in shaping interpretations of disability on college campuses. By definition, the medical model predominately focuses on an individual’s diagnosis and functional limitations.

Outside of a campus's office of disability services, there is little awareness of ability difference and diversity. Faculty and administrators are not mandated to address disability or participate in related trainings. Disparities between IDEA's Part B Child Find mandate (IDEA 2004) and the ADA's individual mandate (ADA 2008) also make transition to higher education challenging. Under the ADA, college students must seek out services and accommodations. In K-12 schools, students meet annually with a multidisciplinary team to review and assess Individualized Education Plans (IEPs). The differences between K-12 and higher education represent a point of difference that other racial and gendered social groups do not have to account for in their civil rights statutes. This point of difference is compounded by discourses about "reasonable accommodations" to meet an individual's needs. In K-12 settings, Individualized Education Plans (IEPs) are legal documents that provide services and accommodations to students and involve a multidisciplinary team, parental and student involvement, and annual review of goals. Accommodations in higher education are incumbent on a person's self-disclosure and the administration of letters of accommodation to faculty and staff. College students must also bear the cost of medical documentation of their disability. The means by which this documentation is interpreted also varies greatly as there are no degree or licensure systems to serve as a case manager in a college's disability services office. Altogether this positioning portrays disability as an individual problem in need of "reasonable accommodations" rather than a symptom of systemic and institutionalized structures supporting able-bodied and able-minded norms.

The institutional shifts resulting from changing demographics of students, faculty, and staff fostered identity centers, fields of study, resources, admissions and recruitment practices, and scholarships for categories of race, gender, sexual orientation, ethnicity, religion, and nationality. Disability, however, is not regarded as a cultural or social identity on par with ethnicity, race, gender, and socioeconomic status because of the highly individualized, biomedical framework.

The field of disability studies contends, however, that the experience of being labeled as disabled functions similar to other social group identities and that the presence of disability can altogether create a different picture of identity and competence. Emerging research on diversity in post-secondary settings speaks to the necessity of intersectional analyses, but this work is almost impossible when disability is not considered part of the constellations of identity on college campuses.

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Discourse

- [Mathematics Education as a Matter of Identity](#)
- [Metaphor and Edusemiotics](#)

Dissensus/Consensus

► [Muslim Education and Ethics: On Autonomy, Community, and \(Dis\)agreement](#)

Distance Education

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Synonyms

[Open learning](#)

Introduction

With the emergence of the Internet, we have witnessed a massive growth in (online) distance education since the 1990s. Distance education – often perceived as an isolated form of individual learning – has now clearly moved into the mainstream. Today, almost all educational institutions offer programs that integrate digital media in an online environment to provide flexible learning opportunities, independent of time and place. However, distance education is not a new phenomenon. Educational technologies have been used to bridge the distance between learners and teachers or teaching institutions for over 150 years. Hence, it is important to build upon theories, practice, and empirical research into distance education when new forms and modes of delivery are developed with new and emerging media.

Therefore, after a definition of distance education and related terms, this chapter sets out to provide an overview of the historical development of distance education and generations of technological innovations associated with it. It will then elaborate on the major theories and models in the context of distance education that were developed

over time. Distance education matured as a professional field of practice and scholarship. At the end of this chapter, a framework of 15 research areas is briefly described to provide a foundation to the discipline of distance education.

Definition of Distance Education

A particular characteristic of distance education is that teachers and learners are geographically separated from each other. Teaching and learning are therefore enabled through various forms of electronic media. Brindley et al. (2004) state that “distance education” or “distance learning” is “the overarching term for media-based learning and teaching” (p. 13). The central concern of distance teaching pedagogy has always been how best to bridge this distance, since distance between students and teachers was regarded as a deficit, and proximity as desirable and necessary. Early pedagogic approaches specific to distance education aimed to find ways by means of which the spatial distance could be bridged, reduced, or even eliminated.

The origins of distance education go back to what were called “correspondence” courses (correspondence study). With the development of new media, which were also used for distance teaching (e.g., telephone, fax, radio, video, computer, etc.), the term “correspondence study” became too narrow. In North America, the terms “independent study” and “home study” were therefore used as competing designations, until the notion of “distance education” finally prevailed. This was formalized in 1982 when the international association of distance teaching institutions changed its name from the International Council for Correspondence Education (ICCE) to the International Council for Distance Education (ICDE).

In 1980 Desmond Keegan proposed a widely accepted definition in the first issue of the journal *Distance Education*. He refers to five characteristics of distance education, which mutually influence one another: (1) the separation of the teacher, learner, and teaching institution; (2) the role of an educational organization in the planning and

development of learning materials and the provision of a student support system; (3) the use of technical media, in particular; (4) the two-way media for communication throughout the learning and teaching process; and (5) the absence of the learning group (Keegan 1980). While learning in groups was not a constituent element of distance education in the 1980s (although it has been possible to meet other students in study centers), the development of online computer conferences has assisted the breakthrough of collaborative learning with networked computers.

The central attribute of distance education is that teachers and learners are separated and technical media are used to bridge the distance between the parties involved in the learning process. The capability of media to afford two-way communication for interaction between learners and teachers and among learners is an essential part of the process. This requirement is reflected in the more recent definition by Simonson et al. (2011): "Distance Education is institution-based, formal education where the learning group is separated, and where interactive telecommunications systems are used to connect learners, resources, and instructors" (p. 126).

The various types of technologies used for teaching and learning are collectively referred to as "educational technologies," and this term includes printed study materials as well. The term "e-learning" generally means learning with electronic media, i.e., via the Internet, but also via television and radio, audio, and video. E-learning is therefore defined more narrowly than distance learning, since the latter may also include print-based study materials and correspondence communication. E-learning can therefore be regarded as a particular form of distance learning, but not all distance learning is necessarily electronic. Online learning is learning and communication via networked computers (online distance education).

With the proliferation of digital media, the traditional boundaries between distance education and face-to-face educational practices are blurring. Hence, terms such as "blended learning," "flexible learning," or "distributed learning" have become prevalent. All these terms describe a continuum between traditional distance education and contact

education, in which pedagogical approaches, methods, and technologies are used to enable extended and more autonomous, individualized, and self-directed learning opportunities.

Historical Development of Distance Education

The development of distance education is closely linked to the advancement of information and communication technologies. Distance teaching institutions have always been spearheading the integration of innovations in educational technology to facilitate the learning and teaching process. Garrison (1985) distinguished between three generations of technological innovations that initiated a paradigm shift in distance education practices. From a historical perspective, the three milestones of technological innovations are print media, telecommunications media/multimedia, and the personal computer. One-way media, such as radio or television, are described as ancillary media: "The main reason is the non-instructiveness of media such as radio and television broadcasts, audio and video cassettes, laser videodiscs, and audiographics. For this reason, these media are viewed as being in a separate category, since they are incapable of providing two-way communication" (Garrison 1985, p. 239). Depending on the flow and direction of information (one-way, two-way media) and the temporal dimension of the interaction (asynchronous, synchronous media), educational technologies can be described as a function of interaction and independence that they afford.

Reflecting Garrison's concept of technological innovations, the development of distance education is briefly portrayed along the following three generations:

- Correspondence generation (since the 1850s)
- Multimedia or Open University generation (since the 1960s)
- Computer and online generation (since the 1990s)

The first generation was print-based distance or correspondence education, in which self-learning

materials were sent via the postal system to the students, who were supported by a tutor via letters. The University of London established the “University Correspondence College” in 1858 for the people in the colonies of the British Empire. The first dedicated distance teaching university was the University of South Africa, established in 1873 in Pretoria, which is still in operation and caters to over 400,000 students. First-generation distance education was characterized by high flexibility and independence of time and space but also by very limited two-way communication.

The second generation is strongly linked to the foundation of the Open Universities to widen access to higher education. Peters (2008) emphasizes the success of the UK Open University established in 1969: “The Open University [...] became famous for its open entrance policy, its focus on teaching adults, and for its extraordinary success in producing more graduates than all other universities of the country put together” (p. 227). This generation was characterized by the development of nationwide distance education system with networks of study centers and the application of a wide range of educational (multi)media, including educational TV, radio, and video conferencing.

As early as 1988, a computer-conferencing system (“CoSy”) was introduced at the UK Open University to support about 1,300 students via online tutoring. The so-called Internet-based learning management systems and virtual campus environments emerged in the middle of the 1990s. With the proliferation of personal networked computers, (online) distance education really moved into the mainstream. The computer or online generation of distance education is characterized by independence of time and space but also by a high grade of interactivity, social interaction, and collaboration via asynchronous and synchronous information and communication tools and applications.

Major Theories and Models of Distance Education

Distance education is rather young as an academic discipline. For the professionalization of the field, it is important that research activities are based on

a solid base of theory as “scholarship can be defined a research grounded in theory” (Moore and Kearsley 2005, p. 220). Major theories and models in the context of distance education began to emerge in the 1960s and 1970s.

Charles Wedemeyer conceptualized distance education as “independent study” (Wedemeyer 1971), in which students are not only independent from time and space but also responsible for managing and controlling their own learning process. Distance education provides opportunities for independent and self-directed learning. However, independent learners do not exist per se. Students need support and guidance to develop into autonomous learners. Therefore, the production of high-quality study materials, the facilitation of independent learning, and the provision of a student support system along the student’s life cycle gained importance. Delling (1971) described distance education institutions as “helping organizations.”

In order to inform policy makers in Germany, Otto Peters carried out a comparative study about distance teaching institutions in more than 30 countries in the 1960s and 1970s and developed his theory of distance education as the most industrialized form of education. He observed the separation of the production of learning materials from the instruction, the division of labor, the use of standardized and rationalized procedures, and the mass production processes. Thus, he conceptualized distance education as follows: “Distance study is a rationalized method – involving the division of labour – of providing knowledge which, as a result of applying the principles of industrial organization as well as the extensive use of technology, thus facilitating the reproduction of objective teaching activity in any numbers, allows a large number of students to participate in university study simultaneously, regardless of their place of residence and occupation” (Peters 1983, p. 111). The application of industrial practices will result in higher quality at lower costs, thus providing increased access to (higher) education.

Börje Holmberg recognized communication, the learner-teacher dialogue, as a core element in distance education. He proposed a conversational theory, which he called “guided didactic

conversation,” as the pedagogical model for distance education: “My theory implies that the character of good distance education resembles that of a guided conversation aiming at learning (. . .). There is a constant interaction (“conversation”) between the supporting organizations (authors, tutors, counselors) and the student, simulated through the student’s interaction with the pre-produced courses and real through the written and/or telephone interaction with their tutors and counselors. Communication is thus seen as the core of distance education” (Holmberg 1986, p. 54).

Also acknowledging the importance of interaction and dialogue, Michael Moore developed the theory of transactional distance (Moore 1993). He derived his definition of transactions from Dewey’s notion of “transactions” between the learners, teachers, and environment. The separation of learners and teachers in distance education leads to special patterns of learner and teacher behaviors: “With separation there is a psychological and communications space to be crossed, a space of potential misunderstanding between the inputs of instructor and those of the learner. It is this psychological and communications space that is the transactional distance” (p. 22). Thus, the term transactional distance refers not only to geographical but also psychological distance between learners and teachers, which is influenced by the extent of structure in the instructional design of a course, the extent of autonomy of the learner, and the extent of interaction (dialogue) between the learners and the teacher.

With the emergence of computer-mediated communication and online learning, Garrison et al. (2000) designed a model for distance learning, in which the educational experience occurs in a “community of inquiry” focused on critical thinking through the interaction of three core elements: (1) cognitive presence, the extent to which learners “construct meaning through sustained communication” (p. 89); (2) social presence, the ability of learners in the community of inquiry “to project their personal characteristics into the community, thereby presenting themselves to the other participants as ‘real people’” (p. 89); and (3) teaching presence, which consists of two main

functions – the planning and instructional design of a course and the orchestration and moderation (“facilitation,” p. 89) of the interaction between the learners, the teacher, and among the participants of the learning experience. Garrison et al. (2000) argue that the learning community is only viable in a computer conference if all three elements are present.

Research Areas in Distance Education

As noted above, research questions should be posed within a theoretical framework and quality research should be embedded within a holistic structure of research areas within a discipline. Furthermore, the structure, culture, history, and past accomplishments of a research discipline form the foundation for identifying gaps and priority areas for researchers. As distance education theory and practice matured, various authors carried out reviews of the research literature and discussed potential categorizations of research areas in the field. Zawacki-Richter and Anderson (2014) suggested a framework of 15 research areas based on a Delphi study along three major lines of research (p. 2):

Macro level: Distance education systems and theories

1. *Access, equity, and ethics:* The democratization of access to distance education afforded by new media and finding ways to deliver high-quality education to those who have limited resources and poor infrastructure. Issues that refer to the (sustainable) provision of distance education in developing areas. For example, what is the impact of distance education (e.g., via mobile learning) on narrowing (or broadening) the digital divide and what is the role of ICT (information and communication technologies) and/or OER (open educational resources) in terms of access to education? Should distance education have an inherent and explicit goal to reduce inequality and promote both high-quality and affordable educational opportunity?

2. *Globalization of education and cross-cultural aspects*: Aspects that refer to the global external environment and drivers; the development of the global distance education market, teaching, and learning in mediated and multicultural environments; and the implications for professional development and curriculum development.
3. *Distance teaching systems and institutions*: Distance education delivery systems, the role of institutional partnerships in developing transnational programs, and the impact of ICT on the convergence of conventional education and distance education institutions (hybrid or mixed mode).
4. *Theories and models*: Theoretical frameworks for and foundations of distance education, e.g., the theoretical basis of instructional models, knowledge construction, interaction between learners, and the impact of social constructivism, connectivism, and new learning theories on distance education practice.
5. *Research methods in distance education and knowledge transfer*: Methodological considerations, the impact of distance education research and writing on practice, and the role of professional associations and higher education institutions in improving practice. Literature reviews and works on the history of distance education are also subsumed within this area.

Meso level: Management, organization, and technology

6. *Management and organization*: Strategies, administration and organizational infrastructures, and frameworks for the development, implementation, and sustainable delivery of distance education programs. What is required for successful leadership in distance education? Distance education and policies relating to continuing education, lifelong learning, and the impact of online learning on institutional policies, as well as legal issues (copyright and intellectual property).
7. *Costs and benefits*: Aspects that refer to financial management, costing, pricing,

and business models in distance education. Efficiency: What is the return on investment or impact of distance education programs? What is the impact of ICT on the costing models and the scalability of distance education delivery? How can cost-effective but meaningful learner support be provided?

8. *Educational technology*: New trends in educational technology for distance education (e.g., Web 2.0 applications or mobile learning) and the benefits and challenges of using OERs, media selection (e.g., synchronous vs. asynchronous media), technical infrastructure and equipment for online learning environments, and their affordances for teaching and learning.
 9. *Innovation and change*: Issues that refer to educational innovation with new media and measures to support and facilitate change in institutions (e.g., incentive systems for faculty, aspects referring to staff workloads, promotion, and tenure).
 10. *Professional development and faculty support*: Professional development and faculty support services as a prerequisite for innovation and change. What are the competencies of online teachers, counselors, and support service staff and how can they be developed?
 11. *Learner support services*: The infrastructure for and organization of learner support systems (from information and counseling for prospective students to library services and technical support to career services and alumni networks).
 12. *Quality assurance*: Issues that refer to accreditation and quality standards in distance education. The impact of quality assurance requirements and regulation and the impact of quality learner support on enrolments and dropout/retention, as well as reputation and acceptance of distance education as a valid form of educational provision.
- Micro level: Teaching and learning in distance education*
13. *Instructional or learning design*: Issues that refer to the stages of the instructional

design process for curriculum and course development. Special emphasis is placed on pedagogical approaches for tutoring online (scaffolding), the design of (culturally appropriate) study material, opportunities provided by new developments in educational technology for teaching and learning (e.g., Web 2.0 applications and mobile devices), as well as assessment practices in distance education.

14. *Interaction and communication in learning communities*: Closely related to instructional design considerations is course design that fosters (online) articulation, interaction, reflection, and collaboration throughout the learning and teaching process. Special areas include the development of online communities, gender differences, and cross-cultural aspects in online communication.
15. *Learner characteristics*: The aims and goals of adult and younger students studying at a distance, the socioeconomic background of distance education students, and their different approaches to learning, critical thinking dispositions, media literacies, and special needs. How do students learn online (learner behavior patterns, learning styles) and what competencies are needed for distance learning (e.g., “digital literacy”)?

According to a large-scale literature review (Zawacki-Richter and Anderson 2014), over 50% of research papers published in major journals of the field deal with topics and issues on the micro level of teaching and learning in distance education, while the most neglected research areas are on the meso and macro level, particularly costs and economics of distance education, innovation and change management, and globalization of education and cross-cultural aspects of distance education. As distance education theory and practice develops further, it will continue to address new themes by enlarging its scope of research areas.

Cross-References

- [Massive Open Online Courses \(MOOCs\)](#)
- [Open Distance Learning](#)
- [Open Educational Resources](#)
- [Open Universities](#)

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Distance Teaching Universities

- [Open Universities](#)

Diverse Meaning Making

- [Multimodal Literacies](#)

Diversity

- [Disability, Diversity, and Higher Education](#)

Divinization

- [Philosophical Idealism and Educational Theory](#)

Doping and Anti-doping in Sport

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Introduction

Doping in sport is recognized as a crisis within government, academic, professional, and media circles worldwide. Doping, which can include performance-enhancing drugs such as anabolic steroids, growth hormones, and amphetamines, is considered to be a significant threat to the integrity of sport because it undermines the fairness of contests, the health of athletes, as well as sport's character/team building and role model function for society. The public good at stake in sport is thought to be so high as to warrant preventative education programs, but also increasingly tougher penalties and broader policing powers.

There are a number of key arguments and counterarguments in the philosophy of sport and

sociology literature on the topic of doping and doping control, which have been critically discussed at length in Hemphill (2009) and are summarized in this entry.

Anti-doping Arguments in Sport

Naturalness

On this account, sport is thought to be the testing of natural abilities, and performance-enhancing drugs and methods (PEDMs) should be banned because they introduce synthetic, foreign substances, or even one's reinfused oxygen rich blood, into the body to help produce training adaptations or performance enhancements that could not be achieved otherwise. However, there is an inconsistency by singling out drugs for prohibition when there is a range of "unnatural," yet acceptable, performance enhancers in sport. That is, in sport, as in daily life, performance is routinely aided by substances (e.g., caffeine, vitamin supplements) or by prosthetic devices that can be considered artificial and external to the athlete (Brown 1980; Lavin 1995; Roberts and Hemphill 1988; cited in Hemphill 2009).

Fairness

On this account, PEDMs should be banned because the use of a prohibited substance is cheating, that is, gives the user an unfair advantage over other athletes. PEDM rule violations not only change the conditions of play without consent, but they undermine the "level playing field," that is, relatively balanced conditions of play. However, the fairness argument is also thought to be inconsistent because there are many advantages that favor the performance prospects of some athletes over others, yet remain unquestioned (Brown 1980; Parry URL; Simon 1995; Roberts and Hemphill 1988; cited in Hemphill 2009). For example, some athletes are born with a preponderance of fast-twitch fibers, which give these athletes a natural advantage over those with less of them. More significant is the fact that some athletes have access to more funding, better facilities and equipment, as well as to greater coaching and other sport science support.

Health

On this view, PEDMs should be banned because they pose significant short- and/or long-term health hazards to athletes. However, it may be inappropriate to judge athletes by a standard of health thought to be more appropriate to a “normal” population (Brown 1980; cited in Hemphill 2009). That is, athletes are already “abnormal” in terms of their performance aspirations and what risks, hardships, and injuries they are prepared to accept and overcome in their quest for sporting excellence. Moreover, it appears inconsistent to single out PEDMs for exclusion when there are a range of acceptable short- and long-term injury and health risks associated with sports participation.

Harm to Others

On this account, athletes who use PEDMs should be banned because they coerce or force other athletes to break the rules and risk their short- or long-term health just to remain competitive. In addition, adult PEDM use in sport should be prohibited on the grounds that adult athletes are influential role models for young athletes who, in turn, may make uninformed choices about PEDM use. However, it is not clear why PEDMs should be banned when other competitive pressures (e.g., weight training, high-tech equipment) are not (Roberts and Hemphill 1988; Simon 1995; Tamburrini 2000; cited in Hemphill 2009). It also seems inconsistent to ban PEDMs when there are other adult behaviors (e.g., alcohol consumption, poor diet) that may also set a bad example to children (Roberts and Hemphill 1988; Simon 1995; Tamburrini 2000; cited in Hemphill 2009).

There are basically three courses of action to deal with the logical inconsistencies laid out above. The first is to ban any and all performance aids (e.g., technology, facilities, coaching) that are considered unnatural, unfair, unhealthy, or cause harm to others. The second is to provide universal access to any and all performance aids so as to level the playing field (Brown 1980; Savulescu et al. 2004; cited in Hemphill 2009). However, both options would likely be too expensive and impractical for implementation. The third option

is to make a special case for why PEDMs should be banned when there are so many other acceptable performance enhancers that may be unnatural, unhealthy, unfair, or cause harm to others.

In spite of these conceptual and logical problems, there still appears to be “pervasive disapproval” of PEDMs in sport (Lavin 1995; cited in Hemphill 2009). The following sections will summarize additional ethical arguments as to why this may be the case.

Respect for Persons

On this account, PEDM use in sport undermines personal autonomy and responsibility. That is, PEDM use should be condemned because it is seen as a crutch or as a shortcut that diminishes self-reliance, hard work, and perseverance (Pound 2005; cited in Hemphill 2009). Moreover, PEDM use can also undermine the ideal of competition, conceptualized as a mutually challenging quest for excellence between persons (Simon 1985, 1995; cited in Hemphill 2009). While the outcome of a sport competition can be influenced by luck or injury, there is still a significant value attached by athletes, spectators, and other stakeholders to the link between success and personal effort. Competition, then, should involve the disclosing and testing of the athletic and tactical prowess of an athlete in response to the valuable challenges served up by the opponent, not their responses to, say, performance-enhancing chemical agents.

There is also the opposing view that PEDM use is consistent with the nature of persons and the spirit of sport. For example, by speeding recovery from training fatigue or injury, PEDMs may permit athletes to train more frequently, for longer periods of time, and with more intensity. PEDM use can be seen as consistent with the Olympic ethos of “faster, higher, stronger”, and several authors argue that PEDM use is consistent with the human drive to expand capacities, self-knowledge, and freedom (Brown 1980; Konig 1995; Shogan 1999; Savulescu et al. 2004; Tamburrini 2006; cited in Hemphill 2009).

However, when PEDM bans are enforced on informed and consenting adults, it seems to disrespect them, that is, deny in adults the very feature of self-determination that is valued and expected

of them as “persons.” On this account, if athletes weigh up the pros and cons of PEDM use and make a voluntary choice, external interference with their freedom of choice seems unwarranted (Simon 1995; cited in Hemphill 2009). There is one qualification to the respect for persons argument. PEDM bans are warranted in the case of children who, due to lack of education and experience, are not fully aware of the consequences of their action (Brown 1995; cited in Hemphill 2009). In other words, soft paternalism is warranted where it can be shown that a person cannot make a voluntary, informed choice.

The notion of respect for persons has some normative force. However, when applied to the doping control issue, this individualistic notion of what it means to be a person renders two seemingly contradictory results. On the one hand, the appeal to self-determination makes the use of PEDMs appear as a prop that diminishes personal effort and responsibility. On the other hand, the appeal to self-determination suggests also that restricting the voluntary and informed choice of adult athletes when it comes to PEDM use is ethically questionable (Hemphill 2009). The following section will summarize a practice conception of personhood and its implications for understanding anti-PEDM arguments.

Practice Goods and Virtues

To speak about sport as a practice is to see it as a cooperative social activity that promotes the pursuit and achievement of goods and virtues internal to the activity (MacIntyre 1984; cited in Hemphill 2009). Internal goods are the shared standards of technical, ethical, or aesthetic excellence, while virtues refer to valued traits or dispositions (e.g., trying to win, courage). On this account, winning at all costs, including the use of banned PEDMs, is unacceptable. Winning in sport has value not simply because of the external rewards (e.g., fame and fortune) it can generate for champions, but because it stands for excellence in a valued community form of life.

While standards of excellence and virtues are sport specific, and may undergo historical shifts, they are thought to provide an internal framework for judging when an individual action is thought

to be acceptable or when it is considered cheating or unsporting. On this cultural relativist-tending position, out the window goes the view that there is anything like a universal notion of personhood or timeless ideal of competition that can settle the issue once and for all about legitimacy of PEDM use in sport. Rather, the practice goods need to be seen more as a historically grounded, but no less powerful, set of collective sentiments or widely accepted beliefs about what sport is or what it should be (Burke 1997; Burke and Roberts 1997, Lavin 1995; cited in Hemphill 2009).

The appeal to collective sentiments and democratic preferences goes some way to making a special case for sport in terms of the “pervasive disapproval” of banned PEDMs and overcoming the ethical inconsistencies cited above. In other words, the sentimental attachment to notions such as fairness, health, and the link between success and effort is still strong enough to uphold the view that PEDMs are largely antithetical to sport.

War on Doping

Government and sporting authorities have gone to extraordinary lengths to increase penalties and expand policing powers to uphold integrity in sport. It is often propped up by the rhetoric of war, which can stigmatize dopers, highlight the righteousness of the anti-doping campaign, and justifying the firm resolve and forceful measures required for its success (Lakoff and Johnson 1980; Scarry 1985; Lakoff 2003; Dingelstad et al. 1996; cited in Hemphill 2009). This section summarizes some of the ethical costs of the “war” and “fight” metaphors.

Some of “collateral damage” of the “war” is thought to relate to the loss of athlete rights to privacy, as when athletes must submit to witnessed urine sample collection, year-round random drug testing, as well as report their whereabouts to drug testing authorities when traveling (Thompson 1995; Schneider 2004; cited in Hemphill 2009). The policy of strict liability means that athletes are “guilty until proven innocent” if found with drugs in their body, regardless of intent. Fairness is also at issue when sport authorities replace the legal precept of “beyond reasonable doubt” with

“comfortable satisfaction,” thus lowering the standard of evidence required to charge and convict athletes (Morgan 2006; Burke 2005; cited in Hemphill 2009). In a view shared by Savulescu et al. (2004; cited in Hemphill 2009), Tamburrini (2006; cited in Hemphill 2009) suggests that global doping sanctions allow for no gradations of guilt or responsibility; a doped athlete from a poor country coerced into using drugs by a totalitarian government is treated the same as a doped athlete from a wealthy country who has access to a wide range of legal performance-enhancing substances, methods, and other resources.

Further to this, Houlihan (2004; cited in Hemphill 2009) argues that athletes are marginalized in the debate by sport authorities who (falsely) presume that athletes’ interests correspond to that of sport governing bodies. Moreover, the war can stifle debate on alternative strategies for drug control (e.g., harm minimization), suppress research on safe performance-enhancing drugs, or reduce the autonomy of national or local sport institutions to develop policies that suit their particular traditions and conventions (Dinglestad et al. 1996; Tamburrini 2000; cited in Hemphill 2009).

Normalizing PEDM Use

There is an alternative way of looking at doping use and control. This final section covers a view that focuses less on athlete responsibility and culpability and more on the impact of high-performance sport culture.

To set the scene, it is not difficult to understand the institutional pressures, expectations, and enticements of elite, professional sport. Mass media, government, and commercial investments in sport accentuate the monetary or publicity benefits of sporting success and raise the expectations for players and all those involved in managing, sponsoring, and watching sport. On this view, as the commercial value of sporting success increases so too do the temptations for players, coaches and managers, and sponsors to employ dubious means (Hemphill 2009).

However, the choice to use PEDMs may not pose a moral dilemma for many athletes. Athletes

operate in a sporting culture where the expectations, norms, and incentives to enhance performance are already in place. Several authors have discussed how athletes can be socialized into a high-performance sport culture (Roberts and Hemphill 1988; Houlihan 1999; cited in Hemphill 2009). When socialized into a culture that fosters trust and reliance on the expert knowledge and methods provided by coaches, physiologists, doctors, psychologists, nutritionists, and a host of other sport science professionals, athletes may see PEDMs as consistent with the sporting culture of performance.

This raises a number of interesting issues. For one, PEDM rule violations may represent less of a moral failure on the part of athletes and more of a culture shift within sport that normalizes PEDM use. Athletes over-socialized into a culture of performance enhancement can make sport seem akin to a syndicate performance, with outcomes less attributable to individual effort and increasingly to a host of external performance-enhancing substances, methods and sport science, and management personnel. As a result, it is questionable to what extent individual athletes are solely responsible and culpable for PEDM rule infractions.

Conclusion

There still appears to be a widespread disapproval of doping in sport, which seems to fuel global efforts to control it by harsher penalties for athletes (and now for support personnel), more sophisticated testing protocols, increased surveillance techniques, as well as information sharing between law enforcement agencies to stem supply. All of this comes at a cost, financially and in terms of athlete rights. It is not clear whether the hard-line approach to achieve pure sport is sustainable, and there is a growing body of knowledge suggesting that other doping control approaches (e.g., harm minimization) might be worth exploring. The increasing use and apparent normalization of performance and appearance enhancing substances and methods in work and everyday life, plus the growth of gene technology, is also making it difficult to insulate sport from PEDM use. Doping and its control is a complex

issue, and there is no doubt that competing social interests and values will continue to jostle and nudge each other in the conversation to define sport and how it should be played.

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Drama, Struggle and Grace in Sport

► [Aesthetics and Sport](#)

Dues

► [Children's Rights](#)

E

Early Childhood Education

► Early Childhood Sector

Early Childhood Sector

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Synonyms

Curriculum; Early childhood education; Knowledge; Metaphor; Sector

The rise of early childhood education (ECE) as both a unique sector of a country's education and social policy and as an important part of nation's economy is a feature across many nations. Historically, each country develops its own local context, although increasingly shaped by global political and economic agendas. Aotearoa New Zealand's ECE system is the focus of this entry, where the metaphor of the *sector* (as ECE is frequently referred to) is explored to interrogate ambivalent claims to knowledge and practice. This short study by way of a singular metaphor – *sector* – explores more than 20 years of intense development that reflects a curious con-fabulation of complex discourses dominated by various forms of neoliberalism.

Almost without exception, ECE developments globally have centered around the notion of quality – an important aspect of production and consumption in economic discourse but arguably less applicable to education as an ethical enterprise involving personal engagement and respect for the dignity of its human subjects. For consumers, standardized products of uniform consistency constitute the basis for relying on particular products to perform their prescribed functions. In the marketplace, standardized quality benchmarks establish the basis for assessing the suitability and usefulness of such products, with consumer guarantee legislation now ensuring that products are fit for their intended purpose. Although quality benchmarks and indicators may be necessary, even beneficial in the service and manufacturing sectors, their application to the education of young children is, at best, problematic, in that it is not clear what the word actually refers to. Although heavily critiqued by educationalists (e.g., Dahlberg and Moss 2005), the idea of quality has underpinned significant policy development in New Zealand.

New Zealand's early childhood education has been heralded by many scholars as a world leader for its development of curriculum, policy, and practice. Especially celebrated are its bicultural curriculum document *Te Whāriki* (Ministry of Education [MoE] 1996) and related planning and assessment practice *learning stories* (MoE 2004). The cause for celebration is as much the collaborative process of its development as the inclusive

nature of its contents. Since policy developments of the late 1980s, and the inception of the curriculum in the 1990s, a comprehensive policy and regulatory framework (in the form of specific policies, strategies and funding) has annexed ECE, now largely privatized, to the stronger State-funded compulsory education sector. Although attendance is still voluntary, recent government initiatives (including financial incentives) intensify the pressure on families for their children to participate in formal, licensed early childhood education programs. Various social services have been recruited to help meet the government's escalating targets for participation rates, currently set at 98%. The onus is increasingly being shifted onto early childhood centers to make themselves desirable enough to attract sufficient numbers of enrollments to ensure economic viability. New Zealand's early childhood education sector has clearly been marketized and can be seen as a forerunner for the marketization of the compulsory education sectors in New Zealand, including recent growth in government funding to support and develop special interest charter schools.

The economic reforms of the 1980s and 1990s inexorably altered the face of early childhood education in line with other areas of social policy in New Zealand. These reforms largely followed a new right political and economic direction, effectively decentralizing government departments, including health, education, and social welfare, to form self-managing units run according to marketized principles. This neoliberal reformulation of the social services entailed proliferation of the dominant values of modern capitalism, including competitive individualism, commodification, and consumption, along with entrepreneurial flexibility in reinventing ourselves to meet the demands of economic intensification. Within this new reality, early childhood is now seen as a mechanism for facilitating women's reentry into the workforce, as an alternative to dysfunctional families for the socializing of children, as an observation and monitoring site for early intervention and protection of vulnerable children, and as a pathway for building a healthy and wealthy State. The recent intensification of

interest in early childhood by government, parents, employers, and communities marks out early childhood as an increasingly contested site for implementation of social policy and renders early childhood as a clearly identifiable sector in New Zealand's education. The idea of early childhood education as a sector has been around, then, at least since the integration of early childhood services in the mid-late 1980s. Early childhood education in other OECD countries has received similar economic emphases and undergone parallel developments, although for manageability, the policy focus of this entry is deliberately limited to developments within New Zealand.

With that background in place, the entry now turns to the conceptualization of early childhood as "sector" and some implications of such a concept for early childhood knowledge/discourse. To frame our thinking within particular concepts in any knowledge domain is necessarily to shape or delimit how we might think about that domain, and by extension, the way we understand knowledge. The converse is also true: what we mean by "knowledge" shapes the way we understand the domain. The rest of this article focuses on the way the word *sector* is used to describe early childhood education, and how the resulting discourse then impacts reflexively on that sector. Such theorizing acknowledges that a particular representation is never an accurate depiction of reality, suggesting that describing early childhood education as a sector is, at best, a metaphor that (like all metaphors) conceals as much as it reveals about its referent. Belying the homogeneity captured or implied in a label such as "sector," the various individuals and organizations that comprise the early childhood sector are members of diverse communities, constructed by a variety of discourses – unique subjects "precariously and temporarily sutured at the intersection of those subject-positions" (Mouffe 1988, p. 44).

Sector as a Metaphor

Metaphor is generally understood as understanding and experiencing one thing in terms of another, for example, we may attribute an intelligent person

with a *razor* wit. Metaphor is not a matter of playing with language; how we perceive, how we think, and what we do are largely metaphorical (Lakoff and Johnson 2003). Metaphor use is systematic – it shapes understanding, experience, and the way we talk. Most concepts are partially understood in terms of other concepts. The *razor* wit metaphor attributed to the intelligent person in the above example provides a conception of the person as having a *sharp* mind who could perhaps *cut* this argument to *ribbons*. Metaphors such as the *razor* wit, the *keen* mind, the *sharp* thinker, and the person who can *cut right to the heart of things* with a *cutting* remark are so pervasive that they are often taken as self-evident. That they are metaphorical may not occur to us, yet it is the way most think and operate. Metaphorical thought then is normal and ubiquitous, conscious and unconscious, yet provides a coherence to our thinking. As principal vehicles for understanding, metaphors play a central role in the construction of social and political reality through a “coherent network of entailments that highlight some features of reality and hide others. The acceptance of the metaphor, which forces us to focus only on those aspects of our experience that it highlights, leads us to view the entailments of the metaphor as being true” (Lakoff and Johnson 2003[1980], p. 157).

Dictionary definitions generally refer to a sector as representing a distinct part of something – in particular a part of society such as a nation’s economy, the housing sector, the educational sector, etc. This involves an understanding of sector as a group with some sort of shared perspective (“we”) with appeals to ideals of community and belonging – an appeal to being part of that group with affiliations and ties. This interpretation sits comfortably with the community and family focus of ECE. There are a range of other entailments, which, in the following exploration, provide interesting perspectives on some of the developments in ECE. The rest of this section explores the etymology of the word *sector*, along with other entailments in the metaphorical use of the word. Space limits the number of possibilities for exploration, but there are, it is hoped, sufficient to support the claim made here for multiple nuances in our understanding of early childhood and the

sector that purports to act as its representative and its champion.

Sector as “Cutting”

The word *sector* is derived from the Latin *sectus* (past participle of *secare* to cut). So a sector may be thought of as resulting from some kind of cut. Our choice of cutting instrument has a significant bearing on the kind of cut we make. Chainsaws and scalpels are both perfect instruments for cutting, albeit for different purposes. In everyday language, we refer to various types of cuts often with metaphorical allusion: clean/clear cut (decisive action), cold cuts (pieces of meat), sweeping cuts (radical changes), and cut throat (unscrupulous violence). Cuts may refer to variations to the way resources are apportioned (salary or funding cuts).

Cuts are made with various intentions: perhaps to segment or to reshape, to make something look different, to make a structure smaller or weaker (as in cutting down a tree), or to make a large object more manageable by being able to manipulate its pieces. In the medical surgery, a cut from the surgeon’s scalpel may be associated with putting something right, curing an illness – the skillful and incisive crafting to put right injured/diseased organs in order to heal and to make better. Although the cut ostensibly causes further damage, the intended outcome is repair – short-term pain for long-term gain – a metaphor carried through to many familiar social situations involving delayed gratification, such as saving for long-term spending goals, working hard to achieve peak fitness, or having a rest after the work is complete. The nature of a cut, then, depends on who is making the cut, their intentions, and their ability to carry out the incision properly.

In defining the early childhood sector, a significant instrument of identification is the curriculum, *Te Whāriki* (MoE 1996) – the result of cutting or dividing up areas of knowledge, socio-cultural development, and pedagogical theories to align with expressed aspirations for competent, capable children. In terms of the current “cutting” metaphor, the curriculum could not be adequately justified in terms of weakening, manipulation, or mere reshaping of knowledge. Arguably, there is

surgical intention in segmenting the curriculum as a specific area of knowledge to engage in skillful and incisive crafting with the intentions of making things better – an intention which many working with *Te Whāriki* would argue is largely successful.

Another aspect of curriculum is evident in our “cutting” metaphor, though, in the phrase “cutting someone off” when driving a car or engaging in a conversation. When we cut people off, we get in their road, usurp their place, try to reach a destination faster than them, or superimpose our version of how things are/should be over and above others. Within the ECE sector, it may entail prescription from positions of formal authority about curriculum or procedural policy. Complying with such prescription is often prerequisite to institutional funding, or even organizational survival, since satisfactory audit reports and continued funding are generally conditional upon such compliance. Compulsory compliance is an issue if one considers curriculum as contestable, with decreasing choice allowed about whether to adopt standards, pre-specified learning outcomes and performance targets as the course for young children to follow under the name of education. For government and for efficient management, imposition of authority may facilitate achieving a preferred outcome with speed and efficiency. Similarly, measurability may provide indications of progress toward targets in imposing strands, dispositions, and stories as specific teaching interventions, but it is doubtful whether superimposing particular prescriptions on others does justice to education in its fullest sense.

Sector as a Geometric Segment

In various MoE statistical publications, the early childhood sector is represented as a segment of a circle, like a wedge of cheese or a pizza slice. The size of the slice represents the level of privilege or the comparative funding of each sector. This is a quantifying reference, in that it is the significance of a sector that is assessed relative to the proportion of the circle compared with other sectors. Within the early childhood sector, similar figures are used to represent the comparative importance of the

various services that comprise the sector, serving as a de facto ranking mechanism. This kind of segmented pie chart signifies the spread of limited available resources among the represented sectors, providing a “zero sum” model of allocation that sets each sector off against all the others. In other words, the problem is made into a competition among sectors for a given and limited resource rather than calling into question the whole basis for the model. Problems in geometry often start with the “given” within which one has to solve particular problems; it is not a legitimate move in geometry to ignore the givens or to challenge the geometric nature of the problem. By analogy, it is not considered legitimate to contest the overall level of resource allocation. Despite government and OECD rhetoric about the importance of early childhood education, a recent NZEI campaign grew wings on the slogan “The biggest cuts to the smallest people.” It may be legitimate, though, to question the intentions of the cutter.

Sector as Territory

From the Greek for area or division, the word *sector* was used in WW1 to refer to the part of a military zone based on a circle around a headquarters. Such an area is designated by boundaries within which a unit operates, and for which it is responsible, such as a division or headquarters. In reference to early childhood, we might think in this way about ministries, government agencies, the early childhood center, or the home as centers of various sectors. In each case, we might impose boundaries and designate a bounded territory using physical walls, fences, buildings, an abstract line, or merely an idea. The idea of territoriality appeals to our human instincts: we are physical beings bounded by our skins, we experience the world as outside ourselves, and we have familiar boundaries inside which we belong. This idea is inherent in the very notion of early childhood centers as places marked out for children. It may be stretching the metaphor too far to describe as a sector the space prescribed for ECE centers in the MoE where licensing regulations require a minimum of two square meters per child. It would

mean each time a child moves, the boundaries are redrawn – perhaps a very productive metaphor for the flexible, playful possibilities of early childhood.

Conclusion

Within this exploration of the early childhood sector and its various entailments is a serious observation that marking out a sector constitutes both a set of discourses and a set of practices, shaping our experience and the way we talk about it. Reflexively, the resulting discourse impacts on that sector in a dynamic and formative way. The ubiquity of metaphor within discourse means that our daily conversations and “common sense” dialogue mask a range of metaphorical entailments that may remain hidden but continue to impact on the way we interpret our experience.

Despite the supposedly homogenizing impact of globalization, New Zealand is one of many countries whose population is increasingly multi-ethnic/multicultural. This complexity is amplified by neoliberal economic demands for a flexible workforce, comprised of competitive individuals, able to solve future problems that do not yet exist and able to thrive amid the plethora of visions for our social and technological futures. Even if it were possible to pin down the early childhood sector within a static, literal definition, it would be an immense problem to secure agreement among the myriad voices about how to respond in any meaningful way. Compounding the issue infinitely is inevitability of metaphorical allusion to represent the future visions and the current actions of what we call the early childhood sector. Possibly, the best we are left with is to acknowledge the problematic and complex nature of early childhood contexts and their competing forms of knowledge and to be aware of the metaphorical imposition of our individual and collective pleasures, fears, and desires on the constitution of early childhood. Whether we are promoting the rhetoric of quality, the politics of participation, or a particular prescription for the early childhood

sector, it is important to acknowledge that each of us has different views about what these things mean and what we might expect from them.

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Earth

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Ecofeminist Pedagogy

- [Environment and Pedagogy](#)

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- [Neoliberalism and Environmental Education](#)

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- [Learning Through Infrastructures: Cybercafes as Spaces for Digital Literacy](#)

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Education and Big Data

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Synonyms

[Analytics](#); [Big data analytics](#); [Large data set](#); [Learning analytics](#)

Introduction

Big data is a significant concern for many academics, largely because it is complex, unmanageable, and open to misuse. While there is a tendency to believe that “big data” might be bad and possibly dangerous, many types and uses for it exist. The challenge of big data for higher education is that it has been, until fairly recently, portrayed as something that is straightforward, clear, and easily delineated, when in fact it is none of these, and there is still relatively little consensus about how it might be defined. This entry explores how big data is defined, described, and utilized in different contexts. It explores different notions of analytics and suggests how these are having an impact on higher education. The entry then explores the claims that are being made about the objectivity of big data and sets these claims in the broader context of what can be claimed and what cannot. In the context of such claims, the way in which the ideas about what is plausible, possible, and honest in the use of big data is examined, and suggestions are offered about what may be useful and realistic uses of big data. The final section explores the possible futures for research and use of big data in the context of higher education and offers some suggestions as to ways forward.

Definitions of Big Data

For many researchers in higher education and across the disciplines in general, big data is

invariably expected to offer new insights into diverse areas from terrorism to climate change. Yet at the same time, big data is also troublesome, since it is perceived to invade privacy and increase control and surveillance. Definitions of big data are wide and varied, for instance, there are definitions that concentrate on scale or diversity and others that focus on the economics of big data. For example, Taylor et al. (2014, p. 3) cite examples such as the number of variables per observation, the number of observations, or both, given the accessibility of more and more data – what Varian, Chief Economist at Google, referred to as “fat data, long data, extensible data, and cheap data.” However, Einav and Levin (2014) argue for three main features of big data:

1. Sources are usually available in real time.
2. The scale of the data makes analysis more powerful and potentially more accurate.
3. Data often involve human behaviors that have previously been difficult to observe.

Kitchin (2014, pp. 1–2) delineates big data as:

- Huge in volume, consisting of terabytes or petabytes of data
- High in velocity, being created in or near real time
- Diverse in variety, being structured and unstructured in nature
- Exhaustive in scope, striving to capture entire populations or systems ($n = \text{all}$)
- Fine grained in resolution and uniquely indexical in identification
- Relational in nature, containing common fields that enable the conjoining of different data sets
- Flexible, holding the traits of extensionality in that it is possible to add new fields easily, as well as expand in size

There is little consensus about what counts as big data, but many across the higher education sector see it as worthy of attention. Conceptions of big data tend to fuse across the realms of collecting large data sets and the processes of managing such data sets as well as examining how, by whom, and for whom the data sets

might be used. For scientists, Kitchin’s stance (Kitchin 2014) seems a good fit, but those in social sciences and humanities tend to use the term data differently. For example, researchers in the social sciences see big data encompassing not just large data sets but also the complexity of how data are synthesized, the ways in which tools are used, and who makes which decisions about management of possible imbalances between data collection, management, and synthesis. Sometimes, assumptions and uses related to big data can be naïve (Brynjolfsson and McAfee 2012). Further, there are a number of difficulties with big data analysis such as the shortcomings of off-the-shelf packages, the storage of data, and possible efficiencies in distributed processing. Table 1 summarizes different ways in which disciplines are seeing and using big data.

Assorted Analytics

There are currently many different types of analytics in higher education, but it is only relatively recently that it has been termed learning analytics. However, learning analytics is in fact rooted in a longer tradition such as educational data mining and academic analysis. Currently (in 2015), learning analytics in education and educational research focuses on the process of learning (measurement, collection, analysis, and reporting of data about learners and their contexts), while academic analytics reflects the role of data analysis at an institutional level. For many researchers in higher education, learning analytics and data analytics are seen as fields that draw on research, methods, and techniques from numerous disciplines ranging from learning sciences to psychology.

This melange of ideas, constructs, and approaches is reflected in the varieties of methodologies being used across different institutions. For example, in the process of analyzing big data, discipline-based pedagogy and disciplinary difference are often transposed in ways that do not necessarily reflect the nuances of the discipline. Furthermore, it is evident that different institutions are using different approaches to collecting and analyzing data. These include Oracle data

Education and Big Data, Table 1 Big data in different disciplines

Context	Understanding and use of big data	Characteristics
Economics (Taylor et al.)	Specific terminology seen as fairly recent – some were working with what is now being termed “big data” a decade ago and believe it has not gained much traction within academic economics	Seen as a class of data which was particular in terms of its size and complexity, although there were several different points of view as to which features rendered it genuinely new
Digital humanities (Manovich 2012)	The use of data analytics to analyze and interpret cultural and social behaviors	Complex overview of data, visual representations of images and videos, exploration of patterns of representation
Education (Sclater 2014)	Use of data to analyze student retention, student engagement, and identification of risk and to examine student progress	Data seen as useful for gaining information, tracking possible problems by student, tutors, and senior management
Business (Brynjolfsson and McAfee 2012)	Use of data to make predictions and management decisions	Information from social networks, images, sensors, the Web, or other unstructured sources are used for decision making in business
Journalism (Lewis 2015)	Journalism that incorporates computation and quantification in diverse ways, for example, computer-assisted reporting	The implementation of mathematical skills in news work as well as the critique of such computational tools
Maths and statistics (Housley et al. 2014)	Creating mathematical tools for understanding and managing high-dimensional data	Tools, algorithms, and inference systems seen as vital for analysis of data within maths and statistics but also other disciplines using big data
Computer science (Rudin et al. 2014)	Use of methods for statistical inference, prediction, quantification of uncertainty, and experimental design	Use of multidisciplinary teams with statistical, computational, mathematical, and scientific domain expertise with a focus on turning data into knowledge
Medicine and health (Lee and Yang 2015)	Predicting and modeling health trends	Locating health patterns Understanding prevalence and spread of disease
Psychology (Moat et al. 2014)	Predicting and modeling trends and the use of data sets to examine behaviors, influence, and use of language	Analysis of trends, behaviors, judgment, and decision making as well as spheres of influence

warehouse and business intelligence software, the use of QlikView to analyze data held in Microsoft SQL Server, and also Google Analytics, Google Charts, and Tableau (Sclater 2014). While there have been various attempts to classify analytics into a clear typology, Table 2 illustrates that issues in higher education are murky and complex. Thus, it is possible to see multiple and overlapping types, including (big) data analytics, text analytics, web analytics, network analytics, and mobile analytics.

Objectivity and Context

There have been suggestions that big data and analytics are necessarily objective. However, the

complexity of their use in different disciplines means that there is little unity about how these data should be analyzed and used. It seems for many researchers, particularly in areas such as economics, that the focus is on complex analysis of big data, rather than asking critical questions about whether big data is new and what can and cannot be done with it. The result is that across the literature there is a wide range of positive and negative claims, which need to be acknowledged, including but not limited to:

Claim 1: Big data speaks for itself. This is clearly not the case since analysis and mapping are researcher driven. There is a need to ask not just what might be done with big data but why (and if) it should be used in particular ways – as

Education and Big Data, Table 2 Assorted analytics

Form of analytics	Context	Purpose
Learning analytics	Module/course level Departmental level	Analysis of student engagement, predictive modeling, patterns of success and failure
Academic analytics	Institutional National International	Analysis of learner profiles, performance of academics, knowledge flow, research achievements, ranking
(Big) Data analytics	Commercial contexts and data warehousing	Development of data mining algorithms and statistical analyses
Text analytics	Information retrieval and computational linguistics	Discovering the main themes in data such as in news analysis, opinion analysis, and biomedical applications
Web analytics	Commercial and academic context and cloud computing	Integration of data across platforms for social research and/or commercial gain
Network analytics	Academic contexts, such as mathematics, sociology, and computer science	Examination of scientific impact and knowledge diffusion, for example, the h-index
Mobile analytics	Commercial contexts but also increasingly in areas such as disaster management and health-care support	To reach many users but also increasing productivity and efficiency in a workforce
Knowledge analytics (this term tends to be used with learning analytics but is generally defined)	Commercial settings and to some degree academic settings	To manage knowledge within an organization and to use organizational knowledge to best effect

well how big and small data might be used together.

Claim 2: There are many good exemplars of big data use. This is not the case, particularly in the social sciences and education, where the landscape is complex and varied. For example, in 2013 Snowden disclosed that the US National Security Agency was monitoring domestic “metadata.” The archive released by Snowden indicated that the e-mails, phone calls, text messages, and social media activity of millions of people around the world had been collected and stored and then without consent been shared and sold (Rodriguez 2013). Although this has brought to light a number of other forms of monitoring and surveillance practices, the US Government argued that it was only “metadata.” The Snowden examples introduce questions for those who work in higher education about how data they collect and are data that collected about them and their students are used in covert ways. It would seem that increasingly government agencies are using big data in ways which focus on economic

outcome results in unhelpful social, political, and cultural bias for educational activities. Such a stance would seem to indicate that there is increasingly a neoliberal agenda shaping higher education, with a growing belief in competitive individualism and the maximization of the market.

Claim 3: There is integration and understanding across the disciplines. While some universities have shared forums for big data, much big data remains in disciplinary silos. There is a need for greater interdisciplinarity and large teams to work together coherently.

Claim 4: There is a coherent view about how learning and academic analytics should be used. It is evident that institutions already seem to be finding themselves having to balance students’ expectations, privacy laws, tutors’ perspectives about learning, and the institution’s expectations about retention and attainment.

These four claims exemplify the need to consider issues of plausibility and honesties in big

data research. What is often missing from claims and debates is how power is used, created, or ignored in the management and representation of big data, or where and whose voices are heard or ignored, privileged, or taken for granted.

Plausibility and Honesties

Ethical issues connected with using big data are complex and muddled. It is often assumed that just because data are public, ethical concerns can be ignored. The open, accessible, and online society has resulted in various kinds of uses of big data, one of which is tracking. For example, many people inadvertently leave tracking devices switched on their mobile phones or leave the Wi-Fi on overnight. The result is that people do not realize they are being tracked, while feeds from social networks are analyzed and visualized, personal movements tracked, and shopping behaviors noted. There is thus a serious lack of privacy, which occurs through the aggregation of users' online activities. Companies can track and aggregate people's data in ways previously impossible, since in the past people's data were held in paper-based systems or company silos. Now, personal data can be mined and cross-referenced, sold, and reused, so that people are being classified by others through sharing their own data. This use of big data is often disregarded – but it is relatively easy to discover most things about most people, and blue chip companies can use such large data sets to ensure market advantage. In day-to-day life, this open but hidden knowledge is already both accepted and ignored. There have been discussions about the need for better formal regulation and changes to the way social media are designed. Yet, almost a decade after the concerns were first raised, the suggested changes are unlikely to occur, and it is difficult to decide how security might be maintained in a post-security world. Now, as time marches on, most people are encountering various forms of liquid, participatory, and lateral surveillance (Savin-Baden 2015).

There are still questions about what it is possible to “know” from big data analyses and ethical challenges concerning what is done or not

done with such analyses and findings. In higher education, the focus and interest in big data have resulted in many researchers rebadging their work as “big data research,” when in fact it is not. Particularly in the humanities, this has resulted in criticism of big data research. Some years later, the pertinent criticisms and concerns of many higher education researchers still seem to have resonance. Big data has changed how data are seen, how they are used, and how they are defined. Such shifts are changing how knowledge is seen and managed in higher education. At the cusp of higher education and commerce, big data tend to be located as neutral, objective, and reliable. This, in turn, obscures the ways in which big data are covertly managed and used and the ways in which people become constructed by and through big data.

Big data, as aforementioned, can be linked to neoliberal capitalism, and engaging the current performative enterprise practices has shift the focus in higher education increasingly toward consumerism, the marketization of values, and the oppression of freedom. Thus, criticality and questioning are being submerged in the quest for fast money and solid learning. In areas of higher education that reject neoliberal capitalism, there is a tendency to shift away from the idea of big data as a resource to be consumed and as a force to be controlled and instead to ask questions summarized below.

How Accurate or Objective Is Big Data?

As a result of the way big data are constructed and used to make policy decisions, it is vital to recognize that these data can easily be a victim of distortion, bias, and misinterpretation. Driscoll and Walker (2014) illustrate how data access and technological infrastructure can affect research results. For example, they demonstrate how differences in timing or network connectivity can result in different results for the same experiment.

Is Big Data Better Data?

While it would be easy to suggest a binary relationship here, it is important to note that big data is not always representative, nor is it necessarily presenting a complete picture of the issues, nor

may it meet high enough standards of rigor and quality. Administrators, faculty, and managers in higher education may find the promise of big data alluring. Assumptions that big data is objective, with clear outcomes that will improve retention, increase student numbers, and ensure there is more money in the university coffers, make this promise highly seductive. Yet these data are not necessarily reliable, and using them for monetary ends in a sociopolitical system such as higher education brings high risk.

How Are Issues of Context To Be Dealt With in Big Data Research?

Big data sets need to be located contextually and there is a need to understand how big data are being used and understood and what is being claimed for them. There is a need for more robust studies and examples across higher education to provide an examination of issues of context by defining and critiquing how big data and definitions of it have changed over time.

What Are the Ethical Issues Associated with Big Data?

The ethical questions relate not only to how data are obtained, as in the Snowden affair (Rodriguez 2013), but who and what is subject to analysis. Ethical considerations also extend to how and where data are reported. For example, Eubanks (2014) researched the electronic benefit transfer card and food stamp use in the United States and suggested that those in poverty are already “in the surveillance future.” The result is that the poor and marginalized that are more easily tracked are already being judged and assumptions made about them, which may or may not be just.

To What Extent Is Big Data Creating Digital Divides?

It seems that the expense of gaining access to big data has resulted in a restricted access to this data, with higher education necessary being marginalized as a sector. Yet the abovementioned study by Eubanks (2014), as well as other studies concerning surveillance, illustrates not merely digital divides but also suggest surveillance divides.

Big Futures

Big data is useful, yet multifaceted, and offers few, if any, quick fixes for new fields of research or data management. In education, social sciences, and humanities, it would seem that relatively few researchers are engaged in analyzing massive data sets. Perhaps the most important considerations in future big data research are to:

- See big data as part of a repertoire of data collection and analytical options.
- Use big data as a means of locating areas that can or need to be explored on a smaller scale.
- Use big data in multi-methodological ways so that the research undertaken is both wide and deep.
- Recognize the advantages, disadvantages, challenges, and power issues of working with large data sets alongside small, fine-grained data.
- Acknowledge that large real-time data sets, such as those produced by social networks, often do not provide a clear or representative picture of realities.
- Recognize that full documentation of how big data were collected will probably be unavailable, and therefore the validity of such data is likely to be unpredictable and tenuous.

Conclusion

There is a prominent expectation that big data can and will deliver more than is really possible and that its questionably clear outcomes will necessarily make a difference to the complexity of human life and experience. The contrasting view questions whether big data can offer anything particularly new or innovative while being concerned about the management of big data and how they are being used in persuasive and pernicious ways. What appears to be a consistent message is that big data is difficult to manage, analyze, and evaluate. Therefore, it is uncertain how robust findings and assumptions, as well as what has been learned, might in fact be. It is vital to recognize that big data is neither good nor bad but useful in

different ways if collated and presented with honesty and plausibility at its core.

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Education and Political Theory: Prospects and Points of View

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Synonyms

Democracy; Inequality; Political theory; Power

Introduction

Education, philosophy, and politics can be seen as the *tripos* in Western tradition, defining the canon and practices of political and educational institutions (Peters 2012). In the light of recent educational research, it could also be argued that the relationship between politics and education is gaining particular popularity. Various international journals such as *Discourse: Studies in the Cultural Politics of Education*, *Journal of Education Policy*, and *Critical Studies in Education* confirm these trends in scholarly discussions. Furthermore, many critical theorists see themselves grounded in Paulo Freire's (1921–1997) work on the political nature of education, particularly made visible in his collection *The Politics of Education: Culture, Power and Liberation* (1985). However, the field of politics of education is highly diverse, often depending on a theoretical approach taken. Some go back to Plato, Aristotle, and Ancient Greek philosophies or find guidance from Enlightenment theories and the work of such scholars as John Locke (1632–1704), Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1788), or Immanuel

Kant (1724–1804). Others might focus on more recent economic theories of Marxism, human capital theory, meritocracy, or philosophical movements of post-structuralism and postmodernism. The theories of Michel Foucault (1926–1984) and Pierre Bourdieu (1930–2002) are particularly widespread in contemporary perspectives on political nature of education. However, the differences in political research are not only limited to theoretical approaches taken, but they vary depending on the questions asked. Some educational studies explore macro-politics of education: educational politics and policy making at global and national levels. These studies tend to be interested in the ways in which political decisions and strategies are developed and how these could be improved. However, Simons et al. (2009a) also argue that educational research is increasingly shifting from macro questions related to economic and organizational theories to critical policy studies in which the focus turns to micro-politics of education inside and outside educational institutions. These researchers distance themselves from the kind of educational research that was aiming to improve existing policy mechanisms, and they rather examine policies and politics in relation to social context, power, and experiences (Simons et al. 2009a). In short, critical studies have brought educational research closer to micro-politics in which the political concepts of power, autonomy, freedom, and resistance receive increasing attention.

The key focus in studies on micro-politics of education lies on the question of democracy and educational formation of citizens. These studies are concern oriented and often confrontational to policies and politics that actively aim to reorganize schooling and education based on the market and managerialist practices (Simons et al. 2009a). Dating back to the end of 1970s and bound with the development of the critical orientation to education policy, studies on micro-politics of education tend to be driven by societal challenges such as globalization, managerialism, and neoliberalism (Simons et al. 2009b). Our own political research has explored these challenges and argued that the processes of neoliberalization and

globalization are particularly evident in higher education contexts with the consequent de-professionalization of academic work, standardization of academic practices, and the marketization of higher education (see Olssen and Peters 2005; Raaper 2015; Raaper and Olssen 2015). It could therefore be argued that educational research on micro-politics is not directed in the first place toward policy but toward the purposes and operation of education and schooling. Scholars inspired by critical policy studies believe that education fulfills a fundamental role in ensuring democracy and democratic formation of citizens. From this perspective, it is not policy or State government that can “save” the society, but it is education that offers an opportunity for emancipation from oppressive policy mechanisms. Furthermore, most studies on micro-politics of education can be regarded as democratic acts in themselves; they are committed to education and society as vividly explained by Simons et al. (2009a, 31):

The critical ethos is not in opposition to democracy, but is perhaps a way of living a democratic life, and a way to be concerned with or to be part of “the public and its education.”

It could therefore be argued that the relationship between education and political theory is complex, and it varies across different dimensions: from macro-politics to micro-politics, as well as from ancient philosophies to contemporary theories of post-structuralism and postmodernism. These dimensions, however, cover a wide range of topics, theories, and theorists. This entry aims to map and introduce some of these political theories that are informing as well as transforming educational research. Furthermore, the entry guides the reader of this encyclopedia in exploring the relationship between education and political theory. We demonstrate the ways in which theories have informed recent scholarly work in education and our understanding of political concepts such as power, autonomy, identity, and resistance. The rest of this entry outlines a selection of entries included in this encyclopedia, creating an excellent starting point for anyone interested in educational research and political theory.

Theoretical Insights: From Ancient Theories to Postmodernism

The entry “► [Mapping the Terrain of Political Theory in Education](#)” by Jeff Stickney demonstrates the complex nature of political theory in education and its historic development from Plato’s *Republic* (1991) and Ancient Greek philosophies to Enlightenment theories of John Locke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and Immanuel Kant, as well as to more recent work of political theorists such as Paulo Freire, Michel Foucault, and Pierre Bourdieu. However, Stickney does not promote a linear understanding of political theories in which one theory transforms into another – a progress from “combat to combat” toward universal reciprocity as Foucault (1977, 151) would critique it – but he relates these theories to various schools of thought such as founding theories, liberal analytic philosophy, and Hegelianism. Stickney also emphasizes the more recent political work in education, particularly the contribution of critical theorists such as Henry Giroux, Michael Apple, and Peter McLaren. We admit that our selection of entries below is not sufficient to cover the extensive map created by Stickney; however, the theories of social liberalism, meritocracy, and human capital as well as postmodernist and feminist approaches aim to provide some food for thought to anyone interested in exploring the political nature of education.

The entry “► [Green, Public Education, and the Idea of Positive Freedom](#)” by William Mace explores social liberalism in education and introduces the work of British idealist Thomas Hill Green (1836–1882). Green’s contribution to public education and the idea of positive freedom cannot be underestimated. Inspired by Green’s work, Mace explores the ways in which Green was influenced by earlier political thoughts of Ancient Greek philosophy as well as by the eighteenth century German idealists Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel and Immanuel Kant. The entry highlights Green’s response to the Industrial Revolution in nineteenth century and his understanding of education as a common good that requires State intervention and funding. Mace concludes by emphasizing the value of Green’s theory to

contemporary understanding of education: education is central for good life, “and [this idea is] especially pertinent today, where rapid technological advances, transnational economic markets, and international terrorism, are again challenging traditional conceptions of freedom and opportunity”.

The entry “► [Meritocracy](#)” by Ansgar Allen explores the legacy of Michael Young’s dystopian essay “The Rise of the Meritocracy” (1958). Allen critically reviews the essay and highlights its relevance to contemporary educational debates. The entry argues that meritocracy is highly fluid and context-specific concept that depends on wider technologies of government. Allen argues that meritocracy as we experience it today is highly neoliberalized: it operates based on individual effort rather than on institutional intervention or social engineering proposed by Young (1958). Meritocracy for Allen is therefore “a descriptive term, and as an educational ideal, meritocracy exhibits remarkable, perhaps dangerous fluidity”.

Like Allen’s analysis on meritocracy, the entry “► [Human Capital Theory in Education](#)” by Donald Gillies questions the societal value of education. Gillies explores the work of Theodore Schultz (1902–1998) and Gary Becker (1930–2014) and argues that the human capital theory has transformed the ways in which we understand education: education has turned into an investment that is believed to produce individual value as well as to increase the quality of economic workforce. Gillies brings examples from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and the European Union policy developments and argues that “Human Capital Theory has become one of the most powerful underpinnings of education policy discourses worldwide”. The entry critiques this narrow understanding of education and the impact it has on schools, learners, and teachers. Gillies also questions the economic significance of the theory and argues that human capital theory does not produce clear economic value to justify its popularity.

Shifting toward postmodernist theories, the entry “► [Foucault, Confession, and Education](#)” by Andreas Fejes explores the work of Michel Foucault (1926–1984) in relation to contemporary confession culture in education. Fejes provides a

genealogical overview of confessional practices from Ancient Greek culture to Medieval Europe and modern societies. Contextualized in the past, Fejes argues that confessional practices today are understood as productive forces necessary for ensuring productivity of education, learning, and societies. More specifically, confessional practices (as these become evident from various assessment technologies) make “the innermost thoughts of the learner available for correction”. Guided by a Foucauldian theorization, Fejes critiques that confessional practices in education allow subjectification and normalization of students: they create specific types of subjects who can be corrected and normalized. Fejes encourages educational researchers and practitioners to explore these often hidden confessional practices in education.

Putting Theory into Practice: Examples of Educational Research

The selection of entries below aims to demonstrate the ways in which particular theories can inform educational research and our theorization of political concepts such as educational leadership, inequality, citizenship, inclusion, and autonomy. The entry “► [Feminist Theories and Gender Inequalities: Headteachers, Staff, and Children](#)” by Kay Fuller explores feminist theories in relation to gender inequalities and school leadership. Fuller introduces the four historic waves of feminist theories: from suffragette movement in nineteenth century to the fourth wave located in twenty-first-century political concerns of sex work, transgenderism, and social media. However, Fuller also argues that each wave has something to offer to contemporary understanding of gender inequalities. Fuller explains her view by introducing the research project on headteachers’ understandings of diversity among school populations in the UK. By drawing on the examples of headteachers Isabella and Katherine, Fuller argues that a single feminist theory is insufficient to explain the contemporary “nuances and complexities of gender as it is socially constructed”.

Dina Kiwan theorizes the concept of “citizenship” in the entry “► [Citizenship, Inclusion, and Education](#).” Guided by a wide range of political theories, Kiwan argues that “the concept of citizenship is a highly contested one; one which has been contested throughout its intellectual history.” Like many other authors in the field, Kiwan goes back to Ancient Greek philosophy and explains the ways in which the early Greeks understood citizenship as a relationship between a person and the city-State or “polis.” Kiwan also traces the understanding of the concept in feudal Europe and in the work of Thomas Hobbes, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and John Locke. The entry finishes by exploring contemporary challenges around inclusion and citizenship, particularly in educational settings. Kiwan argues that there are multiple understandings of citizenship that draw on various educational approaches: “moral,” “legal,” “participatory,” and “identity-based” conceptions of citizenship. However, the entry also notes that Western liberal democracies tend to rely on participatory transformative pedagogies when promoting inclusion.

The entry “► [Universities and the Politics of Autonomy](#)” by Mark Murphy explores more recent issues of academic freedom, academic identity, and institutional democracy in higher education settings. Murphy draws on critical theory and explains that “political debates concerning the university are numerous and usually rancorous”. The entry argues that highly popular Foucauldian and Marxist theories in university studies might not be sufficient to portray an adequate picture of contemporary university politics and processes. Murphy argues that the scholarly debate requires a more nuanced account of institutional autonomy in which the question of how do universities balance the competing demands for autonomy and control becomes the key focus of the critique and discussion.

Cristina Costa and Mark Murphy continue with the focus on university practices in the entry “► [Digital Scholarship: Recognizing New Practices in Academia](#).” Costa and Murphy apply Pierre Bourdieu’s (1930–2002) theory of practice and Axel Honneth’s (born 1949) work on recognition and identity to explore the implications

digital practices have on academic profession. The authors theorize the web as “a new alternative space where intellectual work can be discussed, published and made openly available to a wide range of communities”. The authors demonstrate the ways in which two theoretical perspectives can complement each other when theorizing digital scholarship and the struggle for recognition. By using the work of Bourdieu and Honneth, the authors argue that changing academic identities should be seen within an intersection of different forms of power and recognition that relate to structural transformations as well as to emotionally charged workplaces.

Conclusion

As the work of various academics demonstrates, the relationship between education and political theory is widespread and complex. Educational researchers and practitioners can be guided by a variety of theories and theorists when exploring a wide range of educational topics and issues. One thing is certain, the use of political theory in education is gaining increasing popularity and scholarly attention. This is possibly because political theories allow us to question the role of education in wider society, particularly when the society is facing major material crises such as population growth, climate change, nuclear, and other forms of terrorism, economic recession along with more recent refugee crisis, and mass migration from developing countries. Therefore, the political issues in education such as power, the purposes of education, citizenship and inclusion, and educational and gender inequalities among many other concerns require increasing scholarly attention. We hope that the overview above provides guidance and food for thought to anyone interested in exploring the political nature of education.

Cross-References

- [Citizenship, Inclusion, and Education](#)
- [Digital Scholarship: Recognizing New Practices in Academia](#)

- [Feminist Theories and Gender Inequalities: Headteachers, Staff, and Children](#)
- [Foucault, Confession, and Education](#)
- [Green, Public Education, and the Idea of Positive Freedom](#)
- [Human Capital Theory in Education](#)
- [Mapping the Terrain of Political Theory in Education](#)
- [Meritocracy](#)
- [Universities and the Politics of Autonomy](#)

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Education and Youth Protests

- [Cultural Studies and New Student Resistance](#)

Education for All

- [Defining Openness in Education](#)

Education for Citizenship

- [School Development and School Reforms](#)

Education for Sustainability

- [Children and Sustainability](#)
- [Environmental Education: A Field Under Siege](#)
- [Environment and Education](#)

Education for Sustainable Development

- [Environmental Education: A Field Under Siege](#)
- [Neoliberalism and Environmental Education](#)
- [Sustainability and Education](#)

Education History

- [Colored Cosmopolitanism and the Classroom: Educational Connections Between African Americans and South Asians](#)

Educational Administration and Management

- [Field of Educational Administration and Its Coevolving Epistemologies](#)

Educational Administration and the Inequality of School Achievement

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Introduction

One of the biggest and most pressing educational problems confronting many countries around the world today is the inequality of school achievement. Although the problem has long been with us, in recent times, it has become far more transparent through the use of international measurements such as the Progress in International Reading Literacy Study (PIRLS), Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS), and especially OECD's Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA). All three report their 3- or 5-year findings in ways which not only rank the performance of the participants from top to bottom, above and below a central standard (e.g., a score of 500) but also identify the range of scores within individual countries between the highest and lowest achievers. Some nations rank consistently well or poorly, while others rise and fall in the rankings; some countries have a very narrow range of scores between top and bottom students, while others have a very wide distribution. For many countries, the range of scores are distributed in ways which reveal that certain groups of children perform well, while other groups of children do not; in countries such as Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States, white/Asian/middle-class children tend to do well, while brown/indigenous/immigrant/working-class children tend to do less well. The data, although not beyond justified criticism, does point to some uncomfortable conclusions about differences in school achievement which reflect underlying social inequalities.

What to do about the inequality of school achievement in countries where it exists to any

significant extent is something which continues to exercise politicians, policy makers, teachers, and commentators, especially when a new set of results is made public. One country has become so concerned about the problem that the Minister of Education not only established a Ministerial Cross-Sector Forum on Raising Achievement but also took a document to Cabinet seeking support for a new initiative, Investing in Educational Success:

New Zealand has an achievement challenge. Our top students are doing as well as students anywhere in the world, but there is a big gap between our top performing students and those who are not doing so well. International studies also tell us that we are not keeping pace with other high performing countries and jurisdictions and are falling short of our own previous results. We must do better and raise the quality of learning and achievement across the board. Doing this requires whole of system improvement. (Parata 2014, s4)

The document continues:

Evidence demonstrates that investing in the profession by raising the quality of teaching and leadership provides the best opportunity to deliver the improved educational outcomes we seek. (Parata 2014, s5)

This captures the problem various countries face.

Addressing the achievement challenge requires two things: explanations which causally account for the inequality and solutions which can have a significant impact on the causes. Given the search for a “whole of system improvement” then educational administration looms large. And never far away from it all lurk philosophical problems. Surprisingly, however, this is an issue which attracts very little philosophical attention, partly because of the scope of the achievement challenge. To be sure, much has been written on discrete elements of the issue (e.g., equality, learning, causal factors, educational administration), but these tend to be treated in isolation rather than connected as part of a coherent and systematic whole. Consequently, there is a dearth of philosophical literature which explores the matter from first to last.

Achievement: Education or School?

Facing up to the achievement challenge depends very much on what sort of achievement is being considered. Sometimes it is cast as educational achievement (Snook and O'Neill 2010, 2014) but this seems to spread the achievement net too wide when education is conceived in the broadest of terms as the qualities of an educated person. Making any progress on this account of achievement would be overly ambitious, even though highly desirable. A narrower definition of achievement, restricted to school learning of the kind which can be measured in some meaningful way, as with PIRLS, PISA, and TIMSS, has the advantage of greater empirical precision but does come at the cost of capturing a very limited range of what students have learned and can do which may not always be to their advantage.

Difference and Equality

Differences are one thing; inequalities are another. Differences abound, in schools no less than other social institutions, but not all differences amount to inequalities. Differences in hair color, when it comes to school achievement, count for nothing. But when differences in school achievement are along, for example, class, ethnicity, or gender lines, then equality comes into consideration, and conceptual trouble enters. Winter (2010) defines the “attainment gap” as “the inequalities in schools in terms of educational outcome between learners with different backgrounds and capabilities” and considers it important because “benefits accruing from an education are substantial and where such a gap exists, it leads to large disparities in the quality of life many young people can expect to experience in the future” (pp. 276–277). She makes reference to “equal educational opportunity,” this being the idea that “every learner should have equal access to an equally good education, requiring on most accounts, the same allocation of educational resources” (p. 277). This requires some refining.

Equality of Access or Opportunity

In a very simple sense, equality of opportunity entails that all are permitted to step up to the starting line and enter the race, so to speak. No one is denied the opportunity of entering but this is about as far as equality of access takes us. Beyond this, future achievement or success is very much a matter of personal effort coupled with a measure of good luck. The problem is that initial inequality is maintained, even exacerbated rather than diminished.

Equality of Treatment

If unequals are treated equally, then it is clear that the initial inequality will be maintained and possibly, in practice, widened. This would be manifestly unjust if the original state of inequality was unjust. It seems reasonable to treat unequals unequally on the understanding that unequal treatment must be to the advantage of the least advantaged child if a measure of equality is to be obtained.

Equality of Outcomes

If unequal treatment is to be justified, it must be on the grounds of achieving some end state such as the equality of outcomes cashed up as the life chances all children should enjoy which neither significantly advantages nor disadvantages them by virtue of their gender, social standing, economic wealth, health status, religious conviction, political status, or right to human happiness.

A Simple Model

A simple (and perhaps simplistic but nonetheless useful) model helps to understand the various parts of the problem and how they connect, albeit in complex ways:

Inputs – Process – Outputs – Outcomes.

Outputs: Where things begin, being that which children produce as a result of learning – their performances in, for example, PIRLS, PISA, and TIMSS.

Outcomes: The sorts of lives children will live in the future when adults which will be marked by differences in health, wealth, housing, status, influence, longevity, and the like. Philosophers have had much to say, too much to list here, about the aims and ends of education, of living a good life, of being life-long learners, of being good citizens, and the nature of a good society.

Process: Learning lies at the very heart of the inequality of school achievement – the external world is experienced through our senses (as inputs) and captured in learning, while the outputs are produced from learning stored in memory.

Inputs: From the stimulation of our senses, we posit things beyond us, in the world, to account for the sensory experiences. So is built our theory of the world, of what exists, and it is from this that we begin to explain what we learn and how we learn.

Causes

Addressing the achievement challenge requires careful consideration of the causes of and solutions to the inequality of school achievement. One of the most detailed analyses of the inequalities in school achievement is to be found in the collected work of Nash (2010) who provides a painstaking realist account of a very wide range of causal factors. Another is Reardon (2011). However, all too often the issue is framed by the within/beyond school dualism: within-school factors include teacher and leadership quality, curriculum and assessment, school learning environments, and various reform initiatives such as charter schools, while beyond school factors include family circumstances (income, health, housing, neighborhood), employment conditions (business decisions), and government policies (taxation, revenue distribution). However, the distinction is flawed.

Snook and O'Neill (2010) examine the within/beyond school distinction in some detail. They point out that there is both a strong relationship

between home background and educational achievement and that teachers can make a difference to student achievement. What is at stake, however, is the relative weight to be given to the two sets of factors. They make some important observations: (1) consideration must be given to both the broad social patterns at the macrolevel of analysis and specific individual lives at the micro-level if a full account is to be given of why it is that many children in poverty underachieve, but not all, and why some children underachieve when not impoverished, and (2) although the focus is on the mechanisms of social class which generate the inequality of school achievement, this may lead to identification of “broader social and economic policy that also need to be changed” (p. 12). They conclude that radical changes to schooling have a limited effect on achievement inequality, and while schools can make a difference, this is not enough.

The within/beyond distinction, largely accepted by Snook and O’Neill, comes in for criticism from Brighouse and Schouten (2011) who identify some problems with the dichotomy. They argue that while some important factors fall neatly into one side of the dualism or the other, others do not: some fit neatly into neither category, and others seem to fit into both. An example they give of the latter is the lengthening of the school day and year which is clearly a within-school initiative but is also a neighborhood-changing reform impacting on parents where their longer periods of employment can earn them more money and their children have less time for risky activities. They conclude “. . .because many policy and practical interventions influence what happens both within and outside the school, the dichotomy does not help” (p. 508). But they offer no alternative theoretical conception.

Clark (2011) does. He rejects the dualism, advancing instead a proximal/distal continuum as a more powerful explanatory account of causal factors. The proximal (closest to the action) grade off to the distal edge. The proximal need not be the most powerful explanatory factors and the distal least so. Some furthest out may be some of the most important causal mechanisms. All relevant

factors range across the continuum with weightings distributed where they fall, varying from one student to the next within the general class of all students. This would allow for fine-grained explanations of individual student achievement contained within larger groups of differentiated achievement.

Deficit Theory

The extension beyond within-school measures to include beyond school factors means, as Nash (2010) made plain, fronting up to the charge of “deficit theory” leveled against those who seek causal explanations in families and communities rather than in schools. Deficits, in a descriptive sense, arise when something is lacking which is needed in order to proceed to something else. If a new entrant child lacks some prior learning (phonetic awareness) required for more advanced learning (competent reader), then there is a learning deficit, and this is an empirical matter. So too is the cause of the deficit, usually located in the home such as parental illiteracy which itself may be a causal consequence of factors further out in the distal past (low parental school achievement in a climate of poverty and unemployment). Intervention with remedial programs in the school can go some way to alleviating the deficit, but not all the way. More is required well beyond the school.

The charge of “deficit theory,” however, often carries with it a pejorative element that those who locate the causes of inequality in the family and community are also laying blame on parents and communities for the deficit, when the culpability really lies with schools. But moral responsibility is inescapable for it is human conduct which creates the policies and distributes the resources which generate and reproduce the inequalities. It is easy with the within/beyond school dualism to apportion blame such that all of it is attached to teachers and principals and none on politicians and educational administrators, but the proximal/distal continuum places blame where it may fall, be it the waywardness of the child, the neglect of the parents, the poverty of the community, the policies of governments, or their implementation

by officials. In short, this is not to blame the victim, the child, but to hold to account all those in the causal chain deemed culpable and, giving due weight to each, hold them all variously responsible for what they have done and what they could do.

Learning

Learning lies at the very heart of the inequality of school achievement. What children learn (inputs) and remember becomes important at some other time (sooner or later) when they informally (response to a teacher's question) or formally (PISA) demonstrate the extent of their learning. An important distinction comes into play – the etiological and the constitutive, with the senses being the boundary. The former are all those factors which fall along the proximal/distal continuum, for it is they which bear directly on experience and are learned, remembered, and forgotten, drawn upon to display learning (outputs) which impacts on the outcomes where they too are located in the etiological. The constitutive is where learning takes place, and here things get philosophically murky. Davis (2004), for example, is critical of brain-based learning, advocating instead an explanation of learning in terms of mental states (intentional ones about real things) and propositional attitudes, or the attitudes we have towards propositions (e.g., hope, wish, believe). Others are more sympathetic to the claims of neuroscience. Schrag (2013) is one such. He offers a reasonably balanced view of the strengths and weaknesses of neuroscience for teachers. Neuroscience may do better at explaining learning as a neural activity which on occasions may generate new findings which feed into decisions about enhancing learning. It is more unlikely that neuroscience will make new classroom pedagogies available to teachers. In short, neuroscience is strong on explanations of learning which contribute to the background information teachers draw upon to make practical decisions about learning and teaching but on its own it has much less to offer by way of practical interventions which can improve teaching practice to

effect raised student achievement. Yet all is not lost for neuroscience and brain-based theories of learning, as the use of cognitive enhancers (medicines such as those used with Alzheimer's patients being taken by students to improve their short-term memory in high-stakes assessments) indicates.

Solutions

All too often, the policy initiatives proposed, and sometimes implemented, are disconnected from the causes and so fail to do the work required of them. It is noticeable how "solutions" come and go while the achievement challenge remains because the interventions do not home in on the causes of the inequality (Brighthouse and Schouten 2011; Snook and O'Neill 2010). The reason for this has much to do with the stranglehold that the within/beyond school dualism has on thinking about the inequality of school achievement. It is easier for politicians and policy makers if solutions are restricted to the within-school variety for responsibility can then be placed firmly on schools and their teachers to be held accountable for the success or failure of their students. Interventions take various forms, for example, curriculum reform (Winter 2014), new types of schools (charter schools), behavioral change programs, innovative learning environments (flexible, digitally based, open-plan classrooms), school-based initial teacher preparation courses, in-service workshops to raise teaching and leadership quality, and the like. Like the pillars of ancient Greek temples, each initiative stands in isolation, disconnected from the rest so there is no coherent and unified strategic approach.

A better way to proceed is to adopt the idea of a web where all the parts are interconnected. Initiatives right across the board form a seamless whole, ranging from those which have a distinct school flavor (such as those above) to those far removed from schools but which impact so significantly on the inequality of school achievement (government policies and resource provision in such things as health, employment, welfare, job training, and the like). If the State is to successfully address the

inequality of school achievement, then it must address the wider inequality embedded deeply in the social fabric of society.

Administrative Action

What are educational administrators at the national level to do if they are to introduce systems-level interventions designed to significantly reduce the glaring and growing inequalities in school achievement of a nation State? A very clear message has emerged, early and late. Evers (1993) observed that administration includes “a grasp of the politics necessary for understanding what is required for implementation” (p. 259), while more recently Snook and O’Neill (2014) argue that “There must also be changes in the wider community and this will require changes in social and economic policy” (p. 38) which include but are not limited to parental support and the enhancement of family and community well-being. And it is here where educational administrators come face to face with an unwelcome reality:

The widespread acceptance of the essentially political view that the educational system is responsible...for social disparities in achievement makes it unnecessary in certain respects to develop an account of the mechanisms that actually generate the inequalities it fails to correct. If the initial disparity is actually rooted in home resources and practices, then...the implications for educational policy are minimal. (Nash 2010, p. 256)

If educational administrators at the national level are to confront the achievement challenge, then they face their own achievement challenge when it comes to whole of system improvement designed to redress the problem of the inequality of school achievement.

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Educational Leadership as a Political Enterprise

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Synonyms

[Administration](#); [Education](#); [Equity](#); [Leadership](#); [Politics](#)

Introduction

Educational leadership is a political enterprise. Scholars in the field first acknowledged the political nature of educational leadership around the middle of the twentieth century. Since that time the study of politics in education has expanded and flourished, becoming a staple of inquiry in leadership and educational administration studies. Not all scholars, however, approach the study of politics in the same way; the manner in which they explore this realm is associated with the meaning they attribute to politics and the research traditions with which they identify. This entry explores how scholars have approached the political aspect of educational leadership over the years. It reviews the various traditions, the meanings associated with them, and the research on politics and leadership that they have generated.

Politics in Education

Inquiry into leadership has a long and varied history. While scholars have focused most of their attention on individual leadership, they have also acknowledged the collective side of leadership, that is, group and institutional action that influences what happens in organizations and beyond. Scholars have also explored leadership in education, including its political aspects. But inquiry into leadership and politics has a decidedly shorter life span than research into politics

generally. This is due, in part, to the belief in much of the Western world that education is, or at least should be, an apolitical enterprise. This belief took shape as a response to the excessive presence of politics in educational institutions of the past.

At the beginning of the twentieth century, reformers sought to put an end to the abuses associated with political interference in school systems, by introducing reforms that would leave education to the professionals and keep it away from politicians. For a period of time, many believed that these changes removed education from politics. Academics bought into this apolitical myth, seeing little need to explore politics in education where none existed. It was not until the mid-twentieth century that scholars began to recognize that the education system and the leadership that governed it was indeed political. They acknowledged that the earlier reforms had merely exchanged one type of politics for another; politics were still present, but they took on another form (Scribner and Englert (1977). The first significant move toward acknowledging and studying politics in education was the work of Elliot (1959).

A field of educational politics eventually grew out of Elliot's efforts. Its initial focus revolved around government- or State-related activities. In time, however, it expanded its horizons to more informal and less legal-centered phenomena. Even so, the meaning of politics was contested and continues so even to this day. One "definition" that many who studied politics agreed upon, however, was as practices associated with "who gets what, when and where" (Laswell 1936). Another way of putting this, as a number of scholars who studied educational politics did, was as "the set of interactions that influence and shape the authoritative allocation of values" (Scribner and Englert 1977). Both of these definitions highlight the distribution processes in communities and schools. As subunits of State government, educational jurisdictions and leaders have the authority to allocate values and can influence the process and outcomes. In this sense they are engaged in political activity.

Over the years, scholars have attempted to categorize the various approaches to politics in a number of ways (e.g., Scribner et al. 2003). The

categories they proposed, however, were contestable and, in practice, often overlapped. For the purposes of this entry, three ideas are identified. Two of these approaches – systems and micropolitics – emerged from what has come to be known as the field of educational politics; the other, equity politics, has taken a different route, although more recently scholars have associated it with the politics of education field (e.g., Cooper et al. 2008). Each of these perspectives approaches politics – the allocation of values – in a different way, and each is associated with a research tradition that shapes the purposes of scholars' inquiries, the manner in which they understand politics, and the ways in which they inquire into them.

Systems Politics

The first studies in education politics took place in the mid-1900s, and they provided the basis for the field of the same name. Many of these inquiries took their lead from the longer-standing discipline of political science. The preoccupation with science at the time was firmly entrenched not just in research into politics but also inquiry in other social domains, like education. Most academics believed that in order to generate authentic knowledge of social phenomena, scholars had to explore the terrain as a science. This was as true for the discipline of educational administration and leadership as it was for most other areas in education. In the struggle to ensure the legitimacy of this form of (social) science, scholars adopted the methods, frameworks, and theories used by the physical sciences and techniques that they believed would allow them to distance themselves from the social phenomena that they were studying and convey in neutral terms accounts of an objective social world. Adherence to these procedures would supposedly allow them to generate generalizable laws that could explain and predict human behavior.

Positivist approaches were attractive for more than just legitimacy reasons; scholars also believed that they could provide social engineers, including leaders, with the keys to control their respective social or physical domains. In order for

them to do this though, social scholars had to integrate functionalist/systems theories into their inquiries. These theories allowed scholars to isolate and measure the relationships of important elements/variables. Information about these relationships could then be relayed to leaders who could use this knowledge to predict the outcome of their actions. This ability to predict the future was predicated on the not-always-acknowledged assumption that human beings were more or less determined by their circumstances and had little choice but to respond to the stimuli that leaders and others initiated.

Like many other social science disciplines of the time, educational politics embraced systems theories and positivism. Systems theories were particularly influential in this regard. In fact the institutions on which political scholars focused actually became known as (political) *systems*. This had two consequences for the study of politics in education; it had an impact on what was studied and how it was studied. This systems approach dictated that research into educational politics focused on institutions rather than individuals as systems were to be found at an organizational rather than an individual level. And so scholars concentrated on large-scale politics including government processes and educational institutions. They studied conflict, struggles for power, pressure group activities, government institutions, structures and actions, policy and policy making, influence attempts, decision making, political parties, and voting behavior. These researchers did not question the allocation processes associated with these phenomena or who benefited from them; they simply took for granted the neutrality of these processes.

The adoption of systems theories also influenced the way in which scholars studied educational politics. Researchers considered educational institutions as if they were systems. For example, many looked at how inputs (demands, supports) were converted (through a political system) into outputs (e.g., authoritative decisions) which resulted in certain kinds of outcomes (e.g., consequences of the decision) that in turn fed back into the political system as new demands or supports (Scribner and Englert 1977). Scholars

routinely measured relationships between power structures and educational decisions, the impact of community contexts on political processes, and the effects of political and economic inputs upon policy outputs. While some employed case studies, most employed surveys and quantitative analyses to confirm these and many other causal links.

The first researchers to study politics in education, then, saw politics as institutional phenomena that could best be studied by employing systems frameworks and positivist methods. Subsequent approaches to politics challenged this position. The first that emerged came to be known as micropolitics.

Micropolitics

Micropolitical approaches first emerged in the 1970s and were prevalent in the 1980s and 1990s. Although they varied, most differed from systems approaches in a number of ways. While system theorists concentrated on institutional phenomena, micropolitical scholars studied the actions and interactions of educators, often within schools. This approach was made possible by changing trends in forms of inquiry. After many years of positivist domination, the field of educational administration and leadership embraced, slowly at first, other theories of organization and methods of inquiry, following the lead of social scientists in other disciplines. In doing so, they paved the way for different ways of understanding educational organizations, leadership, and politics.

The research tradition that first challenged the systems approach in educational leadership studies was known as subjectivism. Much of the subjectivist criticism of systems/quantitative inquiry targeted the assumptions on which these latter approaches rested. Thom Greenfield (Greenfield and Ribbins 1993) was perhaps the most articulate advocate of subjectivism in educational administration and leadership. Greenfield claimed that organizations were individual constructions originating in the minds of people. For him, people were not in organizations; organizations were in

people. In marked contrast to the systems/positivist approach, organizations were constructed entities, the product of the perceptions, wills, and values of the people who worked and learned in them. Students, teachers, administrators, and trustees interpreted what they saw about them, often in very different ways, and then acted on the basis of these interpretations. Unlike the automatons of the systems/positivist world, these individuals could decide for themselves what they wanted to do.

The idea that the willful perceptions and values of people shaped organizations seriously undercut the possibility of establishing causal relationships in organizations. If people were responsible for making the organizations of which they were a part, capable of deciding for themselves what they wanted to do, and thus unpredictable, how could one reasonably establish causal relationships in organizations? Critics like Greenfield argued that people did not obey general laws, but simply did what they felt like doing. The conclusion that he and others reached was these input/output system models, attractive as they were to those seeking control of their organizations, did not adequately depict the world in which educational leaders worked. This subjectivist view also ushered in another, perhaps more realistic way of seeing and studying organizations and leadership. If organizations were constructed by people, then tapping into their perceptions and experiences could reveal what really happens in these places. While these methods might not generate the useful (yet illusory) generalizations that systems advocates sought, they could nevertheless provide useful insights into practice.

Motivated by a desire to compensate for the shortcomings of the systems approach and a wish to explain the failure of current reforms, these academics looked for politics not at an institutional level, but within schools. While not denying that politics existed at a systems level, they nevertheless sought to understand how allocation processes played out on an interactional level within educational institutions – in what people felt, said, and did. Unlike systems scholars, they assumed that these organizations were conflicted entities, populated by people who employed power

to promote their own interests. Those who explored politics from a microperspective painted pictures of organizational life from which leaders could learn. Unlike systems scholars, some researchers specifically studied individual (school) leaders – how they used power to realize their interests and influence the way in which values were allocated in their institutions.

Micropolitical approaches differed from systems politics in two key ways. Shunning methods that sought to establish causal relationships and predictability, they attempted to illuminate allocation processes within schools by revealing how they worked on the ground, in the daily grind, and in the thoughts, words, and actions of the people involved. Although they acknowledged the impossibility of achieving objectivity in their studies, they nevertheless sought to distance themselves from these political practices, neither questioning these processes nor advocating for particular practices. Another way in which they distinguished themselves from systems researchers was in the role they attributed to individuals. Microresearchers looked at micropolitical practices through an individualistic lens; they assumed that individuals or groups of individuals, not processes or structures, were responsible for shaping allocation practices. Unlike systems scholars, they assumed that power, interests, and conflict were largely individual products. Advocates of yet a third approach to politics would react critically to this undue emphasis on individuals and an implicit endorsement of allocation processes in schools.

Equity Politics

A third approach to politics in education focused on the fairness of the allocation process. In education, this view of politics was the last to emerge, although it is somewhat puzzling that it did not appear earlier, given its explicit focus on distribution. This perspective draws on a long history of ideas about critique and fairness. Central to this tradition is Marx who drew attention to the inherent unfairness in the quickly expanding nineteenth-century capitalist production system.

One of his fundamental conclusions was that a few benefit from social arrangements that penalize many others. Subsequently other scholars, most notably those associated with the Frankfurt School, broadened Marx's critique, targeting, among other things, rationality and positivism. Scholars in education eventually embraced a number of these ideas, including a critique of current social structures and a desire to engender change.

In contrast to systems and micropolitical approaches that implicitly and explicitly endorsed the current distribution of values in educational organizations, equity scholars questioned the manner in which these processes occurred. They believed, first and foremost, that these processes were unfair and that inequities occurred systematically both within organizations and communities. The result was that some groups were persistently, consistently, and systematically marginalized, while others continued to enjoy privileges. Unlike Marx who concentrated exclusively on social class, though, scholars in education illustrated that these unfair practices also cut across gender, race, sexual orientation, and many other structures of opportunity.

The first scholars to introduce these ideas to education drew on Marx and the Frankfurt School and others like Freire and Dewey. They emphasized that education played a crucial role in the generation of wider inequities that were the product of wider systemic structures. A particularly influential early inquiry by Bowles and Gintis (1976) provided a wealth of empirical data that demonstrated that the education system both reflected and reproduced wider inequalities. Other scholars (e.g., Giroux 1983), however, took issue with this overly deterministic approach. They maintained instead that these inequalities played out in more intentional and subtle ways in the day-to-day interactions in schools. Policies and practices generated unique cultures where taken for granted practices – such as the hidden curriculum – provided advantages for some students at the expense of others. As a result already-marginalized students continued to be disadvantaged, while the privileged continued to benefit from the system.

It was not until the 1980s that scholars in educational administration and leadership

imported these views. Drawing on sociology of knowledge and Frankfurt School ideas, scholars (e.g., Bates 1980) exposed the inequities associated with management and leadership practices. In doing so, they both critiqued current approaches to inquiry in leadership and advocated for change. Among other things, they demonstrated how the research at the time – positivist, postpositivist, and subjectivist – was not neutral, but worked to prop up leadership practices that sustained an inequitable status quo. Others identified leadership practices that generated equity in educational organizations. Operating under the social justice leadership banner, these scholars both critiqued the idea that leadership practices are naturally neutral and fair and studied leaders who promoted equity, inclusion, and social justice.

Only recently has equity politics been embraced as a legitimate part of the field of educational politics. The first substantive offering appeared as part of a *Politics of Education Yearbook* (Marshall 1991), and the chapters were described as representing the new politics of race and gender. Other articles, book chapters, special issue journals, and edited books have followed. They have explicitly targeted the allocation of value processes in education, educational administration, and leadership. They have explored issues of school finance, segregation and desegregation, school services, gifted students, and urban governance. These and other scholars make the point that many school policies, and, in particular, recent reform efforts are not neutral, but highly political and value laden, often obscuring race, class, and gender inequalities (Cooper et al. 2008)

Conclusion

To this day, political inquiries continue to be a staple of research in the field of educational leadership and administration. The research traditions that provided the foundation for systems, micro-, and equity political approaches still guide these inquiries, although contemporary approaches continue to develop and transform. Whatever the approach, it is evident that

scholars have come to acknowledge the place and importance of politics in educational leadership in education.

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Educational Leadership as Critical Practice

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Synonyms

Critical practice; Critical scholarship; Educational leadership; Social interaction; Theory/practice divide

Introduction

The aim of this entry is to introduce the turn to practice in the social sciences that has occurred in recent years and examine how and why this turn has been taken up by scholars in the field of educational leadership. This entry outlines major trends in emergent scholarship which adopt a “critical” approach to educational leadership as a form of practice, that is, one which embraces an explicitly political, humanistic, and transformative agenda in its theorization of practice. It examines the different approaches to theorizing educational leadership as practice drawing on recent developments in practice theory and philosophy that have emerged in the field as a result of this turn, including practice scholars such as Pierre Bourdieu, Michel Foucault, and Theodore Schatzki. This entry summarizes the key contributions that a critical practice approach has made to the field and concludes with possible future directions for this trajectory.

Turn to Practice

In the past two decades, there has been a turn to practice in the social sciences as an alternative way of understanding the social world. This “practice turn” (Schatzki 2001) has renewed interest in what might appear at first glance to be ubiquitous and often overlooked, taken-for-granted phenomena underlying human life and social interaction – the everyday practices of human beings. One of the major reasons for this resurgence of interest in practice are attempts by social scientists and philosophers to move fields of research beyond the dualisms that still characterize much Western thinking, for instance, mind/body, theory/practice, objectivity/subjectivity, logic/emotion, individual/society, and masculine/feminine. The thinking underlying this practice in turn rejects notions of external social structures and systems framing social interaction and derives from a range of fields, most particularly the field of philosophy and thinkers such as Martin Heidegger and Ludwig Wittgenstein.

Practice theorists are drawn from a wide range of disciplines and constitute a broad array of understandings and conceptualizations of what they mean by practice. However, practice approaches to the social world are characterized by some central and shared understandings. A key feature of practice accounts is that they accord primacy to the everyday practices in which humans engage as a fundamental part of daily lives. They view the social world as made up of practices and utilize practices as their fundamental unit of analysis. This is in contrast to analyses which afford primacy to individuals' accounts of the social world – that is, social phenomena are constructed by the thinking and conceptualizing of the sovereign individual.

These practice accounts are in contrast to analyses which view the social world as composed of social structures and systems – which shape power relations between human beings. Moreover, practice approaches reject the rationalism – the commitment to a form of technical reasoning – that underpins modernity, as encapsulated in the Cartesian binary of the mind/body. As feminists have noted, such dualisms and forms of reasoning privilege particular forms of knowledge and ways of understanding the world. For instance, dominant discourses of leadership and management as rational, orderly, and linear processes reify forms of knowledge that are traditionally associated with constructions of (white) masculinity. This privileging locates critical and practice-based theorizing of leadership, which examines leadership as embodied, gendered, classed, racialized practices, composed of non-propositional knowledge and tacit understandings – as “other” to these dominant paradigms.

Practice approaches represent what has been termed a practical ontology, rooted in the intelligibility of practices. In order for humans to make sense of our social world, we are crucially reliant on *shared* understandings of how to go on in this world. This practical intelligibility allows us collectively to make sense of, function in, and potentially transform the world in which we live. The centrality of everyday practices as described

switches the researchers' gaze from a functionalist and systems perspective – where the world is apprehended via objectified systems and structures, or from an individualistic cognition perspective – to one where the world is apprehended from the perspective of the individual acquiring knowledge and understanding.

For sociologists such as Pierre Bourdieu or Anthony Giddens, a practice approach to understanding the social world assists theorists in transcending traditional social science divisions in which human activity is constructed as a dialectical interplay between individual human agency versus external social structures. For philosophers and literary theorists such as Michel Foucault and Jean-Francois Lyotard, understanding language as practice means reconceptualizing it as a “discursive activity” (Schatzki 2001, p. 10) of shared meaning-making made possible through people using and mastering the language. Mastering and employing a language is not an individual property, nor does language correspond to an external social structure or system. Rather, language and learning a language is a collective social phenomenon that shapes our social world. As a social phenomenon, it is thus steeped in and productive of power relations – to enter a discourse means learning what forms of knowledge and knowing are valued and foregrounded and, implicitly, which forms of knowledge are marginalized.

The centrality of practice to our social world is a key assumption that underpins more recent *critical* approaches to understanding educational leadership as a collective social phenomenon. A practice approach to educational leadership that adopts a critical lens views leadership as constructed by discursive understandings and forms of knowledge about this thing called “leadership.” It constructs leadership as a set of social practices which compose our understandings, know-how, and relationships with other human beings with whom we interact in the practice and in the material world in which the practice is enmeshed. Critical approaches to educational leadership posit leadership practice as invariably an effect, and productive of, power relations and as inherently political – situated in civil society

and the institutions which compose that society. It is to how and why this approach has been taken up in educational leadership that we now turn.

The Emergence of Critical Approaches to Educational Leadership

Educational leadership as a field has been critiqued for its uncritical borrowing from the sciences and management, beset with questions of its legitimacy and dominated by a positivist approach in which researchers attempted to establish the field as a scientific discipline in its own right. The field has tended to be dominated by individual agency/structure and systems dualisms as a means of understanding the social world of educational organizations and their performance. Individualizing approaches to understanding the phenomenon of educational leadership and the performance of educational organizations such as schools have drawn on the “great man” theories of leadership. These theories predominantly valorized the traits of (male, white) individuals. More recently, notions of the individual, heroic transformational leader have been utilized as explanatory lens for why some schools may be more effective in their outcomes than others. The valorization of leaders and leadership has become a dominant tendency in the past two decades, supplanting an earlier dominant systems tendency in which educational institutions were viewed as part of complex systems, and educational leaders as the role incumbents in organizations. Thus a focus on systems as an external organizer of human practice became the main explanation for a school’s (or other educational organization’s) performance.

As part of an endeavor to establish itself as a science, educational administration scholars drew on technical and functionalist approaches to administration, in order to produce generalizations about schools as organizations. Post World War II, systems theory became a particularly popular explanatory lens by which the functioning of schools could be conceptualized. Schools as organizations were theorized as complex social systems composed of interrelating and

interdependent sets of activities in which the formal role of educational leaders was but one aspect of the organization’s functioning, albeit an important one. The search for “law-like generalisations” (Evers and Lakomski 2012, p. 60) about the shared characteristics of educational leadership was premised on the belief that the structure and organization of schools could be controlled and predicted through scientific methods. This endeavor for prediction can still be seen in the many current attempts to produce Principal Standards that characterize many contemporary education systems in Anglophone nations.

Thomas Greenfield’s arguments in the 1970s for subjectivist and humanist approaches to the study of educational organizations represented the first major rebuttal of the positivist orientation of educational administration as a field of practice and scholarship. From the 1980s onwards, as a reaction to dominant positivist and functionalist accounts of educational organizations, and drawing on developments in the social sciences, as well as social movements such as civil rights and feminism, a range of scholars emerged, writing in what has come to be known as the “critical tradition.” This scholarship represents a broad range of approaches including feminism, humanism, post-positivism, postcolonialism, postmodernism, and critical policy. It examines the social and political impacts of educational organizations and of educational administration and leadership scholarship.

From a critical perspective, one of the major weaknesses of systems theory is that it conceives of organizations as abstract units, decontextualized from considerations of power relations, politics, and the specific historical and material contexts in which they are situated. Similarly, individualist accounts of the transformational leader who is able to transform a failing school are critiqued for they fail to consider the asymmetrical power relations within which leadership as a practice is exercised, such as the impact of gender and race on how leadership and leaders are conceived and represented. Nor do they consider the varying and specific contexts in which schools and other educational institutions operate. In short, critical scholars argue that educational leadership is not a politically neutral practice,

exercise, or process. Nor is it a property that is owned and wielded by a solitary individual over others. For critical theorists schools and other educational organizations are not power-neutral and decontextualized sites which can be subject to a purely scientific gaze, but rather are a critical component of the broader social relations of ruling. The managers and administrators who lead them therefore are not politically neutral role incumbents exercising a technical and managerial “science” – the organizational outcomes of which can potentially be controlled and manipulated. Rather, they are social and political agents whose practices have educational, social, and political implications, operating in organizations where different kinds of practice only make sense as part of the collective meaning-making exercised by its agents.

Schools, universities, and other educational organizations are viewed as sites of permanent struggle and contestation over meaning, with educational administrators occupying a crucial role in frequently reproducing social and power relations as part of the status quo. Conversely, critical theorists point to the opportunity that administrators have for challenging and subverting institutionalized power, given the authority and power they hold. Hence, there is a body of literature that has emerged examining the role that educational leaders can play as social activists and community advocates. In the educational leadership field, critical theorists have played an important role in examining the potentially deleterious social impacts of major schooling movements, such as the shift towards school self-management that has occurred since the 1980s as a result of the spread of neoliberalism as a dominant ideology.

The Turn to Educational Leadership as Critical Practice

Drawing on the turn to practice emerging in the social sciences, a small body of work has begun to emerge in critical theories of educational leadership which examines leadership from a range of practice perspectives. Predominantly the “thinking tools” of French sociologist, Pierre Bourdieu

(Wacquant 1989, p. 50) have been employed. Initially, Bourdieu’s research with Jean Claude Passeron was widely employed by educational sociologists in the 1970s to examine how education acted as a site of cultural reproduction via the hidden curriculum. More recently, in educational leadership scholarship, Bourdieu’s concepts of habitus, field, capital, misrecognition, and strategy have provided an alternative lens with which to conceptualize the classic agency/structure dilemma of sociological theory. In other words, it has assisted in thinking beyond binaries, that is, how we take into account the role that social structures such as class, gender, and “race” play in shaping individual practices – while also recognizing the impact of individual practices – on these structures. It has provided useful tools with which to critique dominant tendencies in the field towards individualist accounts of the leader as transformational leader and manager, which overlook issues of the embodied nature of power, for instance, how social categories such as class, gender, “race,” and sexuality are socially constituted and embodied in the white male habitus of the principal. Alternatively, it has been employed to critique more positivist accounts such as the dominant school effectiveness movement. The latter attempts to isolate the key factors which effective schools and leaders exhibit but has tended to assume schools as socially and politically neutral sites and to overlook or downplay the impact of broader social and political contexts on schools and effective school leadership practices. It tends to reproduce essentializing and homogenizing constructs of the leader and leadership which are culturally decontextualized and empty of considerations of how schooling, as a field of social practice, is marked by struggles for legitimacy by differing agents who bring varying levels of capital to this field.

A number of insights have been gained through the employment of a Bourdieuan lens. It has helped us to understand leadership as a form of social practice which is constituted by the dialectical interplay between one’s individual habitus (the internalized social structures of individuals which embody how they view the world and which shapes one’s tastes, perceptions, and the

principles which underlie our actions) and the fields of power (structured, socially constituted spaces such as schools and universities). The notion of the habitus of the effective principal, for example, suggests that educational leaders are not aggregates of personal qualities or traits, divorced from the social contexts in which they have been raised, but instead come to the field of practice of schooling with their tastes, preferences, and dispositions already shaped by the social categories of class, gender, and ethnicity which their habituses embody. Their habitus is activated by encounters with the particular logics of practice which are at play in the schooling field, such as in Anglophone nations, the application of neoliberal economic principles which valorize a competitive and individualistic logic of the market, in which improved test results are a crucial part of the stakes over which schools and systems struggle in their quest for legitimacy. These logics of practice locate principals as business managers, entrepreneurs, and corporate leaders, rather than educational leaders.

In addition to Bourdieuan analyses, alternative practice approaches have begun to be employed by critical practice scholars in educational leadership. For instance, Foucault's analysis of knowledge and power has been used to examine how a market discourse of education and educational leadership "systematically forms that about which it speaks," by legitimating "certain forms of leadership for certain purposes ascribed to leadership." Thus, it is argued, such discourses produce "effects of power such as knowledge about what counts as leaders" and by implication, what does not count, what is delegitimated (Lingard et al. 2003, pp. 128–129).

Another recent approach is a site ontological perspective. One of the criticisms of Bourdieuan analyses of educational leadership practice is that concepts such as fields and habitus discursively suggest practices as "always and already structured" (Wilkinson 2010, p. 42). Ironically, then, this approach can draw the gaze away from the social practices that constitute educational leadership. The site ontological perspective instead argues that organizations such as schools can be conceived of as social phenomena unfolding

through the "happening" of practices and activities' (Schatzki 2006). Rather than analyzing educational leadership as interactions between participants in a practice, or as socially constituted and constructed fields and habitus, educational leadership practices are "sites of the social" (Schatzki 2002), interconnected with professional learning, teaching, and student learning practices, and needing to be analyzed as they unfold in specific school sites in all their "happeningness" (Kemmis et al. 2014).

Conclusion

The study of educational leadership as critical practice rejects the traditional theory/practice divide and the premise of the rational model of science, in which scientifically derived knowledge provides the basis for theories that are then applied to practice. Rather it refocuses the analytic gaze by bringing theory into the lifeworld of educational practices. It emphasizes the social and purposive nature of educational leadership as a practice, arguing that leadership practices can only ever be understood in the specific sites in which they occur – through the words, ideas, and discourses that construct knowledge/power relations; and through their performance in social spaces and in relationship with others and the material world. Adopting a critical practice lens to examine educational leadership practices over those of agents does not suggest a rejection of the agency of human beings. Instead it foregrounds a political, humanistic, and transformative agenda, by suggesting possibilities for dialectical explorations of the simultaneously reproductive and transformative nature of leadership practices in their moment by moment unfolding within social organizations such as schools.

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Educational Leadership, Change, and the Politics of Resistance

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Synonyms

[Educational leadership](#); [Micropolitics](#); [Organizational change](#); [Resistance](#)

Introduction

Educational leaders are pivotal players in change and reform activities. However, despite the proliferation of literature on change management, most major change efforts disappoint. As Grey (2005, p. 97) argues, “[t]he most striking thing about change is that it almost always fails.” Obstacles, setbacks, and resistance are the norm.

To begin, it is important to distinguish between first- and second-order change processes (Watzlawick et al. 1974). First-order change

concerns modifying or adjusting existing practice to improve effectiveness without consequential alterations to the educational institution or its work. Second-order change, however, involves systematic organizational restructuring and renewal, incurring fundamental or radical departures from usual practice. Educational institutions easily manage most first-order change initiatives which occur frequently, but second-order change is often problematic. Change is about improvement, solving problems, and confronting challenging issues, but the greater the change required, the greater the levels of resistance with concomitant impacts on productivity, work satisfaction, and loyalty.

Resistance to Change

The notion of “resistance” is a common theme in research about change. “Resistance” refers to social actors embedded in opposing power relationships wanting to challenge, disrupt, and/or overturn organizational decisions, discourses and/or power relations, and the social norms through which they are maintained. “Resistance” is usually described in negative terms, referring to oppositional responses (actions and nonaction), such as ill will, resentment, defensiveness, or confrontation.

Evans (1996) argues that it is human nature to oppose change unless individuals are involved in its creation. Major change requires people to give up feelings of comfort, long-held values or beliefs, and established routines. It entails new thinking, extra time, and effort; hence those affected try to retain comfort and quell confusion by practicing caution, constraint, and subversion, thus protecting the status quo. Abelson (1995) adds that individuals are defined by their strongest beliefs, so when major change challenges long-held attitudes, values, or assumptions, it becomes a threat to identity, making resistance inevitable. Machiavelli (1998) famously maintained that everyone is motivated by self-interest, so reform perceived as being personally disadvantageous presents itself as a risk to be contested. And while coercion heightens

resistance, even the most reasonable and necessary change efforts are often met with resistance.

Blase (1991) describes resistance to change as a micropolitical activity that is always present but which intensifies during periods of major change, making change efforts more complex and messy. Defining micropolitics as “the use of formal and informal power by individuals and groups to achieve their goals in organizations” (Blase 1991, p. 11), micropolitical structures and activities involve both convergent and divergent processes (those that enable and distract from achieving change). Resistance encapsulates the latter. Change evokes micropolitical defensiveness because it shifts power arrangements and can highlight inconsistencies and inadequacies associated with past behaviors or performance.

Rogers’ (1995) work on the diffusion of innovation presents a bell curve of change adoption responses (from “laggards” to early adopters). Rogers cites homophilous systems (such as educational institutions) as those where change is most likely to be met with skepticism, suspicion, and resistance. In these situations, individuals from similar backgrounds achieve cultural convergence through their adherence to norms and values, and resist changes perceived to upset these arrangements and assumptions. Rogers has his critics, however, who point to problems with post facto definitions and suggestions that individuals (or organizations) fall into one particular change adoption category regardless of different change contexts and situations.

The “grief cycle” (Kubler-Ross 1969) is commonly used to describe change resilience, inferring that individuals experiencing major change undergo similar emotional phases as those who have lost a loved one: denial (disbelief), anger (change is unnecessary), bargaining (attempting to alter activities to suit preferred outcomes), anxiety, sadness, disorientation (insecurity), depression (despair), and finally acceptance, action, and going along with the change.

Resistance can stem from ideological, psychological, sociological, or logical factors. Ideological resistance can be the result of opposition to the political positioning or values underpinning education policy or strategy. Psychological resistance

can be the result of personal emotional associations, for example, educational leaders may perceive barriers in communications with those harboring negative views about leadership or leaders (where other factors such as gender or race also play a part). Sociological resistance may result from deep-rooted institutional or community beliefs and coalitions. Resistance can also be based on criticisms of the rationale for change or the logic behind change processes being introduced (such as a lack of time or consultation).

All forms of resistance are political and influence the extent and nature of micropolitical activity within the educational institution and are often justified as professionalism (Blase 1991; Sarason 1990). However, while people can oppose change on many grounds, some may not be against change per se, but oppose the way change leaders go about it. Others still may be ambivalent about change, which can be construed as resistance.

Criticisms about the notion of “resistance to change” are based on the implicit hegemonic, hierarchically biased assumptions associated with the term: inherent connotations of virtuous, holistic, visionary educational leaders advocating change in contention with myopic and self-interested opponents who disrupt the achievement of strategic goals. Critics argue that change resistance can derive from various intentions and motivations, not all of which are “bad.”

A further criticism is that the failure to probe the roots of resistance may be a result of institutional “undiscussables” – a term used by Argyris (1980). Undiscussables are topics that are too uncomfortable for open conversation with social actors being reluctant to raise “risky and threatening issues, especially if these issues question underlying organizational assumptions and policies” (Argyris 1980, p. 205) or reflect badly on leaders. Undiscussables promote conformity while skewing data and subsequent change efforts.

“Resistance” to change is acknowledged as a predictable political phenomenon in educational leadership and a worthy focus of research in this field. To date, however, there is little research available focusing on educational leaders’ own resistance to change.

Why Educational Institutions Are Resilient to Change

It is human nature to resist change, unless implementers are involved in its creation (Evans 1996). Individuals are comfortable with the way things are; they are familiar with the way things work; they have established routines; and organizational cultures operate to maintain the status quo. Initiating change requires people to give up something – feelings of comfort, long-held values or beliefs, or ways of working. The change may entail encountering a different environment or new collaborations or reduced budgets – in extreme cases people may lose their jobs. Whatever, there will be some break from the past, new effort and thinking required, and extra time needed to implement the new pursuit. Uncertainty is never welcomed – it is easier to remain the same.

While change is difficult in all organizations, there are a number of barriers that are particular to the field of education that make major change especially difficult. Some relate to the nature of teachers' work. Teachers' work is complex, demanding, and requiring untold interactions each day and attention to the varied needs of large numbers of students, many of whom have learning or social difficulties. Schools have never served such diverse student populations. With current expectations that no student can fail, teachers are expected to tailor courses and pedagogy to individual needs to ensure optimal learning for every student. Some argue that students are becoming more challenging and can be harder to motivate, with teachers having to perform well in order to grasp and retain students' attention and cooperation to ensure learning engagement (see, e.g., Evans 1996). Curriculum expectations are constantly changing and expanding. On top are the daily, unexpected requests, complaints, demands, and queries from students, parents, and others. Hence, the quotidian of educational life is messy, busy, and exhausting and stakeholders are many. Time for prolonged planning, reflection, or problem solving is always lacking.

Educational institutions are also expected to enact mandatory policy change agendas that are

extrinsic to internal priorities, which add to workload and steal time. The technical-rational-structural approach often adopted by education bureaucracies further exacerbates problems about change. Change is ongoing and uncertain and time is pressured, but imposed directives regularly ignore this fact. Top-down mandatory change often assumes a straightforward, logical, predictable implementation with prescriptive timelines and procedures, thereby failing to grapple with the complexity and dynamism of educational life. An unintended consequence is it diverts efforts from teaching and learning.

Another salient factor is that practitioners are rarely involved in policy or change agenda formulation. They are acted upon – they are not cosponsors of change – and are often portrayed as a part of the problem rather than as the solution to educational problems.

For many reasons it is common for older individuals to be more cynical and resistant to change (Evans 1996; Grey 2005). This is understandable since life often becomes more, not less, complicated with aging: family responsibilities increase (with pressures from children and aging parents), financial commitments present restraints, personal health issues may emerge, and eventual retirement plans must be made. Older staff can also be more confident, vocal, and visible dissenters, and seeing it is in their interests to maintain the status quo.

It is also a history of failed reforms that makes some experienced practitioners very cynical and resistant to change. Long-standing staff members are custodians of stories about the unintended, unanticipated, negative consequences or side effects of change. Educational leaders initiating change are often told that “this is the way we do things here” or that “we tried that once before and it didn't work.” And in terms of the latter comment – in most cases this would be accurate.

While issues of low morale and disengagement may emerge from the nature of teachers' work, these are not helped by regular media attacks from politicians and public commentators. Politicians often cite purported problems to gain legitimacy for new reforms and restructurings, which erodes public confidence in education even further. In

addition, parents are more demanding, placing increasing responsibility on educational institutions as increasingly they are spending less time with their children (Evans 1996). These conditions are hardly conducive to inspiring change and innovation. Reform requires effort in an atmosphere of trust.

Governments' responses to global forces to ensure national economic competitiveness can release "dark" micro repercussions. Educational leaders cite ongoing external interventions; intensified workloads; insufficient resources; the timing, nature, volume, and disruption of externally imposed initiatives; and union objection as hindrances to change that exacerbate resistance and antagonism (Gronn 2009). Further exacerbating factors include a lack of agreement about policy or direction, increasing stress and burnout, widespread disenchantment and disengagement, rapidly changing student populations, a lack of collaboration in education policy making, and insufficient professional learning, preparation, and induction for principals focused on change, micropolitics, and resistance (Evans 1996; Gronn 2009).

Experiences of Educational Leaders

In education, resistance to change can come from within or outside the educational institution. Overwhelmingly, however, educational leaders view resistance as a negative, disruptive phenomenon stemming from self-interest, with perceptions being highly influenced by the behaviors exhibited by resisters. Resistance to change evokes differing responses among the people involved and can be active or passive and severe or less interfering. Specific behaviors include vandalism or violence, professional sabotage, disrespectful or discourteous conduct, clandestine caucusing or social exclusion, formal complaints, the withholding of information, rumor mongering, slander, and blackmail. Resistance behaviors can have institutional effects such as an increase in resignations or transfers, lowered productivity, increased absenteeism, and a general sully of the workplace culture.

Resistance is exacerbated when factionalism and divisions appear within a group where there is more at stake for individuals holding strong views one way or another and when a sense of common purpose or collective vision evaporates. Crucial throughout major change is cohesive leadership – disloyalty or disunity makes the change process even more difficult. Educational leaders may, however, harbor their own opposition to change imperatives such as policy interventions or accountability procedures. Hence compliance is a conscious agential act – one that may not stem from honesty or integrity, whereas resistance may (reinforcing the view that not all resistance acts are unjustified).

A leader's tenure within an educational institution can influence the nature and extent of change resistance, with the early stages of tenure in a new institution being the time when the most robust forms of resistance are likely to be experienced. Leaders with long-standing tenure appear to experience fewer examples of aggressive resistance the longer their tenure. This indicates that education communities may experience difficulty in coming to terms with a new leader, new ideas, and unfamiliar *modus operandi*, whereas over time, a leader's views and processes become known, expected, and accepted. The initial years of a leaders' tenure are when the most radical reforms are likely to be undertaken (through necessity or choice) which may also explain this phenomenon. Further, educational leaders with long experience report more confidence in their position, major change processes, and outcomes. Overall, however, resistance to second-order change appears to be part of the change territory in education.

A culture of complaint is seen to have superseded an era of greater compliance in education and is viewed as an outcome of consumer choice, competitive individualism over collectivism, political and media appeals to students and parents as consumers of education, and an emphasis on market forces emphasizing responsiveness to consumer power. With a greater range of interested parties and higher community expectations, legal or procedural rights are more likely to be pursued to procure desired outcomes, with

complainants being more convinced of the effectiveness of these strategies.

Protestors increasingly seek restitution through power brokers such as boards/ councils, external supervisors or regulators, or unions. Others may seek to disrupt support networks within internal institutional leadership. Formalized resistance strategies increase the workload of educational leaders through meetings, negotiations, deputations, and formal documentation requirements, having to ensure procedural compliance or attend reconciliation or court appearances. The processes are stressful but effective in delaying or allaying mooted changes. While stakeholders and staff members can express a range of emotions, educational leaders feel constrained to act confidentially, diplomatically, and courteously. Educational leaders have to be adept at appearance management, hiding true feelings to present a steady, “bulletproof” persona, which is not always easy.

Opponents of change have considerable formal means of resistance available to them – means enhanced through localized knowledge, cultural resources, and associations. When change fails, resistance tactics have proven worthwhile.

Addressing Change Resistance

Change resistance in education can emanate from a number of sources: an overload of change initiatives; cynicism; a lack of ownership, consultation, or communication; insecurity and anxiety, a lack of support and recognition; or doubts about the benefits of change. Given that major change is difficult to enact, there is a considerable body of literature that attempts to address and reduce change resistance. Commonly mentioned ameliorative behaviors include:

- Articulating and communicating a clear rationale for major change based on transparent information
- Focusing the rationale for change on benefits for students
- Involving and negotiating with stakeholders who will be most affected by the change in

the development of common understandings, goals, and processes

- Being respectful of past practices
- Identifying and co-opting key people to lead aspects of the change activities and work with others through change processes
- Negotiating expectations – being transparent about what is going to happen, when, and how
- Developing role statements, responsibilities, and realistic timelines
- Widely communicating and reporting progress toward goals through formal and informal means
- Providing necessary professional learning and other resources
- Inducting newcomers to the change process
- Providing encouragement and support, with change leaders being personally available and involved
- Encouraging discussion about difficulties and devising solutions collectively
- Maintaining a strong focus on professional learning – growing talents, interests, skills, and knowledge, while fostering mentoring and coaching activities
- Being magnanimous with thanks, praise, encouragement, acknowledgment, and rewards (Evans 1996; Sarason 1990)

Conclusion

Opposition and resistance are to be expected in major educational change, with emotionality often overriding rationality. Resistance is exercised in myriad overt and covert ways, and educational leaders cannot underestimate how difficult change is to manage, or how antagonistic some people will be. And no matter how well planned, change can have unforeseen repercussions (positive and negative), which may incur further upset. Power struggles, political intrigue, ideological difference, and the maneuvering of knowledge and personal agendas make for micro-political messiness in school life and thwart change efforts (Sarason 1990). Resistance tactics are deployed because they often have the desired effect.

Resistance must be anticipated and acted upon. Educational leaders require political astuteness to lead and manage change successfully, yet many researchers reveal the lack of essential knowledge and skills of school leaders as the cause of change failure (Blase 2005; Evans 1996). As governments place more emphasis on measurable performance outcomes, leading and managing change will become even more important for educational leaders, with concomitant implications for their selection, appraisal, and longevity in the job. As Buchanan and Badham (2008, p. 18) argue, “the change agent who is not politically skilled will fail.”

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Educational Leadership, the Emotions, and Neuroscience

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Synonyms

[Affective neuroscience](#); [Decision-making](#); [Educational leadership](#); [Emotions](#); [Folk psychology](#); [Somatic marker hypothesis](#)

Introduction

Discussions of the emotions have recently become prominent in educational leadership research which advocates the belief that emotions are important for leadership to be effective. A central part of this research is the common sense concept of emotion that underlies the empirical studies of emotion and leadership. This notion, however, is part of folk psychology which, as a failed empirical theory, is unable to answer some of the most fundamental questions raised in the education and leadership literature: how emotions are generated, what they are, and how they are shared between people. This entry presents an overview of why emotions are believed to be important for leadership in education, how emotions are understood in the education literature, what is known about the history of the concept of emotion, and what the neurosciences can tell us about the nature and origins of “emotion.” The entry concludes by indicating in which ways new neuroscientific knowledge contributes answers to the questions raised in the educational leadership literature.

Leaders and Emotions

Unlike the fields of organizational behavior and general leadership studies with their established

research literatures, the turn to the emotions as integral, and hence legitimate, components of leadership in education is relatively recent. At the same time, however, philosophical treatments of emotion have had a long and controversial history (Solomon 2010). Two features of emotion continue to shape the contemporary discussion: the view of emotion as primitive and dangerous, therefore in need of control by reason and, secondly, the very distinction between emotion and reason itself as constituting two different and opposing “natural” kinds. The emphasis on emotion as nonrational has been a characteristic of traditional, rational decision-making theory, prominently represented in educational administration by Herbert Simon, while the renewed focus on emotions and leadership represents a response to the predominant cognitive orientation in leadership and organization studies generally.

The discussions of emotions in education accept implicitly the nonrational – rational distinction as a true characterization of both emotion and reason – but focuses on one side of the dichotomy by investigating the emotional experiences of teachers and principals, without questioning the dichotomy itself. General themes in the empirical educational (leadership) literature are the presumed impact of teacher/leader emotions on students, educational outcomes, and teacher education programs. Topics include the emotional aspects of teachers’ lives, emotions in teaching, and emotions and leadership more generally where emotions and leadership are considered as shared influence (Zorn and Boler 2007). A strong theme running through educational leadership discussions is the assumption that emotions are situated in social–political contexts, are therefore more than an individual’s personal psychological property, and thus need to be investigated from within a social–political framework. In addition, there is a strong emphasis on gendered power relations that are said to shape the emotions of leaders, in particular women leaders, who are forced to adjust their emotions to the dominant rational, male administrative culture. Such adjustment requires emotional labor, which means suppression of genuine emotion or inducing emotions not felt in accordance with the requirements of the

workplace. Further to the empirical studies conducted on emotions and leadership in education, the concept of emotional intelligence provides a theoretical framework based on the belief that the emotional skills of leaders are imperative for effective leadership. Although the meaning of emotional intelligence remains ambiguous, its definition of emotion is that of folk psychology.

In the empirical literature, four reasons are offered in particular to support the claim that emotions are relevant for understanding leaders in education (Berkovich and Eyal 2014). (1) Emotional experiences and their displays express leaders’ reactions to social reality and how that reality relates to their goals; (2) leaders’ behaviors affect the emotions of teachers and others with whom they interact; (3) leaders’ affective abilities are precursors of their emotions and behaviors, and as such, of desired work outcomes; and (4) leaders’ emotions are also influenced by societal factors that have contributed to making administrative work more complex and political in unstable and competitive environments. The emotions referred to are generally those we describe in words such as fear, anger, disgust, surprise, sadness, and happiness. Explicit definitions of emotion are rare in the educational leadership literature, and where they occur, they are in keeping with folk psychological theories of emotion as in Berkovich and Eyal’s account (2014, pp. 2–3) who describe emotions as affective experiences that include individual emotions such as fear or joy, and can be accompanied by bodily expressions, and sometimes lead to action.

The current state of knowledge of emotions in the education and educational leadership literature is descriptive in nature and largely presents phenomenological studies of how emotions are seen and experienced in teaching, learning, and leading contexts. Questions considered important for future research, raised but not addressed in the current literature, concern how agents manage to transmit emotions, or “catch” the emotions of others, as in emotional contagion. Above all, the current literature takes for granted the common sense understanding of emotion. While it is true that principals and teachers (and everyone else) have developed their own repertoires of how to

deal with their own emotions and those of others, given their general understanding of how the language of folk psychology and the meaning of its concepts works in everyday life, when these repertoires break down, as they often do, predictions of expected behavior can go badly wrong, with sometimes devastating consequences. This problem cannot be solved within folk psychology as emotions are not identical with the words we use to describe them. What we call emotions are mental states generated by and instantiated in biological brains and bodies. They are thus amenable to scientific investigation, as has long been recognized by Darwin. Recent work, especially in emotion science and affective and cognitive neuroscience, has contributed much to a better scientific understanding of the nature, origins, and functioning of emotion and what we call the emotions generally. It helps clarify whether or not, or in which sense, emotions can be said to be important for leadership to be effective. But first it is necessary to get an idea why folk psychology presents a false theory of mental states.

Folk Psychology and the Ambiguity of “Emotion”

Following Dixon (2012), the term “emotion” has not become applied to the systematic study of mental phenomena until the mid-nineteenth century. As we now use the term, it subsumes two distinct categories of mental states that had held sway since Aristotle and St. Augustine: troubling desires and passions on the one hand and the milder and less dangerous affections and sentiments on the other (Dixon 2012, p. 339). This distinction became blurred through the works of the moral philosopher Thomas Brown (cited in Dixon 2012) whose conception of “emotion” comprised quite diverse mental states. Ever after, “emotion” was treated as a significant *theoretical* category for the systematic study of the mind but remained difficult to describe, with a view of emotion as vivid feelings, on one hand, and emotion as expressible in bodily motion, on the other. This ambiguity has plagued emotion research to the present day. It is a source of contention in

contemporary accounts of emotion theory as the meaning of “emotion” changes depending on the theoretical frameworks adopted by psychologists. For folk psychology, however, this does not matter. As the oldest framework that purports to explain our mental phenomena, it is pervasive, deeply rooted, and denotes:

the prescientific, commonsense conceptual framework that all normally socialized humans deploy in order to comprehend, predict, explain, and manipulate the behavior of humans and the higher animals. This framework includes concepts such as *belief, desire, pain, pleasure, love, hate, joy, fear, suspicion, memory, recognition, anger, sympathy, intention*, and so forth. It embodies our baseline understanding of the cognitive, affective, and purposive nature of people. Considered as a whole, it constitutes our conception of what a person is. (Churchland and Churchland 1998, p. 3)

Debates about how to appraise folk psychology’s nature, what functions it has, and whether it can evolve have crucially centered on the question whether it is like an empirical theory or merely a social practice whose generally shared vocabulary makes possible a myriad of social activities such as the ones referred to in the above quote. Its purpose was said to be normative rather than descriptive, and unlike empirical theories its general sentences or laws were not seen to lend themselves to causal explanations. Delimited in this way, folk psychology was said to escape the kind of scrutiny to which every empirical theory can be subjected and which could in principle lead to its rejection, reduction, or even elimination.

It is now generally accepted that our common sense conception of mental states is theoretical in exactly the same way that the physical phenomena of science are, with the *propositional attitudes* (...believes, desires, fears that *p*) showing the same semantic structure as scientific theories (Churchland and Churchland 1998). Crucially, as folk psychology makes claims about the nature of mental states as representable in linguistic form, in light of both evolutionary knowledge of the late development of language propensity, and recent knowledge of actual brain architecture, functioning, and information processing, this claim has turned out to be unjustified. The basic units of

human cognition are not sentence-like structures, but patterns of excitation levels across a large population of neurons. Information processing does not consist of deductive inference between sentences but synaptic firings across activation vectors that transform them into yet other such vectors. None of the above comments deliver a fatal blow to folk psychology. But it does follow that if folk psychology is as theoretical as other theories of science, then mental phenomena, including our emotions, are a proper subject for scientific investigation. On the other hand, the folk psychological understanding of emotion/s continues unabated in everyday life.

Emotion Naturalized

While the study of the nature and origins of emotion is a common goal of both folk psychological science (the new emotion science) and affective neuroscience, the historical tension and definitional ambiguity more clearly affect the former. Emotion science is concerned with specification and classification of emotions, a difficult enterprise due to unstable shifting definitions. It focuses on such questions as how many emotions there might be and what emotion is anyway so that it can be measured. Affective neuroscience, on the other hand, is interested to explore the underlying neural substrates of emotion and is therefore primarily concerned with causal rather than definition or classification issues (Panksepp 1998). Affective neuroscience can be said to have evolved from the second view of emotion as embodied, drawing on Darwin's theory of emotions, and continued by James and Lange, whose combined views have become known as the James–Lange theory of emotions. In brief, the theory maintains that emotions are embodied. Commenting on the everyday view that emotion comes first and elicits bodily expression second, James says “My thesis on the contrary is that *the bodily changes follow directly the PERCEPTION of the exciting fact, and that our feeling of the same changes as they occur IS the emotion.*” (James 1884, pp. 189–190). According to James, there is no ephemeral substance “left over.” The

common sense sequence, described by James, of “we meet a bear, are frightened and run,” is simply the wrong order. Expressed more formally, as Prinz (2004, p. 44) puts it, “... emotions are perceptions (conscious or unconscious) of patterned changes in the body (construed inclusively).” But as emotions have also been characterized as cognitive appraisal systems, a more comprehensive account integrates both perception of body states with cognitive appraisal of the person's overall situation, so that an emotion can be described as “a pattern of neural activity in the *whole* system . . . including inputs from bodily states and external senses.” (Thagard and Aubie 2008, p. 817).

This broad definition is based on a recent and still controversial conception of brain organization as rather more fluid than previously assumed, being better characterized by dynamic affiliation of neural systems than modularity. Because of such dynamic organization, emotion circuits and cognition circuits are so closely interlinked that it is more appropriate to speak of the cognitive–emotional brain. The traditional, philosophical dichotomy between reason and emotion, on this account, is no longer defensible. When applied to that traditionally most rational of activities, decision-making in educational administration, as elsewhere, this particular result implies that rationality *de facto* depends on emotion for rational decisions to be possible at all (Lakowski and Evers 2010). The most influential argument supporting this claim is Damasio's (1996) somatic marker hypothesis which in essence claims that positive or negative body signals such as gut feelings and hunches subconsciously “presort” how to appraise and thus respond to a stimulus. By signaling a positive or negative valence, the body (racing pulse, sweaty palms, increased heart rate) indicates how to respond to a situation and thereby reduces the potentially infinite decision space. If this thesis is generally correct, then emotions are indeed integral to decision-making and are part and parcel of all the neural machinery that enables humans to make choices and survive. Understood naturalistically, emotions are rational.

Given that emotion is embodied and its definition expanded as indicated, the question asked in

the educational leadership literature on how emotion “travels” between people, or is “caught,” central to the claim that leader emotion affects or “influences” other persons, and work outcomes, can in principle be answered by neuroscience. Unlike folk psychology, it investigates the origins, nature, and mechanisms of emotion and emotion transmission. The most basic form of transmission is known as *emotional contagion*. It refers to the human tendency automatically to mimic another person in regard to facial expressions, vocalizations, postures, and movements. This tendency has been studied especially in regard to empathy, also mentioned as fundamental in the leadership literature. It was found that humans do not empathize all the time and that an emotional connection and response is subject to an appraisal process and thus not merely automatic. Whether the actual neural mechanisms that generate empathy are primarily mirror neurons, as has been suggested, is still a matter for debate. However, there seems to be scientific consensus that human brains are hardwired for emotional, or broadly, social connectivity, regardless of what the actual neural mechanisms are that make this possible.

Conclusion

The discussion of and recent emphasis on emotion in education and educational leadership has rightly drawn attention to a neglected domain of human behavior. As mental phenomena, emotions are described in the language of folk psychology as this is the oldest and most deeply rooted language we have in which to express them. The acknowledgement that emotions, whether positive or negative, have an important role to play in education and educational leadership opens up a new dimension for research. While the phenomenological descriptions of emotion in leadership and classroom studies will continue to be necessary, and while the emphasis on social, cultural, gender, and power frameworks adds important dimensions to understanding emotions in broader contexts, these descriptions do not tell us what emotions are, why they work, or fail to work the way they do, how we can read or misread them,

and how emotions get shared in the first place. The language of folk psychology is not fit for this task, and is likely to be replaced, step by step, by the language of neuroscience that offers a causal account of the nature and origins of emotion and the mechanisms that make sharing between humans possible at all. The investigation of emotion sharing, from neurobiological perspectives to social–political environments, has barely begun. But the better we understand how brains and bodies produce emotion, the better we will be able to understand human behavior in its complexity, including what is referred to as “influence,” a feature commonly believed essential for leadership. The neuroscientific evidence we have so far about biological brain architecture and how brains actually work has already contributed to the elimination of one highly influential philosophical dichotomy, that between reason and emotion, that has underpinned education and educational administration theory and practice. Rational decision-making, it turns out, is not possible in the absence of emotion. Whatever effective leadership may turn out to mean, understanding the causes of such human mental phenomena as emotions is an indispensable prerequisite.

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Educational Policy and Administration

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Introduction

In my 1992 Midwest PES paper “Analytical Philosophy and the Discourse of institutional Democracy,” I briefly discussed the hostile criticism of Analytical Philosophy of Education (APE) by Professor Walter Feinberg and contrasted it with

Prof. B. Paul Komisar’s analytical discussion of the various forms of discourse in education. Contrary to Feinberg’s caricature of APE, Komisar does not restrict himself to analyzing “crystallized concepts” nor does he ignore “struggles over meaning.” “Komisar identifies four major categories of discourse in education, one of which is termed “Political Discourse.” The three kinds of Political Discourse in education are (1) Philosophy of Education, (2) Policy Discourse, and (3) Publicity Discourse. All of these uses of language in education can be vague or ambiguous and can serve as the battleground in Feinberg’s “struggles over meaning.”

In this paper, I shall examine some key concepts, images, and ideals that are the subject of controversy in educational policy-making and administration with the goal of showing the contribution that a philosopher of education can make toward understanding “struggles over meaning” in policy and administration. Let me state for the record that I reject the view that the proper task of the philosopher in this area would be to show the “implications for policy and administration” “of various “schools of thought” in academic philosophy and to urge practitioners to make a dogmatic commitment to a single “ism.” I suspect that my writing shows the influence of many of my teachers, colleagues, and students and the different views that they hold.

Policy and Administration

Educational policy and administration deal with the actual conduct and operation of educational institutions. A perennial problem for the philosopher of education is to demonstrate a connection between educational ideas and actual organizational processes. A possible strategy is to show that a particular ideology has become the basis for human action by showing that a proposed system of rules that the ideology advocates is actually followed. According to James E. McClellan (1968), policy-making is itself a rule-directed activity that generates the rules that govern the activities of office holders in an institution. Administration is commonly characterized as the

Author was deceased at the time of publication.

maintenance of the rules that govern an institution (Lipham 1964). For McClellan, the process of policy-making must ideally: (1) acknowledge conflicting interests, (2) be generated by an organization that carries on a public and reasonable debate, and (3) produce rules that can be actually enforced. James M. Lipham contrasts “administration” and “leadership,” identifying “leadership” with activities intended to change the rules of an institution while “administration” maintains those rules. Notice that McClellan’s definition of “policy” is programmatic in that it treats policy-making as a rational process. An older distinction – going back to Woodrow Wilson (1856–1924) – contrasts administration and politics and identifies “administration” with rational organizational analysis and “politics” with irrational social conflict.

Notice that in the above analysis, I employ John Rawls’s notion of an “institution” as an analytical tool. Educational policy and administration take place within the context of educational institutions. For Rawls, an institution is “a public system of rules which defines offices and positions with their rights and duties, powers and immunities, and the like. These rules specify certain forms of action as permissible, others as forbidden; and they provide for certain penalties and defenses when violations occur (51).” While John Rawls is not an analytical philosopher, I shall employ his metaphor in an explanatory fashion (see Pepper 1982). I have already attempted to show conflicting uses of “policy” and “administration” in the writings of McClellan, Lipham, and Wilson. Now I shall use Rawls’s metaphor as a “meta-metaphor” in an analysis of four metaphors that have had major historical influences on the practice of educational policy and administration.

An educational institution may be either an instrumental system (IS) or a noninstrumental system (NIS). In an IS, the institution exists to achieve a goal and the lack of attainment of the goal may threaten the existence of the IS. In an NIS, the institution exists because the activities that go on within the institution are seen as worthwhile – period. Also the rules that govern the institution may be either a tightly coupled system (TCS) or a loosely coupled system

(LCS). A TCS has strict, precisely defined rules that prescribe virtually every activity that office holders participate in. In an LCS, the rules are vague or ambiguous and subject to continual reinterpretation. In the next section, I will describe four metaphors for educational administration that can be put into practice and become full-blown ideologies: the temple, the traditional factory, the human relation-oriented version of the factory, and the jungle (see March 1972; Weick 1982).

1. In the temple, the school is a TCS and an NIS.
2. In the traditional factory, the school is a TCS and an IS.
3. In the human relation-oriented factory, the school is still an IS but has become an LCS.
4. And in the jungle, the school has become an LCS and may be an NIS. (But the jungle institutions may not survive for long.)

Administration and School Images

Terrence E. Deal and Martha Stone Wiske see both policy-making and administration as heavily influenced by one’s vision of schools as organizations or school images. They identify three metaphors – the factory, the jungle, and the temple – as the bases of three contemporary school images. The main section of this article will discuss the history of these school images. The final section of this article will address parallels between the philosophical reflections on educational policy of Thomas F. Green and John Dewey and the policy-making of James B. Conant and his archenemy Frederick M. Raubinger.

The School as a Temple

The metaphor of the school as a temple places the administrator in the role of a priest whose task is to enact rituals and ceremonies that maintain the faith. William Torrey Harris (1835–1909) – a well-known advocate of idealistic philosophy – rose to the position of Superintendent of Schools in St. Louis and subsequently served as US Commissioner of Education. Harris

would have insisted that only those activities carried on through social institutions have educational value (Dunkel 1973). In the nineteenth century, States increased the power of school administrators (Karier 1982). William Estabrook Chancellor (1867–1963) narrowed William Torrey Harris's faith in American institutions to a faith in public schooling. Chancellor was contemptuous of politicians and businessmen. He explicitly compared schooling to religion and superintendents to ministers. Chancellor advocated an increased authority for school administration and the abolition of school boards. Like his hero Woodrow Wilson, Chancellor sought to separate administration from politics. Ironically, in 1920 Chancellor's career temporarily ended because he became involved in a smear campaign against presidential candidate Warren G. Harding. He was dismissed from his teaching position, hunted by a lynch mob, forced to leave the country, and had his book on Harding burned by Harding Administration. Books on school architecture of the late nineteenth century explicitly referred to the school building as a temple (Cutler 1989). After several years as a traveling salesman in Canada, Chancellor returned to the United States and resumed his teaching career (Mason 1986; Russell 1968).

The School as a Factory

Chancellor's textbooks were displaced by those of Ellwood P. Cubberley (1868–1941). While Cubberley was sympathetic to Chancellor's authoritarian views, Cubberley's ideology was based on a different metaphor: the factory. Cubberley sought to establish a profession of educational administration, promoted the use of intelligence tests as a selection device, and urged the increased presence of businessmen on school boards. The rhetoric of the school as a temple was being displaced by the new rhetoric of efficiency (Scott 1915). Like Chancellor, Cubberley deplored the presence of women and minorities on school boards, but unlike Chancellor, Cubberley idolized businessmen. He saw children as the product of the school as factory – designed by the professionals to meet the needs of society. Cubberley saw the American educational

system as the apex of civilization and the professional school administrator as one of history's greatest heroes. But – like Chancellor and Wilson – Cubberley sought to free administrative decision-making from the conflicts of politics. Cubberley believed that the presence of businessmen on school boards would give the professional school administrator greater freedom of decision-making (Callahan 1962).

The Human Relations Approach

Douglas McGregor (1906–1964) opposed the authoritarian inclinations of both the temple model and the factory model. He studied psychology at Harvard during the 1930s – a time when Harvard psychologists sought to identify themselves as scientists and divorce themselves from philosophy. Like many early writers on organizational behavior, he based his views of organizations on means-ends rationality and argued that, in a congenial work environment, employees will seek to integrate personal objectives with organizational goals. McGregor deplored the carrot and stick approach to management. As President of Antioch College from 1948 to 1954, he sought to include students, faculty, and blue-collar workers in discussions of college policy, but his openness left McGregor vulnerable to the machinations of professional anti-communist informers who were willing to spread outright lies about student activities on the Antioch campus. In McGregor's view of management, we see a tension between the rhetoric of the democratic institution and the image of the school as a factory (Oliker 1976).

The School as a Jungle

A 1960 paper by McClellan applauded administrators' efforts to develop scientific administrative theory but warned that the then new behavioral science-based administrative theory assumed a centralized model of decision-making. But the administrative theorists discussed by McClellan may have been engaged in wishful thinking. During the mid-1950s, a popular film (based on a popular novel) introduced a phrase into the national vocabulary that contained a new and disturbing metaphor for the school: The Blackboard Jungle (see Hunter 1955).

The need for constant negotiations, the exercise of power, and the flux of symbolic meaning that are characteristic of the school as jungle seem to be the school image that informs the administrative theory of James G. March – a distinguished social scientist on the faculty of Stanford University. During the 1970s, March conducted extensive studies of college presidents and school superintendents. His resulting works can be understood as a rejection of most of the assumptions of educational administration theory in the twentieth Century. Specifically, March rejects the assumptions that: (1) organizations exist to achieve goals; (2) individuals act on their beliefs; and (3) only actions based on goals or beliefs are rational. He sees schools as “organized anarchies” or “loosely coupled systems” which have ambiguous goals, unclear relations of means and ends, and decisions made in the context of chance interactions of people, problems, and solutions. For March, actions on the basis of intuition and tradition are just as rational as actions toward a goal mind. His work even hints at a convergence with the long-forgotten views of W.T. Harris. March’s disciple Karl E. Weick urges school administrators to consider the leadership style of a clergyman as possibly more appropriate to schooling than that of a management scientist.

Ideals of the Educational System: Democracy or Rationality?

While the metaphors of temple, factory, and jungle do seem to identify four kinds of educational institutions, we lack any clear intuitive characterization of educational systems. And the question of the very existence of educational systems is still controversial in some circles. Philosophical inquiry about educational systems and the making of educational policy at the national level seems to involve at least three central questions:

5. Does nation N have a system of education?
6. Can policy for that system be made rationally?
7. Can policy for that system be made democratically?

According to Thomas F. Green, the Educational System began to take shape around 1910. The System is a well-organized institution defined by rules that operate with the rigor of an Aristotelian practical syllogism. The System as Green sees it as composed of primary and derivative elements.

The primary elements are:

- P1: Schools
- P2: A medium of exchange
- P3: A principle of sequence

While the derivative elements are:

- D1: Size
- D2: A system of control
- D3: A distribution of goods

And the System “behaves” according to such laws as:

- L1: The Law of Zero Correlation
- L2: The Law of Last Entry
- L3: The Principle of the Moving Target

Green paints a picture of the System as a well-programmed computer that will continue to function in spite of the misguided (he thinks) efforts of reformers. This claim may be reassuring to the conservative who fears the breakdown of the System, but it is hardly reassuring to those who see the System as perpetuating social injustices. Green’s L1 asserts that educational credentials become worthless once everyone attains them. L2 can be summarized as the claim that the least advantaged social groups cannot benefit from the System until the higher status groups have exhausted the System’s resources. And L3 maintains that the attainment of educational credentials can change from being sufficient conditions for social status to being necessary conditions.

Why did the System come into being? In the nineteenth century, a wide variety of schools existed with drastically different functions. John Dewey favored the organization of a national system of education as an expression of the evolution

of America into a democracy. In teacher education the normal schools which taught teaching methods existed completely separate from university education departments which prepared educational researchers. Dewey's ideal was a unified college of education that integrated both functions and prepared teachers in the public interest.

Dewey would have rejected Green's suggestion that the logic of the educational system is unassailable by any external standards. He warned in a 1903 paper entitled "Democracy in Education" that the authority structure of any kind of educational institution must be evaluated by the standard of whether it impedes or encourages the freedom of thought that is necessary in a democratic society. Thirty-five years later, Dewey reiterated this point in a paper entitled "Democracy and Educational Administration." In that paper – an address to a group of school administrators – he chided his audience for their failure to develop structures that allowed teachers a sufficient role in decision-making.

The conflict between the views of Green and Dewey on educational policy-making can be termed a conflict between rationalist and democratic philosophies. This conflict is not just a theoretical debate for the philosophy of education classroom. During the 1950s and 1960s, New Jersey State Commissioner of Education Frederick M. Raubinger (1908–1989) attacked the work of the Educational Testing Service – located in Princeton, New Jersey – and its guiding inspiration former Harvard University President James B. Conant (1893–1978) as an undemocratic elite who had seized educational policy-making from public officials. Like Chancellor, Conant was fond of dismissing critics of public education as being misinformed. Raubinger, by contrast, was a firm believer in local control of education (Shine 1975) who devoted an entire chapter of his 1974 educational administration textbook to a discussion of democratic theory. In the early 1970s, Conant sought to establish the Education Commission of the States which took as its mission the expansion of the 2-year community colleges.

Raubinger pointed out in 1972 that the ECS has also sought to increase the power of the 50 State governors over educational policy at the expense of education officials. In his autobiography "My Several Lives," Conant clearly advocated the expansion of the 2-year college at the expense of the 4-year college. Because of the influence of Conant and the ETS, Raubinger was forced to resign as New Jersey State Commissioner of Education in 1966. From 1966 to 1976, Raubinger taught in the Department of Educational Administration at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.

During the 25 years since Conant completed his autobiography, the 2-year college has continued to be the subject of fierce debate (Levinsohn). The conceptual framework of this entry can illuminate controversies over this new kind of institution. The earliest type of 2-year college – the junior college – satisfied a public demand for access to higher education while rationally fitting into the educational system and enabling students to transfer to bachelor's programs. But the junior college was never seen as a "temple of learning" like the traditional university. Almost immediately, the factory model of administration with greater emphasis on vocational education and a rational fit with the job market became the controlling ideology of the junior college. However, recent demands on these institutions by ethnic minorities have placed faculty in a jungle environment wherein the role of the teacher is poorly defined. Cynical administrators see this situation as an opportunity to deprofessionalize teaching and expand vocational programs that do not terminate either in a degree or in the opportunity to transfer to a bachelor's program. But newer non-degree programs and the reduction of faculty can be seen as antagonistic to the demands of the community for more course offerings. Jungle-oriented administrators' attempts to save money may backfire and antagonize the community and threaten the survival of the institution. Perhaps a return to the more ministerial role by educators that was characteristic of the school as temple could even be defended as democratic (see Weick 1982)!

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Educational Practice

► [Critical and Social Justice Pedagogies in Practice](#)

Educational Semiotics, Greimas, and Theory of Action

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Synonyms

[Action](#); [Culture](#); [Edusemiotics](#); [Ethics](#); [Greimas](#); [Modal competence](#); [Narrative](#); [Narratology](#); [Semiotics](#); [Signification](#)

Introduction

This entry addresses the action theoretical semiotics derived from A. J. Greimas's theory and positions it in the context of edusemiotics. Greimas's narratological theory is discussed and investigated in terms of its fruitfulness for education. The entry focuses on the major features of Greimas's theory such as his famous actantial model as well as the anthropomorphic, or human- and subject-centered, approach in general. According to Greimas, at the core of the meaning of every significant discourse, there lies a typical human situation within which the actants – or entities that assume certain roles in a narrative story – function as Subject and Object, Sender and Receiver, and at times also as Helper and Opponent. Greimas's central analytic tools, the semiotic square and the generative model, are interpreted in dynamic terms and applied to the analysis of education as a meaningful practice. These tools help us see education as a value-based action and shed a critical light on the presupposed dualism between nature and culture in the context of education. For the analysis of

action, Greimas's major concepts prove themselves to be especially useful. The conception of competences expressed, specifically, in modal verbs such as *want*, *can*, *know*, and *must* is significant for education. As such, education becomes an action that strives to develop students' competences. In this action, the roles of teacher and student are dynamically differentiated. While a student acts as a Subject actant, a teacher acts as a Sender. The role of Sender is, however, shifting, thus defying the solely central position it assumed during the beginning and ending phases of the narrative, edusemiotic process.

Why Greimas?


A. J. Greimas (1917–1992) is one of the most important semioticians and the founder of the Paris school of semiotics (Perron and Collins 1989). Starting as a linguist specializing in semantics, he contributed to the Continental semiotics founded by Saussure and was also influenced by such important structuralists as Barthes, Levi-Straus, and Hjelmslev. He then turned to narratology by way of Propp and developed his theory in the direction of the anthropomorphic analysis of subjectivity. In *Structural Semantics* (Greimas 1976) he stated the famous actantial model: Subject, Object, Sender, Receiver, Helper, and Opponent. The most comprehensive, though quite a desultory, presentation of his theory is in *Semiotics and Language: An Analytical Dictionary* (Greimas and Courtés 1982). For Greimas, semiotics is not the study of discrete signs but rather of the continuous signification process: the articulation of meaning that takes place in the two macrosemiotic systems of natural languages and the natural world. Thus, Greimas's theory is not restricted to the linguistic sphere. The concept of a sign as a Saussurean relatively fixed dyadic combination of content and expression is not as important to him as either the smallest signifying elements (semes) of which every sign is composed or the larger signifying wholes, meaningful expressions or discourses, which are the main research object of his semiotics. The two famous

tools for semiotic analysis developed by Greimas are the semiotic square and the generative model.

Like Peirce, Greimas was striving for a theory of semiotics as empirical science using a hypothetical–deductive method with formal metalanguage. Yet he shunned metaphysical speculation and did not, in contrast to Peirce, appreciate any ontological interpretation of his theory (Greimas 1987). Greimas’s semiotics employs three levels of metalanguage. The signifying expression (the whole) is to be translated into a language of description which then must be “interpreted” in methodological language forming the second level. Thirdly, methodology must be explicated in epistemological language. This structure offers a way to keep research under conceptual control and normatively neutral.

The Semiotic Square

The semiotic square is a heuristic device suitable for analyzing both the smallest semes and the fundamental structure of discourse as a whole. Such analytic tool is based on the basic structuralist idea of binary opposition. For Saussure (1983), the meaning of a sign – a word – depends on its negative relation to other words in that it does *not* mean what other words mean. This relationship is not simple; one sign can differ in multiple ways from another. In Greimas’s semiotic square, there are three kinds of relations: contrary (horizontal, incremental, inclusive, permissive), contradictory (diagonal, absolute, exclusive, negation), and complementary (vertical, conditional, presupposing). The term under investigation is placed in the upper-left corner and, if some other terms can be placed in other corners, then its “meaning” is known! (Fig. 1). For example, if the sign being studied (S1) is *masculinity*, then the contrary term (S2) would be *femininity* and a contradictory one would be *non-masculinity*, which is the complementary term to femininity; respectively, non-masculinity is complementary to femininity. It is important to acknowledge that there is a dynamic model built into the semiotic square; a



Educational Semiotics, Greimas, and Theory of Action, Fig. 1 The semiotic square

sign (or thing) can change to the contrary only via negation: from S1 you can get to S2 only via non-S1.

The Generative Model and Values

The generative model is a process–structure used to analyze a discourse as a whole by differentiating between its deep and surface structures. The deepest level represents the fundamental *value* structure analyzed with the semiotic square. At the *semio-narrative* level, the Subject interacts with other actants, eliciting action motivated by the fundamental value structure. This surface level is still abstract. All the concrete details, such as individual actors, their features, and time and space relations, appear at the third discursive level. As a heuristic device, Greimas’s model does not claim to be realistic; rather, it depicts metaphorically the creation of meaning from an abstract idea to the concrete story or expression: from surface to depth. The fundamental, or basic, values can be individual or social, depending on the type of discourse. If the discourse belongs to idiolects (i.e., its meaning is individually based), then the basic value structure is Life vs. Death. The basic values of sociolect (or collective) discourses are Culture vs. Nature. These values can be positioned in a semiotic square, and it can be seen that the value balance can be shaken if the other is negated to contradiction. For example, in the folkloric fairy tale as a traditional subject matter of research in narratology, when a dragon steals the Princess, this manifests a negation of

Culture to Non-Culture, eliciting a strong axiological evaluation: Culture is good, Nature is bad. This imbalance of values is the motivation for the Sender actant, the King, to send the Subject actant, the Prince (usually a foreigner), to negate Nature by killing the dragon and to return Culture to its safe position by rescuing the Princess. The actants' actions can be analyzed as narrative programs and schemas, for which Greimas developed the formal metalanguage of description.

Dispositions are important because all the dynamics of being seems to be based on them. A helpful way to see the relation between dispositions and qualities is that they are just two sides of the same coin. The manifestation of any quality is based on a disposition of being, and any disposition can manifest in a certain situation. Just as the way that any being manifests qualitatively and quantitatively in its environment is based on its dispositions, the Subject's action is based on its competences (Pikkarainen 2014).

Modality and Competence

Greimas's crucial theoretical invention, from the point of view of edusemiotics, is the conception of modalities, specifically related to the concept of competence. The modality is something which modalizes or transforms one sign into another. The basic modalities are *being* and *doing*, which reciprocally modalize each other. The easier case is doing, which means causing something to be. Doing causes a change in the properties of an Object, so it causes this object to be other than it was before, and thus it modalizes its being. Reciprocally, the being of the Subject modalizes its doings. A particular kind of being – certain properties of the Subject which cause or make it possible for it to do something – is competence. Greimas discussed education, and specifically didactics, as an activity that edifies the competence of the student (Greimas 1979). Even more important for the study and practice of education are *modal competences*, which refer to the idea expressed in natural language by modal verbs: *want*, *can*, *know*, and *must*. These modalities also serve as the keys to the semiotics of passions (Greimas and Fontanille 1992).


The concept of competence can be compared to the ontological concept of disposition. The possible properties of any being are often divided in two categories: *dispositions* and *qualities*. The latter are regular features like size, color, height, weight, etc. Dispositions – such as *fragility* – are strange, however, because they are not at all perceivable and manifest only in certain situations. Fragility manifests only when the fragile being breaks. Often a disposition is then also gone.

The Structure of Education

How can the meaning of education as a practice be analyzed using Greimassian tools? Contemporary education has a sociolectal rather than idiolectal character, even though it includes idiolectal meanings (especially from the students' viewpoint). The basic tension of modern pedagogy, known after Kant as the *pedagogical paradox*, is the tension between freedom as a goal of education and coercion as its means. Complementary to this is the tension between an individual and society as a whole. These two dimensions form a cross-table of four areas or principles. Two of these principles are rather traditional content and expression, stemming from the days of Fichte and Herbart. The first is a student's ability for growth as a natural feature, referred to as *perfectibility* by Rousseau and *plasticity* by Dewey. The second is the demand by educators for autonomous action from their students. These are still individual principles. The social side encompasses the principle of contextuality or the effect of prevailing culture on education, hopefully eliciting a better future for society (Mollenhauer 2014).

An analysis of the basic values of education is beneficial at this point. The strongly one-sided axiological evaluation of the value structures of discourses typical to archaic folklore is problematic in the context of contemporary education. The paradoxical tensions in education suggest that one cannot choose either side – Nature vs. Culture – or even strive for harmony between them, because the essence of modern education is based precisely on the dynamic contradiction between

**Educational Semiotics,
Greimas, and Theory of
Action, Fig. 2** Semiotic
square of education



them as informed (even if implicitly) by Cartesian dualism between body and mind. Therefore, positioning the abovementioned principles of the theory of pedagogical action in the corners of the semiotic square is appropriate (Fig. 2). The individual growth-ability (the presupposed competences) represents Nature, the demand for autonomous action (teaching) represents Non-Nature, contextuality represents the prevailing Culture, and a better future represents Non-Culture. According to this analysis, there is in education a double-dialectical process where the negation of Nature (e.g., discipline) makes cultural existence possible and the negation of Culture (e.g., critical education) makes natural existence possible. This dialectic assists in resolving the problem between dichotomized views of education as a tool to radically transform society and also as a tool to secure the cultural status quo.

The Role of the Teacher

In order to construct a semio-narrative actantial structure of pedagogical action, some classical Greimassian conceptions are to be revisited. One concerns the actantial roles: Who is the Hero in (as a Subject of) educational process? If teacher or educator is the Subject, then what is the role of the student, and vice versa? The canonical narrative schema of a Subject posits a sequence of acts or

the Subject's trajectory consisting of three trials or tests: qualifying, decisive, and glorifying. In the first test, or *manipulation*, the Sender evaluates the competence of the Subject and makes an initial contract. In the second test, called *performance*, the Subject, who acts according to their competence and the initial contract, tries to solve the problem. In the third test, called *sanction*, the Sender/Receiver evaluates the competence of the Subject according to their accomplishments and either accepts or rejects them. Hence, the student is the Subject, and the teacher is the Sender. However, from the edusemiotic perspective, the teacher is also subject to analysis in terms of teaching and evaluation, thus becoming both a Sender and a sent Subject trying to advance and protect the Culture (now attuned with Nature) by developing students' competences.

Educators aim to affect the future actions of students by causing changes to their competences. Competence is a strange property: it is not directly perceivable but can only be inferred and assumed according to the perceivable *action* of the Subject. The evaluation of competence is thus complex. To affect someone's competence is even more complex. Three ways to change a Subject's competence can be posited: by pure chance, with no special or known reason; by means of biological maturation, or decay, or physical injury as causally effable properties; and by *learning* wherein competence changes along with the actions of

Subjects. The only efficient way to affect students' competence, therefore, is for teachers to make them do something by sending them to perform (Pikkarainen 2010).

Action, Learning, and Teaching

Greimas describes action as merely a sequence of narrative programs or individual acts where an actant causes something to be. Formally, a narrative program is expressed as $A1 > (A2 \text{ and } Ov)$; this can be read in terms of Actant 1 causing Actant 2 to get a value-object, i.e., some property. This sequence is in line with the classical analytic theory of action. In action theoretical semiotics, however, action is understood broadly as a continuous circular interaction between Subjects and their environment. Such a circle includes reciprocal effects: The deeds or narrative programs travel from the Subject to the environment. As a recursive feedback from the environment, perceptions travel to the Subject. Also, external and internal actions are differentiated, with the latter referring to the Subject's thinking in terms of planning deeds and evaluating perceptions and the former as perceivable by an observer. The deeds affect the objects in the environment, but the internal action is not effable to an observer. Both spheres of action cause, or can cause, some changes to the competence of the Subject. If and when people act, they always learn something. There are no strict laws about what kind of learning follows from particular kinds of action, yet it can be assumed that doing X will develop the competence of something more or less similar to X.

Teaching thus becomes *action* when and where one is trying to make another person do something that would cause the latter to learn what needs to be learned. Even though the two actors can be *one* person (as in the case of *self-education*), the same questions arise: How can someone know which competences are possessed and which are still needed? Exactly what needs to be done to obtain the needed competence and how can this be achieved? While some of these problems can be

partially solved by the curriculum, educators need to develop interpretive skills as a province of edusemiotics so that they can fully tackle their tasks.

Modal Dynamics and the Levels of Learning

Modal competences affect our actions and our learning in a certain structural way. Unlike Greimas's semiotic square, the structure presented here can be drafted as a circle. The natural starting point for the analysis of the circular structure is the modality of *want*. Action is always elicited by some kind of wanting to do, or to get, something. The next modality is *can*, which may be realized or not. If it is realized, then the Subject gets what is desired, but often the trial remains unsuccessful. Both successful and unsuccessful trials in different environments will lead to some kind of knowledge, which would then increase the probability of success. The last modality is *must*, which directly affects *wanting* as a kind of second-order relation. Secondly, the various levels of learning can be differentiated. The lowest level is connected with the material striving for self-maintenance and survival: learning here is *pragmatic*. The nature of the *must* modality is peculiar to this level and can be expressed in the technical, "if...then," terms: if you want X, then you must do Y. The second, and very broad, level is *social learning*, where complex collections of actants participate in different actions. Here, the Subject must take into account the other ways of wanting and acting expressed by all members of society, and the *must* modality can become a form of social norm. At this level, the language develops that creates a special area of shared and public knowledge. This, in turn, leads to the third and highest *existential* level of learning. This is the level at which human Subjects develop proper conscience, i.e., a sense of individual and universal moral responsibility. Edusemiotics not only reconceptualizes Greimas's theory but also calls for the continual research into the modalities of competence that enhance learning and ensure

ethical relations between teachers, students, and larger environments.

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Educational Technology

► Open Educational Resources

Educational Technology (I)

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Technology

There are many ways of understanding technology. In this entry, technology is conceived, in a very broad manner, as any human artifact, method, or technique that is created for the purpose of making it easier for man to work, travel, or communicate or to make life more fun and enjoyable to him.

Technology, in this sense, is not new – as a matter of fact, it is almost as old as man, homo creator, himself.

Not every technology invented by man is relevant to education. Some technologies only extend his muscular physical strength. Other technologies only allow him to move through space more quickly and/or with less effort. Neither of these are greatly relevant to education. Technologies that amplify man's sensory powers, however, no doubt are relevant to education. The same is true of technologies that extend his capacity to communicate with his fellow men. But above all, this is true of technologies, such as are available today, that augment man's intellectual powers: his capacity to acquire, organize, store, analyze, relate, integrate, apply, and transmit information.

Technologies that greatly amplify man's sensory powers (such as the telescope, the microscope, and all the other instruments that amplify man's sense organs) are relatively recent and made modern experimental science possible.

Technologies that extend man's capacity to communicate, however, have existed for centuries. The most important ones, before the nineteenth century, are the invention of typically human (conceptual) speech, of alphabetical writing, and of printing (especially the printed book). The last 200 years saw the appearance of the modern post office, the telegraph, the telephone, photography, cinema, radio, television, and video.

Technologies that augment man's intellectual powers and that are centered on the digital computer are the most recent, since they were developed mostly after 1940. The computer is gradually absorbing the technologies of communication, to the extent that these become digital.

Technology in Education

A variety of expressions is normally employed to refer to the use of technology, in this sense, in education. The rather neutral expression “Technology in Education” seems preferable, since it allows us to refer to the general category that includes the use of every form of technology relevant to education (hard and soft, including

human speech, writing, printing, curricula, programs, chalk and blackboards, and, more recently, photography, cinema, radio, television, video, and, naturally, computers and the Internet).

It is admitted that nowadays, when the expression “Technology in Education” is used, hardly anyone thinks of chalk and blackboards or even of books and magazines, much less of something abstract such as a curriculum of studies. Attention is normally concentrated on the computer, because it became the point of convergence of all the more recent technologies (and of some of the old ones also). And especially after the explosive commercial success of the Internet, computers are hardly ever thought as standalone equipment: the network became the computer.

It is sensible, however, to remind educators that human speech, writing, and, consequently, lectures, books, and magazines, not to mention curricula and programs, are technology and that, therefore, educators have been using various technologies all along. It is only their familiarity with these technologies that somehow makes them transparent (i.e., invisible) to them.

“Technology in Education” is preferable, as an expression, to “Educational Technology,” since the latter seems to imply that there is something intrinsically educational in the technologies involved, which does not seem the case. The former expression allows for the possibility that technology that was invented for purposes totally alien to education, as is the case of the computer, may, eventually, become so tied to it as to make one wonder how education was ever possible without it. Human conceptual speech, writing, and, more recently, the printed book were also invented probably for purposes less noble than education. Today, however, education is almost inconceivable without these technologies. In a few years the networked computer will almost certainly be in the same category.

Distance Education, Distance Learning, and Distance Teaching

Of these three expressions the third is probably the least used and yet, it is the only one that is technically correct.

Education and learning are processes that take place within the individual – there is no way that education and learning can occur remotely or at a distance. Education and learning occur wherever the person is – the person is, in central and very important ways, the subject of the educational and learning process, not its object. So, it is difficult to imagine how Distance Education and Distance Learning are possible, despite the popularity of these expressions.

It is perfectly possible, however, to teach remotely or at a distance. It happens all the time. Saint Paul taught, from a distance, the Christian faithful who were in Rome, Corinth, etc. – using handwritten letters. Authors, distant in space and in time, teach their readers through printed books and articles. It is possible to teach, remotely or at a distance, through motion pictures, television, and video. And, today, we can teach anyone, almost anything, any place, through the Internet.

So, the expression “Distance Teaching” will be used in this article whenever there is need to refer to the act of teaching remotely or at a distance. That education and learning can happen as a result of this teaching is undeniable, but, as argued, this should not lead us into thinking that the education and the learning taking place as a result of remote or distance teaching is occurring remotely or at a distance.

Technology-Mediated Learning

Despite its popularity, distance teaching is not the best application of technology in education today. This place should be reserved to what might be called Technology-Mediated Learning.

As mentioned, there is no doubt that education and learning can occur as a result of teaching. But neither is there doubt that education can occur through self-learning, i.e., the kind of learning that is not associated with a process of teaching but that occurs through man’s interaction with nature, with other men, and with the cultural world. A large portion of human learning takes place in this form, and, according to some researchers, learning that takes place in this form is more significant, that is, happens more easily, is

retained longer and is more naturally transferred to other domain and contexts, than learning that occurs as a result of formal and deliberate teaching processes (i.e., through instruction).

What is especially fascinating in the new technologies at our disposal today, particularly in the Internet, and, within it, in the Web, is not that with their help we can teach at a distance, but that they allow us to create rich learning environments in which persons who are interested and motivated can learn almost anything without having to fall victims of a process of formal and deliberate teaching. Learning, in this case, is mediated by technology alone.

There is no doubt that behind the technology there are other persons, who prepare the materials and make them available in the net. When someone uses the resources now available in the Internet in order to learn in self-motivated, exploratory fashion, he uses materials of different natures, prepared and made available in the most widely diverse contexts, not rarely without any pedagogical intent, and he does it in an order that is totally unpredictable, and that therefore cannot be planned, and in a rhythm that is totally personal and regulated only by the desire to learn and the capacity to assimilate and digest what he finds.

Because of this, it does not seem viable to call this experience Distance Teaching, as if it were the Internet that taught, or as if it were the people behind the materials that taught. What is taking place in a context such as the one described is Technology-Mediated Learning, self-learning, that is, learning that is not the result of teaching.

Consequently, the main categories in which the possible uses of technology in education can be classified are:

- In support of Face-to-Face Teaching
- In support of Distance Teaching
- In support of Self-Learning

The Justification of Distance Teaching

Many people might feel inclined to justify Distance Teaching by simply asking: "Why not?"

However, there are good reasons to discuss whether Distance Teaching is justified, what justifies it, and what its merits are relative to Face-to-Face Teaching.

On the one hand, there are those that assume that Distance Teaching does not substantially differ from Face-to-Face Teaching. If teaching is good, and it is possible to teach at a distance, then we should do it.

On the other hand, there are those who see advantages in Distance Teaching in comparison to Face-to-Face Teaching: greater reach, better cost/benefit ratio, and, mainly, greater flexibility (for both teachers and learners), since they believe Distance Teaching can become so personalized as to become individualized instruction.

Over against these two favorable positions, there are those who think that in Distance Teaching one loses the personal dimension that, even though not necessary for teaching itself, may seem essential to effective teaching.

Are Face-to-Face and Distance Teaching Equivalent in Terms of Results?

Leaving aside, for the moment, the second position, there is an obvious contradiction between the first and the third position, since defenders of the first assume that there are no substantive differences between Face-to-Face and Distance Teaching (the "virtual" character of Distance Teaching not being considered essential), while defenders of the third position believe that the "virtuality" (or remote character) of Distance Teaching removes from the teaching relation something important, or even essential to it, namely, its personal character, which, according to them, is what makes teaching effective.

Who Is in the Right in this Dispute?

A qualified agreement with the first position seems justified. Teaching involves three elements: the teacher, the learner, and that which the teacher teaches the learner (the "content"). For the teacher to teach the content to the learner, it is no longer necessary, today, that they should both be in spatial-temporal contiguity that is, that they share the same space at the same time.

Socrates insisted (against writing-based teaching) that spatial-temporal contiguity between teacher and learner is essential to teaching, but only because he did not know, and could not even imagine, contemporary telecommunications. Because of this, he claimed that distance teaching (in his case, writing-based teaching) prevented dialogue, questioning and answering, real personal communication between the agents involved (teacher and learner). His argument obviously does not apply today.

The personal character of a relationship, today, is independent of physical proximity in space and time. It is possible, nowadays, to maintain extremely personal – even rather intimate – relationships at a distance, using modern means of distance communication, involving text, sound, image (static and dynamic). On the other hand, mere spatial-temporal contiguity is not guarantee of truly personal relationships. The very large classrooms that exist in some schools often lead to a highly impersonal relationship between teacher and learners, despite their proximity in space and time. Many times, in these contexts, the teacher does not even know the name of the students and is totally ignorant of their personal characteristics, which are highly relevant to effective teaching.

This said, it must be admitted that, other things being equal, face-to-face, eye-to-eye communication allows for more effective teaching than does remote communication, even when the most modern means of distance communication are employed. In face-to-face communication one can rather easily detect the nuances of non-verbal sound expressions (the tone, pitch, and volume of the voice, the rhythm of the speech, the pauses, the subtle emphases) and of body language (especially facial expressions [in which eye contact is perhaps the most significant aspect], but also posture, hand, arm, and leg position, the possibility of touch and other forms of physical contact, etc.).

(This consideration is important for something that is going to be claimed below, namely: if a model of teaching does not work under the best conditions, why should it work when conditions are not so favorable?)

Does Distance Teaching Offer Advantages vis-à-vis Face-to-Face Teaching?

Let us consider, now, the second position described above, namely, that there are advantages to Distance Teaching in relation to Face-to-Face Teaching. If this thesis is correct, the advantages of Distance Teaching may compensate the disadvantage to which attention has just been called.

It was said, before, that the defenders of the thesis that Distance Teaching is more effective than Face-to-Face teaching point to its greater reach, its better cost/benefit ratio, its greater flexibility (both to teachers and learners), and its greater potential for personalization and even individualization.

Reach

There is no doubt that Distance Teaching has greater reach than Face-to-Face Teaching. A program of Distance Teaching such as Brazil's TeleCurso 2000 reaches millions of people each time it is ministered (broadcast) – infinitely more than could be reached if the same course were taught face-to-face.

Cost/Benefit Ratio

Here the question is not so easily decided.

The cost of developing (producing) quality Distance Teaching programs (that involve, for instance, television, or even video, or specialized software) is extremely high.

Besides this, the cost of delivery can also be reasonably high. If these programs are broadcast through commercial television networks, delivery costs can even be higher than development and production costs – with the added disadvantage that delivery costs are recurring, not one-time costs.

Because of this, these Distance Teaching programs only offer a favorable cost/benefit ratio if their reach is really great (reaching, for instance, over one million persons).

It is true that development costs can be divided by the various deliveries of the program. A quality Distance Teaching program can be delivered literally hundreds or thousands of times, while its

development costs remains the same. The only overall cost component affected by the recurring delivery of the program is its delivery cost, a fact that makes its development costs/delivery costs ratio proportionally lower as the number of deliveries increases. If the number of deliveries is not high, however, this reduction in the ratio may not be significant.

Many of the institutions interested in Distance Teaching today are searching for “shortcuts” that will reduce development costs. Unfortunately, these are rarely found without reduction in quality. Instead of using costly communication means such as television and video, these institutions are using predominantly text in the development of the programs and primarily the Internet (Web and e-mail) in its delivery (so reducing both the cost of development and the cost of delivery). In addition, lest development costs are increased, the text components are adapted from texts previously published and not prepared with the Web in view. The result is that these Distance Teaching programs are little more than correspondence courses delivered through the Internet instead of through the conventional post.

It is true that these institutions try to add some value to the texts made available through the Web offering the learners opportunities of synchronous communication with the author of the texts and with each other through dedicated chats. But chats are quite ineffective for this sort of exchange when many people take part in it.

When Distance Teaching is understood basically as a process of making written texts available through the Web and following this with discussion through e-mail e chats, it is not difficult to believe that its cost/benefit ratio will be more favorable when compared to that of Face-to-Face Teaching.

It is important to register here that if the texts thus made available are prepared specifically for the Web, being therefore enriched with structures such as links (hypertext), annotations, commentaries, glossaries, navigation maps, etc., then the efficacy of Distance Teaching can be greatly increased. But this means that teaching materials will have to be rewritten, with the consequent increase in cost.

Flexibility

Given the fact that distance teaching can use both synchronous and asynchronous communication, there is no doubt that, especially when the latter are employed, teachers and learners have greater flexibility to define the amount of time and the schedule that they are going to use for the course. Web pages, databases, e-mail are all available 24 h per day 7 days a week, and so can be accessed according to the greatest convenience of the user.

Personalization and Individualization

It is here that the defenders of Distance Teaching place greater emphasis. Here is what Octavi Roca says, in his article “Education Technologies in Educational Processes” (in *Toward an Educational Technology*, edited by Juana M. Sancho [ArtMed, Porto Alegre, RS, BR, 1998]):

Most education professionals are aware of the fact that individuals are different from one another, have different needs, objectives, cognitive styles, etc., and that, therefore, each individual uses the learning opportunities that are offered to him in ways that are most adequate to his needs, objective, learning style, etc. . . . Thus, it is obvious that teaching must be adapted to all these factors. We have known this for a long time. These differences have always been acknowledged. But, before, they were seen as problems to be eliminated – a difficulty for the teacher. . . . Now, however, we have the means to organize our teaching in full recognition of the fact that the diverse capacities of each person represent a great richness and that teaching must start from that. . . . The end result of this recognition is that teaching will be more and more adapted to each person in particular. (p. 185)

Is it possible to implement these desirable features in Face-to-Face Teaching as it takes place in the school? Maybe – but it seems very difficult, unless the school be somehow reinvented.

Let Us See School, as we know it, cannot really take into account the different needs, interests and learning styles of the learners and offer each of them personalized and individualized teaching because this kind of teaching comes into collision with a basic assumption of the school: standardization and uniformity.

To expect that the school will provide personalized and individualized teaching is equivalent to

expecting that a conventional automobile assembly line will produce cars that are personalized to the individual needs and desires of the customers. This will not work. The assembly line, as we know it, was invented to standardize, to allow that identical cars be made with speed and efficiency. The school, likewise, was created to do something similar in relation to its students. Its model is the assembly line. Its end was to be the production of individuals that, from an educational viewpoint, were as standardized and interchangeable as the automobiles produced in an assembly line. If the students preserve some degree of individuality at the end of their schooling, this will be in spite of the school, not because of its work.

The educational model (or paradigm) adopted by the school is centered on the transmission of information, from the teacher to the learner, through teaching.

This model is outdated – and it is not difficult to see why.

This model is centered on teaching. Teaching is a triadic activity that involves the teacher, the learner (“teachee”), and the content that the former teaches to the latter. Because of this the school gives priority to the content to be transmitted (the curriculum), and, consequently, to the transmitter (the teacher), leaving the learner in the last place – his task is merely to absorb whatever is transmitted to him. Because of this, the school is typically centered on contents and teachers, whereas the opposing tendency described above is centered on the learner (adapted to his needs, interests, cognitive style, and learning rhythm).

What is defective in this conventional model adopted by the school is not the fact that it takes place face-to-face: it is the fact that it is not flexible enough to allow for students with different needs, interests, cognitive styles, and learning rhythms.

Can personalized and individualized education be implemented through Distance Teaching?

If the model employed for Distance Teaching programs is the same used for Face-to-Face Teaching, we will end up having Distance Teaching programs that do not differ substantially from their face-to-face counterparts.

If it is known that this model no longer works, even in optimal communication conditions, where the teacher can communicate face-to-face, eye-to-eye with the learner, why should it work in contexts where teacher and learner have to communicate in suboptimal conditions, as it is the case in Distance Teaching?

It does not seem sensible to repeat, virtually or remotely, the errors of a model that no longer works in its face-to-face implementation. A different model or paradigm is needed.

Technology-Mediated Learning: A New Model

The model of education that will become prevalent in the information society will probably not be centered on teaching, face-to-face, or remote: it will be centered on learning. Consequently, it will not be Distance Teaching – it will probably be something like Technology-Mediated Learning.

This model will have to make provision for the different needs, interests, cognitive style, and learning rhythms of the learners. Whoever wants to participate in a nonlearner role in this model will have to make available, not Distance Teaching modules, but rich learning environments to which anyone can come and in which anyone can learn.

The Internet and the Web, or whatever comes after them, will have a fundamental role in this process.

The Internet is rapidly becoming, through the Web, a repository for every sort of information that is made public. Because of this, people will be coming to the Web to satisfy their information needs. The prevailing model, from now on, will not be some (the teachers) transmitting information to others (the learners) but many (students, workers, anyone who needs it) coming in search of information in places where they know they can find it (the Web). In Internet terms, it will be more “pull” than “push.”

The task of discussing, analyzing, evaluating, and applying this information to practical tasks will be, more and more, performed not through the school, but through specialized virtual discussion

groups, where everyone can alternate in teaching and learning roles. What is virtual here is the group, not the learning: this will be real enough to satisfy most people's learning needs.

If the school can reinvent itself and become a learning environment of this type, it may survive. But the Internet, the Web, e-mail, chats, text-based discussions, video conferences, etc., will have to be in the center of it and to become a regular part of its routine. What is said of the school here applies to schools of every level, including universities.

An example of a learning environment of this type is the discussion group EduTec and the site EduTecNet, set up to discuss the use of technology in education. Its URL is <http://www.edutecnet.com.br>.

Educational Technology (II)

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"Educational technology" refers to a field of study and practice that is conventionally conceived in light of its two constituent words. First, it is concerned with the educational applications of technologies and not the myriad uses of technologies in modern society. Second, it examines those aspects of education that are crucially dependent on (usually new) technologies.

This conventional conception tends to lead along a path focusing on techniques: Research studies compare learning through the use of some new tool versus learning in a traditional way. Cost/benefit analyses are done to measure overall value of the new tools. Training in the use of new technologies is advocated as necessary and sufficient for educational reform. Not surprisingly, behaviorist models of learning have provided the conceptual framework for much of this work; more recently these have yielded somewhat to cognitive or constructivist models but often still with an embrace of *techne* over reflection or critical analysis.

Despite widespread use of the term, the delimitation of "educational technology" is fuzzy at best. Can we say definitively that specific technologies are educational? One way to consider that question is to look at the common use of the term in different historical situations. Today, the "technology" in educational technology is usually assumed to refer to new communication and information technologies but prior to the advent of the World Wide Web it meant stand-alone computer systems or programmed instruction. Before that, people spoke of educational technologies as including film strips, television, tape recorders, globes, and other media. In some discussions, educational technology includes any device, medium, or artifact that is used for instruction, thus both the familiar chalkboard and the textbook. In others, that meaning is extended to include lesson plans, assessment procedures, essentially any form of codified educational practice. As educators have employed more tools in the classroom and as they have looked to the technologies of work practices, it is difficult to identify any technology that cannot at some time be considered potentially educational. For example, the advent of low-cost digital telescopes and the ability to access astronomical photographs through the Web has made the telescope an educational technology in many classrooms.

Alternatively, can we say that technology use is a separable aspect of educational practice? The profusion of courses, graduate programs, journals, conferences, and texts on educational technology suggests that such is the case. However, the characterization of what counts as educational technology is often left unexamined, and the uses of the term are inconsistent. A case can be made that all education involves technologies; indeed, the development of writing systems is often conceived as one of the major technological advances in human development. To the extent that education has evolved along with writing, changes in education can be characterized as the successive emergence of new forms of teaching and learning through the use of new writing tools and systems – manuscripts, printing, typewriting, word processing, email, hypertext, and so on.

It is useful to turn to work in the field of technology studies. There, at least three layers of meaning for technology are typically identified (see MacKenzie and Wajcman 1999). First, there are *physical devices*, such as automobiles, telephones, or oil pipes. Second, there are the *procedures, activities, or organizational systems* that incorporate these devices. These may be represented in user manuals but also in daily habits of users of the technologies. Third, there is the *technical knowledge* that enables particular activities, for example, the accumulation of experiences by a midwife constitutes a technology for assisting in births. The line between these layers is not sharp: Devices can reify procedures, organizations are mutually constituted by their artifacts, and activities can be viewed as both knowledge and practices. This is in fact precisely the reason why people studying technology cannot restrict their view to physical components per se.

Returning to the question of what aspects of education, if any, are technological, the layered conception of technology suggests that technology is not a separable component of educational practice, but rather, a perspective, or set of perspectives, one may adopt on all educational activity. Some of the major perspectives are these:

First, educational technologies can be viewed as *texts*, as symbol systems to be interpreted by users. This perspective has led to a variety of analyses in the tradition of literary criticism. The prevalence and power of technologies as bearers of meaning leads, for example, to Heidegger's question concerning the essence of technology. His concept of *Gestell* (enframing) inscribes technology as a mode of thought prior to the scientific revolution, one which "reveals being" in a particular way. Thus, people are defined by the technological way of thought, and not simply users of technological devices.

More recently, Reeves and Nass present a different notion of reading in their concept of the media equation. They argue that people treat computers, television, and new media just like real people and places. They carry over to the technological realm the social norms of gender, language, honesty, politeness, and so on that they employ in social interaction.

As different as the Reeves-Nass analysis may be from Heidegger's, both recognize that technologies are cultural formations and that their design, distribution, use, and interpretations need to be considered within a sociohistorical perspective and not merely a technological one (see Bruce and Hogan 1998).

A related view sees educational technologies as *bearers of power relations* in society. The essays in Bromley and Apple's collection address this point across issues of gender and class and in terms of the teacher as a worker using technologies. Disembodied power is implicit in Heidegger's analysis and perhaps most strikingly in Ellul's notion of *la technique*. By "technique" Ellul means not simply particular methods for employing a given technology but the inexorable force of a technical way of thinking that threatens humanistic values. Foucault of course is widely associated with the notion of power as exercised through discursive practices. The layered account of technology then accords well with his analyses of the devices, activities, and knowledge needed to maintain institutions such as prisons.

Not all analyses of power in computing take the bleak road. In fact, the beneficent use of "power" and "empowerment" in the discourse about education technology is striking. For example, a widely read US government report (*Power On!*) makes a deliberate play on the idea of electrical power for computers as a way to empower learners. Interestingly, both those alarmed by the uses of new technologies in education and those enthralled by them see a strong linkage between the tools and their meaning, sometimes to the point of becoming technocentric.

Another view of educational technologies argues that the *context of use* is critical for understanding. This perspective leads to the idea of cultures of computing (Star 1995), as opposed to tools with effects that can be considered in isolation from the beliefs, values, norms, roles, and other practices inherent within a social system. It also argues for *situated evaluations* (Bruce and Rubin 1993) of technology use, in which the first task is to determine what a technology is, not to assume that it can be specified independent of a specific sociohistorical context.

In the last decade, a number of writers have extended the biological concept of ecology to that of *information ecologies* (see Nardi and O' Day 1999). From this view, a particular technology, say a computer connected to the Web, must be understood as operating within a complex system comprising people with different bases of knowledge and purposes; organizational rules and procedures; physical components such as walls of a room, tables, and chairs; and various other devices such as clocks, lighting, paper and pencil, and other computers. Here again, the benefit of the technology cannot be ascertained independent of a larger system.

Perhaps the dominant view in current discourse about new communication and information technologies is that of *media*. Not only are there obvious links from the book to television to the Web as media for conveying information, but also many educators are drawn to the *mediational* function of these new media. Extending Vygotsky's sociohistorical theory, they see new technologies providing affordances for learning. They *mediate* between students, between student and teacher, and among task, resources, situation, and student.

One of the most productive views of technologies, especially educational technologies, comes from Dewey (see Hickman 1990). For Dewey, a technology can be seen as a means for resolving a problematic situation, including any impasse on a path of inquiry. That means for resolution can be a physical device, such as a calculator; a representational device, such as the exponent to indicate raising a number to a power; a revised procedure; or a new conception. The appeal of this view is that it provides a unified account across artifacts, procedures, and knowledge. In addition, it shows a way to think of educational technology use in relation to technology use beyond the classroom.

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Educational Theorists

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In 1989, Helmut Peukert organized in Hamburg an intensive seminar on the work of Wilhelm Flitner at the occasion of his hundredth birthday. Flitner who was to die 1 year later had been teaching for almost 30 years in Hamburg and was one of the leading figures of the so-called

Geisteswissenschaftliche Pädagogik. This was a crucial tendency in educational thought which has been very influential far beyond German borders throughout a large part of the twentieth century. And although there are, no doubt, very dubious and questionable aspects related to the entanglement of at least some of its representatives in the NS policies and ideologies, there is also no doubt that the “Geisteswissenschaftliche Pädagogik” has played a very important role in the exploration of the possibility of the elaboration of autonomous educational thought.

It is no surprise then that the central question of the seminar in Hamburg concerned the place of a “general educational theory” (“Allgemeine Erziehungswissenschaft”). And that the central reference was to Flitner’s phrase that such a theory relies on a “basic pedagogical thought” (“einen Pädagogischen Grundgedankgang”) which brings different central and *internal* pedagogical concepts into relation such as “*Bildung*,” “*Bildsamkeit*,” “*Bildungsweg*,” and “*Bildungsziel*” (see Peukert 1992). In fact, the seminar closed a decade in which German philosophy and theory of education (“Allgemeine Pädagogik” or “Allgemeine Erziehungswissenschaft”), after the emergence and tremendous flourishing of critical and emancipatory pedagogy in the 1960s and 1970s, felt itself increasingly colonized by sociology and critical social theory (reducing education in one way or another to ideology or socialization and disciplinary power). It was also a decade also in which it was confronted with what it considered to be a worn-out idea of individual emancipation and a pointless critique of education (as “oppressing” theory and practice) that seemed to imply even the end of educational theory and of education as such, as proclaimed by the anti-pedagogy declarations (“Anti-pädagogik”). In 1983, Klaus Mollenhauer’s “Vergessene Zusammenhänge” (in 2014 translated in English as “Forgotten Connections”) had been one of the first attempts to explicitly deal with these issues. He explicitly stated that the so-called Anti-Pädagogik offered one of the reasons for writing the book. Another crucial reason is the apparent “pathlessness” or *aporia* in which, according to Mollenhauer, educational theory had landed, leading him, one of the most

important German educational theorists, to state 5 years later that thinking about “*Bildung* und *Erziehung*” has become so difficult that we might even say that the pedagogical era has come to a provisional end (Mollenhauer 1986, p. 7).

Nevertheless, Mollenhauer remained strongly concerned for the development of an autonomous educational or pedagogical thought and maintained that we should continue to address the “basic set of pedagogical issues” that nobody can ignore who is dealing with education. It was one of the reasons that he was also present at the aforementioned seminar in Hamburg in 1989. And it is clear that Mollenhauer was establishing himself consciously a (today maybe somewhat “forgotten”) connection to a tradition of educational thought that started with Schleiermacher that was clearly present in the “Geisteswissenschaftliche Pädagogik” and wanted to identify some basic and particular “features,” which would characterize the educational phenomenon and the pedagogical relationship. This should offer the starting point for the elaboration of a proper educational thought or general study (called “Allgemeine Pädagogik” or simply “Pädagogik”). It is also in line with this tradition that Johann Friedrich Herbart claimed and elaborated “*einheimische Begriffe*” (“internal concepts”); that Wilhelm Flitner suggested and requested, as we mentioned before, a “*pädagogischer Grundgedankengang*” (“basic pedagogical thought”); and that Martinus Jan Langeveld stated that educational thought (“*theoretische pedagogiek*”) is no philosophy but “*pedagogics*” (“*Pedagogiek*”) and proposed the “*animal educandum*” as the constitutive pedagogical-anthropological “fact.” But, undoubtedly, also people in other places of the world such as Paulo Freire or John Dewey have been part in this endeavor to invent, create, or establish a particular mode of thinking (conceptualization, problematization, argumentation, criticism) that engages directly with the phenomenon of education and tries to explicate some of its characteristic features.

For us today, taking up or reenacting this intellectual endeavor to indicate a proper place for educational thought seems crucially relevant.

Indeed, in a time where we are confronted not only with a sociological or ideological colonization but with the omnipresence of (bio-) psychological approaches (including the apparently unavoidable “learning discourse”) toward the educational field and, moreover, with an ever-pervasive emptying of traditional frames of reference, the question of “elementary pedagogical issues” and of a proper educational thought deserves to be taken up and emphasized once again.

However, we would like to point also to the risk of a particular philosophical “colonization” of educational thought. Indeed, explicitly taking distance from psychological, biological, or even sociological approaches to education is to a large part central to the actual self-understanding and self-definition of philosophy of education. But one of the reasons for reemphasizing the importance of the tradition of educational thought “proper” is that philosophy of education and educational theory, having the tendency to rely on philosophical master thinkers such as Habermas, Wittgenstein, Levinas, Lyotard, Agamben, Rorty, Arendt, etc., run the risk to be trapped in a movement of instrumentalizing or even marginalizing education and learning. The risk is that education and learning are considered to be foremost a field of application for theories developed elsewhere and for other purposes or to be a field of practice with a function or meaning that is only to be derived from other noneducational practices.

While philosophy of education is often engaged in great efforts to disentangle the complexities of the work of the master thinkers, education and learning are often turned into a field of application, if education and learning as well as a genuine educational concern are not completely marginalized. One could oppose to this thesis and argue that almost all of these philosophies and theories acknowledge themselves that learning and education are important and some of them even explicitly invoke learning processes (Habermas 1981), learning curves (Latour 2004), learning (Sloterdijk 2014), childhood (Lyotard 1988; Agamben 2002), or teaching (Levinas 1998) as crucial phenomena to clarify their understanding of our world and our being. Our thesis is,

however, that this focus on education and learning is often motivated by another than educational concern.

In this respect, we can distinguish between different kinds of philosophers, first, the *learning philosophers* (e.g., Habermas, Latour, Sloterdijk) for whom education and learning seem to be notions that indicate a process of change. However, they always in one way or another postulate these notions as needed to save or Mollenhauer 2014 close their ethical, political, or social intellectual project, that is, to explain how ethical, political, or social changes come about. As such, educational change and the educational meaning of change are either being ignored or ridiculed. And if it is conceptualized, in one way or another, education is narrowed to a form of socialization (habituation, acquisition) or – in progressive circles – an attempt to counter-socialization. Ultimately, the social and cultural theories of these (*social*) *learning philosophers* are theories about grown-ups and about how adults need learning but without becoming a child. Secondly, we could speak about “enfance/infantia” philosophers (e.g., Lyotard, Agamben). Without going into detail, and hence doing injustice to the complexities of the work of these authors, we do think their references to education and childhood often become *images* or *metaphors* to think about what is at stake in adult life. For them, education and learning are at least not the key concern. And if their thoughts are translated to (philosophy of) education itself, it is perhaps not a surprise that education runs the risk of being framed in therapeutic or ethical terms. The risk is a kind of personalization by putting in one way or another a dialogical or analytical relation between persons, that is, the person of the teacher and the person of the pupil, central stage. The pedagogical key issue is not turned into an issue of socialization or counter-socialization but becomes the act of “doing justice” to someone (or even to enfance/infancy as such). In a different way, for sure, we can relate, thirdly, also some *teaching philosophers* to this ethical framing of education. Although we also cannot render it in its complexity, we could point here for example to Levinas’ use of the *teaching* metaphor to describe the way

the ethical demand is inscribed before the subject comes to itself (Levinas 1998). It is a description which in the context of philosophy of education is often turned around so to say, to understand teaching as quasi-identical with an ethical relation. An ethical framing of education is very often related to an understanding of ethics in terms of being summoned before the “face of the other” as the “Law” beyond any law. Perhaps another version of this ethical teaching philosophy is the work of Judith Butler (2005) on the decisive role of an act of interpellation in the constitution of subjectivity. In line with this, there is the interpretation of the act of teaching as working according to the logic of interpellation and focusing on the relational and performative dimension of the child’s subjectivity. Furthermore, such *enfance/infancy* philosophers and teaching philosophers, perhaps, should be distinguished from *game philosophers*. Again without claiming to make a final statement about the complexity of his work, we could think of Wittgenstein (1965), with his concept of language game being the most telling one. Probably here, the focus and concern are already much more on the practice of education, although the experience of education itself and the specificity of educational and learning events and relations are much less outspoken. Education along these lines is not a matter of socialization or capacity to act but a matter of initiation.

As we indicated before, while all these philosophies and theories acknowledge that childhood and change through education are important and while they are postulating the existence of conditions of childhood and childish conditions, education and childhood are at once “instrumentalized,” be it as a temporary condition, a necessary evil, or a logical factor in view of ethical, political, or social change or be it as an image or practice to conceptualize what is difficult to conceptualize in adult life. The risk of/for philosophy of education and educational theory is to be trapped in the same movement of instrumentalizing or even marginalizing education and naturalizing learning. And a maybe unexpected example is offered by the meanwhile influential distinction by Biesta (2009) between qualification, socialization, and subjectification. For him, these are the three functions or roles of education, and often all three of

them are playing a role. Clearly, Biesta wants to focus on the role of subjectification – becoming a person, by finding a place in the world – against the often dominant roles of socialization and qualification. The critical question, however, is whether these are the three roles or functions to be distinguished when looking indeed at education from a pedagogical/educational perspective. Although we recognize for sure that Biesta contributes importantly to emphasizing the role of education in a time of learning, we think this is not the case and that the distinction is the result of combining the three different approaches which are all external to education. It seems as if the qualification function pops up when looking at education from an economic perspective, while socialization (and the process of integration in social norms and values) is the key term when looking through sociological lenses. Subjectification, then, is what appears when approaching education either politically (in line with a certain reading of Rancière: becoming someone which is at the same time challenging the existing social order in terms of equality) or ethically (in line with a certain interpretation of Levinas: becoming someone which is always motivated by a call from the other in terms of doing justice). We think that qualification, socialization, and subjectification represent three versions of taming education: an ethical-personalizing or political-equalizing taming of education that imposes ethical or political standards on change (subjectification), an economical one that imposes an exchange value or investment calculus (qualification), and a sociological one that tames educational change by imposing the rules of social and cultural reproduction – or in a progressive version – the rules of social renewal and change (socialization). In one way or another, part of this taming is that a specific “destiny” (natural, or social, cultural, political, etc.) is put forward as the horizon to think about education or about change through education. From a pedagogical/educational or “internal” perspective on education, we think it is important to link up with the basic idea that human beings have no natural or other destination, and education in one way or another is exactly about “finding” one’s destiny.

In order to strengthen such an internal perspective, i.e., a pedagogical or educational approach and to do justice to the phenomenon of learning and education itself, we suggest that it would be helpful to deal with some major issues in educational philosophy and theory returning to some “early modern” and “modern” key figures in the field of education. It is the authors who have developed an *educational* approach or theory, contributed to an *educational* vocabulary, and expressed a deep *educational* concern in their intellectual but often also their practical work. Some of these figures are really broadly renowned (such as Comenius, Herbart, Dewey, Buber, Peters, Freire, Mollenhauer) and others less known (such as Rodrigues, Deligny, or even Ortega y Gasset and Langeveld), at least in the western Anglo-Saxon and German context. We deliberately mention “educational theorists or thinkers,” or at least philosophers or educationalists who did some substantial work in educational theory or educational philosophy. To give voice again to these authors and their educational ideas would be the first ambition, but not the only one. Another aim would be to show that educational theory and philosophy is not just “applied” philosophy (or any other applied discipline), but could be regarded as a particular mode of thinking including specific forms of problematization and conceptualization. This means that we do not need some extended biography or an extensive bibliography of these key figures, but rather descriptions or indications on the “ethos” and “approach” of these educational theorists and thinkers. What we need is a specific attention on the mode of thinking (conceptualization, problematization, argumentation, hesitation, criticism) through which each of these key authors discusses or engages with the phenomenon of education and the related practices, theories, and discourses. Without exception, the work of these key figures is a way of finding a proper answer to what was at stake in their present, in view of their past and future, and in ongoing discussion with practices of education and other voices in educational theory and philosophy. We could thereby draw attention to the

force, creativity, and originality of their ideas and carefully show or expose what is “educational” in their work and what is still “topical” (without pointing directly at relevance). This could help us to show how educational thinking is not only an abstract (mental) activity but somehow always involves a particular relation to (or care for) oneself, others, and the (educational) world. As such, it could contribute to the development and elaboration of thinking and practice, a “language” of education, and learning itself.

One important issue that such an elaboration of a “language of education” entails considers the aspect of translation. Indeed, although it applies for many fields, especially this field of “educational thought” or philosophy of education deals with serious difficulties of translation, since they concern essential notions such as “pedagogy” and “education” itself. It is, for instance, problematic to translate the German “Pädagogik,” the Dutch “pedagogiek,” the Spanish “pedagogia,” or the French “pédagogie” with the English “pedagogy.” In other languages, pedagogy is not restricted to school education but refers to acting and relationships in other spaces of learning as well. And even when used in relation to school education, in other languages, it can refer to aspects of schooling that have to do with broader aims and practices associated with becoming an adult or becoming a person. An even bigger problem is related to the notion of education. The English term has a broad meaning but remains at the same time closely associated with formal education. However, it is important to keep in mind that it often has a specific meaning and that therefore there is in fact often a hesitation whether to use the notion of “educational” or “pedagogical.” And let us, lastly, point to the (German) notion of “*Bildung*” which is now also increasingly appearing and discussed outside the German context (or the context strongly influenced by it). Although attempts at translation have been tried by philosophers and historians, the notion actually remains mostly untranslated and seems on the way to become part of the language of education more broadly and generally, apparently being able to articulate

concerns that transcend the German context to which it was connected.

To conclude and summarize, we think that, in order to confront and think our educational present, educational or pedagogical thought should not only distance itself from sociology, psychology, or economy but also from ethics, politics, and – and this is the main point we wanted to make – also philosophy (at least philosophy limited to master thinkers). It is not because we consider these disciplines and approaches as unimportant or irrelevant, we do not at all, and we do acknowledge for sure the importance of philosophy but because it could help to elaborate a language, problematization, and conceptualization of education and learning that is itself educational, especially when being today under the spell of the “learning society.”

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Educational Theory

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Educational Theory: Herbart, Dewey, Freire, and Postmodernists

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Three Revolutions in Educational Theory

In the nineteenth century, we learned with Johann Herbart that motivation depended on our intellectual apparatus. Then, we built the teaching of thinking into a lesson that started with a scientific or moral issue. The students, since they had a good intellectual apparatus, a good mind, would be able to follow the lesson. Motivation to study would appear in so far as the students themselves used the intellectual apparatus. The teacher would give the matter, in a logical or historical form, and the students, naturally, learned this form. There was the supposition that the mind was a logical thing and the matters of the lessons should be showed in a logical or historical way.

The great revolution in teaching by the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century was a revolution made by John Dewey. He developed several critiques of old pedagogy. The main critique was that the intellectual apparatus didn't work alone. The intellectual apparatus, Dewey said, actually depended on motivation. Lessons constructed in a logical and/or historical way needed to be changed. The lessons should be put in a psychological way. So, Dewey took once more a theme from Comenius and Rousseau. Lessons should start with the problems of the world – problems that brought interest and motivation for the children. The teachers, of

course, could show the logical and sequence of an issue, but they should know that the child learns this only after a translation of the topics in a psychological way.

This revolution was a potent event. It quickly put Herbart in the past. Of course, a lot of teachers continued doing things in the way Herbart had fixed, but the new books about pedagogy started to tell new things. They told that the child thinks! The books said “the way a child thinks is not wrong, but the child thinks a different way.” Logical and historical ways of teaching should be under the control of the psychological and sociological way of teaching. Dewey and Kilpatrick made a great contribution to teachers and the beginning of the twentieth century: they brought the child forward to become the central point of the school and of teaching. Then, educational theory could gain force from the new psychology and sociology. If Herbart epitomizes the nineteenth century as a century of collective education, so we can say that Dewey epitomizes the twentieth century as a century of pedagogy – philosophy of education and science of education together.

But the twentieth century didn’t see only this. The twentieth century, mainly after the Second World War, watched the emergency in the scene of the Third World. In several countries, a close colonial-type relation with the metropolitan country came to an end, and in the democratic world, the welfare State appeared like an ideal. As a consequence, I see the important appearance of poor and “odd” children inside schools and with this a third moment in the educational theory in the world in the twentieth century: the pedagogy of Paulo Freire.

Paulo Freire didn’t disagree with Herbart about teaching as something that should be done in a collective fashion. He also agreed with Dewey, of course, about motivation, psychology, and sociology. But the new ingredient inserted by Freire into the games of educational theory was the political ingredient.

Freire said that pedagogical action should be a political action but a specific political action: action to make humans free. Dewey also wanted this. But Dewey believed that education and

social democracy walked together. For Dewey the concept of education only made sense in a democracy. Paulo Freire on the contrary, thought of education in a situation without democracy. He thought of education in a place without democracy and thought of education as being like a motor to achieve social democracy. So then, with Freire, educational theory finished a cycle – the modern age in educational theory.

What I wanted to show is that in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, there were three revolutions in education theory. The first revolution: pedagogy became a science of education with Herbart. The second revolution: pedagogy should be linked to social and psychological life problems with Dewey. Finally, the third revolution: pedagogy would depend on political perspective in order to help the poor people.

But, before the end of the twentieth century, the twenty-first had already started. A new and fourth revolution in pedagogy is in course: the postmodern educational theory.

The Postmodern Age and the Narrative Turn

I think that two books are the protagonists of this new movement: in 1979 the publication of *The Postmodern Condition* by Jean François Lyotard and in the same year the publication of *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* by Richard Rorty. I do not believe that Herbart would understand these books. I don’t know if Paulo Freire read these books. But I imagine that Dewey would have liked these books. These books didn’t come to tell us that Herbart, Dewey, and Freire were wrong. They came out to say that educational theory could become more open and free.

My friend Michael Peters likes Lyotard. I also like Lyotard, but I think that Lyotard and Rorty are in agreement in several points, at least in those points that I would take to make educational theory.

Very briefly, what Lyotard and Rorty said in those books is the following.

Lyotard reminds us that a lot of people already did not believe in metanarratives. Therefore, it was

useless that we, the philosophers of education, continue to tell metanarratives to teachers. The teleology of Adam Smith, Hegel, or Marx is a thing of past. They could no longer support all or any educational theory. When I read Lyotard I didn't think that his book implied that Herbart or Dewey or Paulo Freire need be given up but that they need to be read without the foundationalist perspective that we are accustomed to read.

Rorty also reminds us that a lot of peoples did not believe in metanarratives and a lot of philosophers in the pragmatist movement could be used to show that real and technical motifs exist in philosophy which discredit metanarratives. But Rorty, in a stronger way, showed me that Herbart or Dewey or Paulo Freire could be used in a new way to make education. They loved to tell stories about education and loved to talk about books that could make us pay attention in stories, movies, novels, comic books, and music about educational situations. Therefore, I understood that we need rather a cultural appeal to teachers than a new or old educational theory.

Might I be talking about "cultural studies," as Giroux and others are doing? Might I be talking about "counternarratives," as Peter McLaren and others are doing?

Giroux and McLaren's books are to be appreciated. They continue the critical perspective learned from Marxism and that is useful both in the Third and the First World. But what I understand as a postmodern educational theory is another thing. In a lot of places in the Third World and in several places in the First World, the training of teachers – poor or rich – is done with educational theories. But what I don't see in such training of teachers in educational faculties is work with culture: novels, classics, tales, movies, comic books, pictures, and so on. Teachers in various parts of the world are trained in educational theories, in a good or bad way, depending on the country and the university. I believe that is wrong. Better educational theory would say that Herbart, Dewey, and Paulo Freire can be read and must be read, but this is useless without Henry James, Nabokov, Machado de Assis, Julia Roberts, Plato, Donald Duck, Ben Hur, Hilary Clinton, The Simpsons, Umberto Eco, Celine Dion,

and Caetano Veloso. Our teachers, in a world that asks for narratives without metanarratives, do not know tales, films, comic books, and so on. For economic reasons in several places and because of the overwhelming value given to educational theories in other places, our teachers forget the main thing in the school: the culture.

In Brazil, in several universities, in the faculties of education, a lot of teachers who train teachers for elementary and high school don't know our best writer, Machado de Assis (now translated into English). Is this a situation specific to Brazil? No! There are several studies that show that our teachers who train teachers have no love of culture. That is the problem: in a postmodern age, if we want to tell stories that can help the different peoples be close – the ideal multicultural of the postmodern age – then we should have good stories from the several cultures in our hands. But our faculties of education are occupied with educational theories and, so, don't bear in mind the narrative turn of our age (see Martin 1993, pp. 124–143).

The Educative Process in a Comparative Ways

Now, I will try to put what I said into a systematic form, comparing the educational process of the educational theories that I quoted. I will put this in a frame below.

Herbart educational theory (three steps)	Dewey educational theory (three steps)
1. Lesson of yesterday	1. Survey about concern of the students
2. Lesson of yesterday linked to lesson of today. Presentation of the new matter. Theories and examples of questions and answers	2. List of the problems about the concerns of the students. Hypothesis about the problems with suggestion of readings
3. Exercise with new questions	3. Ideal experiments or experiments in laboratory
Freire educational theory (three steps)	Educative and pragmatic action in the age of narrative turn (three steps)

(continued)

1. Survey about common words and issues of community	1. Presentation of cultural, cross-cultural, ethics, and political problems with movies, novels, tales, comic books, music, and so on
2. List of the words and issues of the community. Making problems: making “normal” problems in political problems. Discussion of solutions	2. Relations between the problems above and the problems of the students’ life. Presentation of theories and philosophies (as narratives) about the problems
3. Political action	3. Action: cultural, social,, and political. This action can be the making of other narratives (including narratives with metaphors) and other problems

In the Herbart educational theory, the teacher leads the process. The student pays attention and works on the exercise. The student does the exercises following the models given by teachers. Dewey changed this. In the educational theory of Dewey, the main concern is the students. Furthermore, Dewey insisted on the formulation of problems and hypotheses. Dewey wanted the learned to act like scientists. Freire put the educational process in the hands of militant “teachers.” He wanted the “students” as men and women with ability to think political problems and start political action (see Ghiraldelli Jr. 1990).

In my idea about an educational theory in postmodernity, the teachers are teachers and the students are students. The teachers lead the educational process, but they should be very sensitive about the problems of our age, and they should be very able to realize that the problems can’t be given without means like the movies, tales, novels, comic books, music, and so on. Then, the educative work is a process of identification between the problems of life of student and the problems shown by means of the cultural material. The teachers supervise, in the end, the production of political, social, and cultural action. This action can be a production of a text, of course. The text made by students can be a normal text but can be a metaphorical text. In this case, the teacher should pay attention to the metaphors. Metaphors, as

Rorty says, are indicative of opportunity to invent new rules and new rights in democracy (Ghiraldelli 1999).

Interpretations in the Educational Theory in the Age of Post-narrative Turn

The problem about this new way to see educative action that I am proposing is in the interpretation. If we see “the reality” by means of the narratives, then what is the correct interpretation?

I would prefer that the teachers didn’t follow this line of reason. Of course, we must agree about several things. But the main idea in educative action in the age of the post-narrative turn is that we, the teachers, should know the narratives very well. The main aim in this new way in which we construct the training of teachers is that all narratives should be pointed toward the end of cruelty. So, interpretation needn’t be a special key to find the truth of the narratives. But, interpretation needs a key to drive the students in the identification of cruelty, and, more than this, we must put into the work a strong hand against the cruelty.

I am not thinking about a method of training teachers to be greatly learned – this was the aim of the nineteenth century. I am not thinking about a method of training teachers to be trainers of scientist – this was the aim of the twentieth century. I am not thinking about a method of training teachers to be political militants – this was the aim of several peoples in the twentieth century. I want to train teachers to be people that believe that a demon can’t be a good professor. The demon would be a good teacher if knowledge held only technical aspects (of learning, science, politics), because the demon can be an intelligent animal. But in a new perspective, the important thing is the end of the cruelty, and this, the demon can’t wish (in a meeting of philosophers in Brazil, in homage to Deleuze, all the philosophers present agreed that the new problem of philosophy was cruelty).

However, some objector might say: you want a kind of teaching with good intentions, and with this I agree, but if the teaching is given by stories, we are in the field of relativism.

This text isn't a technical text of philosophy of education. So, I will avoid a great discussion about objectivity. But I think that all people who are thinking about relativism should pay attention to the words of Davidson:

Should we then agree with Hans-Georg Gadamer when he says that what the text means changes as the audience changes: "a text is understood only if it is understood in a different way every time"? I think not. There can be multiple interpretations, as Freud suggests, because there is no reason to say one rules out others. Gadamer has in mind incompatible interpretations. It is true that every person, every age, every culture will make what it can of a text; and persons, periods and cultures differ. But how can a significant relativism follow from a truism? If you and I try to compare notes on our interpretation of a text we can do so only to the extent that we have or can establish a broad basis of agreement. If what we share provides a common standard of truth and objectivity, difference of opinion makes sense. But relativism about standards requires what there cannot be, a position beyond all standards. (Davidson 1993, p. 307)

If we pay attention in the words of Davidson, we will see that relativism is a ghost. Do we believe in ghosts? People that believe in ghosts can't understand anything beyond Herbart, Dewey, and Freire. But people that don't believe in ghosts can understand very well a new way to think about the training of teachers in the next century. I call this "training of the training of teachers in an age of the post-narrative turn."

What Davidson says is the following. All and any people in our age, in a democracy, admit that "difference of opinion" makes sense. Difference of opinion needs common standards that we share – this is our intersubjectivity. But relativism requires all and any position to be a different position and to be equivalent at the same time. This would eliminate our common standard that we share and would become the "difference of opinion" a logically impossible thing.

I think that Davidson's argument is enough in our case. Teachers, students, and cultural means and work have several things in common. These commonalities allow our educative conversation and, of course, our development toward knowing if our problems are better understood with a Disney story or a Henry James story. Then, in my

conception of the new educational process, or in our new educational theory, there is no place for the fear of "cultural industry," as it appears in the old Frankfurt School. Cultural programs that show us "reality" have different viewpoints, as we have different viewpoints. But, although we have our differences, we can understand each other, of course.

My arguments here do not jettison Herbart, Dewey, and Freire. I think that Freire and Herbart would not understand my position concerning relativism, but they would accept my love of narratives. Dewey would not have problems with my position on relativism, I think, but, perhaps, he would say that "reality" is a thing more real than the books, movies, tales, and music can tell us. I think not. "Reality" in education is a cultural reality. Is it a postmodern educational theory? That is what I believe.

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Educationalisation

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Educationalization of Social Problems and the Educationalization of the Modern World

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Synonyms

[Educationalisation](#); [Pedagogisation](#); [Pedagogization](#)

Introduction

The catchword “educationalization,” which enjoyed some popularity around 1920, has been used increasingly since the 1980s, first in the German and then in the Belgian and English discussions. Although the uses of and intentions behind the term are far from identical, they all express a perceived intersection between distinct social practices, one of which is education. As a rule, this intersection is interpreted as assigning education the task of coping with perceived social problems. Accordingly, the most popular expression of this mode of thought has been labeled, in an abstracting way, the *educationalization of social problems*. This entry builds on that but suggests a more comprehensive view, less reactive in character by claiming that since the eighteenth century the construction of modernity, progress, and open future depends on an idea of education that promises to be the engine of modernity by means of (new) and broadly disseminated knowledge and technologies and, at the same time, an instance of moral reassurance empowering the individual exposed to these modern conditions and their moral hazards to act morally or virtuously. *Educationalization of the modern world*, in this more comprehensive way, is a key concept for understanding and deciphering the grand narratives of modernity and the modern self.

Educationalization of Social Problems

Even though the label *educationalization of social problems* has been popular internationally for less than 10 years (Smeyers and Depaepe 2008), the notion goes back to a German discussion in the 1980s under the label *Pädagogisierung sozialer Probleme* (see Proske 2001). The matter itself, however, is much older and refers to specific issues of hygiene, economy, delinquency and prisoners, and, later on and very broadly received, children’s sexuality, *pédagogisation du sexe le l’enfant*, or pedagogization of children’s sex (Foucault 1978, p. 104).

Beyond these explicit uses of “educationalization” the issue itself is omnipresent. Sunday schools and Bible classes were organized for workers in the first half of the nineteenth century to prevent moral decay in light of a monetary economy; most automobile drivers in the world attend driver education classes and have to pass a test – institutionalized in Germany as early as in 1902 –, and children of all ages have traffic education at school to protect them against the dangers of increased motorized traffic. These more gradual processes of educationalization are supplemented by more tangible events. When, for instance, the United States saw their nation and the Western world at risk after the launch of Sputnik by the Soviet Union in 1957, it educationalized the Cold War by passing the very first national education law, the *National Defense Education Act* in 1958, expressing the view that “Education is the First Line of Defense” (Rickover 1959). And when, a few years later, the environment had become an affair of public concern, for instance triggered by the book *Silent Spring* (Carson 1962), endangered nature became educationalized, as expressed, for instance, in the *Journal of Environmental Education* (1969) and in educational trails teaching walkers about nature. And when again a few years later in the United States the national crises after the Vietnam War, the oil crises in the 1970s, and the near collapse of the automobile industry in the early 1980s led to the perception of *A Nation at Risk* and the conclusion of an *Imperative For Educational*

Reform, this expressed the educationalization of economy and economic policy. A rising teenage pregnancy rate in the 1960s led to an educationalization of sex through the introduction of sex education in schools, which gained new urgency with the outbreak of HIV/AIDS in the 1980s. Museums were made more attractive by the invention of museum education around 1990. And when immigrant adolescents in the suburbs of Paris and Lyon protested violently in 2005, their behavior was not seen as a reaction to their poor living conditions or poor life chances but as an expression of the wrong education, as France's Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin stated in 2005. Human life is a site of what UNESCO has called "lifelong learning" and propagated since 1962, a phenomenon that was critically noticed (and explicitly labeled "educationalization") as early as in 1929 (Fischer 1929, p. 286).

The expansion of the education system in the 1960s and the 1970s as a Western expression of the educationalization of the Cold War also led to a process self-reassurance of the educational sciences, in which the explicit notion of "educationalization," or *Pädagogisierung*, started to serve as a (self-)analytical tool. In this context the notion of the educationalization of prison inmates has been discussed, profiting of course from the immense discussion of Foucault's account of the *Birth of the Prison* (Foucault 1977). Additionally, relevant research focused on educationalization phenomena in all kinds of contexts, for instance, in human resources, in marketing, and even in developing city districts, and, of course in developing the Third World (see Proske 2001).

Based on these German disciplinary (self-) reassurances, the Belgian historian of education Marc Depaepe suggested using "educationalization" as a key concept to understand fundamental processes in the history of Western education and dedicated a large part of his research to this idea in the first decade of this century (see Depaepe 2012). Depaepe invited also philosophers of education to participate in this disciplinary self-reflection of education (Depaepe and Smeyers 2008; Smeyers and Depaepe 2008), focusing on the *educationalization of social problems*. The

discussion proved to be fruitful in detecting actual educationalization of phenomena such as health, the family and the child, or even philosophy or educational research. By pointing at the fact that *educationalizing social problems* continued to be a part of the educational culture even though schools have repeatedly proven that they are an ineffective mechanism for solving these problems, David F. Labaree (2008) pointed to a larger cultural context than education itself; it is precisely here that the term *educationalization of the world*, a process starting in the long eighteenth century, gets a distinct meaning with regard to the *educationalization of social problems*.

The Educationalization of the World in the Long Eighteenth Century I: The Challenge

Up to the mid-eighteenth century, it was not at all "normal" to interpret perceived problems educationally – that is, to assign the solving of problems to educational practice. What then made this educationalization, this educational turn, possible? This development had very specific requirements that have little to do with education; the increased educational reflexes were reactions to problems that were originally perceived as non-educational. Decisive for the educational turn were changes in the way that people thought about two fundamental things in interpreting their lives: first, how people imagined history and development and second, how they viewed the relation between money and politics. Both of these transformations, which remain important today, occurred around 1700 and replaced older perceptions and core notions that went back to the ancient world. They mark the transformation of the early modern period in history to the modern period. The first of these transitions (history and development) was initiated in France, the second (money and politics) in England. Both together created challenges, "problems," that were addressed in many ways, and the educational way seems to have been deemed the most promising, with effects up to today.

The transformations in the perception of history and development were initiated in France at the court of the King Louis XIV in Versailles, when the ancients' way of looking at things came under attack in the "quarrel of the Ancients and the Moderns." Whereas up to the end of the seventeenth century, time and thus history had been seen, in analogy to the seasons, as an eternal cycle of events; in the eighteenth century a linear way of thinking ("progress") came to prevail that was oriented towards the future and in which outcomes were open. At first, around 1680, this optimism applied only to progress in the sciences, but soon after, progress was seen also as a social and political program: Humanity would develop progressively towards peace, justice, and bliss, and political conditions that impeded this progress had to be destroyed. This was the justification for the French Revolution of 1789. The most impressive interpretation of this rational thinking on progress is probably that in *Outlines of an Historical View of the Progress of the Human Mind* by Marquis de Condorcet (1743–1794). According to Condorcet's interpretation, the French Revolution was the gateway to humanity's final great developmental epoch.

The second transformation has to do with the relation of money to politics, which changed towards the end of the seventeenth century at first in England. Up to that time, an ideal had prevailed in Europe according to which dispassionate reason was supposed to guide politics. At the same time, the commercial economy had been considered as something "lower" or "basier," because it was accused of diverting attention and interest away from the common good and of exposing people to the passionate pursuit of profit: In this system of thought, calm, rational governing was seen as good and passion-driven money-making as bad. But around 1700 and up to the present day, this system of thought was lost, not least because the commercial economy had become a social fact and actually very important for politics. This ideological bias – the idea of dispassionate reason as a condition of good politics and the actual importance of the discredited commerce, connected to passions – had to be

solved in order to legitimate the systems of political power, which depended more and more on money (for instance, to cover the rising costs of the massive expansion of administration or for the standing armies with their mercenaries).

The two transformations not only found enthusiastic supporters, they also gave rise to existential uncertainty, critique, and debates. The most important reaction to the capitalization of politics in a world that all of a sudden seemed to be driving progressively into an open and unknown future was the revival of a political ideal that in research is called classical republicanism or civic humanism (Pocock 1975). This ideal had roots in ancient political philosophy, was brought back to life in humanism in Florence around 1500, and formed the political background of the reformation in Zurich after 1520. Later, it shaped the founding of the Commonwealth of England (1649–1660) as well as the Puritans, who emigrated to the British colonies in North America, and it was particularly revived in the founding years of the United States. It is a firmly antimonarchist – that is, republican – and anti-capitalist political ideal, in which the citizens virtuously stand up for the common good. Their only passion is patriotism, love of the fatherland and its laws, which the citizens themselves have issued in self-government.

The Educationalization of the World in the Long Eighteenth Century II: The Solution

However, the advancement of the commercial society could not be halted by fully developing the ideal of the republican citizen. The natural sciences produced know-how for farming methods in agriculture, and surplus products were exported. Technical advances simplified the production of goods, trade flourished, and the capitalist bourgeoisie pushed for more political influence, especially in France, which ultimately led to the outbreak of the French Revolution in 1789, legitimized by theories of progress. On the other hand, and somewhat paradoxically, over the

course of the eighteenth century the political ideal of the anticapitalist citizen committed to the common good became increasingly attractive. The two opposing ideals were the central issue in a large part of the famous debates between the Federalists and the Anti-Federalists concerning the Constitution of the United States.

In other words, in the second half of the eighteenth century, the contradiction between progress in science and the economy on the one hand, and the popularity of the ideal of the anticapitalist citizen on the other, led to attempts to reconcile the two positions. It was not by chance that this reconciliation was pursued effectively in the Protestant strongholds of Switzerland. Protestantism – notwithstanding its different denominations – had turned from the Catholic emphasis on the institution (the Holy Mother Church) to the individual's soul as the instance of salvation, with no fundamental need of consecrated mediators (priests) between God and the individual. This Protestant focus on the individual's soul became the starting point of the educationalization of the world, insofar as the soul became the central object of education. The difference between German Protestantism (Lutheranism) and Swiss Reformed Protestantism (Zwinglianism and Calvinism) led to two different educational ideologies. Whereas Luther's unworldly political and social ideology led to the political indifferent and antimaterialistic contemplative educational ideology of *Bildung* (Horlacher 2016); the Swiss Reformed Protestantism developed an educational program aimed at active citizenship as a reaction to these fundamental transformations.

The key to accepting the changing living conditions towards a commercial life on the one hand and at the same time to adhering to the republican ideal of the selfless patriotic citizen on the other hand was to focus on the danger zone, so to speak, that is the human soul. Against the background of a commercializing society and the maintained ideal of the virtuous republican citizen, the keyword was "correct modification" of the soul – making the soul virtuous – which was interpreted as strengthening the soul,

developing inner strength. This idea subsequently became the starting point of the educationalization of the world, for it meant that a person with sufficient inner strength or virtue could safely resist all temptations of the (commercial) world and be a virtuous and active citizen. Here, inner strength represented the Protestant internalization of the steadfast Roman warrior hero, fighting not so much the enemy in the battlefield but rather the inner enemy of selfish passion. It was to be expressed as republican virtue in the time of commercialization; in this way it interlaced the common good and commercial society and thereby shaped the future for the welfare of all.

This modification – that is, strengthening the soul towards (civic) virtue – was the program that was to be realized through education. In this cultural transformation process the "self" became the crucial object of the growing subject; it was constantly assessed and monitored through self-reflection, which was often recorded in diaries. Educating the young towards self-examination thus appeared as the key to resolving the conflict between republican politics and the modern economy, as guarantor of an ordered modernity that does not fall prey to the passions related to power but instead is meant to ensure the common good *and* progress. Those who – through education – could strengthen the souls of children did not have to fear the open-ended and uncertain future of a commercializing society. It is this idea that is at the origin of the educational turn, the great transformation process that educationalized the world in a lasting way. Many persons had a part in shaping and popularizing this transformation, but none were as influential as Zurich-born Johann Heinrich Pestalozzi (1746–1827), who through his lifetime became the great promoter of an educationalized world, the star of an educationalizing culture that started to assign more and more perceived social problems to education (Tröhler 2013). This was the basis of the erection of mass schooling as the likely most successful new social subsystem in the Western world through the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries.

Educationalization of Social Problems as Phenomenon of the Educationalization of the World

The overall political, social, and cultural transformations brought about by the American Independence and the French Revolution created manifold uncertainties, in which the educationalization of the world became contextually nourished and demanded educational instruments or methods. Competing methods were propagated: Johann Ignaz von Felbiger's "normal method," Andrew Bell and Joseph Lancaster's monitorial systems, and Pestalozzi's educational method, which promised both harmonious-natural development of all the human faculties and morality and virtues. However, even if the monitorial or the normal method proved, for limited purposes, to be more successful than Pestalozzi's method, it was the latter that became the icon of the educational turn at the turn of the nineteenth century, possibly precisely because his method proved to be not really applicable at schools. The reduction of Pestalozzi's education aspiration – forming the virtuous citizen – to modern schooling was never his intention; his aim was more the educational salvation of Europe against the background of its moral and political decay: Good (virtuous) politics depended on a good education, and good education depended on "face to face and heart to heart" encounters.

Even when after a quarter of a century of political and social upheavals and economic transformations between the outbreak of the French Revolution and the Congress of Vienna, the European countries decided upon a program that was called restoration; Europe was on a track of progression, desperately in need of reassuring social order. Ideas of natural laws and the inalienable rights of every man as well as the local/regional identities of most of Europe's inhabitants had to be made compatible with the newly defined territorial entities called the nation-States. Whereas these nation-States were becoming defined and justified politically by the constitutions and defended militarily by the armies, the inner coherence of the nation-State, the inhabitants' identification with the nation-State, had to be made by education, respectively the school systems. The educationalizing culture in the beginning of the

nineteenth century expressed the hopes and fears of an unknown future that had to be ensured through loyal citizens, resulting from educational processes to be implemented in organizational contexts, the schools. As a rule, all the nation-States defining themselves constitutionally as territorial entities passed encompassing education acts within 2–3 years after passing their constitutions (Tröhler 2016 in press).

It is one of the characteristics of an educationalized culture to react to unfulfilled expectations not only with educationalization of perceived social problems but also with more and allegedly better educational opportunities in general. Compulsory education was continuously extended and teachers trained more and more. The moral part of this teacher training had to be covered through the genre *history of education* and the more practical part through psychology of education. The ennoblement of teacher training to an academic subject/field was largely owed to the ongoing establishment of psychology as academic discipline, whereby it is no coincidence that psychology focuses on the individual's soul and that the earliest psychologists were – with hardly any exception – sons of Protestant ministers and/or had studied Protestant theology themselves (Tröhler 2011). But even when psychology had become an autonomous discipline working with empirical methods, the educational rhetoric remained idealistic, serving moral values deemed relevant for individuals to cope with the manifold challenges of progress, resulting from the enhanced knowledge production and knowledge dissemination in the educational systems.

Against this background, the educationalization of the world was not limited to solving perceived social problems such as health, crime, economy, ecology, traffic, military, teenage pregnancy, public behavior, or drugs and alcohol but was more fundamentally connected to the process of modernization itself, brought about by the modern sciences and ideas of freedom. Both the sciences and freedom seemed to be inevitable and desirable but at the same time under constant suspicion of creating an endangered individual, and it is here that education becomes a fundamental part of the modernist narrative itself and not

only of the process of the history of Western education, which would limit its focus to the educationalization of social problems. The educationalization of the world, transnationally propagated by organizations such as the OECD and globally disseminated by organizations like the World Bank or UNESCO, is the key to understanding the cultural (and ultimately Protestant) construction of modernity and the modern self as a self-reflective lifelong learner in the system of thought that embodies fears and the hopes for redemption at the very same time.

Cross-References

- [Environment and Education](#)
- [Nation, Nationalism, Curriculum, and the Making of Citizens](#)
- [Quest for Heroes](#)
- [Religion and Modern Educational Aspirations](#)

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Edupunk

- [Defining Openness in Education](#)

Edusemiotics

- [Educational Semiotics, Greimas, and Theory of Action](#)
- [Edusemiotics, Subjectivity, and New Materialism](#)
- [Ethics and Significance: Insights from Welby for Meaningful Education](#)
- [Deleuze's Philosophy for Education](#)
- [Derrida and the Ethics of Reading](#)
- [Semiosis as Relational Becoming](#)

Edusemiotics To Date, An Introduction of

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Synonyms

[Experience](#); [Habits](#); [Language](#); [Meaning](#); [Pedagogy](#); [Peirce](#); [Policy](#); [Relation](#); [Semiotics](#); [Sign](#)

Introduction

Semiotics is the study of signs, especially as regards their action, usage, communication, and signification (or meaning). The word semiotics derives from the ancient Greek words for sign and signal. In ancient times semiotics was a specific branch of medicine, with signs describing symptoms. Later semiotics became a branch of philosophy, with signs describing the nature of things. Semiotics exceeds the science of linguistics, the latter limited to verbal signs of words and sentences, and encompasses both natural and invented signs, such as culturally specific artifacts. Human beings are sign users, and semiotics can also serve as a metalanguage, the function of which is to describe human action. Semiotics both constructs models, or sign systems, and considers them to be its own object of research. Edusemiotics – educational semiotics – is a recently developed direction in educational theory that takes semiotics as its foundational philosophy and explores the philosophical specifics of semiotics in educational contexts. As a novel theoretical field of inquiry, it is complemented by research known under the banner “semiotics in education” and which is largely an applied enterprise. In this respect edusemiotics is a new conceptual framework used in both theoretical and empirical studies. Edusemiotics has also been given the status of being a new subbranch of theoretical semiotics, alongside biosemiotics or ecosemiotics, and it was launched as such at the 12th World Congress of the International Association for Semiotic Studies (IASS) held in September 2014 at the New Bulgarian University (Sofia, Bulgaria) that included participants from Europe, Australia, and North and South America.

History, in Brief

While Ferdinand de Saussure’s structuralist perspective addressed largely linguistic signs, Charles Sanders Peirce’s philosophy did not limit signs to verbal utterances. Signs also perfuse the nonhuman world in a variety of guises. Peirce’s perspective was pansemiotic and

naturalistic and emphasized the process of signs’ growth and change called *semiosis*, representing the action, transformation, and evolution of signs across nature, culture, and the human mind. In contrast to isolated substances, such as body and mind in the philosophy of Descartes, a Peircean genuine sign as a minimal unit of description is a tri-relative entity, referring to something that it is not (its object or referent) via a third category (interpretant). Human experience is always marked by signs, and all thinking and living proceeds in signs.

Preceding the birth of edusemiotics, in 2008 a group of mostly European researchers in education formed an informal online community under the name Network for Semiotics and Education (out of Oulu University, Finland). The Philosophy of Education Society of Great Britain funded two international research seminars conducted by this group: in the University of Cergy in Paris in 2011 and in the University of Bath in 2012. Papers arising from these seminars appeared in two special issues of the *Journal of Philosophy of Education* (JoPE). Some members of the group were also invited to run a symposium at the Finnish Educational Research Association conference in Helsinki, followed by another one at the meeting of the International Association for Semiotic Studies in Imatra, Finland, in June 2013.

As a novel term, “edusemiotics” was coined by Marcel Danesi (the editor in chief of the journal *Semiotica*) as a subtitle to his Foreword to the comprehensive volume *Semiotics Education Experience* (Semetsky 2010). Recent research summarized in *Edusemiotics: Semiotic Philosophy as Educational Foundation* (Stables and Semetsky 2015) and *Pedagogy and Edusemiotics: Theoretical Challenges/Practical Opportunities* (Semetsky and Stables 2014) continues and develops this critical and creative impulse. While the first book is coauthored, the second represents an edited collection of chapters by international researchers including such members of the Philosophy of Education Society of Australasia as Jayne White and Marek Tesar. The seeds of edusemiotics however had been planted much earlier (some of these seminal works are listed in References).

Edusemiotics as an Anti-Dualist Philosophy

Stressing the importance of “sculpting a veritable *edusemiotics for the future*” (Danesi 2010, p. vii), Danesi commented that “until recently, the idea of amalgamating signs with learning theory and education to establish a new branch, which can be called *edusemiotics*, has never really crystallized, even though the great Russian cultural psychologist Lev S. Vygotsky had remarked . . . that. . . ‘human beings actively remember with the help of signs’ . . . In these words can be detected the *raison d’être* for establishing a connection between *semiotics* as the science of signs, *learning theory* or the science of how signs are learned, and *education*, that is, the practical art/science of teaching individuals how to interpret and understand signs.” Danesi noticed that research in education “has traditionally turned to psychology to help it transform teaching into a more ‘learning compatible’ and ‘performance-oriented’ activity” (2010, p. x). The shift to philosophy enabled by edusemiotics started to bring into sharp focus the dimensions of epistemology, ontology, and ethics often missing in educational research, together with existential questions of meaning – positing those as especially valuable for education and in urgent need of exploration.

Educational theory today, even if implicitly, is often haunted by the ghosts of the past: Cartesian substance dualism, analytic philosophy of language, and the scientific method of modernity as the sole ground for educational research. Human subjectivity with its gamut of experiences and purposes is thus excluded. Edusemiotics as an alternative philosophy is marked by several distinctive characteristics, the first being the priority of process over product as especially important for the discipline of education traditionally focused on finite measurable outcomes. Another important feature of edusemiotics as a distinctive conceptual framework is its ability to overcome the principle of noncontradiction and the logic of the excluded middle. The holistic perspective taken by edusemiotics entails relational ethics; expanded experience; emphasis on interpretations surpassing factual evidence; a conception of

language understood broadly in terms of semiotic structures exceeding the linguistic but encompassing images, diagrams, and other regimes of signs; embodied cognition; and the importance of self-formation as a lifelong process, thus having implications for education throughout the lifespan, inclusive of children and adults. Especially significant is edusemiotics for exploring questions of educational policy and practice and alternative research methodologies, including but not limited to phenomenology and hermeneutics with a view to positing multiple recommendations derived from its foundational principles.

In defiance of the fragmentation of knowledge still prevalent in education, edusemiotics construes a unifying paradigm that opens up a range of opportunities for human development and transformative education. Edusemiotics is an *integrative* conceptual framework. Integrative practices are largely absent from the Western educational system and relegated to Eastern traditions and philosophies such as Tao or Buddhism. In the West, philosophy and education continue to suffer from the great bifurcation between sign and object, between man and world, or – at the socio-cultural level – between self and other. Overcoming such habitual dualisms both in theory and in practice is the ultimate purpose of edusemiotics. Edusemiotics continues and reinterprets the intellectual legacy of major philosophers and critical theorists, crossing over from American Pragmatism to Continental philosophy and also revisiting ancient philosophies, for example, Hermeticism. Philosophers in the pragmatic, versus analytic, tradition reject a sharp dichotomy between subject and object, body and mind, as well as epistemology reduced to the spectator theory of knowledge. Keeping this rejection from being just a slogan is indeed a task pursued by edusemiotics. This task is complex and requires the synthesis of cognition and affect, logic and ethics, and ontology and practice.

A minimal unit of description in edusemiotics, like in semiotics in general, is not an individual thing or person, but a sign as a relational – versus substantial – entity, which continuously engages in changes and transformations, thus defying the

perceived binary oppositions between not only Cartesian categories of mind versus matter but between all other dualisms. As a philosophy of education, edusemiotics aims toward ultimately organizing a sense of the relational self, in which a generic other would be integrated. C. S. Peirce's semiotics presents the whole universe as perfused with signs. In such a universe, the human mind is not separate from the environing physical world but is engaged in a continual participation with it, thus forming a holistic process-structure, a network, encompassing sociocultural and natural aspects. People are signs among signs and are sign users. Everything is a sign – still, nothing is a sign unless it is interpreted. This statement sounds paradoxical, yet the presence of paradoxes is one of the characteristics of semiotics and edusemiotics. The modes of inference include, in addition to deduction and induction, also abduction functioning on the basis of the logic of discovery rather than just the logic of justification. Signs, via the dynamics of multiple interpretations and translations into other signs, evolve and grow. Learning is achieved not by an analytic, Cartesian mind that observes the world from which it is detached, but by synthetic – or integral – consciousness that constructs an expanded field of meanings informed by lived experience. Edusemiotics interrogates anthropocentrism, positing an embodied mind connected to the greater, posthuman environment. Education, in semiotic terms, is a relational process of growth as a function of engaging with, and learning from, signs situated in life, in experience, in ethical practice.

Some Practical Implications of Edusemiotics

Experiential learning expands the walls of the traditional classroom and opens it to the greater social and natural world. Edusemiotics partakes of an open-ended practical inquiry that does not aim to attain finite and indubitable knowledge. It problematizes the prevalent role of formal instruction and elicits alternative pedagogies. Pedagogy in

the spirit of edusemiotics is not reducible to teaching “true” facts, but aims to enrich experience with meanings and values. Thus, learning by means of using signs becomes a modality of both formal and post-formal pedagogies that strengthen relations and connections and are oriented to meaning-making practices; the value dimension of edusemiotics is thus implied. This perspective defies the reductionist paradigm and the model of educational research as exclusively evidence based. Edusemiotics posits empirical evidence as always open to interpretations. It creates a novel open-ended foundation for knowledge which is always already of the nature of a process, thus subject to evolution, development, and the intrusion of signs that need to be interpreted anew in the unpredictable circumstances of lived experience for which our old habits of thought and action may be unfit or counterproductive. The process of semiosis that encompasses human beings functioning as signs elicits the transformation of habits as especially important in the context of education.

Logic as semiotics is the science of the necessary laws of thought. It defies the classical principle of noncontradiction that dates back to Aristotle and relates to the law of the excluded middle that “informs” the analytic logic of the propositional (verbal) language: a proposition is either true or its negation is true – that is, there is nothing in between the two parts of the contradiction. All binary opposites become subject to mediation enabled by the paradoxical structure of genuine signs that have an included middle (in this or that guise) which ensures signs' dynamic growth in meanings rather than the attainment of stable truth. In contrast to the law of noncontradiction that continues to haunt education on the basis of which teachers demand unambiguous and singularly “right” answers, edusemiotics asserts that it is precisely logical contradictions (or moral dilemmas that may be embedded in lived experience) that may serve as important learning material. It is the indirect mediation as a semiotic interpretation that establishes a triadic versus dyadic relation. As relational entities, signs defy the logic of *either-or*; and it is the

mediation peculiar to genuine signs that constitutes their most distinctive aspect and amounts to the logic of the included middle, of *both-and*, that characterizes edusemiotics and makes education transformative and creative.

It is because of this logic that the creation of new signs takes place: signs grow, that is, they become other signs within the interpretive, that is indirect, mediated, and recursive, process of semiosis. Such process is the very foundation for the transformation of habits in actual practice. The transformation of habits – both in thought and in action – is embedded in the relational dynamics of “becoming” in contrast to static “being.” Accordingly, edusemiotics as a theoretical framework leads to reformulating the received notion of progress equated with material success and quantitative measures. Edusemiotics changes the perception of standards that serve as the established policy for testing, assessment, and evaluating academic success versus failure. Failure, in accord with the process of signs being transformed into other signs, may turn into its own opposite, that is, carry a positive value by virtue of being a learning experience. The edusemiotic perspective leads to positing new ethics oriented to creating reconciling relations between ourselves and others that can bring about mutual understanding and sharing each other’s values. Signs function as unorthodox “texts” comprising human experiences that can be “read” and interpreted. By responding to, and interpreting, such texts’ indirect and often subtle messages that, rather than being “clear and distinct” Cartesian ideas, often reach us at the unconscious levels only, we ourselves become *more developed signs*.

Human Development

Edusemiotics has a bearing on teacher training and educational policy-making. Because semiosis is a never-ending process of signs becoming other signs, education cannot end when a child grows up: personal development proceeding through the life span cannot be limited to professional training. Edusemiotics demands a continual

engagement with signs inclusive of personal moral and intellectual growth as the transformation of habits. Edusemiotics reconceptualizes adult education in terms of lifelong learning from events and experiences, positing the human subject as a sign among other signs always already engaged in relations comprising the process of becoming. Edusemiotics defines subjectivity as a process. Such process necessarily involves self-reflection. The realization of meanings in lived experience enriches this very experience with its existential dimension and replaces moral norms and binary codes with relational ethics. A semiotic approach to the structures of knowledge leads to reciprocity between ethics and reason, knowledge and action. Teachers’ self-knowledge becomes a must, because without knowing oneself one cannot know others – hence one would be unable to establish a genuine self-other relation as foundational for the *ethics of integration* – a distinguishing feature of edusemiotics.

The edusemiotic process of the evolution and transformation of signs intrinsically determines new opportunities for human development and transformative education and necessarily encompasses the future-oriented dimensions of becoming, novelty, and creativity. These elements were the defining characteristics of Alfred North Whitehead’s process philosophy and need to be taken into account in education. As creative, edusemiotics problematizes the model of teaching reduced to the unidirectional transmission of pre-given content from a generic teacher to a generic student. Rather, teachers and students together are part of the same semiotic process: they form a single relational unit. In other words, teacher and student cannot function as individual and independent entities. When a teacher’s aim is to instruct and a student’s to receive an indubitable instruction, they, unbeknown to each other, put into practice the habitual philosophy of Cartesian dualism. Edusemiotics however posits a teacher and a student as one unified, albeit double-sided, whole – a sign, a relation. They are interrelated and interdependent by virtue of being embedded in the mutual field of signs creating shared meanings.

Conclusion

Edusemiotics demands that the anti-Cartesian logic of signs becomes our new habit in life. However the educational field tends to subscribe to an old dualistic worldview across theory, practice, research, and especially policy! The old habits of thought and action appear to be resilient; indeed we wouldn't call them "habits" otherwise. Even if habits can eventually evolve and grow by virtue of themselves being signs of experience, they tend to become fixed and rigid, thus closing themselves to change and transformation in the manner of genuine signs. To put into practice the program of education in edusemiotics remains a current challenge. Still, research seminars and lectures are being given by "edusemioticians" at conferences around the world, and graduate seminars on the topic have been offered in some universities, notably in the University of Chile. In November 2014, a symposium on edusemiotics took place at the Philosophy of Education Society of Australasia Annual Meeting in Hamilton, New Zealand. A special issue of the journal *Semiotica* titled "On Edusemiotics" is currently in production. And a comprehensive volume *Edusemiotics – A Handbook* is forthcoming with Springer Publishers.

The overall aim of edusemiotics is the creation of "the open society" (Peters 2009, p. 303; Simons et al. 2009) as the transformation of the whole of the knowledge economy. Continuing research in edusemiotics is needed to eradicate old habits and investigate the effects of such a perspective on diverse sociocultural relations. Edusemiotics is educative as it leads us out of old habits. Indeed, the Latin *educare* means to lead out as well as to bring out something that is within, however not confined within the narrow boundaries of Cartesian cogito. Edusemiotics displays radical, expansive reason constituted by signs. This reason should begin to inform educational policies and educational reform.

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Edusemiotics, Subjectivity, and New Materialism

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Synonyms

[Deleuze](#); [Dewey](#); [Edusemiotics](#); [Embodiment](#); [Feminism](#); [New materialism](#); [Peirce](#); [Post-humanism](#); [Quantum physics](#); [Relation](#); [Science](#)

Introduction

Edusemiotics is a novel direction in educational theory. New materialism is a novel direction in cultural theory. Both areas of research, while "located" in humanities, pay close attention to contemporary developments in natural sciences such as physics and biology. Both are strongly

anti-dualist. However, while new materialism seems to revert to the philosophy of *monism*, edusemiotics emphasizes the irreducibly *triadic* structure of signs that ensures their dynamics and enables their action and evolution. New materialism tends to draw from the continental tradition in philosophy (notably Deleuze), while sources feeding into the latest developments in edusemiotics are plenty, including American pragmatism. Still, both directions have much in common and seem to exit in parallel – their appearance in their respective fields (cultural studies and education) is nearly simultaneous. Being anti-dualistic, they also deny the division between ontology and epistemology. As for the dimension of ethics, both demonstrate a relational, and partaking of feminist, bent. Both problematize all binary divisions and rigid classifications in favor of relations, maps, diagrams, and cartographies. This short entry does not aim to “compare or contrast” edusemiotics with new materialism but rather intends to present some selected conceptualizations in both areas of research, mapping them into each other’s trajectory and thus opening avenues for further cross-disciplinary research. The entry presents human subjectivity as always already posthuman, emergent, continuously learning, and equipped with semiotic competence.

Semiotics and New Materialism

Semiotics – and, by implication, edusemiotics – is not just *about* signs: it concerns itself primarily with the *action* of signs (a point often missed). It was St. Augustine who first stated that the action of signs proceeds in nature and in culture. In modern times, C. S. Peirce proclaimed that the whole universe is perfused with signs which possess the quality of irreducible triadicity. The action of signs is not direct or dyadic but indirect or mediated. The sign stands for something other than itself, by virtue of the existence of some “third” element *between* the two: that is, indirectly. Genuine semiotic action is always relative to this included third; therefore, the interaction between any two subjects is not purely subjective: according to contemporary semiotician John

Deely, it is suprasubjective. Such action cannot be described by the action of any individual agent: a sign is a relation between self and other that presupposes their mutual participation in the same semiotic process and demands what Deleuze and Guattari (1987) called mutual solidarity. As such, a proper semiotic relation is based on intra-action (not inter-action) – a term that Karen Barad (2007) coined for the purpose of defining the metaphysics of new materialism which intends to emphasize the dimension of “between” and constructs, accordingly, onto-epistemology that serves as an unorthodox foundation for ethics. A feminine approach to ethics in education, such as the ethics of care and its follow-up, the ethics of integration (Semetsky 2010), presents relations as being ontologically basic.

The key neo-materialist scholars of today who target dual oppositions are Rosi Braidotti, Manuel DeLanda, Karen Barad, and Quentin Meillassoux (e.g., Dolphijn and van der Tuin 2012). Braidotti continues a feminist tradition in cultural theory that, just like edusemiotics, interrogates logocentrism and anthropocentrism in favor of posthumanism and culture-nature assemblages (signs), thereby positing human subjectivity as unavoidably embodied. Meillassoux’s materialism, while “speculative,” is however not foreign to scientific rationalism: he calls for establishing the absolute scope of mathematics as a formal (rather than vernacular) language to describe reality, albeit under the *proviso* of including the dimension of meaning in science.


Inquiring into the nature of the language of signs (verbal, mathematical, or otherwise) is one of the tasks pursued by edusemiotics (Semetsky 2013) that brings to mind Leibniz’s and Deleuze’s explorations of *mathesis* as the unified science. While Descartes remained skeptical of the project of the *universal language* as it became known, Leibniz had envisaged a formal *scientia generalis* of all possible relations between all concepts in all branches of knowledge taken together. This unified science of all sciences, called *mathesis universalis*, would employ a formal universal language of symbols, with symbols themselves immanent in life, in nature. Deleuze (2007) points out that the “the key notion of mathesis. . . is that

individuality never separates itself from the universal... Mathesis is... knowledge of life” (pp. 146–147) and has liberating and creative power. Such knowledge of life is equivalent to the knowledge of signs “spoken” by life: it partakes of the *intensive* science posited by DeLanda (2002).

DeLanda focuses on the nonlinear dynamics of the (neo-)material world as consisting of matter-energy flows rather than stable physical structures. In turn, edusemiotics does not restrict the semiotic reality to matter and energy but affirms the “third” dimension of information: together they form the triadic signs that perfuse the world, thereby denying that matter is inert or dead (Semetsky 2013). Body is minded and mind is embodied. The premise of ancient Hermetic philosophy (which is one of the precursors of edusemiotics) that matter is alive and grounded in relations is confirmed by new science. Edusemiotics and new materialism alike are “breakthrough” areas of research, and it is the life of signs (human and nonhuman) that literally “breaks through” general categories and rigid classifications. It is the entanglement (the term used by Barad, who borrows it from quantum physics) of matter and meaning that eliminates the remnants of positivism and renders invalid the subject-object dualism. However much earlier, it was John Dewey – one of the theoretical forerunners of edusemiotics – who posited the relation between the observer and the observed via the very *act* of observation, therefore strongly rejecting the method of “objective” science.

The Science of Signs

The developments in semiotics as the science of signs represent the process of recovery from classical physics as the unfortunate heritage of positivism and the paradigm for all other discourses, including research in social sciences. The dynamical structure of a quantum entity is triadic. The apparently opposite terms of A and not-A as its perceived “other” are in a triadic relation in accordance with the semiotic logic of the included middle designated as T (Fig. 1).



Edusemiotics, Subjectivity, and New Materialism, Fig. 1 A genuine triadic relation describing a quantum entity

The cutting-edge science of coordination dynamics (Kelso and Engström 2006) does not separate the world of nature from the human mind but posits a single entity designated as body ~ mind. The symbol tilde (or squiggle ~) creates a new vocabulary to describe the philosophy of complementary pairs (signs) that spills over analytic reason and the mere expression of linguistic truths. This symbol designates the “between” relation as intrinsic to edusemiotics, new materialism, and quantum physics alike. The notation (~) between body and mind indicates a unifying connecting relation as the prerogative of genuine signs. The logic intrinsic to the action of signs demonstrates the radical rationality of semiosis that overcomes widespread dichotomies.

The principle of complementarity (versus opposition) was first posited by physicist Niels Bohr who questioned the “either-or” description of nature (either particles or waves). For Bohr, whose position incidentally inspired Barad’s research, the interplay of *yin* and *yang* tendencies forming one integrated whole in the Chinese philosophy of Taoism was relevant to, and informative for, his new theory. Physicist David Bohm, positing the process of holomovement, emphasized the absence of any direct (mechanistic) causality in lieu of the relations between events interwoven into the whole by the network of quanta. What we tend to perceive as binary opposites at the level of ordinary experience are in fact not contradictory but complementary at the most subtle, quantum, level. They are engaged in coordinated, relational dynamics that makes them a pair, a couple, a double-sided single entity: a sign. It is coupling that demonstrates the continuous balancing act – what Leibniz would call a

dance of particles folding back on themselves – as a property of the relational network of signs that coordinate, or reconcile, nature and culture.

Semiosis is the relational network of signs which are perpetually in action, and quanta (Fig. 1) partake of signs full of implicit information that continuously changes its mode of expression, fluctuating between polar opposites. The logic of the included middle ensures the coordination dynamics that “champions the concept of functional information, and shows that it arises as a consequence of a coupled, self-organized dynamical system living in the metastable regime where only tendencies... coexist” (Kelso and Engström 2006, p. 104). Meaning emerges when such coordination is temporarily stabilized. Signs – as well as quantum entities – are *a priori* virtual tendencies only, and Deleuze was right when he postulated his ontology of the virtual. Yet signs become actual – that is, acquire meaning – when interpreted in practice. It was Peirce who saw that the full development of semiotics as the science of signs required a dynamic view of signification: the process of the production of meanings as included thirds called interpretants. At the practical level, when we step into the lifeworld of experiences participating as such in the action of signs, then, due to the string of interpretants that include our own actions, we begin to understand the meanings of this and subsequent experiences: we learn by actively creating such meaning!

Edusemiotics, Nomadic Education, and Semiotic Competence

The concept of “nomad,” as posited by Deleuze and Guattari, is fruitful for edusemiotics. A nomadic place is always intense because nomads’ existence is inseparable from the region or space they occupy: together they create a rhizomatic network of interdependent relations. The smooth space occupied by nomads is an open-ended relational process ~ structure (with *tilde*) in contrast to a closed striated space ordered by rigid schemata, point-to-point linear connections, and displaying strict boundaries and

borders. The classical episteme of metric systems, technical objectives, and precise measurements and classifications gives way to an experimental and experiential “field... wedded to... non-metric, acentered, rhizomatic multiplicities” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, p. 381); these qualitative multiplicities (versus quantitative or metric units) are semiotic relations or signs. The action of signs as the primary subject matter of semiotic inquiry extends beyond verbal language, even though it is only through linguistic competence that this range can be brought to light for us as inquirers and learners.

Experiential learning is equated with the development of semiotic consciousness, which is the explicit awareness of the function of signs acting across nature and culture. A semiotic consciousness presupposes fully fledged semiotic competence, of which linguistic competence is only a subset. It is semiotic competence that edusemiotics is designed to elucidate in the field of educational theory and practice. This perspective is important to edusemiotics with its attention also to such expressive “languages” as images, diagrams, graphic symbols, hieroglyphs, as well as signs portending in the world. Such a broad understanding of semiotic systems makes it clear that the notion of “text” exceeds its literal meaning. Texts can be of any physical structure that embodies ideas as signs. The whole of culture, in such a radical sense, is a text and so is the “book of nature.” Both texts can be read, interpreted, understood, and acted upon.

While the notion of “agency” is essential, it is never an individual agent that “acts” within semiosis. As signs are relational entities, so are human agents who are themselves signs and should always be taken in the context of their relations with others, in nature and culture alike. Edusemiotics considers human subjectivity as always already posthuman and situated in nomadic spaces. Barad, in the context of new materialism, advocates the concept of agential realism based on the ontological inseparability of “agencies.” It is the relation that is ontologically fundamental, and such relations (as genuine signs) constitute an unorthodox agency as a community of inquiry. Peirce attributed particular significance

to community in its knowledge-producing practice: “The real, then, is that which, sooner or later, information and reasoning would finally result in, and which is therefore independent of the vagaries of me and you. Thus the very origin of the conception of reality shows that this conception essentially involves the notion of a **community**, without definite limits, and capable of a definite increase of knowledge” (Peirce CP 5.311). Such a community of practical inquiry is theoretically unbounded by space or time and is future-oriented, notwithstanding that as discrete physical individuals we of course remain finite human beings:

Finally, as what anything really is, is what it may finally come to be known to be in the ideal state of complete information, so that reality depends on the ultimate decision of the community; so thought is what it is, only by virtue of its addressing a future thought which is in its value as thought identical with it, though more developed. In this way, the existence of thought now depends on what is to be hereafter; so that it has only a potential existence, dependent on the future thought of the community. (Peirce CP 5.316)

Edusemiotics alerts, however, that what is finally known is bound to lurk in the *future* precisely because a semiotic system remains open to new information, new experiences, new meanings, and new modes of action. A sign’s closure on its meaning is simultaneously an opening to another, more developed, one. The state of complete information, pointed to by Peirce, remains a limit case that, paradoxically, would forever “close” a system by putting a stop to its very dynamics. Achieving a semiotic competence is a never-ending learning process.

Posthuman Subjectivity

Nomadic education proceeds along the lines of signs-becoming-other (read: self-becoming-other) – and human subjectivity, which is itself a sign, emerges amidst the experiential “*encounter*” of the sensible object and the object of thought” (Deleuze 2007, p. 151). Still, the emphasis on individual agency remains a deeply ingrained habit of contemporary philosophical thought

and, by implication, education: either implicitly or explicitly, both tend to carry on the Cartesian tradition with its strict boundary between the dual categories of mind and body, subject and object, self and other, human and nonhuman. The value of relations and the nature of the self ~ other complementary pair as a minimal theoretical unit posited by edusemiotics remain either ignored or underestimated. It is a relation that *extends* human mind into a larger world that includes both socio-cultural and natural aspects. Human subjectivity as community is thus necessarily posthuman and presupposes an ecological awareness. It was John Dewey who persistently argued against separating human experience and the whole of culture from nature. He spoke about the cooperative (or civic) intelligence necessary for associated living which, for him, was what democracy was all about.

For Dewey, experience is never exclusively personal: it is “nature’s, localized in a body as that body happened to exist by nature” (Dewey 1925/1958, p. 231). A semiotic process is cooperative because of the transactional dynamics that involves responses on both sides of the relation and as such “constitutes the intelligibility of acts and things. Possession of the capacity to engage in such activity is intelligence” (Dewey 1925/1958, pp. 179–180). Semiotic competence demands developing posthuman intelligence as a significant part of education that considers “Natural events... messages to be enjoyed and administered” (Dewey 1925/1958, p. 174). When the human mind extends to accommodate the non-human nature, we begin to understand the meaning of such an expansive experience. Dewey’s philosophy is an invaluable resource for edusemiotics.

Edusemiotics demands a shift of perception from static objects and stable structures to dynamic processes crossing over the mind-body dualism and leading to the dynamical “formation of patterns in open systems” (Kelso and Engström 2006, p. 112). It is fully semiotic, anti-dual, reason that is always open to the creation of meanings, and as such it should become instrumental for forming, informing, and transforming education. New, emergent, meanings are the natural consequences of triadic logic on the basis of which

new signs, including ourselves, are created. We are not Cartesian Cogitos but signs possessing eco-centric (not ego-centric) consciousness. Edusemiotic intelligence exceeds even interpersonal reasoning (which remains invaluable for our relations with and understanding “others”) and includes a *transpersonal* aspect, thus bringing into existence the deepest meanings latent in the posthuman dimension of experience, in nature. Edusemiotics would be incomplete without a developed posthuman intelligence, which in turn is a function of growth, learning and developing semiotic competence as part and parcel of edusemiotics.

The ultimate task of edusemiotics is to produce subjectivities that are open to the larger environment (comprising other people, cultures, nations, languages, natural habitats), thus forming with it one organic whole. Taking responsibility for developing a new type of holistic intelligence capable of putting into practice relational ethics, hence sustaining both human and posthuman communities, is one of the many challenges faced by edusemioticians. Educational policy needs to be informed by the semiotic logic of the included middle. Accordingly, policy-makers – rather than merely articulating theoretical goals, missions, norms, rules, and measures – should become aware of the action of signs.

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Emotions

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Synonyms

[Affect](#); [Feeling](#); [Passion](#); [Sentiment](#)

Introduction

Cognitive science has shown that emotions are a *sine qua non* for cognition, and nowadays emotions are not anymore understood as irrational or “nonintellectual” feelings. The debate regarding the nature of emotions is still ongoing; however, it would be possible to provide a general definition of emotions as complex states of mind and body, which have an active power – they are not

characterized only as receptivity – that impacts human’s intentionality towards the environment.

The goal of this entry is to highlight the role of emotions in reasoning, focusing on their meaningfulness in learning environments and in those educational practices where emotions work together with rationality to enhance understanding and learning. Following the description of the three main ways to understand emotions in the contemporary philosophy of emotions, this entry will discuss the differences between the standard cognitivist approach and other approaches grounded in the embodied cognition in education.

Emotions as Judgments

Cognitivism in the philosophy of emotion assumes that emotions are identical to propositional judgments. In the *History of Western Philosophy*, Aristotle was the first to highlight the rational valence of the *pathemata*, and the Stoics provided the identification between emotions and evaluative judgment. Many contemporary philosophers ground their cognitivist approach to these ancient roots (cf. Nussbaum 2001) valorizing the intelligence of emotions in practical reasoning.

The arousing of prejudice, pity, anger, and similar emotions has nothing to do with the essential facts, but is merely a personal appeal to the man who is judging the case. (Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 1354 a16–19)

Emotions as Perceptions A quite novel approach is the perceptual model (cf. Prinz 2004), for which emotions are a form of perceptions, i.e., the more primitive and basic form of cognition. This approach has significant consequences for moral philosophy, since it claims that as perceptions are related to judgment about the empirical world, emotions are, therefore, related to moral judgments (Goldie 2007).

The perceptual model emphasizes the “feeling towards,” i.e., the intentional character of emotions: just like perceptions, emotions overcome themselves in order to reach the object they are for. This model has a mind-to-world direction:

The emotions are intentional. By this I mean that the thoughts and feelings involved in an emotion have a directedness towards an object. [...] the object of an

Note: None of the terms mentioned as synonyms carries the meaning that “emotion” has come to bear in cognitive sciences and contemporary philosophy of emotion.

emotion is that onto which one's thoughts and feelings are typically directed, and to which they typically return, so the object of my pride in this example is not just myself, nor just my house, but my-house-which-belongs-to-me. (Goldie 2000, pp. 16–17)

In practical reasoning, emotions are not only a passive stance, but thanks to their intentional and motivational power they are an active force in the “organization” of patterns of actions. As in the cognitivist approach, emotions “could be said to be judgments, in the sense that they are what we see the world ‘in terms of.’ But they need not consist in articulated propositions.” (De Sousa 2014, p. 19). Following this direction many exponents of the perceptual model reply to the main critique toward cognitivism, i.e., the non-conceptual apprehension of the world of beast and babies (cf. Deigh 1994), by binding emotions with desires.

Emotions as Body Feelings and Other Similar Approaches

The criticism towards the standard version of cognitivism has led to new paradigms that share the recognition of the strong value of body experience and environment. Even if these approaches have some peculiar traits creating differences among them, one could still highlight the common rejection of the standard assumption that cognition is instantiated “centrally” by the brain only. Emotions are expressions of the whole living organism embedded in the world and affectivity pervades the mind.

According to William James emotions are body feelings: in the apprehension of reality first comes the body feeling and then the judgment of experience. Physiological changes precede emotions that are the subjective experience of body changes.

If we fancy some strong emotion, and then try to abstract from our consciousness of it all the feelings of its characteristic bodily symptoms, we find we have nothing left behind, no “mind-stuff” out of which the emotion can be constituted, and that a cold and neutral state of intellectual perception is all that remains. (James 1950, p. 173)

Aside from James's account, in this category we could count those approaches emanating from continental philosophy, mainly from phenomenology, existentialism and women's philosophy, and multidisciplinary approaches that combine different disciplines as philosophy, psychology, sociology, biology, and neuroscience. In particular, enactivism (Varela, et al. 1991), that describes an embodied and embedded cognition, and the extended mind hypothesis (Clark and Chalmers 1998), that focuses on the cognitive valence of external tools, have elaborated very promising theories about the role of emotions in general or particular emotions in cognitive processing (cf. Colombetti 2014; Slaby 2014; Candiotti 2015; Carter et al. 2016).

In these approaches, the comprehension of emotions is grounded in an account of the mind that emphasizes its embodied and affective character, making the emotion the more primitive way in which an organism understands, decides, and acts in a particular environment.

Emotions in Education

Generally, the theoretical background of most methodological approaches with regards to the use of emotions in reasoning comes from cognitivism and, partially, from constructivism. Problem solving and multiple intelligences (emotional intelligence, among the perceptual and conceptual ones) are emphasized by cognitive methodologies in education. One such approach suggests that emotional intelligence can fulfill the human experience of life and that its promotion could improve significantly the majority of relational skills. Daniel Goleman (1995) outlines five skills involved in emotional intelligence: (1) being aware of one's emotions, (2) managing emotions, (3) motivating oneself, (4) empathizing, and (5) relating well with others in a group. He explains that these skills can be learned just like any other subject. Many trainings have been developed (i.e., the Life Skills training) in order to make students aware and leaders of their emotional competency, both in their positive and

negative outcomes, providing them some tools for feeling.

If we think of emotions as essential elements of human intelligence, rather than just as supports or props for intelligence, this gives us especially strong reasons to promote the conditions of emotional well-being in a political culture: for this view entails that without emotional development, a part of our reasoning capacity as political creatures will be missing. (Nussbaum 2001, p. 3)

The capability approach, developed by Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen, stresses the importance of emotions as inner resources of the human being to develop her/his potentialities and to determine the quality of life – not only for the individual but for the community as well.

For constructivism (Averill 1980) the social context represents the basis of the generation of emotional responses; social epistemology moves beyond the traditional focus on solitary knowers and stresses social and public mechanisms in the quest for truth. A variety of projects were developed in the direction of creation of emotional life in safe learning environments where dialogical communication and sharing cognition were improved (i.e., the Philosophy for Children curriculum created by Matthew Lipman and the contemporary Socratic Dialogue).

[...] what often causes a breakdown of understanding is that the parties involved are able to appreciate only the linguistic or the cognitive factors involved in their interaction with one another but fail to achieve that exchange of emotions that would make their mutual understanding a reality. (Lipman 2003, p. 270)

The experienced and embodied knowledge stresses the external shared dialogical embodiment of the cognitively-motivational state of students. The key idea is that knowledge processes are not abstract but embedded in real practical situations (cf. Ardeli and Ferrari 2014). The social ratiocinating interactions are emphasized in all disciplines, also in the scientific ones. Some learning programs (Prensky 2013) based on the extended mind theory are still at work, often connected to

media education. Extended emotions represent a meaningful hypothesis among the externalist conceptions of mind to design educational programs where knowledge is not understood as the goal of solitary knowers but as the dynamic result of an active and external cognitive and learning process emerging from the interaction inside a group.

The affective dynamics pertaining to a group profoundly transforms the individual group member's emotional experience. Could this process reach the point at which entirely *novel* emotional processes are constituted? This would be a case where goings-on on the group level would function as a phenomenal extension of an individual's emotions. (Slaby 2014, p. 32)

What is crucial to understand about the learning group settings is that the classroom emotional climate (CEC) is not just something good to pursue because it creates a better environment to improve the relationship among students and between students and teachers but, significantly, that it is exactly this learning environment that permits to attain cognitive and learning achievements. That is why emotions are not just shared but also “extended.”

A wide overview – even if not exhaustive – of the many and different programs which have as background what was presented here as the third approach on emotions (emotions as body feelings) could be found in Lund and Cheni (2015).

Conclusion

Discussions about the influence of emotions in learning and in the ability to process information, i.e., if emotions just affect learning or if they are a necessary component of reasoning, are still à la page. Research on the so-called epistemic emotions, i.e., curiosity, love of truth, wonder, intellectual courage, and meticulousness, looks very promising and offers significant contributions to the debate. Moreover, these results are strictly connected to research about the usability of knowledge learned since this kind of emotions could be seen as “facilitating structure” (Immordino-Yang

and Damasio 2007) for the application of knowledge and therefore for practical reasoning.

Another import field of research focuses on transdisciplinary methodologies utilized to improve the emotional skills of the students. Regarding this point the emotion cross-cultural studies, combining art, literature, music, drama, film, etc. are very encouraging.

As the entry has underlined, there are many different theoretical and practical approaches to emotions in reasoning; however, it is possible to highlight a common and general account of the contemporary theories and projects, that is the recognition that emotions really matter, since they make something or someone more prominent, i.e., meaningful in relation to our acts. Then, regarding the learning theory and practice, emotions are very important to improve student's motivation towards learning, their attention to determining salience to the topics, their capabilities to storage information, and to use the knowledge learned in daily life. Emotions have not just an instrumental value for learning – for example, helping to make juicier the process of learning for the students, more connected to their experience, and able to improve the students' participation to the process – but also an intrinsic value, defined by the role of emotions in reasoning, i.e., to be the primitive source for the subject to understand and decide how to act in the world.

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Cross-References

- [Dialogue and Critical Pedagogy](#)
- [Educational Leadership, the Emotions, and Neuroscience](#)
- [Emotions and Educational Leadership](#)
- [Socratic Dialogue: A Comparison Between Ancient and Contemporary Method](#)

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Emotions and Educational Leadership

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Synonyms

[Educational leadership](#); [Emotions](#); [Feminist and critical approach](#); [Psychological approach](#); [Socio-cultural approach](#)

Introduction

In the last two decades, there has been growing research challenging the binary between reason/emotion embedded in mainstream literature on educational leadership. For many years, emotions were characterized as irrational, and as such, they were not considered to have a legitimate place in the workplace (Ashforth and Humphrey 1995). But research on emotions in the workplace, including educational organizations, started to flourish in the early 1990s after it gradually became evident that emotions were influential in decision-making, motivation and behaviors in organizations, administration, and leadership. Although the importance of researching emotions for understanding educational leaders is realized, the literature on emotions and educational leadership is still limited (Berkovich and Eyal 2015). In addition, there is still considerable conceptual work to be done in relation to the theoretical approaches that are mobilized to explore emotion in educational leadership.

The aim of the present entry is to review findings and methods about the emotional aspects related to educational leadership during the last two decades. This is not a comprehensive review of specific literature but rather a broad sketch of the landscape to provide an overview of the field. The entry begins by showing how and why emotions are relevant to understanding educational

leadership. Next, it discusses the different theoretical approaches of emotion that have been utilized in educational leadership research; it is also suggested that theoretical assumptions about emotion have relevant methodological implications in terms of how emotions are studied. Then, the entry summarizes some of the most important findings in the study of emotions in educational leadership, outlining the major themes emerging from research. The entry concludes with the implications of these findings for future research about emotions and educational leadership.

How and Why Emotions Are Relevant to Educational Leadership

In the last two decades or so, there have been calls for balancing logic and artistry in leadership (Deal and Peterson 1994), for leading with teacher emotions in mind (Leithwood and Beatty 2006), and for passionate leadership (Davies and Brighouse 2008). Moreover, empirical work has indicated that emotions are powerful forces in school leaders' lives warranting attention (Berkovich and Eyal 2015). There is also growing evidence in the research literature that the affective world of school leaders is both complex and intense (Samier and Schmidt 2009). School leaders are confronted on a daily basis with a variety of emotions that are inextricably linked to personal, professional, relational, political, and cultural issues.

The school leaders' emotional struggles have significant implications for their decision-making, well-being, and overall leadership style. School leaders are constantly engaged in emotion management processes, often with serious implications not only for their emotional health but also for their professional effectiveness (Blackmore 2011); at the same time, however, research also documents how mechanisms of emotion management help school leaders promote their own agenda, survive the high emotional demands of school leadership, and bring meaningful changes to their school (Beatty and Brew 2004). School leaders' handling of the emotions in their own reflective practices and in their relationships with

parents, students, and faculty shapes and reflects the climate and culture of their schools (Leithwood and Beatty 2006).

In general, it has been suggested that emotions are asserted for understanding educational leaders in four ways (Berkovich and Eyal 2015). First, emotional experiences and their displays in educational organizations are manifestations of leaders' visions, desires, and fears. For example, positive emotions may indicate the fulfillment of a desired goal, while negative emotions may be indicative of the opposite. Second, educational leaders' behaviors have an impact on the emotions of those with whom leaders interact. For example, teachers' negative emotions may indicate unfavorable leadership behaviors; on the other hand, teachers' positive emotions may be indicative of favorable leadership behaviors like transformational and supportive leadership behaviors. Third, it has been suggested that leaders' affective abilities (or "emotional intelligence") are more likely to promote desired organizational outcomes, because leaders are enabled to control their own emotions or direct the emotions of others toward desired goals. Fourth, educational leaders' emotions may be influenced by macro-factors and social structures that have made educational leadership work to become more conflicted and political. Thus, economic, social, and political conditions influence the work of educational leaders and their emotional lives, and, therefore, their desired work outcomes.

Approaches in the Study of Emotion in Educational Leadership

Generally speaking, the study of emotions in educational leadership has followed three major approaches: the psychological approach, the sociocultural approach, and finally the feminist and critical approach. The strongest influence has been from psychological theory, management theory, and brain science, particularly Daniel Goleman's work on emotional intelligence; the influence from feminist social theory, critical organizational theory, the sociology of emotions, and critical pedagogy has been less, yet it seems to

gain considerable ground in recent years (Blackmore 2011).

The psychological approach treats emotions as individual, private, and autonomous psychological traits and states. The influence of this approach has been mostly evident through Goleman's notion of emotional intelligence. Emotional intelligence is being mobilized in educational leadership to urge teachers and leaders to handle the emotions of themselves as well as those of others and to develop emotional literacy. The notion of emotional intelligence has been translated into the educational leadership literature as a new source of leadership strength (see Blackmore 2011). Therefore, it is argued that emotional management is important for the success of organizations, including educational ones; in fact, emotional intelligence is linked to the success of one's leadership style. For example, for those who are able to express and manage their emotions appropriately, it is suggested that they are more capable to achieve influence over others and be more effective in creating a productive professional environment. The methods of data collection grounded in the psychological approach are usually questionnaires and emotional intelligence tests; the epistemological assumption embedded in these methods is the notion of emotions as individual, psychological traits.

The psychological approach has been critiqued because it focuses on the leader as an individual and fails to address the limits and possibilities arising from the contextual and situated relationships in which the leader works (Blackmore 2011). Furthermore, the social and organizational cultural dimension of emotions is taken as given with the assumption that leaders work within the frame of existing social and organizational conditions. There is no theorization of the relationship between agency and structure, no theory of how power works in organizations, and little discussion of the emotional economies of organizations; instead the organization and the leader (with his or her individual emotions) are treated as universal concepts, without specific histories or identities formed and negotiated through complex social relations (Blackmore 2011).

Recent studies on emotions and educational leadership are following the growing trends in educational leadership research toward a social and organizational cultural approach (Zorn and Boler 2007). This approach moves beyond a focus on leaders in specialized roles and toward seeing both emotions and leadership embedded in a social and organizational environment (e.g., see, Leithwood and Beatty 2006). Additionally, this is a departure from the view of emotions through individualist and psychological terms toward a perspective that also recognizes the sociocultural dimension of emotions. Research following this interactionist view of emotions and educational leadership emphasizes that emotions and leadership are influencing each other, and thus, there is an interrelation between emotions and their social and organizational setting.

The sociocultural approach has also been critiqued (see Blackmore 2011; Zembylas 2009) for conceptualizing emotions and social settings as individual forces that act upon each other (Zorn and Boler 2007). That is, there is still a dualistic view of educational organizations in which individuals experience private and autonomous emotions which act upon and are influenced by organizational culture. Even Beatty's social and organizational analysis of emotions in educational leadership through a social constructionist lens (see Leithwood and Beatty 2006) makes the problematic assumption that organizations are either constructed or pregiven (Zorn and Boler 2007). Her approach assumes that emotions are still perceived as private experiences located in the psychological self (e.g., successful leadership is associated with personality characteristics), thereby failing to really take into account the power relations and the role of social and political structures in forming feelings in teachers, learners, and leaders.

Recent work in the social sciences (including cultural studies, feminist studies, sociology, political science, and communications) increasingly recognizes emotions as part of everyday social, cultural, and political life (Zembylas 2009). Emotions in leadership, therefore, are not only a psychological matter but also a political space in which school leaders, teachers, students, and

parents interact, with implications for larger political and cultural struggles for change. In the emergent new approach, the social and political dimensions of emotions are recognized, offering important insights in educational leadership, organizational change, and school reform literature. As a theoretical construct, the notion of emotions as relational and contextual – which also implies a move from psychological methods of study to sociological and anthropological perspectives – highlights how culture and politics relate to emotions. This theorization of emotion contributes to a different understanding of educational leadership in which issues related to the social and political factors influencing leaders' emotions, the leaders' emotional practices and their impact on school culture, and the "affective economies" under which educational leadership is enacted become the center stage of interest.

Major Findings of Research

Following the above approaches, there are three core themes emerging from findings on emotions and educational leadership in the last two decades (Berkovich and Eyal 2015; Blackmore 2011): (a) how leaders express their own emotional experiences; (b) what the effects of leaders' emotional experiences are on others; and, finally, (c) whether emotions and leadership are understood as abilities or as social practices that arise within particular social, cultural, and political settings. Each theme is briefly discussed below.

In relation to the first theme, research findings indicate that there are three kinds of factors that influence leaders' emotional experiences and their displays: (a) contextual factors at the macro- and microlevel, (b) leadership role factors, and (c) mission-related factors (Berkovich and Eyal 2015). Contextual factors concern issues of sociocultural power relations at the macrolevel (e.g., gender, race, social class, poverty, ethnicity, and age) that shape emotional norms within a society or an educational organization and influence leaders' emotional expressions and displays. For example, neoliberal educational policies promoting accountability and competition influence

leaders' emotional experiences, evoking negative emotions that have an impact on leaders' work (Blackmore 2011). Similarly, the lack of professional autonomy or sufficient organizational support and positive climate at the microlevel evoke unpleasant emotions in leaders. Furthermore, leaders' emotions may be influenced by several key characteristics of the educational leadership role such as structural isolation and workload (Berkovich and Eyal 2015). Finally, factors that are relevant to the mission of leadership in itself – e.g., resistance and obstacles in the pursuit of social justice and equity – seem to be associated with leaders' negative emotions; on the other hand, positive emotions are evoked when there is some success in overcoming resistance and obstacles. Leaders seem to develop a variety of strategies for coping with the emotional and structural dimensions of mission-related leadership.

In relation to the effects of leaders' emotional experiences on others, findings show that leaders' emotionally supportive behaviors (high or low) appear to be particularly important because they affect others' emotions (Berkovich and Eyal 2015). Thus, relationship-oriented behaviors focusing on supporting others and promoting their needs have a positive impact on others' emotions. These behaviors influence the emotional climate of the school, although there is no evidence whether they directly or indirectly influence the learning outcomes. On the other hand, mistreating behaviors by leaders (e.g., aggressive, controlling, or abusive behavior) seem to have harmful effects on teachers' emotions. The methods used to study the effects of leaders' emotional experiences on others are both quantitative and qualitative, but given the emphasis on behavior, most of the studies are influenced by behavioral and social psychology.

Finally, in relation to how leadership and emotions are understood and enacted as social practices that arise within particular social, cultural, and political settings, there seem to be two different directions followed. On the one hand, there is a focus on leaders' emotional abilities – grounded in the exploration of emotions around the concept of emotional intelligence (see Berkovich and Eyal 2015). Studies are primarily quantitative (e.g.,

using self-reports) and show that leaders' general emotional intelligence abilities are correlated with transformational leadership behaviors. Qualitative studies also indicate that leaders acknowledge the significance of empathetic abilities for the leadership role; empathetic abilities are also valuable for mission-related factors such as social justice transformation. It is suggested that empathetic abilities can make a difference in the organizations climate and professional relations and that such behaviors can be developed by training. Moreover, it is shown that educational leaders use a variety of strategies to regulate their emotions. As such, self-regulation of emotion is considered an important ability in enacting the leadership role in order for the leader to appear in control of himself or herself and the situation.

On the other hand, feminist and critical leadership literature is concerned with how leadership is entangled with emotions as gendered and racialized practices (Blackmore 2011; Zembylas 2009). For example, there is evidence how women have often been pathologized for their emotional expressions, being positioned as emotional and weak and not effective leaders but natural carers/teachers of young children. Emotions, then, in this body of educational leadership literature, are theorized as sites of both social control and power. This perspective challenges the body of work that sees emotions as just located within the individual, but rather recognizes that educational leadership is embedded in social and political structures and unequal power relations. Research that is conceptually grounded in this perspective shows how emotion is displayed, perceived, and understood differently according to the gender, racial, cultural, and political positioning of the leader and the norms of the organization or society. The tensions that arise as a result of the "politics of emotion" within a particular setting also highlight the deeper ethical struggles for those concerned with social justice and transformational leadership.

Conclusions and Implications

This entry focused on findings and methods about the emotional aspects related to educational

leadership during the last two decades. The discussion showed that the field is still in its early developmental stage (Berkovich and Eyal 2015). Although the emotional dimensions of educational leadership are widely recognized in the literature, the dominant approach does not draw from feminist social theory, critical organizational theory, the sociology of emotions, or critical pedagogy, but rather from psychological theory (Blackmore 2011). However, recent work into the “politics of emotions” creates new openings for enriching our perspectives about the dynamics of affective relations in the political landscape of the school culture. These openings have to do with a critical understanding of the role of emotions in the constitution of power relations in educational organizations, how emotion discourses are formed and mobilized, and what their political implications are. To study emotions in educational leadership within this theoretical framework allows the exploration of spaces that move beyond theories that psychologize emotions and treat them as internalized (e.g., psychoanalysis) or structural theories that emphasize how structures shape the individual (e.g., Marxism). In this sense emotions are neither private nor merely effects of outside structures. The role of power relations in how affective economies are constructed directs attention to an exploration of emotion discourses and the mechanisms with which emotions are “disciplined” and certain norms are imposed and internalized as “normal.” This kind of theorization allows educational leaders first to identify such discourses and then to destabilize and denaturalize the regimes that demand certain emotions be expressed and others disciplined.

The contribution of new approaches in researching and theorizing emotions in educational leadership amounts to an intervention in a much larger debate about subjectivities in school culture, in which concepts of affective elements of consciousness and relationships, community, and reform are slowly being reexamined (Zembylas 2009). This sociopolitical dimension of emotions in educational leadership creates the difference between possible and real transformation, and it

is this difference that constitutes the power of the more recent theoretical ideas presented here as critical “tools” to challenge contemporary discourses about emotional intelligence in educational leadership – discourses which are caught in the obsession for performativity, efficiency, bureaucratic rationality, cultural assimilation, moral self-control, and normalization of “emotional skills” (Blackmore 2011). The need for a deeper conceptualization of this sociopolitical character can guide future research on emotions in educational leadership in whatever locality, research informed by a genuine search to understand the power and the limitations of the political merits or demerits of any affective economy within an educational organization.

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Emotive Expression

- [Quest of Educational Slogans, The](#)

Empathy

- [Social Emotional Learning and Latino Students](#)

Empire

- [Poststructuralism, Postcolonialism, and Education](#)

Empirical Science

- [Wittgenstein as Educator](#)

End of Philosophy, The

- [Nietzschean Education and Gelassenheit-Education](#)

English

- [Global English, Postcolonialism, and Education](#)

Enlightenment

- [Mach and Science Teaching](#)

Entitlements

- [Children's Rights](#)

Environment and Education

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Synonyms

[Education for sustainability](#); [Environment-as-an-integrating-context](#); [Environmental education](#); [Nature-based education](#); [Outdoor education](#); [Urban environmental education](#)

Introduction

Environment and education have been primarily understood in two main ways in educational philosophy and theory in much of the English-speaking world. In brief, these ways tap into (a) questions of surroundings and relations to those, and (b) what is worth knowing, valuing, and doing about patterns and changes in our interactions with our environments.

The connection between the two is most apparent when environmental educators consider the positive and negative effects of human-environment interactions and livelihoods on the conditions for living and flourishing on earth for all its inhabitants – human and otherwise – more broadly, not just those in which people dwell. Thus, in this entry, while the main focus in environmental education is on the second aspect, the first will be sketched too, as it sets the scene for various cross-cutting considerations about environment and education.

Experiencing a World Around Us

The first sense mentioned above taps into the familiar conception and meaning of environment as *that which surrounds* and to which *an organism responds and adapts*. Implicit within this is a sense that people's engagement with their

surroundings has multiple dimensions (Ingold 2000): it is intellectual as well as sensuous, aesthetic as much as a matter of ethics, involves volition and emotion and not simply cognition, and is historically conditioned even if it also remains indeterminate, i.e., open to the possibility of change.

Following this line of reasoning, an environment forms the grounds and sources for various options and activities of dwelling, personhood, security, reciprocity, economy, and identity formation (and their disruption), for individuals and groups. In other words, for this entry, it behoves us to recognize that all education takes place in an experiential space, and following phenomenological considerations, *being in place* is where one comes to know others and is known to others.

As Bonnett (2004) notes, terms such as *oikos* (as home), *khôra* (as a key root for understandings of space), and *topos* (the equivalent for place) communicate much of the existential dimensions to a sense of both the conditions and contexts of talk of environment. They also hone attention on what is concrete, specific, and particular to people living in habitable places, in contrast to what is abstract, idealized, or mythic for our experiences in and across some of the diverse environments, lifeworlds, and possibilities for life on this planet. Thus, an “environmental education,” as an important way of bringing these matters together, may involve elements of environmental awareness and nature appreciation (e.g., fostering a sense of awe and wonder, grasping the aesthetics of the sublime and picturesque), as much as lead to a questioning and even rejecting of certain ways of living in particular places, by becoming aware and appreciating their connections to others, e.g., through colonialism, globalization, and accelerating consumptionism.

To return to the first sense though, in educational and developmental psychology, a key concern is what an environment affords a learner during different phases of an individual’s lifespan, taking into account their motivations, intentions, ableness, and behaviors when interacting with an environment. Thus, from early childhood studies and experiential education to many of the models of developmental psychology and

phenomenology that can inform aspects of educational philosophy and theory, a key focus is on the gaining of capabilities and insights to interact with an environment, particularly through motor skills and cognitive development. These might include through the discovery of new opportunities for movement shifts in perception and worldview, and novel forms of interaction for an individual with an environment into adulthood (see, Sheets-Johnstone 2009), e.g., through outdoor education, environmentally sensitive arts programs, or a “green skills” training syllabus for adults in the vocational sector. Teaching and learning in a range of high-quality environments – and ensuring those afford rich educational experiences – are key corollaries for this sense of linking environment and education.

However, the “baggage” associated with such a view must also be elaborated, by recognizing that environment is typically assumed to require a degree of naturalness to the spaces surrounding an individual, e.g., in outdoor settings or in places for play, discovery, navigation, adventure, instruction, and gainful employment. For educators, while this “intentional field of significance” (Bonnett 2004) is usually recognized as co-constructed, for an individual learner, the environment may still be assumed to be one beyond the traditional classroom setting. Indeed, it may be on *terra firma* rather than (say) water, often in rural settings rather than urban ones, in relatively pristine environments in preference to degraded ones, and with the teacher’s and learner’s attention steered towards the ecological rather than, for example, the economic realities of ways of living. This is despite a long tradition of a variety of approaches to studying environment and society, such as in geography, biology, and “home economics,” as well as in alternative approaches, e.g., urban and built environmental education. Some of these can be traced to, for example, anarchist traditions of thought (e.g., Ward 1978) and more contemporary expressions in psychogeography with its interests in liminal and problematic environs (e.g., rooted in situationist perspectives). These alternatives tend to invite (or require) more of a focus on the experiencing and shaping of environmental consciousness and reflexivities

and, more recently, questions of affect and materiality in offering critique of human-environment interactions, as in exploring and our responses to (typically) urban, postindustrial, and derelict environments. Thus, a key area ripe for development in educational philosophy and theory is examining the significance of everyday places, spaces, and life to environment and education. These include how environments are appropriated, imagined, inhabited, and reworked through diverse intentions and interpretations of places and spaces; their shifting affordances and interactions, including in relation to those environments that might be marginal and/or hidden from society at large, including to its educators and learners (e.g., risky, mundane, ambiguous, paradoxical, ecophobic or unattractive environments, as well as “non-places” – see Augé (1995), on the significance of motorways, hotel rooms, airports, and shopping malls to learning about “super-modern” ways of life).

Other new directions for educational philosophy and theory in this regard include incorporating insights from ecological anthropology and the environmental humanities. These shift the focus away from that of an individual’s senses and meaning-making in two key directions, namely, towards (i) the sociocultural beliefs and practices in both adapting and maintaining environments and ecosystems, and (ii) studying and learning from a wide range of human responses to environmental challenges and problems and how these are represented – and possibly addressed – in historic, contemporary, and possible societal formations and worldviews, e.g., given currents in politics, economics, history, epistemology, and demographics.

A major concern can be voiced though, regarding the degree of environmental *determinism* that can be embedded in some of the assumptions at work in associated philosophies and theories of education, including within a broad sweep of “ecopedagogies.” In brief, that exposure to selected and primarily biophysical environments can be assumed to predispose people to develop particular values, insights, behaviors, or societal trajectories, or put more strongly, that ecopedagogies inculcate these. We return to this concern in the next section,

but at this point, we note this situation contrasts with the emphasis in much social thought on *possibilism*, which seeks to recognize anthropological and democratic constraints and limitations, including matters of contingency and negotiation in the construction and outcomes of meaningful environmental educational experiences, e.g., in empowering eco-identities, sharing or deconstructing unsustainable social relations, and challenging environmental injustices. In other words, a possibilist focus affords a stronger emphasis on concerted and complex configurations of human interactions given, for example, various facets of structure and agency and on notions of success and failure in this regard, e.g., when learning from our mistakes with the environment. It also serves to shift the emphasis away from simplistically “reading off” pedagogical priorities from environmental conditions, e.g., the “earth education” of the 1970s and 1980s in the USA and the United Nations’ versions of “education for sustainable development” of the 2000s. In both, while a sense of interconnectedness and transformation is strongly expected, in fact, neither has had the wide-ranging and far-reaching uptake and impacts that their sponsors and advocates have expected.

Given these observations, a key area of critique of “deterministic” readings of environment and education involves rejecting the uncritical promotion of what amounts to an adjustment mode in education, e.g., by “acclimatizing” to contemporary social issues. This approach is largely discredited in political and educational philosophy as symptomatic of an ideological project akin to neo-colonialism and, in relation to ecophilosophies more specifically, often harbors an unwitting continuation of majority lifestyles that exploit the earth. To illustrate, climate change education is not mainstream education, and it tends to focus attention primarily on strategies of *adaptation* or *mitigation* to what is largely unseen and unfelt, even if it is comprehensible and occasionally tangible or probable as a phenomenon. Its marginal status and the former strategy are critiqued as largely business-as-usual economically and politically; they also tend to ignore ecocentric and biocentric possibilities, particularly those interested in pursuing deeper forms of

environmental activism beyond reformism. However, the latter strategy is also critiqued too, because it seems to require such large-scale rethinking of the conditions conducive to the survival and flourishing of communities (biotically and abiotically) into the future (with concomitant major shifts in environmental policy, economic organization, and cultural configurations). Thus, it leads some commentators to wonder if educators have the capacity or traction to address these in the contemporary public sphere (see Orr 1994). An alternative, as Gruenewald (2003) puts it, is to further emphasize the spatial aspects of social experience in the form and substance of curriculum, via *critical pedagogies of place*. These require addressing the twin objectives of *decolonization* and *reinhabitation*, so as to challenge “all educators to reflect on the relationship between the kind of education they pursue and the kind of places we inhabit and leave behind for future generations” (p. 3). But again, questions can be asked as to whether the post-naturalistic turn in environmental philosophy has yet to been taken into account in such ecopedagogical thinking or even the post-humanistic turn in educational philosophy more generally (e.g., Haraway 2013).

For educators and educationalists then, key questions might arise regarding the educative value of contemporary forms of environmental education and the visibility or otherwise of environmental topics in education in general, including how these are conceived and construed. Orr (1994) once observed that it is the most educated in conventional Western forms of schooling who have the largest footprint on the planet, given their careers and lifestyles, but also their perpetuation of the prevailing economic system, built as it is on continuing to strain both the resources and capacities of people and planet to be resilient and diverse. Thus, rather than focus on questions of whether exposure to, for example, wilderness as part of a person’s formal education is an essential requirement for schooling, or whether field-based experiences offer extrinsic and intrinsic value to teaching and learning, key questions for educational philosophy and theory can become those of the relation of people-environment interactions to larger social structures of community, culture,

society, economics, and politics – and education’s role in all this.

All Education Is Environmental Education: For Good and Ill

The second understanding identified in the introduction crystallizes many of the preceding concerns. It relates to the modern concept of relation and response to environmental conditions, particularly in light of their degradation and destruction, at local to global scales. The primary concern for education here is exploring, understanding, and appreciating the extent of the consequences these changes have for human and other (mainly animal) species, and the ecosystems on which all depend in the immediate to longer term. Given the severity of some of the threats associated with the so-called environmental crisis, key questions for educators and educationalists include the following: Can education address all aspects of the environmental crisis? What should be the focus and priority of such work? And, when do interventions to address the crisis become “uneducational”? Put otherwise, a counterintuitive question is, is education as much part of the problem as part of the solution, including via an “environmental education” that seeks to address this?

In the remainder of this entry, we briefly consider some of the intellectual resources for responding to such questions.

First, scholarship on key environmental issues typically traces a wide range of shifts in conditions, understandings, the sciences, and the histories of awareness and action about environmental problems. In brief, in the West, the birth of the Romantic movement and the Industrial Revolution has become emblematic of early concerns about air pollution in industrial centers, where awareness and understanding eventually lead to legislation to curb emissions. During the mid- to late nineteenth century, the conservation movement associated with forestry in India, Europe, and North America provoked fuller considerations of such principles as stewardship and sustainability, and an emphasis on the role of civic

and scientific responsibilities to manage natural resources for current and future generations. Environmental protection and wilderness preservationist societies as well as restorationist and “back-to-nature” movements sowed many of the seeds for what has become modern environmentalism (most often associated with figures such as John Ruskin, William Morris, John Muir, Henry David Thoreau, Gifford Pinchot, Patrick Geddes, Aldo Leopold, Rachel Carson, and Ansel Adams) including its extension, some would argue, into the environmental education movement, in the 1960s. Thus, within education, the content knowledge about such key concerns has often come to focus on sifting through the various phenomena and impacts of contemporary and prevailing patterns of human-environment relations and identifying the scale, interconnectedness, likelihood, and urgency of their effects on conditions for living now and into the future.

Typical environmental concerns since the post-war period have ranged from growth in human population and resource demands; pollution of air, land, and water; overfishing of the oceans; destruction of tropical and temperate rainforests; extinction of entire species; depletion of the ozone layer; build-up of greenhouse gases; desertification; wind and water erosion of topsoil; disappearance of farmland and wilderness because of encroaching development ... yet as the nature educator, David Sobel (1996, p. 10) has cautioned, “what’s important is that children have an opportunity to bond with the natural world, to learn to love it, before being asked to heal its wounds.”

Second, more recent strands and splinters of academic activity have continued to raise questions of praxis, particularly in relation to themes of environmental health and justice, political ecology, Gaia theory, biophilia, deep ecology, ecofeminism, anti-consumerism, eco-socialism, post-materialism, ecotheology, weak and strong sustainable development, ecological economics, environmental aesthetics and hermeneutics, greenwashing, ecojustice, permaculture, animal rights, the Slow movement, among many others. In their own ways, these raise important considerations for educational philosophy and theory

(Luke 2001), most notably, the range of ideas and assumptions in play that reinforce or critique the anthropocentric bulk of what counts as knowledge and knowing, and the priorities for teaching and learning particularly in relation to human and “more-than-human” well-being in times of pressing and acute environmental problems, locally to globally.

Third, how anyone responds to such lists is often seen to be a feature of how “green” a person is, in recognition that various shades of environmental (and) educational thought are available. For example, “light green” conservationists are likely to be more anthropocentric than the ecocentrically oriented “dark green” deep ecologists, while ecofeminists may have overlapping strategies and tactics for change with some but not all of the approaches taken by social ecologists, militant “ecoteurs” in “monkey wrench gangs,” if not the gradualists aligned with nongovernmental organizations such as the Sierra Club and the North American Association of Environmental Education. However, while views on the role of lobbying vs. direct action and their educational relevance and rigor may differ considerably, what unites many environmentalists and educators in this field is the idea that humans are part of nature and members of a larger and more inclusive “biotic community” than crude human exceptionalism suggests. Thus, people have obligations or duties to each other in the present, and to future generations, to support biological and cultural diversity, and to work for justice and peace in human actions and practices. Exactly how these themes and their prioritization are worked out has been picked up most recently in debates about the scope and reach of the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals, including in relation to Goal 4 which is focused on Education.

Conclusion

Attempts to environmentalize education can be readily understood alongside other notions in curriculum theory that try to intuit a matter of concern and a curriculum response. Thus there is an explicit curriculum in this area, but this may or not contain

aims and content related to (all) environmental topics. Then, given the notion of a hidden curriculum, we must also recognize this may go against the grain of those or offer a supplement or corrective (e.g., by greening the educational institution's grounds, buildings, supply chains, community relations, etc.). Also noting the received curriculum, we can recognize that what is proposed may not transpire in the experience of students or staff, perhaps because it is interpreted and possibly contradicted by other dominant interests in education. In other words, these features trouble simplistic notions of indoctrination in education by "environmentalists," the likelihood of technocratic authorities coercing particular responses to environmental problems, and that the current generation in schools will automatically be able to address the intra- and intergenerational aspects of environmental issues, even if the problems are largely those they've inherited.

Cross-References

- [Environmental Activism](#)
- [Environmental Learning](#)

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Environment and Pedagogy

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Synonyms

[Complexity theory](#); [Ecofeminist pedagogy](#); [Environmental subjectivity](#); [Postcritical pedagogy](#); [Transformative learning](#)

Introduction

Discussions concerning environment and pedagogy are typically located within fields related to environmental education (EE) and education for sustainability (EfS). These fields work across spheres of outdoor, experiential, and critical ecopedagogy as well as ecofeminist pedagogy, philosophy of education, and curriculum. They ultimately rely on philosophical positionings that relay various culturalist and materialist perspectives, reveal complex socio-political commitments, and occupy discourses that govern specific educational contexts.

Nevertheless, environmentally and culturally sensitive pedagogy is practiced within educational situations where ideals of plurality are also adapted to align with educational and societal metanarratives (typically patriarchal, neocolonial, capitalist). Thus, environment-related pedagogy freights various tensions and contradictions into the general education of young people and life-long learners.

In such circumstances, environment-as-pedagogy would most likely work to foster caring relationships at several levels of consciousness. These range from learning about meanings of

direct experience in natural places to those of values that implicate certain worldviews within knowledge structures of education and society. Recently, however, several commentators on the fields of EE/EFS have suggested a need to expand our repertoire of “pedagogical arts” in ways that reconceptualize and practice critical pedagogies across a growing range of applications, including in ways that challenge extant sociocultural and socioecological agendas. What seems most difficult to grasp concerning a broadened pedagogy – particularly when conceived as emotional, embodied, and emplaced – is how this implicates learning experiences in identity construction (i.e., subjectification processes).

An initial response might be to introduce complexity into talk of pedagogical practices, using sensitizing strategies that are at once intercultural, natural, action oriented, community based, and interdisciplinary. More theoretically innovative and politically crucial, however, is thinking beyond the limits of pedagogy, including in ways that will not foreclose on those moments of intersubjective articulation of environment and pedagogy but also interrogate the performative.

New Beginnings?

Environmentalism, it is said, conveys an ethico-historical imperative that connotes humanity’s ecological responsibilities. Indeed, a variety of shades of environmentalisms have emerged, ranging from discourses of sustainable development to those of deep ecology, the common assumption being that are broadly united by a growing desire for action towards a more socially and environmentally just world.

As an ethical base for educators, environmentalism can serve as a justification for teachers’ existential, political, professional, and personal quests toward embracing pedagogy beyond traditional educational discourses and practices. With an historical and intellectual dimension too, these can be mapped at several levels of thought, including by implicating imperatives of care and responsibility for the natural world.

This caring for the environment resonates with the pastoral concern for future generations and thus for pedagogical care as part of an educator’s ethical responsibility. The concept of responsibility encompasses expanding levels of care from personal and social values to include environmental values. In these terms, all forms of pedagogic care have sociocultural and political dimensions and may also connote forms of critical pedagogy that work both within and against traditional education.

In this regard, critical forms of pedagogy, including ecopedagogy, interrogate taken-for-granted interrelations across cultures, environments, and governance structures that produce ideological and hegemonic mainstream educational theory and practice. Critique is intended to not only reveal social inequalities and disadvantages but to also provide means for change as participatory actions for a more socially just and ecologically sustainable world. The point is that if concerns about social and environmental justice are warranted, they must remain part of the argument for pedagogical change and by implication, curriculum change.

In Freirian (2013) terms, the philosophical challenge for education, as for society, is stark: how to penetrate the thick wrapper of existential, political, personal, and practical commitments that always already occupy societies. Environmentally sensitive pedagogies are thus implicated in micro-politics that expose macro social, and thus educational, forces of power. Questions of purpose for environment and pedagogy become questions of social and environmental values fundamentally grounded in ways of knowing and being (i.e., onto-epistemic positionings).

A deeper and broader view of “eco”pedagogy also draws attention to operations of politics and power at educational policy levels and how policy discourses become curriculum and praxis. Not seeing “culture-nature” as fixed but as something that changes as young people’s identities are (trans)formed means that crucial issues of pedagogy and learning must be addressed, be they institutional priorities or teachers’ usually tacit pedagogic beliefs. Even if such perspectives were manifest as curriculum imperatives

governed by societal values, there also remains the question of clarity of teachers' positionings and roles in "educating" and making sense of curriculum/policy, such as in relation to perpetuating a "politics of unsustainability." Accordingly, matters of teaching/learning strategies, interactional methods, community and cultural environmental responsiveness, and spaces/places/learning contexts must also be addressed.

To illustrate, environment and pedagogy intersect as "emplaced" EE. This involves stepping out of school to explore what counts as knowledge production in diverse learning environments. In such places of learning, says Ellsworth (2005), we must explore what it means to think of pedagogy not in relation to knowledge as a thing made but as knowledge in the making. Thus it may be in spaces between emotion and cognition that sensation has ontological priority over language and knowledge, including in pedagogy.

Environment-Pedagogy and Learning

Pedagogy has become, in recent years, a notoriously elusive construct at the heart of complexities of educational change. In the writings of many environmental educators, there is a suggestion that something is missing that surfaces at the interface of environmental theory, pedagogy, and change. Empirically, numerous articles in EE/EfS periodicals have raised questions about the theoretical groundings of educational inquiry and generated thinking about ends-means questions. In EE research journals, questions also concern how theoretical and political agendas are informed by particular research agendas. However, important questions remain about environment-related pedagogy, questions about the complexity of theory-practice thinking or of postcritical ecological ontology and pedagogy and about the politics of difference that demands material engagement across hybrid subjects in transformative and performative (environmental) education.

In order to merge questions of inquiry and pedagogy, it seems timely to (re)consider what may emerge more explicitly from onto-epistemic

assumptions and critical praxis emplaced and replaced as materialist performative and post-human perspectives. Of course, overriding political questions remain about why a long-desired integration of "environment" with general education pedagogy has not been achieved and does not seem imminent – why an anthropocentric worldview has not been replaced with an ecocentric one, for instance. The response in educational policy struggles regarding environment and pedagogy is limited: it remains within dominant discursive/material structures of society. But it is equally important for educators and curriculum policy authority to retain a critical attitude in relation to pedagogy, environment, and learning.

A key postcritical concern is how to be ethical, generous, and kind when the playground of academia resembles "Hunger Games" (Koro-Ljungberg et al. 2015). Overlooked in the management of education systems is the level of theorizing that tends to separate production of knowledge (i.e., matters of fact) from the production of subjectivities (i.e., matters of concern) in contexts of teaching and learning. If environment-related education and pedagogy is as concerned as it says it is with the production of eco-identities and subjectivities, and if educational inquiry has matured beyond attitudes and values, then postcritical notions of teaching as becoming ethical, as generous/kind and generative (even when the playground of education is not), become important. Teachers more pedagogically savvy of the theoretical/conceptual importance of connecting goals of education (including EE/EfS goals) have purchase in enabling experiences strategically, within almost any educational framework, to (re)construct their curricula accordingly.

Treating teachers as intellectuals capable of theoretical work within the power relations of educational systems is possible if teacher education programs, reconceptualized as pedagogical spaces for collaborative (teacher-student) constructions of meaning, can get beyond the divides of theory/practice, science/aesthetics, and mind/body. Making layers of past ideologies visible in nondeterminist and nonessentializing modes of both feminist poststructural and new materialist approaches may go a long way toward

engaging identities/subjectivities as part of reconceptualizing socio-cultural-environmental frameworks for pedagogy. At issue is engagement of theory at levels of consciousness that trouble concepts such as environmental discourse, nature, and the environment itself that are themselves changing, as are concepts of (environment-related) pedagogy. Thus, for environmental theorists and educators it would seem unwise to ignore onto-epistemic dimensions (an ethics of being and knowing) in constructions of EE.

Bridging Theory-Practice Gaps

An overwhelming impetus from critical education of the 1980s and 1990s was to challenge colonization and oppression of teachers and students from every angle. If poststructural theorists were right in describing the subject as a discursive process, then pedagogy as an attempt to intervene in ongoing processes by which the subject was fashioned should also have purchase in fashioning environmentally sensitive subjects, even if in “willful contradiction” to dominant social discourses.

Nonetheless, education is never a neutral process, as Paulo Freire (2013) pointed out. Either it facilitates integration into the present system or facilitates change or transformation. For the last half-century, educators who have “environment in mind” have been anticipating new pedagogies, at once relational, experiential, and community oriented, as projects shared with critical, feminist, and posthumanist educators engaged in practicing “alternative” pedagogies. Many of these pedagogical encounters were intended to go beyond previous critiques of education, cognizant of the dangers of perpetuating the very forms of authority that environment-related programs sought to “modify.” Yet stories of EE, full of good intentions, were then subsumed by institutional cultures and research that ignores theory-based pedagogical shortcomings.

Many critical environmental educators have continued to work toward reconfigurations of pedagogy outside community values of competitive individualism, anthropocentric knowledge

structures, and neutral inquiry methodologies across identity positions of race, class, gender, culture, and environment. In fact, in the larger fields of education, new theoretical trajectories portray pedagogy as incomplete unless characterized by some form of intervention in the unconscious through interchange between the teacher and learner (Ellsworth 2005). Teaching is implicated in the very formation of the personal unconscious self, as a kind of unmeant knowledge which escapes intentionality and meaning and which the subject cannot recognize. To engage with authority is most effective (in willful contradiction) but has been least calculated. What feminist materialist pedagogies have recognized is that EE, if practiced as traditional pedagogy, cannot get at this unmeant knowledge. Rather, in assessing relationships between teacher and student, it is argued that both can learn how to theorize rather than simply recount their experience. In such forms, both teachers and students can reflect critically on how that experience is woven into the fabric of the unconscious discourses of traditional educational and social systems.

This is where critical pedagogy becomes postcritical. “Post” takes on meaning in moving the “critical” beyond resistance narratives to view relational ethics, aesthetics, and politics as performative of social agency. Agency, so reconfigured, at once implicates the onto-epistemic governance of the subjective effects of pedagogies. Thus if we assume that an environment-pedagogy connection implies agential forms of pedagogical praxis in transforming education, inclusive of environmental ethics, then changes have to occur at all levels of educational provision but especially within the performativities of teacher educators and teachers themselves.

For Todd (1997), the crucial question concerns the indeterminacy of desire for change, the notion that we cannot make others want to take on an ethic no matter how socially or environmentally just. However, because we can assume that people are not immutable to the educational experiences and contexts provided, nor unaffected by systems of representation, teachers can create the kinds of pedagogical spaces and places that impact identity and ethics in certain ways.

Transformative educators recognize language games and learning environments, as well as conscious selection of particular spaces and places, as part of the pedagogical dynamic in transforming the “discourse” of the class and the identities of participants. These educators often go out on an institutional limb to make particular experiences part of the subject matter. While this may not sound different, incorporating discussions of values and ethics and worldviews into (re) interpreting the “discourse” of the class (in terms of one’s public identity and political commitments) can open discussions of unconscious desires and conditioned responses. Notwithstanding the danger of abuse/indoctrination in open discussion forums, it is argued that such activity offers no greater risk than currently exists as desires/identities circulate within and without education. Even so, pedagogy is always risky but risks might be viewed differently if desire and identity theory become subjects of the debates. The pedagogical point is to allow space for self-interpretation in ways that make evident how that self is profoundly connected to social roles, discursive systems, and intersubjective relations implicated in other people’s lives. This requires a different kind of pedagogical understanding in order to interpret the interchange between teachers and students.

Environment-Pedagogy Reconsidered?

An ethically generous post-ecocritical turn as part of a new generation of agentive realist inquiry understands pedagogical thinking as between bodies and agents rather than as localized inside the mind of an isolated teacher. Pedagogical knowing is a matter of going beyond the human/nonhuman divide and acknowledging our coexistence with the rest of the world. The relationality of pedagogy as a locus of ethical responsibility opens toward qualitative dimensions of learning in which we also attend to affective dimensions of knowing. For environmental educators to engage transformative educational agendas requires conceptual exploration of a range of cognitive and

affective tensions, such as onto-epistemic breaks with discursive practices that limit the possibilities of new knowledge. While environmental educators continue to press for greater school emphasis in curriculum and pedagogy, these deeper philosophical arguments cannot be assumed to have already taken place. Exploration of ways that our pedagogies represent knowledge and being in the world (our onto-epistemic groundings), as warrants for curriculum and pedagogy, become central questions for a renewed educational philosophy and theory. Questions of the politics of change and individuals’ professional self-narratives, as well as the discourses that these narratives valorize, require levels of self-reflection that can expose and address tacit philosophical alignments and pedagogical preferences. In other words, environment as theory/discourse (within one’s subjectivity) requires the development of strategies that illustrate how new emerging methodologies may transform practice through differentiated engagements with pedagogy.

Finding alternatives that work toward social-relational environmental goals to bring new ideas and perspectives to education implicates, for example, public argumentation concerning new theories and practice. The common ground becomes the theoretical-pedagogical meeting place for collaborative dialogue and planning to introduce and critically engage new perspectives. Within environment-pedagogy framings, questions of how we are to teach and learn, understood as relational collaborative processes within different onto-epistemic frames of knowing and learning, are no longer simply about human but the nonhuman material world as well, profoundly aware of the learner’s identity formation/subjectification. Challenges for pedagogues with environment in mind go beyond the traditional and “alternatives” polarization. In point of fact, one could regard environmental educators’ earlier attempts as a kind of archaeological pedagogy of attempts for changes in education systems related to profound global changes in knowledge, environments, and societies over half a century.

These changes have generated new knowledge about knowledge networks (Peters 2004) that have provided the substance for rethinking what counts as knowledge. They have created conditions for rethinking formal education through lenses of reconceptualized pedagogy grounded in both philosophical and practical debate. Although arguably the field of EE has had few theoretically based inquiries, it could be argued that a field somewhat under-theorized and under-researched can be reengaged with epistemic and ontological ideas, as Latour (2004) says, from matters of fact to matters of concern.

What might become of pedagogy if educators were to reconsider it in terms of the “responsible uncertainties” (Sellar 2009) of multiple onto-epistemic inquiries? If environment-related pedagogy, for example, could be framed as relational processes in ways that privilege intra-activity beyond normalizing discourses, then researching the in-between spaces and edges of identity limits may afford students the opportunities to narrate and reflect on what has occurred. Such is the new literature framed on relational processes that have ontological primacy over the knowledge and identities produced. Even as elusive concepts, environment and pedagogy demand complex inquiry of the unpredictabilities of the pedagogical relations as social and contextual. As Ellsworth (2005) says, pedagogy teaches but does not know how because we come to know onto-epistemically as learning only after it has taken place – as affect prior to cognition – in relationship.

Environment-related pedagogy, whether or not its practitioners know it, have always been caught up in Bateson’s (2000) idea of “breaking away” from traditional prescriptions of curriculum, instruction, and pedagogy. The message for fields of study such as EE/EfS is to become more cognizant of the depth of their own problem and to engage pedagogy with transformative agendas in relation to shifting worldviews as a base for shifting praxis. As Hipkins et al. (2010) argue, unless environment-pedagogy relations in theoretical and practical

work actually “get” the profound philosophical shift in conditions of knowing, then EE practice may continue to do what it has always done. Rethinking pedagogy in terms of onto-epistemic referents may be regarded as developmentally appropriate growth in epistemological sophistication (Egan 2008).

Cross-References

- [Environmental Activism](#)
- [Environmental Learning](#)

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Environmental Action Competence

- [Environmental Activism](#)

Environmental Activism

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Synonyms

Activism and environment; Environment and education; Environment and pedagogy; Environmental action competence; Environmental social movements; Sustainability and education

Introduction

Environmental activism is primarily linked to studies in the fields of environmental political science, environmental sociology, and environmental psychology. However, in this entry, the focus is on the relationship between environmental activism, on the one hand, and learning and education, on the other. Roughly speaking there are two major approaches to addressing this relationship. One belongs to the studies of social movements within the research fields mentioned above. The other is within educational research with a focus on environmental and sustainability education (ESE). However, before discussing these further, the concepts of environment and activism are briefly introduced.

The Concepts of Environment and Activism

Neither environment nor activism are strictly defined concepts nor are they interpreted consistently by scholars. For some, the environment is synonymous with nature, while for others, it is more specifically about conflicts of interests regarding humankind's stewardship of the natural environment. The concept is also blurred by the varying interpretations of nature over time, place, and culture and the intertwining of considerations of nature and culture, e.g., as nature-culture.

Furthermore, in relation to activism, environmental efforts are typically not restricted to the critique of environmental problems but also include efforts to solve those problems, leading to a broader concern with the policies and politics of sustainable transitions.

The concept of activism is also interpreted in diverse ways. A key issue here is whether activism can be considered more or less synonymous with the basic human competences of activity, action, and/or agency or whether it instead constitutes a specific form of agency. Activism is certainly an expression of human agency and consists of activities. Moreover, these activities are intentional and goal directed, which is often regarded as a key characteristic of actions. As a sociological category though, activism commonly (but not always) refers to collective, intentional actions aimed at changing a policy, societal institution, socio-technological or economic system, and/or culturally embedded practices.

Thus, there are several ways of differentiating environmental activism. For example, Bronislaw Szerszynski suggests a matrix to differentiate contemporary forms of environmental activism. One dimension distinguishes between purposive and principled action – the first aiming to achieve direct political results and the second concerned with changing values or behavior – while the orthogonal dimension differentiates countercultural and mainstream forms of practice. Inspired by this matrix, Andrew Jamison differentiates environmental activism as follows:

1. *Community environmentalism* which is oriented toward changing policies by creating spaces for dialogue between factual scientific information, technical suggestions for solutions, and local knowledge leading to the empowerment of local citizens
2. *Professional environmentalism* which is likewise oriented toward changing policies but mainstreamed in its professionalized organizational forms and techniques so as to gain success in concrete cases
3. *Militant environmentalism* which is characterized by a morally driven countercultural activism taking place in the public medialized space

4. *Personal environmentalism* which is value oriented but mainstreamed in the sense that it takes place within the established societal institutions as individuals' personal efforts to change their habits and green their lifestyle

These different ideal types have obvious consequences for the kinds of learning and educational efforts taking place, but before considering those in detail, we need to consider how these issues have been addressed by scholars in the field of social movement theories.

Environmental Activism in Social Movement Theory

The scholarship of "social movements" ranges from classical approaches focused on contradictions between social classes (such as when movements are collectively organized efforts to promote class interests) to approaches reflecting the sociocultural tensions of postwar Western societies where, for example, social movements are understood as agents of revolt against existing societal structures and cultures more broadly. Associated theories have developed quite differently in relation to environmental activism, with one primarily European socioculturally oriented strand standing in marked contrast to a primarily conventional empirical and psychological-oriented strand in the USA.

In Europe, Alain Touraine and Alberto Melucci are key figures in the historical reconceptualization of social movements. These movements were understood to challenge dominant cultural codes, acting with levels of information and communication also used by technocratic powers. Touraine and Melucci also characterized social movements as collective identity formations containing sets of values and beliefs that empower those who share and identify with them.

In concord with this conception of social movements, but also inspired by Jürgen Habermas' work on different types of knowledge interests, Ron Eyerman and Andrew Jamison (1991) developed what they termed a cognitive approach to the analysis of social movements.

Although it is a general approach to studying social movements, it was initially developed in relation to an empirical study of environmentalism and knowledge. For Eyerman and Jamison, the cognitive praxis of social movements is the social action from which new knowledge originates. By focusing on social movement agency as a matter of challenge to dominant sociocultural knowledge as well as a praxis for developing new knowledge and sociocultural identity, their approach focuses directly on the relationship between movement, learning, and education. Environmental activism is approached as creating, as well as taking place in, new public learning spaces. In these spaces, new cognitive practices are developed in struggles targeted at environmental improvements, while as a praxis, it also implies criticism of societally dominant forms of knowledge as well as new knowledge formation.

Inspired by Habermas, Eyerman and Jamison also analyze the cognitive practices of environmental activists, to explore their cosmological, technological, and organizational knowledge interests. Their work shows how social movements are not restricted to specific organizations with a permanence over time; rather, they occur in certain phases of societal transformations in which their strength as movements is dependent on their ability to learn and develop alternatives. These alternatives include all three types of knowledge interests in ways that are able to challenge and transform prevailing knowledge interests. However, this differentiation means that environmental activism does not necessarily develop into a social movement. For example, in his later work, Jamison points to a polarization of environmentalism into those working inside a green business or ecological modernization approach and those who use environmental issues to fuel their militant political activism. However, in his view, none of them offer new, alternative forms of knowledge. Rather, Jamison finds the potential for this among those sporadic environmental agents whom he describes as "hybrid agents," transgressing the affirmative and radical opposing poles of environmentalism. Potentially, education might provide platforms for such hybrid innovative knowledge making.

One objection to Eyerman and Jamison's approach is that it remains primarily inspired by analysis of environmental activist modes rooted in the 1960s and the following decades. Meanwhile, it is less appropriate to understand the forms of social movements, environmental activism, and knowledge production of the social media saturated societies of today in this manner. Alternative analytical lenses include those that draw on the comprehensive work of Manuel Castells on the network society. Castells suggests understanding social movements in terms of networks of agents, whether at local levels and/or virtually connected across spaces. In line with this network approach, the political scientist, Christopher Rootes, has studied the use and production of knowledge among environmental activists pointing to the relationship between local activism and transnational environmental organizations. Rootes (2007) shows how local activists draw on the discourses of transnational organizations and have learnt to act in ways that are more likely to confirm these discourses than dissolve concrete environmental conflicts. In a later study, he adds that environmental activists do not simply transfer knowledge from each other across the globe but interpret and adapt the knowledge to fit their own context.

In the USA, a focus on the analysis of collective behavior often seeks to conceptualize social movements as observable empirical phenomena developing according to their own inner logics, such as from spontaneous crowd actions to the formation of publics and social movements. While this approach has enabled both structural-functionalist and symbolic interactionist contributions, the focus on resource mobilization of recent times has challenged the automatic starting point of a collective behavior perspective, in focusing its analysis on organizations and not the individual. However, the collective behavior approach persists as part of US social psychology, when scholars employ in the study of environmental activism by focusing on the motives, attitudes, and behaviors of environmental activists and their groups. For example, Paul Stern et al. (1999) developed the value-belief-norm theory, based on empirical research documenting

how individuals not only accept the values of a particular environmental movement but also believe that these values are under threat. Their individual and collective actions are believed to help protect those values, and they experience an obligation for pro-movement action. Other studies have gone deeper into exploring how these values and beliefs are created and sustained. They point to the importance of "significant life experiences" derived from, for example, direct encounters with nature, peer role models, and community-based programs enabling collective action as crucial factors in fostering the values and beliefs that will later motivate environmental action and even activism.

Contributions from Environmental and Sustainability Education Research

As indicated in the introduction, the relationship between environmental activism and education/learning has also been addressed in relation to environmental and sustainability education (ESE). While there are only a few contributions within this field of research explicitly addressing environmental activism, several contributions to the development of ESE theory are of relevance to understanding the role of education in relation to environment activism. This issue has been extensively debated in ESE research, not least in response to the politics of the field and its boundaries but also the widespread practice of prescriptive and individual behavior modification-oriented educational practices of environmental NGOs. Four strands of response are identified, and each draws on generic theories of educational and learning into the development of ESE theory, in their own way. They also offer unique contributions to how the relationship between education and environmental activism is framed.

The first strand, often presented as "education for the environment," belongs to the tradition of critical pedagogy inspired by the work of Paulo Freire (among others) as well as by critical theory. Education is inevitably understood to be political. However, the departure point for critique is recognizing that the human interests and ideologies

underlying the dominant positivist and technical rational approach to education (such as via schooling), as well as to the environment, are hidden and hegemonic. In light of this, the political role of a critical-emancipative pedagogy is to scaffold learner's critical thinking on structures of powers and decision making and, in ESE, to "increase pupil's awareness of the moral and political decisions shaping the environment and to give them the knowledge, attitudes and skills that will help them to form their own judgements and to participate in environmental politics" (Huckle 1983). Hence, the role of ESE is to enable what critical theorist Oskar Negt has described as "exemplary learning" in order to promote critical environmental activism.

Partly inspired by the same critical theoretical tradition but also influenced by German "*bildung*" theory and John Dewey's work on democracy and education, Karsten Schnack and Bjarne Bruun Jensen developed an action competence approach to ESE. In contrast to the "education for the environment" approach, it abstains from demanding a starting point in the critical historical analysis of the educational system and the environmental issue. Rather, they state explicitly that the role of education is not to offer environmental solutions but, in an educationally constructivist way, to enable pupils to engage with human environmental conflicts and to learn by doing how to become active citizens in democratic societies (Schnack and Jensen 1997). One way to operationalize the approach is to apply the IVAC method, by which pupils learn from investigating an issue, visioning on problem-solving, acting as societal agents in their local community, and experiencing the effects of their attempts to promote changes. IVAC, it is suggested, integrates environmental activism as part of education although with the aim of socializing students to becoming "action competent" citizens rather than to necessarily solve a specific environmental problem.

While the two theoretical strands mentioned above are both oriented toward educating students in formal educational settings to become critical and engaged citizens in relation to environmental and sustainability issues, other strands are primarily oriented toward enabling environmental

activism in nonformal educational spaces for social change and learning.

First, we must again recognize that social learning is a concept that has been used and understood in several ways. In ESE, it is partly inspired by Jürgen Habermas' theory of communicative action and related ideas of deliberative democracy in political science. In this respect, social learning is about providing spaces for dialogue between agents with different positions and attitudes on environmental or sustainability matters, whether it is with the ambition of gaining consensus or providing a platform for agonistic mutual clarification of disagreements (Wals 2007).

Another source of inspiration comes from the social learning tradition in public planning and organizational learning theory, such as that tracing its origins to the work of social psychologist Kurt Lewin and his successors, and which is also a living part of contemporary environmental and sustainability planning and management theory. The social learning space in this approach is not just a space for deliberative communication but oriented toward innovative co-thinking and problem-solving. Consequently, the social learning strand of ESE is about providing spaces in public planning, in communities, and at workplaces that enable participants to act together in relation to environmental and sustainability issues and to learn from each other. This may be through organized dialogues and workshops which are not only about routine problem-solving but, similar to Jamison's thoughts, enables innovative hybridity between multiple actors.

Closely related to social learning theory, the fourth strand addresses the request for fundamental sociocultural changes and paradigm shifts in worldviews, such as in debates about climate change and other global risk issues, by focusing on the necessity of transformative learning. While the potentials and challenges of transforming existing knowledge and wider mental structures are a well-known topic in psychology and learning theory, ESE scholars do not necessarily pay much attention to the individual oriented contribution on transformative learning from Mezirow and his successors. Rather, they tend to draw on a

range of other theoretical contributions emphasizing transformative learning as a relational and collective process. To illustrate, besides drawing inspiration from the capability approach and critical phenomenology, Heila Lotz-Sisitka et al. (2015) look to the post-Vygotskian work of Yrjö Engeström on expansive learning. They pay special attention to the insight from expansive learning research of focusing on the identification of “germ cell” activities, that is, activities that embody a potential response to deep-seated societal contradictions, which can foster and lead to new forms of agency and to substantive social change at multiple levels. Drawing on the work of Michael Neocosmos, among others, Lotz-Sisitka et al. (2015) suggest a supplement to the concept of transformative learning with the concept of transgressive learning. This stresses that transformative processes can only “search for emancipatory inspiration in the exceeding of culture through the contradictions it itself engenders.” Change-oriented and transformative ESE, in this sense, must highlight the importance of disruptive competences, which are developed in relational reflexive movements focused on the transformative elimination of absences in and through learning processes.

Where the other three strands of ESE contribute to the theoretical exploration of the relationship between environmental activism and learning/education by pointing to the importance of critical-political, action-experience, and social-dialogical qualities, the transformative-transgressive strand raises critical question of the relevance, potentials, and problems of environmental activism as collective efforts that promote transformative learning and change.

Environmental Activists as Educators and Learners

As shown above, both social movement and ESE scholars have pointed to public learning spaces as potential platforms for deliberations, innovative cocreation, and transformative learning. Recent ESE research supplements this by focusing more specifically on the role of environmental activists

as educators and learners. In particular, environmental activists’ learning can be understood as fundamentally tensioned given their feeling of a call to act and yet being overwhelmed and exhausted. Navigating this tension, besides learning new information and developing new skills, activism can disrupt and deepen one’s sense of self-identity. Jonas Lysgaard (2016), for example, has explored the strong relationship between activism, learning, and processes of identity formation. Drawing on Slavoj Žižek and Jacques Lacan, he points to a double-layeredness which includes an exclusion of one’s own “bad practices” from the narratives environmental activists tell about themselves. Similarly, Katrien Van Poeck and Joke Vandenabeele (2014) have shown how environmental activists take on a particular mode in their role of educators, through what Maarten Simons and Jan Masschelein have labeled, “teachers-as-masters.” Of note is how this role is characterized by relations of care for an issue from which the teacher-as-master invites learners to respond and learn from, in the joint exploration of the issue. However, as Pierre Walter (2009) found, liberal, progressive, behavioristic, humanistic, and radical approaches to adult education all exist among environmental movements, be those of North America or beyond.

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Environmental Culture

- [Environmental Education: A Field Under Siege](#)

Environmental Education

- [Children and Sustainability](#)
- [Environment and Education](#)

Environmental Education in Brazil

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Introduction

Environmental education (EE) in Brazil is part of the ecological turn in Western societies, led by ecological movements that emerged in the middle of the twentieth century. EE goes beyond the notion of the public sphere as an exclusively human common space, including the presence

and the agency of the other nonhumans (e.g., the planet, the interspecies relations, biodiversity, forests, water, climate) in the common ground of life.

There are important differences between EE practices in relation to the understanding of the environmental issues. The research field of EE in Brazil has been developed under the influence of national policies and of global governance over the past decades. A recent proposal aiming to set new national goals for education and rebuild curriculum propositions has questioned the presence of EE as a compulsory discipline in Brazil. The debate raised between educators and policy makers has been marked by controversies motivated by political interests.

The environmental field is a concept based on the notion of “social field” defined by Bourdieu (1989) as a relatively autonomous space of social relationships historically situated. It produces a set of ethical values, identifying features of an ideal subject, and naturalizes certain ways of seeing and behaving that triggers the rules of the game established within the field. In this context, the environmental field can be defined by the extensive diversity of players and social interests that it engages.

The beginning of the EE field in Brazil dates back to the 1970s, during the earliest environmental movements and the emergence of organizations toward the conservation of nature. In relation to government actions addressing EE, there was the establishment of the National Secretary of Environment (Secretaria Nacional do Meio Ambiente – SEMA) in 1972. It was created as a response to the international debate raised in the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, also known as the Stockholm Conference. However, it was only in the 1980s that EE was expanded through the increasing number of environmental organizations.

The countercultural environment of the 1960s and the revolutionary principles of the 1970s drove the emergence of the environmental field in the 1980s. The environmental movement was guided by a romantic and revolutionary utopia in the face of environmental issues and as a reaction to rationalist thought and technocracy that prevailed in the 1980s (Carvalho 2010). In Brazil, it

was only from the 1980s that educators started being called “environmental educators.” Since then, an increasing number of national, and more recently Latin American, meetings have been organized indicating the construction of a social identity related to educational practices concerning the environment.

From the 1990s, partnerships between civil society (e.g., activists, intellectuals, and scientists) and the State were established in nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). This cultural environment sought to improve environmental practices, which was enhanced by the Conference of Environment and Development in 1992 in Rio de Janeiro (ECO-92). The “Earth Charter”, created in the ECO-92, was completed in 2000, as a declaration of fundamental ethical principles for building a fair, sustainable, and peaceful global society.

During the preparatory process of the Civil Society Conference – Global Forum – concomitant to the ECO-92, the Brazilian Network of Environmental Education (Rede Brasileira de Educação Ambiental – REBEA) was established in Rio de Janeiro with members from all regions of Brazil. The REBEA encouraged the first Journey of Environmental Education, as well as the Environmental Education Treatise. This institution also organizes the Bi-annual Regional Forum and the National Forum of Environmental Education. Also, the “Treaty of Environmental Education for Sustainable Societies and Global Responsibility” was created during the International Day of Environmental Education, at the Global Forum. In the 2000s, educational changes following the National Curricular Parameters and Guidelines established in 1997 also contributed to the institutionalization of EE in Brazil. In the last two decades, the developments of the research field, as well as public policies for EE, have expanded in Brazil, as shown below.

EE Policies in Brazil

The EE institutionalization process through public policies begun in the 1980s and was consolidated in the 1990s. The proposal of a National

Environmental Policy approved in 1981 included EE as a discipline in all educational levels. The importance of EE was strengthened with the Constitution of the Federative Republic of Brazil, enacted in 1988. This Federal Constitution included a specific chapter on environmental issues where the EE was established as a civil right. In 1994, the National Environmental Education Program (Programa Nacional de Educação Ambiental – ProNEA) was created, in line with the Treaty of Environmental Education for Sustainable Societies and Global Responsibility and in order to “ensure, at the educational level, the balanced integration of multiple dimensions of sustainability – environmental, social, ethical, cultural, economic, spatial and political.” Then, the National Policy for Environmental Education (Plano Nacional de Educação Ambiental – PNEA) was implemented in 1999, with the understanding that environmental education is an essential and permanent component of national education and should be present in an articulated manner, at all levels and modalities of the educational process. Launched by the Brazilian Ministry of Education in 2001, the “Parameters in Action Program” included EE as a theme required for all levels of education. In 2002 the government launched the Brazilian Agenda 21, organized by the Commission for Sustainable Development Policies (Comissão para o Desenvolvimento Sustentável – CPDS), supported by the Ministry of Environment.

By the 2010s, there was already a well-structured legal framework to regulate the EE, and public policies for EE have been improved. In 2012, the National Council of Education (Conselho Nacional de Educação – CNE) elaborated the National Curriculum Guidelines for Environmental Education. In 2013, the Direct Money in School Program was launched by the Ministry of Education with a specific section aiming to support Sustainable Schools. This program aimed to offer financial support for the improvement of environmental sustainability in public schools. Under the motto of transition to sustainability, this program promotes Environmental and Quality of Life Committees, called

COM-VIDA, as a local key element in the transformation of these schools into sustainable educator’s spaces. The COM-VIDA improve the participation of the whole school community seeking to promote social and environmental actions of sustainability as well as establishing relationships between the school community and its territory. In 2014, the National Education Plan was approved for the period of 2014–2024. The National Education Plan is a law, guaranteed by the Federal Constitution, which sets guidelines, goals, and strategies for the national education every 10 years. Currently, the National Education Plan unfolds the construction of the Common National Curricular Basis (CNCB). This aims to establish the essential knowledge and skills that Brazilian students should learn throughout their basic education. The Ministry of Education is the institution in charge for the development of the CNBC. It launched a first version document in 2014 in the form of public consultation for analysis and suggestions. Brazilian researchers and educators have spoken out in favor of including EE in the CNCB. In that document, sustainability is cited as an integrating theme, but there is no specific reference to EE.

The case of Brazil corroborates with a debate raised in Latin America in relation to concepts of sustainability and environmental education in the area of education. In Brazil and in most Latin American countries, the most suitable concept is environmental education and not education for sustainability or education for sustainable development (Sorrentino and Portugal 2016). This argument is shared by the majority of Latin American environmental educators who acknowledge that environmental education is the concept that bears the entire history and the social context in the area. Thus, even the United Nations Organization sought to disseminate the concept of education for sustainable development; environmental education was mostly kept in specialized literature, legislation, and everyday school and community actions in Brazil and Latin American.

Finally, despite the entire legal framework and the attempt of public policies in reiterating the

importance and even the obligation to EE in all levels of education in schools, the EE practices are still punctual and discontinued. Two factors contribute to the difficulty of establishing EE in schools. First, the emphasis of these policies was on the crosscutting nature of EE. The legal framework prevented, for example, the creation of an EE curricular discipline in school, allowing it only in higher education and keeping EE as a peripheral issue in the formal curriculum system. A second factor is the complexity of laws established at the federal level to be implemented in the local realities by the State and local levels of governance, in a large country like Brazil.

A summary of the main public policies for EE in Brazil is presented in Table 1.

Environmental Education in Brazil, Table 1 Key public policies for EE in Brazil since the 1980s

1988: The Brazilian Constitution establishes that EE in all level of education is a citizenship right and a duty of the State
1989: Establishment of the National Environmental Fund to support EE projects
1992: Establishment of the Ministry of Environment
1994: Launch of the National Environmental Education Program in line with the Treaty of Environmental Education for Sustainable Societies and Global Responsibility
1997: Establishment of the National Curricular Parameters and Guidelines with environment as one of the crosscutting themes
1999: Implementation of the National Environmental Education Policy that determines the inclusion of EE at all educational levels
2001: Launch of the Curricular Parameters in Action Program that included EE as required for all levels of education
2002: Implementation of the National Environmental Education Policy by Decree 4.281/2002 and launch of the Brazilian Agenda 21
2012: Establishment of the National Curriculum Guidelines for Environmental Education
2013: Launch of Direct Money in School Program for Sustainable Schools
2014: Implementation of the National Sustainable Schools Program
2015–2016: Development of Common National Base Curriculum

Source: elaborated by the authors

The Research Field of EE in Brazil

Research in EE has increased in Brazil in recent decades. Scholarly works have been developed in different areas of knowledge, addressing the mainstreaming of environmental education as a research field in the country. Many researchers agree to address the problems environmental in the school curriculum, but point out that this discussion should place these problems in wider contexts like democracy, autonomy, quality of life, sustainability, relationships society and nature. Discussions on the theme also raise the need for a curricular subject of EE or to assert it transversally.

In the 2000s, the number of graduate programs in Brazil increased and included EE research. There has also been an increase of national scientific events, which include EE in their working groups (Carvalho and Farias 2011). These events include the participation of institutional research groups and specific journals for publication in the field.

In 2005, the Ministry of Education launched the survey “What do schools do when they say they offer environmental education?” in order to map out the presence and trends of EE in basic education. The survey conducted by Trajber and Mendonça (2006) revealed an increase in the number of schools that included EE between 2001 and 2004. It was established that the main methods applied in schools were projects, followed by Special Subjects and insertion of environmental issues in subjects. As for motivation to include EE, 59% of schools participating indicated that this was due to the initiative of teachers, and 35% said that it was a result of the implementation of the national curriculum standards.

In higher education, the University Network of EE Programs for Sustainable Societies (Rede Universitária de Programas de Educação Ambiental – RUPEA) was created in 2001, with the aim of expanding spaces of action and dialogue of university groups in the field of EE, as well as disclosing environmentalization experiences of higher education. A survey conducted by RUPEA between December 2004 and June 2005 indicated a controversy surrounding the interdisciplinary and transversal insertion of the

environmental dimension in the curriculum, since many of the surveyed universities used a specific course in EE as a strategy.

Carvalho and Farias (2011) conducted a survey of the papers presented at the Meetings of the National Association of Graduate Studies and Research in Education (ANPEd), at Meetings of the National Association of Graduate Studies and Research in Environment and Society (ANPPAS), and at Meetings of Research in Environmental Education (EPEA) between 2001 and 2009, as representative of the research output in environmental education (EE) in the period. The outcome of the survey indicated that the most highlighted topics were the theoretical and methodological discussion on the fundamentals of EE in ANPEd, popular and community EE (e.g., EE focused on specific communities and social groups such as women, indigenous, black people descendants of slaves – the *quilombolas*) in ANPPAS, and EE in formal education in EPEA. Examining the themes of the three events, they found that the concern with EE in formal education was constant in all of them, representing 22% of the work. The authors emphasize that the presence of research production in EE in the researched events was a factor of legitimacy as a research area. It highlights the demand of researchers in EE as to the acknowledgment of this as a practice sustained by rigorous knowledge.

Another reference on the research field in Brazil is the Theses Bank of the Coordination for the Improvement of Higher Education Personnel (CAPES) and the Brazilian Digital Library of Theses and Dissertations of the Brazilian Institute for Information in Science and Technology (IBICT) where master’s dissertations and doctoral theses conducted in Brazil in recent years are deposited. The search for environmental education in the IBICT shows a total of 3,763 theses and dissertations in this decade (between 2010 and 2016), being that 468 related to formal education. In the CAPES bank there are 1,221 publications in EE registered between 2011 and 2012, 736 related specifically to formal education. The majority of research comes from the field of education, with the remaining distributed in 79 other areas of knowledge. It can be observed that more than 60% of the records are related to formal education,

reinforcing the importance of this research focus in Brazil in recent years, which also reported Carvalho and Farias (2011).

Concepts of EE

Facing the controversy emerged from the environmental education, EE could be characterized generally as the production and reproduction of the belief in nature as “good” (i.e., “good” in the philosophical sense) that should be preserved above the simple interests of society. That is an eminently ethical question. This belief sustains the utopia of a symmetric relationship between the interests of society and natural processes. This utopia is challenged precisely because we still live inscribed in a paradigm of human/nature dichotomy. This reference is historically constituted, especially in relation to the legacy of modernity, which was founded on the constitution of a “great divide” between nature and culture (Latour 1994; Descola 2005). To maintain alive this great division, it becomes necessary a permanent effort of “purification,” especially by normal science, in order to separate natural and cultural phenomena. However, this effort is not always successful, because in the plan of material life the permanent overlap between society and nature insists on creating difficulties for the modern project of objectivity that is intended to separate nature and culture into two distinct ontological zones. This epistemological crisis has led philosophers, anthropologists, and other thinkers to discuss this separation, claiming a symmetrical ontology (De Landa 2003) or a symmetrical alternative (Escobar 2007). It can be argued that the tension between nature and culture gives rise to a new modern epistemology. Corroborating with this idea, Steil and Carvalho (2014) proposed the concept of “ecological epistemologies” to identify the region of convergence of non-reductionist thinking that opens up new possibilities to operate within this tension, reordering the dualities without resorting to determinisms, whether culturist or biological. Ecological epistemologies oppose both the idea of a the dilution of culture in nature and an assimilation of nature by culture, considering that

the coproduction of human and natural history makes us all human and nonhuman, guests, and “co-citizens” of the same world.

Another perspective of EE is its justification as a pedagogical action necessary to confront the environmental crisis. One of the substantive arguments in this case relies on the criticism of the consequences of industrial capitalism. Again, the criticism refers to modernity and the rise of industry; intensive use of natural raw materials, based on the exploitation of labor; and the concentration of population and urbanization. The more intensified the processes of industrial society became in order to allow access to material goods in larger scales, the more risks are produced. An example is the contamination of food with pesticides, which is an “invisible” risk, even if it is a well-known fact. In this sense, Beck (2011) believes that nowadays the social production of wealth brings with it the social production of risks, which affects everyone regardless their social class. Although joining in the criticism of the legacy of modernity, authors take different positions in the field of actions. While Beck (2011) tends to seek a departure from the paradigm of modernity, presenting political and normative solutions for environmental issues, Latour (1994) and Descola (2005) choose a less radical approach. For Latour, the project of separation between humans and nature was never accomplished; therefore, “we have never been modern.” Thus, by investing in the utopia of symmetry between humans and nature, we walk alongside an ethical evolution of thought, which considers nonhuman as political agents that interact with humans. Descola (2005) believes that the concern with the effects of human action on the environment points to a change in this modern thought. Furthering the debate, Ingold (2012) proposes the notion of meshwork to think about material culture and relations of communication, integration, and flows between “things.” These “things” or “nonhumans”, unlike “objects”, are porous and fluid, laden with vital flows and integrated with the cycles and dynamics of life and the environment. In this sense, the author criticizes the theory of actor-network of Latour, Law, and Callon (Latour 1999), understanding that it still preserves a metaphysical division

between subjects and objects, since it gives objects a fetishized agency and disregards the unequal distribution of flows and senses along the network.

This way of understanding nature and non-humans from the concepts of flow, symmetry, continuity, and coevolution brings potentially new opportunities for environmental education practices in contrast to the predominantly normative practices in EE. Perhaps we could call this educational attitude as post-humanist, since it takes the human decentralization in the hierarchy of environmental determinations seriously. Thus, in this perspective, the recognition of the non-human is due to an aesthetic and ethically oriented attitude and is not exclusively cognitive or based on technical and instrumental rationality of what is recognized as “environmentally friendly” to the greater benefit of human life.

We must, however, consider that inside the general concept of environmental education, various particular notions of EE still remain, disputing the particular meaning of environment in a field of social conflicting interests and epistemologies. So, the diverse ways to understand EE bring to educational sphere the great division and the ways to overcome it. On the other hand, the different EEs pursue to influence on the ways society understand and make use of the nature, producing specific social environmental conditions in relationship between the universal and the particular, that is, between the society as a whole and the education in particular coproducing relationship.

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Environmental Education: A Field Under Siege

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Synonyms

Education for sustainability; Education for sustainable development; Environmental culture

Introduction

Facing the current consumption and production patterns associated to neoliberalism, environmental education (thereafter EE) is a controversial and contending field in different levels and modalities. This field is composed by a wide repertoire of pedagogical practices that pursue supposedly common objectives, but actually has qualitative different scopes. This repertoire fluctuates between approaches that question the (*à la mode*) civilizing trajectory and approaches that only tend to mitigate some of the problems caused by a certain way of life. In its more critical versions, it is a field of explicitly subversive social practices in confrontation with the establishment. Thus, even from its apparition, EE has fought for defining its own identity.

Due to these characteristics, EE has been directly attacked – even since the early 1990s – by a series of discourses that question its pertinence and validity by formulating proposals such as education for sustainable development (ESD), in tune with groups of interest and multinational corporations that intend to impose a *pensée unique*, that is, a single way of thinking (Ramonet 1995) in order to govern social and political life.

Background

EE originates hand in hand with the social preoccupation as a consequence of the enormous environmental deterioration that took place during the second half of twentieth century, as a consequence from industrialization expansion and urbanization in global scale, as well as demographic explosion. Some authors appeal to the main importance of environment in some previous philosophical and pedagogical traditions and currents, even if with heterogeneous arguments (i.e., Rousseau, Locke, Vives, Rabelais, Comenius, Pestalozzi) that may be considered as valuable contributions in order to understand the role played by the environment in the socialization processes of individuals, as well as in the understanding of the world and of the place we occupy in it. However, the

acknowledging and recognition of the environment as a vital good to be preserved and ameliorated is a social construction than appeared only recently – in the decade of the 1960s – thanks to educational processes that seek to face socio-environmental problems and the complex causes that overdetermine them, by promoting certain values, attitudes, competences, and behaviors (Caride and Meira 2001).

The very notion of EE was expressed for the first time in a meeting of the World Conservation Union (IUCN) in 1948, even if its acceptance only took place some years later since it had to compete against some other concepts such as mesology education and education for conservation. It was at the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (Stockholm 1972) where environmental education got its international patent when it was referred in Principle 19 of the Final Declaration as a desirable task in every population sector in order to induce a sense of responsibility towards the environment in all its human dimension. Recommendation 96 of the same Conference recognized EE as one of the fundamental elements to confront seriously world environmental crisis (cfr. Belgrade Charter 1975).

From then on, multiple meetings and organizations have contributed to develop a corpus of principles and criteria for action around the recognition of the environment as a complex entity in which elements and processes of diverse nature interact (i.e., biophysical, political, socio-cultural, historical). Thus it requires holistic, cooperative, interdisciplinary, and transdisciplinary approaches for its adequate comprehension, as well as the assumption of a permanent education, innovative and critical, able to transform educational systems. This is a priority in order to develop necessary knowledge, abilities, values, and attitudes in students; to intervene individual and collectively; and to prepare citizens in the prevention and effective solution of problems.

As it usually occurs in the social field, EE has been transversalized by numerous discourses (Sauvé 2005). It has been so charismatic that it has generated enthusiasm in grassroots organizations that work on diverse topics. However, it has

not become a priority in public policies of many countries, since they have only taken them into account in instrumental terms to reach what they consider more transcendent goals. Perhaps this has occurred because it is a field that contends against the conventional curriculum as well as the economical interests that govern national policies.

In regard to school educative processes, the debate about environmental education typology as thought by Lucas (1979) was prevalent many years. Such typology was based in the differentiation between education *in*, *about*, and *for* environment, with the purpose of understanding the different meanings given to the concept. From our point of view, only the last one could be called EE. However, the most frequent treatment has been the incorporation of subjects and discrete topics in the curriculum closely linked to Science Education. Some other proposals that are more creative are based in critical arguments that provoke questioning the usual ideological and scientific basis of conventional knowledge, as well as the place occupied by environment. Among these innovative proposals, we can also find the strengthening of affective – and not only cognitive – processes in regard to environmental topics; an effort to open students' mind in order to hear usually excluded voices (i.e., feminism, indigenism) and, to try to construct new meanings for the educational act. Unfortunately these proposals have been hindered by refractory educational systems, sedimented schemes that are focused on transmissional disciplines and methods, as well as a group of teachers that are not well prepared for the necessary change. Summing up, EE tends to be reduced to a mere aspect of contents adapted to the traditional curriculum; its real potential as a learning strategy and process for social change is thus wasted.

Stages and Approaches

EE's trajectory can be summarized into four general historical stages. The first one is foundational and covers the end of the decade of the 1960s as well as the decade of the 1970s. Its main focus is the contribution of education for the conservation

of natural environment, the solution of environmental problems, and the training of specialists in order to improve its management. Theoretical and institutional basis for EE are settled in this stage, thanks to a process headed by United Nations (UN). After UN Conference on the Human Environment (Stockholm 1972), UNESCO and UNEP were in charge of the International EE Programme (1975–1995) and organized a series of regional and international meetings and designed pedagogical inductive materials that were useful to establish a common ground in regard to objectives, instruments, and strategies of educative actions for contributing to solve environmental challenges. In this phase, guidelines resulting from Belgrade Charter (UNESCO-PNUMA 1975) and the Intergovernmental Conference on Environmental Education in Tbilisi (1977) are very relevant. The latter established that EE “should provide the necessary *knowledge* for interpretation of the complex phenomena that shape the environment, encourage those ethical, economic and aesthetic values which, constituting the basis of *self-discipline*, will further the development of *conduct* compatible with the preservation and improvement of the environment; it should also provide a wide range of *practical skills* required in the devising and application of *effective solutions to environmental problems*” (UNESCO 1978, p. 25; our italics).

The second stage covers the decade of the 1980s. It is a time for transition that coincides with the end of the Cold War and the consolidation of a new World Order characterized by a neoliberal ideological and economic hegemony. It underlies the need to create awareness in the entire population, and mainly in the youngest generations, about the environmental problems, as well as to train them in knowledge and habits that contribute to their solution. The research gives priority to positivist methodological and quasi-experimental approaches, with a great influence of conductive psychology. The 1987 UNESCO-UNEP International Conference on Environmental Education and Formation on Moscow established the basis for EE in the 1990s that identifies four priorities: “(i) the search for and implementation of effective models of

environmental education, training and information; (ii) general awareness of the causes and effects of environmental problems; (iii) general acceptance of the need for an integrated approach to solving these problems; (iv) training, at various levels, of the personnel needed for the rational management of the environment in view of achieving sustainable development at community, national, regional and worldwide levels” (UNESCO-UNEP 1988, p. 6). As underlying ideas of this approach we find the attribution of environmental problems to the supposedly irrational behavior both of individuals and social collectives. Also in 1987, *Our Common Future* (WCED 1987) was published. Best known as *Brundtland Report*, it inaugurated sustainable development as the articulating approach in the global environmental policy. The prescriptive irruption of this concept has been crucial for the evolution of EE during the last three decades.

Third stage beginnings can be situated with the UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED, Rio Summit 1992). The Stockholm approach which dated from 20 years ahead was given an important transformation at the Rio Summit. The concept “environmental education” disappeared from Rio Declaration and in the approved official documents, mainly “Chapter 36” of *Agenda 21*. The EE concept is also left behind due to the belief that it ignores the social and economic dimensions of environment and for having caused a naturalistic educational praxis and thus is replaced by Education for Sustainable Development (ESD). Simultaneous to Rio official Conference, the NGO’s Global Forum was held (1992) giving place to the *Treaty on Environmental Education for Sustainable Societies and Global Responsibility*. It criticized EE’s role in regard to a globalizing market to which operational logic inequity generation and biosphere deterioration are mutually linked, as direct effects of human pressure on natural resources and drains. Sustainable development, a key concept in the official discourse, is strongly questioned since it nurtures the belief that sustainability and equity as priority goals can be answered back without doubting about the hegemony of a mode of production, distribution, and

consumption that ignores the limits of the biosphere to satisfy with dignity the needs of every human community.

Rio Summit (1992) generated a bifurcation in the field of the educational responses to the environmental crisis that is still valid today. The Third International Conference on Environment and Society: Education and Public Awareness for Sustainability (Thessaloniki 1997, also known as Tbilisi+20) made an effort to stop this fracture by means of promoting the inclusive concept of EE for sustainability. However, the achieved consensus was ignored by the UN Commission on Sustainable Development (CDS), a high-level UN forum that examines and supervises the national, regional, and international progress of *Program 21*. Consistently, RIO+10 Summit on Johannesburg recommended to give impulse to education on sustainable development (ESD). In harmony with this line of thought, the UN General Assembly (2002) approved the establishment of the ESD Decade (2005–2014).

Nowadays we are in the fourth stage. It responds to the dialectics established between the aforementioned approaches. Such dialectics polarizes the field of educational response to environmental crisis between reformist positions that affirm that it is possible to find answers to such a crisis without really questioning the established development style, on the one hand. On the other, there are postdevelopmental positions that assume the impossibility of solving the challenge of environmental crisis without questioning the basic assumptions of the dominant economic order. The first ones are based on the belief that a development sustained on a finite world is possible, as well on the idea that poverty can be eliminated without questioning the models of production, distribution, and consumption that give access to high figures of welfare and richness in the affluent societies (most developed countries and the wealthy group of developing countries and emerging economies). The second ones challenge the ideological, political, and economic substratum that connects both faces of contemporary crisis: environmental and social. From this point of view, EE should focus on revealing the structural nature of the crisis and train citizenship

in the necessary competences for a social and political action that is responsible and democratic. Challenging the link between education, growing, and development established in Rio+20 Summit (2012), in regard to the Green Economy concept, the necessity for a certain EE appears. This approach should be focused on the construction of social, economic, and cultural forms for decreasing, by preparing communities and societies for resilience in a future of scarcity (of fossil energy, food, drinking water, etc.) where it will be necessary to adapt human life to the changes that unavoidably will be produced as a result of the human habitat transformation as a consequence of climate change and other concurrent transformations of the biosphere. Diverging with ESD, EE confirms the necessity to politicize once and again the social praxis “to develop political-pedagogical itineraries depending on the unmet needs of populations and the sustainability requirements of specific territories, from each one’s own cultures, local economies and a more just relationship with global markets, each one’s own structures of employment, the carrying capacities of their ecosystems, allowing to build the human well-being in harmony with life and mother earth” (Rio+20 Educational Group 2012).

Conclusion

As it has been explained, a dominant discourse of EE now characterized by the discourse of ESD has prevailed. It marginalizes and makes other discourses and agents invisible, focused on a way of life that praises the Western urban way of life, the knowledge legitimized and institutionalized that tends to standardize the recipients of education and privileges individual instead of collective action, without really questioning neither the grounds of this hegemonic lifestyle nor its comfort zones. This discourse has colonized the discourses of multinational organizations that disseminate it as valid and safe recommendations. In this respect, A. Gough (1997) denounces, “The dominant discourses in environmental education threat the subject knowledge as homogenous and unitary because knowledge must be consistent

and coherent (163)... [then] English-speaking Western male-developed worldviews have dominated environmental education discussions to date” (xix).

As it can be observed in the new UN *Agenda 2030* for Sustainable Development, organized around 17 objectives approved in 2015 UN General Assembly (cfr. Objective 4.7), ESD continues being regarded as an education oriented towards promoting a change of attitudes and habits in coherence with the market economy functioning, which underlying logic is never questioned, based on ideas of growing as a development and richness premise in terms of going beyond poverty. This view ignores the fact that we live in a resource-finite world that cannot absorb the manifold impacts generated by human activities. This approach is openly aligned with the prevailing development style but is, however, disguised with an institutional and colonizing discourse that states it can place the world in the way towards an inclusive, sustainable, and resilient development.

Climate change is the most evident fact that demonstrates we have surpassed the biosphere limits with devastating consequences for every human society and, above all, for the most vulnerable ones. In this new scenario, some challenges faced by environmental educators, mainly the ones belonging to the most vulnerable countries, are to develop the necessary abilities and competences in order to promote actions and projects in respect to adaptation, disasters risk prevention, vulnerability, integral risk management, and strengthening social and community resilience.

Having said all this, an EE that puts criticism into practice is certainly skeptical about change possibilities at the margins of market economy system. This kind of EE, disconnected from such system, becomes postdevelopmental or post-apocalyptic or postcolonial, emphasizing the political dimensions and, therefore, the urgent need to get involved with the new social movements with an alter-world character. In convergence with some intellectual and organizational waves such as the emerging degrowth movement, the movement of communities in transition and with the Andean living well (*sumaj kawsay*)

movement, makes evident this disconnection: educational practice is focused on community-life, people and social groups empowerment, the formation of citizenship, experiencing alternative lifestyles, as well new forms of production, distribution, and consume that actually take into account the biosphere limits and the need to equally distribute natural resources and environmental carrying, to promote democratic practices and collective decisions that are made in a more participative way.

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Environmental Learning

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Synonyms

Environment and education; Environment and pedagogy; Sustainability and education

Introduction

Learning about an environment can be achieved through a wide array of senses, contexts, and situations. This entry explores what environmental learning entails, how individuals make meaning in that learning, and key contexts, intersections, and challenges in environmental learning.

Environmental Learning

We start our explorations by noting that an individual is not always cognizant of the environment around them at any given point in time. Yet one's senses constantly take in data the body then processes, including on how an environment may become intelligible to them and others, and in what ways an environment may be “disturbed.” This fundamental automatic processing mode suggests that what is well learned and encoded in long-term memory in relation to “the environment” demands attention only when something is different, changed, or unusual. Indeed, lack of critical attention to a familiar environment can lead to assumptions and held beliefs or knowledge that are not necessarily true.

Why does this situation arise, and what does it mean for environmental learning? First, understanding self and self's relationship to an environment is in great part *learned* through lived

experiences and possibly reflections on those, starting with formative affect and the processes of adaptation involving the whole person (Kolb and Kolb 2012). For Bronfenbrenner (1977), this can be understood through a series of intersecting frames. The present setting of an individual acts as the *microsystem* for learning, with other concurrent settings in the person's life suggestive of a *mesosystem*. Environmental learning amplifies the meaning of the setting as learning and setting are often intertwined and explicitly related. What Bronfenbrenner refers to as the *exosystem* is the formal and informal social structures around the individual, parallel to the notion of ecosystems of learning offered by Uden et al. (2007). Finally, the *macrosystem* refers to the overarching institutional patterns and values of the individual's culture, a major determinant in one's approach to human-environment interactions.

With this framework in mind, it is clear that regardless of one's understanding of an environment, we understand that humans learn to exist within a particular environment through normed behaviors, beliefs, and attitudes. For example, people may learn about how things work through the trials and tribulations of experience, but also how to acclimate to and shape perspectives about an environment through the interaction of their culture and dispositions. Thus, the capacity for reflexive mobility should also be recognized: it emerges through a human's sociocultural capability to weigh options, choose lifestyles, express identities, and compare alternative merits of places to live and visit.

An easy route into further considerations of such reflexive learning about environments, their conditions, and their affordances comes from recognizing that because the environment is always present, humans are prone to pay attention to what is outside their norm. For example, when traveling or vacationing, people may acclimatize or accommodate to the norm of the setting and scene around them. Taken together (as "acclimation"), an individual's sensorium aids their scanning of the environment for things that are different or out of place. Thus, an unexpected stimulus of a smell creates a sudden awareness of hunger, while an odd sound in the background may force a change in focus to what

had previously been ignored. In other words, we can recognize that a change in the usual is what triggers a sense of danger for the human brain in an environment (the automatic detection aspect in automatic/controlled process theory).

Natural Learning

However, while the natural function of being unaware to becoming aware of an environment can afford a complex system of ways to learn about a place, notions of reflexivity also flag that intentionality may be directed toward enabling a fuller sensorial engagement in a wide range of settings. These include experiencing a wide range of emotions in a natural environment – awe, fear, contentment, threat, happiness, connectedness, aloneness, and more. But is this all there is to how one comes to know about an environment and how an environment in turn shapes learning?

Many models of experiential modes in environmental learning can be readily simplified to three basic cognitive components: of data intake, processing, and retrieval. Data are taken in through the senses then processed through filters of prior experience to understand if the data are comparable to held understandings or expectations, challenge what we "know," or are simply beyond comprehension because the data have no filter. Then, a choice is made to act or not use the data to further expand understanding the phenomenon, reject the information, or let go of the information as not relevant. In such models, learning is typically understood as a spiraling, generative process of creating and transferring meaning for stimuli and events from a person's experience or understanding to other contexts (Wittrock 1974).

Yet because everyone has a distinct embodied, sensed, and encultured way of taking in and processing information, the way one learns or makes meaning of information is unique. People see colors and things differently, taste differently, and have differing abilities of smell, touch, and hearing. This is not to suggest that there are no shared general processes or preferences for learning but that an individual's unique sensory filters ensure any common environmental experience is felt and interpreted differently. Such differences

increase over time as one's filters amplify data recall through complementary, cumulative life experiences and challenges of reconstructed and reproduced memories and culture which lead to how one "chunks" data into preexisting filters.

Coupled to this, the ways in which one becomes aware of and respond to the world and human learning in general presupposes a specific social nature and process by which we grow into the culture around us. Fundamentally learning is a social act involving relationships between people and the modes and tools of communication between them (Boud et al. 2009). Shared meanings are socially constructed and contextualized using cultural lenses, and environmental experiences are interpreted through socially constructed mores, norms, and ideals. Such understandings are transmitted through modeling, stories, language use, and culturally approved play.

Why does this matter for environmental learning? Environmental data do not always mesh with the culturally grounded narratives internalized in childhood, including those messages about what to do in an environment or about environmental issues that are subsequently reinforced or challenged during the experience of everyday life. Indeed, as Henry (2009) suggests, interpretations can be biased, incorrect, or impossible to falsify, but they are learned "in the sense that they are assimilated as truthful knowledge and impact consequent behavior. Relatedly, consider also the transmission of ideas or knowledge with no empirical component whatsoever. Values can be powerful drivers of human behavior and must similarly be learned, whether at church, around the dinner table, or on the street" (p. 133).

In school, children learn both facts and cultural interpretations of "environmental facts" without distinction. Equally, changes in the natural world are not necessarily comprehensible or easily reflected in how the world is sensed or interpreted in everyday life. Consider the concept of cultural amnesia related to the environment wherein an individual assumes that the quality of the environment in which they moved through childhood is the baseline of a good, healthy, or quality environment. Through the lifespan, what one learned at one point is held to be constant, regardless of

changes in the environment. Thus, while taking in data is constant, making meaning of these data can be intentional, tacit, or dismissed.

Contexts for Environmental Learning

Environmental learning can also be understood through a fraying framework of postindustrial, Western orientations which tend to assume that learning is largely limited to the formal arena of schooling (Strauss 1984). One reason for this assumption is that since learning is commonly and culturally defined as what happens in schools, it is logical to assume that what is learned or obtained outside of school is discredited or dismissed as inferior. Yet learning does not stop during the course of one's life, even as interpreting the experience of life as learning may be dismissed, along with the understanding of learning as engagement with one's environment.

What distinguishes learning from knowing is critical here, particularly for appreciating the significance of the contexts and preferred experiences for environmental learning, such as via outdoor education. A child's earliest experience of the sky may change over time from questions of why is it blue (the social construct of color) to why the sky is crying (projecting what is known about self to another object) and then later, becoming enmeshed in a more complex understanding of gasses, water vapor, weather patterns, and climatic perturbations. Equally, knowledge can change temporal understandings of what one feels, experiences, and learns. Every new experience in one's life has the potential to change who the person is and reshape how the individual remembers what was in the past. As an adult, for example, it is impossible to recall a memory of outdoor play from childhood without casting that memory through the alterations of repeated telling and adding to or taking away details by others who offer alternate elements to the story.

This blurring of the quixotic, exceptional, and abstracted and the associated meaning-making typically plays out against the backdrop of people being continually exposed to their environments and others sharing these environments in everyday life. Educators seeking to focus on **everyday learning** and its critique highlight that the scope

and textures of people's lived experiences are best understood through explorations of daily living and its parameters. For environmental learning, what may appear trivial or innocuous moments provide countless opportunities for interacting with and learning about the environment and environmental issues (Ardoin and Heimlich 2015).

This is because in daily interactions, people engage with natural and built environments, even as they find themselves talking about seemingly random things, memories, or events. But in every exchange, there is the potential for new data, insights, or connections made related to an environment. Whether at a farmers' market or a restaurant, taking a walk in a park or walking down a crowded sidewalk, one never knows when an idea or experience with the environment will add to understanding an issue, challenge something considered known, or delight, surprise, or affect one deeply. In such contexts, examples of learning possibilities might be insights into the carbon load for different foods, challenges of quantity, and quality of food production for restaurateurs, an awareness of invasive species locally or a sudden connection to understanding heat islands.

This suggests that **incidental learning** is a key to understanding environmental learning too. We learn from those things around us that contain messages shaped by others, even if this is unintentional. Television, news programs, radio talk shows, movies, magazines, social media – there are many sources from which individuals take information and add to their chunks and networks of understanding. A key challenge of incidental learning for educators is that people pay attention to sources of information with which they are most likely to agree, and in that way reinforce rather than challenge held understandings, beliefs, or attitudes. Thus everyday and incidental learning are often sources of knowledge or affect with no specific source for the individual – they become things that are just “known.” Jarvis (2012), in writing about the inability of adults to realize present learning, notes that a great deal of such learning is “incident, pre-conscious and unplanned. In a sense we respond to events in a living manner – but then learning is about life” (p. 1).

Broadening this out, **informal** and **nonformal** learning and learning settings are often used to address how formal learning processes connect with incidental ones. In adult education, the non-formal and informal are usually defined by who sets the agenda and who determines the outcomes. In environmental education, informal typically refers to any out-of-school organized or structured learning. Other definitions suggest implicit, unintended, opportunistic, and unstructured learning and the absence of a teacher, or establishing what the knowledge structure or tradition is and who holds primary agency (the teacher?).

Although the literature continues to debate the definition and scope of informal environmental learning, there is relative agreement on the contexts in which such learning might occur. For environmental learning, the long list of informal learning settings includes nature centers, parks, science centers/museums, natural history museums, zoos, arboreta, aquariums, botanical gardens, forests, nature preserves, animal refuges, and more. These often hold the status of cultural institutions too, and as such, are not passive repositories but places of cognitive and affective change where, for example, visitors are challenged to sense and question the status quo or are introduced to alternative ways of perceiving the world.

Learning at the Intersections

For most individuals, environmental learning does not consciously fall into categories of formal, informal, nonformal, incidental, or everyday learning. Rather, what one knows, believes, and values about the environment is a product of living life. An interesting and confounding variable is that of the subjects/topics/issues that exist in the margins of disciplines or foci. Consider health and the environment. What is good for the environment is often good for public health and vice versa. In work on the conceptual landscape of environmental education, the concept of bridging has emerged as an important metaphor. Bridges are where individuals as learners or participants can enter an exchange from two differing perspectives. Public health could focus on an issue such as brownfield sites and related programming from

the perspective of reducing sickness, while environmental education could see the issue as related to cleaning the environment. An outdoor program for children could be intentionally driven by environmental learning, or it could be about getting children outdoors – a goal of the “children in nature” movement. Bridging suggests activity and learning may appear to be the same, but the intention is different depending on the desired outcome. Thus, some environmental learning may be intentional learning, but through a different discipline.

Learningscapes

As suggested above, environmental learning is unlikely to be a clean, linear process but rather a function of being a person, a complex construct in itself. People are constantly exposed to stimuli and data, and as learning is cumulative across experiences and time, individuals are challenged to be meaning-makers of these experiences across contexts. The concept of a *learningscape* offers a way to bring environmental learnings together through focusing on how a person moves through the world and has the potential for meaning-making across, among, and between myriad experiences of one’s life, including in relation to the social roles through which the individual has those experiences.

Social role theory tells us the individual within the context will determine many of the behaviors one performs, including how one knows, thinks they know, feels and believes, values, and acts toward the environment. Equally, the role an individual plays at any given time greatly influences the lenses through which they interpret intake data. Consider the different experiences and outcomes for an individual when visiting a nature center with a small child as ward versus with friends out for a good time versus as a professional looking at the facility, programs, and interpretation. Thus we note, social role influences how an individual engages in institutions, structures, society, recreation, and what they take away cognitively, affectively, and skill wise from all their experiences, and then how they construct meaning, especially around understanding and action on environmental concerns. As Lave and Wenger

(1991) emphasize, “learning is not merely situated in practice – as if it were some independently reifiable process that just happened to be located somewhere; learning is an integral part of generative social practice in the lived-in world” (p. 35).

Breaking Traditional Learning Constructs

What typically distinguishes schooling from other sites for environmental learning is that what is taught is not necessarily for the learner’s interest or immediate use. Additionally, environmental education has historically been reliant on the “knowledge leads to attitude leads to behavior” or “attitude leads to knowledge leads to behavior” constructs of behavioral learning. Even though the myth that knowledge or affect alone can lead to behavior change has been repeatedly challenged, the field continues to be overly reliant on cognition-affect-performance models and meaning-making that privileges one over the other, as if causality rather than correlation had been established too (see Heimlich and Ardoin 2008).

In brief, an oversimplified focus on behavior mistakes focusing on behavioral outcomes rather than (1) the steps required to reach those outcomes or (2) readiness of the individual to move toward an action or a change in a behavioral routine. The goal of any behavior may be met through multiple pathways and by varying motivations, not the single action being promoted by the educator. For environmental learning to be integrated within a person’s life, it is necessary to understand the grounds for that within the person.

To elaborate, the concept of conation highlights the importance of volition or the will/desire to do something. It merges what one knows, whether factual or held belief, with what one feels about something. Organizing environmental learning into cognitive, affective, and psychomotor outcomes is good for schooling and evaluation, but separating domains of learning does not resonate with how people naturally learn. Thoughts, beliefs, facts from assumed authorities, skills, values, passions, and so on are brought into learning, and their interactions determine what we take in and the meanings we make. Thus attention to the conative raises important questions for an environmental educator’s focus

on behavior – whether as habits of mind or habits of the body. Can their work incorporate and teach both, and the intersection of both, while is integration more a matter of rhetoric than reality?

Conclusion

Environmental learning is a natural, human process. We live in and with complex systems and we interact with those systems constantly. Rethinking *how* we learn and engage with and within our environments, and how we learn to make meaning of that engagement, can facilitate more authentic learning about the world around us. Schools, informal institutions, media, and others conveying messages about the environment have an obligation to help the receiver of the information make meaning of the content/message within the individual's life. Part of that meaning is through understanding how knowledge, affect, and behavior intersect to shape one's environmental behaviors and learning.

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Epistemology and Educational Administration

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Synonyms

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Introduction

This entry explores in detail the ways in which epistemology shapes both the structure and the content of some of the major theories of educational administration. It does this by examining the epistemological assumptions that lie behind the kind of methodologies required to justify such theories or those epistemologies that query, on epistemological grounds, the relevance of a justificationist framework. Theories to be examined include traditional science approaches that assumed logical empiricism, traditional critical theory approaches that adopted transcendental forms of justification, humanistic approaches that saw values as central, perspectival Kuhnian approaches that advocated subjectivism, post-modern views based on a challenge to the notion of justification, and those that saw coherence as a model of justification. There are many more possible examples, but these well-known theories provide useful exemplars of a more generally applicable thesis.

The Theory Movement

In the early 1950s, in the USA, a concerted and well-funded effort (by the Kellogg Foundation) was made to upgrade research in educational administration with the purpose of improving schools. The aim was to make research more scientific. The model of “scientific” was one borrowed from logical empiricism, in particular,

a version of Herbert Feigl’s view that he had taken from the natural sciences and had adapted for social science. And there was a major exemplar of these ideas in the field already: Herbert Simon’s book *Administrative Behavior*, first published in 1945. The model had three distinctive features:

1. A theory was to be seen as a hypothetico-deductive structure. Roughly speaking, a theory’s most general claims are at the top of the structure with less general claims appearing further down the structure. Phenomena could then be explained by showing that they could be subsumed under relevant claims in the theory.
2. Justification of a theory’s claims proceeds by a process of empirical testing. That is, the theory implies particular empirical outcomes. If these are observed, the theory is confirmed. If contrary outcomes are observed, the theory is disconfirmed. Justification is a matter of accumulating many confirmations and no disconfirmations.
3. Operational definitions of all theoretical concepts are required. This amounts to being able to give empirical measurement procedures for these concepts.

The nature of these claims is driven largely by epistemology. On the matter of operational definitions, it is a question of how do you know what the terms mean, with meaning being given by some empirical measurement procedure. Empirical testing lies at the core of justification. And recasting a theory as a hypothetico-deductive structure is done precisely to facilitate testing.

There are two significant consequences for the content of theories in educational administration. The first is the total exclusion of ethics that arises from belief in a sharp distinction between facts and values. A science of administration is one that deals in knowledge about the way the world is, that is, what can be observed or known through observation. Claims about what ought to be the case, in the sense of a moral “ought,” lie outside the domain of science. This ethics-excluding partition continues even to the present day where perhaps the most influential textbook in this

tradition, Hoy and Miskel's *Educational Administration: Theory, Research, and Practice* (2013), now into its ninth edition, omits ethics. You would think that this would be perceived as a serious omission because administrators are constantly dealing with the question "What ought I do?" In response, it is tempting to push the answer off into outside goals, construing means as the province of scientific administrative theory. However, even among alternative means, they may not be equivalent on moral grounds.

A second significant consequence is the focus on administrator behaviors, due to the fact that these are observable. In social science, it is hard to make this work even for the simplest behaviors. Consider, for example, Skinner's attempt to give a behaviorist account of language learning. He begins with a *reductio* argument as follows. Suppose we have inputs in the form of stimuli that causally impinge on a black box (the mind) which in turn causally impinges on output behaviors. But if there are any significant relations between inputs and outputs, we can methodologically just dispense with the black box assumption and theorize in terms of the linked observable inputs and outputs.

To this argument, Chomsky raised two key objections. The first concerned the definition of a stimulus. How is a stimulus to be distinguished from the many other features of the environment in which a person is causally enmeshed? The required answer is that a stimulus is something that a person attends to. The problem is that the notion of attending to is a mental property or at least something that resides inside the black box. The second objection queries the possibility of establishing systematic links between stimuli and behaviors. For example, how would you ever know that seeing a Renoir on an art gallery wall is more likely to produce the spoken behavior "That's a Renoir" as opposed to "That matches the carpet" or indeed any arbitrary number of other spoken responses.

These kinds of criticisms helped usher in the cognitive revolution that began in the early 1960s. Nevertheless, social science requires more. Consider the behavior of quickly raising one's arm with added descriptors specifying rotation, length,

angle from the vertical, angle from a person's front, and so on. None of this is sufficient to meet the explanatory requirements of social science which operates on more fine-grained distinctions. Is the person swatting at a mosquito, bidding at an auction, signaling to a distant acquaintance, or suffering from a tic?

Subjectivism

While traditional science of educational administration continued to flourish, largely by ignoring some of the more drastic strictures its logical empiricist epistemology imposed, from the mid-1970s, more systematic alternatives began to be developed drawing on different epistemological positions. The first of these to gain traction as a major challenge was that proposed by Thomas Greenfield. In his classic paper – (Greenfield 1975) – his initial target was the purported objectivity of theories in natural science. His familiarity with the work of Kuhn provided the relevant philosophical ammunition. His various arguments were pitched at establishing the conclusion that empirical evidence was never sufficient for rationally choosing among competing scientific theories, especially those that are paradigmatic. Rather, it is those theories that determine what counts as appropriate empirical evidence. Scattered throughout his paper are three characteristic arguments. First, the fact/theory distinction blurs because observations are always theory laden. Second, theories are always underdetermined by empirical evidence. That is, it is always possible to draw an arbitrary number of different curves through a finite number of data points. Finally, test situations are always complex making it often hard to determine which particular claims or set of claims is being disconfirmed by observations. For Greenfield, if all the evidence there is for a theory is empirical evidence and if empirical evidence is never sufficient for rational theory choice, then what counts is a matter of human subjectivity.

Greenfield then extends this idea to social science but with a further consideration. Because the relevance of human subjectivity is essential for interpreting and understanding the actions of

others, the entire apparatus of natural science explanation and justification is entirely inappropriate in social science. Organizations are not realities out there to be fitted into a hypothetico-deductive framework of empirical lawlike generalizations being subject to testability conditions, a view that still manifests within the systems-theoretic approach to theory building and testing. Rather they are human inventions, the result of collective interpretations and interpretations of others' interpretations. There is no quest for lawlike generalizations. Rather the quest is for sets of meanings that people use to make sense of their different worlds. If there is a switch in these meanings, then there is a corresponding change in organizational reality (Greenfield 1975, p. 7). Greenfield's arguments ushered in the notion that traditional science of administration was just one possible paradigm for understanding the social world. There were others, including Greenfield's subjectivism.

Ethics and Educational Administration

Another approach provided a way to incorporate values into administrative theory. This was first pioneered in the field by Christopher Hodgkinson in his *Towards a Philosophy of Administration* (1978). In this work, Hodgkinson accepted fully the claim that there is a sharp separation between fact and value. However, what followed next for Hodgkinson was a complete reversal of the argument that traditional science of administration advocates had used to exclude ethics from educational administration. For Hodgkinson drew attention to the many ethical issues that arise in administrative life, including both the setting of organizational goals and the making of choices about how to achieve them. Rather than ethics being peripheral to organizational life, he argued that it was central. The result was both simple and profound in its consequences. If science excludes values and if values are central for administration, then educational administration is not a science at all. Rather, it is a humanism.

Hodgkinson developed an account of organizations based on his epistemology of values. He

posited four types of values that formed a hierarchy. At the bottom were type III values whose justification depended just on human affect, what people felt. At the next level were Type IIb values, those justified by appeal to the collective will or a shared solidarity. At the next level, Type IIa values were justified by appeals to rationality. This category could include both utilitarian arguments, including the more arcane methods of utility maximization, and Kantian, or deontological, arguments based on transcendental deductions of what norms are presupposed for ethics to be possible. At the top of the hierarchy of values were those classified as Type I. Called "transrational," their epistemology took the form of a superior kind of intuition. Although not justified by an explicitly Platonic appeal to the abstract forms, the affinity with Plato's ideas is clearly there.

This account of values was much more than just a taxonomy of the kinds of ethical decision-making that might exist in organizational life. It was also presumed to offer a structure for understanding organizations based on the kinds of ethical decision-making that existed at each level of organizational life. Thus, at the bottom of the organizational hierarchy could be found the rank and file whose characteristic decisions were Type III. At the next level, a more collective dynamic prevailed. The next level was where rationality dominated, the province of management. And at the top was where the big decisions on organizational purpose and means for achieving it could be found, administrators exercising Type I judgments.

Critical Theory

A further illustration of the role of epistemology from the history of the field can be found in the influence of critical theory, the most systematic expression of which can be found in William Foster's *Paradigms and Promises* (1988). The epistemology derives from the early work of Habermas, particularly his *Knowledge and Human Interests* (1972). For critical theorists in this incarnation, the principal weakness of traditional science of educational administration lay in

its assumption that there was only one type of knowledge, namely, scientific knowledge. Habermas, employing Kantian style arguments, identified three fundamental human interests: an interest in manipulating and controlling the world, an interest in communication, and an interest in freedom. More explicitly, scientific knowledge, in presupposing the requirement of manipulation and control, when applied to people, places a premium on treating people as means rather than ends in themselves. Hermeneutical knowledge has, as a presupposition for communication, an ideal speech situation where barriers to communication such as power and inequality are to be resisted and removed. Finally, emancipatory knowledge presupposes social and political arrangements that support the promotion of human freedom.

When this view of knowledge is applied to theories in educational administration, the structure of theories is affected by needing to accommodate these types of knowledge, and the content of such theories is transformed. Thus, critical theory implies accounts of administration that include an ethics of respect for persons, for treating persons as intrinsically of value rather than their value residing merely in their contribution to the organization. It stresses more democratic forms of organizational practice and participation, but in the cause of communication and in honoring the freedoms associated with democratic practice. Moreover, it counsels a wider sense of organizational responsibility with goals being set not just under the constraints of organizational functioning, but with an ethical constraint for promoting the betterment of society.

Postmodernism

A fifth, more recent view reflects postmodern influences on educational administration. There are two main varieties of this. The first is a sociological thesis, best described using the term postmodernity, where a society is fragmented, boundaries are unclear, geographies are de-centered, controls are less prevalent, and the

present is a possibility of chaos. This is an empirical thesis about the nature of society. The second variety is primarily a philosophical thesis, with a central component being a view of epistemology. Again there are differences within this variety. The one to be dealt with here derives from Richard Rorty's book *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* (1980). The book defends three characteristic theses. The first is that there are no foundations to knowledge. This anti-foundationalism is taken to compromise the task of justifying knowledge, to render the task otiose. The second is anti-essentialism, a gesture toward the fluidity of ontological boundaries. It comes with the notion that many of our familiar categories to do with gender, handicap, race, and class are social constructs that are malleable. The third is anti-representationalism, the notion that our theories are not representations of the world and that they do not mirror nature.

The earliest systematic expression of these ideas in educational administration can be found in Spencer Maxcy's edited volume *Postmodern School Leadership* (1994). Because of overlapping skeptical epistemologies, there are some similarities between Greenfield's subjectivism and philosophical postmodernism. However, while Greenfield was content to leave open the kinds of nonempirical factors that might influence theory choice, a number of postmodern writers in the field have settled on the importance of aesthetics. The most recent book-length example of this is Fenwick English and Lisa Ehrich's work *Leading Beautifully: Educational Leadership as Connoisseurship* (2016). What needs to be looked at closely is whether aesthetic criteria for leadership have an implicit epistemological function. That is, can these criteria be used to make good decisions in the same way that inferences from data can be helpful. There are ways in which the epistemology can be implied without being able to be specified. One classical example is Aristotle's practical wisdom – unable to be specified in rules but visible in wise outcomes. Another is Hodgkinson's account of leadership as a moral art. On his view, something that is an art cannot be specified by a procedure or an algorithm. And so it may be with leading beautifully.

Naturalistic Coherentism

The final approach to be considered is that developed over a 25-year period through a series of books and many papers by Colin Evers and Gabriele Lakomski. (For a recent overview, see Evers and Lakomski 2015.) Their epistemology is known as naturalistic coherentism. The coherentism is based on the notion that there is more to justification than empirical adequacy. In addition to empirical adequacy, what else is important is that theories need to be consistent, they need to be comprehensive, the various parts need to cohere, and there is value in simplicity which tells against the addition of ad hoc assumptions to bring the theory into line with empirical evidence. This combination of epistemic virtues makes for a coherentist account of justification. Although this epistemology is not foundationalist and leaves open the question of essentialism, it is representationalist. That is, it claims that our best theories are like maps that help get us around our social and natural worlds at better than chance or coin tossing. The naturalism is a tilt against so-called armchair epistemology. It is the requirement that the epistemology is sanctioned by our best natural science. Furthermore, a science of administration is also required to cohere with natural science. In developing accounts of decision-making, expertise, leadership, the role of emotion, and practical reasoning, Evers and Lakomski's naturalism draws on work in cognitive neuroscience to account for the dynamics of knowledge acquisition and change and of knowledge representation. On this view, the best administrative theory would be one that accounts for administrative phenomena in the most coherent way. But note a caveat. Administrative phenomena occur in material contexts. So, for example, the most appropriate theory of leadership in one school can be entirely inappropriate for another school. This result leads to an emphasis on theory building. Because a lot of knowledge in social science is both provisional and context dependent, this approach sees building an account of leadership as a trajectory of trying out theories that are believed to be useful, applying them and then if they are unsuccessful, using the coherentist

epistemology to make improvements for the next iteration of application. The result is a process view of administrative knowledge rather than a content view. In terms of what the epistemology allows in a theory, its holism permits both ethics and considerations of human subjectivity to be part of the resulting web of belief. And in the matter of structure, a theory is best seen as a web, as Quine imagined, with the most central, least revisable parts at the center and the most easily revised parts toward the periphery.

Conclusion

Although the above five examples provide clear evidence of the role of epistemologies in shaping both the content and the structure of theories in educational administration, it is arguable that this is something that applies to many other approaches to educational administration. This will be evident from the various contributions to the encyclopedia's section on educational administration.

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Ethics and Education

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Synonyms

Authoritarianism; Deontology; Ethical contingency; Ethics of care; Professional judgement in ethics; Utilitarianism

Introduction

Ethics are concerned with choices about interhuman relationships (Barrow 1982), but educators situated in a multicultural global mass media cannot avoid confrontation with the dominant bourgeois patriarchal Western values which they learnt as unconditional truths of logic or fact. Actions based on either deontology or utilitarianism remain rationally indeterminate, requiring a judgement involving the context in which the rational choice must be made. This article presents a complex triad of ethics to balance competing ideologies of ethics.

Educators in particular are exhorted to make space for previously marginalized voices to recognize values other than their own. But to what extent can they question the value of their values? Inability to move outside one's contingent practices and assumptions can prevent teachers from recognizing oppressive practices, especially their own. Yet recognizing relativism can lead to a terror of exercising independent judgement, so that one takes refuge in the rules of others, the dominant local conventions. This professional

implementation of the conventional rules and sanctions of the system can ironically be unethical, leading to impositions of power which can be seen as unfair if routinely applied. Authoritarian control lies directly counter to a view of ethics as professional powersharing, though it is compatible with and often concealed within an economic rationalist framework of increased and controlled efficiency. Any systematic ethical theory runs the risk of being labeled modernist, dogmatic, or insensitive to other cultures. The Kantian shift to idealist categorical imperatives or an Aristotelian appeal to ends which justify means seem to militate against simplistic appeal to logic or fact. Professional ethics requires ongoing judgements, interpretations of codes of conduct.

Where will the educator locate ethical codes of conduct or guiding rules for conduct? In ethics, we build up a rational frame composed of concepts such as good, honesty, justice, blame, and bullying, which help us to see connections between certain types of action and practices and for which often tacitly we generalize rules for good and bad behavior through social agreements. These concepts may well be transcendently necessary before we can get any notion of a social being off the ground. As Rawls (1989) noted while we can agree about concepts, the conceptions which link these to our daily practices are more culturally contingent. What makes ethics more than a matter of mere “intuition” or haphazard choice is that it is connected by these common concepts, which means that we can talk about our different conceptions by using a vocabulary of shared concepts, showing by examples what we mean by our conceptions.

Ethical explanations and theory are traditionally polarized: the Aristotelians versus the Platonists, the utilitarians versus the Kantians, or the consequentialists versus the deontologists (Stout 1988; Strike and Ternasky 1993; Frankena 1963). In a postmodern era, it is less useful to treat them as oppositional theories than as frameworks which simply identify different aspects of morality.

Wren (1993, p. 81) identified two major forms of morality: the deontic and ethical. The central

features of the deontic group, he says, are keyed to the notion of right action (relatively impersonal features such as justice, judgements, criteria of fairness, duties, rights, claims, and so on), and it therefore includes juridical, proceduralist, and intuitionist conceptions. The teacher who identifies with this will probably place more emphasis on the development of students as good citizens with a sense of civic duty. The ethical group (teleological, self-actualizing, and romantic) is so-called because its central features are keyed to the various personal notions of the good (such as happiness, self-actualization, personal excellence, authenticity, autonomy, and other forms of human flourishing) but will probably be favored by the teacher who seeks students’ personal happiness.

To separate out the ethical from the deontic, private from public, intra-moral from extra-moral, however temporarily, may distract us from seeing their interdependence. An autonomous or self-actualized person must have a personal commitment to public duty for it to be meaningful for him.

Many philosophers now present tripartite theories of philosophy which lend themselves more easily to a conversation about differences rather than a conflict between them. Beck (1994) names caring as the central concern of ethics, but says it is justified by both deontological and consequentialist arguments. Strike and Ternasky (1993, pp. 13–66) distinguish an Aristotelian perspective, a liberal democratic tradition, and a feminist perspective. Nozick (1990, pp. 151–156) identifies three basic stances to value questions – the egoistic, the absolute, and the relational which connects the first two stances.

A triadic taxonomy is proposed (Haynes 1998) in the form of an evolving spiral of judgement in which there is no prior value or end point.

1. **consistency:** a “subjective” aspect in which one internalizes practice to shape intentional actions. Here ethical acts are deliberate, chosen, shaped, and made justifiable by the personal coherence of internalized rules and concepts, meaning and values,
2. **consequences:** the “objective” aspect of ethics which sees practice as externalized individual

or social behavior, in terms of its known and anticipated causes and consequences, both immediate and long term and

3. **care:** in which the carer attends to the cared-for in a special mode of nonselective attention or engrossment which extends outward across a broad web of relations. It is a holistic and responsive making of reciprocal connections in order to help others in a special act of receptivity.

Kohlberg outlined a neo-Kantian hierarchy based on a Piagetian notion of thought as interiorized action, leading from concrete to formal operations, from egocentrism to rational autonomy. He believed that moral judgement and moral behavior were conceptually as well as causally reciprocal, two moments of a single personal unity and that moral unity was the cognitive career of an individual subject or self. Each individual moves through reflection on disturbances to equilibrium from an egocentric and concrete level to a universal and abstract level of reason, through the three distinct levels of moral development (preconventional, conventional, and post-conventional). This is consistent with a constructivist epistemology, in which an individual builds language systems from their engagement with a physical reality, ignoring political and social influences.

A similar rational developmental model underpins most national curricula, requiring students to abstract from the particularity of their circumstances to the universal principles apparently underlying each subject area. The principle of respect for persons defines the moral sphere. The more consistent one's actions are with one's self-constructed principles, the more ethical one is. The principle of respect for persons requires the subject to consider all persons as morally equal, which is also a matter of consistency. It means that you must do unto others as you would they should do unto you, a notion referred to by Hare as universalizability.

Universalizability means that whenever one uses the term "ought," one must be ready to apply it to all similar situations, for all persons. On the rational consistency view, lying is always

wrong, whatever the circumstances. Whatever one person is morally obliged to do in a particular situation, all others in comparable situations must also be obligated to do. Generalizing from one experience to the other is the most usual way we make meaning, and we encourage students to do it in schools. It becomes dangerous if the conceptions and generalizations so formed become rigid and closed on the basis of past experiences, for instance in racial stereotyping. The strength of the rational consistency model is at the same time its weakness because its categories of ethical concepts are abstracted and therefore distant from the complexities of real and experienced situations.

There are problems with the efficacy of any system which becomes logically consistent without contradictions, because, as Gödel pointed out in his attack on formal logical systems, such systems become self-justifying and circular. If ethics were only a set of coherent conceptions or principles, we would not know what to do when those principles came into conflict. Neo-Kantians (like O'Neill 1996) cannot evade this problem by building a more complicated system of qualifiers into the system, or by ranking the rules in some hierarchical and abstracting structure to resolve conflicts between them, for that only pushes the resolution of issues back to a more abstract set of ideals.

The consequences approach therefore places its emphasis on what can be observed and agreed upon intersubjectively, and like utilitarianism, it focuses on the scientific or measurable aspects of morality. It is also a teleological view – that is, it focuses on goals rather than internalized rules. Actions are assessed by the extent to which they reach those goals. It looks at cause and effect rather than at principles and outcomes rather than intentions.

Many educators adopt a consequentialist or utilitarian position for most of their decisions. They attempt to provide a felicific calculus for each action, that is, draw up all the possible beneficial consequences, weigh them against the possible harmful consequences, and carry out that action which promotes the greatest happiness or well-being for the greatest number of people. The

position is called “objective” because it promotes the belief that such a calculus can be agreed upon, that different people can see the consequences of any action as if they were real in the world, and that the units that are being measured are really units.

A consequentialist theory of ethics is not inconsistent in its movement up a hierarchy with Kohlbergian ethics because from the subjective point of view, a young child starts with an immediate egocentric and concrete concern for pleasure and pain as immediate benefits and costs and builds up from that calculus to a wider awareness of short term and long-term consequences to a concern for abstract consequences. As a person internalizes the rules that they construct both through concrete operations and the acquisition of social practices through language, the physical consequences of their actions become less and less easy to distinguish from the linguistic and logical structures of knowledge and belief. What counts as a consequence becomes more and more abstract as it is forced to cover a wider and more complex set of actual and possible circumstances.

The consequential point of view by itself is inadequate as a foundation for ethical behavior, if it presumes that the greatest good for the greatest possible number could be discovered independently of any conceptual structure or idealistic structure. Such a structure is necessary to provide the criteria for good or bad consequences. As Kant said, percepts without concepts are empty; concepts without percepts are blind. Janus-like, they are not mutually exclusive, but different aspects of the same actions.

A hierarchical dualistic model which combines consequentialism and a move towards logical consistency is inadequate because it still basically assumes a modernist model of the moral subject. One can only arrive at the “truth” of maximizing benefits or of universalizability within a frame of transcendental arguments which presume categorical imperatives, moral laws which cannot be disobeyed, or facts which exist outside a web of beliefs. We are confronted with the paradox of polyglot universalism, treated consistently by O’Neill (1996) or consequentially by Nussbaum (1997).

Although universalizability principles transcend cultural values, we cannot deduce from these concepts which practices or conceptions are to count as most worthwhile. Simply thinking within a coherent system of abstract ideas will not help us settle intercultural disputes. The two great comprehensive ethical systems – Kant’s ethics of duty and utilitarianism – put enormous emphasis on human rationality. In a complex world, competing coherent systems will require ongoing negotiation for the competing merits of different conceptions of ethics which could each be consistent with their own abstracted concepts but are incompatible with one another (Lyotard 1988). Reason alone will not show the fly out of the flybottle.

Heidegger (1927) posited that *Sorge* or *Care* as an ontological attribute is a prerequisite to reasonableness. Ethical sensitivity seems closely related to care. Care, argued Gilligan (1982), is not a matter of logic or justice, but more a matter of caring within a circle or web of responsibility. The emphasis on contextuality and narrative moves the care frame outside an objectively measured one or a logically constructed one and is centered in the personal response. To care is to inhabit a Habermasian lifeworld, to be aware rather than reflective (Habermas 1990, p. 207).

Gilligan’s conception of morality as concerned with the activity of care centers moral development round the understanding of responsibility and relationships, just as the conception of morality as fairness ties moral development to the understanding of rights and rules (Hekman 1995).

Because an ethic of care focuses on response to the situation it is more grounded in the perceptions of situations than the abstracted reflection and measurement of them required by either the consistency or consequences model. The strengths of the consistency and consequences approaches, namely that they invoke important forms of cognitive accountability, are at the same time its weakness in placing too much emphasis on rationality and too little on the immediate response, a way of seeing which is personal. While caring uses distinction as an instrument it does not depend upon it for its meaning.

What do we mean when we advise someone to take care? How is it related to the more sentimental notion of caring? The thesaurus indicates that care is related to anxiety, responsibility, being anxious, and being careful. This is a common thread throughout many of those who write about the need for an ethical community to be a caring one (Noddings 1984; Nussbaum 1996).

The ethic of responsibility is needed for ethical practices to be meaningful, because it is a holistic response rather than a distanced or analytic one. This ethic of responsibility or care picks up the etymology of responsibility as responding (Buber 1961), that is, it is one in which one responds to the concerns of others, not out of a sense of duty but out of a feeling of responsive mutuality (Benhabib 1992). The apparent gender differences are more illusory than useful and the ethic of care or responding to the world situationally and holistically is as much an agent of conceptual development as it is a different manner of conceptualizing morally.

The ethic of care is not superior to the consistency or consequences aspects – they are all necessary components of a dialogical and relational process of moral growth.

Both care and consistency are marks of personal integrity and commitment, and in that respect opposed to consequences which focusses on what happens regardless of the way any individual perceives it. But in taking care as well as caring, one must pay attention to the Other while consistency remains a matter of one's internalized conceptual and logical schemata. From another perspective, thinking about consequences and internal consistency are both cerebral and analytic, the knowledge of cause and effect that can allow us to consider consequences often being at least proto-theoretical. In that respect care, holistic, and sensed rather than intellectual is oppositional to consistency and consequences.

To illustrate their interdependence, I (Haynes 1998) borrow a metaphor from Lacan (1975, p. 112), that of the Borromean knots, interlocking rings such that when any one of the rings is cut the entire interlocking system falls apart. What the

Borromean knot particularly emphasizes is the fall from privilege of any one of the rings that constitute the knot. Neither consistency, consequences, nor care provides adequate foundation for ethical decisions, but jointly they constitute the base for ethical decision-making.

To remove ethics from a logical or factual foundation does not make it anarchic or chaotic (Squires 1993). Ethics is founded on reasonableness and an educator will be ethical to the extent to which he or she gives serious consideration to these three aspects of any situation:

- What are the consequences, both short and long term for me and others, and do the benefits of any possible action outweigh the harmful effects?
- Are all the agents in this situation being consistent with their own past actions and beliefs? That is, are they acting according to an ethical principle/ethical principles which they would be willing to apply in any other similar situation? Are they doing to others as they would they should do unto them?
- Are they responding to the needs of others as human beings? Do they care about other people in this particular situation as persons with feelings like themselves? Are they attentive to others?

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Introduction

This entry focuses on Victoria Lady Welby's (1837–1912) theory of meaning – which she denominated *significs* – and addresses her contribution to education as, specifically, the problematic of educating for values. To bring Welby's legacy into edusemiotics is timely, especially considering that her work does not yet enjoy the notoriety it deserves. Yet her conceptualizations demonstrate the connection of her unorthodox theory of meaning to the philosophy of education today – a key concern in both *edusemiotics* (Stables and Semetsky 2015) and *semioethics* (Petrilli and Ponzio 2010), whence ethics is informed by signs, their interpretation, and translation in the context of practical life and human actions. Such new direction explored on the basis of Welby's *significs* as a theory of meaning focuses on the relation between signs, sense, and values. A particularly important contribution from semioethics today is the special attention it devotes to the relationship between the study of language (philosophy of language) and ideologies as social planning. This interdisciplinary enterprise is especially important for education in the context of so-called *global semiotics* (Danesi et al. 2004). The study of semiotics, according to eminent semiotician Thomas Sebeok, went through the paradigm shift during the last century thus passing through the boundaries of its earlier, exclusively glottocentric, sphere to include the whole of life.

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Ethics and Significance: Insights from Welby for Meaningful Education

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Synonyms

Child development; Edusemiotics; Ethics; Experience; Language; Meaning; Practice; Semioethics; Semiotics; Significance; Significs; Translation; Values

Lady Welby on Experience and Meaning

Stating in her essay “Sense, Meaning, and Interpretation,” originally published in two parts in the journal *Mind*, that everyone of us is in one sense a born explorer and our choices lie in what world we would explore, Lady Welby points to the value and meaning of human experiences in the world, which – as Charles Peirce made clear – is perfused with signs: it is a semiotic world. Her major *oeuvre* “What is Meaning?” was reviewed by Peirce, the event leading to an 8-year correspondence between

them (Hardwick 1977). Welby considered language to be just one, albeit preeminent, of the forms of broader expressions manifesting sense and significance that surpass solely linguistic representations. In an apparent affinity with Deweyan pragmatism and its focus on the reorganization and revaluation of lived experience, Welby addresses the most important components of experience as distinction and unification, comparison and combination, analysis and synthesis at once, and against the background of the confused manifold of the as yet hidden significance. Welby signals the need for studies on child development and criticizes the educational system for not sufficiently recognizing the child's inherent capacity for interrogating reasons, for the explicit "why" question. However, typical formal schooling systematically blunts the child's interest in language.

Reflecting on the progress of Welby's signifiacs, Charles Ogden asserted that the most urgent reference and promising field for signifiacs lies in the direction of education – to which we add now the importance of tracing the main lines of development as proceeding from signifiacs to semioethics in the context of current advances demonstrated by edusemiotics with which Welby's theory demonstrates a remarkable affinity. For Welby, the theoretical exploration of meaning that embraces the whole of life experiences and cannot be confined to verbal signs, the related principle of translation, and the questions of education are closely interconnected. She was writing lessons, emphasizing the duty of saying what we mean and meaning what we say, and understanding what we hear or read, thereby promoting education in language for an adequate development of the interpretive and signifying capacity, ultimately for reflection on the relation between language, logic, meaning, and understanding. A "significant education" is education for critical linguistic consciousness, meaning, and value. Welby describes her concept of signifiacs as

a method of mental training, which, though implied in all true views of education, is not yet practically recognised or systematically applied. In a special sense, it aims at the concentration of intellectual activities on that which we tacitly assume to be the main value of all study, and vaguely call "meaning".

Its instructive and disciplinary value must be secondary to this, as they are both ultimately dependent upon it. (Welby 1983[1903], p. 83)

Similarly to later semioticians like Roland Barthes denouncing the fascism of language or Michel Foucault's critique of the order of discourse, Welby denounces the tyranny of language and expression when they tend toward uniformity, homologation, and the adherence to values imposed from above by a given linguistic system and ruling social norms. She maintains that from early childhood everyone should be educated in the spirit of conscious awareness and the development of critical and creative thinking. Welby theorizes the concepts of difference and singularity, maintaining that each human being is unique, so that beyond commonality given by the relation with the other in social life, but from a "significant" perspective developed in the direction of semioethics, identity emerges in terms of difference and the logic of otherness – not unlike much later, poststructuralist and feminist, veins in educational philosophy that contributed to the development of edusemiotics as a novel theoretical foundation for education (e.g., Semetsky 2006; Noddings 2006, 2010) to date. Welby's approach implies education for listening to the other, for difference based on the logic of otherness, for being responsive to the other, and for engaging in dialogue with the other. The value of "otherness" is thus affirmed. Her long-term project was social change through the development of critical linguistic consciousness and training in responsible thinking based on values informing human actions (Petrilli 2009, pp. 371–379).

Welby's work prefigures both John Dewey's philosophy of democratic education and Charles Morris' contributions. Indeed, Morris referred to the school system as a form of social organization for the perpetuation of culture underlining the interconnection between education, communication, and political-ideological orientation of the community. He was adamant that the totalitarian society cannot give widespread attention to semiotics as regards its educational plans because such knowledge of sign phenomena would make it less easy to manipulate those who have this knowledge. He

asserted that it is precisely because of this fact that semiotics should have a prominent place in the educational system of a democratic society.

Welby worked on educational issues relative to all spheres of knowledge and experience throughout the entire course of her research. In her “Questions for Teachers,” she formulates 50 questions bearing on theological and eschatological issues aiming to teach educators per se to interrogate the text. Text is composed by signs that need to be interpreted rather than taken as “facts.” No text should be accepted passively. Interpreters must establish relations of active participation, relate dialogically to the text, interrogate it, and question value systems, behavioral patterns, and belief systems. The connection between language, logic, and meaning involves education understood as educating for meanings and values and laying down the pathway to critical thinking and ethical responsibility. Welby called for systematic training in critical and creative reflection and wanted “to persuade parents and schoolmasters that the first need is to centre all education upon the question of ‘Meaning and how to convey it’” (1983 [1903], pp. 140–141). Educating in the meaningful use of language is our moral responsibility, the capacity to interrogate sense and significance – our ethical commitment toward the general improvement of the human condition and interpersonal relationships.

A significant education develops the power of interpretation and expression from different points of view. Educating for meaning and values teaches students to make distinctions and detect fallacies and confusions, whether intentional or unconscious, to establish connections and associations among ideas and research fields, to link all parts of growing experience, and therefore to apply in practice the principle of *semiotic translation*. Beyond interlingual translation, to *translate* is to confront, contrast, compare, and associate multiple signs and sign systems (whether verbal or nonverbal), linguistic expressions and value systems, spheres of knowledge, and lived experience. This involves identifying a common denominator (metaphorically of course), common language, and shared meanings on the basis of which one

can interpret the unknown other, and thereby make sense for, and find significance in, our experience of relating to others. Reflecting on analogy and translation, also described as “inter-expression,” the processes of transferral, transvaluation, and the translation of meaning through human experience constitute a test to the validity of meaning beyond enhancing signifying value generally. The first analogy upon which all others are constructed is the one between one’s own mind and others: “we forget that we cannot say one word to our fellow without assuming the analogy between his ‘mind’ and our own” (Welby 1983[1903], p. 43).

Welby introduces the term “metalemma” for linguistic metaphors, underlining the importance of resorting to imagery as well as experimentation and verification for communicative effectiveness. Unconscious logico-linguistic mechanisms should be lifted to the surface of consciousness as a step toward dealing with inferential or interpretive inadequacies and communicative deficiencies at large. This, for Welby, implies developing a propensity for the critique of imagery and analogy from early childhood while acquiring adequate habits of analysis, verification, and classification. She signaled the need for training in the use of imagery (popular, poetical, philosophical, and scientific) as well as teaching strategies oriented to such awareness. She describes the “critique of imagery” as a method against confusing and fallacious inferential processes. Interestingly, Peirce’s mode of abductive inference is typically considered fallacious from the viewpoint of the strictly analytical philosophy of language that affords no place for semiotic mediation and interpretation and posits signs as exclusively verbal and reducible to their direct representations. However, abduction is invaluable in edusemiotics that recognizes the unconscious dimension of experience and the necessity to become aware of it by developing self-reflective, critical, and creative consciousness. Interpreting the nonverbal “language” of images, translating it into verbal expressions, and utilizing all forms of inference including abduction, deduction, and induction are part and parcel of fully-fledged edusemiotics (Semetsky 2011, 2013).

Welby's *Significs* as a Theory-Practice Nexus

Welby's theoretical research was inseparable from practice: she was not only attending school lessons but also constructing elaborate lesson plans to conduct lessons herself on an experimental basis. In this context, Welby remarks:

The following extracts are from a series of twelve familiar lessons on "Sign and Sense" given by a grandmother to a boy eight years old, and reported verbatim. They gave much delight, not because of any aptitude on the part of the teacher, but obviously from the natural affinity of the subject and the fascination of its problems to the young mind. The lessons, however, had to be discontinued from the time the boy went to school. It is to be hoped that the time is not far off when such lessons in worthier form will become the recognised introduction to the school course. (Welby 1983[1903], p. 306)

A signifiical education is education in training thought to identify problems and ask questions, rather than pave the path to final truths. Asking questions is a condition for the acquisition and transformation of our conceptual knowledge and practical skills: the dynamic reality of the question sweeps the mind forward in an endless movement to new and wider horizons. To develop an inquiring spirit in a child is much more significant than providing ready-made answers. Any answer in fact should be just a departure point for a string of new questions. Welby was keen to confront her ideas with the semiotic perspective and was convinced that we should not ignore the need to reassess the relation between languages and values in the direction of education founded on the study of signs embedded in life. Teaching methods should be revised and updated in light of research on language and meaning, while questioning the relation to values and applying in practice the principle of translation. Welby envisaged the children of tomorrow as being educated in a *sense of sense* so to understand what the meaning of "meaning" per se is. Children should be educated to understand what signs signify and to learn how to translate and interpret the dialectics pertaining to real practical life. Educating for meanings and values can provide guidance to better navigate through the "jungle" that we call

language. The children of tomorrow, whose education is indeed "signifiical," would be able to interpret and translate the signs of experience. Such new generation of students, if and when educated in significs and semioethics, will be able to understand the deeper meanings that are available today only to, using Welby's words, *the sheer force of genius*.

As all human beings are instinctively endowed with "mother sense" or "primal sense," such sensibility is a priori for the development of critical consciousness, creativity, and ethical responsibility. Welby comments that if mother or primal sense continues to be more vital in women than in men, this is because women are more capable of shaking off the effects of "high" civilization and typical or conventional education. She insisted on early childhood education and bringing up children in the spirit of crucial importance of preserving and utilizing all aspects of language, not only as regards the economy of knowledge but also using language for lucidity, grace, melody, dignity, beauty, and the power to express the inexpressible. The following passage deserves to be quoted in full to underline the importance of Welby's theory of meaning for edusemiotics as a new, and future-oriented, direction in the philosophy of education:

We must remember that while the appeal to the matter-of-fact character would have told on the side of economy, of simplicity, and of efficiency . . . the appeal to the imaginative character would have told on the side of truer conception, whether abstract or pictorial, whether ethical or artistic, whether making for truth, goodness or beauty. The prosaic type would have seen the point best on the economical, . . . as a question of success or failure, praise or reproof, reward or punishment. The imaginative or emotional type would have seen the iniquity and folly of crippling or mutilating the most precious of its gifts, of starving instead of fostering a really vital energy. All alike would by this time have contributed abundantly to our store. For the whole mental atmosphere and attitude of a generation thus trained from the very beginning of life would be altered. Its centre of gravity would be changed. Its world would also at once be expanded; the area of the common interest enlarged and concentrated, and value of life revealed and enhanced.

[. . .] We should at last touch [a child's] natural tendency to seek a "because" for everything – to link together all parts of his growing experience. As all fun and chaff, no less than all wit and humour,

depend on turns either of sense or meaning or significance; as the ludicrous depends on the incongruous, and our sense of the incongruous depends on the strength of our mastery of the congruous, this method of education would lend itself, as no other could attempt to do, to the child's craving to be interested, excited, even amused in learning. (Welby 1983[1903], pp. 212–218)

Conclusion

Welby's corpus includes a selection of extracts from different authors expressing their views on education, in support of her own position and touching on such themes as educational reform, teacher training, and student training strategies, the importance of motivation and interest in learning processes and of imagination, the objects of primary education, the place of classical studies in the educational system and of grammar, etc. Her focus on play and imagination in the acquisition of knowledge recalls Peirce's notion of the *play of musement*, later developed by Thomas Sebeok with regard to his concept of primary modeling. The present-day problems relative to educational theories and pedagogical practices show that an expansion of philosophy of education to the point of its convergence with semiotics is now necessary. It is such current expansion that constitutes the critical instance of philosophy as semiotics, that is, an open-ended field of inquiry and research demonstrating that the fully-fledged science of signs is always in the process of evolution, rather than being an achieved end result to boast about.

Welby's contribution to edusemiotics is thus indispensable, her historical place among such "edusemiotic precursors" as Peirce, Dewey, Deleuze, Kristeva, or Noddings notwithstanding. Nor is her theory of any small account as reflected in the fact that, with respect to other extant possible denominations circulating at the time, including "semiotics," she should have preferred to introduce the neologism *significs* to underline her inexhaustible interest in sense and significance, in *value* and not simply linguistic meaning. With her choice of the term "significs" for her research, the question she underlined is not that of whoever professes this or that discipline or subject matter nor in the established role of scholar, scientist, or intellectual.

Instead, it is the question posed by an ordinary person in everyday life, namely, what does it mean for me, for us, today, now, or later and what sense and what value does our practical experience have. This is a question that semioethics recovers and that also is central to edusemiotics.

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Ethics and Values Education

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Synonyms

Ethics education; Moral education; Values education

Introduction

Ethics and values education encompasses a wide variety of aspects, conceptual frameworks, topics, and approaches. Arising out of the field of ethics, it foremost has to be sensitive to a multi-dimensional and deep anthropological nature of human being and the recognition of this in educational processes. The relational and communitarian nature of ethics (arising out of the recognition of a human being as relational being, a being of community, and a being of dialogue) is extremely important and dictates reflections on justice, solidarity, compassion, and cooperation in the spirit of a genuine dialogue in the field of ethics and values education, which further call for openness, reciprocity, and mutual recognition. These aspects are of key importance for ethics and values education, since one of its main goals is to strengthen such dialogical and emphatic stance on all levels of educational process. These should not address and stress merely basic ethical norms and values (such as liberty, dignity and respect for life, equality, truthfulness, nonviolence, social justice, solidarity, moderation, humility, nondiscrimination, well-being, and security) but also turn to virtues that are at the heart of each individual development and development of a community as a whole. The dialogical nature of ethics and with this also of ethics and values education therefore stipulates openness toward the other and thus invites us to be open in the process of mutual growth and learning. In the formal educational process, an all-encompassing nature of ethical reflection and ethical awareness calls for an integrative approach, in which ethical topics are addressed in most if not all the subjects in school, trans-circularly, and in school life as a whole.

The global recognition of the importance of ethics and values education is well reflected in the 1996 UNESCO report of the International Commission on Education for the Twenty-first Century. "In confronting the many challenges that the future holds in store, mankind sees in education an indispensable asset in its attempts to attain the ideas of peace, freedom and social justice. The Commission does not see education as a miracle cure or a magic formula opening the

door to a world in which all ideals will be attained, but as one of the principal means available to foster a deeper and more harmonious form of human development and thereby to reduce poverty, exclusion, ignorance, oppression and war" (Delors et al. 1996). Since the field of ethics and values education is very broad and includes changing trends, this entry addresses just some of its key aspects, especially those related to more recent views and approaches, which stress the aforementioned integrative, holistic, and comprehensive nature of it.

Ethics and Values Education

In a narrower sense the term ethics and values education applies to all aspects of the process of education, which either explicitly or implicitly relate to ethical and axiological dimensions of life and are such that can be structured, guided, and monitored with appropriate educational methods and tools. Evaluative and ethical dimensions are an integral aspect of every educational process. "Education implies that something worthwhile has been intentionally transmitted in a morally acceptable manner. It would be a logical contradiction to say that a man had been educated but that he had in no way changed for the better or that in educating his son a man was attempting nothing that was worthwhile" (Peters 1970, p. 25). Ethics and values education specifically converts this implicit goal into an explicit one, following a recognition that vital presence of moral and value dimensions cannot be sensibly denied and the idea of a value-free education process proved to be a delusion. Among the main aims of ethics and values education are the following: to stimulate ethical reflection, awareness, autonomy, responsibility, and compassion in children, to provide children with insight into important ethical principles and values, to equip them with intellectual capacities (critical thinking, reflection, understanding, decision-making, compassion) for responsible moral judgment, to develop approaches to build a classroom or school environment as an ethical community, and to reflectively situate an individual into local and global

communities with a mission to contribute to them. All this enables children to overcome prejudice, discrimination, and other unethical practices and attitudes and at the same time shape proper attitudes toward themselves, relationships they form, society, and environment

Ethics and values education steers children toward the search and commitment to fundamental values, meaning, and purpose in their lives. Ethics and values education is also oriented into nurturing respectful attitude toward others (both individuals and communities alike) and putting one's beliefs, attitudes, and values into practice. As such it cannot be limited to one school subject or a set of subjects, since the initial all-encompassing nature of ethical reflection and awareness calls for a trans-curricular, integrative approach. If one regards values in a broad way as comprising of principles, fundamental convictions, ideals, standards, or life stances that guide individuals, their evaluations, and behavior (Halstead and Taylor 1996) both in their personal and social lives and include in this also a broader reflection upon them, then in a sense a field of ethics education overlaps with values education. In a narrower sense values education refers to a process of educational transmission of dominant social values to individuals to somehow incorporate them into the society.

Aims of Ethics and Values Education

Some of the main aims of ethics and values education have already been mentioned: to stimulate ethical reflection, awareness, responsibility, and compassion, to provide insight into important ethical principles and values, to equip an individual with key cognitive and noncognitive (moral) intellectual capacities (critical thinking, reflection, understanding, decision-making, compassion) for responsible moral judgment, to reflectively situate individual into local and global environment, and to enable individuals to overcome prejudice, discrimination, and cultural and other stereotypes. Next, the aims include that ethics and values education encourages children to explore diverse dimensions of values and various possible

justifications for moral status of action and to apply them in school, at home, or in professional life. It paves the way for reflective exploration of different ethical evaluative standpoints and analysis of their practical implications. It also enables them to gain confidence and self-esteem, foster cooperative behavior, stimulate and deepen moral motivation, shape their character, and enable overall growth in terms of purposeful, morally excellent, and satisfying life.

All these are connected into a more general, overall goal, among others defined by Dewey. "The formation of a cultivated and effectively operative good judgment or taste with respect to what is aesthetically admirable, intellectually acceptable and morally approvable is the supreme task set to human beings by the incidents of experience" (Dewey 1980, p. 262). One can add to this that "[o]ne purpose of moral education is to help make children virtuous – honest, responsible, and compassionate. Another is to make mature students informed and reflective about important and controversial moral issues. Both purposes are embedded in a yet larger project – making sense of life. On most accounts, morality isn't intellectually free-floating, a matter of personal choices and subjective values. Moralities are embedded in traditions, in conceptions of what it means to be human, in worldviews." (Nord and Haynes 1998) It thus stimulates individuals to make values relevant for their lives in a concrete social context in an experiential and expressive manner. The open questions remain: How can ethics and values education be genuinely effective, how can it gain a real hold on children as opposed to a simple recognition or authoritative assent, and what are the (pre)conditions for its efficacy (Silcock and Duncan 2001)?

Approaches and Methods

One aspect related to ethics and values education is how much of it and in what form should be based upon ethical theory. The answers here vary quite a bit, but a consensus seems to be emerging in the direction that a straight transposition of particular ethical theories as the main content of

ethics and values education is ineffective. "Another way of looking at ethics education, a favourite among traditional philosophers, is to see professional ethics education as an opportunity to learn about philosophical theories of ethics. Under this approach, the students are taught one or more ethical theories (usually utilitarianism, Kantian deontology, or care theory) and are then taught to apply these theories to resolve, or at least inform, ethical dilemmas. Among philosophers of education, who have dealt with ethics of teaching, however, it is generally agreed that this applied-theory approach to ethics education is particularly problematic" (Warnick and Silverman 2011, p. 274). When we move from the early education toward professional ethics education, the stress on ethical theory of course enhances but in a sense that ethical theory forms the basis of ethics education (not its main contents) since it can increase students' understanding of particular normative or evaluative stance, increase their capacities to formulate cogent justification and moral arguments, increase their ethical reflection and capacities of good decision-making, and lastly underpin a particular ethical code relevant for the field of professional study.

In early education this role can be played by incorporation of critical thinking and philosophy with children and inquiring community approaches. These can also secure the necessary balance between individual and societal aspects of values education. "As Socrates would have it, the philosophical examination of life is a collaborative inquiry. The social nature of the enterprise goes with its spirit of inquiry to form his bifocal vision of the examined life. These days, insofar as our society teaches us to think about values, it tends to inculcate a private rather than a public conception of them. This makes reflection a personal and inward journey rather than a social and collaborative one and a person's values a matter of parental guidance in childhood and individual decision in maturity" (Cam 2014, p. 1203). That is why reflective and collaborative approach is so essential, since it can secure a middle ground between individual relativism and a straight imposition of dominant social values, it fosters development of good moral judgment, and it enables us

to put ourselves in the position of another and finally to develop a dialogic and inclusive stance.

There are several specific methods developed for the field of values education. These range from inculcation of values by teaching, storytelling, or school practices and policies to approaches that are more open and reflective (philosophy with children), address specific aspects of morality (care ethics approach, empathy approach, cognitive developmental ethics education, character education, infusion approach, etc.), or are oriented toward ethical action (service learning approach). One of the more popular approaches in the past was the values clarification approach (Simon et al. 1972), which (following the lessons of moral pluralism) rejected the idea of inculcation and offered an individual an opportunity for free personal choice or preference regarding values and their understanding. Criticism of this approach stresses particularly the questions about its effectiveness and the lack of philosophical and educational foundations, while one of the reasons for the decline of its popularity was also its erratic implementation. One of its main proponents, Kirschenbaum (1992) has later accepted much of this criticism and proposed a more comprehensive values education approach. It is based upon four aspects of comprehensiveness. The first aspect concerns the content, since comprehensive values education includes personal and social, ethical, and moral issues. Secondly, the comprehensive approach includes a variety of difference methodologies. Thirdly, the approach gets extended throughout the school life, including both classes and all other school-related activities. And lastly, the comprehensive approach includes not merely children and their teachers, but the entire community and including other institutions as agents of values education (Kirschenbaum 1992, p. 775).

Joined to this trend was also character education as a specific form of ethics education, focusing primarily on character development, e.g., development of moral virtues, habits, and other aspects of character, which then translates into morally right action and meaningful life. Building upon an ancient tradition and educational ideas of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, this form often

obtained a more limited form of moral education through the use of role models and exemplars as key tools. With the rise of modernity, it slowly started to lose its appeal and relevance, primarily due to secularization and a focus on rules of conduct. Ryan (2015) states that in the 1980s, as a response to concern about poor academic achievements and bad behavior, educators have rediscovered character education (also as part of a wider trend of the return of virtue ethics championed, e.g., by G.E.M. Anscombe and Alasdair MacIntyre). Character education thus focuses on cultivating virtues and forming good character habits and at the same time eliminating poor habits. It is crucial that it begins early in childhood and rests on the assumption that parents and later on teachers begin the engraving process of habituation to consideration of others, self-control, and responsibility, and later on this individual takes over the formation of his or her own character (Ryan 2015).

In recent decades there is also a rise of other integrative and comprehensive approaches, which take into account both traditional educational goals and new findings from moral psychology and other sciences. In line with this development, Silcock and Duncan (2001) put forward the following preconditions for successful values acquisitions in schools.

- (1) Process condition: Optimal circumstances for the integration of values into students' lives must include in part their voluntary commitment at some stage of this process. This means recognizing their autonomy, competence, and personal choice in line with their moral development.
- (2) Conceptual condition: Values education must lead to personally transformed relationships between students and themes and contents considered worthwhile, which means that the move from belief toward motivation and action presupposes "co-construction", a consciously accomplished, cross-transformation where what is studied becomes a personal value through the act of commitment, while the commitment itself becomes a value-commitment via the potent nature of what is transformed (e.g., the potential a moral virtue has to change one's life)" (Silcock and Duncan 2001, p. 251).
- (3) Contextual condition: There has to be at least partial consistency or concurrence between the values, virtues, ideals, or standards learned and wider sociopolitical context, since this is necessary for ethics and values education to be as free as possible from internal inconsistencies regarding both contents and goals of it. Thus, in order for ethics and values education to obtain lifelong lasting relevance, one must include a wider understanding and grounds of the mentioned values, virtues, ideals, or standards they appeal to.

Some Challenges

Quite a number of challenges have been raised in regard to ethics and values education. In the context of school education, one challenge is how to situate it within the curriculum, especially regarding more explicit approaches that promote specially dedicated ethics and values education classes, given ever more pressing time demands of the curriculum and a possible lack of sensitivity to age-specific moral maturity. Another challenge is the global, plural, and multicultural world we live in that puts pressure upon the question of which values to choose in the beginning. Here ethics and values education can either appeal to some core common values (e.g., Hans Küng's *Weltethos* approach) or specifically include education for an inclusive cosmopolitan society (the abovementioned values clarification process was in part developed in response to this recognition).

From the perspective of teachers and other educators, one of the main challenges is the recognition that they often lack a more specific knowledge about ethics and values and related competencies to tackle them in the classroom in a coherent and integrative way. Education professionals are often additionally burdened with pressures toward more effective educational outputs, working schedule flexibility and mobility, new topics in curriculum, and increasing number of

students with adjustment disorders and often also with a lack of effective lifelong learning opportunities. Often they express skepticisms about their assigned role as some sort of moral authority or role model. All this may decrease the willingness and strengthen the reluctance to actively adopt a particular ethics and values education model.

Conclusion

Ethics and values education is a challenging field and task, which must harbor aspect of thinking, understanding, and community in order to be effective. “Values education therefore cannot be simply a matter of instructing students as to what they should value – just so much ‘teaching that’ – as if students did not need to inquire into values or learn to exercise their judgement. In any case, it is an intellectual mistake to think that values constitute a subject matter to be learned by heart. They are not that kind of thing. Values are embodied in commitments and actions and not merely in propositions that are verbally affirmed” (Cam 2014, p. 1208). The central aim remains striving to develop an autonomous, responsible, and caring individual to form a morally good society.

Cross-References

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- Ethics and Significance: Insights from Welby for Meaningful Education
- Ontology and Semiotics: Educating in Values
- Philosophy with Children
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- Values in Science and in Science Classrooms

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Ethics of Care

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- [Philosophical Roots of Gilligan-Kohlberg Controversy, The](#)

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Examining the “Service” of Business Education for Women: A Service-Dominant Logic Perspective

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Synonyms

[Shortcomings](#); [Inadequacies](#)

Introduction

Numerous studies identify failures in business school *output* (Thomas and Corneul 2012). Citing a gap between the skills and knowledge desired by prospective employers and the preparedness of new business graduates, the business school

faces increased pressures to improve education. A lack of relevance in topics, outdated teaching methods, and insufficient faculty diversity are among some of the most predominant arguments for improving the business school experience.

These failures, and corresponding need for improvement, are particularly important for women as existing research have been found to have a (greater) disproportionate impact on women than men Connell and Ryan (2011). Currently, business schools are said to evoke a male dominant bias due to the focus on “hard” management and the overly aggressive and competitive environment (Parsons and Priola 2010; White et al. 2011). A cumulative effect of sexist use of language, presentation of stereotypical views of women, and instructors favoring male students reportedly dissuade women from enrolling and achieving success in business classes (Crombie et al. 2003). In support of these claims, recent statistics suggest that business is the only area of graduate studies that has not seen a similar increase in women.

Stakeholder groups such as prospective employers, business practitioners, and incoming students benefit from an improved business school curriculum because students may be better prepared to face the reality of an increasingly complex and diverse business environment (McMurray et al. 2016). In particular, because the business school relative to other areas of education is the typical entry point for employers recruiting management-level trainees, many suggest the College of Business (COB) should improve business practice. Unfortunately, reports suggest the experience of a business school education may extend beyond graduation to perpetuate gender equality in the workforce (Warhurst 2011).

Our research into these COB failures suggests many are likely the result of traditional views of economic exchange (i.e., economic science) upon which a significant majority of business thought and, more importantly for this context, business education is based. Recent research in marketing has demonstrated the failures of many classic economic assumptions, or premises; yet these same assumptions and corresponding failures as

a result of classic economic theory have not been addressed or articulated in any educational context. As such, we begin with a brief, yet critical, discussion of the (economic science) foundation upon which America's COBs were, and continue to be, based. We use this historical foundation to frame (and explain) how current COB curricula and teaching methods have negatively impacted all COB students, and particularly women. We then discuss how new marketing theories relating to service (singular) provide not only an alternative lens for understanding education's role and practice but also practical, and immediately actionable, avenues for improving the current COB educational system for women, as well as all students in general.

The Foundations of Business Thought and Education

When the opportunity of a formal business education emerged at the end of the nineteenth century with the creation of America's first business colleges (e.g., the Wharton School in 1881 – University of Pennsylvania; the Booth School in 1898 – University of Chicago; the Tuck School in 1900 – Dartmouth College), the prevailing thinking was that a nation's wealth, and therefore value, was rooted in one's access to natural resources and the, subsequent, wealth (i.e., outputs) one's resources could produce not only for the enhancement of the nation's members but also for export in exchange for the desired resources and outputs one lacked domestically (Smith 1776/1904). The fundamental practices taught in early COBs were very functional by nature and focused on practical approaches to management. During this time, most faculty were either current or retired industrial managers (primarily men) teaching male students who lived and worked near the campus in which they were enrolled. As economic thought and the focus of business education began to shift toward research (to improve business practices), economic science became the fundamental curriculum of these business colleges. Specifically, these theories were rooted in the ever-

growing need to enhance production and distribution efforts as production increasingly moved away from the agricultural fields and individual homes and into the factory. Theories pertaining to specialization of labor suggested these newly formed business colleges, and sub-disciplines (e.g., marketing, accounting), would provide the necessary efficiencies to enhance one's (America's) overall wealth (Vargo and Lusch 2004).

However, emerging disciplines' early efforts to gain legitimacy are often grounded in justification, differentiation, and classification of what is being taught and/or studied. Like that of economics earlier on, each subdiscipline believed that if they were to ever be "accepted" as viable "sciences," they must be able to model, in a deterministic sense, mathematical rules, and "laws" similar to those of mathematics and other (natural) sciences (e.g., Mill 1848). Quantifiable measurement became a critical, *and enduring*, focus.

Similarly, as economics was rooted in the transformation and subsequent sale of resources for maximal (exchange) value (e.g., selling price), COBs, too, became obsessed with the development of *tangible outputs* (goods). They, unlike their *intangible* "siblings" (services), were easily measurable, quantifiable, and highly similar to those resources empirically studied within economics. Furthermore, due to *repeated* misinterpretation and (mis)citation of Adam Smith's, the "father of economic thought," *Wealth of Nations* (1776/1904 – Vol. 1, Book 2, Ch. 3, pp. 314–318), services were deemed "unproductive" and, therefore, unworthy of any significant, much less leadership, role in business research/curricula.

A Goods-Dominant Logic to Business and Business Education

This overt, almost singular, focus on production outputs ushered in what has now become commonly referred to as the goods-dominant logic (GDL), which has dominated business school curricula throughout the twentieth, and even early twenty-first, century (Bettencourt et al. 2014; Vargo and Lusch 2004). Value, wealth, and, therefore, success have all become inextricably linked

to the production of tangible, homogeneous, and nonperishable goods. Thus suggesting that homogeneity in curriculum and students provide relatively more value due to increased efficiency. Services, conversely, have been commonly referred to as having IHIP (intangible, heterogeneous, inseparable, and perishable) characteristics; all of which are seen as largely negative for maximizing one’s (e.g., a company or nation’s) exchange value potential (Dunne et al. 2014).

A term that is almost ubiquitous in COB classrooms, corporate boardrooms, and even shareholder reports is *value-added*; this “value-added” lens is foundational to the GDL paradigm of business yet is easily applied to the current, educational, context. When viewed through a “value-added” (GDL) lens, students are “goods” or “products;” producers (faculty, curricula, administrators, etc.) *add value* (mold, create, or enhance) to their products (students). To further underscore how truly pervasive the GDL – and symbiotically the value-added paradigm – is *throughout all* of education, consider how often one might hear the phrase, “to *shape* individuals’ (or even the country’s) future” via education (or by being an educator).

Products need shaping (value-added) so they can later be sold in a marketplace for the greatest amount of value (exchange value). Understandably, a business education is heavily influenced by the value-added concept. The value-added concept may (un)knowingly be operationally appealing to educators because it positions (educational) value in terms of what each sub-discipline, college, and even university *controls*. Administrators do research what companies’ likely responses are to different variations in the bundles of attributes taught to students, but these responses are only done to maximize the course materials embedded upon students (output). This focus suggests the value of the materials, labor, and services contributed to each output (student) is unidirectional, and it simultaneously underemphasizes the importance of the customer (recruiters in the marketplace), as well as the students who bring their own knowledge, skills, experiences to the classroom. Consequently, the integration of these resources

aids (future) employers in better identifying needs, solving problems, and providing solutions (i.e., to provide service) to their respective customers.

The Failure of a Goods-Dominant Logic for Business Education

As suggested earlier, a GDL perspective puts a heavy emphasis on analytical models and reductionism – what is measurable, quantifiable, controllable, and, therefore, easily standardized. It is a production-focused mentality centered upon generating outputs (e.g., students) that has led to a singular philosophy for educational exchange in the COB. Although this may have aided the efficiency of information exchange during that time, businesses, their resources, and therefore their current needs require business schools provide more than one (standardized) solution (e.g., vestiges of the assembly line). Students are not, and should not, represent production outputs. Similarly, not all students have, nor desire, similar capabilities either for jobs or, more importantly, *their educations*. What is needed is a *change in philosophy* – one that not only better addresses the needs of the marketplace (one’s future employers) but also, and more importantly, the *service* of education for all students.

A Service-Dominant Logic for Education

Over the last decade, a new, and significant, paradigm off/for business has emerged – a Service-Dominant Logic (SDL) (e.g., Vargo and Lusch 2004). At its most foundational level, it argues that individuals *do not* buy, exchange, or even produce goods; rather, *service* (through the performance of deeds, processes, and performances for others) *is the root of all exchange* – business, social, interpersonal, etc. While Vargo and Lusch’s (2004) initial conceptualization was framed for the marketing community, its application has grown significantly over the last decade to include many domains outside of business (see Bettencourt et al. 2014 and Vargo & Lusch 2016 for further discussion).

A Jobs-To-Be-Done Lens: Women and Business Education

If COBs are to best address the known impediments for women achieving a meaningful business education, they must view the problem(s) using a JTBD-lens. A JTBD-lens shifts the focus from what is being produced to enabling students to get their jobs done successfully. As such, this is achieved by asking the "right" types of questions, such as "How do women evaluate value when it comes to their educational experiences and desired results?", "What unique know-how does (our) COB possess that might help women make the most out of their educational experiences?", "How might our know-how be better integrated with the resources of partners (other colleges, company partners/recruiters, business thought-leaders, etc.) to help women cocreate the most meaningful educational experience(s) via the COB?", and "What are some of the current needs, and problems faced, by our resource partners so as to better understand the desired jobs-to-be-done by our (future) female graduates?"

By embracing a JTBD (service) lens, COBs can do a better job in their quest to provide a meaningful, and by extension, more valuable, educational experience to women. Understandably, such questioning challenges long-term, firmly-held assumptions about value and the role of not only the COB, but also, and more importantly, its female student population. Students are no longer "products" to be shaped, created, or managed; they are *active* participants in the value creation process. Similarly, employers are no longer customers of COB-created value; they too are active participants in the value-creation process. *Everyone* (students, faculty, companies, and colleges) *is a cocreator of value, and value is only realized through the exchange of service* (knowledge, skills, and abilities through the act of deeds, processes, and performances for the benefit of others).

Primary Jobs-To-Be-Done to Improve Business Education

The following discussion is by no means and attempt at an exhaustive, or comprehensive, solution to the current criticisms/trends associated

with COBs. Instead, it is intended to provide a baseline understanding, or framework, upon which further, more specialized, investigations can build. In so doing, the conclusion will describe the three primary criticisms voiced in the literature, while simultaneously identifying how a JTBD-lens might identify appropriate questions and corrective measures to be taken in the future.

Question 1: What Teaching, and/or Learning, Approaches are Most Desirable by Resource Partners (e.g., Recruiters) and (Female) Students to Better Address the Needs of the Workplace? Extant research has consistently demonstrated that students have a strong desire to feel challenged while simultaneously learning topics that are relevant to future employment. Yet the traditional paradigm of business schools is hard-pressed to provide students with relevant business educations to meet the needs of diverse employers. COB courses largely require students to learn information that is often too technical, too heavily rooted in "best practices" (standardized), overly rational, and routinely focused on delivering short-term, non-contextualized, materials that lack lasting value applicable to the current (or future) business environments (see Augier and March 2007).

Such mechanized, overtly measurement-driven education has led many to suggest that COB students exiting college with underdeveloped, yet extremely important, behavioral skills, particularly those relating to effective communication, multicultural awareness, and leadership (Hawawini 2005). All of these "softer skills," as many refer to them, are routinely pointed out by recruiters as *critical* for building relationships, establishing trust, and evoking a sense of commitment and "citizenship" amongst colleagues and businesses alike. Taken together, critics suggest COBs are failing to sufficiently prepare students for an increasingly complex business environment where relational skills, the ability to interact with, and operate within, diverse populations, and a keen ability to problem-solve are paramount.

For women, the lack of relevance in coursework has additional implications for their

success. As a result of the indicated preoccupation with measurement and control in business courses, education theorists suggest students are taught under a pretense of a male moral bias. For women, relational theory (often considered to be a part of feminist theory) provides an approach to understanding women’s experiences (this theory does not propose to apply to all women) that may be indicative of their sense of self and morality (Buttner 2002). Relational theory suggests that much of women’s psychological development is rooted in connection to others. Relational practice in organizations contributes to employee effectiveness and enhanced work performance. Further studies suggest cultivating relational practices, particularly for women, operating in large corporations may lead to a competitive advantage in the marketplace as a result of better relationships, empathy, collective empowerment, and enhancing team effectiveness (Rapoport and Bailyn 1996). For women entrepreneurs, relational practices also reportedly enhanced the decision-making efforts of the startup team and aid in the development of a unified vision of their venture (Buttner 2001).

Thus one approach to improve the relevance of topics and materials covered in the coursework is to use relational theory in practice. For women, particular emphasis must be placed on the value of the diversity of experiences brought forth by various resource partners. Facilitating such relational, softer, skills in a classroom environment is sure to be *both* challenging and rigorous for faculty and students. From a faculty-member’s perspective, one is no longer able to “control,” or pre-plan, one’s lectures and classroom-experiences. Such classroom experiences are *organic* and *dialog-driven*, which will surely put a premium on educator preparedness. However, the challenging-nature of such a service-driven, classroom environment does not fall solely at the feet of faculty members. If students are to enhance the collaborative and relational skills employers’ desire, students must come (significantly) prepared to each and every class meeting; failure to do so will surely limit, if not eliminate, the possibility for dialog-driven, cocreative, learning experiences. Furthermore, cocreative learning

environments are predicated on students’ willingness to put forward one’s own judgments/ideas for critical evaluation by other students and the faculty member(s) involved. Dialog-based, seminar-style classes should simply result in a more organic, more idiosyncratic learning experience emphasizing the knowledge, skills, and experiences of all participants (faculty and students). Absent relational theories in practice, all students, but particularly women, will not have an opportunity to learn, engage, and practice these skills during their business school experience and, thereby, lose some of their competitive advantage in the workforce.

Question 2: What Current Teaching Techniques Used in the COB are Likely to Stifle (Female) Students’ Maximal Learning Potential, and What Resources Exist That Might Later be Integrated to Enhance Students’ Future Classroom Experiences? Unidirectional, lecture-based teaching continues to be the norm throughout much of the COB. This may be carryover from the GDL paradigm, the result of faculty fears over losing control of the material to be covered or perhaps some combination thereof. Regardless of its origin, predetermined, lecture-based classroom experiences fail to accommodate the learning preferences/predispositions of many students. Lecture-based teaching is a passive method of embedding knowledge in students. Furthermore, it limits the opportunities students have to meaningfully engage in conversation with faculty and students alike when a topic(s) of interest presents itself to the student. As such, it’s not surprising that recent research finds students are 1.5 times more likely to fail a course(s) if taught in a unidirectional, lecture-based format (Freeman et al. 2014). Lecture-based classrooms simply result in many students perceiving the learning environment as “closed” for active questioning.

For employers, the lecture-based approach can be problematic because students are not prepared to communicate and consequently advocate for their ideas. One alternative implemented by many COBs is the case-based method of teaching. Popularized by the Harvard Business School, this approach to learning was designed to give

students the opportunity to learn by solving real-business problems. Unlike a lecture-based approach, the students lead classroom discussion while the professor is responsible for facilitating dialogue (i.e., coproducing knowledge and skills).

For women, the lecture-based and case-based approaches to learning provide different challenges. First, a lecture-based approach to learning is found to be less effective when students are not engaged in the classroom dialogue and to be particularly problematic for diverse student populations. For under-represented minorities' (e.g., women in the business school), alternative approaches to traditional lecture-based courses can improve perceived leadership skills, positively reinforce core concepts, and help students break down complex tasks. However, currently, self-reports suggest business cases are not valued similarly by women and men. A recent study suggests more than half of the women enrolled in business schools could not relate to the characters in the case studies because they are absent in many roles (Catalyst Survey 2000).

Thus potential options for improving case-based dialogue and learning may require altering characters in cases to include women in leadership roles with specific case-scenarios identifying business success from the perspective of women leaders. Furthermore, altering the structure of dialogue may bring increased benefits to women as previous research suggests much of the traditional classroom conversation is dominated by male students. Additional resources may include classroom response systems (i.e., clickers), flipped-classrooms, and connected learning. Arguably, the transition from viewing female students as similar to males (output) to cocreators of educational value may also bring a significant refocus to future approaches to classroom dialogue.

Question 3: What Resource Partners (e.g., Faculty, Industry Experts) are Available, or Should be Integrated in the Future, so as To Enhance (Female) Students' Ability to Cocreate New Knowledge, Skills, and Competences? Lack of diversity limits exposure to diverse experiences, skills, and knowledge from which to best examine a problem for possible service solutions.

Business, in particular, faces increasing globalization, rapid technology development, and changing workplace demographics. As such, the business school faculties, similar to business practitioners, are a critical catalyst of change to improve the diversity of students entering Corporate America. Industry experts suggest that gender-diverse companies are more likely to outperform their peers by 15% and ethnically-diverse companies are 35% more likely to do the same. Teams with diversity are much more likely to outperform their peers in team-based assessments, and for companies with women represented on the board of directors, they are also shown to outperform their peers.

From a JTBD lens, faculty are cocreators of service via their unique knowledge and skills. If students and business practitioners are to receive the reciprocal effects of improving gender and diversity profiles among COB faculty, then the COB must improve diversity of faculty teaching in the classroom. The value of these relationships is supported by recent reports suggesting that female COB students report not having adequate opportunities to work with female faculty while acquiring their business degree (Catalyst 2000). Furthermore, recent reports suggest a majority of the US flagship State universities lag far behind in their faculty diversity when compare with that of their student body (Myers 2016). Upon consideration of faculty as cocreators of knowledge, skills, and value, efforts to increase the diversity of faculty have critical implications to enhancing the diversity of students as well as that of future business executives. Thus industry practitioners must support the teaching of business faculty to enhance the diversity of gender (and ethnicity) facilitating learning in the classroom today.

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Exclusion

► Social Imaginaries and Inclusion

Existential Individual Alone Within Freire's Sociopolitical Solidarity

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Synonyms

Angst; Authenticity; Conscientization; Dialogue; Existentialism; Freedom

Introduction

Freire's work has been recognized as lacking some careful and systematic attention to details on occasion (Dale and Hyslop-Margison 2011; Gerhardt 1993; Roberts 2010). This is not a serious criticism but is simply accepted as characteristic of his humanizing approach. One example of an event Freire identifies as important but does not provide systematic details about is the personally existential encounter an individual must face *alone* while being educated and liberated to participate in the sociopolitical solidarity of her context. Existential encounters are often marginalized due to the all-important focus upon dialogue between others. This contribution seeks to draw attention to the existential experiences of educational transformations to which Freire refers, explaining that these are not just juxtaposed

ideas (Hufford 2010) but must necessarily be experienced *alone* because of their existential nature and that these experiences are also considered to be a necessary element for his pedagogy for transformation.

Existential Influences

Themes such as dehumanization, alienation, domination, existential, fear of freedom, and authenticity are some examples of the terminologies that are present in Freire's writings which demonstrate the influence that existentialism had upon some of his thinking. Freire was well acquainted with the works of the existentialists such as Buber, de Beauvoir, Jaspers, Kierkegaard, Marcel, Sartre, and others and was personally acquainted with, and quite influenced by, Eric Fromm. Comparing the existential works of Fromm and Freire is quite illuminating and so several references to Fromm's works shall be made in this chapter.

While existentialist philosophies are readily recognized for centering their concern upon the *individual* who often feels alone, alienated, and anxious about the recognition of a certain sense of personal freedom, it is not systematically clear in Freire's work of a similar sort of individually felt dread and angst concerning one's existence. However, this chapter seeks to tease some of this out. Through his educational writings which are aimed towards liberating the oppressed social classes, particularly in South America, Freire often makes reference to the oppressed as "an exploited social class." This may be understood as an attempt to empower the entire membership of the group as a *social-political* phenomenon rather than as one which is centered upon each personally existing *individual*. This is often supported by Freire's (1985, p. 99) preference for such notions as "we think" rather than "I think."

It is clear from the descriptions of oppressive systems that Freire wanted us to understand them as *social-political* phenomena of cultural oppression affecting an under-class, which he described at times as the "masses of common people." Nevertheless, we can appreciate that he, along with other significant philosophers of education such

as John Dewey with his emphasis upon a "new individualism," recognized that an education for liberty involves a site of struggle in the lived existence of each *individual* – at least for one phase of the process. Freire (1998, p. 65) describes the felt impotence of the oppressed class as "existential weariness" because it is experienced by each individual who has a sense of being too insignificant to have any real potential for making a difference. He also describes this same "existential weariness" as a "spiritual weariness" because it is "emptied of courage, emptied of hope, and above all, seized with fear of adventure and risk" (Freire 1994, p. 114). This is particularly relevant for the notion of the "fear of freedom" which Freire appreciated is not easily overcome for those who are oppressed.

Freedom

For Freire, the overall aim is to attain liberty for all – including for the oppressors as well as for the oppressed. He often described such freedom as a culture for which a liberating education is an essential component. The sort of freedom which he espoused was not unlimited and irresponsible, "perverted into license" as if it were absolute. Rather it is a socially responsible freedom which respects the humanity in all persons irrespective of their social position in life.

Cultures of oppression which domesticate and silence the masses make people consider themselves as lacking the freedom and capacity to enact change and to assertively pursue greater liberty. Freire (1985, p. 115) importantly describes this system as a culture for controlling the aspirations of the oppressed as it is "crucial for dehumanizing ideology to avoid, at all costs, any opportunity for men and women to perceive themselves as reflective, active beings, as creators and transformers of the world." In addition to being dominant throughout the whole of society, this is a culture which is internalized at the *individual* level. Therefore, cultural action for liberating and bringing about changes in social structures, institutions, and practices *first* requires that *individuals* take action from a basis of self-conviction

rather than being caught up simply *following* and being led by what the rest of the crowd might be doing – even if the crowd is enacting a culture of liberty. This is because even in this social situation the individual herself is not authentically free if she is nevertheless being led passively by others. She must be led by her *own* personal convictions and intentions.

This is a crucial step that is often overlooked and is quite existential in nature. Freire's education for liberating, while a social affair involving dialogical relations, does not *give* freedom to people as if freedom was *something* to be "had" or obtained. Rather, freedom is more ontological in nature because it involves the very *being* of people. This transformation of individuals enables them to *be* free rather than just to *have* freedom, and as an ontological phenomenon this pertains to each individual who undergoes conscientization. This site of the individual struggling through reflective and critical thought is an important dimension for political action to begin, as Freire (2000, pp. 108 & 124) explains that others cannot "think for me" but liberated people must become "masters of their thinking."

The felt sense of freedom at the *individual* level is important for all political actions because it is "the freedom that moves us, that makes us take risks..." (Freire 1998, p. 102). He appears to reference Fromm's book *The Fear of Freedom* in the preface of his *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* in relation to education for critical conscious-raising because inevitably each individual must grapple with a new sense of personal freedom in order to enact living politically according to a new and emancipative culture which is often at odds with the dominant culture. Importantly, in Fromm's (1942, p. 91) book is his argument that we are unfortunately too often fascinated with "freedom from powers *outside* ourselves and are blinded to the fact of *inner* restraints, compulsions, and fears." In line with this, Freire (1994, p. 115) argues that this inner fear prevents individuals' struggling. Significant freedom for both Fromm and Freire is freedom of one's inner *will* – one's intentionality – which must be grappled with *alone* while in the midst of being in and with the world.

Conscientization and Existential Angst

Conscientization is a form of *intentionality* which provides personal *purposefulness* for being *with* the world. In order to pursue the process of enabling people to be liberated through education, Freire (2000, pp. 55 & 111) argues that "the first stage must deal with . . . oppressed consciousness" which he described as "alienating domestication [and] . . . the bureaucratisation of the mind." Interestingly, he explains this as a consciousness which transforms "everything surrounding it into an object of its domination . . . everything reduced to the status of objects at its disposal" (Freire 2000, pp. 58–59) where the people "no longer *are*; they merely *have*." This is a reflection of some similar ideas found in Fromm's *To Have or to Be?* and *The Art of Being*. Consequently, one of the first things he tries to encourage his students to appreciate is that culture is an anthropological concept which is distinctively different from the assumed static condition of the world of nature which is often accepted as being more "objective" (Freire 1975, p. 41).

His critique of the silence that is produced in the oppressed social classes identifies that these people believe too much in an objective reality for which they feel separated and powerless to influence. Drawing upon de Beauvoir, Freire (2000, p. 74) argued that "the interests of the oppressors lie in 'changing the consciousness of the oppressed, not the situation which oppresses them'". Hence is focus upon encouraging his students to consider the manner which they are actively relating to their own context.

Freire's (1985, pp. 51 & 68) process of conscientization centers the "existential situations of the learners" themselves including their sense of subjectivity and how they relate to a world of human culture. This is portrayed clearly in his book *Education for Critical Consciousness* in which he presents drawings of ten existential situations to his adult students which they could *relate* to as part of their present existence. Understanding human persons as relational beings who relate to their relations is a key existential concept. Developing this in some detail, Kierkegaard has famously argued that "truth is subjectivity." By

this he meant that in order to live a more meaningful life, *how* one relates to the entities around one has more significance than coming to “know” (in an objective sense) the nature of the “*what*” of the objects themselves. This existential notion of “subjective truth” appears significant for Freire. Not in the sense for establishing “truth” in an epistemological sense of gaining knowledge *about* the facts of reality but rather understanding is as “truly relating” to one’s situation in an authentic manner, in a reflexive sense for how one *relates* to one’s environment in which one plays an active and present role.

Freire’s philosophy appears to be more action-oriented than that of the existentialist philosophers but he does value the internal strife – or anxiety – that is required to reorient a human life towards greater conscientization. Similar to the existentialists, he argues against a “spectator approach” to life and appreciates the existential angst – involving “emotional power” and what he refers to as the “dramatic tension” (Freire 1975, p. 29, 1985, pp. 128–129) of our existence. This is experienced when one encounters a critical revelation through the demythologizing praxis of a liberating education which seeks to uncover how one is positioned and then relates to the world one finds oneself “thrown” in, as it importantly seeks the *raison d’être* of the facts behind one’s *facticity*. Freire (2000, p. 115) argues that critical consciousness raising must seek a holistic view of things, “a totality.” This is much like Heidegger’s notion of “total relevance” and Dewey’s notion of “significance” – it is the “big picture” understanding of the hegemonic culture in which we are embedded – and for Freire it is essential to give particular importance to the political dimensions of our world.

This “totality” view of Freire’s is also akin to Kierkegaard’s religious stage of giving meaning and purpose to all that we do. Indeed this totalizing “religious” view is able to provide a *why* for all entities in the environment, including a *why* for being moral. As Freire (1998, p. 53) explains that “what makes men and women ethical is their capacity to ‘spiritualise’ the world.” Hence through education, *doxa* (accepted understandings of the dominant ideology) is challenged and

replaced by *logos* (totality of meanings in which persons participate in *making* such meanings) enabling people “to perceive critically *the way they exist* in the world” in order to transform it and themselves (Freire 2000, pp. 81–83). Freire describes this process of “becoming fully human” as an “existential experience” (*ibid.*, p. 75) because it involves creating a culture within oneself often including fear and anxiety, but which is also shared in solidarity with others.

The inclination to develop existential purposes were previously absent in the minds and intentions of the oppressed because these are not compatible with the dominating culture. Therefore Freire (2000, p. 39) argues that conscientization “is a task for radicals” which is reflective of Fromm’s notion of *Disobedience* for which he argues for the importance of being a revolutionary in the sense of being with a shared vision of a better world rather than just being a disobedient “rebel without a cause.” It is understood that “the revolutionary process is eminently educational in character” (Freire 2000, p. 138) because it enables the students to better see the world as in need of change and is not a world with a “fixed entity,” which is a key feature of Freire’s problem-posing education. In a more tempered articulation of this same idea is that conscientization encourages *curiosity* to evolve as an important aspect of a strengthening personal intentionality. He explained in his *Pedagogy of Hope* that one of the reasons he gave his adult learners drawings of existential situations with which they had some familiarity was to render them sympathetic. In turn, this promotes curiosity, which in turn begins the process of conscientization (1994, p. 65).

Authenticity and Authentic Dialogue

There are frequent references to “authenticity” in Freire’s works and in particular in relation to his understanding of dialogue. Authenticity is a key concept in existentialism, pertaining to the individual who makes/chooses one’s *own* meanings, purposes, and intentions. Freire doesn’t always use authenticity in this manner that is specific to existentialist philosophy. However, he does

appear to use it when he describes the oppressed as “unauthentic beings” and for claiming that the people’s destiny was to overcome this in order to become “authentic human beings” (Freire 1975, p. 16). He also employed this term authenticity for better understanding the potentially liberating relationship between educators and their students as one involving “authentic dialogue.”

Educators are not to impose themselves or their teachings onto students in a paternalistic sense because this would perpetuate the myth that students ought to be dependent on their teachers. Rather students and teachers are to be *with* each other as equal human beings – not necessarily united by identical ideas, aspirations, and feelings – but having a unity through diversity, oneness with difference, and a dialectical solidarity which is a hallmark of democratic living (Freire 1994). This is partly represented through Freire’s notion of authentic dialogue and due to the inherent differences to emerge through dialogue he explains that this activity is able to provoke a critical attitude (Freire 1975). Sometimes this is represented in secondary sources as “egalitarian dialogue” or “dialogic inquiry.” However, they present themselves as “methods” or “techniques” of pedagogy but for which Freire would be opposed. Both egalitarian dialogue and dialogic inquiry tend to be focused upon the rationality and validity of propositions and arguments for which all participants are free to challenge and engage with in a rather cognitive sense. However, these concepts do not adequately capture the existential dimension of authentic dialogue that was important for Freire (1975, p. 45) who described it in Buber’s existentialist phrase as an “I-Thou relationship.”

Freire (2000, p. 88) argued that “human beings are not built in silence” and so dialogue serves as “an existential necessity” to humanize persons. Therefore *authentic* dialogue brings to light the important existential personal *courage* needed by each individual student to overcome personal fear in order to transcend the oppressing culture which silences them from sharing their *own* understandings and feelings. Asserting one’s own voice is not encouraged nor welcomed in an oppressive culture which manifests itself as an *inner* culture of

“manipulating” and silencing voices because the individual believes herself not to be worthy or capable of having a view of her own that may be contrary to the culture of the status quo.

In summary, while Freire’s works can be primarily understood as engaging with and transforming social-political practices, he greatly appreciated the important role of the existential site of struggle within individuals which they must encounter in order to participate in liberating education. This is evident through acknowledging that the dominating culture of oppression exists in the inner world of individuals in addition to being manifest in the external practices of society. Transforming oppressive political societies first requires the raising of critical consciousness or conscientization in the inner worlds of individuals. Freire argued that this might at first be encouraged through sympathetic recognition which leads towards curiosity. This might develop into a more determined interest to inquire into cultural practices more rigorously. The emergence of a new intentionality through this educative pedagogy might then enable individuals to face their fear of freedom and to choose new aspirations for themselves. Then as a collective of individuals, *action* in solidarity may follow. Of existential importance is the courage that is required to overcome the existential anxiety encountered at the individual level, at the interface between actual present conditions and the possible new conditions which are hoped for.

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Expertise and Educational Practice

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Do experts have distinctive ways of knowing and distinctive modes of deploying knowledge in performance? The idea that they do has been commonplace, but these claims have been subjected to considerable scrutiny in recent years. Consider:

- H1: There are ways of knowing distinctive of expert knowledge.
- H2: There are distinctive forms of rationality (the rational deployment of knowledge) characteristic of expert practice.

H1 is the key hypothesis. It is independent of H2, but if H1 were true, that would add weight to the case for H2. Contrariwise, if H1 is false, that erodes the reasons for H2. With regard to both hypotheses, it is useful to think of a spectrum from conservative to profligate conceptions of knowledge and rationality, respectively. The conservative opposes the proliferation of ways of knowing and forms of rationality; the profligate endorses proliferation. The key methodological issue concerns the status of the claims made in favor of either hypothesis: Just what is at stake in claiming H1? I shall focus on H1.

This entry provides (section “[History](#)”) a brief overview of some of the historical sources for this debate, (section “[Key Theoretical Claims](#)”) a summary of some key theoretical claims and methodological assumptions, (section “[Assessment of Lines of Debate](#)”) an assessment of some of the main lines of debate, and (section “[Lines of Development](#)”) an indication of potential development.

History

Sources for the idea of distinctive non-propositional ways of knowing can be found in Polanyi's notions of tacit knowledge (1958, 1966), Ryle's knowing-how/known-that distinction (1949), and the Dreyfus and Dreyfus taxonomy of expertise (1986) and appeal to Aristotle on practical knowledge and wisdom (Dunne 1993, Wiggins 2012). Evidence for the appeal to forms of knowing embedded in our practical engagement with the environment is often sourced from Heidegger and Wittgenstein – Stickney (2008), Simpson (2014), and Smeyers and Burbules (2006, 2008) – and the analysis of practitioner behavior (Schon 1983, 1987, 1991) and in psychological theorizing about how experts decide, e.g., Gigerenzer (2000), Gigerenzer and Selton (2002a, b), and Klein and Zsombok (1997). See Searle (1995, 2001) for the Wittgensteinian influence on the role of the “background” in models of rational action.

Key Theoretical Claims

Is there reason to proliferate ways of knowing? In debates in education, the idea of different ways of knowing, some of which are only available to expert practitioners, has become almost commonplace. The Dreyfus model that differentiates ways of knowing from novice to expert has dominated nurse education (Benner 1984), and Schon's account of reflective practitioners that appeals to both Polanyi and Ryle in its appropriation of the idea of nonpropositional ways of knowing has been influential in many fields of professional education. The prevalence of these claims is due largely to the idea that profligacy captures the phenomenology of expert performance. It strikes many that there is something about "the what it is like" to know and act in the moment that is difficult to capture in ordinary propositional modes of knowing (Eraut 1994, 2000; Hager 2000; Beckett and Hager 2005). Acting on the basis of expert knowledge often seems not to be based on a model of deliberation and weighing of reasons in the scales of some preferred model of rational action (Gigerenzer 2000).

This emphasis on phenomenology raises a central methodological issue: What question is being answered with H1 and H2? Is it a phenomenology question of the form "what is it like for experts to think and act in the moment?", or is it a constitutive question of the form "what constitutes the knowledge deployed in expert performance?". That is to say, to what is a theory of expert knowledge and action answerable? Is it answerable to phenomenological adequacy (it describes the "what it is like" of expert knowledge and performance)? Or is it answerable to metaphysical adequacy (it characterizes accurately the nature of the knowledge and its modes of employment in expert performance)? Call the latter metaphysical constraint on theorizing the constitutive constraint, for it amounts to the idea that our account of expert knowledge should deliver what is constitutive of expert knowledge; howsoever, it may seem to the knowing subject. The phenomenological constraint simply takes the requirement on our theorizing to be that our account fits the first-

personal avowals of expert knowers in action (Dreyfus and Dreyfus 1986; Collins 2010).

The phenomenological approach faces an obvious challenge: howsoever, it may appear to practitioners that they are using knowledge that is difficult to articulate and often deployed without full conscious awareness of what is being deployed; is there any good reason to think that what is at stake here (what makes it knowledge) is anything other than what is at stake with ordinary propositional knowledge? It is unclear why an account of what someone knows that informs their performance has to be answerable to what they say they know, let alone why the subject's first-personal access to what they know should be the deciding factor in how what they know is to be fitted into categories of types of ways of knowing. For this response to Gigerenzer's phenomenological case in support of H2, see Chater and Oaksford (2000).

Philosophers working outside education debates have only recently taken detailed interest in this, and the key debates are now foundational – is there anything distinctive about expertise with regard to the types and deployment of knowledge?

There are two main lines of debate – the McDowell/Dreyfus debate and the debate about the viability of Ryle's knowing-how/knowing-that distinction. In the former debate, McDowell (*locus classicus* 1994; see also 2013) has a line of argument that pushes the conservative view that all knowledge is propositional, contra the profligacy advocated by Dreyfus. The latter debate draws on McDowell but is more concerned with assessing Ryle's argument that knowing-how is separate from and cannot be analyzed in terms of knowing-that.

Assessment of Lines of Debate

See Schear (2013) for a thorough collection essential for the McDowell/Dreyfus debate. Central to the debate is the question:

What's a Proposition? A key driver for proliferating ways of knowing is phenomenology. It is

oftentimes difficult for experts to articulate the knowledge they deploy in their moment by moment expert action. At the extreme, they might even say that their response is intuitive. Dreyfus uses “intuition” to pick out the highest level of expert knowledge. The case for proliferation is based on the difficulty and sometimes inability to articulate a propositional content. Suppose you cannot articulate fully what you know in a situation and words are inadequate to express what you know. McDowell’s key claim is that it does not follow from such inarticulacy that what is known is not a proposition. To understand how the inarticulate can nevertheless still be propositional, we need to clarify the concept of a proposition.

If you individuate propositions with sentences (you count propositions and distinguish between them by counting and distinguishing sentences – strings of symbols), then inarticulate knowings cannot be propositional. For example, a nurse might express the way she performs a complicated four-layer bandaging technique by saying:

1. I do it like this.

Sentence (1) does not individuate a proposition. The same sentence can be used by a pianist to express the way they play a particular phrase – the same words, different items of knowledge. If you count propositions by sentences, then what the nurse knows cannot be propositional. But the assumption that propositions are individuated by sentences has no good basis, and hardly anyone in contemporary philosophy would endorse that assumption. It is commonplace that we can make sense of propositions that are only expressible with context-sensitive words (like the demonstratives, “this” and “that”); see Luntley (1999) for overview and McDowell and Pettit (1986) for an early key collection. If so, the fact that experts often express themselves with such sentences tells us nothing about whether or not the knowledge expressed is propositional. It might seem to the expert that it is impossible to articulate what they know. But if that just means “impossible to express in full in context-independent language,”

that says nothing about what constitutes the knowledge in question, and it says nothing that is inconsistent with the idea that the knowledge is knowledge of a proposition.

A proposition is a complex structure, a combination of concepts that in virtue of its structure forms a whole thought that can be either true or false. A concept is a repeatable component of such structures. There is no more need to identify a concept with a word, as there is to identify a proposition with a sentence. There can be context-dependent concepts, and, when the words used in a context to express such concepts are then deployed in a sentence used in a context, you get a context-dependent proposition. Here’s a simple example. Consider a shade of blue for which you have no name. You call it simply “that shade” as you point to it. Suppose you can recognize that shade on different occasions. If so, you can use the words “that shade” as a repeatable component of thoughts when, for example, you look at the paint color chart and think:

2. I like that shade; it will look good on my wall.

and use it again when looking at swatches of material for the curtains and you think:

3. I’m not sure that shade will go well if I use this material for the curtain.

If you endorse the proposition expressed at (3), that bears on the rationality of continuing to endorse (2) – most likely you will decide that the earlier thought expressed in (2) was mistaken. But your thought expressed with (3) only bears on your assessment of what you thought with (2) if the phrase “that shade” picks out the same shade of blue. But that is exactly what we ordinarily think is happening in such examples. The fact that what we are thinking is not fully expressible in words (we rarely remember the names for subtle shade differences on paint manufacturers’ color charts) does not mean that we are not thinking propositional thoughts with (2) and (3). Indeed, the obvious explanation of why, on thinking (3), we retract the thought at (2) is precisely because there is an ongoing way of thinking about

the shade of blue expressed by “that shade.” That concept figured in a candidate for knowledge at (2), it figures again in the knowledge expressed at (3) which is why, if we endorse the proposition expressed with (3), we retract the earlier claim. There is a continuous way of thinking of a color shade that features in both propositional knowledge contents. The knowledge at stake in the example is propositional knowledge.

The point generalizes. Consider the nurse who finds it difficult to articulate why she thought the patient was relapsing – it was something about their look and the pallor of their skin, but quite what it was that they spotted slips through the net of their descriptive vocabulary. Experienced nurses typically respond to very fine shades of appearance and behavioral difference in forming judgments about the well-being of patients. It does not follow that their knowledge is non-propositional, for there is the option of saying that what they know is that the patient “looks like this” and then they point. Those who share their experience and training (including regular exposure and attention to fine differences of pallor, temperature, anxiety in patients’ demeanor, etc.) will see what they are pointing at and be able to use that appearance in other cases. They will have a concept. See Luntley (2007).

The McDowellian idea that all experience, even the most finest grained differentiations, can be captured conceptually is a powerful tool in the case against proliferating modes of knowing; see Gascoigne and Thornton (2014). It does not mean that there are no differences between expert knowing and novice knowing, but the difference lies not in different modes of knowing. The difference might be in the objects of propositional knowings. The novice performs on the basis of propositional knowings, the content of which is given in context-independent propositions – the sorts of propositions that can be expressed in context-free language and the sorts of propositions that figure in general rules for performance that are applicable across many if not all situations. In contrast, the expert, although still using propositional knowledge, is able to exploit propositions that represent the particular details, the fine grades of difference in the saliences of situations. So their

engagement with situations is more dependent on experience and what their perceptual skills make available to them (they notice more details than the novice). Their perceptual attention provides more bearing on what they do than the novice, but what their perception provides is not a different nonpropositional way of knowing. See Ainley and Luntley (2005, 2007) for details of a pilot empirical study of experienced classroom teachers that concentrates on the role of attention in differentiating expert knowledge.

A related debate concerns Ryle’s (1949) distinction between know-that and know-how. Ryle had argued that it is impossible to reduce know-how to know-that. The knowledge that makes action skilful cannot consist solely in propositional knowing-that. His idea was that skilful performance required knowing-how and not mere entertaining of a proposition. Whatever propositional knowledge might be relevant in considering action, the agent needs to know not just what the proposition is, but how to deploy it. Skilful action requires knowing how to apply knowledge. If knowing-how were not separate to and more basic than know-that, then one could never act on knowledge, and one would merely entertain propositions. In a number of seminal publications, this argument has been put under intense pressure Stanley and Williamson (2001), Stanley (2005, 2011). The point exploits the McDowell insight outlined above.

Suppose you thought that knowing how to open a door by turning the knob was an irreducible item of knowing-how. Propositions about the way in which locks work can be entertained, but mere grasp of the propositions does not explain the action of opening the door – you need to know how to use the knowledge contained in the propositions. Stanley’s key initiative is to note the existence of practical modes of presentations – practical ways in which things can figure in thought by virtue of practical concepts. One can know that doors open when the knob is *turned like this*. This practical mode of presentation is, like the McDowellian perceptually dependent concept – the shade *looks like this* – a context-dependent concept. It is a concept available to the thinker in virtue of their grasp of a

way of acting. As such, grasping the proposition that the door opens when you *turn the knob like this* would suffice to explain the action of opening the door despite the fact that it uses propositional knowing-that, not knowing-how. Once again, the case for proliferating modes of knowing is undermined by an analysis that shows that know-how can be captured with know-that.

Note that the intellectualist case shows that it is possible, once one grasps the point of context-sensitive modes of presentation, to analyze know-how in terms of know-that. The Stanley argument for intellectualism is a powerful tool in defense of conservatism about modes of knowledge. It does not, however, settle all the questions one might have about the knowledge that shapes expert performance.

If your question is, “Is it possible to analyze all the knowledge deployed by experts in performance in terms of propositional knowing-that?” then the McDowell and Stanley arguments provide a powerful case for epistemic conservatism. But suppose your question is slightly different. Consider the following:

- (a) How does knowledge of activity-dependent propositions depend on activity?
- (b) How do we acquire activity-dependent modes of presentation?

It is tempting to think that we acquire the knowledge involved in knowing that this is the way to open the door, by first knowing how to open the door. We first acquire the skill at door opening, and then we can label exercises of the skill by using the activity-dependent concept in thinking and talking about our opening it *like this*. In other words, one might think that although once acquired we can, as theorists, represent what the skilful actors know as propositional knowing that the door is opened *like this*; the skilful actor might never think or talk about their skill and simply know how to open the door. In that case, one might think that the know-how is, in terms of what underpins the skilful performance, the knowledge that matters. See Winch (2010, 2011, 2015). Wiggins (2012) has a defense of know-how against the intellectualism that repays careful consideration. Wiggins

acknowledges the Stanley and Williamson point but claims that knowing-that is the “step child” of knowing-how. It is not fully clear what the force of Wiggins’ claim is at this point. Is it just a return of the prioritizing of phenomenology of the knower’s point of view, or is it a move toward a deeper point that attempts to tackle questions (a) and (b) above. If the latter, it suggests a direction that warrants further development.

Lines of Development

Context-sensitive concepts (whether perceptually dependent or performance dependent) are concepts that are dependent on experience – our experience of things as we perceive them and our experience of our own actions. If question (b) makes sense, there ought to be an account of how we acquire such concepts. One of the problems with the McDowellian position is that it can give no such account, see Crane (2013), Schellenberg (2013). For McDowell, experience is conceptually structured through and through; there is no level of experience other than that delivered to us by concepts. There is, then, for McDowell, no account of the origin or acquisition of context-sensitive concepts. One line of potential enquiry in these debates is to explore the scope for such an account.

There are many problems with this line of development. At a minimum, any answer to (b) requires a theory of how experience can present us with things (including the form of our own actions) in patterns that are less than conceptual. The very idea of a nonconceptual content to experience is, however, fraught; see Carman (2013) and Noe (2013), and see Gunther (2003) for overview of that debate. But it is not necessary that the contribution of experience need be in terms of content, albeit a nonconceptual content. Experience might provide a *relation* to things and properties in conscious attention and that is what enables concept possession. This idea is exploited in Luntley (2009) developing insights due to Campbell (2002). See also Luntley (2015) for the idea that a relationist account of attention contributes to the way the aesthetics of experience

plays a foundational role required for answering (b). That suggests a quite different account of what differentiates experts and novices: it is not the type of knowledge they deploy; it is their capacity for learning and generating new concepts. Experts tend to use more context-sensitive concepts and propositions because the form (aesthetic) of their experiential sensitivity and scrutiny provides them the resources to notice and attend to new things, find new saliences, and develop new ways of thinking and talking about the phenomena at hand. See Luntley (2011) for this way of differentiating expert and knower.

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F

Fairness in Educational Assessment

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Synonyms

Bias; Care; Consistency; Differentiation; Equality; Equity; Justice; Opportunity to learn; Reliability; Respect; Transparency; Trust; Validity

Introduction

Fairness is a moral virtue and a fundamental quality in educational assessment. Understanding of fairness in educational assessment has evolved with developments in learning theory and measurement, and it has increasingly been recognized as a necessary quality for inclusivity in education. Fairness is closely related to, but distinct from, the societal concepts of equality, equity, and justice and the measurement concepts of bias, reliability, and validity. In practice, three conditions contribute to fairer educational assessment: opportunity to learn, a constructive environment, and evaluative thinking. Multiple strategies, revolving around the principle of transparency and the provision of opportunity to demonstrate learning, should be used to ensure fairer educational assessment for diverse learners.

The Concept of Fairness

Some English words are used fleetingly by one generation, snatched up like new toys and quickly abandoned, whereas others are used by generations for centuries. The roots of the word *fair* date back to the Germanic period in Northern Europe (400–800 AD). In Old English, fair meant beautiful, pleasant, or agreeable, and it was broadly applied from physique (e.g., fair hair) to sailing (e.g., fair wind). By Medieval Times, it was also used to describe good treatment of others (e.g., fair dealings), particularly in following the rules of competition (e.g., fair play). This etymological transition illuminates the link between two definitions of *fair* in English language dictionaries, which might otherwise seem disparate. Fair is a physical quality characterized by an absence. A fair day lacks inclement weather. Fair is also a behavioral quality, specifically interacting or treating others without self-interest, partiality, or prejudice. Both of these definitions underlie the meaning of fairness in educational assessment.

Common expressions relating to fairness help explain how educational stakeholders interpret the concept. A *fair shake*, for example, means to give someone or something a reasonable opportunity. The expression comes from games of chance and it holds two ideas stemming from the above etymology. The first is openness; game rules usually require dice to be visible as they roll. The opposite is reflected in expressions, such as under-the-table or shady deals, that

refer to dishonest or questionable proceedings. The second element is balance; the playing surface and the sides of the dice should be even so that the results are not impeded by irregularities. This idea is expressed as fair and square in business. The association with balance suggests that fairness is not extreme. Fair weather is pleasant, neither very hot nor very cold. To do something fairly well means it is good, neither a poor nor an excellent performance. In contrast, favoring one side, person, or perspective is considered unfair, or biased. Fairness in human interactions involves reasoning, or weighing the balance. It is for this reason that unbiased opinions, independent investigators, and evenhanded judges are sought, particularly when high-stakes decisions are involved.

A complication for discussion across educational contexts is that the word fairness is not directly translatable, with the exception of Scandinavian languages. In other languages, the related terms equality, equity, and justice are necessarily used. *Equality* refers to sameness, or the state of being equal. Treating people equally can be fair in some situations (e.g., cutting a cake), and it is an important step for social justice (e.g., universal human rights), but its application can also have the reverse effect. For example, one-strength-fits-all eyeglasses would clearly be unfair for some. *Equity* is the state of being just, impartial, or fair. Something equitable is proportionately equal, meaning that it is distributed according to need. The three bears in Goldilocks, for instance, had an equitable arrangement in beds and bowls. *Justice* is the quality of being fair, reasonable, or just. The word *just* also has multiple meanings, and it can be used to mean morally right (e.g., a cause), based on sound reason (e.g., a decision), or deserved (e.g., desserts). As their definitions indicate, equity, justice, and fairness are closely related, and they are often used in tandem. However, their use in context shows that they are not completely synonymous. For example, just is more apt as a descriptor for a cause than for access, whereas the opposite is true for equitable. Furthermore, neither equity nor justice encompass the same sense of openness that is associated with fairness.

The universality of the concept of fairness has been questioned because of the missing cognates across languages. Several points suggest that at very minimum, fairness is widely considered desirable as a social quality. All world religions preach the ethic of reciprocity (i.e., the Golden Rule), which essentially encourages fair treatment of others. Fairer social and economic practices are promoted by international initiatives (e.g., fair trade), and similar concerns about fairness in education are voiced across national boundaries (e.g., research on grading). Additionally, research in behavioral sciences has shown that most humans and some animals have a sense of fairness that goes beyond the level of cooperation needed for survival. In counterpoint, there are radical differences in political opinion regarding the notion that *life is unfair*. From a liberal perspective, this idea provides initiative for social reform, whereas in conservative economics it is used as justification for perpetuating the status quo. Although the latter may simply be political rhetoric, there is an underlying equation of fairness with sameness, which is also how some educational stakeholders understand fairness. Thus, while fairness is widely appreciated, different interpretations exist within and across educational contexts.

Imperatives for Fairness in Educational Assessment

Educational assessment encompasses two main types: classroom assessment and external assessment. Both involve the process of collecting and evaluating information about student learning, but they serve different purposes. In *classroom assessment*, teachers and students ideally use various assessment strategies, tools, and tasks for two purposes: to support ongoing teaching and learning (i.e., formative assessment, or assessment for learning) and to report on the achievement of learning expectations (i.e., criterion-referenced summative assessment). Classroom assessment usually relies on teachers' knowledge and professional judgment. *External assessment* includes standardized tests and large-scale assessments developed commercially or by organizations

outside the classroom. Standardized tests are used to determine individual levels of achievement in reference to a norm group, usually for the purpose of certification or selection (e.g., program admission). Large-scale assessments are administered at regional, national, and international levels, either within or across educational systems. They are usually used for accountability, meaning that their purpose is to evaluate system effectiveness. The purpose of an assessment affects what should be considered during its development and use for the fairest results. Guiding principles or standards have been produced by various test developers, educational committees, and professional organizations since the mid-twentieth century. Although these documents do not always clearly define fairness, they reflect a strong interest in fair assessment in the educational community.

Three imperatives underpin the quest for fairness in educational assessment. The first is democratic. Various forms of assessment have been used through history for candidate selection. Government appointments in China were based on written examinations for centuries, from the Han Dynasty (202 B.C. to A.D. 200) to the early twentieth century. Written examinations were also used, from the mid-nineteenth century on, to select candidates for university admissions in western nations. The prestige conferred through a rigorous selection process was initially of more interest to the administering institutions than any democratization of the process. Examinations came to be seen as fairer because they allowed merit to be considered in the selection process. They thus appeared to broaden access to opportunity, which had previously been restricted to a privileged minority. With the development of psychological and educational measurement in the twentieth century came a dramatic rise in the prevalence of high-stakes testing, and the significant consequences for students became apparent. By the beginning of the twenty-first century, the long-lasting effect of classroom assessment on students' identities and learning trajectories was also recognized. Democratic values now call for inclusive educational systems that recognize and support student diversity. From a technical perspective, this requires attention to multiple factors

in the design, administration, use and consequences of educational assessment to ensure that some students are not favored over others. Specifically, when student characteristics and abilities (e.g., gender, ethnicity, language) are not relevant to the construct (i.e., subject or concept) being assessed, they should not affect the results. In sum, while examinations have not historically always been fair or democratic in intent or consequence, a democratic imperative for fairness in assessment has evolved from the tradition of selection by examination.

The second imperative relates to measurement. The quality of information that assessments provide is affected by stakeholders' perceptions of fairness. Students' perceptions influence their motivation in the assessment process, their degree of engagement, and thus the degree to which they demonstrate learning. When principals and teachers administer externally developed assessments in schools, their perceptions of fairness influence how they present the materials to students and the degree to which they follow the developers' instructions. Perceptions of fairness should be taken into account in the development and revision of an assessment tool for the same reason that face validity and credibility are considered. When stakeholders view an assessment as fair and meaningful, genuine participation is more likely, as opposed to superficial compliance or disengagement. Additionally, information gathered from one group can be used for revision to improve subsequent perceptions of fairness, thus further increasing the quality of the results.

The third imperative is pedagogical. As theories and knowledge about learning have evolved, educational assessment has increasingly been seen as a social process that shapes identity and influences opportunity to learn. Interest in using assessment for learning has grown internationally. For assessment to serve this purpose effectively, students must be willing to reveal what they do and do not know, and teachers must be able to recognize and act on the information students provide. This necessitates a trusting, respectful, and engaging learning environment where students feel psychologically safe enough to make mistakes. Students are also more likely to engage

when learning expectations and assessment criteria are clear and relevant, and they are more likely to continue learning when assessment results (e.g., feedback) and interactions (e.g., peer comments) are meaningful. The beliefs and knowledge that teachers and students bring to teaching and learning interact with different elements of fairness (next section). The fairness of classroom assessment, regardless of purpose, is affected by classroom relationships and interactions, which in turn influences the learning environment. When this circular process is scaled up from classrooms to systems, based on the assumption that all educational assessments should ultimately inform teaching and learning, the pedagogical imperative for fair assessment is at the heart of the enterprise.

The Evolution of Fairness in Educational Assessment

The field of educational assessment emerged in the twentieth century as a result of two earlier developments. Interest in the mind had taken a decidedly scientific turn in the latter half of the nineteenth century as experimental psychologists attempted to measure human intelligence. At the same time, student numbers were rising dramatically in many nations with the growth of compulsory public education. Various systems were borrowed from universities for grading achievement, which resulted in mounting concern about the assignment of students' grades. Assessment methods at the time (i.e., essays and oral recitations) permitted a great deal of subjectivity in grading decisions, and there was wide variance in the criteria and evidence being used by teachers. New psychometric methods held promise for greater consistency, and the subsequent proliferation of educational tests were considered fairer because they could be objectively scored. In retrospect, the initial response to concerns about fairness in educational assessment focused primarily on the issue of reliability. Although progressive alternatives were proposed, they were not popular at the time, and objective tests won the day.

Scientific technique and standardization had considerable appeal for efficiency in expanding educational systems, and testing was increasingly common after WWI, particularly in American schools. However, earlier charges of racism following the development of intelligence tests continued to surface. By the end of the 1960s, attempts to build "culture-free" tests had failed, and measurement specialists were looking for algorithms for fair use of test results by employers and educational institutions. The 1974 edition of the *Standards for Educational and Psychological Tests* explicitly acknowledged the potential unfairness of testing, particularly for women and minority groups, and called on developers to examine test items for bias. The terms fair and unbiased were often used as synonyms up to this point, but the meaning of bias narrowed with advancements in statistics. Bias in measurement refers specifically to systematic error in test scores, which occurs when factors that are irrelevant to the intended construct of an assessment influence the results. Because evidence of bias can be found through statistical analysis of differences in how groups of test takers respond (e.g., differential item functioning), unfairness in external assessment still tends to be equated with bias.

Toward the end of the twentieth century, the technical focus that had dominated discourse and research in educational assessment began to shift. The value-laden nature of assessment and the need to consider its consequences were emphasized in validity theory. Debate ensued on several fronts, particularly about ownership of responsibility for assessment consequences (i.e., test developers or users) and about the feasibility of validation for all uses of an assessment, especially those beyond what the developers intended. Measurement and assessment specialists continue to disagree about the scope of validity, diverging on whether it is purely a measurement concept or a matter of ethics. This raises questions regarding the relationship between validity, reliability, and fairness. Overlapping areas on a Venn diagram with three circles representing these key qualities could change considerably according to differing perspectives or purposes in assessment. Nonetheless, clear definitions are needed for key qualities

to guide assessment practices. At present, general agreement exists on two points. First, fairness is similar to validity and reliability in that it is not dichotomous, which means that it is determined by degree. Second, unlike validity and reliability, fairness is not in itself a technical quality, but it is affected by technical quality. Fairness is a requirement for the ethical practice of educational assessment, which in turn contributes to the broader matter of social justice.

Achieving Fairer Educational Assessment

Fairness in educational assessment is complex, and it cannot be ensured through any one practice. Fairer assessment can be achieved in different ways, with some conditions or strategies being more important in some situations than others, depending on the purpose of the assessment and the individuals assessed. Conditions and strategies for fairness should be considered proactively in the design and development of assessment tools and tasks, continually through assessment interactions, and retrospectively in reviewing the assessment process.

Three conditions for fairer educational assessment are opportunity to learn, a constructive environment, and evaluative thinking. *Opportunity to learn* is a seemingly self-defining term that can vary considerably in breadth. It can simply mean exposure to test content or refer more broadly to the alignment between curriculum and assessment. It can also refer to a gamut of socioeconomic and educational factors that enable learning, including the availability and quality of resources (i.e., teachers, learning materials, technology, etc.) and students' ability to use them within an environment or system. While ensuring opportunity to learn for every student in the fullest sense is a social justice issue beyond the scope of any one assessment, it should be considered in planning and interpreting results in both classroom and external assessment. A *constructive environment* is one that respectfully encourages students to fully participate and disclose their knowledge and learning through assessment.

This requires an extent of buy-in, meaning that an assessment must be perceived as worthwhile, or at least necessary. Interactions between students, teachers, principals, and parents can affect the environment for external assessments and hence the quality of results. For classroom assessment to genuinely and openly serve learning, high levels of trust and respect must be nurtured, not only between teachers and students but also between classroom peers. Creating constructive environments for fairer assessment requires *evaluative thinking*. This involves asking questions, identifying assumptions, seeking evidence and considering different explanations, or in brief, critically evaluating assessment practices. In external assessment, evaluative thinking should be part of a formal process (i.e., validation) that draws on qualitative and quantitative evidence for fairness (e.g., panel reviews, DIF). In classroom assessment, teachers' self-evaluation about assessment tools, tasks, and interactions should be part of reflective practice. Reflection is particularly important for recognizing assumptions or beliefs that might lead to bias, and for receptivity to the knowledge and learning of diverse students, even when it diverges from the expected. Most importantly, all educational assessments benefit from the acceptance of responsibility for fairness and thoughtful planning, administration, and interpretation.

Multiple strategies can and should be used at each phase to ensure fairer educational assessment. Several strategies relate to the principle of *transparency*. It is widely accepted that students should know how their work (i.e., performance, product, responses) will be judged before an assessment begins. A basic strategy is to provide clear instructions. Assessment criteria that flow logically from learning expectations should also be made explicit. A challenge in this process is to specify criteria sufficiently for students to understand it without constraining what they demonstrate or what is evaluated. Additional criteria should not come into play in the marking process (or scoring, grading). This is especially problematic in performance assessments where differing responses are possible (e.g., problem solving) and personal preferences creep into the judgment

process. Transparency makes assessments fairer by reducing the potential influence of irrelevant factors. It also supports the primary purpose of classroom assessment, particularly when the formative process should in itself be an opportunity to learn.

A second set of strategies revolves around the provision of *opportunity to demonstrate learning*. Students should have multiple, varied, equitable, and meaningful opportunities to demonstrate their learning. Offering students multiple opportunities allows teachers to gather sufficient information to make fairer decisions (i.e., increasing reliability), especially in summative assessment that affects placement or certification. Offering students varied opportunities allows learning to be demonstrated in different ways and enables different types of learners to succeed. Because assessment formats (e.g., multiple choice, essay) affect students differently, using varied methods prevents any one type from overly benefiting or penalizing students. Providing students with equitable opportunities, where appropriate accommodations allow individuals or groups to demonstrate what they know, also makes assessment fairer. A tension here goes back over a century to when it was noted that fair comparison of scores was not possible with inconsistent grading. The need for consistency (i.e., equal treatment) versus the need for differentiation (i.e., equitable treatment) depends on whether the purpose of the assessment is to compare scores or support learning. Whenever assessment results are used to distribute a benefit or opportunity, there should be a consistent basis for comparison. This is why the comparability and appropriateness of procedures, including accommodations, are important in external testing and when summative grades are used for external decisions (e.g., admissions). In contrast, when the goal is to advance learning, assessment can be individually tailored, such as in adaptive computer assessment. A final strategy for fairness, offering students meaningful opportunities to demonstrate learning, requires a balance between two core qualities in the ethics of teaching: care and respect. Care must be tempered with respect for students' learning to ensure that opportunities are engaging without being superficial, and that

they are genuinely challenging without being impossible. Assessment that recognizes and responds to the knowledge and learning of diverse students is fairer in the long term because it enables subsequent opportunities to learn. In essence, educational assessment should give all students a fair shake at success in their learning careers.

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Faith

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Fanon and Decolonial Thought

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Introduction

Frantz Fanon (1925–1961) is probably the best known theorist of the Third World and a major reference in various formal fields of study, including Africana philosophy, and postcolonial studies. He is also an important reference in cultural anthropology, cultural studies, and political theory, among other fields (see Gordon 2015). This is an outline of some of his major contributions to a broader and less formal area: decolonial thought or decolonial thinking. Decolonial thinking refers to varied forms of knowledges that explore the significance of modern colonialism and that assert the relevance of decolonization. It is expressed in multiple ways: from written and oral discourses, to social movement organizing, to scholarly studies, to political manifestos, to dance and performance, music, poetry, and visual art, etc.

Fanon's work is a major reference in twentieth- and twenty-first-century global decolonial thinking.

His four major published texts *Black Skin, White Masks* (2008, originally published in 1952), *Toward the African Revolution* (1988, originally published in 1964), *A Dying Colonialism* (1965, originally published in 1959), and *The Wretched of the Earth* (2004, originally published in 1961) provide acute analyses of the experience of being colonized, of the mechanisms of colonization, and of the process of decolonization. Many of his insights are highly relevant for education as formal education itself has often served as an instrument of colonization. Also, decolonization can be conceptualized as a form of unlearning, relearning, and innovating. Fanon's work has influenced major theoreticians of education, such as Paulo Freire, and is one of the main sources of decolonial pedagogy (Walsh 2013).

It is not possible to understand Fanon's work or his impact without considering that many of his insights into colonization and decolonization are based on his own experience in colonized settings and his participation in movements for decolonization. Fanon lived in a time of major global transformations, including the propagation of decolonization movements in Africa, Asia, and the Caribbean. He was born in what was then the French colony of Martinique and died as a member of the Algerian Liberation Front, which sought the decolonization of Algeria. His thought was deeply informed by the living conditions and the various movements that defied colonization in both places. He was also a veteran of the Second World War and was intimately familiar with how colonial and racial divides worked inside Europe. His writings have circulated and continue to circulate, not only among scholars interested in understanding modern colonialism and decolonization, but even more so among groups of activists, including intellectual-activists and artists, who pursue decolonization. A more detailed definition of decolonial thinking serves as a basis to identify several of Fanon's major contributions to this area of knowledge.

Decolonial Thinking

Decolonial thinking has perhaps two basic elements: the first one, clearly stated in the work of

one of Fanon's teachers, the renowned poet, statesperson, and thinker Aimé Césaire, is that colonialism is a fundamental problem (Césaire 2000) and the second one, greatly illustrated in Fanon's work himself, is that decolonization is a project. That decolonial thinking takes colonialism as a fundamental problem rather than as a secondary issue or a problem of pure historical significance means that colonialism has deeply shaped key practices, ideas, and structures in our modern world. It means that modern ideals, such as progress and development; modern institutions, such as the nation-State; and modern conceptions of knowledge and subjectivity, such as the liberal arts and sciences and the sovereign self, have come into being with colonialism as a background and an implication.

Considering colonialism as a fundamental problem may sound like a minor consideration, but it signals a profound turn in theory and philosophy as it goes directly against the norm of conceiving the colonial subject as a problem. This decolonial turn is the result of a change of attitude in the colonized whereby she emerges as someone who poses questions, who identifies problems and who considers her lived experience and knowledge as relevant in the process of elucidating and seeking to respond to such problems. The transition from a modern/colonial attitude of seeking recognition by the colonizer – as in desiring to become White or seeking to obtain value by being recognized as White preferably by Whites – to a decolonial attitude of challenging the presuppositions of the colonial system and worldview is central in Fanon's entire oeuvre and a basic element in decolonial pedagogy and decolonial thinking.

As Césaire so clearly indicated in his classic *Discourse on Colonialism* (Césaire 2000), the emergence of colonialism as a problem is inextricably interrelated with the critique of modern Western civilization. The reason for this is that not only colonialism became broader and arguably more devastating in Western civilization but also that Western modernity portrays colonialism as a vehicle of civilization and as an apparent solution to the problem that is the colonized. For Césaire, modernity creates a particular form of

colonialism that, instead of regarding it as a problem, it tends to pose it as a solution. Raising the question of colonialism as a problem therefore involves a critique of Western modernity.

Central in the decolonial critique of Western modernity is that what is usually called modern civilization is deeply tied with the creation of relations of power, conceptions of knowledge, and forms of being that lead to colonialism or reproduce a colonial logic in various ways. This is a logic that organizes society and that makes sense of the geopolitical space and of everything that appears in its horizon according to perceptions of degrees of humanity. The closer to an ideal of the human subjects and groups are, the more they can enjoy a certain condition considered normal for humans, and the farther away from that ideal subjects and groups are, the closer they will be to a condition of death or early death, misery, dispossession, and permanent slavery and war. This is a form of colonialism that involves racially motivated genocide and racial slavery and that can continue even after the formal end of slavery and colonialism. In that sense, in decolonial thinking, colonialism refers more to an overarching modern logic of dehumanization that can be characterized as coloniality, than to historical colonialism per se, as it is found since so-called "prehistory" and "Antiquity" (Mignolo 2000; Quijano 2000).

Likewise, for decolonial thinking decolonization is less the end of colonialism wherever it has occurred and more the project of undoing and unlearning the coloniality of power, knowledge, and being and of creating a new sense of humanity and forms of interrelationality. In that sense, decolonization or decoloniality is an unfinished project that seeks to bring the problem of coloniality to an end without assurances that this will ever happen. The goal is, as Fanon put it, "to be actional" (Fanon 2008, 197): to undo and create rather than simply to follow or react in face of discourses of modernization and coloniality.

More than only reflect about the impact of colonization on subjects and bodies of knowledge, decolonial thinking involves an assertion of the colonized subject as a critical perspective and an affirmation of colonized and/or

non-Western knowledges as sources of sustainable critical and transformative thinking, which themselves are submitted to critique and to innovation in light of the struggle for decolonization. Decolonial thinking often also takes into consideration and is shaped in part by Western thought, but it is not confined by the authority of Western canons or committed to Western modernity as a project. Instead, decolonial thinking typically reveals multiple experiences, desires, and ideas, particularly among subjects and communities that are often depicted as lacking an active internal life or proper reason, and explores their potential for critique and decolonization. Decolonial thinking is also found between two or more languages and cultural experiences divided by colonialism or different forms of dehumanization and often finds itself at the crossroads of various conceptions of the body, histories, and claims to space and land.

Fanon's Contributions to Decolonial Thinking

Fanon's contributions to decolonial thinking are too many to discuss in a few pages, but it is possible to identify various key ideas in his work about the problematic nature of colonialism and coloniality, and about the character of decolonization as an unfinished project. One such idea is the anthropological and the ontological character of coloniality, in the sense that coloniality is not only a question of social order but also of conceptions of being human. In short, coloniality locates the colonized out of the bounds of proper humanity. Fanon observed this in the constitution of the meaning of Blackness. The ontological separation – the location of different people in scales of being and its lack – between colonizer and colonized is made particularly apparent when it appears in the form of the divide White colonizer and Black colonized. Fanon uncovered the arena of non-humanity, put in question the European human sciences on that basis, and shed new light into thinking about, from, and with those considered nonhuman.

For Fanon, the modern conception of Blackness is tied to modern colonialism and racial

slavery, which together are part of coloniality. This makes the notion of ontological separation between subjects and groups part and parcel of coloniality. The notion that (modern) colonialism, racial slavery, and coloniality are built on ideas and practices of ontological separation is not necessarily Fanon's invention, but his work provides some of the clearest and most insightful descriptions and analyses of this condition. The link between colonial hierarchies of knowledge and power with notions of ontological lack would affect and redefine other forms of human classification and organization such as those based on gender, sex, and class.

A second key contribution from Fanon to the understanding of coloniality as a fundamental problem is the appreciation of the depth of coloniality and, particularly, the understanding of the complexities and contradictions of colonized subjectivities. The regime of colonial ontological separation does not leave the subjects that it categorizes intact. It does not simply order and classify already existing subjects but rather engenders the subjectivity of those subjects. In the same vein, modern colonization is not merely about the appropriation of land or the exploitation of work but also about the very definition of identity and subjectivity. In modernity, not only land, work, and society but subjectivity itself is colonized. This is what leads to the phenomenon of Black people who detest their Blackness and who want to escape from it that Fanon investigates in *Black Skin, White Masks*. Whites are also conditioned by this situation, but the overwhelming presumption about them is that they do not have to undermine much of what they are in order to claim full humanity. Also, claiming superiority over the Black and the colonized appears as part of a path to claim full humanity. White skin also automatically tends to grant protections and privileges to those perceived as Whites even when they fail to adhere to the expectations of the dominant heteronormative and masculinist definition of humanity.

A third contribution by Fanon to decolonial thinking is the analysis of the multiple forms of evasion that both colonized and colonizer take in order to avoid recognition of coloniality as a problem. Coloniality is a regime of ontological

separations that organizes society and creates subjectivities while preventing its own thematization as a problem. Since colonization has to do with the creation of people considered as lesser human beings, colonization itself is considered to be superfluous or not important. This is part of what Fanon identified as the “cat and mouse” game of reason in modernity/coloniality (Fanon 2008). Since a Black person is supposed to behave more as a passive object than as an agent or a subject with a point of view, whenever a Black person adopts reason as a mode of response to coloniality, the standards of reason become so unstable and shifting that it is impossible for the Black person to make any advance in the recognition of her or his equality or in the importance of problems that affect her or him. In a modern/colonial anti-Black world, the fundamental problems are identified from the perspective of the colonizer. Recognizing the relevance of colonialism, which is typically posed as a problem by the colonized, would be to give the colonized too much credit, which goes against the directives of the colonial world. And since colonialism is not taken seriously by the colonizer, this would mean that it would not be taken seriously by any of the colonized who themselves are striving to be accepted by the colonizers or at least to enter their world and obtain its benefits. This means that the assertion of colonialism as a fundamental problem itself can be considered an insurgent and revolutionary act.

The first three of Fanon’s contributions to decolonial thinking have to do with a better and deeper understanding of colonialism as a problem. The remaining three address the idea of decolonization as a project. The first such contribution is Fanon’s insistence about the uncertain and undefined character of decolonization and about the centrality of attitude. That is, for Fanon, there can be no specific manual for decolonization, no premade model of life after a revolution for decolonization, and no certainty that such revolution or its triumph will ever occur. Decolonization is to be pursued because there is no other way in which one can imagine living in a context marked by coloniality. This is so because, if coloniality undermines the basic coordinates of humanity,

then an affirmation of oneself as a human being needs to involve a critical engagement with coloniality. This is to a great extent a matter of attitude and of actions guided by such attitude. But attitude neither offers nor rests on the clarity of a manual and it does not rely on more than a very general notion of the world that it is trying to create. Attitude denotes an orientation toward oneself, others, one’s surroundings, what has been imposed, and what one considers less alienating. Attitude is also a way of orienting oneself in and of conceiving of time and space. It is the orientation of the self in time and space, a time and a space that have been, like the self itself, colonized and that call for decolonization.

While decolonization is fundamentally undefined and uncertain, it is also a generative process that can be assumed as an ongoing project. This is Fanon’s second main contribution to the understanding of decolonization. Fanon urged revolutionaries involved in the process of decolonization to pay attention to the changes to self and society that occurred in the context of the revolution because the best point of departure for the society of tomorrow appeared not in the canons of Western thought, in the past, or in any specific tradition but in the very changes introduced or facilitated by revolutionary struggle. Fanon saw decolonial activity not so much as action toward a fixed goal, but itself as a generator of ideas, relations, and actions that needed to be preserved and continued after any organized effort to increase decolonization. In *A Dying Colonialism*, for instance, Fanon highlights the changes in the relation between family members that were occurring in the Algerian revolution, such as an increasing sense of equality due to the participation of multiple members of the family in the revolution. He also observed and applauded the forms in which the Algerian people, particularly those involved in the struggle for decolonization, appropriated Western knowledge and technologies such as Western medicine and the radio. Fanon advocated for such changes to serve as key references for the society to be built after the revolution. For Fanon it was also clear that political independence was far from representing the accomplishment of decolonization. Decolonization remained as an

incomplete project even after independence. But it had to be assumed as such.

Unfortunately, Fanon found some of the same kind of contradictions that he had observed in the sector of colonized Black people that he studied in *Black Skin, White Masks* in an Algerian society in the process of decolonization. The process of decolonization, therefore, has nothing automatic about it and it is continually challenged from the outside and the inside. Realization of this reality leaves to a third contribution to the understanding of decolonization: decolonization has to involve the continued cultivation of oppositional and coalitional consciousness (Sandoval 2000). This is a way of looking at the world critically, on the one hand, but also constructively and in search for establishing relations with others, on the other. Oppositional and coalitional consciousness is, like the notion of decolonization as a project itself, the outcome of a decolonial attitude. The decolonial attitude is an ethico-political orientation that seeks to affirm what Fanon considers the basic coordinates of human activity: a “Yes to life. Yes to love. Yes to generosity,” and a “No to man’s contempt. No to the indignity of man.” (Fanon 2008, p. 197). The decolonial attitude seeks to “build the world of the *you*” (Fanon 2008, p. 206). This is a world where everyone can appear as a “*you*” in front of another rather than as an ontologically separated entity that provokes anxiety, sadism, desire, and fear. Decolonial thought is a form of thinking that seeks to help create this attitude and to build such a world.

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Fanua

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Feedback as Dialogue

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Introduction

Feedback can be an important catalyst for improvement. Helpful comments which enable students to see issues from fresh perspectives are central in supporting the ongoing development of work in progress. In mass higher education, there is a variety of evidence from different contexts that students and teachers have misgivings about the ways in which feedback processes are currently handled (Boud and Molloy 2013). Students perceive that feedback often comes too late to be useful; it frequently fails to connect; and there are usually insufficient opportunities to act on the feedback received. Both teachers and students experience frustration with the limited positive impacts of how feedback processes are managed.

Given the centrality of feedback for learning, there is an urgent imperative for fresh ways of thinking about feedback processes and associated development of staff and student feedback literacy. The aim of this entry is to chart some prospects for feedback as dialogue: how students can take a more active role in seeking, generating, accessing, and using feedback. For feedback to be sustainable, students in higher education cannot rely predominantly on the teacher to provide insights in that they need additional ways of developing their own capacity to make informed judgments (Carless et al. 2011).

At the outset, it is worth considering meanings of feedback. Central to my position is to view feedback as a process not as a product which is delivered to students. Feedback processes involve information which usually comes from a peer, a teacher, or oneself. They also involve sense making when students engage with and interpret comments they have received. Building on these strands, feedback is defined as follows:

Feedback involves dialogic processes whereby learners make sense of information from various sources and use it to enhance their work or learning strategies.

The notion of students using feedback is crucial because only then are feedback loops successfully closed. A problem with much current feedback practice is that it involves hopefully useful information that is not acted upon (Boud and Molloy 2013). Transmission forms of feedback are limited in analogous ways to transmission forms of pedagogy (Sadler 2010).

In the next section, feedback is contextualized within a wider set of influences, such as curriculum, pedagogy, and assessment. Then in the main section of the entry, five ways in which feedback processes can operate dialogically are analyzed. Some challenges for dialogic feedback and how these might be tackled are then discussed. The conclusion sums up some key messages.

Contextualizing Feedback Processes

Feedback processes are more than about feedback per se; they are part of a wider network of factors

which include curriculum, pedagogy, and assessment. Successful feedback exchanges are also reliant on positive relationships between participants: often a challenge in mass, sometimes impersonalized, higher education.

Feedback processes need to be seen as an integral part of the curriculum and certainly not just something that comes at its end. Feedback should be embedded within curriculum design to facilitate opportunities for students to engage with feedback and carry out productive dialogues about academic work.

In line with this perspective, there are also pedagogic dimensions to feedback which evolve from how teachers interpret their roles in the instructional process. A conception of teaching focused mainly on information transfer may lead to teacher-controlled forms of feedback, for example, correcting misconceptions. A constructivist view of teaching suggests a more active student role in feedback processes.

The way sequences of assessment tasks are designed is an important facilitating or inhibiting factor for dialogic feedback. When there is a cumulative series of tasks in a course, there is greater potential for feedback from one task to inform the next. With these kinds of assessment designs, students engage more actively with feedback messages because they can use them when it counts toward their course performance. Conversely, a one-off examination or end-of-semester essay may have some pragmatic or academic advantages, but these forms of assessment are unlikely to promote productive feedback processes.

The pedagogy of feedback processes also involves relational issues, such as care, trust, class atmosphere, and relationships between participants. Relational aspects of feedback are salient in that feedback is an aspect of interpersonal communication. These often lead to tensions between critical feedback which risks harming the self-esteem of the recipient and more encouraging feedback which may fail to stimulate desired improvements. Honest, constructive comments are more useful than empty praise, but it is a hard line to draw. One person's constructive critique may be another's wounding

criticism. When providing searching commentary, it is useful to reiterate that the aim is to help the learner to grow. Trust develops when one perceives that an interlocutor has one's best interests at heart. Conversely, distrust can emerge from feedback providers who seem threatening, unapproachable, or dogmatic (Carless 2015).

Implementing Dialogic Feedback

Five ways in which feedback processes can operate dialogically are now discussed: integrated cycles of guidance and feedback, peer feedback, technologically facilitated feedback, internal feedback, and teacher-generated written feedback.

Guidance as Feedback

One of the main problems that students perceive with feedback is that it often comes too late for them to use, especially in relation to summative comments on end-of-semester assignments. This problem is exacerbated in that students find it difficult to use feedback from one course on another course taught by a different teacher.

A useful pedagogic strategy to tackle this problem is to provide integrated cycles of guidance and feedback within regular course scheduling (Hounsell et al. 2008). Students value guidelines about what is expected, support in understanding criteria, how they might tackle assignments, and preemptive hints based on teacher understanding of common problems students experience in the assignments being undertaken.

An important part of the guidance process is clarifying goals, expectations, and standards. A common strategy is to involve students in generating criteria or rubrics: such processes start to engage students with the characteristics of good performance. Probably even more useful from the student perspective are samples of student work: exemplars of performance from previous or parallel cohorts. Exemplars are concrete manifestations of quality (Sadler 2010). The dialogic analysis of such samples can play an important role in students developing an appreciation of the nature of quality work.

A complementary strategy involves the use of "on-display assignments" (Hounsell et al. 2008) in which student work is openly visible to classmates rather than remaining private. Oral presentations, posters, and group projects carry visibility, thereby facilitating opportunities for dialogue, peer feedback, and clarification of standards. These act as guidance by enabling students to self-evaluate their performance against that of others.

Peer Feedback

Peer feedback or peer review involves students commenting on each other's work. Students gain a lot from examining their peers' assignments, identifying strengths, weaknesses, and areas for improvement. Such processes begin to sensitize students to what good performance looks like and differences between their work and that of others. There is also potential for peer feedback to be available more quickly and in greater quantity, in comparison with more authoritative but slower teacher input.

Students often resist peer assessment using marks because they do not feel comfortable awarding grades to their friends and classmates. This is why peer feedback is usually more effective than peer assessment. There is also sometimes student resistance to receiving comments from peers because they worry they are not sufficiently insightful or that some classmates do not take peer feedback seriously. An important counter-argument is that the processes of peer review go beyond the usefulness of specific individual comments. Peer review opens our horizons to different ways of doing things and enables us to compare our approach to that of others. It can remind us what we are doing well and also sensitize us to key areas of improvement.

A key research finding is that the giving of peer feedback is often more beneficial than receiving comments because it is more cognitively engaging: involving higher-order processes, such as application of criteria, diagnosing problems, and suggesting solutions (Nicol et al. 2014). This is an important part of the rationale for peer feedback which needs to be communicated with students so that they are clear

about the potential benefits of involvement in peer review. Student involvement in peer review processes should be a core component of course designs (Sadler 2010).

Technology-Facilitated Feedback

Technology has considerable potential to promote feedback dialogues, especially when it is pedagogy rather than technology which drives developments. Learning management systems (LMSs), such as Moodle, can be used to store feedback, and students might be required to show how they are using feedback from previous assignments to inform current submissions. Discussion forums on LMSs can enable students to involve themselves in dialogues around course content or work in progress. These are often more motivating for students when some kind of incentive is included, for example, assessed participation or online quizzes. Social media, such as Facebook or Twitter, are also increasingly being used for academic interaction.

Peer review can also be enabled through technology. For example, within the Turnitin suite of applications, PeerMark can be set up to allow students to read, review, and evaluate submissions from one or more of their classmates. Clickers or electronic voting systems can be used to collect students' views, promote peer discussion, and enable teachers to understand learning progress. These strategies relate to the pedagogic principles of peer review and integrated guidance and feedback as discussed above.

Electronic marking and feedback through tools, such as "Track Changes" or annotated PDF documents, seem popular with students, although still attracting some resistance from staff (Glover et al. 2015). Another recent trend is audio or video feedback, whereby teachers record verbal commentary on student work and then send the file electronically. This kind of feedback enhances students' perceptions of teacher concern for their progress and seems to carry potential to enhance relationships between participants. An additional dimension involves student response to audio or video feedback comments, for example, through screencasts.

Internal Feedback

Internal feedback refers to the inner dialogue or self-monitoring in which students are engaged when they are tackling a task. All students are producing internal feedback as they work on tasks and assignments, but many students are not self-monitoring effectively. The development of students' capacities to monitor themselves is congruent with a key aim of feedback processes to enhance student abilities to self-evaluate their own work (Nicol and Macfarlane-Dick 2006).

Students refine their ability to self-evaluate their performance when they are involved in activities which involve them in making academic judgments, developing better understandings of what good work looks like and how it differs from their attempts, and strategizing to close the gap between the two. Peer feedback and the analysis of exemplars of student work are two processes discussed above which support these goals.

The student development of judgment needs to be embedded systematically across the duration of an undergraduate program. There is evidence that students can become more accurate in judging standards of their own performance when given extended opportunities to self-evaluate (Boud et al. 2015). Enhancing student capacity to make judgments and self-evaluate effectively is arguably one of the most useful things teachers can do.

Dialogic Written Feedback

Even within conventional marking of student written work, it is feasible to engineer some dialogue. On the cover page of their assignments, students can be asked to state those aspects on which they would most like to receive feedback (Nicol 2010). This prompts them to reflect on their work and starts to develop some partnership in assessment and marking. It may also save the marker time as they can focus their comments more on the issues identified by students. Feedback is sometimes based too much on what the teacher wants to say, rather than on students' needs and interests.

Another variation would be for the cover page to include a summary of how students have addressed previous comments that they have

received. In this way, students are being prompted to build a cumulative sense of the feedback they are engaging with and indicate how they are acting on feedback messages.

Written feedback which raises questions rather than setting up teacher comments as the final judgment also contains possibilities for developing dialogue. Such processes can be facilitated through iterative cycles of drafting, revising, and resubmitting when there is more potential for written feedback from teachers or peers to be acted upon. Students need to be encouraged and supported to close feedback loops. This is an important part of their feedback literacy.

Addressing Challenges for Dialogic Feedback

Various challenges for dialogic feedback and how these might be tackled at institutional, student, and teacher levels are now discussed.

An obvious institutional barrier relates to large class sizes which would impede teacher-intensive forms of feedback. An emphasis in this entry has been on peer review, student self-evaluation, and technology-enhanced feedback as practical tools which have potential to alleviate, if not fully overcome, the challenges of teaching large classes. Further institutional barriers include lack of time, resources, and incentives which are compounded by the need for many staff to prioritize research. An emerging trend in a number of British universities is an extension of teaching excellence awards to include other elements, such as “best feedback award.” This provides recognition for good practice, stimulates the surfacing and dissemination of worthwhile feedback strategies, and reinforces the image of feedback as being an important issue, worthy of attention.

There are also various student-related barriers for effective feedback processes. In relation to peer review and self-evaluation, not all students interact deeply with peers on academic matters and some may lack the motivation to do the hard work of reflecting on their performance. They may prefer to use social media and technology for leisure rather than academic work. These points relate to the thorny issue of student engagement. A potential way forward is to develop

course climates in which norms include giving and receiving peer feedback and reflecting on progress. Teachers need to have faith in students to want to maximize their learning and be willing to generate and use feedback for their own improvement.

At the teacher level, a barrier is modest assessment and feedback literacy. Only a minority of teachers seem to have thought carefully about assessment task sequences and effective feedback designs. For some, feedback may equate to marking which is generally regarded as an unpleasant academic chore. Feedback as dialogue is best implemented through thoughtful, skillful, student-focused teaching. This is often not easy in view of the multiple demands of academic life. The assessment literate teacher involves students in communication and negotiation around feedback processes and scaffolds student assessment and feedback literacy, so that students become clearer about their active role in seeking, engaging with, and using feedback.

The practices discussed in this entry are intended to be workload neutral. Teachers need to focus their efforts on where guidance and feedback have most potential, spending less time on forms of end-of-semester marking which the literature indicates are unproductive. Teachers could include more in-class dialogic activities which support student development of evaluative capacities and less time on one-way transmission of comments after a course is completed. Effort invested on the development of student feedback literacy might in the long run achieve workload economies for teachers.

Conclusion

To sum up, effective feedback processes go beyond comments and marking in that they are the products of wider sets of influences which include curriculum design, assessment policy and practice, how teaching and learning are approached, and relationships between participants.

Feedback is a contextualized form of social communication in which care must be taken with blanket recipes. This caveat notwithstanding,

promising practices in developing dialogic feedback processes mainly involve:

- Activating the student role in seeking, generating, and using feedback
- The integration of feedback, assessment task design, and the development of student capacities to make academic judgments
- Timely discussion of student work, including in-class guidance, peer feedback, and technology-enhanced dialogues
- Creating course climates which encourage and facilitate the above

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Feminism and Philosophy of Education

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Introduction

Feminism has now influenced nearly all the academic disciplines and traditions and has also informed newer areas of inquiry as they have come into existence. Feminist thought has been fairly contagious, with insights arising in one

corner of the academy being “caught” in others. Thus the scholarship of, say, a feminist biologist may come to be reflected in that of a psychologist, and vice versa. This pattern has characterized feminism in philosophy of education, where feminist ideas originating elsewhere are brought to bear on questions and problems in the field and where, occasionally, ideas developed within the field are exported to other traditions and disciplines.

Jane Roland Martin: Pioneer

In the USA, Jane Roland Martin was one of the first professional philosophers of education to bring a feminist perspective to her work. Reflecting back on the field prior to the 1980s, Martin noted the absence of discussions by or about women:

Whether one was thinking of women as the subjects or the objects of educational thought, for all intents and purposes we had no place at all: as subjects, women’s philosophical works on education were ignored; as objects, works by women and men about women’s education and their role as educators of the young were largely neglected. Moreover, the very definition of education and the educational realm adopted implicitly by the standard texts in philosophy of education excludes women. (Martin 1999, p. 150)

Martin herself has made significant efforts to remedy the situation she described, writing extensively on girls and women in relation to various topics of interest to philosophers of education – curricula, school organization, and educational aims, to name just a few. A pair of major articles published by Martin in 1981 and a third article appearing in 1982 generated much discussion and debate among philosophers of education and, seemingly, opened the door to feminist scholarship in the organization (Martin 1981a, b, 1982). Martin remains one of the most prolific feminist philosophers of education, and between 1985 and 2011 published ten books and countless articles, the vast majority of which are informed by a feminist sensibility and address some aspect of education in relation to girls and women.

The Reach of Feminism in Philosophy of Education

Since Martin first wrote about gender and education, feminism has influenced more and more philosophers of education. This may be due in part to the fact that during this time there has been a dramatic increase in the number of female philosophers of education. A measure of the growing number of female philosophers is their membership in the Philosophy of Education Society and a measure of their influence is their representation in leadership positions in that organization; among the most recent Philosophy of Education Society Presidents (between 2006 and 2016), there have been five women. All these female presidents have been sensitive to gender issues, and four – Susan Laird, Audrey Thompson, Barbara S. Stengel, and Barbara Applebaum – have made significant contributions to specifically feminist thought (e.g., Laird 2008; Thompson 1998; Mayo and Stengel 2010; Applebaum 2000).

While it is not surprising that women have produced most of the feminist scholarship in philosophy of education, certain feminist criticisms and insights are now fairly widely discussed – and often embraced – by philosophers of education, regardless of their sex. At the very least, many philosophers of education now make an effort to account for gender when it appears to be relevant; and over the years, the relevance of gender in numerous and diverse situations has become much more apparent. There is perhaps no clearer example of feminist thought informing scholarship in philosophy of education broadly than that provided by Nel Noddings’s *Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education* (1984). (Noddings herself was influenced by feminist thought in psychology, most notably by Carol Gilligan, who challenged male-centric understandings of moral development (Gilligan 1982).) Briefly, the ethic of care arises out of natural caring, such as when a parent cares for her child: “It is that condition toward which we long and strive, and it is our longing for caring—to be in that special relation—that provides the motivation for us to be moral. We want to be

moral in order to remain in the caring relation and to embrace the ideal of ourselves as one-caring” (p. 5). Noddings’s book inspired countless publications, as philosophers of education (among other academics) drew comparisons and connections between “caring” and various other moral and educational phenomena, for example, caring and justice (e.g., Held 1995); caring and political theory (e.g., Engster 2004); and caring and leadership (e.g., Beck 1994).

Noddings’s scholarship on moral thought and education has been phenomenally influential. But other feminist scholars have also produced important and eminent work within philosophy of education in regard to the particular topics they study. For example, Megan M. Boler has worked extensively on questions related to gender, technology, and democracy (e.g., 2008/2010), and Huey-li Li has expanded the concept of “ecofeminism” (2007). In both cases, these authors have examined phenomena occurring largely outside schools (and draw on literature that is largely outside of the education corpus) but then show why and how these phenomena and literatures matter in educational terms. Feminism and philosophy of education have also been drawn together in several works examining mothering in relation to education. *Maternal Thinking*, by Sara Ruddick, and *Women’s Ways of Knowing* by Mary Field Belenky, Blythe McVicker Clinchy, Nancy Rule Goldberger, and Jill Mattuck Tarule are perhaps the most famous examples of such work, but more recently Amy Shuffelton has also considered mothers’ implication in education. (Mothering also figures into Noddings’s care ethics.)

Other feminist scholars working in philosophy of education have helped to illuminate the educational significance of female philosophers (outside education) whose writings have been undervalued or ignored altogether by other philosophers of education. For example, Natasha Levinson has written extensively about the work of philosopher Hannah Arendt, while Susan Laird has focused her energies on the writings of Mary Wollstonecraft. Levinson and Laird make compelling cases that Arendt and Wollstonecraft

matter educationally – although in very different ways.

With important exceptions, much of the literature published by feminists from the 1960s until well into the 1980s tended to focus on the experiences and interests of white (generally middle class) women and girls and often failed to question whether all women and girls shared these experiences and interests or to seriously examine what differences might exist. However, especially over the past two-plus decades, an increasing number of feminists have developed a greater sensitivity to experiences of girls and women that are linked to race, class, culture, and sexual orientation, among other factors. In philosophy of education as well, there has been a growing appreciation of such differences and their implications for educational theory and practice. Audrey Thompson, for one, argues that standpoint epistemologies articulated by Black, Asian, Chicana, and other feminists of color challenge the assumed universality of certain ethical and educational theories (Thompson 1998).

There is no single feminist voice, and different feminist scholars are aligned with different theoretical orientations, ranging from the liberal to the poststructural. In an effort to capture this diversity of thought, some observers refer to “feminisms” rather than to the singular “feminism.” The scholarship of different feminist philosophers of education reflects these different strands in feminism more broadly (e.g., Diller et al. 1996; Thayer-Bacon et al. 2013). Despite this diversity, the work of philosophers of education who adopt a feminist stance reflects the key insight that a failure to attend to the ideas, problems, and experiences of females, as well as males, is bound to produce incomplete and distorted analyses of educational phenomena; this insight exists alongside efforts by some to problematize such concepts as “female” and “male,” “woman” and “girl.”

The foregoing account offers a mere sample of the kinds of topics and approaches adopted by philosophers of education who identify as feminist, whose work is explicitly influenced by feminist thought, and/or who have made contributions

to the scholarship on feminism and philosophy of education. There are many other scholars whose work is informed by and advances feminist thought in philosophy of education.

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Feminist and Critical Approach

► Emotions and Educational Leadership

Feminist Pedagogy

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Synonyms

Critical pedagogy; Feminism; Gender; Women's studies

Introduction

Feminist pedagogy is an approach to education that brings to bear feminist theory, feminist activism, and women's experiences on educational content, the learning environment, the relationship between teacher and student, and the connection between the learning environment and the outside world. The approach emerged as a clear educational strategy by the 1980s and was influenced by feminist activism, critical pedagogical theory, and the progressive education movement in the United States. Like critical pedagogy, feminist pedagogy rejects traditional pedagogical approaches that perpetuate hegemonic power structures. Feminist pedagogues are particularly critical of educational approaches that maintain gender oppression and other intersecting forms of oppression. Feminist pedagogy envisions

learners as active agents who work in community with teachers in an environment that values personal experience to critique and change the societal conditions that maintain and produce uneven power relationships.

History

Feminist pedagogy emerged as a cohesive educational approach by the 1980s after an increasing number of feminist scholars applied its principles in their classrooms and wrote about them in articles and other texts like the influential *Learning Our Way: Essays in Feminist Education* (Bunch and Pollack 1983). Many early feminist pedagogues were influenced by feminist movements in the 1960s and 1970s and adopted tactics from those movements, including consciousness-raising. This technique consisted of small groups of women meeting to discuss their personal experiences of gender oppression. The practice of consciousness-raising helped remove the barriers presented by women's isolation in individual homes throughout society and placed value on women's experiences by allowing each participant time and space to share her own story. This practice was also designed to help women see their experiences of sexism and misogyny not as isolated cases but as part of a pattern that reflected broader structures of systematic gender oppression. Consciousness-raising was seen as a model by some feminist pedagogues for a new educational structure that could work to eradicate traditional gender roles and gender oppression.

Many feminist pedagogues have also been influenced by Paulo Freire's theory of critical pedagogy and his critique of the "banking" model of education wherein students passively receive knowledge rather than playing a role in their educational experience, thereby missing a chance to view – and change – the power relations at work in their lives. Feminist pedagogues influenced by critical pedagogy have not been without their critiques of its theorists, particularly when critical pedagogues have conceptualized learners as coherent or essentialized individuals, uncomplicated by intersecting identities and their

corresponding intersecting forms of oppression (Crabtree et al. 2009). Feminist pedagogues share with advocates of critical pedagogy, however, a concern with structures of power and oppression and the aim to empower students to be active agents in both the learning process and in the effort to change the conditions of their lives and societies. For these reasons, feminist pedagogues are often seen – and see themselves – as members of a broader community of critical pedagogues. In addition to the feminist movements of the 1960s and 1970s and critical pedagogical theory, some feminist pedagogues have been influenced by John Dewey and other theorists associated with the progressive education movement in the United States, particularly its commitment to "experiential learning, social responsibility, [and] a reclamation of the civic mission of education in a democracy" (Crabtree et al. 2009, p. 3).

Definition

Feminist pedagogy concerns not just the content covered in a particular educational environment but also the environment itself and the relationships of power within that environment and in the broader world in which that learning environment is situated (including the education system and the larger society in which it is located). In other words, one is not a feminist pedagogue simply because one teaches feminist theory or women's studies or engages one's students in discussions about women, women's experiences, or even structural gender oppression. This is because engaging in feminist pedagogy also means adjusting one's approach to the classroom environment and the relationships of power within the learning environment and the outside world. Likewise, courses on topics not explicitly associated with feminist theory or women's studies might be feminist pedagogical environments when they are informed by feminism and approach the learning process in a manner that accounts for relations of power and oppression, particularly gender oppression. Certainly, however, because feminist pedagogy is informed by feminist thought, it remains important for feminist pedagogues in facilitating a

learning environment that rejects gender oppression as well as other intersecting forms of oppression, including homophobia, racism, and classism. Specifically, feminist pedagogues committed to feminism value women's experiences as well as activism designed to end gender oppression, see feminism as a philosophy through which one can learn about "the entire human condition (not just that of women)" (Crabtree et al. 2009, p. 1), and view gender oppression as intertwined with other forms of oppression.

Also important in a feminist pedagogical learning environment is a concern with the relationship between teacher and student, particularly with regard to power. Feminist pedagogues strive to foster "a participatory, democratic process in which at least some of the power is shared" (Shrewsbury 1987). They do not erase the role of the instructor as teacher, but seek to also empower students, viewing power in this context in a positive light rather than as a tool for domination (Shrewsbury 1987). These educators work to provide students with independence and agency, building a community of learners who facilitate the learning process rather than being docile recipients of knowledge. While this is an important approach for all critical pedagogues, it takes on a crucial role in the context of feminist pedagogy since women's experiences and arguments have historically been dismissed as unimportant or invalid. Feminist pedagogues, therefore, view the learning environment as a potentially liberatory one when students are empowered in the classroom, but also one in which both teacher and student constantly reflect on the learning experience and the educational content (Shrewsbury 1987). In this way, both teacher and students share responsibility for learning and determining what counts as important.

Given this collaborative environment, students are often involved in the process of evaluation rather than simply being subject to it. Feminist pedagogical environments often involve students in the process of evaluation with tools such as self-evaluations, student-generated evaluative tools, and peer reviews of student work. Evaluative measures seldom rely exclusively on rote memorization, but usually employ more substantive measures such as written work.

Among the knowledge and content often considered important in the feminist pedagogical learning environment is personal experience. Given the long history of dismissing or minimizing women's experiences or viewing them solely through the lens of those in power (i.e., through a dominant, patriarchal perspective), valuing personal experience in the feminist classroom serves three important purposes. First, it problematizes devotion to supposedly "objective" truths, offering instead a model wherein knowledge production is a process and objectivity is a myth since so-called "objective" truths are often simply reflections of dominant ideological positions. Second, valuing personal experience in the feminist pedagogical environment helps validate women's experiences as knowledge and personal experience generally "as one among several valid forms of evidence and authority" (Hoffmann and Stake 1998, p. 81). Finally, just as in the consciousness-raising groups of the 1960s and 1970s, sharing and listening to stories of others' experiences of oppression and domination help students identify larger structures of systematic oppression, make connections with others around shared experiences of oppression, and begin to build coalitions to combat it.

The learning process in a feminist pedagogical environment is a reflexive one, where students and teachers constantly exercise critical thinking and reflect on educational content, the learning environment, and the outside world in which it is situated. Because the teacher and students cannot escape, but are always embedded in, a society of gender oppression, this reflexivity allows for critical thinking about how these individuals, the class content, and the structures in which they are situated (the educational system, the university, etc.) may be replicating or complicit with gender oppression.

This concern with the outside world within which the learning environment is situated reflects feminist pedagogues' general concern with power relations as well as with helping students become aware of their place in these relationships of power (a goal related to the feminist tactic of consciousness-raising). In addition to being generally concerned with systematic societal gender oppression, feminist pedagogues also concern

themselves specifically with the way in which the educational system itself is often designed to replicate and encourage societal gender norms as well as structures of gender oppression. Feminist classrooms are therefore oriented toward feminist activism. This might take the form of critiquing the university or educational system, its policies, the traditional arrangements of power therein, its economic role and policy, and the laws, regulations, and norms of the greater society in which the educational system is situated, particularly as these structures maintain and perpetuate gender oppression.

An additional characteristic of feminist pedagogy that has developed out of reflexivity and a general concern about uneven relations and structures of power is its understanding of oppression as intersectional. In other words, feminist pedagogues see gender oppression as part of a larger web of oppressions that include racism, classism, homophobia, as well as oppression of the transgender community and others with non-conforming gender identities. Feminist pedagogues' understanding of these oppressions as intersecting means that one cannot simply address sexism, racism, and the like individually but instead must consider them as connected. Teachers and students in a feminist pedagogical learning environment are also reflexive about the ways in which they may inadvertently perpetuate one form of oppression (racism, for example) in the process of attempting to eradicate another: gender oppression. Importantly, distinct but compatible pedagogical approaches such as black feminist pedagogy and queer pedagogy have been developed by activists and theorists in these areas alongside feminist pedagogy precisely because of the need to fully account for the ways in which traditional hegemonic approaches to pedagogy perpetuate multiple forms of oppression.

Tactics and Strategies

Just as teaching feminist theory or women's studies or addressing women's experiences in the classroom does not, on its own, constitute feminist pedagogy, neither can this approach to education be boiled down to a list of classroom tactics or strategies. However, some tactics and strategies

have become closely associated with feminist pedagogy because of the ways in which they facilitate its practice. Many of these tactics are associated with critical pedagogy in general, including arranging the classroom in a circular or semicircular seating arrangement to encourage participation from students, echo a commitment to shared power, and place student contributions on the same level as teacher instruction. Some tactics, however, take on a particular meaning in the context of feminist pedagogy.

While many critical pedagogues use small groups to invite student contributions and allow for an intimacy that is not possible in a larger classroom setting, when used by feminist pedagogues, this strategy echoes the history of consciousness-raising groups. In other words, small groups are often employed in a feminist pedagogical environment to facilitate the sharing of personal encounters with gender oppression, privilege, and domination in an intimate environment where students are inclined to feel more comfortable disclosing their experiences. This format allows for the discussion of potentially sensitive topics that may be difficult to discuss in a larger group setting. Attentiveness to sensitive topics that relate to gender oppression is, in fact, another hallmark of feminist pedagogy that extends beyond the use of small groups.

Feminist pedagogues are concerned generally with conversational strategies that encourage participation from all students while exercising keen sensitivity to situations where students may feel their diminished societal power in the classroom. Because the learning environment does not exist outside of, but is in fact embedded in, a larger society that condones or permits sexual assault of women, overt gender oppression in the form of catcalls or jokes about women, homophobia, transphobia, racism, classism, and the like, feminist pedagogues strive to create an environment where students feel comfortable sharing their experiences as victims of these practices while acknowledging that many of the students in the learning environment may have internalized the structures of power that perpetuate these practices such that they view them as normal. Many feminist pedagogues characterize the effort of creating an environment where victims of oppression feel

comfortable sharing their experiences as creating a “safe space” in their classroom. While there is some debate as to whether a completely “safe” space is possible, all feminist pedagogues make efforts to help students feel comfortable discussing personal experiences of gender oppression to help place them in a larger context of oppression and to facilitate the process of mobilizing for social change. The effort to create “safe” spaces also includes attempts to integrate theory and personal stories from marginalized communities (like the LGBTQ community, for example) particularly when members of those oppressed communities are not represented in the classroom or are not inclined to identify themselves or their experiences. In other words, feminist pedagogues often highlight otherwise invisible or ignored oppressions in the classroom to make them visible and to avoid replicating intersecting forms of oppression in the pursuit of addressing gender oppression.

Finally, in addition to calling students’ attention to the ways in which the topics discussed in the learning environment relate to society at large, many feminist pedagogues require explicit engagement with the outside world in the form of service learning, social activist projects in the local community, and the like. These practices underscore the importance in feminist pedagogy of connecting the work done in the learning environment with the community at large while also echoing its roots in (and enduring connection to) feminist activism.

Conclusion

Influenced by feminist consciousness-raising, critical pedagogy, and the progressive education movement, feminist pedagogy endures as an approach to education rooted in feminism that influences teachers’ and students’ engagement with educational content, the learning environment, and the broader world in which the educational environment is situated. This approach is concerned with uneven relationships of power, with particular attention given to structural gender oppression as well as other intersecting forms of oppression. Practitioners of feminist pedagogy consider uneven power as it affects teachers and

students as well as the greater environment in which both are situated. These practitioners aim to empower those who are disempowered, seeing students as active agents, valuing women’s experiences, and facilitating critical reflections on the effects of hegemonic uneven structures of power. Tactics in the feminist pedagogical environment include small group work, discussions, and other activities designed to minimize uneven power relationships in the classroom, value personal experience as a form of knowledge, and facilitate critical inquiry. Because of feminist pedagogues’ commitment to connecting the educational environment with the outside world, students also engage in service learning and other forms of feminist activism in the community to promote social change. This and other similar feminist pedagogical strategies emphasize the importance not just of feminist theory but of feminist practice and highlight the usefulness of feminist pedagogy in a variety of educational environments.

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Feminist Theories and Gender Inequalities: Headteachers, Staff, and Children

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Introduction

The connection feminists have made between the personal and the political is no less relevant in the twenty-first century than in the 1960–1970s when

it became the message of second-wave feminism. Education feminists have linked personal experiences with feminist research projects about girls and women's experiences to engage with epistemologies and methodologies that speak back to traditional ways of knowing about education and educational leadership. Such research might be about researchers, educators, leaders, or children, young people, and adult learners. Thus, feminist standpoint theory values women's "insider" perspectives; their standpoints uncover unequal power relations beyond the individual at organizational, social, and political levels. This entry provides first an overview of feminist theories. Next, there is an overview of literature concerned with leadership for equality, diversity, and social justice. In the following section, Fraser's (2007) framework of recognition, redistribution, and representation shapes two women headteacher/principals' constructions of gender inequalities among women and girls in their schools. Their varying degrees of critical consciousness are discussed in the light of feminist theories. The entry ends with conclusions about the education of school leaders, teachers, children, young people, and adult learners.

Feminist Theories

Feminist thought has been organized historically. Although women's writing and oral histories of sex inequalities date back further, the first wave of feminism is located in the nineteenth to twentieth century. Second-wave feminism began in the 1960s and third-wave feminism in the 1980s and 1990s when Rebecca Walker declared she *was* the Third Wave. The fourth wave of feminism, connected with in the twenty-first century, remains highly contested. Particular concerns include the nature of spirituality, community and oppression, male or (pro)feminists, transgenderism, sex work, and relationships in social media. Indeed, each wave is characterized by contemporary issues. The concepts of "woman," "experience," and "personal politics" pose problems for a single conceptualization of feminism. There are

undeniably multiple feminisms. The articulation of women's experiences, their identity politics, and engagement in wide-ranging debates negates the existence of a single feminist theory. There follows an overview of *liberal*, *radical*, *socialist*, *poststructural*, *Black*, and *postcolonial feminisms*.

Liberal feminism is associated with first- and second-wave feminisms. It focuses on establishing equality for women relating to suffrage, property ownership, divorce, employment rights, and access to education. This individualist, meritocratic approach focused on achieving justice and enabled some governments to enact sex discrimination legislation. Indeed, much was achieved through second-wave feminism for some women. However, it is critiqued widely for its exclusion of women of color (Davis 1981; Mirza 1997) and the perpetuation of the hierarchy of dualism. *Radical feminism*, as a reaction to liberal feminism, is a theory of difference that recognized women's experience as inextricably linked to embodiment. Systemic change, begun by liberal feminists, needed social and psychological change, to overthrow patriarchal oppression that privileged the "male/masculine" over the "female/feminine." However, the insistence on universality and the concept of patriarchy again excluded Black and Global Majority (BGM)/Black and Ethnic Minority (BEM) women. *Socialist feminism* challenges capitalism as well as patriarchy by recognizing unequal class relations alongside gendered oppressions. The exploitation of women's unpaid labor in the home shifted the focus onto private *and* public worlds. A Marxist analysis sees the gendered division of labor as constituent of production and the distribution of the family wage. These three feminisms form a foundation for understanding the evolution of feminist theories.

Poststructural feminism, *Black Feminist Thought*, and *Postcolonial feminism* address the assumption of universal womanhood. They are associated with third-wave feminism. Poststructural feminism problematizes binarized and essentialist categories of "woman" and "man." Education feminists have used poststructuralism to reconstruct their understanding of leadership to

offer an alternative to “masculinist” leadership (Blackmore 1989). Reconstructed theories are useful in work focused on social justice; the problematization of key concepts means a single vision of liberation for women is resisted. The feminist projects of African-American or Black British women are not the same as those of White Americans or White British women. Nor are they the same projects as for women in developing countries. For example, Black feminist thought portrays African-American women as “self-defined and self-determining within intersecting oppressions” (Collins 2000, p. 273) or a matrix of domination. Crenshaw’s (1991) theory of intersectionality ensures the intersections of race and gender are a focus for Black feminist research. Colonialism has done damage to indigenous peoples worldwide. Postcolonial feminists acknowledge diasporic histories impact on women’s lives regardless of whether or not there is direct personal experience of migration. Contemporary imperialism and the hegemony of Western scholarship that seeks to control “hearts and minds” and sees “Third World women” as a homogenous group have been powerfully critiqued (Mohanty 1988, p. 336). Critical theorists have also used queer theory to trouble essentialist conceptions of leadership. Thus, various and seemingly incompatible gender theories have led to a retheorization of gender as heteroglossic (Francis 2012). These theories have informed this research into headteachers’ understandings of diversity among school populations. There follows an overview of a selection of literature concerned with leadership for equality, diversity, and social justice.

School Leadership for Equality, Diversity, and Social Justice

A small but rich literature highlights Black women leaders’ connections with the school communities they serve in the United States (e.g., Dillard 1995), the United Kingdom, and South Africa. Familiarity with the community might be advantageous to the school principal. School

leaders appear to suit some communities and schools and not others. Fitzgerald (2006) problematizes the expectation that indigenous women leaders in New Zealand, Australia, and Canada should take responsibility for indigenous children’s welfare and learning. There is a need to simultaneously value school leaders’ connections with, and care for, potentially marginalized communities and not to confine them to working with particular school populations. School leaders from dominant “raced” and gendered (White (fe) male) groups have responsibility to lead for social justice. Feminist leadership theory is inherently linked with social justice. In order to establish justice (parity of participation), a three-dimensional theory of justice requires redistribution, recognition, and representation (Fraser 2007). Redistribution occurs by dismantling economic class structures that impede participatory parity; recognition confers cultural status; and representation ensures political voice and a share in decision-making (Fraser 2007).

A Position of (Under)Privilege

Educational leadership gender theorists have experienced, firsthand, the nature of gendered oppressions that variously intersect with “race” and ethnicity, social class, and critical incidents such as discriminatory and violent experiences (Lyman et al. 2012). This author has positioned herself as a single, White, middle-class woman of working-class origins (Fuller 2013). Her experiences of gender inequalities are likely to be different from those of women daily experiencing the intersecting oppressions of racism and sexism and other protected characteristics outlined in the United Kingdom Equality Act (2010): age, disability, gender reassignment, marriage and civil partnership, pregnancy and maternity, religion or belief, and sexual orientation. The focus, here, is on two White women headteacher/principals’ awareness of gender inequalities among the school population (see Fuller 2013). Each had experienced gender inequalities in their professional lives. The account is framed by Fraser’s

(2007) three-dimensional theory of justice: recognition, redistribution, and representation.

Headteachers' Recognition of Gender Inequalities: Self, Staff, and Pupils

Isabella was a headteacher of a mixed (coeducational) comprehensive school. More than half the pupil population was of minority ethnic heritage as 28% Asian, 15% Black African Caribbean, and 11% from other groups. Over a quarter of children were eligible for free school meals; 30% had a special educational need; and for 28% English was an additional language. Isabella was married with a daughter of school age. She recounted multilayered awareness of gender inequalities that drew on her classed, gendered, and minority White ethnic identity as the daughter of a European immigrant. Bullied at school for dressing differently and coming from a strict background, she aspired to a future different from her friend's, who was pregnant as a teenager. Education was an escape route, "I thought I have got to get out of here" (adapted from Fuller 2013, p. 91). Isabella experienced bullying in the workplace where her ideas were blocked. In response, she learnt to think creatively. Her support for women's advancement extended to leading professional development training at national level. The gendered division of labor meant women did not generally gain curriculum leadership experience. Isabella recognized women's multiple and changing needs in the workplace as nonteaching staff, teachers, and aspiring headteachers. She recounted an incident relating to Black girls, identified by their teacher as troublemakers.

Katherine was a headteacher of a selective girls' school where the majority were White British, with a substantial proportion of Asian-Indian girls. Girls were from affluent backgrounds. A high proportion had a range of physical and emotional difficulties; many spoke English fluently as an additional language. Katherine was divorced with no children. She had worked in a middle leadership role with an "awkward" male junior colleague. In response, she learnt to

approach people in different ways. Katherine recognized nonteaching staff (women) were important to the operational management of the school. Teachers supported girls academically in their own time. She recounted anecdotes about her impatience with colleagues and single-minded decisiveness in senior leadership team meetings. Katherine distinguished between girls by personal circumstances such as affluence, family illness and death, and low self-esteem that accompanied peer group comparisons in a high-performing, selective, single-sex school. Low self-esteem demonstrated itself as withdrawal or misbehavior. Girls' "neuroses" were caused by family pressure. They presented as anorexia, self-harm, and teenage pregnancy.

Redistribution of Resources: Staff and Pupils

Isabella attributed achievement of social mobility to the acquisition of cultural capital. She redistributed economic, cultural, and social capital to three groups of women. First, there were informal arrangements to support nonteaching staff taking degrees. She awarded time to complete assignments. Ten learning assistants aspired to a higher education. Second, the head of physical education did not want to become "a middle aged woman in a tracksuit on the field" (adapted from Fuller 2013, p. 96). The woman retrained as head of information and communications technology. Third, Isabella had promoted a woman to a senior leadership post; she went on to achieve a further senior post elsewhere within six months. Isabella shared her cultural capital (professional knowledge) by nurturing colleagues and the capital her reference provided. Isabella recounted an occasion when a teacher reprimanded three Black girls for singing in his music lessons. Where he saw misbehavior, Isabella saw raw talent. She used her position to invite them to sing at a public performance.

Katherine did not describe support for women teachers. Instead, she recounted a light-hearted conversation with a female deputy headteacher who had reflected on Katherine's impatience in

meetings and single-minded decision-making. Her support for staff in external facing conversations was more likely to be about protecting the school's reputation than professional trust of staff. Nonteaching staff (largely women) were valued highly as key to operational management. They were seen as "pupil partners" (adapted from Fuller 2013, p. 47), alongside teachers, in an attempt to break down barriers between highly qualified professional teachers and less educated and low-paid nonteaching staff. She redistributed resources to less affluent girls by passing on second-hand uniforms from lost property and subsidizing residential trips. However, her recognition of girls with a range of difficulties and personal circumstances translated into resignation that nothing could be done to support them, "A pregnancy, and the baby's produced in the middle of the GCSEs [public examinations] helps everybody doesn't it? Yes. There's nothing you can do about that, at all" (adapted from Fuller 2013, p. 47).

Representation: Staff and Pupils

Isabella's willingness to listen to staff and pupil voices can be seen above. Her "open door" policy and practice meant staff asked "can I have two minutes?". Isabella valued dialogue among staff. Training days were spent as teams of people talking; time was allocated for teachers to work together to "plan, prepare, argue, talk, think" (adapted from Fuller 2013, pp. 122–123) about pedagogy. Other spaces for dialogue existed; "they can talk in their unions, they can talk in the staff room informally, or they can come in here" (adapted from Fuller 2013, p. 123). The voices of the Black girls described above were heard, valued, and publically afforded high status. Isabella had found the key to unlock their self-esteem and potential; "I think everybody can succeed at something if you find the key."

Katherine's "open door" was a mechanism for surveillance; her consultation of colleagues was an opportunity for them to "feel" they had been heard; "I don't suffer fools. I'll let them talk, because it's important that people think that, feel that they've had their say and people feel that I've listened"

(adapted from Fuller 2013, p. 46). A school inspection report noted some girls thought their welfare and aspirations were of interest to staff only when they affected academic achievement. The report cited a survey that rated academic support more highly than personal support and noted girls thought there was no adult who knew them well and to whom they could turn for help. They were unable to represent their own interests.

Which Feminist Theory Aids Understanding?

Isabella and Katherine's achievement of headship can be seen through the lenses of liberal and radical feminisms associated with women's rights to higher education and equal access to employment opportunities with men. Headship of girls' schools (like Katherine's) was associated with educated, professional women from the nineteenth century. Isabella's success in achieving headship in a mixed school is indicative of breaking down barriers in a patriarchal society that expects coeducational school leaders to be men. Isabella's concern for the advancement of women at all levels of the organization, and in the profession more widely, suggests a feminist commitment to closing the gender gap. Her achievement of social mobility can be located in socialist feminism. Education enabled her to cross the economic class borders of her upbringing; it is not surprising she saw education as the means to dismantle class barriers for others.

Neither Isabella nor Katherine constructed woman-/girlhood as universal. Isabella recognized the intersections of gender with "race"/ethnicity and social class. Katherine recognized the intersections of gender with social class but did not recognize the high proportion of Asian-Indian girls at the school in her account of diversity. Using Blackmore's (1989) reconstruction of leadership, her leadership discourse is constructed as masculinist rather than feminist (Fuller 2013). Isabella was sensitive to existing stereotypes and prejudices surrounding Black girls; she turned a teacher's prejudices into a celebration of the girls' singing talent. These constructions might be seen

through the lenses of poststructuralist and/or Black and postcolonial feminisms. However, neither headteacher recognized the intersections of “race”/ethnicity with gender inequalities among staff.

Contemporary gender theorization recognizes a single feminist theory is insufficient to understanding the nuances and complexities of gender as it is socially constructed. Holvino (2010) draws on multiple feminist theoretical frameworks as socialist, poststructuralist, and transnational/postcolonial/“Third World” feminisms to advocate knowledge production through intersecting, overlapping, and interacting theories. Such an approach has been discussed as gender heteroglossia (Francis 2012) and polyglossic simultaneity (Fuller 2014). An intersectional approach is necessary to uncovering combinations of multiple sites of oppression and inequality, for example, among BGM/BEM staff members (Collins 2000; Crenshaw 1991).

Conclusion

This short entry focused on a feminist theorization of gender inequalities experienced by school leaders and of their understanding of gender inequalities among staff and children. While women, and Black and Global Majority women in particular, *should* be better represented in secondary school headship as a matter of social justice, the fact remains that being a woman headteacher does not lead to feminist leadership. It does not even lead to the recognition of multiple needs, desires, and interests of women and girls, or of men and boys in potentially marginalized groups, in a diverse and pluralist society. Rather, in their leadership for social justice, men headteachers might be (pro)feminist, and women headteachers might be masculinist. It cannot be assumed that headteachers recognize gender, “race,” and class or that their leadership is about eliminating marginalization and developing inclusive practices, particularly when some are committed to working in and perpetuating a selective school system. What remains is a need to educate and prepare school leaders for the exercise of

leadership for equality, diversity, and social justice. Such education and leadership preparation would enhance the critical consciousness of children and young people, teachers and nonteaching staff, aspiring leaders, and headteachers regarding gender, “race,” and other combinations of inequalities in schools, the education system, broader society, and in politics. An understanding of feminist theories as they have evolved over time would facilitate that.

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Feminization Thesis: Gender and Higher Education

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Introduction

In contemporary society, women have made significant gains in terms of their participation rate as undergraduate students worldwide, to the extent to which a feminization of higher education thesis has been put forward. Claims have arisen that women are “taking over” higher education, not only in terms of student numbers, but also the culture of universities (Leathwood and Read 2009).

But to what extent has an increase in the number of women in higher education led to a reconceptualization of gender and the university as a “space” in which women are no longer “out of place” (Aiston 2006)? There are many indicators to suggest otherwise, for example, prevailing sexism, “laddism” and a culture of harassment that has been identified as an aspect of university life for women undergraduates in the UK and the USA (NUS 2013). In Mainland China, the dominant discourse of graduate women as a “third sex” (men, women, women with PhDs) represents highly educated women as troublesome transgressives who refuse, or who will be unable, to take their place in traditional family hierarchies (Aiston *in press*).

This entry aims to interrogate the feminization thesis in the context of contemporary research in the field of gender and higher education. As such the entry will draw on critical frameworks, such as feminism, to discuss the numerous social justice challenges that endure with respect to gender and higher education in the twenty-first century.

Counting Women In

Headlines around the world, including the UK, USA, Australia, and parts of Europe, proclaiming

“Gender gap widens as women graduates outpace the men” (The Australian 2015), present a somewhat misleading picture of the position of women in the academy. Research highlights the geographic variation with respect to women being “counted in” as undergraduates. Statistical data compiled by UNESCO and the United Nations emphasize that while globally women are at an advantage, in countries with very low levels of participation in higher education, such as parts of Asia and sub-Saharan Africa, women are effectively excluded. These data also show that the gender gap is reversed at postgraduate level – men outnumber women as PhD candidates and as researchers. Moreover, it is important to recognize differences between countries within regions, for example, while women are well represented as students in most countries in Central and Eastern Europe, there are exceptions, such as Turkey (Leathwood and Read 2009).

This leads us to our next issue, the underrepresentation of women at the highest levels of the academic profession. Extensive research internationally has documented the lack of women academics as full Professors and senior leaders (e.g., Dean, Vice-Chancellor/President). So while women might be considered as being “counted in” as students, particularly as undergraduates, they are distinctly *absent* from the higher echelons of the academic hierarchy (Morley 2014). The underrepresentation of women as academic leaders is often explained away/justified in terms of time. Since the number of women entering higher education as undergraduates has increased, then so it follows, according to pipeline theory, that women will enter and rise through the academic ranks – it is just a matter of time. But research indicates that this is clearly not the case (see, for example, Aiston 2014, with respect to Hong Kong). Intervention is required, a point to which we will return, if women are to be more equally represented in the most senior leadership roles of the profession. To assume that simply waiting will rectify this situation is what can be termed as a “dangerous discourse.”

While the focus of this entry is women in higher education, it is also important to note that there are groups of young men who are also at risk of not

being “counted in,” for example, Latino young men who are “vanishing” from the US higher education system (Saenz and Ponjuan 2009).

Disciplinary Tribes, Disciplinary Ghettos?

The total aggregate figures reported in the headlines fail to adequately interrogate the issue of disciplinary difference. While in some countries women comprise half of all undergraduate students, this equal distribution does not extend to all subjects studied. Here we might draw on the concept of “academic tribes” that refers to groups of scholars based on disciplinary boundaries, in which, the discipline, or “territory,” is fiercely guarded by the tribe (Becher 1989). Adopting a critical gender lens to the notion of academic tribes, we can see how some disciplines are constitutively male. Most obviously, science, technology, engineering, and maths – the STEM disciplines – remain overwhelmingly male in tertiary education. A theory of gender difference in ability, namely, female “deficit theory,” is offered as an explanation as to why women are underrepresented in STEM subjects. Feminist researchers, however, have challenged gender stereotypes – the notion that women are not “cut out” for science and put forward theories of gender as being socially constructed as alternative explanations. For those women who do enter these disciplines, gender remains a salient factor. Women are predominately to be found studying biology, or for those small number of women who enter engineering, certain fields are considered more appropriate, chemical as opposed to mechanical engineering, for example.

But it is not only the STEM disciplines in which women are underrepresented. The humanities are largely subjects in which women are overly represented; however, there is significant lack of gender parity, comparable with the STEM disciplines, for women students and academics in philosophy. Philosophy, particularly analytical philosophy with its emphasis on formal logic, is represented as an inherently male discipline.

In some respects, we might consider women students and academics as inhabiting disciplinary ghettos, in so far as they study subject areas regarded as gender appropriate. However, at the end of the twentieth century, women academics were at the forefront of creating a new academic tribe, an academic tribe based on interdisciplinarity, which sought to counterbalance white, male, western knowledge – namely, women’s studies, or, as it is more likely to be referred to now, gender studies.

A Masculine Culture

As noted above, some fear that *too* many women are being “counted in” to higher education, while researchers are concerned that not enough women are entering what are considered as the male disciplines, or entering the most senior academic ranks and leadership positions. But what of the culture of higher education? Has the academy, culturally, become feminized? As indicated in the introduction, it would seem not. Research shows that women in higher education do not typically have a gender-neutral experience of the environment. Women students, studying subjects in which they are in a minority, experience strongly masculine cultures – referred to in the literature as the “chilly climate thesis.” This might comprise of alcohol and pornography in science project rooms, to very aggressive argument styles in the philosophy seminar. Or, as indicated in the introduction, the proliferation of “laddism” on some of the most elite campuses in the world, in which women students are sexually objectified. This objectification ranges from unwanted comments about their bodies, to unwanted groping or touching, and even rape. Fraternity and sports societies – heavily focused around drinking large amounts of alcohol – have been exposed as chanting rape songs, distributing leaflets referring to women as “slags” and “mingers” and discussing raping women students who identify themselves as feminist (see extensive recent media coverage of these issues, for example, in The Huffington Post).

While women academics are not exposed to the forms of “laddism” in the guise as detailed above, they are nonetheless positioned “differently” to their male colleagues, as a result of gender stereotyping. Academic women are more likely to take on different, less prestigious roles in the *research* prestige economy of higher education. Their academic identities are constructed as “academic mommies,” “caretakers,” with greater responsibility for teaching, student welfare, committee work, rather than research, which is privileged in the academy. It is therefore not surprising to find that empirical data show a gendered research productivity gap, with women, for example, publishing less than their male colleagues and receiving less research funding. A common explanation for this phenomenon is that family responsibilities affect the research productivity of women academics. But there is evidence to suggest that this is not always the case. There are other significant structural and systemic discriminatory practices in the profession to which we can look, for example, the allocation of workload (Aiston and Jung 2015), exclusion from elite male groups and important networks – referred to as the “old boy’s club” – and a lack of access to mentors.

Policy and Practice

There are higher education sectors around the world that have recognized some of the above issues. Societies concerned to bring about social justice – the concept of parity that extends to all aspects of society – take “deliberate and specific intervention to secure equality and equity” (Chapman and West-Burnham 2010, p. 26). Let us take the example of the position and status of women academics in the UK. In 1990 British universities were described as “bastions of male power and prestige” (Hansard Society Commission) leading to the introduction of institutional equal opportunity policies. However, researchers have subsequently called into question the effectiveness of such policies suggesting that the culture of the academy has not substantially changed,

that such policies operate primarily as mechanisms to protect institutions legally, and that a gap exists between policy and actual practice. Moreover, the introduction of policies *imagined* to result in institutional fairness has been described as the “postdiscrimination” blues, as if the mere existence of the policy negates the inequality. At this point, we might consider the nature of discrimination that such policies set out to tackle, namely, cases of overt discrimination, which can be very difficult to pursue and “prove.” However, scholars suggest women academics experience the sector differently largely due to what is termed as “hidden discrimination”; discrimination that is subtle, deeply embedded, and almost intangible. Here the concepts of micro-inequalities and unconscious bias are hugely relevant.

“Microinequalities” are small, unjust inequalities that are part of the larger story. They are small events, which are covert, often unintentional and occur whenever people are perceived as “different.” The cumulative effect, however, can impair performance, damage self-esteem, and possibly lead to withdrawal. For those who experience such microinequalities, a common response is to give alternative interpretations of the event, or wonder why the person is so sensitive (Brennan 2013). Let us take an example. The scenario is as follows, a vibrant research seminar series at a leading research-intensive university attracts internationally renowned scholars to speak on issues related to a particular community of experts. There is a woman scholar in the department whose expertise lies in this field, but she is never asked to chair, or act as a respondent to the papers. Before each event, she is sent details in a round robin email alert, which advertises the upcoming seminar and her male colleagues’ participation.

Could this behavior by this group of male scholars be explained as an example of unconscious or implicit bias? Such bias stems from gender stereotyping, which has been discussed in relation to academic women earlier in the entry. An excellent example of the operation and consequence of unconscious or implicit bias can

be seen in what has become an infamous study of how academic scientists from research-intensive universities in the USA rated the application of a “student” for a laboratory position (Moss-Racusin et al. 2012). The “student” was randomly assigned as male or female, but the academics reviewing and rating the application were in fact looking at the same CV. The result? Academics rated the “male” applicant as significantly more competent and hireable than the “female” applicant. Also it is important to note that both men and women exhibited this bias. With the increasing recognition of the role played by unconscious bias in the academy, progressive institutions of higher education have instigated awareness-raising and training to tackle this difficult issue.

Conclusion

The aim of this entry is to interrogate the feminization thesis in light of contemporary research in the field of gender and higher education. So the question remains, have women taken over the academy? Research clearly indicates not. Women remain underrepresented in the “male” disciplines as students and consequently as academics. Women are missing at the highest levels of the profession, in terms of senior academic status and leadership roles. This is a significant issue for a number of reasons; women generally are not therefore party to decision-making at the most senior levels of our universities. In their absence, women as students are denied female role models, and their interests within the university are not being represented by their own sex. The culture of higher education remains one in which women are still positioned as “other,” that is, differently to their male peers. Equal opportunity policies and initiatives have not led to a shift in the culture of higher education, and the existence of microinequities and unconscious bias render tackling gender discrimination tricky. And of course, it is important to acknowledge the gendered outcomes of higher education; the persistence of a graduate gender pay gap, even for those women who have studied the same subject as their male peers. A report from the UK in 2013,

for example, found that while women as law undergraduates were well represented, they went on to be paid 28% less at the start of their careers in comparison to male law undergraduates.

In conclusion, it might appear that in the twenty-first century, particularly in developed, Western contexts, that gender is no longer an issue. However, caution must be exercised, as this entry has shown. Evaluating the position, status, and experience of women in the academy must remain firmly on the agenda.

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Field of Educational Administration and Its Coevolving Epistemologies

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Synonyms

Coevolution; Educational administration and management; Epistemological pluralism; Field of study

The theory and practice of educational administration and management have been arenas of competing intellectual traditions. Related literature elaborates on the strength and weaknesses of various research methods and practices, the corresponding epistemologies and, ultimately, the underlying philosophies of science. This entry opens with a historiography of administration and management studies and the question of whether educational administration and management constitutes a *field* of study in itself, and, if this is indeed the case, what could possibly be the field's *conditio sine qua non*. It is suggested that it has been the very coexistence and coevolution of contentious administrative practices and theories that give way to the *field*, which continues to be withstood by a tension between scholarly pluralism and an intuitive/instinctive (hence, categorically irrational) belief that there must be one single greatest research framework-methodology, epistemology, and best practice. To maintain a salutary tension between theory and practice, as well as among multiple epistemological traditions – which has historically been the main

concern and contention in the *field* – educational administration and management must continue aiming at the betterment of education as a whole by means of rational, honest, and liberal debates instead of intellectual exclusivism and isolation.

The management of education as practice existed long before its transformation into a scholarly discipline in and of itself. Ancient civilizations of the East and the West, from the Confucian *Great Learning* to the Greek *Paideia*, never dichotomized education from culture, humanities, polity (Greek πολιτεία), tradition, literature, and mind-heart (Chinese 心 *xin*). Rather, education and family/society were inextricably linked, to be looked after by households and State administrators, that is, “citizens,” as in the Aristotle's *Politics* and *The Athenian Constitution*.

When modern rationalism brought about the practice-theory dichotomy heralded by the Cartesian distinction of *res extensa* and *res cogitans*, the already widespread social practice of administering and managing education grew to be popularized and institutionalized, overlapping – not entirely by chance – with the introduction of humanitarian mass public education by Joseph Calasanz.

Social practice alone, however, did not constitute an academic field of study or *field*. It was only in late modernity that educational administration and management (EAM) emerged as an academic discipline with its own theory added to practice, although it is not clear exactly when. Etymology can assist in the task of identifying the emergence of the EAM as a *field*. The *Oxford English Dictionary* (OED) (OED 2012) is of particular interest because, unlike Spanish or French dictionaries that only recognize words officially sanctioned by their national language academies, the OED attempts to identify and date the earliest usages of terms recorded in the public domain.

The English verbs “to administer” and “to manage” derive from Latin to denote serving and handling things and issues. “Administration” as a noun initially indicated “providing something” as in administering justice or religious sacraments. The meaning of public function or office emerges around the late fifteenth century. In the Napoleonic era, there emerges the idea of people

responsible for an organization, who are considered collectively as the managing body or administrative department of an organization or business. The concept that an administrator should be a leader vested with authoritative power is really quite recent – the term “administration leader” was first coined in an academic paper from *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* in 1907.

In the seventeenth century, the English noun “management” already connoted the supervising or ministering of enterprises and people; it was, thus, only nominally distinguishable from the term “administration.” It was also used pejoratively, as an irony about or mischief played on a victim, what educationalists today might call bullying. It is only in the early nineteenth century that “management,” in the sense of a governing body of an organization or business, first emerges (OED 2012). In the March 1893 issue of *The Economic Journal*, “management” indicated for the first time the character of a scholarly discipline or science, as evidenced by the use of “management committee,” for example. The term *scientific management*, coined by Louis Brandeis, was first utilized in 1911 by F.W. Taylor who pioneered the moving of managerial practices from the domain of art/craft to the “science” of multiple observations and deductions, leading to the generalization and practice for higher productivity also known as *Taylorism*. However, alongside Barnard, Urwick, and Fayol, Taylor has been counted as a “practitioner-scholar,” as opposed to a pure theoretician such as Herbert Simon and his theory of scientific decision-making (Greenfield 1986). Related technical concepts multiply around the same period. The term “management consultant” appears in the 1935 *Manhattan Classified Telephone Directory* and July 1938 issue of *The Journal of Business of the University of Chicago*.

“Management” as a subject matter worthy of being taught – hence the compound “management education” – was first published in *The Journal of Education* in 1920. Finally, the terms “management science” and “institute of management sciences” (different from Taylor’s *scientific management*) were first published in 1954.

The fact is that, at the turn of the twentieth century, “management science” was a subject to be taught; “administration leader” surreptitiously entailed what Michel Foucault would classify as a “system of differentiation of power”; and, such terms were used mostly in academic circles. This suggests that general administration and management was already an academic and public discourse, with the majority usage seemingly coming from American academia. In other words, at the turn of the twentieth century, general administration and management had been discursively constructed as a field of study.

Although a typical historiography of EAM almost always starts with narrative of scientific management or administrative science (Greenfield 1986), it is uncertain that EAM was regarded as a distinct *field* from general administration and management. The dawn of the EAM *field* is often traced to the 1950s and 1960s, with applied/behavioral psychologist A.W. Halpin’s comparison of the leadership of aircraft commanders with educational administrators and D. E. Griffiths’ theorizations of educational leadership, hence the appellatives *New Movement* and *Theory Movement*.

An alternative account of EAM as a *field of study* dates it back to the writings on school hierarchy and leadership of William Payne in 1875, followed by the creation of training courses for school practitioners at the University of Michigan and Columbia University’s Teachers College. This view relies on the fact that there were public schools and discussions surrounding autonomous local educational leadership in the United States from the 1830s. This could perhaps indicate that related managerial conjectures and polity constituted a *discipline* (Blount 2013), although it is not clear that such archaic educational administrative debates and practices became a *field*. Soon after this, John Dewey was prolifically writing in clear managerial terms about the “organization and management of the school or system of schools” (1895), the “mechanics of school management” (1904), and the “modes of school administration” (1933).

It is uncertain whether these “practitioner-scholars” (Greenfield 1986) with their pragmatic

arguments and intents meet other two important conditions of an academic discipline: a social space where the interplay between structure and human agency takes place and an inner coherence of a substantive subject matter with identifiable boundaries.

Despite the fact that theories such as motivation, leadership, managerial skills, organizational culture, and transformative action still form the main bulk of its scholarship, the EAM *field* appears to resist being associated with the mainstream business administration field. Instead, it relies more on the paradigm of Western social science. This has guided the field's development since the 1950s as experts of the field such as J. Darech, P. Hallinger, and A. Walker have suggested.

EAM has long been associated with developments in general social science. The latter per se, however, does not provide EAM with a distinct social space where the interaction between structure and human agency occurs. A common opinion among scholars in the field is not that social science and EAM are undistinguishable but, rather, that EAM heavily depends on social science research frameworks and methods. If sociology as a science is to be traced back to Auguste Comte, it is only natural that the EAM *field* has relied on scientific methods of an empirical-positivist kind.

Bourdieu's concept of an academic *champ* (1969) is not a physical location but a social structure and arena in which participating agents pursue desired resources, power, and ideas. It is mainly over the latter that scholars in the EAM *field* struggle (conflict theory perspective) and toil (functionalist perspective) to discover new frontiers of the *field* by expanding it further, by building upon existing knowledge, or by demolishing it critically with a promise of reconstruction. Such dynamics between structure, agency, and discourse occurs in EAM, with a global network of experts and societies devoted to it who consider themselves knowing, justifying, exploring, and doing EAM (Evers and Lakomski 2012). Furthermore, this ripples out to greater academic circles and the general public through a score of reputed academic journals such as the *Journal of*

Education Administration. Nevertheless, the *field* itself emerged (literally, as in complexity science) founder-less, unforeseen, and unexpected "while" and "with" scholarly publications and debates were taking place in the referred arena. To reiterate, EAM became a *field* as scholars were discussing, examining, criticizing, and arguing about their common concerns, while they feel, believe, and enact identities as members of a community of inquiry. This has important implications for one of the main claims of the present encyclopedic entry: coexistence and coevolution of multiple epistemological traditions gave rise to the EAM *field*.

Such efforts of the EAM *field* balance over two fulcra. The first is the tension between theory-oriented scholarship and practice-oriented research (Park 2015). This distinction can be traced back to the Aristotelian distinction between theoretic knowledge that aims at truth and practical knowledge that aims at action (*Metaphysics* 993b19-23). Yet this does not imply a total separation between administrative theory and practice, denounced as one of the key dichotomies causing harm to the field (Evers and Lakomski 2012). The to and fro between the two edges, theory and practice, constitutes an epistemological dualism in its own right, reported to have historically been more persistent than the dialectics between positivist and non-positivist scholarship, as elucidated by D. E. Griffiths and D. Willower.

A second fulcrum has been the debate over one of the most critical issues in the field, namely, a lack of dialogue between the humanities and the logical empiricist version of science, in other words, the dichotomy between the theoretical elaborations and the hypothetico-deductive pursuits of the so-called science of educational administration. This tendency to make a clear-cut distinction between science and humanity-arts within EAM academic circles was analyzed early on by T. B. Greenfield in favor of the humanities, even subjectivist humanity, over positivist science and, by Christopher Hodgkinson, in favor of genealogical moral philosophy. These were in turn counter-refuted, in a Popperian fashion, by the *naturalistic coherentism* that advocated a continuum between the natural sciences and the

humanities in EAM (see works by Evers and Lakowski). Similarly, it is undeniable that changes in the *field* of sociology greatly influenced both the theory and practice of schooling. The transition from Weberian and Durkheimian bureaucratic and functionalist society to the post-industrial era gave way to more critical – if not deconstructivist – political, and epistemological theories by neo-Marxian as well as neo-Kantian liberal theories proposed by J. Rawls and, after him, K. Strike (Bates 1983).

The greatest challenge for EAM to be considered a *field* is the inner logical coherence of a substantive subject matter with identifiable boundaries that makes it distinguishable. At first sight, the boundaries between EAM and general social science and general administration and management can hardly be regarded as strong as clear. It is common for faculties/schools of education around the world to be classed as social sciences. Furthermore, key issues addressed by the EAM *field* are often indistinguishable from general administration and management in which educational institutions are but a type of organization. If these considerations and practices are further entertained, it is not unthinkable that EAM be subjected to a *reduction* or *inter-theoretic reduction* by which science itself tends to merge disciplines and fields into by the principle of Ockham's razor. From medicine to law, there is a burgeoning number of specialisms that get further atomized into subspecialisms, each with its own pretention to be an independent field. In this view, EAM is a likely candidate to be merged into the *field* of education as an area of enquiry in, say, education policy or general administration where education would be a type of organization or enterprise. A relatively recent – but largely unsuccessful – managerial response of global higher education institutions to this problem is the advocacy and establishment of interdisciplinary and multidisciplinary divisions, departments, and research centers.

What has been crucial for even talking about EAM as a potential *field* or *subfield* is an enlightened social space à la Habermas, namely, openness to equality, common concern, and rational argument. Perhaps unwittingly for the

protagonists themselves, the aforementioned experts, and many others, their very academic arguments (theory/practice and multiple epistemologies and their underlying philosophies) gave origin to and have nurtured the EAM *field*. Rather than a community of like-minded individuals and one homogeneous epistemology, it was the pluralism, coexistence, and coevolution of contentious practices/theories as well as variation in epistemological and methodological commitments that constructed the *field*. In this interpretation, scholars in it are adaptive agents who form a structure/system (a community of practice or inquiry, if terms other than complexity are used) where they act and interact influencing each other's changes over time. This systemic environment or complex adaptive system where divergent epistemologies coexist and coevolve is precisely a *field*.

The most formidable enemy for the EAM *field*'s sustainability is perhaps therefore exclusivism a not-quite-scientific conviction that there ought to be one single rationality, an exclusive research framework-methodology, epistemology, and a single set of "best practices." This clashes with the coexistence and coevolution of different intellectual traditions. In order to contribute to the betterment of education as a whole, the EAM *field* should remain open as an adaptive system. Furthermore, rather than grand treatise-like and exclusive theoretical claims, it has been suggested a thematic approach to theoretical elaborations seems better suited and healthier to the field (Park 2015).

In conclusion, educational administration and management is a rather complex *field* with weak boundaries forged by a community of diverse practices and theories. Without pretension to be a postmodern critique, a dichotomy between these two seems untenable because theory informs practice, and observed/experimented practices tend to be theorized. The interplay of structure and agency leading to developments of theory and practice in the *field* does not hinge on uniformity but contrast among various epistemological commitments and the corresponding philosophy of science that allow equally diverse approaches and engagements with it. Precisely, this tension among every so often contentious positions and their debates over theory and practice have given

birth, energized, and sustained the *field*. Field contributors' conjectures meet refutations triggering further claims and rejoinders. After all, this is how sciences advance, not by dogma but falsification. As the saying goes, problems worthy of attack prove their worth by hitting back. Theorization of educational administration and ethics converges here as scholars attempt to fathom human actions and practices in the *field*. It is this tacitly agreed environment of critical dialogue and diversity of practice that is likely to be conducive to further expansion of the *field*. The real challenge lying ahead of the *field* of educational administration and management is scientific and moral coherence of its protagonists and critical respect for their coevolving epistemological pluralism.

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Field of Study

- [Field of Educational Administration and Its Coevolving Epistemologies](#)

FIFA

- [Competition and Fair Play](#)

First and Second Language Literacy

- [Biliteracy](#)

First Person

- [Phenomenology in Education](#)

First Principle

- [Philosophical Idealism and Educational Theory](#)

Folk Psychology

- [Educational Leadership, the Emotions, and Neuroscience](#)

Fonua

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Synonyms

[Fanua](#); [Feagaiga](#); [I'e toga](#); [Placenta](#); [Pute](#); [Sacred relationships](#)

Introduction

Fonua has been researched and introduced to academia by Tongan scholars (Mahina 1992; Taufe'ulungaki 2004, as cited in Tu'itahi 2005).

This entry starts by defining the word/concept and then discusses the Samoan equivalent, which is fanua. Then there is the unpacking of the multiple meanings of fanua and its cultural relevance to Samoan people. What follows is a brief overview into the significance associated with i'e toga (fine mats) and the importance of sacred relationships.

Definition

Fonua is a Tongan concept that best describes land, people, and ongoing relationships (Tu'itahi 2005). The same concept is acknowledged by the various Pacific Island cultures. Fonua is the word for Tonga and Niue. For Maori it is whenua; Samoa, fanua; Fiji, vanua; Cook Islands, 'enua; Tokelau, fenua; and Tuvalu, manafa.

Fonua also connects the various stages of the cycle of human life. For example, a baby is born into the fonua (land); she experiences life and builds relationships with the fonua (land). The baby's fonua (placenta) that nourished and supported her is buried back to the fonua (physical land). The pito (umbilical cord that connects the baby to the fonua, placenta) is also buried in the fonua (physical land). When she dies, she is buried in her fonualoto (land within the land or grave) (Tu'itahi 2005).

Fanua

For the Samoans the burial of the fanua (placenta) and pute (belly button stump) involves a special blessing by the faifeau (minister), which is later followed by a celebratory feast by the aiga (family). As the fanua is buried, a tree or plant is placed on top to symbolize that this belongs and connects to a particular child, and therefore as the tree grows, so too the baby develops and is nurtured and cared throughout his/her life. Sometimes the pute is brought back from overseas for burial on the family fanua (land), in the belief that as these Samoan children grow up in foreign places, they will one day travel back to Samoa, to their other home and place of belonging (back to their fanua) (Utumapu-McBride 2014).

There are cultural protocols that expectant mothers adhere to protect themselves and their babies. For example, the mother is never left alone; there is always someone with her and walking behind her, especially at night time as the spirits are drawn to her baby. The mother's hair is always tied up and not loose. Some chores are forbidden, like hanging the laundry. Mothers are taught not to wear helter neck tops or dresses with ties around the neck, nor do they wear bathing towels or lavalava around their neck either. This is to prevent the umbilical cord from being wrapped around the baby's neck. When mothers consume food like a roast meal, they are not allowed to cut the meat and eat it directly from the serving dish. The food must be eaten only from their own personal plate. A pregnant woman should not consume food that has been contaminated or stolen. When the baby is born, there are several traditional massages, like for mumu (inflammations and swellings) and to help with ila (birthmark and rash) with Samoan oil, plants, and herbs (like fuefue sina, also known as *Vigna marina*) (University of Hawaii at Manoa n.d.).

According to Tui Atua (2009), many Samoan words used today bond man and his environment in spiritual ways. For example, the Samoan terms for eleele (earth) and palapala (mud) are also the words for blood. Fatu (rock) is also the word for heart. Fanua (placenta) is also the word for land. For Samoans this shows how Papa and Eleele are the descendants of man. Even more so the burying of the pute (belly button stump) and fanua (placenta) into the land or earth shows symbolism in these rituals, which connects spirituality with the harmony and respect for the environment. The naming of a baby has special significance and draws connections from tua'a (ancestors), aiga potopoto (extended family), and fanua (land) (Tagoilelagi-Leota et al. 2013).

Samoa's Tusi Fa'alupega (village salutations) contains all the hierarchies for all families in both Samoa and American Samoa. The chief/orator title/s shows where each family is placed throughout the land. It shows the stratified layers of high-ranking chief and orator families. The Tusi Fa'alupega also identifies the names of the fanua (land) and the malae (open area of land where

ceremonies are conducted) for each family, including the name for the taupou (high chief's daughter) or manaia (high chief's son). A position of a family within a nu'u (village) can be easily traced by using the Tusi Fa'alupega. This wealth of cultural knowledge is learned by a matai (chief/orator) over time and recalled and spoken in speeches at ceremonies and significant events. For Tagoilelagi-Leota (2010), she states:

A Samoan child comes to the centre not alone but armed with his/her family gafa (genealogy), language and culture as a protective cloak that also contributes to learning. Within this gafa lies the fa'alupega of the children's families and villages in which people take pride when they are publicly acknowledged. (p. 43)

A strong sense of patriotism is also expressed when reflecting in one's fa'asinomaga (cultural identity) in regard to fanua. Samoan people take pride in their connection to fanua and culture, as seen in the uptake and display of cultural tattoos, whether full-body pea for men, malu for women, and taulima (ankle, hand, elbow, or shoulder tattoos). In addition to the other aspects of fa'asamoa aganu'u (Samoan culture) that show loyalty and allegiance are tautua (service), alofa (love), and fa'aaloalo (respect).

Even though some of the fanua in Samoa is government owned and freehold, most of the land is customary (under the control and guardianship) of matai (chiefs) of a nu'u (village) that represent the collective interests of the aiga potopoto (extended family). In Samoa the fanua tanu (burial place) can be either on family fanua (land) or at a communal or village tu'ugamau (cemetery). Before a tree is cut down, a fa'alanu (or prayer chant) is performed. This seeks permission from the god of the forest for taking the tree or using any of its parts (Tui Atua 2009).

There are also the indigenous cultural beliefs, which are still adhered to nowadays. For example, the crying of the ve'a (banded rail bird) serves as a warning that something bad is going to happen. This is also the same as hearing the eerie crying of a cat at night, an omen predicting death. Even having dreams, about a wedding or teeth, is also a signal of pending bad luck or having an eye that continues to twitch (means that something is

wrong). The superstitious beliefs that have been passed down by our elders, such as covering the mirror at night, to avoid seeing the reflection of an aitu (spirit/ghost). In particular villages in Samoa, the aitu take offense easily; therefore people have to behave accordingly and respectfully (especially outsiders).

I'e Toga

I'e toga (fine mat) is a product from the fanua (land), made from the leaves of the pandanus plant. It is also known as measina a Samoa (a precious, cultural treasure). The i'e toga is presented at ceremonial occasions or events that mark the life span development of a Samoan person. At birth the i'e fa'atupu (mat for the king) when presented represents the child, his/her position in the aiga, ancestry links, and her link to the fanua. The same i'e toga will reappear again when the child is older at his/her wedding day. The various i'e toga are presented at particular significant stages of a Samoan person's life, such as between birth and death. Ulumoega o le fa'afailelegatama (mats and i'e toga given by the mother's family to the father's family) also includes fala pepe (baby mats) and i'e fa'atupu and i'e fa'amatua (marks the milestone of first-time parents). Ulumoega o le fa'aipoipoga (i'e toga) these are presented by the bride's family to the groom's family before or after the wedding. The i'e fa'atupu is then presented to the husband's family. This important gathering of the two families is where the bride meets her new in-laws chaperoned by her aiga potopoto (extended family) and her ancestors (Tagoilelagi-Leota et al. 2013).

I'e o le mavaega (special fine mats at a funeral) is often presented by either the husband or wife's family when he/she dies; this i'e toga is to say goodbye to the deceased person, marking the end of his/her life span (Tagoilelagi-Leota et al. 2013). Other important events when i'e toga are given are saofa'i (bestowal of titles to chiefs or orators); opening of churches, schools, halls, and other buildings; liutofaga (reburial); induction of a new minister; unveiling of a headstone; birthdays;

graduations; and ifoga (ritual where the offending person/s pleads for pardon from the offended person/party).

Sacred Relationships

There is a sacred relationship between parents and their children. This began when mothers started nurturing their babies from their fanua (womb). Parents provide love and support for their children as they grow. Hence it is the beginning of sowing the seeds of obligation and loyalty, whereby children are always expected to listen and obey their parents, with the apron strings being cut at death. Unlike the Western universal notion of independence or complete freedom from parents/elders upon reaching a particular milestone, like turning 21, joining the workforce, being eligible to vote, or moving out of the family home, these are not recognized by Pacific Island cultures.

There is also a sacred relationship between brother and sister, known as feagaiga. According to Tui Atua (2009), “the feagaiga was founded on the principle that women have the gift of producing and nurturing life. As child bearers women were seen as sharing divinity with the gods” (p. 111). The sisters were seen as the peacemakers of a family, as well as being capable of granting blessings or curses. Feagaiga has also been extended to all families and to the faifeau (minister) (Tui Atua 2009). In old Samoa, “women had the highest authority, such as the sisters of the ali’i (high chief) and in every aiga (family) the sisters of the matai (chief) had authority over family matters” (Meleisea et al. 1987, p. 28). For the faifeau, the relationship with his/her congregation is also sacred. The literal translation of the word faifeau means someone who does chores or the servant of God.

Conclusion

The concept of fonua/fanua represents the cultural ecology or cyclic bond with the interlocking connection of land, people, and ongoing relationships. For the Samoans there is always a link

with the fanua; it is about the place of birth, sense of belonging, cultural identity, and the love and tautua for the family.

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Foreignness

- Phenomenological Theory of *Bildung* and Education

Formation

- *Bildung*: Potential and Promise in Early Childhood Education

Formation of School Subjects

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Introduction

This entry examines the history of subject knowledge from the early 1960s to date, through the work of critical theorists and sociologists. It looks at the reexamination of the role of sociological and historical methods in the study of curriculum and the importance of understanding the social history of the school curriculum and in particular school subjects.

Studying Subject Knowledge

In Britain in the early 1970s, there was a wave of change in secondary schooling from a previously selective “tripartite” system toward a fully comprehensive system where all types and abilities of children were grouped under the roof of one school. This transformation in the organization of secondary schooling led to an interesting series of curriculum debates both within schools and outside schools about the form that the comprehensive school curriculum should take. In addition to comprehensive reorganization, the regime of school examinations was fairly liberal at the time and a good deal of work was done to define “mode 3” examinations. These examinations were set up and partially conducted by the teachers themselves in association with examination boards (the Associated Examining Board was a pioneer in developing this mode).

Basil Bernstein, Michael Young, and Brian Davis at the Institute of Education in 1969/1970 were examining issues of knowledge and control, and a series of new mode 3 examinations were being developed in new subject areas such as environmental studies, urban studies, and community studies. These new subject areas seemed to offer the chance of better patterns of motivation and involvement for the children of working

people than had been on offer from the more “traditional subjects.” Certainly the levels of interest and engagement that these syllabuses facilitated seemed to imply that here were new approaches to learning which may well improve on or at the very least complement the traditional subjects of the secondary school curriculum.

Toward a History of School Knowledge

So far studies of the history of contemporary knowledge, let alone school knowledge, have tended to resemble the pre-paradigmatic stages of disciplines and a new wave of work began to emerge in the 1970s. The studies have argued that in school curricula “by extending our sense of history we can develop a different way of viewing the species” (Macdonald and Walker 1976, p. 86). Mary Waring’s work on Nuffield science was developed from a similar perspective:

If we are to understand events, whether of thought or of action, knowledge of the background is essential. Knowledge of events is merely the raw material of history: to be an intelligible reconstruction of the past, events must be related to other events, and to the assumptions and practices of the milieu. Hence they must be made the subject of inquiry, their origins as products of particular social and historical circumstance, the manner in which individuals and groups have acted must be identified, and explanations for their actions sought. (Waring 1975, p. 12)

The justifications for historical studies of the evolution of school knowledge can be found at the level of thought and action.

Firstly, such work will improve social scientific of school knowledge. Historical studies can elucidate the changing human process behind the definition and promotion of school subjects. Employing this strategy shifts the emphasis from questions of the intrinsic and philosophic value of subjects, from their existence as objective realities, to the motives and activities immanent and inherent in their construction and maintenance. Further, historical scrutiny offers insights into the existence of patterns and recurring constraints: why, for instance, certain “traditions” in school knowledge survive and others disappear. While historical studies do not as their major intention

seek to prove particular theories, nonetheless they may use and contribute to theory.

Secondly, at the level of school practice historical studies can aid analysis. Such studies might even aid in explaining the emergence and maintenance of anti-research traditions among teachers. Partly, teachers' antipathy derives from the point Shipman et al. (1974) makes about the curriculum project he was involved with:

The end-product of the project was determined in the field, in contact with the school, not on the drawing board. . . in the end it was what worked that survived. Shipman et al. (1974, p. 2)

But the autonomy of the teacher, his capacity for active reinterpretation, should not be overestimated for major constraints do exist. Hence, Shipman's judgment in a sense missed the point: only what is prepared on the drawing board goes into the school and therefore *has a chance* to be interpreted and to survive. Exploring the editing process which takes place on the drawing board of history with respect to school knowledge is more than static historicism. By understanding this process, it is possible to argue a range of constraints that are immanent in the teachers' work. Historical studies should be a prerequisite to attempts to change classroom practice. Linking the teacher to the history of her/his working milieu could further the potential for actively creating new history.

Studying Subject Knowledge

As can be seen in the above, a good deal of this research program for developing a social history of school knowledge owed a debt to the work of critical theorists and sociologists of knowledge from the 1960s to 1970s onward.

At that time, a new impetus to scholarship on school subjects had come from sociologists and specifically from sociologists of knowledge. Writing in 1968, Frank Musgrove exhorted educational researchers to "examine subjects both within the school and the nation at large as social systems sustained by communication networks, material endowments, and ideologies" (Musgrove 1968, p. 101). In the communication networks, Esland

(1971) later argued that research should focus, in part, on the subject perspective of the teacher:

The knowledge which a teacher thinks 'fills up' his subject is held in common with members of a supporting community who collectively approach its paradigms and utility criteria, as they are legitimated in training courses and 'official' statements. It would seem that teachers, because of the dispersed nature of their epistemic communities, experience the conceptual precariousness which comes from the lack of significant others who can confirm plausibility. They are, therefore, heavily dependent on journals, and, to a lesser extent, conferences, for their reality confirmation. (Esland 1971, p. 79)

Michael F. D. Young (1971) sought to follow up the relationship between school knowledge and social control and to do so in a manner which focused on content and form. He argued, following Bernstein, that:

Those in positions of power will attempt to define what is to be taken as knowledge, how accessible to different groups any knowledge is, and what are the accepted relationships between different knowledge areas, and between those who have access to them and make them available. (Young, 1971, p. 31–32)

His concern with the form of high-status school subjects focused on the "organizing principles" which he discerned as underlying the academic curriculum:

These are literacy, or an emphasis on written as opposed to oral presentation, individualism (or avoidance of group work or cooperativeness) which focused on how academic work is assessed and is a characteristic of both the 'process' of learning and the way the 'product' is presented; abstractness of the knowledge and its structuring and compartmentalizing independently of the knowledge of the learner; finally and linked to the former is . . . called the unrelatedness of academic curricula, which refers to the extent to which they are 'at odds' with daily life and experience. (ibid, p. 38)

This emphasis on the form of school knowledge should not exclude concerns like that of Williams with the social construction of particular contents. The crucial point to grasp is that it is the interrelated force of form and content which should be at the center of the study of school subjects. The study of subject, form, and content should moreover be placed in an historical perspective.

In fact, Young later came to acknowledge the somewhat static determinism of his earlier writing in knowledge and control and to argue that historical work should be an essential ingredient of the study of school knowledge. He wrote of the need to understand the “historical emergence and persistence of particular conventions (e.g., school subjects).” By failing to situate the problems of contemporary education historically, one is again limited from understanding issues of politics and control. He concluded that “one crucial way of reformulating and transcending the limits within which we work is to see. . . how such limits are not given or fixed but produced through the conflicting actions and interests of men in history” (Young 1977, pp. 248–249). Young’s recent work moves back to a more concise concern with subject knowledge (Young 2008).

New Directions for Studying School Subjects

The important work by sociologists of knowledge in defining research programs for studies of school knowledge led on to an acknowledgment by some of them that historical study might complement and extend their project. In studying school subjects, the enquiry has arrived at a new stage. Sociologists of knowledge like Bernstein and Young, subsequently, have played a vital role in rescuing and reasserting the validity of this intellectual project; in the process, however, some of the necessary focus on historical and empirical circumstances has been lost. The task undertaken was to reexamine the role of sociological and historical methods in the study of curriculum and to rearticulate a mode of study for extending an understanding of the social history of the school curriculum and, in this work, particularly school subjects.

Beginning in 1985, *Studies in Curriculum History*, a series of 20 books, was launched with this view in mind. In the first volume, *Social Histories of the Secondary Curriculum* (Goodson 1985), work was collected together on a wide range of subjects: classics, science, domestic subjects,

religious education, social studies, and modern languages. These studies reflected a growing interest in the history of curriculum and, besides elucidating the symbolic drift of school knowledge toward the academic tradition, raised central questions about explanations of school subjects whether they are sociological or philosophical.

Emergent work in the United States began to focus on the evolution of the school curriculum studied in historical manner. Kliebard’s (1986) writing on the curriculum in the United States from 1893 to 1958 discerned a number of the dominant traditions within the school curriculum and, as noted, came to the intriguing conclusion that by the end of the period covered the traditional school subject remained “an impregnable fortress.” His later set of essays usefully complements this theme (Kliebard 1992). However, Kliebard’s work does not go into the details of school life. In this respect Franklin (1986) provided some valuable insights in a case study of Minneapolis. Here the vital negotiation from curriculum ideas, the terrain of Kliebard’s work, toward implementation as school practice is seen. In addition, a collection of papers put together by Popkewitz (1987) examined the historical aspects of a range of subjects: early education, art, reading and writing, biology, mathematics, social studies, special education, socialist curriculum, and a study of Rugg’s work. Likewise, Apple’s work provided helpful studies of school texts (Apple 1993).

The study of the written curriculum of school subjects should afford a range of insights into schooling. But it is very important to stress that such inquiry must be allied to other kinds of study: in particular studies of school process, of school texts, and of the history of pedagogy. Hamilton (1989; reissued 2013) elegantly sought to capture some of these complexities as they intersect and interact. Schooling is composed of the interlinked matrix of these, and indeed, other vital ingredients. With regard to schooling and to curriculum in particular, the final question is “Who gets what and what do they do with it?”

The preactive definition of school subjects is part of this story. That is not the same as asserting a direct or easily discernible relationship between

the preactive definition of subjects and their interactive realization in classrooms. It is, however, to assert that the written curriculum most often sets important parameters for classroom practice (not always, not at all times, not in all classrooms, but most often). The study of written curriculum of school subjects will firstly increase understanding of the influences and interests active at the preactive level. Secondly, this understanding will further the knowledge of the values and purposes represented in schooling and the manner in which preactive definition, notwithstanding individual, local, and national variations, may set parameters for interactive realization and negotiation in the classroom and school.

The Need for Curriculum History

The danger of breaking the links between interaction and historical circumstances can be well illustrated by studies of curriculum definitions and classroom practice. Through interactionist overreaction, practice in classrooms can be elevated to a pedestal where the curriculum is seen as presented and negotiated by the teacher as agent. Even where the curriculum, as in the National Curriculum, has been clearly politically designated elsewhere, interactionist and micropolitical studies hold on to the agency of the teacher.

This view conspires with the view of government regimes that say when learning fails to take place, the teacher as front-line agent must be, by definition culpable (or incompetent). The preactive definition of the curriculum and of general historical circumstances is lost in the spectacle of classroom myopia (see Goodson 2014).

In much of their work on curriculum, philosophers have taken the curriculum as a given. Hence the historical environment in which knowledge is socially produced has been ignored. This ahistorical aspect of philosophy has defused its capacity to act as an antidote to the transcendence and immersed immediacy noted above.

Hirst (1967), for example, talked about school subjects “which are indisputably logically cohesive disciplines” (Hirst 1967, p. 44). In fact such a philosophical perspective is rooted in particular

and rather contestable educational convictions. Most notable is the assertion that “no matter what the ability of the child may be, the heart of all his development as a rational being, I am saying, intellectual” (Hirst 1976). In accordance with these convictions, Hirst (and also Peters) argued that “the central objectives of education are developments of mind” (Hirst and Peters 1970, pp. 63–64). These objectives are best pursued by “the definition of forms of knowledge” (later broadened to include “fields of knowledge”). These forms and fields of knowledge then provide “the logically cohesive disciplines” on which school subjects are based.

The philosophy of Hirst and Peters, therefore, provides an explanatory basis for the school curriculum as trying to promote the intellectual development of its pupils. In their model of school subject definition, it is often implied that the intellectual discipline is created by a community of scholars, normally working in a university, and is then translated for use as a school subject. Phenix (1964) defines the intellectual discipline base in this way:

The general test for discipline is that it should be the characteristic activity of an identifiable organised tradition of men of knowledge, that is of persons who are skilled in certain specified functions that they are able to justify by a set of intelligible standards. (Phenix 1964, p. 317)

When such a discipline has been defined and promoted and a university base has been established, it creates a cycle of virtuous self-fulfillment to argue that this is a bona fide academic form of knowledge. This academic discipline can then define and direct the “academic” school subject. The model, by ignoring historical process entirely, celebrates this fait accompli in the painstaking creation of disciplines and associated school subjects. This model is devoid of explanatory potential because the stages in the promotion and emergence of disciplines and subjects are left unexplored, as are the reasons for the “symbolic drift” toward academic forms. In fact, academic subjects tend to follow similar evolutionary profiles which tell us a great deal about the structuring of material interests and resources (Goodson 2014). By examining school subjects

as “professional communities” with clear “missions” and underpinning material interests, it is possible to understand the symbolic drift of academic disciplines and school subjects toward common culminating patterns.

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Formation of the Idealist and Progressive Kindergarten Movements During the Nineteenth Century, The

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Foucault and Early Years Parenting

► [Incredible Years as a Tool of Governmentality: A Foucauldian Analysis of an Early Years Parenting Program](#)

Foucault and Educational Administration

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Introduction

The aim of this chapter is to demonstrate the usefulness of Michel Foucault’s work for the study of and research in educational

administration. While Foucault's work has been used extensively across many domains within education and to some extent in educational administration, his ideas can bring significant utility in identifying the operation of power, the formation of subjects, and problematizing ongoing claims to totality and best practice that routinely appear in the fields of educational administration and leadership. In meeting these aims, this entry is divided into two main sections: first, an examination of some Foucauldian ideas and concepts in the form of a "toolbox" that can be "put to work" in educational administration and, second, the implications for the problematization of knowledge construction in the area of educational administration. Specific concepts examined include discursive practices, disciplinary power, subjectivity, and ethics. The application of these concepts will be linked to some examples of research that have been undertaken in the field drawing on Foucault's ideas. This line of inquiry will be of significant interest to those seeking to work with more "critical" perspectives in educational administration, management, and leadership studies.

Building a Foucauldian Toolbox

The influence of Michel Foucault's work has been far reaching throughout much of the humanities and social sciences. Education, and even in recent years, educational administration, has also seen an increasing array of applications of Foucault's ideas. This has not been an easy undertaking for scholars of educational administration as the field has very much been a core part of the modernist project of education and contains a variety of discourses that Foucault's work certainly challenges and problematizes. More critical approaches, such as those drawing on the work of Foucault, are still very much marginalized in the field of educational leadership, management, and administration. As a field, educational administration (including the much more faddish term "leadership") has drawn on a variety of competing approaches such as (but not limited to) scientific, problem solving, humanist, moral, and symbolic

interactionist with which to understand educational administration. Critical theorists, phenomenologists, feminists, and poststructuralist approaches have also been drawn upon to constitute fields of knowledge and also shape the knowledge production of educational administration. The importance of Foucault's work is that its criticality not only leads to a troubling of mainstream educational administration discourse but also allows for more generative approach to think differently about educational administration. Foucault actually said little about education and educational administration. However, he was very much concerned with the administering and governing of lives and individuals within particular regimes of practices.

Discursive Practices

Foucault is well known for his historical investigations into the links between rationalization and power in specific areas such as prisons, hospitals, asylums, and sexuality. Central to much of this work is the notion of discourse as well as, more specifically, discursive practices. Broadly speaking, Foucault uses discourse to refer to the historical traces of things that are said, or a complex set of practices that privilege some statements and exclude others. It is not simply about language, although individual statements are important. Discourse is importantly linked to both relations of power and the formation of knowledge. In order to understand discourse and analyze discursive practices, Foucault argues that they must be examined where and when they occur (see Foucault 1972).

Furthermore, Foucault famously stated that discourses "are practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak" (Foucault 1972, p. 54). He goes on to say that discourses are more than just language and it is the more that one needs to reveal and describe. It is in the *practices* that certain truths are inscribed and knowledge is produced. The focus is less on the explicit language or linguistic structures but more so the ensemble of discursive practices that constitute what counts as truth. To study things as they are said, Foucault describes four rules of discursive formation according to the formation of *objects* (i.e., the objects of discourse), *subjects* (who is

speaking), *concepts*, and *strategies* (Foucault 1972). It is through these rules of formation that Foucault is able to identify specific practices as “places as where what is said and what is done, rules imposed and reasons given, the planned and the taken for granted meet and interconnect” (Foucault 1991, p. 75).

Disciplinary Power

Foucault’s work on power very much centered on the ways that power operates through social relations and in social institutions. In *Discipline and Punish* (Foucault 1977), Foucault was concerned with exploring how individuals are disciplined, managed, and controlled through various practices. These disciplinary practices included normalization, hierarchical observation, and examination. Further to these practices, Foucault argued that Bentham’s panopticon was a central feature of disciplinary society. The panopticon is an architectural mechanism that divided prisoners into separate cells whereby they are under constant surveillance with the central observer unseen so that the prisoners believe they are always on view. Foucault developed these ideas to show how power is exercised or functions as a set of actions upon actions rather than something that is held by an individual. Power is therefore a relation between individuals or groups of individuals rather than existing as a form of domination or repression. It is also important to note that Foucault was not developing a theory of power but, rather, tools for analysis of how subjects are formed through various practices and discourses. These ideas are important for understanding how individuals in schools are constituted as subjects through various educational, societal, economic, and political discourses.

Links to schools and education have been extensively made through Foucault’s work on disciplinary power. The dividing up of school subject areas (or disciplines), for example, is one way that disciplinary practices are brought to bear on individuals for the purposes of normalization, examination, and observation. In relation to educational administration, disciplinary practices are central to the operation of administration of education both on the bodies of educational leaders as

well as through them for the purposes of disciplining others such as teachers and students (see Nietzsche 2011). An understanding of how school leaders and administrators are constituted by and through discourse is a key element of the study of educational administration (also see Anderson and Grinberg 1998; Gillies 2013; Mennicken and Miller 2015).

Subjectivity

In Foucault’s later works, he was interested in clarifying that he was not developing a theory of power but more so developing tools for an analysis of the subject or how individuals are made subjects in various domains. Foucault uses the term subject to refer to two things: first, subject to someone else’s control and dependence and, second, tied to one’s own identity by a conscience or self-knowledge (Foucault 2001a). For Foucault, the subject is constituted and shaped by various discourses that are closely linked to social structures and practices. It is these sets of power relations that need to be described and analyzed. Individuals are constructed through multiple discursive practices and as a result Foucault argues against the notion of the existence of a universal human subject. One of the core aspects of educational administration and leadership has been the attempt to define the leader or leadership in the form of a fixed and therefore usable identity to articulate good leadership or best practice in the functioning of an educational organization. Foucault’s work can be used to disrupt these claims for a universal human subject and seek to develop a more nuanced understanding as to how subjects exist at the intersection of multiple and often conflicting discourses.

Governmentality

The notion of governmentality has been increasingly drawn upon over recent years, particularly in education policy research to argue how neoliberal conceptions of education reform have become pervasive. However, what still remain less common are detailed examinations of specific practices that work to construct particular neoliberal discourse in education as well as the sorts of practices that both make room for and develop

forms of counter-conduct. For Foucault, governmentality is concerned with the rationalities of government or the conduct of conduct. The word conduct specifically refers to behaviors and actions and also to conduct of the self. In order to analyze government, it is the practices that try to “shape, sculpt, mobilise and work through the choices, desires, aspirations, needs, wants and lifestyles of individuals and groups” (Foucault 1991, p. 12). The study of educational organizations, administration, and leadership is an excellent target for these kinds of analyses as education is a vehicle for government to develop specific behaviors and practices of individuals and the population for the purposes it sets out.

Ethics

Towards the end of his life, Foucault spent a lot of time investigating ethics and technologies of the self. Foucault distinguishes between the notions of ethics and morals. For Foucault, morals are the sets of values that are usually prescribed by certain institutions such as the church, families, and schools. Ethics refers to the formation of oneself as a subject according to rules or codes of action. That is, Foucault considers ethics to be concerned with the relationship one has with oneself with respect to codes of action (Foucault 1992). Foucault developed a fourfold ethical framework to understand the aspects of ethical work on the self and in relation to others. These consist of the *ethical substance*, or part of oneself that is to be considered for ethical judgment; *modes of subjectification*, or ways in which individuals are made to recognize or think about their moral obligations; *forms of elaboration*, or self-forming practices or activities; and, finally, *telos*, or mode of being that is characteristic of an ethical subject (Foucault 1992). These ideas have significant utility to understand the work of educators and how they work to become particular ethical subjects, in both the governing of themselves and in the governing of others. Education is a deeply ethical activity and Foucault’s work can allow us to understand such technologies of the self as individuals work towards particular ethical goals and subject positions (see Niesche and Keddie 2015).

Problematizing Educational Administration

Foucault’s work is challenging for educational discourses and particularly discourses of educational administration, management, and leadership. Drawing on Foucault’s concepts requires the exploration of practices that exercise certain relations of power, form particular knowledges and subjects, and as a result construct educational leadership and administration as multiple forms of discourse (Niesche 2011; Gillies 2013) and not a phenomenon that is immediately knowable, instrumentalist, and provides the “truth” of best practice. By problematizing educational administration and examining how particular statements are constitutive of certain discursive formations in relation to educational administration, management, and leadership, it becomes possible to identify how some statements and practices work to privilege particular constructions of educational administration. Foucault uses the term *problematization* to call into question those taken for granted discourses and ways of thinking in the field. Foucault argues that his role is not to prescribe solutions as this would then be instituting new regimes of truth that would also then need to be unmasked (Anderson and Grinberg 1998). Foucault’s aim was to underscore problems, to raise questions that consider issues in their complexity, and to allow those at the grassroots or local level to voice their concerns and be allowed the space to speak. For example, as Foucault explains:

I have absolutely no desire to play the role of a prescriber of solutions. I think that the role of the intellectual today is not to ordain, to recommend solutions, to prophesy, because in that function he [sic] can only contribute to the functioning of a particular power situation that, in my opinion, must be criticised. (Foucault 2001b, p. 288)

In other words, solutions and best practice models to educational administration and leadership need to be interrogated in favor of local practices, studying the exercise of power and counter-conducts. It is for this reason that Foucault has been described as a nuisance for organization studies (Mennicken and Miller 2015).

Foucault's predilection for asking "how" questions rather than "what" or "why" questions means facing disruptive and uncomfortable explanations for organizational phenomena.

Of course, there are a multitude of challenges for anyone wanting to draw on Foucault's ideas in educational administration. First is the complex and challenging writing and language that Foucault used in his works. Second is understanding the context of his writings as they took place during a particular temporal moment in continental philosophy and challenges in postwar France. Third is his numerous influences and engagements with the work of philosophers such as Nietzsche, Kant, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty and a variety of in-depth historical analyses in fields other than education (although *Discipline and Punish* has been linked to schools as disciplinary institutions). Fourth is Foucault's penchant for changing his views on issues and what might be the overall focus of his overall research project. He would never say that he was wrong but rather that he has changed his emphasis or clarified what his project has been about all along. Therefore tracing a linear progression of ideas is problematic and certainly against the tradition of his writing. Fifth is the difficulty of placing or categorizing his work, as it does not easily fit into any particular categorization. For instance, Foucault has been labeled both a structuralist and a poststructuralist amongst many other descriptions. Sixth are the challenges of choosing which of his concepts to put to work. This is due to the large number of concepts but also their interrelatedness so that distinction between concepts becomes problematic. For example, the interrelationships and slippery language between the notions of power, the subject, regimes of truth, governmentality, pastoral power, discourse, ethics, and biopower (to name a few) illustrate the difficulty of putting these ideas to use in other domains.

Therefore the task for scholars and researchers in educational administration is to draw on the work of thinkers such as Foucault to pose problems and to challenge dominant modes of thinking around efficiency, effectiveness, educational leadership, and best practice. These are the

discourses that marginalize alternative, more critical viewpoints that are still very much needed in the field. Particularly since education reforms premised on moves to school-based management and other neoliberal regimes of practices in education, there is a need to hold to account discourses that continue to maintain the status quo of inequality; the underperformance of minority groups; the privatization of schooling to the interests of big business; the shifting away of education from educational leadership, management, and administration; and other such processes that have worked against more democratic forms of administration and leadership in schools and education more broadly. Sadly, discourses of leadership have been coopted by governments, think tanks, and other vested interests to pursue such policies in education that work against the development of alternative and more transgressive approaches to enduring educational problems.

There needs to be a focus on specific practices, the constraints and possibilities for action, how leaders are constituted as particular subjects, and an understanding of how power relations work to produce certain effects. Foucault's ideas can continue to contribute strongly to these challenges and in fact, in the current educational moment, are essential to criticize the workings of education policy and discourse. However, this is not the only aim of Foucault's work, for there can also be a more generative aspect by creating the conditions for a variety of stakeholders to speak out and have their voices heard. This is possible through interrupting dominant discourses and putting forward ways of thinking differently about educational administration discourse.

Traditional approaches to educational administration have few tools to be able to explain and understand the shifting subjectivities of educational leaders. Rather, they tend to try to identify ideal models of working that can then be transferred to other sites for the purposes of effectiveness and efficiency. Foucault's work offers a different role in examining the variety of power relations that construct multiple subjectivities and, in fact, subjectivities that can often be in tension with one another. For example, maintaining an

educative purpose to administration and leadership as the core purpose of schooling can be in tension with neoliberal discourses and normative models of best practice. Foucault's work seeks different forms of knowledge, to make sense of the contradictions, crack, and fissures in educational administration discourse and to identify practices that are understood in their local circumstances of the school, community, and also broader social, economic, political discourses, and education policies. This can be a fruitful line of inquiry that may provide alternative accounts of administrative and leadership practice in education at a time when such avenues are being closed down through neoliberal education reforms with a particularly narrow and conservative view of educational administration and leadership at its core.

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Foucault and Educational Theory

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Synonyms

[Educational policy](#); [Genealogy](#); [Sociology of education](#)

Introduction

When one is speaking about Michel Foucault, it seems that he would be a strange rebellious intellectual with obstreperous dazzling ideas. The question “who is Foucault?” has various responses and some of these can be contradictory. This diversity has masked Foucault's ideas rather than elucidating them. Moreover, Foucault's various works, different contexts of his analyses and discussions, and his intellectual turns during his thinking life have redoubled this ambiguity. While in some papers like “who is author?,” one encounters with a radical structuralist; in later works the footprints of poststructuralism can be traced. Regarding these contradictory descriptions, Foucault attempted to deny some of them on the one hand and acknowledge others or some aspects of them on the other hand (Marshall 1990). In addition, he argued that none of these labels can be fitted to his thought, despite the fact that everyone reflected some aspects of it.

However, when Dreyfus and Rabinow published *Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics*, Foucault with a comprehensive view redefined his different works as a project concerning the subjugation of human beings. He claimed that he wanted to show different modes of this objectification during the history. Since these various modes have been distributed in different arenas of human social life, Foucault's critical project deals one way or another with these various areas. Education is one of these areas in which human beings are thought to be subjugated. It is a value-laden site that

divides students by labeling and discriminating them in various value systems. All of these reasons persuade us that educational theory can be investigated in Foucault's project seriously.

But can one say that Foucault concentrates on education for its own sake? Many scholars would respond in the negative. For example, Gutting (1994, p. 16) emphasizes that "his theorizing is typically not for its own sake but in response to the demands of a specific historical or critical project." One cannot take Foucault, therefore, as an educational theorist. His studies about human knowledge and educational practices, however, have significant implications. Then, it seems that although his purpose has been breaking various truth idols in human knowledge rather than establishing a new kind of knowledge or theory, his reflections on educational theories and practices have affected the educational arena. Regarding this, Foucault's inspirations for educational studies which signify educational theory and practice in a unique manner will be delineated.

When Foucault speaks of subject and objectification, he recognizes three kinds of relations in which human subjects are placed: relations of production, of signification, and of power (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1982). While relations between different members of a school can be problematized from power relations point of view, curriculum content which is derived from knowledge discourses may reflect signification relations. Therefore, it seems that educational area can be considered in Foucault's project at least from two points of view. While the first perspective concentrates on subject and power networks, the second one puts emphasis on knowledge and power interrelations.

Education, Subject, and Power

In Foucault's view "Man," the central concept of contemporary human science, does not "exist" (Foucault 1973, p. 368). Investigating the various ways in which discourses have transformed human beings to objects, Foucault claimed that human is the "recent invention" of Western culture, or rather, "appears in ambiguous position as

an object of knowledge and as a subject that knows" (Foucault 1973, p. 323). Accordingly, human sciences are based on this active knowing subject and, at the same time, have objectified human being as an object to be known (Marshall 1990). Educational theory, therefore, from this point of view will be a discourse in which human beings are taken as objects. Concentrating on modern notion of human as an object, educational discourse attempts to redefine educational aims, teachers' duties and students' tasks, content of curriculum, methods of learning and teaching, and educational standards.

Consequently, educational theory should be considered as what Foucault refers to in a number of occasions as "culture of the self" (Besley and Peters 2007); a discourse that its major concern is to construct "self" and "subject." Foucault's critical attack on the unique universal nonhistorical reason and the truths generated by it can be understood as decentering the "self." Regarding the two kinds of ethics in Foucault's thought, one based on external codes and the other on independent aesthetic existence, Besley and Peters (2007) distinguish self-denial from self-mastery and attempt to investigate educational theory by this theoretical framework. As a result, some educational approaches, like neoliberalism, that concentrate on external codes can be criticized and assumed as denying the self.

On the other hand, educational area is based on different interactions between many agents like students, teachers, parents, and principals. As these interactions are interwoven with power, investigating them one can find some power relations that objectify human beings. For, in Foucault's view, power is redefined as a texture of human life and relationships. At the same time, educational theories support these hierarchical relations in terms of various justifications. For example, forms of students' seats compared to teachers' positions in classes, place of principal's office in the school and forms of seats located in it for parents, and many other points in the architecture of school buildings establish these hierarchical relations and provide conditions for bringing power to play. Regarding this role of power in educational institutions, Foucault (1979)

emphasizes that *panopticon* is spread throughout all the schools. This panopticon makes everything visible for the power and thereby makes the power more economic and more effective. In addition, pedagogical status of teachers in educational process and procedures of teaching, learning, punishment, and rewarding provide conditions for the exercising of power on students as objects. Teachers are subjugated in this system as well. Rigid objectives, behavioral educational aims, the criteria which identify professional teachers, formal procedures of promotion in teaching, and systems of rewarding and rebuking all surround teachers and bring power to play in educational area. Foucault's critical analysis of systems of differentiations established by traditions, law, and theories can be understood as an attack on these hierarchical relations in which the power exercises on subjects and limiting their freedom shapes them gently as it wants.

Furthermore, educational theories legitimize these exercises of power on subjects. This task can be assumed as a rationalization which occurs in the theoretical atmosphere of education. An educational theory develops knowledge about people, their beliefs, behaviors, and lifestyles to shape them in a special manner. Concepts like "good," "humane," "legal," and "norm" require special kinds of rationalization which attempt to dominate on the whole intellectual arena and justify power role in educational practices.

Thereupon, some concepts like teacher's authority in class and hierarchical relations implied in it should be considered as a kind of instrument at the hands of shaping power for objectification. As a result, concentrating on such problematic relations, Foucault attempted to challenge with educational theories that justify them. Some of the indications of this challenge have been elaborated and expanded in further analysis on, for instance, teaching professionalization (See Labaree, 1992) and punishment (See Marshall, 1990).

Education, Knowledge, and Power

Another way of human objectification is located in relations of significance. One may consider

Foucault's work as tracing these significance relations in epistemic and language areas. According to Foucault, not only every piece of our knowledge has been influenced by power but also it can be a product of power. Thus, power can do many things: "It 'excludes', it 'represses', it 'censors', it 'abstracts', it 'makes', it 'conceals'. In fact, power produces; it produces reality; it produces domains of objects and ritual of truth" (Foucault 1977, p. 194).

When Foucault denies the neutral knowledge and argues that knowledge and power are interrelated, one can conclude that all truths join powers. He takes knowledge and power in one integrated system in which each of them supports the other. In this relational model, power and knowledge transform from two external elements to two inter-related elements that influence each other. There is not, therefore, any liberating truth that can be opposed to power.

Consequently, given human sciences as various discourses in which different truths are constructed, there may be something to be said about sciences and their supposed rigid truths. As Foucault himself claimed, he wants to emancipate people from these strict scientific truths that play the role of rigid prisons:

My role – and that is too emphatic a word – is to show people that they are much freer than they feel, that people accept as truth, as evidence, some themes which have been built up at a certain moment during history, and that this so-called evidence can be criticized and destroyed. To change something in the minds of people – that's the role of an intellectual. (Foucault, in Martin et al. 1988, p. 10)

To emancipate people from such quasi-prisons – that people accept as truth and evidence – Foucault attacks on epistemic areas and truths produced in them. Moreover, in an interview, Foucault points out that his problem is tracing and finding those discursive or non-discursive practices that render something as a matter that can be true or false (Kritzman and Sheriden 1990, p. 257). He argues that what is counted as truth is produced and determined by the discursive practices or conceptual systems. Different conceptual systems and discursive practices then make different games of truth. When

Foucault speaks about truth games, he does not refer to really “true” systems but merely to some sets of conventional rules according to which truth and falsity of a statement is determined. “Truth games” then include the conditions of the emergence of truth and falsehood (Gutting 1994).

These regimes of truths are relevant to social-historical conditions and model truth in a different meaning. In this model, truth is a matter of human world which is made during power struggles. It is constructed because of several complicated types of restrictions. It can justify restrictive effects of power and enable some technologies with the aim of regulating human life. Then, every society and every social condition imply their particular regimes of truth (Foucault 1980, p. 131). Truth regimes, therefore, are combined from contingent matters not pure and necessary truths.

Investigating these “truth games” and their historical features, Foucault tries to break their sacred idols down and touch them by his critical hands. Then, he holds that a genealogist should attempt “to unmask determined ‘truth games’” and observe them in their historical contexts. This renders them as something related to their backgrounds, involving specific technologies and ways by which human beings perceive themselves, and denies their universal necessities (Foucault, cited in Martin et al. 1988, p. 18). As a result of this, people have some relative nonuniversal truths which are open to critique and reexamination.

Truths in educational institutions can play important roles. First of all, schools as formal institutions should shape students’ lives. It seems that knowledge contents actualize this aim more than other components of curriculum. Educational contents, textbooks, and various scientific truths can be seen as instruments of objectification and subjugating students. As a result, the Foucauldian view provides a theoretical perspective to investigate and analyze the knowledge contents regarding their relations to power and their roles in limiting and shaping students. These critiques provide conditions for challenging truths and questioning knowledge contents offered in classes.

Foucault, regarding the complex of power-knowledge-subject, analyzes school examinations and marks and interprets them as normalization

procedures which bring power to play. In the examinations, power exercises on subjects through knowledge networks, “disciplines,” and scientific “discourses” that produce truths. For examinations interweave knowledge and values and thereby locate students upon their marks in hierarchical categories which impact on their positions in social relations and their sociopolitical actions.

Educational Theory and Historical Studies

All of Foucault’s studies can be accounted as historical but in a new meaning of history. Foucault rejects the triple matrix of origin-continuity-subject that identifies the traditional concept of history and thus in his historical studies of education goes beyond this matrix. As Foucault (1977) himself says, a genealogist challenges the pursuit of the origin because it implies on the exact essence of things and presupposes the existence of immobile forms. He holds that listening to the history, a genealogist “finds that there is ‘something altogether different’ behind things: not a timeless and essential secret, but the secret that they have no essence or that their essence was fabricated in a piecemeal fashion from alien forms” (Foucault 1977, p. 78). Notions like “origin” and “continuity” can impose on history some ultimate goals associated with a superhistorical perspective that guides history in a special way.

Relying on Foucault’s insights in several genealogies of prison, sex, and human sciences, one can argue that his genealogy is a kind of “present history,” which tries to tell us many stories about several struggles occurring between diverse powers constructing our present conditions. The present history has been characterized as “the union of erudite knowledge and local memories which allows us to establish a historical knowledge of struggles and to make use of this knowledge tactically today” (Foucault 1980, p. 83). Consequently, the constructive elements of our present conditions can be found.

However, these conditions are contingent and people can change their present by manipulating

them. This kind of historiography locates truths in their social-cultural contexts and defines discourses in relation to these contexts. Truths, then, are not universal, necessary, and absolute. They are products of discursive and nondiscursive practices as sociocultural conditions occur in special historical moments. People can have other products if they change those conditions. Accordingly, not only should educational theory be regarded as a historical phenomenon but also it should be taken as a contingent phenomenon in terms of power relations in social conditions.

Conclusion

Foucault's concern about human being objectification on the one hand and the critical role of education in this process on the other hand leads to Foucault's concentration on educational theory and practice. As a result, one can investigate educational practices and sites as those surveillant procedures that are controlling and regulating students' lives. Educational theory in its turn supports this objectification and subjugation of students. As Foucault attempted to challenge these subjugating procedures and technologies, he could not avoid from challenging popular educational theories. So, according to him, we should be suspicious about educational theories and take a critical stance against them. This critique can be promoted by applying new Foucauldian framework consisting of some critical concepts like power, knowledge, subject, and transient constructive truths. This stance can demonstrate some implicit aspects of educational phenomena.

Cross-References

- [Education and Political Theory: Prospects and Points of View](#)
- [Educational Leadership](#)
- [Educational Policy](#)
- [Educational Practice](#)
- [Educational Theory](#)
- [Marxism](#)
- [Nietzsche](#)

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Foucault, Confession, and Education

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Introduction

[T]he confession became one of the West's most highly valued techniques for producing truth. We have since become a singularly confessing society. . . Western man has become a confessing animal. (Foucault 1998, p. 59)

If something useful about the present is said by Foucault's (1998) argument that Western man has become a confessing animal and that confession has become the most valuable technique for producing truth in society, we will argue that we live in a confessing society. One of the primary arguments made by Foucault (1998) is that verbalization has become a central method through which people make themselves visible to themselves and to others and that people come to know who they are through verbalization. In his writing, psychoanalysis is used as an example of how previous Christian practices of confession have become appropriated by a secular *scientia sexualis* (Foucault 1998), which has spread to most aspects of private life. In this context, confession does not specifically limit itself to the confession taking place in church, but it also signifies the most private and intimate relationships that we have with our lovers, family, friends, and with ourselves. Confession has become scientized.

Keeping the concepts of confession and verbalization in mind, we can see how there are numerous contemporary practices in which we are invited to speak about ourselves, making our dreams, wishes, aspirations, fears, and faults, for example, visible to ourselves and others, not the least in the media; reality TV shows, such as *Big Brother* and *Nanny TV*; or online social communities, such as Facebook and Twitter. But also within education, through the mobilization of examination practices or reflective practices where students are asked to scrutinize themselves and make this visible to themselves and to their peers and teachers. Verbalization (disclosure) could thus, in line with Foucault's work, be seen as one of the most prominent features of the confessing society. One could argue that "there is a transhistorical human need or psychological compulsion to confess" (Taylor 2010, p. 6). In the following, I will, based on one book I have cowritten (Fejes and Dahlstedt 2014), and one book I have coedited (Fejes and Nicoll 2015) on confession, firstly outline a short genealogy of confession based on Foucault's work, and provide examples of how confession operates within education.

A Genealogy of Confession

Today's confessional practices are not a unity or a homogeneity, nor are they immutable. The purpose here is to provide a short genealogy, a historical account of lines of descent and emergence of confessional practices, in order provide one possible starting point for analyzing contemporary confessional practices as they operate in education so that they can then be looked on anew and assessed critically. Foucault's wider historical analysis of technologies of the self at different periods in the "West" aimed to demonstrate this. His analysis was not intended to construct a history of these forms, for this would be an attempt to contribute to the analysis of history as progression. Foucault suggested that techniques of confession, which focus specifically on "verbalization" of the self, emerged as practices of the human sciences. He argued that knowledge acquisition in the human sciences required this technique, so these practices and this knowledge supported the establishment of a new way of governing (Foucault 2003a). In contemporary times, therefore, confession has become "scientized" "through clinical codifications, personal examinations, histological techniques, the general documentation and data collection of personal data, the proliferation of interpretative schemas and the development of a whole host of therapeutic techniques for 'normalization'" (Besley and Peters 2007, p. 16). Verbalization has become linked to science and reinvented in practices which promise to help us live a better life. This "scientization" places confession in the interface between public and private domains, where it always requires an "other," either real or virtual, to whom one confesses (cf. Fejes and Dahlstedt 2014; Foucault 1998).

Care of the Self as a Path Toward Knowledge of the Self

In his genealogy, Foucault traced the confession back to the Ancient Greeks and the relationship between the Greek practices of "care of the self" and the Delphic statement "know yourself." During the Greco-Roman period, the latter (knowing yourself) appeared as a consequence of the former

(care of the self), where much later, the Christian concept of knowing yourself obscured “care of the self.” Self-renunciation in Christianity came to be a condition for salvation. In order to renounce the self, you had to know yourself. Foucault elaborated on how the relationship between care of the self and knowledge of the self emerged and changed during the Greco-Roman period, in contrast to practices influenced by the emergence of Christianity and the present era, which have produced different forms with distinguishable effects in terms of power relations.

During the Greco-Roman period, care of the self was a general philosophical principle. To care for the self was to make life an art object – a “*tekhnē*.” To care for the self was about existence. Care of the soul was an art, but only in so far as it involved caring for the activity of the soul and not the soul as a substance. The aim was to develop good values *in* life (as opposed to values aimed at a life after death, as occurred later in Christianity). Writing became an important technique in this endeavor. Taking notes about oneself and the activities of the day, reviewing them and keeping notebooks, was a way “to reactivate for oneself the truths one needed” (Foucault 2003a, p. 153). Through this writing, the subject became the object of the writing activity. Writing was not about knowing oneself and searching for the truth about oneself as would later be the case in Christianity. Instead, writing was about finding the truths an individual needed in order to develop good values and turn life into the art of existence.

Examination of conscience emerged within this writing activity as a technique of the Greco-Roman period. For the Stoics, this involved a self-examination of the deeds of the day. However, the writer was not looking for bad intentions. Faults were simply good intentions left undone. The focus was on remembering the truth or recovering a truth that had been forgotten, in order to be successful in one’s intentions and to develop good values in life. The subject had not forgotten himself, but had forgotten the rules of conduct and what ought to have been done. By recalling errors committed, the subject emerged in the gap between what had been done and the rules for what should have been done: “The subject

constitutes the intersection between acts that have to be regulated and rules for what ought to be done” (Foucault 2003a, p. 157). Thus, self-regulation became important in the art of living, where the focus was on the activities and deeds of the person rather than on the thoughts. Care of the self as a writing activity and an art of the self also constituted knowledge of the self in relation to these rules of conduct. As I will illustrate later, this focus is different from Christian concepts where the focus was on thoughts, verbalizing, and making sins visible.

Another stoical technique for the care of the self was known as *askesis*. *Askesis* involved drawing truth out from memory, “not a disclosure of the secret self but a remembering” (Foucault 2003a, p. 158). The truth was once more not to be found within the self, but in the teachings of the master. The master’s words were memorized and turned into rules of conduct. The aim was to make life subjective through truth and to prepare for the reality of the world (Foucault 2003a, p. 158). *Askesis* involved remembering the truth of the master as a set of rules for shaping self-care on a daily basis.

The Stoics construed care of the self as an activity that required listening and remembering rules. These activities were methods of preparing for life as an art, and ways of mastering the self. The techniques of writing, self-examination, and *askesis* were integral methods of caring for the self, through which individuals trained themselves for life.

Knowledge of the Self as a Path Toward Purity

With the emergence of Christianity in the third and fourth centuries, the relationship between care of the self and knowledge of the self was reconfigured. Aesthetics were no longer concerned with existence, but became linked to purity. The aim of caring for the self was to maintain purity. Physical integrity rather than self-regulation became important. The self was no longer something to be created (an art of living), but rather something to be renounced and deciphered. Care of the self was replaced by a requirement to know the self in terms of personal sins. In Christianity, writing became a test that

“brings into light the movements of thought, it dissipates the inner shadow where the enemy’s plots are woven” (Foucault 2003b, p. 121). In Christianity, writing was used to help individuals find the truth about themselves as a way of accessing the light, by making their inner thoughts visible to themselves (disclosing themselves). To renounce oneself one had to know oneself, and this truth was deciphered through writing. Knowing oneself, renouncing the self and one’s sins through writing as a form of purification, became the way to truth.

During early Christian times, the self was disclosed through the ritual of exomologesis: “a ritual of recognising oneself as a sinner and penitent” (Foucault 2003a, p. 162). This did not require verbalization, as the bishop imposed the status of penitent on the individual. Through this ritual, the status of the sinner was made public and confirmed. Thus, exomologesis was a status rather than an act. During the fourth century, Foucault identified a practice of “exagoreusis,” which had emerged in monastic orders as a distinctive verbal practice for disclosing the self, requiring purity of thought. Exagoreusis was a form of self-examination related to two principles of Christian spirituality: obedience and contemplation. Obedience for the monk involved total obedience to the rules and to the master, while contemplation concerned an obligation of the monk to turn thoughts continuously to God and to ensure the heart was sufficiently pure to see God. There was only one way to discriminate between good and bad thoughts: “to tell all thought to our director, to be obedient to our master in all things, to engage in the permanent verbalisation of all our thoughts” (Foucault 2003a, p. 166). Confession was a mark of truth and allowed the master to discriminate between good and evil. Even if the master did not respond, “the fact that the thought has been expressed will have an effect of discrimination” (Foucault 2003a, p. 167). This was therefore a confession involving sacrifice of the self through a permanent contemplation of God.

There is a big difference between exomologesis and exagoreusis. Their common element involves the fact that a person cannot make a disclosure without renunciation. In

exomologesis, “the sinner must ‘kill’ himself through ascetic macerations . . . disclosure of the self is the renunciation of one’s own self” (Foucault 2003a, p. 167). In exagoreusis, the self constantly verbalizes itself and obeys the master; renouncing oneself and one’s own will to the extent that it has no expression. Foucault described exomologesis as the “ontological temptations of Christianity” and exagoreusis as the “epistemological temptation of Christianity.” While the former positioned the ontological being as a sinner, the latter considered the self in constant search of self-knowledge (cf. Taylor 2010). Exomologesic and exagoreusic practices continued until the seventeenth century. However, Foucault (2003a) considered the relationship between the disclosing self and the drama of verbalizing renunciation of the self to have been important throughout Christianity.

With the emergence of the human sciences in the seventeenth and eighteenth century, confession was once again reshaped. The focus shifted to knowledge of the self and verbalizing this knowledge without renouncing the self. The aim was now to build a new and improved self. With this, a different type of rationality of governing emerged, aiming to shape and foster subjects, simultaneously governing themselves and others through the conduct of conduct (Foucault 2007).

Confession, Education and an Alternative Form of Critique

Confessional practices emerge today as a new alignment in the exercise of productive force said to be necessary to the maintenance and productivity of education, learning, and societies. These practices operate as technology in the conduit or channeling of power in a particular way that makes the innermost thoughts of the learner available for correction and the possibility of their internalization as specific forms of practice of self-scrutiny. The discursive regime as apparatus of education and learning may be fragmented but alliances of power operate strategically. They operate through actions relating one person to an “other”; one confessing and one receiving that

confession in attempts at shaping the self and others. These techniques support new modes of governing people, in part through scientific knowledge of education and learning that has emerged to inform and support them.

Such operations can, e.g., be seen in practices of the examination. Through an examination students are objectified, compared, ranked, and finally graded. But students are also, through examinations in the shape of logbooks and self-evaluations etc., required to scrutinize who they are and how they behave and to disclose this to others, may it be teachers, students, or an virtual other in the form of the “norm.” In doing so, students are both shaping themselves, as being shaped by others. Similar operation can be seen within the frames of cognitive behavioral programs in school. Here, techniques such as providing students with a “heart” when they have done something good are used. Students are asked to evaluate and scrutinize themselves and their behavior during the lesson and make this public to the class by saying if they deserve a heart or not, and thus the confession is at play. So, if confession is widespread in education, why do we need this kind of analysis?

The confession can be connected up with Foucault’s notions of an alternative form of critique as a way of life and mode of existence through practices of the self (Fejes and Nicoll 2015), allows the possibility for alternatives to a modern art of critique which allows us to think that we know what we do through it. It allows the raising of questions of the productive and limiting effects of processes of governmentalization and the exercise of power through practices and knowledge that education and learning entails. Once we start with the assumption we are caught up in such processes, questions arise about the politics of this and what this does.

By analyzing how confession operates, the focus is not to offer a scientific truth or knowledge. Rather it is about putting aside questions of the truth or otherwise of confession as technology in education by examining what goes on in specific sites where it is taken up as practice, so as to consider the power and politics of this. The focus is directed on the power relations involved and

thus the politics of this knowledge and these practices. This is to acknowledge that there are limits to the methods of the production of scientific knowledge, in that they preclude exploration of the effects of power in constituting or shaping practices and knowledge of “selves.” The efforts are tactical in focus – they are partial, incomplete, fragmentary analyses of what is going on *in terms* of power. In this they are political and discursive acts. They construct knowledge of a sort to act as “monsters on the prowl” (Fejes and Dahlstedt 2014), at the margins of pedagogical discourses. These are not “antiscience” or against science, but are analyses that sit in contrast to scientific investigations. They sit on the margins of the field of study of education contributing a different kind of analysis and critical starting point for questions. They are monsters in their potential to open a field of possibility for practices. For, they implicate the field by questioning whether teachers, researchers and politicians, and parents know what they do, and is done, through a science of learning-to-learn and its associated discourses for the constitution of the self through confession in teaching and learning.

Conclusion

A focus on confession extends research resources for exploring detail in practices of education and learning. This is an experimentation, in ways to extend and challenge thinking. To simply ask: what does a technology of confession in education and learning do to ourselves and societies (cf. Fejes and Dahlstedt 2014)? By putting aside questions of the veracity or otherwise of a teaching and learning technique (whether or not it works), it is possible to examine the detail of what goes on in sites where the “confessional” is taken up as practice.

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Foucault's Work in Philosophy and History of Education, Reception and Influence of

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In its relentlessly critical mode, Foucault's philosophy challenged most of the boundaries that circumscribe traditional disciplinary fields and their methodological approaches. Either in spite of those challenges or because of them, Foucault's work has been taken up in a startling array of intellectual fields ranging from philosophy and history to social work, religion, and education.

Foucault refused to advocate specific political agendas or methodological directives for intellectual inquiry. He also discouraged readers from following his lead: "What the intellectual can do is to provide instruments of analysis. ...But as for saying, 'Here is what you must do!,' certainly not" (Foucault 1980, p. 62).

Although Foucault seldom referred to Nietzsche explicitly in his writings, Foucault did declare that the impact of Nietzsche's writings

on his philosophy was profound. For example, Nietzsche's philosophy is like Foucault's in that it does not follow in the tradition of a modern quest for truth. Like Nietzsche's, Foucault's philosophy is meant to galvanize readers, not just inform them. Following Nietzsche, Foucault called his own later historical work genealogy. We can also see Nietzsche's influence in Foucault's poetic use of language and in his historical approach to political problematization.

Foucault's Reception in Educational Research

Foucault's philosophy, his concepts, theories, and histories have been appropriated to serve in multiple and contradictory projects in educational studies. The magnitude of disagreement is so great that it would be appalling if it were not also appropriate to Foucault's philosophy.

In the field of educational studies, British educational sociologist Stephen J. Ball edited the first collection of essays explicitly engaging the work of Foucault in education. Published in 1990, *Foucault and Education* contains chapters written by nine educationists from Australia, Canada, Great Britain, and New Zealand. In their analyses of educational issues, these chapters draw primarily from Foucault's book *Discipline and Punish*. In 1996, James Marshall, educational philosopher originally from New Zealand and contributor to the earlier Ball anthology, published *Michel Foucault: Personal Autonomy and Education*. This book focuses on the philosophical issues of humanism and offers an elegant analysis of Foucault's relationship to enlightenment commitments. In 1998, *Foucault's Challenge* was published, extending Ball's previous work on Foucault in educational studies. This volume, edited by Thomas Popkewitz and Marie Brennan, brings together authors from Australia, India, New Zealand, and the United States. Contributors to this book draw from many of Foucault's works. The chapters range from interpretations of Foucault's work to applications in such fields as political science and literary criticism. In 2004 another anthology appeared entitled *Dangerous*

Coagulations?. Editors Bernadette Baker and Katy Heyning selected for this volume papers from the inauguration of the Foucault and Education Special Interest Group of the American Educational Research Association. Also in the field of education, Michael Peters and Tina Besley published two books on Foucault: *Why Foucault? New Directions in Educational Research* and *Subjectivity & Truth: Foucault, Education, and the Culture of the Self*. Since the 1990s, Foucault's work has been taken up across a broad spectrum of projects in educational philosophy and theory (Fendler 2010).

The authoritative compilation of Foucault's shorter works is *Dit et Écrits*, edited by Daniel Defert and François Ewald, published by Gallimard originally in four volumes (1994) and later in two volumes (2001). The authoritative anthology of commentary is *Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics* (1982), edited by Hubert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow. Foucault's lectures from the Collège de France have been translated by Graham Burchell and are being published in book form by St. Martin's Press.

Foucault's Contributions to Philosophy of Education

At the most general level, Foucault's work challenged all the prevailing traditions of modern critical theories of education including Marxism, phenomenology, existentialism, psychoanalysis, and structuralism. Foucault's philosophical position with respect to prevailing critical theories changed in his various writings. However, eventually, and in an unrelenting sense, Foucault's philosophy can be read as a critique of critical theories in education.

Foucault's Philosophy of Power

Foucault's theory of power contrasts with modern and Marxian theories in which power inequities are categorical and structural. For example, from the perspective of modern structuralism, we would be inclined to see the teacher as more powerful and the students as less powerful because of their respective institutional roles. However, Foucault's theory of power is discursive

and not structural. That means we can analyze exercises of power not in terms of institutional roles, but rather in terms of what people say and how people act. For Foucault, power is not something that people have; power is something that people exercise in practice.

Foucault proposed a theory that distinguishes power from domination. Domination is a relationship in which one party has no options (e.g., an infant or a shackled prisoner). In contrast, power is a relationship in which both parties have at least some options. Foucault outlined several modalities of power that are exercised in democracies including disciplinary, bio-power, and pastoral power.

Foucault's pastoral power is relevant to educational philosophy because the concept helps us see ways people who are taking care of us are also exercising power. The care may be benevolent, rational, and healthy, and it is also an exercise of power. Pastoral power helps us to see that a democratic citizen is a particular kind of person. If we participate in a democracy, we are expected to govern ourselves in ways that are recognizable to others. There are many ways of behaving that are not acceptable in a democracy. Our definitions for being good people are aligned with democratic definitions of what it means to be normal. There is a limit to the diversity that is tolerated in our democratic systems, and there is a tacit model for the kind of behavior that is valued in the society. That model is a product of power relations, however benevolent or well intentioned.

Critical Theory, Post-structuralism, and Postmodernism

Much critical theory in educational research is derived from Marxian philosophies of social justice. In contrast, Foucault's philosophy was framed in terms of discourse, a critique of the Marxian concept of ideology. In that way, Foucault's work can be understood as a critique of critical theory. There is no agreement about classifying Foucault's philosophy in terms of either structuralism or post-structuralism. Both intellectual movements are components in the philosophical context of Foucault's work.

Some scholars think that Foucault's early books (*Madness and Civilisation*, *The Birth of the Clinic*, and *The Order of Things*) are structuralist. Foucault's theories share with structuralism the conviction that thought cannot be separated from language (see White 1973, pp. 23–54). At the same time, there are other factors that argue against classifying Foucault's work – even his early books – as structuralist. For one thing, Foucault explicitly denied that his work was structuralist.

The term post-structuralism is derived from linguistics and anthropology; the term postmodernism is derived from architecture and the arts. Postmodernism departs from Modernism. Modernist architecture is exemplified by the work of the Bauhaus school, which began in Germany in 1919. Famous modernist architects are Le Corbusier, Ludwig Mies van der Rohe, and Walter Gropius. The characteristics of modernist art and architecture are functional design, the lack of ornamentation and decoration, and simplicity in form. One way to think about the concept behind modernist architecture is “the bare necessities.” A modernist style of design includes the bare functional necessities of a building and eliminates anything that might be added for aesthetic purposes only. Modernism, like modern philosophy, is associated with industrialism, efficiency, rationality, and functionality.

Just as post-structuralism follows from structuralism, postmodernism follows from modernism. And just as post-structuralism takes many diverse paths away from structuralism, postmodernism also takes many diverse paths away from modernism. Postmodernism is not just one thing; it is many different things. Postmodern movements are generally those that reject modernist qualities of coherence, rationality, objectivity, linear hierarchy, and organization.

Foucault himself rejected the label of “post-modernist”; in fact, he claimed (provocatively and playfully) that he did not know what “post-modern” meant. However, since Foucault's philosophy departs so radically from modern philosophy in its aim and method, it is easy to see why Foucault is considered by many people to be a postmodern thinker.

Governmentality in Educational Philosophy and Theory

One of the most generative Foucaultian contributions for educational philosophy and theory is his concept of power-knowledge. By studying the historical power dynamics that shape what we call knowledge, Foucault's theories have been used to shed light on the production of knowledge and the histories and processes by which various curricula have been created, aligned, revised, legitimated, and rejected.

In educational theory, Foucault's concept of governmentality has been influential in discussions of power relations in schooling and around issues such as critical pedagogy and possibilities for freedom in schools. In their wonderful introduction, Barry et al. (1996) summarize Foucault's thinking about freedom this way:

The possibilities for liberal forms of freedom may historically depend upon the exercise of discipline. Freedom, in a liberal sense, should thus not be equated with anarchy, but with a kind of well-regulated and ‘responsibilized’ liberty. (p. 8)

As this quotation illustrates, rather than opposing government and freedom, the notion of governmentality emphasizes that practices of freedom are themselves a form of governance. Governmentality is a term that allows us to talk about the norms by which we govern ourselves as free people. Governmentality is neither a bad thing nor a good thing.

Rather than regarding governmentality as a kind of power to be resisted in education, we can understand governmentality as a lens through which we recognize ourselves and the ways we behave. Thus it is more difficult to disclaim ethical responsibility for our own actions, that is, we cannot so easily say, “It is because of the system that I act this way. It's not my fault. There are dominant social and political forces at work.” The lens of governmentality leads us to question – not to deny – the degree to which our actions have been dictated by social norms. At the same time, through the lens of governmentality, it is also more difficult to claim individual autonomy for our actions, that is, we cannot so easily say, “I have agency that allows me to resist the forces of domination. I am capable of acting independently,

and I can take responsibility for my own actions.” Governmentality supports neither State control nor individual autonomy. For Foucault, governmentality, like genealogy, serves a critical – provocative – function. It does not tell us which perspective is “true,” but serves to undermine the individual-versus-State dichotomy and replace it with a perspective in which we understand freedom to be regulated by power relations and power relations to be defined in the context of freedom and discipline. This perspective, then, serves as a basis for us to be skeptical and critical every time we hear allegations of blame and responsibility that attempt to explain problems with the educational system, students, or teachers.

Foucault's critical philosophy can help us to reconsider what we know about the various purposes of schooling. Comparative education researchers and educational historians have shown a wide variety of purposes of schooling in different places and times, including social reproduction, vocational preparation, social assimilation, upward mobility, credentialism, and preparation for democratic participation. Those are debatable purposes and contentious issues in education, and they are all thinkable.

Foucault's philosophy invites us to consider what is not thinkable. For example, we might imagine that the purpose of schooling is to intensify our experience of pleasure as we eat, dance, make love, and listen to music. The idea that schools – including curriculum, pedagogy, and assessments – would be designed to cultivate our capacities for pleasure does not really make sense, and the strangeness of the idea is a product of governmentality – or how we govern ourselves in the name of normalcy. Foucault's work incites us to ask instead: What would a primary grade curriculum look like if the purpose of schooling were to cultivate enjoyment of life? How would we design a lesson plan to teach children to be more fun loving?

Foucault's Approach to Educational Historiography

Just as some philosophers do not consider Foucault to be a philosopher, some historians do not

consider Foucault to be a historian. The reasons for both are similar: Foucault's work challenged the rules of research in both philosophy and history.

Archaeology is the study of a cross section of artifacts in a particular time. It is unlike mainstream history because it analyzes a variety of artifacts in one time period rather than tracing the development of one thing over a period of years. The term *episteme* was used to refer to the knowledge system in a particular time. The episteme is the pattern that can be seen across various disciplines like economics, linguistics, and science. An episteme forms the basis for distinguishing scientific from non-scientific:

I would define the episteme retrospectively as the strategic apparatus which permits of separating out from among all the statements which are possible those that will be acceptable within, I won't say a scientific theory, but a field of scientificity, and which it is possible to say are true or false. The episteme is the 'apparatus' which makes possible the separation, not of the true from the false, but of what may from what may not be characterised as scientific. (1980, p. 197)

Foucault's use of the term genealogy is usually distinguished from archaeology. However, by most reckonings, genealogies are based on archaeologies. While archaeology works to understand how artifacts fit together in a historical moment, genealogy works to figure out what kind of people would fit into that set of artifacts. Foucault's genealogies are generally based on archaeological-type studies. That is, he examined a cross section of artifacts (archaeology) and then asked questions such as: what kind of people would live in such a way?

Foucault's approach to history does not try to be objective, but rather it aims to be a critical history of the present. This does not mean that Foucault wrote history in flagrant disregard of facts. Rather, the focus and emphasis of his historical analysis were shaped by concerns about the present, including the role of chance in human lives. As he wrote, the job of genealogy is to restore chance to its rightful place in history. Recognizing that reason has been one of the disciplinary technologies of modern societies, Foucault repeatedly reminded us that much of history

cannot be explained by anything other than “the iron hand of necessity shaking the dice-box of chance” (Nietzsche’s *Dawn* cited in Foucault 1998, p. 381). Foucault celebrated the role of chance in history because chance defies determinism; chance makes change easier to imagine. If we do not think of history as proceeding in some inevitable or predictable manner, then history is not so deterministic, and it is easier for us to imagine that things might be different in the future.

Implications for Teaching: Exemplary Critique

One path of insight into Foucault’s philosophical project is to look at it in terms of pedagogical theory. In pedagogical theory we can analyze teaching as being comprised of three roles: provider, facilitator, and model. Most teaching includes all three roles, and different teachers may favor one role over the others at different times for different purposes. We can classify Foucault’s philosophy as being most closely related to modeling or “teaching by example.”

People who are not educators may not recognize facilitating or modeling as important aspects of teaching. Noneducators often perceive lecturing as “real” teaching; teaching equals telling. Along the same lines, some readers tend to assume that the role of philosophy is to provide solutions for problems and guidelines for action. Modern and analytic philosophies are regularly written in the form of lectures, and they can be classified as expository in genre. We expect philosophy to provide us with information, principles, and evaluations, just as we expect teachers to provide us with information, principles, and evaluations.

But Foucault’s philosophy does more than provide us with information; it also provokes questions and models the exercise of freedom. By means of provocative devices, Foucault’s philosophy facilitates our ability to think critically. By means of its poetic devices, Foucault’s work excites our imaginations and disconcerts our expectations. When Foucault problematized the

foundations of modern philosophy – including reason and the search for truth – Foucault was practicing an ethical life. His philosophy does not explain to us how we can be free, and it does not try to persuade us to resist dominant forces. Foucault does not enjoin us to “do as I say.” In fact, he does quite the opposite; he entreats us not to follow him. Foucault’s philosophy offers us a model – an example – of one person’s striving to live an ethical life of critical proportions. We can take it or leave it.

Genealogy cannot legislate autonomy for us, it recognizes no grounds on which such an act of legislation could be secured, but it can (and does) exemplify its commitment to the value of freedom in the form of its reflection on our present (Owen 1995, p. 492). As a form of exemplary critique, genealogy is itself an act of transgression. In sum, legislative critique is like direct instruction; it teaches by telling and bestows agency. Exemplary critique is like modeling; it teaches by example, and it embodies agency.

Conclusion

Analytic philosophers understand Foucault’s logical arguments and ethical formulations, but they often disregard his focus on clinical practices or the poetry of his language. Writers in rhetorical studies and literature may focus on the poetry and his exemplary mode of persuasion, but tend to ignore the details about obscure practices in psychiatric hospitals. Historians can relate to the meticulous empirical archival work in Foucault’s studies, but they may be put off by his refusal to look at history objectively or to draw causal inferences connecting historical events.

With all these different characterizations and criticisms of Foucault’s work, how are we to decide what Foucault really meant? This is a clear question, but unfortunately, for any discussion of Foucault’s work, it does not have a clear answer. When we read about all the different ways Foucault’s work has been received in educational philosophy and theory, it is helpful to remember the characteristics of Foucault’s philosophy as provocative, problematizing, and poetic. The

objective is not to arrive at certainty about the truth, but rather to seize the opportunity to think our lives afresh.

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Fractal

► [Deleuze, Ontology, and Mathematics](#)

Frankena's Model for Analyzing Philosophies of Education

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Synonyms

[Aims of education](#); [Analysis](#); [Analytic philosophy of education](#); [Normative philosophy of education](#); [Practical syllogism](#); [Values](#)

Introduction

William Frankena (1966) has suggested a model for analyzing philosophies of education based on practical syllogism which goes back to Aristotle. Even though the deductive method in philosophy of education was the subject of attacks, Frankena's model has been influential as it has been appealed to in religious education studies (e.g., Cohen 2010), applied branches of education (e.g., Martin 2011), as well as philosophical reflection on education (e.g., Covalleski 2007). Frankena's model helps students to analyze philosophies of education and acquire a proper understanding of values education (Litke 1976), teacher education (Ainsworth and Johnson 2005), and workplace education (Hager 1999).

Frankena's Model

According to Frankena (1956/1969), there have been three types of philosophizing called speculative, normative, and analytical. In the speculative activity, one attempts to combine scientific findings with the results of moral, aesthetic, and religious experiences to present a picture of the world and humans' position in it in a way that it provides a meaning for human life. In the normative activity, the aim is to determine goals, norms, and standards for human personal and social behavior to orient human beings' actions. Finally, in analytical or critical activity, the aim is to analyze and explore the concepts, assumptions, and methods used by philosophers, scientists, and ordinary people.

Therefore, Frankena talks of three research methods in philosophy of education. By considering education as a discipline, he takes the philosophy of education to be a philosophy of the discipline of education. Then, he divides this discipline into three parts:

1. The experimental science of education that deals with real things.
2. The normative part of education that is concerned with educational and management goals and advices.

3. The analytical part that analyzes the concepts related to experimental science of education (such as intelligence) and the concepts discussed in the normative part (e.g., justice), and explores the methods for justifying the advices given in these parts.

Philosophy's relation to these parts becomes somehow clear because the three activities mentioned by Frankena respond to these three parts. The studies in philosophy of education are, in fact, connecting or utilizing philosophy in the respected parts of education as it is explained below.

In the light of the first part of philosophical activities and education, it can be said that theoretical philosophical activities can affect the experimental science of education; for instance, the image by which humans are presented can be used as an assumption in education. Frankena holds that as far as the empirical science of education is dependent on philosophical assumptions, it is in fact philosophical in nature (Frankena 1969, p. 289).

In the second part, on the normative activity in philosophy and the science of education, the relation of philosophy and education is apparent as well, because the normative view in philosophy can be used in the normative issues of education, in a way that Frankena believes that the normative part of education is nothing but a branch of normative philosophy. He considers this part as "the heart of philosophy of education" (p. 289). In his opinion, the method used in this part of the philosophy of education is practical syllogism. In this method, two premises are combined to achieve a conclusion in the form of a normative advice related to aims or methods of education: one normative premise obtained from, for instance, the philosophy of ethics and a factual or realistic one obtained from the common sense, science, or philosophy. Frankena presents the following example. Any kind of advice on religious education in schools is dependent, on the one hand, on the goals of education related to the moral or social philosophy (the normative premise), and on the other hand, it is dependent on the credibility of the religious beliefs and the significance of religious teachings (the realistic premise).

Finally, in the third part, concerned with the analytical activity in philosophy as well as education, the relation between philosophy and education can be seen in using the methods of philosophical analysis in educational concepts.

Therefore, in Frankena's opinion, three kinds of research can be carried out in the philosophy of education:

1. A theoretical research that attempts to provide assumptions concerning the human beings and the world in relation to the process of education.
2. A normative research on goals, principles, and methods that can be used in the education.
3. An analytical research that aims at explaining the concepts used in education.

Frankena holds that from among these three, only the second one, the normative research, is the heart of education. In this type of research, a practical syllogism is used.

However, it is worth mentioning in passing that Frankena takes the theoretical syllogism as the proper method in relation to the first type of research. A theoretical syllogism contains two declarative premises and one declarative conclusion. When philosophers of education reach a declarative conclusion, they provide scientists of education with negative heuristics that prevent them from following hypotheses that are incompatible with that conclusion as well as with positive heuristics that encourage them to pursue the hypotheses compatible with it.

Although Frankena (1956) had previously suggested three kinds of philosophies of education, in his later article (Frankena 1966), without mentioning the theoretical research, divides the philosophies of education into two major kinds: normative and analytical. Frankena's main attempt is to show how one can analyze the normative philosophies of education. Hence, he holds that his work is itself an analytical one: "Since I am here seeking to show how to analyze a philosophy of education, this essay is itself an example of analytical philosophy of education" (Frankena 1966, p. 8).

Frankena suggests a model for this purpose. The first notion discussed in this model is that

there are two types of propositions required in the normative philosophies of education: normative and factual. Normative propositions, which are prescriptive, are themselves of three types:

1. Propositions related to the fundamental goals and principles of education.
2. Propositions related to the knowledge, skills, or viewpoints that should be formed during education.
3. Propositions related to the methods and practical procedures that should be used in education.

On the other hand, the factual propositions concerning the relations between things are of two types:

1. Propositions that indicate what kinds of knowledge, skills, or viewpoints are required to achieve the fundamental goals or for following the basic principles.
2. Propositions that indicate the required methods for acquiring the abovementioned kinds of knowledge, skills, or viewpoints.

Factual propositions can consist of explanatory hypotheses, psychological theories, experimental findings, predictions, etc. They can also consist of epistemological, metaphysical, or theological propositions. In addition, there might be some analytical points beside each one of the five types of propositions. Based on these five types of propositions, three types of normative philosophies of education are possible.

The first type is more philosophical and general in which the details are left to the educationists. In this type, the structure of philosophy of education is a combination of normative propositions of the abovementioned first or the second type, on the one hand, and a factual proposition of the first type on the other hand. In this combination, the premises include a normative proposition of the first type and a factual proposition of the first type and the conclusion is a normative proposition of the second type. For instance, in Aristotelian philosophy of education, the two premises and the conclusion are as follows:

- (a) The main goal of education is to have a good life including inherently valuable activities such as thinking and reflection (A normative proposition of the first type).
- (b) A good life is achieved through dispositions such as moderation, practical wisdom, and knowledge of mathematics, physics, and philosophy (A factual proposition).
- (c) To achieve the good life, dispositions such as moderation, practical wisdom, and knowledge of mathematics, physics, and philosophy should be cultivated (A normative proposition of the second type).

The second type of normative philosophies of education is less philosophical, since the starting point of this type is the list of knowledge, skills, and attitudes that should be cultivated in individuals, while this list is not obtained from a deduction like before, rather it might be borrowed from a philosophical work, it might come from eclectic sources, or merely what the society or the government requires. This kind of philosophies of education has a structure that is a combination of two normative propositions of the second or the third type and a factual proposition of the second type. In this combination, the premises include the normative proposition of the second type and the factual proposition. The following is an example for the second type of philosophy of education:

- (a) Mathematics is a branch of knowledge that its disposition should be cultivated in individuals.
- (b) The method X is effective or helpful in teaching mathematics.
- (c) To cultivate mathematical disposition in individuals, the method X should be used.

The third type of normative philosophies of education has a perfect or complete form that combines the two former types. In Frankena's opinion, to understand a philosophy of education fully, one should follow these steps:

1. One must first look to see what dispositions it says education should foster (Box C).

2. Next, one must try to determine the rationale given to show that education should foster those dispositions. To do this one must:
 - (a) See what its basic normative premises are – its basic values, principles, or ends (Box A).
 - (b) See what factual premises are brought in (implicitly or explicitly), empirical, theological, or philosophical (Box B).
 - (c) See how these go together to make a line of argument of the ABC pattern to show that the dispositions listed I should be cultivated.
- (3) Then one should look for recommendations about ways and means of teaching, administering, etc. (Box E)
- (4) Fourthly, one must seek to discover the rationales for these recommendations. To do this one must:
 - (a) See what factual statements based on observation and experience are brought in (possibly borrowed from psychology, etc.) (Box D).
 - (b) See if any premises from Boxes A or B are used here.
 - (c) See how these go together to make a line of argument (or a battery of separate arguments) to show that the ways and means recommended should be used in the cultivation of the dispositions listed (Pattern CDE).
5. All along, of course, one should notice any definitions or bits of analysis that occur and see how they fit into the discussion (Frankena 1966: 13). (Boxes A–E)

Using The Model for Analysis

Frankena's model is very useful in analyzing philosophies of education. In this model, the fundamental goals or values are the basis of the chain of syllogisms that follow them but they are not the subject of justification themselves. Frankena, of course, alludes that in providing reasons for why the fundamental goals should be followed, different views bring about some philosophical premises into the structure of argument but he does not see these premises logically necessary:

It is in this part of a philosophy of education that epistemological, ontological, and theological premises most often appear, but they are not logically necessary. What *is* logically required is, first, some normative premises stating basic goals or principles...and second, factual claims stating that certain dispositions are conducive to the achievement of those goals or to the following of those principles...(Frankena 1966, p. 10)

Thus, what is important for Frankena as the first step is to give some basic premises about the fundamental values. However, it is a serious question to ask while methods of education or dispositions to be cultivated need to be justified, why should the fundamental goals be taken beyond justification? In answering this question, one might state that in Aristotelian practical syllogism, which is presupposed by Frankena, it is envisaged that the practical reason is concerned with the means to goals not goals themselves. This notion is based on the interpretation of some of Aristotle's writings in which he has said that the practical reason is for thinking about means not goals (Aristotle 1925, 1145a5-6) or reflection is for means not goals (Aristotle 1925, 1112b13, 1112b34-35).

However, this interpretation is controversial. Some (e.g., Dahl 1984, p. 39) believe that Aristotle has taken some roles for practical reason in relation to goals as he states: "If therefore to have deliberated well is a characteristic of prudent men, deliberative excellence must be correctness of deliberation with regard to what is expedient as a means to the end, a true conception of which constitutes prudence" (Aristotle, 1142b31-34). Therefore, the practical reason would play a role in determining the goals as well as using the suitable means to reach these goals. According to Dahl (p. 42), in Aristotle's view, the role of the practical reason in determining the goals is played by inductive reasoning, through which the reason uses its experiences of good deeds as especial cases to reach a generalization and an understanding of virtues, as it is mentioned in some cases (Aristotle, 1143a35-b5).

Thus, it seems that a further and more preliminary practical syllogism should be added to Frankena's model in order to justify the

fundamental goals. This preliminary syllogism would be like this:

- I ought to live and be alive.
- Being alive requires having a good life (as a bad life destroys the life altogether).
- Therefore, I ought to have a good life.

Again, a further syllogism might be needed to show what a good life requires.

- I ought to have a good life.
- A good life requires having permanent goals.
- Therefore, I ought to have permanent goals.

For making clear what is a permanent goal, as Frankena stated, philosophical premises arrive at; however, contrary to what he holds, these are necessary for arriving at a conclusion which plays a vital role in choosing a philosophy of education.


As it is clear, the conclusion of the last syllogism was the final stage in Frankena's chain of syllogisms back from methods of education through the required dispositions. By the added syllogisms, we take some further steps to reach the fundamental goals. The premises of these practical syllogisms again include a normative and a factual proposition. The first normative proposition includes an "ought" in relation to answering the humans beings' essential needs. This might be called the fundamental "ought." This proposition is the most fundamental "ought" of the living human beings, the response to which gives rise to human endeavors. In other words, there is no more fundamental purpose for humans than what is stated in this proposition, therefore, it can be said that this value is the most fundamental one for humans. It should be especially noted that in practical syllogisms, there might be a question concerning the conclusion of the syllogism to be taken whether as a "hypothetical imperative" or as a "categorical imperative." If the conclusion is hypothetical, it is not required to be carried out and one only carries it out when one decides to do it. However, when the fundamental "ought" comes into consideration, the conclusion would be decisive and unavoidable.

However, some believe that a practical syllogism as a practical inference should not contain

premises consisting of psychological states such as demands and needs, because inference should be valid and validity lies within the purely logical relations. For instance, Gem Anscombe (2005) in criticizing G. H. Von Wright has stated that there is no difference between practical and theoretical syllogism and both should contain descriptive propositions in order to be valid based on the logical necessity of truth relationship ($p, p \rightarrow q: q$). Therefore, she holds that practical syllogism should not contain premises consisting of individual demands and needs, except the ones that express something peripheral that does not affect the functionality of the logical inference. As Anscombe states, setting a goal is required in practical syllogisms, however, propositions related to the goal cannot be considered as the essential premises for the syllogism. She mentions the following example:

- Everyone who intends to kill their parents should get rid of this intention by meeting a psychiatrist.
- I intend to kill my parents.
- If I meet up with a psychiatrist, I would get rid of this intention.
- A is a psychiatrist.
- Then, I will meet up with A.

Anscombe means that the expressed intention in the second proposition plays no role in the logical validity of the inference and it is in fact, a historical notion. The only thing that is logically significant is the truth relationship. Von Wright (Schipf and Hahn 1989) points out two notions in his response. First, practical syllogisms express the necessary means for goals, not any means that accidentally might result in achieving the goals. Therefore, the necessity of the goal is transferred to the means as well, making them necessary too. He believes that Kant also agrees with this notion, since Kant holds that anyone who wants to reach a goal will want the means that are inevitably related to that goal and are at their access. Second, one should not restrict the acceptable logical relationships to relations of truth among propositions because in that case there would be no doxastic logic, of the sort we have got today, in which the logical relations among propositions of beliefs are at stake.



Frankena's Model for Analyzing Philosophies of Education, Fig. 1

One might say that the first “ought” proposition is about a fact containing “is” and amounts to saying that: “It is the case that every human tells oneself: ‘I should have a good life.’” If so, then the normative proposition turns to be a factual one and combining this proposition with another factual proposition will prevent from achieving a normative goal. However, it should be noted that to change an “ought” proposition to an “is” proposition in this way would be like substituting a completely different proposition. Naturally, substituting another proposition will change the conclusion as well. Based on the “substitutivity principle,” only if a proposition is substituted with its equivalent, can one expect that the conclusion will remain the same. Therefore, to substitute the mentioned descriptive proposition with the prescriptive one is tantamount to assembling another syllogism; it does not mean that the previous syllogism (containing the prescriptive and descriptive propositions) does not result in a prescriptive or normative proposition (Fig. 1).

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Frankfurt School

► Critical Theory as Metatheory of Education

Frankl and the Philosophy of Moral Growth

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Synonyms

Freedom of will; Logotherapy; Meaning of life; Socratic dialogue; Therapy

Introduction

“When we are no longer able to change a situation, we are challenged to change ourselves.”

Viktor E. Frankl, Man’s Search for Meaning

The aim of logotherapy is, first of all, the moral and the spiritual growth toward meaningful life. Logotherapy was founded by Dr. Viktor Emil Frankl (1905–1997). According to Frankl, the most important issue for a human being is him/her search for the meaning of life. “Logos” is the Greek word for “spirit” and “meaning.” Thus, Frankl’s logotherapy is a meaning-centered therapy. The highest dimension of human is spiritual, but this should not to be taken as religious statement. Spirituality means human’s ability to do and express highest things in human life, like beauty, art, truth, and goodness. Spirituality can also include religion but not necessary.

Frankl called logotherapy as “education toward responsibility.” That means the responsibility for living one’s life authentically, in other words, meaningfully (Frankl 1986, p. 14). Logotherapy can be understood as method to heal somebody who has mental illness. However, this definition is correct but too narrow, because it loses the most essential idea of the logotherapy. Logotherapy is a lifelong process to grow, to learn, and to find meaning of life to be a human being. The meaning of life and being a human being are about “to serve a cause or love a person” (Frankl 2006, p. 14). Serving a cause, however, stays unclear through his writings, while the other part – love a person – is quite clear. Loving a person is connected to human being’s ability to self-transcendence: “What I see as self-transcendence is that being human always means related to or pointing to something or someone other than oneself” (Frankl 2006, p. 31). Logotherapy is different from psychoanalysis, because the methods of logotherapy are less retrospective and less introspective. It focuses on the future of a human’s life instead of past – it searches for the meaning of life.

Viktor E. Frankl as Founder of Logotherapy

Frankl was a psychiatrist and a neurologist, and also he finished his doctoral thesis on philosophy. He presents his ideas of logotherapy on his writing

Man’s Search for Meaning, which has sold over 11 million copies in over 20 different languages. The original title of Frankl’s book in German is *Ein Psychologe erlebt das Konzentrationslager*. The first part of the book describes his horrific experiences in the concentration camps, and the second part provides a basic introduction to his ideas of logotherapy. During the Second World War II, Frankl was subjected to four different concentration camps and was dehumanized to a mere number: 119,104 (Benvenista 1998). In August 1945, Frankl returns to Vienna, where he was told about the death of his wife, his mother, and his brother (Boeree 2006).

Man’s Search for Meaning is unquestionably the most important and well-known opus of Frankl. He presented logotherapy more scientifically and more widely in his book *Ärztliche Seelsorge: Grundlagen der Logotherapie und Existenzanalyse (The Doctor and the Soul)* in the year 1945. This book is also his habilitation work for the University of Vienna. Frankl published in 1966 *The Will to Meaning – Foundation and Application of Logotherapy*, which he regarded as his most systematic book in English.

Logotherapy and Human Being

Logotherapy is also known in our days as Logotherapy and Existential Analysis (LTEA). Logotherapy is called the third Viennese school of psychotherapy after the “first school” of Sigmund Freud and the “second school” of Alfred Adler. Logotherapy is an internationally acknowledged and empirically based meaning-centered approach to psychotherapy. Especially the legacy of Frankl’s logotherapy is taken care by two institutes: the Viktor Frankl Institute founded in Vienna in 1992 and Viktor Frankl Institute of Logotherapy founded in Abilene, Texas, in 1978. Some of the most notable followers and commentators of Viktor Frankl logotherapy are Elisabeth Lukas, Maria and Edward Marshall, Joseph B. Fabry, and Alexander Batthyany.

Logotherapy is called humanistic therapy, because its core question is to define what

human being is. Frankl saw reductionist understanding of human as pseudoscientist idea by which human phenomena are reduced to subhuman phenomena (Frankl 1979, p. 25; 1988, p. 85). He believed that there is no psychotherapy apart from the theory of human being. This is why logotherapy has very powerful idea of human being, and it can shortly be presented through six points:

1. The human being is an entity consisting of the body, mind, and spirit.

The first point deals with a body (soma), mind (psyche), and spirit (noos). According to Frankl, the body and mind are what we have and spirit is what we are. Frankl also developed a theory, which he called dimensional ontology. The lowest dimension is the body, the next dimension is the mind, and the highest dimension is the spirit. He saw that dimensional ontology could give some answers to the most essential problems of philosophical, the problems of freedom of the will and problems between the body and mind. However, he did not get further in this area of ontology he only repeated this possibility several times.

2. Human being's life has meaning under all circumstances, even the most miserable.

Frankl thought that this is a lesson he learned in concentration camps. Even in your last minutes before death, your life does not lose its meanings, quite the opposite.

3. All human beings have a will to meaning.

This is the major motivation for living and acting. When we see meaning, we are ready to act. This is considered to be different than our will to achieve power and pleasure.

4. Human beings have freedom under all circumstances to activate the will to find meaning.

We are free to activate our will to find meaning, and this can be done under any circumstances. This deals with the change of attitudes about unavoidable fate. Our circumstances in the world put limitations on what we can do or wish, but we always have freedom to choose our own attitude, how we relate to the circumstances.

5. Life has a demand quality to which human being must respond if decisions are to be meaningful.

The meaning of the moment is more practical in daily living than ultimate meaning. Unlike ultimate meaning, this meaning can be found and fulfilled. This can be done by following the values of society or by following the voice of our conscience.

6. The human individual is unique.

The sixth assumption deals with one's sense of meaning. This is enhanced by the realization that we are irreplaceable.

In essence, all human beings are unique with an entity of a body, mind, and spirit. We all go through unique situations and are constantly looking for finding meaning. We are free to do this at all times in response to certain demands. More widely, Frankl presents his idea of philosophical anthropology in his paper called as *Zehn Thesen über die Person*. This paper have been modified and added to the end of his opus *Ärztliche Seelsorge* edited by Alexander Batthyany (Frankl 2013; Batthyany 2013).

Three Basic Concepts of Logotherapy

Frankl is speaking through his texts three fundamental assumptions of logotherapy, which form a chain of links interconnected with one another (Frankl 1978, p. 14, 1988, p. vii, 2010, p. 72):

1. Freedom of will
2. Will to meaning
3. Meaning of life

These three basic concepts are alpha and omega of the logotherapy. We have freedom to find meaning in what we do and what we experience. This freedom makes us human beings. Frankl addresses that the most valued idea what Sartrean/Heideggerian existentialism has thought us is that human being is not a thing among other things but something quite else: "But a human being is no thing. This no-thingness, rather than nothingness, is the lesson to learn from

existentialism” (Frankl 1988, p. 6). Even when we faced with a situation of suffering, we have freedom to choose how we deal with that suffering. According to the logotherapy, humans are not fully subject to conditions but are basically free to decide and capable of taking their stance toward internal (psychological) and external (biological and social) conditions (Batthyany 2015). Freedom is here defined as the space of shaping one’s own life within the limits of the given possibilities.

The will to meaning must be understood distinctively from the will to power by Nietzsche and the will to pleasure by Freud. The will to meaning can be seen as the primary motivation of humans but not as a negative force. When humans cannot realize their “will to meaning,” they will experience an abysmal sensation of meaninglessness and emptiness. This abysmal sensation, which logotherapy calls existential frustration, can also result in neuroses. For this type of neuroses, logotherapy calls “noogenic neuroses” in contrast to neuroses in the usual sense of the word, i.e., psychogenic neuroses (Frankl 2010, p. 62). Logotherapy assists humans in perceiving and removing those factors that hinder them in pursuing meaningful goals in their lives. Humans are sensitized for the perception of meaning potentialities; however, they are not offered specific meanings. They are guided and assisted in the realization of those meaning possibilities they have detected themselves. In other words, there are no ready answers on what you should do.

Life has meaning under all circumstances, even the most miserable ones. Thus, all human lives are precious and unique. Frankl speaks a lot about the spiritual dimension of human being. He sees that it is the highest dimension of human. Although, he thinks that religion is everybody’s private thing and that the logotherapy does not make any difference between different religious. You can be Muslim, Christian, Jew (as Frankl was), or atheist and still you have this highest spiritual dimension. Frankl: “Logotherapy, as a secular theory and medical practise, must restrict itself to factual statements, leaving to the patient the decision as to understand his own being-responsible: Whether along the lines of religious

beliefs or agnostic convictions. Logotherapy must remain available for everybody. . . . in cases of atheistic patients and usable in the hands of atheistic doctors.” (Frankl 1978, pp. 23–24.)

Our main motivation for living is our will to find meaning in life. According to Frankl (2006, p. 133): “We can discover this meaning in life in three different ways: (1) by creating a work or doing a deed; (2) by experiencing something or encountering someone; and (3) by the attitude we take toward unavoidable suffering” and that “everything can be taken from a man but one thing: the last of the human freedoms – to choose one’s attitude in any given set of circumstances.” The meaning of life has nothing to do about your age, conditions, health, or abilities. It is important to realize that logotherapy does not declare or offer some general meanings of life. Rather, the question is to help people to achieve the openness and flexibility that will enable them to shape their day-to-day lives in a meaningful manner.

Paradoxical Intention, Dereflexion, and Socratic Dialogue

The main tools of logotherapy are paradoxical intention, dereflexion, and Socratic dialogue. First two methods are used also pathological cases, but it is stressed that when doing so, the environment must be safe, enclosure, and controlled. The third method Socratic dialogue can express a case of logotherapeutic session and also the main idea of the logotherapy. The idea of logotherapy is Socratic because there is no ready-made answers, but everybody must find your own questions and the answers to your own question. And at the same time, logotherapy has the answer: the meaning of life is self-transcendence to other living being, care, and love.

In paradoxical intention guided by the therapist, clients learn to overcome their obsessions or anxieties by self-distancing and humorous exaggeration, thus breaking the vicious circle of symptom.

Dereflexion is the application of human being’s will to meaning and his capacity of self-transcendence. A logotherapist sees a human

being, not basically concerned with maintaining him/her inner equilibrium by gratifying one's drives but as directed toward something other than oneself, reaching out toward other persons to meet. The patient is dereflected from his disturbance.

Dereflection is intended to counteract compulsive inclination to self-observation. Trough paradoxical intention the patient tries to ridicule his symptoms, while he learns to 'ignore' them through dereflection. (Frankl DS 255–254)

When a patient is afraid that something bad will happen to him/her, the logotherapist encourages the patient to intend or wish for precisely what she/he fears (Frankl 1978, p. 138). If you have a severe stage fright, the logotherapist might ask, what is the most horrific thing that can happen to you when you go to stage? After this, the logotherapist asks him/her to imagine this situation.

Socratic dialogue is a conversational method frequently used by logotherapists. In Socratic dialogue, the specific questions are aimed to raise the consciousness of the patient in order to provide the patient possibilities to find the meaning of one's life and give the patient freedom to fulfill his life.

In the philosophical setting, this technique of guiding by questioning was introduced by Socrates, who characterized it as a sort of "spiritual midwife." Meaning cannot be given, it must be discovered. This is why the Socratic dialogue tends to be a struggle. First, it is a struggle between a therapist and a patient, but finally it is a struggle in the search for meaning. In the final phase, the therapist steps back and makes himself/herself useless.

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- Castoriadis on Autonomy and Heteronomy
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Freire and a Pedagogy of Suffering: A Moral Ontology

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It is important to emphasize that, in speaking of “being more,” or of humanization as ontological vocation of the human being, I am not falling into any fundamentalistic position. . .

—Paulo Freire (*Pedagogy of Hope*, 2007, p. 84)

Introduction

Paulo Freire has been widely and richly studied within the fields of pedagogy, freedom, hope, oppression in terms of liberation education, and methodology (Roberts 2000, 2016, and many others). For Freire, literacy, “through which the self learns and changes” (1985, p. 6), is an effort for an individual to take control of his world (cf. Freire 1985, 2006, 2007). This is, metaphysically, a process of humanization. Freire’s educational philosophy focuses particularly on the ontological and moral nature of human beings in the struggle for liberation from economic, social, and political domination. He says in *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* (2006) that the aim of humanization is authentic liberation, which is a praxis, “reflection and action upon the world in order to transform it” (p. 51). Human beings in their ontological agency can look critically at the world and become capable of accepting the limits, transcending the contradictions, and educating each other “through the mediation of the world” (cf. p. 32).

Humanization is thus Freire’s ethical ideal (cf. Roberts 2000). Human beings, for Freire, are ontologically incomplete, always in the process of “becoming.” Likewise, the world, in which they are situated, is neither a static nor closed order, but a *given reality* which humans must accept and to which they must adjust. This given reality is resource of humans to overcome dehumanization, to create history, and to become more fully

human. The very thought of oppressed people has been conditioned by being oppressed, “by the contradictions of the concrete, existential situation by which they were shaped” (Freire 2006, p. 45). The ideal of the oppressed, Freire believes, is to be men, through recognizing the common humanity of their opponents and including them in one’s moral scope. “This is their model of humanity” (p. 45).

Confronted by such existential conditions, humans pursue their supreme value of freedom with critical agency and responsibility. According to Freire, freedom, an ideal located inside of man, is “the indispensable condition for the quest for human completion” (Freire 2006, p. 47). This ontological condition entails a motivating force for liberating action. Freire says:

In order for the oppressed to be able to wage the struggle for their liberation, they must perceive the reality of oppression not as a closed world from which there is no exit, but as a limiting situation which they can transform. (p. 49)

Such motivation thus “becomes a need, a necessity” (2007, p. 85). Freire goes on to say in his *Pedagogy of Hope* (2007), we even “invent the opportunity of setting ourselves free to the extent that we become able to perceive as unconcluded, limited, conditioned, historical beings” (p. 85). Furthermore, he emphasizes that the sheer perception is not enough and yet must be joined with “the political struggle for the transformation of the world” (p. 85).

Liberation of human beings, thus pursued constantly and responsibly, must be acquired, Freire insists, “by conquest, not by gift” (Freire 2006, p. 47). The oppressed *must* fight for their liberation in order to become more fully human, which, driven as their ontological vocation, is a form of spiritual and societal transformation. The liberation of individuals, as Freire puts it, “acquires profound meaning only when the transformation of society is achieved” (2007, p. 85). These strands of concepts, inherently interrelated in the process of the self-action, are the philosophical premises of Freire’s pedagogy of humanization.

The choice of title for this entry is to highlight the philosophical ground of Freire’s ethical ideal, humanization, vis-à-vis human suffering. Freire is

surely known best for his landmark text, *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, wherein he addresses the “sharpness and intensity” of our moral and epistemological struggle in the “limited situations,” inasmuch as that we must meet our ontological need, namely, to hope, and to be more fully human. Yet, human suffering experience, such as hunger, poverty, limitation, and oppression, is an integral part of what it is to be human, and its significance for education may not have been widely noted. In a deepest understanding of the texts, this entry points out that while most studies concentrate on his methods and techniques, Freire’s deeply rooted philosophical aspiration in metaphysics has been less examined. Taking a comparative approach to Eastern and Western perspectives, this entry examines the strong yet less explicitly studied aspect of Freire’s metaphysical and moral commitment, particularly the place of human suffering in educational transformation. It indicates that Freire’s critical pedagogies both embody and entail a human primal ontological force, invariably, for self-action, freedom, and emancipation. The entry concludes that a pedagogy of suffering, with its roots in Freire’s lived experiences, is not at all a “teaching method,” but rather an ontological challenge and possibility, calling for our moral aspirations of becoming more fully human.

The Onto-epistemological Ground for Suffering and Morality

Concern for humanization leads at once to the recognition of dehumanization, not only as an ontological possibility but as an historical reality.

—Paulo Freire (*Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, 2006, p. 43)

Freire’s philosophical position is that “both humanization and dehumanization are possibilities for a person as an uncompleted being conscious of their incompleteness” and dehumanization “is a distortion of the vocation of becoming more fully human” (Freire 2006, pp. 43, 44). Human beings have an ability to react existentially and transcendently to their circumstances and therefore are bound to hope for freedom and

transformation. The oppressed discover that “without freedom they cannot exist authentically” (p. 48). For Freire, oppressed people are affected by being submerged in the situation of oppression, so they have “fear of freedom.” Therefore, it is necessary to develop a critical consciousness in the oppressed, so that they can see outside themselves, understand their situation, and begin to think about their world. This happens, Freire believes, through dialogue in education. The basic message of *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* is to affirm that it is humans’ responsibility to react thoughtfully and positively to their circumstances.

This is, Freire says, “not just a question of grit or courage. It’s an ontological dimension of our human condition” (Freire 1998, p. 47). Here, Freire’s philosophical ground is necessarily humans’ ontological possibility, their potential for accepting and transcending their existential conditions, particularly their suffering situations, such as oppression, affliction, despair, and sadness. One of humans’ obvious advantages is their capacity to go beyond the factors of conditioning. Suffering and hope are the two intrinsic notions in understanding Freirean critical consciousness. Hope is generated, as Freire asserts, in the process of reflecting on pains and suffering (Roberts 2016, pp. 53, 55–56, 58, 63). This process, seeking for critical understanding of the existential condition, is, in Freire’s own expression, “the unmasking of the ‘why’ of my experience of suffering” (2007, p. 23). With this new understanding, one can “engage in a political struggle for the transformation of the concrete conditions in which the oppression prevails” (p. 23). As such, critical consciousness and dialectical recognition of thought and action are ways to reclaim humanity and to become humanized (cf. Chen 2012, pp. 53–78). Humanity can be attained, or “regained,” in Freire’s assertion, through transforming action, such as self-action, self-overcoming, and liberating, so that a new situation can be created. Humans’ onto-epistemological possibilities can thus be enhanced from and through suffering (cf. Roberts 2016, pp. 75, 77, 81; Chen 2012, pp. 138–159).

An ontological reading of Daoist and Confucian traditions can accommodate Freire’s

ontological and epistemological possibilities. In a hope of wakening humanity, Laozi wanted people to awaken themselves first. “Truly,” Laozi said, “the greatest gift you have to give is that of your own self-transformation” (cf. *Dao De Jing*, 2006). Similar to Freire’s humanizing vocation of becoming more fully human, the ethical ideal for Laozi rests on human inner power, the ontological force inherent in Nature (or cosmos), which leads humanity to moral attainments. For Laozi, individuals are capable of realizing their authentic *de* (virtue) to the full, in that the idea of an authentic ontological core assures the possibility of attaining wisdom – Aristotelian *phronesis* (practical knowledge). In its very nature, humanization, living though lived experiences, is restored.

Freire’s onto-epistemological consciousness of human conditions suggests possible ethical meanings of human suffering. This sort of ethical understanding manifests the acts of consciousness, representing the response of a creative mind and sensitive conscience to the extraordinary misery and suffering of the oppressed around him. Mengzi, one of the key thinkers of Confucianism, insisted that the recognition of suffering for all sentient beings is a reason for action (cf. Mengzi 2006). Similar to Freire’s calling for developing critical consciousness in the oppressed, Mengzi’s need for such recognition calls for a high level of consciousness. That is, one develops one’s moral sense through recognizing suffering. The only difference is that Freire addresses the recognition of suffering of the oppressed, while Mengzi that of the oppressor. When conversing with the King, Mengzi offered ways of how to act morally, suggesting that people could develop their moral sensibilities by having their attention drawn to appropriate analogies similar to moral significant cases such as the recognition of other’s suffering. Mengzi emphasized, “All people have a mind that cannot bear to see the suffering of others” (2.6), because all people have a mind of commiseration – the mind of humanity (cf. Chen 2012, p. 35). And Laozi’s rhetorical question may stress Freire’s ontological and epistemological position of humans’ moral capacity,

when he asked, “Who can enjoy enlightenment and remain indifferent to suffering in the world? This is not in keeping with the Way” (cf. *Dao De Jing*, 2006).

Freirean Pedagogy and Moral Possibility

I like to be human because in my unfinishedness I know that I am conditioned. Yet conscious of such conditioning, I know that I can go beyond it, which is the essential difference between conditioned and determined existence.

—Paulo Freire (*Pedagogy of Freedom*, 1998, p. 54)

Freire’s pedagogies are sprung from his ontological conviction that humans are aware of being conditioned in their “incompletion” or “unfinishedness,” the state of which does not determine but only effects them. Therefore, in dealing with their existential conditions, they have free will to “recognize themselves,” to “overcome the contradictions,” and to “transform the world” (cf. Freire 2006, pp. 43–70). Consequently, humans are morally responsible for their action. They act and decide as individuals and are accountable as such: “I know that I can go beyond it,” proclaims Freire. Clearly, for him, human interactions with the world are only existentially conditioned, and such conditioning entails moral possibility. Freire affirms:

[Oppressed] people must first critically recognize its causes, so that through transforming action they can create a new situation, one which makes possible the pursuit of a fuller humanity. (Freire 2006, p. 47)

In light of the motivating force for liberating action, Freire’s ontological characterization of human beings emphasizes a viable possibility for humanization (cf. Freire 2006, p. 43).

Freire’s metaphysical unfinishedness of humanity as existential conditioning is reified in Laozi’s metaphysics of *Dao*, the level of pure consciousness that manifests the ontological source of cosmos and humanity. Similar to Freire’s critical thought, the level of consciousness is unbounded, hence capable of being awakened, enlivened, and expanded. Laozi’s *Dao of Nature* and *Dao of Man* represent the dynamic

of the Nature and humanity, and the interrelation thereof, as he assured:

The *Dao* produces the One.
The One turns into the Two.
The Two gives rise to the Three.
The Three brings forth the myriad of things.
... (*Dao De Jing*, 2006, Chapter 42)

Like Nature that is not static, but evolving and changing, Man's ontological characterization, for Laozi, is of ability to meditate, to experience, and to transcend. This is the possibility of *de* (human virtue), corresponding to Aristotle's moral virtue or excellence in *Nicomachean Ethics*. Thus, is entailed a universal teaching of universal reality – a great attainment of Man, for Laozi, and raising consciousness with “objective transformation of reality” – a “liberating pedagogy,” for Freire (2006, p. 48, p. 50).

Freirean pedagogies are grounded from the development of critical consciousness. In forming the pedagogy of the oppressed, Freire says, it is “a pedagogy which must be forged with, not for, the oppressed (whether individuals or peoples) in the incessant struggle to regain their humanity. ... And in the struggle this pedagogy will be made and remade” (Freire 2006, p. 48). Freire's pedagogies, therefore, cannot be narrowly conceived as merely teaching “methods” or “techniques.” The term “pedagogy” employed by Freire, as Peter Roberts (2000) describes, denotes “a complex philosophy, politics and practice of education” (p. 13). These contextual complexities not only shape Freire's pedagogical activities but also reflect his philosophical principles. For Freire, every educational decision, policy, or practice implies a particular thought of human beings and the world as well as a specific ethical position (cf. Roberts 2000, p. 57).

These are the very possible dimensions that Freire holds as most significant in any pedagogy. The significance of Freirean pedagogy relates a process of transformation in the whole of life and represents sociopolitical and cultural intervention and complexity. As Roberts (2000) lucidly accounts, they include “a conception of human beings and the nature of reality, an epistemological theory, an ethical position, and a political stance – from which broad (not fixed) underlying principles are derived” (p. 70).

Conclusion and a Pedagogy of Suffering

To live is to decide, to opt, to choose, to struggle. This confirms our existence as ethical and political beings, and signifies the crucial importance of education in social and individual formation.

—Paulo Freire (*Pedagogy of Freedom*, 1998, p. 53)

Freire encourages people to open their minds, as to experience hope and possibility through collective experience. He says, we must fight for hope and possibility, because “hope of liberation does not mean liberation already. ... and we must hopefully labour to create them” (Freire 1997, p. 44). To achieve liberating transformation, Freire calls for “problematizing the future” (p. 42). For Freire, the past links to the future through the present. He relates his own exile, as an example, to argue that while in exile he did not live only in the past, but existed in the present to prepare himself for possible change (cf. Freire 1997, p. 67). Freire accounts, “My homeland is also pain, hunger, misery. It is also hope of millions who remain hungry for social justice” (p. 40). In Freire's own words, “I cannot be indifferent to the pain of those who go hungry, [and] I cannot suggest to them. ... that their situation is the result of God's will. That is a lie” (Freire 1998, p. 45). The past must be regarded as possibility for the future, as Freire puts it, “if the future is to break out of a fatalistic determinism” (Freire 1997, pp. 36–37).

Freire's own suffering experience gives rise to his critical consciousness. His ideological stand elucidates his pedagogical framework – a pedagogy of suffering. This implies humans' agentic power to transcend suffering and the possibility for the emergence of consciousness and critical intervention in reality. As Freire confirms, only power that springs from the weakness of the oppressed will be sufficiently strong to free both the oppressed and the oppressor (Freire 2006, p. 44). Similar to a pedagogy of suffering, Freire offers “problem-posing education,” a pedagogy that is not merely the intellectual excise, but also the ethical practice of freedom. For Freire, in order to transform a concrete situation of oppression by establishing the process of liberation, people need to confront the dire situations – suffering, pain, or oppression (cf. Freire 2006, p. 46). Freire explains

that problem-posing education “affirms men and women as beings in the process of *becoming* – as finished, uncompleted beings in and with a likewise unfinished reality” (p. 84). This is, as Freire calls, “[A]uthentic liberation – the process of humanization” (p. 79). A pedagogy of suffering – imperative to transform suffering situation – signifies Freire’s philosophical, ethical, and educational position (cf. Freire 1998, pp. 72–74).

By and large, Freirean humanizing pedagogy is humanist and libertarian pedagogy. It consists of two different stages, says Freire:

In the first, the oppressed unveil the world of oppression and through the praxis commit themselves to its transformation. In the second stage, in which the reality of oppression has already been transformed, this pedagogy ceases to belong to the oppressed and becomes a pedagogy of all people in the process of permanent liberation. (Freire 2006, p. 54)

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Freire and the Body

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It is the human body, young or old, fat or thin, of whatever color, the conscious body that looks at the stars. It is the body that writes. It is the body that speaks. It is the body that fights. It is the body that loves and hates. It is the body that suffers. It is the body that dies. It is the body that lives!

—Paulo Freire (Freire & Faundez 1989)

Introduction

Freire left behind a legacy that speaks passionately to the relationship of the body to emancipatory forms of education. This encompasses a pedagogical perspective that remains fully cognizant of the primacy of the body in the construction of knowledge. Freire’s philosophical renderings are anchored to an understanding of teachers and students as material beings and thus call for a pedagogical process informed by a humanizing ethos of the body to support reflection, dialogue, and solidarity, as we labor for the common good. As teachers and students participate more fully in the dialogical process of communal learning, the materiality of their bodies also must be understood as rightful allies in the formation and expression of collective consciousness. Of this Freire (1983) said, “true education incarnates the permanent search of people together with others for their becoming fully human in the world in which they exist” (p. 96). With these ideas in mind, this essay considers some of the salient ways in which the body is made central to Freirean thought.

Banking Education and Disembodiment

In *Teachers and Cultural Workers: Letters to Those who Dare to Teach*, it is apparent that for Freire (1998b) providing a rightful place for the

engagement of the body in the classroom encompasses an integral view of students as multi-dimensional human beings. It is this integral view that is often negated within banking education, where a more complex understanding of the body and its significance to intellectual and political formation is generally absent – unless it is being directed toward corporal control of students. Since the epistemological focus of traditional education privileges cognition, other important ways of knowing are easily ignored or dismissed. As a result, student voices and physical expressions of the body that fall outside the mainstream cultural register are systematically silenced. It is also worth noting that this phenomenon is predicated upon the prevailing notion of the individual as psychological self, whose intelligence and “ego strength” is supposedly gauged by the ability to function effectively, irrespective of external conditions.

In contrast, Freire (2002, 1993, 1989a) counters the limits of this Western pedagogical tradition that disembodies knowledge, supporting the banking approach to education, which negates the role of the body in teaching and learning. Freire understood this to be tied to the intellectual history of the West, where the mind and the body, as the mind and the heart, are deemed antagonists in the process of intellectual formation. This tradition of disembodiment shapes antidialogical classroom practices and expectations that students compartmentalize themselves, without contending with the manner in which this approach to learning reproduces asymmetrical relations of power that oppress organic constructions of knowledge. Freire (1998a) recognized that such disembodiment serves to disable the formation of student voice, social agency, and democratic participation – a process that can be even more disabling to oppressed who seldom enjoy the resources and opportunities of their more affluent counterparts.

Accordingly, Freire (1993) noted that students are expected to engage their studies as objective, distanced, and impartial observers, even when the object of their study may be intimately linked to brutal conditions of human suffering that are a part of their lived histories. He rightly argued

that traditional academic expectations affirm that feelings and intuition corrupt the process of teaching and learning and, thus, should be feared. Of this he argued, “the categorical negation of emotion and passion, the belief in technicism, ends in convincing many that, the more neutral [or disembodied] we are in our actions, the more objective and efficient we will be” (p. 106). Hence, university students, for example, are slowly but surely socialized to labor as uncritical, descriptive, “neutral” scholars, dispassionate, disembodied, and alienated from the subject of study. This results from a pedagogy conceived epistemologically in deeply *estranged* ways, devoid of the very qualities that humanize our existence.

Freire posited that, unfortunately, educators prepared in a banking pedagogy seldom possess the necessary political acumen about the body to deflect deficit notions embodied commonsensically within the classroom. This further incapacitates the human sensibility necessary for critical engagement of the larger conditions of inequalities that shape the lives of historically oppressed populations. Common authoritarian responses to student physicality also ignore or misinterpret meaning and intent behind student behaviors outside the mainstream, converting the body into an object that must acquiesce to the teacher’s will or be expelled (Darder 2015). In the process, little attention is given to the dialectical relationship that students have with their material world – a relationship that for working class youth of color, for example, requires constant navigation of the minefields of structural oppression perpetuated by racism, poverty, and other forms of social exclusions. The unfortunate consequence is that disembodied knowledge seldom leads teachers and students to grapple critically with deeper moral questions of education, which would undoubtedly challenge social and material relations that sustain human suffering and structural inequalities.

The Estrangement of the Body

Freire (2002) made a variety of references in *Pedagogy of Hope* that reflect his recognition

that the material conditions of estrangement that shape the lived histories of oppressed students, workers, and their communities are made visible and are profoundly expressed through their bodies. This can be witnessed in their skin, their teeth, their hair, their gestures, their speech, and the movement of their arms and legs. As such, student bodies provide meaningful maps of identity and powerful insights into the tensions, struggles, and needs that students from oppressed communities express in the classroom and out in the world. In concert with Marx, Freire (1998a) understood that hegemonic schooling is founded on a politics of estrangement, which like that of estranged labor functions to alienate youth from their bodies and the natural world. He considered the estrangement of the body akin to “that invisible power of alienating domestication... a state of refined estrangement... of a loss of consciousness of the body” (p. 102).

Hence, banking education exists as an arena of domestication, where abstract knowledge and its constructions are decontextualized, disembodied, and objectified. In response, students are forced to acquiesce to its alienating function, limiting rationality, and technocratic instrumentalism. With this in mind, Freire (1998a) asserted in *Pedagogy of Freedom* that it is insufficient to rely on abstract approaches to learning, where disembodied words and texts are privileged in the construction of knowledge: “words not given body (made flesh) have little or no value” (p. 39). His concern here was with the manner in which educational processes of estrangement cause false dichotomies that alienate students from their material world – the only true realm from which liberatory education can be forged.

Given the significant role of the body in the pedagogical process, Freire noted how the ontological and epistemological estrangement of the body in banking approaches interfere dramatically with the capacities of students to know themselves, one another, and their world. Ignored is the obvious fact; our lives unfold within the vital experiences of the flesh and its sentient capacity. Instead, the body is seen as an object to be controlled, contained, or

transcended, given its potential to disrupt the hegemonic order. This negation sidelines the affective and relational needs of student bodies that must endure, resist, and struggle to become free from the social and material entanglements of a society that imprisons them, both ideologically and corporally.

Repressive views of the body and sensuality within education also serve to negate, overtly or covertly, the cultural knowledge and wisdom of oppressed cultural populations, whose epistemological view and expression of the body in their cultural process of knowing may differ substantially from the mainstream’s dichotomy of body and consciousness. In the process, this often alienates and estranges students from ways of life, including human suffering, which exist outside of the limited scope of the hegemonic lens, whether linked to class, gender, ethnicity, sexuality, skin color, physical constitution, or spiritual beliefs.

Unfortunately, it precisely the power of sensuality, with its revolutionary potential to summon dissent and nurture empowerment, that is systematically stripped away from student experiences within the classroom. In response, Freire’s view of the body challenges conservative ideologies of social control historically linked to Western pedagogical traditions, which negate the body’s relevance. Disembodied views of teaching and learning have also led to pedagogical practices that perpetrate violence upon the oppressed through an erasure of the body and the annihilation of the flesh in the act of knowing. Accordingly, inequalities are reproduced through class, racialized, gendered, ableist, and heterosexist perceptions and distortions, which are embedded, wittingly or unwittingly, in prevailing attitudes of hegemonic schooling.

Teachers, whose bodies too are similarly restricted, alienated, and domesticated by their workplace are under enormous pressure to follow strict policies and procedures for classroom conduct, instead of employing more creative and humanizing approaches, grounded in the actual needs of students. We can return here to Freire’s (2013) notion of “the human being as a conscious

body” (p. 128) and his assertion that domestication is responsible for “a loss of consciousness of the body” (Freire 1998a, p. 102). As a consequence of this disembodiment (a symptom of estrangement), Freire recognized that teachers generally experience an uphill battle in meeting standardized mandates, which systematically functioned to also extricate student bodies from the equation of their learning.

Meanwhile, educators who struggle to implement liberating strategies in this context of estrangement are also often forced to become masters of deception – saying what the principal or district office wishes to hear, while doing behind closed doors what they believe is in the best interest of youth. Unfortunately, having to shoulder the physical stress of this duplicity can drive some of the most effective teachers away from their chosen vocation, given the intolerable alienation this engenders. While others, who simply feel defeated or frustrated by the pressure, adopt more authoritarian approaches manipulate or coerce cooperation, justifying their decision with contradictory rhetoric about the pragmatic necessity. What cannot be overlooked is that authoritarian practices of the classroom not only “blindfold students and lead them to a domesticated future” (Freire 1970, p. 79) but also alienate teacher labor as well.

Implicit here again are deficit assumptions and debilitating preconceptions projected upon teachers or students whose bodily appearance or expression is perceived to be outside the classed, racialized, patriarchal, heteronormative, abled, or spiritual mainstream of acceptable classroom behavior. Consequently, students from working class and racialized communities, where the body’s spontaneity is given greater primacy and freedom in the act of knowing, are often expected to sacrifice the creative and sensual knowledge of their bodies to an atomized, abstracted, and dispassionate logic of being. As such, Freire (2005) pointed to “the need for an interdisciplinary reading of bodies with students, for breaking away from dichotomies, ruptures that are enviable and deforming” (p. 52) in the forging of a critical praxis of the body.

Critical Praxis of the Body

Freire’s ideas on the body point then to the need for teachers and students to labor in the flesh. This is to say that liberatory forms of teaching and learning must be rooted in the materiality of human existence, as a starting place for critical praxis. Freire (1993) argued, “It is [through] this process of change, of transforming the material world from which we emerged, that creation of the cultural and historical world takes place (p. 108).” However, there is nothing automatic or “natural” about this process of social change nor is it a process that can solely rely on calculating logic or cold rationality. Moreover, given that the body’s sentient quality overwhelmingly shapes student experiences, their bodies constantly resist or desist, adjust or rebel, rejoice or despair in their desire to experience the freedom to be.

As a political and organic entity, the body plays then a significant role in making sense of the material conditions and social relations of power that shape our lives. Similarly, a praxis of the body can support teachers in building a democratic educational practice, where students are not asked to confront themselves and each other as strangers, but rather in the spirit of human kinship and community. This link between the body and communal life is also central to Freire’s understanding of *conscientização*, which can only unfold and evolve within the context of solidarity and political participation – *in the flesh* (Darder 2015).

So much so, that in *Pedagogy of the City*, Freire (1993) spoke to the undeniable centrality of the body in the act of knowing the world: “The importance of the body is indisputable. . . its importance has to do with a certain sensualism. . . even in connection with cognitive ability. . . it’s absurd to separate the rigorous acts of knowing the world from the [body’s] passionate ability to know” (p. 87). Freire’s own passionate way of being in the world and his many references to the “beauty of the body” and “the restlessness of bodies,” bore witness to the ways in which the body’s sensuality and sexuality had a

determining impact on consciousness and reason. In *Pedagogy of the Heart*, Freire (1998c) commented on the “gradual improvement in performance on the part of the student, as the pedagogy of questioning started to gain ground against the pedagogy of answers, and as issues around the body were addressed” (p. 62).

Yet, despite major institutional efforts to repress and control the desires, pleasures, and mobility of the body within the classroom, Freire’s writings support the view that students seldom fully surrender their bodies or readily acquiesce to authoritarian practices – practices which in themselves provide the impetus for resistance, especially in those students whose dynamic histories are excluded within mainstream education. Instead, Freire (1970) recognized that in their struggle for freedom, students who are repressed will “try out forms of rebellious action” (p. 64), engaging in the construction of their own cultural forms of resistance that may or may not always function in their best interest.

Yet, often, expressions of student resistance are enacted in the classroom through alterations of the body – be they clothing, hairstyle, posturing, manner of walking, way of speaking, the piercing and tattooing of the body. These actions represent then not only acts of resistance but also alternative ways of experiencing, affirming, and knowing the world, generally perceived by officials as transgressive and disruptive to the social order. In a footnote in *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, Freire (1970) made reference to the pedagogical significance of this phenomenon by saying that teachers cannot “see youth rebellion as a mere example of the traditional differences between generations. Something deeper is involved here. Young people in their rebellion are denouncing and condemning the unjust model of a society of domination. This rebellion with its special dimension, however, is very recent; [in that] society continues to be authoritarian in character” (p. 154).

Freire contended that often this authoritarianism led to historical absences of the body in the classroom, due to institutional fears associated with the body’s real potential for disruption and subversion. Thus, he called upon an emancipatory

ethical commitment to counter the disembodiment of our humanity – a commitment that lies at the heart of Freire’s liberatory pedagogical project. To endure daily confrontations with oppressive forces, for example, Freire (1998a) urged us to “struggle for the material conditions without which our body will suffer from neglect” (p. 95). Nevertheless, often missing from educational discourses is precisely this ethical connection of the body to critical praxis.

The Body as Ethical Terrain of Struggle

Freire (1993) embraced the totality of the body in the act of knowing, insisting “It is my entire body that socially knows. I cannot, in the name of exactness and rigor, negate my body, my emotions and my feelings” (p. 105). With this in mind, Freire (2002, 1989) posited that the human body constitutes an ethical terrain of struggle from which all emancipatory knowledge must emerge. Without the materiality of the body, our teaching and learning is reduced to processes of abstraction and fragmentation that attempt to falsely render knowledge a neutral and objective phenomenon, absent of history and ideology. Accordingly, Freire (2002, 1998a, 1993) understood the body as the medium for our existence as subjects of history and as politically empowered agents of change. We are molded and shaped by the structures, policies and practices of economic domination, and social exclusion, which violently insert our bodies into the alienating morass of an intensified global division of labor.

Therefore, it is not surprising that in *Pedagogy of the Heart*, Freire (1998c) merges the question of the body to ethics, when he asserts, “I refuse, for all these reasons, to think that we are eternally destined to live the negation of our own selves. In order to be in the world, my conscious body, my unfinished and historical being, needs food as it needs ethics. The fight would make no sense to me without this” (p. 89). Hence, for Freire, the integration of the body served as an indisputable ethical dimension of revolutionary praxis and this, emancipatory education, in that, ultimately: *It is the body that lives!*

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Freire, Paulo (1921–1997)

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Introduction

Paulo Freire is one of those public intellectuals who makes any attempt to study his ideas apart from his life problematic. Although many contemporary scholars – on the assumption that philosophy of education is simply a history of philosophical doctrines about educational problems – have made that attempt, it is virtually impossible to restrict any interpretation of his life's work to his writings. Moreover, his texts are full of anecdotes and personal stories, and his *oeuvre* is composed not only of theoretical texts but also of interviews, letters, class records, lectures, and other forms of writing (cf. Gadotti 2001), and his understanding of philosophical

thought approaches Foucault's (2011, p. 210) characterization of the latter as "a history of forms, modes, and styles of life, a history of the philosophical life as a philosophical problem, but also as a mode of being and as a form both of ethics and heroism." This manner of living a philosophical life originates with Socrates, who occupies a singular and paradoxical educational position, as shown in Plato's *Apology* (Plato, *Apology* 33a ff.), that is, he takes care of himself by not taking care *ipso facto* of himself but by taking care that others take care of themselves (Foucault 2011, p. 158). What makes Socrates a paradoxical educator also makes him a philosophical hero. As a heroic form of ethics, his philosophical life embodies philosophy not as content or knowledge but as a form of examined living, as he himself demonstrates in the *Apology*. There is no Socratic education outside his philosophical life and no philosophy of Socrates outside his educational life. As also shown in the *Apology* (21e ff.), Socrates presents this task as a divine mission given by the god Apollo to awaken the Athenians: philosophy is, then, born as a form of educational life as much as a religious enterprise. There is a long tradition built upon this conception of philosophy as education, which originated with Socrates and is rarely remarked upon (cf. Masschelein and Kohan 2015), like the ancient Cynics and a few prominent Latin-American philosophers as educators, like the "Socrates of Caracas," Simón Rodríguez (Kohan 2015). It is precisely in this tradition that Paulo Freire could, as a vivid example of a philosophical and educational life, be perfectly inserted, much more than in the history of philosophical doctrines.

Freire as Founder of a Tradition: Philosophy as Education

For the reasons offered above, this entry will include references to Paulo Freire's writings as well as to his life, with no pretension to deliver a complete or full account, but rather aiming to provoke a problematization of the legacy of this powerful figure in educational philosophy.

One way to understand Freire's life project is to try to identify his life and work with the discourses

of philosophy as education that originated with Socrates. Let us consider at least two alternatives: (a) the Cynic tradition, illustrated by Diogenes' life, in which one's own philosophical life is in itself educative and implicitly contains a political value – philosophy and education are here political in their way of inhabiting the public space – and (b) the Platonic, illustrated by the Allegory of the Cave, in which the philosopher, knowing the Good, liberates others' lives by taking them out of their devalued world of shadows and copies of the real they are immersed in. In this second discourse, philosophy is educational and political if and only if it changes the way others live in order to approximate their lives to what it is considered the true one.

Freire's own testimony confirms this last perspective as a task given by himself to himself: as a young man, he wandered the fens, streams, and mountains of his native Recife and moved to the rural areas of Pernambuco to work with slums people and countrywomen, inspired by a loyalty to the figure of Christ servant and liberator. But the hard reality of the lives of the people he served led him directly to Marx, in whom he found an "objective basis" to continue Christ's mission. In his own words, Freire "stayed with Marx in worldliness looking for Christ in transcendence" (Freire 1997). As such, his life project had to do with taking care, as a Christian shepherd, of the poor, excluded and dispossessed, based on a Marxist understanding of social history. Marxism functioned as the theoretical background to his task of political liberation through educational praxis, which he understood as infusing Christian values into the oppressed in the specific context of a southern, developing country such as Brazil. The analogy with a Platonic reading of Socrates suggests itself here: like the Socrates of the cave, Freire understood his philosophical and educational project as a mission, guided by a religious inspiration, with the political aim of liberating others from the shadows they inhabit at the dark underground.

There are at least two specific senses in which Freire seems to have understood this task, which give specific and prominent meaning to his thought, character, and vocation: (a) the task of

education is to give the oppressed (and, eventually, the oppressors) not only the consciousness of their condition but also the desire to transform it (he seeks not only intellectual liberation but an existential as well) and (b) the final political end of philosophy as education is to transform not only the condition of human beings (taking them from the cave) but also turning social reality into a non-oppressive one (a world with no caves). In order to accomplish this project, Freire involved himself from the very beginning of his adult life with educational theory and practice through his studies in law at his native Recife. But political conditions influenced his project decisively. Three main periods of that project can be distinguished, marked by the urgent need to abandon Brazil in 1964 following the eruption of the military coup d'état and by his return to the country in 1980.

Certain characteristic features accompany this educational militant for the poor from his youth to the end of his lifetime. For one, he always combined an academic life with activism in the realm of educational policy. As a very young man, he taught at the same school in which he had studied and directed programs in adult literacy. At the same moment that he finished his Ph.D., he became a professor at the University of Recife and very soon was made a member of the State Council of Education of Pernambuco. With the coup d'état in 1964, the National Program in Adult Literacy he coordinated was suspended, and he was driven into exile. He stayed a few months in Bolivia, and following a coup d'état there, he moved to Chile. Over a period of 15 years, he traveled the world and ran educational programs in several African countries sponsored by UNESCO and the World Council of Churches. Upon returning from exile, he taught at several universities in the State of São Paulo, where he also cofounded the Brazilian Labor Party – which actually governs the country since 2002 – and occupied the position of Secretary of Education of the city of São Paulo.

The Errant Philosopher as Educator

Given all this political commitment, the analogy with the Socrates of Athens loses some force. Socrates states at the *Apology* that fortunately he

has not participated in politics; otherwise, he would have died much earlier (Apology 31d). However, the life and vocation of another Socrates, closer to Freire's historical place and time – the nineteenth-century Venezuelan Simón Rodríguez – offers a striking similarity. Rodríguez, known as the “Socrates of Caracas,” devoted his life to popular education, to the extent of founding an experimental school for the poor and socially excluded – in Chuquisaca – which represented the vanguard of liberatory education in the first decades of the nineteenth century. He also maintained, like Socrates and Freire, a strong connection between philosophy and education, or understanding of philosophy as a way of living an educational life (Kohan 2015).

What probably most strongly and specifically connects Freire and Simón Rodríguez in their way of enacting philosophy as education is the idea of errantry: they both live a life of philosophical essaying and wandering, inventing new forms of schooling, holding to the education of the excluded as an ethical and political anchor for a traveling form of existence. The circumstances of Freire's major book *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* illustrates his condition of errantry: written in Chile, it was first published in New York in 1970, forbidden publication in Brazil, and only finally issued there in 1974. His other major work, *Pedagogy of Freedom (Pedagogy of Autonomy)* in the original Portuguese), dates to the end of his life. Not only is there more than 20 years between these two works but also a number of other differences. For one, the tone has changed. If they both read more like political manifestos than theoretical treatments, the former points to a revolutionary society, while the latter defends a “democratic” one. The main dialectical pairs of the *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* are oppressor vs. oppressed and banking vs. liberating pedagogy. Humanization vs. dehumanization, positivism vs. dialectic, and hierarchy vs. dialogue still underlie his thinking, but operate less strongly as elements of a narrative strategy; the class struggle is still identified as a motor of history and as one among others; and the subject of history has changed from the monolithic oppressed to a gendered and ethnic situated subject.

A Life Lived Opposing Oppression

The humanizing project of the *Pedagogy of the oppressed* is not without tensions regarding its real possibility and opportunity. On the one hand, it is assumed to be possible when its pedagogical method is presented or its main strategy is portrayed. The latter has two moments: first, the oppressed unfold their condition and become conscious of it through the perception of the “untested feasibility” which they previously did not even consider and, in a second, moment they search for a way to put it into practice (Freire 2004, p. 110). On the other hand, Freire affirms that education itself is not a path for revolution, which requires, as a condition, a social change that does not come from education. Once the oppressive reality is transformed, the contradiction educator-educated is overcome in a dialogical relationship, and the pedagogy of the oppressed turns into a liberating pedagogy for every human being (Freire 2004, p. 44). This tension may be an expression of Freire's doubts concerning the real possibilities of education in a class-based society. Taken as a whole, his work does not seem to aim to demonstrate education's possibility, but rather to show its importance and meaning as a conscientizing, humanizing, liberating, and dialogical practice. The idea of dialogue might be considered to be Freire's most specific theoretical contribution to a Marxist pedagogy. It transforms the relations of all its discursive characters – the oppressed, the oppressors, and even between oppressors and oppressed. Dialogue is, for Freire, “radical exigency of every authentic revolution” (Freire 2004, p. 149).

Pedagogy of the Oppressed also presents Freire's pedagogical method, which was developed in order to teach rural workers in the poorest Angicos, northeast of Brazil, to read. According to him, forty hours is enough to create the conditions to start the process of liberation of the oppressed and to learn to read through reading the world and one's situation in it. In order to apply the method, some guidelines need to be followed: leave the stultifying techniques which depotentialize what can only be a thoughtful and creative activity; produce the so-called culture cards to make contact with the knowledge of the

oppressed; create conditions for learners to problematize the meanings given to the words that regularly appear in their vocabulary and thus give them consciousness of their class; help them to repudiate the attributions of inferiority ascribed to their class, so that through generative words and themes they can empower their own reading of the world; convince that they can unfold all the power of which they are capable to read, to think, and to act creatively; invite them to reject apathy and conformism; and engage actively as cultured beings and producers. It is, then, as much a methodology devoted to cultural and political literacy as it is to language literacy. Regularly revisited by Freire himself, the method has progressively become less a specific way to teach or a methodology and more a political principle for education – the unconditional affirmation of the principle that “any human being can learn to read and write (a language, but also a social reality) if provided with the appropriate conditions to do so.”

The Errantry of a Philosophy of Education

Pedagogy of Freedom (2001), published more than 20 years later and just a few months before Freire died yet written with hope, passion, and enthusiasm, has another tone, vocabulary and spirit, beginning from the title: a pedagogy that originally addressed a class now addresses a concept. Some words (such as “revolution”) disappear, others (such as “awareness” or “oppressed”) lose centrality, some others (such as “dialogue” or “autonomy”) are resignified, and new words appear (like “ethics” or “aesthetic”). Even though Marxism loses its centrality in Freire’s final approach, a very similar anthropological, epistemological, and ontological background remains, based on the “unfinished human condition” and the consequent human curiosity to “be more,” both individually and culturally. However, the main difference is in the book’s political tone: if *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* – in spite of the ambivalent relationship between education and revolution reflected there – was “revolutionary” in spirit, *Pedagogy of Freedom* looks more “reformist,” and the idea of revolution is replaced by a less ambitious but still unconditioned

commitment to transformative education, expressed in his nostrum “change is difficult, but not impossible” (Freire 1997, p. 30 ff.). Its subtitle (“Needed Knowledge for Educational Practice”) still shows a high commitment to practice, and all three sections of the book focus on teaching and teachers. Each of the nine sections of the three chapters offers a kind of requirement to “thinking well” that ought to form the basis of all educational practice (Freire 1997, p. 11 ff.). The list of requirements is long: rigor, epistemological curiosity, criticality, risk, humility, beauty, non-discrimination, generosity, consistency, experience, communicability, hope, participation, dialogue, and demanding. The book, then, could be understood as offering a normative set of principles for good teaching practice. It is Freire’s last testimony – less simple, political, and appealing than the *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, but also more open, flexible, and, interestingly dialogic.

Paulo Freire: A Tropical Socrates?

In philosophy as education, it all started with Socrates. Foucault points out, in his *The Courage of the Truth*, two opposing paths, illustrated by Platonism and Cynicism along which a true life may be found: in another world or in another form of life (Foucault 2011, p. 246 ff.). One path is drawn starting from the *Alcibiades*, where the care of the self is understood as the contemplation of one’s own soul as a path that leads to the contemplation of another World. The other path is drawn from the *Laches*, where the care of the self does not lead to so much to self-contemplation, but to the issue of how the self should live a caring life in this actual world. There has been constant interaction between these two paths, and Foucault explores the Gnostic currents in Christianity in an attempt to think a coherent relationship between both (Foucault 2011, p. 247).

Paulo Freire might well be inscribed in this tradition as a contemporary attempt to harmonically combine the other world and another life – a Christian world and a more just and inclusive social life. And just as Socrates’ educationally and philosophically revolutionary life encountered a deadly political reaction in Classical

Athens, so did Paulo Freire's life of errantry in our time. Even more, regarded from all political sides, contemporary Brazilian education might be regarded as a proof of the failure of his project: from the left, the reality of more than 13 million Brazilian adult illiterates and from the right, accusing him, as the public demonstrations of March 2015 did in Brasília, of being the source of "Marxist indoctrination." Between these two forms of critique, hundreds of thousands of educators seem to be enacting a confirmation of his accomplishments daily, in a variety of forms, often in very adverse conditions, inspired by the promise of a more dialogical educational practice.

Paulo Freire is a distinctly Latin-American and popular Socrates. Loved and hated like the Athenian, he devotes himself to an educational and philosophical mission in which a political commitment to the liberation of the excluded is inseparable from a way of living. To that extent, it is singularly inspiring not only for those who work in philosophy and education in this part of the world but for anyone sensitive to the needs of justice anywhere and any time.

Cross-References

► [Rodríguez, Simón](#)

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Freire's Christian Faith

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Synonyms

[Critical education](#); [Faith](#); [Freire](#); [Religion](#)

Introduction

Paulo Freire was one of the most well-known educators in the world. Elements of his work have been incorporated into fields as diverse as nursing, social work, and business management. Much of the attention given to Freire's work has focused on the Marxist elements within his analysis of education and society. What receives far less attention, however, is the fact that Paulo Freire was a Christian. Freire's religious beliefs seem to have influenced much of his theory and practice. Indeed, one writer claimed that "those of us who espouse critical pedagogy and embrace Paulo Freire's visions of praxis and conscientization work out of a tradition, often unknowingly, with deep ties to religious faith" (Stenberg 2006, p. 271). Freire's faith is easy to miss, even though numerous articles have been written about it. He seldom used words such as faith, religion, and spirituality and used the words Jesus, God, and Creator even less often. In most of his books, Freire did not make explicit connections among his faith, his theory, and his activism. His was not a proselytizing faith; he was not trying to win converts to Christianity. Nor was

he comfortable speaking about his faith (Freire 1997). Instead, his faith seemed to provide him with a personal motivation for his work:

This is how I have always understood God – a presence in history that does not preclude me from making history, but rather pushes me toward world transformation which makes it possible to restore the *humanity* of those who exploit and of the weak. (Freire 1997, pp. 103–104; original emphasis).

Freire further clarified the crucial link between his faith and his fight against injustice when he wrote about “the fundamental importance of [his] faith in [his] struggle for overcoming an oppressive reality and for building a less ugly society, one that is less evil and more humane” (Freire 1997, p. 104).

For readers of Freire, understanding the role Freire's faith played within his work adds context to his Marxism. Freire drew from Marx in creating a language of critique and a framework of analysis, but his faith seemed to help provide Freire with the motivation to critique society in the first place. This understanding also sheds light on a number of “why?” questions that arise in analyzing Freire's work, such as why did Freire emphasize dialogue and relationships, and why is humanization people's historical vocation? Finally, this understanding helps to illuminate the connection many of the most significant concepts within Freire's writings had with his Christian beliefs.

A Lifelong Religious Motivation

Freire seems to have felt a faith-driven call for justice throughout his life. Even as a young child, growing up as a Catholic in Recife, Brazil, Freire felt a call to advocate for justice:

I remember that when I was 6 years old, one day I was talking with my father and my mother, and I protested strongly against the way my grandmother had treated a black woman at home – not with physical violence, but with undoubtedly racial prejudice. I said to my mother and to my father that I couldn't understand that, not maybe with the formal speech I am using now, but I was underlining for me the impossibility of being a Christian and at the same time discriminating against another person for any reason. (Horton and Freire 1990, p. 243).

This faith influenced Freire in deciding to begin meeting and working with peasants and workers in Recife's slums. About this decision he claimed, “I have to confess that I did that pushed by my Christian faith” (p. 245). Later in his life, even into the years just before his death, Freire maintained clear religious convictions. In his talking book with Myles Horton (Horton and Freire 1990), Freire stated that “I would say that I am a man of faith” (p. 246). Elsewhere, Freire gave a more robust articulation of his faith:

Being a Christian, a revolutionary; these are very close. It assumes the totality of humility of telling me that I am a man trying to become a Christian; I am a Christian trying to become a revolutionary. *I am a Christian revolutionary or a revolutionary Christian because I know what I want to become.* (Costigan 1983, p. 37; original emphasis).

Freire described his work as responding to a call: “The Word of God is inviting me to re-create the world, not for my brothers' domination but for their liberation” (Freire 1972, p. 7). Freire explained this call when describing his work in the Recife slums. He wrote, “I know that I had been sent, but Christ did not do that personally. I don't want to say that I have such prestige. I went because I believed in what I heard and in what I studied” (Horton and Freire 1990, p. 245). Freire further explained the call from Christ and how that call resonates within the Gospels. He wrote that he

was fascinated and continue[d] to be fascinated by the indivisibility of the content of the Gospels and the manner in which Christ communicated them. Christ's teaching was not, and could never be, the teaching of one, who like so many of us, sees himself to be the possessor of truth which he seeks to impose or simply transfer. He was himself Truth, the Word that became flesh. This word could never be learned if, at the same time, its meaning were not also grasped, and its meaning could not be grasped if it were not, also, incarnate in us. This is the basis of the invitation that Christ made, and continues to make to us. . . . (Freire 1984, pp. 547–548)

For Freire, the best way to teach the Gospels was to try to live them as a call to social action: “To know the Gospels through seeking to practice them. . . is, thus, the best way I have of teaching them” (p. 548). Towards this end, Freire explained, “Christ will always be, as he is for me, an example of the Teacher” (p. 547).

Freire's relationship with the Catholic Church was also revealing about his faith. In his native Brazil and also in Chile, the Church had a powerful influence over society, especially in its educational role. Thus, when the Church taught, for example, that God caused suffering as a punishment for people or that to challenge the Church was to challenge God, those teachings impeded Freire's goal of humanization. If people held on to those kinds of false teachings, as Freire considered them to be, then they were less able to engage in conscientization. Freire, in his support of a prophetic church, challenged such myths that served oppression. He argued that "the prophetic position demands a critical analysis of the social structures in which conflict takes place" (Freire 1985, p. 138).

Freire's connection to Liberation Theology was part of this reaction against the oppressive tendencies of the Church. Freire was aware of the response such actions would provoke from the Church. He stated that if we invite people to "tear away the veils that hide the facts and reveal the true causes of their misery and oppression...we will be damned as enemies of the Christian Western civilization" (Freire 1972, pp. 6–7). Yet, Freire challenged the Church anyway, just as Jesus challenged the Pharisees. As Freire put it, "Christ was no conservative. The prophetic church, like him, must move forward constantly, forever dying and forever being reborn. In order to be, it must always be in a state of *becoming*. There is no prophecy without risk" (Freire 1985, p. 139; original emphasis).

God was not an abstraction for Freire. God was not absent from the workings of the world. Nor was God, to borrow from Marx, merely an opiate. Instead, Freire wrote that God's relationship with people was central to the process of liberation:

God's relationship over us is based on the fact of our finitude and our knowledge of this finitude. For we are incomplete beings, and the completion of our incompleteness is encountered in our relationships with our Creator, a relationship which, by its very nature, can never be a relationship of domination or domestication, but is always a relationship of liberation (Freire 1969, p. 29).

In other words, Freire's purpose for liberation seemed to be both material *and* spiritual. He stated

that "the true humanization of man cannot be brought about in the interiority of our minds; it has to take place in external history" (Freire 1972, p. 7). His purpose was material in that external reality can impede people from becoming fully humanized: "If objective reality keeps man from being humanized, then he should change that reality" (p. 7). But liberation was also spiritual in that the process of becoming and people's awareness of their unfinished nature (Freire 1970) is only made whole in relationship with God.

Religious Language and Symbolism in Freire's Work

Religious language and symbolism fill Freire's work. While *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, his best known book, for example, brims with religious symbolism, one can find such language and symbolism across a number of Freire's writings. The following takes a brief look at some of the religious connections found within a few well-known aspects of his work.

Relationship

Relationship is central to Freirean praxis. Freire lamented the breakdown of the relationship between educators and learners. Problem-posing cannot effectively happen unless relationships between teacher and student are developed first. Distinctions between teacher and student can begin to be erased only within supportive and respectful relationships. Freire's focus on relationship can be traced, in part, back to people's relationship to God. Freire held that people's relationship with God is central to liberation. It is through relationship to God that people experience wholeness, "completion of our incompleteness." Freire placed relationships at the center of human experience when he wrote that "to be human is to engage in relationships with others and with the world" (Freire 2013, p. 3).

Dialogue

Dialogue is the means by which Freire's educational practice happens. True dialogue reveals reality as a process and admits no dichotomy

between people and the world (Freire 1970). But this dialogue takes an a priori faith in humankind. Faith and hope connect, for, as Paul defined faith in his letter to the Hebrew Christian congregation, "Faith is the assured expectation of what is hoped for, the evident demonstration of realities that are not seen" (Heb 11:1). Freire made an explicit connection between dialogue and his religious faith when he wrote "Existence is a dynamic concept, implying eternal dialogue between man and man, between man and the world, between man and his Creator. It is this dialogue which makes of man an historical being" (Freire 2013, p. 14). Freire imbues dialogue with spiritual purpose by linking dialogue between people with dialogue with God.

Naming

The act of naming is perhaps the core component of creating and analyzing generative themes. Freire stated that "to exist, humanly, is to *name* the world, to change it. Once named, the world in its turn reappears to the namers as a problem and requires of them a new *naming*" (Freire 1970, p. 69; original emphasis). People, then, transform the world through naming it. For Freire, naming "is an act of creation; it must not serve as a crafty instrument for the domination of one person by another" (p. 70). Freire articulated a connection between naming and God's direction to Adam to name the animals of the Earth:

It was when God said to the human beings that they would *give a name* to the things. I read this when I was very young and never forgot it. Giving a name is something which generally comes after transformation. I transform. I create. I then give a name. (Costigan 1983, p. 35; original emphasis)

Language, through naming, becomes a world-builder. In reading the word-world, people are presented with the problem of renaming the world with new words, thus building new worlds.

Freire's use of the phrase "the word" also carries another religious overtone. In the Bible, in the Gospel of John, Jesus is referred to as "the Word" (John 1:1). Jesus, "the Word," was sent by God to transform the World and preach the good news of God's Kingdom (Luke 4:43). Freire

recognized Jesus as the Word, borrowing from John 1:14 in stating that "just as the Word became flesh, so the Word can be approached only through man" (Freire 1972, p. 7). John wrote that "All things came into existence through him, and apart from him not even one thing came into existence" (John 1:3). Here the Bible states that God created all things through Jesus, "the Word." Freire's symbolism is subtle, but powerful. "The word" refers, on one level, to actual words, to language, which are powerful tools for building and analyzing the world. But on a deeper level, Freire seems to link Jesus, "the Word," as cocreator of the world, with language, "the word," also as a cocreator of the world. Both worked towards a utopia: one, God's Kingdom; the other, a more immediate material utopia. But, for Freire, the material utopia is linked to the spiritual utopia. As Freire put it, "That is why I insist that a Utopian and prophetic theology leads naturally to a cultural action for liberation, and hence to conscientization" (Freire 1972, pp. 7–8).

Problem-Posing

Freire believed that faith alone was not enough to address problems; action was also required. He argued that "being in faith means moving, engaging in different forms of action coherent with that faith" (Freire, 1997, p. 104). Problem-posing can be seen as action grounded within faith. Problem-posing is based on dialogue, and "dialogue...requires an intense faith in humankind, faith in their power to make and remake, to create and re-create, faith in their vocation to be more fully human" (Freire 1970, p. 71). Indeed, Freire seemed to imbue problem-posing with spiritual qualities: it affirms people as beings in the process of becoming and as beings who can transcend themselves. Additionally, problem-posing helps people to unveil reality, what Freire called "demythologizing reality." Freire's view of faith and works is similar to that of the Apostle James who wrote, "Of what benefit is it, my brothers, if someone says he has faith but he does not have works?" (James 2:17). Freire's identification of Christ as "the Teacher" is instructive here (Freire

1984). Throughout the Gospels, Jesus's disciples called him "Teacher." As he preached the news of the Kingdom, he criticized the religious leaders of the day for distorting God's word, for example, in telling the Pharisees that "you skillfully disregard the commandment of God in order to keep your tradition" (Mark 7:9). Plus, he was engaged in his own form of demythologizing as he tried to help people understand God's Kingdom. In doing these things, Jesus spoke to everyday practices and injustices that affected the people.

Easter and Rebirth

Perhaps the most religiously symbolic language Freire used was that of Easter and rebirth. For Freire, the move towards conscientization required a profound shift within a person, especially a person from the First World. Freire claimed that "for the First World to hear that Word [the Word of God inviting people to re-create the world], it must previously undergo an Easter. It must die as First World and be reborn as Third World" (Freire 1972, p. 7). Elsewhere, Freire asserted that "conversion to the people requires a profound rebirth. Those who undergo it must take on a new form of existence; they can no longer remain as they were" (Freire 1970, p. 43). This rebirth demands

a renunciation of myths that are dear to them: the myth of superiority, of purity of soul, of their virtues, their wisdom, the myth that they save the poor, the myth of the neutrality of the church, of theology, education, science, technology, the myth of their own impartiality. (Freire 1985, p. 123).

But this death and rebirth is not reserved for elites from the West. Students must also experience their own death and rebirth. Just as teachers must die to their previously held beliefs about teaching and about students, students must also die to their previously held beliefs about being students and about learning. Freire speaks here not just to sacrifice but also to profound love, for love is "an act of courage" and is required as commitment to the cause of liberation (Freire 1970, p. 70). Freire argued that it is a "loving action" to invite people to "tear away the veils that hide the facts" (Freire 1972, p. 6). He claimed that love of the world, of people, and of life is the

foundation of dialogue (Freire 1970). And he held that his work with peasants in the slums of Recife was reinforced by love (Horton and Freire 1990, p. 247). Freire's language of death and rebirth implies not a physical death, of course, but a death of previously held ideology, a rebirth into a new way of thinking, and the love for people to undergo that difficult process.

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Freire's Philosophy and Pedagogy: Humanization and Education

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Synonyms

Conscientization; Dialogue; Liberation; Neoliberalism; Praxis

Introduction

At the heart of Paulo Freire's philosophy and pedagogy is the notion of humanization. While Freire's understanding and application of this central concept underwent some subtle shifts as his thought progressed, much remained consistent from his earliest books to his final writings. This entry explores some of the links between humanization and other key terms in Freirean theory – praxis, dialogue, and conscientization – and comments on Freire's depiction of neoliberalism as an example of dehumanization.

Humanization, Transformation, and Education

Freire's most comprehensive treatment of humanization can be found in chapter 1 of his classic early work, *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* (Freire 1972). There, he develops the idea that humanization is both an ontological and an historical vocation. Humanization is understood as a process of becoming more fully human. This is an ontological vocation in the sense that it involves becoming more completely what we already are or are meant to be as human beings. From a Freirean perspective, all human beings have this vocation, though each person is unique in the way he or she pursues this. But the process of humanizing ourselves does not take place in isolation from other human beings, or merely “inside our heads”; it unfolds in social contexts shaped by past and present structures, policies, beliefs, values, and practices. Humanization involves a form of work, a process of struggle, that never ends. From a Freirean perspective, we remain necessarily incomplete, unfinished, ever-evolving beings. We become *more* fully human, not *fully* human.

Underlying Freire's philosophy, then, is an ontology of restlessness that suggests a need for continuous searching, striving, and learning. Education is thus seen as a fundamental part of what it means to be human. Freire's emphasis on education as a process of ongoing transformation should not be taken to mean that nothing remains

constant or that everything is changing all the time. As human beings, we each have aspects of character – dispositions, beliefs, modes of thinking, and acting – that, in their unique combinations and permutations, distinguish us from others. Without something persisting, further change would not be possible. Freire is insistent, moreover, that the tendency to embrace the new simply because it is new should be avoided; instead, we should seek to discover what is worthwhile in both the old and the new (Freire 1976). But there is never a point at which we can say educational transformation is no longer necessary, possible, or likely. We cannot know precisely what will be demanded of us by future circumstances or events. We are always conditioned – not *determined* (Freire 1998a) – by the ever-changing world in which we exist. Continuity and change, for Freire, are dialectically related, and it is the interaction between the two that makes transformation possible. The influence of both Hegel and Marx, among others, can be detected in Freire's interpretation of the dialectic. Arguably, however, it is Marx who played the more important role. Freire's concern is not just with changes within the individual but also with contradictions, resistance, and transformation at wider economic, social, and political levels.

We realize our capacity for humanization through praxis (Mayo 1999; Schugurensky 2011). Freire refashioned this ancient philosophical notion in the light of the politics of his time. Praxis, as he defines it in *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, is reflection and action upon the world in order to transform it. “World” in this context includes both the material domain of nature and socially constructed reality – our institutions, legal systems, forms of cultural expression, workplaces, leisure activities, and so on. Freire does not see praxis as a linear, step-by-step process or phenomenon. It is not a case of having to reflect first, then act, then reflect again. Often the two elements of praxis will be intertwined: we can act while reflecting, and careful, deep, purposeful reflection – with others – can itself be seen as a form of action. Freire's point is that we must not neglect either element in

conceiving of our task as human beings. He warns that reflection without action can become mere verbalism (e.g., endless talk by politicians about the need to address climate change, with no significant measures being put in place to do so). Equally dangerous is the tendency to act without thought, as in, for instance, blindly following a charismatic leader in an act of violence. Freire calls situations of the latter kind “activism” (Freire 1972). The linked elements of reflection, action, and transformation continue to produce new tasks across the human lifespan. As we engage in reflective action, the transformed reality that results from this demands fresh reflection and action, and so the process goes on.

Freire qualifies his account of praxis further: praxis, if it is to be humanizing, must be dialogical and critical. The “critical” aspect of praxis is encapsulated in the much misunderstood Freirean notion of *conscientization*. Freire was not the first person to employ this term in its original Portuguese form (as *conscientização*), but he was the best known proponent of the idea. Conscientization is sometimes seen as a process of moving through fixed stages of consciousness in an ordered, sequential manner. This runs counter to Freire’s explicit suggestions about how the term should be understood. It is true that in his earliest work Freire (1976) speaks of three different levels of consciousness – magical, naïve, and critical – but he does so as a means of describing dominant patterns of thought among particular groups in Brazil at given moments in its history. He did not intend those descriptions to be seen as immutable categories for distinguishing between individuals at different stages of educational development. He argued repeatedly that his ideas must be contextualized and that the methods adopted in one situation need not be the same as those applied in another. Others saw conscientization as a kind of “silver bullet,” attributing to it powers far beyond those Freire himself had intended. Freire was always clear that education on its own can only do so much; it can contribute to the process of social change, but it must be seen as just one part of a wider political process. For a period, Freire stopped referring directly to conscientization, but the essence of

the concept – an educational process of deepening our critical understanding of the society in which we live – remained across his corpus of published writings. Conscientization is not a stand-alone process; rather it can be seen as the reflective element of praxis. Conscientization occurs not in fixed, finite stages but continuously as a part of the unending process of human formation and transformation.

The dialogical element of praxis is equally important and is also much contested. For Freire, we are beings of communication, and dialogue is a distinctively human possibility. We are never truly alone in our thinking, feeling, and acting. We remain connected to others even while physically separated from them by time or distance. Dialogue presupposes a relationship between two or more human beings, but this need not be a direct, “real time,” face-to-face encounter. We can speak of engaging in a dialogue with a text, for example, building a connection between ourselves and the author, creating an intellectual conversation that can keep growing and changing over time. Freirean dialogue is not merely aimless or casual conversation. This is not to deny the potential value of talk of this kind; conversing in a relaxed way with friends or family can be vital in enhancing relationships and allowing us to “unwind” from the pressures of the day. But for dialogue to fulfill the educational purpose Freire has in mind, it must have a strong sense of structure, rigor, and direction (Freire and Shor 1987).

Dialogue from a Freirean perspective is not at odds with the principle of respecting and responding to difference; to the contrary, it depends upon it. There must be something we have in common in order to communicate with each other at all. Equally, however, if we imagine a situation (this would not be possible in practice) where everything between two or more participants in a conversation was the same, there would be nothing that provides the impetus or “motor” for dialogue. Dialogue relies upon difference to prompt reflection, to disrupt the flow of events, to unsettle, and sometimes disturb. Of course, differences can sometimes provide a barrier to communication. Dialogue can be impeded by cultural misunderstanding, by class

differences, and by the attitudes, expectations, and behaviors of those present in a conversation. Freire was not naïve about the challenges posed by attempts to cross barriers of these kinds. He took seriously the claims made by those working in identity politics about the difficulties of bringing the principle of dialogue to life in educational situations characterized by class, ethnic, and gender differences. He argued, however, that teachers and students in such situations are never characterized *just* by their differences. He advocated a stance of “unity through diversity,” aware of the criticisms this would bring but also cognizant of the destructive impact of theoretical infighting on the political Left (Freire 1997).

Neoliberalism, Dehumanization, and Liberation

Humanization needs to be understood alongside its opposite: dehumanization. According to Freire (1972), dehumanization is a reality, but it is not inevitable. Dehumanization is the process of constraining, through ideas, attitudes, structures, and practices, the pursuit of humanizing praxis by others. In dehumanizing others, we also dehumanize ourselves. A prime example of dehumanization in the late twentieth century, as Freire saw it, was neoliberalism. Neoliberalism emerged near the end of Freire's life as a complex, multilayered doctrine, applied in different ways in different parts of the world. In its Brazilian form, neoliberalism served as a prompt for Freire to reclaim the need for humanization. In *Pedagogy of Freedom*, he uses the phrase “universal human ethic” to capture what he means by humanization, contrasting this with the ethics of the market under neoliberalism (Freire 1998a). The neoliberal focus on self-interested, self-contained, utility maximizing individuals contrasts markedly with Freire's emphasis on humanization as a social process, driven by a sense of care for others. Neoliberals see knowledge as a commodity to be traded in a similar manner to other goods and services in a competitive market. For Freire, knowledge emerges through our dialogical, critical interaction with others and an ever-changing

world. Neoliberals, Freire argued, are too certain of their certainties; too reluctant to consider alternatives. They have a fatalistic view of human history, convinced their way of understanding human beings and of structuring our social and economic world is the only realistic possibility. Under the influence of neoliberal ideas, educational policy has been driven by an obsession with measurement and performance. From a Freirean perspective, the reduction of human beings to numbers not only diminishes and denies the complexity and unpredictability of human knowing but also dehumanizes the educational process. Neoliberalism, as Freire observed it, created a giant schism between the “haves” and the “have-nots,” exacerbating existing social inequalities. It stood as key “limit situation” at the end of the twentieth century, requiring “limit acts” from those committed to resisting it (Freire 1972, 1998a; Roberts 2010).

This leads to another key concept associated with Freire's work: liberation. In Freirean theory, liberation can be seen as the concrete manifestation of humanization. It will be recalled that Freire saw humanization as both an ontological and a historical process. Liberation is the realization of the historical dimension of becoming more fully human. Liberation for Freire is, in part, a process of struggling against oppression. Freire's primary focus was class oppression, but he acknowledged that oppressive attitudes and actions could be evident across multiple lines of difference. Liberation, Freire makes plain, is never simply given. Working against oppressive structures, policies, practices, and ideas is difficult, sometimes frighteningly so. It is, in many contexts, a matter of life and death, with brutal suppression of political criticism and dissent. Liberation requires commitment and courage. It is not a finite state to be achieved, after which no further work will be necessary; rather, it must constantly be remade. Liberation struggles often throw up contradictions and tensions, demanding careful reflection and dialogue across resistance groups. This is where the need for “unity through diversity” becomes apparent. Groups on the political Right typically have not only far more substantial financial resources at their disposal than those on the Left

but also often display greater pragmatic unity in the face of resistance from oppositional groups. Allowing differences among those on the Left to become a source of strength and hope rather than divisiveness is crucial in advancing the wider struggle against the destructive impact of neoliberalism (Freire 1997, 1998a).

The struggle against oppression, in its myriad forms, can only be understood as a liberating process if certain virtues are in evidence (Freire 1972, 1998b; Roberts 2010, 2016). Foremost among those virtues, for Freire, is *love*. For those who are teachers, love involves the cultivation of a deep sense of care for the students with whom one works, together with a love of knowledge, learning and the process of investigation. Freire (1972) adopts from Che Guevara the notion that love is a revolutionary virtue. It is an expression of our humanity, our connectedness with other human beings. This is not, however, a matter of loving humankind "in general" or as an abstract idea. Love as Freire understands it deals with particulars, with the messiness and complexity of real human lives. Freire also stresses the importance of *hope*. This too is not a false hope based on a refusal to confront the political realities of the present. Hope implies engagement, and this can be harrowing. Indeed, hope often becomes most meaningful and significant precisely in situations where all appears lost. Hope thus conceived becomes not so much the opposite of despair as its dialectical complement. Despair need not cancel out hope; it can give it its very reason for being (Roberts 2016). *Trust* is also crucial from a Freirean point of view (Freire 1972). Neoliberalism, as enacted in institutions such as schools and universities, often relies on a model of accountability where there is a fundamental lack of trust in those being held to account. From a Freirean perspective, the demand for accountability should be replaced with the principle of responsibility, the ethical partner of trust.

Other pedagogical virtues to which Freire paid attention include humility, openness, respect, and a willingness to listen (Freire 1972, 1976, 1998b; Freire and Shor 1987). These human qualities are closely related to each other. Humility arises from our recognition, as both teachers and learners, that

there is always much that we do not know. Freire (1976) notes that no one is ignorant of everything, just as no one can know everything. If we have humility, Freire showed, we will not only accept doubt and uncertainty but come to value them as essential to the learning process. If we are to gain a greater awareness of what is yet to be known, openness is essential. Openness for Freire does not mean one is completely porous; there should always be a process of "filtering," where the contents of consciousness are subjected to critical scrutiny. Similarly, while Freire favored the idea of openness as a principle for social organization, he did not want openness without limits. The open exchange of ideas and the maximizing of opportunities for human creativity must be balanced against concerns for human dignity and social justice. Respect for others is a key criterion in considering the possibilities for, and limits to, openness, and this is also a key educational virtue for Freire. A posture of respect acknowledges the seriousness of education and the importance of each participant in a teaching and learning situation. It recognizes that each person has a distinctive body of experience and knowledge to draw upon in an educational encounter. Building on existing understanding, without merely affirming it, is one of the essential elements of Freirean liberating education. Finally, learning from others, and learning more about ourselves, requires the ability to pay attention and to listen, patiently and reflectively, while also retaining our own right to form and express ideas.

Conclusion

Humanization is the pivot on which everything else in Freirean education turns; it binds the ontological, epistemological, ethical, and political elements of Freire's theory and practice together. Freire's philosophical analysis of this complex concept has been highly influential, but there are always possibilities for further work as scholars and practitioners take up Freirean ideas, consider their strengths and weaknesses, and apply them in novel ways in different educational contexts. At the time of his death, Freire was deepening and

extending his understanding of humanization and dehumanization in the light of the emerging ecological crisis. This was just one of the projects he had in mind. As a thinker, he could never sit still for long. He was aware of his own unfinishedness and was eager to continue writing and reflecting. Paulo Freire was the embodiment of the principle of ongoing educational change, and there is much that remains to be done in building on his legacy in the twenty-first century.

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Gadamer and the Philosophy of Education

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Synonyms

[Bildung](#); [Dialogue that we are, The](#); [Effective history](#); [Fusion of horizons](#); [Play](#); [Plurality of tradition](#); [Predisposition](#)

Introduction

“It is not so much our judgements as it is our prejudices that constitute our being,” writes Hans-Georg Gadamer in the opening paper of a collection of his essays titled *Philosophical Hermeneutics* (Gadamer 1976). This claim is a provocative one and announces one of the more memorable motifs in Gadamer’s writings. It also pursues in fresh directions a new note in

twentieth-century Western philosophy originally introduced by Heidegger. But more importantly for educational purposes, as we shall see, it opens up some promising paths for how teaching and learning are to be thought about, researched, and carried out.

Gadamer’s Radical Preoccupations

Gadamer is a philosopher who has concentrated on investigating the inescapable features of human understanding and the kinds of encounters with inheritances of learning through which understanding itself is advanced, or sometimes beclouded. It is surprising then that he has written little specifically on education. An active philosophical career spanning more than seven decades – till his death in 2002 at the age of 102 – has seen the publication of 42 books and monographs and over 350 articles, increasing portions of which are translated into English, Italian, French, and other languages. Five short essays of his on higher education – chiefly in Germany – have been assembled in English as Part I of a 1992 collection titled *Hans-Georg Gadamer on Education, Poetry, and History – Applied Hermeneutics* (Misgeld and Nicholson 1992). In addition, Gadamer has made some references to his own education in his autobiographical collection of short essays *Philosophical Apprenticeships* (1985). Apart from these occasional writings, education does

not feature as a topic in Gadamer's work. It is worth adding here however that in his hundredth year, Gadamer presented an address in Eppenheim titled "Erziehung ist Sich Erziehen" ("Education is Self-education," Gadamer 2001). The fact remains that on themes like the defensible purposes of teaching, the emergence of one's identity in experiences of schooling, or on issues of authority and justice in education, his writings make few explicit references. Yet they are replete with quite radical implications for issues just such as these where the practical conduct of education is concerned.

This radicalness has been overlooked by some critics who see in Gadamer's recurring encounters with "tradition" the preoccupations of a conservative (e.g., Eagleton 1983; Caputo 1987). The radical dimension of Gadamer's work lies not in anything like an overt political or social vision, as for instance might be said of Paulo Freire's works, or in a different way, of John Dewey's. It lies rather in Gadamer's emphasis on investigating what most Western philosophy since Plato has either overlooked or misconceived, namely: "what happens to us over and above our wanting and doing" when understanding of any kind takes place (Gadamer 1989, p. xxviii.). The consequences of Gadamer's investigations into what unavoidably happens behind our epistemological backs as it were are gloomy for both epistemology and metaphysics, at least as conceived and practiced for centuries. The pretensions of metaphysics to all-inclusive knowledge and of epistemology to establishing secure foundations for certainty are thoroughly critiqued in the course of Gadamer's enquiries. They are made to yield pride of place to something more primordial in the experience of human understanding. It is a bit disconcerting at first sight to learn what this something more primordial turns out to be: interpretation, preconceptions, even prejudices. On Gadamer's argument, philosophical reflection can properly help us to become aware in greater degree of these predisposing constituents of human understanding. Such reflection may discipline or reorient these predispositions. But, he insists, interpretative preconceptions always remain in play and reflection cannot get rid of

them in the name of autonomous reason, or certainty, or any all-encompassing overview. In undermining the traditional claims of metaphysics and epistemology then, Gadamer's account of human understanding – which account he calls philosophical hermeneutics – suggests that human understanding, far from being ultimately capable of rational autonomy, remains somehow irrevocably biased.

A conclusion like this seems at first sight to mark a victory for subjectivism, or even relativism. This would be dismal news for education's claim to be an enlightening and rationally defensible undertaking. But this news remains bad only as long as one's views on rationality itself are in thrall to an outlook – still quite common in Western intellectual circles – which considers the securing of foundations for certainty to be goal of rational enquiry itself. Such a rationalist stance, including positivistic and phenomenological variants of it, is subjected to painstaking critique in Gadamer's arguments. Engaging with a very wide range of philosophical works, these arguments seek to illuminate some inherent limitations in human understanding. Gadamer is keen to illustrate how such limitations have occasioned not only individual instances of human learning to take a wrong path, but whole traditions of human learning to do so. If these researches of Gadamer's can indicate more promising pathways for teaching and learning and their defensible pursuit – if also more modest pathways than those which seek certainty – then the charge of relativism is revealed as misplaced. So also is faith in the rationalism of any philosophy which might wish to uphold such a charge.

New Pathways: Six Educational Themes

This brief sketch should help to highlight, in the paragraphs that follow here, the main points at issue between the new directions marked by Gadamer's arguments and the more traditional currents of Western philosophy. In focusing on those parts of Gadamer's philosophy that are most pertinent to educational concerns, I will identify here six key themes. These are to be

found firstly in his major work, *Truth and Method* (Gadamer 1975 for German text, Gadamer 1989 for English translation) but they are refined and expanded upon in his subsequent writings. The six themes – which are a selective rather than a comprehensive survey – are the primacy of play (*Spiel*) in the experience of understanding, the principle of “effective history” (*Wirkungsgeschichte*), the predisposing of thought by language, the plurality of tradition, the “fusion of horizons” (*Horizontverschmelzung*), and the “dialogue that we are” (*das Gespräch das wir sind*).

In his efforts to illustrate the primacy of play in human experience, Gadamer contrasts this primacy with that given by epistemology to the critical consciousness of the individual. The player – or participant if the word “player” sounds too trivial – in a game, a debate, a dance, or a conversation is always involved in something more than that of which he or she is conscious. While consciously contributing to the play, even with decisive personal initiatives, the player is also *being played* along by the ceaseless flow of actions of others: by the countless moves, reversals, anticipations, constraints, surprises, nuances of meaning, etc. which animate the play and give it its ever-emergent character as an *interplay*. This interplay presupposes a prior context – or contexts – of assumptions, attributions, capabilities, and so on, which gives the participants’ actions intelligibility and significance in their own eyes, if not coherence in the eyes of all. This remains true whether the play takes place in a courtroom, a classroom, a boardroom, or through a conversation, a correspondence, a journal article, a feud, or whatever. The heart of Gadamer’s point is that in our understanding of all purposeful human engagements, what we can properly attempt to achieve is the stance of a critically alert participant as distinct from that of a critically detached observer or objective analyst. (By “our” and “we,” he means humankind.) The stance of detached observer, despite its methodological or theoretical appeal, can give inflated, even illusory pretensions to the activity of critique. All critique, Gadamer argues, belongs within the larger social interplay and historical flow of that which is being critiqued.

This is one of the more important insights associated with the second of the six themes, the principle of *Wirkungsgeschichtliches Bewusstsein* (consciousness of the effects of human historicity). The twofold import of this principle can be put roughly as follows: firstly, there is the consciousness of the effects of history on the contexts where human understanding takes place; secondly, there is the consciousness of being affected in our own understanding by these effects (Gadamer 1989, p. 300 ff.). This has some sobering consequences for philosophy as rational critique. It does not rob critique of its insights or its purpose, but it deprives critique of any claims to an authoritative final word. Critical philosophy, especially as epistemology, has traditionally assumed that it can somehow get behind the contexts which predispose human efforts at understanding; that it can expose the shortcomings of such contexts and succeed in overcoming them. The intellectual attraction of success in this endeavor still presents itself frequently in philosophical discourse as something worthy of philosophy’s own best attempts. But Gadamer’s entire work argues that this attraction is a mirage that all too often fails to be recognized as such.

The third of Gadamer’s themes chosen for this summary, the predisposing of thought itself by language, addresses this issue. It is primarily in language that human experience of a world gets understood and communicated. But to learn a language as one’s own, Gadamer points out, is to become a participant in an informal apprenticeship. In this apprenticeship a growing fluency in expressions and turns of phrase is inseparably linked to the internalization of certain opinions and convictions rather than others. Some parallels with Wittgenstein’s later philosophy become evident here, where language is understood not as a set of tools to be mastered and then employed at will, but as something which remains ever active in shaping our thinking and doing, as well as our speaking. The effects of history, it turns out, pervade language and its usage just as thoroughly as they influence the consciousness, or rationality, of individuals. From this one may conclude that, despite the aura of commanding insight and conceptual mastery associated with philosophical

analysis and critique, the part language plays in conditioning human experience remains crucial. Its pervasive influence in shaping whole inheritances of learning is perhaps the most significant thing about language itself. A champion of the autonomy of reason who overlooks this point might thus fail to detect some decisive presuppositions which quietly condition thought and articulation, even to the extent of stifling the best possibilities of reason itself.

Such dangers may sometimes lie elsewhere than where a rationalist philosophical orientation is disposed to look for them. From a liberal Enlightenment perspective for instance, curtailments of reason and its exercise are often seen to arise where learning and upbringing are marked by a uniformity, or conformity, of outlook invested with the authority of long tradition. There is of course an abundance of historical evidence to support this. Yet these dangers are scarcely less real where diversity has become so prevalent that it can be characterized as a disparate plurality of traditions. In this latter instance, different traditions can act as so many conformities for their own followers, each having its definite truth for its own adherents. It is worth adding that while many such traditions may be primarily religious or ethnic in character, not all are. Some may have a predominantly intellectual temper, for instance.

This introduces the fourth of the six themes: the plurality of tradition. Against both older and more recent uniformities Gadamer argues that tradition is wrongly understood as that which already possesses its own truth for its adherents. More importantly, he continues, the real significance of any tradition, or more precisely, any particular embodiment of a tradition, lies in the *claim* to truth of an unfamiliar kind which it *addresses* to the learner, or the newcomer. So this is not primarily an event of transmission on the one side and of acquiescence on the other. Rather it is an interplay that is ever pregnant with possibilities of new understandings, confrontations, misunderstandings, transformations, and so on. To be properly fruitful the interplay must try to remain open, resisting in particular the thrall of anything partisan. This identifies one of the

main ethical responsibilities of teachers and educational leaders. Before leaving this point it should be noted that the English word “tradition” is used in *Truth and Method* to translate both of the German words *Tradition* and *Überlieferung* (e.g., Gadamer 1989, p. 306, pp. 336–338). *Überlieferung* signifies much more than can be captured in a single English word, namely: everything that influentially “lies over” us from the past. Its educational suggestiveness is more evident than that of the term “tradition.”

Turning now to the fifth theme, a genuine encounter with tradition involves what Gadamer calls a “fusion of horizons” (*Horizontverschmelzung*); on the one hand the horizon of understanding the learner brings with him or her to the encounter and, on the other, the horizon of something specific within tradition which addresses the learner in this encounter. This “something specific” could be a theorem in geometry, a skill in turning wood, a piece of music or verse, a theory in science, a religious teaching, a foreign language, and so on. “Fusion” (*Verschmelzung*) is perhaps not the best word to convey what is meant here. What Gadamer has in mind is not a melting together in which all differences are laid to rest, but an attentive to-and-fro between the learner and the otherness of that which addresses the learner. It is something in which tensions are uncovered and brought to the fore rather than glossed or passed over (Gadamer 1989, p. 306). A particular embodiment of a tradition – scientific, literary, religious, etc. – is brought to active articulation, but that articulation and its own presuppositions can also be questioned and re-questioned by the learner. The learner becomes in this event a more fluent and more discerning participant, as distinct from an “expert” or an “authority” on anything. The learner’s understanding may become transformed in such encounters. But such transformation does not make them events of mastery of something that has now been brought under the learner’s manipulative control. Rather, to allow tradition in any of its manifestations its full voice is also to acknowledge that this voice, like one’s own understanding, is subject to limitations and disfigurements. As a description of

the happening of human understanding, the “fusion of horizons” seeks to illuminate this happening as something which is ever vulnerable to fallible turns, including indeed the institutionalization of such mistakes. The “fusion” is itself an active seeking for a more inclusive and self-critical understanding, as distinct from any completed understanding.

The last of the six themes, “the dialogue that we are” (*Das Gespräch das wir sind*), can be viewed as a natural conclusion of the other five. To illustrate this it is worth assembling these five here as a list of propositions: (a) Human rationality is properly to be understood not as something secured in place by an autonomous reason, but as a continuing play of influences which seeks a more inclusive coherence. Joining in this play means that one is being played – consciously or not – as well as playing. (b) These influences themselves bear the marks of an effective history – i.e., of a history that shapes what actually becomes more influential and what becomes less so. (c) This effective history predisposes thought and language but can also render both of them fluid, and open to new directions. (d) Tradition is properly to be understood not as the burdening force of what has already been institutionalized and which then seeks compliance from learners. Rather, tradition is to be understood as the abundant plurality of all that lies over us as humans in our cultural inheritances, old and new. (e) Encounters with inheritances of learning are properly conceived as active interplays between cultural horizons which are differently predisposed, which are becoming more fluent and critical, and which are also oriented toward a more adequate understanding.

Taken together, these five propositions suggest something crucial about humankind’s capacity for understanding, or to speak in an educational idiom, about the potentialities for understanding that learning environments need to cultivate. This “something crucial” is captured by Gadamer’s phrase “the dialogue that we are” – something that is at once both empirical and educationally beckoning. The educationally suggestive dimensions of “the dialogue that we are” are already

present in Gadamer’s perceptive historical review of the concept of *Bildung* in the opening chapter of *Truth and Method* (Gadamer 1989, pp. 10–19).

Conclusion

To make these educational dimensions explicit is to underline the point that for Gadamer *Bildung* is no longer a metaphysical concept, as it was for Hegel for instance. Availing of Gadamer’s fertile insights, *Bildung*, as the education of one’s human capabilities and dispositions for understanding, can now be properly seen to involve a number of emphases that have commonly been passed over. These fresh points of emphasis are as important for the philosophy of education as they are for educational practice. Let us conclude with a brief reference to just four of them. The first is an emphasis on teaching and learning more as an investigative *event of participation*, with both overt and unseen consequences, than as a matter of transmission of cognitive content and “values.” The second is an emphasis on attentiveness to the otherness, sometimes the challenging and unsettling otherness, of that which addresses human experience when an interplay with any of the voices of tradition is deliberately undertaken. The third is an emphasis on gaining in each instance the fluency which enables an informed and critical questioning of the claim to truth embodied in such addresses. The fourth is an emphasis on incremental, or sometimes decisive shifts in self-understanding, informed as much by an attitude of self-criticism as by a capability for critique. Taken together, these points disclose something of the educational tenor of “the dialogue that we are.” That is to say they disclose something of an educationally fruitful and ethically defensible pathway for what is at once aspirational and practical in the empirical matter-of-factness of teaching and learning.

Cross-References

► [Hermeneutics and Educational Experience](#)

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Gender Equality in Sport

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Introduction

Aside from some notable exceptions (Young 1980, 1988; MacKinnon 1987; Bryson 1987), mainstream feminism has rarely devoted sustained attention to an analysis of sport. This ignorance of sport by feminists is detrimental to developing a broader understanding of female subordination because the practice of sport is one of the most overt sites of contemporary male dominance. The differences in sporting performance both display and help to underpin the dominant conceptualization of human bodies as members of one or the other of two natural, dichotomous, and hierarchically organized categories of gender in modern society.

It is now over 30 years since the pioneering feminist sport philosopher, Jane English (1988), suggested three reforms to the contemporary organization of sport that would advance the position of females within the sporting world and help to break down the dominance of men. Her first strategy was to integrate males and females in sports where there are negligible differences between the sexes or where the differences between males and

females cancel each other out. English's second reform was to have separate sex teams, based on physiological criteria, in sports where the differences between men and women in these criteria are relevant to performance in these sports. Further, females should be allowed to "move up" to the male teams if they are skillful enough to counteract these physiological differences. The final suggestion offered by English was to create new sports that favor the physiological and anatomical advantages which females possess over males. Historically, sports have been developed which favor characteristics, such as height, weight, speed, and strength. In statistical terms, most men will have an advantage over most women in these criteria, and this is then reflected in the level of achievement of men and women in sports such as football, basketball, or athletics. The development of new women's sports would allow women the opportunity to succeed as the best athlete, rather than being marked as the best female athlete in a "male biased" sport.

Some of these aims of the women's movement in sport have been achieved. The integration of many junior-sporting competitions allows boys and girls to participate together. Legislation, such as Title IX in the United States and Equal Opportunities Acts in other countries, has endeavored to equalize the resources, if not the rewards, available for participation in sports for females. Professional tours and competitions in women's sport have gained greater public exposure and created greater financial rewards for the athletes, in sports such as golf, tennis, and basketball. Other sports where differences are negligible, such as marathon swimming, have been integrated on some occasions. Some male sport competitions have allowed females to break through the velvet curtain and appear as players.

This short summary will suggest that current research in the sport and gender equity area has moved on from a "counting numbers" version of gender equality to an idea of the equity of female authority in sport. Male authority in sporting discourse and organizations has always been granted on the basis of the apparently neutral criteria of performance. Excellence in sports has been narrowly defined in terms that generally suit

male athletes and, hence, the perpetuation of male authority. Gender equity arguments in sport philosophy are utilizing feminist foundations to produce greater authority for the females who are part of the sport community (Burke 2010, pp. 11–28).

Early Pioneers: First-Wave Sport Feminism

In order to challenge the current differences in access to authority between the genders, it is important to create awareness of the way that this difference has been produced and protected in history (Hall 1996, pp. 37–40). The current differences in both participation and authority between men and women in sport can be linked historically to historical discourses about women's passivity, dependence, and health which were partly produced and sustained through their limited sporting participation. Anne Balsamo describes these public beliefs in the following way:

... women were discouraged from participating in sport through what we now understand to be culturally defined "facts" of the female body. These facts asserted that women were "eternally wounded" because they bled during part of their reproductive (menstrual) cycle. ... Limiting women's participation in sport and exercise functioned both to control women's unruly physiology and to protect them for the important job of species reproduction. (1996)

Jennifer Hargreaves (1994) suggests that the late nineteenth century was a period of massive expansion in the opportunities for females in the industrialized society. Advances in the fields of women's sports and physical education represented new forms of challenge to the traditional positions for women. The impetus for the provision of sport for females had little to do with liberal notions of freedom and equality. It had more to do with the provision of training to be a good mother and the use of physical work to oppose the natural sexual urges of females, which were suggested as potentially draining for both sexes. Sports, when offered to women, were depicted as mechanisms of social control and

maternal advancement, with men and women playing in qualitatively different ways according to beliefs about their different individual natures. However, from this gendered beginning, women's participation in sport grew.

Feminism and Gender Equality in Sport: Second Wave

According to Catharine MacKinnon (1987, p. 35), the foundational impulse of liberal feminism "has moved to change the dead ends that were all we were seen as good for and has altered what passed for women's lack of physical training, which was really serious training in passivity and enforced weakness." The response in many Western societies, pressured by liberal feminists, has been the implementation of laws, programs, and economic interventions by the State, to try to redress any past inequality in terms of opportunities between females and males. In Britain, the UK Sex Discrimination Act was passed in 1975. It made discrimination on the basis of gender illegal in the context of employment and education. However, the practical implementation of the Act is made difficult in sport by its construction which allows the practice of sport some opportunities to escape from the legislation, often under the guise of dubious biological justifications. As with similar legislation in most countries, there is an exemption clause, Section 44 of the UK Act, that allows for unequal treatment where "strength, speed, and physique" would make mixed competition disadvantageous for either sex. This clause designed to limit adult male participation, when their bodies are considered too big or strong to fairly compete with females, has been used to limit even prepubertal participation by girls in sports such as soccer and softball. In all, the Act reinforces the historically produced discourse of the physical superiority of men and the inferiority of women. McArdle (1999, p. 44) explains, "sports bodies were arguing... that the law allowed them to adopt discriminatory practices that would be unacceptable in virtually every other area of employment."

In the United States, the equal opportunity legislation pertaining to education includes

sections that deal with sport and PE. Title IX of the Education Amendments (to the Civil Rights Act of 1964) was passed in 1972 to remove any system of preferential treatment on the basis of sex in education. There was an immediate increase in funding and facilities for female athletes after the implementation of Title IX. Yet, while the number of active female athletes has increased, there has been a substantial reduction in the number of female coaches and administrators. Since its implementation, Title IX has seen the substantial reduction of women's programs headed by women. This reduction in coaching and managerial roles has even occurred within the pool of sports that women have traditionally played. Increased participation in sports with a history of female participation has resulted in reduced opportunities for females to speak about their participation in these sports, as a coach or administrator.

Calls for human equality remain an important part of the mechanisms available to females to obtain authority, both in sport and in society. The idea is explained well by Catharine MacKinnon when she states that although she thinks "the real feminist issue is not whether biological males or biological females hold positions of power," she also contends that it is utterly essential that women are in these positions of power in order to promote the "real feminist issue" (1987). Some feminists have tended to ignore equal opportunities legislation as merely the incorporation of females into sporting practices that are controlled and defined by males. In contrast, it is essential for females to have access to power in order to resist the maleness of control and definition of social practices, and access to power in some practices may begin with access to participation. This may especially be relevant in many contemporary sports, where women have not yet won the battle for access to participation in all sports, so equal access to some sports remains an important ideal to be achieved (Burke 2010, p. 20).

The substantive use of equal opportunities legislation has mostly been limited to expanding the resources and protection given to females participating in those sports that confirm the so-called athletic "limitations" of their gender. The impulse

behind equal opportunities legislation is to protect the sporting opportunities for most women in most sports. But the legislation has been (ab) used to protect the exclusivity of male sports from “eccentric” females who could reveal the overlap between the sexes in sporting performance. Sporting segregation serves to protect men from the recognition that there is an overlap between male and female performance. Segregation is most ferociously defended when women wish to enter male sports or when women in male sports begin to outperform men. Equal opportunities legislation has not effectively been used to challenge the symbolism associated with gender-segregated sports.

The inclusion of women in gender-segregated sports may have a diminishing effect on the centrality of sport to the discourse of gender. Sport participation has placed females in the public view as physically capable people and people capable of resisting and using violence. It may be that liberal legislative interventions, such as the Title IX Act in the United States, give female athletes the security and position necessary so that they may produce discursive changes about both sport and gender.

Equity and Female Authority in Sport: Third-Wave Resistance

Radical feminists claimed that the mere positioning of females into institutions and practices, which have been traditionally occupied and controlled by males, would not, by itself, produce an authoritative female voice. The interests, values, virtues, and descriptions which men use are set up as human categories. At the same time, females are excluded from these categories and the production of discourse about these categories. As a result, the interests and values of women are ignored or trivialized, and the status of women exists in relation to their subservient role toward men.

The entrance of females into some sports, so that they were no longer exclusively male activities, created problems for the preservation of male authority in sport.

Several methods of resisting female intrusion into male sports arose. There were medical, legal, and scientific pronouncements against female participation in sport, still evident in discussing women’s participation in traditionally male sports such as boxing and football. Active socialization and positive reinforcement of female passivity are apparent in both popular culture and in sport. Trivialization and sexualization of female performance by the sports (male) media undermine the athleticism of many female athletes. All of these silencing acts maintain the male athlete and male sport as the standard, with the female athlete treated as an “add-on” to the supposedly gender neutral structure of sport.

Far more powerful acts of silencing were those that the female sport’s community took up as beneficial, profitable, and pleasurable for female athletes. Organizations which governed female sports in ice dancing, synchronized swimming or women’s bodybuilding, opposed the “masculinization” of their athletes by legislating against certain practices such as excessive muscle bulk and requiring other practices such as makeup, which maintained the trivialization of females as second-class athletes. Other sports, such as netball, basketball, cricket, athletics, and hockey, promoted the use of body-tight clothing to highlight the sexuality and eroticism of their athletes. Other female athletes participated in the production of soft-porn calendars which reinforced the idea that athleticism and emphasized femininity are compatible.

If these mechanisms did not catch all female athletes, then to further support the idea of “natural”, dichotomous and hierarchical categories of the sexed body, the “rational” principles of fairness and equality of opportunity were embraced and used by males to display female inferiority. Let females participate in all sports, as this will show their inferiority to males. The formal organization of sport, which favors male’s physiological advantages over females, allows for the “ideology of equality” to display female’s inferiority. Where female performances display overlap, a secondary set of undermining epitaphs are ascribed to performers, “drug-taker,” “lesbian,” “masculine,” or “ugly,” that are equally as

powerful in denying females access to authoritative positions in sport.

It is common in sports to tie athleticism to notions of physical power and force, which in turn are related to notions of the male body and masculinity. This exclusion of women from the narrow notion of athleticism has accomplished a contrast between men and women in two ways. Firstly, women athletes who engage in physical/masculine sports have their femininity and heterosexuality brought into question through the mechanisms of sex testing, drug testing, stereotyping, and disrespectful media portrayal. Conversely, women who participate in female sports are viewed as appropriate female role models. This has limited the choices that females can make to participate, even in the world of equal opportunities. Hence, Iris Young's (1988) suggestion that "sport and females are mutually exclusive categories" is validated by some women at the level of their bodywork. It involves women accepting practices in order to be included in the community of appropriately sexed humans, even when such practices make them marginal and non-authoritative members of the smaller community of athletes.

However, paraphrasing Foucault's ideas, while oppression occurs from a variety of points, including the sexing of the female athletic body, using a variety of discourses, it also encourages a variety of resistances to challenge normal knowledges. Sites of resistance to femininity in sport commence at the same time as training in femininity begins. Sport offers females a practice in which they can challenge the ways that their bodies are normally inscribed as female. There are females who develop new images of women through resistive participation in sport. Female body builders are one group of athletes who show such resistance to the dominant image of female athletes in society. This power goes beyond participation and incorporation into the dominant discourse. It involves the development of an alternative discourse. Potentially, sport performance offers a space where females learn to actively transform and resist the social constraints on physicality that are imposed on them. From a feminist perspective, this transformative physicality allows women to embody empowerment or feminist consciousness.

Liberal feminism, by itself, does not produce this change in authority. But equal opportunities legislation, taken to its limit of ignoring prescriptive gender roles and characteristics, may open up a space for the socialization of females as authoritative figures through sporting participation (Burke 2010, p. 21). More public challenges to the relations between the genders in sport are likely to occur when women enter sports that are exclusively or predominantly male. In order to develop this radical edge to liberalism, it is necessary to shift the foundation of equal opportunities away from questions of the numbers of female participants and toward the idea of equitable respect for the authority of female participants in different sports.

Sport is viewed as one of a number of practices where this relationship between the two genders is made explicit and is maintained. Feminist research tries to create a discourse where this unequal relationship of power may be broken down. There are diverse and divergent strands of thought and political action within the movement of loosely collected traditions that are called feminist. What all these groups share is a concern with improving the position of women in society. This difference in explanations, campaigns, and solutions displays the plurality of possible feminist positions. As Iris Young asserts (1997), we would be better served as feminists if we recognized that, at certain times, it will be necessary to argue as a liberal feminist, concerned with public issues such as the inequality of funding for female sport bodies or the lack of access to certain sports for females. At other times, it will be more useful to argue in terms of the radical feminists and challenge the male bias in the descriptions of sporting excellence or sporting entertainment.

Cross-References

- [Feminist Pedagogy](#)
- [Feminist Theories and Gender Inequalities: Headteachers, Staff, and Children](#)
- [History of Philosophy of Sport](#)

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Gender Practices in Early Childhood Education

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Introduction

The early childhood education and care (ECEC) sector has been identified as being fraught with misinformation and conflicts around issues relating to gender (McNaughton 2000). While there

are multiple often complex and conflicting beliefs about gender within the ECEC sector, three main views have been identified as most influential. Such influential ideas shape both how gender is understood and therefore enacted by those involved in the ECEC sector and how gender policies develop at center, local, and national levels. Firstly the essentialist view of gender, prevalent in lay society, is keenly felt in the sector although not as prevalent in academic current literature. Secondly, more common in the current profusion of literature is the perception of gender as developed through gender-role socialization. Finally, over the past two decades, a post-structural perspective has risen in popularity in order to support identification and analyzes the complex power relationships that develop through gender roles and identities.

Gender Development in the Early Years

The importance of gender development in the early years is clear as children's early notions begin evolving during this time (Yelland 1998). The development includes children's gender identity, one's inner sense of one's own gender, and their understanding of gender role, the expectation, activities, and behaviors assigned to males and females within society along with gender norms, the stereotypical homogenized idea of a gender (Robinson and Diaz 2006). Gender norms are pervasive in all aspects of children lives including their educational settings. The forming of these concepts begins around 18 months with most children identifying as a boy or girl by the age of three although gender consistency, the understanding that gender remains the same over time even if superficial physical characteristics change, does not generally occur until around 6–7 years (Browne 2004).

During the early years, the young are likely to strictly adhere to gender roles and presentation. Adherence to a rigid understanding of what it means to be a girl or boy by young children, based on gender norms and external symbols such as hair length and clothing style, can lead to children clinging to a stereotypical view of gender

roles (Browne 2004). Children's gender rigidity is also likely to lead to homophily, the tendency for children to form same-gender or same-sex groups and eschew cross-gender play. Under the influence of same-sex peers, themselves holding rigid views of gender, the educational setting provides a strong context for stereotypical gender-role socialization to occur.

Gender Essentialism

The essentialist perspective of gender positions the norms and roles assigned to gender as inextricably tied to a fixed set of traits and characteristics. Gender essentialism is sometimes conflated with biological determinist theory but the latter provides a much broader perspective of essentialism. Similar to historical gender essentialist discourses, which reached the peak of influence during the eugenics movement of the early twentieth century, current theory supports the notion that gender difference is biologically hard wired, inevitable, and inflexible.

Within this paradigm, gender difference identifies females as more empathic and emotional and while males are positioned as more logical and rational (Guerin 2001; Robinson et al. 2006). While there is a small but growing volume of academic literature espousing gender essentialism, it is not currently prevalent in the ECEC sector. Despite this, the gender essentialist perspective is increasingly found underpinning much of the current popular literature on the children in the early years (Browne 2004; Eliot 2010). Underpinned by classical humanism and the fixed and unchangeable notion of the Platonic human ideal, gender essentialism homogenizes gender roles and gender norms to a single idealized character set within a male/female binary. This notion of gender as appearing within a hierarchical binary, with male positioned as superior to female, has become a central organizing phenomenon for gender (Robinson et al. 2006).

Influential in the current surge of gender essentialist, literature has been the development of new sciences and technologies in the fields of genetics and neuroscience (Browne 2004; Guerin 2001).

Based on these scientific advances, much of the popular literature supporting gender essentialism claims connections has been found between personality, aptitude, and gender in recent neurobiological scientific research (Browne 2004). In contrast, to the claims of gender essentialists found in popular literature much academic research acknowledges that science has yet to find conclusive proof for personality or aptitude difference based on gender (Browne 2004).

Gender Socialization

The mid-twentieth century brought new ways of understanding of gender and gender development based on socialization as a group of theories arose as a critique of essentialist development perspectives. These theories strove to explain how human development occurred within societies rather than as a natural phenomenon.

Early Gender-Role Socialization Theories

Gender-role socialization differs from gender essentialism assuming that gender role; identity and norms develop through social influences and engagement. The development would occur as children observe the behaviors, traits, and attitudes considered appropriate for the biological sex they are assigned at birth. Over time there have been multiple theories of gender-role socialization that strive to explain how the behaviors and expectations related to social roles and norms are integrated into a personal identity and social expression (Maccoby 2000).

The earliest of the gender-role socialization theories was based on social learning theory. Formulated by Albert Bandura, social learning theory proposes that identity develops through negative and positive reinforcement, meaning that acceptable gender roles would be predominately imposed on the subject. Later behaviorist theories, including cognitive developmental theory and gender schema theory, also considered gender identity to be imposed upon a subject. Sometimes called sociobehaviorism, these theories are largely rooted in empiricism. Criticism of the notion that individuals are passive in the imposition of

identity leads to further development of socialization theory as researchers began to investigate the ways that subjects themselves are active in identity construction as they interact with their own cultural contexts (Maccoby 2000). Underpinned by notions of relativism, this belief that the creation of knowledge and identity is formed through engagement within a cultural context places on emphasis on language and interpersonal relationships.

Sociocultural and Ecological Theory

The most currently influential socialization theory, in early childhood pedagogy and practice, is sociocultural theory and ecological theory. When using these theoretical lenses to view gender development, the individual is identified as being immersed within a complex mesh of cultural gender roles, norms, and rules that that would be incorporated into the individuals own gender identity and presentation. Sociocultural theory, which emerged in western academic writings through the writings of Russian social-constructionist Lev Vygotsky, emphasizes the role that children and adults play in the active construction of their own identity and roles within their specific social contexts. Similarly, influential is the ecological theory of Urie Bronfenbrenner that also positions identity as constructed by the subject within their social context. Both ecological and sociocultural theory continue to have a strong influence on the international ECEC sector, especially through the pedagogical approach developmentally appropriate practice (DAP). Through DAP there is potential for teachers aligning to gender socialization theory to still emphasize the link between gender and biological sex characteristics. DAP, as a pedagogical practice espousing a child-led curriculum, leads to some teachers having limited agency around challenging children's gender stereotypical play. DAP can also support the notion that the ECEC environment is and should remain neutral to allowing students to develop their individual gender identities which along with the focus on individualization can discourage teachers from engaging with children as actors within a wider social context (Kane 2012).

Post-Structural Theories of Gender

In recent decades, there has been an increase of educationalists who, while still considering gender development as occurring through socialization, critique both sociocultural developmental theories and essentialist theories. Instead, post-structural theory has been identified as a new way to consider gender and to explore the existing relations of power that are embedded in society (McNaughton 2000). Post-structural gender theories do not consider gender identity to be created through fixed biological characteristics or as a learned state. Rather post-structuralism considers gender to be a socialized role continually acted out or performed throughout life, an act described as performativity by feminist scholar Judith Butler (Blaise 2005). Therefore, when using a post-structural lens, gender roles and identity are neither biologically fixed or integrated from cultural transmitters but instead are purposefully acted out in relation to other identities such as culture, race, and class (Maccoby 2000).

This post-structural lens challenges the notion of gender as a boy/girl binary rather it positions gender presentation as performance on a moveable contextual continuum as individuals make sense of often complex gender roles and norms within social contexts and gendered relationships (Robinson et al. 2006). McNaughton (2000) identifies the post-structural notion of gender as performance as especially relevant in the early years of education sector as children often “play” with notions of gender identity during the preschool years.

Gender and Pedagogy

Each of the main three beliefs about gender identified in ECEC, essentialism, socioculturalism, and post-structuralism, influences pedagogy either through teachers individual practice or in the broader range of educational policies.

Essentialism, Gender and Pedagogy

Essentialist notions of gender have been historically influential in early childhood pedagogy. The philosophic underpinnings of both Froebel's play-

based learning and Piaget's stage-based learning, central to early practice and pedagogy, were influenced by essentialist thinking both considering there to be a "natural" development of childhood (Robinson et al. 2006). "The notion of the naturally developing child" Browne (2004, p. 14) claims "is still a very powerful concept for early years practitioners." Teachers and curriculum builders drawing from gender essentialist theory are likely to consider children playing in gender stereotypical ways as an expression of their natural gender roles and maybe unlikely to challenge this potentially stereotypes behavior (Blaise 2005). Teachers might consider themselves to have little agency to change or challenge "naturally" developing behaviors and traits if they considered it appropriate to do so at all. Robinson et al. (2006) point out that gender essentialist theory has long justified gender inequalities in education.

Michael Gurian, a central figure in the resurgence of gender essentialist theory, has written extensively on the intersection of gender and education and the resultant impact on learning and curriculum. Drawing on recent neurobiological research Gurian (2001) claims that gender differences in brain development lead to gendered learning needs proposing that even in early childhood boys and girls have different learning capacities, motivational skills, and personality traits. Such views homogenize learning abilities and styles. For example, the current debate around boy's educational success, prevalent internationally across the wider education system, reaffirms gender essentialism by homogenizing learning styles and educational successes and failures based on gender role. Browne (2004) though asserts that Gurian's (2001) claims although well established in popular literature lacks academic (Browne 2004). According to neuroscientist Lise Eliot (2010, p. 36), such literature has in fact "*no genuine neuroscientific justification.*"

Socialization, Gender and Pedagogy

Teachers adhering to gender socialization theory are likely to consider children playing in gender stereotypical ways as children responding to and imitating gender roles and traits observed in their

wider community (Blaise 2005). Pedagogy developed in response to development in gender socialization theory identifies the challenging or elimination of gender stereotypes from the educational environment as crucial. Described as the nonsexist approach to gender equity this pedagogy developed from the 1970s.

This method includes pedagogical practices such as the use of nongendered pronouns, teachers, and literature promoting nontraditional gender roles and providing equitable access to opportunities for play. This pedagogical response identifies gender as adaptable allowing teacher's agency to explore and challenge such behaviors. This acknowledgment of teacher's ability to have agency in children's gender stereotyped does not though always mean teachers take up this opportunity in daily pedagogy recognizing the need to challenge gender stereotypical play (Robinson et al. 2006). While this method may endeavor to limit the socialization of gender stereotypes, it does not challenge gendered unequal relations (Robinson et al. 2006).

Post-Structuralism, Gender and Pedagogy

Numerous post-structural theorists (Blaise 2005; Browne 2004; McNaughton 2000; Robinson et al. 2006) highlight the role that post-structural theory can play in teachers' pedagogical practices. Teachers aligning to post-structural theory of gender development identify explorations of gender and gender roles as needing to be actively incorporated into the curriculum, both as a response to children gendered play and proactively to explore and critique gendered norms and gendered power relationships. The anti-bias approach, developed by Derman-Sparks (1989) and based upon Paulo Freire's notions of critical pedagogy, proposes the development of pedagogy that directly supports teachers and children to tackle discrimination and create inclusive environments. While still developing in practice and pedagogical application the anti-bias approach can be found in use in several nations. Another approach, also underpinned by post-structural thought, which provides an alternative method for exploring and challenging issues of gender equity is queer theory (Blaise

2005). By exploring the impact of heteronormalization intersecting with gender role teachers can interrogate how gender binaries and the normalization of heterosexuality can uphold gender roles and norms and how this impacts practice (Robinson et al. 2006).

Gender and Policy

It is internationally recognized that issues of gender, race, and class are central to the quality practice of ECEC (Robinson et al. 2006). While in international practices and policy approaches to gender vary widely, there is an acknowledgment of the need for gender equity. Although approaches vary greatly, two broad categories are identifiable across the policies of developed and developing nations.

Developing Nations, Gender and Policy

In developing nations, the policy approach identifies the necessity for equitable pedagogy and practice while also recognizing that a need concerning both access and quality of girls' education still exists. Both international organizations such as the United Nations and national governments have developed policies designed to encourage gender equity education. This policy direction is seen as crucial to providing an overall equitable approach especially in areas where social and cultural constructs such as poverty and gender traditions may limit gender equity (Kane 2012).

Developed Nations, Gender and Policy

In developed nations, approaches to gender equity vary in degrees of explicitness in the curriculum, legislation, and policy from the explicit to the invisible. With multiple practices and pedagogical approaches to gender there is little consistency in approaches across the international sector. Further, to this McNaughton (2000) identified that gender issues have become increasingly removed from the ECEC sector and teachers' daily routines, despite the considerable amount of development in children's understanding of gender that occurs during the early years.

In a number of developed nations, the lack of a specific focus on issues relating to gender and gender equity has been identified (Blaise 2005; Browne 2004; McNaughton 2000). While the intent for gender equity is likely to be entrenched in government policy and law, the focus is often subsumed within a group of diversities, including gender identities, culture, ability, and sexuality. Without a specific policy direction teachers may acknowledge the need for embracing difference in gender norms and roles but not recognize a need to challenge play and stereotypes that fit into traditional gender norms.

The more explicit approach towards gender equity can be identified with the provision of specific legislation and policy. An example of the explicit emphasis placed on gender in early childhood policy and curriculum can be seen in the focus placed on gender equity in the Swedish ECEC. Within Swedish ECEC policy and curriculum gender equity is given a privileged position, mandatory in practice and legislated for in the policy, along with providing a focus on research on gender equity programs and professional development (Pramling Samuelsson and Sheridan 2004).

Summary

With gender as a central phenomenon for organizing society, young children's gender boundaries are closely monitored and shaped across all aspects of a child's life. As this monitoring and shaping also occur including through interaction with other children and teachers making the ECEC sector important to gender development (Yelland 1998). Further, the multiple pedagogical approaches to supporting gender equity in ECEC mean that there are inconsistencies in the importance placed on gender and the role that gender plays in early childhood development. As such there are a number of implications for teacher educators and early education policy makers that may not be addressed in a sector that is beset with conflicts and confusion relating to gender (McNaughton 2000).

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Gender, Postcolonialism, and Education

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Synonyms

Colonialism; Difference; Feminism; Gender; Identity; Marginality; ‘Other’; Postcolonialism; Power; Social change

Introduction

Postcolonial and gender theories emerge from political struggles and intellectual traditions which connect in important ways for education. Most significantly, these theoretical constellations converge in their critique of dominant power and, with this, in their challenge to the production of normative knowledge and authority relations. For example, critical explorations of the colonial and gendered operations of power interrogate how culture and identity are imbricated in the past and present taken-for-granted primacy of “Western,” masculinist knowledge. Such inquiries trouble the ways in which educational practices can silence, obscure, and sideline the knowledge, experiences, and understandings of women and the majority of the South. In doing so, postcolonial gender theories in education are driven by a desire to engage in social change. They explore the pedagogic possibilities for resisting and dismantling the co-constitutive logics of colonial and gendered oppression.

Postcolonial and gender theories sit in the nexus of activism, politics, and academia. Political struggles have shown the coloniality of gender and the gendered order of colonial violence. It is important, therefore, to understand the development of, and relationships between, postcolonial and gender theories in social and historical context. The first-, second-, and now so-called “third”-wave and “post”-feminist movements, de-colonial and independence struggles, the struggles for rights and recognition in the diaspora and indigenous rights campaigns have all influenced the intellectual developments of postcolonialism and gender theory. For instance, the influential work of the Subaltern Studies Group/Collective in the 1980s cannot be considered outside of historical struggles over representation and recognition in colonial and postcolonial India. Additionally, much black and postcolonial feminist scholarship has emerged as critical responses to the deficiencies and blinkers of “Western” feminist politics and its frequent assumption of a universal category of “woman.” Indeed, de-colonial and political struggles by women in the global South, as Connell (2015) reviews, have

produced powerful theorizing about the colonality of gender. But because the global economy of knowledge is at odds with the political history of gender relations, often these forms of knowledge – these theories and philosophies – are not recognized as being as such within the academy.

The different sociohistorical contexts in which theories about gendered colonial relations are produced and mobilized point to the significant diversity contained under the collectivizing umbrella terms of “postcolonial” and “gender” theory. This chapter reviews major contributions to this field, outlining three converging concerns of postcolonial and gender theory that have salience for educational theory and philosophy and research and practice. The first is a concern to understand, theorize from, and challenge the power dynamics of “marginality” and “difference.” The second relates to the subjectification of the Other and how the subjects of “woman” and “postcolonial” become “known,” contained, and controlled. The third regards the development of educational theories of change: the challenging of epistemological and ontological assumptions surrounding colonial and gendered relations across the global North and South.

Margins: “The Silent, Silenced Center”

Postcolonial gender theories critique the operations of power that create normative claims about the value of masculine Eurocentric knowledge and practices. This engagement sees the constitutive forces of colonialism as gendered; “If, in the context of colonial production, the subaltern has no history and cannot speak,” Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak reflects, “the subaltern as female is even more deeply in shadow” (1988, pp. 82–83). Spivak, a significant member of the Subaltern Studies Group, suggests that the “margins” constituted through the gendered postcolonial political economy are “the silent, silenced center” (1988, p. 78). The projects of postcolonial gender theorists to decenter the Self and privilege the voices of the heterogeneous Other seek, therefore, to challenge the hierarchical

binaries of center/margin, Self/Other, North/South, and male/female.

The consideration of what constitutes the “margins” and “marginality” is fundamentally about questioning how the majority world has come to be positioned as marginal to the Euro-male-center. This is an educational concern that cannot be unhooked from past and present political and economic organizing logics. How and why, for example, have gendered colonial forms of knowledge been circulated, legitimized, and normalized through social and educational institutions? In her recent work on feminist theory, author of *Southern Theory* Raewyn Connell examines how the cultures and practices of higher education and the academy support the taken-for-granted salience of (gendered) theories, knowledge, and practices from the global North. Connell argues, “In the era of neoliberal globalisation, the metropole continues to be the main site of theoretical processing, now including corporate research institutes and databanks” (2015, p. 51). This is a process of what Spivak terms “epistemic violence,” in which the knowledge and understandings of the Southern majority are dismissed through cultural and knowledge practices that fail to challenge the construction of the “South” as the colonial “Other” (1988, p. 76).

For postcolonial feminist theory, a focus on the margins is also a means to examine the politics of difference and diversity. Chandra Talpade Mohanty, a seminal figure in the field, for instance, laments that her contributions to postcolonial feminist theory were misinterpreted as a concern for relativist difference in the context of the “triumphal rise of postmodernism in the U.S. academia in the past three decades” (2003, p. 504). This is exacerbated, Mohanty contends, by a “world that appropriates and assimilates multiculturalism and “difference” through commodification and consumption” (ibid, p. 505). In response, Mohanty asserts the need for a conceptualization of marginality that seeks to unveil and challenge the political, social, and economic processes of power that creates the social, economic, and epistemological conditions for “marginality.” To support this project, Mohanty suggests the value in Gustavo Esteva and Madhu Suri

Prakash's terminology of "One-third world" and "Two-thirds world." This language, she argues, more accurately reflects global differences, in contrast to "misleading ideological or geographical binarisms" contained within the couplets "Western/Third World" and "North/South" (2003, p. 506).

The intellectual and political work of postcolonial gender theorists can be seen as a commitment taking the position of the margins in order to critique and challenge the structural bases of "epistemic violence" (Mirza 2009, p. 236). "If we pay attention to and think from the space of some of the most disenfranchized communities of women in the world," Mohanty claims, "we are most likely to envisage a just and democratic society capable of treating all its citizens fairly" (2003, p. 510). This is to eschew an exoticized, commodified reading of "difference," as well as a cultural relativism that risks suspending the possibility of political action.

For example, drawing on black feminist bell hooks, Heidi Mirza suggests that marginality can be a "radical location in which black women can situate themselves in relation to the dominant group through 'other ways of knowing'" (2009, p. 242). As hooks argues:

Marginality is a central location for the production of counterhegemonic discourse – it is found in the words, habits and the way one lives.... It is a site one clings to even when moving to the center. . . . it nourishes our capacity to resist....it is an inclusive space where we recover ourselves, where we move in solidarity to erase the category colonizer/colonized. (as cited in Mirza 2009, p. 243).

Mirza's research on black women's representation and experiences in UK higher education advances a black feminist epistemology. She suggests discriminatory institutional practices are challenged by women of color through their continual resistance and renaming of the "regulatory effects of the discourses of educational inequality in higher education" (Mirza 2009, p. 244). This is to view the struggle at the margins as a struggle for social change.

Importantly, however, for many postcolonial gender theorists, the task is not simply to invert the authority contained within North/South, male/

female, or to naively celebrate "marginalized voices." Sara Suleri, in her influential paper "Woman skin deep," warns against "the simplicities that underlie unthinking celebrations of oppression, elevating the "racially female voice" into a metaphor for "the good"" (1992, pp. 758–759). Critical of the binarisms that she sees postcolonial gender theory at risk of reproducing, Suleri engages complex debates about subjectivity and identity, asking "which comes first, gender or race?" (p. 759). Critically reflecting upon Minh-ha Trinh's 1989 *Women, Native, Other* and bell hooks's 1989 *Talking Back*, Suleri (1992) warns of the dangers of testimonial assertions of postcolonial womanhood. She argues for nuanced historical engagement that moves postcolonial feminist critique out of its discursive and cultural realms and into addressing past and present socio-political and legal practices.

In this way, Suleri offers a provocation to consider the role and purpose of postcolonial and gender intellectuals in the continuing violence of colonization. The question she poses is an ongoing debate for the field, with many arguing against seeing raced and gendered identity through an "additive model of double or triple jeopardy" (Mirza 2009, p. 234). Mirza, for example, argues: "a black feminist epistemology is contextual and contingent and examines the differentiated and variable organizing logics and beliefs that structure women's lives in various historical times and geographic places" (234). Gurminder Bhabra (2014) also calls attention to historical contingency. She argues that a radical deconstruction of the margins remains illusory if the knowledge of the Self and Other is continually constructed as separate: to move beyond binary hierarchies, the *connected* constitutions of knowledge need to be reconstructed. The educational challenge for the field of postcolonial and gender theory is how such relational understandings of marginality can be achieved.

The "Postcolonial Woman" Subject

Postcolonial conceptualizations of the "margins" challenge gendered colonial subjectifications of

the “Other.” In his 1952 seminal *Black Skin White Masks* Frantz Fanon draws on psychoanalysis to examine how gender is constituted within the colonial subject. Fanon (2008) suggests the white “Colonial Self” and the black “Colonized Other” are mutually created through the assertion and presumption of European cultural ascendancy and through complex relationalities of desire operating in and through sexualized and gendered colonial discourses that capture both men and women. In doing so, Fanon calls attention to the gendered, embodied, emotional, and affective dimensions of colonial power. In postcolonial theory, the subject positions of “woman” and “man” are understood as embedded within the colonial project. As scholar Amina Mama writes, “to understand violence against women in postcolonial Africa we must understand the violence of colonialism; and to understand that, we must start with ‘gender relations and gender violence at the imperial source’” (Mama 1997, as cited in Connell 2015, p. 53). These contributions understand gender relations, gendered subject positions, and gendered embodiments, as central to the continuing relations and consequences of colonialism.

In education, Heidi Mirza examines how when navigating educational spaces black women’s identities and bodies become sites of political, postcolonial struggle. She writes, “For postcolonial women of color, it is impossible to escape the body and its reconstructions as we negotiate our embodied social situations” (2009, p. 235). Mirza’s work on higher education in the UK investigates the ways in which the embodied experience of being and becoming a “postcolonial subject” shapes experiences of exclusion, inclusion, success, failure, and participation in education (2009). She examines how the dominant white gaze of higher education institutional practices works to surveil and contain the subject of the black woman, who is now “included” within the institution, but does not necessarily “belong.” This renders the black woman a “mute visible object” (Casey 1993 in Mirza 2009, p. 239). In turn, the feature of benign multiculturalism in education – a contingent inclusion that requires the subject to assimilate – displaces political and

institutional challenges to “the technologies and power of monolithic whiteness” (Mirza 2009, p. 244).

Postcolonial queer feminist scholar Sara Ahmed also takes up the affective and embodied dimensions of “difference” and “inclusion.” In *On Being Included* (2012), Ahmed examines the limits of institutional attempts to address racism and diversity in higher education. She explores how purported institutional commitments to diversity and inclusion can exacerbate the embodied and discursive effects of “difference.” Ahmed claims those who are “different” are often relegated the task of performing and creating institutional practices of “diversity.” She concludes her research by suggesting that those who raise issues about institutional racism often end up being understood as obtrusive. “Diversity practitioners,” Ahmed states, “not only come up against the wall, as that which does not move, they are often themselves encountered as the wall, as obstructing the movement of others” (2012, p. 186). Her point is that institutional and educational practices of “diversity” – as with Mohanty’s critique of difference – can be a smokescreen for a failure to genuinely enact equitable practices. “Diversity” can be adopted as a part of a global marketing campaign, rather than in the interests of institutional transformations required to tackle embedded cultures of racism. Ahmed, therefore, aims her critique at institutional declarations of antiracism that paper over the need for interventions in the political economy of inequality.

The Educational Challenges of/in Postcolonial Gender Theories

Ahmed’s critical examination of the diversity practices of higher education institutions follows a long line of interventions into education by scholars working with postcolonial and gender theories. Indeed, education is at the center of these theoretical considerations: as an instrument of dominant power and a possible tool with which to challenge, subvert, and critique taken-for-granted colonial and gender power and assumptions.

Hazel Carby, author of the highly influential “White woman listen! Black feminism and the boundaries of sisterhood,” for instance, levels incisive critique of education in her 1982 “Schooling in Babylon.” Carby argues schools in Britain work in association with the police and social services to discipline and govern black youth, rather than address the wider social and institutional relations of colonial racism. She likens the practices of so-called progressive teachers to the pacifying role of missionaries “in the wake of the armies of colonisation.” Carby asserts, “Like missionaries these teachers have not examined their own racism in their preoccupation with their own spiritual regeneration through ‘doing good’ to black youth” (1982, p. 199). In particular, Carby (1982) views education as a political, social, and cultural act and as a site of struggle. Writing nearly three decades later, Mirza (2009, p. 244) similarly states, “educational institutions must be seen, not just as mechanisms through which individuals are unconsciously subjected to dominant ideological systems of race, class, and gender, but rather as sites of struggle.”

A key dynamic of this struggle is that of knowledge and epistemology. This has significance not only for the institutions of education but also the institutions and practices of research. For instance, in *Decolonizing Methodologies*, Linda Tuhiwai Smith examines how knowledge, and the claim to “know,” is inextricably connected to the history of colonization. She asserts (1999, p. 63), “The globalisation of knowledge and Western culture constantly reaffirms the West’s view of itself as the center of legitimate knowledge, the arbiter of what counts as knowledge and the source of ‘civilized’ knowledge.” Schooling, she writes, is “directly implicated in this process” (ibid, p. 33). Curricula, maps, colonial histories, and language all reinforce, Smith suggests, a view of indigenous peoples as periphery and Other. To understand the role of education and schooling, therefore, is to understand the past and present knowledge practices, which were – and are – inextricably bound to colonization. Underpinning this is Christian and Enlightenment thinking, which judged “some of us as higher-order

savages who deserved salvation in order that we could become children of God” (ibid).

For postcolonial gender theorists, the intellectual and political task of challenging colonial and gender power is often seen as pedagogic. For example, bell hook’s *Teaching to Transgress* (1994) explicates her approach to “engaged pedagogy,” developing upon the ideas of Brazilian educator and activist Paulo Freire and Vietnamese Buddhist monk Thich Nhat Hanh. Engaged pedagogy, hooks suggests, is a political act that goes beyond critical and feminist pedagogies in its concern with the process of self-actualization for both teachers and students. For hooks (1994), such a pedagogy embraces difference, openness, and the opportunity for intellectual comradeship and discovery through the decentring of “Western” authority.

From different perspectives, a number of postcolonial gender theorists have attempted to explore the possibility for pedagogic practices of resistance. As Mohanty reflects, the “recurring question is how pedagogies can supplement, consolidate, or resist the dominant logic of globalisation” (2003, p. 523). Mohanty suggests that a “feminist solidarity” pedagogic approach best addresses relational constitutional difference (2003). The focus here is not only on the intersections of race, class, gender, nation, and sexuality but also on the interweaving histories, narratives, and experiences of these communities (2003, p. 522). This, argues Mohanty, avoids continuing to treat the “Third World Other” as a pit stop on a tour of difference and starts to examine and critique historical and sociological interrelations. Similarly, Connell advocates an approach based on understanding “gender *fundamentally* in the perspective of colonality” (2015, p. 59). She suggests a “solidarity-based epistemology,” based on “mutual learning on a world scale, in which different formations of knowledge are respected but enter into educational relations with each other” (ibid).

In these ways, the political and intellectual projects of postcolonial and gender theories are centrally educational projects of social change. Brought together, theories and philosophies of gender, postcolonialism, and education offer a

relational, intersectional, and historically nuanced view of social change that is attentive to the political economy of gendered colonial inequality and alive to the possibilities of its transformation.

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Gender, Sexuality, and Marxism

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Synonyms

Abstinence-only education; Curriculum; Education; Homophobia; LGBTQ; Marxism; Sexuality; Teachers

Introduction

In the areas of sexuality and education, sexual dogma serves the purpose of dividing the working class (Agostinone-Wilson 2010). This is done by invoking the expectation of celibacy on certain sexual minorities while heteronormative beliefs leave unquestioned the ability of heterosexual married teachers to display their sexual identity through trivial yet identifying markers such as casual talk about spouses and children or photographs of husband or wife exhibited on one's desk. These everyday actions (and heterosexuality itself) are presented as neutral while any kind of LGBTQ or feminist advocacy is seen as “political.” Such efforts prevent the unity of the workforce required to overcome the worst abuses of capitalism (D’Emilio 1992). So far from being a “fringe issue,” sexuality is a cornerstone of how oppression operates through capitalism.

Adding to the hysteria already promoted by abstinence-only education are heightened fears about pedophilia and its link to homosexuality – a long-standing belief system with roots in the acceleration of capitalism under late 1800s industrialization (D’Emilio 1992). It is important to note that accusations of “sexual deviance” have been evoked several times throughout history in order to target groups by questioning their patriotism or as part of anticommunist witch hunting and red-baiting. This was also seen in early 1970s State efforts to fire any teacher or supporter of a teacher suspected of being gay or lesbian.

Homophobic policies impact not only the LGBTQ community but straight educators as well, because rigid gender norms target everyone (Valenti 2010). To quell majority fears and to distance themselves from these social constructs teachers have often presented themselves as asexual, particularly if they come from minority groups regularly targeted with hyper-sexualized stereotyping such as African-Americans and gay males. Majority fears about sex also shape sexuality education curriculum and laws about marriage. These have deep historical roots within K-12 schooling.

Thus the ideology of celibacy and its relationship to education needs to be understood within a

dialectical historical analysis of how teachers (gay and straight) were and are expected to conduct themselves (Agostinone-Wilson 2010). Related to this is the one common historical thread running through Jim Crow terrorism and contemporary racism, lynching, torture, gender bias, and homophobia: fears rooted in sex (Reich 1971). For example, during the Jim Crow era, black males were portrayed as sexually deviant and prone to rape white women, even though most sexual assaults were and are same-race. In a similar vein, gay males in particular were and are seen by majority culture as sexually aggressive pedophiles. Myths about these groups spreading sexually transmitted disease are another common belief promulgated within mainstream culture, as with media coverage of AIDS in Africa. In all of these cases, these stereotypes serve to justify targeting minorities with violence and discrimination.

This entry consists of three sections: The Role of Homophobia in Schools, The Ideology of Celibacy within the Historical Framework of Teaching, and Sexuality Education Curricula.

Role of Homophobia in Schools

While certainly issues of race are controversial enough, addressing LGBTQ concerns within K-12 schools involve constantly competing interests of religious, economic, and cultural groups regarding beliefs about sexuality and morality. A large portion of teachers in the USA and Canada hold homophobic beliefs toward LGBTQ youth. Kennedy and Covell (2009) report that 85% of teachers and 80% of guidance counselors working in K-12 schools are opposed to including LGBTQ issues into curriculum. Kennedy and Covell also found that gender-based harassment is aimed at gay male students in particular by heterosexual male students making up the majority of harassers. Even students who are not gay or lesbian but who are simply *perceived* to violate norms of gender are targeted, making all students, gay or straight, potential victims.

Homophobia is clearly linked to antifeminist thought and sexism. Certainly gender-based harassment and bullying is the primary means of

enforcing heteronormativity, reflecting the embeddedness of violence within K-12 schools. In the USA, an estimated 1.6 million K-12 students experience gender-based harassment and bullying with LGBTQ kids being three times as likely as straight peers to have been physically assaulted or involved in a fight (Swearer et al. 2008). These acts of violence are not a matter of individual intolerances but are a systemic part of a society that is set on preserving heteronormativity through policing how one dresses, acts, talks, and interacts with others (Swearer et al. 2008).

Heteronormativity is also enforced through specific beliefs disseminated within the school about what is or is not masculine. Even though the media features stories about body image and its impact on girls, boys are by far subject to more scrutiny about their gender appropriateness. This forms a masculine hegemony where those who follow appropriate gender norms and those who are viewed as violating them experience the high cost of loss of peer attachments and solidarity (Agostinone-Wilson 2010; Valenti 2010). Heterosexual males who do not fit the masculine norms are “gay baited” where they are pressured to demonstrate that they are manly enough (Swearer et al. 2008). Usually, this results in even more instances of harassment as those pressured often engage in antigay bullying to show that they are macho.

Remaining closeted is often a strategic decision used to preserve one’s job, especially if one works with younger children. Passing strategies are used, including pretending to have a boy/girlfriend, not challenging homophobic harassment, bringing opposite sex dates to school functions, avoiding LGBTQ topics in class, or even withdrawing from general school culture and keeping to one’s self, often in rejection of the climate of “willingness to disclose” information that permeates many school settings where everyone knows everyone else’s business (Agostinone-Wilson 2010). These strategies often further isolate LGBTQ educators. For many teachers, this is a continuation of their experiences in high school where they never saw themselves reflected in school curriculum, or when

LGBTQ issues were brought up, it was always in the context of harassment or scare tactics related to HIV/AIDS.

Ideology of Celibacy Within the Historical Framework of Teaching

The ideology of celibacy is that sexuality is limited to heterosexual marriage (and within some religious conservatives even then it is only reserved for procreation). Anyone not included in that category is expected to abstain from sexual activity. Expectations of self-control are also bound up with celibacy, which spill over into self-denial for the state and control writ large. Teaching remains one of the few professions where asexuality is held to a higher standard.

Celibacy and asexuality function to make LGBTQ teachers and students invisible. Issues of sexuality are dismissed as having no relevance for most K-12 students, and a default norm of heterosexuality is maintained. Preservice and full time teachers view LGBTQ issues as not being worth learning or that these topics are politically correct. This invisibility is sustained by homophobia where many LGBTQ teachers and students remain closeted and safely out of the way. The default norm of heterosexuality is further enforced via celibacy by sexuality curriculum that advocates abstinence, traditional gender roles, and the like (Agostinone-Wilson 2010; D'Emilio 1992).

The feminization of the teaching force was central to Horace Mann's vision of school reform in the mid-1800s. In order to meet the growing demand for school teachers at the same time factory work was attracting men away from becoming teachers, women were recruited due to their labor being readily available with no competition from other employment sectors, enabling wages to be kept low (Spring 2004). However, resistance to middle class women working outside of the home had to be overcome and part of the way to do this was to ensure the public that teachers' conduct would be heavily monitored and shaped toward Christian virtues of purity.

Today, women provide essential labor for the majority of K-12 schools and child care centers,

yet this has not translated into elevated wages or the promotion of teaching to a true profession. The shadowy borderlands between profession and babysitting hovers over teaching as a form of labor, yet not fully recognized as "labor" in the 1800s, despite low wages and poor working conditions facing female teachers, including marriage bans and a lack of maternity leave which were not addressed until the mid-twentieth century (Spring 2004).

The discourse of the "good" teacher with its focus on celibacy, personal conduct, control of the classroom, and subject matter mastery often supersedes addressing inequality. Personal conduct of teachers reflects an overarching expectation of conduct in society at large, where following rules is emphasized over confronting injustice, including overt and hidden taboos, rules, and regulation of behavior, which are linked to expectations of the ruling elite. Part of the onus of conduct is that anything of a sexual nature should be contained within the family. These expectations of conduct took place against a backdrop of increased State regulation and credentialing of teachers, reflecting an interest in social efficiency (Agostinone-Wilson 2010).

Sexuality, and especially demands for asceticism, therefore becomes a critical arena for accepting the State. However, rifts occur as people attempt to grapple with social expectations and their own desires. This resulting conflict between morality and biology produces neuroses which manifest themselves into antisocial, sadistic acts. Reich (1971) took Freud's thesis of fear of death much further when he located the source of sexual oppression in the oppressed themselves.

It is not much of a leap from sexual repression to the acceptance of corporal punishment, then the emergence of sadism, and finally applying these neuroses to those of a different race or sexuality. It is notable that the kinds of sexual stereotypes aimed at black males are similar to the stereotyping of gay males: sexual rapaciousness, loose morals, and accusations of "recruiting." With recruiting, black males were and are viewed as "going after" innocent white women, whereas gay males are viewed as pursuing underage boys. Here, we see the logic of the purity movement

folded into racism (Valenti 2010). These stereotypes serve as a de facto justification for public punishments in the form of beatings or “gay bashings,” just as lynching was often justified on the grounds of a black man simply looking at a white woman. By contrast, African-American women were not protected in such a manner.

However, there are key differences in the ways that sexual stereotyping emerges through homophobia and racism. African-Americans, often more readily identifiable through skin color, have encountered stereotypes of genetic intellectual inferiority, whereas gay males are identified by their display of “feminine” characteristics and behaviors, with many remaining closeted and beyond detection. At the same time, anyone (straight or LGBTQ) can be labeled “fag” or “dyke” as a form of social condemnation, whereas it is difficult to assign someone the label of a minority group (“nigger lover” is about as close as one can get to such assigned labeling). Because conservatives cannot bring themselves to consider the possibility of homosexuality being a genetic characteristic, LGBTQ people have escaped such biological stereotypes that often face minority groups.

Ultimately, Reich (1971) concluded that to end sexual oppression would require a fundamental overthrow of the organizing principles of capitalism – mere transgressing of sexual boundaries was not enough. This means that patriarchy, sadism, and oppression are not natural features of human beings. Things are constantly changing and evolving, including within the sexual sphere, as borne out by anthropological research indicating the fluidity of human experience.

Sexuality Education Curricula and Homophobia

Sexuality takes particular normative forms within official school curricula in K-12 settings, sending messages about what is or is not appropriate. Even when people might agree that sex is an important health topic for schools to cover, they usually bring up the “proper” developmental age of the student as an excuse to not provide too much information.

Even as religious groups such as Focus on the Family release statistics arguing that having premarital sex increases one’s likelihood of being poor and divorced later on, the median age of first sexual experience in the USA is 17 years, indicating that potential future poverty and being alone are not sufficient deterrents (Valenti 2010)! This means that by 12th grade, most students have had either oral or vaginal intercourse with nearly 15% experiencing anal intercourse. Just because one is not married or even living with someone does not mean one is not having sex – by age 44, 99% of Americans have had sex with the majority having had sex outside of marriage (Valenti 2010). Teen pregnancy rates are declining in first world nations, which are partially attributed to young people engaging in oral sex. However, teenagers have the highest rates of sexually transmitted infections (STIs).

In looking at sexuality curriculum, it is no surprise that the abstinence-only movement emerged during the backlash against the sexual revolution of the 1960s and 1970s. In 1981, the *Adolescent Family Life Act* was passed, providing funding only for pregnancy prevention programs that advocated strict abstinence with no contraception, in many cases couched in religious terms. After a lawsuit in 1993, the Act was not allowed to fund programs with overtly religious messages (Valenti 2010). As a result, the abstinence-only literature took on a secular tone, with an emphasis on the health benefits of chastity. The abstinence movement was further bolstered by the 1996 *Welfare Reform Act* under the Clinton administration which provided 50 million dollars in funding for abstinence-only programs.

Abstinence-only education is inherently homophobic in a variety of ways. First, this type of sexuality education completely ignores health concerns of LGBTQ people (Agostinone-Wilson 2010; Valenti 2010). Second, guidelines for abstinence-only programs prohibit mentioning anything sexual outside of the context of marriage. As Valenti (2010) points out, LGBTQ students are “essentially taught that sexual intimacy is something they can never experience” (p.110). Of course, an exception is when HIV/AIDS is mentioned, it is then tied to the gay community.

Third, some schools cite existing sodomy statutes as justification for not addressing gay issues in sex education.

In addition to being homophobic, abstinence-only curriculum is sexist with its focus on virginity as a primarily female attribute and evidence of a girl's/woman's worth. Virginity is therefore linked to being a "good" person with the implication that girls and women will be at risk of being "used goods" if they engage in premarital sex. The virginity and abstinence movements are not about empowerment but about a return to normative (read: sexist) gender relations (Valenti 2010). Linked to the nuclear family and compulsory marriage, chastity emerges as a demand to institutionalize these family forms (Reich 1971). Finally, virginity pledges that are part of the abstinence-only movement provide a convenient way to intimidate lesbians to remain closeted, as Valenti (2010) discovered in interviews with high school students who had taken the pledge partly as a way to provide cover for their homosexuality.

Among the many fallacies in abstinence-only curriculum are promotions of double standard views of gender, with exhortations for male students to control themselves and be manly men while female sexual desire is not even a point of discussion at all (Valenti 2010). What results is a policing of female desire in particular, since the only appropriate context for it (and the double standard means that women have the most to lose in terms of overall worth) is within straight marriage, and even then the primary purpose is for procreation, not pleasure. Reich (1971) explains that this promotion of patriarchy feeds right into fascist and authoritarian governments where males are privileged financially/legally and extorted to suppress women whereas non-class-based patriarchal/matriarchal societies were more fluid and open to societal change. Compulsory monogamy, then, is part of what gives heteronormativity its power and justifies the status quo.

Abstinence-only education is religious in its message, reflecting the most conservative of Christian denominations/sects in its views on sexuality. Comprehensive sexuality education is targeted by conservatives as one of the primary avenues for "secular humanism" in K-12 schools

and is seen as a major threat to parental authority. Major funding for abstinence-only education plays off of this base of reactionary support in the form of major donations from the Heritage Foundation, the National Advisory Council for Abstinence, crisis pregnancy centers, and, of course, the US government (Valenti 2010). This curriculum is couched in secular language expressing concern about "getting the truth out" about the supposed fallacies of safe sex, but its curriculum is religious on many levels.

Class-based societies have a vested interest in establishing paternity; therefore, virginity serves an important economic function in capitalist society by guaranteeing lineage. This positions women's sexuality as a commodity used to reinforce the nuclear family as the preserver of private property (Reich 1971; Valenti 2010). Abstinence-only education is part of a larger religious movement with economic interests in controlling women's rights so as to control working class wages. In reacting to the downward mobility of their wages and the collapse of the social safety net, conservatives have turned to sex as a target for the source of social ills, rather than a capitalist economy which is Godly and cannot be critiqued.

Put plainly, what the abstinence-only movement requires is that young people suppress their sexual selves in service to the State. Religion is the primary – though not the only – vehicle for steering people into the nuclear family arrangement, which is critical for reproduction of the workforce that capitalism demands. Since our society levels the most social benefits on married couples (inheritance, medical coverage, tax breaks, housing loans), the ruling elite are interested in limiting this to heterosexuals, though gay and lesbian marriage could certainly be assimilated into a capitalist system without a hitch as we are currently witnessing.

What this demonstrates is that economic concerns can lead to desires to address social issues in the form of attempts to police morality. Though the temperance movement was eventually connected to the abolition of slavery and the growth of feminism, it focused the bulk of its efforts on prohibiting a behavior. In a similar vein, abstinence-only advocates are chasing a

shadow of what cannot be while leaving the root cause of oppression intact.

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Gendered Violences and Queer of Color Critiques in Educational Spaces: Remembering Sakia, Carl, and Jaheem

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Synonyms

Anti-black; Anti-normative; Carl Joseph Walker-Hoover; Difference; Gender; Genderqueer; Homophobia; Nonnormative; “Others”; Performance; Queer; Sakia Gunn; Transphobia

Introduction

Queer of color (QOC) critique arises from a field outside of education. However as recent educational studies and some scholars (see

Brockenbrough 2015; Coloma 2013; Cruz 2013; McCready 2013; Pritchard 2013) in the field have noted, queer of color critique offers useful theoretical insights and tools to enhance educational research practices. The aim of this text is twofold: to offer an overview of queer of color critique and provide relevant connections between QOC critique and education broadly defined. To do so this text uses the figures of Sakia Gunn, Carl Joseph Walker Hoover and Jaheem Herrera, youth of color as fulcrums to illustrate the stakes and therefore necessity of intersectional approaches like QOC critique. Queer of color critique provides educators and educational researchers useful ways to address issues of anti-Black racism and anti-queer antagonisms as they cut across those bodies marginalized because they are demarcated by difference, otherness, and nonnormativity.

Before continuing, it is important to note how queer is deployed throughout this text. Informed by queer theory and in particular queer of color critique and Black queer theory, lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer (LGBTQ) are used interchangeably. In doing so, this text specifically attends to how LGBTQ identities signal an understanding of queerness as a unifying identifier of sexual desires and sexualities that are not heterosexual. While this definition rings true for many of the subjects discussed within this essay, who can be understood as queer because of same sex desire, this text advances an argument for a more intentional understanding of how youth of color and Black youth in particular as racialized subjects are queered and thus experience differential treatment and harm.

To be a racialized other, within an American context, has always been imagined queerly, despite efforts to understand social justice issues related to race and sexuality through monocausal lenses. Examples of this can be seen in how Black familial structures, sexual lives, and citizenship have been policed and read as aberrant within the United States (Cohen 1997; Ferguson 2004; Somerville 2000). For example, Cathy Cohen (1997), in discussing the regulation of enslaved Black bodies “to endure a history of rape, lynching, and other forms of physical and mental terrorism,” demonstrates how Black people as a

“marginal group [...] lacking power and privilege although engaged in heterosexual behavior, have often found themselves defined as outside the norms and values of dominant society” (p. 454). Of importance is Cohen’s (1997) critique in the failure of queer politics to actualize anti-assimilationist, disruptions to dominant norms, which might produce, “a politics where the *non-normative* and *marginal* position of punks, bulldaggers, and welfare queens, for example, is the basis for progressive transformative coalition work” (p. 438). Cohen’s (1997) article, *Punks, Bulldaggers, and Welfare Queens: The Radical Potential of Queer Politics*, highlights the possibility of thinking through queerness not only in relationship to same-sex desire and attraction but to consider how nonnormative, deviant lifestyles, and racialized subjectivities are positioned queerly.

As a project queer theory seeks to unsettle various forms of normativity, thus, its utility is to consider how to unsettle logics, which normalizes the degradation of racialized subjects, gender non-confirming youth, and those outside of heteronormativity. In this way this text in reviewing current queer scholarship which focuses on the intersections of race, nonnormativity, and power builds upon extant scholarship in education which asks us to consider how racialization processes in a racist society perpetuate systemic forms of oppression and how those most affected react in kind (Dumas 2013; Dumas et al. 2016; McCready 2010).

Remembering Sakia Gunn, Carl Joseph Walker-Hoover and Jaheem Herrera

The victimization of queer youth in recent years has arguably garnered growing public concern in regard to the homophobic bullying and violence received by gender nonconfirming students, self-identified same gender loving youth, as well as their presumed heterosexual counterparts (Brockenbrough 2015). This is evidenced in the national news coverage of LGBTQ youth suicides in 2009 and the subsequent reverberations of this coverage (James 2009). For example, in

September 2010, Dan Savage, syndicated columnist and author created a YouTube video along with his partner Terry Miller to inspire “hope” for LGBT youth experiencing bullying and harassment ([It Gets Better Project](#)). Savage and Miller’s initial video was a “response to a number of students taking their own lives after being bullied in school, they wanted to create a personal way for supporters everywhere to tell LGBT youth that, yes, it does indeed get better (It Gets Better Project).” Their video served as the catalysts for the It Gets Better Project (IGBP), which launched its initial website in October 2010 ([It Gets Better Project](#)). The reception of the IGB project led to an overwhelming response of YouTube videos created by internationally acclaimed celebrities, politicians, businesses, as well as a myriad of concerned individuals. However, as Puar (2010) notes despite the virality of these videos and their aspirational, claim it doesn’t just get better.

Puar’s (2010), pointed critique illuminates the ways that race and other forms of difference in their absence thwart advancing nuanced discussions on the multiple forms of oppression which conspire to queerly mark students both inside and outside of schooling contexts. Take, for instance, Carl Joseph Walker-Hoover and Jaheem Herrera, youth of color who committed suicide in 2009. On April 6, Hoover’s mother discovered him, with an extension cord wrapped around his neck, hanging from the third floor rafter of their home in Springfield, Massachusetts (James 2009). Herrera, a resident of Atlanta, Georgia, took his life 10 days after Hoover (Simon 2009). Discovered by his mother and younger sister, Herrera was found hanging by his belt in his bedroom closet (Simon 2009). Hoover and Herrera were both only 11, when they decided to silence the daily taunts they experienced, of being called, “girlie,” “gay,” or “fag” (James 2009; Simon 2009).

Markedly different than suicide, Sakia Gunn, a self-identified Black lesbian, experienced anti-queer violence in part due to her gender nonconformity. May 2003, in Newark, New Jersey, Gunn, a 15-year-old Black lesbian, was stabbed and bled to death after refusing the sexual advances of her killer Richard McCullough

(Freeman 2008; Goodman and González 2003). Sakia, Jaheem, and Carl all in their gender non-conformity became queered subjects. Their lives and the tragedies of their deaths highlight how affronts to heteronormativity are connected to the ways that those deemed as ostensibly straight can be queered by hierarchical systems of power. Sakia in her refusal of McCullough and heteropatriarchy, her daring to exist in her truth made her a vulnerable target (Brown 2015). This same vulnerability can be seen in the treatment of Herrera and Hoover because of their nonnormative performances of masculinity. Noticing these connections not only becomes important in combating racism, homophobia, and other threats to “equity and justice in American education” but also in improving the afforded safety, quality, and right to life these youth experience (Brockenbrough 2015, p. 29).

The monocausal framing of the issues as illustrated by popular responses to Sakia, Jaheem, and Carl miss the systemic ways that race, sexuality, class, youthfulness, and gender (expression) simultaneously structure the lives of youth. Such frames ignore how issues of race, ethnicity, and class interact with issues of homophobia and anti-queer antagonisms. The deaths of non-LGBTQ people of color are deeply connected to the deaths, suicides, violence, and victimization experienced by LGBTQ-identified individuals because “young folks of color operate in the world as queer subjects, the targets of racial normalizing projects intent on pathologizing across the dimensions of race, class, gender, and sexuality. By normalizing their degradation, marginalization, and invisibility, it becomes something to which we no longer pay attention” (Cohen 2010, p. 128). To talk about race, sexuality, and difference, we need tool kits that do not eviscerate bodies rhetorically or discursively as they are disappeared and destroyed literally by State apparatuses and individual agents upholding systemic forms of oppression. Queer of color critique provides an avenue for researchers, educators, and those concerned with supporting efforts to address homophobia, racism, and other issues of social justice in educational contexts broadly defined.

Queer of Color Critique

Defined initially by Ferguson (2004), queer of color critique “interrogates social formations as the intersections of race, gender, sexuality, and class with particular interest in how those formations correspond with and diverge from nationalist ideals and practices” (p. 149). An interdisciplinary field of analysis, QOC critique centers the lives of queer people of color, their relationship, and resistance to power.

In its analysis, QOC critique assumes that approaches to the cultural studies of race, class, gender, and sexuality are segregated, resulting in the “monocausal protocols” which can only consider a particular subjectivity at the expense of another (Crenshaw 1991; Ferguson 2004). These “monocausal protocols,” in their exclusive approach, also reproduce accounts of marginalized subjects, which give precedence to those within the group who are more privileged, in which Blackness may be only thought of to equal maleness, or femininity to only equal White women, etc. (Crenshaw 1991; Muñoz 1999; Ferguson 2004).

QOC critique is informed by two theoretical legacies, women of color feminisms and queer theory/studies. Engaging queer theory broadly, QOC critique aligns itself with queer studies focus on challenging heteronormativity, destabilizing and denaturalizing identity categories based on sexuality, and understanding the formation and possibilities of transgressive sexual and gender formations in relationship to patriarchy and heteronormativity (Brockenbrough 2015; Eng et al. 2005; Jagose 1996; Sedgwick 1993; Somerville 2007; Warner 1993). As a genealogical offshoot of queer theory, Black queer theory is also influential in understanding the landscape in which queer of color critique emerges. An interdisciplinary project which blends theories, methodologies, and analyses of Black studies and queer studies, Black queer theory, in its fusing the social sciences and humanities, strives toward a liberatory project which usurps monolithic identity formation and strategies based on these formations to imbricate, race, class, gender, and sexuality (Johnson and Henderson 2005). Concordantly, other racialized engagements with queerness (e.g., queer Asian/

Asian American studies, Puerto Rican queer studies, Black queer Diaspora studies, queer Latina/Latino studies, etc.) characterize the entanglements and distinguishing characteristics of queer of color critique (see Allen 2011, 2012; La Fountain-Stokes 2009; Lim 2013; Manalansan 2003; Muñoz 2000; Rodriguez 2003, 2010; Tinsley 2008).

As a field, QOC critique narrates itself as emerging from women of color feminism instead of white Euro- and American-centered gay/lesbian/queer theory (Hong and Ferguson 2011). Women of color feminist have been instrumental in forging a bevy of scholarship, theoretical paradigms, and interventions, which seek to understand how race, sexuality, gender, and other forms of difference are co-created (Collins 1995, 2004; Crenshaw 1991; Gaunt 2006; Hooks 2004). Developing the analytic of intersectionality, women of color feminist have helped to illustrate the ways that systems of oppression are created in relationship to one another and are experienced simultaneously by an individual. Equally important is how women of color feminist scholarship challenges regimes of knowledge formation and production which would seek to discredit the knowledge of women and people of color and in doing so further instantiate hegemony (Alexander 2005; Brown 2013; Minh-ha 1989; Moraga and Anzaldúa 1983).

Exploring the Possibilities of Queer of Color Critique in Education

In his review of queer of color critique in educational research, Brockenbrough (2015) makes key connections between this particular body of scholarship and educational literature. Specifically, he draws out three key themes, which he proposes as recurrent in the scholarship and proposes for the development of each into a fuller research agenda for educational research. These themes include “the politics of knowledge production; the lived experiences of intersectionality; and the politics of queer visibility” (p. 32). Brockenbrough in illuminating these three themes pays close attention to the agentive practice of queer youth in order to offer a critical counterbalance to youth victimization narratives (see Blackburn 2005;

Brockenbrough 2015; McCready 2013). Moreover, his review of extant QOC critique literature in relationship to education illustrates how QOC critique when applied as an analytic lens has multiple applications for educational scholars not just for those interested in queers of color but who broadly “share a concern for social justice in education (Brockenbrough 2015, p. 38).”

Aligning with Brockenbrough’s call to seriously take up QOC critique in educational research, this text underscores the importance to consider what the lives of youth such as Jaheem Herrera, Carl Joseph Walker-Hoover, Sakia Gunn, and other youth queered through their non-normative performances have to offer the field of education. Take, for instance, Carl’s mother, Sirdeaner Walker, who on more than one occasion wished to express the fact that her son was not gay but that he was relentlessly bullied and that the schools did nothing (Essence 2009; Walker and Byard 2011). In an interview, Sirdeaner states, “I have been homeless, but Carl and I made it through [. . .] I was a victim of domestic violence, and we made it through. The one thing we couldn’t get through was public school” (James 2009, p. 3). What would it mean to think of QOC youth experiences in relation to a failing public school system, which abuses and punishes racialized, feminine, gender nonconfirming, and low-income/working class bodies? Further, what would it mean to analyze the structures, which perpetuate this type of violence, and how queer youth of color navigate these structures?

As educational researchers attend to the multiple ways of improving queer students of color, it is important to remember the lives and stories of Sakia Gunn, Jaheem Herrera, and Carl Joseph Walker-Hoover. Each illuminates the need for complex tool kits which would allow educational researchers to attend to the development of curricular and pedagogical interventions and the exploration and appreciation of the knowledge created by queers of color in and outside of schooling contexts which might better foster life-enhancing opportunities for these youth. Neither Carl nor Jaheem identified as gay or same gender loving, accordingly the bullying that they

experienced can neither be understood nor addressed through monocausal frames. Anti-bullying efforts, which focus simply on sexuality, fail to adequately address the intersectional nature of this issue (Pritchard 2013).

Queer of color critique like other discourses of difference (e.g., critical race theories, disability studies, crip theory, etc.) provides important and necessary ways to attune to the lives of queer youth of color, expanding the ability of educational researchers to create theories and methodologies which live, practice, and imagine ways of being that liberate and challenge domination. The usefulness of a QOC critique lens in educational policy and practice is that if taken seriously, the intersectional approach it provides would address issues of dominance across the multiple vectors in which students actually experience these. Schools in their operation are representations of discourses and ideologies of the culture in which they are embedded. Furthermore schools serve as primary centers to foster these ideas. As microcosms, which reflect dominant and marginalized communities/identities and also perpetuate ideologies of value, it is presumable that safer schools might lead to safer streets. The type of danger Jaheem and Carl experienced in school mirrored the danger Sakia faced beyond the schoolyard. The school taunts Carl and Jaheem's experience; their rhetorical violence lays the bedrock for the discursive and physical violence Sakia endured that ultimately cost her, her life. This relationship is critical as educators continue to take seriously the implications of educational policy and practice to shape the bend of our society toward social justice.

Paying attention to the lives and agentic practices of queer youth of color while expanding our practices as educational researchers is of the utmost importance given our historical moment. A moment in which we see the continued expansion of modes of power which brutalize racialized bodies, the poor, women/girls, non-gender confirming and a host of other deviant devalued bodies and communities (Brown 2013; Cacho 2011; Hong and Ferguson 2011). Sakia, Jaheem, Carl and others like them deserve not only our best efforts but the ability to live and to do so on their own terms.

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Genderqueer

► Gendered Violences and Queer of Color Critiques in Educational Spaces: Remembering Sakia, Carl, and Jaheem

Genealogy

- [Foucault and Educational Theory](#)

General Education

- [Liberal Arts Education](#)

Geography

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Gestell

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Gilligan

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Gilligan-Kohlberg Controversy

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Kohlberg started his research on moral development in the mid-1950s when he began to prepare his doctoral thesis. The thesis was presented in 1958 under the title *The Development of Modes of Moral Thinking and Choice in the years 10–16* (Kohlberg 1988). Kohlberg takes as a starting point Jean Piaget's four-staged model of the application of rules and the two types of morality. In his book *The Moral Judgement of the Child*, Piaget

(1983) uses a game of marbles as an example of an extremely complex system of rules, “a kind of jurisprudence of its own.” When adopting the rules, a child goes through four successive stages. The first stage concerns just a purely motor and individual character and thus does not have any significance for Kohlberg, but the next three stages form the foundation of Kohlberg's theory. Those three Piaget's stages are the stage of egocentrism (II), the stage of cooperations (III), and the stage of codification of rules (IV). From this study of rules of a game, Piaget concludes that there are two types of respect which are at the same time two types of morality: the morality of heteronomy and the morality of autonomy. Kohlberg used Piaget's model as the form of preunderstanding in his empirical research on boys' moral thinking (Kohlberg 1973, p. 632):

Our psychological theory of morality derives largely from Piaget, who claims that both logic and morality develop through stages and that each stage is a structure which, formally considered, is in better equilibrium than its predecessor. It assumes, that is, that each new (logical or moral) stage is a new structure which includes elements of earlier structures but transforms them in such a way as to present a more stable and extensive equilibrium.

Here, Kohlberg adapts Piaget's application of Hegel's theory of phenomenology of the spirit – the development of consciousness and civilization – and especially the concept of *Aufhebung*. Explicitly, Kohlberg wants to tie his theory to the ethics of Kant and Rawls (Kohlberg 1973, p. 632):

These ‘equilibration’ assumptions of our psychological theory are naturally allied to the formalistic tradition in philosophic ethics from Kant to Rawls. This isomorphism of psychological and normative theory generates the claim that a psychologically more advanced stage of moral judgment is more morally adequate, by moral philosophic criteria.

As Habermas (1995) points out, Kohlberg's empirical data is theory-laden, and we want to add that it is so within the Hegelian and Kantian paradigms. Its validity is connected to the validity of Kant's moral universalism and Hegelian-Piagetian evolutionism. These philosophical paradigms can never be empirically verified.

In his doctoral thesis, Kohlberg (1988) writes not about stages but modes of moral thinking. Kohlberg interviewed seventy-two 10–16-year-old boys living in the suburban areas of Chicago. Half of them were upper-middle class, the other half lower to lower-middle class. He presented them a moral dilemma and started posing questions related to dilemma. He used three different dilemmas (later on there were ten dilemmas), to which there are no right answers. Kohlberg was not interested in the solutions of the informants as such but rather in the reasons or bases that the informants presented for their solutions. The Heinz dilemma was one of the moral problems that Kohlberg used in his very first studies. Kohlberg (1988) used the following formulation:

A woman was near death from a special kind of cancer. There was one drug that the doctors thought might save her. It was a form of radium that a druggist in the same town had recently discovered. The drug was expensive to make, but the druggist was charging ten times what the drug cost him to produce. He paid \$200 for the radium and charged \$2,000 for a small dose of the drug. The sick woman's husband, Heinz, went to everyone he knew to borrow the money, but he could only get together about \$1,000 which is half of what it cost. He told the druggist that his wife was dying and asked him to sell it cheaper or let him pay later. But the druggist said: "No, I discovered the drug and I'm going to make money from it." So Heinz got desperate and broke into the man's store to steal the drug for his wife. Should Heinz have broken into the laboratory to steal the drug for his wife? Why or why not?

In the 1960s, Kohlberg did intensive empirical and theoretical research to create a proper developmental theory of human morality. Kohlberg (1969) presented the result of that work in a long article called "Stages and Sequence: The Cognitive-Developmental Approach to Socialization". In this article, Kohlberg presented three bases of moral judgments and six stages of development in the following way (Kohlberg 1969, p. 376):

Basis of moral judgment:

- I. Moral value resides in external, quasi-physical happenings, in bad acts, or in quasi-physical needs rather than in persons and standards.

Stages of Development:

1. Obedience and punishment
2. Naively egoistic orientation

Basis of moral judgment:

- II. Moral value resides in performing good or right roles, in maintaining the conventional order and the expectancies of others.

Stages of Development:

3. Good-boy orientation
4. Authority and social-order maintaining orientation

Basis of moral judgment:

- III. Moral value resides in conformity by the self to shared standards, rights, or duties.

Stages of Development:

5. Contractual legalistic orientations
6. Conscience or principle orientation

Later, Kohlberg named these three bases of moral judgments as the preconventional, conventional, and postconventional level (e.g., Kohlberg 1981, pp. 17–19; 408–412). The descriptions of the six stages remain essentially the same. In the first stage, action is motivated by avoidance of punishment, in the second stage by desire for reward or benefit, in the third stage by anticipation of disapproval of others, and in the fourth stage by anticipation of dishonor and by guilt over concrete harm done to others. In the fifth stage, action is concerned about maintaining the respect of equals, of the community, and own self-respect, and in the sixth stage, about self-condemnation for violating one's own principle (Kohlberg 1969, pp. 381–382). Kohlberg presents a basic "pro and contra" motive-related argumentation to the question "Should Heinz steal or not" as shown in Table 1.

Kohlberg has also asked actual political moral problems. In his article "Capital Punishment, Moral Development, and Constitution," Kohlberg applies his Kantian theory of moral development to empirical study on moral judgments on capital punishment (Kohlberg and Elfenbein 1981). In this study, Kohlberg and Elfenbein come to the following conclusion (Kohlberg and Elfenbein 1981, pp. 242–242):

We show that the moral principles applied by individuals to the problem of capital punishment derive from their stage of moral development. . . On the

Gilligan-Kohlberg Controversy, Table 1 Typical expressed motives for action in the case of Heinz' dilemma (modified from Kohlberg 1969, pp. 380–381)

	Should steal	Should not steal
Stage 1	If you let your wife die, you will get trouble	You shouldn't steal the drug because you'll be caught and sent to jail if you do
Stage 2	If you do happen to get caught you could give the drug back and you wouldn't get much of a sentence	If his wife dies, he shouldn't blame himself, it wasn't his fault she has cancer
Stage 3	If you let your wife die, you'll never be able to look anybody in the face again	After you steal it, you'll feel bad thinking how you've brought dishonour on your family and yourself; you won't be able to face anyone again
Stage 4	You'll always feel guilty that you caused her death if you don't do your duty to her	You're desperate and you may not know you're doing wrong when you steal the drug
Stage 5	If you let your wife die, it would be out of fear, not out of reasoning it	You'd lose self-respect and respect in the community, if you are carried away by emotion and forget the long-range point of view
Stage 6	If you let your wife die, you'd always condemn yourself for it afterwards	If you stole, you wouldn't be blamed by others but you'd condemn yourself because you wouldn't have lived up to your own conscience and standards of honesty

basis of our longitudinal data and our theory of moral development, we claim that attainment of the most mature stages generates moral condemnation of the death penalty.

We very much want to support Kohlberg's and Elfenbein's conclusion because capital punishment represents a very biblical concept of justice and its supporters must have some deficiency in their moral reasoning: supporters of capital punishment are not fully matured adults with fully developed moral consciousness. Unfortunately, this conclusion leads to a very strange situation, because Kant himself thinks that capital punishment is the just punishment for murder (see Ataner 2006). Did Kant seriously misunderstand his own moral theory, and did he never attain the most mature stage of moral development? Are there also other people or groups who have not attained the most mature stage of moral development because they do not agree with Kohlberg's interpretation of Kant's political liberalism: people who do not support constitutional parliamentarism (e.g., Aristotle or Marcus Aurelius); people who do not recognize the private ownership of land, water, and air (e.g., Thomas More, Karl Marx or Sitting Bull alias Thathánka Íyotake); people who do not believe in universal moral principles (e.g., William James or Martin Heidegger), etc.? If one does not accept

Kantian humanism, has she or he attained the moral maturity (see Kakkori and Huttunen 2012)?

Kohlberg believes that political liberalism "will not be replaced by a new ideology of the West but will continue to be its dominant ideology for the next century" (Kohlberg 1981, p. 233). Furthermore, Kohlberg believes that the liberalistic concept of justice represents a higher conceptualization of justice in the same sense in which a higher developmental stage in morality represents a higher understanding of justice. In society, too, there is a trend in the progression toward higher stages, and that is why the trend toward liberalism is the "natural" one (Kohlberg 1981, p. 237). One could claim that moral education based on Kohlberg's theory is indoctrinative (e.g., Broughton 1986) because it aims at Kantian universalistic moral thinking and political liberalism and rejects alternative modes of moral and political thinking. Kohlberg denies that his approach to moral education is indoctrinative. Kohlberg (1981, p. 28) says that his approach "differs from indoctrinative approaches because it tries to move the student's thinking in a direction that is natural for the student rather than moving the student in the direction of accepting the teacher's moral assumptions. It avoids preaching or didacticism linked to the teacher's authority." Maybe it avoids the teacher's didacticism, but it might not

avoid Kohlberg's own preaching and didacticism on universal moral principles and political liberalism as the natural telos of society. And how do we know that the direction of Kohlbergian moral education is "natural"? Even Kohlberg's distinguished friend and supporter, the philosopher Jürgen Habermas claims that stages 5 and 6 in Kohlberg's theory are not natural stages (Habermas 1990, p. 224).

Kohlberg does not take seriously the possibility that human morality and its development could consist of more than mere cognitive moral reasoning. Even Piaget writes about the important role of a child's first moral feelings (see Piaget 1981, pp. 44–55). Maybe moral sentimentalists have some say on this matter. Maybe empirical research on moral sentiments is also needed (see e.g., Juujärvi 2003). Maybe there is some knowledge on love, i.e., "love knowledge," which is not blind. We do not want to say that Kohlberg's moral theory is a total failure and that all his empirical findings are good for nothing. Kohlberg will have a permanent place in the history of ethics, psychology, and education. His theory on moral development deserves a serious consideration. Nevertheless, we claim that his theory on human morality and its development is one-sided and tendentious.

Carol Gilligan, a friend and a colleague of Kohlberg, familiarized herself very deeply with Kohlberg's research method and moral thinking. Gilligan started her academic career as a researcher in Kohlberg's research project. Gilligan describes a case of two 11-year-old children, Jake and Amy, participating in a study with Kohlberg's formulation of the Heinz dilemma. Jake's answer was clear: Heinz should steal the drug (Gilligan 1993, pp. 25–38). Jake used logical argumentation like comparing the value of human life and the drug. He also used the argument that mathematics is the only totally logical thing. Thus, the moral dilemma can be solved by logic and reason, and everybody would come to the same conclusion, because his solution is rational. Jake also considered the fact that stealing is against the law. Here he claimed that laws can be wrong, because you cannot write up a law for everything you can imagine. Jake did not change

his answer when more questions about the dilemma were asked. Jake's judgments are scored as conventional on Kohlberg's scale, a mixture of stages three and four. He has the ability to use logic, to differentiate morality from law, and he was sure about his judgment based on justice.

According to Kohlberg's theory, Amy's judgment of the dilemma appears to be a full stage lower than that of the boy. Gilligan found this problematic. Why was Amy rated at a lower level? Amy's answer was unsure (Gilligan 1993, p. 28): "Well, I don't think so." She thought that there could be other ways to solve the problem, like to borrow the money or negotiate on the matter. But Heinz's wife should not die, either. Amy's main concern was the effect that theft could have on the relationship between Heinz and his wife. What happens if Heinz has to go to jail? Who would then take care of the wife? For Amy, the dilemma was not mathematical but human. It is more like a narrative of relationships that extends over time. In the course of the interview, Amy's answer becomes unsure. She could not see the problem apart from the surrounding world. Gilligan argues that this is why her mode of moral thinking completely evades Kohlberg's theory. Gilligan does not rate the children, but she sees that Amy's judgments contain the insights central to an ethic of care, just as Jake's judgments reflect the logic of justice.

The Heinz dilemma is problematic, and it is possible to ask whether it really measures the state of moral development. In the Heinz dilemma, motivations of the druggist and his situation are excluded, just like the sick wife's view and her voice are excluded from the moral problem at hand. In Kohlberg's research, it was already decided what the highest moral level contains: the autonomic subject, who believes in universal moral principles, who is sure of his argumentation, and who does not change his opinion even if new information comes up.

Based on her research, Gilligan published in 1982 a book called *In a Different Voice* in which she presents her critique on Kohlberg. The book became to be one of the most influential books in the field of the ethic of care. The ethic of care has two different lines: the feminist ethic of care (e.g.,

Noddings 1984; Benhabid 1987; Tronto 1993), and the phenomenological ethic of care (e.g., Benner 2000; Paley 2000). Both of the labels are a little bit misleading. The feminist ethic presents care as a starting point for ethics. These theories try to clarify the female–male dichotomy in morals, and they are closely related to practice. The phenomenological ethic of care is based on a very heavy philosophical background, and it is not phenomenological in the way phenomenology is usually understood.

Gilligan's book is not an ordinary research report. It is polemic and written in a narrative style. She refers in the book to three studies, and one of them is "A Naturalistic Study of Abortion Decision" (Gilligan and Belenky 1980). Gilligan describes later on that her thinking changed during this study. She was "struck by the realization that women were constructing the dilemma in a way that was completely at odds with the public conversation" (Gilligan 1998). The public discussion of abortion was framed as a conflict between the right to life and the right to choice, raising the question of whose right took precedence in a formulation that pitted the fetus against the mother or women against men – this has not changed in today's public discussion. The women were not pondering the question of justice. The dilemma for them was that they could not see any way of acting that would not hurt someone. And still, they had to make a decision. In Gilligan's book, the different voice is the woman's voice against the man's voice that also represents the public voice (Gilligan 1995, p. 123):

Listening to women's voices clarified the ethic of care, not because care is essentially associated with women or part of women's nature, but because women for a combination of psychological and political reasons voiced relational realities that were otherwise unspoken or dismissed as inconsequential.

The different voice of women must be listened to attentively, because it has been suffocated for so long. Gilligan asserted that women have different moral and psychological tendencies from men. According to Gilligan, men think in terms of rules and justice and women are more inclined to think in terms of caring and relationships. This is,

of course, a simplistic picture of Gilligan's ideas. She wants Western society to equally value the discourse of justice and the discourse of care. Gilligan stresses that the question is not whether women and men are really different or who is better than the other. Her questions are about perception of reality and truth, how we know, how we hear, how we see, and how we speak. From this point, Gilligan developed her idea of the ethic of care (Gilligan 1993, p. xii).

After Gilligan's book, the ethic of care received a feministic label. This label facilitated many interesting and important researches, but it also orientated Gilligan's care ethic as a women's ethic that is an alternative for men's ethic of justice. This was partly Gilligan's intention but not the main goal. In her books, Gilligan writes about the necessity of recognizing the dual context of justice and care.

Joan C. Tronto sees that "the ethic of care" has become part of the vocabulary of contemporary feminism, but the term "the ethic of care" remains unclear (Tronto 1993, p. 125). Gilligan sees the same problem, and she wants to clarify the two different types of the ethic of care. There is difference between a feminine ethic of care and a feminist ethic of care (Gilligan 1995, p. 122): "A feminine ethic of care is an ethic of the relational world as that world appears within a patriarchal social order." Caring as a feminine ethic includes special obligations and interpersonal relations, and this means selflessness or self-sacrifice. That world is apart and separated politically and psychologically from a realm of individual autonomy and freedom which is the realm of justice and contractual obligations. "A feminist ethic of care begins with connection, theorized as primary and seen as fundamental in human life" (Gilligan 1995, p. 122). The human being is understood as having myriads of connections and relationships to other people. This is fundamental to the essence of the human being. She is not considered an autonomic subject with separate being and sense of justice. The feministic ethic of care sees a problem in the feminine ethic of care, and that problem is the disconnection of relationships.

In her book, Gilligan describes three moral perspectives and two transition phases of the

Gilligan-Kohlberg Controversy, Table 2 Interpretation of Gilligan's stages in the development of the ethic of care (see Gilligan 1993, p. 74)

Stages in the development of the ethic of care	
Perspective I	Caring for self
<i>Transition I</i> From caring for self to responsibility to others	
Perspective II	Caring for others
<i>Transition II</i> From inequality to caring for self and others	
Perspective III	Understanding interconnection between other and self. Care becomes the self-chosen principle. No one should be hurt

ethic of care (Table 2). These are also sequences in the development of the ethic of care. Gilligan does not give any age references, nor physical or social. We can even ask can we ever really reach the third perspective.

The first one is the initial perspective, through which one is caring for oneself in order to survive. This stage is followed by a transitional phase in which this is seen and criticized as selfish. "The criticism signals a new understanding of the connection between self and others which is articulated by the concept of responsibility" (Gilligan 1993, p. 74). In the second phase, good is equated with caring for others. This also causes the second transition. When only others are recipients of one's care, problems with relationships arise. The inequality between the self and the others as receivers of care leads to a reconsideration of relationships in an effort to sort out the confusion between self-sacrifice and care as goodness. The third perspective focuses on the dynamics of relationships. Care has no more anything to do with self-sacrifice but is the chosen principle of judgment. This judgment "remains psychological in its concern with relationships and response but becomes universal in its condemnation of exploitation and hurt" (Gilligan 1993, p. 74.). In this stage, knowledge is an important aspect, but it is not cognitive knowledge but instead knowledge of relations between people and understanding of social interactions. In this stage, the ethic of care reveals one of its principles: the self and the others are interdependent. It becomes clear that just as the incidence of violence is in the end destructive

to all, so the activity of care enhances both the others and the self.

One of Gilligan's most striking criticisms of Kohlberg's theory is that it has adopted the male form of life as a norm. She asks: "How to listen to women in women's terms, rather than assimilating women's voices to the existing theoretical framework" (Gilligan 1995, p. 120). The neutral and impartial point of view to equality and justice, which Kohlberg considers the highest stage of moral development, is constructed through men's eyes, and thus it is not neutral and impartial at all. The norm of the human being is man, and men's experience stands for human experience. Can we trust a theory that has this kind of inequality in its core? Gilligan claims that Sigmund Freud, Jean Piaget, and Erik H. Erikson also have a man's point of view. Gilligan states that Kohlberg's construction of the highest stage of morality as reflective understanding of what is right is one-sided because it does not leave room for care and human relationships, which are essential parts of the morals of maturity. For Gilligan, maturity is the stage in which an adult human being recognizes the dual context of justice and care.

Gilligan's theory has been criticized from several points of view. According to Nunner-Winkler, Gilligan postulates that "'in the classic dichotomies between, reason and compassion, fairness and forgiveness, justice and mercy ... thought and feeling' (Gilligan 1984, p. 4), females always opt for the latter pole" (Nunner-Winkler 1990, p. 115). Nunner-Winkler presents empirical evidence against Gilligan's assumption. The data is taken from a research project conducted by Nunner-Winkler and Dröber (1986). In the research, they compared the reactions of males and females (aged 14–22) to two moral dilemmas: the legitimacy of abortion and the justifiability of draft resistance (Nunner-Winkler 1990, p. 116). They found out that even females are more concerned about concrete costs and situational details. It is a question of more an instrumental sort of cost-benefit calculation than of taking care and compassion. The quotation from Gilligan is cited correctly, but the addition after it is questionable. Gilligan would not argue like that because

according to her research women do not always “opt for mercy and feelings.” The terms for the dilemmas, “legitimacy of abortion” and “justifiability of draft resistance,” represent Kohlbergian and Kantian universalistic moral theory. Thus, the moral dilemma is posed in a theory-laden way in Nunner-Winkler’s and Dröber’s (1986) study, just like it was in Kohlberg’s own empirical studies. In this respect, Eva Skoe’s (1998), Soile Juujärvi’s (2003), and John Snarey’s (1998) empirical research projects are very interesting. They have used two sets of moral dilemmas: those which evoke care-based reasoning and those which evoke justice-based reasoning. Possibly, there are also other bases for common-sense moral reasoning.

Sheyla Benhabib (1987) sees that Gilligan challenged the old paradigm and that it is common for adherents of an old research paradigm, like Nunner-Winkler, to respond by arguing in three ways: (1) the data base, (2) accommodation within the old theory, and (3) object domain of the two theories. The data-based argument means that the data base does not support the conclusion drawn by the revisionist. The accommodation within the old theory means that some of the new conclusions can be accommodated by the old theory. The argument of the object domain of the two theories claims that the new and old paradigms have different object domains and are concerned with explaining the same phenomena after all. Benhabib sees that Kohlberg resorts to all three arguments in his answer to Gilligan (Benhabib 1987, pp. 78–80).

Gilligan is on the right track when she writes about the dual context of morality and moral maturity. Most of us would consider such a person very odd who bases his or her morality solely on the Kantian notion of duty and justice, like Abraham who would sacrifice his son in the name of duty. Likewise, most of us would consider immature a person who always listens to his or her moral sentiments and never considers duty, impartiality, and validly agreed rules and laws. Nevertheless, Gilligan is wrong in the respect that she thinks – like Kohlberg – that these matters can be proven by empirical research. We need empirical research on moral growth, but no empirical

Gilligan-Kohlberg Controversy, Table 3 The dual context of justice and care in moral development

Phases of moral development	Lawrence Kohlberg	Carol Gilligan’s supplement
First phase	Preconventional moral consciousness (stages 1–2)	Caring for self (Transition I: From caring for self to responsibility to others)
Second phase	Conventional moral consciousness (stages 3–4)	Caring for others (Transition II: From inequality to caring for self and others)
Third phase	Postconventional moral consciousness (stages 5–6)	Understanding interconnection between other and self. Care becomes the self-chosen principle. No one should be hurt

research and data can provide an answer to the question what moral maturity is.

Like we said earlier, Gilligan’s critique of Kohlberg partly reminds Hegel’s critique of Kant’s ethics. Like Hegel, Gilligan wants also to take moral feelings seriously and put much emphasis on the social nature of morality. Nevertheless, Kohlberg’s moral theory and empirical finding are not to be forgotten. They need to be revised and improved but not to be forgotten. This actually is Gilligan’s intention. She did not want to reject Kohlberg’s theory but supplement it with the aspect of ethics of care. Gilligan is calling for the dual context of moral development which is illustrated in Table 3.

Possibly moral development and moral maturity contains more elements than aspects of justice (Kohlberg) and care (Gilligan), but there is good reason to believe that these aspects are worthwhile. More empirical and philosophical studies on this subject are needed.

Cross-References

- [Philosophical Roots of Gilligan-Kohlberg Controversy, The](#)

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Global Citizenship Education Reconsidered: Taking the “Migrant” Other Seriously

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Contemporary Views on Global Citizenship Education

Global citizenship education has gained much currency in the last decade through rigorous volumes of which the following three texts have been identified: *Education for Citizenship and Democracy* (Arthur et al. 2008); *Global Citizenship*

Education: Philosophy, Theory and Pedagogy (Peters 2008); and *The Cosmopolitan Reader* (Wallace Brown and Held 2010). Firstly, global citizenship education is built on understandings of individuals and society in relation to the exercise of rights, identity, participation, and their attachment to "internationalism" – that is, relations between and not across nations (Arthur et al. 2008: 4–5). In European societies in particular, citizenship education is conceived in terms of a basic language of rights, a worldview of humanity as a marketplace of autonomous and competitive individuals, and ideas of community engagement, solidarity, and belonging in a discourse of freedom and equality (Banks 2008: 310). Yet, as recognized aptly by Banks (2008: 310) – one of the contributor's to the volume – such a view of citizenship education is not substantive in the sense that "[it] fails to persuade people that they ought to trust and love each other." The lack of public responsibility shown by several European nations in even preventing migrants to cross their borders on route to destinations of their choice – mostly Germany – is a testimony of the lack of trust and public-spirited cooperativeness and compromise required to enact their sense of universal moral responsibility. Of course, one recognizes that a similar lack of public responsibility might be ascribed to the home countries of migrants, whose failure to enact civic security is evident in the thousands of women, men, and children, who continue to seek refuge under the most treacherous of circumstances. But that discussion is not the purpose of this contribution.

Secondly, in relation to culture, democratic public life and multiculturalism, it is argued that global citizenship education "offers the prospect of extending both the ideologies of human rights and multiculturalism, perhaps, post-colonialism, in a critical and informed way" (Peters 2008: 11). Advancing a human rights discourse goes along with being responsive to "war crimes," "crimes against humanity," and "crimes against peace," whereas enhancing critical multiculturalism involves deepening openness to culture and democratic public life concomitantly with an aspiration for "peace, justice and solidarity" (Peters

2008: 6, 8). Despite the aforementioned laudable aspirations of global citizenship education, the inhospitality shown to human beings is evident not only in the refusal to access but equally evident even once entry is granted. Typically, therefore, a migrant is met by barbed-wire fences, meant to physically control migrants' access to other nations, followed by confinement of large masses of migrants to camps reminiscent of World War II Nazi prison and concentration camps. Vivid scenes, such as the latter, bring into moral questioning, on the one hand, the universal treatment of "strangers" in host countries and, on the other hand, the physical fencing in of human beings that undermine the very idea that all humans belong to a single moral community. Put differently, the cultivation of global citizens and talk of cosmopolitanism are currently being given scant attention that militates against the European Union's role in securing justice and refuge for asylum seekers. Perhaps, more alarming is the reality that even when those seeking safety or safe passage are allowed beyond borders, their physical displacement is further dehumanized through political languages (as in quotas of people allowed access) and spaces (as in barbed-wire camps), which are articulated and erected for the sole purpose of deterring others, or for pushing people back from whence they had come.

Thirdly, at the heart of global citizenship education is the cosmopolitan idea that all humans should be respected equally and that all humans are equal in their moral standing (Wallace Brown and Held 2010: 2). Five interrelated themes in relation to global citizenship or cosmopolitan education are identified: global justice through education that fosters sympathies for the plight of those beyond one's border; cultural cosmopolitanism that recognizes that all individuals are made up of multifarious cultures and that humans identify with such cultural obligations; legal cosmopolitanism concerned with the application of international law in the pursuit of global justice; political cosmopolitanism with its distinctive focus on global governance and the reform of international political institutions in line with cosmopolitan ideals; civic cosmopolitanism aimed at constructing a sense of cosmopolitan citizenship

(Wallace Brown and Held 2010: 9–13). Global justice, respect, and moral equality are tersely under threat considering that some European nations are now using profiling methods to distinguish between migrants from Syria and migrants from other Arab nations. While it might be easier to consider this type of extrapolation of human beings, as some derivative of Orwell’s dictum that some “animals are more equal than others” or, more appropriately, that some Muslims might be more inclined toward extremism than others, the sheer indignity of such an assessment of people becomes increasingly hard to swallow. Behind this disrespect and unequal treatment of migrants is the misunderstanding that among some migrants extremist “Islamic” terrorists might be present who will jeopardize the security of some European nations. As incredible and misplaced as this (mis)understanding might be, it begins to lay bare, on the one hand, the type of demonization necessary for the cultivation of fear, which, in turn, is necessary, for the justification and motivation of Islamophobia. On the other hand, the writing on the wall is clear that extremists, and those that liberal democracies ought to fear, are not “one of us” – they are “other to us,” and the well-being of liberal democracies rests on keeping those others out.

In sum, global citizenship education can broadly be stroked along ideas of community engagement, solidarity, and belonging; extension of universal human rights and critical multiculturalism; and equal moral respect and justice to all human beings. As has been intimated thus far, such understandings of global citizenship education are being put at risk especially in light of the most recent migration crisis that faces European nations. Why?

Global Citizenship Education at Risk: Paying Lip Service to the Vulnerability of the “Migrant” Other

The following account as reported in *The World Post*, dated 16 September 2015, on the plight of most of the Syrian refugees confirms the disrespect, injustice, and inequality with which they

are confronted. More than 50% of the migrants fleeing conflict and repression in their countries are from Syria, with some of the refugees emanating from Afghanistan and Iraq, thus debunking the view that refugees are illegal “economic” migrants searching for economic opportunities according to many hard-line politicians like Britain’s Nigel Farage, Slovakia’s Robert Fico, and Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban. Despite Turkey haven taken in more than 1.9 million Syrian refugees this year, the country does not grant them (refugees) permanent asylum. The temporary protection Syrian refugees are granted is coupled to the idea that refugees will one day return to their countries. Small wonder humanitarian conditions in the overcrowded refugee camps in Turkey have deteriorated steadily. Half of the 1.1 million Syrian refugees in Lebanon live in insecure dwellings, and in Jordan two-thirds of the 600,000 Syrian refugees live in poverty according to the United Nations Refugee Agency causing many refugees to resort to begging, survival sex, and child labor. Moreover, there is also a growing fear among many anti-immigrant Europeans that Islamic State militants are hiding among migrants and want to sneak into Europe to commit terror attacks.

After Germany initially welcomed the refugees generously, the country has imposed border controls on “the frontier with Austria, which has restricted movement across the frontier with Hungary, which has in turn started imprisoning migrants who cross illegally from Serbia” (*The Economist* 2015). The imposition of border controls has also led to eastern European interior ministers blocking plans for 120,000 refugees to be resettled across the EU under a system of quotas (*The Economist* 2015). Restrictions, such as these, have not only undermined and brought into disrepute the idea of global citizenship but has placed under a spotlight the harsh humiliation and human rights violations inflicted upon refugees. Whether young or old, physically strong or vulnerable, refugees are currently held in check in camps, controlled by military posts, and subjected to tear gas and water cannons, as a means of maintaining order. The idea of such inhumane treatment is instigated by the attitudes of military

police who do not hesitate to let refugees know that they do not belong in the countries through which they travel – such as blocking trains filled with thousands of refugees on route to different nation States – and that the unwelcoming encounters are provoked by anti-immigrant protesters who claim that refugees take away the indigenous people's economic opportunities (CNN 2015).

Now if equal moral respect for all human beings, the contravention of migrants' human rights, and their denial of belonging (in this instance to the European community) are some of the aspects of global citizenship education that are being brought into question, then one can only infer that such an understanding of education is too difficult to internalize on the part of many Europeans. Global citizenship education is dealt a ferocious blow when people's rights to have rights – that is, "to be recognised by others . . . as persons entitled to moral respect and legally protected rights in a human community" (Benhabib 2011: 60) – is punctured. Migrants have a right to be recognized as moral beings worthy of "equal concern and equally entitled to be protected as legal personality by his or her own polity, as well as the world community" (Benhabib 2011: 62). The point is, the world community seems to undermine – as the migrant crisis further unfolds – the rights of other (migrants) to have similar rights and duties it (the world community) ascribes to itself. Similarly, the incidences of violence migrants encounter at the border crossings elicit similar distrust they faced in the home countries by violent rulers – in the case of Syria, the dictatorship of Basar al-Assad. When migrants suffer such disrespect, they are said to experience global moral injustice as their suffering merely escalates on account of a lack of global responsibility. Responsibility, Young avers (2007: 174), is a "moral right that respects agents [people] as individuals and expects them to behave in respectful ways toward others." Consequently, due to a lack of responsibility, and compassion, global citizenship is palpably undermined.

What is even more disconcerting about understandings of global citizenship education is that migrants are viewed as belonging to their own

nation States and communities. Syrian refugees are perceived as not belonging to the European nations to which they migrate on the grounds that their sense of belonging is considered only in relation to their own country of origin. In this regard, the existence of human-made borders, in a very real sense, determines not only an individual's citizenship but also an individual's humanity. There is nothing humane in trapping human beings in barbed-wire camps, inasmuch as there is nothing humane in witnessing a journalist tripping a father, as he desperately runs toward any hope of safety while holding his son in his arms. And yet, while the actions of the journalist were duly condemned, the silences around the inhumane treatment of people, just like Aylan Kurdi, or the latest, yet to be identified 5-year-old Egyptian girl, remain unbroken. The visible hatred shown toward migrants by some European members of nation States, particularly migrants with Muslim identities, is a dystopic threat against global solidarity and citizenship. Quite pertinently Benhabib (2011: 194) posits the following in relation to the threat of dystopia:

The damage done to the European sense of solidarity is intense and will not be so easily and quickly healed. European dystopia also manifests itself in hatred towards foreigners, and particularly Islam; in the increasing marginalization of those who cannot enter the jo-market . . . in the withering away of political culture through the weakness of an increasingly boring social democracy which is too squeamish to embrace internationalism, or implement the tough and innovative solutions that could curb global capitalism.

Such a dystopic view of belonging is a definitive onslaught against global citizenship education that can be remedied only through a reconceptualized understanding of belonging. For such a discussion, the author turns to the seminal thoughts of Giorgio Agamben.

Toward a Theory of Co-belonging

Many Europeans view migrants, like themselves, as citizens of particular nation States with their commonalities, differences, and identities. Syrian

refugees are viewed as people that collectively share a faith (Islam), place of origin, and repression at the hands of both ISIS and the Assad regime. Consequently, although they belong together, they are viewed as not belonging to European nations. This nonrecognition of belonging subjects refugees to humiliation, pain, and perpetual embarrassment. Agamben (1993) offers an account of community that is constituted by at least three dimensions: Firstly, a community in becoming, Agamben avers (1993), is one that is not bounded by identity, difference, and commonality but rather constituted by “whatever singularity”: “Whatever singularities cannot form a *societas* because they do not possess any identity to vindicate nor any bond of belonging for which they seek recognition” (Agamben 1993: 86). “Whatever” is constituted by a potentiality to become this or that rather than an actualization of this or that. Here, Agamben (1993: 18) posits that “[w]hatever is the thing with all its properties, none of which, however, constitutes difference. In-difference with respect to properties is what individuates and disseminates singularities” If migrants were to be considered as within “whatever singularities,” they would be seen indifferently which means that they would not be considered as “migrants” or “refugees” but rather as humans without difference – that is, without appropriating identities such as being Syrian, Muslim, and Arab.

Secondly, a coming community resembles a “new humanity” that finds improper and insignificant emotion such as shame, arrogance, conformity, and marginality; rather, such a community “represents an opportunity unheard of in the history of humanity . . . [because such a community is one] without presuppositions and without subjects, [that enter] into a communication without the incommunicable” (Agamben 1993: 64). My interest in a community as a “new humanity” is that host nations would not consider “migrants” and “refugees” as shameful subjects that have abandoned their places of origin and should now conform as gracious beings due to their marginalization and exclusion in their own countries. Instead, following Agamben, a community of

humanity does not bear any shame nor does it have to suffer at the arrogance of other people that demand their assimilation into the cultural dominance of the host nations. A coming community is one “without classes . . . where differences of language, of dialect, of ways of life, of character, of custom, and even the physical particularities of each person – has lost any meaning for them and any expression and communication” (Agamben 1993: 63–64). If Europeans and migrants would be so daring to engender such a coming community, then the possibility that one will look at the other as “other” would dissipate – and, communication among them would be enhanced and where “shame can finally rest in peace” (Agamben 1993: 64).

Thirdly, a coming community that does not presuppose commonality and identity as preconditions for belonging and appropriates “whatever singularity” “is a community to which all belong without claiming to belong, a community of ‘whatever beings’ that share nothing except their own being thus in pure communicability and ontological immediacy” (Mills 2008: 130). More lucidly, a coming community is one in which “the singularities form a community without affirming an identity, that humans co-belong without any representable conditions of belonging” (Agamben 1993: 86). Of interest to this point is the idea of co-belonging. The struggle between migrants and some European nation States does not happen because of determinate contents such as democracy and liberty but rather a struggle for a recognition of humanity. In this way, the potentiality that people co-belong devoid of any representable identity would be highly possible. When Europeans and migrants co-belong, they do so because they are jointly committed to cultivate one another’s humanity – that is, that all people are dignified human beings to be treated with the utmost respect as their singularities “appropriate belonging itself” (Agamben 1993: 87).

In sum, global citizenship education is dependent on the exercise of moral equality toward all human beings, exercising a universal human rights culture that recognizes the just treatment of all humans and that communities ought to

pursue a path of co-belonging in whatever singularity. When global citizenship education is geared toward engendering communities of co-belonging, the current migrant crisis would not only gain the much needed attention it thoroughly deserves but would actually dissipate as the fate and fortunes of the migrants and their host communities become enmeshed in a form of human interconnectedness that is still to come.

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Global English, Postcolonialism, and Education

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Synonyms

Colonialism; Education; ELT; English; Globalization; Postcolonialism

Introduction

This entry will consider the postcolonial cultural politics involved in the development of English as a global, international, a lingua franca, and world language within the sphere of education, with a particular focus on the field of English language teaching (ELT).

English language teaching (ELT) has, perhaps, been one of the fields at the forefront of engaging with the postcolonial cultural politics of education and the English language. Scholars have acknowledged and engaged with positive aspects of the globalizing of English. However, it is the way in which ELT scholarship has sought to interrogate and analyze the ideologies, discourses, conceptual frameworks, and practices which constitute the phenomenon of Global English that elucidates the postcolonial cultural politics at play. The multifaceted identity of English as an international language, a global language, and a lingua franca has made such engagement with postcolonial theories even more significant, especially when this identity has consistently been subject to criticism. These controversies are deeply rooted in questions of power struggle, racial discrimination, professional racialization, Western dominance, and hegemony, all of which are associated with the history of colonialism, its legacies, and – what is sometimes alleged to be its close family – globalization. This entry is concerned with the interrelationships of English, ELT, and the cultural politics of postcoloniality.

Global Disability

► [Disability and Samoa](#)

English, ELT, and the Constructs of Colonialism

The dominant status of English and ELT in almost all parts of the world is inextricably tied to colonialism as Pennycook (1998) argues in this signature work based on his research into the development of English and ELT in a number of former British colonies including India, Malaysia, Singapore, and Hong Kong. ELT as a field, a sphere, and an industry in the Centre (English-speaking Western countries) as seen today has its root in the colonial Periphery. In fact, during the colonial period, the development of ELT had started in the Periphery first, largely because of the colonial governments' needs to train a selective English-speaking mass who could work for them and help them rule over the local. ELT was later brought back to the Empire and is now "exported" to the world largely from and by the Centre. Based on the above, it could still be argued that ELT is the "product" of the Centre, although it was geographically located in the Periphery during the colonial period.

If in the colonial times ELT increased British colonial power intensively and extensively and thereby supported colonial governance, then ELT today similarly functions to strengthen the current global expansion of English and, consequently, spread and maintain its underlying cultural values. In this way, ELT can be seen as a vehicle to serve the interests of the colonialists in the past and what are described in the contemporary milieu as "linguistic imperialism" and hegemonic globalization (Pennycook 1998; Phillipson 1992; Tupas 2015).

Phillipson (1992) sees the increasing dominance of English and ELT as "linguistic imperialism," in which the Centre continues to impose its own cultural values, military and economic power, desires, and needs upon the Periphery through ELT as it is tied to various "aid" schemes as well as through the means of development and globalization. He sees English and ELT being carefully exploited to maintain the power of the English-speaking Western world, mainly the USA and the UK. According to Phillipson (1992, p. 271), English – "a superior language" – and

ELT – "a superior teaching practice" – became simultaneously promoted globally with support of three arguments, "relating to capacities, English-intrinsic arguments, what English is; resources, English-extrinsic arguments, what English has; and uses, English-functional arguments, what English does."

English and ELT have helped most in gaining the success of the Centre by acting as a tool, an instrument, and a neutral means to build a bridge between Centre and Periphery, as Phillipson (1992) argues. He refers to earlier works that show how the internalization of Centre values and ways of thought in Periphery countries has been mostly done via the "educated" in the Periphery, who have now ensured that there is no need for the Centre to be physically present. To add to that, computers these days help spread the values of the Centre to the Periphery much faster than any form of physical invasion could do. What's more, when scholars from Periphery countries are offered scholarships to do their research in the Centre, as Phillipson (1992) continues to argue, they are guided and influenced by the Centre and their research aims are often to benefit the Centre. He also argues that these scholars are the ones who will bring Western values, ways of thought, and the results of their research back to their countries. By doing so, these scholars contribute to the spread of English linguistic imperialism. They, whether unconsciously or not, are those who share common interests with the Centre's representatives; and if they are not aware of what they are doing, they then become active forces who transmit Western values and English linguistic imperialism to their home countries. Specifically, via English language and Western education, the elites in the Periphery have helped the Centre accomplish what colonialism failed to achieve. They are the ones who promote English and ELT the strongest. These propositions have been central to Phillipson's seminar work (1992).

The explosive growth of the use of English has been accompanied by the similarly rapid expansion of ELT. Moreover, according to Pennycook (1998), a colonial legacy that is still driving the spread of English and ELT is "the West is better,"

a view often held by both Westerners and non-Western people. This common and persistent view is getting even stronger, as increasing numbers of governments endorse English-medium education at all levels and as the demand for English is increasing throughout the non-English-speaking world (Chowdhury and Phan 2014; Jenkins 2014; Phan 2016).

Colonial Manifestations in Global Postcolonial English and ELT

An important reason why English has been generating multiple positioning and identifications, and has been evoking multiple emotions and sentiments, has been its root in colonialism and in the postcolonial cultural politics. These competing images of English as an enabler and English as a force of (neo)colonialism have been a consistent tension within the sphere of ELT.

Given that ELT had a long history of direct connections with colonialism and that ELT was both the product and weapon of colonialism, it carries in itself many of the ways of thinking and behaving that are still part of Periphery and Western cultures. In both Centre and Periphery countries, subconsciously led by the colonial spirit, English is purposefully used to exclude certain groups from power and social mobility and to create discrimination among people in societies on the basis of race, ethnicity, social class, and linguistic and cultural backgrounds (Kubota and Lin 2009; Phan 2008; Tupas 2015).

Pennycook (1998) argues that many current ELT theories and practices embody in themselves colonial thinking and views, particularly the colonial and postcolonial Self and Other dichotomy that places the superior Self over the inferior Other. These have implications for teaching methodologies, pedagogies, and questions of identity, whereby anything tagged with “Western” and/or “native English-speaking” or simply “native” is considered superior.

The most dominant dichotomy in the domain of English and ELT is perhaps the native and nonnative divide. Despite the increasing effort in deconstructing this native-speakerism syndrome

in ELT worldwide, native speakers of English are often seen and even projected as being better teachers of English because of their nativeness and Western origin, as discussed in Holliday (2005).

The dichotomy between native and nonnative teachers of English has been deeply rooted in the ELT pedagogy and practice. Phillipson (1992) calls the tenet “the ideal teacher of English is a native speaker” (p. 185) a fallacy. According to this tenet, the native-speaker teacher is regarded as “the best embodiment of the target and norm for learners” (p. 194). Argued by Phillipson (1992) and Holliday (2005), this tenet or this native-speakerism syndrome is not only insisted by the Self but is also validated by the Other. When the native-speaker norms are in contact with the norms of other speakers of English, it is often the case that the former are used to make judgments against the latter. Despite its international status, English in different forms of uses is still employed to exclude many of its users and to assert and strengthen the legitimacy of Standard English from the English-speaking Western countries.

Holliday problematizes past and current theories and practices of ELT while paying specific attention to those in Teaching English to Speakers of Other Languages (TESOL) with a particular “attack” on the native-speaker norms. He discusses how World TESOL people “behave with each other and with . . . students within a multicultural TESOL world” (p. 1) and shows how a number of colonial and postcolonial relationships preexisting and emerging in World TESOL have been nurturing and supporting “native speakerism” (p. 6). He also addresses a number of “conditions within which native-speakerism has developed and become such a powerful force in World TESOL” (p. 39). Holliday argues that the close connection between native-speakerism and a modernistic discourse in TESOL appears to empower and support native-speakerness and simultaneously places the Other in a much less favorable position, and worse than that, the real person of the student is in effect excluded from the whole picture. This becomes more serious when this connection involves

“correcting” the “culture” of the foreign Other, the very aspect that Pennycook (1994, 1998) also identifies and challenges.

Holliday looks at “learner-centeredness” and “autonomy,” “two of the key concepts of English-speaking Western TESOL professionalism” (p. 63), to further demonstrate how they have been used to justify the superior position of native speakers of English. Regarding learner-centeredness, Holliday argues that this very concept demands that the foreign Other of the “non-native speaker” be trained both linguistically and culturally, and this is what consolidates, legitimizes, and reproduces native-speakerism. Holliday further points out that “learner-centeredness” appears to be a mask which hides the intention to correct “the behaviour and culture of the Othered ‘non-native speaker’ students” (p. 78).

Holliday offers his own interpretation of the second key concept “learner autonomy,” seeing it as being driven by the “us”-“them” discourse embedded in native-speakerism and culturism, which involve “corrective training” (p. 79). He criticizes the tendency to contrast unquestionably and automatically “passivity” (assumed to be attached to the Othered “nonnative-speaker” students) with “autonomous learners” and “true learning” (assumed to be aligned with Western English-speaking TESOL). This tendency assumes that the Other student do not have “autonomy” and their “autonomy” can only be obtained by being trained through “learning strategies” developed and advocated by the Self teacher. “Passivity,” in the mindset of the Self, seems to be a property just owned by the Other. Holliday also acknowledges that it seems very difficult not to fall into the trap of dichotomizing Self and Other in TESOL regardless of how aware and critical one can be.

Regarding the Other teacher, Holliday demonstrates that native-speakerism pictures the nonnative-speaker Other teacher as being deficient who need to be trained and corrected by the native-speaker Self. Sadly, this deficit approach in viewing the nonnative-speaker Other TESOL teacher is very often, if not more often, taken by those teachers themselves, as Holliday clearly points out.

In short, as the scholars surveyed above show, while postcolonialism is a political project to critically interrogate colonialism, what is embedded in the global development of English and ELT shows that many postcolonial practices still function as colonizing forces. Specifically, English and ELT carry and enact presumptions of the inferior Other. These stereotypes normally suggest that the Other, including teachers, students, trainers, and trainees, is inferior than the Self in terms of “authentic” knowledge of the English language, teaching methodologies and approaches, teaching and learning styles, and values and cultures. This portrayal accordingly urges and self-urges the Other to change to adjust and to learn from the native Western Self. And the superior Self and inferior Other cycle continues.

Counterarguments

However, in acknowledging the agency of “the Other” in the global spread of English and ELT, many scholars have challenged the way in which the dominant discourse is rooted in native-nonnative dichotomy and impoverished postcolonial perspectives in explaining the field of ELT and TESOL. These scholars argue that the Other sees many benefits in learning English and that English must be understood beyond the usual colonial and postcolonial remnants (Kachru 1986; Jenkins 2014; Widdowson 1997). They show how speakers of English as an international language (EIL), English as a lingua franca (ELF), and World Englishes (WE) have been able to resist and appropriate English and ELT. These speakers of English own and can own English. These speakers, in fact, have been leading the growth of English and ELT with their own spirit, purposes, and innovation.

Kachru’s (1986) identification of three Circles of English marked a significant moment in the study of postcolonial English, which has led to the development of World Englishes. English, in this sense, encompasses a variety of Englishes that are evolving out of different communities, territories, States, countries, and regions, each of which enjoys its distinctive characteristics

reflecting its history, culture, linguistic repertoire, and educational landscape. The promotion for a sense of equality among all these Englishes has been at the heart of World Englishes studies; and implications for the teaching of World Englishes are offered by those leading the area. However, to date, the teaching of Standard English varieties from English-speaking Western countries still dominates ELT and TESOL globally.

Perhaps one of the most eminent advocates for politics-free English and ELT is Henry Widdowson, who since 1997 has been arguing for English as “a kind of composite lingua franca which is free of any specific allegiance to any primary variety of the language” (1997, pp. 399–400) including the English from the very Centre (English-speaking Western countries). Widdowson asserts that it is because he is aware of the politics of English and its consequences that he attempts to urge English users to look at it as the language “used internationally across communities as a means of global communication” (p. 399), but not as the language owned by the Inner Circle (the Centre). He forcefully maintains that it is impossible to control language once it is used and that this is precisely the case with English.

Widdowson’s work, though criticized by many scholars, has inspired the initial development of EIL, a branch of which later took a separate path and evolved itself exclusively into ELF. This branch has been led by scholars such as Jennifer Jenkins (2014) and her associates. ELF offers space for imaginations about English that could truly liberate and empower its speakers, regardless of how and in what forms English is used and expressed. It argues for the recognition of full agency of ELF users. The concept of “standard” in ELF is almost totally dismissed and irrelevant which has sparked ongoing debate and critique in the field, particularly since the late 2000s.

Specifically, criticisms of ELF (O’Regan 2014) have been raised over ELF promoting a “free” English whereby users of English regardless of their knowledge and understanding of the language, and regardless of their social status and aspirations, what they do, and where they are located, can own English and create their own

norms that would be valued and accepted by the international and global community. In other words, certain ELF works tend to imply that a power differentiation between Self and Other has little impact on the appropriation of English and on the development of an evolving and self-evolving ELF. This is precisely a major misconception embedded in the ELF scholarship, according to O’Regan (2014) who argues that the global elite are still the ones shaping the future of English and dictating the ownership of it and deciding what and whose English is standard. In the same vein, this reality is consolidated by Tupas’s (2015) edited volume on the study of postcolonial English and ELT. All the contributing authors demonstrate with empirical evidence that Englishes are unequal in diverse contexts and settings around the world.

Other scholars have continued to advance EIL through their commitment to examining the close relationship between the cultural politics of English and ELT and questions of agency, identity, empowerment, pedagogies, and knowledge production. Angel Lin, Ryuko Kubota, and Phan Le Ha, for instance, have hardly ever lost sight of this relationship in their works while still having been able to show the complex picture behind the worldwide spread of English and ELT (Chowdhury and Phan 2014; Kubota and Lin 2009; Phan 2016).

Current and Future Development

In short, the worldwide spread of English and ELT has been indebted to colonialism, postcolonial development of the field, and the current global desire for English-medium education. Adding to this, neocolonialism and neoliberalism are now dominant within cultural production; and again English and ELT have been the most effective and powerful means to transmit these ideals globally. They are not different from colonial and postcolonial practices and have appeared to be disguised behind the internal desire to learn and own English of the Other. As this desire is growing stronger, the dependence on the Western Self is also getting more intense and multifaceted,

because the view that “the West is better” has never died but has often been mixed in the agendas of empowerment and internationalization and commercialization of education (Chowdhury and Phan 2014; Phan 2016).

As such, works devoting to examining the blurriness of the postcolonial Self and Other and to investigating the multidimensional exploitation of postcolonial neoliberal English and ELT by every stakeholder are emerging (O'Regan 2014; Phan 2016). Put differently, the spread of English is hardly natural or neutral. It can be beneficial but is always coupled with certain politics and controversies. Phan Le Ha argues in her works cited above that the politics associated with English and ELT does not necessarily have to be dictated by any high power authority, but is often generated from within any individual, any institution, and any entity. Therefore the question of agency, identity, and power in EIL cannot be reduced to any single grand ideology. To respond to this call, any work related to the global development of English and ELT ought to recognize the dynamic nature of postcolonialism as well as ought to engage with the cultural politics of postcolonialism in creative and liberating ways.

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Gramsci and Culture

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Antonio Gramsci, Italian philosopher, journalist, and socialist politician, lived at the beginning of this century in Mussolini's Fascist Italy. His work, partly developed in the long imprisonment imposed on him by Mussolini, constitutes a political theory that is considered as one of the great contemporary philosophical contributions to the critic and the social fight for the transformation of the capitalist society.

The starting point for his theory has as genesis Marx's conception concerning the development and operation of the capitalist society, composed of the contradictory duality between dominant class and subordinate class, between possessors and the poor, and between the capitalists and the proletariat. The private ownership both of the earth and of the means of production of the material life (base or infrastructure of the society) has, in the superstructure, i.e., in the ideological and spiritual sphere of the society, a direct correspondence. Gramsci agrees with Marx in the conception that the class which seizes the material power also seizes the ideological power or the power of the ideas, and that's exactly the knot he took advantage of to deepen and to develop his political theory. His main thesis is that the superstructure maintains the class relationships, and that this dominance is executed by the mechanisms of hegemony of the State and of the civil society. To overcome this hegemony, it would be necessary to develop a counter-hegemony, what can be gotten if the working class, including the socialist intellectuals, promote the creation and the development of a new culture, in opposition to the bourgeois hegemony. Or better: the emphasis of the economical and social transformation happens in the superstructure, in the field of the values and norms as in man's and world's vision.

Holding these general ideas in mind, we will develop, in the following section, a brief synthesis

of the concepts involved in this thesis: (a) civil society, (b) hegemony, and (c) State. And, inside this conception, the strategy to overcome the bourgeois hegemony includes these other concepts: (a) hegemony crisis, (b) war of position, and (c) the intellectuals' role.

With this, we intended to contribute with theoretical subsidies to the debate on the problem of the hegemony in the bourgeois societies in this global phase of the capital.

Key Concepts

- (a) **Civil Society:** it is located in the superstructure, although its roots are in the material production. Its role is the perpetuation of class relationships and prevention of the development of the class consciousness. It is composed of private social organisms $\frac{3}{4}$ responsible for the production and reproduction of the hegemony $\frac{3}{4}$ and by the State, the public organisms. It has as function the direct dominance, both in the domain of the hegemony and in the use of coercion.
- (b) **Hegemony:** from the Marxist thesis that the class is the dominant material force in society and at the same time its dominant intellectual force, Gramsci added to the Marxist philosophy the concept of hegemony. Hegemony expresses the consent of the subordinate classes to the bourgeois dominance, which comes as the other face of the power: the face of the domain of consciousness and of the reproduction of ideology.

Hegemony embraces the following aspects:

- **Inter-bourgeoisie:** the dominant fraction inside the civil society exercise the control through its moral and intellectual leadership. This dominant fraction (which can alternate depending on the force relations in the inter-bourgeoisie) detains the power and the capacity to articulate the interests of the other fractions. It doesn't impose its own ideology, but combines common elements, extracted from visions of the world and interests of the allied groups.

- Bourgeoisie X proletariat: the bourgeoisie uses its political, moral, and intellectual leadership to impose its vision of the world as something comprehensible and universal, which in this way molds the interests and needs of the subordinate groups. Thus, although hegemony is political-ethical, it is also based on the decisive function of the economical activity. And this is made through a group of institutions, practices, and agents that embrace the productive and administrative sectors, as well as the political and the technological ones.

It should be pointed out that for Gramsci, there is no monolithic power among all those hegemony apparatus. The class struggle inserts itself in all of them, and this explains the changes and the resistances to the hegemony of the dominant class.

- (c) **State:** it represents hegemony as guaranteed by the armor of coercion. It can be schematized by the formula: political society and civil society.

Similarly to the production forces, the control of consciousness is also an arena for the political fight.

The State is an “educator” in the sense that its tendency is to create a new civilization type or level. It operates according to a plan; it impels, incites, requests, and punishes. These actions lead to a “passive” revolution, in other words, to a constant reorganization of the power of the State in the sense of preserving its hegemony through the exclusion of the masses over the economical and political institutions.

In Gramsci’s perspective, the historical-social changes, the movements that happen in the relationships between structure and superstructure, obey two principles:

1. “No society assumes responsibilities for whose solution the necessary and sufficient conditions don’t still exist, or that at least are not about to appear and to develop.”

2. “No society is dissolved or can be replaced before developing and completing all the implicit life forms in its relationships.”

Movement or change types:

- Organic: are those that generate relatively permanent character changes and are linked to the mode of social organization. Example: change from feudalism to capitalism.
- Conjuncture: are the movements that come as occasional and immediate. Of course the conjuncture movements and changes depend on the organic movements, but their meanings neither have a wide historical reach nor alter the structure or mode of economical-social organization of society.

Forces that impel the movement/changes:

- Economic: expressed in the conflicts between capital and work
- Politic: since the corporations to the highest expressions in the political parties
- Technical-military: considered by Gramsci, the decisive forces

Starting from these key concepts, how could the transformation happen if the arena of the consciousness is the immediate space for the principal struggles of the dominant classes against the subordinate ones?

Gramsci thought three strategies to overcome the bourgeoisie hegemony: hegemony crisis, position war, and the intellectuals’ role.

- (a) **Crisis of Hegemony:** has its origin when the classes separate from their political parties and the civil society enlarges its power and autonomy through unpopular acts by the leaders in the State. This loss of the consent makes the society no more a directing power, but only dominant, just exercising its coercive force. That crisis is not a direct function of the economical crises, although these can also generate them. This crisis are not a direct function of economical crises, although these can also

generate them. They can be caused by the loss of welfare, poverty, etc. Although the crisis of the State is an important factor for the socialist transformation, this is not enough. It is necessary that the crisis occurs in the whole power complex and not just in the most immediate instance of the hegemony, which is the State.

- (b) **War of Position:** it is the siege of the State by the working class, by developing and enlarging a counter-hegemony through the creation of a popular culture that gives foundation to a new world vision: norms and values of a new society that would replace the consent of the bourgeoisie. Like this, the arena of the consciousness would be reconstructed with a new man's and world's vision.

This new culture would be developed by the party of the masses, a party that would not implant a vertical understanding, from top to bottom, but something organic, which relates the party as a whole, because it would be created by all those involved in it.

This process of construction and education of a counter-hegemony would have as mission to build great powers of cohesion, centralization, and innovation, which would be mining the power of the hegemony.

- (c) **The Intellectuals' Role:** Premise: "All men are intellectual...but not all men play the intellectuals' role in the society."

Degrees of intellectual activity: Higher level: creators of the several sciences, philosophy, art, etc. Lower level: administrators and divulgers of the existent intellectual wealth.

Under the capitalism: the schools form intellectuals of several levels whose functions in the civil society (private organisms and State) are those that organize the hegemony, the spontaneous consent of the population. This consent is born from the prestige the bourgeoisie has in society and of the apparatus of State coercion that legally assures the discipline for those that admit the consent.

In the transformation or revolutionary process, the intellectuals' role would be given by their technical capacity to act as thinkers and organizing elements of the subordinate classes.

Their mission is not professional, but, as partners of the construction of a new culture through the party of the masses, he/she would have the function of driving the ideas and the aspirations of the class to which they organically belong, taking into account that all the men are intellectual and think, although not all fully develop that capacity, due to the bourgeois hegemony.

The party of the masses must therefore merge the traditional intellectuals (professional) and the organic intellectuals of the subordinate classes around a conception of the world that transcends their class interests, so that the workers awake their intellectual possibilities (through the educational functions of the party) and contribute to the war of position, creating the counter-hegemony of their class.

Intellectuals, School, and Culture

Perspective transformation of the school:

- Role of the school: to form intellectuals that will organize/form a new culture.
- Objective: to contribute to the creation process of a counter-hegemony against the dominant hegemony.
- Justification: it is in the arena of consciousness "that the elites use their organic intellectuals to maintain the dominance." However, given the inequalities and the injustices, it is necessary that the subordinate classes free their consciousness from the bourgeois hegemony and create a new culture. And in this process, school can have a role as transformer.

Necessary conditions:

- Public and free school: only in this way the school may involve all generations, without divisions of groups or castes. The efficiency of the school is better and much more intense when the relationship between teacher and student is small.

- Buildings: the school should be a college school, with bedrooms, refectories, specialized libraries, laboratories, classrooms for the work of seminars, etc.
- Duration: the unitary school should correspond to the period of elementary schools in average, reorganized not only in relation to the content and teaching method, but also with regard to the disposal for the students attending the several degrees in the school career.

The teacher's role:

- To quit the reactionary position and to become a “friendly” guide.
- To accelerate and discipline the child’s formation according to the superior type in struggle against the inferior type.

Curriculum: (10 years)

- First phase: 3–4 years. Besides teaching the first instrumental “notions” (reading, writing, duties, geography, and history), the fundamental notions of the State and society should be learned as primordial elements of a new conception of the world.
- Second phase: the rest of the course should not surpass more than 6 years, so that, when the student was 15–16 years old, he/she would have concluded all the degrees of the unitary school.

Presupposed curriculum effects:

- Unified manual and intellectual work
- Values: intellectual self-discipline and moral autonomy

Method:

- The study and learning of creative methods in science and life should permeate the whole course. Therefore, the school should be a creative school.

For Gramsci, creative school doesn’t mean inventors’ and discoverers’ school; it indicates a

phase and an investigation method of knowledge and not a “predetermined program” that forces the innovation and originality at any cost.

For him, to discover a truth by himself, without suggestions and external helps, is creation (same as the truth is old) and demonstrates the adequacy of the method. Therefore, the fundamental school activity will grow in seminars, in libraries, and in experimental laboratories. The aim of education is, at most, to develop the intellect, that is, a habit of order and system, a habit for relating the whole new knowledge with the ones that are already possessed and to integrate them together, and what is more important, the acceptance and use of certain principles, as center of the thought. In this critical university, history exists and it is not just a new book of novels; the speakers and publications of the day loose the infallibility; eloquence doesn’t replace thought, nor the courageous statements or the colored descriptions occupy the place of arguments, says Gramsci.

Final Consideration

In the Gramscian theory, it is relevant to think in what degree a plan that involves the participation of the collectivity cannot be conducted as one moment – among others – of discussion and development of a new culture of a counter-hegemony.

In this sense, it is of fundamental importance to discuss what type of vision of man and of the world is giving a foundation to the everyday life of the people involved in this process, which values are present (whether from hegemony or not), and how one could take advantage of such moment to carry ahead the construction of the new culture.

On the other hand, in these moments when the Left all over the world lives what Therborn (THERBORN, Göran. In SADER, Emir (org.), 1995) analyzes as the crisis of the socialist culture (in identity level, values, and world vision), the accomplishment of a task as this we suggested is of highest importance for the future of the Left itself, because there won’t be a democratic equality if a socialist culture does not exist. And the

socialist culture needs to be reconstructed on the basis of popular participation (consciousness), as stated by Gramsci, and not in the vertical direction of an “illuminated” vanguard, as the world history has been registering until now.

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Green, Public Education, and the Idea of Positive Freedom

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Introduction

The industrialization of nineteenth-century Britain was a key moment for political theory; it catalyzed a group of British scholars to radically rethink the conventional understanding of liberty and what it is to be “free.” The movement, often referred to as British Idealism, sought to address the social evils of its time, such as poor working conditions, increasing inequality, and a lack of adequate medical care and education. The

Idealist’s took the view that classical liberal assumptions such as laissez-faire and freedom of contract underpinned and reinforced these evils and aimed to revise liberalism in this context. The key thinkers included Bernard Bosanquet, Edward Caird, F. H. Bradley, L. T. Hobhouse, and T. H. Green. Here the focus is upon the latter, T. H. Green (1836–1882), due to his immense contributions to political philosophy and, importantly for this collection, his arguments for the extension of public education in Britain and his pivotal role as a precursor to the welfare State.

Contextualizing Green’s Theoretical Background

Green, a fellow of Balliol College Oxford, was primarily influenced by the German Idealism of G. W. F. Hegel, Kant’s liberal egalitarianism, and the Greek thought of Aristotle, which he then brought to bear on classical liberalism. The concept of positive liberty has now become commonplace, and although Green is often referred to as a theorist of this ilk, the term fails to fully encapsulate his complex liberal position and his normative theory of justice (Simhony 2003). His “New Liberal” stance added a positive dimension to classical formulations of liberty, defining freedom in the more expansive notion of self-realization, as opposed to mere absence of restraint and interference. In brief, he argued that for individuals to be considered free, they need the “capacity” or “ability” to be free. This aligned strongly with his conception of the common good, which played a lead role in his theory of freedom.

Green’s arguments for a positively enabled State – which provides the conditions for individual self-development and the common good – influenced substantial educational reforms in Victorian Britain. Until the late 1800s, elementary schooling was provided by voluntary associations, namely, the church. Therefore there was no national provision as such. For Green this system was wholly inadequate for the time, as educational opportunities were largely only open to the British upper classes. Key to understanding his defense of

public education are his notions of the common good, self-realization, and internal freedom, which constitute “freedom in the positive sense” (Green 1986a, p. 200). The concepts are interlinked but referenced sporadically throughout his work, no doubt due to his untimely death and the posthumous publication of his key lectures and texts. Here they are addressed in turn, in order to present the role education plays in society, which hopefully reflects Green’s intentions.

Green on Education as Common Good

Education was the great leveler for the British Idealists, whose key goal was to extend equality of opportunity. The education of the working class was a central focus of Green’s scholarship. It informed his vision of integrating education into the fabric of civic life, exercised through his conception of the common good. This has been cogently expressed as an ideal that emerges from the “good society: a community of mutually developing individuals, the moral requiredness of which justifies the construction of social order in terms of both justice and citizenship” (Simhony 2001, p. 71). It is an ethic of society that can be contrasted with the classical liberal view, of atomized individuals cooperating merely for mutual advantage. The good is common, as Green explains, because it is not a “good for [oneself] or for this man or that more than another, but for all members equally in virtue of their relation to each other and their common nature” (Green 1986b, p. 95f). In *Prolegomena to Ethics*, he states that the “true good must be good for all men, so that no one should seek to gain by another’s loss, gain and loss being estimated on the same principle for each” (Green 1906a, p. 281).

Therefore the common good is a moral ideal that individuals in society should act in accordance with and seek to promote. Individuals and institutions, as moral agents, can use the common good to test the moral validity of their acts. For example, Green asks whether a law or course of action contributes “to the better being of society,” which can be measured against whether the act

contributes to the establishment “of conditions favourable to the attainment of recognised excellences and virtues” (Green 1906d, p. 434). However he adds an important liberal caveat to this statement, that even if such acts meet the criteria above, they should not “detract from the opportunities of others” (Green 1906d, p. 434).

The common good can be interpreted further as a criterion, in respect to the objects that individuals choose to pursue. As Green’s central concern is the self-development of individuals, he subsequently argues that this can be achieved by pursuing, or willing, certain objects. The nature and moral value of these objects depend upon whether they allow an agent to achieve intrinsic self-satisfaction. Importantly though, this requires the realization of moral objects to be a social activity, as society acts as the conduit through which moral self-development can take place. It is a mechanism through which true common goods can be recognized. For Green, “human society presupposes persons in capacity – subjects capable each of conceiving himself and the bettering of his life as an end to himself – but it is only in the intercourse of men, each recognised by each as an end, and not merely a means, and thus as having reciprocal claims, that the capacity is actualised and that we really live as persons” (1906a, p. 209).

The good is thus common, as it is something which has to be shared in common with others. Green stipulates that the only object of intrinsic value is “the perfection of human character – a perfection of individuals which is also that of society, and of society which is also that of individuals . . .” (1906b, p. 291, also 1906a, p. 210). Therefore, what is good for an individual is also good for society. Resultantly social goods are not private but good for individuals as members of a community (Green 1906b, p. 271). Aristotle’s influence now surfaces, as Green essentially argues that human beings are social animals and can only fully realize themselves within a community. It is the necessary condition for self-realization to take place. A critical aspect of society is that “persons” recognize one another “and their interest in each other, *as persons*, i.e., as beings who are ends in themselves . . .” (Green

1906a, p. 217). Mutual recognition thus enables individuals to appreciate whether the interests they pursue are true moral goods, ones that are noncompetitive, are not private, but good for the community as a whole:

... the only good which is really common to all who may pursue it, is that which consists in the universal will to be good – in the settled disposition on each man's part to make the most and best of humanity in his own person and in the persons of others. (Green 1906b, p. 287)

Education can thus be viewed as a derivative of the common good, as Green's philosophy is derived from the moral character of individuals, rather than a prescribed set of principles. It forms part of the "supply," of "conditions favourable to good character" (Green 1906c, p. 400). Not only should education be enjoyed in common with others, as a noncompetitive and public good, but it importantly enables individuals to become self-questioning moral agents, allowing them, and their society through the common good, to progress further with their own self-perfection. To reveal how this is so, focus now turns to Green's notion of self-realization.

Green on Self-Realization

Securing educational resources is of particular importance for Green, as it allows individuals to develop their rational capacities and in essence gives them a greater ability to act in accordance with the common good. Consequently "without education one could not develop one's character and pursue morally good ends" (Plant 2006, p. 30). This can be seen as an extension of John Stuart Mill's work. He defended the notion of a private sphere of noninterference, so that individuals could be left alone to develop their higher faculties. Yet Green placed more emphasis on the role of community. For him, to be morally autonomous and to realize these higher faculties meant acting in accordance with the common good. Although individual autonomy remained central, it could not be separated from community and the common good and thus lead him in a different direction to Mill's liberalism.

Green's account of moral autonomy is perhaps best explained by using the concept of a "lifeplan," which illustrates his divergence from classical liberalism (Simhony 1993, p. 31). For individuals to be acting in accordance with their lifeplan, they must be organizing and pursuing their interests in light of the self-conscious exercising of their will and reason. Freedom is not only the absence of constraint and interference but the ability for one to "exercise the capacity of will and reason" (Simhony 1993, p. 31). This is what he meant by the term self-realization. It is the combination of the self-conscious effort individuals make to satisfy themselves and the capacity they have to conceive of themselves in a better state, one which can be reached by rational action.

The self-conscious effort Green has in mind is directed toward an individual becoming a full moral agent. Thus self-realization, or real freedom, is a moral ideal (Green 1986c, pp. 228f, 234, 242, 244, 246). It involves individuals striving to be the best they can be and thus able to freely exercise their human faculties (Green 1986a, p. 201). Freedom therefore relates to the internal nature and development of the individual, as a self-realizing moral agent. It concerns a person's character, their possession of "a habitual disposition to do what is good because it is good" (Nicholson 1990, p. 122). However there is also a strong communal dimension. It is the social institutions of society that can inculcate in its members, ideas of what it means to be free, and facilitate the necessary mutual recognition between citizens, as full moral agents (Nicholson 1990, p. 120). Consequently real freedom aligns with the common good through reciprocal recognition, and society must therefore progress as a whole toward the moral ideal of real freedom. It cannot be realized in a society where there is oppression (Nicholson 1990, p. 120), as in that case, some individuals would lack the power to make the best of themselves. This introduces Green's concept of "internal freedom," that is, the individual's capacity to overcome "internal" obstacles to the good life. In other words to be able to fully develop their human faculties and will the common good, education would be central here.

Green's Contribution to the Educational System

The value of education is its ability to enable individuals to develop their human faculties and moral conscious, to contribute to the common good, and to essentially achieve “true freedom” in the positive sense. Yet Green’s philosophical idealism was not devoid of practical experience: he contributed to the Taunton Commission, tasked with investigating Britain’s secondary school system; was on the School Board for Oxford elementary schools; a leading figure in the founding of the Oxford School for Boys; a member of the National Education League; and part of the university extension movement, which aimed at improving higher education opportunities for women.

The most controversial aspects of Green’s arguments for elementary education were that he thought it should be provided by the State and be compulsory. This was a novel idea at the time. However he saw problems both in the quantity and the quality of education offered by voluntary associations and feared that children may be indoctrinated if education was overseen by religious organizations. He argued that more public funds should be made available to provide for nationwide State elementary education. Attendance would be free, and parents would be compelled to send their children to school. The last point is contentious. However Green felt that during his “modern” times, parents lacked sufficient educational responsibility for their children, due to mass labor that often meant parents would be away for long periods of time (Green 1911a, p. 432). This was especially the case for the working class families.

Education was highly significant because without it, individuals would not be able to develop themselves to the best of their ability. Green claimed that “without a command of certain elementary arts and knowledge, the individual in modern society is effectually crippled as by the loss of a limb or a broken constitution,” as she “is not free to develop [her] faculties” (Green 1986a, p. 201). It therefore comes under “the province of

the state to prevent children growing up in that kind of ignorance which practically excludes them from a career in life” (Green 1986a, p. 201). This statement refers directly to his notion of capacity, in this case elementary education enables “the growth of the capacity for beneficially exercising rights” (Green 1986b, p. 161). As rights are reciprocal and thus form part of the common good, they act as a base for developing the “perfect character” in individuals and “in others” (Green 1986b, p. 23). Compulsory education should therefore be enforced by the State, as part of its duty is to remove obstacles to individual self-realization (Green 1986b, p. 161). A lack of education hinders the development of a child’s capacity for rights and constrains the “free exercise of [their] human faculties” (Green 1986a, p. 202). Education therefore forms a significant part of what Green calls freedom in the positive sense: “the liberation of the powers of all men equally for contributions to the common good” (Green 1986a, p. 200).

With regard to secondary schools, he adopted a different position, notably they should not be made compulsory. However they retained an essential role in his vision of educational reform. The reform he suggested essentially served to create equality of opportunity via a “ladder of learning” (Plant 2006, p. 34). The system he proposed consisted of having a three-tier system for schools. The first level would cover basic aspects of education beyond manual labor, such as literacy and writing, and move to the third, which would essentially be preparing students for university (Nicholson 1990, p. 171f). By having a careful grading of children and schools, overseen by school boards, and a provision made for scholarships, educational opportunities would be open to students from all social backgrounds. Essentially he advocated a meritocratic system which rewarded ability rather than wealth. Although he thought that parents who could afford to send the children into further education should pay (Green 1911b, p. 412), scholarships that would relieve poor students of fees would be key to generating equality of opportunity. Therefore children from the poorest backgrounds, who demonstrate good ability, should be able to take advantage of the

intellectual opportunities that higher levels of education offer.

Green also thought that this system would ease class antagonism:

“Common education is the true social leveller. Men and women who have been at school together, or who have been at schools of the same sort, will always understand each other, will always be at ease together, will be free from social jealousies and animosities however different their circumstances in life may be” (Green 1911c, p. 457f).

Therefore if the State actively removes social barriers, such as education, social unity should improve as well. It reflected his overarching idealist philosophy, that society is not constituted by atomized individuals but rather as a community of mutually indebted citizens: an integrated whole sharing a common good (Gordon and White 1979, p. 4). Only collective action could remove these obstacles that hindered individual self-development. Green argued that “[t]o educate one’s children is no doubt a moral duty,” but it importantly prevents “a hindrance to the capacity for rights on the part of the children” (Green 1986b, p. 161). In Britain this meant reforming the voluntarist school system, which Green believed had had its chance and failed. Instead a comprehensive State-managed educational system was necessary, one that allowed able students, regardless of their background, to reach the highest levels of education. He justified this approach morally, in respect to the common good and individual self-realization.

Green did not abandon liberalism but reformed it. Traditional liberal principles of self-help and self-reliance remained highly significant. However he thought that his proposals did not violate such principles. State-provided education would not damage self-reliance. If a parent was already sending their child to school, they would not notice the new law (Green 1986a, p. 203, 1986b, p. 161), and if parents were not, then they were already failing in their moral duty and the State’s noninterference would not improve the situation for those children (Nicholson 1990, p. 170). Similarly Green advocated elementary education for farm laborers, as ignorance was a contributing

factor to low wages for these workers. Education therefore reinforces self-reliance (Nicholson 1990, p. 176).

Conclusion

In sum Green had a keen awareness of circumstance. For example, he promoted women’s education, but thought that policy would be unsuccessful if it raced too far ahead of public opinion (Green 1986a, p. 210). In a similar vein, he recognized that industrialization had created new problems for British society and new sources of exploitation. Thus he argued that the State was justified in adopting a more interventionist position, in order to give all its citizens an equal opportunity of obtaining the good life. Education is clearly central to this goal, and especially pertinent today, where rapid technological advances, transnational economic markets, and international terrorism are again challenging traditional conceptions of freedom and opportunity. Green’s work has further contemporary relevance, in relation to a revised social democratic conception of public education as a universal right. Education for Green clearly fulfills a positive community function premised on the norms of cooperation and universal entitlement, rather than as a competition based on neoliberal “choice” policies, which have come to characterize the post-welfare state settlement since the 1970s. Essentially Green asks what skills and competences are necessary for the realization of the good life, postulating that these, and thus education, should not be competitive but fundamental rights for all.

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Habermas and Philosophy of Education

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Synonyms

[Communicative action](#); [Education](#); [Interaction](#);
[Intersubjectivity](#); [Life world \(Lebenswelt\)](#)

Introduction

Jürgen Habermas (born 1929, in Düsseldorf, Germany), considered the greatest living German philosopher, of international renown, is also a critical intellectual, attentive to the new flows of argument and problematizations of society that may break down constellations of power and broaden inclusive relations. His main concern, ever since his work when young, has been loss

of respect and of the meaning of human life and emancipation. His project intends to deal with this problem and produce a systematic grounding of rationality using a reconstructive analysis of the cognitive and normative contents of our practices. He thus moves away from a substantial indication of what a just society would be to investigate the conditions which make it possible for the subjects to deliberate about their lives through processes of understanding. This is a fascinating object that depends on forms of communication able to promote rational formation of the will. The possibility of communicative rationality is accompanied by a skeptical evaluation of the world situation. In the scenario in which we move, there is a kind of haziness, a narrowing of prospects (*die neue Unübersichtlichkeit*). Even acknowledging a certain unintelligibility in our time, Habermas does not hurry to reach conclusions. On the contrary, despite the multiple transformations that have occurred in modern societies, he considers that no radical change has occurred in the way of debating our future possibilities, which will lead him to endorse the postmodern movement that occurred at the end of the 1970s. Nor can the project of modernity be taken up again using the same criteria and that is where his effort lies: reconstructing the normative Fundamentals and formulating a critical theory that will include the social pathologies, enabling a new type of rationality to emerge.

Habermas is influenced by the traditions of the enlightenment, idealism, and neo-humanism that

wagered on a process of cultural and spiritual formation at the beginning of the nineteenth century, in Germany, on philosophy of language and pragmatism. In his own words, he was influenced “by philosophical principles that highlight the intersubjective constitution of the human spirit, namely: the hermeneutic tradition that goes back to Wilhelm von Humboldt, to the American pragmatism of Charles Sanders Peirce and George Herbert Mead, to the theory of the symbolic forms, to Ernst Cassirer and Ludwig Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language” (Habermas 2005, pp. 17–18).

Communicative Action Theory: Concepts

In 1981, Habermas published his *magnum opus* “Communicative action theory” (*Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns*), prepared during over two decades, intending to redimension reason from a communicative perspective, reconstruct a social theory that will articulate the world of the system and the world of life, and restore the normative content of modernity. The central thesis refers to the existence of a *télos* of understanding in language, namely, as speakers we are already participants in a rational intersubjectivity.

The instrumental, economic, and bureaucratic rationality that pertains to the system world invades the lifeworld, with the consequent loss of meaning and freedom. Communicative action is differentiated from other actions, namely teleologic action, in which the actor chooses means with utilitarian ends; normative action, in which the action is turned to common values and respect for the norms agreed by the social group; and dramaturgic action, which involves the self-representation of the subject when dealing with a public. Different from the others, communicative action refers to the “interaction of at least two subjects, capable of speech and action, who establish an interpersonal relationship” (Habermas 1987a, 1, p. 128). Outstanding in this action is the interpretation and search for understanding with a view to consensus. When we act communicatively, we are prepared to hear what the others

have to say, that is, the possibility of challenging the validity of the announcements is accepted.

The validity claims can always be criticized and are the following: claim to truth, which refers to the objective world and is constituted by the theoretical discourses; the claim to rightfulness or justice in which the utterance of the participants must be right according to the prevailing norms; and the claim to truthfulness, which refers to the subjective world and the authenticity of the subject (the express intention of the speaker must coincide with what he thinks). It is necessary to accept these validity claims from a partner in discourse to begin a movement of communicative rationality. The communicative practice has, immanently, the possibility that the participants will enter an argumentative process, present good reasons, and critically examine the truth of the enouncements, the rightfulness of actions and norms, and the authenticity of expressive manifestations. If there is a challenge to them, it is possible to begin the argumentative process anew until consensus is achieved. Since everything that is presented can be criticized, this process allows identifying errors and learning from them. Consensus can only be established because it is supported on the intersubjective recognition of validity claims that can be criticized. According to Habermas:

It must be possible to defend what we consider to be true with convincing reasons, not only in another context, but also in all possible contexts, that is, at any time and against anyone. The discursive theory of truth is inspired by this; in this way an enouncement is true when under the demanding conditions of a rational discourse, it resists all attempts at refuting it. (1999, p. 259)

In this way, in modern societies, individuals can coordinate their interests communicatively. Communicative action has a kind of anchor that feeds the interpretations of the participants in the interaction, called the lifeworld (*Lebenswelt*), the horizon in which we move. This is a concept from the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl, introduced by Habermas to link social action to the rationalization processes. The actions are understood based on the lifeworld which refers to the pretheoretical, convictions, nonproblematized

self-evidence: “this collection of knowledge that provides the participants in communication with *non-problematic background convictions*, background convictions which they assume are guaranteed” (Habermas 1987b, 2, p. 191). The lifeworld contains an interpretative reserve that makes it possible to anchor our actions in the face of the risk of disagreement that could occur in any process of comprehension. These are cultural contents, values, interpretive patterns that are situated within the sphere of life experiences. The understanding that occurs in the lifeworld establishes the process of education and formation, since “when the child participates in interactions, with reference people that perform concrete actions, it internalizes the evaluative orientations of its social group and *acquires* generalizing capacities for action” (Habermas 1989, p. 497).

The lifeworld produces and reproduces itself symbolically by means of communicative action and becomes rationalized, producing the basic structures of modern consciousness. In communicative action, the participants say yes or no to the actions of speech, regarding their validity, both when we describe things of the objective world and when we refer to the justice of the norms or express our opinion about our feelings about something. This condition as participants in interactions allow all to question the validity claims. In this way, interaction can continue. Mostly we understand each other based on a set of familiar conviction that constitutes the aforementioned “collection of knowledge.” When these convictions are broken down or stabilized, they are submitted to discussion and are no longer part of the lifeworld. But when they become customary, they return to the lifeworld which is resized and rationalized, constituting the structures of modern consciousness. The rationalized lifeworld is differentiated into three structural components: culture, personality, and society. Thus,

communicative action serves tradition and the renewal of cultural knowledge; as to the aspect of action coordination, it serves social integration and the creation of solidarity; finally, as regards the aspect of socialization, it serves to form personal identities. The symbolic structures of the lifeworld are reproduced through continuing the valid knowledge of stabilization of group solidarity and the

formation of actors that can respond to their actions. The reproduction process includes the new situations with the already existing states of the world. [...] To these processes of cultural reproduction, social integration and socialization correspond the structural component of life that are culture, society and personality. (1987b, 2, pp. 208–209)

As an intellectual, Habermas maintained an open attitude to interlocution with his critics and was attentive to the problems of society. This led him to give new influxes to his philosophical project, with the investigation of the principles of communicative action in the field of ethics, in *Moral consciousness and communicative action* (*Moralbewusstsein und kommunikatives Handeln*, 1983, and revised edition in 1984) and *Comments on discourse ethics* (Habermas 1991) and in the field of law, in *Law and Democracy* (*Facticity and Validity*) (*Faktizität und Geltung*, 1996). There are also theoretical deployments of his theses in various works, among which the main ones are *The Inclusion of the other: Studies in Political Theory* (Habermas 1996), *Truth and Justification: philosophical essays* (Habermas 1999), *between naturalism and religion: philosophical essays* (Habermas 2005). He took active part in the debate on contemporary issues and recognizes the force of noninstitutional social networks that express the organization of groups that are not part of political power. In this sense, he participates in the public debates on biotechnology, multiculturalism, religion, inclusion of the other, besides a great number of political essays about globalization processes, the public sphere, democratization, issues of tolerance, terrorism, the role of the State in reducing social inequalities, the Nazi past, among other topics.

Educational Implications

Habermas did not write a treatise on education, but his work supplies significant element to review/recreate the concept of formation insofar as it not only points out the blemishes of an education process caught in the illusions of the theory of subjectivity and the pitfalls of instrumental rationality, it also offers instruments to

reinterpret the concept of education emphasizing intersubjectivity. In other words, the very concept of formation may undergo corrections of its idealistic assumptions if it is submitted to a discursive process which leads education to review them and improve the level of public controversies. Through language we could problematize and transform our heritage regarding what is education, in the light of the experiments we perform.

Although the educational processes are not the specific object of his investigation, he concerns himself with the broader social processes of learning, because any significant social action depends on the rational critique and communicative competencies which result from constructive learning processes, as was understood by Jean Piaget (1896–1980). According to Habermas' interpretation of Piaget's concept, constructive learning is based on the following supposition: first, the supposition that knowledge, in general, can be analyzed as a product of learning processes; then, that learning is a problem solving process in which the subject who learns is actively involved; and, finally, that the learning process is guided by the discernments of the very subjects directly involved in this process.

In a broad sense, Habermas' theory is a defense according to which communicative action is a learning of subjects in interaction. Education, on the one hand, must promote the discursive and argumentative capacity, so as to prepare the subjects to meet their demands and become inserted in democratic processes; on the other hand, it must promote public discussion about the rationality criteria underlying the educational actions, and promote the continuity of knowledges and wisdom of the cultural tradition that will ensure the interpretive schemes of the subject and the cultural identity (Hermann Prestes 1996; Hermann 1999).

Educational action is only feasible because we are with others in a common world, in a multiplicity of experiences. In this type of formation, there is an echo of Humboldt's neo-humanist tradition, according to which education is a work of oneself, in a dialectical opening between experience in the world and project of a world. In Habermas' words, it is the "intersubjective constitution of the human

spirit" (2005, pp. 17–18). Otherwise we would have the wealth of the formative process reduced to a mere preparation of technical competencies, a training, in an irresponsible lack of attention to the competencies that transform man "into a person" (Ibid. p. 17).

And the formation of subjects that are capable of interacting does not occur a posteriori, but from the experience of communicative processes, since "we men learn *from each other*" (Ibid.). Habermas is conscious of the importance of a formative process for the democratic principles to "take root in the minds and hearts of people" (Ibid. p. 25) and also to establish a space opened by the discursiveness of public opinion. Reason and discourse, formation, and constitution of a new mind set mix in intense reciprocity. It is especially in this aspect that Habermas reveals the influence of the democratic tradition in education. From Dewey's pragmatism, he inherits the antielitistic and egalitarian attitude, associated with the belief that education is vital to promote humanity.

He wagers on man's capacity to modify himself and the environment by developing communicative procedures that respect the different life forms and are able to generate the cultural and moral survival itself of the social world. Habermas' theory is challenging, because his virtualities to establish a foundation for a public sphere instigate the promotion of a rational reconstruction process of education. Therefore, no educational crisis permits abandoning the project; on the contrary, it requires constant argumentative tests, so as to promote a democratic culture. This sets us constant challenges. For this reason, it can be said that reading Habermas provokes a kind of therapeutic shock, namely, the destabilizing confrontation that reading his work brings from the limits of theoretical assumptions that, by tendency, lead education into the pitfalls of idealizations. These limits are not really a novelty but take on their own relevance in the ensemble of the work, since with the same skill as he points them out, Habermas indicates also how not to do away with claims born within this same idealism that, together with our historical consciousness, bring a validity to which we cannot turn our back. His

critique, thus, is not immobilizing. On the contrary, it is challenging because it requires very high hermeneutic efforts to reconstruct an educational process that has already diagnosed its pathologies and that now, conscious of the pitfalls of idealism, has to deal with self-responsibility.

Habermas' theory has an illuminating role for philosophy of education, because it offers very specific criteria to – when facing the “lack of transparency of time,” as Habermas himself called it – point at an education that is more adjusted to the present times, in which we are easily confounded by two problems: the devaluation of a common world that would prepare the existence of the public sphere; and the misleading promise of reducing formation exclusively in favor of developing capacities, especially for the work world, abandoning the tradition of education as a human and ethical formation. Habermas' theory manages to offer an articulate conceptual analysis that enables viewing these problems more adequately, exposing their tensions and challenges, allowing one to foresee that the projection of possible alternatives requires an interdisciplinary effort to cover the complexity of the issue. Besides, his defense of moral universalism and the possibility of an intercultural dialogue offer theoretical instruments for education to deal with a radically plural world, give new life to processes of opening to the other, and render effective an education sensitive to differences and to multiculturalism.

Habermas adds to the idea of spiritual formation inherited from the tradition of the enlightenment, especially from Hegel, the formation of the political will that is translated by the communicative competence to respond to the demands of the community. The interaction perceived by the communicative action involves everyone's responsibility in a network of relations – a response to the other. No matter how difficult, formation depends on the patient process of repairing the communicative competency, the effort to open the way for the subjects themselves to find answers to their problems, and this is a responsibility pertaining to everyone, which results from interaction in the lifeworld and not from specialist's knowledge.

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Habermas and the Problem of Indoctrination

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The Problem of the Criteria of Indoctrination

In the philosophy of education, the concept of indoctrination refers to unethical influencing in a teaching situation. Indoctrination means infiltrating (drilling, inculcating, etc.) concepts, attitudes, beliefs, and theories into a student's mind by-passing her free and critical deliberation. When – on a general level – we define indoctrination in this way, it is easy to say that indoctrinative teaching is morally wrong and that teachers or educational institutions should not practice it. The problem is how do we acknowledge indoctrinative teaching? By what criterion

do we consider teaching to be a form of indoctrination or to have elements of indoctrination?

The educational philosopher Ivan Snook has divided criteria that have been used in educational literature into four classes (Snook 1972, pp. 16–67):

1. The method of teaching as a criterion of indoctrination. In the US context, thanks to John Dewey, the tendency is to connect indoctrination to a certain teaching method. This illegitimate teaching method is said to include the following elements: (a) Teaching is authoritarian; (b) Teaching content is drilled in students' minds; (c) There are threading elements in teaching and free discussion is not allowed. Some writers label these as *irrational teaching methods*.
2. The content of teaching as criterion of indoctrination. According to the trivial content criterion, the content of teaching determines whether or not teaching is indoctrination. As Anthony Flew put it: "No doctrines, no indoctrination" (Flew 1972, p. 11).
3. The intention of teaching as criterion of indoctrination. The first person to use the term indoctrination in its pejorative sense was William Heard Kilpatrick (see Gatchel 1972, p. 13). Kilpatrick emphasized the intention of the teacher in his concept of indoctrination. He did not deny the possibility of unintentional indoctrination, but nevertheless considered the teacher's intention to be the most important criterion of indoctrination. John White defines a teacher's so-called indoctrinative intention in the following way: "The child should believe that 'p' is true, in a such way that nothing will shake this belief" (White 1972a, p. 119, 1973, p. 179).
4. The consequence of teaching as a criterion of indoctrination. When we consider indoctrination in the light of the consequence criterion, we focus our attention to the outcomes of teaching and education. According to this criterion, teaching is indoctrination if the outcome is an *indoctrinated person*. John Wilson claims that an indoctrinated person lives in self-deception. She is a kind of sleepwalker

(Wilson 1972, p. 18). The ground of the beliefs of such a person are believed to be untenable or beyond rational reasoning. An indoctrinated person holds her conviction despite of counterevidence.

These four criteria – stated in this traditional way – include serious problems that could potentially render the entire concept of indoctrination useless in the context of a postmodern teaching situation. I agree with Snook, who claims that indoctrination cannot be defined as "irrational teaching methods" (Snook 1972, pp. 22–23). It is clear that when a teacher teaches in an authoritarian style, she tends to produce nondiscursive and indoctrinative learning, although this is a very ineffective way to indoctrinate in a modern teaching situation. It is mainly used in the military, in some private educational institutes, in some workplaces, and in other so-called total institutions (see Peshkin 1986). However, the lack of this kind of teaching does not necessarily remove the danger of indoctrination, which is why I disagree with John Wilson, who insists "it is also logically necessary to the concept of indoctrination that the indoctrinated person arrives at the belief by non-rational methods" (Wilson 1972, p. 19). The point in the concept of indoctrination is not, nor should it be, the concrete teaching method. The same concrete teaching method (e.g., question-answer circle) can be used either for indoctrinative purposes or for legitimate educative purposes. But I do not want to reject the aspect of method in the theory of indoctrination.

One might think that problems of the method criterion can be overcome by the use of the content criterion. According to the content criterion, teaching is indoctrination when the content of teaching consists of *unscientific doctrines*, regardless of teaching methods. This sounds promising, but the problem is how to define the term doctrine. What is the difference between a doctrine and scientific knowledge, quasi-science, and true science? Philosophers of science have not reached agreement on this subject, but teachers are expected to be able to discern between a doctrine and an irrational belief. Members of the Vienna Circle claimed that science is a system of true or justified beliefs

(justificationism; in the context of indoctrination, see, e.g., White 1973). On this matter, I agree with Imre Lakatos, who has written that after the non-Euclidean geometry, non-Newtonian physics, and inductive logic, “it turned out that all theories are equally unprovable” (Lakatos 1974, pp. 94–95). There were good reasons to abandon scientific justificationism.

Also Karl Popper has clearly demonstrated the incompetence of justificationism. He created the so-called criterion of falsification to be used as a demarcation between science and quasi-science. In educational literature, Gregory and Woods, and Tasos Kazepides, have revised the content criterion in accordance with Popperian falsificationism. Gregory and Woods claim that unscientific doctrines are such the kinds of statements that we can never know are true or untrue (e.g., political or religious conviction). No new findings or conditions can make a doctrine false. Gregory and Woods call this the “not-known-to-be-true-or-false” property of doctrines. In the case of scientific knowledge, there must be some condition when the statement will be falsified. According to Gregory and Woods, Karl Marx’s political economy was not a doctrinal system in the beginning; afterward Marxism became a quasi-scientific and non-falsificative doctrinal system (Gregory and Woods 1972).

This Popperian revision of the content criterion also has serious problems. Every scientific theory has some elements that are non-falsificative. Let us take Euclidean geometry as an example. From the point of view of falsificationism, one can say that Euclidian geometry is a doctrinal system, because there is no condition in which it could be falsified. But it would be ridiculous to say that the teaching of Euclidian geometry represents a form of indoctrination, because it does not include any criterion of falsification.

I am in strong agreement with John White, who claims that indoctrinated beliefs need not form a doctrinal system. As White likes to say, “indoctrinated beliefs could be of any kind whatever” (White 1972b). If this is the case, for the purpose of the indoctrination theory, we do not need any demarcation criterion in order to separate doctrines from science.

Ivan Snook’s and John White’s strategy to avoid the problems of method and content criteria is to connect the concept of indoctrination solely to the intention of the teacher. Of course, the teacher is an indoctrinator when she wants to indoctrinate or manipulate students. This type of case is clear (the case of the total institution). But how many teachers really want to indoctrinate students? Teachers who have truly understood the ethical codes of teacherhood have no intention of indoctrinating students. So, it is more meaningful to assume that indoctrination happens unintentionally (by structural causes). In this case, the traditional formulation of the intention criterion (see White’s definition mentioned earlier) is useless. The intention criterion does not recognize indoctrination that is caused by institutional or social structures. I presume that in the (post)modern teaching situation, indoctrination occurs at the level of hidden curriculum (see Snyder 1973). No teacher or no educational institution openly and intentionally indoctrinates students, although many unreflected attitudes and beliefs (e.g., racist and ethnocentric beliefs that would be rejected in the open and critical discourse) are transferred to the next generation through education.

The traditional formulation of the consequence criterion is also very problematic. It presumes that an indoctrinated person does not change her mind regardless of the counterevidence. But who is to say that a person is indoctrinated? Should an unindoctrinated rational person always change her mind when the counterevidence is presented? What amount of the counterevidence is needed for a rational person to change her mind? Was Einstein an indoctrinated person because he did not accept the quantum physics regardless of the very reasonable counterevidence presented to him? We could also take an example from ethics. If I postulate (and I do not give any rational grounds for doing so) that the “categorical imperative is a pure fact of Reason,” and I believe it to be so regardless of any counterevidence, am I an indoctrinated person?

One way to reconstruct a more actual and useful concept of indoctrination for a modern teaching situation is to apply Jürgen Habermas’s theory

of communicative action as Robert Young has done. Young's Habermasian concept of indoctrination opens up some promising perspectives, but on the other hand Young's theory has problems of its own. Before focusing on Young's theory and its problems, we must take a short look at Habermas's concept of the ideal speech situation and his theory of communicative action.

Jürgen Habermas on Linguistic Interaction

The Concept of the Ideal Speech Situation

With the concept of the ideal speech situation, Habermas is referring to the idealized conditions of speech. The ideal speech situation refers to the situation where conditions for argumentative action are ideals. This means that in discourse there is no other force than the force of better argument. There are no inner or outer restrictions that determine the outcome of discourse. Only the force of better argument determines the speech situation. In the ideal speech situation, systematically distorted communication is excluded (Habermas 1984a, p. 177). In this imaginative yet factually ideal speech situation, it is possible to gain consensus about all those subjects that generally are discursive in nature.

Habermas outlines four conditions for his ideal speech situation:

1. All potential participants in discourse must have equal rights to use speech acts in such a way that discourse could be permanently open to claims and counterclaims, questions, and answers.
2. All participants in discourse must have equal opportunities to present interpretations, to present assertions, recommendations, explanations, and corrections, and also equal chances to problematize (problematisieren) or challenge the validity of these presentations, to present arguments for and against. In this way all possible critiques are visible and no unreflected prejudices remain.
3. These two conditions facilitate the free discourse and the pure communicative action in which participants, by means of presentative speech acts (repräsentative Sprechakte), equally express their attitudes, feelings, and wishes and also in which participants are honest to each other (sich selbst gegenüber wahrhaftig sind) and make their inner nature (intentions) transparent.
4. Participants have equal opportunities to order and resist orders, to promise and refuse, to be accountable for one's conduct, and to demand accountability from others. It is only in this way that the reciprocity of action anticipations (Reziprozität der Verhaltenserwartungen) is realized (Habermas 1984a, pp. 177–178; see also Benhabib 1986, p. 285).

Habermas claims that no empirical investigation or study could ever reveal the facticity of the ideal speech situation, yet it still operates within it. It is a simultaneously real element of the discourse and a counterfactual standard for actual discourse (Habermas 1984a, p. 180).

Later on Habermas simply stops using the notion of the ideal speech situation and begins referring to the universal presuppositions of argumentation. He starts to speak about "universal conditions of possible understanding" and "general presuppositions of communicative action" (Habermas 1979, p. 1). In his article *Discourse Ethics: Notes on a Program of Philosophical Justification*, Habermas relies on Robert Alex's formulation of universal presuppositions of argumentation (Habermas 1990, pp. 88–89):

- (2.1) Every speaker may assert only what he really believes. (2.2) A person who disputes a proposition or norm under discussion must provide a reason for wanting to do so. (3.1) Every subject with the competence to speak and act is allowed to take part in a discourse. (3.2) a. Everyone is allowed to question any assertion whatever. b. Everyone is allowed to introduce any assertion whatever into the discourse. c. Everyone is allowed to express his attitudes, desires and needs. (3.3) No speaker may be prevented, by internal or external coercion, from exercising his rights as laid down in (3.1) and (3.2).

In this article, Habermas says that he does not want to specify, renew, or change his former notion of the ideal speech situation (Habermas

1990, p. 88). In his book *Between Facts and Norms*, Habermas definitively leaves the concept of the ideal speech situation behind and claims that discussion of “the ideal communication community” (Karl-Otto Apel) and “the ideal speech situation” tempts the improper hypostatization of validity claims (Habermas 1996, p. 323).

Communicative Action and Speech Acts

At the heart of the theory of communicative action is the vision that the modern world view is differentiated into three parts. This is why nowadays there are better opportunities to come to a mutual understanding. Following Karl Popper, Habermas distinguishes the objective world, the social world, and the subjective world. A communicatively competent speaker can independently present differentiated statements concerning any of these three worlds. She can independently evaluate any statement about the world with proper validity claims. There are three validity claims for these three worlds:

1. Truth (Wahrheit). A claim that refers to the objective world is valid if it is true, i.e., if it corresponds to the reality.
2. Truthfulness (Wahrhaftigkeit). A claim that refers to the subjective world is valid if it is honest, i.e., if it has an authentic relationship with the subjective world.
3. Rightness (Richtigkeit). A claim that refers to the social world is valid if it does not contradict commonly agreed social norms (Habermas 1984b, p. 440).

Let us examine the example of the claim “Teachers have right to practice indoctrination in schools.” This claim refers to the social world, and its proper validity claims is rightness (justice). A communicatively competent opponent could challenge this claim by stating that it contradicts that which is commonly considered as morally correct behavior (or it would be commonly considered as such in a free and critical discourse). If an opponent merely says that “My inner self told me that indoctrination is wrong” (truthfulness or

authenticity) or “It is scientifically proven that indoctrination is wrong” (truth), she is using an incorrect validity claim and she is not a communicatively competent speaker. So, in this case, the proper validity claim is that of rightness or justice.

To understand why Habermas has placed so much emphasis on the demand of mutual understanding, we have to look at Habermas’s theory of social action. First, Habermas divides ideal (pure) types of action into the categories of social and nonsocial action. An object of nonsocial action is nature, and the objects of social action are other people. According to Habermas, nonsocial action is always purposive-rational instrumental action: The actor makes use of specific objects for his or her own benefit. Social action can be either success-oriented strategic action or understanding-oriented communicative action. Strategic action is purposive-rational action oriented toward other persons from a utilitarian point of view. The actor does not treat others as genuine persons but rather as natural objects. Strategic action means calculative exploitation, or manipulation, of others. An actor who acts strategically is primarily seeking her own ends and manipulates other people either openly or tacitly. Communicative action is the opposite of strategic action. Communicative action – or its pure type – means interpersonal communication, which is oriented toward mutual understanding and in which other participants are treated as genuine persons, not as objects of manipulation. Actors do not primarily aim at attaining their own success but want to harmonize their plans of action with the other participants (Habermas 1984b, p. 285; see also p. 333.) (Fig. 1).

Habermas’s most vulnerable claim is that the tendency toward understanding is the immanent telos of speech or the original mode of language use. The instrumental use of language (in other words, strategic action) is, according to Habermas, parasitic on the original usage. “(...) the use of language with an orientation to reaching understanding is the original mode of language use, upon which indirect understanding, giving something to understand or letting something be understood, and instrumental use of language in general, are parasitic” (Habermas 1984b, p. 288).

		Action orientation	
		Oriented to Success	Oriented to Reaching Understanding
Action situation	Nonsocial	Instrumental action	—
Action situation	Social	Strategic action	Communicative action

Habermas and the Problem of Indoctrination, Fig. 1 Pure types of action (Habermas 1984b, p. 285)

To state arguments in support of this vulnerable claim, Habermas presents his own interpretations of John Austin’s speech act theory. According to Austin, the basic form of a speech act is **Mp**.

I claim,	that it is raining
M	<i>p</i>

The performance of this basic form of a speech act means that:

1. The speaker expresses state of affair *p* (i.e., *p*), in other words executes illocutionary speech act.
2. The speaker makes a claim, promise, command, avowal, etc., in other words executes a locutionary speech act (which is seen in modus **M**).
3. By carrying out a speech act, the speaker produces an effect upon the hearer, in other words executes a perlocutionary speech act. As Austin himself put it: to say something (*p*), to act in saying something (**M**), to bring about something through acting in saying something (Austin according to Habermas 1984b, p. 289).

Thus, Habermas claims that locutionary and illocutionary speech acts are the original features of language usage. If the speaker wants to achieve any kind of perlocutionary effects, she must execute locutionary and illocutionary speech acts in a satisfactory manner. The speaker must achieve so-called locutionary and illocutionary aims before reaching at any perlocutionary ends. Habermas thinks that the perlocutionary aspects of speech do not belong to *the immanent telos* of the speech act. A perlocutionary aspect appears only after people begin to practice instrumental action in the linguistic interaction (i.e., strategic action). When this happens, locutionary and

illocutionary aspects of speech are recruited as a means to utilitarian ends (strategic use of language). Strategic action is the kind of linguistic interaction in which one or more speakers want to produce perlocutionary effects. As such, only a portion of all linguistic interactions belongs to the category (pure type) of communicative action. The difficult question is, as will become clear below, whether teaching is communicative or strategic action.

Robert Young’s Critical Concept of Indoctrination

In sketching the non-indoctrinative and critical concept of teaching and learning, Robert Young constructs the concept of an ideal pedagogical speech situation (IPSS). It is based on Habermas’s theory of the ideal speech situation (ISS) explained above. It also refers to Klaus Mollenhauer’s educational theory (Mollenhauer 1972, p. 42; see also Masschelein 1991, pp. 134–136). Young interprets Habermas in the following way:

The idea of the ISS is a critical reconstruction of the assumptions of everyday speech communication. It is argued that these assumptions underlie the possibility of speech communication and are universal (...) When we speak we normally act as if a certain situation existed, even though, in fact, it does not. These assumptions are contra-factual (...) for without these assumptions there would be chaos. The assumptions are:

1. that what we are saying or hearing is intelligible, i.e. is coded according to the usual rules, etc.;
2. that what we are saying or hearing is true so far as it implies the existence of states of affairs;
3. that the person speaking are being truthful or sincere;
4. and that the things said are normatively appropriate considering the relationship among the people and between them the situation they are in.

(Young 1989, pp. 75–76)

For the purpose of the ideal pedagogical speech situation, Young defines a perlocutionary speech act as follows: “Perlocutionary action involves a special class of strategic action – that in which illocutions are employed as a means to ends other than reaching understanding and freely co-ordinating action plans in the light of validity claims” (Young 1989, p. 106).

Young emphasizes that we should not equate perlocutionary utterances with imperative utterances. Imperative utterances form merely one class of perlocutions. This class of imperative utterances admits two subdivisions:

Imperatives which appeal to known positive or negative sanctions which the person in power can control (type 2) and imperatives which appeal to a known normative context of legitimate authority (type 1) (...). But there exists another general class of perlocutions which might be called ‘deceptions’ or ‘ulterior purposes’ (type 3). In these, as Strawson has shown, a speaker has to succeed in getting a hearer to accept an illocutionary claim in order to succeed in some further purpose, which must remain concealed. (Young 1989, p. 106)

For example, a dishonest car salesman performs speech act type 3 when she is trying to persuade the customer (the perlocutive act) to buy a faulty car by presenting (illocutionary speech act) false statements (locutionary speech act) about its condition. In this way, the car salesman is attempting to successfully achieve a concealed strategic end, the sale of a faulty car at a good price.

With the concept of the ideal pedagogical speech situation, and with types 2 and 3 perlocutions, Young develops his own theory of indoctrinative teaching: “If the ideal pedagogical speech situation (IPSS) is one in which the student is able rationally to assess views or, at least, come to hold them in ‘a manner open to rational assessment,’ then only those speech acts which are illocutionary but not perlocutionary (in senses 2 and 3) can characterise the form of action we would want to call ‘educational’ rather than ‘indoctrinatory’” (Young 1989, p. 107). Because the difference between “illocutionary and perlocutionary acts (in senses 2 and 3)” is in the teacher’s intention, we can regard Young’s criterion for indoctrination as a communicative version of the intention criterion.

According to Young, it is not possible on the level of empirical pragmatics to show which of a teacher’s singular speech acts are legitimate (represent true education) and which are illegitimate (represent indoctrination). Perlocutionary intentions become visible in the structure of interaction over time. This is the general weakness of any intention criterion. Intention criterion focuses attention on the teacher-student relationship and excludes the aspects of social systems or ideological processes. Young recognizes this weakness, although he does not provide any supplementary criterion concerning content or consequence of teaching.

Critique of Young’s Criterion of Indoctrination

Young’s concept of the ideal pedagogical speech situation is problematic. It is based on Habermas’s theory of the ideal speech situation, which Habermas has abandoned or revised to something else. Both the ideal speech situation and the ideal pedagogical speech situation are ambitious attempts to overcome historicity, the context dependence of all our concepts. The concept of the ideal speech situation relies on the assumption that there exists some transcendental language game (Karl-Otto Apel), which precedes every actual speech situation. I think that these concepts (ISS and IPSS) contain values and preferences of our time, values that I gladly acknowledge. Nevertheless, conditions of the ideal speech situation are not properties of the transcendental language game. Attempting to promote these conditions to transcendental standards is, however, problematic.

Both traditional intention criterion and Young’s revised version do not recognize indoctrination that is caused by social structures and indoctrination that occurs at the level of hidden curriculum. In these cases it may well be that the teacher never uses sense 2 and 3 acts, but still some unreflected attitudes and beliefs are infiltrated into students’ minds. The teacher’s intentions may fulfill any requirements of validity, but some structural mechanism could still cause systematically distorted communication in teaching, which eventually leads to indoctrination of students.

Another problem is that teaching is a very special form of human interaction, which is why the concept of the ideal speech situation – and the concept of communicative action as such – may be poorly suited to the act of teaching. Is teaching, in its essence, communicative or strategic action? One could present very convincing arguments in favor of the notion that teaching is not at all communicative action (e.g., Moilanen 1996). According to Habermas, interaction is always strategic if perlocutive aims are involved. Where teaching is concerned, one could define didactic aims as perlocutive aims. From this point of view, teaching always remains as a perlocutionary action (in senses 2 and 3), in which the teacher attempts to influence others (*Beeinflussung des Gegenspielers*), and the teacher's success can be evaluated by criterion of effectiveness (the validity claim of the instrumental and strategic action). In this respect, teaching is always strategic action and teachers undeniably use perlocutionary speech acts (in senses 2 and 3).

One could also claim that teaching cannot be placed along the axis of communicative-strategic action (see Oelkers 1983; Kivelä 1996). I would still rely on Habermas's basic concept of interaction (communicative versus strategic action), but in a productive way. I want to introduce the concepts of communicative and strategic teaching, which are not simple applications of Habermas's original concepts. I follow Jan Masschelein's strategy to conceive pedagogical action as simulated communicative action (Masschelein 1991, p. 145).

I claim that the issue in the problem of indoctrination is not the question of what kinds of perlocutionary speech acts are legitimate (see also Puolimatka 1995, p. 153). The problem is more complex, and other aspects of teaching (content and consequence) should also be taken into consideration.

The Modified Habermasian Concept of Indoctrination

I understand communicative teaching to include value orientations in which the teacher commits herself to universal presuppositions of

argumentation and acts in accordance with these maxims as to the best of her ability ("normative minimum"; Mollenhauer 1972, p. 42). Pedagogical communication is a kind of simulated communicative action, and it is more simulated in the early stage of education. When a teacher teaches seven-year-old pupils, the words "to the best of her ability" have different practical consequences than in the case of a teacher who teaches twenty-year-old students. The value orientation is the same, but the practice or application of presuppositions of argumentation is different. When we understand communicative teaching in this way, as an exceptional form of communicative action, the concept of communicative teaching is looser than the concept of communicative action itself. I would like to think that communicative teaching – as an exceptional application of communicative action – still remains within the realm of communicative action, although teachers sometimes make use of sense 2 and 3, illegitimate perlocutionary, speech acts. I could imagine that the amount of perlocutive aims – the degree of simulation of the proper discourse – is higher in elementary school than in institutes of higher education, but the value orientation of teaching is still the same in both cases.

In dealing with the dilemma of indoctrination, we should refrain from focusing specific attention on the singular speech acts of a teacher. When the telos of education is to produce mature and communicatively competent people and the content of teaching provides materials for independent and critical thinking, then the teacher may use methods that, when taken out of context, may resemble strategic action and the perlocutive use of language (or may de facto be some form of strategic action depending on how one defines strategic and communicative action).

In this respect, I have set two parallel criteria for indoctrinative teaching: (1) the communicative method and intention criterion and (2) the empowering content and consequence criterion.

The Communicative Method and Intention Criterion of Indoctrination

Like William Kilpatrick, I think that the most important element in non-indoctrinative teaching

is the respect for other persons. Habermas defines communicative action as a kind of linguistic interaction in which one's fellow man is considered as a genuine person and in which aims and ends of action are decided in an environment of free and equal discussion. Opposed to this communicative action, there is the strategic action in which one treats others as a natural object, solely as a means to an end. I define the strategic teaching as the kind of teaching in which the teacher treats her students solely as objects, as objects of a series of didactical maneuvers. This strategic teaching is a form of indoctrination (strategic teaching is not the same as indoctrination), when a teacher tries to transfer teaching content to the students' minds, treating them merely as passive objects, not as active co-subjects of the learning process. Then the teaching is in no sense the simulation of the communicative action but the pure strategic action.

I define the communicative teaching, which is based on "The Bildung as a human teaching situation" ("Bildung als menschlich gültig Situation," Schäfer and Schaller 1976, p. 57), as contradictory to the strategic teaching. The aim is a communicatively competent student who does not need to rely on the teacher or any other authority for that matter. In communicative teaching, students are not treated as passive objects but as active learners. In communicative teaching, a teacher and her students cooperatively participate in the formation of meanings and new perspectives. In communicative teaching, the teacher does not impose her ideas on the students, but rather they make a joint effort to find a meaningful insight regarding the issues at hand. What I refer to as communicative teaching very closely corresponds with Gert Biesta's "the practical intersubjectivity in teaching." Biesta does not understand education "as a one way process in which culture is transferred from one (already accultured) organism to another (not yet accultured), but as a co-constructive process, a process in which both participating organism play active role and in which meaning is not transferred but produced" (Biesta 1994, p. 312). Unlike Biesta, I do not consider teaching (no matter how good a teacher is) as a symmetrical communicative action.

Communicative teaching is nearest to the ideal of communicative action that can get in a real teaching situation. Communicative teaching is a simulation of communicative action, a simulation of a free and equal discourse. It is also a simulation of democracy and democratic mode of action. This means that there could be no communicative teaching in the school, if there exists no kind of practice of a school democracy. Nevertheless, pedagogical action essentially remains as an asymmetrical relationship, because the teacher and her students do not share a common level of communicative competence. Only after a person has completed her education (*Bildung*) is she prepared to engage in the proper communicative action.

However, even my revised version of the method and intention criterion does not recognize the unintentionally or structurally caused indoctrination. Let us take, for example, the Hitler Jugend assembly in Germany in the 1930s. No matter how communicatively orientated the teacher or the Gruppenlieder was, elements of indoctrination were strongly present. The Hitler Jugend was a very effective training institution, and we cannot gain a comprehensive picture of its operations if we restrict our examination to the teachers' intentions and methods. In some teaching situations, no matter what a teacher's intentions and methods were, the outcome was still an uneducated ("indoctrinated") person. Thus, it is clear that we need aspects of the content and the consequence of teaching.

The Content and Consequence Criterion of Empowerment

The starting point in the empowerment content criterion is the constructivist view of knowledge (see, e.g., Berger and Luckmann 1979; Young 1992). Nowadays, teaching cannot be based on the notion that there exists a group of objective facts, which are deposited into students' minds like money is deposited in a bank. According to the constructivist view, knowledge is constructed through social processes. Knowledge does not imitate outer reality, but rather the system of knowledge is a construction of the reality. When the constructivist nature of knowledge is

recognized, higher demands with regard to the teaching content are directed. The teaching content should provide students with opportunities to construct their own creative and multidimensional view of reality. The teaching content should also promote students to engage critical self-reflection. Thus, if we want the teaching content to be non-indoctrinative, the teaching content should contribute to students' reflectivity toward those meaning perspectives that they have already adopted and toward those that are taught (see Mezirow 1991). The teaching content should not provide any easy answers but rather should improve students' own power of judgment and capacity for mature deliberation. I consider content that limits students' meaning perspectives and minimizes as opposed to increases students' own power of judgment as indoctrinative. In the case of indoctrination, the teaching content tends to keep students at an immature stage. The non-indoctrinative teaching content gives students both the freedom and faculty to determine their own differentiated identity, world view, and conduct of life.

The consequence criterion of empowerment is related to the theories of modern identity and reflective modernity (Beck et al. 1994). The idea of this criterion is to promote such kind of education that contributes to the formation of reflective and relatively open identities. In modern societies, identities are open to a certain extent. In every society, some part of identity is solid as a result of primary socialization, but in modern societies, the individual tends to remain somewhat incomplete. The modern individual is conscious of her capacity to change her own identity, and she possesses the perspective of many possible identities. This relatively open form of identity produces the pluralization of life worlds and meaning perspectives. People tend to grow up differently in modern societies. This corresponds with the situation that Emile Durkheim called organic solidarity (Durkheim 1984). In the stage of organic solidarity, society needs autonomous, independent, critical, and professional individual personalities. My claim is that if educational institutions tend to systematically produce closed identities (which are necessary in a traditional society

during the stage of mechanical solidarity), we can presume that these institutions impose some form of indoctrination. In modern or postmodern society, educational institutions should encourage a reflective attitude toward one's own identity.

Epilogue

Habermas's theory of communicative action could be a very important – but not sufficient – contribution to the theory of indoctrination. Robert Young was the first to apply Habermas to the theory of indoctrination, but Young's concept of indoctrination has its own inherent problems. Young's theory concentrates solely on the speech acts of the teacher, which should not be the point in the theory of indoctrination. This is why I present here a revised version of the Habermasian concept of indoctrination and I also supplement it with the content and consequence criterion of empowerment. I have to say that my critique toward Young concerns only a small portion of his larger critical theory of education. With the exception of this concept of indoctrination, I am very much in agreement with Young.

My revised Habermasian version of the concept of indoctrination requires the application of a proper theory of a subject and its genesis. The question is: How does a human grow into a mature person with the capacity for critical self-reflection and self-knowledge? Neither Habermas's theory of communicative action (which includes the socialization theory) nor the traditional analytic philosophy of education (and English sociology of education) provide the theory of a social subject.

Another problem is the question of power in education. According to Michel Foucault:

The individual is no doubt the fictitious atom of an 'ideological' representation of society; but he is also a reality fabricated by this specific technology of power that I have called 'discipline'. (Foucault 1992, p. 194)

Foucault poses a great challenge to the theory of indoctrination. If the Foucaultian illustration is the whole truth about individuality, then the

critique of indoctrination is impossible. My aim is to create a critical theory of education that takes into consideration both the aspect of freedom and the aspect of power in the process of socialization.

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Hayek and Education

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Friedrich Augustus Hayek is one of the most respected – if seldom read – of the theorists who, whilst defending a particular concept of

liberalism, from the basis of the discipline of economics – created the new political philosophy of “neo-liberalism.” Hayek has been particularly significant in the development of “Public Choice Theory,” which attempts to apply neoclassical economics to political life. In this way Hayek is a very important character behind the reform of education in many countries of the world: many of his views are now regarded as orthodox in sociology and education.

Class and culture: Hayek was born in Vienna on May 8, 1899. He was the son, grandson, and greatgrandson of men who were both scholars and public servants. His family belonged to the lower ranks of the gentry – Hayek as a member of the minor aristocracy would have been entitled to the honorary “von” except that the Austrian empire which lent such titles their legitimacy ceased to exist after the First World War.

During the First World War Hayek served as an officer in the Imperial Army. Afterward he returned to his studies in Vienna, but spent a few months at the University of Zurich, where he furthered his interest in psychology, on which he published a book, *The Sensory Order*, many years later, in 1952.

Hayek had a successful and eclectic education at the University of Vienna, where he studied law, and economics. He gained his doctorate in jurisprudence in 1921 and in political science in 1923.

The Austrian School

During his university career Hayek belonged to or helped to form the “Geistkreis” which was a loose association of university students and teachers who were interested in a range of topics. Associations of this kind had been a vibrant characteristic of Viennese intellectual life for many years. Hayek’s group were in a sense heir to the Menger circle, although he points out that Menger’s coffee-circle – the first “Austrian School” – were senior civil servants as well as professors in economics. The influence of Menger upon Hayek and upon economics in the academy and its reading in the world of politics would be hard to overestimate. In a sense, Hayek is the vehicle by

which Menger’s most important ideas were diffused throughout the English speaking world.

The distinguishing marks of the series of groups which form what is known as the “Austrian school” in economics are adherence to

- A narrow interpretation of Adam Smith’s views on the character of markets; the “invisible hand” converts individual participation in the market to general wealth
- The desirability of a minimalist role for government in the economy
- “Methodological individualism” (Carl Menger’s original contribution to economic theory)
- The notion of the “subjective theory of value” – also a contribution of Carl Menger – which attributes value to unpredictable individual preference, rather than to any fixed and calculable notion of the components of value

The Austrian school of economics owed its success – perhaps even its existence – to its peculiar ability to convert the great political doctrines of liberalism to a form of economic thought which restricted liberalism so closely to financial and economic affairs – both of the individual and of the State – that it posed no threat to the autocratic rule of the Emperor of Austria, and hence was not simply allowed to exist, but members were given favored positions within government. Participation in the market, not in government, or political life, became the great paradigm of freedom.

The Vienna Circle

Another group which had its effect upon Hayek was the Vienna Circle, the distinguished group of philosophers of science, who, starting with Ernst Mach, provided the foundations and parameters of scientific positivism. Hayek records his indebtedness to Mach, and to the ideas of Moritz Schlick, also of the Vienna Circle. Another member of the Vienna Circle who influenced Hayek was Karl Popper, whose book, *The Logic of Scientific Discovery* (1935) was at one and the same time a challenge to the school of logical

positivism, and yet was constructed in that tradition. Popper's views confirmed Hayek's dissatisfaction with the teachings of Mach as applied to social science, and yet reinforced his views as to what constitutes "science."

Career

In 1921 Hayek took a position in the (government-sponsored) Abrechnungsamt, an office for clearing debts incurred before the war, under Ludwig von Mises, and became a member of Mises "Privatseminar." His association with Mises was in many ways intellectually congenial to him, but his differences with Mises over rationality and epistemology sharpened his thinking on these points, and directed him toward a view of "subjectivity" and its consequences which took him on a rather different exploratory path.

As a result of this work and his exposure in 1923 to American debates on economic changes over time, he became interested in "business cycles" on which he wrote a paper which drew the attention of Lionel Robbins and this eventually led to his being offered a position at the London School of Economics.

During the war Hayek, although now a British citizen, was not involved in the management of manpower or resources in the way that most other British economists and many other academics were, from Lord Keynes down. Instead he reflected on what he saw as the inverse relationship between "planning" and individual freedom, and became one of Keynes's most effective critics. In this period he wrote *The Road to Serfdom* (1944), a book whose popular style secured his influence on political affairs for the future, but caused misgivings as to his professionalism among economists.

In 1950 Hayek was offered a position at the University of Chicago, not in the economics department or the school of management of public policy but in the school of social science, the "Committee on Social Thought." Hayek's interests were by now turning from economics to wider questions of human life: the processes of mind and perception (Hayek 1952a), and the relation of

individual minds to social order and constitutional issues (*The Constitution of Liberty* 1960). Although substantially sympathetic to the Chicago school of economists, he disagreed with them on monetarism and regarded them as "logical positivists" – a position he no longer adopted. Hayek regarded Friedman as "on most things . . . sound" but saw Friedman's book *Essays in Positive Economics* as "dangerous" (Hayek 1994, pp. 1434–1445). Eventually Hayek was invited to the University of Freiburg, where except for a relatively short period at the University of Salzburg he remained for the rest of his academic career.

Economics as Social Science

Hayek, always a voracious reader, read a great deal in the wider liberal tradition, and explored the writings of Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart Mill, Saint-Simon, and Comte, and published works on several of these writers. He was in a sense looking for a firm basis for a "social science." Menger's methodological individualism gave him the unit on which a science, in Mach's logical positivist understanding, could be built. But it did not account for what could and could not be admitted to this science.

Karl Popper's book *The Logic of Scientific Discovery* (1935) gave him some of the methodological ground he was looking for, although Hayek hesitated to commit social science completely to Popper's definitions of what constituted research methodology for social science. In particular Hayek wanted to maintain that the very identity of researcher and subject in the human sciences gave the researcher access to information in the form of "understanding" of motivation which would not be possible in other sciences, where the subject was inanimate or animal.

This reservation is an important aspect of Hayek's views on "rationality," a core concern of economists, since theirs is a science which attempts to explain human behavior. Hayek believed that rationality was a quality which was intelligible to other rational people. If a person's actions could not be understood, he was irrational.

Irrational persons were in a sense outside the pale: their behavior could not form the kind of patterns of iterated behavior which constituted “laws.” However, Hayek did not put the faith in human rationality which was typical of Kantian philosophers: he believed that human rationality was limited, and that it could not by itself be responsible for the great human institutions which form the backbone of (Western) society – the market, the family, the church.

The Evolution of Spontaneous Order

These institutions, so vital for the continued existence of “society,” he believed to have formed over time, by a process of evolution. The evolutionary process had weeded out less advantageous forms of human relationships, and had left behind these outstanding examples of the “spontaneous” creation of order from the chaos of myriad individual human decisions. No one human he contended was sufficiently rational to be able to coordinate all the variables which came together in one of these institutions: they were therefore not of human design, although they were of human creation. In effect Hayek had devised a scheme of social Darwinism which valorized certain institutions – the market, the Church, and the family, as evolutionary survivors, and therefore the “fittest” form of human institutions. His term “spontaneous order” however also suggests that these institutions erupted from the evolutionary process without genealogy – without a history. “Collectivism” – which he sometimes calls “tribalism,” he regards as an early and inferior form of human organization, now outmoded by the evolutionary process.

Catallactics

In further examining one of these institutions, the market, Hayek emphasized “catallactics”: the “science of exchange.” The price mechanism supplied information to the buyer. Competition amounted to a research program: only in a competitive context could the buyer have the choice

which made possible evolution from those choices of higher forms. Hayek regarded competition as a discovery procedure which compensated for the limits of knowledge, not as an end in itself. Limitations to competition result in a lack of information available to buyers, and consequently the evolutionary process – the process of continual improvement – is interrupted or distorted. He has no qualms about the unequal distribution of wealth arising from competition or inheritance: he was not interested in “equality” as a desirable feature of political or economic life. In his view, the impartiality of the application of the rules of competition would make the consequences acceptable to those who might experience disadvantage through that mechanism. The market is equal, and democratic, because everyone can enter into it, and it is free because no one is obliged to buy or sell.

The Application of Economics to Politics

From this valorization of the market and competition Hayek makes one of those great moves of “displacement” which creates a new discipline. Hayek developed an acceptance of Adam Smith’s “invisible hand,” the notion that the market is the vehicle for converting many individual transactions into general wealth by marrying buyers and sellers, and conveying information about supply and demand through the price mechanism, into a notion that that mechanism could be applied to other areas of human endeavor. For the corollary of Hayek’s idea of the limitations of human rationality was that humans are not capable of encompassing all the variables they need in order to make the grand decisions which government makes, particularly when it decided to do without, or reduce the role, of the market. This is the point on which he had disagreed with Mises: Hayek believed that Mises overestimated the possibilities of rationality, and therefore laid himself open to those errors of planning, predicting the future, and government intervention which were characteristic of socialism, communism, and fascism. The market on the other hand is an institution which compensates for the limited rationality

of human beings, yet allows them freedom in the sense of being able to make “choices” and incorporates their myriad choices into an evolutionary process of perpetual improvement. Therefore the market is a superior form of governmental institution than government. The role of government should be limited to protecting the bases of the market: personal and property rights. Although he is prepared to accept a limited role for government as a “safety net” this must not be allowed to create monopoly or to undercut or otherwise distort the market.

This is the theme of Hayek’s most popular and influential book, *The Road to Serfdom* (1944). In this book Hayek argues that State intervention, the welfare State, socialism, fascism, bureaucracies, all share the same fallacy: that the human mind is capable of integrating the needs of the populace into a plan which can be executed by government. To accept the exigencies of wartime planning in peacetime is to start down the road which leads to fascist dictatorship, and ends the freedom of individuals. This book was directed squarely at the work of J.M. Keynes, whose economics was a direct response to the political and economic needs of the Great Depression, and whose adherents were working on the theoretic and practical application of his ideas in the welfare States which developed throughout much of the Western world during the 1930s and 1940s. *The Road To Serfdom* became very popular, and according to Cockett, formed the basis for Churchill’s unsuccessful election campaign in 1947.

Although the importance of this book and subsequent writing by Hayek should not be underestimated, his real impact but also ironically his effectual theoretic subversion – took place, not directly through his own writings but through the machinery he set up to spread neoliberal conceptions of economics, politics, and government.

The Mt Pelerin Society

In 1938 Hayek had been part of a “Colloquium Walter Lippmann” which was called to consider the problem of the encroachment of socialist and fascist forms of government and the lack of

effectiveness of liberal arguments. Any plans for coherent and practical action were interrupted by the war, which was in itself a gorging, a gluttony of State control and intervention. After the war, Hayek tried again. He called a select meeting at Mt Pelerin in the Swiss Alps, of people dedicated to similar, neoliberal, and conservative ideas. The Mt Pelerin society was formed. Among its founding members were Hayek, Milton Friedman, Karl Polanyi, Karl Popper, James Buchanan, and the English millionaire Ralph Fisher. Fisher’s money provided the basis for the establishment of the Institute of Economic Affairs – the IEA, which took as its business the task of creating a favorable climate of opinion for the implementation of neoliberal principles of economic and government management. The IEA published the “Hobart pamphlets,” a series of simple, easily read articles on matters of public interest, all written from a clearly identifiable neoliberal point of view, but all claiming the impartiality of “science” and rationality. These short, clear texts, some of which were written by Hayek, have influenced the thinking of politicians and economists all over the world.

The success of the IEA proved the inspiration for the creation of similar “think-tanks” all over the world. Cockett estimates that they now number about 500. Prominent groups of this kind include the Adam Smith Institute, the Centre for Independent Studies, the Heritage Foundation, the Hoover Institute, the New Zealand Business Round Table, etc.

Hayek is not the only economist to be publicized through the IEA, but the common themes are ones which are consonant with Hayek’s ideas – the importance of the market, the stress on “market messages,” the fostering of competition, the need to diminish the impact of government on the economy, the indifference to social and economic inequality. Other parts of the neoliberal package he would be less happy with: human capital theory, for instance, reflects precisely that objection Hayek had to Mises’ belief in the possibility of human rationality: manpower planning preempts the market, but only the market, according to Hayek’s ideas, could rationally coordinate the demand and supply of labor.

Planning, a necessary feature of the implementation of human capital theory, is the first step down the “road to serfdom.”

Hayek and Democracy: The “Rule of Law”

Hayek’s views on the limitations of individual rationality caused him to have a fairly pessimistic view of democratic institutions. His political views it must be remembered were formed in a youth spent under the most conservative government in western Europe, under whose auspices liberalism had been recast as the freedom to get rich, not to alter the government. To Hayek’s way of thinking democratic government offered a means by which taxpayers could be coerced by nontaxpaying majorities. There is no guarantee under democratic government that the principles of justice or fairness will be followed, but rather, given the Smithian concept of the self-interest of the individual, it is likely that lobbies will suborn politicians by means of an appeal to their self-interest. The very notion of “social justice” – which is in the interest of the poor majority – must, by impelling government to interfere in the interests of egalitarian distribution, bring about a totalitarian form of government (Hayek 1976, p. 68, vol. 2). A well-governed country must therefore have some form of limitation on the self-interest of politicians and lobby groups.

To this end, Hayek developed the idea of a kind of “super-law” which would enforce general rules of just conduct. Initially Hayek’s concept of the “rule of law” was vaguely assimilated to Plato’s notion of the Rule of Law under the philosopher kings. But where Plato saw the Rule of Law as being an outcome of the government of just men, Hayek saw the rule of law as a way of controlling venal men. In his later writing, the rule of law becomes a proposal for a particular form of second House, the very purpose of which is to impose limits to the power of government. Hayek acknowledges the conflict between the idea of a universal rule of law and the idea of egalitarian access to the fruits of good government:

A necessary, and only apparently paradoxical, result of this is that formal equality before the law is in conflict, and in fact incompatible, with any activity of the government deliberately aiming at material or substantive equality of different people, and that any policy aiming at a substantive ideal of distributive justice must lead to the destruction of the rule of Law. (Hayek 1986, p. 59).

The idea of a universal superlaw has been widely spread and influential in various countries who have instituted some laws which are beyond the immediate power of government to alter – rules affecting, for instance, the inflation rate, the control of central banks, and the like. Essentially, the political program of a small group of economists has become “laws” which have been inscribed into statutes so that they become structural. Even if people of a different political persuasion should manage to attain power, their economic and political options are thereby limited.

A New Form of Liberalism

It might be argued that Hayek sought to reinscribe in liberalism the elements of advantage and property which the liberal theoretic disposition to egalitarianism had put in jeopardy. The insistence on a form of liberalism which re-emphasizes property and in effect makes participation in political affairs reconceived as economic affairs dependent upon having a stake with which to enter the market is an idea not only redolent of nineteenth-century liberalism but a formulation with great appeal in a Western world in which the traditional ruling groups find themselves under threat by others requiring inclusion in terms derived from the principles of liberalism itself. Hayek’s unease with the extension of power to other groups can be seen in John Stuart Mill and Harriet Taylor, in whom, despite his evident sympathy with the emotional and social difficulties in their relationship, he has little sympathy with her extension of liberal ideas of freedom beyond the conventional – indeed he describes her as “rationalist”, (a serious criticism from Hayek!) and remarks that after her death Mill “withdrew a little from the advanced positions” she had caused him to take up (Hayek 1951, p. 266).

Education

Hayek's views on the superiority of markets have been widely applied, not least in the field of education, with results which he would have found deeply distasteful. On education Hayek was a classical liberal: he believed profoundly in the value of a liberal arts education, and would have resisted the notion of an education geared to the economy, both because of its inherent inadequacy as education but also because the limitations of our knowledge make it impossible to educate students for a future we cannot know. This is evident in his spirited attack on the Ecole Polytechnique, and its belief that it was possible to know – and consequently engineer – all things. The Ecole Polytechnique in Hayek's opinion is the real origin of socialism: its belief in the possibility of knowing enough to be able to alter human society he describes as “hubris,” the pride which challenges the gods. In a similar vein, throughout his life he attacked “scientism,” again on the grounds of the extent of knowledge, particularly in the human sciences. It is these very limitations of human knowledge which in Hayek's view make the market so important, because it creates, conveys, and reveals information in a way no other human institution can emulate. Hayek intensely disliked the restricted form of knowledge taught at the Ecole Polytechnique – he mentions in particular the absence of Greek and other languages, history and literature – and its result:

...the technical specialist who was regarded as educated because he had passed through difficult schools but who had little or no knowledge of society, its life, growth, problems and its values, which only the study of history, literature and languages can give. (Hayek 1952, p. 110).

Presumably he would not be in favor then of the limitation of education to the vocational and commercially vogue subjects which is too often the logical outcome of the application of market principles to education. Indeed, genealogically, the notion of human capital, which underlies much of the pressure on schools to become training grounds for the economy, derives from Hayek's associate Ludwig von Mises' views,

and conflicts directly with Hayek's suspicion of rationality, planning, and predictability.

Although the remodeling of education as a “market” might be seen to be in accord with Hayek's views on “catallaxy,” that is, that competition between schools should reveal information about the best model of school, the one which commands the highest price presumably being the evolutionary survivor, his prescription for curriculum was quite deeply affected by a notion of the requisites of the development of a subjectivity which could not in itself be reduced to a planned production of a certain kind of worker, or even manager.

Hayek's profound distrust of government involvement in the economy might lead one to imagine that he would support the privatization of education, but there is no evidence in his account of his education at the University of Vienna that he believed it would have been more effective as a private institution. The general acceptance of his views on the inherent dangers of government provision of services has been used to support programs of privatization, including steps toward the privatization of education. It seems likely however that Hayek would support at least a minimum involvement in government provision of education as a public good. The essential problem for education which arises from the application from Hayek's views is that the application of market principles may limit the formation of the individual whose judgment, exercised in a multiplicity of choices, creates the market's evolutionary drive toward perpetual improvement. Hayek's opposition to the narrow education of the Ecole Polytechnique indicates that, whatever the cost, quality education is essential to the continued liberal project, even in its neoliberal form.

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Health

► [Disability and Samoa](#)

Hegel

► [Hegel on Moral Development, Education, and Ethical Life](#)

Hegel and Critical Pedagogy

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Synonyms

[Hegelian dialectics and Freire's pedagogy](#); [Lordship and bondage](#); [Oppressors and oppressed](#)

Introduction

One of the most important contributions to the critical pedagogy of Paulo Freire comes from German philosopher G. W. F. Hegel. While there is an ongoing debate as to whether Freire's *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* (*PO* hereafter) has superseded its intellectual predecessor, this section will focus on unearthing the underlying influence of Hegel's philosophy through a comparative description of the *PO* and the *Phenomenology of Spirit* (*PS* hereafter).

Both Hegel and Freire sought to write a book that could serve as a ladder toward self-awareness, freedom, and liberation. In Hegel's case, the *PS* is a history of the *education* of consciousness, one that results in "absolute knowing," which is also referred to by Hegel as the "standpoint of science" (as in the *Science of Logic*) (Hegel 1991). In other words, the *PS* focuses on the tendency of world history (i.e., Spirit, or the totality of the history of all consciousnesses, of all human beings) toward freedom and defines "science" as the philosophy or vantage point from which the reader can comprehend this process and become aware of this journey, which is also the reader's own journey.

It should be noted at this point that by "all human beings," Hegel meant white, European, subjects. There is debate in the literature as to whether Hegel was influenced by the Haitian Revolution (Buck-Morss 2009), as well as to his feminist credentials (Mills 1995). Nonetheless, in the *PS* all the crucial historical, political, cultural, religious, and philosophical references are properly speaking European; the *PS* generally excludes consideration of other civilizational perspectives.

In Freire's case, the *PO* offers a pedagogy, a method that can spur the process of the education and ultimate liberation of the oppressed consciousness. Its underlying assumptions are similar to Hegel's: the oppressed and the oppressor are incomplete beings who can become conscious of their own incompleteness and attempt to become more fully human. A closer examination of the following themes will reveal the parallels and differences in more detail (Mills 1995).

Lordship and Bondage

One of the most visible resemblances between Freire and Hegel is in their treatment of the relation between the master and the slave. In the *PS*, the chapter on Lordship and Bondage belongs to the development of self-consciousness at the individual level; later chapters in the *PS* will deal with the same topic from the societal and spiritual level. Self-consciousness can be defined as a prototypical human that knows itself as a subject and is aware of its capacity to transform the world and its surroundings.

But where did this “subjectivity” come from? How did it develop? Lordship and Bondage is preceded by a section in which Hegel argues the following: nature or the objects of desire (food, water, all of natural existence) cannot properly be the medium through which a person comes to awareness of its own subjectivity; only through a relation to another human can a person come to know itself as a subject. In other words, only through the struggle against another human can the human animal awaken its self-consciousness. This is the education process that self-consciousness undergoes in Lordship and Bondage.

Thus, the struggle between the master and the slave is one of recognition; both want to be recognized as the master, as a subject. When they first encounter each other, each thinks of itself as subject and the other as a mere animal. Insofar as each self-consciousness is unwilling to accept the other’s authority – for to do so would entail the self-negation of selfhood – each tries to force the other to recognize a foreign authority, and the struggle necessitates the risk of life as proof of independence from nature.

Each self-consciousness is here engaged in a struggle for a misguided notion of freedom, namely, the notion that only as an independent individual can I be said to be a person, a subject. Kant’s moral laws, the Hobbesian sovereign, are all built upon this fantasy of pure detachment from society and nature. Self-consciousness is, hence, the ultimate egotistical being, wholly absorbed within itself and only preoccupied with and only aware of its private interests. Everything beyond is seen as a mere limitation, as a shackle, and as a radical otherness.

The struggle for recognition, however, fails if one or both parties die because a claim to authority is a claim insofar as there is someone to obey. The struggle can result in a positive result only if one self-consciousness learns that life is essential to be a self-consciousness; there is no such thing as a dead subject, and thus life and subjectivity constitute an unbreakable interdependence. In the midst of the struggle, then, if one of the parties pays heed to its instinct for self-preservation, it will be forced to submit to the will of the other, accepting a dependent existence and becoming a slave. The victor, who has thus proved itself to be a pure independent self-consciousness, is the master.

The lord is now in command of the slave by virtue of proving he has no fear of death and is therefore independent from nature. Moreover, he can enjoy that which provides sustenance through the labor of the bondsman. This mediation allows the lord to further annihilate the independence of life; for example, the pig becomes pork, a human food, not an animal that has an independent existence. In this pure comfort, the master achieves self-identity with life, turning everything in the natural world into an extension of his will.

A problem, however, arises. The lord lacks the one thing that drove him into the struggle in the first place: recognition by an equal, another self-consciousness. In degrading the bondsman to a thing, the one recognizing the lord’s authority is not a subject. The master certainly grants the slave a certain level of recognition. After all, masters do eat food prepared by slaves, give them commands in a shared language, etc. But this recognition is of a limited kind and at best equates the slave to animals with more advanced cognitive functions. For the master the one thing that makes a human truly human is missing in the slave: the capacity to live by normative values, to obey a law for its moral worth alone, and to be absolutely free and independent.

And because the master’s authority is only morally binding and human, if it is recognized as such by another human, the lord is condemned to be uncertain of his own subjectivity. In other words, to be a human among animals is to not be a human at all. This is the result of a recognition that is one-sided and unequal: a radical

dissatisfaction that will drive the lord into unconscious manifestations of insecurity and doubt. As the blame is pushed on the slave, the master will resort to ever more tyrannical expressions of rage and madness. Ultimately, in dehumanizing the bondsman, the lord dehumanizes himself, sinking to animal desire, to a subhuman existence precisely because he attains the independence and power over everything.

This movement is a dialectical reversal, wherein the master showed that its essential nature is the reverse of what it wants to be; in wanting to become a subject, it nonetheless sinks into the existence of an object because it lacks recognition. The slave, on the other hand, will also go through a dialectical reversal and become the truly independent self-consciousness.

The bondsman believes that the lord is an independent subject. What it does not yet realize is that in the experience of being subjugated and forced to labor, it has itself already become a potential subject. The lord merely declared its independence from life *in principle*, but *in practice* it is a glutton, a slave to its animal desire. The slave, on the contrary, by way of servitude, denies his own natural impulses; through work, the slave postpones the satisfaction of desire.

Not only does he achieve independence from life in the labor process but also an enduring recognition in the product of this work. While for the master everything that has an independent existence is alien and therefore needs to be subjugated to its will, for the slave the product of his work is an external thing that retains its independence vis-à-vis its creator, but is nevertheless not really alien. By transforming the world, the slave sees himself reflected in the thing. Thus, a new form of independence is revealed to the slave, and he comes to see in the independent existence of the object his own independence: If the object, something completely at the mercy of the slave's work, still retains an independence, a self-identity, then the slave himself, though enslaved, also possesses the same kind of independence.

Hegel ends this section by emphasizing that both the absolute terror of death and alienated work are essential for the slave's transformation. In other words, the master, who makes sure the

slave faces both of these oppressions, is essential to the slave's freedom. Without a fear that can make the slave tremble and despair, work becomes a mere expression of self-certainty. Conversely, without work, there is nothing that can reflect back to the slave his own essential independence. Fear without work is pure dependence on the master, and on nature, work without fear is pure independence, a form of fully self-absorbed vanity. The freedom earned by the slave in his torments is an embedded one. It is an independence that can only and necessarily come forth within the confines of absolute dependence and servitude.

However, this freedom is only an inner freedom of the mind, not yet the objective freedom that can only come through the abolition of the institutions that enforce enslavement. The slave's independence, its freedom, is therefore something that will not help him attain mutual recognition: this freedom is merely the freedom of stoicism, a retreat into the abstract kingdom of the mind.

Oppressor and Oppressed

Freire's account of his own master-slave dialectics borrows many aspects from Hegel's. But he also diverges significantly, not the least because for Freire, the stoic freedom of Hegel's slave is inadequate for the context of a postcolonial Brazil in the twentieth century. If Hegel's chapter ended in a subjective freedom (which Hegel goes on to supersede), Freire will set his aim at objective freedom, at the overthrow of the objective conditions of enslavement and oppression. This underlying difference is the source of the main divergences in their respective analyses.

From the outset, Freire shares the foundational assumptions of Hegelian thought: the meaning and essence of being human is to be recognized as a subject and to develop our capacities as social agents in this world. Dehumanization is the negation of this essence, and it is the vocation of those affected to strive for freedom and recognition. Freire also takes from Hegel the idea that oppressors are not fully human; in Hegel's terminology, they have not attained self-consciousness or rather regress into animal desire. Freire further adds that only the oppressed can achieve the liberation and

humanization of both parties. And the way to achieve this is, just like in Hegel's case, through work and through praxis.

A crucial difference surfaces here: the objects of work in Hegel's case were things of nature – stones, animals, plants, wood, etc. The kinds of work involved were along the lines of carpentry, farming, cooking, construction, and such. In Freire's case, the objects of revolutionary praxis are social relations, that is, the institutions of social oppression, exploitation, and dehumanization. And this kind of work involves a spiritual rebirth of the oppressed consciousness, one that is marked by the love of humanity.

In the beginning, Freire says, the oppressed will adhere to the oppressors; they think that to be free is to have power over nature and over other human beings. This was true of Hegel's slave as well. It sought the status of master, but lost in the ensuing struggle. Freire names this misidentification with the master as a manifestation of the slave's fear of freedom. To achieve freedom, the oppressed must embrace the risks of freedom that revolutionary struggle entails. Here is yet another difference with the *PS*: while for Hegel the fear of death was crucial for the slave's development as a spiritually, if not physically, free subject, for Freire the condition for the freedom of the oppressed is to be rid of the fear of death.

But the courage of the oppressed is not motivated by the desire to control and suppress the freedom of another being; this was the mistake that the master made in the *PS*. For Freire the struggle of the oppressed is not aimed at gaining power over the oppressors. Doing so would only result in a new situation of oppression. This is the reason why the oppressor can never be the liberators and humanizers; they know only of violence and lovelessness. The oppressed, on the other hand, have the capacity to shed their fear of freedom, which also involves the fear of death, and turn their fight into an "act of love."

The notion of love is central to Freire's thought. And even here, there are remarkable similarities with Hegel's emphasis on the collaborative nature of mutual recognition. In the *PS*, self-consciousness is described as essentially split, a duplication, something that is radically

independent, free, and self-determining only insofar as it exists in a relation of radical dependency. In other words, self-consciousness is radically dependent, first and foremost on nature, because life is the medium in which the self is embedded; secondly, on "others," because the self cannot exist as such without recognition, without another self acknowledging me as a subject.

Of course, the *PS* has shown how self-consciousness tries to suppress this dependence and claim its independence over nature and over its own social peers. And it has also shown that the master inevitably fails in its quest because it had a naive idea of what independence means; it is impossible to "supersede" another human being, i.e., to force recognition from the other, unless the other is willing to give it. A human is, after all, different from a fruit, and nothing done externally can forcefully extract recognition. No amount of violence can help the master become a humanized self-consciousness. Consequently, the action of seeking recognition can only be achieved together, in communion and in solidarity, as an act of love for the other that is nothing but an act of love toward oneself. Hegel tells us that self-consciousness needs to become aware that it at once is, and is not, another consciousness, if it ever wishes to move beyond the limiting narrowness of self-identity and into full humanness. This is also, in essence, what underlies Freire's notion of revolution as an act of love, rather than of violence. Its goal is not to suppress an enemy but to affirm the essence of being human for both the oppressors and the oppressed.

Moreover, the struggle to achieve this will not come without a fight; Freire was not a pacifist. In his view, freedom has to be conquered, for the transformation of the objective conditions of oppression necessarily involves all forms of power struggle. In this sense, Freire is also agreeing with Hegel insofar as the latter believed that in some instances, bloodshed and death are part of the life process of spirit by which renewal and birth become possible.

Lastly, it should be noted that both Freire and Hegel shared a similar ontological framework; if their belief in the perfectibility of humankind is still highly debatable, what is certain is that both

affirmed the very possibility of historical progress. For Freire, humanization was not merely a historical possibility but a human vocation that the oppressed are fated to pursue. And while dehumanization is for him a historical reality, it merely comprises an “inauthentic” expression of social reality. Hegel, on his part, similarly affirms the “self-certainty” of the master as a necessary element in the slave’s development into stoicism but labels it as a “one-sided” and misguided manifestation of spirit (this confidence in the march and progress of history would come under heavy critique and doubt in the course of the twentieth century).

It is against this ontological background that Freire’s pedagogy is designed to make an intervention: its goal is not to direct the oppressed or grant them freedom (this is impossible). Rather, the emphasis is on helping them open a path toward their own liberation. The means to achieve this is a dialogical pedagogy that is synonymous with the practice of freedom. In other words, it is a pedagogy that helps both teachers and students recognize each other as essential to their respective identities as free subjects. And above all, it is a pedagogy that fosters a concrete set of actions aimed at changing the objective conditions of existence beyond the confines of the classroom. Thus, when undertaken dialogically, education is potentially a historical intervention in objective existence of revolutionary proportions.

This means that while Freire borrows from Hegel the main outlines of his ontological framework, the pedagogy introduced in the *PO* constitutes the main point of departure between the two thinkers. On the one hand, Freire’s pedagogy spoke for a different constituency; the *PO* is the theoretical manifestation of a different social group, in a different historical time. On the other hand, this pedagogy represented a non-prescriptive blueprint for a form of political praxis, a point of view that is absent in the *PS*. While the *PS* inhabits the skins of the particular forms of consciousness in history, it does so only to the extent that it shows how the inner workings of its own assumptions bring about its own collapse. The book itself is written from the “standpoint of science,” a point of view that is universal and from where the reader can comprehend the

entirety of the process of the spirit’s development. Thus, in developing a pedagogy that focuses on praxis, Freire abandons the standpoint of absolute knowing and claims the particular social space inhabited by the revolutionary class of his time.

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Hegel and Philosophy of Education (I)

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In European eighteenth century the reform of pedagogy or the education of children and youth was one of the most important themes discussed in families, social gatherings and a variety of auditoriums. These debates reached the nineteenth century centered on an incompatibility between the necessity of disciplining children and youth and, at the same time, guaranteeing the development of moral or ethical autonomy. To Bernard Bourgeois (1978) the philosophy instituted by G. W. F. Hegel is both “a pedagogical philosophy and the pedagogical philosophy” (pp. 9–10). For Hegel the education process consists of becoming conscious of the need of limiting one’s impulses in order to realize oneself as an ethical being. The educational process takes the immediate subjectivity [without mediation, undetermined, in itself,

singularity or individuality] to, from the exterior, conduct it to the mediate subjectivity [educated man: “citizen”], determined by the rationality that manifests itself in the State (*Staat/Volksgeist*). That’s why Hegel says that the educated man is a moral, ethical, universal; that is, he is saying that the essence of the educational process is found in the universality of the spirit of the people (*Volksgeist/Staat*), in which the “good and bad, fair and unfair contents, are determined, for usual cases of private life, in the laws and costumes of the State” (Hegel 1946, p. 77). These contents express the proper morality [Moralität] of each social class and the harmonization of the interests of the classes in a rational state.

This “major history” is the *efetivation* of a movement that is beyond all historical people, being over and above each immediate moral community. It is the realization of the idea that, in its substance, is the universal spirit (*der Geist*; God). In this history, the universal spirit was initially joined to matter in an undetermined way – nature; *physis* – and, by an act of will, perceived thyself limited by materiality. This experience in the material world was made by Asiatic, Greek-Roman and German peoples, and in these peoples some individuals accomplished the task of self-consciousness of the spirit. These individuals give a positive answer to the problem of existing morality, exceeding the undetermined dissatisfaction of other men – who just complain, express their dissatisfaction, remaining in the negativity – these individuals overcome, those difficulties and make a new morality.

Do historical individuals know the state of the world? Are they able to predict the course of history?

Hegel supports that “the state of the world is not known. [...] The others follow this soul’s conductor, because they feel that in him is the irresistible power of his own internal spirit” (Hegel 1946, pp. 78–79). For Hegel, historical individuals are practical; they are not theoretic or philosophic. They act aiming to achieve their private interests, but these, even though they do not know, are of the absolute spirit. Since trap of the reason – producing the self-consciousness of people spirit.

Since the real educators of people are their heroes, educational processes are necessarily formal. The child and the young have an immediate subjectivity that needs to be adapted to the proper morality spirit of the people. Thus, the familial and scholarly education can only be initially formal discipline (*Zucht*), since it must adapt, in an external way, each singularity to the morality of people. This discipline, however, is not arbitrary and is not abstract, because it is the people spirit that requires it and it is, in itself and by itself, the manifestation of the universal spirit. The universal spirit requires that each individual overcomes himself as a being, as wish impelled by the matter that he also is, to become a complete spirit, that knows which are his needs and, because of that, knows how to restrain himself and limit himself. This discipline is not, in fact, something that is taught only in the schools, since it is the needed expression of the people spirit’s morality. The school must maintain and develop this morality and, in the case of schools that lead to higher education, expose its reasons. Moreover, the schools that lead to higher education must train the students in the disciplined intellectual work required by science and philosophy. The restless young spirit, that is, found in gymnasium, must be restrained and, by a pedagogic trap, conducted through classic literary studies to the comprehension of the morality which has its principles in the spirit of the Greek people (cf. *Bourgeois* in Hegel, 1978, pp. 43–57). The same is not required in technical schools adequate to the interests of the classes of manual workers. This division of schools according to the social classes does not imply any depreciation of those who take university courses, because the social division of work does not imply any essential difference among men, because the individuals have their function designated and, therefore, their duty designated; and their morality consists of behaving according to this duty (Hegel 1946, tome I, p. 75).

In fact, for Hegel, university does not distinguish men; any distinction comes from their acts. These acts are qualified by their knowledge of the people spirit. Schooling is only one of the possible paths to the formation of the individual, because ethical acts (of morality, civility, citizenship) depend on the conformation of the individual to

the people spirit, being in a common life [civil society], particularly through the reformed Christian religion. Notice that, for Hegel, philosophy and sciences are not efficient agents of transformation of the world. This transformation is only made by practical men, historical individuals, who are not philosophers and do not need philosophy. For Hegel, philosophy is, in fact, the “notary” of history, that is, takes note of what has already happened. It is like the owl of Athens, which only wakes up at nightfall.

The educated man reaches universality which objectivates itself completely in the State composed by free men – aware of their needs and, therefore, capable of self-limiting. Only in the State [*State/Volksgeist*] man has rational existence. All education tries to ensure that the individual does not continue being something subjective, leading him to make himself objective in the State.

[...] The truth is the unit of the general will and of the subjective will; and the universal is in the Laws of the State, in the universal and rational determinations. (ibid., pp. 88–89)

Moral life is the essence of the State. Through the unification of the subjective will as the general will, the will is both an activity and the principle by which social life is established. The life of the State “implies the need of the formal culture and, therefore, of the birth of sciences, as well as of a poetry and of with art in general” (ibid., p. 139). These formal human activities need to be cultivated in schools; the same happening with philosophy which is the thought of the thought. Since the universal thought is destroyer, keeping only the principle of the spirit – the liberty – we have that the educational task is the one which destroys the immediate subjectivity so that the universality of thinking goes on its course – alienation determined by the people spirit. But this is not an infinite path, because it has an end [terminus], which “is to turn to itself” (ibid., p. 145). That’s why Hegel states that: “all individual needs to go through in his distinct fields, which are the bases of his conceit of spirit ...” (ibid., p. 147). The schooling education is, then, the form of the culture (*Kultur*) and the educationally formed man is the one who lives the universality of the culture, lives the content-substance of the people spirit.

As we saw, although Hegel does not propose a philosophy of education, his philosophical system is a pedagogy that leads the singularity of his state of almost philosophical unconsciousness to his state of consciousness. Not by chance he wrote and rewrote the *Encyclopædia* (Hegel, 1970), a manual through which he taught philosophy starting from the immediate consciousness of his listeners and leading them to philosophical consciousness. Certainly that manual required and requires comments that clarify its movements, which is the way whose starting point is in the idea-logic from which goes through idea-nature to reach the idea-spirit, the three moments – or syllogism – of the thought that thinks itself.

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Hegel and Philosophy of Education (II)

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Hegel’s contribution to education has been largely overlooked by those in philosophy and in educational theory. This is astonishing because Hegel’s

philosophy, of all Western philosophical systematic and nonsystematic critiques, is arguably the one which is most clear about its educational foundations. Before Hegel became a university lecturer, he was for 8 years (1808–1816) the headteacher of the Nuremberg Gymnasium or grammar school. In that time not only did he write his *Science of Logic* (1812, 1816), he thought through issues of pedagogy and of learning and teaching in many of his letters which are still current nearly 200 years later. These letters written between 1808 and 1816 contained reflections on discipline, on the problems and advantages of student-centered learning, on the contradictions of independent learning, on the bad practice of “spoon-feeding,” on the part that the classics can play, and many other aspects of educational theory and practice. I cannot, in what follows, rehearse all of these, and the interested reader should consult Butler and Seiler (1984).

I will, however, give a brief overview of his educational theory and practice in the Gymnasium before looking at the ways in which education plays a wider and much more significant role in his philosophy overall.

As a teacher Hegel combined an interesting mixture of what we would call traditional and progressive ideas. He discouraged dueling, fighting, and smoking as well as political activity. In his school address of 1810, he stated that “for those attend our school we expect quiet behaviour, the habit of continuous attention, respect and obedience to the teachers and a proper and seemly conduct both towards these and their fellow pupils” (Mackenzie 1909, p. 163). He also introduced military drill into the school day, arguing that it helped students to learn quickly and “to have the presence of mind to carry out a command on the spot without previous reflection” (1909, p. 165). He was impressed by the discipline held in the classroom of Pythagoras who demanded that his pupils keep silent for the first four years of their studies. Surely says Hegel, “the philosopher at least has the right to ask of the reader to keep his own thoughts quiet until he has gone through the whole” (1984, p. 293). Such comments give us today the impression of an authoritarian and didactic teacher, one who did not encourage his pupils to think for themselves or

to express their own opinions. Progressive teachers today would see such an approach as at best fearful of losing control in the classroom and at worst as a dogmatic reproduction of the status quo and a suppression of voice and difference. Postmodern thinkers might add that it is no longer credible to believe that a teacher can claim to be offering “a whole.” Hegel’s response to such thinking even in 1816 was that “it has become the prejudice not only of philosophical study but also – and indeed even more extensively – of pedagogy that thinking for oneself is to be developed and practised in the first place as if the subject matter were of no importance” (1984, p. 340). Four years earlier Hegel also expressed the view that “the unfortunate urge to educate the individual in thinking for himself and being self-productive has cast a shadow over truth” (1984, p. 279).

Yet, on the other hand, a much more liberal side to his views on students can also be found. Mackenzie notes that he was much liked by his students and that his “genuine enthusiasm for knowledge” (1909, p. 32) was infectious. He could teach most subjects with ease; he encouraged wide reading and took a personal interest in the students’ reading material. He interviewed all the students before they left the Gymnasium, whether they were proceeding to university or not.

His distaste for traditional didactic forms of instruction is clear in his reproach of the district school councilor, whose “only concept of educating the young is the misery of endless inculcating, reprimanding, memorising – not even learning by heart but merely the misery of endless repetition, pressure and stupefaction, ceaseless spoon feeding and stuffing. He cannot comprehend that in learning a young mind must in fact behave independently” (1984, p. 199). In another school address Hegel made a speech that echoed the thoughts of many modern educators about respect for the learning and freedom of the student. Hegel says that teachers should not induce in children a feeling of subjection and bondage – to make them obey another will even in unimportant matters – to demand absolute obedience for obedience’s sake and by severity to obtain what really belongs alone to the feeling of love and reverence.

A society of students cannot be regarded as an assemblage of servants nor should they have the appearance or behavior of such. "Education to independence demands that young people should be accustomed early to consult their own sense of propriety and their own reason" (1909, p. 175).

Summing up this ambivalence at the heart of Hegel's educational theory and practice, he notes that "to regard study as mere receptivity and memory work is to have a most incomplete view of what instruction means. On the other hand, to concentrate attention on the pupils own original reflections and reasoning is equally one-sided and should be still more carefully guarded against" (1909, p. 167). The contradictory nature of Hegel's reasoning here and his seemingly holding two irreconcilable views are totally in keeping with the philosophical system for which he is so infamous. In moving now to look at the part education plays in the system, we can make a smooth transition by looking at one of the most educationally significant of Hegel's letters. Speaking not only of philosophy in the Gymnasium but of philosophy as a whole, Hegel wrote:

Philosophical content has in its method and soul three forms: it is 1. abstract, 2. dialectical, and 3. speculative. It is abstract insofar as it takes place generally in the element of thought. Yet as merely abstract it becomes - in contrast to the dialectical and speculative forms- the so-called understanding which holds determinations fast and comes to know them in their fixed distinction. The dialectical is the movement and confusion of such fixed determinateness; it is negative reason. The speculative is positive reason, the spiritual, and it alone is a really philosophical. (1984, p. 280)

It is this triune system which has made Hegel one of the most difficult and challenging yet profound and comprehensive thinkers of the modern era. His philosophy is unusually, but importantly, a theory of what education actually is. Fundamentally, Hegel views education and learning as "experiential" (see Hegel 1977, p. 55). But to have a philosophy of education or, better, a science or philosophy that is education, experience has somehow to experience itself, to recognize the educational development which is taking place. The logic of this "self-experience"

has the triune structure outlined above. An object is thought (known) and then mediated in its being known as a thought thought again or known as not known and finally known and not known as both of these. This final stage is therefore not final at all, and its instability is its being educational or our continued learning from and about experience.

Hegel's system has been and continues to be characterized variously as dogmatic, totalitarian, closing, oppressive, and domesticating and as the archetypal model of a system which believes it has grasped the structure and content of knowledge as a whole. But these interpretations, be they from within Marxism, critical theory, postmodern theory, feminism, literary theory, philosophy, sociology, or cultural studies, have not read and continually refuse to read Hegel's system educationally. The only thing that grows in "certainty" in the system is our own comprehension of the necessity of uncertainty in all that we do, all that we think, and all that we learn. When the philosophical and spiritual education which lies at the heart of Hegel's system is interpreted only as an ordinary abstract education offering abstract knowledge, then it is interpreted as if it were an "empirical whole." But such thinking is precisely what our philosophical education undermines and continually protests against.

More sophisticated readings of Hegel, particularly those which place him in relation to Kant, argue that he is not offering a naive theory of truth nor a philosophy of absolute closure (see, e.g., Rose 1981). However, unlike Rose, most other commentators who find that they can identify with the circle of misrecognition in Hegel and sympathize with the power of its return cannot go the "whole" way in comprehending this misrecognition to be science. The charge against Hegel is that his phenomenology of experience and learning overcomes its own uncertainties by claiming (or desiring) to have its meaning, structure, and truth present to it before those experiences (see, e.g., Beardsworth (1996), p. 59). The circle, in other words, completes only what it presupposes or what it wants to complete, leaving no room for the different, the incommensurable, and the impossible.

This is a difficult charge to consider in such a brief space, but three defenses can be made here (see also Tubbs, 1997). First, to assume that uncertainty and difference have a significance somewhere other than within the circle of experience is to reify them and to separate them from the conditions which are their predetermination, even if this predetermination renders them “impossible.” Second, such reification is only another repetition of modern (bourgeois) social and political relations, separating again the laboring consciousness from its objects and refusing the philosophical and spiritual import of the logic of their return to each other in and as experience (again). Third, it is therefore Hegel (and Nietzsche!) who offers a critique of modern unfreedom without importing concepts of impossibility, trace, or “difference,” concepts which themselves presuppose negative experience not to be its own education and development. The Hegelian system stands guard against all such presuppositions of education, positive and negative, abstract and dialectical, empirical and postmodern.

What, then, do we learn within the circle of experience? Do we overcome our misrecognitions? Do we learn from our experiences to see the world “correctly”? Do we arrive at the truth? The answer for Hegel is both yes and no. We do arrive at a recognition of that which we have misrecognized, but this recognition does not overcome misrecognition, and it does not save or “mend the world” (Fackenheim 1994). It does give us a philosophical and spiritual understanding of the world and it is positive in this sense. But it retains its negativity for it is based on our experience in which our knowledge of the world is always lost. How, then, would we live within this negation of negation? The answer is we would live educationally, learning and continually struggling to comprehend the contradictory and difficult nature of those experiences, to know them as both true and untrue, and to resist all one-sided repetitions of modern unfreedom. This philosophical and spiritual education is far more dramatic than any abstract determination about truth or identity which resolves the difficulty. In any case, as Hegel made clear in the Introduction to his *Phenomenology of Spirit*, such resolutions cannot hold against the

negative power and inevitability of further experiences in which the philosophical and the spiritual return again (and again).

To end, two further things can be said of Hegel and education. First, the structure of his philosophical system, being as it is a science of rational experience, is also a model of personal, social, spiritual, and political development. His *Philosophy of Right* (1967) reveals this educational structure showing the movement from “natural” family education to the civil education of bourgeois social relations in which the family is replaced as educator. Second, within civil society we experience many different ways in which our civil relations have truths beyond their immediate bourgeois appearance. These are our experiences of culture which, for Hegel, represent the relation between persons and the universal. *Bildung* is the term used by Hegel to describe this sort of education, but it does not “end” in culture or in cultural studies. Culture for Hegel is not the “end of reason” (1967, p. 125) for our experience of culture (it could, e.g., be religious or aesthetic) is itself another education for us, one which Hegel describes as “the absolute transition from an ethical substantiality which is immediate and natural to the one which is intellectual and so both infinitely subjective and lofty enough to have attained universality of form” (1967, p. 125). Freedom becomes for Hegel an educational issue characterized by the difficult struggle to make these experiences our own education, our own spiritual self-development. Rejecting reason and freedom on the grounds of their difficulty and their tendency to disappoint us, and even to oppose themselves, as recent postmodernism has done, would be despised by Hegel. The difficulty is precisely what freedom consists in and demands.

Lastly and perhaps most controversially, Hegel has a philosophy of history. This means that he sees the same educational development outlined above in the unfolding of human history. It would seem from his *Philosophy of History* (1956) that the rationality of the West marks the highest expression of human development that the world has seen and, according to Fukuyama (1989), can expect. “Late twentieth-century Western” philosophizing has largely rejected such a view,

rejecting in particular its racist and imperialist overtones that “west is best” and that all other world views are underdeveloped, naive, simple, whatever. (At times Hegel seems equally derogatory to women.) In response, at the very least one is obliged to read the *Philosophy of History* in the light of the system and therefore educationally. What the *Philosophy of History* reveals is the history of human misrecognition of itself and of its knowledge of truth and the forms in which that misrecognition has been represented. Nor does the philosophy of history for Hegel necessarily culminate in the end of history. True, at times, it appears that there is little left to do, but equally and predominantly our “philosophical” stage of Western development is that in which our own negativity is still also our own subjectivity. This is the basis of the modern State but is still characterized by misrecognition and struggle and not by final resolutions. Those “final solutions” which have been part of the Western twentieth century are not Hegelian in nature; indeed, they are expressions of what happens when the struggle of freedom and of education is refused or is itself reified. The use of international law to try and combat the triumph of unfreedom may well be Hegelian, but international law itself is also another form of misrecognition and necessarily both master and slave of world spirit. It is by no means the case that Hegel’s philosophy of history precludes other world views, e.g., Judaism and Islam, from developing their relationship between State and religion or human freedom and divine law or again between reason and God, in their own ways. There is evidence that this has always happened, continues to happen, and will happen in the future. Hegel’s critics are perhaps more imperialist than their adversary and certainly less open to education and learning in assuming that other world views are either inside or outside the philosophy of history rather than, as the West is, in constant negotiation with it and repetition of it.

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Hegel on Moral Development, Education, and Ethical Life

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Synonyms

[Curriculum](#); [Ethics](#); [Hegel](#); [Moral Development](#); [Philosophy of Education](#); [Recognition](#)

Introduction

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831) was an important educational thinker. He was, besides Kant, the most eminent philosopher of German idealism. His first great work, *Phenomenology of Spirit* (1807) was of revolutionary significance. He developed in his *Science of Logic* (1816) a dialectical system of categories, which was, for example, important for Marxist philosophy. His later philosophical system was summarized in *Encyclopedia* (1818), which he began to write in Heidelberg. Later in Berlin, his philosophy became internationally famous. He died of cholera in 1831 (on Hegel’s biography see Pinkard 2000; general introduction to his thinking Beiser 1993; Hösle 1987).

Hegel was especially influential for continental philosophy – Marxism, hermeneutics, post-modernism – and also affected American pragmatism, for example, John Dewey. Hegel as a pedagogical thinker is not so influential, but for the philosophy of education even today remains very interesting. New interpretations of his philosophy, for example, the discussion of his social ontology and recognition (*Anerkennung*), are potentially fruitful for educational theory and worth further development (on recognition see, for example, Honneth 1995, 2010; Ikäheimo and Laitinen 2011).

Besides his academic career, Hegel had very extensive experience as a house and school teacher. He was 45 years old when he acquired his first full-time academic post, a professorship at the University of Heidelberg in 1816. Two years later he moved to Berlin. Before the Heidelberg post, he had spent 14 years as a house and school teacher instructing children and young adults. From 1808 to 1816 he held the post of Rector and Professor of Philosophy at the Gymnasium at Nuremberg and wrote there not only one of his theoretical main works *Science of Logic* (1816) but also the pedagogically important *Philosophical Propaedeutic* (published 1840 as a separate volume (XVIII) of the *Collected Works*). At this time, he reflected pedagogical questions also in his letters and school addresses.

Towards the “Concrete Ethics”: From Morality (*Moralität*) to Ethical Life (*Sittlichkeit*)

Following Aristotle, Hegel sees ethics in connection to politics. Ethical action is always situated in a society: virtues, for example, are connected to different social roles to which a citizen has socialized in a society. Hegel’s starting point is on the other hand the ethics of Kant. He stresses like Kant the importance of obligations and universal human rights. However, he does not accept the formalistic traces of Kantian ethics. Kant’s categorical imperative is a universal, law-like formal rule, underlining the free, autonomic choices of a

moral agent. The historical and social context is irrelevant for ethical action.

According to Hegel, Kant does not connect moral universalism to the practical motivation and interests of an agent in a concrete historical situation. The Kantian ideal of moral agency leads to an empty conception of both the agent and the moral rules. Kant does not take seriously the specific goods that make up ethical life in a certain society and culture. His rational agent has no moral feelings, no interests, or *summa summarum*, no real ethical motivation which would constitute a concrete, socially situated morality in the Hegelian sense. This concrete morality can be found only in a connection between morality (*Moralität*) and ethical life (*Sittlichkeit*), in understanding the specific goods, roles, and ethically significant institutions within a particular society.

Hegel does not reject Kantian morality totally – this would lead to a cultural relativism, which Hegel does not represent. Hegel accepts the cornerstone of the Kantian ethics: the free will. Only free agents can be considered as morally responsible. Morality makes sense only if we can critically reflect on traditional *mores*, traditional moral practices and habits. In this sense, Hegel is not a conservative, who would restore traditional morality as such – his famous *dictum* concerning the reasonability of reality does not mean that the existing order as such would be rational. One should rather critically reflect on how the existing order could be changed towards rational, moral, and political standards. Historically the most important principle is the increasing freedom, which constitutes the cornerstone of Hegel’s philosophy of history (*The Philosophy of History*, compiled after his death, is probably the most widely read of Hegel’s works). History is progressive; a progress towards a society in which all are free through a progress in a consciousness of freedom. It is therefore clear that Hegel does not accept cultural relativism, which cannot criticize different forms of suppression of individual freedom.

In the German historical context, where the development of capitalism at the beginning of nineteenth century was still very weak, Hegel’s liberal and bourgeois political thinking (especially

in his doctrine of “civil society,” *bürgerliche Gesellschaft*) is quite radical. His doctrine of State (*Staat*) is not a totalitarian, as many earlier interpretations have misunderstood. The Hegelian State is not only a result of a social contract based on mutual protection of private property, like the Lockean State. Hegel calls this kind of liberal State *Notstaat*, a State based on need. This State is exclusive; it leaves the powerless and poor people without protection.

On the contrary, real State is, for Hegel, more: it is a political unity which promotes common good equally for all of its citizen (it is in this respect a family-like unit). Hegel demands, for example, equal education for all citizen. The State recognizes also individual liberty and preserves a sense of shared identity. It is a moral unit in the Kantian sense: It respects all its members as goals and does not accept using others only as a means. The Hegelian State is in this respect altruistic, a family-like unit, which does not accept economical instrumentalization and exploitation of each other's productive and consumptive capabilities. State is based in a general commitment to a way of life based on rational and coherent principles. The idea of constitution represents this possibility of a State to be a moral agent of its own. At the same time, constitution must express the deepest interests of the individual citizen (Pinkard 1988, pp. 146–148). The Hegelian State is therefore not a totalitarian whole, because it expresses the rational will and freedom of the individual citizen.

Education in its different forms is closely connected to this institutional structure of ethical life (or society as a whole). Family education is mainly moral education, in which children are educated in the sphere of mutual love, which is the institutional principle of family as a moral unit. This earliest education is mainly instinctive, children are gradually assimilated through loving and caring interactions with parents into altruistic human action, in which others are respected as goals. Mutual recognition of individual interests and capabilities is here, already, important. Through school education, children become gradually become members of a larger community, leading to legal membership of civil society and State, capable to begin ground their own families.

The school is as an institution a kind of corporation. Hegel calls all organizations, which unite people with common interests into groups that represent their interests, corporations. He does not mention schools and universities in this context. Guilds and unions are typical examples of corporations. But considering that schools take the reasonable interests of children and young adults as their guiding lines, one should also call schools corporations. Universities are a special kind of corporation because they produce new knowledge and mediate it to young adults. They are therefore also corporations for scientists and intellectuals.

On the other hand, schools and universities are more than corporations because they are organized by the State as a political unit (not only as a part of *Nootstaat*). They are therefore more general and reason-based institutions than guilds and unions, which represent only the interests of small groups. Schools prepare children to act for a better future as becoming State citizens. In this respect, schools and universities are not only mediating to the next generation traditional knowledge as such but are also critical moral and political institutions, which help to formulate the general will (cp. Rousseau's reason-based *volonté générale*, which is not the common “will of all,” *volonté de tous*, the will of potentially irrational majority, Rousseau 1762) of future generations. Schools and universities anticipate a probable future in discussing important local and global problems like current environmental questions. In Hegel's time, such a problem – especially in Germany – was the building of a national State. Therefore the question of patriotism was, in the Hegelian pedagogy of nineteenth century, an especially important problem. This question also arose in other European countries. For example, the most important Finnish Hegelian, J.V. Snellman (1806–1881), who extensively researched the problems of school education ca. 1840, became a national leader in Finland. Finland was at that time an autonomous part of Russia and became independent in 1917 in the turmoils of the Russian Revolution (on the pedagogy of the Finnish Hegelians see Väyrynen 1992).

The Hegelian pedagogy is for this reason morally and politically grounded: The social context and the questions concerning the possible

development of the society are important. On the other hand, the structure of knowledge and its adaptability to the psychical development of children must also be taken into account. Hegel stresses in general the activity of the children in learning processes. In this respect, the development of children's subjectivity, self-consciousness, and personality are crucial goals in all education, be it purely theoretical or practically political. Hegel develops these practical questions of pedagogy extensively and connects them firmly to his more general philosophical views.

Dialectics of *Bildung* and the Fundaments of Moral Education

Hegel's pedagogical views are based in his concept of *Bildung* (one could translate it as a general becoming or formation of man). The concept was developed in German neohumanistic and romantic thinking, for example, in Goethe and Schiller. However, Hegel's conception is original. *Bildung* is not a harmonic development like natural growth, it is rather a dialectical process, in which antagonistic elements play a crucial role. The development of a child begins from a natural and instinctive state, which is irrational, capricious, and amoral – not at all idealized, as in Rousseau inspired pedagogies. *Bildung* begins as an alienation from this natural domain: A child must first be morally educated in the family. There are elements of coercion (and therefore alienation), but the main thing is that the institutional principle of family, love between parents and child, immediately assimilates the child into the normative rules of family life. This first stage of *Bildung* is therefore taking place quite harmoniously, in the immediate substantiality of the ethical life in the loving and caring family.

At school, the antagonistic aspects of *Bildung* became more explicit. Norms are more systematically inculcated and the pupil is forced to sacrifice his immediate idiosyncrasies and interests to the experience of the systematic demands of thought, guided by curriculum. Hegel summarizes this process of *Bildung* as follows: "The final purpose of education ... is liberation and the struggle for

higher liberation still; education is the absolute transition from an ethical substantiality which is immediate and natural to one which is intellectual and so both infinitely subjective and lofty enough to have attained universality of form" (Hegel 1971, p. 125). In this respect, school teaching mirrors the whole society: it supports the development of the subjective self-consciousness of the pupils and prepares in this way their future lives in the civil society (*bürgerliche Gesellschaft*). For example, the competitive elements at school prepare children to the life in capitalistic society.

On the other hand, school teaching must prepare the pupils to work for the more general, communitarian interests of the State (*Staat*) as ethically responsible citizens. The demands of capitalism may not totally dictate the goals of the education system which has, as a part of the political State, a critical autonomy from the economic system. Especially in higher education (gymnasium, university), general humanistic and scientific goals have a priority. Hegel's concept of school education clearly mirrors in this way his general views of society. From the viewpoint of moral education, the task of the school is antagonistic, it must support both egoistic and altruistic goals. This mirrors the antagonism of the whole society.

The process of the child's education, in a way, mirrors the bigger historical process of the *Bildung* of mankind. The formative stages of Spirit (*Geist*) provide the material element for the curriculum. This must be communicated to the child. Hegel describes this process in his *Phenomenology of Spirit* as follows: "Thus as far as factual information is concerned, we find that what in former ages engaged the attention of men of mature minds, has been reduced to the level of facts, exercises and even games for children; and, in the child's progress through the school, we shall recognize the history of the cultural development of the world traced, as it were, in a silhouette" (Hegel 1979, p. 16). Hegel stresses therefore the importance of the classics of Greece and Rome: they allow the child to distance himself from his own immediate interests and narrow practical demands of a particular historical situation. This is something that philosophy does more abstractly. Hegel therefore even speculates that

the classics ought to be accorded a more prominent place than philosophy in the Gymnasium's curriculum (Hegel 1986, Introduction p. xvi).

Historical knowledge and classics help the children to develop their skills of critical thinking – classics are not, as some conservative philosophers like Hans Georg Gadamer have seen, something in which the universal nature of Spirit could be most easily found. They are rather intellectually a kind of *significant other*, through which the mind of the child can return to itself as mentally enriched but at the same time as free to criticize even the classical views. Hegel is of course a modernist, for whom classics are not an unsurpassable authority but rather equal partners in the common search for truth, sustainable values, and ethical life.

Classics are especially important for moral education. They help to develop the moral sensitivities of the child and create preconditions for the development of the child's capacity for participation in the life of his society as a full citizen in emphasizing the different duties of the citizen. Morality will be inculcated gradually through the study of classics. On the other hand, also practical philosophy is important in this respect. Its central systematic role in the Hegelian curriculum will be analyzed later.

Classics are for Hegel not authorities, but rather models for encouraging the pupil's own ethical and social activity. They are an important tool in awakening this activity. For Hegel, all real learning is an active process. Hegel emphasizes this strongly in his second Nuremberg *School Address* in writing that "if learning limited itself to mere receiving, the effect would not be much better than if we wrote sentences on water: for it is not the receiving but the self-activity of comprehension and the power to use it again, that first makes knowledge our possession" (Hegel 1909, p. 167). The goal of moral education is active political citizenship. This is possible only if pupils learn practical morality instead of mere abstract morality or moral theorizing. The pupil must learn how to apply moral rules and obligations in different social contexts, leaning on an authentic, concretely situated ethics as opposed to mere formalistic approach. Kantian ethics is for Hegel only a starting point and the ultimate goal is to teach ethical judgment, an ability

to evaluate different social contexts and their special ethical problems in order to find solutions. This is possible especially through the study of classics, because through them a positive alienation from the current interests and their limitations becomes possible.

How to Build Pedagogically Relevant Curriculum?

One could speak of the primacy of practical philosophy in the Hegelian view of curriculum (modifying Kant's "Primacy of the practical reason," *Primat der praktischen Vernunft* – see Kant 1978, pp. 191–194). According to Hegel, the subjects of Law and Ethics are pedagogically best suited for children, while they contain material which is more directly practical, connected to the immediate life problems of the children (for example, what rights and obligations do I have in a certain social context? and why?). These are also easier to grasp for the children than purely theoretical questions. Concepts of practical philosophy are more immediate and definite for the child, suitable for their psychical development. Theoretical subjects, for example, the concepts of Logic are only "shadows of the real" and therefore harder to grasp. Also the subjects of the Philosophy of Nature are not very well suited for children, because many of the children regard them as boring and irrelevant (Hegel 1986, Introduction pp. xviii–xix). The concepts of practical philosophy combine the possibility of immediate experience in a life context with rational form: They are therefore best suited to produce valid knowledge from the theoretical viewpoint of the German idealism, which tried to combine empiristic and rationalistic traditions of philosophy.

As already mentioned, Hegel's general view concerning the formation of knowledge was activistic. Following Kant and Fichte, he stressed the constitutive role of subjectivity in the formation of knowledge. This subjective aspect and the objective validity of knowledge can be easily connected with each other in the human context, than in the case of nature. Hegel actually leans here on the conception of *actors knowledge*,

developed earlier especially by Aristotle, Hobbes, and Vico, according to which people can have a more certain knowledge of the things that they have – or could have – made. People can, for example, *reenact* – to use the expression of Collingwood – historical actions in their mind and understand, on which values, goals, and believes historical actions were based. As Giambattista Vico (1668–1744) stressed, this kind of understanding can reach a more certain knowledge than the empirical research of nature, because people have no possibility to grasp such an inner view of the principles behind the creation of nature (creationistic position excluded).

The priority of Law and Ethics in the Hegelian curriculum stresses the objective validity of their concepts. They are therefore ideally suited to combine the subjective starting point of all knowledge with objective certainty. Hegel's metaphysical position is objective idealism and this is pedagogically easiest to understand in the realm of objective spirit, in which the doctrine of ethical life (*Sittlichkeit*) plays a key role. Basic institutions of the society, family, civil society, and State are for him primarily historical products of human mind, and people can understand them correctly only if they can reenact, what kind of values, goals, and believes they objectify. Even the children can easily understand, how, for example, the concept of private property rights was born (possessing first my own body and power to work, as Locke explains). On the other hand, private property has objective validity expressed at the institutional level. Obligations and norms express this objective aspect and the reasons for these rules are not even for children any harder to understand as the ideas of basic rights.

Understanding the concepts of Morality and Law, therefore, gives the children an intuition regarding objective knowledge is possible combining constructive subjective aspects and objective validity in a society. The children may therefore already learn to avoid simplified theoretical positions like naïve realism or subjective relativism. Michael George and Andrew Miller have summarized this central idea of Hegel well in their *Introduction to Hegel's Philosophical Propaedeutic* in writing, that “Education generally, by

retracing the path of Spirit's self-realization, raises the individual's subjectivity to a recognition of the rationality underpinning the social institutions of *his* society. . . . The *Propaedeutic* therefore . . . (brings) the child of the modern world into that state of intellectual appreciation which alone would enable him to participate as an active, rational, informed and concerned citizen of his society and age” (Hegel 1986, *Introduction*, p. xxi).

Hegel underlines in his didactics the primacy of the content instead of form. He criticizes Kant's *dictum* of the priority of philosophizing instead of the content, basic concepts of philosophy. Hegel believes that the two cannot be separated so easily. It is in reviewing the content that one learns to philosophize. Children especially need the careful, systematic study of the content of law and morality, in order to learn philosophy. Philosophy devoid of content and systematic structure is haphazard, empty, and fragmentary. This does not exclude the activity of the children's subjectivity: as George and Miller put it, “to think through detailed material in class and in homework is to re-enact the principle of thought itself . . . the pupil must then take on the hard ‘labour of the Notion’, i.e. think though (should be through? – KV) the problem himself and ‘possess’ it” (Hegel 1986, *Introduction*, p. xix). Although Hegel criticizes such pedagogies, which stress the role of a play, he does not underestimate the positive role of the imagination in child's subjectivity. Especially the study of classics of Greek and Rome – and also Defoe's *Robinson Crusoe* – take children to a different world and encourage their imagination. It is important to reflect freely different possibilities: this promotes children's capability to critical thinking.

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Hegelian Dialectics and Freire's Pedagogy

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Heidegger and Curriculum

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Introduction

Martin Heidegger (1889–1976), one of the most influential philosophers of the twentieth century, did not develop a philosophy of education per se. However, the remarks he did make about it, his brief efforts at higher education reform, and

his philosophy, more broadly, have rich implications for education. Yet when it comes to the question of *curriculum* – of what should be taught and learned – the tenor of Heidegger's thought militates against a definitive position (Hodge 2015). His philosophy is characterized as revolving around a single question, the question of "being." This is the question of the ground of intelligibility, the disclosure of entities as entities to us. For Heidegger, the question of being is *the* question of philosophy. It also concerns the meaning of our own existence and the meaning we make of others and the world. It is a question that concerns our cultural milieu which is today pervaded by an instrumental mentality and an associated fascination with technology and sense of faith in technical solutions. It is a world wherein the being of things and people is taking on the character of "resource." Heidegger's analyses of the existential and historical modes of being that shape the sense we make of the world suggest two basic interpretations of education. There is education that inducts us into the forms of disclosure characteristic of the age, and education that seeks to comprehend these forms of disclosure and move beyond them to ask the question of being directly and for ourselves. In terms of curriculum, at least one type is clearly implied: a curriculum that guides induction into established ways of understanding being. But Heidegger's philosophy casts such a curriculum in a problematic light. Foisting authoritative interpretations of being on young and developing people is to suppress the question of being. To impress upon human being ready-made ontologies and life projects is to consign another generation to what Heidegger called the "forgetfulness of being." The question concerning curriculum then becomes acute. How can there be curriculum that promotes the question of being if any decision about what is important to teach and learn is to settle, prematurely, the question of being?

Curriculum Orientations

To get at this question, it is helpful to consider ways curriculum itself has been understood. For

this purpose, Schubert's (1986) framework for analyzing curriculum is employed. According to Schubert there are three major curriculum traditions or "orientations" that contend for a place in or dominance of the curriculum. The "intellectual-traditionalist" perspective embraces what is often called the "liberal" or "disciplinary" curriculum which seeks to pass on the greatest cultural and scientific achievements of humankind. The "social-behaviorist" approach has a focus on present needs and promotes knowledge and skills for coping and flourishing in contemporary society. The third tradition is what Schubert terms the "experientialist," and it is concerned with the actualization or growth of learners, developing the essence of the human through more or less guided experiences.

Many of Heidegger's remarks about education and philosophical arguments can be considered in the light of one or another of Schubert's curriculum orientations. In general, Heidegger (2010) takes a critical line on what he calls the "tradition." For Heidegger, the tradition is our cultural heritage contained in works and systems of knowledge. The problem with it is that it transmits presuppositions about the meaning of being and human being. These are powerful metaphysical assumptions that guide our stance toward being. Heidegger is critical of what he sees as the "forgetfulness of being" that characterizes our culture and which derives from the weight of received interpretations of being. Since the intellectual-traditionalist curriculum is devoted to preserving the very tradition Heidegger thinks contributes to our forgetfulness, this orientation would appear to be suspect. A Heideggerian critique of the liberal arts curriculum tradition was elaborated by Spanos (1993), who argued that a conservative reaction against Heidegger-inspired "post-human" curriculum in American higher education was underway. Spanos describes a resurgence of the intellectual-traditionalist curriculum in contemporary society.

However, it is not possible to simply turn away from the tradition promoted by the intellectual-traditionalist curriculum. Heidegger makes a great deal of what he calls a "destructive" reading of the great works of human culture. He thinks the

tradition springs from genuine insights into being or can be made to reveal insights, but that such opportunities are lost in the official processes of transmission and acquisition. Hence a seminal contributor such as Plato can be on the curriculum today without any of his ontologically germane insights coming to light. But these same works can be dismantled through a "destructive" reading and their original insights recovered. For instance, a destructive reading of Plato's allegory of the cave reveals experience of the essence of truth and missteps of interpretation that have had a decisive influence on the way truth is understood within the tradition (Heidegger 1998). Intellectual-traditionalist curriculum – the liberal curriculum of the great works of humanity – therefore has the potential to merely transmit a deadening set of assumptions or can be read in a particular way so as to unlock ontological insights. In a Heideggerian sense, everything depends on the attitude to the tradition when it features in the curriculum.

As Heidegger's critical views evolved, he focused more and more on the dangers of what he called the "essence of technology." His concerns were not directed to technology as such but at the instrumental mind-set that envisages and values technical solutions to all problems and questions. Heidegger (1977) believed that this mind-set he calls "enframing" tends to reduce everything to resources. The idea is that in the contemporary world, entities become a stock of resources or raw material awaiting extraction and refinement. Resources are more or less sophisticated and either in or awaiting deployment. Even human being has been encompassed by this mind-set. We have become "human resources," subject to development, correction, and deployment in processes that involve the construction, stockpiling, and deployment of other resources. For Heidegger, the mind-set of enframing is a totalizing system that progressively embraces every entity. Schubert's "social-behaviorist" orientation can be understood as an approach to curriculum attuned to the demands of enframing. This orientation aims to fit learners to life and work in a contemporary world ruled by enframing. Technologies and sciences are

especially valued in the social-behaviorist curriculum, while the great achievements of the past are not neglected so much as updated so that their contemporary uses are highlighted. Curriculum serves as a blueprint for the refinement and adjustment of human resources as well as a source of guidance for living among and working with resources.

Heidegger's (1977) analysis of enframing seems to offer no escape from the totalizing ambitions of instrumentalism, but he does stress that human being retains an inalienable possibility of extrication from the great system of enframing. Humans respond to something when they partake in the project of enframing, and their response and creative endeavors are necessary to further the project. Heidegger explains that this response is to a "call" from being. So, while humans can play at submitting to the dictates of enframing and see and treat themselves as resources, they cannot be completely reduced. They remain the one called by being and retain the creative scope to conceive of being in different ways. There is always a remainder from the process of enframing humans, and thus the possibility is always there for disruption of the project. Indeed, in Heidegger's estimate, the danger of enframing harbors the key to lifting its spell. Enframing is potentially a great teacher and the stage for envisioning genuine alternatives. In a way, this promise at the heart of the danger of enframing echoes the potential of a destructive reading of the liberal tradition to reverse the deadening effects of the tradition. The social-behaviorist curriculum orientation can be approached in a way that offers a way out of the grip of enframing, but it requires an approach dedicated to discovering the underlying emptiness of the era of enframing.

Schubert's third curriculum orientation is the "experientialist." He has in mind the ideas of Dewey here, but it also encompasses the broader humanistic doctrine of the value of the human essence and the propriety of educational endeavors that seek its unfolding. The experientialist curriculum orientation problematizes a focus on content that characterizes the intellectual-traditionalist and social-behaviorist orientations. Pinar's (1975) notion of *currere* presents a way to understand

the critique of curriculum as content. In Pinar's view, curriculum as content can be likened to a guide for tourists, while the curriculum as *currere* is the actual tour, the course experienced. The experientialist curriculum is therefore concerned with experiences, and the purpose is to develop what is within the learner. This curriculum orientation has parallels in the work of Heidegger, especially in his earlier "existential" phase. The early Heidegger (2010) was committed to the methodological principle of analyzing human being to get at the meaning of being. The deep connection between being and human being (which underpins the saving potential of the danger of enframing too) can be realized in "authentic" moments and decisions. These junctures represent those times when the being of the human being is experienced to be at stake, when the path before us is deliberately taken as my own. Moments that also bring our own being before us are experiences of anxiety and contemplating our own death. These are experiences that expose our finitude and our separate existence from the crowd. In the early Heidegger, then, experience can be the way to an authentic mode of being, a form of existence that sloughs off the forgetfulness of being and confronts us with the big question.

However, Heidegger's doctrine of authenticity does not fully coincide with the curriculum visions of the experientialist. The problem here can be appreciated in the light of Heidegger's (1998) critique of humanism. He argued that since Roman times, the educational project or *paideia* has involved taking some idea of the human essence and actively shaping the conduct and thought of the young in conformity with it. In Heidegger's view, this is a problematic undertaking because it means prescribing what is to be educated from the learner. The outcome of the Roman *paideia* is known in advance. For the Romans, it was a picture of the human as civilized, the image of *homo humanus*. But for Heidegger, to promote a prior understanding of the human and then developing learners according to this understanding is to close off an attitude of openness to being, especially of the human being. Forming humans according to a preformed specification of the human serves to repeat traditional

ways of being. Humanism blunts sensitivity to the question of being and discourages the open stance necessary to face the question. Heidegger believes that later programs of human formation such as Christianity, communism, and even Sartre's existentialism repeat the fundamental mistake of humanism, leading him to apply the label of humanism to all these later systems that are tied to programs of forming human conduct and knowledge. This criticism applies, too, to the modern humanisms of Rogers, Maslow, and Knowles. They each propose programs of formation that make assumptions about the true essence of the human and the need to realize it through appropriately guided experience.

An Ontological Curriculum

It may be appreciated, then, that the very project of curriculum is problematized by Heidegger's philosophy. A content focus, exemplified by the intellectual-traditionalist orientation, implies that curriculum is given over to the service of the tradition, but the tradition in Heidegger's (2010) early work is fundamentally problematic because it transmits influential yet faulty assumptions about the meaning of being. An intellectual-traditionalist curriculum will promote forgetfulness of being because by it we are supplied with ready answers to our deepest questions, absolving us of the need to question for ourselves. The social-behaviorist orientation is also focused on content, but it is up-to-date content that is designed to equip learners to play a part in the technologically driven society we now inhabit. In his later work, Heidegger (1977) identifies a significant problem with this society, and it is the pervasiveness of the instrumental mind-set of enframing. A social-behaviorist curriculum is by definition one that will instill the values and knowledge required to enframe. The experientialist orientation does not have a focus on content, but because it emphasizes the value of experience for developing the human essence, it makes assumptions about what it is that is being developed. In Heidegger's (1998) philosophy, promoting an idea of the human, even if it does not

take the material form of curriculum content, is still to suppress the open emergence of the being of humans. Although an emphasis on the experience side of curriculum in the spirit of Pinar's (1975) notion of *currere* resonates with Heidegger's (2010) early existential philosophy, while ever an experiential curriculum is based on realizing some idea of the human, only limited, conforming results will be aimed for and recognized.

These critical perspectives on the three curriculum orientations identified by Schubert (1986) do, however, contain the seeds of a Heideggerian approach to curriculum. "Content" certainly was important to Heidegger. His analysis of human being (Heidegger 2010) foregrounded the aspect of "thrown-ness", the ontologically significant fact that we are always already engaged in the culture and projects of our society. Asking the question of being does not occur in a vacuum. In our time, it is by deeply understanding the tradition, especially as it affects us in the form of "enframing," that we can reawaken a sense of the wonder and uncanniness of being. But such a recollection requires us to approach curriculum content as something that must be seen through. Such a curriculum must possess scope to seek beyond the boundaries of disciplines, competencies, and subject areas. Heidegger's (1993) proposals for higher education curriculum reform reflect this critical approach to curriculum content. He argued that students and faculty need to interrogate the ontological ground of the entities that are usually the exclusive concern of disciplinary content (Thomson 2005). Heidegger called for what could be considered an "ontological" curriculum orientation, one that has in view the ultimate need to inquire after the meaning of being, using content as a stepping-off point.

A second dimension of a Heideggerian approach to curriculum can be understood in terms of experience. Such an approach contrasts with Schubert's (1986) experientialist orientation in that it is explicitly decoupled from any prior understanding of the human to be unfolded through experience. Instead, the experiential dimension of a Heideggerian approach to curriculum concerns what Heidegger (1988) called the "ontological difference" – the difference between

being as such and beings. Experience is usually, “factically,” experience with beings – the things of our world. To feel and ask the question of being is, however, to take a radical turn in the midst of beings. It is in one sense a “course,” *currere*. But it is *currere* that takes an ontological rather than ontical direction. It is an orientation to the ontological difference in the context of things. It is a mode of curriculum that uses experience as a stepping-off point, discarding any ideas of a goal taken from the measure of the human.

An ontological curriculum is suggested by Thomson’s (2005) analysis of Heidegger’s destructive reading of Plato’s cave allegory. Plato used the allegory to illustrate his metaphysics, narrating stages of soul’s ascent from a world of shadows in the cave below to the experience of truth in the bright light of day above. For Heidegger, Plato’s allegory can be read for its insights into truth but also for its educational vision connected with the soul’s journey from darkness (opinion) to light (knowledge). Thomson argues that the world of the cave can be regarded as the contemporary enframed world. The soul’s adjustment to the conditions of the cave represents modern education that is both enframed (by neoliberal policy frameworks) and enframing (by shaping learners as resources to work in a world of resources). The intellectual-traditionalist and social-behaviorist types of curriculum correspond to the curriculum of the cave. In Plato’s allegory, the soul’s path to freedom begins when it is unshackled and can look around to see how things really are in the shadowy world of the cave. Thomson explains that a “negative freedom” is attained at this stage, an experience of discontent with the world rendered as resources and understood in instrumental terms. The next stage in soul’s journey in Plato’s story is to the surface and an experience of the source of light and truth – the sun. For Thomson, this is the stage where the learner orients to the question of being and reaches the goal of an “ontological education.” The path traversed by the learner can only be understood in an experientialist way up to a point. The ontological *currere* is the path that leads all the way to the surface and to the possibility of asking the question of being for oneself.

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Heidegger and Learning

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“What is lacking, then, is action, not thought. . . . We must be ready and willing to listen.” Martin Heidegger, *What is Called Thinking?* (Heidegger 1968. Henceforth cited parenthetically as *WCT*).

“The hardest apprenticeship is that by which [people] learn how to hear and heed no imperative other than that relation. . . ‘setting the human *logos* in its proper relation to the *Logos*’.” Reiner Schürmann, *Heidegger On Being and Acting: From Principles to Anarchy* (Schürmann 1987).

Introduction

Martin Heidegger returned to the University of Freiburg in the winter semester of 1951, and in the following summer of 1952 he delivered his final lectures before his formal retirement from the

university. Those lecture courses were organized under the title *Was heisst Denken?* or the question *what is called thinking?* or what *calls* thinking? (In his editor's note, Krell writes, "What is called thinking? What calls for thinking? Both questions try to translate the title of Heidegger's 1951–1952 lecture course *Was heisst Denken?*" Krell (1993)). As J. Glenn Gray reminds us in his introduction to the first English edition of Heidegger's lectures, these courses in 1951–1952 "were also the first lectures he was permitted to give [in Freiburg] since 1944, when he was drafted by the Nazis into the people's militia (*Volkssturm*) and was afterwards forbidden to teach by the French occupying powers." Gray adds that the interruption in his teaching must have been costly for Heidegger because "Heidegger is above all else a teacher." (Gray, p. xvii) It is productive to listen to Gray's pronouncement and allow it to guide us towards an understanding of what Heidegger tells us about learning in that last year of teaching at Freiburg.

"Heidegger is above all else a teacher" – this is verified by one of his most renowned and devoted students, Hannah Arendt, who, when asked by the *New York Review of Books* to write an essay to commemorate Heidegger's eightieth birthday, audaciously dated his nativity as "neither the date of his birth (September 26, 1889, at Messkirch) nor the publication of his first book, but the first lecture courses and seminars which he held as a mere *Privatdozent* (instructor) and assistant to Husserl at the University of Freiburg in 1919" (Arendt 1971). Arendt continued:

For Heidegger's "fame" predates by about eight years the publication of *Sein und Zeit* (*Being and Time*) in 1927; indeed it is open to question whether the unusual success of this book – not just the immediate impact it had inside and outside the academic world but also its extraordinarily lasting influence, with which few of the century's publications can compare – would have been possible if it had not been preceded by the teacher's reputation among the students, in whose opinion, at any rate, the book's success merely confirmed what they had known for many years.

There was something strange about this early fame, stranger perhaps than the fame of Kafka in the early Twenties or of Braque and Picasso in the preceding decade, who were also unknown to what is commonly understood as the public and nevertheless exerted an extraordinary influence.

For in Heidegger's case there was nothing tangible on which his fame could have been based, nothing written, save for notes taken at his lectures which circulated among students everywhere. These lectures dealt with texts that were generally familiar; they contained no doctrine that could have been learned, reproduced, and handed on. There was hardly more than a name, but the name traveled all over Germany like the rumor of the hidden king.

It is indeed quite tempting in the space of an encyclopedia entry to take up the philosophical history of Heidegger qua teacher, and thereby engage his thinking in relation to Arendt and his other famous students whom Sheldon Wolin called "Heidegger's children" (Wolin 2001). If Heidegger is above all else a teacher then it is quite reasonable to trace the educational force of his thinking in the output of his prolific and influential students who, like Arendt, Herbert Marcuse, and Hans Jonas, were among those who attended his lectures and seminars, especially the earliest ones that produced the notes that circulated like bootlegged live performances.

Today, however, it is impossible to imagine the notes from the early lecture courses retain the aura they once emanated when they were circulated in Germany 39 years before the hidden King was dethroned from his professor's chair in Freiburg. Indeed, impossible, because *l'affaire Heidegger* continues to generate increasing infamy, most recently with the 2015 publications of Heidegger's *Schwarze Hefte*, or "black notebooks," where, from 1931 to 1970s, Heidegger kept his own private notes. Not the early traded notes, but, rather, the black notebooks is where it is claimed, today, that one encounters the lingering rumor of the hidden King, a rumor that has now morphed into the rumor of what the King has hidden behind the closed doors of his study.

Krell insists that Heidegger's black notebooks can only be read as exemplars of *unthinking* because there is almost nothing that is genuinely thought-provoking in the thousands of pages (Krell 2015). What one encounters in *Schwarze Hefte* is generated from the mood of the egomaniacal, written by a fugitive from thinking. Yet it remains a question how far removed these "private" words stand in contrast to Heidegger's "public" teaching. And this question is relevant

to those who remain students of Heidegger's published writing that now includes the notorious black notebooks alongside the revered monographs, lectures, dialogues, essays, and poems. Indeed, engaging in a conversation with him, which is to say learning with him, demands that we acknowledge the coexistence of both the famous and infamous figures, the two "Heideggers": the one figure appearing in the seminar room, who moves with his students into the clearing of thinking, and the other, remaining behind closed doors, working *sub rosa*. With the one we encounter the "Privatdozent" or "teacher" and with the other hand we encounter "Herr Rektor" or "administrator."

Today students of Heidegger who are moved by his thought-provoking writing are also familiar with the *sub rosa* Heidegger, and with the details that Gray did not include in his 1968 introduction to *What is Called Thinking?* Heidegger was elected rector of Freiburg University on April 21, 1933 (3 months after Hitler became chancellor). He became a member of the Nazi party on May 1st and remained one until 1945. And during that 12-year span Heidegger gave at least one well-known lecture course titled "Introduction to Metaphysics," where he notoriously professed "the inner truth and greatness of National Socialism." This line remained in the text when it was published in 1953, exactly 1 year after he offered his final courses in philosophy at Freiburg.

"Heidegger is above all else a teacher." From the historical distance of time and place what we learn from *l'affaire Heidegger* can be summoned up in the title of a book by Nietzsche, who was the subject of a lecture course Heidegger offered at Freiburg between 1936 and 1940 (Heidegger 1991. See Krell's introduction, "Heidegger Nietzsche Nazism."). The title of Nietzsche's book is *Human, All too Human*. Placed within existential force generated by this title, the two Heideggers are, together, absolved by the higher truth revealed in the tragedy that constitutes a human life: to be human, all too human, is to coexist as sinner and saint.

The complete title of Nietzsche's book bears a coincidental relation to the name of the city (Freiburg aka Free-city) where Heidegger lived

and taught: *Human, All too Human: A Book for Free Spirits*. The extended title suggests first and foremost the form of Nietzsche's writing: the aphorism. And with that in mind the title, along with the form it evokes, we find an important fragment in Heidegger: "the essence of truth is freedom." The fragment, from the essay, "On the Essence of Truth," ("On the Essence of Truth," *Basic Writings*, p. 123.) yields a word question that students of Heidegger are repeatedly confronted with: "*freedom?*"

In 1987, the same year that Victor Farias published *Heidegger et le Nazisme*, the English edition of Reiner Schürmann's *Heidegger: On Being and Acting* was published. Schürmann's thesis is that Heidegger must be read from the end to the beginning (i.e., studied from his last deeply musical and poetic writings and from there back to *Being and Time*). ("The Point here is that the correct understanding of his early writings is obtained only if he is read backward, from end to beginning. . . . When read backward, from the last writings to the first, Heidegger appears in a different light. Once again, his texts alone are at issue. From the viewpoint of the typology, *praxis*. . . is the only response that the actors in history give, and cannot but give, to the constellations of presencing that enclose them. . . . Heidegger then attempts to think presencing explicitly as plural. The action that responds to presencing so understood, will be diametrically opposed to the *Führerprinzip*; it would be a type of action irrationally alien to all reduction to the uniform, an action hostile to the standard. . . . Presencing then appears more Nietzschean, deprived of metaphysical principles, 'chaotico-practical' . . . anarchy." Schürmann, *Heidegger*, pp. 13–14.) A fragment from Schürmann's book directs us to expand the title of Heidegger the "teacher" as "teacher/learner". This expanded title enables us to grasp the priority of learning to Heidegger's later project, which, in effect, will enable us to trace this priority *back* to the beginning of his earliest work as a *Privatdozent*. Schürmann writes: "The hardest apprenticeship is that by which [people] learn how to hear and heed no other imperative than the relation. . . of human *logos* in its proper relation to the *Logos*."

An apprentice is a novice, a beginner, but also a beginning. As Arendt citing St. Augustine once insisted, we can begin because we are a beginning: “[the human person] is free because [they are] a beginning. . . . Because [they *are*] a beginning, [the human person] can begin; to be human and to be free are one and the same. God created [humanity] in order to introduce into the world the faculty of beginning: freedom” (Arendt 1977). In this sense, an apprentice in the Heideggerian sense is not only a beginner in being a novice but also beginning in being the appearance of freedom in the world. Learning how to hear and heed *Logos* entails *becoming* a beginning. The learner is the realization of freedom in the world.

Learning undertaken by the apprentice of *Logos* involves a *techne* (τεχνη) that is no mere technical technique (“how to”) but a *poiein* (ποιεῖν) that responds to the fundamental question “*freedom?*” *Poein* (ποιεῖν) hears the question of freedom as the question of Being and responds by making meaning. In turn, the hardest apprenticeship is learning how to listen to human *logos* in relation to *Logos*, and thereby receiving the call (inspiration) to make or compose a meaningful contribution to the world, which is to say, a work of art that gathers others into the clearing, or region of peace. Learning to listen is thus the process of learning the *techne* that most properly attains to human being: dwelling. “The word for peace, *Friede*, means the free, *das Freie*. . . . To dwell, to be set at peace, means to remain at peace within the free.” (“Building Dwelling Thinking,” *Basic Writings*, p. 351 Heidegger). In sum, responding to the call of *Logos*, to the question of freedom, entails undertaking the work that brings about peace.

“Heidegger *is* above all else a teacher” – and as one who pursued the evasive dynamic of thinking, he remains *before* and *beyond* all others a learner. With regard to Heidegger in the context of learning, what should interest us is what remains *before* and *beyond* the *personas* (the masks placed upon him by himself and by others, including his students past, present, and those who will come later). To hear Heidegger the teacher is to listen-with Heidegger the learner, which is to listen *not* to Heidegger *per se* but to *Logos*. When we do

this, the student recognizes what remains *before* the figures of “Heidegger,” behind these masks, is the shared breath, the human spirit, the Soul, which is ultimately exhaled through and moves *beyond* those masks. Thus what remains always *before* and *beyond* is the inspiration (the breath inspired, spirit) from *Logos*, received through the fundamental question “*freedom?*” and carried out in response to the instruction to “make something meaningful,” “make a world of meaning,” “make a meaningful world”: make, build, something lasting; something beautiful; something that will sublimate mortality; and something worthy of remembering, of repairing, and renewing.

In order to receive *Logos*, and thus to be inspired by the Word, the mask of “Heidegger” must give way to the call that precedes from the Spirit that is heard as the *antepersona* of Herr Recktor. Learning proceeds via listening, because human *logos* (saying) is preceded by *Logos* (universal calling) (Stauffer 2015). For the later Heidegger, the one a student must begin with, removing the mask of power proved to be the most difficult challenge within “the hardest apprenticeship.” As Krell puts it, the fundamental questions pursued by Heidegger “What calls on us to think? . . . give *us* pause. Here we must assert less, listen more.” (“Editor’s Introduction to *What is Calls for Thinking?*,” *Basic Writings*, p. 366 Krell). For his part, Heidegger recognized the struggle with the mask of power in his final lectures, announcing from the onset that the fundamental task of the teacher is to be a learner, and within the context of a learning community, the *first* learner:

The teacher is ahead of his apprentices in this alone, that he has still far more to learn than they – he has to learn to let them learn. The teacher must be capable of being more teachable than the apprentices. The teacher is far less assured of his ground than those who learn are of theirs. If the relation between teacher and taught is genuine, therefore, there is never a place in it for the authority of the know-it-all or the authoritative sway of the official. It is still an exalted matter, then, to become a teacher – which is something else entirely than becoming a famous professor (*WCT*, 15).

The move from assertion to listening involves a resolution to relinquish willing, or to will

non-willing, what Heidegger following the medieval mystic theologian Meister Eckhart calls *Gelassenheit* (releasement). Releasement of the will is a suspension of the will-to-power, that desire to impose or place upon oneself, others, and the world a *singulare tantum*, a single world-view or system of belief (dogma). *Gelassenheit*, the releasement of the will, places one into learning via unlearning, into the uncertainty that is confronted beyond dogma and the will-to-power: "when we learn to think. . . we must allow ourselves to become involved in questions that seek what no inventiveness can find.... [We] can learn only if we always unlearn at the same time.... we can learn thinking only if we radically unlearn what thinking has been traditionally" (*WCT*, 8).

"Heidegger is above all else a teacher" – *before* and *beyond* teaching is learning, which entails heeding call to think that is put underway by *Logos* with the thought-provoking question: "*freedom?*"

On the first day of his last course at Freiburg, Heidegger begins by telling his students that "we must be ready to learn thinking." And then he adds, "As soon as we allow ourselves to become involved in such learning, we have admitted that we are not yet capable of thinking." First and foremost, then, the task at hand is to learn how to *hear* the fundamental question placed before us: "*freedom?*" The hardest apprenticeship is the one that places us in the tutorial of listening.

In that same first lecture Heidegger informs his students that there is one exemplar in the history of philosophy: Socrates. He was "the purest thinker of the West," because he was a learner and not a professor, i.e., not one who professed to have knowledge. Socrates stood in the draft, which is to say, he remained unmasked, an oral thinker (as opposed to an orator) who remained steadfast in the dynamic flux of dialogue:

All through his life and right into his death, Socrates did nothing else than place himself into this draft, this current, and maintain himself in it. This is why he is the purest thinker of the West. This is why he wrote nothing. . . (*WCT*, 17)

Socrates asked questions, and he listened, and then asked more questions, and listened again.

The dialogic repetition pointed toward thinking, and away from knowing. In leading this process, Socrates demonstrated the strength required of the one who is an apprentice of *Logos*. Heidegger's "most thought-provoking is that we are not yet thinking," which he repeats mantra-like throughout the session of his last course, is a version of Socrates' "all that I know is that I know nothing at all." Both are the aphorisms of the teacher who is first and foremost a learner.

Philosophy offers its own form of education, and with Heidegger we can identify a pedagogy of philosophy that offers us a tutorial in "the essence of truth. . . freedom." In this sense to be a student of philosophy is to undertake the hardest apprenticeship, which demands remaining in the draft, in the dynamic flow of *Logos*, and thereby moved by the Word, and thereby constantly renewed by the existential study of the question, "*freedom?*" The student of philosophy (*Logos*) is put "underway to learn thinking" (*WCT*, 25), but this by no means suggest that they are being instructed in "good" or "correct" "reasoning." The aspiration of ethics, as a practical science, is in contrast to the radical uncertainty of existential freedom a "refuge" for people "from any draft too strong for them." On the contrary, the hardest apprenticeship for "those who practice the craft of thinking" (*WCT*, 25) offers only the guarantee of possibility that history has not foreclosed upon the future. The future remains open so long as the student remains unmasked, *sans persona*, and that requires a relation to the present that transcends the familiar, the repetitive, and thereby disrupts behavior and motivates action. Learning is thus a relation of attentiveness to the possibility that remains in the presence of the actual.

When Heidegger speaks of the "present," he is naming what is *presencing* before and beyond what is perceived to be actual or real (as understood by a fugitive from thinking). Perception of presencing happens by way of acute attentiveness: listening. Listening is thus a unique kind of relation to the present that places the student in the position to receive the presencing of existence (Being) in the specific moment or existential situation. This is what William Blake is describing when he writes of receiving "a World in a grain

of sand, and a Heaven in a wildflower, Infinity in the palm of your hand, and Eternity in an hour.” (William Blake, “Auguries of Innocence,” (public domain)). Learning prepares the student for the reception of Being via listening. “In order to be capable of thinking, we need to learn it first. What is learning? [A person] learns when [they] disposes everything [they do] so that it answers to whatever essentials are addressed to [them] *at any given moment*. We learn to think by giving our mind to what there is to think about” (*WCT*, 4).

To perceive what remains and exceeds “the real,” and comes before what “is” and remains not-yet, the student must *learn listening*: “what we can do in our present case, or anyway can learn, is to listen closely,” which “is the common concern of student and teacher” (*WCT*, 25). We might describe the learning of listening as the *community* of learning shared by student and teacher. And here Heidegger, as teacher/learner, is borrowing from Heraclitus who said, “Listen not to me, but to *Logos*, and know that thinking is common to all.”

With the hardest apprenticeship, the student learns to listen closely, and through close listening responds to offering made in the clearing that persists in-between the chronological order (*chronos*). *Logos* heard through the opening or break in time is named *kairos*. And those who practice the craft of thinking through the art of listening experience a transcendence from the chronological into the kairological, which is described by Heidegger, following Kierkegaard, as the leap. “There is no bridge here – only the leap. . . .” The leap named here is the final emancipatory releasement (*gelassenheit*) into the place where thinking resides: the clearing or the place where dynamic flow or draft of *Logos* is moving: “By way of this series of lectures, we are attempting to learn thinking. The way is long... to reach the point where only the leap will help further. The leap alone takes us into the neighborhood where thinking resides” (*WCT*, 12).

“Heidegger *is* above all else a teacher” – we must insist on using the present tense for the obvious reason that those who read Heidegger, which is to say study and thereby continue to learn from Heidegger, are drawn into the draft of his thinking, into the existential and ontological

dimension where Heidegger’s teaching exists in a *dynamic present* that defies the boundaries of the chronological, and the historical. For Heidegger, learning is occurring when we attend to what calls on us to think, and when we attend to what is compelling us to take up the essence of truth, which, for Heidegger, is freedom. Most forcefully, this call arrives from art, which is both the result of and the inspiration for the actualization of freedom. And this is why Socrates, whom Heidegger called “the purest thinker” and who remains the exemplary teacher, was inspired to undertake philosophy by the call he received from a dream-figure who repeatedly instructed him “to make music, and work at it” (*Phaedo*, 61b).

With the figure of Socrates as the exemplar, it may be the case that what is demanded for learning, for taking up the hardest apprenticeship, is first and foremost a listening that opens the student to the philosophical imaginary where dream-figures and muses appear. Perhaps this kind of listening will enable the student to not only hear the call of *Logos* but to hear also in this call the address of *Mythos*? This may be what Heidegger is indicating when he speaks of the transcendence into the kairological that happens by way of a leap. For it is by way of the imagination and dreaming that thinking perceives possibility, the sudden burst of the future, in the present. Heidegger tells his last group of Freiburg students: “The *mythos* is that appeal of foremost and radical concern to all human being which makes [humanity] think of what appears, what is in being. *Logos* says the same. . . .” (*WCT*, 10). The leap is thus a releasement or letting go of the fear and anxiety of the unknown and unknowable that drives thinking into exile. The leap into the realm of imagination and dreams, and thus the transcendence beyond what is falsely designated as “actual” or “real,” is, of course, part of the allegorical tradition of philosophical learning that was initiated by Parmenides: “the early Greek thinking (Parmenides, fragment 8) are precisely the ones to use *mythos* and *logos* in the same sense” (*WCT*, 10). If, at the end of his teaching career, Heidegger was describing that learning as the transcendent leap via listening takes the student into the region where *Mythos* and *Logos* remain together, then he

was at the moment returning to one of his earliest pronouncements, which, before the publication of his famous *Being and Time*, he declared that the encounter with and of thinking will always require run ahead to the past: “*It is Dasein’s running ahead to its past, to an extreme possibility of itself that stands before it in certain and utter indeterminacy. Dasein as human life is primarily being possible, the Being of the possibility of its certain yet indeterminate past*” (Heidegger 1992). to the past and through such running build up the momentum to take the necessary transcendent leap into the realm where things are different because they are disclosed via dreams, and different things are possible and made real through art:

“...the leap takes us abruptly to where everything is different, so different that it strikes us a strange... Though we may not founder in such a leap, what the leap takes us to will confound us....we must be ready and willing to listen. Such readiness allows us to surmount the boundaries in which all customary views are confined, and to reach a more open territory” (WCT, 12–13).

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Heidegger and Mood

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Mood as an Educational Issue

It is not uncommon to hear teachers talk about the moods of their classrooms. A morning art class might have an “exciting” or “adventurous” mood, while the very same class in the afternoon might seem “dead” or “flat.” Teachers use a variety of synonyms for such moods. When they walk into a classroom, they immediately and intuitively gage the “temperature of a room” or they pick up on the “vibe” of a class. These highly complex and poetic words indicate something is in the air, something that one cannot quite figure out yet nevertheless has a real presence. In fact, such moods are a constant topic of discussion. Are they caused by particular students, by the time of day, by the weather? The more one analyzes possible points of origin, the more mysterious and nebulous such moods become. And the implications are indeed serious. Adventurous or dead moods shape what is taught and how it is taught. The teacher, perhaps more than anyone else, understands that mood plays a role in how we relate not only to others but also to knowledge.

In this brief entry, I will assert that noted phenomenologist Martin Heidegger offers an important starting point for thinking through a philosophy of mood. By outlining Heidegger’s basic understanding of mood, I will hope to clarify three issues raised in my introduction: that moods seem to lack specific and identifiable causes, that they appear beyond our immediate and willful control, and that they disclose certain forms of knowing, relating, and being.

A Phenomenology of Mood

One of the most fascinating and controversial aspects of Heidegger’s analysis of *Dasein* in *Being and Time* is his description of mood

(*Stimmung*). Rather than an internal state, Heidegger argues that mood is a constitutive aspect of *Dasein's* being in the world. Heidegger uses the concept of *Dasein* (a compound composed of “*da*” there and “*sein*” being) to describe human beings in order to escape certain traps in the history of philosophy that attempt to define the human as a self-sufficient substance such as a soul. Instead of reifying the being of human beings into such a substance, Heidegger grounds our *special* kind of being in a “there.” Stated differently, *Dasein* is its situation. Because *Dasein* is the “there” of its situation, there is no fundamental gap separating the self from the world. Indeed, dichotomies between internal and external cease to make *sense* from a Heideggerian point of view. As such, *Dasein* is fully immersed in a world of relations, roles, practices, and equipment; it is its being in the world. Famously, Heidegger writes, “*Dasein* is its world existingly” (II.4, 364). Chapter 5 of the first division of Heidegger’s masterpiece *Being and Time* is an attempt to understand the structure of the “there” in *Dasein's* being there. This peculiar sense of thereness is comprised of three interrelated and equi-primordial dimensions: understanding, discourse, and mood. These dimensions or structural facets are equi-primordial in the sense that they are all equally primary and none of them can be explained without reference to the others. Due to limitations of space, I will not be able to discuss understanding and discourse; thus, my presentation below is somewhat artificial, cleaving mood off from a greater whole of which it is merely one facet.

Mood is part of an interdependent totality of characteristics that constitute *Dasein's* being in the world (its being there). The German word for mood, *Stimmung*, also means the tuning of a musical instrument. In English, we can play a bit with the word “tuning” in the sense that mood *attunes* us to what is meaningful in our lives. Stated differently, a mood *tunes us into* what is relevant. The there of *Dasein* is only a there (as a particular place wherein something meaningful can arise) because of mood. There are three important points to make about the nature and function of mood in relation to *Dasein's* being there.

To begin, because mood is ontologically primary to *Dasein*, we are always already in a mood. There is no stepping outside of a mood. *Dasein* is moody as such. Mood has a kind of atmospheric quality that is neither inside us as a private emotional state nor is it outside us as an objective substance which we can objectively observe. Whereas individuals might be able to move from one mood to another, there is no being outside of any mood. In short, there is no transcendental perspective that is divorced from a mood. *Dasein* finds itself in a mood. In this sense, there is some phenomenological truth in the common, everyday phrase “so-and-so is in a mood.” The “in” here is not spatial so much as existential, indicating that *Dasein* is always already worldly, wrapped up with and attuned to its situation.

Second, if we did not have an ontological capacity for being in a mood, then *Dasein* would not find anything familiar, relevant, or important to care about. For Heidegger, mood is a “disclosive submission to the world, out of which we can encounter something that matters to us” (1.5, 138, p. 177). A mood makes possible the ability to orient one’s self toward something, therefore producing the precondition for meaning. To be in a mood is to find one’s self in a clearing where the mood lights up certain things, people, roles, and features of the situation that can become relevant. For instance, if I am in a depressed mood, then certain possibilities will not light up for me, the world will appear dim and lifeless, and nothing will solicit my attention. That which might have seemed important one day, now appears irrelevant. The equipment that once called out to be used goes silent, and the relationships with others that once motivated me now appear insignificant, strange, or uncanny. If I am in a mood of love, then new relationships and forms of intimacy open up as real possibilities, and all my efforts become directed toward a focal practice of courtship. When in love, the there of *Dasein* is charged with electric tensions, gestures become infused with heightened meaning, and life as such blooms with a new sense of beauty. In both cases, to be in a mood means that the world is suddenly unlocked as a place of significance (or lack thereof). Even seemingly detached

and “objective” points of view (as in the empirical sciences) have, at their base, some kind of mood that situates them in a world (the scientific world or any other world for that matter). Without a mood, nothing of relevance could disclose itself to us, even in a science laboratory.

Third, and this follows from the second point, mood is not under our subjective control. Moods “assail us.” They seem to come from the outside and wash over us. Thus one cannot voluntarily enter into a specific mood, nor can one necessarily use one’s will to escape from a mood that one has entered into. As such, mood poses interesting questions to behavioral psychology, not to mention political theories of agency. On this reading, Heidegger emphasizes *Dasein*’s fundamental passivity. We receive moods, we find ourselves in them, and as such, there is something in our fundamental experience of the world that is *beyond our control*. Take, for instance, both depression and love. One cannot simply talk one’s self out of being depressed, nor can one talk one’s self into being in love. Depression and love *happen*; we find ourselves in these moods. And we should put full weight on the notion that we “find ourselves” in and through a mood. The self does not exist outside of the mood; *it is its moody situation*. Thus, the mood of depression or love is inseparable from who we are at the time and how the world is (how it appears). What is so infuriating about both of these moods is that they seem to arrive at the most inopportune of times and do not respond to our willful attempts to direct or control them.

In division one of *Being and Time*, Heidegger singles out anxiety (*Angst*) as an important mood. Anxiety is important because of the unique way it discloses *Dasein*’s being there (being in the world as a whole). Unlike fear having a definite cause (let’s say a bear in the woods), anxiety is rather diffuse and seems to lack a clear cause, which one can point out. Because there is no apparent cause, there is also very little that someone can do to ameliorate the overwhelming sensation of anxiety. In this sense, anxiety does not present *Dasein* with any action. Although *Dasein* is normally found coping and dealing with the world that it is in, anxiety presents an uneasy experience of being *in* the world but not *of* it. The focal practices

that orient us are suspended, the equipment that affords us action is inoperative, and the relationships which give our lives meaning seem inconsequential.

Usually, the world is taken for granted and is thus part of our background practices, roles, and experiences. It is so close to us that we pay it no mind. But when the rich significance of the world that invisibly props up our daily activities collapses, we feel paralyzed. The brilliance of Heidegger’s phenomenological method does not see this paralysis as mere nihilism. Indeed, it is only when the call of the world falls silent that something significant about the world is disclosed to *Dasein*. When the world loses its significance, all we are left with is the bare *structure* of that world (the worldhood of the world). Heidegger summarizes: “the *world as world* is disclosed first and foremost by anxiety” (232/187). When the world breaks down, then *Dasein* realizes the fundamental structure that makes a world possible. Lack of a world reorients *Dasein* to the basic fact that it is worldly.

Implications for Educational Research

Having summarized Heidegger’s basic phenomenology of mood, I would now like to turn to why this feature of *Dasein* is so important to educational philosophy and research. First, as Lauren Freeman (2014) argues, Heidegger’s phenomenology of mood is an important resource for addressing certain oversights, contradictions, and misunderstandings found in the psychology of emotions. Central to Freeman’s analysis is the fact that moods are not mere mental states but are rather the worldly preconditions for mental states (including emotions, feelings, beliefs, and so forth). Stated differently, moods are more basic than cognitive and/or emotional states. Indeed, private states of mind are derivative of a more general (public) mood. Yet in psychology, the worldly dimension of mood is often ignored or confused with private, subjective, and internal emotions. And because the starting point of psychology presupposes an internal and an external, it misses *Dasein*’s fundamental connectedness

with and responsiveness to the world. Further, psychology assumes that moods can be atomized and decontextualized. In this way, empirical studies of “mood” fail to recognize how moods are directly connected to being there in a place and are holistically connected with the other facets of one’s sense of self. Freeman concludes with suggestions for how psychology can clarify and complexify its understanding of mood as different from emotion.

Given the dominance of psychology in educational research, I would argue that Freeman’s critique is particularly pressing. Drawing on Freeman’s work, I would suggest that educational psychology (and certain branches of educational philosophy that draw heavily on psychological research) pays attention to the following questions: How are mood, emotion, feelings, and desires related to yet distinct from each other? What are the starting assumptions behind mood research, and how do these assumptions reveal and conceal certain features of mood? Do psychological experiments accurately ground mood in context and personal meaning? Does the experiment pay close enough attention to what it feels like from the first person perspective to be in a mood? Such questions interrupt the hegemonic dominance of psychology in educational research by returning us to the importance of phenomenological and ontological concerns.

Second, as I have explored with my coauthor Justin Garcia (2014), there are certain dangers in grounding teacher education in skill development and belief clarification. Both of these approaches miss how teaching is first and foremost contextual, embodied, and richly meaningful as a focal practice. Instead of beginning with clarifying what preservice teachers believe to be good teaching and with rudimentary skill building/knowledge acquisition (such as how to write a lesson plan or the proper way to handle disciplinary problems in a classroom), we suggest helping orient students toward teaching as a meaningful practice – as a worldly practice. To do so, we suggest students should observe classrooms not for learning about how to be a good teacher but rather to experience classrooms as worlds composed of interrelated subjects, pieces of

equipment, practices, and moods. Garcia and I call for a phenomenological form of preservice teacher education that helps students *get into the mood* of classroom life through poetic writing and journaling that captures what it feels like to be in a classroom. Such writing does not merely describe the mood of a classroom as if mood were an objective thing. Rather it would be moody writing, and through such moodiness, open up the fundamental questions of teaching. It is only against a background of meaningful attunement to teaching as a way of being in the world that skill development and belief clarification can have any meaning or relevance beyond pure instrumentalism.

A third aspect of mood that is worthy of note for educational philosophers concerns the ways in which different moods might offer up different educational opportunities for students. As stated above, moods are world disclosing. New facets of the world can be revealed through changes in mood. On this view, knowledge of the world is never neutral, detached, and omniscient but rather refracted through various moods. This means that moods such as wonder, melancholy, anxiety, boredom, and love (just to name a few) might grant students multiple ways of experiencing and apprehending the world. Certain moods might be more conducive to certain kinds of activities, thinking, and teaching than others. Recognizing the moodiness of a classroom becomes a unique opportunity for teachers to reflect on what kinds of learning, studying, dialoguing, and practicing become real possibilities that *Dasein* can plunge into. Drawing on Heidegger’s evocative phenomenology of boredom, Jan-Erik Mansikka (2009) describes the educational relevance of this mood. Boredom can lead students from learning that is not meaningful to learning that leaves them empty to a profound experience of undetermined existential potentialities that manifest themselves when students stop learning and wait.

But remember, moods do not have clear causes; they assail us and therefore might very well be beyond an individual will or intentional act of control. As such, the moodiness of a classroom is a particularly pressing issue for teachers. Let us assume that a particular classroom has a

“lousy” mood or a “disengaged” mood. It would be incorrect to attribute such a mood to any given student, activity, or piece of equipment as moods do not have direct, assignable causes. Attributing a “bad” mood to a particular student (or group of students), for instance, would miss how moods operate as worldly, atmospheric conditions that defy clear and easy subject/object, inside/outside dichotomies.

Yet is a teacher thus powerless over the mood of a classroom? Interestingly, Heidegger observes that great orators are great because of their understanding of mood. Audiences have a particular type of public mood that washes over them (think of public sporting events today). “It is into such as a mood,” writes Heidegger, “and out of such a mood that the orator speaks. He must understand the possibilities of moods in order to rouse them and guide them aright” (Heidegger 2008, p. 178). To understand the possibilities of moods means that the orator is himself/herself within the mood, effected by the mood, and thus moved by the mood. We can never be outside of the mood and as such have limited control and autonomy. And this goes for teachers as well as orators. By understanding mood, teachers dwell in the mood of the classroom in order to sense the mood’s educational possibilities. In this way, they might be able to rouse and guide students in and through moody variations. But first and foremost, the teacher must be open and receptive to the mood (whatever it is) in order to modify it from within through certain gestures, practices, and so forth. This is a line of philosophical inquiry and research that has not yet been adequately addressed within radical, progressive, or conservative forms of pedagogy, all of which often see the teacher as a heroic figure who can transform a classroom through his or her will.

In sum, I hope to have provided a tentative outline of mood as it is presented in Heidegger’s early masterwork *Being and Time*. I have also charted three ways in which mood is helpful for educational research and educational philosophy. First, a phenomenology of mood helps correct certain misconceptions of mood in the dominant psychology of emotions. Second, mood should become a main concern for teacher educators

who are concerned with how students enter into the world of teaching. And third, mood is a pedagogical issue in that different moods can unlock different educational experiences and insights into the world. What all three of these lines of inquiry share in common is a concerted effort to return not simply to Heidegger to answer pressing educational questions but rather to return to phenomenology as a method for addressing questions that other dominant discourses such as analytic philosophy or psychology miss.

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Heidegger and Schooling

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Synonyms

[K–12 public education system](#)

Introduction

Any attempt to associate Heidegger’s work with schooling, that is, a K–12 public education system, or an attempt to draw on Heidegger’s work for gaining insights or ideas about schooling faces serious challenges. Admittedly, educational

matters and the concept of “education” itself are not missing from his philosophy; for example, in several places he discusses “teaching” and in different cases he presents his view on higher education. However, Heidegger does not link his philosophy directly or explicitly to children in schools nor does he offer any program for K–12 public education or any structured theory of development that might be applied for K–12 students. While he sees the university as “the pinnacle of our educational system” (2002a/1945, p. 30) and designates to it a role in his philosophical project, he virtually ignores schooling as a system that might have relevance for his philosophical ideas. But Heidegger’s own disregard of the pre-higher education system does not mean that his philosophy is not useful for schooling; insights from Heidegger’s work are inspiring both in characterizing the current situation of education and in suggesting specific courses of action. In reflecting upon the relevance of Heidegger’s work in relation to schooling, this entry avoids the temptation to suggest an Heideggerian education in which “Dasein” is simply replaced by “student.”

Between the University and Schooling

Heidegger’s critique of the dominance of metaphysics as the foundation for Western thought and for the way we see the world and ourselves leads him to challenge the traditional place of the human being as a subject, from a status of active ownership to a role of subordinate listener: “the authentic attitude of thinking is not a putting of questions – rather, it is a listening to the grant, the promise of what is to be put in question” (1982b/1959, p. 71). Heidegger conveys this reduced or lower status of the human being by animating concepts such as Being, world (“world worlds”), language (“language speaks”), time (“time times”), and space (“space spaces”). For Heidegger, one crucial implication of this shift in human’s status for education is a change in meaning of truth from correspondence to unconcealing:

This same interpretation of being as *ιδέα* [*idea*], which owes its primacy to a change in the essence of *ἀλήθεια* [*aletheia*], requires that viewing the

ideas be accorded high distinction. Corresponding to this distinction is *παιδεία* [*paideia*], the “education” of human beings. Concern with human being and with the position of humans amidst beings entirely dominates metaphysics. (Plato’s Doctrine of Truth, in *Pathmarks*, 1998/1967, p. 181)

The prevailing subject-object dichotomy results in education that is based on objectifying content and transferring it from those who hold it to those who are perceived as needing or seeking it. The metaphysical perception of truth equates between “idea” and “state of affairs” and leads to a “reduction of education by the logic of contract to the status of commodity to be exchanged for consideration according to the law of equivalence” (2002a, p. 40). Heidegger uses Husserl’s notion of “intentionality” in order to explain truth as world disclosure. He argues that “[w]ithout radically rethinking intentionality, the university’s attempts to lay claim to its much vaunted neutrality, to evade being the organ of the nation-state and of the market, is quite futile” (ibid., pp. 42–43). Heidegger understood that as a result, being under social, economic, and political stresses, the university is deprived of an independent intellectual freedom and becomes a tool in the service of powerful self-interested forces:

the university finds itself under a categorical imperative to advance the understanding of intentionality before all other service to society, whether in the interest of church, state, or civil society. . . . eschews the rational imperative of relevance in all the forms that fitness for purpose may take, such as utility and expediency, on the one hand, or conformity to convention and custom, on the other. . . . [the university] cannot be an instrument of social engineering or, more generally, simply a *means* to an end, without ceasing to *educate*. (ibid., p. 30–1)

Heidegger is concerned about a situation in which the university loses its identity and explicitly warns against “subversion of identities, of crossing the line between education and politics, university and state; of exceeding the limit beyond which philosophy becomes ideology [*Weltanschauung*] and teaching turns into propaganda” (ibid., p. 28). Since the time of Heidegger’s warning against instrumental usage of the university, the literature tends to attribute crisis and other catastrophic terms mostly to higher education, as

the university attracts a lot of attention among scholars who are worried about the institution's loss of identity as a result of over-vocationalization and a decrease in the prestige of undergraduate studies stemming from market forces. However, as a result of instrumentalism, public K–12 schooling is just as much in a state of emergency and requires appropriate measures in order to protect it. Moreover, as higher education is fed by the K–12 system, it might be that in some sense the higher education crisis originates from the perception of parents and students at the pre-university level and that at least some of the problems of higher education – especially those in the humanities – can be addressed by changing attitudes toward public K–12 schools. We should remember that unlike higher education, schooling is an obligatory system and as such it reaches all parts of the society, including those that choose not to attend or are excluded from the university – populations that at least in some sense are more vulnerable to being influenced by the social forces that Heidegger warns against. With regard to higher education, Heidegger sought to promote agency for the university in order to shield it from external powers:

the defining trait of the university lies in its *self-assertion* [*Selbstbehauptung*] from the social powers that are bent upon bringing it to heel, insofar as they are ultimately threatened by the institutionalizing of the practice of interpreting intentionality and transcendence in a free and unfettered way. (ibid., p. 31)

The same social forces that are concerned about “a free and unfettered” university are also – if not more – worried about independent or autonomous schooling that will define for itself its goals and strategies. Thus, when Heidegger's vision of self-assertion is coupled with K–12 public education, the result is schooling that has its own agency in such a manner that it could identify and protect itself from attempts to serve the needs of powerful social forces.

Building on Nietzsche's notion of will-to-power, Heidegger argues that our contemporary late-modern way of being – that is, the way we perceive beings and our world – is a *technological* one, not in the sense of technological devices

(although this is one consequence) but in the sense of calculative thinking, that is, considering everything, including ourselves, as “standing-reserve” [*Bestand*] (*The Question Concerning Technology*, 1977/1955), resources to be mastered and optimized. This technological tendency, which Heidegger called enframing (*Gestell*), is the dominant way of thinking, and it is demonstrated everywhere, in scientific and nonscientific domains, from medicine through transportation to education. The same technological tendency to control and to optimize also guides the social forces that seek to influence education. Since this way of thinking is aggressive as it precludes other ways of thinking, Heidegger argues that “we must, of course, first rid ourselves of the calculative frame of mind” (1982b, p. 104).

There are already increasing voices within the critical schooling literature that acknowledge and criticize the operation of public education as a machinelike system that operates upon students as inputs in order to convert them to required outputs and voices that challenge approaches of “what works” in schooling as well as in educational research. As education is entangled in enframing, and as this way of being serves the human being's tendency to control its environment as well as its fellow human beings, education becomes a key agent in glorifying, praising, celebrating, and promoting humankind's ego – secondary perhaps only to science. Instead of playing this endorsing role, Heidegger's alternative and radical philosophy is inspiring as it enables us to think about schooling that is not dictated by political or economic desires, counterintuitive as such a situation might seem.

As an alternative for a transactional conception of education, and based on his ontological inquiry, Heidegger calls us to found education on guiding students toward awareness, attention, and response to the existential call; instead of the temptation and the urge to relay content, education should be a buffer or a barrier between the student and instrumental demands:

If the pose of teacherly omniscience and the authority that this pose articulates are disincentives to learn, then the question of education is the question not of how to transmit knowledge but of how to suspend it. The concrete teacher is one who

temporarily stages the scene of resourcelessness. Education is not a passing on of knowledge and skills either in the medieval paradigm of master/apprentice or in the modern of seller/consumer. Rather call it a withholding, a delaying of articulation, in order that the student may attain an answer. . . . The teacher's silence is finally what has to be heard. (2002a, p. 41)

Here, too, the critical schooling literature is not left behind and makes a case for a governing principle of suspension rather than the efficient transmission of knowledge in schools.

Language and Educational Experiences

For Heidegger, language is a central "instance" of Being and of Dasein: "The being of anything that is resides in the word. Therefore this statement holds true: Language is the house of Being" (1982b, p. 63). There is direct linkage between the call to which the human being listens and language: "man by virtue of his language dwells within the claim and call of Being" (1982a/1959, p. 5). In language – and reflecting on language – we find a linkage to Being and as such to ourselves, a linkage formulated by the "guide-word": "The being of language: The language of being" (1982b, p. 72). Similarly to other notions, in Heidegger's philosophy language gains life, or personality, a status or power over the human being, and as such the relationships between the human being and language are changed, if not inverted: "What we speak of, language, is always ahead of us. Our speaking merely follows language constantly" (ibid., p. 75). Instead of an objectified perception of language as a communication instrument – one which also serves us in schools to transfer content – Heidegger inquires about "undergoing an experience with language" through which:

something befalls us, strikes us, comes over us, overwhelms and transforms us. When we talk of "undergoing" an experience, we mean specifically that the experience is not of our own making; to undergo here means that we endure it, suffer it, receive it as it strikes us and submit to it. It is this something itself that comes about, comes to pass, happens. (ibid., p. 57)

Thus, when experiencing language, we face a call: "the reflective use of language. . . must be guided by the hidden riches that language holds in store for us, so that these riches may summon us for the saying of language" (ibid., p. 91).

Heidegger reaches these ideas regarding language through reading and analysis of poetry. His close reading of poems (e.g., in *On the Way to Language* (1982a, b) and in *The Origin of the Work of Art* (2002b/1950)) reveals experiences with language that for him tells us something about ourselves. But reading and writing are key elements in schooling, as they – initially as basic skills and later as means for learning – are crucial for the student's studies. Therefore, perceiving language not as a communication tool but as a hint for Being that reveals, calls us, causes us something, changes us, means for schooling a shift in treating or encountering texts: from "using" to "confronting" or "facing." Writing or reading texts is not a peaceful activity but a painful one that involves a struggle: not just a struggle in creating or understanding the text itself, but moreover a struggle with what the text does to us, what the text makes us realize about ourselves, and whether we are the authors or the recipients. As writing and reading, in the broad sense of being-in-the-world, involve truth as world-disclosure, and as "[t]he unhidden must be torn away from a hiddenness; it must in a sense be stolen from hiddenness . . . Truth originally means what has been wrested from hiddenness" (1998, p. 171), so writing and reading become violent acts that are accompanied by heavy responsibility and possible far-reaching consequences.

Heidegger's inquiry into the possibility of experience with language opens the door for educational inquiry into broadening the notion of "experience" in general beyond designed or calculated circumstances that are meant to create experiences for students. When students attend schools, as well as when they refer to school assignments at home, they are placed in environments and situations that are planned to stimulate them to react in a cause-and-effect manner. As such, educational experiences are seen through a pragmatic lens by which the student is called to respond to the educator's voice, mostly as it is

drawn from the curriculum. However, a broader notion of experience that exceeds the ready-made curriculum will include any experience that students and teachers undergo – in schools and especially outside school – as a source for educational reflection. Heidegger alludes to the need to integrate students' lives within his critique of the predominance of *theoria* over *praxis*:

Instruction is thus modeled on exchange: to teach, the teacher disregards the differences and distinctions within the concrete student manifold and addresses himself to the faceless, abstract student that is his counterpart. Likewise, to learn, the student abandons the idiosyncratic expressions of his life for a generic way of thinking that raises him to the level of the teacher. (2002a, p. 40–1)

In addition, Heidegger's goal of initiation of a "living philosophizing" (1995/1983, p. 57) within his students, and his (2002b) descriptions of the Greek temple as well as van Gogh's paintings, supports an educational view that allows a central role for unsolicited experiences that are not based on a body of knowledge and are not tested in advance. An implication for schooling is an establishment of a parallel mechanism for creating educational opportunities, derived from students' – and teachers' – own lives, alongside the curriculum. This means that schooling becomes less predictable and more surprising. Such an approach probably necessitates reducing the volume of curriculum in schooling in order to make room for students' and teachers' experiences as they bring them into the classroom. It is the educators' task to decide which and how aspects of students' lives are relevant for schooling, but it seems that students' own interests, their relationships with family and friends, and their encounters with culture – "high" culture as well as popular – are a fertile ground for alternative educational experiences.

Preparing for a Failure

One way in which Heidegger conducts his phenomenological inquiry is bringing forth situations when the flow of being-in-the-world is interrupted and our unreflected immersion within our

environment becomes apparent. In *Being and Time* (2010/1927), this phenomenon is illustrated by showing how our awareness of the hammer's "handiness" (p. 69) emerges as a result of an absence of malfunction of the hammer. This technique of discovery out of deficiency is also demonstrated in Heidegger's investigation into the nature of language. Heidegger identifies situations of missing words, and for him these cases reveal something about language's treatment of us:

But when does language speak itself as language? Curiously enough, when we cannot find the right word for something that concerns us, carries us away, oppresses or encourages us... undergo moments in which language itself has distantly and fleetingly touched us with its essential being (1982b, p. 59)

In its extreme form, Heidegger's attention to deficiency is manifested, of course, in his analysis of Dasein's mortality. His critique of the metaphysical subject-object divide leads him to connecting following "the way of education" and our finitude:

the way of education ineluctably returns us from the soaring heights of theory to the lowly gutter of our finitude. The way of education constitutes the passage into thought, but not a lifeless conduit connecting us as subject to an object by way of representation. No, where it leads only discloses itself as we venture onto it with the weight of our entire being. (2002a, p. 32)

Heidegger's positive attitude toward what does not work in our lives and his ontological inquiry into deficiency is in striking contradiction to the dominant tendencies in educational planning and in educational policy to base education according to cause-and-effect logic and "what works." Thus, Heidegger's attention to breakdowns together with his association between our finitude and education points to the possibility of schooling that instead of focusing mostly on preparing students toward achievements and the purchasing of future identities also significantly addresses the possibility of failures and disappointments in students' lives. "Failure" here does not mean our demise, that is, our biological finitude, but rather a collapse of one's world, whether in a personal context when one's project fails or in a broader context with regard to one's social belonging.

Current education rarely ever refers to failure outside the educational context, that is, beyond referring to students' achievements in school in relation to expected results. The fact that life outside school (physically) and life after school (postgraduation) are full of failures, and as such failure is part of the human "story" and a repeated experience, is almost totally overlooked.

Conclusion

Heidegger can be regarded as a forerunner of the contemporary situation of institutionalized education in general and of today's schooling in particular. As problematic phenomena identified in research can be explained through Heidegger's analysis and terminology, it seems that the greatest potential of his work for schooling is in identifying and characterizing ills, weaknesses, and threats. Therefore, should educators and policy makers (who, unfortunately, are not necessarily the same people) consider Heidegger's insights or ideas drawn from them, they still face the task of designing alternatives as responses to the dangers Heidegger identified and highlighted.

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Heidegger and Wonder

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Introduction

Heidegger's analysis on wonder is comprised of detaching wonder from its commonly assumed connotations and associating it with seemingly unconventional ones. As such, Heidegger parts ways with the customary interpretations of wonder as being synonymous with curiosity. He reflects on and "de-structures" the history of wonder as the origin of philosophy in the West by affiliating it with ideas like need, necessity, distress, lack, creative suffering, an engagement with the known and the usual, and, finally, with his theories on truth and being. Such connections and abstractions provide the conceptual vista for Heidegger to establish what he calls a "retrospective sketch" of wonder (1994, p. 148).

Heidegger substantially deliberates on wonder in one of his works in particular, a lecture in a series of lectures given in Freiburg from 1937 to 1938 entitled "The Need and the Necessity of the First Beginning and the Need and the Necessity of an Other Way to Question and to Begin" (1994, pp. 131–164). One of the central ideas he builds his study on is Plato's *Theaetetus* (2004). This is an oft-quoted classical reference for wonder in the West, in which Socrates glorifies *thaumazein* – wonder – as being the origin and beginning of philosophy. Readers of this entry will find the dialogue a helpful resource in

illustrating some dimensions of wonder that Heidegger preoccupies himself with in his work.

Wonder and the Need for Other Ways of Questioning and Beginning

Even though Heidegger devotes an entire lecture mainly to wonder, he does not immediately engage with it in his piece. He first elucidates how certain, supposedly negative, concepts that usually connote a lack or absence of thinking are in fact imperative elements for thought. Indeed, for Heidegger these concepts “arise out of surpluses or abundances” of thought provided that we are willing to tune out of the field of view of our calculating reason (1994, pp. 6, 22 & 132). The first such concept on which Heidegger builds the foundation of his sketch on wonder is the “need” of the first beginning for thinking. Heidegger’s take on need as “the ground of necessity for primordial questioning” is not related to vacuity nor perplexity; it is not a beginning for thinking waiting to be assimilated into a mode of knowledge (e.g., into a theory or a school of thought).

This need, whose essence according to Heidegger we need to have “the most profound understanding of,” arises from the distress of not knowing the way in or out (1994, p. 132). Distress for Heidegger is that between-space for thought where thinking has not yet become categorical, determined, or finalized. The distress does not guide us into another mode of knowledge, nor does it propel us to assimilate into a theory. In Heidegger’s own words, “it does not simply compel us into already determined relations to beings, ones already opened up and interpreted in their beingness” (1994, p. 134). Instead, it is an implicit self-opening – as well as a between, a mode of being, and a space that is not yet determined and controlled by any concrete theory or idea – that humans are thrown into or disposed in (1994, p. 132). This is surely not an ordinary space that existed before the experience of distress. Because the in-between is not appropriated by pre-established ideas, it is a place where beings emerge for the first time in their beingness. It causes humans to see things without being limited

to, for example, concepts immediately associated with them. That is why this not-yet-determined-by-ideas space has great potential for thought. It disposes us “into the beginning of genuine thinking and thoroughly determines it” (1994, p. 136). In doing so, it affects who we are, and it is therefore a space for the highest possibilities for human standpoints to come to light and to be created.

This between-space does not designate a space between two modes of knowledge. In essence, wonder caused by distress and need does not make you grow out of a kind of knowing, nor will it make your thoughts grow into another form of knowing. “What here permits neither an out nor an in oscillates back to itself in an extraordinary sense as this between” (1994, p. 139). It is this dwelling and turning inside one’s own knowledge, and not turning outside toward an unknown object, that Heidegger delights in when it comes to discussing his ideas of wonder. Rather, this oscillation helps a whole to surface that contains all the directions that thinking can go in, all the “whence”s and “whither”s of thought (Heidegger 1994, p. 137). The usual, existing, predefined concepts and beings that created our knowledge will look weakened with *thaumazein*, and the possibility of looking at our thoughts is brought forth and brought to light (Noroozi 2015, pp. 12–13) (See, e.g., when Socrates makes *Theaetetus* dizzy with wonder as he questions him on his knowledge of mathematics and makes him reflect of the limitations of knowledge in general, yet Socrates does not provide an escape out of this wonder and instead celebrates it as the origin of philosophy). Heidegger calls this the surfacing of an “undifferentiated” whole; “the measurelessness of the undifferentiatedness between what beings as beings are as a whole and that which presses forth as inconstant, formless and carrying away, which means here at the same time what immediately withdraws” (1994, p. 139). He regards the undifferentiatedness as a sign of abundance of thinking and not a lack thereof, acknowledging that this mode of undifferentiated “between” is very difficult to create; nonetheless, it is a gift for thought, one whose importance society has unremembered and one whose loss is to be grieved (1994, p. 133).

Wonder as enmeshed in distress and the need of an undifferentiated *between* is in sharp contrast with theories that deem wonder as a prelude to more certain knowledge. Correspondingly, it is antithetical to what can be called an analytic look at wonder: one that legitimizes the presence of wonder as a *beginning* epistemic activity provided that it eventually becomes “wedded to a concern for truth” or absorbed to knowledge and one that is necessary so far as it “gets the ‘real’ inquiry going” (Kingwell 2000, p. 88). Wonder in this light can be regarded as what Francis Bacon calls a broken knowledge (1895, p. 270), with its sustenance being ultimately preclusive to real knowing.

Wonder and Its Conceptual Affiliates

Once we are familiarized with Heidegger’s preference for associating concepts like distress and need to structure a discussion on wonder, it becomes easier to imagine that for him, common representations of wonder – associating it with concepts like curiosity and awe – are insufficient and objectionable.

Indeed, that wonder, as having been described as the beginning of philosophy by Socrates, which is interpreted as something close to curiosity is for Heidegger a “weak and pitiful determination of origin” (1994, p. 135). For Heidegger, curiosity is a thief of wonder or, at best, a degenerated form of it (Stone 2006, p. 207). In his work *Being and Time*, Heidegger completely refuses to see curiosity as identical with wonder. Curiosity is in search for novelty and unknown and has at least three constitutive elements that make it different from wonder: “a specific *not-staying* with what is nearest,” “distraction by new possibilities,” and “*never dwelling anywhere*” (2010, p. 161 emphasis in original). For Heidegger, Western philosophy did not originate in curiosity but in a need for another way of questioning. The primordial beginning of thinking was created out of a distress of not knowing the way in or the way out: a distress determined at oscillating back to itself as opposed to assimilating into another structure of thought or instead of being amused by an unknown object of awe.

Indeed, regarding philosophy in general as an activity that was initiated in curiosity and as being infatuated with unknown and unusual objects is a form of trivialization of philosophy. Heidegger critiques the “readily cited” approach to wonder as the origin of philosophy, arguing that this robs philosophy of wonder and the wondrous. Philosophy rose because we faced questions about knowing and truth that we found inexplicable. In order to recapture philosophy, Heidegger exhorts us to acknowledge that philosophy is not only wondrous in essence but it becomes “more wondrous the more it becomes what it really is” (1994, p. 141).

By the same token, Heidegger also engages in a certain “dispelling” of concepts – other than curiosity – that are normally regarded as synonymous to and associated with wonder. Concepts like admiration, astonishment, and awe share affinities with wonder because they encounter elements of surprise and unexpectedness juxtaposed to or set against the exceptional and the unexpected. Similar to the experience of wonder, they all start with “the wondrous” (1994, p. 140). Admiration, to take a case in point, sees the unusual foregrounding from its usual surrounding as wondrous, together with astonishment and awe, which have positions of suspense taking when dealing with the wondrous. They are all however mainly enamored with the unknown and the unusual, whereas wonder is more like a hinge (Miller 1992) that oscillates back to the known and the usual.

Heidegger’s Sketch on Wonder

Heidegger ultimately develops thirteen theses in order to construct his theories on wonder. A few of the theses are: (a) In wonder, what is most usual itself becomes the most unusual; (b) In wonder, what is most usual of all and in all, in whatever manner this might be, becomes the most unusual; (c) The most extreme wonder knows no way out of the unusualness of what is most usual; (d) Wonder as between the usual and the unusual, wonder as dwelling in a between, between the most usual, beings, and their unusualness, their

“is”; (e) The eruption of the usualness of the most usual in the transition of the most usual into the most unusual. What alone is wondrous: beings *as* beings; (f) Wonder displaces man into the perception of beings as beings, into the sustaining of unconcealedness; (g) Wonder as a basic disposition belongs to the most unusual (1994, pp. 143–153).

A reciprocal interplay of need and distress of another way to question and begin, wonder through these thirteen theses is portrayed as having a very critical relationship with the known and the ordinary. Through wonder, we are taken out of our ordinary involvement with things. Wonder thus “makes what is ordinarily unquestioned, questionable, makes what ordinarily seems familiar, strange” (Malpas 2006, p. 259). The unusualness of the usual creates a reflective stance toward one’s knowledge. Thinking can be seen as having become an interrogatory position toward the known (Noroozi 2015, pp. 12–13) or a formative peculiar return to beginnings (Sallis 1995, p. 244). Wonder does not seek to escape from this unusualness of the usual by attempts to dominate it. It does not seek control over the unknown, nor does it seek mastery over the known *per se*. It dwells on beings and their “is” by turning to the usual (1994). “It cast back wholly on itself, knowing that it is incapable of penetrating the unusualness by way of explanation, since that would be precisely to destroy it” (1994, p. 145). It thereby creates the necessity to feel a need for another way to begin thinking about the usual, the known, and the truth.

Another concept Heidegger links to wonder in his statements is the idea of creative suffering and tolerating. Not every activity requires this creative suffering according to Heidegger. Ski jumping or acting, for example, might need admiration and can live on without the wondrous, but philosophy or any other “essentially creative power” needs to preserve the suffering (1994, p. 141). Heidegger’s notion of suffering does not refer to the orthodox meanings of the word, resembling a “Christian-moralistic-psychological way of a submissive acceptance” or “a renunciation of all the pride” but more a sense of what he calls an “acceptance of what overgrows man and in that way transforms him and makes him ever more tolerant for

what he is supposed to grasp when he has to grasp beings as such and as a whole” (1994, p. 151). This borders on aesthetic suffering: being patient with thinking and not hurrying to incorporate it into an already established thought. He turns to Holderlin’s poem “The reflective god hates all untimely growth” to illustrate the aesthetic essence that this suffering bears for the sake of the growth of thoughtful questioning (p. 153).

Heidegger ultimately brings in what he calls *aletheia* as an imperative element inherently related to *thaumazein*. *Aletheia* is the Greek word for truth, but this is not truth as projecting its common meaning of actuality, facticity, or correctness. In fact, Heidegger pleads to win back for language “the hidden power of naming the essential” (1994, p. 132). He questions the practice of relying on common meanings as a norm for interpretation – truth being one of them – and returns to the Greeks and the pre-Socratics to determine and reevaluate what truth means. He thus hopes to determine and celebrate the correlation between wonder and truth, to thereupon call our attention to their pivotal relationship and thus reverse the course of modern history in dealing with contemporary philosophical problems (Korab-Karpowicz; Stone 2006 p. 207).

Truth, from the Greek word *aletheia*, embodies what Heidegger calls unconcealedness. *Aletheia* for Heidegger is “a progressive ‘disclosure’ of an entity” (McCumber 2005 p. 590). Heideggerian truth does not imply dissection or an “explanatory dissolution” of something unusual in order to make it similar, familiar, controlled, or something to eventually be turned into a fact (1994, p. 148). Through this unconcealedness the entities and beings approach us not as preformulated definitions or to-be-formulated ideas but as “beings as beings.” This disclosure of beings displaces us into “the essence of one who perceives and gathers in the open and thereby first experiences the hidden and closed as such” (ibid). Socrates’ dialogue with *Theaetetus* and him feeling dizzy with wonder when Socrates questions his knowledge of mathematics and calculation can be one example of experiencing unconcealedness through the distress of wonder that takes you “to the point of not understanding” (Heidegger 2010, p. 161).

For Heidegger, this truth as unconcealedness has two Greek concepts as its leitmotifs: *phusis* and *techne*. *Phusis* (from which the word “nature” is also derived) can refer to a number of things: growth, becoming, generation, decline, degeneration and death (Vallier 2005, p. 414), “the manner in which something appears or manifests itself and the conditions of one’s birth” (Keltner 2005, p. 318), or what Heidegger himself describes as “beings as a whole, beings *qua* beings” (1994, p. 146), as well as what “emerges into the light,” “to shine forth and therefore to appear” out of itself and to “remain standing” (2000, p. 75).

Techne is the other word related to truth and wonder. *Techne* here does not denote technology nor a sense of a skillful mastery but more a sense of knowledge, a know-how, “to grasp beings as emerging out of themselves in the way they show themselves. . . to care for beings themselves and let them grow” (1994, p. 155). *Techne* embraces a special relationship with being and with *phusis*. The pure acknowledgment of beings (*phusis*) in truth is to happen through *techne*; *techne* helps prevent the incorporation of *phusis* into the realm of reason and as such creates the need for a primordial other beginning for thinking about *phusis*. *Techne* thus helps with grasping of beings and getting transformed by them. In the meantime, *techne* releases that very grasping and does not allow calculations to be brought in to dominate it. *Phusis* can thus be protected from being turned into principles. In essence, *techne* can “maintain the holding sway of *phusis* and the wondrous in unconcealedness.” (1994, p. 153). As such, *techne* is critically related to wonder as it unfolds and establishes the preservation of the wondrous as opposed to assimilating it into previous or future forms of thinking.

However, if *techne* metamorphoses into a “know-how” in the sense of “getting an idea,” grasping will no longer be a creative suffering but a constant assimilation that can have grim consequences: *phusis* (as what comes forth and comes to light) becomes something to grasp, to calculate, and to make ordinary for one’s knowledge. This way, *techne* serves as the method for the transformation of truth as unconcealedness into sameness (*homoiosis*). This is a subtle yet profound process

of “the loss of the basic disposition, the absence of the original need and necessity” which, Heidegger warns, ultimately degenerates the original essence of truth (1994, p. 156).

If this type of *techne* prevails, carrying out wonder can in fact destroy wonder. If truth as unconcealedness is substituted with truth as sameness and correctness, we will then also have the possibility of “positing of goals.” The danger is that once goals are posited, “the avidity for learning and calculation” (1994, p. 155) gets in place of basic disposition of wonder, and thinking can consequently escape out of the necessity of the primordial need in order to reach a goal. We are therefore to resist bringing *aletheia* into the realm of calculative reason, to preserve its wondrousness and “to let it stay as the wholly other” (Heidegger 1994, p. 155). The end product of wonder – as the most simple and greatest “all-decisive beginning” – is for Heidegger not a formation of a theory or an end in a comfortable or comforting resolving law. It is to transform the current modes of knowing and to create needs for other ways to question and think (1994, p. 150).

Furthermore, if postulating aims to become predominant, philosophy will become institutionalized and will turn into a practice of reaching goals and thus end up not needing the distress and in-between. As such, wonder as “a need for an otherwise beginning for thinking” has to surrender its originality and is thus violated by attempts to be assimilated, formed, and educated on the grounds of proposed goals. In fact, the more philosophy aims to educate according to posited goals, the more insidious it gets. That is why Heidegger critiques aspirations for philosophy becoming an institution and even for philosophers to be rulers. Genuine philosophical knowledge for Heidegger is not to engage in calculative speculation and representation or to “limp behind a being” that is already known and institutionalized. Rather, it is a knowledge that starts in a distress and need for another way to question beings and knowings, one that “leaps ahead, opening up new domains of questioning and aspects of questioning about the essence of things, an essence that constantly conceals itself anew” (1994, p. 5).

Incidentally, the danger of positing goals for wonder (thaumazein) had historical repercussions. Heidegger points out that the Greeks were primordial the custodians of *aletheia*, which originated in wonder, before the calculating reason took over philosophy. The West then moved away from *aletheia*, and man became *animale rationale* (Heidegger 1994, pp. 20 & 163). Philosophy then got “entangled and hostaged” by theology, and in the modern period, it became a factor of culture belonging to the realm of calculative notions of being. Philosophy was then deemed as having started in curiosity. Accordingly, in contemporary times, truth as unconcealedness and wonder as rising from the need and distress of another way to think became the “most unquestioned” (1994, p. 158). Those who romanticize philosophy by calling for its return are, according to Heidegger, referring to the time when philosophy was a cultural asset. This leads to a misconstrued notion as it actually overlooks the origin of philosophy having been in a need for a sustained unconcealedness, the need for other ways to begin thinking, and the need to establish, engage with, and sustain the wondrous. We humans forgot that our task was to “become prepared for the necessity of the question and the necessity for the inexplicability of the truth” (Heidegger 1994, p. 141).

Essentially, for Heidegger, discussions of wonder as a hinge between connecting the need of a primordial way of thinking with truth are to result in transforming perspectives on knowing and grasping, relinquishing the search for a new doctrine, refraining from assimilating truth as unconcealedness caused by wonder into facts and general knowledge, and leaping into what he calls “a more original and more simple course of essential occurrences in the history of Western thinking” (1994, p. 162).

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Heidegger as Teacher

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Synonyms

Arendt; Gadamer; Phenomenology; Teaching

Heidegger began his university teaching career in 1915, a century ago as I am writing, following achievement of his habilitation – the qualification

for becoming a *privatdozent*: a university instructor or teacher (one who can teach and supervise doctoral candidates independently and who may be considered eligible for a tenure-track position). This achievement required two main steps, the first of which was successful completion of his “qualifying dissertation” or “*Habilitationsschrift*” (Sheehan 1988, p. 77). The *Habilitationsschrift* (still used in many European countries) is undertaken after the doctorate (which Heidegger completed in 1913), requiring a further dissertation to be written and argued. A major difference between the two is that the doctoral dissertation is conducted under direct supervision, with the *Habilitationsschrift* reflecting work of a more independent nature.

After successful completion of his *Habilitationsschrift*, Heidegger was required to undergo the second main step in acquiring one’s habilitation – the “licensing examination” (Sheehan 1988, p. 81) – which involves delivery of a trial lecture. This he duly undertook, and, being deemed successful, Heidegger was awarded the *venia legendi* in philosophy on August 5, 1915 – his actual license to teach philosophy. During the second week of November of that year, “he officially initiated his teaching career with the lecture course *Grundlinien der antiken und scholastischen Philosophie* [*The basic trends of ancient and scholastic philosophy*]” (p. 82) at the University of Freiburg. In this lecture course Heidegger encountered “among the twenty-one students enrolled in the lecture . . . one Fraulein Elfriede Petri from Wiesbaden. A year later she and Heidegger would be engaged to be married” (p. 82). I mention this for two reasons: (1) I shall use some excerpts from Heidegger’s many letters to Elfriede, his wife, to help illuminate his experience of teaching, and (2) understanding Heidegger as a teacher requires insight into how he related to his students, of whom Elfriede was one.

The renown associated with Heidegger’s philosophical work did not initially spread through his publications but through his teaching. In fact most volumes of his *Gesamtausgabe* (collected works) have been constructed using notes from lectures and seminars. Different to many academics, Heidegger focused on his teaching more than his publishing. Hans-Georg Gadamer, a student of

Heidegger’s who followed him in his move from Freiburg to Marburg in 1923, drew a sharp contrast between Heidegger and the professor “who devoted the full force of his interest to his publications and saw teaching as a secondary form of activity” (1992, p. 5). “With Heidegger, it was the exact opposite,” Gadamer (p. 5) recounted. “In fact, we can see today that after *Being and Time* he didn’t even write any more books actually. Those were all more or less university lectures or seminars” (pp. 5–6). And yet it was the focus on his teaching which lent success to the writing he did publish. “Heidegger’s ‘fame’ predates by about 8 years the publication of *Sein und Zeit* (*Being and Time*) in 1927,” observed Hannah Arendt (1971, p. 50), another of Heidegger’s students of that time. “Indeed it is open to question whether the unusual success of this book . . . would have been possible if it had not been preceded by the teacher’s reputation among the students” (p. 50).

One aspect of this reputation was due to the way in which Heidegger connected with his students through his teaching. “It was remarkable,” Gadamer (1992, p. 6) asserted, referring to “the personal attention to and awareness of the student which we saw particularly in Heidegger.” “It was amazing how he took hold of every question that was asked and saw something in it that was positive” (p. 6). And “because of him the lecture format became something totally new. It was no longer the ‘lesson presentation’ of a professor who put his essential energy into research and publication” (1985, p. 48). Elisabeth Hirsch was another student of Heidegger’s at Marburg. She “took several seminars with Heidegger” which she identified as “equally exciting although by no means easy. We would read a text and discuss it sentence by sentence. Heidegger’s most valued quality was that he would listen to the student with patience and interest” (1979, p. 340).

Another aspect of this reputation was how Heidegger, instead of merely communicating time-worn interpretations of classical philosophical texts, employed a means of philosophizing that brought these texts to life in an existential way. “It was technically decisive,” argued Arendt (1971, p. 51), “that, for instance, Plato was not

talked about and his theory of Ideas expounded” – in the traditional manner – “rather for an entire semester a single dialogue was pursued and subjected to question step by step, until the time-honored doctrine had disappeared to make room for a set of problems of immediate and urgent relevance.” Hence “the rumor [amongst students] about Heidegger put it quite simply: Thinking has come to life again; the cultural treasures of the past, believed to be dead, are being made to speak” (p. 51). “There exists a teacher,” Arendt proclaimed, attempting to capture the mood of the time, and so “one can perhaps learn to think” (p. 51). “Today this sounds quite familiar,” she acknowledged, “because nowadays so many proceed in this way; but no one did so before Heidegger” (p. 51).

It is important to comprehend these two reputational aspects of Heidegger’s teaching not as separate but united – as features of the task of teaching through phenomenological philosophizing. As one they illuminate the new philosophical and pedagogical pathway along which Heidegger was trying to lead his students. Through careful consideration of Heidegger’s philosophic pedagogy, Ehrmantraut (2010) astutely discerned that “in Heidegger’s lectures on philosophy . . . it could be said that the subject matter of the philosophic lecture *is* the existence of the auditors themselves” (p. 41). In other words, “the aim, content, structure and procedure of the lecture are determined not only by the subject matter . . . but also by the existence of those who attend the lectures” (p. 41). Gadamer (1985) alluded to this when he recalled how “Heidegger’s mode [of teaching] consisted in him making the interpretation of a text as convincing as possible, to a point where we risked losing ourselves in it. That is how things went in Heidegger’s lectures” (pp. 38–39). And the same pedagogical event was evident in the teacher. “The unique thing about his person and his teaching lay in the fact that he identified himself fully with his work and radiated from that work” (p. 48).

Heidegger’s teaching was an attempt to work phenomenologically in the manner in which he had further developed Husserl’s work and to have his students engage phenomenologically. As

Arendt recalled, “the rumor . . . had it that there was someone who was actually attaining ‘the things’ that Husserl had proclaimed, someone who knew that these things were not academic matters but the concerns of thinking men [*sic*]” (1971, p. 51). However the difference between phenomenological thinking and that evident in more traditional lectures presented a formidable pedagogical challenge for Heidegger (as for any teacher) because of the “distinction between the expectations that a student usually brings to academic lectures and the fundamental ‘comportment’ that is demanded by genuine philosophizing” (Ehrmantraut 2010, p. 52). Such genuine philosophizing is phenomenological, and this was how Heidegger interpreted the classic philosophical work of Aristotle, Plato, and other early Greek thinkers. This phenomenological thinking was not the usual academic thinking characterized within debates between empiricism and rationalism. In phenomenological thinking the concepts remained living, existential, thus necessitating a “turning around of philosophical comportment” (Heidegger 2004, p. 11). For “it is only where empirical and rational moments work together that experience rings true” (2002, p. 46). This “philosophizing” thus “demands something more of the student than does ordinary scientific study, it requires a ‘different kind of attentiveness’” (Ehrmantraut, p. 52). But “just what comportment is demanded is, Heidegger admits, ‘confused’ and ‘uncertain’” (p. 52).

The challenge Heidegger had taken on was to reinvent philosophy phenomenologically, and he found that the best way to do this was through teaching his students, many of whom were more open to challenging the philosophical status quo than university colleagues. “Who among those who then followed him can forget the breathtaking swirl of questions that he developed in the introductory hours of the semester,” Gadamer (1985) recounted, all “for the sake of entangling himself in the second or third of these questions and then, in the final hours of the semester, rolling up the deep-dark clouds of sentences from which the lightning flashed to leave us half stunned” (p. 48). This was a memorable situation for students like Gadamer and Arendt, but for others the

philosophical “leap” (Gray, 1968, p. 21) that was required by phenomenology presented too much of a challenge. In a letter to Elfriede dated 1932, Heidegger confided that “even though I have the large lecture hall firmly in my power, I cannot rid myself of the feeling that it passes them by and if it does hit the mark it is hardly worthwhile” (2008, p. 136). This concern was patently visible during a lecture series that Heidegger taught in the winter semester of 1920–21 in Freiburg titled *Einleitung in die Phänomenologie der Religion* [Introduction to the Phenomenology of Religion]. Part way through the semester Heidegger was forced to make an “abrupt change in course content” as a “direct result of student complaints to the Dean of the Philosophical Faculty over the lack of religious content in a course on the philosophy of religion” (Kisiel 1993, p. 172). Many students held expectations that they were to learn more about the traditional philosophy of religion, whereas for Heidegger (2004) the course entailed engaging phenomenologically with “factual life” (p. 45) as expressed through “religious experience” (p. 47).

While some students struggled unsuccessfully with Heidegger’s phenomenological teaching, those who managed to make the leap set off with enthusiasm along the pathway that now opened before them. “We were an arrogant little in-group and easily let our pride in our teacher and his manner of working go to our heads” Gadamer (1985, p. 49) reminisced. But this was not “a ‘circle’ centered around and directed by a ‘master’” Arendt (1971, p. 50) argued. “Here there was neither a secret nor membership; those who heard the rumor were acquainted with one another, to be sure, since they were all students” (p. 50). “But there never was a circle and there was nothing esoteric about his following” (p. 50). “Still,” Gadamer (1985) acknowledged, “it was remarkable how Heidegger, who had invented the term ‘liberating care,’ could not prevent a large number of people from losing their freedom to him. Moths fly into the light” (p. 50).

This close connection between Heidegger and many of his students, encouraged by the challenges of working phenomenologically, seemed to be at the center of the justification to ban him from teaching at the end of the Second World War. Insight into this event is made accessible via a letter penned by

Karl Jaspers, a close colleague of Heidegger’s since the early 1920s, when asked to contribute his opinion to the denazification committee which was hearing Heidegger’s case in 1945. Jaspers had no major concerns with Heidegger being allowed to continue his philosophical work postwar, if this was to be primarily through his writing – but he did not condone Heidegger continuing his teaching. He recommended that the committee suspend Heidegger “from teaching duties for at least several years” (Jaspers, cited in Wolin, 1993, p. 150). Following a fairly drawn-out process, a suspension did result, which had a deleterious effect on Heidegger’s health. Shortly after, in 1946, Heidegger spent 3 weeks at a sanatorium having succumbed to a depressive episode. It was not until 1951, Gertrud Heidegger (2008, p. 218) notes, that Heidegger was “made an emeritus professor” at the University of Freiburg and “able to take up his lecturing at the University once again.” He continued lecturing until 1957, after which his teaching consisted mainly of seminars.

Jaspers justified his recommendation regarding Heidegger by way of a concern with “the education of youth” which “must be handled with the greatest responsibility” for “the youth must first reach a point where they can think for themselves” (cited in Wolin, 1993, p. 149) – before being exposed to Heidegger’s thinking. “Heidegger’s manner of thinking, which,” argued Jaspers, “seems in its essence unfree, dictatorial, and incapable of communication, would today in its pedagogical effects be disastrous” (p. 149). Jaspers’ reference to Heidegger’s teaching as unfree accords somewhat with Gadamer’s observation that students lost their freedom to him. And while there was a definite political concern in such statements, also highlighted is the strength of the teacher-student relation which Heidegger achieved through his pedagogy.

As soon as Heidegger was able to return to teaching, he delivered a lecture series titled *Was Heisst Denken?* [What is called thinking?] in which he expounded perhaps his most well-known commentary on teaching. And yet even while pronouncing on teaching, it was Heidegger’s pedagogy which stood out, as revealed in comments from J. Glenn Gray, the translator of these lectures, who through his

close affiliation with the text perceived how “Heidegger is first and foremost preoccupied with the students before him, only secondarily with the wider circle of readers who will necessarily miss the vital character and nuances of the spoken word” (Gray, 1968, p. vii). It is this vital character and nuance of phenomenological engagement which is better served through teaching via the spoken word than the written word. Heidegger’s teaching, as Gadamer has relayed, engaged students in question and response, in dialogue that enabled access to phenomenological philosophizing. “We learned from him what a lecture could be,” Gadamer (1985, p. 37) attested, “and I hope that none of us has forgotten.”

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Heidegger on Teaching

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Synonyms

[Phenomenology; Teaching](#)

Central to the contributions Heidegger makes to education are his pronouncements on teaching. These statements are not numerous, but where they appear they are significant because they situate teaching within Heidegger’s broader philosophy. In addition they offer a concrete way to comprehend how this philosophy may be applied – as Heidegger applied it – in terms of the encounters between teacher and student(s), by way of Da-sein.

Perhaps the most famous of Heidegger’s statements on teaching occurs in his 1951–1952 lecture series *Was Heisst Denken?* [*What is called thinking?*], the first lecture course he delivered on his return to teaching following his postwar suspension. I include the major section of this proclamation on teaching here, while acknowledging that more of relevance was said in the flow of this first lecture in the course:

Teaching is even more difficult than learning. We know that; but we rarely think about it. And why is teaching more difficult than learning? Not because the teacher must have a larger store of information, and have it always ready. Teaching is more difficult than learning because what teaching calls for is this: to let learn. The real teacher, in fact, lets nothing else be learned than – learning. His conduct, therefore, often produces the impression that we properly learn nothing from him [or her], if by “learning” we now suddenly understand merely the procurement of useful information. The teacher is ahead of his apprentices in this alone, that [s]he still has far more to learn than they – [s]he has to learn to let them learn. The teacher must be capable of being more teachable than the apprentices. The teacher is far less assured of his [or her] ground than those who learn are of theirs. If the relation between the teacher and the taught is genuine, therefore, there is

never a place in it for the authority of the know-it-all or the authoritative sway of the official. It is still an exalted matter, then, to become a teacher – which is something else entirely than becoming a famous professor. (Heidegger 1968, p. 15)

On reading this statement many teachers will find themselves in agreement with Heidegger on the point that “teaching is more difficult than learning.” However Heidegger seems to contradict this position in a less well-known statement on teaching made in an earlier lecture course of 1935–1936 titled *Basic Questions of Metaphysics* and translated as *What is a thing?* In this pronouncement the same themes are prominent around teaching and learning, and yet he here proclaims learning to be more difficult than teaching:

True learning only occurs where the taking of what one already has is a self-giving and is experienced as such. Teaching, therefore, does not mean anything else than to let the others learn, i.e., to bring one another to learning. Learning is more difficult than teaching; for only he who can truly learn – and only as long as he can do it – can truly teach. The genuine teacher differs from the pupil only in that he can learn better and that he more genuinely wants to learn. In all teaching, the teacher learns the most. (Heidegger 1967, p. 73)

There is much of Heidegger’s broader philosophy embedded within both of these statements – and it is to his broader philosophy that we must turn in order to belie this seeming contradiction. Heidegger signposts the way to their complementarity through the notion of “to let learn” or “to let the others learn,” as mentioned in both statements. To let learn evokes a sense similar to that of “letting be,” which is an important phenomenological concept for Heidegger. As phenomenological it holds a different meaning than the same phrase expressed in the vernacular. For Heidegger letting be speaks to our existential engagement, as Da-sein, where “*Da* is namely the word for the open expanse,” thus Da-sein is “being-in-an-open-expanse” (2003, p. 69), an open characterized by meaning rather than as a mere collection of things. Heidegger employed the hyphen in Da-sein to highlight the Da (for a detailed unpacking of Heidegger’s use of Dasein and Da-sein see von Herrmann 2011).

Ordinarily we speak of letting be whenever, for example, we forgo some enterprise that has been planned. “We let something be” means we do not touch it again, we have nothing more to do with it. To let something be has here the negative sense of letting it alone, of renouncing it, of indifference and even neglect. However the phrase required now – to let beings be – does not refer to neglect and indifference but rather the opposite. To let be is to engage oneself with beings. On the other hand, to be sure, this is not to be understood only as mere management, preservation, tending, and planning of the beings in each case encountered or sought out. To let be – that is, to let beings be the beings they are – means to engage oneself with the open region and its openness into which every being comes to stand, bringing that openness, as it were, along with itself. (Heidegger 1998, p. 144)

Letting be, while generally considered to refer to our engagement with this open region (as Da-sein) and through this with beings which appear meaningful in some way via this open region, also embraces our engagement with other human beings as other Da-sein, other versions of being-in-an-open-expanse. This comes to light in statements made by Heidegger in conversation with Medard Boss (Heidegger 2001). Boss was a psychiatrist and concerned with application of Heidegger’s philosophy in understanding another human interaction – between doctor and patient. In these statements we see Heidegger emphasizing how important it is for “the investigator,” the person concerned with the other human being, to first be able to “experience him[or her]self as Da-sein.” Without this it is difficult if not impossible to accomplish an “appropriate letting be” of the other Da-sein – as contrasted with “inappropriate representations”:

The letting-be of this being (the human being) in light of Da-sein is extremely difficult, unfamiliar, and must always be examined anew by contemporary scientists, but also by the one who has gained familiarity with the projection of Da-sein. The “letting-be,” that is, accepting a being as it shows itself, becomes an appropriate letting-be only when this being, the Da-sein, stands constantly in view beforehand. [This can only happen] when the investigator has experienced and continues to experience himself as Da-sein, as ek-sisting, and when all human reality is determined *from there*. The elimination and avoidance of inappropriate representations about this being, the human being, is only possible when the practice of experiencing being

human as Da-sein has been successful and when it is illuminating any investigation of the healthy or sick human being in advance. (Heidegger 2001, p. 223)

The difficulty of letting be in relation to another Da-sein lies in the ability to engage Da-sein – which is perhaps the most difficult challenge of phenomenology: gaining the starting point of phenomenology (see Quay 2015). In this sense learning is more difficult than teaching, for one must learn to engage Da-sein, to experience being-in-an-open-expanse of meaning–ascribed things and other Da-sein (being-in-the-world), before one can teach. “Only [s]he who can truly learn – and only as long as [s]he can do it – can truly teach.” This “truly” (synonymous with “genuine”) is a Heideggerian pointer toward the importance of learning how to achieve the starting point of phenomenology (Da-sein) in order to engage with another human being via and as Da-sein – and thus to be able to teach this person. “How difficult this is has been demonstrated by decades of misinterpreting being-in-the-world as an [ontic] occurrence of the human being in the midst of other beings as a whole, of the ‘world’” (Heidegger 2001, p. 223). This misinterpretation is based on misunderstanding the Da as ontic, as a collection of separate things of which meaning has to be constructed (which is why Heidegger places ‘world’ in quotation marks), rather than as an open expanse through which these things are first meaningfully encountered. This misunderstanding also positions Da-sein as Dasein, as a separate thing amongst other separate things, but “Da-sein is not a being,” Heidegger (2013, p. 120) implores; being-in-an-open-expanse is not a thing, but can be understood as one amongst other possible “ways of *being*” (Heidegger 1985, p. 295). However, he did acknowledge that his use of Dasein/Da-sein in *Being and Time* – “very awkwardly and in an unhelpful way” (2003, p. 69) – contributes to this misinterpretation.

Additionally, Heidegger points out that engaging Da-sein and applying this awareness to investigating another Dasein need not, of itself, develop into a full-blown phenomenological investigation. “The method of investigation ‘appropriate to Da-sein’ is not phenomenological in itself but is

dependent upon and guided by phenomenology in the sense of the hermeneutics [interpretation] of Dasein” (2001, p. 223). In other words, while this experiencing of other Da-sein is not a full blown phenomenological investigation, it still requires achieving the phenomenological starting point, which is Da-sein. It can then be guided by application of phenomenological concepts attained through other more detailed phenomenological investigations. Heidegger’s phenomenological concepts – such as care, attunement, understanding, and letting be – can make such a contribution.

So learning can be understood as more difficult than teaching, because we must be able to learn in this way (by gaining the phenomenological starting point, Da-sein) before we can truly teach. But what of Heidegger’s other claim that teaching is more difficult than learning? This seeming contradiction can be unwound if we pay heed to Heidegger’s emphasis on the teacher’s learning. In both circumstances it is teaching which is more difficult because of the challenge of the teacher’s learning in relation to other Da-sein. When learning is more difficult than teaching, it is the teacher’s learning in relation to other Da-sein we are referring to. When teaching is more difficult than learning, this is understood on the basis that teaching (underpinned by teacher learning in relation to other Da-sein) is more difficult than student learning. The heart of the matter is that “the teacher is ahead of his [her] apprentices in this alone, that [s]he still has far more to learn than they – [s]he has to learn to let them learn.”

Having identified the difficulty inherent to learning in this way, the focus of Heidegger’s statements on teaching shifts from the teacher’s learning to the teacher’s teaching, the application of this learning in relation to other Da-sein, when teaching; in other words, “to let learn.” But how does one, as teacher, accomplish this in concrete terms? One pointer toward this may be Heidegger’s identification of possible concrete “modes of concern” for another, such as “being for-, against-, and without-one-another, passing-one-another-by, not-mattering-to-one-another” (2010, p. 118). It is obvious that most of these examples reveal an “indifference” (p. 118) to another. However there are also “positive

modes,” of which Heidegger identifies “two extreme possibilities” (p. 118): to “*leap in for*” (p. 118) and to “*leap ahead of*” (p. 119). Here, to *leap in for* another is “to take the other’s ‘care’ away from him [or her] and put itself in his [or her] place as taking care” (Heidegger 2010, p. 118). This is care understood phenomenologically, acknowledging how Da-sein “is concerned in its being about that being” (p. 185). Leaping (in this example) is always understood in connection with this existential care. Problematically, by leaping in for another Da-sein and taking away existential care, a major problem is created for the other Da-sein in its concern for being, even though this leaping in for may have been undertaken with positive intentions.

[In leaping in for] the other is thus displaced, [s]he steps back so that afterward, when the matter has been attended to, [s]he can take it over as something finished and available or disburden him[or her]self of it completely. In this concern, the other can become someone who is dependent and dominated even if this domination is a tacit one and remains hidden from him [or her]. (Heidegger 2010, pp. 118–119)

Expressed in terms of teaching, here the teacher, not acknowledging the other as Da-sein, comprehends the meaning of the situation from his or her own Da-sein exclusively, and is not even aware that the other’s existential care is taken away. The other, positioned in this way, adapts (or not) their Da-sein to be able to function in this situation.

However, “in contrast to this, there is the possibility of a concern which does not so much leap in for the other as *leap ahead of* him [or her] in his [or her] existentiell potentiality-of-being” (Heidegger 2010, p. 119). To “*leap ahead of*” is “not in order to take ‘care’ away from him [or her], but rather to authentically give it back as such” (p. 119). Hence leaping ahead of is concerned with the other as Da-sein, as their own being-in-an-open-expanse as a “potentiality of being.” “This concern which essentially pertains to authentic care – that is, it pertains to the existing of the other and not to a *what* which it takes care of – helps the other to become transparent to himself in his care and *free for it*” (p. 119). This authentic care is the authenticity of acknowledging the other as Da-sein, and thus as their own

“care,” which can also be expressed as freedom: the freedom of letting be, as Da-sein; which in a teaching-learning situation is the freedom of letting learn. Heidegger’s point is that teaching must let-learn by letting-be by leaping ahead of, through embrace of the other as Da-sein, with all of the challenges that this may introduce.

For Heidegger a teacher is not someone who has “a larger store of information . . . always ready” like a “know it all” or “official,” and thus a teacher is different to a “famous professor.” This emphasis on content expertise alone overlooks how the teacher must also learn to embrace the other as Da-sein, which can never be fully perfected. Teaching is “an exalted matter” because teaching works by way of Da-sein. Herein lies the candor of Heidegger’s statement that “in all teaching, the teacher learns the most.”

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Heidegger's Enframing and the Indigenous Self in Education

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Introduction

Aspects of Heidegger's personal life scream out to be confronted, especially when it is the indigenous writer referring to him and even if his sinister idiosyncrasies in that instance are not the key theme of that writer's text. The controversy of Heidegger – that he “wrote some really frightful rubbish, some of which explicitly links his philosophy to the most abominable political movement of the modern period” (Bowie 1997, p. 139) – must surely be at stake in any indigenous comparative that seeks to draw on his works. He was, after all, supportive of the extermination of a group of people: such a nasty complicity will not be lost on the indigenous scholar. The recent release of his notorious Black Notebooks only further confirms his involvement. Yet his philosophy on the dark recesses of colonization that force an object to appear in advance *as* constrained thing is, for indigenous counter-colonial purposes, compelling and amounts to “anything but rubbish” (Bowie 1997, p. 139). Since Plato but gaining momentum in Descartes, Heidegger argues, Western humanity has been predisposed toward an object or even people as if they are this or that in advance, and this primordial engagement has become the hallmark of the Western relationship with the world. Because Heidegger writes so unremittingly and profoundly on that very problem, yet due to his simultaneous personal convictions, he challenges his indigenous reader with a dilemma: he or she must tread carefully with Heidegger and his philosophy.

That seemingly natural and innocuous act of deciding what to do with Heidegger actually reveals a comportment to the world that has its roots in the very problem he discusses. Managing Heidegger – acknowledging the validity of his works and reorganizing parts of his private life

so that they do not impede on the indigenous scholar's work – demonstrates the innateness of enframing: it is simply *there*, as a template through which Western humanity, and thereby the colonized indigenous self, peers out at the world. Although enframing cannot (and most certainly should not) be confined to a discussion about education, it can nevertheless be thought about in the context of indigenous educational philosophies. This entry incorporates indigenous holistic thought around education with the problem of enframing.

Introducing Enframing

There is no single best place from which to launch a discussion on enframing, for it strangely claims the writer even before his or her attention is brought to it. Enframing, then, is complicit with being because it is a revelation or call to the self to respond. Of course, the writer is not alone in that disclosure, because for Heidegger enframing is an *a priori* that has immediately incorporated with the modern self. It lies beyond experience, but it dictates how one will act in response to that most primordial orientation. Enframing, or *Gestell* as Heidegger calls it in *The Question Concerning Technology*, is characterized by a particular predisposition toward things, where the self is oriented toward an object so that the latter may be captured and used instrumentally thereafter. Heidegger's abstract use of the term *Gestell* (which normally refers to a concrete entity) opens the issue up for discussion, away from one revolving around the social use of a thing to one turning on the profound philosophical enactment of the object by the human self and by Western modernity as a whole. In its universality, enframing is therefore something quite different from its symptoms, and Heidegger is clear that to confuse the two is dangerous. Its ubiquity heralds a related warning: that a delusion of modern thought lies in an authoritative, final discussion about enframing that would declare a logical, demarcable beginning and end. Enframing in that incorrect reading becomes something else much closer to its current manifestations which,

although needing discussion, should not take priority. Any reversion to the issue as a scientific or even sociological one is a result of Western humanity's tendency, as Heidegger (1967) notes, to not think about the difference between being and beings. Enframing is a particular disclosure through *technē* that defies limits, and for Heidegger its fusion with, and subsequent hiddenness within, its instrumental manifestations – such as computers, televisions, and the nuclear bomb – is a natural outcome of the conflation of being and beings.

Enframing constitutes entities and practices, including seemingly straightforward phenomena such as language. Language as Heidegger envisages it is not a phenomenon independent from the world, but when related to enframing, it is seen as sourced in the human self – a thorough outcome of the rational mind. Language is hence one thing in the world among others that is constrained: it can be wielded to assign the world its place and to staticize things themselves. According to Heidegger, humans do assign labels to these objects only because the world has been represented in a *Gestell* fashion in advance, meaning that humans do have some degree of agency in their reference to objects. This statement on its own may be applicable to a number of language philosophies that link with the metaphysics that enframing typifies; however, the degree to which objects are allowed to manifest their own subjectivism marks a great divergence between empiricism and phenomenology. In enframing, there is a prior determination of how objects are to be viewed in the first instance, and this preconception will show itself up in the label assigned to those things. That is, while humans deceive themselves that language is self-created, Heidegger argues that we give names to objects in the world only because we have already represented the world in a particular way (in this case, as *enframed*) to begin with. Enframing hence constrains the self in advance and the language the self transfers to those things.

There is one additional, crucial concept of Heidegger's that deserves brief mention here – that of *Bestand*, or “standing reserve.” While related to enframing, *Bestand* refers more

to an outcome of that metaphysical orientation, and is characterized by a more obvious activity against the world, involving the stockpiling of the latter's objects. Here we encounter a pragmatic gesture of enframing, one that is not equivalent with that deepest imprint of the self on the world but instead conjoins with it. In this instance, the indigenous self has consigned things to their rightful place or given them a label that categorizes them in accordance with their usefulness. This is a definitive development for Western humanity, even in the most unlikely areas. Richardson (2003), for example, notes that even the spiritual dimension is inevitably made into an entity relational with the self when he states that “coming to the nineteenth century . . . [one] find[s] the emphasis placed upon a philosophy of “Life-force,” but the basic pattern is still the same. A being attains status as a being only to the extent that it is absorbed in some way or other into man's life, sc. becomes a living-experience” (p. 327).

Introducing Indigenous Holism

The ubiquity of metaphysics – the fact that it is an *always-already* – is iterated in “Building Dwelling Thinking” in Heidegger's discussion about the fourfold or quadrate, where he explains that one thing is consistently claimed by others. Indigenous peoples may find Heidegger's works here especially fascinating, as the latter appears to represent a gathering together of four entities (and the given presence of all the others in any one of those) within one. Indigenous thought – as far as it is explained in literature, and in terms of much of its practice – is premised on a strong holism, where things in the world are thoroughly interconnected (Deloria 2001; Mika 2014). In much traditional indigenous educational practice, what was considered to be most important was the transmission of thought about those things such that they were sustainedly kept together. Moreover, the self was one thing among many, and how he or she represented the thing would have repercussions for the self's well-being (and education for many indigenous groups was seen as an issue of well-being at the same time, for people were

educated in accordance with a holistic depiction of the world). Things were also perceived to be vitally active, and, in synchronicity with what Heidegger notes about the fourfold, they were consistently mirrored between each other, so that they were thought of as inseparable.

This persistent activity between them creates constant tension for any one thing in the world (Mika 2014; Plebuch 2010) that is held up for contemplation by the self. Heidegger deliberately obscures the four entities and their ongoing drive against and with each other because their true form and interaction simply cannot be clarified. Although it would be tempting to conceive of that invisible facet as a “backdrop,” such a description sets up obscurity against clarity, to which Heidegger and indigenous groups would undoubtedly be opposed. On the contrary, it may better be thought of as a recessive tendency that nevertheless depicts how a thing is to appear and that has always called for the thinker’s attention. The complex intermesh of all entities necessarily means that a certain amount of humility has to be sustained in the face of them, including in their representation in educational processes.

For indigenous groups, the terms for entities hold special significance. Language – its means of clarifying the backdrop of an object as much as the object itself – displays a culmination of all things. Individuals would be encouraged to think about the proper terminology to use in reference to an object, so that it retained its innate relationship with the world. In that meeting place of the All, to which the concern of the self is drawn, a distinctive humility toward the world could also be found in language. Terms sourced from indigenous languages would be suffused with a depth that could not be approached by their denotative meaning; they resonated with the things they represent and are as much imbued with their own life as more concrete objects. Language from an indigenous perspective still attempts to ensure the oneness of things; in selecting a way of discussing one particular object of many, the indigenous self is not meaning to fragment it from its context but highlight both its obscure context and the entity. Human beings therefore

do not so much create language as work alongside it to highlight things’ resonance with each other (Mika 2015). Indeed, language is a phenomenon that originates from without for many indigenous groups, and it can often work in tandem with that exteriority to reveal, if nothing else, the limits of human knowledge. In that process, it merely provides curvature for a thing – it hints at its opacity rather than its solid truth – and hence forecloses against trying to grasp any entity as controllable.

The Influence of Enframing on Indigenous Perception and Education

Heidegger was concerned for the corrosion of Western culture through its metaphysical dedication to enframing, and so it remains for the indigenous thinker to draw from his works to suggest their relevance for his or her communities. For indigenous thought, Heidegger signals that there is at play an entrenched colonization that cannot be simply calculated or resolved by conventional studies and research. After all, enframing is the most primordial definer of the world, including when indigenous peoples retain some practical and philosophical vestiges that resist enframing. Instead of trying to set out to use empirical methods to research enframing, the indigenous thinker is posed with the challenge of burrowing deeply into terms and ideas but to withhold from declaring the “eureka” moment of having discovered the true parameters of enframing. This universality is not necessarily a cause for pessimism, and the fact that the writer is drawn to speculate on enframing is perversely due to enframing itself: here, Heidegger refers to a phrase from Hölderlin’s “Patmos” and reveals the potential of enframing through its “saving power.” What an indigenous reading of Heidegger does identify for the writer, however, is that there is an imperceptible gauze that interposes itself between the self and the world. This membrane is irremovable and orients the self toward the world in advance, and for the self, it is connected to issues of colonization and, perhaps disturbingly, indigenous metaphysics as well.

The unnerving possibility that indigenous metaphysics interrelates somehow with enframing, or that the latter may in its own right have brought our attention to the former through their co-diffusion, deserves some attention. Heidegger (1977) holds that there is in enframing a “destining that gathers together” (p. 31). Although there are important subsequent words in that quote that specifically describe the character of enframing, this initial signal about its activity is interesting on its own account. Its interplay with the self, as with indigenous metaphysics generally, emphasizes a sort of calm “coming to bear” or engulfment that has already taken place. That an entity has always endured, that it has always given itself to the world or arisen from something prior to it (such as, for instance, the Earth Mother – a common discourse among many indigenous peoples), is undoubtedly nothing new to indigenous people. This persistent “beckoning” in its most fundamental sense dictates that all things in the world are completely interrelated, and moreover that each thing reveals itself in its own way, and yet in tandem with its relationship with all other things as well as the prior phenomenon that gives rise to it.

Enframing may hence seem to read from the same page as indigenous metaphysics to the extent that it “endures most primally out of the earliest beginning” (Heidegger 1977, p. 31). Here again, though, some key words have been omitted from the quote, and any similarity between indigenous metaphysics and enframing draws to a close when we include Heidegger’s fuller intent. Enframing, to be sure, “grants permanently” as the rest of that quote highlights, but while we may be tempted to believe that enframing is precisely the same as indigenous metaphysics, we should remember that enframing only reveals its possibilities for humanity *despite itself*. Instead, what lies within enframing is a *challenging forth* that is forever attempting to put the world in its pre-ordained place. Heidegger’s reference to its controlled components as *Bestand*, or “standing reserve,” is notable for its emphasis on orderability and has particular significance for indigenous thought because it indicates a

distancing of the self from an object. Where in much indigenous thought the self and object are perceived to be one, or the object of contemplation was always already imbued with all other things in the world, now the object, true to its etymology, is thrown in front of the self. For the self, the object is thoroughly unrelated, even though it formerly shared a genealogy with the self.

It is the *notion* of totality that is threatened by enframing, but importantly for indigenous peoples, it may be the world as a whole – in a much more material sense – that is put in its place through the proscriptive activity of language or through any metaphysical orientation toward the world that seeks to allocate it its proper realm. In education, the world is made productive (Fitzpatrick 2002), through how the object is already posited in advance as a constrained entity. For Heidegger, as we have seen, enframing limits the full possibility of the world, and for indigenous peoples, the classroom may be a primary site where the All is constantly transmitted as an enframed entity. Indigenous peoples are therefore barred from access to a culturally appropriate, speculative educational practice that attempts to retain things in their totality. Even language – the “house of Being” (Heidegger 1999, p. 239) – is already elided into an enframing attitude so that the self’s openness to an object’s full potential is thoroughly limited well in advance. Enframing, most primordially for education in indigenous contexts, in all its aspects, turns the indigenous self toward the whole so that it can be dealt with in its isolated components, and this colonized notion of the All is then transmitted in nonindigenous educational settings.

Summary

Enframing has set the scene for things to be referenced in ways that are most convenient for humanity, but according to Heidegger this highly controlling approach is not to be confused with any sort of equipment. Instead, enframing exists intangibly within the very lens of perception,

directing the perceiver to move toward an object such that it is knowable and certain. For the indigenous thinker – him- or herself trained in a mainstream education system – a culturally appropriate access to the world may be predicated on the notion that the world is holistic, but enframing is inherently diffused throughout education so that it conditions things, draws on language that reflects the object as a single phenomenon rather than an interrelated one, and represents the object in an unmysterious fashion. In education, how free one is to perceive the interrelated object may indeed become an issue that is revealed, somewhat paradoxically, through the nature of enframing itself, and it is perhaps here that the indigenous self is called to both consider what their own metaphysics is, its relationship with enframing, and its possible resistance to the latter.

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Herbart, Johann Friedrich (1776–1841)

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Introduction

This systematic thinker developed an educational theory, and its foundational ethical and psychological theories. At the same time, full recognition is given to the relation between educational theory and practice.

Herbart was born in 1776, in Oldenburg in Germany in the household of a jurist. His private education at home and, from the age of 12, a gymnasium, had already brought a first introduction to the philosophy of Kant, Wolff, and Leibniz. His education also exemplified the idea and ideal of a broad, humanistic education as to the role of art and the aesthetical: he learned to play the piano, cello, flute, and harp. At 18 he started a study in law at the University of Jena, where he was soon to change this *Brodstudium* (“bread study,” “just for money”) for the study of philosophy which attracted him so much more. In Jena, he was confronted with Fichte, whose philosophy he soon started to criticize. As early as 1798, he wrote an epistemological sketch to defeat idealism and defend realism in philosophy – a strand in his thought that will remain and can be discerned in all his philosophical, educational, and psychological work. At the same time, he gained experience in educational practice as a private teacher of three boys in the Steiger household in Bern, 1797–1799. Then he resumed his academic studies. He received a doctorate at the University of Göttingen in 1802, where he stayed to work as lecturer, later professor, until 1809. In that period the first educational works and the practical philosophy appeared.

From 1809 to 1833, Herbart was professor of philosophy at the University of Königsberg, formerly Kant’s chair. Königsberg is in Prussia, where educational matters were at the center of

political attention at that time. Wilhelm von Humboldt, Minister of Education, supported Herbart in realizing a plan already conceived of by Kant, viz., the establishment of an educational seminary at the university. Approximately ten boys were tutored by approximately ten teacher training students. A few experienced teachers were the guarantee that the pupils received a good, broad, and balanced education. Herbart himself taught mathematics. In his Königsberg days, Herbart's academic work concentrated on the development of a psychology after the new scientific paradigm that combines the empirical and the mathematical (note that 1776, Herbart's year of birth, was David Hume's year of death). In 1833, Herbart returned as full professor to the University of Göttingen. Here he wrote his late, as much lucid as concise and systematical, educational work *Umriss pädagogischer Vorlesungen* (*Umriss*, 1835, the second edition appeared in the year of his death, 1841; "Outline of Educational Lectures").

Herbart counts as one of the most systematical thinkers in the modern educational, academic discipline known as *Pädagogik* on the continent. He has left a rounded and close-knit oeuvre that is worthwhile reading and studying. From his first publications in the beginning of the nineteenth century, he developed an educational philosophy intertwined with practical philosophy (ethics) and psychology as its foundational disciplines. The fundamental educational ideas systematically presented once more in his late work, the *Umriss*, can already be traced in his early *Die ästhetische Darstellung der Welt als Hauptgeschäft der Erziehung* (AD, 1804; *The Aesthetic Representation of the World as Education's Main Concern*) and, more extensively, in his *Allgemeine Pädagogik aus dem Zweck der Erziehung abgeleitet* (AP, 1806; *General Educational Theory, Developed from the Aim of Education*). In between, he presented his ideas on ethics in the *Allgemeine Practische Philosophie* (APP, 1808; *General Practical Philosophy*) and, in a chain of works, his empirical, scientific psychology the *Lehrbuch zur Psychologie* (*Textbook on Psychology*) that appeared in 1816, a rewritten edition in 1834, in which he repeatedly emphasizes that it is

a popularization and a shorthand of the main scientific work, i.e., the two-volume *Psychologie als Wissenschaft, neugegründet auf Erfahrung, Metaphysik und Mathematik* (*Psychology as Science, Refounded on Experience, Metaphysics and Mathematics*), which he published at his own cost in 1824 and 1825.

The psychological works of his Königsberg years are, as much as the practical philosophy developed in his first Göttingen period, permeated by Herbart's educational interest. The objective to understand the possibility and the process of education and to develop a theoretical and practical sound concept of education is the gist of his entire work.

In his practical philosophy, Herbart explicitly relates to Kant. He thinks that Kant's conception of practical reason is not educationally fruitful. As an alternative, Herbart develops his idea of *aesthetic judgment* and its development and its relation to ethical judgment. It is evident from the early work that ethical and educational theory converge, and it is in the discussion of Kant's theory of practical, ethical judgment that this unity is accounted for by Herbart. In the AD of 1804 – Kant's year of death – there is a 15-page explanation of what is a few years later, in the AP and the APP, spelled out in greater detail. It is Herbart's concern to form an idea of morality and freedom as *real possibilities*, in other words, as possibilities realizable in historical time, in contrast to the transcendental and universal character of the Kantian conception of morality and freedom. Herbart's concern is inherently educational: the concept of the ethical is presented in unity with the concept of its development over time in childhood and youth.

Herbart's difference with Kant should not blind us to a crucial similarity. Herbart agrees with Kant that morality should not be identified with prevailing, historically given moralities. Rather, the ethical judgment of the free, autonomous human subject is crucial (*Der Sittliche gebietet sich selbst*; AD, Herbart 1986, p. 62). However, when it comes to the matter of such judgment, Kant dismisses this question by turning immediately to its *form*, i.e., the formal generality of the categorical imperative that distinguishes practical

judgment from random arbitrariness. Herbart explicitly chooses a different route here. Kant distinguishes, in his Critiques, practical, ethical reason (*der praktischen Vernunft*) from aesthetical reason (*Urteilstkraft*, “power of judgment”), while first having distinguished pure, theoretical reason (*der reine Vernunft*). Herbart connects aesthetical and ethical judgment and emphasizes their shared comparative-deliberative character in which form and content are indissolubly connected.

The overall aim of education is *Tugend*, virtue, which is elucidated in practical philosophical terms: “Virtue is the development in a person of the idea of inner freedom into a persistent reality” (*Tugend ist (...) die in einer Person zur beharrlichen Wirklichkeit gediehene Idee der inneren Freiheit*, *Umriss*, section 8). Like the other practical philosophical ideas (such as benevolence and equity), this practical philosophical idea of “inner freedom” is about the relation between insight and will, *Einsicht und Wille*. The relation which pleases (*gefällt*, the outcome of a nondiscursive, rather contemplative deliberation; to behold is to see) in this case is that the will follows the insight. Insight and judgment are as such the outcome of deliberation and reflective distanciation. This is also the case when they are concerned with human will and action and, more in particular, with one’s own will and action in relation to those of other people – the matter of ethical judgment.

Deliberating and judging one’s own will and action implies a certain duplicity, an essential self-referentiality and reflexivity. This duplicity is an important theme in Herbart’s AP, where it is discussed as the distinction between “objective character” and “subjective character.” It can also already be discerned in the AD, for example, in this passage:

See to it that the pupil finds itself as choosing the good and rejecting the bad: this, and nothing else, is character education! This elevation to a self-conscious personality should without a doubt happen in the mind of the pupil itself and it should be executed by the pupil’s own activity; it would be nonsense for the educator to produce this essential power and pour it into the soul of the other being. (AD, Herbart 1986, p. 61)

This is an important educational thought: the activity of the child itself as crucial to its own development and education, in contrast with a formative activity on the part of the educator. Further, there is, in the opening phrase (“the pupil finds itself as choosing...”), the mentioned duplicity that Herbart shall later elaborate upon in his scientific psychology. This psychology, underestimated or even dismissed for a long time, is re-appreciated presently because of its remarkably topical concept of the unconscious. Herbart’s educational and psychological thought is as much intertwined as his educational and practical philosophical thought.

Already in the AP, there are instances of Herbart’s notably realistic sense of psychological phenomena. The intriguing distinction of objective and subjective character, in which an idea of the importance of the unconscious is assumed, is a good case in point:

It is an old complaint, that the human being often has as it were two souls. He observes himself, wants to grasp himself, like himself, guide himself. But already before this observation, when he is immersed in things and the outside world, he *has* a will and occasionally very specific character traits. These are the objective, which the observing subject either agrees or conflicts with, by a *newly* created will, produced in a completely different mood. (AP, Herbart 1986, p. 141)

The subjective character agrees with or disproves of what it finds in the objective character. Objective character shows in what one consistently wants, chooses, and avoids. There are many inclinations and they are not equally strong – there is an element of choice here. Persons can understand themselves from the direction of their own motives and preferences and arrive at a judgment about it – in this way, explicit maxims or principles arise. Rules and principles are a late product in the individual’s development and education; they evolve from reflection on previously formed preferences and inclinations.

The educational side of the idea of a self-conscious and reflective person that “finds itself as a judging and choosing being” is relevant: aesthetical (and ethical) judgment originates from a broad and balanced “circle of thoughts” (*Gedankenkreis*). Education mainly contributes to the aim of virtue along this line: rather than

forming the will, it is geared toward building up knowledge of the world and insight. It is not educationally wise to try to influence or build the pupil's character and morality directly by moralizing or preaching. This is “a sort of false economy” (*eine Art von falscher Ökonomie*, AP, Herbart 1986, p. 179) that wants to attain immediately something which can only be the outcome of a gradual development over time. It is educationally unwise to demand of children an instantaneous acceptance of and obedience to specific moral rules and values, instead of waiting for the development and the coming into existence of aesthetical and ethical judgment in educated persons themselves. Certainly, as children participate in the everyday life of the community, they can be expected to adjust here and now to the custom and rule of that community; this is part of what Herbart calls *Regierung* (“reign”). And there is a place for the direct, dyadic interaction between educator and pupil which Herbart labels *Zucht* (“discipline”). But in the main part of education, *erziehender Unterricht* (“intellectual education” or, better, “general education”), it is crucial to give time – to wait and see – and to educate the mind and thoughts to wait. The gradual establishment of a rich and balanced circle of thoughts is education's first and main issue. Aesthetical (and ethical) judgment will arise in due time from full, “completed” perception and representation of its object (*vollendeten Vorstellen ihren Gegenstandes*; AD, Herbart 1986, p. 63).

Herbart illustrates this by the example of hearing harmonic proportions in music. Suppose, he says, that the teacher is asked to furnish further evidence: he could only laugh and regret the obtuse ear that did not already perceive. In other words, one can sound the musical chord and let it be heard, but then the chord has to speak for itself. It is impossible to produce further arguments to back up the aesthetical judgment. This type of judgment springs from a completed perception; it is not the outcome of an argument or a line of reasoning. Aesthetical judgments are about perceptible proportions, be it in music (not about an isolated tone, but about various tones sounding simultaneously, chords, concords, discords) or in human affairs. Here, it is about relations between

human beings, comparative relations between what the one person does, or desires to do, and what the other does or desires to do, and also between the thinking and doing, insight and will, of each person individually. Here too, as in music, judgment arises from the completed, balanced perception of comparative relations in their full concreteness and detail.

The prime task of education is the “aesthetical representation of the world” (*aesthetische Darstellung der Welt*), the indirect contribution to the origination of aesthetical and ethical judgment, nourishing it by increasing the pupil's knowledge and understanding of the world, in which aesthetical proportions occur in ever-changing concrete configurations. Education's first concern is, therefore, what the perceived world will be like:

This world should be a rich, wide-open sphere full of varieties of life! (. . .) Such a revelation of the world – the *entire* world and *all* known ages – can rightly be called the main concern of education. (AD, Herbart 1986, p. 67)

Erziehender Unterricht is characterized by breadth and many-sidedness; in other words, it is a general, liberal education. It aims at the broadly interested and versatile mind that is eventually of ethical relevance. The person who is broad in mind, in knowledge and in thought, is also broad in desires and in interests (*wer viel kennt und denkt, der verlangt viel*; AD, Herbart 1986, p. 65). Whereas a restricted outlook, by its very one-sidedness, comes close to egoism: “The one-sided person approximates the egoist, even when he does not notice it himself, because he relates everything to the small circle of his own life and thought” (*Umriss*, section 63). The richer and fuller the world opened by education, the less one-sided and narrow-minded, and the more well-balanced, the judgments originating from the *Gedankenkreis* will be. This is why *erziehender Unterricht* should intentionally and methodically correct and complement one-sidedness that pupils have already acquired, more or less arbitrarily, in “experience and human association” (*Erfahrung und Umgang*) in the outside world and at home. Broadening horizons, or with Herbart's metaphor, opening all doors: “In order to intervene educationally in the existing thoughts and views

of the pupil, all doors should be opened to him” (*Damit der Unterricht in die vorhandenen Gedanken und Gesinnungen des Zöglings eingreife, müssen ihm allen Pforten geöffnet werden; Umriss*, section 36).

Again, time and reflection are relevant, as is clear from an idea in Herbart’s psychologically based, remarkably realistic didactics, viz., the idea of the “respiration of learning” (*geistige Respiration*; AP, Herbart 1986, p. 172). Neo-Herbartians interpreted the stages of learning (“clarity, association, system, method”) as a didactical method in the hands of teachers, but they are rather a characterization of the learner’s activity. It is one of the ways that Herbart drew attention to the importance of time in education. In the *Umriss*, he speaks about the “alternation of deepening and reflection” (*Wechsel der Vertiefung und Besinnung*; section 66): breadth and many-sidedness imply that this “many” is acquired successively and, subsequently, that it is connected, united in a balanced “circle of thoughts,” and thus truly appropriated. In his 1834 *Lehrbuch zur Psychologie*, this educational thought is also expressed: “the general requirement that deepening and reflection, as an intellectual respiration, should always alternate” (*die allgemeine Forderung, dass Vertiefung und Besinnung, gleich einer geistigen Respiration, stets mit einander abwechseln sollen*; 1965, p. 169).

As critical as he was of Kant’s idea of transcendental freedom is Herbart of the metaphysical idea of totalization, as developed by Hegel in Herbart’s days. It amounts to a “foolish forgetfulness of earthly boundedness” (*höriches Vergessen der irdischen Beschränktheit*), as Herbart formulates it in the concluding pages of the 1834 *Lehrbuch zur Psychologie* (1965, p. 196). Philosophy of history should “beware of the projection of a systematic totality onto the variety of historically known events and societies, as if the one were the necessary complement of the other and everything would connect into a single unity of the human spirit. All previous history is a beginning, of which the continuation cannot be predicted” (ib.). This is a good example of Herbart’s realistic sense of the historical and of the contingency of human existence. Both educational and political

practice work with moving and manageable forces (*bewegliche und lenksame Kräfte* (1965, p. 197)). They share the assumption that under certain circumstances and in due course, a permanent character can be gained – however, there are no necessities to build upon. “Iron necessity” is as much a detrimental illusion as absolute freedom is (1965, pp. 196–197). In education, one’s personal destination is eventually a matter of one’s own choice – but that choice itself is contextualized, therefore contingent. The occupation that the young person chooses for himself in his context can, therefore, be only an approximation of his true destination, one that the real society he lives in allows for (*sein Beruf, oder die Stellung und Wirksamkeit welche in der wirklichen Gesellschaft der Bestimmung möglichst ähnlich ist*, 1965, p. 198).

The relation between educational theory and practice that follows from this is given in Herbart’s idea of *tact*. Educational theory, however much scientifically informed, does not rob educators of their own judgment of their situation, but offers them insights with which they can improve their own practical deliberation and judgment. Tact consists in the power to judge situations of action. As every action situation is necessarily historical and therefore unique, it is not possible to deduce from theory how to act in actual practice. The situation itself always has to be judged on its own merit and in the light of its specific problems. Educational tact is the practitioner’s theoretically formed power of judgment. Theory does not produce ready-to-use recipes which educators might apply blindly, but sharpens, schools and directs the perception and interpretation of one’s own situation. The educator is never exempt from judging the practical situation, because no theory has ready-made answers for future historical situations on offer.

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Hermeneutic Philosophy

► Social Imaginaries: An Overview

Hermeneutics

► Hermeneutics and Educational Experience

Hermeneutics and Educational Experience

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Introduction

During its long history – in biblical research, in literary criticism, in legal studies – hermeneutics was an interpretative art which sought to avoid the kinds of misunderstandings that arise from rigid,

or hasty, or overly literal interpretations. Thus, an old rule of hermeneutics states that any part of a text must be understood in the context of the whole, but also that the whole must be understood in the context of its parts. This rule, which has helped to inspire various kinds of modern philosophical research, implies that there is unavoidably some circular interplay involved in coming to understand texts. Historically the term “texts” in hermeneutics referred mainly to important or influential documents such as scriptures, legal documents, or literary texts. Two main features distinguish contemporary hermeneutics from more traditional forms. Firstly, the circular movement of interpretation comes to be disclosed as an inescapable feature, not just of understanding texts, but of human understanding itself. Secondly, the scope of hermeneutics as a field of research undergoes a significant shift. It moves from an enquiry concerned with an understanding of texts to one concerned with investigating what happens when understanding itself takes place in human experience more widely, including the experience of carrying out research. These developments have made hermeneutics itself a major theoretical resource for research in the humanities and social sciences. The consequences of such developments for research on educational experience will be explored below.

Questioning the Standing of Theory

To make the exploration more illuminating it is worth adding a few comments at the start on the significance of the two features just described for the issue of research procedure, or for what is frequently called the “theoretical standing” of research activity. In relation to the issue of circularity, the kind of understanding that merits the status of “research understanding” undergoes an important change. Without losing its critical focus on the question or data being investigated, it now pays more systematic attention to the context the researcher herself/himself brings to the enquiry. In particular it puts the spotlight on the nature of the assumptions that invariably reside in that context – e.g., biases of a gendered, ethnic,

religious, social class or other kind. Here the notion of research as certainty tends to lose anything like an unquestionable authority or absolute finality. A research outlook, or theoretical stance, that is disciplined by hermeneutic awareness grants a procedural priority not to certainty, but to the more provisional notion of justified warrant; a warrant that remains open to further criticism and revision. On this account, what may reasonably lay claim to such warrant can be summarized as follows: the argument or theory which offers openly the best fruits of its own disciplined efforts but which can also withstand the kind of critique that seeks to be as non-parochial and as well-informed as it can be. In relation to the second issue – the broadening scope of hermeneutics itself – it is not surprising that the expansion of hermeneutics into the main currents of ontology, epistemology and ethics has given rise to new questions within these domains themselves, indeed to new questioning *of* the domains themselves. In particular, any claims by ontology or metaphysics to have achieved a magisterial vantage point are called into question. Similarly called into question is any kind of epistemology which insists on absolute, as distinct from provisional notions of objectivity or certainty.

Hermeneutics as Philosophy

Broadly speaking then, two key ideas mark the transition from traditional hermeneutics to philosophical hermeneutics: that of a *circular interplay* rather than a linear logic in human understanding itself and that of *inescapable limitations* in human understanding itself. This transition is associated chiefly with the researches of Martin Heidegger and Hans-Georg Gadamer. Heidegger's critique in *Being and Time* (Heidegger 2008, first published in 1926) of the "essence" of human being (*Dasein*) unsettled the presuppositions on which centuries of traditional understandings of being were based. He shifted the emphasis of enquiry from "being" as a *what* with certain "properties" to the verbal sense of the word: i.e., to a kind of being *who* is from the start a being-in-the-world. What was definitive moreover in Heidegger's

ontology was that this is a being for *whom* his or her own being-in-the-world is the issue (Heidegger 2008, Section 9). "Being" is no longer associated with changeless essence, and essence itself (*Wesen*) is understood as "to be": a self-understanding that is *to be* thought about, decided upon, neglected, renewed, etc. in one's encounters with an unfolding historical world.

In carrying through this major shift, Heidegger focused with a new incisiveness on what he described as the "circle" at play within the historicity of human understanding in all of its modes, not just in that involved in understanding texts. Here he brought hermeneutics out from the domain of textual criticism and into what he called "fundamental ontology" (p. 32). In illustrating the play of prior influences in all understanding he broke radically with epistemology. He rejected epistemology's mistaken insistence on separating understanding from interpretation. Heidegger argued that this "circle," or interplay, is anything but a vicious circle. He emphasized that interpretations, always influenced by the interpreter's "fore-conceptions," remain integral to all acts of understanding and that in the circle itself lies an overlooked possibility of "the most primordial kind of knowing" (*B&T*, §32). In order however to realize this possibility, critical attention would have to be paid not only to what the interpreter was attempting to understand but also to the interpreter's own "fancies" and "popular conceptions," to the preconceptions that remain ever active in steering such attempts. "Primordial knowing" of this kind would be very different from what philosophy traditionally regarded as absolute knowledge. As Paul Ricoeur succinctly put it in one of his many essays on hermeneutics:

"It is because absolute knowledge is impossible that the conflict of interpretations is insurmountable and inescapable" (Ricoeur 1981, p. 193).

The new paths opened by Heidegger were developed in a major way by Gadamer's researches. In these researches hermeneutics becomes something much more significant than a method for systematically interpreting texts. Rather, as *philosophical* hermeneutics, it proceeds from a recognition of the point that interpretation

cannot finally be overcome and replaced by objective knowledge. Against the claims of classical epistemology that anything less than a certainty cleansed of all bias is a deficiency, philosophical hermeneutics stresses the point that interpretative understanding is humankind's inescapable way of experiencing a world. There may be better and worse efforts at understanding, but all such efforts involve some element of interpretation from the start. Human understanding is thus constituted less by the rational autonomy of critical consciousness than by a rationality that is itself unavoidably interpretative, whether vigilantly so or not. (See also the entry on ► [Gadamer and the Philosophy of Education](#)).

Philosophical hermeneutics has thus provided an understanding of human rationality which is quite different from how rationality has been understood in traditional Western philosophy – including both metaphysics and epistemology. It has given up the pretensions to absolute knowledge that characterized many centuries of metaphysics. It has given up the quest for unshakeable foundations for certain knowledge associated with classical epistemology. It has focused in a special way on the relationship between the predisposed self-understanding of the interpreter and the active character of everything that addresses that understanding. This “everything” could include the reading of a text, the experience of a debate, the conduct of an experiment, and, not least, the presentations of a teacher. Pursuing the educational implications of this, it must be remembered that teachers are interpreters and learners just as much as pupils or students are, albeit at a different level of experience.

Educational Experience

A hermeneutically disciplined understanding, on this account, would be particularly important for how educational experience is to be understood, and in particular for educational research. Firstly, it would disclose in each instance the advent of the unexpected in what the learner, or interpreter, is attempting to understand. This is often called the

“object of learning.” But such a reified term beclouds the point that this “object,” whether in science, history, languages, or whatever, is itself an active field of enquiry, continually in need of newcomers, as distinct from being a store of inert knowledge or ready-made skills. Secondly, a hermeneutic view of educational experience would shed light on the more subtle, or overlooked dimensions of the joint situation where a teacher has a leadership responsibility in seeking with students to understand something new. Previously undetected biases, as well as new insights, might thus be progressively disclosed about both learner and teacher and about what addresses the efforts of each. These disclosures might be surprising, or disquieting, or satisfying, or inspiring, or otherwise challenging. There is a strong parallel here with Dewey's remarks on “collateral learning” in his late work *Experience and Education* (1938/1991). “Perhaps the greatest of all pedagogical fallacies,” Dewey writes, “is the notion that a person learns only the particular thing he is studying at the time.” The attitudes that the student learns collaterally, but in an often unobserved way, may be much more significant in the longer term. “The most important attitude to cultivate” Dewey observes, “is the desire to go on learning.” (Dewey 1991, p. 48). The parallel between a hermeneutic and a Deweyan perspective here gives a particular ethical orientation to experience that is properly educational in character. The remainder of this article will seek to elucidate this ethical orientation a little more. A good way to start is by considering possible difficulties or objections.

If preconceptions play an inescapable part in all instances of human understanding, isn't every act of understanding likely to be something of a misunderstanding? How would one distinguish a form of understanding that brings a change for the better rather than a change for the worse in this connection? The short answer to the first of these questions is “yes,” but a yes that discloses unforeseen insights rather than bringing enquiry to an abrupt end. Gadamer's approach to such questions is to emphasize what he calls “the dialogue that we are / *das Gespräch das wir sind*” (Gadamer 1989, p. 378). To explain, the world experienced by humans is constituted by a totality

of influences, a totality that is ever changing and that is itself made possible through the articulations of multiple literatures, sciences, religions, musics, politics, and so on. In no two individuals is the range of such influences, including salient and minor influences, likely to be identical. Each individual moreover experiences only a tiny slice, a very partial slice, of such influences. “Partial” here should be understood in both senses of the word: firstly, incomplete; secondly, affected by bias. This double limitation is a feature of the human condition itself (again, some resonances with Dewey, also with Popper, later Wittgenstein and others), and the ethical orientation it signals for educational endeavor is likewise twofold. Firstly there is an acknowledgement of the provisional character of the fruits of even the most advanced accomplishments of human intellect. Secondly, and arising from this acknowledgement, there is a certain *conversational imperative*. What I mean by this is an openness to critique, a desire to further one’s best understanding of the matter to date by seeking informed perspectives from others. This provides fresh impetus for advances to be made in an educational journey; one of seeking, listening, experimenting, reconsidering, and so on. But crucially, this conversational imperative of educational experience includes a recognition that the journey itself is unfinished, and probably unfinishable, as far as humans are concerned.

Such an ethical orientation steers clear of any and all conceptions of a final truth that human reason might authoritatively seek to claim as knowledge. It conceives *educational* experience instead as being ever “on the way” to truth. Where the quality of that educational experience is concerned, this orientation gives a pedagogical priority to questions over answers, to attentive listening over assured assertion, to the openness of enquiry over the finality of pronouncement. This is not to say that one would have to abandon here one’s previous convictions. Hermeneutics itself would argue that such an abandonment would be far from self-transparent and could only be partial, even at best. Rather it means a willingness to place at risk in one’s engagements with others the claim to truth in these underlying

convictions. Such engagements include, not least, the engagements of teaching and learning. Reference should be made here to the early Socratic dialogues of Plato, for instance *Euthyphro*, *Gorgias*, *Protagoras*, *Apology*. The combination of critique and self-critique embodied in the standpoint of the Socrates depicted in these works anticipates much of the ethical perceptiveness and ontological cast of Gadamer’s “dialogue that we are.” A hermeneutic reading of these early works of Plato also reveals the Socratic origins of what I have called above the conversational imperative of educational experience.

In his major work *Truth and Method* (1960/1989) Gadamer was frequently less than explicit in drawing the more far-reaching consequences of his arguments; consequences that are radical for how educational experience is to be understood. This inexplicitness has led to a range of criticisms. The early criticisms came from opposite perspectives. On the one hand, by Habermas and others he was charged with conservatism. The heart of this charge is that philosophical hermeneutics privileges the claims of “tradition,” with all its institutionalized exclusions and unacknowledged inequities, to the neglect of the claims of critique. On the other hand, the relativist charge of “radical historicism” was made against Gadamer’s hermeneutics by critics such as E.D. Hirsch (1962) and E. Betti (1967). Some authors writing from post-modern perspectives have mistakenly sought to dismiss what they have termed the “hermeneutics of meaning” (Lyotard 1984), or “deep hermeneutics” (Dreyfus and Rabinow 2014), as some kind of teleological “grand narrative,” or some kind of metaphysical grasp for comfort.

Gadamer’s debate with Habermas has borne many fruits. A critical focus and an emphasis on practice are more in evidence in Gadamer’s later writings. Habermas’s later writings, for their part, engage in forms of critique that are much more hermeneutically alert than his earlier writings. Against his other critics Gadamer has never failed to point to the “scientific” (*wissenschaftlich*) nature of his researches. These others include those who are conservatively disposed like Hirsch and Betti, or those postmodern writers who erroneously regard hermeneutics as some kind of

latter-day metaphysics. His researches, Gadamer insists, are not concerned with the defense or advocacy of one or other unscientific commitments, but with something that is properly empirical: the “integrity of acknowledging the commitment involved in all understanding.” His concern, he explains, is “not what we do or ought to do, but what happens to us above our wanting and doing” (Gadamer 1989, p. xxviii). In one of his later writings (“Reflections on my Philosophical Journey,” 1996), Gadamer again stresses the point that what he means by “tradition” is nothing conservative, or indeed pristine. Rather, tradition signifies the open-endedness of the totality of inheritances that constitutes a humanly experienced world:

For we live in what has been handed down to us, and this is not just a specific region of our experience of the world, specifically what we call the ‘cultural tradition’ . . . No, it is the world itself which is communicatively experienced and continually entrusted (*traditur*) to us as an infinitely open task. It is never the world as it was on its first day, but as it has come down to us (p. 29).

Evident in these quotations from Gadamer is an investigative or “empirical” emphasis that disavows the kind of metaphysics that claimed superiority for centuries over other forms of learning. But it also disavows the empiricism of the skeptical philosophy that came to challenge such metaphysics in the eighteenth century. For instance, the hermeneutic notion of a conversational imperative reveals (contra David Hume) how an “ought,” or ethical orientation, can quite naturally arise from an “is” – i.e., from an uncovering of the predisposed nature of human understanding itself. With hindsight one can readily see that Hume’s empiricist philosophy needed to be empirical in a more radical sense in its own efforts to disclose the nature of human understanding.

These remarks highlight the importance of what Gadamer and others have called the *universality* of the hermeneutical in human understanding, including theoretical forms of understanding promoted by research. Far from imposing a uniformity of interpretation on educational experience, this universality is captured in Gadamer’s

own phrase: “we understand in a different way if we understand at all” (Gadamer 1989, p. 297). Attentiveness to these differences – of sensibility, of conviction, of cultural orientation, and so on – reveals the ethical tenor of philosophical hermeneutics as one that is both critical and ecumenical, conservationist and radical, inclusionary and pluralist, progressive and unfinished. It embodies a sense of universality which is not an a priori one but one which is constituted in the to-and-fro of dialogue itself and which remains open to further criticism and revision. Authors who have taken a critically hermeneutic stance to Gadamer’s own work have variously described this as an “interactive universalism” (Benhabib 1992) or as a “constitutive universal” (Ricoeur 1981). This kind of universality differs then from the “totalitarian” universality that postmodern authors criticize and shun. Like the conversational imperative considered earlier, such a universality now emerges as a practical necessity for educational experience. This is all the more pertinent if teaching and learning are to be conducted not only in a genuinely fruitful way but also with a defensible warrant amid the plurality of humankind, locally or globally.

Cross-References

► [Gadamer and the Philosophy of Education](#)

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History of Philosophy of Sport

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Introduction

Numerous longer and more in-depth histories of the philosophy of sport have been written in the last five years. Seven articles in the 2010(2) *The Journal of Philosophy of Sport* were dedicated to the history of sport philosophy around the world: all of which built on Kretchmar's earlier work on the philosophy of sport history in North America (1997). Two specific and very good short histories of philosophy of sport can be found in Torres' *The Bloomsbury Companion to the Philosophy of Sport* (2014) and McNamee and Morgan's *Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Sport* (2014).

The present discussion of the history of the philosophy of sport will not revisit what has already been written; rather, the focus will be an overview of the political history and concomitant culture of physical education and athletics and give perspective of how these programs and activities influenced the development of the scholarly study of philosophy of sport.

What Is Philosophy of Sport?

To do philosophy of sport is to ponder about human interaction with play, game, and sport.

Typical philosophical questions pertaining to sport may lie in the nature of things (i.e., metaphysics) such as: What are the necessary and sufficient conditions of sport? What relations and distinctions are apparent among play, game, and sport? Or who are we as we play a sport? A different question may have to do with the value of sport, play, and games, i.e., “Does play develop character and virtue? Does play lead one to the meaning of life? What is good about sport? What values exist through play?” Yet a different question has to do with how and what we learn as we play a game or sport (epistemology), “What do we know when we play a game?” And yet another sort of question might be what is beautiful, ugly, artistic, sensual, and good (aesthetics)? “Why and how is sport aesthetic? What is the historical basis of the philosophy of sport?” (Kretchmar 1997; Morgan and Meier 1995). Though the questions above are notably a modern interpretation of the philosophic purpose of sport, these sorts of questions or variations of them have existed as long as humans have participated in play and sport.

Philosophical discussion surrounding sport historically is linked to virtue and athleticism and is older than a Western concept of sport. Reid (2011) wrote well about the historical philosophical statements that can be found in the athletic feats of kings and pharaohs in early Egypt and Mesopotamia. Later the notion of training virtue through athletic practice can be found in the writings of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle and then through the Roman writings of Lucretius, Seneca, and Marcus Aurelius (Reid 2011).

Sport philosophy cannot be understood in the modern age outside of the parameters of the history of physical education. Gerber (1971) wrote a seminal text and chronicled the history of physical education as well as its relationship to athletics from the Greek period, through the Renaissance, to European Influence, to the USA. She also covered important writers who discussed the meaning and importance of activity and even what and how activity should be accomplished. Throughout her writings she discusses philosophy of the body as a means of exercise, health, fitness, and preparation for war. Often these writings are dismissed as not being true

philosophy in the modern sense, however, such a point of view limits our understanding of history. Gerber’s work focuses on the philosophical importance of these writers in relationship to physical education.

With this being said, there is a rich history of writers from the ancient period to the modern age. In North America, the historical beginning of modern academic sport philosophy, as we know it today, is tied to the late 1800s discussion of the purpose, principles, and philosophy of physical education and athletics, as well as a debate in the mid-1950s about the relevancy of physical education as an academic discipline in colleges and universities.

North American Physical Education

The story begins in 1861 when a physician physical educator began a professional journey to bring systematic physical education instruction to universities and colleges. Edward Hitchcock, appointed Professor of Hygiene and Physical Education at Amherst College in Massachusetts, was the first and only such professor until 1879. Hitchcock was the first doctor-physical educator in the world and the first to unite medicine and school physical education (Gerber 1971). He would not be the last – it became a trend to hire physician physical educators – and if any university or college was incorporated around the same period, its own history will note the hiring of these same credentialed individuals.

Harvard’s Dudley Allen Sargent’s pioneering work from 1879 using anthropometric measurement bluntly informed the world that young college educated men were woefully unfit; his work in curriculum development supported by measurement research became a standard for the physical development of college students. Sargent did not stop with his own students or his program at Harvard, he instituted a Harvard Summer School of Physical Education, as well as a physical education preparation program called the Sargent School for Physical Education. His work was probably the most influential and philosophical since it focused on what programs should

be. Again, if one were to pursue the archives of US universities, Sargent-trained educators would be in evidence.

Other important educators of the period included individuals who championed physical education across the USA and around the world, for example, Nils Posse (introduced Swedish gymnastics), Edmund Mussey Hartwell (defined the profession), Delphine Hanna (learned from Sargent and Posse and taught Thomas Wood, Luther Halsey Gulick, Jesse Feiring William, Jay Nash, and many more), William Gilbert Anderson (invited all of the notables to start an Association for the Advancement of Physical Education), Robert Tait McKenzie (sculptor, artist, and physical educator, offered great art about the ideal man), Luther Halsey Gulick (organized the Academy of Physical Education, the prestigious invited group of physical educators, researchers, and writers of the field, still in existence today), Thomas Denison Wood (organized an academic program at Stanford that gave physical education the same standing as other subject matter), Clark Hetherington (acted as a modern philosopher of physical education), Jay Nash (took the concept of play to its broadest connotations to the life experience of children and adults), Charles McCloy (led movement for increased research, focused his work on “physical rather than educational”), and Jesse Feiring Williams (wrote more philosophically and completely about physical education since “Plato”) (Gerber 1971).

None of these curriculums existed in a vacuum and focused only on “activity.” These influential physical educators asked what should be the purpose of physical education? Is the physical separate from the mind? What is the role of physical education in the greater education experience? What principles and philosophy should guide these programs? These questions mirrored the times in which progressive reformers took aim at an educational system that was sedentary and exclusive of any physical activity (Kretchmar 1997).

Soon college educators would gather to form an organization to discuss the merits of physical education, the curriculum, and the principles to guide such a program. In 1885, the Association

for the Advancement of Physical Education was formed and with it early physical educators debated the philosophy and principles that should guide and mentor curriculum within physical education and athletics and that debate continued for more than 50 years. Noted individuals mentioned above wrote passionately and extensively about what they thought physical activity should be in all educational settings.

Kretchmar (1997) has argued that these writers, though well intentioned, did not “do philosophy,” rather they “were more interested in sport, dance, exercise, play, and games as vehicles for education than as phenomena in their own right” (p. 188). Not to disagree with Kretchmar, but they did philosophy as they knew it – they addressed the pressing issues of the times and how and why physical activity should be. They also discussed and argued the link of education to physical education, i.e., education of the physical or education through the physical.

An ancillary philosophic issue throughout this period was the role of college athletics. Many did not believe athletics should be associated with physical education programs; others however believed the opposite, athletics should be a laboratory of what is learned in physical education.

Athletics in the USA began as early as 1852 as student-run activities, but it wasn’t long until colleges and universities realized the problems and potentials of such programs. It was argued that students did not have the capacity to manage such programs and universities needed to manage competition to control corruption. Perhaps it was for such ideal purposes, but Smith (2010) argued it was more to control and capture the amount of cash that ticket sales were bringing in. As is typical of universities, when athletics was subsumed into the academy it was placed into an academic unit to be managed, and that unit was the fledgling department of physical education. To give credence to athletics, early philosophers of physical education noted that athletics was a laboratory for physical activity, see Jesse Feiring Williams (Organization and Administration of Physical Education, 1922) and Thomas Wood and Rosaline Cassidy (The New Physical Education, 1927). Athletics and physical education were married

into a pseudo curriculum unit supported by a philosophy that argued for the benefits of competition and physical activity, i.e., sports, for students.

In these early years, large numbers of male students participated in athletics coached by men who were physical educators and coaches. Women were not necessarily in athletics, but were offered physical activity through dance programs and even play and recreational sport competitive experiences usually managed and lead by women physical educators through student organizations such as the Women's Recreation Association. Administrators of these programs were typically educated and influenced by the major philosophic writers of the period of time including Wood and Cassidy, Hetherington (*School Programs in Physical education*, 1922), McCoy (*Philosophical Bases for Physical Education*, 1940), and Feiring Williams. For over much of 80 years, they debated whether physical education was through the body or of the body. Athletics was supported through the belief that competition builds character. The women debated whether girls and women should compete, and they generally decided it was not good form either physically or socially. These disagreements between the men and women, plus social concern about men and women studying together, resulted in separate departments of physical education with separate buildings, separate administrations, and even separate and unique philosophies that guided their curriculum and preparation. Women physical educator writers focused on principles applied to women's issues of the times and spoke eloquently for a different model of sport competition and physical activity for women and established their own organization the Division of Girls and Women's Sports and eventually the AIAW (Association of Intercollegiate Athletics for Women) (Stoll and VanMullen 2014).

Sometime in the late 1890s and early 1900s, academic majors in physical education appeared in colleges and universities across the USA, and those majors were directed toward developing teachers of physical education and male coaches in schools throughout the USA. The philosophy of physical education was thus also projected

toward why physical education was important as well as offering principles as to how physical education and athletics should be managed and what curriculum should be offered.

1950 Conant's Challenge

All was well until debate swelled about the place of professional programs in universities and colleges. James Conant, president of Harvard University in 1963, criticized the preparation of American teachers in his *The Education of American Teachers* and even though his text only had a few paragraphs about physical education, those few paragraphs had a major effect on those individuals who were teaching and writing in the field.

Some writers argue that Conant's affect may not have been so noteworthy, but those who were in the educational system of the time know otherwise. Twietmeyer (2012) argues the "tenuous and contested nature of the discipline's philosophy foundations" were insecure and there was no direct confrontation by Conant. Perhaps, but the profession felt in great jeopardy – perhaps because Conant's book was generally read by administrators who also questioned the academic worth of physical education.

Whatever the case, there was a direct response from Franklin Henry, a respected professor of physical education at Southern California who argued for a discipline. The profession responded so powerfully and swiftly to Conant and Henry's short academic piece that a major change occurred to curriculum and preparation in physical education as well as professorial expectations (Sage 2013).

Unfortunately the major change that occurred also moved athletics out of the laboratory of physical education into its own department or commercial program – without academic ties to any department in the university. In the USA, this decision has had far-reaching negative ramifications for athletes, coaches, and the institution. Women athletics left the AIAW for the NCAA (National Collegiate Athletic Association), and the women physical education fears became reality – women's programs mirror the men's

competitive programs, and fewer and fewer women are involved in coaching and administration. Discussions about ethics, principles, and the philosophy of the organization and administration of athletics ceased. Philosophy of sport is NOT done within athletic departments, because coaches are seldom if ever professors of physical education. The discussions about philosophic issues moved elsewhere to academic disciplines such as sociology or history of sport. These discussions have affected little in the practice of athletics.

By the late 1960s, physical education professors needed an academic discipline, a body of knowledge that had theoretical roots and a research agenda. They had *no choice*; administrators actually forced them to either research and publish or leave to athletics or just leave. Those professionals who were focused toward writing about principles of physical education and athletics had to make a directional change in their writings as well as how they wrote and how they thought about activity. A very few did, the rest chose a different subdiscipline, sociology, literature, history of sport, or just retired from the profession.

It is important to note that the upsurge that occurred caught the physical education professionals in a catch 22 situation – they really hadn't been trained or educated in the greater discipline. This was true for all physical educators whether they saw themselves as sport sociologists, sport historians, or in this case philosophy. Now they were calling themselves sport philosophers instead of physical educators. As a subdiscipline – what was the body of knowledge to be studied? Some writing did exist that was philosophical and directed toward sport in general, i.e., Metheny, *Connotations of Movement in Sport and Dance*, 1965; Harold Slusher, *Man, Sport and Existence*, 1967, plus a very important work by Paul Weiss, *Sport: A Philosophic Inquiry*, 1969.

It is at this juncture where fate and individual choice made a difference in future direction.

The year was 1970 and no organization existed for “philosophers” of sport and no specialized journal existed. Three programs did exist at universities to train sport philosophers, i.e., Illinois

with Earle Zeigler, USC with Metheny and Slusher, and Seymour Kleinman at the Ohio State University. Also there was a unique program at the State University of New York, College at Brockport, where under the deanship of Warren Fraleigh, six sport philosophy-trained individuals taught six different courses exclusively devoted “to philosophic content and inquiry” (Kretchmar 1997, p. 192).

Philosophy of Sport

Kretchmar (1997) gives a play-by-play analysis of how the professionals of the period, Weiss, Fraleigh, Gerber, moved to establish a professional organization that had its first meeting in 1972 and its first conference in 1973. The society, titled Philosophic Society for the Study of Sport, immediately founded a professional scholarly publication, *The Journal of the Philosophy of Sport* (see iaps.net). The purpose of the society was to foster interchange and scholarship among those interested in the scholarly study of sport. The Society changed its name to the International Association of the Philosophy of Sport in 2001. This organization has been the root from which scholarly organizations have bloomed throughout the world, including Europe, Asia, and South America. Though the membership of IAPS is not large, there is a determined, energetic, and scholarly group that continues writing and writing well – many of these individuals are consultants for major global sport organizations (See IAPS.net). Unfortunately, even though it is a respected disciplinary study in graduate programs around the world, philosophy of sport courses have disappeared from undergraduate physical education, sport science curriculum in the USA; and this trend is not unique to the USA. The reason is tangled, but the answer rests with convincing the greater disciplines of sport science, exercise science, and physical education of philosophy of sport's importance to their disciplines. With that being said, the scholars continue their writing and offer important, thought-provoking scholarship concerning sport and competition.

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History of Teacher Education

► [Teacher Education at the Intersection of Educational Sciences](#)

Hobbes and Philosophy of Education

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Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) is generally regarded as the founder of English moral and political philosophy. His most important work was *Leviathan* (1651), in which he offers a version of contract theory. One way in which obedience to the Sovereign can be attained, according to Hobbes, is by education (Marshall 1980). However, Hobbes

may be interpreted here as offering a form of governmentality* as his form of education can be seen as a method for ensuring that people come to accept the authority of the Sovereign.

Hobbes’ political theory is based upon a kind of contract theory in which, to avoid a life in the state of nature, a stable society or Commonwealth must be established. This society, outlined in *Leviathan*, requires people to relinquish to the Sovereign (a person or persons) their right to decide what is in their best interests. The Sovereign, imbued with reason, makes the laws which must be obeyed, except in the case of self-defense. But why should people obey the Sovereign? First, according to Hobbes, because it would be unjust – i.e., doing something which one had forgone the right to do. But, second, if people were correctly educated, then reason would dictate to them why they should obey the Sovereign.

The Sovereign is judge of what is necessary for the peace and defense of the State, including being the judge of what hinders or disturbs these ends, of the ways of obtaining these ends, and of the opinions men hold. Actions proceed from opinions according to Hobbes, and, if peace is to be obtained and maintained, then men’s opinions must be well governed. Thus, the Sovereign has the duty and the power not only to decide what “doctrines and opinions are averse, and what conducing to peace,” but also to ensure “what men are to be trusted . . . in speaking to the multitudes of people; and who shall examine the doctrines of all books before they be published. For doctrine repugnant to peace can no more be true, than peace and concord can be against the law of nature” (*Leviathan*, EW, III, p. 169).

On obedience to the Sovereign and education, Hobbes appears to generate a paradox. On the one hand, he argues for absolute power, absolute obedience, censorship, and the suppression of opposed beliefs and teachers thereof, and on the other hand, he states explicitly that it is the duty of the Sovereign to educate the people on political matters. Education, it might be thought, might be incompatible with absolute obedience, censorship, and the suppression of opposed beliefs and persons holding or teaching such beliefs. If education could lead to such beliefs, then instead of

obeying, the Sovereign subjects might revolt. Hence, education could lead to a state of war. Yet peace is the overriding concern of Hobbes' political theory. There is something of a paradox then as what is said about the duty of the citizen, namely, obligation, which seems to be inconsistent with the duty of the Sovereign, namely, education; if the Sovereign desires peace, then one cannot educate, whereas if one desires education, then one cannot ensure peace.

Hobbes states explicitly that the Sovereign does have duties of an educational nature in these areas. Thus, while the Sovereign is responsible primarily for the safety of people, "safety" is not to be interpreted as "bare preservation" but rather as "general providence," "...contained in public instruction both of doctrine and example." As it was contrary to the Sovereign's duty to relinquish any aspect of his power and authority, so also was it against his duty, "to let the people be ignorant, or misinformed of the grounds, and reasons of those his essential rights; because thereby men are easy to be seduced, and drawn to resist him..." (*Leviathan*, EW, III, p. 323).

However, instruction, teaching, and learning can all take place without being educational (that is, if one holds a concept of "education" which does not cover any change whatsoever in behavior). In order to decide whether this instruction was educational, we would need to know more about Hobbes' specific proposals.

When he discusses the particular details of what should be taught as part of the Sovereign's duty, he mentions such things as: not to be in love with any form of government which they see in neighboring States, not to be led by fellowmen, not to dispute the Sovereign's power, to honor their parents, and not to harm others (*ibid.*, p. 326), but it is unclear whether Hobbes is talking about the development of favorable attitudes, which is compatible with development through fear of adverse consequences, or of favorable attitudes to be developed from and as a result of reasoning.

This ambiguity reoccurs in a similar passage (*ibid.*, p.327):

they ought to be informed, how great a fault it is to speak evil of the Sovereign representative, whether one man, or an assembly of men, or to

argue and dispute his power; or any way to use his name irreverently, whereby he may be brought into contempt with his people and their obedience, in which the safety of the commonwealth consisteth, slackened...

In order that people can "...hear those their duties told them and the positive laws, such as generally concern them all read and expounded" (*loc cit.*), Hobbes suggested that a special day should be set aside for this education. Laws and duties are to be told and read - hardly education. Yet, on the other hand, they are to be expounded and the people must come to know and understand "the grounds and reasons of these his essential rights" (*ibid.*). That sounds more like education.

Hobbes believed that *Leviathan* revealed knowledge of man and his social organization which was of a scientific kind - but we must know what Hobbes meant by scientific. Here, he was influenced by the physician Harvey who had in turn been influenced by Galileo (Watkins 1973). An idea common to all three was that if we are to understand something, we must first take it apart or resolve it. In Galileo's hands, the motion of a projectile is broken down or resolved into principles of horizontal and vertical motion: for Harvey, it is literally dissection. Starting from sensible wholes, one proceeds by dissections to the discovery of activating principles or causes. Once the nature of the sensible whole has been ascertained, then the whole is literally put together again or recomposed. It is essentially this view of science, - resolve, idealize, compose - that underlies Hobbes' thought. Science, he says (*De Corpore*, EW I, p.26.):

...is the knowledge we acquire, by true ratiocination, of appearances, or apparent effects, from the knowledge we have of some possible production or generation of the same; and of such production as has been or may be, from the knowledge we have of the effects.

The method of "true" ratiocination (*loc cit.*) "is either compositive or resolute, or partly compositive and partly resolute. And the resolute is commonly called analytical method as the compositive is called synthetical."

Analytical method is seen by as the method by which one comes to understand and to arrive at definitions (*ibid.*, p.69):

For example, if there be propounded a conception or idea of some singular thing, as of a square, this square is to be resolved into a plane, terminated with a certain number of equal and straight lines and right angles. For by this resolution we have these things universal or agreeable to all matter, namely, *line, plane* (which contains *surfaces*), *terminated, angle, straightness, rectitude and equality*; and if we can find out the causes of these, we may compound them altogether into the causes of a square (and) ...by resolving continuously we may come to know what those things are.

Thus, the analytical method is concerned to arrive at definitions. We understand what things are when we have the definition. The method is to subsume particular under universal and universal under universal, and thereby arrive at universal terms of the widest generality, e.g., “body” and “motion.”

Synthesis for Hobbes is the deduction of the consequences from certain primary propositions which essentially are the definitions arrived at by analysis. To this extent, there are explicit parallels to logical and geometrical systems.

In presenting his views, Hobbes placed greater emphasis on deduction and *composition* than either Galileo or Harvey who were more concerned, perhaps, to give a detailed account of how they had arrived at their primary propositions. Galileo had been more concerned with logical or mathematical deduction; Harvey, however, believed that in piecing a biological whole together, some account should be given of its biological history and thus presumably of how changes and adaptations in a species had assisted in its survival or even in its flourishing.

It is this latter aspect of composition which Hobbes appears to take from Harvey and which makes his account of political organization in *Leviathan* not strictly deductive from his primary principles. Hobbes’ starting point is a sick society. He resolves, idealizes, and composes to arrive by a genetic-historical-deductive trail not at a sick society but, rather, at a regenerated society – the *Commonwealth*.

Apart from his genetic-historical trail of composition, considerable weight is thrown on the primary propositions or definitions. Hobbes says that a person who refuses to accept these primary

propositions is in the position of refusing to be taught (*Leviathan*, E.W.III, p. 73f). These propositions can be explained, or they can be “caused” by the senses (e.g., motion can cause us to acquire the concept of motion). The primary propositions are also like imperatives. Hobbes believed that people really *knew* these imperatives even if they were not aware of them. The teacher has to make the primary propositions and imperatives clear, and if these procedures were followed, then obligation to obey the Sovereign would occur through education.

Whether or not we agree with Hobbes’ *Commonwealth*, or with his view of education, it is clear that he is offering an account of *how* citizens can be obliged to follow the laws of society. For Foucault, traditional political philosophy, theories of the State, and studies inspired by Marxism concerning class domination give us answers to the question, “Who exercises power?,” but such answers require at the same time a further resolution. He argues that simultaneously we must answer the accompanying and intertwined question “How does it happen?”. His answers to this question are to be found in his account of *governmentality* (Foucault 1979).

In his accounts of governmentality, Foucault places much stress upon the subject’s refusal to be subjected. But, given that power can only be exercised upon a free agent, and not upon a slave in chains, and that for Foucault, freedom must be continuously exercised if it is not to be lost, then the liberty of the subject is an important presupposition of the exercise of freedom. Thereby, one can see why refusing to be subjected or subordinated must be associated with attaining and maintaining liberty. Foucault’s genealogy of liberty, from the heretical practices of dissenting religious sects in the time of the Reformation to the Enlightenment, may then be seen as establishing the historical importance of insubordination as a means of preserving liberty. As the liberty of the subject is a presupposition of exercising freedom, it becomes also a presupposition of ethics for Foucault. Somewhat paradoxically it would seem, insubordination, or refusing to be subjected, becomes a necessary aspect of ethics.

In his response to Kant's "What is Enlightenment?" (Foucault 1984), Foucault sees enlightenment itself as being an attitude toward the present. According to Foucault, what we have lost in Kant's message of Enlightenment is his message of maturity and its attainment through the critical use of reason. While Foucault disagrees here with Kant's universal notion of reason, he agrees that theory must be critical. He also applauds Kant for addressing actual features of the period of his existence and designating a form of modernity where self-awareness and norms must be created out of themselves. To accept the authority of others here was for Kant to be in a state of immaturity and to accept a form of self-imposed tutelage. Maturity required knowledge therefore of the self and whether one was subjected in forms of tutelage. Foucault also applauds Kant's challenge to know and to exercise reason publicly (an audacious stand in the times of Frederick II).

Enlightenment for Foucault and Kant requires then both self-awareness and a certain attitude toward the authority of others. For Kant it was immature and unenlightened to accept that authority and to be subjected, to be in a position of self-imposed tutelage.

Foucault was often dismissive of Hobbes. What he did not seem to acknowledge, however, was that Hobbes had offered a theory of governmentality an answer to Foucault's "how" question. Of course, the account offered by Hobbes of an education system designed to impose tutelage and suppress insubordination and different beliefs was anathema to Foucault.

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Honneth on Moral Growth

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Introduction

Axel Honneth is the foremost representative of the so called third generation of the Frankfurt School. He started his academic career as a Habermasian Marxist influenced by Foucault's philosophical and anthropological ideas. In his early writings, Honneth connected Foucault with the tradition of critical theory. Honneth launched his theory of recognition in 1994 and re-orientated the whole Frankfurt School research. Ever since there has been intensive discussion concerning the Honnethian theory of recognition.

Honneth's project is distinctive and central to the third generation of critical theory including, first, the idea of society and history based on the struggle for recognition by social groups. Second, Honneth contextualises the normative foundations in the deep structures of subjective experiences such as disrespect and misrecognition. These ideas, struggles and subjective experiences, are elicited from Hegel's philosophy. The first element, the idea of the struggle for recognition between groups aims to show that freedom occurs through conflicts between groups rather than through conflicts between individuals. For Honneth, social groups represent both the driving force of historical development and a vital condition for human flourishing. Honneth's three forms of recognition, love, rights and social esteem are the basis for moral growth and denial of these forms causes struggles for recognition. Honneth connects Hegel's three forms of recognition to the social psychological examinations of identity development. Moral growth flourishes only when the development of three psychological self-relations is guaranteed, self-confidence, self-respect and self-esteem. For Honneth, the history

of western countries provides the empirical support for his thesis that the spheres of family, market economy and will formation have developed towards more moral and democratic practises via struggles for recognition. The historical struggles in the spheres of social freedom enable individuals now to form more freely intersubjective relationships in love, rights and social esteem.

In recent writings Honneth has extended his influential work in the theory of recognition to address the question of public education. Honneth explores recent neoliberal tendencies towards privatisation and economic competitiveness in schooling. These tendencies are violating educational equality and emptying democratic virtues from public education, downgrading the role of public education in the reproduction of democratic societies. Secondly it empties democratic virtues from public education downgrading the role of public education in the reproduction of the democratic societies. Honneth introduces alternative educational policy by contending that democracy needs democratically oriented public education. Fulfilling this demand, it is necessary to revive the philosophical tradition of Kant, Durkheim and Dewey. Honneth contends that the revival of this tradition generates cogent ideas for democratic education.

Axel Honneth on Moral Growth

Honneth's theory of struggle for recognition and moral growth relies on two writings the young Hegel: *Natural Law* (Hegel 1975) and *System of Ethical Life* (Hegel 1979). In *Natural Law*, Hegel criticizes natural law and social contract theories because they are unable to conceive society as an ethical totality (see Honneth 1995, p. 12): a community of morally mature persons who behave virtuously toward each other. According to theories of natural law, society is just a constellation of single egoistic subjects who have made a contract that they do not fight against each other in order to live peacefully and practice economic activity. In such a community, there is no prospect for moral growth. When Hegel speaks of ethical totality, he

has in mind the polis of the Ancient Greek style (city-State) in which every citizen behaves virtuously enabling “universal and individual freedom” (Hegel according to Honneth 1995, p. 13). For this reason, Hegel intentionally uses the term *Sitte* (habits, customs). *Sittlichkeit* (virtuously behaving) grows from *Sitte*. In other words, the ethical totality grows from reciprocal good behavior. The ethical totality does not emerge from laws of the State (social contract theories) or moral conviction of atomic individuals (Kant’s moral theory). Moral growth is possible only in ethical totality. Morality comes from living customs and habits that are actually acted out in the community.

One might ask, what is the motivation behind *sittliche* (ethical) conduct or reciprocal good behavior? Why do individuals not stay at the immature moral state of civil society (market society) where everyone seeks only their own interests? Hegel provides the answer in his text *System of Ethical Life* (*System der Sittlichkeit*; Hegel 1979). The answer is that recognition is the basic motive for moral social action. On the other hand, recognition is also the basic source of social conflicts. Honneth uses Hegel’s quite unknown text as a foundation for his theory of the struggle for recognition. According to Honneth’s Hegel interpretation, relationships of mutual recognition are the source of a subject’s self-knowledge and basic striving for moral growth (Honneth 1995, pp. 16–17).

Hegel inherits the idea of struggle from Thomas Hobbes, although the purpose and outcome of the struggle is different in Hegel’s social theory. The struggle is not for self-preservation like in Hobbes’ social contract theory, but for recognition, and the outcome of the struggle is not a contract among individuals but a more mature level of ethical relations. “Instead of starting from a struggle of all against all, Hegel begins his philosophical account with elementary forms of interpersonal recognition, which he presents collectively under the heading ‘natural ethical life’” (Honneth 1995, p. 18). Natural ethical life (*natürliche Sittlichkeit*) includes both family relations and formal legal relations in the civil society. It might seem strange that Hegel places

civil society (in the meaning of economic activity; a market society) under the label of natural ethical life. The family is somewhat natural in every society, but what is “natural” about the civil society (market society)? Perhaps Hegel thinks that the family and some sort of civil society will arise spontaneously in each complex social constellation. The thing that does not appear in a spontaneous way is absolute ethical life (*sittliche* State; fatherland). It requires major personal and socio-historical moral development, which mature Hegel calls the phenomenology of the spirit. For Hegel, the absolute ethical life is a kind of final solution (*Aufhebung*) to all social conflicts and ethical dilemmas (e.g., *Das Adam-Smith-Problem*, see Huttunen 2011) in society. According to Honneth’s interpretation, Hegel’s theory includes three levels or social contexts in which the struggle for recognition happens: the family, the civil society, and the state. From these three instances follow three modes of recognition and three objects of recognition. These three modes of recognition are also states of moral growth:

1. The family for Hegel is “the universal reciprocal action and formative education of human beings” (Hegel according to Honneth 1995, p. 18). In the family, individuals recognize each other mutually as emotionally needy beings. In the family, the source of morality (*Sittlichkeit*) is not a cognitive concept (rights and duties) but the feelings of love and care (Honneth 2007, p. 153). The mode of recognition is an affective intuition (*Anschaung*), and the object of recognition is to meet the individual’s concrete needs (food, care, love, etc.). The denial of these needs (misrecognition) is the same as denying one’s humanity. *Sittliche* behavior on this level means loving and caring, i.e., affective intuition. The purpose of the family labor of raising children is to promote the child’s “inner negativity” or independency.
2. As the individual grows older, he or she begins to struggle for the recognition of his or her autonomy. On the level of the civil society (market society), persons reciprocally recognize each other’s right to ownership, i.e., the

right to be a legal person. As a legal person, an individual has the right to say “yes” or “no” to all offered transactions. This is called negative freedom in Hegel’s terminology (Honneth 1995, p. 19). Robbery or other illegal action in the civil society (e.g., forming a cartel is a form of stealing) means that the wrongdoer is denying others the right to say “yes” or “no” as a legal person. The mode of recognition in civil society is the “cognitive concept” with which persons reflectively recognize each others as legal persons. The object of recognition is to satisfy a person’s need for formal legal autonomy. *Sittliche* behavior in this level means respect for the “abstract law” (cognitive concept). Hegel’s notion of abstractness of law means that the law “does not yet have its reality and support in something itself universal.” The abstract law does not contribute to the formation of the concrete ethical totality (*sittliche* State; value community). It contributes only to the formation of the abstract legal person and formal legal relations between persons.

3. Hegel claims that people seek and struggle for a more advanced form of personality and mode of recognition. The civil society is a constellation of abstract legal persons who do not affectively care for each other. It is a formally just society but it is not a decent society. I believe that this decent society is what Hegel means with the notion of “absolute *Sittlichkeit*.” The movement from natural ethical life (*Sittlichkeit*) to absolute ethical life (*sittliche* State) is a process of moral development or learning both on the social and the personal level (Honneth 1995, pp. 23–24). For Hegel, the *sittliche* State represents the true or absolute *Sittlichkeit*. The State is not a constellation of egoistic individuals but an organic whole which consists of “whole persons.” It is the highest phase of an individual’s moral development. Hegel believes that intellectual intuition (*Anschauung*) emerges in this future community. Hegel claims that the individual “intuits himself as himself in every other individual” (Hegel according to Honneth 1995, p. 24). Intellectual intuition is a kind of reflective family love between the “members

of a whole.” Honneth thinks that the concept of solidarity depicts Hegel’s intention well. On the level of the state, the mode of recognition is intellectual intuition which is an “affect that has become rational.” The object of recognition is individual particularity or a person’s formation into a free subject who knows his own particular abilities and recognizes the particular abilities of others.

With his creative interpretation of Hegel’s *System of Ethical Life* (Hegel 1979), Honneth produces his own theory of identity formation which is at the same time a theory of an individual’s moral growth. Honneth thinks that recognition must be based on some of the person’s existing abilities and skills. By receiving recognition from others, one achieves one’s identity: one learns to know oneself and one’s special characteristics. When one receives positive recognition because of some particular ability, one starts to form a positive self-image. One becomes aware of one’s abilities and qualities. According to Honneth, humans require the intersubjective recognition of their abilities and achievements in order to develop a productive relationship with themselves (Honneth 1995, p. 257).

Honneth states that the recognition is given on three hierarchical levels. The person begins at the first level and gradually moves on to the higher levels. Accordingly, Honneth’s theory includes three so-called practical self-relations in the moral development of personality: (1) self-confidence, (2) self-respect, and (3) self-esteem. These practical self-relations are achieved at the three levels of the struggle for recognition, which are family (love), civil society (rights), and state (solidarity) (Honneth 1995, p. 126).

An individual’s self-confidence is established and reproduced in the relations of friendship and love. This is the first level of recognition. At this level, one seeks recognition of one’s existence, that is, recognition that one has the right to exist as the kind of person one is. This elementary form of recognition takes place in the primary socialization process within the family and within circles of other persons that one is close to. Through one’s very first contacts with one’s parents, one

Honneth on Moral Growth, Table 1 Intersubjective relations of recognition (Modified from Honneth 1995, p. 129)

Dimension of personality	Needs and emotions	Moral responsibility	Traits and abilities
Forms of recognition	Primary relationships – <i>love, friendship</i>	Legal relations – <i>rights</i>	Community of value – <i>solidarity</i>
Practical relation to self	Basic self-confidence	Self-respect	Self-esteem
Forms of disrespect	Abuse and rape	Denial of rights, exclusion	Denigration, insult
Threatened component of personality	Physical integrity	Social integrity	Honor and dignity

gradually achieves a basic level of trust. One learns to express one's needs without the fear of abandonment. Love and friendship are the forms of recognition by which parents create basic trust. The experience of love and care is a precondition for the formation of an individual's identity and morality (*Sittlichkeit*; Honneth 1995, p. 253). This first level of recognition and individual moral development does not have any similarities with Kohlberg's preconventional moral consciousness. Actually Honneth comes close to Carol Gilligan's notion of self-love as the first level of moral development (see Gilligan 1993, p. 73; Kakkori and Huttunen 2010).

At the second level of recognition, the individual strives for the practical self-relation called self-respect. Self-respect, in this context, means that a person in a community of rights gains recognition as a legally and morally mature person. Hegel refers to this community of rights with the term civil society. On this level, the individual either receives or does not receive basic legal rights. Recognition on this level also means that one is accepted as an autonomous person who has the right and the competence to take part in the discourses in which people reach consensus on political and theoretical issues. The issue is not just that the person has a right to ownership and a right to take part in contracts, but it is also the Kantian universal respect for the freedom of the will of the person. On this level, "the individual is recognized as a person who ascribes the same moral accountability as every other human being" (Honneth 1997, p. 30). To put it differently, this level of recognition entails regarding this individual a person who is responsible for his or her own actions. The opposite of this is a paternalizing attitude which denies the

individual's freedom of will, autonomy, and ability to work independently. Self-respect grows out of recognition of responsibility, which the individual gains on the level of the civil society (community of rights).

On the third level of recognition, the individual strives for self-esteem. Self-esteem is built through the respect one receives for one's work. Here, it is essential that one is recognized for work through which one expresses oneself. Only through self-directed and autonomous work can one perform one's freedom of will. And only when one begins to work out of one's own free will for a common good can one become respected in a community (or the State, in Hegelian terminology). Self-esteem means that one sees one's work being acknowledged and recognized. On this level, "the individual is recognized as a person whose capabilities are of constitutive value to a concrete community" (Honneth 1997, p. 27). This way, the individual really becomes recognized as a person who has something to give to the community. The reciprocal recognition of each other's work creates a strong feeling of solidarity in the community.

Table 1 summarizes Honneth's view of the various components of recognition. The forms of disrespect are also presented in the table. The first level of disrespect insults one's physical integrity. Its most extreme form is physical abuse. The denial of physical integrity could lead to permanent psychological damage, which would then interfere with the development of practical self-relations. The denial of social integrity means that the individual is not considered a mature person. One is not treated as a person having freedom of will – that is, one is not considered a subject of one's action, but rather an object that causally

reacts to stimuli. This way, one's moral responsibility is kept in an undeveloped stage. The disrespect that occurs on the third level of recognition implies that no recognition is given even though one's work is worthy of such recognition. When one only receives feedback regarding one's actions on making a mistake, one's self-esteem does not develop (Honneth 2007). This kind of disrespect is directed to a person's honor and dignity.

For Honneth, full moral maturity means that the person feels connected with other members of the value community (communitarian view), is able to give honest recognition to the work of other people, and, vice versa, is able to receive recognition from them. By his own action, he creates a possibility for good life for others and for himself. Only by working together people are able to achieve good self-esteem and full moral maturity which are *sine qua non* for good life.

In his recent writings, Axel Honneth (2012, 2013, 2015) has dealt with such themes as *Bildung*, educational policy and education for democracy. These writings elaborate Honneth's view on individual's moral growth through dialectic of recognition. According to Honneth, after defeating Nazism in Germany, it was natural to retrieve the unlearned practices of democratic decision-making through nationwide education. Nevertheless nowadays the important link between educational concepts and democracy has been broken. Honneth worries that contemporary political philosophy has lost sight of the educational processes which produce cultural and moral conditions vital for democracy and its existence. Honneth claims that the studies of educational processes should be at the center of political philosophy (Honneth 2012, pp. 430–431). Honneth asserts that democratic theory as political philosophy is unable to make a proper contribution to the normative function of preschool, general school, and adult education (Honneth 2012, p. 431).

Honneth illustrate the gap between theories of democracy and the theories of education with the so-called *Böckenförde theorem*. This theorem states that liberal democracy in its constitutional form, comprising the rule of law, the protection of

fundamental rights, the separation of powers, and so on, possesses no secure foundation for its legitimacy and effectiveness. On the one hand, the liberal democratic State can function only when liberty, guaranteed for its citizens, is exercised and regulated from within the moral substance of the individual and by shared values in society. On the other hand, the liberal State is unable to command or enforce these inner regulative forces through authority or legal power without first giving up liberalism. The *Böckenförde dictum* highlights an inherent problem of democracy by suggesting how to defend the moral ground of democratic society without heading for totalitarianism. The general misinterpretation of *Böckenförde theorem* states that democracy has only minor possibilities to reproduce its own moral and cultural basis, and eventually this basis can only be justified by returning to something predemocratic or to pre-modern life-forms, tradition-oriented communities governed by substantive ethical or even religious conceptions (Böckenförde 1991; Honneth 2015, p. 22; also Hirvonen 2016).

Honneth argues misinterpretation of *Böckenförde theorem* leads to a conclusion that State-organized educational processes have no reason to teach democratic-promoting behaviors (Honneth 2012, pp. 432–433). This general misinterpretation of the *Böckenförde theorem* has created the illusion that democratic virtues like the moral attitudes of collaborative decision-making, abilities for tolerance, empathic skills, abilities to understand the perspective of the other, and the ideas of the common good are not the tasks of public education. These ideals necessary for the reproduction of a functioning democracy are widely thought to develop through a process of ethical socialization in pre-political communities. Because democracy itself has no means to reproduce its moral and cultural grounds, democratic education seems futile. Honneth claims that the tradition of Kant, Durkheim, and Dewey defends State-organized mandatory public education that cultivates democratic values, empathy, and communicative decision-making skills (Honneth 2012, pp. 433–434, 2015).

The danger in the misinterpretation of the *Böckenförde theorem* is that these ideas will

effectively displace the democratic elements from State-administered education. Honneth refers to the term “civic minimum,” introduced by neoliberalism, as the new requirement for public schools. According to premises of civic minimum, the publicly mandated requirements to teach democratic virtues and civic knowledge in schools must be minimal. Thus parent responsibility is increasing in the cultivation of these values. Civic minimum is defended by the arguments that public decisions on the contents of the school subjects will be less time-consuming, bureaucratic, and quarrelsome. The civic minimalism is carried out with the school voucher system where the State gives parents a certificate of funding which parents are able to apply toward tuition of the school of their choice, public or private, secular or religious. The idea of civic minimalism is defended by arguing that the only way to solve the problem of achieving the consensus on civic education under the conditions of pluralism is to minimize the civic component of schooling and leave parents to decide what education would be best for their children. In this way, democratic disagreement over public schooling can be minimized. Following the idea of a civic minimalism, parents have constitutional rights to determine every feature of their children’s schooling except the civic minimum. It introduces itself as an alternative to democratic deliberation (Honneth 2012, pp. 433–435).

Conclusion

For Honneth, full moral maturity, i.e., self-esteem, is possible only in an ethical totality in which persons reciprocally recognize each other’s importance in the community. Honneth’s third phase in the development of individual’s self-relation and morality is pretty much the same as Robert Williams’s interpretation of Hegel’s universal consciousness (see Huttunen 2011). The difference is that Honneth prefers notions of the *sittliche* State (value community) and does not engage Hegelian philosophy of (universal) consciousness. In this sense, Honneth comes close to Gilligan, who also dislikes the philosophy of

consciousness and who emphasizes the relational nature of morality. Nevertheless Honneth has some prejudices toward Gilligan’s view. Honneth presents an explicit criticism of Gilligan’s feminist ethics (Honneth 2007, p. 174): “If we follow Deigh’s presentation ... we will quickly get the impression that he is seeking to rehabilitate Carol Gilligan’s thesis of two moralities (men’s moral against women’s moral) in a psychoanalytic fashion.” Honneth has an unjust interpretation of Gilligan’s view. Gilligan does not hold the notion of men’s and women’s separate moralities. She has done empirical research against this kind of feminist ethics (Kakkori and Huttunen 2010).

Gilligan’s critique of Kohlberg parallels Hegel’s critique of Kant’s ethics like all communitarian critiques of neo-Kantianism, and in this sense, Gilligan’s ethics has many similar features with Honneth’s ethics of recognition. In an Hegelian manner, Gilligan wants to take moral feelings seriously and put emphasis on the social nature of morality. Nevertheless Kohlberg’s Kantian moral theory should not be abandoned. It needs to be revised and improved but not abandoned. This actually is Gilligan’s intention. She does not want to reject Kohlberg’s theory but supplement it with the aspect of ethics of care and relational nature of morality (see Kakkori and Huttunen 2010).

Thus if we reconstruct Kohlberg’s view on moral maturity in Gilliganian fashion, we end up with Honneth’s Hegelian view on the third level of morality and self-relation. This mature level refers to the ethical social totality (*Sittlichkeit*) in which the other person is encountered (faced) in a reciprocal dialogical relationship of recognition. From Honneth’s ethics of recognition and social theory, we can learn that moral maturity has to include the aspects of love, virtues, communal moral habits (*Sittlichkeit*), and democratic virtues provided by proper public education.

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Horkheimer and Philosophy of Education

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Max Horkheimer (1895–1973) was the general manager of the Institute of Social Research at Frankfurt University from 1930 and its dominant figure. Together with Theodor Adorno, Herbert

Marcuse, Erich Fromm, Walter Benjamin, Leo Lowenthal, Otto Kirchheimer, Friedrich Pollock, and Franz Neumann, he formed what became known as the “Critical Theory” of “The Frankfurt School.” However, each of these thinkers developed unique theories and perspectives that problematize considering their work as a “school” (Gur-Ze'ev 1996).

Two stages of development characterize Horkheimer's work in Critical Theory. A positive utopianism and optimism toward the possibility of revolutionary change characterize the first stage in his thinking. His Critical Theory of this period was committed to social and cultural transformation. The second stage, starting in 1944 and the joint publication (with Adorno) of “Dialectic of Enlightenment” (Horkheimer and Adorno 1988), manifests a negative utopianism and a harsh critique of Marx and orthodox Marxism. In Horkheimer's words this shift represents a move from Marx to Schopenhauer (Horkheimer 1985a, p. 309) and from the quest for revolution to a commitment to education (Horkheimer 1985b, p. 417). The dividing lines are sometimes unclear and unstable. We can find philosophical pessimism in the writings of the young Horkheimer and his letters (Horkheimer 1927) and optimistic attitudes in his later work (especially in his public speeches on education while serving as rector of Frankfurt University) (Horkheimer 1985a, pp. 361–456). However, fundamental changes in his philosophical orientations and its educational implications evolved, as he himself readily acknowledged (Horkheimer 1985b, pp. 336–353), with the advent of World War II and the Holocaust. For all the common ground between the first and the second periods of Horkheimer's work, two essentially different philosophies of education are articulated. The first, or the immature stage of development of Horkheimer's work, is its best known and most influential part, especially in the Anglo-Saxon world. This is especially true regarding the influence of Critical Theory on the New Left in the 1960s and 1970s. This part of Horkheimer's work was of special relevance, influencing Critical Pedagogy as developed by thinkers such as Paulo Freire, Henry Giroux, Ira Shor, Cathleen Weiler, Peter McLaren, and Stanley Aronowitz.

While in the first period Horkheimer did not devote much of his energy to schooling, one can understand the whole project of constituting a critical theory as an effort to articulate a philosophy of education. Here education has to be understood in the broader sense, as relating to practices, concepts, and symbolic development that constitute emotional formation, conceptual apparatus, conscience, and consciousness and the historical, local, collective, and individual possibilities and limitations.

Already in his now classic “Critical and traditional theory,” the production of knowledge is not to be detached from social power relations and interests. Science too has to be understood not only as part of the reproduction of the hegemonic order; it is to be seen also as part of its protection, regardless of the opinions and the consciousness of the individual scientist (Horkheimer 1977, p. 18). Nor is Critical Theory neutral, but it identifies with specific and concrete social interests: “It has no unique evaluative standard beside its interest in the overcoming of social injustice” (Ibid. 64). Critical Theory manifests itself not only as a struggle on the stance of knowledge but of the possibilities for human liberation. This aim of Horkheimer’s Critical Theory is manifested in a critique of ideology, with a materialistic dimension on the one hand and a commitment to an interdisciplinary and unifying new science on the other. The educational implications of this kind of Critical Theory are constructed by its positive utopianism: “a vision of a better reality, which overcomes the present oppressive reality. This transformation [of Utopia] becomes the arena of today’s theory and praxis” (Horkheimer 1985c, p. 105). In other places in this period, Horkheimer presents the aim of Critical Theory as nothing less than “building a new world” (Horkheimer 1985d, p. 294). Here the critique of the hegemonic ideologies and the struggle against the present order of things is an educational process in line with the Enlightenment’s humanist tradition, from Lessing’s *The Education of the Human Race* to Marx’s *Communist Manifest*. The historical struggle itself is conceived as an educational process of humanity to which Critical

Theory makes an irreplaceable contribution. This is because the struggle over the control of knowledge, the representation of reality, and the representation of relevant knowledge about knowledge and about the context in which it is produced is inseparable from the potentials for social responsibility and the prospects of emancipatory political activism. This is also a central element of Critical Pedagogy as a realization of Critical Theory in the schooling process. Here it is important to note some of the central preconceptions and assumptions of Horkheimer’s project:

1. A human essence, in which reason, solidarity, and quest for freedom are central. This is the foundation of the Enlightenment’s conception of unlimited human potential for emancipation and elevation. In this sense it is a moral imperative as well as a political need to struggle for progress in the realization of unfulfilled human potential.
2. Critical Theory offers a liberating concept of knowledge, which is capable of dividing “emancipatory” from “oppressive” representations of knowledge and its legitimization apparatuses.
3. The foundation of an enlightened critique is unproblematic. Immanent critique, not fundamental justification and metaphysical argumentation, ensures the stance of Critical Theory and its educational implications not as mere contingent and contextual rhetoric.
4. Social reality not only justifies Critical Theory; it also contains the potentials for its realization and for the constitution of a better human coexistence. The irrationality of capitalist production, distribution, and consumption; the actual interests of the proletariat; and the inconsistencies within the system as evident in bourgeois philosophy – all manifest the justification of Critical Theory as well as its future victory.

The second stage of Horkheimer’s project can be described as philosophical pessimism. In contrast to many critical theorists who refer to his Critical Theory with or without postmodern

adjustments, the later Horkheimer explicitly dissociates himself from the Marxian tradition. He dissociates himself from the tradition which believed in the possibility of “the good society,” wherein not only social relations but also thought itself could be elevated (Horkheimer 1985b, p. 339). He abandons the revolutionary project since, according to Horkheimer, by his essence the revolutionary tends to become an oppressor. This is because the claim for justice cannot have the upper hand without its transformation into its opposite. As long as there is room for liberty, collective violence will continue to rule, he asserts (Horkheimer 1985e, p. 247). Freedom and justice are contradictory in terms (Horkheimer 1985b, p. 340). Progress has not come to a temporary halt – there is no room for progress in principle!

Horkheimer’s pessimism has three levels: metaphysical, theoretical, and historical. On the metaphysical level, according to Horkheimer, power as the will to life or as will to overcome life governs being, and within it there is no room for meaning, aim, or a struggle detached from the total role of power as active meaninglessness. On the theoretical level, Horkheimer understood the immanent critique of Critical Theory as related to conceptual possibilities of the Enlightenment that have been dissolved by the victory of instrumental rationality over the tradition of objective reason. The second half of the twentieth century is marked not by lack of rationality but by the omnipotence of rational organization of social relations, production practices, and the culture industry. According to the later Horkheimer, Critical Theory has lost its conceptual context, and within the current culture industry can no longer justify its aims (Horkheimer 1974, pp. 101–102). The essential point here is that this historical moment is conceived not as a temporary situation or a historical accident: it is essential to being, in which for humans the “adjustment to the power of progress contains the progress of power. And each time it produces degeneration which does not manifest the defeat of progress but its success, which reveals itself as its opposite” (Horkheimer 1988, p. 42). The successes of capitalism and the

integration of socially antagonistic elements such as the proletariat set the historical dimension of his pessimism. The “totally administered world” (which already Marx was committed to) is rational and self-regulatory, and within it there is no room for the historical possibilities that were open in previous stages of modernity (Horkheimer 1985b, p. 348). This is because the present system has been successfully developed into a stance where not only does it master the consciousness of collectives, it even constitutes and controls the instincts of the individual in accordance with the needs and imperatives of the system (Horkheimer 1974, p. 141). This position is highly relevant for emancipatory education today, especially in face of recent postmodern feminist, multicultural, postcolonial, and other alternatives to hegemonic education. Note that on this point Horkheimer presides over the “hard” postmodern discourse, which addresses the end of the subject and the contingency of hegemonic knowledge, as well as resistance to the system (which is actually part and parcel of the system). Horkheimer, however, did not abandon Utopia and responsibility to the Other or the commitment for transcendence. His pessimism is not a preview for solipsism, nihilism, or escapism. It is a new setting for the realization of the principle of hope and for the struggle over a potential counter-education.

Horkheimer’s later Critical Theory abandons optimism but it is unconditionally Utopian. The possibilities for transcendence and change are not grounded in the present reality but in the essence of being and in the human subject qua subject. The powers, which produce the “subject” and control his or her consciousness, knowledge, identity, and actual social function, normally have the upper hand. However, according to Horkheimer, as “facts” they do not have the last word. Hegemonic knowledge and power structures are not disregarded in the name of actual authenticity, autonomy, or freedom to act in line with “genuine interests.” The openness of being and the human potentials to become different from constructed by the system are vital elements for the constitution of a non-repressive and non-naïve educational alternative. Horkheimer

calls this alternative “negative theology,” but it is theology without a God or messianism without a messiah. Horkheimer’s mature work does not abandon critique of ideology and resistance to the triumphant culture industry and the logic of capitalism. It does not give up the struggle for counter-education, but it certainly urges us to beware of today’s exile of spirit on the one hand and the arrogance of the revolutionary tradition on the other. The sensitivity to the presence of power and meaninglessness within dogmatic revolutionary alternatives is no less important than the emancipatory potentials of ideology critique and democratic activism within the present political order. The later Horkheimer connects this humanistic tradition to the fundamental philosophical questions and challenges the realm of self-evidence not only within the hegemonic power relations and groups but also in the praxis, theory, consciousness, and self of the critical educator herself. Within this framework life becomes, again, a mission, and within dialogical settings the struggle over self-constitution and re-articulation of identity, knowledge, and intersubjectivity becomes concrete, even within a (almost) totally constructed and controlled reality.

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Human Capital Theory and Education

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Throughout Western countries, education has recently been retheorized under Human Capital Theory as primarily an economic device. Human Capital Theory is the most influential economic theory of Western education, setting the framework of government policies since the early 1960s. It is seen increasingly as a key determinant of economic performance. A key strategy in determining economic performance has been to employ a conception of individuals as human capital and various economic metaphors such as “technological change,” “research,” “innovation,” “productivity,” “education,” and “competitiveness.” Economic considerations per se in the past, however, have not determined education.

In *The Wealth of Nations* (1776) Adam Smith formulated the basis of what was later to become the science of human capital. Over the next two centuries two schools of thought can be distinguished. The first school of thought distinguished between the acquired capacities that were classified as capital and the human beings themselves, who were not. A second school of thought claimed that human beings themselves were capital. In modern Human Capital Theory all human behavior is based on the economic self-interest of individuals operating within freely competitive markets. Other forms of behavior are excluded or treated as distortions of the model.

A prominent explanation for that move is provided by a recent reformulation of Human Capital Theory which has stressed the significance of education and training as the key to participation in the new global economy. In one of its recent reports the OECD (1997a, p. 7), for example, claims that the radical changes to the public and

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private sectors of the economy introduced over recent years in response to globalization will be “severe and disturbing to many established values and procedures.” In another report that explains internationalization in higher education as a component of globalization, the OECD (1997b, p. 11) believes that “internationalism should be seen as a preparation for twenty first century capitalism”. (This form of capitalism is based on investment in financial markets rather than in the manufacturing of commodities, thus requiring dependence on electronic technology). That organization also boldly asserts that internationalism is “a means to improve the quality of education” (OECD 1997b, p. 8). In keeping with Human Capital Theory it has been argued that “the overall economic performance of the OECD countries is increasingly more directly based upon their knowledge stock and their learning capabilities” (Foray and Lundvall 1996, p. 21). Clearly, the OECD is attempting to produce a new role for education in terms of the human capital subject required in “globalised” institutions.

In terms of structural reform, under Human Capital Theory the basis for nation-State structural policy frameworks is the enhancement of *labor flexibility* through regulatory reform in the labor market, as well as raising skill levels by additional investment in education, training, and employment schemes, and immigration focused on attracting high-quality human capital.

Human Capital Theory has been criticized on a number of counts. Two critiques are outlined here: one external and one internal. The clearest statement of the deficiencies of Human Capital Theory goes to the heart of neoclassical economics. The revival of economic sociology, in particular at the hands of Fred Block (1990, p. 21), seeks to challenge the basic assumptions motivating the methodology of neoclassical economics. He claims these rest on two basic building blocks. The first is the idea that the economy is an analytically separate realm of society that can be understood in terms of its own internal dynamics. Economists are perfectly aware that politics and culture influence economy, but they see these as exogenous factors that can be safely bracketed as one develops a framework that focuses on purely economic factors. The second

key foundation is the assumption that individuals act rationally to maximize utilities. Here, again, economists are acutely aware that individuals are capable of acting irrationally or in pursuit of goals other than the maximization of utility, but the strategy of excluding these deviations from the rationality principle is justified by the effort to identify the core dynamics of an economy.

For Block (1990), these assumptions on which neoclassical, and therefore also, Human Capital Theory depends are cast in universal and ahistorical terms. Given the facts that they emerged from a body of theory which was first formulated in the nineteenth century and that they continue to provide the basis for neoliberal restructuring of the State in the 1980s and 1990s within most western liberal democracies, it is, perhaps, time that these original assumptions were reexamined. Together the two assumptions provide a basis for the model of the self-regulating market which harmonizes transactions for products, labor, and capital.

Economic sociology challenges the first assumption by arguing that the society and culture can not be arbitrarily split from the economy. Clearly, both the society and culture shape the preferences of individuals in various ways. Social factors also influence economic contractual transactions. Even the contract rests on cultural understandings and the legal framework which is itself historically determined. The methodological foundations of neoclassical economics obscure the social, cultural, and political determinants of economic action. Marginson (1993, p. 25) argues that this results in an analysis that is ahistorical and, through a tautological procedure, continually rediscovers the centrality of purely economic notions. Based as it is on the false premise of the “naturalness” of the pursuit of economic gain by human inclinations, the “economic fallacy” imagines that capitalist societies do not have cultures in the way that primitive or premodern societies do. When we recognize that the pursuit of economic self-interest is itself a cultural creation, then it is apparent that we too are ruled by deeply held, but unexamined, collective beliefs.

Human Capital Theory, then, is an impoverished notion of capital. It is unable to understand human activity other than as the

exchange of commodities and the notion of capital employed is purely a quantitative one. This misses the point that capital is an independent social force where the creation of social value comes about through its capital accumulation and continual transformation through the circulation of commodities. Under capitalism, labor is structurally separated from the means of production. Labor and the means of production are concentrated as commodities and capital in the hands of an opposing class. The means of production are not only physical but also appear in social relations. The individual under capitalism can only come to grips with the means of production through selling his or her labor commodity. The struggle of the laborer to improve life's conditions is mediated then through the social relations within which they find themselves. Given this explanation, human capital is an abstract form of labor – a commodity – and not capital. Commodities such as human capital are therefore part of the life cycle of capitalism as a form of labor and not able to be exchanged independently of it.

The second assumption exposed by Block (1990) which is of primary importance to Human Capital Theory is also open to criticism on a variety of grounds. In modern human capital theory all human behavior is based on the economic self-interest of individuals operating within freely competitive markets. Other forms of behavior are excluded or treated as mere distortions of the model. Friedman (1962, pp. 100–101), for example, has argued that all the benefits of vocational and professional education are limited to the individual who is educated. The maximization of rational self-interest separate from the social group that the individual belongs is a central article of faith in human capital theory. A criticism of the rational utility maximizer (Block 1990, p. 25) suggests that the elevation of self-interest to a position of dominance on which much economic analysis rests is itself a consequence of social arrangements.

What constitutes rational action depends to some degree on the context which Human Capital Theory denies with its individualistic methodology. From a poststructuralist perspective, Elster (1983)

emphasizes the problematic nature of individual rationality that is behind any notion of self-interest. According to Elster (1983), under conditions of complexity and uncertainty, the gap between rationality in action and perfect rationality can be substantial.

Further criticism of Human Capital Theory concerns a more technical problem with criticisms about the employment of the theory as a means of accounting for national economic growth. Arguments about economic growth accounting such as Becker's (1994) show at best that education contributes to differences in earnings between people and then only in certain circumstances. This criticism comes from Blaug (1987a, p. 233), who contends, "it has to be said that the models so far examined in the growth accounting literature fail utterly to explain the mechanism by which this effect is produced." The contention that economic growth emanates from education is a non sequitur because, while it may be granted that education contributes to growth, so do many other activities. Blaug (1987a, p. 231) says that what must be illustrated is "not that education contributes to growth, but that more education would contribute more to growth at the margin than more health, more housing, more roads, etc."

The fundamental thing that growth accounting ignores is the costs of the resources already invested in the educational system and therefore the calculations tell us nothing about the net returns of spending on education. In this respect, Blaug (1987b, p. 134) argues that "public expenditure on tertiary education depends not only on the costs of instruction but also on the volume of direct aid to students." Blaug (1987b, p. 135) further notes that the "levels of public spending on student aid can encourage or discourage the private demand for tertiary education but *cannot* directly affect levels of economic development or rates of growth of GNP per head." Even within economic discourse, "investing" in education does not necessarily bring equity. Nevertheless, the commitment of Western governments to education policies of economic growth through human capital development is increasingly funded through private debt in the form of student loans.

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Human Capital Theory in Education

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Introduction

This entry is a critical exploration of the rise and limitations of Human Capital Theory (HCT) within the field of education. In recent times, HCT has become one of the most powerful underpinnings of education policy discourse worldwide. At both supranational level, within such

bodies as the OECD and the EU, and within national education systems, the influence of HCT is considerable. Promoting education as an “investment” which yields returns in due course to the individual in terms of pay and to the State in terms of employment and economic growth, HCT provides a captivating model for neoliberal governance of State education. The theory thus promotes State education systems as subservient to the vaunted knowledge economy, as instrumental for economic growth. In this entry, the nature and development of HCT are outlined, its current influence indicated, and its effects highlighted. The entry concludes by pointing to some of the weaknesses of the theory as applied to the field of education, as well as some of the problematic issues around conceptions of schooling and of young people which the theory produces.

Historical Background

Since its formulation in the early 1960s, Human Capital Theory has developed into one of the most powerful theories in modern economics. The growth of the concept of the “knowledge economy” in the last 20 years has also afforded it a further degree of importance because of the strong connections it sees between education and training and economic growth. Where economic activity becomes focused on knowledge, on intellectual rather than physical labor, then the importance of education to that economy seems all the more crucial. Human Capital Theory thus lays considerable stress on the education of individuals as the key means by which both the individual accrues material advantage and by which the economy as a whole progresses. In a simple equation, the more and better education individuals possess, the better their returns in financial rewards and the better the national economy flourishes.

Human Capital Theory has thus promoted education to a key instrumental role in boosting economic growth. The better the investment made by individuals in education, the better they and the

economy will do. This elevated status, however, is not without its problematic aspects. There is a risk of education being narrowed to economic goals, of the broader aims and purposes of education being submerged, and of the person being reduced merely to “human capital,” not as a life to be lived, but as mere economic potential to be exploited (Gillies 2011).

The modern roots of Human Capital Theory are usually traced to the work of two key theorists, Theodore Schultz (1902–1998) and Gary Becker (b. 1930), both associated with the “Chicago School” of neoliberal thought, although Jacob Mincer (1922–2006) had made earlier reference to the concept. There are, essentially, two elements to the theory. The first relates to theorizing that wage differentials or income distribution can be causally connected to education (in this case understanding the term as including schooling, tertiary education, training, and professional development). Much of the early research within Human Capital Theory looked at how earnings could be linked to educational experience: in its simplest form, longitudinal studies compared the earnings of high school graduates as opposed to college graduates in the USA. Schultz (1960, p. 571), noting that college graduates earned more, argued that in this sense the costs of a college education could be viewed as an investment, embodied education becoming “human capital,” which offered later returns in the form of relatively higher wages. Research showed that there was a financial return for the time and resources dedicated to education and training and so families and individuals could be interpreted as undertaking these as a form of investment which would pay dividends later in the form of higher earnings. Education, therefore, was no longer to be viewed as “consumption” but as investment.

The second core element in early Human Capital Theory is related to this finding. Whereas classical economics had tended to view the workforce in purely quantitative terms, Human Capital Theory introduced a qualitative aspect. Education and training were seen as the most important ways in which the quality of the workforce could be enhanced. College graduates did not earn more by

chance: it was because of the quality of their work that they earned more. Thus, education and training yielded broader economic returns than individual earning power. There were generic economic benefits for society which accrued from a well-educated and well-trained workforce. Just as individual choices about education and training could be understood in relation to judgments about likely returns on such investment, so at a national level, the education system could be justified in the light of likely returns in the form of economic growth.

It was this second aspect of Human Capital Theory that had the greatest political effect. Schultz (1962) suggested that the rapid recoveries of both Japan and Germany after World War II could be more easily explained if one took note of the preexisting high levels of human capital in these well-educated countries. Developing human capital was therefore an important way in which economies could grow and, indeed, survive or recover from setbacks. Becker (1992) argued that, outside of the Eastern Bloc, human capital investment in the form of educational opportunities was central to those countries experiencing faster economic growth from 1960. In its appropriated form, the theory was thus held to be able to account for economic growth *per se*.

Becker (1975, 1993) also sought to develop Human Capital Theory in a particular way. Concentrating primarily on individual decision making in relation to personal educational investments, Becker fused the theory with rational choice theory and began to explore its explanatory potential in a whole range of social activities previously untouched by economics such as family and marriage. Becker’s analysis, therefore, shifted paradigmatically from economics in terms of a relational mechanism between things and processes within a social structure to the analysis of an activity – the internal rationality governing an individual’s choices and behavior.

In recent times, the definition of human capital has widened somewhat so that it is not simply knowledge or skills but also “competencies,” “attributes,” and “attitudes” such as “reliability, honesty, self-reliance, and individual responsibility” (Becker 2002, p. 6). Education remains center

stage, however, as the key factor in forming such human capital, which itself remains crucial for “economic success.”

It is clear from even a cursory glance at government policy across the world that education has a highly elevated status, constructed in one particular sense – as instrumental to the economy – and so conceptualized quite differently from how it has been widely understood in the past and, perhaps, in the vernacular. While Human Capital Theory has thrust education into the political limelight, it is education in one particular role only, and its continued central importance relies almost entirely on its capacity to continue to be seen as economically vital.

Human Capital Theory and Education

From its very earliest days, however, Human Capital Theory has been controversial. There is concern at seeing education viewed in such narrow economic terms, omitting broader and richer purposes and practices. Whole areas of the curriculum such as the expressive arts, and the humanities in general, struggle for perceived relevance when bald economic purposes are given exclusive attention. Similarly, conceptualizing humans as mere capital goods seems excessively reductivist, omitting much of what it means to be a person. The notion of humanity becomes narrowed to that of economic agency, risking constructing people as mechanical objects as opposed to living persons. Even when relationships and shared values are taken into account, HCT tends to view these as crudely instrumental to providing the stability for economic activity rather than of intrinsic worth. These represent two significant challenges for Human Capital Theory: that it diminishes the concept of education and that it diminishes the concept of the human. The development of Human Capital Theory in relation to rational choice theory also fails to take account of motivation in human behavior, other than for personal advantage. The idea of an altruistic motive, or being motivated by the public good, or concern for others, is essentially denied by its adherents. Even in relation to career

development, issues around job satisfaction, challenge, enjoyment, status, and so on are all absent from the account. The model also assumes that all further education is geared for the labor market and so cannot account for the expansion of educational activities within the retired population for whom there cannot be any hope of financial benefit accruing nor of employment advantage.

Human Capital Theory does not, of itself, necessarily involve such a narrow view of education, but there is a tendency within the theory for a very pared-down model of education to be presented. Education – and so prosperity – becomes entirely focused on the human as an individual unit and on education as solely a matter of individual choices, leaving as unproblematic the nature of the system, and the nature of the socioeconomic, cultural, and political context which has shaped and continues to shape educational provision and experience. Inequalities of outcome can be attributed to the shortcomings of individuals in respect of their choices or capital returns. The overarching economic, social, and political system is essentially absent from any analysis.

Human Capital Theory does present a central role for teachers as those who help create and develop human capital. Far from being minor public servants cocooned from the harsh realities of tooth and claw capitalism, teachers now become repositioned as key figures in developing the human capital necessary for the goal of economic growth. A major focus for the OECD and others, therefore, has been “teacher quality.” Children will not develop as desirable human capital unless they have been educated effectively, and that requires a high-performing teacher workforce. Human Capital Theory does also position education as both an individual and a public good. The theory holds that the returns on education investment are both personal and social. The individual is rewarded financially, and the economy as a whole is boosted by individuals with advanced human capital. The education system and its quality becomes an extremely important focus for State investment, whether that is public money or in some partnership with private finance.

Human Capital Theory and Economic Debate

Beyond education, however, there is a long-established debate within economics which addresses a whole range of contested issues around Human Capital Theory and its variants. One is that without a preexisting successful economy, it is not obvious that human capital development has positive national economic impacts. A weak economy typically sees the flight of human capital to more rewarding economies and so local investment in education may have no local return whatsoever. Well-qualified young people emerging into a weak economy will not find the expected rewards which HCT would promise; instead, it may only be through migration to stronger economies that such people will find financial gain. In times of severe economic downturn, the best that educational qualifications may provide is the chance of securing any job rather than growth-enhancing employment. They serve as a security net against the worst which an economic crisis may threaten. Overall, it may be not so much that educational qualifications derive benefit but that lack of qualifications derives loss.

Critics also question the simplicity of the model of education-economy causality which some HCT theorists offer. Schultz himself (1971) has sought to clarify that because of the “long gestation period” between educational investment and economic return, it was “absurd” to think that sudden crises in relation to inflation or deflation could be tackled by turning on and off the education tap. Nevertheless, this pared-down model persists particularly in political discourse.

A further economic argument centers around the idea that educational qualifications do not themselves endow the individual with relevant human capital but that they merely act as a “signal” to employers. Indeed, it is now recognized that while educational qualifications may signal evidence of human capital, they say nothing explicitly about work ethic, for example. Thus, later conceptions of human capital have broadened out to encapsulate issues around attitude and other attributes (Becker 2002), which are also seen as key factors.

There is also a rich seam of criticism directed at Human Capital Theory from a Marxist perspective, which typically argues against the absence of the notion of social class within the theory, the failure to recognize value and surplus value within the Human Capital Theory model, the elision of the labor/labor-power distinction, and the failure to recognize labor relations within the workplace nexus.

The view that economic woes can be tackled through the refocusing of the education system leads to a number of challenges for the education sector. In austere times, reduced resources will tend to be concentrated in areas seen as most closely linked to the economy. This can be seen most starkly in relation to higher and further education where considerable pressure has been exerted on the arts, humanities, and social sciences. Such disciplines which have no simple correlation to economic activity or growth become viewed as an expensive indulgence, and their continued existence becomes dependent on attempts to demonstrate their economic importance rather than on the promotion of any fuller conception of education.

In the schools sector, pressure on the curriculum tends to be more in relation to its focus as opposed to structure. The emphasis shifts from knowledge and disciplinary depth to transferable skills, and especially those seen as conducive to market profitability. As pressure to reduce costs in the private sector grows, industry increasingly looks to shift the costs of training to the education sector itself. A key focus becomes the quality of school leavers and college and university graduates in relation to employability. When allied to the view that national economies need to compete in a global knowledge economy, it is easy to see how the demands to increase the quality of employability in young people become increasingly critical. There is a clear risk of narrowing the curriculum to “skills for work,” and the concept of personal growth, or of development as “whole” individuals, is lost.

Schultz (1967) pointed out decades ago that the poor and disadvantaged represented the “best unexhausted investment opportunities” compared to the rich and the middle class. In other words, the State had failed to exploit their potential

sufficiently, and, given their lowly status, the opportunity for high returns was considerable. However, the public investment required to counteract systemic inequality has proved to be much higher than the willingness of politicians to act, and the result has been that very little has been done to address this aspect of Human Capital Theory. Because it has been fused with rational choice theory, the focus in Human Capital Theory since has been on individuals and equality of opportunity rather than on equalizing starting points through socioeconomic adjustment. In times of economic difficulties, governments will cut back even more on the sort of additional support required for less advantaged communities and individuals to improve their educational and vocational prospects. Crude credit balance approaches may override issues around equity, fairness, and access, and it is not surprising to see funding challenges around inclusion, special education, and related issues. Here, the human capital/investment approach can be seen to clash with a children's rights approach. Education for all, when founded on rights, is in a much more secure position when compared to one merely conditional on notional investment returns. Because Human Capital Theory views those experiencing socioeconomic disadvantage, or those with learning difficulties, as wasted investment opportunities rather than in terms of justice, equality, or morality, then only a very obvious financial return can justify the costs incurred in the educational provision for such groups. This would seem to leave the theory in a very questionable ethical place. Many young people, because of the physical or cognitive difficulties they face, will never be able to generate for themselves or for the economy, the sort of financial returns expected of HCT, far less to "repay" the costs of their care and education. It is this cold calculation bereft of compassion or empathy that renders HCT repugnant to many.

Conclusion

Despite these reservations – economic, political, and moral – Human Capital Theory remains

central to current global economic policy. At national and supranational levels, it remains the dominant discourse. It offers a simple model for politicians and governments to understand and a manageable way of seeking to boost economic growth. As such, it affords a prominent place to education, but it positions education in a subordinate, instrumental role which many find narrow, dispiriting, and inadequate.

Cross-References

- [Hayek and Education](#)
- [Neoliberalism and Education Policy](#)
- [Neoliberalism and Globalization](#)
- [Neoliberalism, Hayek, and the Austrian School of Economics](#)

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Human Rights and Education

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Introduction

Humanity is facing at present a deep transformation in every domain of human life: politics, economics, social relationships, religious beliefs, etc. If we accept Castells's approach (Castells 1997), the core of this transformation is the process of globalization dominated by the web and the flows of information. Both web and flows are characterized by flexibility, so that they can adapt very fast at any change in the environment, and mobility, because they keep changing all the time. There is not any specific center of the web, only nodes that also can change, grow, and disappear.

Societies are connected through rapid, large-scale networks on interaction, modifying daily our notions of time and space. However, as long as these globalization processes are dominated by neoliberal conception of society, it is economics that is the mainstream of every policy implemented by governments and all social institutions; and only those policies that yield an increase in money benefits are the good ones, not to say that they are the only possible policies. Free market is accepted as the only point of reference and as the yardstick everybody uses to assess the achievements of social life: the more free

market we have, the best for all and for everything. One of the worst consequences of this reductive approach (economics, free market, and managerial manners) is that instead of globalization offering a more inclusive and solitary relationship between nations and cultures, it has fostered exclusion and has broadened and deepened the gap between the wealthy and the poor. Poverty (cultural, social, or economic) is at present a worse problem than it was 30 years ago when the process of globalization just started its new and accelerated pace.

This pessimistic conclusion is in tune with Lyotard's earlier analysis of the postmodern condition (Lyotard 1984). Some tendencies Lyotard identifies in advanced technological societies have not faded away; even more, they are at present more deeply rooted in social life than in 1979, when Lyotard published his critical description. I want – just for the purposes of this entry – to mention only two characteristics: first, performance and effectiveness have displaced justification as criterion of personal and social behavior, and knowledge, as any other thing, has been commercialized to the point of becoming one of the main commodities in economic markets; second, people have difficulties in accepting a vision of humanity as a whole (“metanarratives”), and they have the tendency to take into account only individualistic conceptions of human action where everybody upholds their parochial and limited point of view. The impressive growth of non-governmental organization in the last years can be understood as a good example of this narrow-minded approach to the problems of humankind: people feel more comfortable cooperating in small organizations that focus on very specific and concrete goals. At the same time, private, charitable, and nonprofit organizations replace the more systemic and inclusive project of the welfare State.

So, what we have got in the course of these last two decades is a big global market where everybody and everything is transformed in a potential commodity ready to be sold or bought in the market or listed in the stock exchange that, thanks to the web, is open 24 hours a day for buyers all around the world longing for making money as fast as possible. The growing rate of immigrant

workers, living and working in subhuman conditions, the increase in women trade and white slavery, or the augmentation of exploitation of children in too many countries is just the ugliest and more terrible consequence of those tendencies. At the same time, what we are missing is some common values that, as Arendt used to say, allow us to build a civil democratic community, in such a way that we can solve conflicts without resorting to raw force and live together keeping the balance between our individual or national identities and the required universal identity.

In the Vienna Conference, summer of 1993 (United Nations 1993), after a long period of discussions and with the opposition of some countries, a declaration was signed – as you know, in the UN language, declarations are no more than a set of moral principles, without juridical or legal implications, that offer all of us a moral goal; in that document human rights were labeled in a very explicit way as universal values: “All human rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent and interrelated. The international community must treat human rights globally in a fair and equal manner, on the same footing, and with the same emphasis. While the significance of national and regional particularities and various historical, cultural and religious backgrounds must be borne in mind, it is the duty of States, regardless of their political, economic and cultural systems, to promote and protect all human rights and fundamental freedoms.” This universality has a double meaning. On the one hand, human rights were a conquest or achievement out of the contributions from many cultures, many countries, and many people along the history of humankind; they were not a Western-biased invention or ideology, even if we have to accept the outstanding contribution of Western civilization, mainly from 1770 onward, to transform human rights in legal precepts binding governments and also individuals. On the other hand, human rights are a minimal (although also very high or maximal) moral standard that has to be respected and enforced in every country all around the world: not any single country can reject or violate any specific right on the grounds of their specific cultural characteristics or their special social and economic conditions.

Human rights are a necessary condition for human life, and they are universal, that is, they are valid for every human being whatever she/he may be: woman or man, African or European, child or adult, Muslim or Catholic, or illegal immigrant or native citizen.

So, human rights should be considered the common set of values we are looking for, and they are those values on which the global world has to be built. Any of us can become citizens of the world not because we can travel quickly and easily from one country to another, not because we can communicate with everybody else in the world using the enormous facilities that offer us the new technology of communication, and not in the least because we can buy a Kodak film, wear Nike sneakers, or eat a McDonald’s Big Burger or Chinese food in any county in the world. We are citizens of the world insofar as we actually are entitled to a set of rights that any government and its representatives (civil service, police, army, etc.) have to respect and protect, regardless of the country where I was born, the nationality written on my passport, or even the fact that I do not have any passport at all. World citizenship and holding human rights is almost one and the same thing; if we split the one from the other, we can get a banal cosmopolitanism, like another commodity in this consumerist society, instead of a reflective one that involves true and solidary respect for others (Delanty 2009).

There is, of course, a deep gap between reality (the domain of *be*: how human rights are respected at present) and ideality (the domain of *ought*: how they should be respected). This is a serious problem I cannot discuss in this entry, important as it is. There are also governments and some people, even philosophers, that do not recognize the universality of human rights and, at best, consider all the discussion about those rights as empty rhetoric, ideology, or wishful thinking; once again, I cannot discuss this criticism in this entry, criticism I have cope with in other papers and books (García Moriyón 1998). I just take for granted, or I assume, that human rights are the moral values we need to help children and all of us to become moral citizens of the world and of our own country, nation, or community. They can help us to

resolve and adequately define some of the complex issues which modern societies have to face, as it is illustrated by the challenging work of many activists of human rights that know how to adapt those universalistic values to particular context, specific cultures, and societies. Even so, the problem we have to face and I want to tackle in this entry is how can we, as teachers, and the school system, teach human rights. There are, luckily, some good contributions to the teaching of human rights that I assume and can be considered as the underpinning of my own reflection (UNESCO 1995a, 1998).

The Content and the Process

To begin with, human rights is not a topic or a subject we can approach in our teaching in the same way we approach mathematics, grammar, spelling, history, or natural sciences. There is no doubt that human rights involve some specific content, some data, and information students need to know if they want to become familiar with all the questions and problems related with this domain. We can think, for example, in the history of human rights, a question people have a tendency to ignore, just considering that the rights they are entitled to have been a part of the social life of their community for hundreds of years; they have also a biased understanding of the implementation of human rights, and they used to think that the violation of basic rights is something that never happens in their own country; they are only violated in dictatorships or impoverished countries. In this narrow and specific sense, human rights education (HRE) is a discipline as any other else in the school's curricula. The real difference becomes obvious as soon as we address the process dimension of teaching, the "know-how" dimension.

According to the point of view of almost every scholar and practitioner in teaching, you cannot teach any topic without paying attention to the "due process" imbedded in that topic. If we want children to learn mathematics, they also have to learn how to "do" mathematics: learning mathematics (language, history, or philosophy) goes

together with doing mathematics (language, history, or philosophy). Although it is possible to talk about general high-order thinking skills, needed in each and every one subject matter, every discipline has its own skills, and if you do not foster those skills, you only get rote learning. It is this "doing," necessary for teaching and learning, that makes a real difference between other disciplines and human rights: "doing" human rights is a very complex and demanding task, as much for teachers than for students. It calls for the involvement and commitment of the person as a whole, in such a way that they can become politically aware and responsible individuals and ready to engage in political and social action. HRE is closer to moral education and has to cope with problems very similar to those moral educators try to solve (Brabeck and Rogers 2000).

One of the most challenging, and more distinctive, features of human rights is that they are not legal or moral prerogatives that authorities (political, economic, educational, or whatsoever authority you can think of) bestow, concede, or give to people. A bestowed right is not a real right. They have rights only people who are able to defend or conquer their rights, to oblige authorities to the recognition, protection and respect of those rights that they are always ready to forget or violate; even more, they have rights only as long as they keep struggling for their rights, as part of a broader struggle for recognition (Honneth 1995). This is not an individualistic approach: the struggle for basic and fundamental rights has been always a cooperative and collective action where mutual aid plays a crucial role; at the same time, our rights come together with our duties in behalf of other people and of society as a whole. However, the personal commitment is an obligation any of us cannot evade. It might be the case that we need help to get our rights respected and fulfilled, sometimes because we are in extreme circumstances, as people suffering torture under dictatorships, and sometimes because certain individuals or groups cannot have power enough to defend themselves, as children, terminally ill people, or quadriplegic. However in all these cases, the help cannot go on longer than strictly needed, and the goal of the given aid is to have them back

as full moral agents, empowered citizens ready to defend their rights.

Then, the aim of HRE is to empower students, that is, to give them all they need to develop or grow as active participants in their lives and as citizens able to discover their rights, to develop new rights that at present are only tentative or confused ones, and to get from authorities the recognition and respect of those rights. It, according to Biesta's proposal, fosters the process of subjectification, together with the process of socialization (Biesta 2013). Children need, first, to develop high-order thinking skills, critical and creative, so that they can look carefully at themselves and the world around them and analyze, criticize, and make good judgments based on sound criteria and tested evidence, proposing then new alternatives to solve the problems they encounter in their activities. These cognitive dimensions are fostered as long as students have the opportunity of discussing all the questions related with human rights in the classroom, in an open, rigorous, and cooperative dialogue with their classmates and the teachers as facilitator of the discussion. The relationship between education, thinking skills, and democracy was strongly emphasized by Dewey and more recently has been the main contribution from Freire, who stressed the need of literacy to empower poor people in a democracy, and Lipman, who claimed for the presence of philosophy in the compulsory curriculum to cultivate thinking skills in the classroom, transformed in a community of inquiry committed to democracy (Lipman 1991).

In the second place, students also need to develop some specific affective dimensions that are the cornerstone of the ability of human beings in the pursuit of their own projects, human rights included. Some scholars at present prefer to talk about character education (Lickona 1992; Rest 1999), and I would agree partly with them, at least in the sense that the kind of moral citizen I am looking for in this entry needs to have a good and strong character, that is, the combination of a set of moral habits (virtues): as a consequence of the practice at school, they incorporate those competences or skills as habits of behavior. We should understand this character not as a well-defined

and stable personal identity, but as a cluster of characteristics in some homeostatic relationship to one another. It involves – and what follows is not an exhaustive enumeration of personal characteristics – an accurate self-knowledge, coupled with self-confidence, that is, being conscious of our own limitations and possibilities, our strengths, and our weaknesses and then trying to braid with all of them a solid and balanced personality but at the same time flexible enough as to adapt itself to mutable circumstances. It also entails courage, strength, or the self, a cornerstone in moral behavior that can be found in many philosophers from Plato (courage) to Maquiavelo (virtu), Spinoza (conatus), or Nietzsche (will of power); courage is a quality that enables children to face difficulty and danger without fear and to act in accordance with their own beliefs, in spite of criticism and pressure from peers and other people. It is deeply related with the challenging characteristic of human rights I just mentioned before.

Another very important bunch of personal dimensions basic for human rights education are those named as social abilities or social personality. Empathy is the ability of climbing out of our own skin and into another's; people need to develop the capacity of taking different perspectives, looking at the situation from the point of view of other people, and trying to share the feelings they have. And they must be capable of empathy not just toward their close relatives or friends but also toward people they meet for the first time, mainly people who are suffering from violence caused by other people or by themselves, or toward those who live far away from them. Other social abilities are openness, as being receptive to new ideas and different viewpoints and attitudes; tolerance, that is much more than the capacity of enduring and goes to interest and concern, to a positive attitude, for ideas, opinions, and practices that differ from one's own, that is to say, a tendency to consider that difference and variety are a social and personal richness (UNESCO 1995b); cordiality, as the readiness to caring for other people's well-being and to being concerned for their suffering; and, last but not least, solidarity and a cooperative disposition.

All these social attitudes are fundamental for the implementation of human rights. I agree with those who admit that human rights are always aimed at personal (individual) rights and that, then, it is meaningless to talk about the rights of a community, ethnic group, or nation, except in those cases where just the fact of belonging to a specific group (gypsies, women, children, etc.) is a handicap in the exercise of your rights or, even worse, is the reason your rights are violated (López Calera 2000). Notwithstanding in these situations we struggle for the rights of every single individual in the group, such that it is expressed in the first article of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In any case, even if we talk about personal rights, they are only meaningful in a society where everybody else is entitled to the same rights as us. This social dimension of human rights has two different sides. First, rights are always a social question because you have rights as a member of a community or country where your rights are recognized and respected, and the whole social life is organized according to those rights, and that is the reason why struggling for your personal rights involves always social changes that affect all the members of the group. Second, your rights are meaningful only if they are recognized by people who have the same rights as you; your rights do not finish where the rights of other people start, but just the opposite; your rights and theirs go together in a close and deep binding. Third, rights involve duties in a “vicious” circle in such a way that you can never say what is first; as expressed in Article 28 of the Universal Declaration:

Everyone has duties to the community in which alone the free and full development of his personality is possible.

Two very important things are needed in order to foster these cognitive and affective dimensions or attitudes in our students – and in ourselves as teachers. First, we have to offer them the opportunity of acting as moral autonomous agents in every activity across their school life. Unfortunately, in the current school system, that active implication of students is not very frequent; the school system focuses its attention mainly on

handing down to children the values and knowledge society thinks worth transmitting, and this asks of children an active participation in the process of learning in order to understand and assimilate all that stuff, but nothing else. Teachers and principals, education administrators, and society as a whole think that children and teenagers are not qualified to participate in the design and implementation of school policies. That is such an important topic that I will develop it at length in a section below.

On the other hand, just as in moral education, in HRE children learn much more from what we do than from what we say. Children do not like at all to be moralized at any place and any time, and from the point of view of moral education, all that moral talk with children and young people is useless. They listen carefully, even if they feel bored to death while we are lecturing them, but do not pay real attention to what we are saying to them: all our lecture goes in one ear and comes out the other. Even more, they can agree with the principles of human rights, but that is not more than repeating the official and accepted moral discourse. As far as their behavior is concerned, modeling is a more appropriate approach to HRE (Bandura 1986): children will develop behavioral patterns similar to those of adults they are living with. A necessary condition for them to internalize human rights and to have them as moral standards of their behaviors is that they discover that we, teachers and adults in general, follow those moral standards in our everyday life. Let’s explore this a little deeper.

Deconstructing the Curricula

As I emphasized in the introduction, human rights are a set of values that everybody, all around the world, accepts as the moral standard they use to evaluate social, political, and economic activities. They are also proposed as guidelines for legal system in such a way that they become promulgated as laws or inform the current legislation of every country; the final step of a universal declaration is to be converted into a convention that, after signed by a number of countries, is binding

on everybody and every country. It does not follow that they are actually embodied in social and personal behavior or in the proceedings or performances of public and private institutions. Most of the time, the promises in the introduction to the Universal Declaration fail to materialize, and the violation of basic rights is the rule everywhere. All of us have the feeling that people – especially those who hold public office or a position of power in society – just pay lip service to human rights and use them as a tool to the pursuit of goals very far from those involved in the ideals of the 1948 Declaration. That is the standard practice in foreign policy all around the world; a perfect example is those countries that use human rights to justify wars and totally forget any right as long as it is a question of making business wealthy and powerful nations. Annual reports from independent institutions, such as Human Rights Watch or Amnesty International, show us an ugly scene for human rights implementation.

However, this contradiction between the values people say to respect and honor and the moral standard they do keep up throughout their life is not only a problem for all those people in positions of power. It is a contradiction that pervades and penetrates every social institution and almost every human person, even those who abide by specific educational responsibilities. We are supposed to follow the principles and directions from the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and that is what we sustain and teach to our students, but with shocking regularity we do not put all those children's rights into practice. Sometimes we skip those rights on account of some harmless oversight; once in a while we think that those rights are not important enough and they have to be put aside in behalf of children's education (I should say "children's training"); even worse, there are many adults who actually think that children do not have as many rights as those included in the convention.

For students themselves it is as if we, adults, would say to them "Do as you are told to do, but not as we do"; they realize that we are asking them to conduct themselves responsibly and to keep up some moral values that we ourselves do not have and do not keep. The most probable consequence is

that they will do just as we do and will pay more or less the same limited attention to human rights as us. They will learn that this moral inconsistency is the normal way of doing, something you can live with without any special annoyance for your emotional equilibrium. More than that, as they have developed at school a wide repertory of thinking skills, they will use them – just as we do – to justify almost every behavior, even those that at first sight are against the main values of human rights.

This distinction between the hidden and the open curricula imposes on us a reflection about what is actually being taught to students in the school system. It is not a question of wonderful public declarations or any other kind of wishful thinking. This is determined by educational policies adopted by the government, and it rests on the implementation of these policies at school by teachers, principals, janitors, trainers, and all those who work with children at formal education. As Apple (1993) said, "the politics of official knowledge are the politics of accords or compromises"; different groups and social movements in society struggle to protect their own interests and to make them legitimate and also to increase their own share of power. At the present time, when the neoliberal political agenda has been imposed on all social life without a very strong critical opposition, the concerns of the less powerful are not really taken into account. Managerialism and business are the models for education; all of us are told that it is needed to bring school and the business sector close together and develop educational models of training where professionalization, entrepreneurship, competitiveness, and social cohesion play an essential role, although the two first goals (employment and competitiveness) get the best of the education and competitiveness, as expected, reinforces social exclusion (Brandsma 2000). The school system is at risk of becoming not the place to empower children, but the place to reinforce the position of those who are in control and to teach children how to be obedient citizens that accept with resignation an official curriculum that legitimates personal submission and exclusion.

Even more complicated is that teachers and students are not equal parts in the educational

relationship. Students attend compulsory school, that is, they are obliged to go there in order to receive the education adult people have decided is good for them to receive; teachers are supposed to have the knowledge and they are paid for handing down all that stuff to children. From the very beginning in kindergarten or primary school, children perceive that they are subjected to social and moral pressure to take their education seriously and to learn all that is taught to them, even when they are unwilling to do so, and that is a frequent attitude after they are 10 years old. Teachers, principals, parents, and every adult person used to say to children that they know better than children themselves what is good for them to do; so, if children want to become good persons and good citizens, they have to accept and follow adults' advice and directions, even if they do not understand very well what are the terrific advantages they will get in a distant future, thanks to their present complete obedience.

As a consequence of all this constant pressure on children, although we are in favor of autonomous thinking, freedom of speech, and creativity as basic ingredients of personal development and democratic societies, we do foster, much more than it would be needed, dependent thinking, acquiescence, conformity, obedience, and a critical acceptance of authority. In the 1920s, Piaget gave a theoretical support to this educational approach when he described children behavior before 12 as heteronomous, and he, as much as Aristotle more than 2000 years before, postponed autonomous and rational thinking till they were 12 years old. Piaget's own intention was to help children to become autonomous and cooperative persons; as a matter of fact, one of his main theses was that children developed a moral sense of their behavior guided by justice as soon as they had contact with their peers, people of their own age; however, in a certain way, he favored just the opposite: to undermine, even ignore, the capabilities that children have from the very beginning of their lives (Gopnik 2009). In the last decades, an important number of studies by psychologists and moral educators have offered us sufficient data to consider that children's heteronomous thinking is more an imposition by adults than a basic

characteristic of a specific stage of children's development. If you treat children as dependent and heteronomous people, they might grow as dependent and submissive. That might be the reason why Dewey, also in the 1920s of the past century, emphasized that the relationship between education and democracy – and, in our case, human rights – is not something we must take for granted.

Had we taken seriously the teaching of human rights at school, we would have undertaken also seriously this deconstruction of teaching and the official curriculum. We had discovered with Basil Bernstein, (2000) that compulsory education does not offer equal opportunities to everybody, owing to the fact that curricula are biased and favor those students whose cultural and social background fits with the standards teachers use to evaluate and assess children's processes of learning. There is an effective discrimination against children who do not speak the language of middle and upper social classes. We had also discovered how girls and boys internalize gender discrimination, because the school reproduces the sexist conditions that are at work in society, no matter how much we insist our devotion to gender equality. And just to give a third example, we had realized that we keep all the time singing praises of cooperation and mutual aid, but our students are assessed and graded by their individual performance, and most of the time we actually foster competitiveness and indoctrinate them into the basic social myths of neoliberal societies.

All these cases, and many more that we would be able to cite, show us that the patient work of deconstruction is a cornerstone of human rights education. That is a necessary step for teachers to wake up to the fact that they are not so committed to human rights as expected and that they are modeling a very different behavior. It does not matter that usually they are not conscious or voluntary supporters of those values that contradict human rights. Be that the case, it does not diminish the fact that those of us who are teachers need to be held accountable for what we do with our students in the schools we are working at. Our own educational practices are flawed as a consequence of living in a society where we are caught

in multiple and sometimes contradictory social relations whose hidden rules we accept. More often than expected, we follow those social conventions just because we want to play the social game, and, in order to do that, we accept its rules; we do not want to be excluded from the game since that would be in any respect the worst of all possible situations. At other times we act as if it is socially expected from us, accepting traditional social norms without thinking carefully about their moral value. We are technical workers that restrict the profession to follow the regulations and conventions that are given to us by educational officials, mass media, and other social institutions. We are not critical and creative professionals that reflect on the ends and means of our educational practice; however, if we do want to take human rights education seriously, we have to develop an autonomous, critical, and creative behavior, and that involves a constant critical reflection on our own practice and on the “hidden side” of the educational system.

The Democratic School

As I just mentioned earlier, it is of course important to include in the compulsory curriculum a specific time in the school schedule devoted to the topic of human rights, in the same way that there is a place for mathematics or language. The actual curriculum of the compulsory school is the result of a social negotiation and a social choice aimed to decide which topics or disciplines are important or valuable enough as to be covered in the schedule. If there is not any specific time when students and teachers work seriously on human rights, we can give little credit to the declared interest in human rights from the part of those who are in the position of making decisions about educational policies. Of course, children can learn basic social values in their everyday life, at school or home, with friends or adults, and they learn their mother language in this way. However, this would be a faulty and superficial learning because they will lack the critical skills needed to get a sound and creative mastery of those topics.

So children should have time to think and talk about human rights. They need, first, to have a better understanding of the history of human rights to discover that many of the rights they are entitled to or they take for granted, as attending school or having medical care, are social conquests that were obtained thanks to the fights of many people, and they can disappear from social and political life as soon as people stop urging them. As a matter of fact, that is the case at present, when under the pressure of neoliberal forces, led by multinationals, the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, the welfare State is being dismantled especially after the great crisis of 2007. The impact of rising inequality is damaging one of the most important goals of public education – the ability of compulsory schooling to offer children an equal chance at academic and economic success (Duncan and Murnane 2011). They also have to ascertain that in today’s world, not everybody enjoys the same human rights, even those more basic and fundamental; they might not know that there are countries where some or many specific rights are systematically violated by the same authorities that are supposed to protect those rights. They should be familiar with reports such as those published by private or public organizations (Amnesty International, Worldwatch Institute, United Nations Development Programme, United Nations Population, or UNICEF, just to mention only a few) and with the new 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, which includes a set of 17 goals (<http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/presscenter/pressreleases/2015/09/24/undp-welcomes-adoption-of-sustainable-development-goals-by-world-leaders.html>) to end poverty, fight inequality and injustice, and tackle climate change by 2030. It would also be very helpful for children to discover that there are many people and institutions all over the world that keep struggling for human rights, sometimes putting their own lives at serious risk. Many times, moral educators and people who work on human rights have the tendency to focus on the violations of basic rights, offering students an approach that makes them feel downhearted and hopeless; it is much more fruitful to emphasize the active social

role of all those institutions, groups, and individual people who struggle in favor of human rights. Children learn that some do care; according to this pedagogical approach, violations are kept in the background, and civic movements deeply engaged in social transformation are in the foreground.

Important as it is in all this discussion, during the regular timetable and on the same or similar terms with other subject matters, we need to take a step forward and to get the whole school pervaded by human rights, not only as a theoretical topic but also as a practical matter, as the cornerstone or the backbone of the school life. Therefore, human rights should be the guiding criteria of the school as an institution, where many people, children and adults, boys and girls, live together and have to establish and follow the rules of their peaceful and fertile coexistence. Children need to be given the opportunity of participating as responsible moral agents in the elaboration and implementation of school policy. Principals, teachers, and all those who are in charge of the education of children tend to think that they cannot participate in the organization of their own education, because they lack the needed skills and knowledge to carry on with those responsibilities, but this is an unjustified prejudice. First, they underestimate children's ability to manage all those problems that are related with their familiar environment (home, school, playground, etc.) and with the social relationships they are used to (parents and siblings, classmates and teachers, friends, etc.); however, if we offer them the opportunity of using their cognitive and affective skills, we realize that they can face successfully their own responsibilities, as the International Democratic Education Network proves (Waghid 2014) (<http://www.idenetwork.org/>) proves.

In the second place, they also tend to undervalue children's reasonableness when their interests and motivations are concerned, and they assume that adults know better than children what is good for them; once again it is a misconception of children's minds and abilities. They have problems – as much as adults have – to keep a balance between personal and social interests and between the present

satisfaction of their needs and the future demands that sometimes oblige us to defer that satisfaction. They can also tell moral rules from conventional or social ones, and they know that it is possible, although not always easy, to change the second kind of rules, whereas moral rules should be respected in a deeper sense: you can modify social and conventional rules after negotiating with all those affected – and sometimes without any negotiation, just using a power position that allows some people to impose their own decision; however, you are abided by moral rules, even in those cases when the pursuance of your duty has adverse effects for you. And all this moral stuff is not something children are not familiar with or they cannot grasp. They can perceive the moral dimensions of many events of their everyday life, events that require them to make moral judgments and to act in a way that can be consistent with their own principles and judgments. They only need to grow in their capability to analyze situations of rising complexity and to find the best solutions for any specific moral problem (Hoffman 2000).

In the third place, as much as moral and political stuff (and that is what is involved in school policy) are concerned, it seems that we forget a golden rule of education: if you want somebody to learn something, give them the opportunity of putting it into practice. People learn to swim in the swimming pool, so children learn citizenship (and human rights involved in civic virtues) participating in assemblies in their schools, where they set the agenda of the topics, then expose aloud in a reasoned form their own view on these controversial questions, and listen carefully to the arguments of his/her classmates and teachers. Eventually, if needed, they make a decision, usually voting the different specific proposals and they are committed to the implementation of their resolution that will be analyzed in a next meeting. As Dewey made it very clear in his deep and sound philosophy of education, democracy is much more than a form of government, we would be able to explain children through lecturing in history or social sciences classes. A democracy is “primarily a mode of associated living, of conjoint communicated experience” (Dewey 1966). Living together in

the school, children participate in a common interest so that each one has to refer his/her own action to that of his/her classmates and to think on the interest of others as something that can give point and direction to his/her own. The biggest the varied points of view and contact, the strongest the feeling of richness and complementarity. In a safe environment of trust and mutual aid, as a democratic school is supposed to be, children internalize slowly but deeply the basic values of democracy, and they realize how worthy and precious they are.

In such a way they are not just passive subjects of the educational policies of their country and school, but active participants in its elaboration and implementation. They will grow as active moral citizens because they, after practicing as active school citizens from the very beginning at their educational process, get the habits and skills needed for citizenship. And they will internalize human rights because they will discover that those rights are the basic conditions that all of us have to respect if we want to solve social problems in cooperation with other people who have different (sometimes contradictory) interests and points of view. Notwithstanding all that involves deep changes in the present way of ruling the school system. The most habitual and widespread practices in the educational system are very hierarchical: officials from the Ministry of Education plan the big lines of educational policies, following in democratic societies the laws enacted by the parliament. Local educational officials adapt those lines to their own specific community. Principals have the responsibility of guaranteeing the right implementation in their school of those educational policies, although they have to adapt them to their specific school. Teachers themselves are the last link in this well-defined chain of command. Their job is reduced to the technical adaptation of educational directions to their students. Of course, students attend the school just to learn, but that learning is many times reduced to listening, memorizing, and obeying. As a consequence of this model, after 12 years attending the schools, children will become good citizens, but in the sense of citizens that respect authority, obey the laws, and never question seriously the orders of

those who hold the top positions in every domain of social life: politics, business, or family.

If we want good citizens, in the sense of persons who can think for themselves, cooperate in the discussion about the ends of society, and live as moral and political agents committed to the principles of justice and the values of human rights, we should put the school upside down. We should, first, transform the classroom into a community of inquiry where everybody has an active role in the process of learning and teaching, a very interesting idea elaborated by Lipman (1991). Students discover that they have their own learning agenda and their own interests than can be accepted as the starting point of their process of education. Teachers stop lecturing and start seeing themselves much more as experienced people who are responsible for the education of their students, and that involves facilitating personal and communitarian development; of them; they find out at the same time that they are also persons who have to learn from their students and whose social role goes further than just looking after technical procedures. In such a way, students and teachers become those active citizens democratic societies are longing for, and they transform the fundamental values of freedom, equality, and fraternity in well-rooted habits of heart.

It is not enough just to transform the class; we have to transform the school itself into a democratic school, pervaded by the principles of mutual respect and mutual aid, where everybody, students, teachers, and workers, is equal and has the same rights. In order to build the school as an institution that models for children and adults what it means to live in a small society guided by human rights, we have to implement an active action to guarantee that those rights are actually respected. We should offer students, from the very beginning of their school life, the opportunity of playing a major role in their own education. This demands two main lines of action; the first one is to create the characteristic institutions and procedures of a democracy: student meetings to discuss openly about the school policies and problems, elections of representatives that will have to account for their behavior as representatives to their schoolmates, and school boards and

commissions where the decisions are made and where there is an appropriate balance between adults and students in such a way that student contributions actually make a difference. There is a long tradition of this style of democratic school that goes back to the anarchist educational practices since at the end of the nineteenth century (Autores Varios 1986) and has very good contemporary examples including the democratic schools in the USA (Apple and Beane 1997). The second line of action cares for the most appropriate moral climate of the school, which goes together with its democratic procedures. Everybody at school is supposed to be responsible of the moral atmosphere that is needed to guarantee that nobody suffers from discrimination or violence and that their opinions are respected and taken into account. Those moral questions come to the front page of the school agenda and are discussed openly, and the right steps are taken to remedy the misbehaviors and to implement the active policies of promotion and defense of human rights. This is the “just community” approach to moral learning developed from Kohlberg’s theory of moral development (Kohlberg et al. 1989).

The Scapegoat and the Forlorn Hope

Any time that society has to face all kinds of social problems and mainly those problems that might be related with morality and the behavior of young people, it is very common that people focus on education and school system and analyze attentively what is going on. If a couple of very young people, 12 years old, commit a violent crime, such as a murder, people tend to think that their behavior has a lot to do with their specific individual characteristics that have turned them into very dangerous people, but at the same time people think that family and school, parents, and teachers have some particular and definite responsibilities for that misbehavior. The feeling that schools and teachers are accountable to society for children’s and teenagers’ behavior grows as long as we have to cope with more common social disorders, such as vandalism, hooliganism, robbery, or just bad manners. The argument is very simple: as core

habits of human behavior are developed early in childhood, those who have to look after children – parents and teachers – have a specific responsibility if children do not get the “good habits” society expects of them. This responsibility is even bigger for teachers because they are supposed to master the appropriate pedagogical techniques in order to get children to internalize those habits; they are paid for that, and if they do not achieve their goal, they are accountable for their failure and they deserve all the criticism from society.

This argument is partly right, and teachers should be much more careful with questions related with moral education of children and also with human rights education. After playing with other children in the park or the playground, the school environment is the place where children start to meet other people in a systematic way, and discover the constraints and advantages of living together. It is the beginning of their social life that, since that moment, should be ruled by social justice. That is the main reason why teachers have to play a very important and active role in empowering children to develop a behavior guided by the respect of all the members of the community and by the consciousness of their own rights and duties. As I tried to state earlier, teachers, curriculum, and the school as an institution have to be committed to the promotion of human rights as the basic values that have to govern social and personal life. And we have to admit that more frequently than desired, they do not pay the needed attention to those questions; they do not attach much importance to human rights and moral values, obsessed as they are by the content dimension of their discipline. HRE is put aside, and it is left to the hidden curriculum that very often involves values against human rights, such as racism, sexism, intolerance, etc.

On the other hand, the arguments of those who launch an attack on teachers and schools are biased arguments, and they want to turn teachers into the scapegoat for a social failure that much more people are accountable for. It is true that human rights are at present that set of social values everybody is committed to, and they are supposed to guide the policies from government and any

other social institution, public or private; however, it is also true that the implementation of those policies is far from meeting those basic values that are the moral content of human rights. So they are modeling for children a social behavior that is only partly consistent with human rights; there is a certain loss of the civic virtues that hold together a society. People, obsessed with the dominant values of competitiveness and efficiency, try to keep all they have got, their standard of living; they just look after their own interest and they wash their hands of the whole public affair. Frightened by the risk of losing their social position and of falling in the black hole of social exclusion, they try to protect themselves in their homes and in their neighborhood, well guarded day and night by police officials and private security companies that offer their protection against any kind of threat and use any kind of security measures. At the same time, obsession for security is undermining fundamental values of democracy (Engelhardt and Greenwald 2014).

There is a serious risk of society falling to pieces, with the gap between the winners and the losers and the wealthy and the poor deepening more and more. At the same time, the social glue that keeps together all the members of society and helps them to share a common project tends to fade. The old liberal myth maintained that the institutions and principles of a society, its public life, might be virtuous, though the individuals composing it were vicious, and the rational choice of individual motivated by enlightened self-interest was sufficient – thanks to the hidden laws of free market – to give rise to the best possible society. Notwithstanding, they took for granted that private virtue and commitment to public welfare were basic ingredients of the social fabric, and they never gave up the ideal of citizenship that sustained the republican order. The good order and the welfare of society hinged on the people taking a public responsibility for each other, even without specific ties or familiarity. It follows that families and teachers should work shoulder to shoulder with many other informal educational settings; children have to learn public virtues and social habits from all those people they meet on the street, in the stores, and in the movie

theaters. It is a big mistake just to delegate civic obligations over to professional bureaucrats or over to formal agencies of law enforcement. If we want to help children to grow as moral agents, committed to human rights, we have to implement social policies that involve everybody in their neighborhoods. It is not fair to wash your hands of public life and then to criticize the professionals we pay to do the job we are abided by.

Teachers themselves are members of this ultra-liberal society that relieve individuals of most of their civic obligations and foster the increasing power of professionals of public welfare. At the same time, they have been taught in the actual values of this society, and they are impregnated by the discourse of competitiveness and self-interest in a worldwide free market. That means that they have some problems to help children to grow according to some values they partly disagree with. As Marx explained in his *Thesis on Feuerbach*, “The materialist doctrine concerning the changing of circumstances and upbringing forgets that circumstances are changed by men and that it is essential to educate the educator himself.” So, much more attention should be paid to the education of educators and to the involvement of the whole society in the challenge of teaching human rights to children and to young people.

There is another momentous difficulty in the path of HRE. Alasdair MacIntyre said some years ago that teachers are the forlorn hope of the culture of Western modernity, because they are entrusted with a mission that is both essential and impossible (Macintyre 1987). On the one hand, they have to shape the young person so that they can practice a specific profession or job and occupy a well-defined social role; this purpose involves legitimization of hierarchical social positions. On the other hand, it is a central purpose of education, and of teachers, to teach young people to think for themselves and to acquire independence of mind so that they, as enlightened people, can play an active role in the society as moral agents and committed citizens. As long as we focus on this second goal of education, it is possible for teachers to add human rights to their daily teaching; and that is the case in compulsory

education, where young people are introduced into the membership of those enlightened people who dare know and think for themselves. However, even in compulsory (and comprehensive) education, teachers tend to focus on the training young people need to become a professional, an expert, or a specialist, with narrowly defined social roles and narrowly delimited interests.

The problem teachers have is that they cannot put aside these contradictory goals of the educational institution. The increasing economic growth and the present globalization of the world market expand the need of specialized professionals, so society demands from schools a stronger involvement in the formation of those people who will occupy the top of the economic system. For most of the people, such a sophisticated education is not needed at all, as long as their jobs are only monotonous and mechanical, without entailing any specific high-order skill. Those persons have to face in their professional activities complex problems that require creative thinking, and they have to make decisions that will have a great impact on society as a whole. On the other end of the economic chain, workers only have to obey the orders and follow the directions they receive from their managers and supervisors; so, society expects of teachers that they will foster those people with the minimal thinking skills required to fulfill their small part in the chain of production or the assembly line and with the basic values of obedience and respect for authorities and superiors. The better the school achieves this goal of selecting people and legitimating the selection, the worse it can accomplish its other goals, to empower children so that they can think for themselves. And MacIntyre is right as he underlines that the gap between those two very different kinds of workers is becoming deeper in modern societies.

However, teachers are seriously committed to the second purpose of education, and they can never give up on the aim of building a community of people with the capacity of critical and creative thinking to dialogue about things that actually matter to those involved in the community. There are, however, three serious difficulties that we should overcome in order to build this

educated and enlightened community. The first one is strongly related with the economic growth and the professionalization and specialization it requires; every person is restricted to the limited area of his/her discipline or subject matter, but they have problems to grasp the whole picture of social and political economy, and they have lost the ability to reflect on the ultimate ends that society is pursuing. The second factor is size; according to the ideals of ancient Greek and modern enlightened political thinkers, such as Rousseau, a democratic society could only flourish as an independent small-scale community. As soon as societies involve millions of people living together in the same city and they are seriously affected by decisions taken thousands of miles away from their own social environment, it becomes extremely difficult to develop in them the feeling of active citizenship and participatory democracy. There is a third factor strongly related with the other two just mentioned. Enlightened thinking and reflection on the ends of society is becoming more and more an activity reserved for experts and specialized professionals, and critical and creative thinking has been confiscated as an occupational responsibility of those who are holding official positions in public agencies or private companies.

Taking all these problems into account, we should not follow MacIntyre too far in his criticism and his very pessimistic conclusion. Those are, of course, serious problems teachers have to cope with, and they have good reasons to feel overwhelmed by those social responsibilities they can hardly carry out. Although the present context offers a specific and very worrying configuration of education, these contradictory purposes can be traced back to Plato. His proposal was to guarantee every citizen with the basic sense of morality and justice, as he himself exposed in the myth of Prometheus and Epimetheus (*Protagoras* dialogue), and to offer those best gifted from birth the best and highest education so that they could occupy the top positions in the polis, the philosophers (*Republica*). Dewey follows this contradiction up to the modern times, but he keeps alive his confidence in the possibility of school contributing to the overcoming of the

contradiction between social classes that have contradictory interests and between national loyalty and the cosmopolitan ideal. But according to Dewey's approach, education, as a necessary social process, must attend to that which connects communities in such a way that the goal of education as a freeing of individual capacity be bound up with education as a progressive growth directed to social aims. This conception of education implies a particular social ideal that has to be defined and implemented not just by teachers and school, but by all the members of society and by political institutions.

A society which makes provision for participation for the good of all its members on equal terms and which secures flexible readjustment of its institutions through interaction of the different forms of associated life is democratic. Such a society must have a type of education which gives individuals a personal interest in social relationships and control and the habits of mind which secures social changes without introducing disorder (Dewey 1966).

The school is, then, a necessary institution in modern and complex democratic societies, and it is a cornerstone in the formation of the active citizens that society needs to achieve the ambitious goals it set itself for its future. School is a necessary condition, but it is not a sufficient condition; it only can contribute its specific share in the human rights education task as long as every other social institution contributes their own share in a common project. The gray clouds that darken the horizon of a society where people live together sharing common interests and acting in accordance with human rights as basic values have been always out there; however, there is not any other way out but working together – teachers, parents, and everybody else in society – to keep alive those values we think are worth struggling for (Garcia Moriyon 2011). Some educational experiences, such as those conducted by Freire in Brazil in the 1960s or the most recent ones, such as the Accelerate Schools Project (<http://www.tc.columbia.edu/accelerated/>) in the USA, or the School As 'Learning Communities' in Spain (<http://utopiadream.info/ca/>) just to mention some of the many examples we could bring

up, give us some hope and help us to think that teachers (and society) have to face serious problems, but they are not the forlorn hope of Western society.

The Good Citizen and the Good Person

Important as they are, human rights are not enough, even if we are focusing on the human rights education. Although there is a well-rooted myth in Western culture about the necessary and advisable separation between the private and the public life, so that many people think, following the old Mandeville's ideal, that private vices give rise to public virtues, this is not more than a prejudice and a narrow approach to social life. If we do want to have human rights values as basic values in social life, we have to pay attention to something more than just human rights.

To begin with, there is a handicap in all human rights declarations. At best, they are high moral standards that allow people and institutions to guide their behavior and that can be used as criteria to assess and judge those behaviors demanding a perfect compliance with those rights. Usually, human rights are no more than wishful thinking, a bunch of good desires to be achieved in a distant future, all the political, economic and social circumstances permitting. Worse, they are just ideology in its worst meaning such as it was defined by Marx and Engels. According to both thinkers, ideology is a system of false ideas, a statement of class position, and a justification for class rule and for an unequal and a hierarchical society. They tend to sustain a society based on human being's alienation and bondage and create a false consciousness in the oppressed social classes because ideology – in this case, human rights – makes them believe that they are living in a society where "all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act toward one another in a spirit of brotherhood," (Article 1) although in this society some people are actually much more equal than others. They are, therefore, weapons for oppression instead of weapons for freedom.

Even if I accept that Marxism despises too much human rights as a bourgeois ideology rejecting any positive values on those declarations, they do hit a raw nerve of social problems. That was the reason why in 1948 socialist countries did not sign the Universal Declaration and struggled for a new declaration where the formal rights were completed and enhanced: almost 20 years later, in 1966, a covenant on economic, social, and cultural rights was signed and entered into force in 1976. This covenant sustained that “the ideal of free human beings enjoying freedom from fear and want can only be achieved if conditions are created whereby everyone may enjoy his economic, social and cultural rights, as well as his civil and political rights.” That risk is still with us, and we have to care not to convert human rights into an empty and formal set of big words that in reality are used to conceal the actual social relationships from those who are suffering poverty, injustice, and social exclusion. In order to build a democratic society, human rights are necessary but not enough; they have to be accompanied by effective social and economic policies aimed to transform society into a just society. At present, this is a well-accepted ideal that directs the policies of international institutions, such as the UNDP: human rights and human development share a common vision and a common purpose – to secure, for every human being, freedom, well-being, and dignity.

As Paul Ricoeur used to say (Ricoeur 1990), moral life of human beings covers three different domains. In the first place, we have moral duties with ourselves, as individuals who are looking for meaning and happiness and who want to accomplish a project of personal development to live our lives to the full; this hard task is related to personal characteristics – or virtues – such as courage, self-knowledge, self-esteem, and moral consciousness, etc., a set of dimensions teachers have to foster in their students and in themselves. Second, we have moral duties with our relatives, close friends, and classmates, that is, with all those we share our everyday life with; in this wider area of social relationship, a different bunch of personal characteristics occupy the stage: friendship, shame, gratitude, forgiveness, empathy, caring,

etc. In the third place, we are members of a society, with its political, economic, social, and cultural institutions; it is in this area where the problem of justice and equality, solidarity, and impartiality comes up, and it is also a domain that demands from us specific moral duties that make possible social welfare and peaceful coexistence of many peoples with different personal projects and different approaches to social and political questions. It is the place for tolerance, empathy, open-mindedness, etc. These three moral domains with different problems and requirements overlap in many ways, and they are also present in distinct moments of our lives or in distinct social roles, and in other cases they come into conflict.

The point of Ricoeur’s way of looking at the problem is that human rights are relevant in the domain of social life, but they are values of minor significance especially in the case of close social relationships. The whole universal declaration of 1948 is, of course, fundamental to recover a basic value for the moral growing of the person; it clearly states the dignity of each and every one of all human beings, an essential element for personal self-esteem and courage, and also lays the foundations of personal well-being and happiness. However, it is almost silent over most of our personal identity and over our specific and distinctive project to develop a meaningful life. And it remains also silent over the second domain of our life, that of close social relationship. Human rights as a juridical body of principles to protect people against oppression was born in the move of modern revolutions, American and French, and it is too dependent on the liberal ideas that were built up in the seventeenth century; one of its goals at the very beginning was to guarantee that everyone in society could pursue his/her own personal project without being subjected to persecution by the government. A key concept that helped society to tolerate a wide array of personal conceptions of the good life and moral good was the scrupulous separation of the private and public life, and this was a big conquest we can neither put aside nor despise. However, contrary to this liberal conception of social and political life, it is impossible to have public virtues unless you foster private

virtues, and we must not push the separation too far. The way you live in your private life, with your family and close relatives and friends, and in your job and neighborhood is strongly related with the way you behave yourself as a citizen. If we want people to be committed to human rights values and if we want good citizens, we have to foster those personal moral habits that define a good person; and it works just the same the other way: if we want to have good moral persons, we have to offer them a good society, guided by the principles of freedom, equality, and brotherhood and sustained on public virtues.

One of the most fruitful discussions between moral and political thinkers for the last 30 years has been centered on the issue of the foundations and procedures of liberal democracies. Rawls began the discussion in 1971, in his book *A Theory of Justice*. Even if after years of discussion he has revised and modified some characteristics of his approach, accepting some ideas from his critics, he still is one of the best representatives of the liberal tradition that overemphasizes the formal dimension of political activities and consider freedom as the cornerstone of democracy. On the other hand, Robert Bellah and some other scholars attacked the roots of Rawls' proposal denouncing what the authors called "utilitarian individualism" – rampant competition and concern for the bottom line, income polarization, and contempt for the "losers"; their proposal was to focus our attention on forms of social organization, be it civil society, democratic communitarianism, or associative democracy, that can humanize the market and the administrative State: they insisted that citizens in democratic societies should go back to the affective warp of the social fabric, those habits of the heart banished to the private sphere of our lives in modern societies. Other scholars, such as Taylor, Walzer, or Sander, followed a similar path to recover the missed democratic strength and to recover the bonds that characterize any community (*Gemeinschaft*), ties that go further than those that define an association (*Gesellschaft*). A version of this controversy in the smaller area of moral education has been sustained between Kohlberg, close to Rawls' standpoint, and Gilligan, whose emphasis

on caring as the central virtue of social life and moral development is close to the communitarians, although her point of view is based on very different theoretical and practical grounds.

In a sense, the whole corpus of human rights declarations and covenants, strong evidence of this need of a moral approach to social life and politics, a project of surmounting a narrow way of elaborating and implementing social policies that at present are too technical, too much under the control of professionals and experts, and too far from the genuine welfare of human beings. According to Chantal Mouffe (1993), a good consequence of this controversy is the recovering of the republican tradition, that all along modernity has stressed the exigency of public virtues; it is not necessary to give up to the beneficial separation of the private and public spheres of human life, provided we cultivate and foster the public moral of the citizens. There is a place for plural conceptions of the moral good, and there is also a place for a shared political good; and both are so interrelated that if one of them vanishes in our society, the other one will vanish shortly afterward. The amazing propaganda apparatus of neoliberal heralds has tried for the last two decades to hide this simple evidence and to conceal with a shroud of silence this republican tradition that just in the American and French revolutions kept together equality, freedom, and brotherhood. That is the reason why as long as we want to offer our students a sound HRE, we have to help them to become good persons and good citizens.

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Human Rights, Postcolonialism, and Education

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Introduction

It should be a complex task to connect the notion of human rights to postcolonialism both historically and in the present. To position education as both an enabler and explainer of human rights in the postcolonial raises further questions about how to understand these couplings. Indeed, there exists a Western bias in the construction and understanding of human rights, education, and even postcolonial discourses. Moreover, assumptions of fixed meanings often override the multiplicities of meaning, origin, and operationalization of the concepts. Thus, while the birth of human rights discourse is geographically multifarious, its historicization has been dominated by a Western imaginary and epistemology.

The problematic occidentalization, to borrow a Saidian line (Said 1978), of human rights in their praxical notations from the past millennia and half and into current political and cultural settlements is an issue that needs to be investigated. The first section of this entry seeks to contribute to this investigation through an historical analysis of the

theoretical and, by extension, practical incongruences that should characterize the space between colonialism and human rights. Following this, through a much needed revisiting of colonialism and connecting it to postcolonialism, the theorizing of the complex story of postcolonialism will be revealed as deserving many more question marks in both its conceptual and semi-pragmatic deployments. This analysis uncovers some of the ongoing descriptive and analytical threads that should operate at the intersections of the three main constructs implicated in the title of this entry. Finally, the last section of the entry is an analysis of the continuities of colonial education and the need to frame new learning possibilities that can advance viable human rights platforms and decolonizing postcolonialism.

A Brief History of Human Rights

As mentioned above, the history of human rights, its social and political constructions, and its possible regimes of implementation are and should be very contentious. A cursory glance of which countries and societies human rights are currently associated with the systematic construction of human rights does not correctly depict the origins of human rights discourse. From a knowledge claims perspective, that should be categorically readjusted. While the idea of human rights and its diverse practical extensions should have been inherent to all social contexts and formations throughout history, in currently dominant Western knowledge analysis, these are usually associated with the Magna Carta (1215), the English Bill of Rights (1689), the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen (1789), and the Bill of Rights in the US Constitution (1791). These associative historical mistakes with respect to the origins of textualized and tempo-spatially binding codes of human rights might have some relationship with the decline of earlier Islamic, Asian, African, and pre-Columbus Americas civilizations during the past eight centuries. The concomitant rise of the West seems to have secured new western-centric hegemonies of history, ideas, and knowledge (cf. Abu-Lughod 1995), including the

presumptive invention of the idea, as well as the operationalizations, of human rights. As Montgomery Watt (2011) shows, though, the noble invention of the first textualized and documented and, later, most comprehensive early platforms of human rights were made by Muslims.

It is therefore argued that the first official document on human rights was drafted by the Prophet of Islam, Muhammad (peace be upon him) through the Medina Letter in 622 AD when he stipulated select rights and responsibilities regimes among the many tribes that resided in the city of Medina (in current Saudi Arabia). As Watt (2011) noted, this document was the first written and officially constituted human rights platform with binding signatures that stipulated both individual and inter-group rights under one system of governance. Interestingly or, perhaps more correctly, consequentially, the second written document on human rights was also created by Muslims, this time by Shiite Muslims in Persia. This more comprehensive human rights platform, called the Treatise of Rights and produced in 659 AD by Ali ibn Al-Husayn, the Fourth Imam of the Shia, contained a detailed set of rights perspectives and expected practices that were as comprehensive as anything created since then either in the West or elsewhere. In a very comprehensive way, especially for a document that did not have any precedence for inclusive categories, the Treatise of Rights discussed and concluded on individual rights, rights of leaders, rights of subjects, and rights of others with this last category concerning how one should relate to and treat “foreigners.” Indeed, familiarizing one’s self with this document, it seems to contain almost everything that has been brought into all successive bills of rights which have been especially purported via Western governance and political systems.

With respect to current major human right documents and contexts, the main one is of course, the United Nations sanctioned Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). This important document which is at least politically agreed upon by all countries, perhaps appears unproblematic *prima facie*. Clearly, all articles in the UDHR were constructed with good intentions and viewing the

first few of these, one can indeed experience a mental state of hopefulness that all people's human rights could be protected. Just to share the focus of some of the first articles, Article 1 states that "all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights"; Article 3 theoretically affirms that "everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person." In Article 4, it is stated that "no one shall be held in slavery or servitude; slavery and the slave trade shall be prohibited in all their forms," and Article 5 asserts that "no one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment." In reading these and other articles in the UDHR, and while acknowledging that no human rights regime can ever be exhaustive, attending to every human condition and relationship, one can still appreciate the post-World War II temporalities of the principles. Furthermore, once can see how, if implemented, the situation could be better for billions of people across the globe. But alas, that is far from the case. In viewing the history of the world with respect to human rights violations, especially since the formulation of the UDHR principles, one can categorically say that each of the 30 articles including the few mentioned above are being violated by governments and others in almost every country in the world. So, close to 70 years after the adoption of UDHR, there is much human rights rhetoric, but the practical record is not encouraging; thus, the need for the implementation of all UDHR principles remains imperative.

Human Rights and Colonialism

While the facts about the original credit of human rights invention in a systematic documented form, although notions and select practices of human rights should have always existed among human populations everywhere, could be settled here, the role colonialism as a massive human rights violation project coupled by deliberate epistemic deformations that accorded all viable ideas, knowledge, and civilizations to the West has resulted in a very different history of human rights. The necessity of sharing an analytical precis on colonialism should

be helpful in connecting it more effectively to the thinning horizons of the postcolonialism belief system. A belief system that, while it continues to be conceptually expounded all over the land, and to be fair, in most cases with good intentions, its expected practicalities (i.e., the end of colonialism in all its forms) are at best shaky, if not majorly absent. The misnaming of colonialism as a civilizing mission (Said 1993) affirms the western perception that others were inferior to them in their human achievement and especially in knowledge and technological achievements. In addition, examining the writings of some of Europe's most important thinkers and their written justifications for colonialism also reveals their conclusion that Africans, Asians, and others they perceived as less endowed in their human faculties were deserving to be invaded, cheated, and multi-purposively commoditized (Abdi 2008a). Reading the factual representations of these then and now dominant opinions, one has to conclude that European human rights, however they were constituted or intended, were not *de facto* or even *de jure* constructed or intended for the colonized. Indeed, even when one studies the UDHR principles, which were announced in 1948, mainly as a response to the destruction caused by the Second World War including the horrible crimes of the Holocaust, one need not miss that the powers who were shaping the agenda of the UN were none other than those colonial powers who were still holding so many colonies in Africa, Asia, and elsewhere. In fact, the word colonialism, let alone any discussion of the issue, is conspicuous in its absence from all 30 articles of the document. Apparently, the crimes of colonialism were not bad enough for their perpetrators as to claim some space in this otherwise comprehensive document that touches almost every other category of violations that could be heaped upon the lives of people.

The Precarious Claims of Postcolonialism

This very brief focus on colonialism is deliberately designed to underline the weaknesses that are inherent in the claims of postcolonialism.

Certainly some worthy works have been written and prepared on the topic (Goldberg and Quayson 2002; Loomba 2005; Ashcroft et al. 2006), with many authors believing they have taken some critical stance on the topic and its potential pragmatizations. Yet more care needs to be exercised with respect to the dangers of unintentionally validating the politico-economic and by extension, livelihood viability of something called postcolonialism. Minimally, the situation needs to be qualified to the extent that while the conceptual constructions and potential practicalities of postcolonialism are more or less temporally meaningful, such cannot be said about the post-“independence” transformational hope of the previously colonized. That is, in terms of power relations, the claim of postcoloniality is not sustainable and cannot be defended theoretically, epistemically, or practically by any serious observer or researcher. From a periodic stance, it can, perhaps, be agreed that the contemporary represents an epochal post facto in relation to the overall global project of physical (not mental) colonization. Yet, if it is the case that colonialism was structured on hugely uneven power relations (Rodney 1982) which spanned across cultural, educational, political, and economic platforms that willfully violated the basic rights of the subordinated, then there remains the need to critically assess the current state of affairs in today’s so-called postcolonial world.

In real terms, while the colonial administrators and military commanders physically left their posts in the old colonies, that viable postcolonial spaces emerged from this is a topic of enduring debate. An example of the mental colonization that ensues in the supposed postcolonial is evident in the fateful words of Thomas Macaulay (2006), former colonial British Governor of India. In his short observations, *Minute on Indian Education*, Macaulay divulged, for epistemic posteriority, the onto-epistemological designs of the British in assuring the loyalty of Indians to colonial ways of reading and acting on the world. Indeed, this piece which spoke about creating limited legions of Indians who are only Indian in their physical contents but British in their mental and resulting behavioral dispositions, and who also act on

behalf of the colonial power as a controlling mechanism for the country’s less Europeanizable masses, is indicative of the power as well as the endurance of mental colonization. Looking both back and forth on the issue, especially as these relate to cultural, educational, and linguistic platforms, one cannot but affirm the almost perfect mechanics of Macaulay’s farsighted designs, especially as these relate to the rhetoric of postcolonialism and the actual continuities of cultural and, by extension, mental colonialism in the country and its large diaspora.

Technically therefore, the claims of postcolonialism, especially with respect to their relationship with human rights, are at best shaky if not mainly untenable. The example of India used here is more or less generalizable to many places in the so-called postcolonial world. Clearly therefore, and unless there is a deliberate and substantial shift or slow evening out of the cultural, linguistic, and educational platforms, then for all practically harnessable intentions, today’s world still favors the colonialist vis-à-vis the rest. With this understanding, there is a need to restart the debates and critically examine the possibilities of epistemic and, by extension, countable freedom achievements that could equitize people’s beings and inter-group global relations. Proceeding from the example of India and checking the postcolonial conditions that are politically or economically more dire, one can actually starkly see the heavier precariousness of the claims of postcolonialism. In the case of Sub-Saharan Africa, for example, the level of control Western countries and their institutions have on the subcontinent hardly fits any notions or practices of postcolonialism.

More often than not, human rights violations that have been mostly learned from colonialism are carried out by local elites that were mostly trained and supported by the old colonial powers. This is now complemented by the perforce impositions of neoliberal globalization (Harvey 2007) with the draconian and recolonizing importations of Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) that were designed by Western institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). SAPs which have been already discredited but still not disowned by the West

have actually led to a recolonized public and educational policy spaces where the ideologically driven and organized violations of people's basic economic rights (Abdi 2008b) are spread over the lives of hapless masses who should still be yearning for some postcolonial redemption and more meaningful livelihood possibilities. But, with no recourse available, the governance structures built on Western nominated nominal democracies that mainly function to facilitate the flow of aid money to the local regimes actually stifle any genuine postcolonial decolonization of politics, economics, or education. These realities also continuously reconstitutionalize the collaborative rules of locally and globally interlocking elite groups (Hoogvelt 2001; Wedel 2009) that hardly respond to the basic needs of the public. Thus, despite the claims of postcolonial politics, the continuing logics and practice of colonialism ensures the ongoing violation of the rights of people. To be sure though, this is happening at a different time, so as indicated above, it is temporally disconnected from colonialism but not in theoretical and practical terms.

Educating for Critical Postcolonialism

In giving concise observations about human rights and colonialism/postcolonialism, one component of the title, education, has to be deployed here as something that instigates new possibilities in the constructions of the former two. Hence the use of "critical postcolonialism" which should minimally do two things. Firstly, it affirms that the situation in former colonies is not a condition of postcolonialism that can recover those primordial citizenship and human rights situations that were lost under colonialism but mostly a continuation of colonialism by other means. Secondly, rather than spread a program of analytical despair on the topic, it should be affirmed that there is hope for the achievement of projects of genuinely decolonized postcolonialism. This is partially related to the important and concretizable perception that despite the thickness of the colonial onto-epistemological restructuring of the world, we never lose at least a residue of human agency

that can be realigned and recapacitated for subjective and social redemption. Minimally or by extended intention, the deployment of the term "critical" should also herald, with important attachments to the original meaning of criticism as contextually improving upon a situation, that there are always some viable liberatory spaces, where the epistemic as well as viable livelihood anticolonial resurrections can be achieved.

To strive for those possibilities, though, in a world so savagely torn asunder in its historical, cultural, politico-economic, and original as well as refurbishable human rights dimensions is not easy. In addition, the idea of educating for something other than current world knowledge and rights disorders requires a novel ideational, analytical, and implementable platforms that can predict and achieve new anticolonial learning perspectives and programs that could reestablish the actionable consciousness of peoples and nations, partially in the way Freire (2000 [1970]) intended, so as to redo the world of the colonized now and for the long term. The need for this thinking and design need not be belabored. But it is still worth reiterating in this short entry piece that an organized and incessant focus on educational analysis in the current context of postcolonialism should be mandated by the enduring force and contemporary curricular continuities of colonial education which, even when it was so counter-communal wellbeing and not conducive to social and environmental sustainabilities, still reigns supreme in the classrooms and lecture halls of almost former colonies. Needless to add for extra emphasis and in relation to the central issue of the human rights perspective discussed here, that an educational system deliberately designed and undertaken for the oppression of the masses cannot, in its original structure and contents, redeem people from its own subjugating qualities. Briefly but firmly, such education was conceptualized, theorized, and implemented for the full scale exploitation of the colonizeds' psyches, cultures, physicalities, and thought processes, thus effecting a primary and enduring depatterning of their worldviews and overall existentialities. Interestingly and quite unfortunately, the basic philosophical and epistemological foundations of

colonial education still characterize almost all learning systems in former colonies. In places like Sub-Saharan Africa, such designs of education did not liberate most people from global political hegemony or from economic deprivation (Abdi 2008b). As such, comprehensively decolonizing colonial education must be directly attached to decolonizing the mind (wa Thiong'o 1986) which, as stated above, remains an important prerequisite for seeking and achieving a viable postcolonial situation.

Clearly therefore, educating for critical postcolonialism requires critical education that is constituted with thick anticolonial pedagogical and learning missions that comprehensively excavate, examine, and speak about the future with conceptual boldness, measured theoretical adventure, and pragmatic prognosis that refuse the racist one-truth paradigms that have been masquerading as the real, indeed only knowledge, for too long. In Gianni Vattimo's (2011) terms, the European/Western claim of one truth ethnocentrically refuses to acknowledge pluralistic epistemologies and multicultural sciences that factually represent the real histories of human beings and their epistemic establishments and modifications (Harding 1998). Educating for decolonized postcolonialism and for inclusively redeemable human rights platforms all in their historical, cultural, political, and economic dimensions requires, therefore, that the reconstructed pedagogical and learning contexts and intersections be thickly connected to a continuing search for epistemic and epistemological rights that should be constitutive of the new struggles to achieve cognitive social justice and rescind the ongoing regimes of epistemicide and linguicide (Santos 2007, 2014; wa Thiong'o 2009). Basically, this should go back to Nyerere's (1968) focus on education for self-reliance which cannot be achieved in contemporary contexts and systems of dehistoricization and deculturation as these are never conducive to social wellbeing and community advancement. As Nyerere himself repeated many times, you cannot decontextualize your society and your world, and then expect to achieve cultural, educational, and economic achievements. It is with this in mind that the connections between human rights, postcolonialism,

and education need so much more than just presumptions about the ending of colonialism as ushering in new human rights platforms that create and sustain decolonized life systems which could benefit the lot of all. Instead, the urgent mission is to do so much more in aiming for, designing, and achieving genuine conditions of newly decolonized postcolonialism that can redefine and maintain contextually useful and horizontally binding human rights regimes which could be equitably applicable to all.

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Humanism

- ▶ [Comenius, John Amos \(1592–1670\)](#)
- ▶ [Humanism, Postcolonialism, and Education](#)
- ▶ [Poststructuralism, Postcolonialism, and Education](#)
- ▶ [Semiosis as Relational Becoming](#)

Humanism, Postcolonialism, and Education

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Synonyms

[Anti-Humanism](#); [Colonialism](#); [Cultural Difference](#); [Eurocentrism](#); [Humanism](#); [Postcolonialism](#); [Universalism](#)

Introduction

It is not unreasonable to claim that humanism has been, and perhaps continues to be, a foundational principle for education. While it may be the case that fewer scholars and teachers would explicitly refer to humanism in the contemporary era, traces of its influence can be seen in the ideals and

commitments expressed by educators from the early childhood through to the tertiary sector. Schools that promote themselves as developing their students holistically, as persons, are just one example of this. However, humanism has encountered a range of critiques since the burgeoning in the 1960s of structuralist and poststructuralist theories. This entry will seek to outline some of the ways in which postcolonial theory has critically engaged with humanism and the effects of this for education. Though it is a term widely used, humanism, ultimately, cannot be neatly defined. Any attempt to do so would be to fix it in an ahistorical space. But humanism has always been historically located and, therefore, constituted. Subsequently, to begin to be able to approach humanism as a concept within the field of education, it is necessary to historicize it however brief and incomplete the task maybe. Indeed, it is only through a historical framework that one can understand the postcolonial engagement with humanism. It is the case that humanism has been interpreted in different ways in various times and spaces. Yet, as it relates to the understanding of education and knowledge today, it is Western notions of humanism that have been most prominent and will therefore be the focus of this article.

History of Humanism

It is generally agreed that humanism goes back at least as far as the Ancient Greeks. Even at this early stage, humanism was implicated in the thinking and practice of education. The classical humanism of Plato and Aristotle enunciated education as having a civilizing function and that knowledge was intrinsic to the concept of the good. There was no need to qualify education as “humanistic” because education as person-centered development of intellectual character for the sake of the good was implicit and assumed. Indeed, this early form of classical humanism that prioritizes the cultivation of the self can be seen also in Confucian and Islamic humanisms (Goodman 2003). Classical humanism tended to be very much focused on how individual moral

cultivation, especially through virtuous living, would lead to the civilizing of humanity. To think of Plato's *Phaedo* here is instructive. Education should help the individual to ensure that the rational part of the self overcomes the irrational, eros-driven part of the self. Importantly, though, this self-cultivation does not merely have its end in the individual, but for the common good. Both the idea of self-cultivation and the ethical orientation toward human flourishing, understood in historically contingent ways, are characteristic of various humanisms over a long period of time.

Over the last 200 years, Western humanism has largely revolved around the contrasting perspectives of the great Enlightenment philosophers, Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) and Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778). These two philosophers can be used as examples of the different emphasis that can be given to either the individual or the common good within humanistic thinking. The following Kantian assertion links the education of the individual with the betterment of humanity: "... children ought to be educated, not for the present, but for a possibly improved condition of man in the future; that is, in a manner which is adapted to the *idea of humanity* and the whole destiny of man" (1960, p. 14).

Kant's more macro understanding of humanistic education can be contrasted with Rousseau's greater focus on the individual.

The philosophical anthropology which drove Rousseau's thinking was that each human is constituted by an inherent self that needs to be developed through the process of education. A Rousseau-inspired education would seek to elicit the goodness out of the child, helping them to grow through their own natural engagement with the world around them. But just as it would be unfair to ignore Kant's focus on the development of the individual self, it would be unfair to completely extract a larger vision from the goals of Rousseau's philosophy of education. Boyd (2009) suggests that the kind of child-centered education found in Rousseau's *Emile* has as its aim "the making of good human beings and through them of a good society" (p. 250). Nevertheless, it can be argued that the emphasis of this humanistic education is on the individual human,

thus leaving the creation of a better society as a secondary consequence.

Within the field of education in more recent times, however, critical pedagogues such as Paulo Freire, Peter McLaren, and Henry Giroux, among others, bring societal transformation into sharp focus as the main aim of education. These scholars argue for an education that exceeds the idea of individual freedom and aims at breaking down the systemic and structural injustices of society. An education that encourages critique of dominant institutions and ideas will lead to this. Here, the emphasis shifts to human flourishing, rather than self-cultivation, as the central focus of humanistic education.

Of course, there are many more examples of humanism at work in education through history, but what these three influential humanistic approaches to education demonstrate, apart from the commitment to the betterment of self and society, is a tendency toward universalizing and essentializing the human. It is this assumption of Western exceptionalism which postcolonial theorists critique, with particular aim taken at this ethnocentric humanism.

Postcolonial Challenge to Humanism: Overview

The postcolonial challenge to humanism can be understood most basically as a critique of the essentialist terms in which it is often articulated and its complicity in colonialism. This focuses on the arrogance of assuming that the ultimate normative conception of the human is the civilized European and that colonialism was a civilizing mission in the name of this humanism. It remains an open question as to whether a humanism that seems to have been so tainted by European forms of knowledge and cultural traditions can survive in a postcolonial and globalized world.

Oddly, perhaps, the particular kind of anti-humanism that comes out of postcolonial critique might well enable the survival of a reconceptualized and rearticulated humanism. One must first understand that postcolonial anti-humanism sees Western humanism as inextricably

tied to the violence – both physical and epistemic – of colonialism. As Young (2004) puts it, this postcolonial antihumanism “starts with the realization of humanism’s involvement in the history of colonialism, which shows that the two are not so easily separable. For from the colonial perspective, humanism began as a form of legitimation produced as a self-justification by the colonizers for their own people, but later. . .was utilized as a form of ideological control of the colonized peoples” (p. 161). What we see emerge, then, from a set of very specific and local historical contexts, is a challenge to humanism that is less concerned with the category of the human in a philosophical sense and more concerned with the cultural politics of humanism. That is to say, the problem with humanism after the onset of colonialism is largely to do with the cultural and political work that it does, or at least is done, in the name of humanism.

However, it could be argued that such a critique, rooted as it is in the realm of the social, leaves open the possibility to imagine and produce a new humanism. In fact, this is the very thing to which Frantz Fanon gestures at the end of his final work, *The Wretched of the Earth* (2001). While this presents some productive possibilities for education, it will first be worthwhile to briefly consider some examples of postcolonial theory’s critique of humanism, those of Frantz Fanon and Edward Said.

Frantz Fanon

Fanon’s critical engagement with the idea of humanism is indelibly marked by his experience of leaving his colonized home for that of the colonizer and by his involvement with the Algerian Revolution. Growing up in Martinique and educated in a French colonial school, Fanon considered himself in some way French; his education had successfully worked to develop such a sensibility and identity. However, on leaving the Caribbean and arriving in France, first to join the French army during WWII and, later to study psychiatry, he was immediately confronted with the reality of his difference.

For Fanon, this difference was inextricably tied to the blackness of his skin. In *Black Skin, White Masks*, Fanon wrote of the way in which white men saw themselves as superior to black men and the way in which this kind of binary logic was at the core of the colonialist’s imagination. No matter how educated and “European” the black man was, Fanon writes that “the European has a fixed concept of the Negro” (2008, p. 23), and this fixed notion was, of course, one that images the black man as inferior. Thus, for Fanon, it was this encounter with the white man through his time in France that opened his eyes to the way in which the black man’s sense of identity was determined by the relation with the white man. He writes, “Ontology. . .does not permit us to understand the being of the black man. For not only must the black man be black; he must be black in relation to the white man. . .[t]he black man has no ontological resistance in the eyes of the white man” (pp. 82–83). This recognition of a difference that was structured unequally posed a significant challenge to the universal assumptions of European humanism and was the beginning of Fanon’s attempt to repudiate this false humanism.

Fanon’s involvement with the Algerian fight for independence sees his relationship to colonialism, and its humanism become more political. While *Black Skin, White Masks* might be read as the theorizing of a psychiatrist, *The Wretched of the Earth* (Fanon 2001) emerges from the lived experience of participating in the Algerian anti-colonial revolution. As such, the way in which colonial violence is treated is much more sensitive to the actual shedding of blood. Thus, for Fanon, any humanism that results in the destruction of humans is not worth its name and certainly not worth standing for. In *The Wretched of the Earth*, he implores his audience to, “Leave this Europe where they are never done talking of Man, yet murder men everywhere they find them, at the corner of every one of their own streets, in all the corners of the globe” (2001, p. 251). That the violence of colonialism was violence against humans could do no less than call into question the very possibility of speaking about the human in any universalist sense.

Edward W. Said

It is often claimed that the publication of Edward Said's *Orientalism* (1978/2003) marks the beginning of postcolonial studies. In the book, Said seeks to demonstrate the Eurocentric knowledge production of the "oriental other." Thus, *Orientalism* refers to the way in which Western colonialism creates a fixed, essentialized, image of the Orient that is, importantly, necessarily inferior to the dominant and civilized West. Leela Gandhi (1999) suggests that *Orientalism* elucidates colonialism "as the epistemological and cultural attitude which accompanies the curious habit of dominating and, whenever possible, ruling distant territories" (p. 67). Such an articulation of colonialism is important insofar as it makes clear that colonialism was not merely an economic (as one may imagine in the case of the East India Company) endeavor and nor did it only result in the kind of violence wielded by bayonets and guns but, more deeply, colonialism carried a certain "epistemological and cultural attitude." In this way, Said demonstrated in *Orientalism* the ways in which knowledge production itself can be considered as violent.

But how does this relate to humanism? Perhaps most simply, insofar as postcolonial critique uncovers the complicity between Western knowledge and Western power, humanism must also recognize its own complicity in colonialism. That is, *historically* speaking rather than *philosophically*, humanism participates in – and perhaps propels – the civilizing mission of colonialism. This is particularly well captured by the now infamous quote from Sir Thomas Babington Macaulay's *Minute on Indian Education* of 1835 in which he claims that those who were "Indian in blood and color" would, through English education, "become English in taste, in opinions, in morals, and in intellect" (cited in Loomba 2005, p. 75).

In terms of the impact of Said's *Orientalism*, arguably the most important was that it conceptualized colonial relations in a way which carried significant implications for humanism and, more broadly, postcolonial studies. As such, this early work of Said's is interesting not so much for what

it says about humanism per se but what it says about ethnocentrism and, more specifically, European ethnocentrism as dominant in a world structured unevenly. Thus, as the quote from Macaulay's *Minute* implies, European colonialism had significant effects in regard to knowledge. In the case of India, for example, the *content* of education was largely British – that is, about British history, culture, politics, and literature. However, it was also a British *style* of education: wooden desks, uniforms, English language, and manners. Furthermore, it was also a British *epistemology*; the empiricism of the post-Enlightenment came to become the common sense and, therefore, largely unquestioned arbiter of what counted as knowledge. *Orientalism* became foundational for postcolonial theorists because of the way in which it so clearly and persuasively argued that orientalist discourse produced the European as superior and the non-European as its inferior "other."

Response to the Challenge

Postcolonialism – as an historical moment, a condition, and a theory – may be seen as marking the end of humanism on empirical, moral, and theoretical grounds. However, the way in which much postcolonial theory has sought to critique binary logic in favor of an acknowledgment of the processes of hybridization and the mutual effects of colonialism on both the colonized and the colonizer has meant that any easy dismissal of humanism might suggest an all-too-simple essentializing of it. Loomba (2005) writes that "Postcolonial studies have shown that both the "metropolis" and the "colony" were deeply altered by the colonial process. *Both* of them are, accordingly, also restructured by decolonization" (p. 22). And while she acknowledges the unequal ways in which the colonizer and the colonized were affected, the key point is that neither the metropolis nor the colony can be represented as a static, essentialized entity. Such an acknowledgment of the restructuring of identity and subjectivity has consequences for the way in which Europe, humanism, the subaltern, or any other representation can be conceptualized.

Dipesh Chakrabarty demonstrates a nuanced critique of colonialism and its effects by acknowledging not just the positives of European thought but also the inevitability of Europe. Indeed, he writes, “provincializing Europe cannot ever be a project of shunning European thought. For at the end of European imperialism, European thought is a gift to us all. We can talk of provincializing it only in an anticolonial spirit of gratitude” (2000, p. 255). Implicit here is a committed resistance to the basic project of colonialism, but not a complete dismissal of the effects of colonialism. For an attempt at the repudiation of Europe would not only be futile, but also foolish.

The same might be said of the humanism that seems to have been inextricably bound to the colonialists’ civilizing mission. A strident anti-colonialism ignores the lessons of Chakrabarty (and others, such as Bhabha) by perpetuating the simple binary which results in a colonial/anti-colonial dialectic, thus producing essentialized notions of both. Instead, Chakrabarty’s aim in *Provincializing Europe* is to relativize the construct of Europe. He seeks to show the way in which European modes of thinking can be challenged and decentered by the telling of histories from the colonies which represent a different logic. A clear example of this is the way in which subaltern histories involving spirits or deities challenge the idea that European thought became universalized through colonialism. What Chakrabarty was able to show was that, despite the attempt to explain or translate local Bengali stories of divine action from the perspective of a European disenchanted, secular worldview, in actual fact these local Bengali ways of thinking and acting continued even after the onset colonialism. The remembering of these local stories is important because they ensure that European thought does not ameliorate difference.

However, by also refusing to dismiss all European thought as “bad,” Chakrabarty provides for the possibility of negotiating new ways of knowing and understanding in the postcolonial. It is this postcolonial way of thinking relationally and critically which also provides the possibility for different forms of humanistic education to be imagined and practiced.

Possibilities for Humanism and Education

Despite postcolonial and other critiques of humanism, calls for its renewal, rather than repudiation, remain. Such a call implies at least three things: first, that the ideas behind humanism are worth retaining; second, that the form which humanism takes can change; and third, that conceptions of humanism need to change. Yet it also seems to imply that there is actually something core to humanism that makes it worth preserving and reconstituting for a global future; such a claim would seem to ignore the particularity of culture. The universal and the particular, it might be suggested, exist as an irresolvable tension. Indeed, Chakrabarty suggests, “we need universals to produce critical readings of social injustices. Yet the universal. . . [produces] forms of thought that ultimately evacuate the place of the local” (2000, pp. 254–255).

Within an educational context of global interconnectivity and interdependence, in which the travel of ideas, people, and knowledge becomes ever more extensive and intensive, it could be conceived that the inevitability of cultural difference could either be trampled by an imperialist global hegemony (a new universalism) or ameliorated and trivialized by a polite cultural relativism. It is here that a humanism emerging from postcolonial theory might have something to contribute.

Indeed, Seth (2011) suggests that “at the heart of the notion of humanism is that something that we all share and which sanctions our aspirations towards equality, despite our differences” (p. 6). So, while humanistic education might be understood as having an impulse or an ethico-political imperative toward the (universal) good, precisely what it is that constitutes the good remains as something which must always be negotiated and reconsidered according to the particular. Through adopting a postcolonial strategy, educators may seek societal transformation in ways that refuse simplistic binary representations of good and bad. As teachers and students increasingly find themselves in places marked by cultural difference, it will be even more important that shared goals and aspirations can be affirmed despite real and

continuing differences. In other words, a post-colonial humanistic education seeks to maintain, rather than release, the tension between the particular and the universal. Articulated in this way, postcolonial humanism has much to contribute to the future of education.

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Humanistic Education

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The term humanistic education is generally used to designate a variety of educational theories and practices that are committed to the world view and ethical code of humanism, that is, positing the enhancement of human development, well-being, and dignity as the ultimate end of all human thought and action – beyond religious, ideological, or national ideals and values. Based on a long philosophical and moral tradition and

manifested in the UN's Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Rights of the Child, the commitment to humanism further implies the fostering of the following three fundamental tenets:

1. The first is philosophical, consisting of a conception of man – men and women – as an autonomous and rational being and a fundamental respect for all humans by virtue of being endowed with freedom of will, rational thinking, moral conscience, empathetic imagination, and creative powers.
2. The second tenet is sociopolitical, consisting of a universal ethics of human equality, reciprocity, and solidarity and a political order of pluralistic, just, and humane democracy. The ultimate commitment is to provide every man and woman with the rights and opportunities to participate meaningfully in the cultural, social, and political spheres of life.
3. The third tenet is pedagogical, consisting in the commitment to assist all individuals to realize and perfect their potentialities and "to enjoy," in the words of Mortimer Adler, "as fully as possible all the goods that make a human life as good as it can be" (Adler, 1982, p.18).

History

Historically, humanistic education can be traced back to the times of classical Athens with its central notion of *paideia*, a few centuries later to the times of ancient Rome with its central notion of *humanitas*, and then the Renaissance's humanists, and in the early nineteenth century, it was the German educator Niethammer who coined the concept of humanism as indicating liberal education toward full humanity.

Traditionally, humanistic education and liberal education – *studia humanitatis* and *artes liberales* – were interchangeable synonyms, designating the education appropriate for a free man. The aim of such education was the attainment of full and worthy human life with the possession of cultural and civic spirit. In the last two centuries, however, the cultural trends of the Enlightenment – the shift to scientific and critical

thinking and to liberal and egalitarian democracy – brought about changes in the theories and practices of humanistic education. It has become much more democratic and pluralistic, open minded and critical, and sensitive and considerate to cultural and individual differences and needs.

Notwithstanding the differences in approaches and emphases, it seems that all contemporary humanistic educators share a commitment to humanize their students in a spirit of intellectual freedom, moral autonomy, and pluralistic democracy. They strive to provide the kind of education that, on the one hand, liberates their students from the fetters of ignorance, caprice, prejudice, alienation, and false consciousness and, on the other hand, empowers them to actualize their human potentialities and lead autonomous, full, and fulfilling human lives.

The Forms of Humanistic Education

Theoretically, humanistic education can be classified into five distinct forms or approaches.

Classical-Cultural Humanistic Education

The first might be called the classical-cultural, which inherently implies the existence of an ideal of human perfection – comprising notions such as *paideia*, virtue, nobility, justice, goodness, and beauty – that should serve as a universal and objective model for regulating the education of all human beings qua human beings. As mentioned earlier, the origins of this form of humanistic education lie in ancient Athens, especially in the ideas of Pericles, Socrates, Protagoras, Plato, Aristotle, and Isocrates. A few centuries later, it was the Romans who established the *studia humanitatis* as a normative and formative education for free persons, which aims at the cultivation of sound judgment and noble character. The Renaissance was the first era in which people called themselves humanists. These humanists were determined to emancipate themselves from the ignorance, dogmatism, and self-abnegation of the “dark ages” toward the kind of truth, beauty,

freedom, and dignity that could be produced by the human faculties if only properly cultivated and exercised. It was also these humanists who established the central theme in all classical humanistic education, adopted by Hutchins and Adler, that “no man was considered educated unless he was acquainted with the masterpieces of his tradition” and that “the best way to a liberal education in the West is through the greatest works the West has produced” (Hutchins, 1954, ch.1). Finally, from the Enlightenment to the end of the twentieth century – with the ideas of Kant, Mill, Newman, Arnold, Babbitt, Hutchins, Maritain, Livingston, Adler, Kirk, and others – classical humanistic education has become more egalitarian, critical, and liberal. Its ultimate ideal, however, has not changed: as put in the words of the Renaissance humanist Pier Paolo Vergerio, humanistic education includes “those studies by which we attain and practice virtue and wisdom; that education which calls forth, trains and develops those highest gifts of body and mind which ennoble man” (Panofsky, 1940, p. 92).

Romantic-Naturalistic Humanistic Education

The second form of humanistic education is most commonly known as the romantic-naturalistic approach. It makes its first appearance in the eighteenth century with the writings of Rousseau who blamed the obsession with cultural progress, encyclopedic knowledge, authoritarian education, and the pursuit of social status for the ills of society and for the production of the alienated, other-directed, and corrupt personality of the bourgeois. Rousseau introduced an alternative conception of the good life that ascribes goodness to man’s natural inclinations and self-regulated development, to spontaneous and playful exercise of natural powers, and to self-directedness and personal authenticity. Good human beings, he contended, should manifest holistic integration of sentiment with reason and of personal interest with the common good. These new images of human goodness and naturalistic education have generated in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries a manifold change in educational theory and practice. In the

modern educational thought of Pestalozzi, Froebel, Dewey, Neill, Korczak, Rogers, Maslow, Combs, Noddings, and others, we encounter all of Rousseau's basic intuitions. To these they have added the presently familiar notions of care, growth, self-actualization, personal fulfillment, self-regulation, trust, experience, relevance, authenticity, and democratic and pedagogical therapeutic climate – all as growth-promoting conditions for the “young plant” in its continual and self-actualizing process of becoming. In sum, the romantic form of humanistic education can be characterized by its fundamental premise that there exists in every one of us an “inner nature” or a “fixed self” that is fundamentally good and unique and that pushes to unfold and actualize itself – in accordance with its built-in code – toward healthy existence and full humanity. True education, therefore, consists of careful “drawing out” and attentive actualization of the individual's inner nature.

Existentialist Humanistic Education

The third form of humanistic education is existentialist, based mainly on the philosophical insights of Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Heidegger, Jaspers, Sartre, Camus, and Buber. Existentialist educators reject the classical notion of human beings as “rational beings” as well as the romantic assumption that there exists in every one of us an “inner nature” or “fixed self” that is fundamentally good and unique. The alternative advanced by most existentialists is that since the essence of man is freedom, in the matter of values, humans can appeal to no external authority, either natural or supernatural, and are therefore destined to choose, define, and create themselves as the true – and therefore responsible – authors of their identities. As Sartre put it, in the “Humanism of Existentialism,” “Man is nothing else but what he makes of himself” (Sartre, 1979, p. 36). Authentic human life, therefore, exhibits an acute sense of self-concern and acceptance of his or her freedom and responsibility for becoming the kind of person he or she eventually becomes. As posited by Martin Buber, Maxine Greene, and other existentialist educationists, it is neither the curriculum nor the teaching methods that are crucial in education but

rather the ability of educators to educate by example, to be present to their students in their full being as individuals engaged in authentic self-creation and self-affirmation. In light of these philosophical and moral insights, existentialist humanistic educators seek to humanize their students by urging them to pursue neither ultimate truths nor self-realization, but to constantly choose, form, and create their identities and life projects – enlarging their sense of freedom and responsibility for the meanings, values, and events that constitute the public as well as the private realms of their lives.

Radical-Critical Humanistic Education

The fourth form of humanistic education is most often identified with radical education or critical pedagogy and with the counter-hegemonic pedagogical theories of Freire, Apple, Giroux, Simon, and Kozol. From this vantage point, to consider educational issues independent of the larger cultural, social, and economic context involves either serious ignorance or cynical, if not criminal, deception. Poverty, crime, homelessness, drug addiction, wars, ecological crises, suicide, illiteracy, discrimination against women and ethnic minorities, technocratic consciousness, and the disintegration of communities and families, to name some of our most pressing problems, are facts of life that effect directly the physical, emotional, intellectual, and moral development of the great majority of children in our culture. Hence, radical educators argue, “pedagogy should become more political and the political more pedagogical” (Aronowitz and Giroux, 1985, Dedication). This implies three major changes in our educational system. It requires:

- That educational discourse, policy, and practice would deal directly with the notions of power, struggle, class, gender, resistance, social justice, and possibility
- That teachers would aim to emancipate and empower their students toward the kind of critical consciousness and assertive point of view that allow people to gain control over their lives

- That teachers, in the words of Giroux, “would struggle collectively as transformative intellectuals . . . to make public schools democratic public spheres where all children, regardless of race, class, gender, and age, can learn what it means to be able to participate fully in the ongoing struggle to make democracy the medium through which they extend the potential and possibilities of what it means to be human and to live in a just society” (Giroux, 1989, p. 186).

Ecocentric-Participatory Humanistic Education

The fifth approach in humanistic education, characteristic of the twenty-first century and to which many relate as postmodern and post-colonialist, might be characterized as ecocentric, non-essentialist, participatory, inclusive, and multicultural. Unlike the previous four approaches, the vantage point is no longer anthropocentric (originally denying the existence and authority of supernatural deities and establishing human sovereignty and responsibility). It is rather ecocentric or environmental: seeking flourishing and harmony not only to the “human kingdom” but to nature as a whole – natural resources and landscapes, biodiversity, and animal rights. This new sense of modesty is apparent not only in man’s relations with nature but also in the social and international realm of ethics and politics. The “participatory” principle or quality refers to an *a priori* denial of any superior cultural code, philosophical stance, or ideological doctrine and substituting it for a constructed and ever-changing intersubjective and intercultural consensus reached by means of a participatory, democratic, reasonable, cosmopolitan, and all-inclusive discourse (inspired by the philosophies of Habermas, Appiah, Hansen, etc.). In terms of educational policies and practices inspired by this outlook and manifesting its tenets, the most dominant and familiar ones are education for environmental and social sustainability, cosmopolitan-multicultural education, and education for a culture of peace and shared life.

Conclusion

Notwithstanding the differences among these five forms of humanistic education, it seems that in their educational projects of humanization they all accept Whitehead’s point that “there is only one subject-matter for education, and that is Life in all its manifestations” (Whitehead, 1979, pp.6-7). In more explicit terms, humanistic education consists in the general and multifaceted cultivation of humans – in a social atmosphere that manifests human dignity and intellectual freedom – toward the best and highest life of which they are capable in three fundamental domains of life: as individuals who autonomously and authentically realize their potential, as involved and responsible citizens in a democracy, and as human beings who enrich and perfect themselves through meaningful and constructive engagement with the collective achievements of human culture. It consists, to use a more recent terminology, in facilitating persons to lead flourishing lives: to develop and employ soundly their innate powers, to make the best use of humanity’s greatest achievements, to actively engage in world betterment, and ultimately to shape for themselves autonomous, meaningful, and worthy life.

Humanistic educators, it is commonly agreed, should further seek to develop well-rounded and integral persons whose culture is manifested not only in their broad learning but also in demonstrating critical consciousness, moral sensitivity, empathetic imagination, social concern, and responsible utilization of knowledge – so that the “tree of knowledge” would also serve as a nourishing “tree of life.” Its ideal is to achieve in their students the right integration as well as the right tension between a commitment to high cultural standards and a strong sense of individuality in both the forms of autonomy and authenticity. Finally, to achieve this and truly facilitate flourishing lives for their students, humanistic teachers take the responsibility to set personal example in the art of living as well as to create at their schools a pedagogical atmosphere of care, trust, support, dialogue, respect, fairness, tolerance, inquiry, freedom, commitment,

responsibility, multiculturalism, and reciprocity. Without these last elements, even the most beautifully woven theory of humanistic education would fail to become a lived reality for its teachers and students.

Cross-References

► [Defining Openness in Education](#)

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Humanities

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Iconic and Symbolic Language

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Introduction

Not only does one communicate in language, but one thinks in language also, as readily attested to by many of those living alone, who, when observed to be talking to themselves, will respond that, so far from going mad, they are merely “thinking out loud.” Indeed one has only to listen to young children, alone in their beds at night, running through the events of their day, or perhaps in communication with siblings, articulating, often humorously, the *relations* between, for example, arms and legs, hands and feet, fingers and toes, and wrists and ankles, not to mention necks, and in such a manner familiarizing themselves with, and often consciously and humorously disrupting, established conceptual categories, to recognize that in addition to being a means of communication or system of *signifiers*, language is also a system of the *concepts signified* thereby. The linguistic *signifiers* and the concepts

signified by them being as Ferdinand de Saussure (1959) and, following him, Jacques Derrida (1973, 1981, 1982) have both noted, like two sides of a sheet of paper, *distinguishable* but *inseparable* aspects of any language. While given that thinking involves having and manipulating ideas or concepts, and the relations between them, then it is entirely unsurprising that, as philosophers as different from them and each other as Ludwig Wittgenstein (1953, 1961) and Willard V. O. Quine (1960), not to mention cultural anthropologists such as Benjamin Lee Whorf (1954) and natural scientists such as Humphry Davy (2015), have all concluded, in addition to being a means of communicating ideas or concepts, language is also a medium or “vehicle” of thought.

“Language” as the *Only* Medium of Thought

What is perhaps more surprising however is that, in addition to claiming that one *can* think in language, many go even further, claiming that one *can only* think in language, a proposition to which others have objected, arguing that, on the contrary, one can, and indeed often does, think “visually” in pictures or pictograms, and that in any event many have thoughts which they have difficulty in putting into words.

In response, it is argued that pictures or pictograms are a form of language also and that in

addition to *symbolic* languages, such as the one which is here being used to think or constitute the concepts or ideas which are, hopefully, being communicated via writing, and which may also be constituted in and communicated via speech, there are also *iconic* languages, consisting of pictures, pictograms, etc., in or by which concepts or ideas may also be constituted and communicated. For instance, when searching for a lavatory, while one may happen upon the *symbolic* sign “Men” or “Women” signifying which room it is appropriate to enter, equally one may happen upon *iconographic* pictures or pictograms of a man or a woman, which perform the same function. Given then that words are not the only form that language may take, so far from the difficulty that some may have in putting their thoughts into words demonstrating that their thoughts are independent of language, it may merely demonstrate that they are having difficulty translating a thought initially delineated in iconic pictograms – or indeed any other nonsymbolic form of language (such as an indexical language) – into the written or spoken words of a symbolic language. Although it may, of course, alternatively, simply be indicative of the fact that even though the thought they are having is constituted entirely in words, it is incomplete or confused.

Concrete Icons Versus Concrete and Abstract Symbols

Now unlike iconic signs, which must, at least to some degree and in some significant respect, *resemble what they represent*, symbolic languages are in no way so constrained; the symbolic words “Men” and “Women” do not remotely *resemble* men or women in the flesh so to speak; their capacity to signify who should go into which lavatory depends not upon *resemblance* but upon *convention*, as is clear from the fact that, adopting a foreign language, such as French, for instance, the terms “Hommes” and “Femmes” may, by the conventions of that language, perform the same task as the terms “Men” and “Women” do in English. Consequently, and most importantly,

while iconic language, constricted as it is by the need to in some degree resemble, or “look like,” what it represents, is therefore *largely* confined to facilitating thought and communication about *concrete* individuals, relations, circumstances, events, etc., symbolic language, being in no way so constrained, readily lends itself to thought and communication regarding *abstract* ideas also, which, precisely as abstract, do not “look like” anything. Thus, while the concrete event of the Norman invasion of Britain, for example, or certain ancient Egyptian personages and events may be iconically depicted and communicated, at least to some degree, by the Bayeux Tapestry and the iconic elements deployed by hieroglyphics, respectively, it is clear that in no way could the abstract ideas and relations, which are being here delineated and articulated in a symbolic language, be *adequately* delineated or articulated by or in an iconic language.

This is not to claim that abstract ideas and relations, etc., cannot be represented at all, albeit often inadequately, by iconic signifiers, for, having conceived of the abstract notion of justice as comprising of the impartial “weighing” of evidence concerning the likelihood of alternative claims regarding the “facts” and the dispensing of punishment, if it is due, in proportion to the degree of injustice involved, justice may then be iconically depicted by a blindfolded (impartial) individual, holding a pair of scales (with which to “weigh” evidence) and a sword (with which to dispense punishment). Nevertheless, this does not alter the fact that, ultimately, such a concrete, iconic delineation and articulation of the notion of justice, and even more so that of the relatively more complex and general abstract ideas and relations also being dealt with here, will fall short of that afforded by a symbolic language.

Iconic Language and Misleading Reification

Moreover, in addition to being *inadequate* to the delineation of complex abstract concepts, ideas, and/or thoughts, iconic language and the thinking it facilitates, relying as they do on mimetic

resemblance, have an inveterate tendency to conceive of what they seek to represent as substantial, which may often be entirely *misleading*.

For instance, while the very existence of a supposedly *immaterial*, yet nevertheless *ubiquitous*, and apparently *male* deity, involving, as it clearly does, a couple of logical contradictions – an immaterial being, by definition cannot occupy material space, and therefore can hardly be ubiquitous, nor, having no DNA, much less any genitalia, can scarcely be male – is, a priori, impossible, the iconic misconception of such a supposedly immaterial deity as a bearded, usually white, man, located in the sky, certainly contributes to, if it does not indeed initially engender, such confusion.

And it was precisely René Descartes' common nonsensical iconic misconception of consciousness – properly understood as a *state* of awareness which, as such, is, as Edmund Husserl has pointed out (Husserl 1962, 1970a, b) (“intentionally”) conscious or aware of the world and its objects – as a reified, which is to say substantial, albeit thinking, *thing* (a *res cogitans*) or mind, a realm of closed interiority, which rendered its relationship to and knowledge of the world problematic. This iconic, reificatory misconception of the consciousness or *state* of awareness definitive of the human subject, as a *thing* or object, resulting, as Jean-Paul Sartre has observed (Sartre 1991), in an erroneously deterministic view of human behavior.

While turning to the misleading impact of iconic reification upon the natural sciences, as Charles Sanders Peirce has pointed out (Peirce 1935), none of the supposedly empirical scientists have ever experienced gravity *per se*, which is to say, independently of those very motions, which, with breathtaking circularity, it is supposed to explain. And as with gravity, so too with gravitons, which, like atoms and molecules, wavicles, positrons, and neutrinos, not to mention electricity and magnetism, strong and weak interactive forces, and thus all the supposed major components of a unified field theory, are nowhere observable in themselves, which is to say independently of the events (e.g., tracks across bubble chambers of photographic

emulsion, twitching of galvanometers, heating of water, etc.) which they are taken to explain. The belief in their independent existence therefore also being the reificatory consequence of iconic thinking.

And it is precisely a symbolic language, whose signifiers, which, operating by virtue of convention rather than resemblance, therefore do not need (and indeed are unable) to resemble the abstract concepts, ideas, and/or thoughts which they may therefore be called upon to directly signify, which enables one to entertain, understand, reflect upon, and communicate these relatively complex insights concerning the, often grossly misleading, limitations of iconic language, and to dissolve, by symbolic conception and the understanding of the sort which we are here engaged in, many of the problems and paradoxes to which it gives rise.

Pedagogically Relevant Implications

Now clearly those who have greater exposure to, and are consequently usually more “at home” in, symbolic language, as spoken in conversation, and/or on the radio, or written on paper or computer screens, will, on average and in general, be much more adept not only at expressing and communicating abstract thoughts but also, most significantly, at delineating, and thus entertaining or *having*, and understanding *them* in the first place, than those who are more exposed to *predominantly* iconic or pictorial modes of communication, such as TV, video, and film. For even though TV, video, and film are generally comprised of symbolic as well as iconic elements, the *sensible iconic image* or surface has a tendency to distract attention from, and even eclipse, the more abstract (or, to employ a symbolic description of an iconic misconception, “deeper”) *intelligible symbolic meaning or thoughts* which the scripted dialog is capable of articulating. And while those living in a *predominantly iconic* culture are often highly competent at dressing, accessorizing, standing, striking a pose, and the like, the predominance of such surface imagery tends to result in whatever *symbolic* communication or conversation they do engage in being focused on

the discussion of concrete things, events, and other people rather than abstract ideas.

All of this being so, it is perhaps unsurprising that despite spending much (often several times) more per capita on high school education than any other nation on earth, the USA, whose culture is increasingly saturated with iconic media, continues to see a drop in the symbolic literacy of its high school students, who currently rank 20th among the leading industrial nations (which is to say those with a comprehensive formal education system) in their average performance on standardized literacy tests. Consequently, although the capacity to write reasonably clearly is generally regarded as the minimum necessary prerequisite of university entry in the rest of the world, many US universities have had to invest extensively in writing courses and even writing centers, primarily geared not, it should be understood, to the fostering of creative, technical, or other forms of specialized writing but to teaching what often amounts to not much more than 7th grade writing skills!

However, although having taken, and passed, such remedial writing courses, students nevertheless often remain demonstrably incapable of writing even minimally coherent papers on or about abstract ideas. Thus while, in their remedial classes, they may well have shown themselves reasonably capable of writing on topics such as "A Day at the Beach" or "What I Did During the Holidays," a very large proportion of these same students, having later attended and completed extensive lectures and reading on topics such as "The Difference Between Belief and Knowledge and the Role of Experience and/or Reason in Justifying Beliefs," nevertheless still have the greatest of difficulty in writing coherently on such topics. Indeed, despite having done all of the above, many students equate the claim that "We are all entitled to our own beliefs" to the claim that "All beliefs are equally justified." The obvious reason for the disparity between their performances in writing and philosophy classes is that whereas the writing class topics, relating to *concrete* situations, events, and relations, *initially* lend themselves to *iconic* delineation or thought, the only difficulty being that of *subsequently* "translating" such *iconic* thoughts into *symbolic*

languages (which even should reference to first-person accounts of feelings also be included, remain largely *descriptive*), philosophy topics, relating more to *abstract* ideas, usually cannot be satisfactorily envisioned iconically but can, from the get-go, only be adequately conceptualized or thought about *symbolically*, and involve much more than purely descriptive articulation.

Difficulty in Writing/Communication Abstract Ideas Is Indicative of the Incapacity to Think Them

This being so, it is unsurprising that – and the pedagogical significance of this cannot be overstated – not only do those who experience difficulty in writing coherently upon more abstract topics also have considerable difficulty in speaking in anything like a vaguely coherent manner about them, but that, even more tellingly, upon being questioned about these difficulties, it soon becomes clear, which as they themselves frequently admit, despite the aforementioned lectures and reading, they never really understood what was being communicated in the first place. *Their difficulty in expressing themselves, whether in speech or in writing, upon such abstract topics, is therefore finally revealed as symptomatic of a more fundamental incapacity to think about or understand abstract ideas, relationships, and interactions.* A capacity which may be most effectively *first* fostered and nurtured in free-flowing conversations, discussions, and/or arguments, not unusually about politics, sex, religion, drugs, and the like, that might take place around increasingly rare family meals or in similar venues.

Small wonder then that, with an ever greater number of single-parent families, as well as two-parent families which, in the face of declining inflation-adjusted median incomes, have found that both parents are forced to work and/or to work longer hours to provide economically adequately for their families, and the consequent reduction in such communicative communal family experiences, children, who therefore increasingly turn to television, film and video games, etc., as a substitute, are missing out on the acquisition,

fostering, and nurturing of symbolic skills. Symbolic skills, which are as essential to thought about abstract ideas, relations, and interactions, as to communication of them; the incapacity to write, or even talk, about abstract ideas and their relations and interactions therefore is largely indicative of an incapacity to think about them also.

Active Participants Versus Passive Recipients and “Inner” Monolog/Dialog Deficit

Furthermore, as if all of this were not, in and of itself, sufficient cause for concern, there are, unfortunately, at least two other troubling consequences of the prominence of the iconic over the symbolic.

Firstly is the fact that unlike symbolic communication via the written or spoken word, which “hot” media, as Marshall McLuhan designated them (McLuhan 1967), require of the reader or listener a high level of *active participation* in the process of decoding as well as imaginative or creative *interpretation* (e.g., readers of A.A. Milne’s books must actively engage in creative co-constituting, along with Milne, the world of Winnie the Pooh), iconic communications, such as afforded by film and television, are, in contrast, “cool” media, or low in such participation (Disney’s “imagineers” offering us already constituted images of Winnie the Pooh and Tigger too), thereby encouraging *spectatorial passivity* in their audiences *rather than the active, imaginative and interpretive participation by which abstract ideas may be delineated and nurtured*.

Secondly, in contrast to symbolic language, as utilized in novels, for example, which, enabling as it does the deployment of abstract ideas or concepts, can readily present, in the form of descriptions of often highly nuanced psychological states and, via monologs, subjects’ thoughts, iconic media have much less facility in this regard. While even though TV, film, and video are, as previously noted, not merely iconic, but also symbolic, media, only clumsily do they accommodate voice-over or other symbolic presentations of the abstract ideas and concepts representative of

subjects’ psychological states and thoughts. Indeed it is for just this reason that one cannot imagine a truly successful film ever being made of J. D. Salinger’s *Catcher in the Rye*, for instance. This being so then, just as the predominance of the iconic over the symbolic not only attenuates communication of, but – given, as we have seen, that we think in language – the development of, abstract ideas, so too we may reasonably infer that it not only attenuates the communication of highly wrought and nuanced psychological states but their development also.

And as with the conscious self, so too, apparently, is the case with the unconscious. That is to say that if, as Jacques Lacan claimed (Lacan 1977), the unconscious is truly structured like, or indeed in, language, then the increasing dominance of *iconic* language will similarly attenuate the development of the unconscious as well.

In light of all this, then we should not be surprised at emerging evidence indicating that the brains of those children for whom television and video have come to replace traditional social intercourse and reading display significantly suppressed neuronal network development in critical areas.

Summation

In sum then, given the centrality of language not only to communication but to thought also, it would appear that the limited capacity of many students to write, or indeed speak, coherently in anything but the most descriptive mode, on all but the most concrete topics, which is to say their lack of fluency in symbolic language, is symptomatic of a limited capacity to think symbolically about anything but the most concrete things, events, relations, and interactions. An incapacity, which rooted, as has been argued, in the increasing eclipse of the symbolic by the iconic, is further exacerbated by the relative passivity encouraged by the latter and the consequently limited capacity for the imaginative innovation and interpretation central to the delineation and development of abstract concepts and/or ideas and, thoughts about their relations and interactions.

The Solution

In light of all the above, it is clear that the endlessly proliferating distance learning and online courses, usually characterized both by delayed feedback, as well as the preponderance of iconic representations, together with increasingly pervasive Power Point “pictogram” presentations, and the incessantly proliferating pedagogic technologies of film, video, computer graphics, and the like, while undoubtedly useful in some contexts, are nevertheless not merely usually inappropriate to the attempt to foster the symbolic thought core to much academic or intellectual development, but may actually suppress it; it is a conclusion empirically attested to by the recent Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Program for International Student Assessment (PISA) study (OECD 2015) of school children in 31 nations, which – without attempting, as here, to analyze or explain why, nevertheless – found broadly speaking their intellectual development to be negatively correlated or inversely related to the employment of such technologies.

It would then seem that by far and away the best way to acquire and nurture symbolic fluency, and the many, not merely expressive but cognitive, capacities associated therewith, including, not inconsequentially, the capacity to write coherently, is by engaging, via ongoing dialogical discussion, characterized by immediate feedback, in abstract analytic conceptualization, thought, and expression, of which the philosophically oriented symposium is most surely paradigmatic. This, aided where appropriate by predominantly symbolically articulated lectures and the reading of written manuscripts or books, as well as the writing of essays which should be speedily graded and returned with comprehensive comments thereon, and should then, ideally, be further discussed, will be most likely to foster students’ active participatory engagement in imaginative and interpretive decoding, thought about, and expression of abstract ideas, situations and relations, and interactions, indispensable to their intellectual development.

Thus not only “In the beginning was the word” but pedagogically speaking it would seem that far beyond the beginning the word, or symbolic thought and communication, should continue to predominate.

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Idealism

► Philosophical Idealism and Educational Theory

Identity

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-

Identity-Work

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-

Ideology

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Introduction

Ideology is a very wide and polysemous concept that can have different definitions depending on the theoretical frame of reference. Generally, we speak of an ideological phenomenon when there is a conditioning of action of one or more individuals by a social power on the basis of objectives and criteria which are not critical and rational but rather in compliance with the objective of power domination.

Studies on ideology got under way in the 1920s and became widespread in the 1960s by means of the spread of Marxism. In the 1980s and 1990s, it was taken up again in the anthropological field with Geertz's research and in the field of political science with Freedman's work.

One of the milestones in this field was the volume *Ideology and Utopia* by Karl Mannheim (1936). This work, even before having the merit of giving a new definition of the concept of ideology in opposition to the concept of utopia, delineated a genealogy of the concept of ideology for the first time enumerating the different preceding meanings and establishing authors such as Machiavelli and Bacon as the philosophical antecedents,

Destutt de Tracy as the founder, Napoleon Bonaparte as the first great detractor, and Marx and Vilfredo Pareto as the classical critics. This book particularly underlined the fact that speaking of the ideology form of thought meant to speak of the historical social formation of knowledge, thought, and cultural processes in general. Mannheim's objective was to demonstrate the existence of what he defined as "nontheoretical" elements of thought, in disagreement with the logical mathematical approach inaugurated by the Vienna circle and by authors such as Russell and Wittgenstein.

Mannheim's theories and the theories of the sociologists of knowledge laid the groundwork for the future sociology of education, to which discipline Mannheim himself later dedicated some important essays.

During the Second World War, a work was written that contributed to a first revision of the historiographical formulation of the problem of ideology which had been advanced by Mannheim. It was entitled *Wahrheit und Ideologie*. It was written by the philosopher Hans Barth and had a first ill-fortuned German edition in 1945, followed by a second edition also in German in 1961 which made it famous and eventually made it a benchmark for successive studies. The novelty of this essay was the way it dealt more attentively with the single phases of the formation of the concept of ideology – the important role of Destutt de Tracy, creator of the term ideology, the clash between the *ideologues* and Napoleon Bonaparte, the political implications of Helvétius' and Holbach's sensationalist theory, and Marx's criticism of ideology in regard to the concept of alienation – but especially Barth examined the theme of ideology in relation to the thought of Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, defining Schopenhauer a "critic of reason."

Nietzsche had already been referred to by Mannheim in *Ideology and Utopia* but only regarding the theory of resentment. Barth's writing, on the other hand, bolstered by the Nietzschean interpretations of Heidegger and Jaspers, emphasized the operation of criticism of occidental metaphysics which Nietzsche had promoted, as, for example, in the work *The Twilight of the Idols*.

Norberto Bobbio wrote an important essay on Pareto entitled Vilfredo Pareto and the critique of ideologies (Bobbio 1973) in which he explained the Paretan term “derivation” with the term of ideology.

At the beginning of the 1960s, authors like Daniel Bell with his work *The End of Ideology* and Jean Meynaud in 1961 with *Destines des ideologies* announced the end of ideologies. But instead of the promised end, those years saw a genuine *renaissance*, both on the social historical level with the formation of collective protest movements of western societies and on a strictly theoretical level with the igniting of a debate which involved almost all of the philosophical and sociological currents of the time.

After the Second World War, Marxism was undoubtedly the thought movement most greatly involved in the debate on ideology.

The benchmark definition is the passage from *German Ideology* in which Marx and Engels equate ideology to a *camera obscura*, identifying it with this process of overturning and even falsifying reality. Within the Marxist scene, there were many important attempts at clarification of the Marxist concept of “false conscience” as well as important revision work. Analyzing this theme, we get the clear impression from a distance of many years and with a critical historiographical observation that we cannot speak of an Italian Marxism as if it were a single and homogeneous block, but rather we must instead speak in the plural of Marxisms, each one of which with its own identity, its own history, and its own destiny. As to the Marxist interpretation that stuck the closest to the negative formula of ideology as a “false conscience,” the meticulous analyses of Georges Gurvitch, who found another 12 meanings of the term ideology in Marx’s work, stood out from the innumerable studies that constituted the Marxist exegesis of the period.

Two heterodox interpreters of Marxism who both proposed a positive understanding of ideology, Gramsci and Althusser, represented a novelty. Gramsci, whose prison writings were published postmortem starting with his *Letters from Prison* in 1947 up to the critical and philological edition of *The Prison Notebooks*, edited by

Valentino Gerratana in 1975, described ideology as a “conception of the world” fundamental for the organization of the masses (Gramsci 1975).

Althusser, on his part, felt the effects of a stronger Hegelian ascendancy and defined ideology as a cultural system with its own internal coherence characterized by a practical social function.

The Althusserian positions were held in great consideration in the empirical studies of the sociologists of education, also called the theorists of social reproduction. It is opportune to mention Bourdieu and Passeron from among them, who wrote one of the classics of neo-Marxist criticism of bourgeois ideology and of scholastic institutions of the bourgeois State, *Les héritières*, in which they denounced how in French schools there were selection mechanisms that were independent from the skills acquired by the pupils but instead dependent upon their social membership.

The Institute of Social Research of Frankfurt, known as the School of Frankfurt, dedicated one of its famous sociology lessons to the concept of ideology in 1954. The Frankfurt analysis dwelt upon the ideological aspects that were intrinsic to mass communications and to the process of Hegelian and Marxist-type alienation produced by these phenomena. It was a denouncement of the implicit, latent, and negative training of the individuals of mass society on the part of post-industrial capitalistic production structures.

The School of Frankfurt warned against a negative, noninstitutional pedagogy that was intrinsic to the very form of postindustrial society and highlighted the spread of alienating non-democratic models of behavior. These themes are to be found to some extent in almost all of the works of the thinkers who were, each in his own way, animators and protagonists of this thought orientation, such as Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno, Erich Fromm, or Herbert Marcuse. This last was the author of a work, *One-dimensional man*, which proposed the controversial task of reopening the question of ideology of advanced postindustrial society. Just as the subtitle suggested, the work opened with a denouncement of the paralysis of social criticism that had begun in the period after the war, which

for Marcuse had led to a society without opposition. Thus Marcuse exhorted the reader to oppose with criticism the specious mechanisms of ideology of the society in which he found himself living.

One of Horkheimer's young students, Gerhard Vinnai, published a work entitled *Football Mania: The Players and the Fans: the Mass Psychology of Football*. The work stirred up a great debate because it analyzed the phenomenon of soccer underlining the mechanisms through which the dominating classes exerted their control over the masses by insinuating a politicalness and an unexpected ideological reality into the sport experience so important in the values of the young.

On the semiotic studies front during the 1960s, Umberto Eco's works tried to analytically characterize the ideological forms inherent in some products of mass culture, combining instances of Frankfurtian, Gramscian, and structuralist origin. This is the case, for example, of *Superuomo di massa. Retorica e ideologia nel romanzo popolare*, a 1976 study. In this work he drew from one of Antonio Gramsci's intuitions about the presence of a superman rhetoric in the serial novels of the nineteenth century. This can be seen first of all with Dumas, who had a determining effect in the development of vitalism in the first decades of the century. Umberto Eco brought out a new individualistic ideology promoting pedagogical values that took inspiration from a rough supermanism and a populist vitalism in the contemporary pulp fiction heroes like James Bond or the comic book heroes like Superman and Batman (Eco 1976).

In the field of psychology of that period, Erik H. Erikson highlighted a typical function of the ideological cultural process in his work *Identity: Youth and Crisis*. It is the reinforcement of a group's social identity. There is in fact a profound relationship between ideology, social identity, and institution. Erik Erikson defined ideology as "the guardian of identity." For Erikson ideology is able to cement the relationships of social actors making up a group because first of all it allows them to elaborate their common needs and difficulties at a superior level of rationality and with a clear and

usable discourse. On the basis of this analysis of reality, which is already discursively aggregating because it is clear and persuasive, ideology furthermore offers a general practical solution to individual problems whose ability to be solved is rationally founded, shared, and convincing. Definitively for Erikson it deserves a more extensive explanation. Ideology cements identity due to its high degree of coherence which is expressed on an individual as well as a social level (Erikson 1968).

Later the scientific works on ideology began to diminish, both within the science of education field and in the more general field of social sciences. Nevertheless two noteworthy contributions on the part of two social scientists of different extraction are to be mentioned. The first in chronological order is the essay by the American anthropologist, Clifford Geertz, entitled *Ideology as a Cultural system*, which received its due attention at the beginning of the 1980s as an alternative to the structuralist approach in decline by that time. Geertz's texts were translated into Italian during those years, and his positions on the theme of ideology reported a resumption of studies and an evaluative theory (Geertz 1973).

In 1986 the book by Raymond Boudon, *Ideology, Origin of Prejudice*, came out. It returned to the theme following the methodology of methodological individualism with a Weberian ascendancy particular to the author. It resumed the classic concept of ideology as a false judgment or self-interested judgment (Boudon 1989).

Another important French contribution came from Michel Foucault's work which constitutes a fundamental reference point for the studies of ideologies. Even if he does not approach this theme explicitly, Foucault develops an analysis and a genealogy of widespread power that can be considered a critique of ideology. Foucault particularly elaborates concepts such as "disciplinary society," "power devices," and "total institutions" which open profound study perspectives of the individual's social conditioning.

In the last few years, in light of the end of the soviet socialist systems and of the ideological greats, Michael Freeden has elaborated new theories on ideology, particularly "thick-centered"

ideology which explain the new contemporary ideological forms. These forms are more strategic and less long term, often to be found in contemporary political populisms (Freeden 2003).

Recently the philosopher of language, Teun Van Dijk, defined a “strategy of ideological discourse” which he outlined in a series of prepositional pairs:

Speak about Us in a positive way.
 Speak about Them in a negative way.
 Don't say negative things about Us.
 Don't say positive things about Them.
 Stress the positive things about Us.
 Stress the negative things about Them.
 Play down the negative things about Us.
 Play down the positive things about Them.

In every ideological discourse, we may observe this integral opposition which may be evident to a greater or lesser degree. We may note, for example, a high degree of this opposition in racist ideologies where the controversy with regard to the dimension of Them reaches the maximum degree: the will to eliminate (Van Dijk 1998).

The reasons for this expressive characteristic have their roots in the nature of group dynamics. To belong to an ideology means in fact to identify oneself with a social group which expresses itself though the cultural apparatus which the name of the ideology designates, but it also means to place oneself in a condition of exclusion and the refusal to have anything to do with whoever does not identify himself with that group.

Cross-References

► [Digital Learning, Discourse, and Ideology](#)

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Ideology of Neoliberalism

► [Neoliberal Globalization and Educational Administration: Western and Developing Nation Perspectives](#)

Illness

► [Disability and Samoa](#)

‘Ilo

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Introduction

The term ‘ilo is present in a number of Polynesian languages with a general translation as seeing or knowing. The terminology ‘ilo in the Tongan language refers to a body of knowledge, as in knowledge about agriculture, fishing, and weather systems. The term ‘ilo also refers to the process of finding, recognizing, and knowing. Thaman (1999) refers to ‘ilo as both the “process of knowing and to the knowledge itself.”

In the process of knowing, *'ilo* is taken to be part of a learning process, *ako*, with the desired outcome of a person having mastered a body of knowledge and become *poto* or *tangata poto*, a learned person (Kavaliku 1966). In the Tongan context, there is a marked difference between *'ilo* as knowledge and *poto*, being the use or application of *'ilo* to a particular situation – in other words, it is applied knowledge. *Ilo* and *poto* and *ako* are three main concepts generally used to describe education in the Tongan context (Thaman 1988). Thaman (1999) further defines *'ilo* in an educational context to include:

- To find – *Na'a ne sio ki a Mele 'i kolo.* (She saw Mele in town)
- To recognize someone or something – *Na'e 'ilo koe e Atu?* (Did Atu recognize you?)
- To find out – *Na'a ke 'ilo 'a e ola e sivi?* (Did you find out the results of the examination?)
- To discover – *Na'e 'ilo 'e Sela ha koloa mahu'inga.* (Sela discovered a treasure)
- To know – *'Oku 'ilo 'e Tevita 'a e ngaahi me'a lahi.* (Tevita knows a lot)
- To be well-informed or knowledgeable – *Ko e faiaiko 'ilo lahi 'a Seini* (Seini is a well-informed teacher)
- Knowledge or information – *'ilo fakatufunga.* (knowledge of carpentry). (p. 728)

In brief, *'ilo* refers to the process of discovering new knowledge as it is also about the knowledge itself.

'Ilo Is in the Discovery Process

The process of finding, recognizing, and discovering, *'ilo*, is a process that is intricately linked to the sociopolitical context. All *'ilo* in Tonga is ranked and classified and to some extent is structured along similar lines to the traditional political structure of the country. For example, particular knowledge system about the sacred kava ceremony (*taumafa kava*) is guarded by certain clans of *matāpule* or talking chiefs. The language, protocol, and traditions associated with the knowledge system of the sacred kava ceremony are specific, rich with tradition, and practiced by a selected number of *matāpule*. The process of discovering, finding out, and knowing about this

sacred ritual is accessible at two key platforms. As this knowledge is taught in the formal school curriculum, every student in Tonga should be able to recognize features and follow through the protocol of the kava ceremony. However, to know and to become knowledgeable and well informed about the *taumafa* kava ceremony, this knowing is only accessible to a few people within defined clans.

The process of discovering, of finding out, and of knowing is to some extent defined by the knowledge itself and the person seeking that knowledge. For example, there are knowledge systems associated with traditional medicine that are often guarded by a clan or family group. There are beliefs often associated with this kind of knowledge that relates to how the clan acquired or come to know of the medicine. Further to this, there are often beliefs about usage of the knowledge and about protection and precautions regarding the use of the knowledge. Seeking of this type of knowledge then is only accessible to defined persons within a clan and remains closed to general public.

However, when knowledge is clearly accessible to all the process of discovering, finding out, and knowing is again linked to Tongan way of thinking. Taufe'ulungaki (2009) describes Pacific people's ways of thinking to be "creative, holistic and spatial; divergent instead of linear logical; interpersonal, which favours groups activities, spoken over written language, and demonstration and doing rather than verbal direction; and kineshetic, which lends itself to physical activities." (p. 15). Further to this, Taufe'ulungaki (2009) argues that the "common learning strategies that emerge from this specific cultural context are: observation, imitation, listening, participation, and asking. The questions are of the information seeking-type and to obtain technical advice" (p. 15). What this highlights is that the act of *'ilo* in the process of discovering is about observation, listening, modeling, and joining in the processes. The *'ilo* process of discovering also involves seeking technical advice, practical to do type of skills and with practical participation in the learning. When carefully examined, this process of *'ilo* or discovering new information is closely

associated with technical and vocational programs offered as an alternative pathway to often heavy academic curriculum in Pacific schools. The *'ilo* process of discovery is practiced in the informal learning sphere as people continue to learn and gain *'ilo* about fishing, agriculture, farming, weaving, carving, and other traditional crafts.

'Ilo Is in the Knowledge System

There is an intrinsic value placed on *'ilo* as a knowledge system. *'Ilo* is worthwhile and valued particularly when it is considered as being useful for the nation and for others. Education is seen as a place where parents invest time and money for their children to acquire *'ilo*, so that they may earn a livelihood and meet cultural obligations. For Tongans, *'ilo* has to be worthwhile and useful for their families and their communities.

In Tongan context, what is considered knowledge and *'ilo* is a body of knowledge that has been tested over time, critiqued and validated through collaboration and consensus. *'Ilo* as a body of knowledge is also recognized to be susceptible to changes over time.

There is a range of knowledge system present within contemporary Tongan culture. Like many other Polynesian cultures, Tongan culture through Christianity, education, and “development” has evolved and lost a number of traditional knowledge systems. The loss of some traditional knowledge systems has been due to decline in usage of the knowledge, changes in environment limiting access to natural products needed in the preservation of some knowledge systems, and change in beliefs regarding certain practices and *'ilo*.

Tonga has a number of traditional knowledge systems (Fua et al. 2011) that include:

Time – traditional time is based on reading signs of nature (sun, moon, stars) and behaviors of animals such as birds and insects.

Beliefs and psychic knowledge – beliefs about dreams, signs, and natural phenomena still play a strong influence in Tonga’s psyche.

Music – traditional knowledge about the use of metaphors and imagery in music and

composition are still in use, but also evident are influences of new forms and knowledge of music.

Dance – there is a range of dances that are still being practiced with some dances inherited from other Pacific countries that were under the Tongan Empire prior to European contact (eighteenth century).

Agriculture – knowledge systems surrounding planting, harvesting, and conservation methods are still practiced with agriculture being one of the main sources of income for the country.

Fishing – although there are some signs of decline in the knowledge system associated with fishing, there still remain strong practices of traditional knowledge and contemporary knowledge added to fishing in both reef and ocean waters.

Navigation – despite a rich navigation history, existing traditional knowledge system on navigation is on the decline, with limited usage of the skills and few people still practicing this knowledge.

Medicine – knowledge on traditional medicine is still practiced together with associated beliefs and the use of medicinal plants.

Rituals and customs – the changes in the knowledge associated with rituals and customs are most evident in all of the knowledge systems. Changes in beliefs, practices, and influences of economics impact on the practices and consequently on the changes in the knowledge systems associated with rituals and customs.

Taufe’ulungaki, Fua, and colleagues (2008) highlighted that *'ilo* when used wisely, people can live sustainable livelihoods in Tonga. Tongan people who live a life of *mo’ui fakapotopoto* demonstrate not only the range of *'ilo* and knowledge systems, but are able to use these knowledge systems wisely to sustain life in Tonga. Further to this, Taufe’ulungaki and colleagues also point out that when people practice *mo’ui fakapotopoto*, there are also behaviors, values, philosophies, and beliefs that are lived and are clearly part of the *'ilo*, of the knowledge system. Taufe’ulungaki and colleagues add another dimension to the

understanding of 'ilo, in that it is not only about knowing and a knowledge system, but being able to live out and practice the philosophies and beliefs that are associated with the knowledge systems.

The Use of 'Ilo in Educational Frameworks

In an effort to translate the philosophy of 'ilo into practice, two educational frameworks have emerged to date.

Langafale ako framework was developed by Fua (2008) as a response to a need from the Tonga Ministry of Education for a framework to guide the professional learning and development of teachers. The *Langafale ako* framework was later used by the Tonga Institute of Education to guide the redesign of the institute's Diploma in Education for primary and secondary teachers.

At the core of the *Langafale ako* framework is the aspiration of a Tongan teacher to be of service to the country, and this is espoused in the phrase *Faiako ma'a Tonga*. In the Tongan context, teachers, teacher educators, and administrators use the phrase *Faiako ma'a Tonga* when referring to the *Langafale ako* framework. When the phrase *Faiako ma'a Tonga* is used, it evokes a sense of duty, honor, and responsibility among teachers.

The *Langafale ako* framework is based on the building of a traditional Tongan fale. In this framework, it recognizes 'Ilo as one of four pillars of a professional learning and development framework for teachers. Within this framework, teachers are required to master a range of knowledge pertaining to teaching that fit the local context as well as respond to a changing global context. The pillar of 'Ilo also encourages teachers to not only share knowledge but also to be knowledge builders themselves. The use of 'Ilo in this framework recognizes that teachers are creators of knowledge and are responsible for ensuring that this 'Ilo is grounded on Tongan context, value systems, and beliefs.

The *Founga ako* framework put forward by Vaioleti (2001) is based on Tongan theories of education, and he presents this for Pasifika

context in New Zealand. The *Founga ako* framework is more detailed in its presentation and exploration of 'Ilo through a number of educational dimensions. The *Founga ako* framework is presented as a guide for both teachers and students to engage in a learning that preserves the knowledge, values, and language of Pacific and Maori people as well as maintain their well-being. In the *Founga ako* framework, it weaves 'Ilo through a number of educational dimensions that considers diversity, identity, social interaction, culturally safe classroom, language, culturally inclusive content, and assessment. An example is the use of 'Ilo expressed within the dimension of culturally safe classroom. In a culturally safe classroom, a teacher's pedagogical behavior recognizes the "knowledge of cultures of community; political and spiritual concerns have key community contacts." In response the students' cultural display shows a search "to understand social, spiritual and academic matters for others readily. Treat classroom as a place to recharge, a home where friends are" (pp. 256–258).

The *Langafale ako* framework (Fua 2008) and the *Founga ako* framework (Vaioleti 2001) are both frameworks build on Tongan education philosophy of *ako*, 'ilo, and *poto*, demonstrating the link between all three concepts. The two frameworks also demonstrate attempts by academics to further explore the 'ilo as a process of discovering and 'ilo as knowledge itself as applied to teaching and learning processes. While the *Langafale ako* framework firmly situates itself in the Tongan context with its people and culture and designed specifically for Tongan teachers, the *Founga ako* framework is more daring in that it takes traditional Tongan education philosophy out of Tonga to a New Zealand context. Further to this, the *Founga ako* framework goes even further to argue for the consideration of this distinctively Tongan education philosophy to be applied for other Pasifika, including Maori, communities in another context. While the *Langafale ako* framework focuses on the professional learning and development of the teacher and traces the teachers' development from preservice stage to in-service training, the *Founga ako* framework gives consideration to both the teacher and the

student. The *Founga ako* framework can be seen as an extension of the *Langafale ako* framework.

Conclusion

'Ilo in a Tongan context is about the process of searching, finding, seeking, and discovering new understandings. 'Ilo is also about the knowledge itself; in fact it is a knowledge system with its associated beliefs, structures, language, skills, and context. 'Ilo in the Tongan context is always situated within a space and purpose but it also remains open to dialogue and critique. 'Ilo is also highly valued when it is purposeful, useful, and worthwhile. Traditional knowledge systems where 'Ilo is grounded are a vast system of knowledge that spans time and space. Tongan traditional knowledge systems range from ocean-based 'ilo to astronomy, to agriculture, to music and dance, and to protocol and customs. While traditional knowledge systems remain strong in some areas, there are also evidence of changes, decline, and new knowledge systems growing.

In an effort to rethink the inherited education systems of the missionaries and colonial administrators, Tongans have been trying to incorporate 'Ilo into the education system. The work of Vaiioleti (2001) and Fua (2008) demonstrates the journey thus far in this effort to incorporate Tongan philosophy of education and specifically of 'Ilo into the education of Tongan people.

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Images of the Child and Learning in the Early Years Curriculum: A Historical Overview

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Introduction

Western early childhood education (ECE) curricular traditions have emerged from philosophical thought of the Enlightenment (late seventeenth to early nineteenth century). This entry is a thematic exploration of images of the child (for example, child as rational or spiritual being), conjured by Enlightenment philosophers. The image of the child sat alongside imagery used by these philosophers in explaining theories of children's learning and teacher pedagogy. The authors suggest that this imagery has underpinned traditions in ECE including developmental psychology (DAP) and sociocultural models.

Enlightenment philosophers conjured a curious mix of imagery to help explain their ideas of childhood and pedagogy that, nonetheless, make sense within their sociohistorical context. Thus, this entry demonstrates a genealogical exploration of philosophical imagery that reflects a modernist privileging of scientific knowledge, individualism, and reason (empiricist trend). These were positioned alongside a focus on the child as a

spiritual being (spiritualist trend) and Romantic themes of nature as divine (nativist trend). In addition, the child was also positioned through Enlightenment imagery as an interconnected being, part of a wider community and not just an isolated biological entity (interactionism trend) (Bruce 2011).

The Enlightenment Period

Over the past three centuries, philosophers have presented differing views of the child: images that posit the child variously as *tabula rasa*, an unfolding organism, a developing moral and spiritual being, and as a scientist exploring nature. Many eighteenth century images of the child were drawn from biological assumptions of the child based on the science of evolution. Other views regard the child as developing according to God's divine plan, expressed in nature.

These two insights of the child as a spiritual masterpiece and as "developing" according to evolutionary science were not contradictory within the context of seventeenth and eighteenth century Western traditions. The science of evolution that children's fetal and childhood stages were in fact recapitulating evolutionary and societal stages was a critical insight that forged an understanding of "childhood" as a stage and of the child as "developing."

During the European Enlightenment, concepts of humankind such as those of life, of work, and of language became integral to the State and to curriculum. The mediaeval city as God's "heaven-on-earth" was replaced with a belief in society and self-seeking beings bound together by civic contracts. Now rational humankind should engage with the world to discover God's plan. Rational civil beings were able to draw on the natural laws of the sciences, mathematics, and logic to make sense of the world. Childhood was the period for molding the child-to-be-citizen, with curriculum the mechanism for developing civil domains required by society.

However, as European societies became industrialized, later philosophers adopted images of the mind as a machine, of learning as architecture. An

understanding of the child as a spiritual being were overtaken in the twentieth century by the concept of "child development" which was shorn of its deeper spiritual meaning.

The modern construction of "the child" as a rational human being emerged to remain embedded within contemporary child development psychology and by association early childhood education (ECE). So in this entry, the authors discuss some of the historical imagery that has descended to inform current principles in ECE. For example, the widespread use (particularly in the United States) of DAP owes its genesis to the Enlightenment philosophers discussed such as Froebel, Montessori, and later developed by Piaget, Erikson, and Skinner (Pound 2011). To illustrate this, the authors discuss the imagery of Froebel who focuses on ages and stages and Montessori who looks at sensitive periods in the developmental process.

Philosophers' Images of the Child and Children's Learning

In this section, we trace some of the historical ideas that have occurred across time and place to construct the modern child and theories of children's learning. The categories of spiritualist, empiricist, nativist, and interactionist, identified by Terri Bruce (2011), are used alongside the additional theme of spiritualist. These overlapping themes discussed below have emerged and become central in understanding the child and learning within society. They have significantly contributed to the construction of certain ontological images of the child, teacher, and curriculum.

Spiritualist

Spirituality was powerfully embedded in Enlightenment images of the child and learning. It was linked to emerging ideas of science, nature, and civil society.

Frederich Froebel (1782–1852) is notable in ECE for creating educational toys that he called "gifts." Froebel's "gifts" had metaphysical connotations: the sphere as "the first, and the last, natural form," universal, experienced by all. For example,

his first gift was the balls which were soft, made of yarn and of a solid color, designed to teach the child (through her interaction with them) the physical laws of the universe such as motion, object, weight, and gravity. The gifts were designed to foster in children a knowledge of humankind and of God and nature (as God's garden on earth') (Adleman 2000, p. 104). Thus the spiritualist and nativist themes were not discordant within Froebel's overall philosophy.

Maria Montessori (1870–1952) combined spiritual and scientific planes. Both planes worked to ensure the unity of spirit, soul, and body. For Montessori, the young child learned through natural laws of development imbued with psychic energy. Montessori used the image of the child as a "spiritual embryo." In the early unconscious stage, Montessori said, this spiritual embryo was guided by natural laws of development which are seen as akin to the psychic life of the child. She argued that this psychic force is cosmic and runs through all of humanity in its natural state. The mind absorbs impressions so that the child undergoes a transformation and does not remain separate from them. The child absorbs language, habits, and customs effortlessly and unconsciously whereas adults have to work hard to acquire these. Thus the spiritual and natural laws of development worked concordantly in the child's growth and education (Tzou 2007, p. 37).

In addition, the child went through what Montessori called "sensitive periods," which were nature's plan to support psychic aspects of mind. Montessori also held that birth to age 3 is the time of the "unconscious absorbent mind," whereas age 3–6 is the time of the "conscious absorbent mind" (Edwards 2002, p. 6). Montessori suggested that the child was engaged in valuable "work," guided by psychic natural laws involving the construction of a "masterpiece" – the future adult. She had a very specific use of the term "work" as a metaphor for construction of the future adult. The child has the potential to provide new direction for the future of humanity.

The spiritual dimension was all-encompassing for Montessori who likened sinful tendencies in the teacher as to weeds in a field: unable to see the child as Jesus saw him.

Empiricist

John Locke's (1632–1704) tract, *Some Thoughts Concerning Education* (1690), addressed the issue of the child's character, of the child as rational being. The newly emerging concept of the child's will was central in such philosophies. The child being free to express him/herself was seen as important in the development of individuality and reason, both of which are pre-requirements of a civil society.

Locke's image of tabula rasa was of young children as analogous to white paper, or wax, to be fashioned by the tutor. Children were "prerational" and required the teacher to mould their emerging rational capacities. This imagery supports a deficit view of the child as lacking and needing to be filled with experiences, concepts, knowledge pre-identified by the teacher (Bruce 2011).

Nevertheless, Locke did suggest that education proceeded best when based on the child's interests and acknowledged the child's need for self-expression. Hence, Locke argued that teachers of young children should offer books appropriate to their interest, such as Aesop's fables and integrate reading with games, for example pasting letters on the sides of dice to familiarize them with vowels, letters, and syllables. Children while playing could be taught to read.

Nativist

Jean-Jaques Rousseau (1712–1778) believed that the child was biologically preprogrammed to learn naturally. He suggested that immersion in nature was the best way to facilitate the child's growth toward a rational, civil, and empathetic adult.

Here the Romanticist tradition is positioned precariously alongside the Enlightenment belief in rationality. Rousseau did not shy away from explaining how the two themes are connected. Using the image of unripened and immature fruit, Rousseau argued that because children differed in important ways from adults they should be educated in the natural world, the locus of all reality. Trying to force them to reason when they do not have the faculty is to impose adult prejudices on them. This could result in their corruption (like rotten and unflavored fruit).

In his novel *Emile* Rousseau used the metaphor of cultivation to express the nature of education (Rousseau 1762/2011). *Emile*, a fictitious character, served to demonstrate Rousseau's educational proposition that the child needs to interact with nature independently from human theories and bodies of knowledge that construct it in terms of inert highly verbal information. Rousseau rejected Hobbes' view of civilization as the state that ordered society, of the social contract. He was deeply skeptical of civilization, and he argued that all humans were born equal and innocent but through social processes humans become affected and manipulated.

Rousseau held that children have natural inquisitive impulses that are always correct. The child rather than the tutor governed their interactions, in an inversion of Hobbes' or Locke's view of the child-tutor relationship. "Take an opposite course with your pupil. Let him always believe he is master." He ought to do only what he wants, but "he ought to want only what you want him to do" (cited Baker 2001 p. 257). Free will is retained by the child but is supported by the tutor to choose wisely.

Froebel drew on Schelling's philosophy, and his contemporary Johann Heinrich Pestalozzi's pedagogy, in stressing the importance of children's interactions with natural phenomena. The kindergarten – meaning literally "garden of children" – refers to his educational philosophy of creating the "right conditions" (environment) for children to flourish (grow and learn). The kindergarten was an idealized view of German society, removed from outside influences (Adlemen 2000; Baker 2003). As with the development of inner spirituality, so Froebel's pietism portrayed children's development as requiring the same series of steps for the religious life as is found in the development of the human race.

Interactionist

Interactionist philosophies stressed the child as more than just a biological unit preprogrammed to learn naturally, but one who must interact with both social (family/society) and natural elements in order to develop. The child's sense impressions were regarded as critical in this interaction

between the interior will, innate developmental predisposition (often regarded as divine), and external world.

To **Johann Friedrich Herbart (1776–1841)**, the child was born without a will of his own (see Baker 2002). It was in the family he initially learned of authority and love. The teacher fostered – through cultivation and exercise of the child's sense impressions – each individual soul to a greater knowledge of their will. Herbart focused on governing, rather than punishing. The teacher guided her charges' mind through a variety of "presentations" which supported the student's "apperception," always building on what had gone before. An ordered program (the "reals") offered a balance between the interior will and the exterior world. Learning built on earlier knowledge, as it was from previously understood perceptions that the child made new sense.

For Montessori, the child's interaction with the wider environment was critical to her development. The role of the teacher was to observe the child closely to see where they expressed interest, in order to take advantage of "sensitive periods of development." Doing so was regarded as the basis of a relevant scientific pedagogy – a premise still significant today. For Montessori, children "revealed themselves" and their "natural intelligence" through free exploration of the didactic material set up and demonstrated by the teacher. The teacher's role was that of a person being precise like the scientist, yet spiritual like the saint; being skilled in techniques of science, yet open to the wider social world. The Montessori equipment was designed to develop the child's sense through which she makes sense of the world.

Herbart also believed that training was most effective when the teacher worked through the student's observed interests and facilitated her interaction with the environment. Learning, Herbart believed – seeing parallels with the laws of Newtonian science – involves action and interaction by an individual seeking equilibrium. The teacher's role was to guide this through careful scientific observation. The power of education to guide the child to societal morality was central to the interactionist theme. Herbart argued that the

teacher should train the child's moral sympathies by introducing the knowledge of previous generations: a science based on ethics and psychology.

Philosophers such as Frederich Froebel, J H Pestalozzi, and Maria Montessori believed that by following their own interests, and reflecting on their learning, children develop civil behaviors and judgments. This is strongly linked to the modern day premise that children should be able to choose their own equipment and follow through with their play. Governance of children, by the State and tutors, would lead to habits of self-governance. For Froebel, the kindergarten was an idealized view of German society, removed from outside influences.

Enduring and Marginalized Images Over Time

In this entry, the authors explore the roots of the current ECE curriculum through an analysis of imagery and images of the child used by Enlightenment philosophers. Current ECE traditions (whether those based on the principles of sociocultural theories or DAP) began as explorations of the metaphysical purposes of being – of life, learning, and civil engagement. The four themes identified (spiritualist, nativist, empiricist, and interactionist) above are highly influential in current ECE contexts.

Thus the images of the child and imagery used by philosophers still inhabit curriculum concepts to a greater or lesser degree (Davis and Sumara 2002). Bruce (2011) has identified a set of common principles that are generally accepted in current ECE theory and practice based on the work of early pioneers such as Montessori and Froebel. For example, intrinsic motivation is based on the early ideas of the child's will discussed above. It also rests on nativist ideas of natural internal impulses. Currently the idea of intrinsic motivation is highly valued in ECE, resulting in environments being prepared to foster child-initiated and self-directed activity (Bruce 2011).

Another common principle in ECE is that of the child's education being based on interactions between themselves and the wider social and

natural environment. Enlightenment philosophers discussed in the interactionist section above focused on this critical educational insight which informs both sociocultural and DAP traditions. The idea that there are certain times when children can learn things best is another principle originating in Montessori's sensitive periods.

However, many of the ideas discussed above have lost any connection to their original social and historical contexts and thus the original intent has become significantly altered. Cut loose from their original source, children's curriculum and teachers' knowledge has become a universal educational "science." While the spiritualist theme has in many cases been cast to the margins, other key ideas have descended to significantly inform both DAP and sociocultural approaches. Arguably, both these approaches coexist in curricula documentation today, with the DAP being dominant.

Universalized assumptions, under the status of "the science of Human Development" operate often undisputed in the global society of today. DAP theories draw on both the empiricist and interactionist trends. They privilege the individual and ahistorical stages of development each child must pass through. For instance, children are seen as infants, toddlers or young children, as they progress through their early childhood years.

Sociocultural theories point to the significance of the cultural and historical contexts that shape teacher-student interactions and aspirations. They also draw significantly on the interactionist thought of early philosophers.

Other insights have been marginalized rather than altered. For example, the centering of theodic curriculum, of moral development by Froebel and Montessori, is less evident today in ECE. Today, Enlightenment images like "divine sphere" or concepts of "will" are shorn of their spiritual meanings in curriculum. As nature has become sanitized, teachers as agents of the State order the child through curriculum with foci on early literacy, numeracy, and social and emotional skills that relate to later employable competencies. The concept of child as a spiritual being has descended so that in most western curricula it is, at best, covert.

Nativist themes have also become marginalized with structural images replacing biological

images; the child-in-nature of Froebel is no longer valued. Rather the science of development prevails. Balls are merely balls: no longer representations of that which connects the child with nature as the universe connects man with God.

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Imitatio

- [Comenius, John Amos \(1592–1670\)](#)

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Implicit

- [Phenomenology, Language, and the Unspoken: The Preverbal Dimension of Children's Experience](#)

Improvement and Accountability Functions of Assessment: Impact on Teachers' Thinking and Action

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Introduction

Assessment is everywhere in schooling. In some countries, it begins before schooling starts with screening tests and interviews for selection into elite or competitive nursery schools or kindergartens. Nonetheless, for most children and adolescents, if assessment is not a regular occurrence, it looms in the background, perhaps haunting or driving their learning. Likewise, assessment plays an important role in curriculum and teaching; assessment is how teachers monitor students' progress through the curriculum and how curricula can be evaluated for effectiveness. Unsurprisingly, assessment is also used by governments, the media, and parents to determine the quality of schools and teachers even though there is strong evidence that such uses have generally negative consequences on teaching, curriculum, students, and learning (Hamilton et al. 2007); although some positive consequences (e.g., teaching being focused more directly on the curriculum underlying the test) have been documented (Cizek 2001).

Educational policy shapes the context in which teachers perform their multifaceted work (e.g., planning, teaching, and evaluating). Policy expresses the societal and cultural norms valued by members of that jurisdiction. Thus, the introduction of policy reform around assessment (e.g., No Child Left Behind or National Standards


vs. Assessment for Learning) may express values not necessarily held by teachers employed to implement such policies. When policy needs to be implemented by teachers, it cannot be assumed that teachers will enact policy as intended. Indeed, there is strong evidence that how teachers conceive of a phenomenon acts to filter (i.e., control what they pay attention to), frame (i.e., control how they understand what they pay attention to), and guide (i.e., influence their behavior) their responses to that phenomenon (Fives and Buehl 2012). Hence, attention needs to be paid to the conceptions or beliefs teachers have surrounding current assessment policies and priorities so as to better appreciate how they are likely to understand, respond to, and implement assessment reforms. This is especially the case when school systems place increasing responsibility for assessment in the hands of schools or teachers, rather than solely in the control of external examination boards. If teachers conceive that assessment is primarily about evaluating student performance or if they conceive that learning from assessment (i.e., improvement) is largely what the student is supposed to do, then it is unlikely they will use assessment information to reconsider their own teaching practices, even if students in their class do poorly on one or more topics covered by the assessment. Offering teachers more training in test statistics, test item writing skills, or curriculum content knowledge, without addressing their conceptions of what assessment is and what it is for might simply create better skilled teachers who still think assessment is about the student rather than their own practice (Brown 2008).

Conceptions

The term conceptions is frequently used in examining teacher beliefs about assessment because it captures not only how assessment is perceived but also the cognitive and affective thoughts, opinions, and attitudes that teachers form about a phenomenon such as assessment. Teacher conceptions are arrived at through perceptions and embodied experiences leading to the formation of beliefs. Since societies offer different

experiences, it is only to be expected that differences in culture or society lead not only to differing policies but also to distinct conceptions of practices or processes. For example, transmission teaching coupled with high respect for teachers and formal examination scores characterizes East Asian societies (Hofstede 2007) as a legitimate means of motivating students, rewarding diligence, and overcoming negative social effects such as promotion through collusion, corruption, or nepotism. In contrast, the Anglo-Commonwealth schooling world is characterized by strong attention to the needs and values of individual children in which the teacher facilitates each child's talents or personal priorities (Stobart 2006). In such societies, assessments that prevent children from gaining access to further learning opportunities is frowned upon, at least by schooling professionals. Thus, it is expected that teacher beliefs within each jurisdiction or ecology will be broadly shared and coherent with the priorities of both policy and society. Under these conditions, teacher beliefs will lead to decision making that could be understood as ecologically rational within that environment (Rieskamp and Reimer 2007). Beliefs that are ecologically rational lead to actions and priorities that make sense within the overall set of priorities of a society. This implies that in a contrasting context, such beliefs might be seen as irrational or unacceptable.

Hence, the conceptual model underlying research into teacher beliefs about assessment (Fig. 1) has twin, interacting tracks leading to student outcomes; the conceptions of both teachers and students in a jurisdiction are influenced by various policy directions and family priorities and these beliefs, in turn, guide their separate teaching and learning practices. These two pathways are shaped by and respond to societal and cultural contexts, meaning that there will be different beliefs and practices in differing social, ethnic, and cultural groups. The model has three important characteristics. First, teacher beliefs moderate or mediate what happens between policy directions and student learning outcomes, rather than relying on processes external to the implementation environment. Second, policy directions are seen as a function of



Improvement and Accountability Functions of Assessment: Impact on Teachers' Thinking and Action,
Fig. 1 Conceptual framework of relations leading to outcomes

priorities within society and culture, suggesting that variation in conceptions and practices within societal contexts will be less than those between contexts. Third, the beliefs students themselves have about schooling, learning, teaching, knowledge, curriculum, and assessment play a strong contributing role in shaping their outcomes.

It is worth considering, as Pajares (1992) suggested, that teacher beliefs or conceptions arise out of their student experiences within a system. This interaction is shown in the double-headed arrows between teacher and student in the diagram. This means that it is likely that the conceptions of assessment students develop through successfully navigating assessment in schooling (i.e., passing tests or exams, doing well on performance or portfolio assessments, gaining qualifications, etc.) stimulate beliefs about the nature and purpose of assessment that student teachers bring with them upon entry to teacher education. These beliefs, of course, may not be appropriate for the role of teacher, depending on policy and practice environments.

Assessment Purposes

Instead of focusing on assessment formats and types (e.g., essays, multiple-choice tests, etc.), it seems more useful to focus on the purposes teachers have for whatever assessment techniques they employ. Assessment has many uses – selection, promotion, retention, deciding awards, grouping students, certification, reporting, tracking progress, and so on (Newton 2007). Many of

these uses are largely administrative rather than educational. While administrative demands are legitimate, in and of themselves, they are often only indirectly related to the primary concerns of educators. Educational uses of assessment focus much more on the possibility that assessment can inform improved student learning and better teaching.

Popham (2000, p. 1) eloquently and forcefully stated:

if educational measurement doesn't lead to better education for students, then we shouldn't be doing it ... the only reason educators ought to assess students is in order to make more defensible educational decisions regarding those students. That's really why educators should be messing around with measurement-to improve student learning. [italics in original]

While Popham uses the term measurement, we can infer that he means assessment – a process of collecting information about student learning that leads to educational decision making. The key educational decision that every teacher needs to engage in is deciding *who needs to be taught what next*. While educational improvement is an essential goal of assessment, this ambition is often overwhelmed by not just administrative, but also accountability uses, normally imposed by political authorities.

Accountability has to do with a simple idea: everyone has to give an account of what they have done in their work. In education, teachers are accountable for their students' learning and they are required to account for their effectiveness to their managers, leaders, and supervisors and,

naturally, the parents of their students. A simple way, though not without problems, to evaluate teachers is to test their students – if teachers have done a good job, their students will do well, or at least better than they did previously, on any assessment of the curriculum teachers were supposed to teach. However, there are many reasons students might not do well on an assessment, independent of how well the teacher has done his or her job. For example, the teacher may be working with students from poor homes, whose parents have little education, or use a language different to that of the school. Alternatively, even an average teacher may appear very good, if the home resources of his or her students are high and those students are extensively helped to learn in out-of-school tutoring for the assessment.

What makes accountability assessment important is that there are often negative consequences for schools and teachers who receive low scores. In examination driven societies, student assessment results are published in the media and used to determine the worth or quality of schools and teachers. In extreme cases, teachers have been fired, students have been forced to repeat grades, and schools have been disbanded. Being associated with high or low achieving schools brings reflected glory or shame to teachers. However, accountability that depends on tests or assessments is a two-edged sword. On the one hand, higher scores are meant to indicate that students have achieved what society expected from schools, and, on the other hand, high scores can be inflated without ensuring that the expected learning has taken place. Teaching to and cramming for the test, let alone cheating, can result in higher scores. Evidence exists that when teachers believe that the negative consequences associated with low scores are unfair or unethical, test score inflation practices will take place (Ravitch 2013). These consequences are easily understood when we realize that accountability has fairly consistent and powerful effects on humans – we tend to comply with the views of those to whom we must give an account of our work (Lerner and Tetlock 1999). This means that teachers will produce results that meet what they know their superiors expect – and if the consequences of failure

are extreme for the individual concerned (e.g., loss of reputation) – then we should expect teachers to deliver high test scores, through whatever means at their disposal. It may also mean that if schools are truly community-based, then teachers may disregard standardized tests completely, if that is what is expected by a parent and leadership group to whom they are responsible. Further, it may mean that teachers would ignore high scores on tests if the students in their class, to whom they are also accountable, press for a broad and diverse curriculum experience rather than a narrow teaching-to-the-test version.

Teacher Beliefs About Assessment

Brown (2008) has framed teacher beliefs about assessment as a multidimensional space in which four competing purposes interact with each other; these are: (1) assessment informs improved teaching and learning, (2) assessment holds schools and teachers accountable, (3) assessment holds students accountable, and (4) assessment is irrelevant or ignored. Extending this framework, assessment purposes can be positioned on a continuum from extremely pedagogical to extremely accounting (Barnes et al. 2015). Harris and Brown (2009) positioned teacher beliefs about assessment in a 2*2 frame according to whether they were predominantly (1) about students or schools and (2) positive or negative evaluations. Generally, their analysis of 26 New Zealand teachers concluded that teachers were most in favor of assessments that improved pedagogical interactions between teachers and students and among students themselves.

Research with the Teachers' Conceptions of Assessment self-report inventory has provided insights into teacher thinking by examining both mean scores and correlations among these four major factors. International comparative studies have generally concluded that teachers give the highest level of agreement to the use of assessment for improvement or pedagogical applications. In addition to New Zealand and Queensland, the improvement purpose had highest value in all jurisdictions (see summary in

Brown 2012). Consistent with the idea that teacher beliefs about assessment develop initially from their experiences and perspectives as students (i.e., assessment evaluates me the student), research studies have found that prospective teachers do not have improvement as their dominant. However, deliberate training of prospective teachers to take on a formative or improvement-oriented approach to assessment has found that future teachers do become more oriented towards pedagogical approaches to assessment (Smith et al. 2014).

Societies can be grouped as to whether the assessment policy focuses on high-stakes consequences (e.g., ranking of schools, entry awards for students, sanctions for poor performance, etc.) or focuses more on low-stakes consequences (e.g., diagnostic analysis of student needs, provision of support to students or teachers, etc.). An important trend is that similarity in teacher beliefs is found across jurisdictions with similar policies and cultures. For example, Hamilton et al. (2007) reported that teachers in California, Georgia, and Pennsylvania had very similar responses, experiences, and attitudes towards standards-based accountability assessments, attributable to similarities between the systems. Likewise, in New Zealand and Queensland, which both have low-stakes, child-centered, formative assessment systems, primary school teachers had statistically equivalent responses to the Teacher Conceptions of Assessment inventory (Brown et al. 2011b). Similarly, teachers in Hong Kong and China, both of which are high-stakes, public examination societies, had statistically equivalent responses to a Chinese Teacher Conceptions of Assessment inventory (Brown et al. 2011a). The similarity of Hong Kong and China and their consistent differences with New Zealand and Queensland has been attributed to the Confucian heritage cultural features of the assessment system in which examinations are a force for both improved learning and improved personal character, while the latter two societies have a more open view in which assessment does not function as a barrier to further opportunity.

Where problems arise for teachers is when supposedly low-stakes policies (e.g., assessment

for learning) are implemented alongside high-stakes examinations or school evaluation systems. In these situations, it is highly likely that formative, diagnostic approaches to assessment will be treated as a “soft” policy, in contrast to formal examinations or school evaluation systems that function as “hard” policy (Kennedy et al. 2011). For example, although Hong Kong has an assessment for learning policy, the society is characterized by high-consequence examinations that determine life chances for children and, by inference, determine the quality of schools and teaching. Thus, teachers strongly associate improvement with holding students accountable (Brown et al. 2009, 2011a), unlike teachers in New Zealand and Queensland (Brown 2012; Brown et al. 2011b). Interestingly, New Zealand and Queensland (Brown 2012) secondary school teachers both agreed more with the purpose that assessment holds students accountable than their primary counterparts; this consistent difference was attributed to the role secondary teachers play in assessing students for qualifications and the greater responsibility adolescents are expected to take for learning.

Hence, teacher conceptions of assessment are, in part, a product of how teachers individually experience assessment in their student careers (usually successfully through the application of individual effort and home and school resources) and how society constructs the role and function of assessment in schooling. At the same time, a consequence of teacher conceptions of assessment is a replication in their practices of the societal norms that contributed to their own success as assessed learners. In other words, *what worked for me as a student* (usually assessment evaluates me – Brown 2008) is *how I will teach*. Since successful students do accept the legitimacy of having their learning evaluated, teachers who emphasize this conception potentially close off the questions that effective teachers should ask: *if my students do not succeed on an assessment, is it because I didn't teach them as well as they needed?* Reflective and effective teachers are open to the possibility that the assessment data are correct and that questions ought to be posed instead concerning their teaching. Good education

systems support the teacher in discovering the ‘bad news’ about their own teaching, rather than laying responsibility solely upon society or students.

Nevertheless, policy change around the use of assessment (e.g., increased accountability or increased formative expectations) cannot be successfully implemented without consideration of the existing conceptions that teachers have and an awareness of the potentially contradictory uses and functions of assessment in the environment. Change in assessment practice clearly involves changing teacher beliefs, but also requires ensuring environments (e.g., tools and policies) support teachers in deploying the desired changes.

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***Incredible Years* as a Tool of Governmentality: A Foucauldian Analysis of an Early Years Parenting Program**

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Synonyms

[Foucault and Early Years Parenting; Post-structural Discourse Analysis of Modern](#)

[Parenting in Early Childhood Education; Parenting as a Site of Governance in Early Childhood Education](#)

Introduction

Educational policies have significant impacts on the lives of those involved, silencing or strengthening one mode of pedagogy over others in society. The way that issues are re/presented within policies limits what is considered to be desirable or even possible in society (Bacchi 2000). Consequently, looking into how a certain issue is problematized and framed in policies invites individuals to unpack the unspoken regulations and issues that derive from these policies. Examining a predominant parenting policy in early childhood education such as *Incredible Years* provides much insight into “what is unsaid yet present” assumptions and taken-for-granted values and beliefs in the current field of parent education.

Foucault’s concepts of “governmentality” and “discursive normalization” are particularly helpful in this respect as they provide tools to systematically unpack a regime of truth and other ways of being that are “eclipsed” and “hidden” underneath this “truth” (MacNaughton 2005). Foucault (1991) describes “governmentality” as “the conduct of conduct”; “a form of activity aiming to shape, guide or affect the conduct of some person or persons” (p. 2). He argues that this activity enables only a certain type of practice and thinking possible and visible to its practitioners and those on whom it is practiced. If a system of power produces a specific form of knowledge as the only conceivable way to understand and characterize a particular context, how can one see what is supposedly made to be “invisible” and “unthinkable” while she/he operates within the same system of power?

Foucault suggests looking deeper into what has been presented and considered as “normal/natural” as well as into the gaps and silences in the milieu and to reconstruct a particular mode of “techniques of power” or “power/knowledge.” He argues that practitioners of this method are enabled to discern how and what power/

knowledge relations are at work “to observe, monitor, shape and control the behavior of individuals situated within the range of social and economic institutions such as the school, the factory and the prison” (Foucault 1991, pp. 3–4).

Drawing from poststructural and postcolonial theories, the problems of current parenting education in early childhood education and the possible implications of these issues are explored. By unpacking discourses of parenting produced by *Incredible Years* (IY) as an accepted parenting program through Foucault’s notion of “governmentality” and “discursive normalization”, the “norm” of parenting that is promoted by the current system and how this concept of “truth” in parenting influences the everyday life of families are examined.

What Is *Incredible Years*?

For its wealth of “evidence” and “science-based” strategies, *Incredible Years* [IY] has been chosen and implemented by many countries as an official parenting program “to prevent and to treat” children’s conduct problems. The aim of the program is to equip “high risk” parents with behavior management skills and developmentally appropriate techniques, so that they can provide better support for children’s development of social and emotional competence and school readiness. Presenting reports of various clinical trials as evidence, the developers and the supporters of IY argue that the program is an efficient tool to prevent “predictable negative consequences” such as violence, delinquency, and substance abuse among these child/ren in adolescence and adulthood (The Incredible Years® 2013). This argument, however, needs more thorough consideration because evidence-based approaches can be criticized for the gap they leave in our knowledge of the reality of children and families’ daily lives. Whether IY does provide sufficient, sustainable, and meaningful support for children and families as trial reports suggest still remains to be seen.

“Desirable/Positive” Parenting in *Incredible Years*

A particular model of parenting is identified as “desirable/positive” within the policy: a self-managing, economically sound, and functional individual who are in control of their children’s education and behavior. The discourses of IY provide a clear illustration of what is considered as a desirable norm of knowledge and valued forms of relationships and interactions between parents and children in the current system. Individuals who demonstrate these attributes are presented as capable and valuable members of society, turning the domain of parent education into a “a site of intense regulation” (Baez and Talburt 2008).

Scientific Discourses as the Universal Truth

Attributable to the last few decades’ growing interest in different approaches to child development (e.g., Vygotsky’s cultural-historical account and Bronfenbrenner’s ecological theory), the use of terms such as “developmentally appropriate practice” has been less popular and is even avoided in some educational disciplines (Burman 2008). However, this does not necessarily herald the decline of developmental psychology. On the contrary, developmental assumptions have become ingrained and naturalized in the way professionals understand and assess children’s learning so that their subtle yet effective power has become less obvious and more difficult to notice at times (Burman 2008; MacNaughton 2005). Traces of Piaget’s stage model of cognitive development still can be found in many teacher training courses and research journals in education, perpetuating the privileged status of developmental psychology as universal, factual, and absolute truth (Burman 2008).

The discourses produced by IY are no exception to this. These discourses portray children’s development as linear and universal progress toward a more logical, intellectually advanced being. Following statements about IY’s theoretical framework, contents and outcomes are

provided by the IY's developers to promote the program (The Incredible Years® 2013; Webster-Stratton 2014). Consider how these narratives establish implicit and explicit truths about the normal child and desirable parenting.

Each of the programs is thematically consistent, includes the same theoretical underpinnings, and is based on the developmental milestones for each age stage.

Each of these core programs emphasizes developmentally appropriate parenting skills and includes age-appropriate video examples of culturally diverse families and children with varying temperaments and development issues.

The programs have been found to be effective in strengthening teacher and parent management skills, improving children's social and emotional competence and school readiness, and reducing behavior problems.

With such a certainty, the discourses in these narratives authorize developmental psychology as the only factual and correct truth by which to understand and measure children's learning and behavior management skills as the "one-fits-all" answer for the challenges that all children and parents face in life. In this way of thinking, other types of knowing, beliefs, and values in parenting must be set aside and are considered unnatural (abnormal), incorrect, and inconsequential for *normal/good* individuals because scientific knowledge is "*The*" *universal/absolute truth*.

The assumption underneath this approach to knowing is that all human beings are the same, thus discovering and implementing the universal and absolute truth that encompasses this essence of human existence will solve the problems of society and achieve further human progress (Smith 1999). Subtleties, complexities, and the messiness of real life are ironed out neatly, reducing the multifaceted challenges individuals experience to a simple and straight problem. In the case of immigrant children and families, there could be a variety of reason for their *less than favorable behaviors* (in the eyes of teachers and other experts). These children and families experience adjustment of social and verbal languages, and environments (climate, food, cultures, and beliefs), which could make it more difficult for

them to demonstrate the desirable conducts in particular contexts. Or it could be financial strains and working at a job that is much less than they are qualified for in their home countries that add extra stress and pressures on immigrant parents.

However, the problem with perceiving and judging individuals in relation to the absolute/universal truth of what postcolonialists refer to as "the West" (Smith 1999) is that the complex challenges immigrant children and parents experience are ignored, while the whole weight of the children's welfare/success rests on parents (Suissa 2006). Instead of endeavoring to understand and support the genuine issues in children and parents' lives, this approach concentrates on highlighting what they are *not* doing right in accordance to the norm, and how to fix this (Suissa 2006). Through this developmental/behavior psychological lens, the immigrant child's frustration that derives from difficulties to master different social skills and languages may be seen simply as aggressive behavior and the manifestation of his/her parents' inadequate skills and knowledge in parenting. Regardless of various socio-economic backgrounds, genders, contexts, cultures, and beliefs, the normalizing discourses suggest that being equipped with this universal/absolute truth should improve the behaviors and performances of problem children and parents.

Foucault (1977, 1980, 2003) challenges this notion of scientific knowledge as universal, indisputable, absolute truth with objectivity. Using an example of penal system and mental institutions, he highlights the regime of truth as "culturally prejudiced, partial, situated and local" for it is a product of particular knowledge/power relations (MacNaughton 2005, p. 23). Therefore, he claims that the regime of truth, or the politics of truth, should be understood as the manifestation of a power struggle over meanings in a specific milieu, rather than as *indisputable truth* that encompasses all human lives (Foucault 1980).

For example, to traditional Korean parents who are brought up in Confucian discourses, what is perceived as good parenting may include teaching children to respect elders and to value a strong

family morality (e.g., teaching children to offer help such as lifting heavy things for elders, and putting the family's needs first, if need be sacrificing their own gains). These values and beliefs are considered as the truth of parenting by some Korean parents, yet they become invisible, irrelevant, and even inadequate in a context where scientific knowledge is positioned with privileged status.

This does not imply that the traditional truth of Korean parenting holds less value/worth than the scientific knowledge. More accurately it unveils the excessive singularity of psychological discourses in modern societies like ours and how it enables the modern disciplinary power to punish the soul of the normal/the abnormal. Contrary to the widespread representation of scientific knowledge as a *neutral* and *universal truth*, it is highly political, and situated (Foucault 1980). Neither does the knowledge re/produced in Korean parenting have more value than the scientific way of knowing as it comes with its own sets of problems and limitations. The strong value placed on family responsibilities and social hierarchies should be understood in terms of how these discourses support the mechanism of power operating in the particular Korean context, rather than as a representation of higher moral values and stronger family bonds within the population. It is a manifestation of "the subjection of those who are perceived as objects and the objectification of those who are subjected," thus providing a useful insight into how the existing power mechanism sustains its authority by producing certain discourses (Foucault 1977, p. 185). In other words, "truth" should be understood as a system of power that regulates and distributes the body, governing the soul of individuals for economic and political production in societies; how normalizing discourses differentiate between the normal and the abnormal; and by whom and how these discourses are authorized.

The Normal/Natural Relationship

The dominating presence of child development knowledge in early childhood education establishes such a convincing picture of "how to 'be' that it is difficult to imagine how to think, act and

feel in any other way" (MacNaughton 2005, p. 33). The discourses of IY offer a clear description of normal/desirable interactions between children and parents:

The foundation of the Incredible Years programs focuses on building warm and nurturing parent-child and teacher-child relationships through children directed play, social and emotion coaching, praise and incentives. (The Incredible Years® 2013)

Drawing from behavioral science and developmental psychology, these statements emphasize the "warm and nurturing" type of adult-child relationships, and the "positive" verbal interactions for a child's learning. The problem arises from the subjective nature of the terms "warm and nurturing" from culture to culture. Some of the more traditional contexts in Korean and Tongan cultures may discourage verbal acknowledgement of desirable behaviors and may seem firm and strict, yet there may be a strong and nurturing relationship between child and parents nonetheless. However, as relationships and interactions between these children and parents do not match the exact representation of the norm, they may appear harsh or inadequate/abnormal childrearing practice to people who are in a position of power to assess and to control (e.g., early childhood educators, health professionals, and social workers).

By presenting discourses of the "normal/desirable" way to be as a parent and a child in an explicit manner, these narratives implicitly categorize those who do not fit into this norm as abnormal, rationalizing the disciplinary power to intervene and conform these individuals (Foucault 1977, 2003). Once *abnormal* individuals are identified, various institutions get involved to *catch them early* so that "predictable negative consequences" will be prevented (The Incredible Years® 2013).

In addition, the appropriate forms of parent-teacher and child-adult relationships are identified in the document. Parents are "to partner with teachers and to be involved in children's school experiences," and to engage in "child-directed play" for the child's academic success and social/emotional competencies (The Incredible Years® 2013). There is no regard for different

cultures' approach to child-adult, parent-teacher dynamics, not to mention a complexity and multiplicity within the same culture. The discourses in IY present active involvement at school and child-led play as the normal parenting practice, whereas other norms of childrearing practice are ignored.

For instance, among various styles of parenting that exist in Japanese and Korean cultures, those who are brought up with more traditional values expect a distinctive role for each individual in relation to the social hierarchies. In the case of the child-adult dynamic in these cultures, it is adults who are assumed to be wiser and more knowledgeable, placing them in a higher position in a social hierarchy. This is not unlike the way that "Western hetero-patriarchal cultures" (Smith 1999) perceive children and adult hierarchies. The difference, however, is the trajectory of this dynamic. Some Japanese and Korean cultures have a more candid manifestation of this child-adult relationship expressed with a more authoritative approach and with defined roles for each party. Either parents decide what is good for their child, expecting the child to comply with their commands, or the child and parents get engaged in separate activities that are appropriate for each position (i.e., "Playing is for the child, and adults need to work, and be responsible and mature.").

The normalizing discourses of active involvement and child-direct play fail to grasp these subtle cultural interpretations and representations of power in complex social dynamics, condemning these parents as unhelpful, uninterested, and incompetent. It is highly presumptuous to assume that these parents care less or have no interest in their child's learning just because they do not demonstrate the precise style of parenting provided in IY. On the contrary, many of these immigrants choose to move overseas to give their children a better chance in life and high-quality education, even if it means making significant sacrifices such as giving up secure careers and being separated from families and friends.

The Normal/Natural Interaction

The program's content and objectives provide added insight into a standard/model behavior of child and parent. The IY's developers claim that

the warm and nurturing relationship can be achieved by applying positive tactics such as incentives and praises. It is also suggested that competent parents should coach/model socially and emotionally acceptable behaviors, and manage children's misbehaviors with "proactive" disciplinary techniques. The desirable interactions and relationships between children and parents are described in microscopic detail.

Program Two: Using praise and incentives to encourage cooperative behavior.

Part 1: The art of effective praise and encouragement

- Getting and giving support through praise
- Recognizing social and academic behaviors that need praise

Part 2: Motivating children through incentives

- Understanding how to "shape" behaviors
- Understanding how to develop incentive programs that are developmentally appropriate
- Understanding ways to use tangible rewards for problems such as dawdling, not dressing, noncompliance, not going to bed, and toilet training (The Incredible Years® 2013)

Many of these behavior management strategies promoted in IY entail verbal and explicit responses. To "shape" children's behaviors into desirable and normal patterns, parents are encouraged to use a great deal of verbal praise, "negotiate" with children, and "motivate" them with "developmentally appropriate" incentives. On the one hand, academic and social skills are distinguished as key competencies to be mastered in the early years and worthy of recognition and verbal praise. On the other hand, noncompliance, not sleeping at given bedtime, reliance on parents for toileting and self-care, and insufficient movements are placed at the opposite end, the abnormal/detrimental behaviors.

By providing these infinitesimal details of desirable parenting, the modern disciplinary power regulates the movement of the docile body, "clears up confusion; it dissipates compact groupings of individuals wandering about the

country in unpredictable ways,” and increases the efficiency of the power in the system (Foucault 1977, p. 219). This subtle and calculated technique of subjection enables the disciplinary power to establish a meticulous chain of surveillance, exploiting the body’s ability to produce to maximum capacity. Multiplicities of each individual are broken down and reduced into inconsequential and manageable pieces of movement for the systematic control of bodies. A fine web of surveillance across disciplines and institutions allows the disciplinary power to distribute the bodies in the most effective manner according to the individual’s attributes and skills, and if need be to recodify the soul of the citizens so they become useful/compliant subjects in the system.

For example, in some cultures (e.g., some traditional Afghani, Chinese cultures) children do not have a fixed bedtime. Being fully integrated into adults’ lives, children stay up with adults to participate in family gatherings and late night feasts. While this is regarded as a normal part of life for these families in their home countries, in the milieu where “Western hetero-patriarchal culture” (Smith 1999) is at the center, the parents may be criticized for failing to ensure enough length of sleep for the child’s health and his/her quality participation in educational settings the next day. The clash between their own values/beliefs and the dominant truth is most likely to be resolved by parents giving in to what is believed to be *normal* in the context in which they operate. Education, health, and welfare institutions identify abnormal children and parents, and refer them to intervention programs such as IY in order to *correct* and *cure* them. Or they may cave in to the pressure of normalizing discourses and make a decision to conform to the norm so that they will no longer be categorized with deficit labels: incompetent and irresponsible parents who have neither sufficient parenting skills nor knowledge. In spite of the dissonance these parents experience concerning cultural beliefs and dominant discourses in parenting, the elusive power of discursive normalization pressurizes individuals to perform according to the norm, reproducing and reinscribing a particular form of childrearing as the truth (Foucault 1977).

Conclusion

The attributes of “Desirable/Positive” parents reflect what is valued within modern society – autonomy, efficiency, economic productivity, science-based and measurable knowledge, and self-betterment. Throughout the policy parenting is described as a form of performance to prove your capability in society; thus failing to meet this specific norm of parenting practice not only indicates one’s inadequacy as a parent, but also incompetency as a member of society.

Caution must be exercised for this construction of parent education as it could operate as an apparatus of the current system, regulating/dominating parents’ and children’s soul and body to conform to the norm of the modern colonizing and scientific regime of truth. Compared with the norm, families and children with different values and beliefs are most likely demonized and pathologized as dangerous/abnormal, being excluded further, and suffering pressure to conform. By identifying these dangers that derive from the current way of understanding parenting, policy makers, educators, and other stakeholders in early childhood education may be able to disrupt what is considered as the only truth in modern parenting, and open up more possibilities for future.

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Indigenous Philosophies and Education: The Case of Kaupapa Māori

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Introduction

This entry focuses on the relevance and potential benefits for Māori and indigenous education of engaging more strategically and critically with philosophy of education, understood as the examination of educational ideas and theoretical frameworks.

To consider kaupapa Māori as an indigenous philosophy of education offers advantages as well as challenges for Māori education. This entry describes links between philosophy of education and kaupapa Māori and extrapolates some key messages in terms of their relevance to indigenous education more generally, starting from an acceptance that everything in education is of political significance (May 2012; Smith 2012).

Kaupapa Māori at the Nexus of Indigenous Education

Kaupapa Māori is widely acclaimed as an example of best-practice indigenous education and a world leader in the indigenous academy (Smith 2012). The two terms “indigenous education” and “indigenous academy” may seem clear and transparent enough but in fact signal a power-knowledge nexus: a complex theoretical site where contested meanings in education collide.

This complexity that characterizes indigenous education has several aspects: First, what counts as “indigenous education” differs between one national or social context and another. Second, there is an inherent tension between local and global levels of indigenous identity since the focus on authenticity privileges the local level, but political and future-focused indigenous aspirations inevitably look toward the global level (Dei 2011).

Paradoxically, the very concept of “indigenous” in a sense homogenizes and thus, arguably, desecrates the local identities and place-based knowledges on which it rests. This paradox is resolved by recognizing that all definitions are limited (Dei 2011): an insight that expresses a weak form of relativism; one that modifies rather than replacing the realist frameworks of universalism.

Seen in this nuanced way, the meaning of “indigenous” as a self-ascribed label (as subjectivity rather than a statistical category) incorporates a political challenge to colonization and Eurocentric subjugation (Dei 2011). In the above statements, a specific identity label such as “Māori” can be substituted for the more general term “indigenous.” The concept of “indigenous” makes a useful translator term, a “place holder” for particular indigenous identity labels, to facilitate meaningful scholarly dialogue among indigenous educators from different places around the world.

The central role of local knowledge in understanding indigeneity ensures that “authenticity” is a key consideration in indigenous education; and the importance to indigenous identity both of symbolism and political collectives, rather than individuals as in dominant economic models, underscores the multilayered concept of “representation” (May 2012). Authenticity and representation are more important concepts in indigenous than in traditional Western accounts of education. But every important educational concept is also important in indigenous education. Logically, therefore, indigenous education cannot achieve its goals without including the entire terrain of education theory. Indigenous philosophy such as kaupapa Māori provides a useful lens through which to reintegrate educational theory into the discourses of indigenous education.

The modifier “indigenous” for nouns such as “education” or “academy” produces a slippage or ambivalence between meanings, which invokes conceptual binaries and raises more questions, including: to which aspects of education or the academy does the adjective “indigenous” refer? Key possible answers are: the identity of groups of people involved in education, in particular students and teachers, and the identities represented in and by the curriculum content, which includes many aspects such as language medium, central concepts and large messages, implicit theories of human life and relationships, lesson formats, classroom materials, assessment, and so on (Dei 2011).

The complexity inherent in indigenous education is both an advantage and a disadvantage. The indigenous nexus provides inherent or philosophical tension that, under favorable conditions, is productive and creative and allows for new, transformative possibilities (May 2012). Given the history and context of political struggle and socioeconomic disadvantage for indigenous peoples around the globe, however, this productive tension is notoriously difficult to maintain, which erodes the criticality of indigenous scholarship. In the case of Māori education, this tendency toward loss of criticality contributes toward the “domestication” of kaupapa Māori (Graham Hingangaroa Smith in Hoskins and Jones 2012, p. 10).

The section below sketches the state of kaupapa Māori research in education after three decades of development, while the third section delineates overlapping theoretical interests for indigenous education and other allied traditions of research. The conclusion draws together these discussions and makes a prediction about likely trends in kaupapa Māori research methodology and scholarship.

Current Practice: What Is Kaupapa Māori Research Like?

Kaupapa Māori theory and research methodology developed first in the academic discipline of education in the 1980s. The emergence of kaupapa Māori as a new form of scholarship capitalized on

the success of kaupapa Māori education before later expanding to include other social science domains such as health, legal studies, and many more. Kaupapa Māori research has been a powerful vehicle for representing previously silenced voices and perspectives of Māori individuals and collectives in education in contexts such as school communities. But there is an unhealthy tendency in education research to equate “data gathering” only with conducting interviews, and this trend is even more pronounced within kaupapa Māori education research (Smith 2011).

The need to establish and consolidate kaupapa Māori learning communities and the imperative to continue to engage with real-world political struggles are two substantive reasons why kaupapa Māori research has been understood mainly in empirical terms (Hoskins and Jones 2012). Indigenous research practices and preferences such as “kanohi ki te kanohi” (face to face) foster the maintenance of the overly simplistic view that kaupapa Māori educational research is essentially empirical in nature. One recent article goes so far as to describe kaupapa Māori as “action based” and an “approach [that] cannot exist without practice” (Mane 2009, p. 2). In short, kaupapa Māori theory has so far been mainly understood and utilized in educational research as a set of principles or guidelines for empirical methods of data collection, usually interviews.

Along with the dominant empirical notion of kaupapa Māori research has gone a corresponding **lack** of kaupapa Māori research of a theoretical or philosophical nature. For example, the above paper avoids labeling kaupapa Māori as a “theory” because “theorising is seen as a luxury not afforded to Māori” (Mane 2009, p. 2). Despite emerging first in education, therefore, kaupapa Māori theory remains under-utilized as a resource for rigorous analysis of ideas and concepts in Māori education, from critical, indigenous, kaupapa Māori perspectives. This means much work in Māori education, and by extension of indigenous education, is still to be done.

After three decades of successful development, kaupapa Māori research in educational theory and philosophy remains a fledgling approach, with great potential to expand beyond current

dominant conceptions, in order to develop further possibilities for Māori empowerment and emancipation (Hoskins and Jones 2012; Mahuika 2008). Despite the success of kaupapa Māori research methodology and its popularity as a basis for many conference papers and postgraduate research dissertations, there is little traditionally published scholarship (i.e., journal articles and books) on kaupapa Māori theory and research methodology. Other than the short reference list given below, small collections of published and unpublished writings on kaupapa Māori, including several literature reviews, are available through the websites www.kaupapamaori.com and www.rangahau.com.

Political Alliances and Intersecting Theoretical Concerns

As a key principle of kaupapa Māori, Māori exercise the right to assert cultural difference from the dominant Pākehā or mainstream culture in Aotearoa New Zealand (Smith 2012). At the same time, Māori practices in contemporary social contexts, including in education, are clearly adaptations of Māori traditions. Hence contemporary Māori forms including kaupapa Māori are, by definition, hybridized cultural forms (May 2012). Implicit in the recognition of Māori difference is a renewed acceptance of social binaries and cultural hybridity. The complex nature of the theoretical nexus of indigenous education intersects with other critical philosophical traditions, including feminism, postmodernism, poststructuralism, and postcolonialism, plus newer forms such as post-humanism, ecofeminism, and new materialism (Ahmed 2000). In each of these traditions, ethnic, gender, class, ability, or other social binaries are refracted through mutually reinforcing sets of social structures (legal system, media, education, health, police, etc.), which maintain and reproduce extensive networks of power relations within society, generation on generation.

Shared theoretical concerns for indigenous education, including kaupapa Māori educational research and other traditions, ultimately derive from the philosophical shift in the paradigm of

science, famously sparked by the book titled *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* by Thomas Kuhn. A revolution in epistemology has since unfolded, with consequential and ongoing effects across the entire academy, including the important question for Māori education of what counts as “social science” (Smith 2012).

The indigenous perspective in education, like other critical traditions, pays attention to the changing boundaries between disciplines of knowledge at local, national, and global levels, which, among other things, influence the ranges of methodologies considered acceptable in each field and subfield. Conservative forces line up with societal power bases, in Māori and indigenous contexts no less than in the mainstream, and therefore contribute to the unfortunate tendency to equate or reduce kaupapa Māori research to empirical (mainly interview) research, as discussed above.

A second related result of the twentieth-century revolution in epistemology was the collapse of the “objective researcher” position in social science. This collapse has given rise to, among other things, the “auto” turn in social science research methodologies. The auto turn in research has included various educational traditions of autoethnography and self-study. These are closely related to traditions of writing as methodology and furthermore linked to the recent blurring between social science and literature (King 2003). On the basis of these connections, narrative theory and data find a place in researching indigenous education.

In Aotearoa New Zealand, the Māori-Pākehā ethnic binary has been effectively exploited in local arts and literature, with the short story proving one of the most effective literary forms. Narrative research is able to capitalize on Māori and indigenous traditions of storytelling, with Jenny Lee’s “pūrākau” methodology being an example of kaupapa Māori educational research heading in this direction (Lee 2007). The importance of language and oral traditional texts and narratives in indigenous traditions also aligns with narrative research (King 2003). A narrative is a vehicle for portraying more complex sets of ideas than quantitative data or interviews, so is fitting for research in the complex contexts of indigenous education.

A narrative can include authentic indigenous and cultural texts by being presented in a bilingual format or entirely in an indigenous language. Narratives are thus able to adequately represent and express the nuanced details that comprise the experience of cultural difference, also referred to as “world view.” The world view concept emerged in the 1970s, again as a result of the epistemological revolution in concepts of science and knowledge discussed above. One of several short stories to explore the consequences of differing world views in Māori contexts is the story *Parade* by Patricia Grace, published in her 1986 collection, and *Waiariki and Other Stories*, which generated a small amount of social science scholarship.

Conclusion: The Future of Kaupapa Māori Educational Research

A key message promulgated in the work of two leading kaupapa Māori scholars, Linda Tuhiwai Smith (2011) and Graham Hingangaroa Smith (Hoskins and Jones 2012, pp. 10–20), is that kaupapa Māori is less a fixed “thing” and more a set of ideas that can be used as an indigenous toolkit for guiding practice, including scholarship, in a wide range of domains (Hoskins and Jones 2012; Smith 2011). Kaupapa Māori in this sense remains something to be created rather than a fixed body of knowledge to be taught and learned. Kaupapa Māori as theory and philosophy allows for creative possibility; that is, for its own change and development, in response to turbulent, unpredictable, and changing external and internal social conditions. Without such an open flexibility, there is no possibility that the dreams of the iwi (people), which largely rest on the potential of kaupapa Māori ideas, could ever be realized.

From this perspective, the future possibilities for kaupapa Māori research are literally open-ended and therefore unable to be determined in advance. But clearly there is a logical, if as yet largely unexplored, role for narrative and autoethnographic methodologies within kaupapa Māori educational research. Accordingly, to predict that significant growth will occur over the

coming years in the number and diversity of kaupapa Māori educational research publications employing these sorts of approaches is a relatively safe bet.

Cross-References

- Critical Education and Postcolonialism
- Critical Gender Studies as a Lens on Education and Schooling
- Cultural Studies
- Difference/Différance
- Feminism and Philosophy of Education
- Feminist Pedagogy
- Literacies and Identity
- Multiliteracies
- Narrative Assessment: A Sociocultural View
- Poststructuralism, Postcolonialism, and Education

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Indigenous Philosophy

- Dine (Navajo) Philosophy of Community as K'è

Indigenous Philosophy of Relationships

- Dine (Navajo) Philosophy of Community as K'è

Indigenous Thoughts in Education

- Islam and the Philosophy of Education: The Three Approaches

Individual and Community in Muslim Education

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Introduction

This entry surveys the writings about the relationship between individual and community in contemporary Muslim education thought. In particular, it will be concerned with the issue of personal autonomy as an educational aim. Following Douglas and Shaikh (2004), Muslim education is defined as *education for Muslims* which includes religious and secular subjects and *education in an Islamic spirit and tradition*. The primary focus will be Muslim faith schools, such as those in Britain. Underpinned by Islamic religious orientation, these schools seek to provide full time education including both the religious as well as secular (national) curriculum subjects.

The relationship between individual and community, autonomy and identity, is an extremely important matter for any collectivity, including those with a religious character. The survival of collectivity depends, at least in part, on the individuals adopting some element of shared identity and practice. At the same time, and particularly in dynamic environments, the community requires people who can show a degree of independence of mind and character to enable it find creative solutions to the challenges thrown by the environment. Individuality does not exist outside of a social milieu; social milieu remains dynamic because of individuality. Education, formal as well nonformal, is often seen as the primary means by which this balance can be struck. It will be seen below that as Muslim education operates increasingly in a global context, there is now a need to revisit the traditionally held ideas about the relationship between individual and community.

Muslim Education and the Issue of Personal Autonomy

There are more than 150 Muslim faith schools in the United Kingdom, thirteen of which are State-funded. The origins of these schools are rooted in parental and communal concerns about the preservation of tradition and safeguarding of Muslim children against what was perceived as the onslaught of a Western secular tide. This conservation goal has always been accompanied by another aim, that of socio-economic mobility through education or academic performance (Halstead 1995; Hewitt 1996; Panjwani 2012). These two aims are intertwined as they are reflected in the mission and objectives of most Muslim schools.

Notwithstanding the long tradition of faith schools in the UK, their desirability and role remains controversial (Ameen and Hassan 2013). This is particularly true of Muslim faith schools. One significant flashpoint in this ongoing debate is around personal autonomy and by implication the relationship between individual and community.

The liberal critique of Muslim schools, and faith schools generally, is that they violate the aim of nurturing personal autonomy among students by exposing them to religious instruction in powerful setting of schooling at an age when they are unable to assess religious views, thereby coercing them – through school policies and social pressure – into adopting school's religion (BHA 2001). In some cases, only Muslim schools are signaled out as incapable of promoting personal autonomy (Levinson 1999).

The proponents of Muslims schools also acknowledge that opposing views on autonomy are a main point of contest in arguments for and against Muslim schools in Britain (Tinker 2006; Meer 2007; Shah 2012). Though some defenders of Muslim schools dismiss liberal critique about autonomy as Islamophobia (Tinker 2006), a closer look at the writings of many Muslim educators shows that autonomy does not receive a prominent place in their work. As Rissanen (2014) notes, "Many Islamic educationalists criticize the individualism of liberal education precisely because of its emphasis on the freedom of individual choice: instead of autonomy, they value the consensus of the community and respecting tradition (p. 31). Submission to the will of God and to the cumulative tradition and its guardians are thus seen as the "soul" of education (Husain and Ashraf 1979, p. 36). This can be seen in the aims of many Muslim schools. For example, the Al-Aqsa Primary School in Leicester seeks:

- To develop the whole personality of pupils with Tauheed at the core and Islam as the main focus of their lives
- To help children acquire a moral attitude to life through conscientious awareness and the practice of divine guidance in all their affairs and transactions (Al-Aqsa n.d.)

In the writings of the critics as well as the defenders of Muslim faith schools there is a widespread acceptance that these schools are non-autonomy supporting and provide education which does not seek to create independent minded students. Rather, their focus is seen by many to be community and tradition centered.

However, this position creates a challenge for Muslim schools because their stated goals also seek an education that prepares students for living a modern life while retaining Islamic identity (Ameli et al. 2005). Given the demands of modern life it is difficult to see how this can be done with an education that does not seek to develop autonomy. In fact, in practice Muslim schools do promote autonomy and independence of thought without which their students would not perform as well as they do. Hence, the issue is theoretical; how to reconcile, if at all, the educational aim of autonomy with Muslim tradition.

Recent Developments: Towards “Overlapping Consensus”

This challenge is now being recognized in recent writings and some Muslim educators recognize that autonomy should be an educational goal in Muslim education (Ahmed 2012; Hussain 2007; Sahin 2013). However, those who take a positive stance on personal autonomy still find it difficult to show this aim can be drawn from Muslim tradition.

One way forward is the proposal to develop “overlapping consensus” between liberal and Muslim traditions (Panjwani 2009; March 2011). Developed by the political philosopher John Rawls, the concept of “overlapping consensus” is underpinned by the recognition of the permanency of the diversity of reasonable comprehensive religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines in modern democratic societies. The concept assumes that despite this diversity, people holding different highest ideals and worldviews are capable of developing agreement around aims such as peace, prosperity, and equal liberty. In the educational context, this would mean that major religious and secular traditions would be able to agree on key values such as autonomy not by an imposition by one tradition over another but by each tradition drawing the elements of consensus from its own historical and cultural roots. The concept takes all major religious and cultural traditions as plural and carriers of resources that can lead them to the acknowledgment of shared values as the

common ground for co-existence. The proponents of “overlapping consensus” between Muslim and liberal educational traditions believe that it is possible to find intellectual resources within Muslim tradition to create a theory of autonomy that has authentic depth in the tradition.

The first point to note in this regard is that religions are interpretive phenomenon. They are neither static nor homogenous. Through fresh interpretation of sacred texts, authorities, and historical movements, religions remain fluid: “Although stable over time, and not subject to sudden and unexplained changes, it tends to evolve slowly in light of what, from its point of view, it sees as good and sufficient reasons” (Rawls 1993, p. 59). Through interpretation, religious community both keeps its sense of rootedness in a tradition while gradually responding to the changing circumstances around itself. This means that new concepts can be developed by drawing upon the tradition, including theological, resources. Such new concepts can facilitate a community’s engagement with its contemporary issue without feeling alienated from its past. But, for this to happen traditions must carry seeds that can germinate through interpretive exercise. It is thus worthwhile to ask whether there are any potentialities in Muslim history for such germination to be possible with respect to personal autonomy.

At the outset it is important to note that developing “overlapping consensus” is not an exercise in anachronism of searching the concept of autonomy in premodern Muslim history. Autonomy is a modern concept; “philosophical reflection on autonomy is modern” (Frank 1992, p. 1). It is not found in premodern Muslim contexts. However, to say that autonomy is a modern concept is to give it a history, to make it contingent. If it originated in the modern West, it also means that it did not exist in the premodern West. If so, there must have been conditions, material as well as intellectual, which led to the recognition of personal autonomy as a value in the modern West. In recent years, the intellectual genealogy of the concept of autonomy has received significant scholarly attention (Schneewind 1998). These work show that there were *potentials* in the

premodern West that were actualized in the “invention of autonomy.” Kant’s *invention* of autonomy was based on these potentials. And, it was not the end of the story. The concept of autonomy has continued to acquire new formulations since Kant. In particular, in late twentieth century, in response to the communitarian and feminist critiques, there arose a move towards dialogical and relational models of autonomy which acknowledges that “individuals are much more deeply dependent on their social environment for the acquisition, maintenance, and exercise of their autonomy” than earlier conceptions have usually accepted (Christman and Anderson 2005, p. 13). The key point in this reconceptualization of autonomy is that socialization does not equal indoctrination. The person who grows up in a religious tradition and comes to discover his/her identity-defining commitment to that tradition may still be able to subject that commitment to critical reflection. It is now acknowledged that culture, socialization, and listening to expertise are an essential part of being autonomous. The claim, more accurately, is that an individual is then able to process the information and fashion their own path – and therefore become the author of their life, as noted by Will Kymlicka:

What is central to the liberal view is not that we can perceive a self prior to its ends, but that we understand our selves to be prior to our ends, in the sense that no end or goal is exempt from possible re-examination. . . . My self is, in this sense, perceived prior to its ends, i.e. I can always envisage my self without its present ends. But this does not require that I can ever perceive a self totally unencumbered by any ends. . . . (Kymlicka 1989, p. 52)

This recent developments in understanding autonomy already shows that the presumed gulf between liberal stress on individual and Muslim stress on community may not be as wide as it is usually assumed to be. Still, it is one thing to claim that autonomy is not necessarily inimical to valuing community and tradition, another to say that Muslim schools should have it as an educational aim. For this the ideal of autonomy needs to find some resonance in Muslim cultures. The question is: are there intellectual and cultural *potentials* in Muslim history that can help forge a

contemporary concept of autonomy that will have authentic depth in Muslim tradition?

One indicator of the existence of such cultural *potentialities* in Muslim contexts is shown in many current political and societal developments in Muslim contexts that imply acceptance of personal autonomy. For example, there is a growing practice of civil society in many Muslim contexts. The lawyers’ movement in Pakistan as well as the Arab Spring are good example of such civil society activism. While it is arguable that any Muslim majority country is genuinely democratic, by voting in large numbers whenever an opportunity has risen, people have indicated their preference for democratically elected governing systems. All these practices presume personal autonomy. Their presence can be seen to indicate that personal autonomy is not in conflict with, what Braudel (1994) calls, the “structural elements” of a civilization, in this case Muslim. Braudel has argued that a civilization refuses “to accept a cultural innovation that calls in question one of its own *structural elements*.” If, as many proponents of Muslim schools argue, personal autonomy is incompatible with Muslim cultures, how does one explain wide acceptance of the above noted practices in these cultures? Perhaps these reflect an intuitive appeal of individuality and autonomy, made possible by cultural *potentialities* already present in the structural element of Muslim cultures

A reading of Muslim history is possible that shows that individual moral responsibility, freedom to make ethical choices, engage in critical reflection on one’s intellectual and social options, and belief in reason’s capacity to discern moral qualities of acts – ingredients that can serve as the basis for personal autonomy – are part of Muslim historical experience. We will briefly focus on three elements: *individual moral responsibility*, *freewill-predestination debate*, and the *Intellectualist theory of ethics* (Panjwani 2009).

The history of Muslims begins with Prophet Muhammad preaching his message to individuals in Makkah. Arabian society in Prophet Muhammad’s time was collectivist. The tribe was the source of honor, safety, and identity. An individual was nothing outside the tribe not only

socially but often even physically because of the harsh ecological conditions (Tabari 2003). In this social context, Prophet Muhammad's act of preaching to individuals rather than tribes collectively presupposes (on his part) that those whom he was addressing have a capacity to think for and reconstitute themselves, to make a moral choice. He spoke to individuals, expecting that listening to his message they would be able to put some distance between themselves and their social and intellectual attachments and constitutions, assessing them against his message. It is proposed here that while the society in Prophet Muhammad's Makkah may not have had a concept of autonomy, the presence of the phenomenon (at least a form of intellectual autonomy) and its presupposition by Prophet Muhammad is hard to deny. Prophet Muhammad's act of preaching indicates his implicit acknowledgment of individual human being's capacity to think for him/herself in a highly tradition-directed society.

The second element is the theological debates about freedom in Muslim history. The Quran contains several verses that proclaim God's power over universe and human affairs; it also has many verses which make humans responsible for their actions and its consequences. Over time, some people began to note possible tension between these two types of verses. God's omnipotence cannot be denied but justice required that human beings must merit reward or punishment. This, in turn, required some way in which human acts must be owned by humans; that their acts become *their* acts. Freewill appeared to be an obvious candidate but was it possible in light of the necessity to accept divine omnipotence? From the eighth century there was a protracted debate about the possibility of human moral freedom in the wake of God's power. The constraints of space will not allow me to go into details. In short, starting from the early eighth century individuals such as Hasan al-Basri (d.728) came to be associated with the position of freewill. In time a powerful theological school called *Mutazillah* argued for human freewill. The Mu'tazila held that not only were human beings free to make moral choices but also that humans were capable, independent of revelation, to know what these choices

were. In other words, the agent, at least in some cases, was seen as capable of knowing the moral quality of acts independent of revelation. The distinctiveness of Mu'tazili theory was its claim that this moral quality of an action was known to an agent, the human beings, necessarily (*'ala d-darura*) or by intuition. In support, it appealed not only to the rational character of human beings but also pointed to the ethical knowledge of people, Brahmins of al-Hind (India), for example, who were believed to have not received any revelation. Mu'tazila thus adhered to ethical rationalism or intellectualist theory of ethics, a position whose dominance in early modern European intellectual life was seen by Schneewind (1998) and others as critical to the subsequent rise of autonomy in modern period. The Mu'tazili position on knowledge of ethics was opposed by the Ash'ari and other positions. The resulting debate was reminiscent of the discussion about the relationship between piety and deity in Plato's *Euthyphro*. There was a rationalist current which took ethics to be ontologically objective and opposed voluntarist position.

For our purpose, the Mu'tazila and Ash'ariyya positions and the freewill debate in Muslim history generally show that the question of human moral responsibility was extensively debated. The intuitions that individuals must somehow be responsible for their acts and that ethics stand objectively apart from the subjective desires of agent (or even the divine) remained strong enough that it could not be sidelined, even if it could not be successfully reconciled with belief in divine omnipotence.

Conclusion

The Muslim tradition, like all religious traditions, had historically emphasized community over individual. Yet, this history also carries a deep seated respect for individual moral responsibility and freewill. Both the necessities of everyday life and requirement of justice required this. Consequently, the resolution of the antithesis [freedom and determination] that came to dominate "recognized the inescapability of affirming freedom in

some sense or other” though it could also “not disavow the Koranic concept of God’s overwhelming domination and supremacy...” (Fakhry 1997, p. 19). Perhaps because of this recognition, modern Muslims in their practical lives have been able to adopt many institutions and practices that are underpinned by personal freedom. Examples ranging from democratic impulse to the adoption of child-centered education across the Muslim world indicate that, rhetoric of some proponents of Muslim education notwithstanding, in pragmatic terms personal freedom is highly valued.

The entry has showed that Muslim educators are engaged in developing new understandings of the relationship between individual and community which can lead to an “Overlapping Consensus” (Rawls 1993) between the liberal and Muslim tradition around the value of independent thinking and autonomy. This requires a reconsideration of both the liberal and Muslim tradition. Rethinking of the concept of personal autonomy in the liberal context, as noted above, has helped in recognizing that nurturing autonomy is not antithetical to initiating children into religious-cultural traditions. There are potentials in Muslim tradition that can be drawn upon to create educational theory that accepts autonomy as an educational idea. Perhaps, through such endeavors will emerge practices that increase “the volume of human autonomy, but not autonomy which, for the absence of solidarity, results in loneliness; and ...[increase] the intensity of human solidarity, but not solidarity which, for the absence of autonomy, results in oppression” (Bauman 1988, p. 231).

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Individuality

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Indoctrination

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Indoctrination and Science Education

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Introduction

Can students be trained to be excellent scientists purely, or failing that mainly, by means of indoctrination? And if not, what role, if any, should

indoctrination play in science education? These are the main questions discussed in this entry. They are epistemic and pragmatic, rather than moral, in character.

Two preliminary questions are crucial to answer effectively, however. First, to what does “indoctrination” refer in the present context? Second, to what extent is indoctrination possible to avoid? In the remainder of this section, these are tackled in turn.

“Indoctrination” might conjure up images of cults using tactics such as sleep deprivation in order to seduce the vulnerable, or of a Bond villain using a brainwashing machine to acquire henchmen. But such a narrow construal of the term is unsuitable in the present entry, which is more concerned with practices and approaches that are typically legally permissible, and are sometimes employed, in contemporary classrooms and lecture halls. So it is better to understand “indoctrination” to refer to teaching, and hence learning, via a highly authoritative, stereotypically transmission-oriented, process. Most notably, absent in such a process is any open critical engagement by the learner with the teacher, and critical engagement with the claims made by the teacher is discouraged, “off-limits,” in the educational context (although it might occur nevertheless, e.g., surreptitiously). No exploration or self-discovery on the learner’s part need be encouraged, or expected, either. (For more on different views of indoctrination, see Snook 1972a and 1972b.)

But can indoctrination, construed in the broad way described above, be avoided altogether? Surely the authority of the teacher on some factual claims, at least, must be sacrosanct? It would be a mistake to think of the matter in an “all or nothing” way. “To indoctrinate or not to indoctrinate?” is not (necessarily) the question. A better one is “When, and to what extent, should teachers indoctrinate?” or, more precisely, “To what extent, and when, should teachers explicitly rely on authority in advancing claims as true, and suppress objections?” As will be shown in the next section, it’s crucial to bear in mind the proper epistemic role of testimony, both inside and outside the classroom, in attempting to answer such questions.

Testimony

As Peter Lipton (1998, p. 1) notes, the importance of testimony can hardly be underestimated:

Mundane beliefs – such as that the earth is round or that you think with your brain – almost invariably depend on testimony, and even quite personal facts – such as your birthday or the identity of your biological parents – can only be known with the help of others. Science is no refuge from the ubiquity of testimony. At least most of the theories that a scientist accepts, she accepts because of what others say.

Indeed, even autodidacts rely heavily on testimonial products produced by others, such as books, articles, and websites. And to the extent that observation is theory-laden, the observation statements people make, and hence believe to be true, typically depend on testimony too. Even the author's belief that he sits at a desk as he writes is dependent on testimony, in so far as his concept of "desk" derives from instances of others showing him what counts as a desk.

Hence testimony cannot be avoided in the educational process, and teachers cannot avoid being testifiers. But even assuming that testifying on something is presenting oneself as an authority on the matter to *some* extent, many interesting authority-related questions about best teaching practice remain. For example, there is scope for a teacher to avoid testifying on some matters, while actively testifying on others. Consider, for example, secondary school students conducting a simple laboratory experiment in which it is hoped that they will see for themselves that Ohm's law – $V=IR$ – (approximately) holds. A teacher might decide to avoid testifying about the law, at least in the first instance, although she might actively testify about how to set up and conduct the experiment, and intervene to help any students having difficulties doing so. Moreover, she might avoid directly testifying about the approximate truth of the law even *after* the students complete the experiment. She might instead offer testimony *about* the testimony of others, namely the scientific community, concerning the law. (This may include explaining what scientists say about results that superficially appear to violate the

law, e.g., that the resistance of circuit components is temperature dependent.) Such meta-testimony – testimony about the testimony of others – might be used to indicate some deference, on the teacher's part, to the authority of the scientific community. She might explain to the class her belief in the reliability, or probable truth, of the community's findings concerning empirical laws.

But is such an approach right? Should one defer to the dominant scientific views of the time in which one finds oneself? And why? Granting that testimony must play *some* central role in science education doesn't answer these questions, which we'll tackle, with reference to the work of Thomas Kuhn and Karl Popper, in what follows. For more on testimony from a contemporary philosophical perspective, Gelfert (2014) is recommended.

Kuhn Versus Popper on Criticism and Dogmatism in Science Education

It's plausible that one's account of good science education will depend to some extent on one's view on what constitutes good science. The reason is simple. Good science education should produce good scientists, or at least have a high probability of producing good scientists (relative to other possible ways of educating scientists). That is, assuming that the students involved have the capacity, or potential, to become good scientists. So let's look at what two of the most influential philosophers of science in the twentieth century – Thomas Kuhn and Karl Popper – said about scientific method, and resultantly science education.

Thomas Kuhn took science education – especially in his own time, in the USA – to centrally involve encouraging dogmatic commitment to the status quo:

[S]cientific education is... conducted through textbooks... [T]he student... is seldom either asked to attempt trial research projects or exposed to the immediate products of research done by others – to, that is, the professional communications that scientists write for their peers. Collections of "source readings" play a negligible role in *scientific* education. Nor is the science student encouraged to

read the historical classics of his field. . . [S]cientific education remains a relatively dogmatic initiation into a pre-established problem-solving tradition that the student is neither invited nor equipped to evaluate. (Kuhn 1963, pp. 350–351)

It may be of some surprise to modern readers that Kuhn took this approach to be good, rather than bad, for science:

Scientific education inculcates. . . a deep commitment to a particular way of viewing the world and of practicing science. . . By defining for the individual scientist both the problems available for pursuit and the nature of acceptable solutions to them, the commitment is actually constitutive of research. . . In addition, commitment has a second and largely incompatible research role. Its very strength and unanimity with which the professional group subscribes to it provides the individual scientist with an immensely sensitive detector of the trouble spots from which significant innovations . . . and almost inevitably educed. (Kuhn 1963, p. 349.)

Later, Kuhn (1970a, p. 5) even went so far as to declare: “It is precisely the abandonment of critical discourse that marks the transition to a science.” The penultimate quotation gives some indication of why Kuhn thought of this, but in order to understand his perspective more clearly, it is useful to grasp his view of how science typically does and, indeed should, proceed. (Kuhn derived methodological norms from historical descriptions. His stance on science education was similar: he sought to find an explanation of the status quo, as he saw it, in terms of its utility.)

To put it simply – for more detail and further references, see Rowbottom (2011) and note especially that the discussion here makes reference only to theories, although paradigms involve considerably more – Kuhn thought that science involves two key phases, namely normal science and extraordinary science. He thought that normal science is the most distinctive part of science and that dogmatism about the theories of the day is crucial, for scientists, in that phase. Why? Because strong commitment to theories encourages scientists to work hard to see what can be achieved with them, over an extended period, and also encourages them to assume that any failures they encounter should not be blamed on the theories. So dogmatism makes science resistant to theory change and also, for related reasons, likely

to expose the limits of existing theories. This is why Kuhn compares normal science to puzzle solving. Puzzles are defined by rules. If a crossword puzzle requires a six letter word, for example, one cannot use a seven letter word instead. To do so would be to fail to engage with the puzzle.

Extraordinary science, on the other hand, is reserved for those periods where repeated failures to solve puzzles come to be blamed on theories. Kuhn is vague about when exactly this should happen. He also admits that it couldn’t happen if every scientist were completely dogmatic. He mentions, for example, that changes in a field are often fomented by relative newcomers and that older scientists may be perfectly reasonable to resist such changes come what may.

So that’s Kuhn’s view. Good science involves long periods of normal science, punctuated by occasional and relatively short periods of extraordinary science. And the periods of normal science are enabled by dogmatism. Thus suppressing and discouraging criticism of standard existing theories is an important part of science education. (For more on the educational aspect, see Matthews 2004.)

Criticisms of Kuhn’s view of science have been many and varied. For example, some have denied that the pattern he sees in the history of science exists in general (even if they concede that it was present in some areas and episodes that Kuhn studied). But more interesting for present purposes is whether such a pattern is genuinely required for, or is even sufficient for, good science. And to probe this, one need not deny that normal science – or something approximating it – is a real phenomenon. Popper, for instance, admitted the existence of normal science but took a dim view of it:

‘Normal’ science, in Kuhn’s sense, exists. It is the activity of the non-revolutionary, or more precisely, not-too-critical professional: of the science student who accepts the ruling dogma of the day; who does not wish to challenge it; and who accepts a new revolutionary theory only if almost everybody else is ready to accept it—if it becomes fashionable by a kind of bandwagon effect. . . In my view the ‘normal’ scientist, as Kuhn describes him, is a person one ought to be sorry for . . . He has been taught in a dogmatic spirit: he is a victim of

indoctrination. He has learned a technique which can be applied without asking for the reason why ... (Popper 1970, p. 52)

Popper's view was that scientists should typically be open to renouncing their theories and should spend much of their time attacking – and trying to refute – said theories. On a related note, he thought that good scientific theories were typically improbable, due to their simplicity and scope. In short, for Popper (1970, p. 55), there should be no “domination of a ruling dogma over considerable periods. . . [because] the method of science is, normally, that of bold conjectures and criticism.”

We cannot hope to resolve the dispute between Kuhn and Popper here. However, it is worth noting that both assume that almost all scientists should be dogmatic, or all scientists should be critical, at any given point in time. (For Popper, almost all should be critical at any point; theories should be cut slack only in relatively early stages of development. For Kuhn, almost all should be dogmatic in normal science, and almost all should be critical and try to proliferate alternative theories in extraordinary science.) Neither seriously considers the possibility that good science can involve a balance of dogmatic and critical practitioners, or a balance of scientists performing critical (or offensive) and dogmatic (or defensive) functions – that is, among other functions. This possibility is articulated and defended in Rowbottom (2011). The basic idea is that proper division of labor between individuals with different dispositions can benefit the scientific community. For example, the presence of someone who dogmatically defends his favorite theory come what may does not prevent scientists as a whole rejecting said theory. And his activities may benefit science in the event that he discovers something new using his theory, even if that is improbable. His presence might help the community to hedge its bets, so to speak.

On this picture, good science education partly involves exploring how a prospective scientist might best contribute to the enterprise of science as a whole. Again, the central idea is relatively

simple. Different scientists do radically different things. And just as some experimentalists would make relatively poor theoreticians, and vice versa, so some theoreticians excel in creative activities, e.g., generating interesting new theories and models, whereas others excel in destructive ones, e.g., finding the flaws in the theories and models of others. And so on.

Even if this is correct, however, it may not be possible to split students into different groups and give them different treatment “ahead of time,” so some difficult choices seem forced. Consider, for instance, the proper role of the history of science in science education. (See Brush 1974; Siegel 1979; Matthews 2015, Ch. 4.) For Kuhn, it's a good thing when “Partly by selection and partly by distortion, the scientists of earlier ages are implicitly represented as having worked upon the same set of fixed problems and in accordance with the same set of fixed canons that the most recent revolution in scientific theory and method has made seem scientific” (Kuhn 1970b, p. 138). And anyone who has studied science, and subsequently the history of science, will know that this happens to a considerable extent in science education. Even at university level, for example, the famous gold foil experiment conducted by Geiger and Marsden, under the direction of Rutherford, is typically presented as having showed that all the positive charge in (gold) atoms is concentrated in a central nucleus. The reality is quite different, in many respects. For one thing, Rutherford considered the possibility that positively charged alpha particles could be “slingshot” by areas of concentrated negative charge and preferred the view that the nucleus was negatively charged at one point. In short, the heavy metal foil experiments weren't nearly so decisive as they are almost always presented as having been. For the details, and supporting quotations, see Rowbottom (*In Progress*, Ch. 4).

Popper's view, by contrast, is compatible with – and highly suggestive of – the idea that studying past scientific controversies would be useful, and proper, for fostering a critical spirit and sharpening critical ability.

Clearly one cannot take both routes. But there are middle roads worth considering. For example, one might typically use heavily simplified history, and admit this explicitly, and occasionally use more detailed historical case studies to allow students to consider how, and why, one theory won out over another. (Scientists are not typically historians and philosophers of science, and this may be a good thing.) One might decide to “distort” somewhat by downplaying the social factors that were responsible for theory change, but perhaps shouldn’t have been.

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Indoctrination and the Un-growth of Morality

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Synonyms

Critical thinking; Gadamer; Habermas; Indoctrination

Introduction

The concept of indoctrination means unethical influencing in a teaching or learning situation imposed by teacher, teaching content, or educational institution (see Snook 1972; Hare 1964; Cuypers and Haji 2006; Kilpatrick 1972; Puolimatka 2001). When successful indoctrination causes infiltrating (drilling, inculcating, etc.) concepts, attitudes, beliefs, and theories into an individual’s mind by passing his or her free and critical deliberation (Huttunen 2003). When on a general level we define indoctrination in this pejorative way, it is easy to reject indoctrination. Its rejection means that we condemn the indoctrinative as teaching morally wrong and demand that teachers, parents, textbooks, or educational institutions should not endorse it. One major reason for indoctrination being reprehensible is that indoctrination prevents moral growth or it represents moral un-growth. According to Richard Mervyn Hare, the aim of indoctrination is to keep children perpetually children, aka keep them in the state of moral immaturity. “Indoctrination only begins when we are trying to stop the growth in... capacity to think for themselves about moral questions” (Hare 1964, 64). Indoctrinative teaching prevents those learning processes that facilitate critical thinking and moral maturity. If the context is adult education, the aim of indoctrination is to turn morally mature person into morally immature person.

Indoctrinative education thus contributes a kind of moral unlearning or un-growth of morality.

One can claim that indoctrination tends to cause un-independent thinking and moral immaturity. In his famous text *An Answer to the Question – What Is Enlightenment*, Kant (2015a) defines immaturity as follows: “Immaturity is the inability to use one’s own understanding without the guidance of another. This immaturity is self-incurred if its cause is not lack of understanding.” In the case of indoctrination, this immaturity is not self-incurred, but it is production of indoctrinative teaching, indoctrinative teaching contents, or indoctrinative teaching institutions.

Indoctrination in Habermasian Sense

Jürgen Habermas (1991, 169) criticizes Hans-Georg Gadamer’s view on education being indoctrinative, although Habermas does not explicitly use the term indoctrination but instead Habermas speaks of *legitimieren mit Autorität* (legitimation with authority): “Gadamer has in mind the type of educational process through which what is handed down is translated into individual learning activities and appropriated as tradition. Here the person of the educator legitimates prejudgments that are inculcated (*legitimieren mit Autorität*) into learner with authority – and this means, however we want to look at it, under the potential threat of sanctions and with a view to gratifications. Identification with the role model creates the authority through which an internalization of norms, and thus sedimentation of prejudgments, is possible. The prejudgments in turn are the preconditions of possible knowledge. This knowledge is raised to the status of reflection when it makes transparent the normative framework within it moves... Made transparent, the prejudgment structure can no longer function as prejudgment. But that is precisely what Gadamer seems to imply. For authority to converge with knowledge would mean that tradition, working behind the back of educator, so to speak, legitimates the prejudgments inculcated into the person growing up; these prejudgments could then be confirmed

only in the reflection of that person. As the person, having become mature, confirmed the structure of prejudgments, he would transfer, in reflected form, the once involuntary acknowledgment of the personal authority of the guardian to the objective authority of a context of tradition. Yet it would remain authority, for reflection would be able to move only within the limits of the facticity of what was handed down. The act of recognition, mediated by reflection, would not have altered the fact that tradition as such remained the only basis for the validity of prejudgments.” In this supposedly Gadamerian model of education – for the sake of clearness I rely on Habermas interpretation – the formation of Kantian autonomous moral subjectivity is impossible. In this model the individual is unable to critically reflect on internalized norms and prejudgments until he or she has learned to follow them blindly.

If Habermas accusation is correct, Gadamer’s view on education is vulnerable to indoctrination accusation. For Gadamer only when the person has become mature, then he or she can critically reflect prejudgments he or she has received from the tradition. This reminds Jack Mezirow’s (1991) concept of critical adult education. Mezirow thinks that school education is always indoctrinative and only adult education could be emancipator and non-indoctrinative. Habermas’s counterclaim is that once individual has internalized norms and prejudgments of tradition, his or her mature reflection would be able to move only within the limits of the facticity of what was handed down by tradition. In the Gadamerian model, the individual is unable to critically reflect on internalized norms and prejudgments until he or she has learned to follow them blindly. Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics which demands us to be open to the authority of tradition makes rejection of indoctrination impossible because pupils and students have to first adopt the tradition before they can critically reflect the content of tradition (for Gadamer-Habermas debate, see Hoy 1978; Holub 1991; Misgeld 1991; Jay 1982; Vattimo 1989; Ricoeur 1990; Giddens 1977; McCarthy 1978).

It is a very difficult task to reconstruct a model of education which provides a faculty of critical

reflection that makes possible for the learner to transcend the context of tradition and be a Kantian autonomous moral thinker. How can an individual and more precisely a child transcend the context of tradition? Without this ability to transcend tradition, a person is not an autonomous moral thinker and his or her competence for moral reflection remains in undeveloped phase.

Stefaan E. Cuypers and Ishtiaque Haji (2006) have very interesting proposal for this dilemma. They name this dilemma with phrase “indoctrination objection” which “calls into question whether education, aimed at cultivating autonomous critical thinkers, is possible” (Cuypers and Haji 2006, 273–274). Cuypers and Haji propose that before autonomous critical thinking, there is non-autonomous “proto critical thinking” which lacks the autonomy but forms foundation for later autonomous critical thinking (Cuypers and Haji 2006). Habermasian model of emancipator learning also presupposes some kind of capacity for critical thinking before mature critical thinking. We might call this as preliminary communicative and moral competence. Before proper Kantian moral maturity, there must be some sort of moral maturity which makes moral development and moral growth possible.

The Kantian idea moral maturity is itself a content of tradition. The problem is that a child must learn essential content of tradition and at the same time she or he must learn to critically reflect this content. Any other form of learning is indoctrinative and represents “a moral unlearning” or un-growth of morality. Gadamer’s hermeneutics implies that learning is always indoctrinative. For Gadamer, *Bildung* (education) is socialization into tradition and its values. Gadamer thinks that we must first understand the tradition and open up to the tradition before we can evaluate and renew it. Habermas wants us to have a critical and reflective attitude to begin with and demands us to trust our own power of judgment. In the Habermasian model of critical learning, the enlightened Cartesian and Kantian autonomic subject postpones prejudices and authority until she has decided which part of the tradition is worth saving. In some sense Gadamer himself acknowledges that his philosophical hermeneutics does not show the

possibility for critique of tradition or breaking free from tradition and thus it is one-sided (Gadamer 1998, xxxvii):

This raises a final question, which concerns less the method than the contents of the hermeneutic universalism I have outlined. Does not the universality of understanding involve a one-sidedness in its contents, since it lacks a critical principle in relation to tradition and, as it were, espouses a universal optimism? However much it is the nature of tradition to exist only through being appropriated, it still is part of the nature of man to be able to break with tradition, to criticize and dissolve it, and is not what takes place in remaking the real into an instrument of human purpose something far more basic in our relationship to being? To this extent, does not the ontological universality of understanding result in a certain one-sidedness? Understanding certainly does not mean merely appropriating customary opinions or acknowledging what tradition has sanctified. Heidegger, who first described the concept of understanding as the universal determinateness of *Dasein* [“human being,” RH], means by this the very projectiveness of understanding – i.e., the futurity of *Dasein*. I shall not deny, however, that – among all the elements of understanding – I have emphasized the assimilation of what is past and of tradition. Like many of my critics, Heidegger too would probably feel a lack of ultimate radicality in the conclusions I draw.

On the other hand, Gadamer has a point when he is claiming that there is no escape from tradition. Everything that we have learned about moral behavior, we have learned from tradition. The problem here is this: Where does this Kantian autonomic subject come from if not from the process of education itself? How can a student or a pupil exercise her Kantian autonomy toward tradition in the process of education, if Kantian moral autonomy is an outcome of education? This situation is called the pedagogical paradox (see Kant 2015b; Løvlie 2007), or it is one aspect of this paradox. Both Gadamer and Emil Durkheim try to avoid the pedagogical paradox by identifying education with socialization. For Gadamer education is the process through which an individual adopts the content of a tradition and becomes a mature member of a community. An individual must first grow into a tradition before she can evaluate the content of the tradition. Durkheim’s view is more or less the same, though he lays more emphasis on the socially

functionalistic role of educational institutions. Durkheim defines education in the following way (Durkheim 1956, 71):

Education is the influence exercised by adult generations on those that are not yet ready for social life. Its object is to arouse and to develop in the child a certain number of physical, intellectual and moral states which are demanded of him by both the political society as a whole and the special milieu for which he is specifically destined.

According to Paul Fauconnet's interpretation of Durkheim, "autonomy is the attitude of a Will that accepts rules because the Will recognizes their rational ground. First a child receives rules from society. The child is not able to evaluate which rules are valid and which need to be either rejected or renewed. Only autonomic attitude is capable of this evaluation, and autonomy grows gradually in the process of education" (Fauconnet in Durkheim 1956, 45). Habermas, on the other hand, claims that evaluation of rules and norms, which happens afterward, is bound to tradition. Habermas claims that if the only basis for validity of norms is tradition (like legal positivism states), then no one possesses true autonomy. Nevertheless, the Habermasian model of education cannot escape the pedagogical paradox. Where does autonomy come from if young pupils are not communicatively competent to critically evaluate the content of tradition? If critical learning requires critical evaluation and reflection of the tradition, a communicatively incompetent learner is unable to learn critically which in turn prevents the moral growth or causes moral un-growth. Through what kind of learning process is a critical and communicatively competent subject formed? Asking this question is the same as asking how *Bildung* is possible, because *Bildung* means formation of a Kantian morally mature (*Mündigkeit*) subjectivity.

For this purpose, I have constructed a model of communicative teaching which tries to preserve the idea of critical learning while recognizing the authority of the teacher and tradition. This model is based on Habermas's theory of communicative action (1984) and discourse ethics (Habermas 1990, 1992). Communicative teaching is close to the ideals of collaborative learning, peer

interaction, and non-teacher-directed communication (see Littleton 2000; Light and Littleton 1999). Empirical studies by Karen Littleton and others show that pupils in schools have better capacities for independent and critical thinking that is generally believed even among the professionals of education. Cuypers's and Haji's (2006) notion of proto critical thinking is well in accordance with this line of thinking. My model of communicative teaching does not totally solve the problem of pedagogical paradox, but it shows the principles that contribute to the formation of conditions for peer learning, the practical intersubjectivity in teaching (see Biesta 1994), and for situation where a teacher and her pupils can cooperatively participate in the formation of meanings and new meaning perspectives.

Communicative Teaching as Facilitator of Critical Thinking and Moral Growth

As I said before, Habermas has not directly dealt with the theory of indoctrination, but there are two versions of Habermasian criteria for indoctrination: Robert Young (1989) Habermasian theory of indoctrination and my own (Huttunen 2003, 2009). Robert Young was first to apply Habermas to the theory of indoctrination, but Young's concept of indoctrination has its own inherent problems. Young's theory concentrates solely on the speech acts of the teacher, which should not be the point in the theory of indoctrination. This is why I presented a revised version of the Habermasian concept of indoctrination. I have to say that my critique toward Young concerns only a small portion of his larger critical theory of education. With the exception of this concept of indoctrination, I am very much in agreement with Young's critical theory of education.

I understand communicative teaching to include value orientations in which the teacher commits herself or himself to "universal" presuppositions of argumentation and acts in accordance with these maxims as to the best of her or his ability (Mollenhauer 1972, 42). Pedagogical communication is a kind of simulated communicative action (see Masschelein 1991, 145), and it is more

simulated in early stage of education. When a teacher teaches 7-year-old pupils, the words “to the best of her or his ability” have different practical consequence than in the case of a teacher teaching 20-year-old students. The value orientation is the same, but the practice or application of presuppositions of argumentation is different. When we understand communicative teaching in this way, as an exceptional form of communicative action, the concept of communicative teaching is looser than the concept of communicative action itself. I think that communicative teaching as an exceptional application of communicative action still remains within the realm of communicative action, although teachers sometimes use language in strategic ways. I could imagine that the amount of strategic use of language is higher in elementary school than in institutes of higher education, but the value orientation of teaching is still the same in both cases. Because teaching situation is asymmetric situation, teaching cannot fully satisfy rigorous requirements of communicative action. At best teaching could be simulated communicative action where pupils can practice their preliminary communicative competence (Masschelein 1991, 145).

In dealing with the dilemma of indoctrination, we should refrain from focusing specific attention on the singular speech acts of a teacher. When the aim of education is to produce mature and communicatively competent people and the content of teaching provides materials for independent and critical thinking, then the teacher may use methods that, when taken out of context, may resemble strategic action and the perlocutive use of language.

In this respect, I have set two parallel criteria for indoctrinative teaching: (1) the communicative method and intention criterion and (2) the empowering content and consequence criterion (Huttunen 2003, 2009).

1. The most important element in the non-indoctrinative teaching is the respect for other persons. Habermas defines the communicative action as a kind of linguistic interaction in which one's fellow man is considered as a genuine person and in which aims and ends

of action are decided in an environment free and equal discussion. Opposing to this communicative action, there is the strategic action in which one treats others as a natural object, solely as a means to an end. I define the strategic teaching as the kind of teaching in which the teacher treats her students solely as objects, as objects of series of didactical maneuvers. This strategic teaching is a form of indoctrination (strategic teaching is not same as indoctrination), when a teacher tries to transfer teaching content to the students' minds, treating them merely as passive objects, not as active co-subjects of the learning process. Then the teaching is in no sense the simulation of the communicative action but the pure strategic action.

I define the communicative teaching as contradictory to the strategic teaching. The aim is a communicatively competent person who does not need to rely on the teacher or any other authority for that matter. In the communicative teaching, students are not treated as passive objects but as active learners. In the communicative teaching, a teacher and her students cooperatively participate in the formation of meanings and new perspectives. In the communicative teaching, the teacher does not impose her ideas on the students but rather they make a joint effort to find a meaningful insight regarding the issues at hand. What I refer to as the communicative teaching very closely corresponds with Biesta's “the practical intersubjectivity in teaching.” Biesta does not understand education “as a one way process in which culture is transferred from one (already accultured) organism to another (not yet accultured), but as a co-constructive process, a process in which both participating organisms play active role and in which meaning is not transferred but produced” (Biesta 1994, 312). Unlike Biesta, I do not consider teaching (no matter how good a teacher is) as a symmetrical communicative action.

The communicative teaching is nearest to the ideal of communicative action that it can get in a real teaching situation. The communicative teaching is a simulation of

communicative action, a simulation of a free and equal discourse. It is also a simulation of democracy and democratic mode of action. This means that there could be no communicative teaching in the school, if there exists no kind of practice of a school democracy. Nevertheless, pedagogical action essentially remains as an asymmetrical relationship, because the teacher and her students do not share a common level of communicative competence. Only after a person has completed her education (*Bildung*) is she prepared to engage in the proper communicative action.

However, even my revised version of the method and intention criterion does not recognize the unintentionally or structurally caused indoctrination. In some teaching situations, no matter what a teacher's intentions and methods were, the outcome was still an uneducated morally immature indoctrinated person. Thus, it is clear that we need aspects of the content and the consequence of teaching.

2. The starting point in the empowerment content criterion is the constructivist view of knowledge. Nowadays, teaching cannot be based on the notion that there exists a group of objective facts, which are deposited into students' minds like money is deposited in a bank. According to the constructivist view, knowledge is constructed through social processes. Knowledge does not imitate outer reality but rather the system of knowledge is a construction of the reality. When the constructivist nature of knowledge is recognized, higher demands with regard to the teaching content are directed. The teaching content should provide students with opportunities to construct their own creative and multidimensional view of reality. The teaching content should also promote students to engage critical self-reflection. Thus, if we want the teaching content to be non-indoctrinative, the teaching content should contribute to students' reflectivity toward those meaning perspectives that they have already adopted, as well as toward those that are taught (see Mezirow 1991). The teaching content should not provide any easy answers but rather should improve students'

own power of judgment and capacity for mature deliberation. I consider content that limits students' meaning perspectives and minimizes as opposed to increases students' own power of judgment as indoctrinative. In the case of indoctrination, the teaching content tends to keep students at an immature stage. The non-indoctrinative teaching content gives students both the freedom and faculty to determine their own differentiated identity, world-view, and conduct of life.

The consequence criterion of empowerment is related to the theories of modern identity and reflective modernity (Beck et al. 1994). The idea of this criterion is to promote such kind of education that contributes to the formation of reflective and relatively open identities. In modern societies, identities are open to a certain extent. I would call this as modern person or modern personality to contrast traditional personality. In every society, some part of identity is solid as a result of primary socialization, but, in modern societies, the individual tends to remain somewhat "incomplete." The modern person is conscious of her capacity to change her own identity, and she possesses the perspective of many possible identities. This relatively open form of identity produces the pluralization of life worlds and meaning perspectives. People tend to grow up differently in modern societies. This corresponds with the situation that Emile Durkheim called organic solidarity (Durkheim 1984). In the stage of organic solidarity, society needs autonomous, independent, critical, and professional individual personalities. My claim is that if educational institutions tend to systematically produce closed identities (traditional personalities), we can presume that these institutions impose some form of indoctrination. In modern or postmodern society, educational institutions should encourage a reflective attitude toward one's own identity. Without this kind of reflectivity, moral growth is difficult or even impossible. Modern educational institutions should contribute to the formation of a modern personality which corresponds Kantian notion of enlightened morally mature person.

Conclusion

Indoctrinative teaching, indoctrinative teaching contents, and indoctrinative educational institutions tend to produce uncritical and morally immature person which is opposite to the Kantian enlightened morally mature person. Indoctrination does not facilitate moral learning and it tends to produce moral unlearning or un-growth. In modern times we appreciate moral maturity and enlightenment; that is why we disapprove indoctrination. We want education contribute to the formation of morally autonomous mature person, but this is easier said than done. We encounter the pedagogical paradox. How can we teach anything, e.g., independent moral thinking, without unintentionally indoctrinating individual to some moral system or tradition of moral behavior? This issue touches the essence of the so-called Gadamer-Habermas debate. I admit that Gadamer has a point when he is defending the authority of (moral) tradition, but nevertheless (supposedly) Gadamerian model of education does not facilitate the Kantian notion of enlightened morally mature person. Habermas' critique of Gadamer hermeneutics is effective, but Habermas's theory lacks the proper educational theory which could show how pedagogical paradox can be avoided or at least mitigated. That is why I have reconstructed a Habermasian model of communicative teaching which aims at overcoming indoctrination and moral un-growth.

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Inequality

► Education and Political Theory: Prospects and Points of View

Informal Assessment

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Assessment is practiced everyday in all social interactions. It is the way we naturally, even automatically, assess each other as we socialize in a variety of situations everyday: “Whenever we take the time to look and notice, we find naturally occurring, unremarkable, and unremarked assessment activities that nevertheless are fundamental in making human collaboration possible. . . [.] . . in-a-glance, on-the-fly mutual assessments underlie all of human sociality, and in fact, the sociality of all social species” (Jordan and Putz 2004, p. 348). This on-the-fly assessment has come to be known as *interactive* (Bell and Cowie 2001) or *informal assessment* (Shavelson et al. 2003) in education, or *inherent assessment* in non-education organizations (Jordan and Putz 2004).

These terms have been used as differentiators from those at the other end of the continuum, i.e., more *planned* or *formal* assessment as applied in education (Bell and Cowie 2001; Shavelson et al. 2003; Wiliam and Black 1996) and *documentary* assessment as applied in organizations (Jordan and Putz 2004).

At any point of the continuum between informal and formal, the assessment process is a cycle of *gathering*, *interpreting*, and *acting* upon the information collected, all *guided with a particular goal* in mind. This goal could be to know if our interlocutor understands what we are saying or to know if students are achieving the intended learning goals.

Any assessment process can be characterized by the following dimensions: (a) the *agents* involved (i.e., the assessed and the assessor); (b) the *role that each agent plays* in a larger social context in relation to other individuals (e.g., supervisor/supervisee; expert/novice; teacher/student/peer); (c) the *purpose of the assessment* or how the information will be used (e.g., to check understanding in a conversation, to improve the assessed performance, to judge and assign a number to the assessed performance); (d) the *type of evidence collected* (i.e., incidental or purposeful; informal or formal); and (e) the *strategies* used to communicate the results of the assessment (e.g., body language, tone of speech, gestures, actions, oral feedback, graphic representations, a score).

The informal-to-formal continuum includes intermediate points. The extremes of the continuum and their intermediate points vary according to the characteristics of each of these dimensions. Informal assessment at one end of the continuum may be completely implicit, as, for example, when a listener in a conversation “looks perplexed and confused” and his interlocutor rephrases what was just said without any justification (Jordan and Putz 2004). In this situation, the listener relied on the speaker's facial gestures to interpret what was being said and what was not fully understood, then rephrased to clarify the intended message. As we move to the other end of the continuum what was implicit gradually becomes explicit, and the assessment message is shared with the assessed (an individual, a pair, or a group). This

explicitness is made evident across all the dimensions.

Informal assessment can be practiced minute-by-minute because everything can be used as a source of information to guide our next move. For example, we can use the interlocutor's gestures and body language, the questions she may ask you or others, the conversation she may be having with another person, or how she responds to the questions posed by you or others (orally or written).

An important element in informal assessment is to maintain an *interpretative* (Davis 1997) state of mind, which allows us to gather the desired information and to know what to do next. Only by maintaining this state of mind is it possible *to notice* – that is, to attend, interpret, and decide what to do next (Jacobs et al. 2010).

A good way to exemplify informal formative assessment and its impact is to focus on a context. Then, the rest of this entry focuses on thinking about informal formative assessment in the context of teaching and learning in classrooms. There are at least two reasons for doing so. First, classroom interaction is a core part of teaching (Alexander 2008) and, as such, offers the ideal setting for analyzing informal formative assessments at a more molecular level. Second, informal formative assessment in classrooms allows analyzing the process with the single goal of improving students' learning.

Informal Formative Assessment in the Classroom Context

Daily ongoing informal assessment in the classroom makes use of various informal strategies to gather information about students' learning. When this process is conducted for the primary purpose of advancing students' learning, this becomes *informal formative assessment* or *informal assessment for learning*.

A critical premise in informal formative assessment is that much of what teachers and students do in the classroom can be described, potentially, as an assessment that can provide evidence about where students are in their learning. Informal

formative assessment, then, involves taking advantage of the numerous opportunities within a class period to collect evidence about where students are relative to the learning goals, and then to use this information to help improve students' learning. That is, much of what occurs every day in the classroom offers potential assessment opportunities. Informal formative assessment has been named **on-the-fly assessment** because it takes advantage of the opportunities, planned (such as a carefully thought question to ask students) and unplanned (such a question asked by a student in the middle of a discussion) to collect evidence about students' level of understanding. For example, when a student asks a question indicating confusion about something, teachers can use this as an opportunity to better understand the students' thinking – that is, they interpret. The important characteristic of this interpretation is to find out *what* the student knows, understands and can do, and not only *if* the student knows, understands, and can do something. The latter one involves a yes/no response approach rather than searching for what exactly students' know and in which way this knowledge can contribute to help reach higher levels of understanding. Only with this type of interpretation, teachers can then decide which action to take that can facilitate, support, and advance the student's learning (e.g., provide feedback, make an instructional adjustment, or suggest additional practice).

Based on classroom observations (Ruiz-Primo et al. 2015), we know that informal formative assessment is not necessarily done consciously: something is noticed, and how to respond to what it is noticed is decided very quickly. Proficient teachers attend; they observe; they look at what students are doing, writing, or saying; and they ask questions that help them understand their students' thinking. All this in turn will inform the teacher's next steps and decisions. For these strategies to work, there is a critical requisite: the teacher needs to fully understand what to look for when attending to what students are thinking. That is, the learning goal should be very clear so it is obvious what to attend to and how to respond to what it is noticed. Informal formative assessment

then can be generally characterized by the conscious discovery of novel information about student understanding in any interaction at any given point in time; it is the constant searching for making sense of students' responses, actions, comments, and behaviors (Ruiz-Primo 2011).

Different from formal formative assessment, informal formative assessment is not necessarily associated with a particular assessment instrument, rather teachers use four sources of information readily accessible to them that offer opportunities to gather information: what students say, what they write, what they do, and what they make. Among all these sources, what students say during any instructional interactions is critical; "...talk is the most pervasive in its use and powerful in its possibilities...[it]...vitaly mediates what the child knows and understand and what he or she has to yet know and understand" (Alexander 2008, p. 118). Thus, one of the most important tasks for teachers is to create interaction opportunities that directly and appropriately engineer such mediation (Alexander 2008; Bellack et al. 1966; Edwards and Westgate 1994). This is true independently of whether the interactions are between the teacher and a student, or the teacher and many students, or among the students themselves.

Instructional dialogues can be viewed as *assessment conversations* (Duschl and Gitomer 1997) in which dialogues become a source of information for interpretation and deciding what to do with the information collected. Assessment conversations are dialogues usually embedded in any activity that occurs in the classroom. "The main purpose of assessment conversations is to make students' thinking explicit, or to voice their understanding so that teachers can recognize and act on it to promote learning. Assessment conversations make evident *what* and *how* students are thinking, enabling teachers to recognize their students' conceptions, mental models, strategies, language use, and/or communication skills. Teachers can then use this information accordingly to guide the next activities" (Ruiz-Primo 2011, p. 17).

Earlier it was mentioned that the formative assessment process is a cycle of *gathering*,

interpreting, and *acting* upon the information collected that is *guided with a particular goal* in mind. In what follows the critical characteristics of informal formative assessment are presented considering this cycle. The discussion starts with what should guide the other activities, clarifying the learning goal and expectations.

1. Clarify what students are expected to learn and how they can show that they are learning.

Assessment conversations can only take place when there is a clear goal that guides the interaction. The classroom instructional activities assigned can be both a learning experience as well as a window into students' thinking. When the most central things students need to learn are clear, the ways to gather information can be streamlined and efficient. The learning goals that guide informal formative assessment conversations tend to be discrete and immediate (e.g., what students need to get from a class discussion or from a task). Reminding students about the learning goals and targets during the interactions make them more purposeful (e.g., remind students the purpose of an activity or a conversation).

2. Gather Information: "*How can students' thinking be made explicit?*"

The key is to design questions and activities that can create windows into student's thinking. They should be designed to reveal *how* students arrived at an answer and their thinking behind the answer. Asking questions, observing, and listening become critical tools for informally gathering evidence about student learning:

Questioning. Questions are asked for a variety of reasons: to make sure students are on task ("Does everyone have their planners out?"), to see if students are paying attention ("Can everyone see this?"), to model our thought process ("Okay, what is the next thing we do when we are solving problems of this type?"), to see if students know or can do something ("What is the density of water?," or "How do we read volume with a graduated cylinder?"), to push students' thinking ("What do you think would happen if we continued this experiment for two more weeks?"),

and to understand students' thinking ("Can you tell me more about why you think that?," or "Show me step by step how you solved this problem?").

Whether conducted with a student, a group of students, or the whole class, questioning, when done purposefully, can reveal a great deal about students' thinking. The questions asked and the interpretation of the students' responses should be based on the learning goal(s). The most informative questions ask students to explain their answer, elaborate on their response, or provide information about why they think something. Asking multiple questions with increasing focus can help to hone in on the source of rationale behind students' thinking or source of confusion. Questions that begin with "why does...?"; "how would you...?"; "could you explain...?"; "why do you think...?"; "why is _____ an example of _____?"; "why is _____ and not _____?" can help to develop dialogical interactions. When we seek to learn something about students thinking, these types of questions become the most fruitful. "Good diagnosis relies on rich questions that elicit learners' higher-order thinking" (Stobart 2014, p. 118). Questions that are closed (with a yes/no answer or with specific correct answers in mind) can help to find *if* students know something, but they may not help to find *what* students know.

Observing and listening. Most teachers observe or listen to students while they are working. What is less common is to observe and listen to students with the purpose of **noticing** – that is, observing and listening with the purpose of learning about students' thinking. It has been observed that when teachers circulate around their classrooms they focus mainly on making sure students are on task (Ruiz-Primo et al. 2015). When teachers focus on knowing more about students' thinking, they use circulating around the room as an opportunity to observe students working and to listen to their conversations, which in turn helps them to learn more about individual student progress. Observing and listening are usually event-oriented activities;

therefore, the teacher should use her knowledge about the content, the potential students' misconceptions, and the nature of the task to make decisions about whether to intervene or not based on her interpretations of what is happening during the event. As teachers walk around, they can use the information gathered to adjust their instruction accordingly on the next instructional episode or they can decide to intervene with a student or a group as they do so. There is a fine line between becoming intrusive and becoming a learning facilitator when a student is working autonomously or a group of students is discussing a task. When to intervene will depend on the stage of the event (e.g., is it the beginning of the task, the middle, the end?), the nature of the intervention based on the teacher's interpretation of the situation (e.g., asking a question that can help a student to see another perspective or deciding that a deeper conversation is necessary), the time constraints (e.g., will the intervention require a conversation with the student that is longer than the time required to complete the task?), and the student's affective stage (e.g., is the student becoming frustrated because there is not advancement in the task while others are moving forward?).

3. **Interpret the collected information.** As mentioned above, on-the-fly formative assessment requires teachers to make quick decisions about how to help students, and teachers typically make these decisions based on quick interpretations of what they noticed. Most of the time, these interpretations are unobservable to another person. They are derived naturally based on what teachers know about the content being taught and how to teach it, students' conceptions, and potential issues the students may have with certain tasks. For example, when walking around the room and the teacher is observing and listening, she may intervene by asking a question to the students working in pairs based on the interpretation of her observations and the students' conversations. The teacher may have decided at a particular moment that a group of students were having a circular discussion and, therefore, they are

not advancing their reasoning about how to solve a problem. A question is asked as a way to assist students in their discussion; the question becomes a scaffold (e.g., Have you all considered the volume of the object?).

4. **Use the evidence of students' understanding to decide what to do next.** The purpose of gathering information on-the-fly about students' thinking is to use it. A critical characteristic of formative assessment, what defines it, is the use of the collected information to reduce the gap between where the student is and where she should be. If teachers do not decide what to do next using the relevant collected information, the gap is not altered. It follows then that there is no improvement of learning and no formative assessment.

Some strategies are more effective than others in helping students to move forward in their learning. For example, rather than just evaluating a student's response (i.e., stating that they are correct or incorrect), teachers can explain or elaborate for the students *why* something is correct or incorrect, *when* something (such as a procedure) can be used, and *how* to use it. Teachers can decide on-the-fly to reteach something or, if the source of the student's confusion is centered in a particular problem, they can guide them through the solution to a problem by modeling with or without the help of students. Sometimes all a student needs is for teachers to clarify or reexplain the task that they need to accomplish. At other times a student's response reflects clear and deep understanding of the content, in which case we might do something to further push their thinking.

There are two additional aspects related to the implementation of informal formative assessment:

Create ways for all students to have the same opportunities to participate in formative assessment. Asking a question and receiving an answer from one student or calling on

the students who most often provide correct answers makes it difficult to conclude that everybody in the class is thinking the same thing. However, it is natural to make assumptions about the whole class from only one or two students' responses. Thus, to make instructional decisions for the whole class (e.g., deciding to move on or assign additional work), it is important to ask a handful of students the same question, including those who are often too shy or tend not to volunteer to participate. When teachers pay attention only to those students who volunteer their participation, they can inappropriately decide to move on even though many students are not ready; therefore, the achievement gap within the classroom can widen. It is important to allow all students the opportunity to advance their learning.

Interact with students while they work independently. A good time to work with individual students is when students are working on something either by themselves, or in pairs or small groups. This could be the best opportunity to visit with identified students who can use individualized feedback and assistance. Research shows that the more proficient teachers tend to provide feedback to almost all their students during this independent work period (Ruiz-Primo et al. 2015).

Informal formative assessment can be conceptualized around the idea that everyday activities can be treated as potential sources of assessment information, from physical gestures during a conversation to body posture or words written or spoken. Such information is used by participants to guide their personal social interactions in a variety of nonschool settings. In the classroom context, informal formative assessment is critical to supporting continuing academic progress for every student. When students' thinking can be explicitly described, it can be thoughtfully examined, questioned, and shaped into an "active object of constructive learning" (Glaser 1995, cited in Duschl and Osborne 2002).

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Infrastructures

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Inquiry

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Inquiry Learning and Teaching in Science Education

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Synonyms

Education; Epistemology; Learning; Science

Introduction

Inquiry teaching is one approach for communicating the knowledge and practices of science to learners. While inquiry approaches to science education offer potential learning opportunities, they also pose constraints on what might be available to learn. Inquiry teaching and learning have a history in science education that warrants analysis from pedagogical and philosophical perspectives. Pedagogical arguments for inquiry approaches are grounded in social epistemology, which makes clear the need for building from extant disciplinary knowledge of a relevant social group in order to learn through inquiry. Establishing a social epistemology in educational settings provides opportunities for students to engage in ways of speaking, listening, and explaining that are part of constructing knowledge claims in science. This perspective on epistemology emphasizes the importance of dialectical processes in science learning. Thus, an inquiry-oriented pedagogy needs to attend to developing norms and practices in educational settings that provide opportunities to learn through and about inquiry. By considering the situated social group as the epistemic subject, inquiry teaching and learning can be viewed as creating opportunities for supporting the conceptual, epistemic, and social goals of science education.

Inquiry in Science Education

Inquiry in science entails conducting an investigation into the natural, social, or designed world

and applications of scientific knowledge to societal issues (Kelly 2014). In education, inquiry approaches are often designed around student-centered activities or investigations. Such investigations typically concern a domain for which at least some of the participating inquirers do not know the results prior to the investigation. Inquiry has been characterized as engaging learners in scientifically oriented questions, proposing hypotheses, formulating and evaluating evidence, arriving at agreed explanations, and communicating results (National Research Council 1996). As such, inquiry is derived from views of knowledge, is underwritten by interpretations of knowledge, and instantiates perspectives on knowledge. Thus, inquiry science poses epistemological questions, and with a focus on science education, these questions can be addressed from a philosophy of science point of view.

It is important to recognize the distinction between the aims of scientific research groups, whose task it is to produce new knowledge, and the aims of education, which include acculturating novices into ways of understanding the natural world. Scientific and educational institutions have different purposes, and failing to recognize the differences confounds aspects of inquiry regarding discovery and learning. Inquiry in scientific research may lead to new knowledge. Inquiry in education serves to instruct members how to engage in relevant, specific processes of investigation, use concepts in context, and develop means for understanding community practices. Under some circumstances, inquiry in educational settings generates new knowledge within the local community, thus showing some similarity with scientific communities.

Challenges for Teaching Science as Inquiry

There are a number of important challenges to teaching science as inquiry. First, students are typically unable to induce sophisticated scientific concepts from empirical phenomena, such as those available through inquiry. As some knowledge is required to learn, then inquiry approaches that situate the student at the center of investigation need to recognize that only with sufficient, relevant background knowledge can answerable

questions be posed by students. Thus, inquiry approaches to science learning need to consider the importance of learning from more knowledgeable members of a community and the necessity of transmission of knowledge and technique.

A second challenge for inquiry instruction is that learning science entails more than learning the final-form knowledge of scientific communities (Schwab 1960; Duschl 1990). While propositional knowledge (*knowing that*) is important, knowing how to engage in scientific practices and how to make epistemic judgments ought not be neglected. Therefore, science learning should include conceptual, epistemic, and social goals (Kelly 2008). While much of inquiry has focused on students' engagement in practical or laboratory activities, pedagogies focused on socioscientific issues and science in social contexts pose important opportunities to learn through investigations in unknown domains. Inquiry can arguably include evaluation of expertise, certainty, and reliability of scientific claims of others. Epistemic criteria must be brought to bear on evaluation of knowledge claims.

A third challenge to learning science as inquiry is the nature of the intended knowledge. Science topics and community practices may be more or less appropriate for an inquiry approach. Some knowledge and practices may be attainable through a student-centered approach, while others require the direction of more knowing others. Clearly, at least some scientific practices can be learned only through intensive effort, which may require extensive participation in a community of learners. Methods of assessment, either formative or summative, need to be carefully chosen to match the learning goals appropriate to the knowledge sought.

Fourth, learning the conceptual knowledge, epistemic criteria, and social practices over time in science domains may require coordination of scope vertically (across grades over time) and horizontally (across subject matter areas at a given grade) across the curriculum. While academics find ways to separate disciplines, and there may be interesting epistemological distinctions, students experience schooling as a whole. Science may not be separate from views and

knowledge of history, mathematics, reading, writing, and so forth. Thus, the challenge for teaching science as inquiry includes understanding how such approaches can be supported or undermined by other curricular decisions and pedagogies, both from within and from outside science programs.

Contributions from Philosophy of Science

The philosophy of science offers much potential to inform science teaching and curriculum development. The perspective from the philosophy of science offers at least four contributions to education: methods for posing questions about science, models for serious thinking about science, understandings about aspects of scientific inquiry, and a skeptical orientation regarding ways that science is characterized in curriculum materials and instruction.

Philosophy of science provides methods for posing questions about science, scientific activity, and values entailed in such inquiry (Machamer 1998). Philosophy of science steps back from the details of specific scientific investigations, debates, and controversies and seeks to examine the rational basis for theory choice. Over time, the characterization of theory change as depicted in philosophy of science has changed, and the debates continue. For example, certain early versions of logical empiricism sought to understand the logic of theory choice. This perspective attempted to view theories as predicting devices and focused on the cognitive content (often viewed as the empirical consequences) of particular theories.

Alternatives of various sorts to this depiction emerged after Kuhn's (1962/1996) influential view of theories as connected to overarching paradigms that influence the nature of observation. Recognizing the importance of theories, beyond their empirical consequences, led to a number of developments in empiricism and scientific realism, also to various social constructionist views of science. Across the perspectives, philosophy of science continues to investigate the inquiry processes of science.

Philosophy of science may identify educational perspectives on science that are not readily available through causal observation or even participation. Careful analysis of theory change,

induction, and explanation in the field of philosophy of science can lead to understandings about the nature of science. Furthermore, increasingly philosophy of science is being influenced by the empirical study of scientific practice. The disunity of science and the range of the many fields that can properly be called science require that understandings such as the nature of science, and disciplinary inquiry such as the philosophy of science, look at specific ways the actual work of science is accomplished. In each of these ways, philosophy of science informs inquiry approaches to teaching science.

Philosophy of science identifies both cognitive and ethical values undergirding scientific inquiry. Such values are relevant to inquiry in science education. For example, Longino's (2002) social epistemology articulates ways that productive discourse can be accomplished in scientific communities. Such discourse provides a normative account about the ways that differences in theory and orientation can be adjudicated through public discourse in a manner that invites publicly recognized standards, equality of intellectual authority, and fair criticism.

Philosophy of science can help educators promote a healthy skepticism regarding how science is characterized in curriculum materials and instruction. As philosophy of science is a discipline dedicated to the study of the history and structure of inquiry (Machamer 1998), it can provide insights in the ways that science is portrayed in educational settings. Such insights identify aspects of the ways that disciplinary knowledge is constructed, assessed, used, and communicated and can inform curricula.

Social Epistemology and Inquiry

Scholarship in philosophy of science, particularly those areas informed by the empirical study of scientific practice, has made the case for a shift of the epistemic subject from the individual learner to the relevant social group (Kuhn 1962/1996; Longino 2002). Such a shift provides the basis for a thoroughly social view of knowledge and practice in science and science education (Kelly 2008). There are clear curricular implications for a social epistemology. These include

creating practical experiences that take into account the extant knowledge of the students, designing investigations that acknowledge the interpretative flexibility of empirical evidence, and situating decisions about experimental results and socioscientific issues in dialogical processes.

The importance of the sociocultural basis of scientific progress is illustrated in three ways: the *sociohistorical contexts of scientific discovery*, the *acculturation of new members to a community*, and the *relevance of epistemic criteria and evaluation of knowledge claims*.

Advances in science emerge from *sociohistorical contexts* where relevant groups of inquirers draw from extant knowledge, design and execute ways of collecting evidence, and propose solutions and evaluate solutions to outstanding, communally recognized problems. The history of science shows examples of the cultural context and fundamental assumptions of the participants at the time need to be taken into consideration to make sense of the development of ideas through inquiry (Kelly 2014).

A second example of the epistemic shift relevant to inquiry for education is the manner that newcomers are acculturated into particular ways of seeing, communicating, and being. This realization about the substantive and important socialization into the ways of being in science counters forms of positivism that based scientific progress on logic and objective experimental facts. These ways of being are dependent on the social practices of a relevant community. Coming to know the scientific ways of seeing, communicating, and being entails active participation in the practices of a relevant community; it requires a form of apprenticeship. Learning to participate and become a member involves collective action. Understanding the ways that the language of a group operates, the nuances in meaning, and the path to modification in such meaning involves use of discourse in contexts. Furthermore, the completion of such an apprenticeship may be critical to being taken seriously by peers.

A third example of social processes involved in scientific progress concerns the epistemic criteria for the evaluation of knowledge claims. Rather than viewing reasoning in science as a logical process of hypothesis testing, contemporary

philosophy of science recognizes the dialectical processes of persuasion, debate, and critique. Indeed, scientific knowledge is social knowledge to the extent that knowledge claims are judged in relevant disciplinary communities.

Longino (2002) and Habermas (1990) each have proposed norms for productive conversations in communities that respect alternatives, but focus clearly on the strength of marshaling evidence. This leads to implications for inquiry centered on the social basis for decisions and the importance of using evidence in science. A dialectic approach to the construction of knowledge claims has plausible relevance to education. Nevertheless, such an approach needs to consider the local context and participants. Interesting questions about inquiry can be raised about students' developmental ages and abilities and variations regarding the science topic at hand.

Philosophy of Science and Learning

The relationship of philosophy of science and learning has been a central part of numerous developments in science education. One intersection occurred during a focus on constructivist learning in science education. Constructivism entered science education through a focus on students' ideas and understandings. These learning theories brought a welcomed focus on students' conceptions. Through careful attention to how students made sense of science phenomena, researchers were able to examine learning from the learners' point of view. This had a significant impact on science education and brought in philosophy of science. For example, the development of the alternative conceptions movement and conceptual change theory both used the work of Kuhn (1962/1996) and others to consider how students' constellation of conceptions served as framework for sense making. These foci led to pedagogy attending to students' sense making and provided opportunities for students to be actively involved in knowledge construction. These constructivist perspectives were criticized as focusing too heavily on the mind of the individual learner and thus were ill equipped to integrate discourse and consider the value of social practice.

A serious competitor to constructivist theories of learning emerged in the form of sociocultural

theory. This view of learning conceptualizes the problem of learning as one of participation and appropriation of knowledge and practices of some relevant group. Central to this view is the important role of discourse processes through which everyday events are constructed. By viewing learning as acculturation, the role of social processes and cultural practices are emphasized. From this point of view, as groups affiliate over time they form particular ways of speaking, acting, and being that are defined by the group membership and evolve as the group changes (Kelly 2008). Discourse practices established by the group become cultural tools for members to construct knowledge. These cultural tools, signs, and symbols mediate social interaction, which forms the basis for learning (Vygotsky 1978). This view of learning entails more than changes in the internalized cognitive structure of individual minds; in addition, participants learn to be members of a group with common knowledge, identity, and affiliation through shared cultural practices that constitute membership in a community.

Sociocultural psychology and philosophy of science share some important central tenets and premises about science, knowledge, and inquiry. Both represent a shift in the epistemic subject from the individual learner or scientist to the relevant epistemic *community*, the relevance of agency within the potential created by a social language, and the value of dialectical processes for proposing, evaluating, and testing knowledge claims. Perspectives from Vygotsky (1978) evince the importance of considering how interpsychological processes can be internalized by individual learners. Much like the social epistemology in the philosophy of science (Longino 2002), the individual has agency and plays a key role in the development of knowledge, but does so within the social languages of a relevant community. This suggests that instructional design for inquiry should consider how social practices are established and used to communicate ways of inquiring into the natural world. Such communication occurs across events leading to the development of knowledge, including the problem-posing phase of inquiry, the sense-making talk around investigations, deliberation around

meaning of results, and evaluation of the epistemic criteria for assessing proposed ideas, models, and theories.

Philosophical Considerations for Inquiry Teaching and Learning

Science education has considered inquiry as a goal for reform a number of times across decades (DeBoer 1991). Whether or not inquiry was in the foreground, we have seen proposed educational change in the form of goals, standards, and frameworks. Reform is a process that can include participants as part of a vibrant democracy where agency and identity are formed through active engagement in educational decision-making. Philosophy has a role in developing the minds of citizens.

Philosophy has the potential to inform educational practice and ways of thinking about reform in educational policy. First, philosophy offers ways of posing questions. Posing questions and examining implications represent a contribution of such philosophical considerations. Posing questions and examining in detail any proposed reform offers a contribution to the overall debate in educational reform. Second, philosophy can contribute through conceptual sorting. Through philosophical analysis of the conceptual content of educational texts (policy, curriculum, frameworks, standards) and of education events (research, teaching), philosophy can bring clarity or identify areas of ambiguity. Developing understandings about the nature of knowing, inquiry, and meaning are central to reform that progresses and advances thinking about education. While such meanings can be informed by empirical study, understanding the meaning of inquiry requires careful thought and analysis. Normative decisions about directions for science education cannot be answered by empirical study alone – a balance must be struck between careful, descriptive studies and philosophical considerations of meaning. Third, philosophy of science can inform our field by scrutinizing the nature of education research, including the important work of understanding ways to develop productive conversations across theoretical traditions. Science and education are human endeavors that require ideas to be generated and assessed through

dialectic processes. The field of educational research should consider ways to enhance discourse around educational practice.

To meet the conceptual, epistemic, and social goals of science education, educators require critical analysis and discussions about the nature of inquiry. This approach can be reflexive about inquiry into inquiry. Work in science studies and the philosophy of education may be helpful for understanding how inquiry can be conceptualized in science education. The field of science education can be informed by both descriptive, empirical studies of science and science education, as well as for the importance of the normative or moral arguments for reason, science, and education. Inquiry most broadly construed entails learning and self-actualization. The educational goal of inquiry should not only be to meet specific standards, concepts, or procedures but rather to develop the capacity for further learning. Through engagement in the sociocultural resources of other people and through interaction with the natural, designed, or social world, learners can develop an enhanced capacity to learn and develop new ideas. Education from inquiry should develop the ability to engage in more inquiry.

Cross-References

- [Cultural Studies in Science Education](#)
- [Educational Philosophy](#)
- [Nature of Science in the Science Curriculum](#)

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Instinct

- [Wittgenstein, Language, and Instinct](#)

Instruction

- [Nietzsche and Schooling](#)

Instructional Leadership

- [Leadership and Learning](#)

Instructional Systems

- [Leadership and Learning](#)

Instrumentalism

- [Neo-pragmatist Philosophy of Education](#)

Integrative Education

- [Social Emotional Learning and Latino Students](#)

Intellectual Virtues and Educational Practice

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“Virtue epistemology” is an approach to the philosophical study of knowledge that foregrounds “intellectual virtues” such as curiosity, open-mindedness, intellectual humility, and intellectual courage. Intellectual virtues so conceived are the character traits of a good thinker, learner, or inquirer.

Intellectual virtues are also related to but distinct from natural cognitive ability. A person can be extremely intellectually “gifted” while also being intellectually arrogant, careless, or lazy. Conversely, a person of mediocre natural intelligence can be highly curious, open, careful, and thorough in her thinking. Again, intellectual virtues are the strengths of *character* needed for the competent and successful pursuit of “epistemic goods” like knowledge and understanding (Baehr 2011: Chap. 2).

Intellectual Virtues as an Educational Aim

Intellectual virtue concepts are useful for fleshing out a plausible but elusive “third aim” of education. To be sure, a good education will equip students with a broad base of knowledge and a wide range of cognitive skills, from reading and writing to basic arithmetic. But it will also do more than this. As one often hears, education at its best also inspires a “love of learning” and shapes students into “lifelong learners” or “critical thinkers.” Such claims are of a piece and

intuitively appealing. They suggest an important educational aim that is at once epistemic and personal. However, the concepts they invoke tend to be vague or slippery. The language and concepts of intellectual virtue offer a richer, more concrete, and compelling way of capturing this aim (Baehr 2013, pp. 249–250).

To illustrate, consider the notion of “lifelong learning.” Plausibly, a “lifelong learner” is someone who pursues new topics and questions, makes time to feed her mind, thinks deeply and carefully about what she is learning, has a good sense of what she doesn’t know or understand, is open to new ways of thinking, and so on. This is another way of saying that she possesses intellectual virtues like inquisitiveness, open-mindedness, and *intellectual* tenacity, carefulness, thoroughness, and humility. Consider also the notion of “critical thinking.” Critical thinking is partly a matter of being *able* to reason well. However, a person can have this ability while lacking either an appropriate sense of when it should be used or the motivation to use it. Such persons fall short of being “critical thinkers” in the relevant, normatively robust sense. To be a critical thinker in this sense, a person must also, as Harvey Siegel has put it, possess a “critical spirit” marked by qualities such as “intellectual honesty, justice to evidence, sympathetic and impartial consideration of interests, objectivity, and impartiality” (1988, p. 39). These qualities also are plausibly understood as intellectual virtues. Because intellectual virtues have both a “judgment component” and a “motivational component,” they secure the kind of rational excellence lacked by the person who possesses the ability to reason well but is disposed to use this ability foolishly or not at all (Baehr [forthcoming](#)).

Virtue epistemologists have given extensive, psychologically rich, and philosophically sophisticated accounts of intellectual virtues like open-mindedness, curiosity, intellectual courage, intellectual humility, and intellectual perseverance (see, e.g., Riggs 2016; Whitcomb 2010; Baehr 2011, Chaps. 8 and 9; Whitcomb et al. 2015; Roberts and Wood 2007, Chaps. 8 and 9; and King 2014). Given the connection just noted between these virtues and the relevant personal-

cum-epistemic educational aim, virtue epistemology contains resources for better articulating and explaining what this aim amounts to. Moreover, the resulting characterization is personally compelling and attractive. Part of what it is to be a “good person” or to be good *qua* person is to possess qualities like inquisitiveness, open-mindedness, attentiveness, intellectual humility, and intellectual courage (Baehr 2011, Chap. 6). We desire these qualities in our colleagues, friends, and spouses. And we seek to impart them to our children and students. This is significant vis-à-vis education, for teachers and students alike are more apt to enthusiastically pursue goals like “critical thinking” or “lifelong learning” to the extent that they are construed in the kind of concrete and personally compelling terms afforded by a virtue epistemological framework (Baehr 2013, pp. 253–255).

Implications for Educational Practice

Given that growth in intellectual virtues is a worthy educational aim, it is important to consider the implications of this point for educational practice. What difference, if any, should it make to how practitioners approach their work with students? The remainder of this entry outlines several principles drawn from philosophy, psychology, and educational theory that together comprise an initial response to this question (for more on this topic, see Baehr 2016, especially Chaps. 10–14; Battaly 2006).

Engaging Agency

One overriding implication is that education should be conducted in ways that systematically engage the *agency* of students. It should not be geared toward the passive absorption of information or the rote memorization of facts and formulas. This is a consequence of what intellectual virtues are and how they are formed.

Intellectual virtues are dispositions of thought and (intellectual) action: they involve observing, wondering, listening, contemplating, judging, doubting, affirming, and much more. As such, an exercise of intellectual virtues engages the

rational and volitional capacities of their possessor in a deep and systematic way (Baehr 2011, Chap. 2). Further, as Aristotle noted long ago (e.g., in Book II of the *Nicomachean Ethics*), character virtues arise (in part) through the repeated *practice* of activities characteristic of the virtue or virtues in question. While Aristotle's point was about moral and civic virtues, it applies no less to intellectual virtues conceived of as character traits. A person develops open-mindedness, for instance, in part through repeatedly taking up and giving a fair hearing to perspectives very different from her own (Battaly 2006).

The upshot is that, where intellectual virtues are taken seriously as an educational aim, students must be actively engaged in the learning process. In particular, given that intellectual virtues are manifested in and “perfect” the activity of thinking, students must be given frequent and well-supported opportunities to thoughtfully and critically engage with the subject matter. (While this can be accomplished in a variety of ways, Ron Ritchhart's work on “thinking routines” [2011 2015, Chap. 6, and 2002, pp. 147–160] provides an excellent example of how teachers can incorporate opportunities to practice intellectual virtues across the curriculum.)

Self-Reflection

A student's progress in intellectual virtues can also be facilitated by her understanding of her own “habits of mind,” that is, her own intellectual character strengths and limitations. Such understanding can help the student identify which areas of her intellectual character might need improvement as well as some steps she might take to bring this improvement about. If conveyed to her teachers, this understanding might also help them to identify interventions with a similar aim and impact.

For these and related reasons, self-reflection is also an integral part of educating for intellectual virtues (Socokett 2012, Chap. 9). Such reflection can incorporate not only a student's first-person, introspective reports about her own intellectual character but also the third-person perspectives of other knowledgeable and trusted parties like

the student's teachers, parents, and friends. This kind of activity should, of course, be developmentally informed and appropriate. And it should be designed with sensitivity to the sorts of biases and other psychological factors known to limit the reliability of self-reflection. When opportunities for self-reflection are structured in this way, they can yield a “working model” of a student's intellectual character that can be utilized by the student and her teachers in the service of the student's intellectual character development.

Attention to Value and Significance

Educating for intellectual virtues also calls for giving serious consideration to the epistemic *motivation* of students. Part of the aim of doing so, as suggested above, is to help instill or inspire in students a desire for understanding and an enjoyment of the learning process, both of which are central to the possession of intellectual virtues. Shaping the epistemic motivation of students is, of course, a complex and challenging process. At a minimum, it requires that students regularly perceive the *value* or *significance* of what they are learning.

Many familiar modes of instruction neglect this principle. Students often are asked to master a subject or skill with little or no reflection on the importance or significance of doing so. In cases like this, it should be no surprise when students exhibit lackluster epistemic motivation (Newmann et al. 2001). Thus, where growth in intellectual virtues is the goal, taking pains to shore up the underlying value and meaning of the curriculum is critical.

This requires, first, that teachers themselves locate and attend to the value of what they are teaching; and, where no such value exists, that they do what they can to alter the curriculum. Importantly, “value” or “meaning” need not be understood in narrowly instrumental terms. Teachers needn't always have an answer to the exasperated student's question, “When I am ever going to use this in real life?” Rather, a great deal of knowledge and many intellectual skills are valuable in a richer, broader sense, for example, on account of helping students better understand their place in the universe, shedding light on how the world works, shaping students into more

informed and competent citizens, yielding insight into the deeper themes or concerns of the human experience, or otherwise contributing to a richer and more meaningful existence.

However, it is important not just that the curriculum have significant meaning or value but also that practitioners call *attention* to this value and give students opportunities to reflect on, explore, and even challenge it (Russell 1926, p. 154). They must be willing to entertain the question “Why are we learning this?” and be prepared with an answer that is thoughtful and reasonable. Again, if students fail to see (or feel) any value in what they are being asked to do or learn, their level of epistemic motivation is likely to remain low, and their intellectual character growth limited.

A Supportive Environment

A practitioner’s best efforts at fostering intellectual virtues in her students will be limited in their impact to the extent that these efforts are undertaken in a classroom environment or ethos that is out of alignment with the practitioner’s goal. For, as virtue theorists have long observed, virtues arise most readily in the context of supportive environments and communities that bolster other more direct efforts at bringing them about (MacIntyre 1981).

Many factors contribute to a classroom climate or ethos. These include the prevailing evaluative language, the core principles that are upheld and practiced, the allotment of time, classroom rituals and routines, and more. Hence, a further implication of treating intellectual virtues as an educational goal is that practitioners must do what they can to create classroom environments that are themselves supportive of intellectual character growth. In such environments, a rich epistemic vocabulary is employed, intellectual growth is regarded as possible, intellectual struggle is valued alongside accuracy and speed, deep understanding of the subject matter is a dominant aim, and there is a well-established expectation that students will actively and rigorously engage with the subject matter (Ritchhart 2002 and 2015). (These works by Ritchhart are an excellent source of concrete examples of how teachers can create classroom “cultures of thinking” that support their students’ growth in intellectual virtues.)

Classroom environments conducive to intellectual character growth also tend to be marked by two *moral* values, namely, respect and care. While epistemically oriented, intellectual character growth remains a profoundly *personal* process. It involves the shaping of students’ fundamental beliefs, attitudes, and feelings about thinking and learning (Baehr 2013, pp. 251–253). Both commonsense and empirical research suggest that such change and transformation does not occur in a relational vacuum, and certainly not in an environment that is relationally hostile. Rather, they require, at a minimum, that students feel safe and respected (Siegel 2012; Berkowitz and Bier 2005; Lickona 1992). Consequently, teachers interested in educating for intellectual virtues must operate with a high standard of respect, both in how they interact with their students and in how they expect their students to interact with each other. Ideally, however, students would not only feel respected by their teachers but also positively *cared* for. While this sets a high bar for teachers, there are ways of interacting with students that can foster a caring teacher-student connection that do not demand unreasonable amount of a teacher’s time or other resources (see, e.g., Porter 2016, pp. 235–237). In any case, it can be expected that a teacher’s other efforts at fostering intellectual virtues in her students will be considerably amplified to the extent that these efforts are undertaken within the context of a relationship that is at once respectful and caring.

Modeling

A final pedagogical implication of treating growth in intellectual virtues as an important educational aim is that the traits in question must be *modeled* for students. Students do not acquire intellectual virtues just by learning *about* them from their teachers. Rather, intellectual virtues, like other kinds of virtues, arise via a complex psychological and sociological process (Kristjánsson 2015). Several aspects of this process have already been touched upon. But a further aspect consists of exposure to compelling examples and “exemplars” of intellectual virtues. Such exposure has the potential to facilitate experiences of intellectual *admiration*, which can lead to the *emulation*

of intellectually virtuous agents, which in turn can facilitate positive growth in intellectual virtues (Zagzebski 2013).

This can be accomplished by sharing stories or other depictions of intellectually virtuous exemplars from history, literature, film, or contemporary life (Bohlin 2005). Perhaps more importantly, teachers can and should manifest intellectual virtues in their own intellectual activity, for example, by demonstrating wonder and passion for their subject matter (curiosity), being willing to admit when they don't know something (intellectual humility), giving a fair and open hearing to multiple perspectives (open-mindedness), searching for and conveying deep understanding (thoroughness), and so on. As this illustrates, it is important that teachers not "keep their thinking to themselves"—that they "think out loud," raising the curtain on what intellectual virtues look like in practice (Ritchhart 2002, pp. 210–217, and 2015, Chap. 5).

Conclusion

Intellectual virtues are an important educational aim on par with knowledge and intellectual skills. Several implications of this fact for educational practice have been identified. Two final observations are in order.

First, in many respects, the sorts of pedagogical principles identified here are ones that the best teachers already abide by and exemplify. This is as it should be, for it is widely thought that education at its best fosters qualities like curiosity, open-mindedness, intellectual humility, and intellectual courage.

Second, it is important to bear in mind that these principles should be understood and adhered to *as a whole*. If a teacher creates a caring and respectful classroom environment, say, but fails to model virtuous thinking or neglects to give her students frequent opportunities to practice the virtues of good thinking, then she is likely to have a minimal impact on the intellectual character of her students. Thus, the principles sketched here point in the direction of a comprehensive educational approach.

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Intensity

- [Deleuze, Ontology, and Mathematics](#)

Intention

- [Meaning and Teaching](#)

Interaction

- [Habermas and Philosophy of Education](#)

Interests

- [Children's Rights](#)

International Philosophy Olympiad

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Synonyms

[History of IPO; Philosophy in high school](#)

Introduction: Olympiad of Culture and Education

The International Philosophy Olympiad is an educational contest for high-school students.

It was inspired by the agonal element of the European cultural heritage – one of the main factors for the “cultural miracle” of Ancient Greece which Elada managed to achieve within a very short historic time frame. They compete not only with athletes but also playwrights, artists, and philosophers. In the twentieth century, the modern *Homo Ludens* expanded vastly the scope of competitions, and one of those, which has acquired large publicity and popularity, is the educational contest, part of the Olympiad.

School Olympiads

In the second half of the twentieth century, many educational contests emerged under the title of Olympiads. They were organized in different school subjects and usually target high-school students.

This is the chronological order of those Olympiads and where they were held:

- 1959 – *International Mathematical Olympiad* (Romania)
- 1967 – *International Physics Olympiad* (Poland)
- 1968 – *International Chemistry Olympiad* (the Czech Republic)
- 1989 – *International Olympiad in Informatics* (Bulgaria)
- 1990 – *International Biology Olympiad* (the Czech Republic)
- 1993 – *International Philosophy Olympiad* (Bulgaria)
- 1996 – *International Astronomy Olympiad* (Russia)
- 1996 – *International Geography Olympiad* (the Netherlands)
- 2003 – *International Linguistics Olympiad* (Bulgaria)

As is clearly seen from the list, the start of such Olympiads before the fall of the Berlin Wall was

done in the “former socialist countries.” The explanation may be found in two aspects: firstly, in Eastern Europe those contests were seen as part of the competition between the two political blocs and a way to prove the “superiority” of socialism in the area of education. And, secondly, the motive of cooperation in the area of education and culture may not be underestimated: it was aiming to aid the process of disarmament and peacekeeping in Europe and the world. Thus, many Olympiads were supported by UNESCO.

History of the International Philosophy Olympiad

The first International Philosophy Olympiad was held in 1993 in Bulgaria. This initiative was born at a seminar, part of the program of *Philosophy for Children*, organized in the summer of 1992 in Varna, Bulgaria.

At that time there were two national Olympiads taking place: one in Bulgaria and one in Poland. Both took place simultaneously but independently in 1989, several months before the fall of the Berlin Wall.

In Bulgaria the initiative for the International Philosophy Olympiad emerged in 1988 as a means which the philosophers at Sofia University “St. Kliment Ohridski” used to further the process of liberalization in Eastern Europe and start teaching classical philosophy in schools. The goal was to replace the Marxist-Leninist subjects taught and rather dominant in Bulgaria all throughout the era of socialism (1947–1990).

The first International Olympiad was held in 1993 in Smolyan, Bulgaria. Three international teams participated, representing Bulgaria, Romania, and Turkey. In the second edition of the Olympiad, in 1994 in Petrich, Bulgaria, the teams of Germany and Poland joined. At the third edition in 1995 in Stara Zagora, Bulgaria, the participants voted for every future edition of the Olympiad to be held in a different country, under the supervision and guidance of the International Committee.

This is the chronological order of the International Philosophy Olympiads: 1993 (Bulgaria),

1994 (Bulgaria), 1995 (Bulgaria), 1996 (Turkey), 1997 (Romania), 1998 (Poland), 1999 (Hungary), 2000 (Germany), 2001 (the USA), 2002 (Japan), 2003 (Argentina), 2004 (South Korea), 2005 (Poland), 2006 (Italy), 2007 (Turkey), 2008 (Romania), 2010 (Greece), 2011 (Austria), 2012 (Norway), 2013 (Denmark), 2014 (Lithuania), and 2015 (Estonia).

In the autumn of 2000 in Istanbul, Turkey, the regulations of the International Philosophy Olympiad were voted and have been used for organizing the Olympiad ever since.

Goals of the International Philosophy Olympiad

The regulations of the IPO define six main goals of the Olympiads:

1. *“To promote philosophical education at the Secondary-school level and increase the interest of high-school students in philosophy.”*

In many participating countries, the organization of the IPO has had positive impact on the place philosophy takes in the school curricula for secondary education, e.g., in Bulgaria after 1990 the substitution of Marxist subjects with classical philosophy was done by members of the team, organizing the National Philosophy Olympiad. In Argentina, a special institute was created to organize and manage the Philosophy Olympiad and facilitate the participation in the IPOs. In Bangladesh the experts who represent the country at the International Philosophy Olympiad helped include the subject of philosophy in the national school curriculum. In 2015 the number of students who took part in the National and International Philosophy Olympiads exceeded 10,000 people altogether.

2. *“To encourage the development of national, regional, and local contests in philosophy among pre-university students worldwide.”*

The prestige and the impact of the IPO have helped initiate new philosophy contests.

- (a) One of those is the *Baltic Sea Philosophy Event* which is organized by the Finnish

representative at UNESCO and is held every year at the end of November on the *Philosophy Day*, under the auspices of UNESCO.

- (b) Another contest is the *Philosophy Owl* which started in 2014. It requires that participants solve different philosophical and intellectual problems, as well as answer questions, based on good knowledge of the history of philosophy.

3. *“To contribute to the development of critical, inquisitive and creative thinking.”*

The criteria for evaluating the essays help achieve this goal: those who strictly use literature style or express subjective opinions or share standard common opinions are not highly evaluated.

4. *“To promote philosophical reflection on science, art, and social life.”*

Each annual Olympiad is based on a specific topic, agreed upon by the organizers. Their aim is to get the participants involved in a current philosophical debate which is held during the days of the Olympiad, and usually philosophers and intellectuals from the host country take part therein, as well as students from the local schools. This topic, however, is accompanying the Olympiad and does not affect the choice of topics for the contest.

5. *“To cultivate the capacity for ethical reflection on the problems of the modern world.”*

There are always ethical problems on the agenda for lectures and debates, held during the days of the Olympiad, and they are discussed by students of tens of countries from different continents and cultures. This helps clarify issues, reflect on them from different perspectives, and overcome prejudice or limitations, thus facilitating the process of forming a well-supported personal ethical stand by the participants therein.

6. *“By encouraging intellectual exchanges and securing opportunities for personal contacts between young people from different countries, to promote the culture of peace.”*

Each Philosophy Olympiad turns into a vivid international forum for young people, and many of the contacts they make during

the event are lasting. They continue to stay connected when they go to university and when they become professionals later on in life. The participants created a group in one of the social networks which functions as a means of exchange of information, opinions, views, as well as a tool for monitoring the personal and professional development and supporting professional cooperation.

National and International Levels of IPO

The Philosophy Olympiads have two levels: national and international.

National Committees. At a national level, the Olympiads are organized by the National Committees who are elected among the philosophy societies, members of FISP, or other similar organizations. The format of the National Olympiad is determined by the National Committee. In some countries the contest strictly complies with the procedures of the International Olympiad, while others use specific forms for the contest (debates, tests, etc.)

The National Committees determine the participating students and teachers, based on their own criteria. The most common procedure is as follows: the winners in the National Olympiad become eligible in the selection process for the International Olympiad. Thus, an extended team is formed of all the winners at national level. This team prepares for the International Olympiad, and at the end of the preparation, two people are elected to represent the country at the international event.

The team that each country sends to the IPO consists of four people: a team leader, a teacher, and two students. The most common practice is the team leader is a standing representative of the country, while the other member is usually the teacher of the student who won the first prize in the selection process.

Apart from those four people, it is possible for guests to attend the official opening and closing of the International Philosophy Olympiad, from the host country, as well as from other countries.

Administrative Bodies of IPO

International Jury

All teachers who take part in the national teams form the International Jury. The members of the jury take part in the evaluation of the written essays. The technical committee of the Olympiad caters for the whole process of evaluation. The regulations of the IPO do not allow representatives of a country to evaluate the works of students from the same country.

International Committee

The representatives of countries who have hosted the International Philosophy Olympiad form the International Committee. The sessions of the International Committee are managed by the chairperson of the National Organizing Committee of the host country. The International Committee is responsible for guaranteeing the stability and integrity of the Olympiad. The Committee discusses the future development of the Olympiad and decides on the countries where the next editions of the IPO are going to be held.

The Committee is entitled to initiate changes in the statute of the Olympiad.

Within the jurisdiction of the International Committee is the selection of two representatives at the Steering Board.

National Organizing Committee

The sessions of the International Committee are managed by the chairperson of the National Organizing Committee, formed by the representatives of the host country. This Committee functions from 1 June of the year, preceding the Olympiad, to 31 May of the year when the country hosts the International Philosophy Olympiad. The National Committee carries out the preparation and the conducting of the Olympiad. The Committee is responsible for covering the expenses of the two participants, the team leader, the members of the International Committee, and the Steering Board for their whole stay. After the Olympiad has finished, the National Organizing Committee sends a report to the International Committee, to the Steering Board of the International Philosophy Olympiad, and to other institutions and

organizations who are connected with the Olympiad in some way.

Steering Board

Another administrative body is the Steering Board. It is comprised of six members: a UNESCO representative, three FISP representatives, and two representatives of the International Committee. The Steering Board is chaired by the president of FISP or by another of its representatives. The successful development of the International Philosophy Olympiad is very much dependent on the cooperation between the International Committee and the Steering Board. The Steering Board is responsible for informing the members of FISP about the Olympiad, as well as for finding ways to fund the organization of the Olympiad. Whenever a dispute arises in the process of organizing the specific edition of the IPO, the Steering Board is entitled to make the final decision on the issue.

The Steering Board determines the prize seats and the prizes. The winners are awarded either medals, golden, silver, and bronze, or an honorable mention.

The secretariat of the International Committee of IPO is located in the Department of Philosophy at Sofia University, Bulgaria.

Participants on the IPO

Only students who are legitimate high-school students during the year of participation may take part in the Philosophy Olympiads.

Each country takes part with a team of two students, while the host country is entitled to a team of 10 students.

The following countries took part in the International Philosophy Olympiad for the period between 1993 and 2015.

Argentina, Armenia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Mexico, Montenegro, the Netherlands, Nigeria,

Norway, Paraguay, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Senegal, Serbia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, and the USA.

In the 2015 edition in Estonia, 42 countries took part.

Topics at IPO

The task of the contestants is to write an essay on one of the four topics they receive.

The representatives of each participating country have the right, and are encouraged to use that right, to send to the secretary general of FISP, no later than 1 March, their suggestions for topics to be included in the four topics at the contest. Among all these suggestions and those of the members of the Steering Board, the representatives of FISP at the Steering Board determine the four contest topics.

The topics may be quotes by philosophers or statements, formulated by the Committee.

The quotes may be no longer than five lines. There are no limitations on the circle of philosophers whose quotes may be selected. The criteria for evaluation are defined in such a manner that the contestants need not know the specific philosopher, school of thought, or paradigm. This is necessary to be guaranteed because the philosophy curricula in different countries vary a lot and thus no specific common area may be defined from where the topics may be selected.

The contestants are not required to present or discuss other ideas of the philosophers on whose quote they are elaborating. It is permissible that quotes by less known or completely unknown philosophers are used because the contestants are not required to discuss the overall ideas or views of the author. The successful essay may discuss the topic as completely isolated from the author or the context.

Examples of Quotes, Used for Topics

1993 (IPO in Bulgaria)

- “Home is far more a state of mind than landscape” (G. Bachelard).
- “Children are antiquities” (G. Bachelard).

- “Everything we see could be otherwise” (L. Wittgenstein).
- “Without ‘now’ there wouldn’t be time and without time there wouldn’t be ‘now’” (Aristotle).

2015 (IPO in Estonia)

- “The adversaries of philosophical literature argue, rightly, that the signification of a novel or a play, or of a poem for that matter, cannot be translated into abstract concepts. Otherwise, why construct a fictional apparatus around ideas that one could express more economically and clearly in more direct language? The novel is justified only if it is a mode of communication irreducible to any other. While the philosopher and the essayist give the reader an intellectual reconstruction of their experience, the novelist claims to reconstruct on an imaginary plane this experience itself as it appears prior to any elucidation.” – Simone de Beauvoir, *Philosophical Writings*, ed. Margaret Simons, p. 270.
- “Death and life, survival and perishing, success and failure, poverty and wealth, superiority and inferiority, disgrace and honor, hunger and thirst, cold and heat – these are the transformations of events, the proceedings of fate. . . . So there is no need to let them disrupt our harmony” – *Zhuangzi*, 5:15. In Brook Ziporyn, *Zhuangzi: the Essential Writings* (Hackett 2009).
- “Thoughts are neither things of the external world, nor representations. A third domain has to be recognized. What belongs to this domain has in common with representations the fact that it cannot be perceived by the senses, but with things the fact that it needs no supporting subject, on the consciousness of which it depends” – Gottlob Frege: “Der Gedanke. Eine logische Untersuchung,” in: *Beiträge zur Philosophie des deutschen Idealismus* 2 (1918/19), p. 69.

Examples of Topics

1997 (IPO in Poland)

- Is philosophy a science?

1999 (IPO in Hungary)

- Is knowledge power?

2015 (IPO in Estonia)

- Some philosophers and theologians since Plato have claimed that the human body is a kind of prison of the soul. Michel Foucault has recently suggested that “the soul is a prison of the body” (*Surveiller et punir*, p.34). Consider some of the conceptions and arguments that might support these opposing views.

When selecting a topic, no two topics of the same philosophical area may be selected. For example, only one topic from *Ethics* may be selected or only one from *Philosophy of Science*.

The topics are presented to the contestants in written form, translated into the four languages of the International Philosophy Olympiad. In translating the topic, editions of the text in the respective language are used, if available. If not available, the quotes are translated into the respective language by the members of the Steering Board.

Essay Writing

The contestants choose one of the four topics and they write an essay thereon in one of the four official languages: English, German, French, or Spanish. However, they are not allowed to write in the official language of the country they represent.

This rule was established in order to give the contestants equal opportunity and a fair start to all. Besides this main goal, the rule helps encourage and facilitate the communication between the participants from different countries, continents, and cultures.

The time limit for essay writing is 4 h.

Essay Evaluation

The essays are evaluated by an International Committee in three stages.

In order to guarantee equal rights to all, the names of the contestants are being coded. The

Technical Committee at the National Committee is responsible for guaranteeing anonymity in the evaluation process and prevent from any conflict of interest.

The essays are evaluated by using the following criteria:

- Relevance to the topic
- Philosophical understanding of the topic
- Persuasive power of argumentation
- Coherence
- Originality

The maximum score is 10 points and the increment is 0.5.

The evaluation scale is as follows:

- 7.5–10 points mean: I suggest this essay for the next stage.
- 5.5–7 points mean: I myself don't suggest this essay, but I will agree if somebody else selects this essay.
- 1–5 points mean: I suggest that this essay should not be accepted for the next stage.

The evaluation process goes through three stages. At the first and second stage, the members of the International Committee evaluate the essays, while at the third stage the members of the Steering Board perform the evaluation.

At the first stage each essay is evaluated by three experts. When the score differs by more than 3 points, the essay is evaluated by a fourth expert.

Only essays which have scored 7 or more points continue to the second stage. At this stage each essay is evaluated by two other experts.

The final score of each essay from the second stage is the average score of all the points, accumulated at the first two stages.

Based on this score, the jury decides which essays proceed to the third stage.

At the third stage the essays are evaluated by members of the Steering Board who make the final rank list and decide who qualifies for prizes and to what prize they are entitled.

A clear evidence of the scope of the IPO, its attractiveness, and its prestige is the fact that among the organizers and the evaluators, many

former contestants may be found, as well as winners of the National Philosophy Olympiads and the International Philosophy Olympiads.

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Internet Access

- [Learning Through Infrastructures: Cybercafes as Spaces for Digital Literacy](#)

Intersectionality

- [Critical Perspectives on Postfeminist Discourses](#)
- [Intersections of Gender and Ability/Disability in Education](#)

Intersections of Gender and Ability/Disability in Education

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Synonyms

[Dis/Ability and Education](#); [Embodiment and Education](#); [Feminism and Education](#); [Intersectionality](#); [Normalcy](#)

Introduction

The educational study of gender is incomplete without an analysis of the intersection of gender and ability. As this entry discusses, gendered schooling structures and practices, schooling expectations, student and teacher experiences, as well as theoretical analyses of gender in schooling are always at once shaped by discourses and material practices surrounding what it means to be able or disabled. This entry explores the entanglement of gender and ability/disability within educational theorizing and the material practices of schooling, drawing especially from the work of critical and feminist disability studies. Gender is always intricately tied to ability/disability and understanding the role and impact of these social identities or constructs, including within educational systems, necessarily involves understanding their relationship with one another.

This entry consists of three parts. First, it describes how gender and ability are entangled as constructs relevant to educational theory and practice. Second, it discusses how normalizing practices within schools that structure inequalities among students in relation to their gender identities must also be understood as informed by a paradigm of “compulsory able-bodiedness” (Robert 2013) (and able-mindedness) that simultaneously structures inequalities among students in relation to their ability status. Finally, it develops an understanding of how theorizing about and practitioner responses to gender differences in educational achievement and classroom behavior are informed by and interpreted through notions of ability and disability. The entry focuses on a specific schooling phenomenon: the gendered and racialized interpretation and framing of “problem” behaviors and intellectual competence through special education labeling and discourses. In exploring these examples of the intersections of gender and ability/disability in schools and educational discourses, the entry aims to highlight new and promising avenues for gender studies in educational philosophy and theory.

The Entanglement of Gender and Disability

A number of disability studies scholars, and in particular those who identify with the growing field of feminist disability studies, have worked to illustrate an important intersection between gender and disability (Hall 2011; Garland-Thomson 2005, 2006; Wendell 1996). Rosemarie Garland-Thomson, whose work on the intersections of gender, race, and disability has been widely influential in disability studies, describes what she calls the “disability system” as a complex web of cultural norms and expectations, modes of representation, and forms of political power that mark some bodies as normal and others as abnormal (Garland-Thomson, “Integrating Disability,” Garland-Thomson, “Feminist Disability Studies”). Says Garland-Thomson, “The disability system functions to preserve and validate such privileged designation as beautiful, healthful, normal, fit, competent, intelligent – all of which provide cultural capital to those who can claim such status, who can reside within these subject positions” (Garland-Thomson, “Integrating Disability,” 260). Thus, one can understand how the aesthetic policing of women’s bodies and behavior, perhaps especially by and through schooling and related institutions, is enacted through notions of ability and normalcy. Practices of bodily conformity, including surgical interventions, consumer products, and fitness regimes, then, are all upheld by a bodily ideal that is a function of what Robert McRuer has called “compulsory able-bodiedness” (2013); that is, they are upheld by the ability-disability system (McRuer, “Compulsory Able-Bodiedness”). For McRuer, compulsory able-bodiedness emerges as a gendered and sexualized imperative of social and political membership as it is comingled with heteronormativity or the social imperative of heterosexual sexuality and gender-binary normalcy. Being able-bodied is a state of healthfulness, normalcy, and virtue that is displayed through gender normative behavior (McRuer 2003).

Two examples, separated by close to a century, are especially apt in illustrating the entanglement of gender normativity, heteronormativity, and able-bodiedness. The first is highlighted in Douglas Baynton’s “Disability and the Justification of Inequality in American History” (Baynton 2013) in which he argues that historical rationalizations and arguments for perpetuating unequal social relations – between men and women, between whites and people of color – have drawn heavily on constructs of naturalized disability. Baynton describes how, in challenging Western suffragists’ arguments for democratic equality, anti-suffragists drew on arguments about women’s natural cognitive and physical inferiority and presented these in propaganda campaigns:

A popular theme in both British and American suffrage posters was to depict a thoughtful-looking woman, perhaps wearing the gown of a college graduate, surrounded by slope-browed, wild-eyed or “degenerate” men identified implicitly or explicitly as “idiots” and “lunatics.” The caption might read, “Women and her Political Peers.” (Baynton, “Disability and the Justification of Inequality,” 44)

In this example, the rhetorical work of arguing against women’s political equality operates through fears and anxieties provoked by disability. Not only does the comparison between women and so-called “idiots” and “lunatics” mark women as disabled – and in particular as intellectual incompetence – but it also perpetuates the idea that those labeled with cognitive or psychological impairments are democratic unequals. Moreover, the juxtaposition of a woman’s educational achievement against disablement suggests distrust in women’s educational pursuits (perhaps especially because educational attainment threatens the gendered social order).

A second example is drawn from C.J. Pascoe’s ethnography on gender and sexuality in high school, aptly entitled *Dude You’re A Fag* (Pascoe 2007). Pascoe describes a scene in which a group of teen boys are working outside on lawnmowers during shop class:

A group of boys grabbed rubber mallets and began pounding away at the tires and other parts of the

mowers instead of quietly dismantling them with screwdrivers the way they had been instructed to do the previous week. . . I laughed along with the boys, who had formed a circle around those who were ferociously beating a lawn mower. Colin, standing next to me in the circle, said, "We have a whole class of retards who hit like girls." (Pascoe, *Dude, You're a Fag*, 37)

In this second example, a put-down operates to position women and people with disabilities in the same group of undesirables. By manifesting physical weakness and mental weakness, respectively, women and so-called "retards" (a highly pre-judicial word very much still in circulation) are positioned as social others, all the while upholding the physically and mentally strong (read able-bodied and heterosexual) male as the social center. Doing the work of theorizing gender within these examples requires understanding the entanglement of ability/disability and gender.

"Compulsory Able-Bodiedness"

In her *Reclaiming a Conversation: The Ideal of the Educated Woman* (1985), educational philosopher Jane Roland Martin writes, "Philosophers do not construct theories of education in a vacuum. Viewing education as preparation for carrying on societal roles, they tie their proposals to some vision of the good society" (Jane Roland 2000). Martin's purpose is to show how educational philosophy and theory have been dominated by a presumption of masculinity, the male mind, and the male student and have neglected the lived experiences and cultural contributions of women. When women's experiences and social roles are marginal in this way, the picture of education that is produced tends to naturalize those ways of knowing, learning, and doing that are articulated and experienced by men.

Many feminist theorists and philosophers have decried the emphasis on the male subject in theorizing societal institutions. This has been perhaps especially clear in the feminist (and post-structuralist) critique of the humanist subject, characterized by reason and rationality, autonomy, and independence (Mohanty 2014; Erevelles 2002; Foucault 1965). According to the feminist

critique of the concept of reason, reason and rationality – objectivity, judgment, philosophical logic – have been seen as the purview of men, while emotion – the affective, the subjective, the everyday – has been conceived of as the purview of women. This has left women as the philosophical and academic Other to men, not only because it denigrates the affective expressions attributed to women but also because it couples femininity with compromised intellect. To bend a phrase from the example quoted in the introduction, women's "educational peers" are cognitive incompetents. Nowhere is this coupling more evident than in attributions of "craziness" that are lodged against women and girls who fail to conform to or tolerate social expectations. Pathologization of women's minds thus occurs through the attribution of mental illness and "the construct of mental disability is deployed as a gendered tool of oppression and social control that positions the labelled subject as incompetence, incredible, and in need of management" (Taylor 2015).

Nevertheless, while the feminist critique of the concept of reason has been the subject of considerable debate within philosophy, (For discussion, see Nagl-Docekal 1999) only a few have acknowledged that what is at stake in these discussions is not only the demotion of the feminine subject but equally the demotion of the cognitively "impaired," dependent subject (Carlson 2001; Kittay 2005). Eva Kittay, for example, discusses how philosophy has long regarded an individual's place in the moral community – their status as a person – as dependent on the possession of particular psychological capacities, especially rationality and autonomy (See Kittay, "At the Margins of Personhood," 100). For those who are unable – or regarded as unable – to possess such capacities, their personhood and status as a social subject are precarious. Thus, the privileging of traditional conceptions of rationality and autonomy leaves both women *and* people with disabilities on the margins social institutions, including education.

The entanglement goes further still. Not only does the emphasis on psychological capacities privilege the historically constructed male subject,

it also privileges the educational emphasis on the mind at the expense and neglect of the body. Yet bodies populate classrooms and, in many ways, frustrate the processes of schooling. Bodies get sick, they can be hurt, they must fit into schooling spaces, and they are, quite simply, uncooperative with the frequently rigid norms of behavior, teaching practice, and educational structure that characterize schools. In her institutional ethnographic study of women with chronic illnesses enrolled in postsecondary educational institutions, for example, Karen Elizabeth Jung (2011) describes how her participants were forced to reveal and expose their bodies – both literally and through physicians notes, and so on – in order to receive accommodations (Karen Elizabeth 2011). While Jung’s participants were positioned so as to reveal themselves and “claim disability,” instructors and administrators were permitted to occupy an “investigative stance” in which they were the deciders of who is authentically disabled and who is not (Jung, “Chronic Illness and Educational Equity,” 276). Yet being on the receiving end of this empowered gaze leaves disabled women exposed to the conditions of erasure – both as they become their bodies and as they face the possibility of having their body’s needs denied (Jung “Chronic Illness and Educational Equity,” 282). Chronically ill women’s “social invisibility” “makes it difficult to incorporate the realities of chronic illness into both mainstream disability and feminist disability research, effectively reinforcing mistaken beliefs that people with disabilities are unable to make significant contributions to traditions of learning in the academy” (Jung “Chronic Illness and Educational Equity,” 282–283). Educational spaces of the university are naturalized as able-bodied spaces – by or through design, in fact (Lennard J. Davis, “Why is Disability Missing from Discourses on Diversity,” *Chronicle of Higher Education* (September 25, 2011).) – and this means that bodies that fail to “fit” (Garland-Thomson 2011) whether in virtue of their disability, their gender, their sexuality, or their race are seen to threaten the natural order of things.

Nirmala Erevelles (2000) uses the term “the unruly body” to signify that bodies, in their

materiality and imperfection, are uncontrollable and always, to some extent, outside of our control (Erevelles 2000). Yet the fear that we cannot control our bodies is precisely what leads to the kinds of bodily interventions that enforce gender and ability perfectionism: fitness regimes, diets, beauty products, plastic surgery, and so on. The imperative of the able body is always gendered because it imposes a disciplinary system that is binarized male–female. As shown in the earlier example from Pascoe – and as her book’s title suggests – displays of strength and destruction help boys to distance themselves from the pathologizing attribution of homosexuality. For girls, displays of femininity – make-up, high heels, hair treatments – afford power and social status (think *Mean Girls*) even as they maintain women’s powerlessness within patriarchal structures. (Indeed, it is interesting to think about the physically disabling and immobilizing effects of high heels, even as they are used as gendered markers of beauty). The maintenance of “compulsory able-bodiedness” thus operates not only as a social and political injunction to power but also as a material constraint against disturbing the social order of the schooling system.

Gendered Pathologization in Schooling Practices

The entanglement of gender definitions, identity, and experience with the social phenomenon of disability shapes how educational theorists and philosophers respond to gender in education, whether implicitly or explicitly. The growing understanding of ability/disability as a social organizing construct and a complex social system can help us to better understand how and why gender is framed as a problem in schools, how students’ gendered and sexuality differences and experiences are pathologized, and, perhaps especially, how institutions of education organize themselves around gender.

Of the many gendered schooling phenomena that educational researchers have focused on in the last several decades, the notion of the disparate social behaviors and success of boys and girls

(The presentation of a gender binary here – boys and girls – is not meant to advocate a view of gender as binary. Rather, gender binaries can be understood as in fact reinstated in schools through discourses and practices of ability and disability.) has been prevalent. Beyond important analyses of how girls and boys are socialized into different roles through and by schooling practices, researchers have also been fascinated by the changing educational attainment patterns that occur between boys and girls' educational achievement both in K-12 schooling and higher education. Among the many areas of focus within this research is the differing social behaviors of girls and boys in schools as well as the different ways in which these behaviors are interpreted. Returning to the earlier example from Pascoe, it is possible to imagine how teachers might interpret the behavior of the boys with the lawnmower as simply "boys will be boys" behavior, as does one of the teachers in Pascoe's study (Pascoe, *Dude, You're A Fag*, 37). On the other hand, the "boys will be boys" interpretation can take on a whole new meaning when attached to particular racialized interpretations of ability/disability. How might this interpretive difference account for why poor black, Latino, and indigenous boys are disproportionality more likely to be labeled with disabilities in school, for example? (Harry and Klingner 2014) How might it explain gender differences in disciplinary and behavioral intervention practices in school that break down along the lines of race and disability label? (Skiba et al. 2002; Lopez 2003).

Certainly, race and gender on their own form a complex web in studying the achievement of boys and girls in schools. In her qualitative study of race and gender disparities in urban education, Nancy Lopez (2003) observes that "notwithstanding the fact that men were generally more rambunctious than their female counterparts, teachers were generally less understanding of young men and more likely to discipline them harshly for the same infractions committed by their female counterparts" (Lopez, *Hopeful Girls, Troubled Boys*, 88). These race and gender complexities are of particular interest to scholars who study the

phenomenon of overrepresentation in special education as well as the discursive coupling of femininity with cognitive incompetence that can position women and girls as educational others.

Overrepresentation refers to the disproportionate number of students of color who are identified within and through particular disability categories in special education (Ferri and Connor 2005). Where an analysis by race and class markers does go a long way towards explaining this disproportionality, Beth Ferri and David J. Connor point out that "within-group gender differences in identification rates confound attempts to explain racial differences as primarily due to race and class" (Ferri and Connor, "In the Shadow of Brown," 95). Gender plays a significant role in how students' racial identities are interpreted and in how they are constructed as disabled. Educational scholars who apply a disability-conscious analysis to understanding the pathologization of behavior have focused not only on how diagnostic and identification practices in special education assessment lead to imbalanced identification along the lines of race but also how the interpretation of social behaviors influences the way that students are seen as able and disabled. To understand these phenomena, some disability studies in education theorists have focused in on understanding how unwanted or unwelcome behaviors are interpreted in the classroom. Fernanda Orsati and Julie Causton-Theoharis (2013), for example, describe how classroom behaviors are interpreted as not only challenging or disruptive but also as evidence of an internal student deficit or disability (Orsati and Causton-Theoharis 2013). These authors argue that the interpretation of behavior – and subsequent assessment of impairment – depends greatly on what they call a "discourse of control" that teachers and other educational professionals draw upon to interpret students. Importantly, these responses focus less on interpreting students' behaviors as they do on interpreting the students themselves. For example, the authors describe the phenomena of teachers grouping students whose behaviors are unwanted: "'they scream', 'they run' 'you need to chase them'"

(Orsati and Theoharis, “Challenging Control,” 516). These kinds of grouping descriptions imply that teachers see these students as “other” and, moreover, that the behavior is evidence of an inherent pathological deficit rather than a social experience (Orsati and Theoharis, “Challenging Control,” 521). Disability becomes that marker of internal deficit.

Thus, for many young men of color the “boys will be boys” adage works not to excuse unwanted behavior but rather to mark it as pathological – as emotionally troubled or disturbed. Susan Baglieri and Arthur Shapiro (2012) describe the disability category of emotional disturbance as a “soft disability” because of the subjective nature of its identification: “soft disabilities” are ones that lack any known or discernible physical or biological markers and are thus based solely subjective methods of assessment and identification (Susan and Arthur 2012). In the case of emotional disturbance, teachers’ expectations of correct or normal behavior – and their reports of apparent abnormal and disturbing behavior – account for much of the identification process and likely much of the phenomenon of overrepresentation of students of color carrying the label of emotional disturbance (Baglieri and Shapiro, *Disability Studies*, 119). Indeed, “being a boy, being Black, and/or poor increases one’s likelihood of being identified as emotionally disturbed” (Baglieri and Shapiro, *Disability Studies*, 119). These theoretical analyses of behavior and pathology-attribution illustrate the intersecting components of gender and ability in schooling. Importantly, in the above examples, one’s perceived or experienced gender identity is significant in determining how one is interpreted relative to disability in schools.

Conclusion

The purpose of this entry is twofold. First, it uses specific examples to describe how ability/disability and gender are entangled as social identities. Whether it is the normalizing practices in schools that maintain gender binaries and reward heteronormativity or it is the disciplining and

pathologization of behavior, interpretations of gender are always entangled with “compulsory able-bodiedness.” Second, it discusses how these examples illustrate the necessity of an intersectional approach to studying gender in educational philosophy and theory. The entry began with the strong claim that the educational study of gender is incomplete without an analysis of the intersection of gender and ability. The purpose of this strong claim is to encourage educational theorists and philosophers who study gender and disability to attend to these important intersections and the complexities they raise for theory, policy, and practice in education.

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Intersubjectivity

- [Habermas and Philosophy of Education](#)
- [Phenomenology of Ethics and Aesthetics](#)

Introducing Philosophy as a Subject Matter in Formal Education

- [Philosophical Inquiry in Education](#)

Islam and the Philosophy of Education: The Three Approaches

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Synonyms

[Comparative philosophy of education](#); [Indigenous thoughts in education](#); [Islamic philosophy of education](#); [Religious education](#)

Introduction

The term “philosophy of education” can be misleading in for understanding the Islamic philosophy of education. Even though this term is well known in educational circles today, it is by no means the case that it can be helpful in finding out the relevant contents in different cultures, including the Islamic culture. As Nicholas Burbules (2000) has aptly pointed out, the technical term “philosophy of education” referring to an academic discipline is not even common in the European countries, let alone the non-European cultures. He holds that in some of the European countries, the terms “educational theory” and “pedagogical science” are used in order to introduce the themes subsumed under the rubric of the philosophy of education. According to him, this gets even more complicated in the case of non-European cultures where the borders of intellectual development and ethical or religious development get blurred, and, thus, terms such as “philosophy of faith” or “philosophy of duty” take the role of introducing what is meant by philosophy of education.

The same difficulty that Burbules refers to is felt in dealing with the Islamic philosophy of education. No doubt something as “Islamic philosophy” appeared in the interface of Islamic civilization and the Greek philosophy which paves the ground for understanding the Islamic philosophy of education by contemplating on educational views of Muslim philosophers. However, something like anti-philosophy was developed too in reaction to so-called Islamic philosophy among Muslim thinkers such as Ghazali. While his views should no doubt be included in the Islamic philosophy of education, he explicitly avoids the rubric of “philosophy” for his views. This suggests that we should take a more comprehensive point of view in dealing with the Islamic philosophy of education than what the limited term of “philosophy” provides us with.

In what follows, three strands of thought will be introduced as the main features of interface of Islam and philosophy of education. In the first strand, “philosophy” and famous philosophers’ thoughts are explicitly avoided, and, instead, a full and exclusive embrace to Islamic scriptures is taken as the key entrance to Islamic educational views. In the second strand, philosophy is taken to be compatible with Islam as a religion, and, thus, it is held that the “Islamic philosophy of education” can be sought properly under this rubric. Finally, in the third strand, which I am going to show as preferable to the other two, philosophical methods and procedures are used in order to formulate the educational thought introduced in Islamic scriptures. It is worth noting that the difference between the third and the first strand is that while the latter avoids any philosophical thought and terminology, the former embraces philosophical methods even though there is a similarity between the two strands in dealing with the scriptures.

The First Approach: Inference from Muslim Philosophical Systems

In this approach, it is held that religion does not only contradict philosophy, but in fact there is a harmony between them because philosophy is

trying to use rationality to reach the same truths that religion has introduced by revelation. In this approach, Muslim philosophers’ systems of thought are used as a basis for deducing educational points of view.

Philosophical Foundations

In this part, some examples of ontological, epistemological, and axiological views of the followers of this approach are introduced. Al-Attas (1980/1996), for instance, in discussing Islamic ontology gets close to mystical metaphysics. Therefore, in Islamic ontology, he puts God at the first level of the hierarchy that the mystics refer to as “Oneness” (ahadiyyah). At this level, God is purely absolute without being determinable in any way whatsoever. The second level of the world is called “the most sacred emanation” (faiz al-Aqdas) of God. This level being somehow limited is divided into three levels: the divine solitary level, the divine names and attributes level, and the level of subsistences (aayan sabetah). Finally, the third level of the world has two sublevels: external objects (aayan kharejiyyah) and the experimental phenomena. In terms of human nature, al-Toomi al-Sheibani (1394/1985) has relied on the Greek philosophers’ opinion that the human being is a rational animal. In his view, this philosophical definition of the human being is acceptable from Islam’s viewpoint.

As for epistemology, in this approach it is held that philosophical or rational thinking is not only compatible with the Islamic view but also this sort of thinking ranks higher in Islam. Motahari (Tabatabai and Motahari 1350/1969, Footnote p. 71), for instance, by criticizing some who hold that Quran talks about the world in a scientific and empirical way, believes that the Quran’s talk is not limited to this but also includes the philosophical and rational method and that the latter, in fact, ranks a higher level.

As for values, the proponents of the first approach have paid attention to the agreement between philosophical ideas and the Islamic viewpoint. For instance, Al-Attas (1980/1996) holds that the Aristotelian virtues are compatible with the Islamic view insofar as they can be integrated into the framework of the Islamic value system.

Educational Implications

The first approach, with regard to its belief in the possibility of agreement and union between philosophical thoughts and Islamic views, deals with a genuine Islamic “philosophy” of education. In what follows, by relying on al-Toomi al-Sheibani’s work as an example, the content of the “Islamic philosophy of education” in this approach is explored.

In the first approach, not only is it permissible to use the term “Islamic philosophy of education” but it is held that the proper way of developing it is to rely on Muslim “philosophical systems” and deduce from them implications for education. Al-Sheibani (1394/1985) by considering the literal meaning of philosophy (to love knowledge) maintains that the term “Islamic philosophy of education” is consistent. Thus, the Islamic philosophy of education, as far as it is a philosophy, possesses the main characteristics of philosophy (such as comprehensiveness, vast prospect, insight, and knowing the ways of applying knowledge) and, as far as it is concerned with education, it brings about those characteristics to the domain of education, and, finally, being Islamic, it is based on Islamic knowledge and is harmonious to the spirit of Islam.

Al-Sheibani (*ibid*, p. 30) holds that assuming Islam as the basis in philosophy of education does not prevent us from using other sources for compiling philosophy of education. Of course, these sources will be considered secondary and should be harmonious to the spirit of Islam. Islam and its cultural heritage are the primary sources, but in addition to them, the cultural and scientific heritage of humanity including philosophical theories and scientific findings of natural sciences and humanities (especially philosophies of education) should be used if they are in accordance with the spirit of Islam. Therefore, the Islamic philosophy of education is always evaluated by indicators such as not being paradoxical, being scientific and practical, being comprehensive in comparison with new philosophical and scientific findings, being dynamic for change and improvement, and being fitted to new findings in knowledge and religious endeavors.

The Second Approach: A Purely Religious View

The second strand in Islamic thought that relates to the themes of philosophy of education, though not to its name, takes it for granted that there is an opposition or a basic difference, to say the least, between the Islamic view and those of the ancient Greek philosophers as well as mysticism. Ghazali (1997) can be considered as a representative of this strand even though his reliance on a particular kind of mysticism makes it difficult to properly classify him into this strand. More recently, some Islamic scholars have supported this view including Ali Ahmad Madkoor (1411/1990) among others.

The Basic Lines of Thought

In relation to ontology, Ali Ahmad Madkoor (1411/1990), among others, holds that, in terms of ontology in Islam, God is the beginning and the end, namely, existence is originated from God. Then, the divine truth, in all forms and shapes of existents – tangible or rational – flows through to the lowest of them, and once again this flow returns to the divine truth that the process has been originated from. As for human nature, as part of ontology, this approach maintains that the image of the human being in Islam is essentially different from the one that philosophers represent. Madkoor (1411/1990), for instance, believes that while “nature” (physic), including human nature, in Greek concerns material things, in Islam the meaning of human “nature,” considering its literal root (tab’e: to bring about an effect), has the connotation that the human being is the creature of God.

Secondly, in terms of knowledge, relying on Ghazali, Madkoor (1411/1990) believes that what is meant by knowledge in religious terminology is to know God. This knowledge includes the sciences of nature, history, etc., only when they are based on the divine foundation. Thus, one can say that the sources of knowledge are religion and reason, while the primacy is for the former and, thus, religion determines the boundaries of rationality.

In regard to the essential or instrumental value of knowledge, Madkour (1411/1990) holds that in Islam a mere subjective knowledge that does not influence human life and behavior is worthless. In dividing the sciences based on Islam, he puts them in two categories: the sciences related to human beings and pure sciences. He maintains that the former should be acquired by religion, and one should not rely and use non-Muslims' findings in that area; such reliance is permissible only for pure sciences.

Finally, in the realm of values, Madkour believes that the source of values is Islamic Shari'a, not social agreement, and since the source is definite, the Islamic values are fixed too (Madkour 1407/1987, p. 208).

Educational Viewpoints

In the second approach, as a result of the general avoidance from philosophy and the differences held between the intellectual bases of Islam and philosophy, a different view is presented regarding education. Madkour holds that one should not use the term "Islamic philosophy of education" because Islam is a divine religion, while philosophy is a human endeavor, and they are not compatible. He prefers the term "Islamic way of education" (p. 45). Based on Madkour's opinion, some of the main features of "Islamic way of education" are as follows: systematic characteristic, divinity, monotheism, universality, stability, comprehensiveness, and balance.

The Third Approach: Philosophy as a Method and Procedure

A third approach in formulating the Islamic philosophy of education is to use philosophical methods and procedures in order to organize Islamic viewpoints in accordance with the structures of philosophies of education.

There are similarities and differences between the third approach and the other two. As far as the comparison between the third and the first approaches is concerned, they are similar as both enjoy the findings of the philosophical world. In

both approaches, dealing with the world of philosophy is accepted and considered favorable. Therefore, using the term "Islamic philosophy of education" is permissible in both of them. Meanwhile, there is a difference between these two. The difference is that while the first approach uses the content of other philosophies, the third approach uses merely methodological insights of other philosophies. For example, in the peripatetic Islamic philosophy a lot of the content of Aristotelian philosophy is accepted. This sort of usage of other philosophies puts an Islamic philosophical system at the risk of being amalgamated and becoming incoherent or coherent at the price of modifying Islamic conceptions to be adjusted to the target philosophical system. Even though philosophical methods and procedures are also somehow dependent on some backgrounds, their dependence is not comparable to that of philosophical thoughts or contents. For example, the dialectic methods of Plato and Hegel are used by contemporary philosophers such as H. G. Gadamer and J. Derrida, but the findings of the latter two are quite different from those of the two former philosophers. This shows that the philosophical methods and procedures have a much higher level of independence from the philosophical systems of thought.

As for the comparison between the third and the second approaches, the similarity is that they both rely on the texts that are peculiar to Islam. However, the difference is that in the second approach philosophy is completely avoided, while in the third approach there is a relation to other philosophies and they are used in a certain way, namely, in terms of methods.

A study which is done in accordance with the third approach is the two volume authored by Khosrow Bagheri Noaparast (2008, 2012). Using Frankena's (1996) model in a progressive way, a structure is suggested for the Islamic philosophy of education including the basic concept of education as well as ontological, anthropological, epistemological, and axiological foundations and principles for guiding educational activities. A brief account of the Islamic philosophy of education according to this work is reported below.

Foundations of the Islamic Philosophy of Education

The ontological characteristics of the Islamic view are as follows:

1. The universe is not exclusively natural.
2. God is at the highest level of the universe.
3. The universe has a teleological characteristic oriented by God.
4. The biological life is only the lowest level of life being ascended to higher levels of life.
5. The ascending levels of life are toward God and associated with self-flourishing.
6. God is the basic good and the basis of goodness.

The anthropological foundations are as follows:

1. The human being is a unified whole comprised of the soul and the body.
2. The human being has an intuitive knowledge of God.
3. Reason can provide the human being with reliable truths.
4. Human agency makes it possible to talk about human actions and individual identity.
5. Interaction among human beings leads to collective action and identity.
6. There are limitations for human beings within which they acquire opportunity for action.

There are ten epistemological foundations of which the first five refer to the known and the rest refer to the knower, as follows:

1. Knowledge has an explorative nature.
2. True knowledge has a correspondence to reality.
3. Knowledge has different levels.
4. True knowledge has stability.
5. Knowledge has unity as well as plurality parallel to its different levels.
6. Creativity is involved in knowledge development.
7. Knowledge is a response to human needs.
8. There are different levels of relation between knowledge and human needs.

9. Knowledge has a dynamic process.
10. Knowledge has a conventional dimension.

Finally, the axiological characteristics are as follows:

1. Values have a subjective aspect in addition to the objective aspect.
2. There are two sorts of values: absolute and relative.
3. Nature has an instrumental value for humans.
4. The human being has a profound dignity.
5. The human being has a profound freedom.
6. Justice is the most important social value.
7. Justice is completed by beneficence.
8. Aesthetic values are partly subjective and partly objective.

Educational Implications

The final aim of Islamic education is achieving a pure life (*hayat tayyebah*). This aim is a comprehensive account of the ideal human life comprising the dimensions of the physical, the thought and belief, the tendency, the will, the action both individual and collective, and the aesthetic. The pure life requires health and strength in the physical dimension; truth in the thought dimension; ethical control of inclinations in the tendency dimension; a will to goodness in the will dimension; good actions in the individual realm; richness, sanctity, justice, and beneficence in the social realm; and finally the transcendence of human aesthetic taste. This aim can lead us to decide about the curriculum and what is to be taught.

As for the basic concept of education, given the human agency in the Islamic view, education in the official sense needs to be understood in terms of an asymmetrical “interaction” between the teacher and the students, as well as a symmetrical “interaction” among the students. That is to say, in any case, a student’s agency should seriously be taken into account rather than being repressed, and, thus, a student should be taken as the other side of an interaction rather than being reduced to a passive and recipient entity. This is because, according to Quran, people’s real identity is what they make by their actions (Quran, 53: 38–42).

There are some educational principles that should guide the educational interactions. These

principles are derived from the three types of anthropological, epistemological, and axiological foundations mentioned above. Giving prescriptive content to these foundations will show the principles.

Conclusion

The Islamic philosophy of education has been introduced under different names and contents. There are at least three approaches in this regard. In the first approach, it is held that Islam does not contradict philosophy, but in fact there is a harmony between them because philosophy uses rationality to reach the same truths that religion has introduced by revelation. In this approach, Muslim philosophers' systems of thought are used as a basis for deducing educational points of view. The second approach relates to the themes of philosophy of education but not under this name. This approach takes it for granted that there is an opposition or a basic difference between the Islamic view and philosophical views derived from the ancient Greek philosophy under the rubric of Islamic philosophy. The first approach embraces rationality by appealing to different philosophical views, but its originality in terms of Islamic views remains a real concern. On the other hand, the second approach obsessively deals with originality in terms of Islamic views but is pessimistic to philosophical thought. In the third approach, at stake is to combine the strengths of the first and the second approach, namely, rationality and originality. In formulating the Islamic philosophy of education, the third approach uses philosophical methods and procedures in order to organize Islamic viewpoints in accordance with the structures of philosophies of education.

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Islamic Education

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Islamic Education and Educational Technology: In the Quest for Democratic Engagement

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Introduction

In this entry the authors examine, firstly, three understandings of Islamic education and show as to how democratic engagement can be enhanced.

Islamic education can be explained as nurturing (*tarbiyyah*), critical action (*ta'lim*), and transformative or good action (*ta'dib*) which they show can be connected to the practice of democratic engagement (Waghid 2011, p. 1). Secondly, they show how technology is advocated in relation to the primary source of Islamic education, namely, the Holy Quran. They specifically refer to the use of “the pen” (*al-Qalam*) in the Quran as an instance of technology and show as how the concept, like Islamic education, is geared towards the attainment of socially just human relations. Thirdly, they argue that Islamic education is commensurable with an application of technology as both practices are oriented towards the cultivation of justice in society.

Islamic Education as Nurturing, Critical Action, and Transformative Action

Firstly, *tarbiyyah* denotes the action of socializing people into a situated body of knowledge (Waghid 2011, p. 2). This necessitates nurturing Muslims about the testimony of their faith (*shahādah*); understanding Almighty Allāh's Angels (*malā'ikah*), Revealed Books, Prophets (*al-Anbiyā*), and the Day of Judgment (*al-Qiyāmah*); acting righteously and justly (*'adl*); and performing practices associated with a Muslim's life ranging from prayer (*salāt*) performed five times a day to pledging of charity (*zakāt*) to the destitute, fasting (*siyām*) during the holy month of Ramadan, performing pilgrimage (*hajj*) at least once in a Muslim's lifetime (if he or she has the means to do so), the life history (*sira*) of the Prophet Muhammad – may the peace and blessings of Allah Almighty be upon him – and the law governed by Islamic jurists for Muslims to enact their lives in consonance with primary sources of Islamic education (Waghid 2011, p. 2).

Tarbiyyah also implies that students need to be exposed to both rational and theological elucidations of knowledge. What this means is that when students are socialized, they do so with the intent of producing more informed and reasonable interpretations of the Quran, with the hope that more

contemplative learning would emanate. The Quran states the following: “Indeed, in the creation of the heavens and the earth and the alternation of the night and the day are signs for those [(wo)men] of understanding” (*al-Imran*, 3: 190). This verse emphasizes the importance of contemplating about the universe in the life of humans. In this way, socialization (*tarbiyyah*) does not merely mean to accept things at face value but rather to reflect deeper about situations and events.

Secondly, *ta'lim* signifies a Muslim's commitment to learning texts and putting some texts to memory from the Holy *Quran* (primary source of Islamic education), *ahādīth* (sayings of the Prophet Muhammad and his life experiences), and learning through public deliberation (*shūrā*) (Waghid 2011, p. 3). *Ta'lim* assists one in articulating one's reasons and in acting responsibly in communities. Such a form of learning would acquaint students with justifiable reasons to explore and explain economic and sociological occurrences in society. Through *ta'lim*, the attainment of knowledge is connected with the freedom of seeing others' points of view, through argumentation and persuasion in accordance with one's epistemological understanding of Quranic verses. And, being able to undertake such an activity of critical action would further require of students to be autonomous, democratic, and responsible citizens. This means that when students read the Quran (the primary source of Islamic education), they do so with the intent of reflecting on the text (and its verses) and by situating themselves within an imaginary realm that would provoke in them thoughts to enhance “socially just” human relations (*al-Nisa*, 4:135). This view of learning is corroborated by al-Attas (1991, p. 34), who posits that one's understanding of knowledge determines one's just relations with other human beings in communities and to come up with ways as to resolve unjust and inequitable situations.

Thirdly, *ta'dib* (good action) considers all humans as equals irrespective of cultural, linguistic, religious, socioeconomic, and ethnic differences (Waghid 2011, p. 4). Goodness is for all individuals in society on the basis of his or her just

or virtuous actions. This is reaffirmed in the Quran: “[And] uphold justice and do good to others and give to the relatives” (*al-Nahl*, 16: 90). Three aspects of *ta’dib* are denoted here: First, “justice” signifies being fair and reasonable in one’s actions towards and in relation to others; second, “doing good to others” through strengthening relationships and establishing trust with others; and third, “giving to the relatives” which means doing good to others instinctively just as one would do to one’s close relatives. *Ta’dib*, therefore, promotes the efforts to expand social justice through shared values, common objectives, and opportunities of mutual benefit to all human beings on the basis of deliberative relationships among communities.

Now, being able to offer one’s reasons, act critically, and in accordance with the values of social justice, transformative (good) change agents would require a deep attraction to democratic contexts on the premise that such contexts would allow people to engage communicatively (deliberatively). According to Benhabib (1996, p. 69), a democratic context could most appropriately be understood as a “model for organizing the collective and public exercise of power in the major institutions [such as schools and universities] of a society on the basis of the principle that decisions affecting the well-being of a collectivity can be viewed as the outcome of a procedure of free reasoned deliberation among individuals considered as moral and political equals.” What Benhabib (1996, p. 69) argues for is a deliberative democratic environment premised on public deliberation in which citizens and their representatives move beyond self-seeking and restricted points of view and skewed power relations, through self-reflection for the common good or general interest. In this regard, Benhabib (1996, p. 70) argues for a deliberative model of democracy, governed by the norms of equality and symmetry; affording equal chances [to all citizens] in initiating acts of speech, questioning, interrogation, and open debate; having the right to question the assigned topics of conversation; and having the right to initiate reflexive arguments about the very rules of the discourse procedure and the way

in which they are applied or carried out. In this way, democratic action is not out of congruence with conceptions of Islamic education as the latter encourages Muslims to act reasonably, deliberately, and justly.

Central to Benhabib’s (1996) elucidation of deliberative democratic action is the notion that such an undertaking among educators and students, say, in Muslim institutions, is guided by autonomous questioning, debate, transparency, reflexivity, and critique – all democratic practices which may enhance communal (*ummic*) engagements among citizens in a society. Following Benhabib’s (1996) notion of democratic deliberation, which resonates with the concepts of Islamic education (*tarbiyyah*, *ta’lim*, and *ta’dib*), institutions of Muslim learning ought to cultivate reflexive and open pedagogical spaces for educators and students to offer their contrasting points of view or interpretations of *Quranic* texts and *ahādīth* in a responsible, deliberative, and just manner.

Being able to critique others also involves “the endeavor to know how and to what extent it might be possible to think differently, instead of legitimating what is already known” (Foucault 2002, p. 191). And, when students become critical, they would create more possibilities for themselves and others (their peers) to imagine things differently with which they might be confronted (Waghid 2014, p. 235). By affording capable students the opportunity to have their voices heard, the possibility exists in enhancing just relations among educators and students. Pedagogically speaking, this makes sense because democratic practices cannot take place if people are made to feel that they should merely memorize the verses of the *Quran* or *ahādīth*, without critically understanding its meanings in engendering just human relations. Learning is a life experience of knowledge acquisition and reflexive understanding, and in such democratic settings, the authors hold that it is through the (re)interpretations of knowledge that are democratically shared and experienced upon which humans could further uncover new meanings and work towards rebeginnings. This brings them to a discussion of Islamic education in relation to educational technology.

The “Pen” as an Educational Technology in the Quran

The concepts of *tarbiyyah* and *ta’lim* can be linked to the enhancement of creative autonomy among students (Kazmi 2015, p. 71). This means that by nurturing within students a sense of innovativeness, the possibility exists for them to be meaningfully engaged in creatively constructing their apprehension of Quranic verses. Now such a notion of creative autonomy is generally perceived as antithetical to a dogmatic view of knowledge construction. However, history seems to suggest the contrary (Kazmi 2015, p. 71) as Islamic education has also been linked to critical action (*ta’lim*) and transformative or good action (*ta’dib*).

As for any enduring civilization, the Islamic civilization could not stand on a narrow plinth of restricted freedom and creativity (Kazmi 2015, p. 72). Many verses in the Quran serve as a testament to the latter claim. For instance, verses in the Holy *Quran* stating “Read in the name of your Lord” and verses which converse about knowledge and teaching humans the use of a “pen” (*al-Qalam*) reinforce this notion of human creativity (*al-‘Alaq*, 96: 1). In the verses of Chapter 68 (*al-Qalam*) of the Quran, the notion of “the pen” (*al-Qalam*) is depicted metaphorically to individuals as a social and pedagogical tool in orientating their actions towards the exercise of creative autonomy (Kazmi 2015, p. 72). In the context of the verses of this Quranic chapter, *al-Qalam* is not referred to as an instrument in a literal sense but rather a condition encouraging an individual to construct deeper meanings or understandings and to share the derived knowledge. Consequently, one finds that the Quran in Chapter 68 encourages humans to have clarity of mind and even relates the concept of *al-Qalam* to being a “reminder” for humanity that nothing in the world can be resolved without clarity of understanding (*al-Qalam*, 68: 52). What is important to note in this apt depiction of *al-Qalam* is that creative freedom (autonomy) is considered a prerequisite for deeper thinking and analysis. Without such a liberty of creativity and contemplative action, *al-Qalam* would simply be considered as a tool

used for reproducing old meanings – an idea that stands in stark contrast to the Quranic emphasis on reflexivity and renewal, whereby people can produce more defensible judgments (*al-Qalam*, 68: 36). In this sense, *al-Qalam* cannot be delinked from educational technology as the latter is inextricably connected to harnessing human reflexivity and renewal – a matter of acting autonomously and innovatively. So when the Quran announces *al-Qalam* (“the pen”) in relation to contemplation and sound reasoning, the authors infer that this can also imply a reference to the use of educational technology.

In our contemporary era, the role of *al-Qalam* has evolved, and many technologies are able to support this metaphorical account of “the pen” as an instrument to foster the sharing and development of deeper meanings and understandings. This claim is echoed in the work of Jeremy (2000), who suggests that educational technologies such as social media platforms can foster the creation of a sphere in which students can demonstrate critical thinking and student autonomy. Furthermore, educational technology studies have shown a tangible difference in how knowledge is transmitted and constructed (Gimbert and Cristol 2004, p. 207).

Hence, through the effective utilization of an educational technology, conditions can be created for active engagement encompassing the sharing of experiences and interpretations among students. Further, humans are commanded to “Read in the name of Allah” rather than reading the name of Allah (*al-Alaq*, 96: 1). By implication, individuals are encouraged to construct new meanings and understandings in relation to their faith (Kazmi 2015) rather than merely echoing what they encounter as if they are obliged to merely repeat the name of Allah Almighty – that is, to see things at face value without contemplation and deeper thinking. These Quranic verses do not set limits on the freedom to construct informed and reasonable interpretations of the Quran but rather encourage Muslims to explore and reexamine in relation to deep thinking and spiritual closeness to Allah Almighty. In other words, using *al-Qalam* (“the pen”) points towards pedagogical advancement through the creative autonomy of people to

think and act transformatively – that is, their actions can engender change that will hopefully be beneficial to the advancement of knowledge.

In today's contemporary era, educational technologies such as social media platforms often serve as deliberative spheres for human engagement – an idea that resonates with Benhabib (1996) explication of deliberative encounters. Through *ta'lim*, individuals are afforded the freedom to critique different points of view by being able to search the Internet for expositions to critically support their points of view. In this way students' understandings or meanings are able to be shaped by their inclination to search for new knowledge from abundant online sources using the Internet. Students are therefore seen as critically active participants in their own knowledge construction and not mere passive recipients of information. Therefore, educational technology holds the promise for enhancing the concept of *ta'lim* by affording students unrestricted choices in the quest to construct new knowledge in a deliberative manner – that is, through engaging with multiple sources of knowledge, students can articulate more tenable and critical understandings of knowledge.

It can be argued that social networking sites such as Facebook, WhatsApp, and Twitter (instances of *al-Qalam*) offer participating individuals deliberative pedagogical spaces according to which they can harness their engagements. In such an instance, individuals may be free from cultural, linguistic, religious, socioeconomic, and ethnic prejudices that may exist in face-to-face interactions. However, the author's potential critic might argue that such a form of anonymity could potentially be detrimental to the expansion of socially just relations among students. That is, with anonymity, a subsequent reduction of accountability on the part of individuals engaging on social networking platforms could ensue. For instance, an "anonymous" student potentially could verbally attack another student in altering their points of view in a belligerent manner, on say the latter's argument for stricter government policies on the influx of African refugees into South Africa and its implications on food shortages, lack of shelter, and other securities. However, this does

not undermine the enormous potential of social media to engender opportunities for students to engage deliberatively, thus allowing even more pedagogical spaces for reflexive and autonomous learning.

Perhaps an act of belligerence could be driven by temperamental emotions on the part of some students. It is here that the concept of *ta'dib* can be most apposite as it expects of students to be good towards others in what they say or do – that is, to act justly and, hence, respectfully towards others. Such a form of goodness would expect of students to engage with others in a responsible and dignified manner. This is not to say that one should always avoid confrontation. What the authors are arguing for, following the concept of *ta'dib*, is that one engages with others in a deliberative manner as Benhabib (1996) explains, listening to the reasons of others and offering one's account so as to prevent hostility and aggression that can undermine more engaging democratic relations among students and educators.

Hence, *al-Qalam*, more specifically the application of a technological "pen," can cultivate more engaging social communication among students, in terms of which ideas and understandings are able to be developed, critiqued, and shared for communal benefit in consonance with the application of concepts such as *tarbiyyah*, *ta'lim*, and *ta'dib*. Put differently, applying "the pen" (educational technology) in the realms of socialization, critical learning and virtuous action would invariably contribute to the (re)construction of more deliberatively enriched understandings of important social concepts on the basis that Islamic education in its various forms is geared towards the attainment of justice in and through human action. It is to such a discussion that the authors now turn to.

Islamic Education and Educational Technology as Practices Oriented Towards the Cultivation of Justice in Society

Institutions are shaped by their practices according to the latter's physical, cultural, social, and economic manifestations in such institutions

(Griffiths 1965, p. 188). Islamic education actions such as *tarbiyyah*, *ta'lim*, and *ta'dib* in relation to *al-Qalam* (educational technology or “the pen”) are practices that give institutions of learning their distinctive forms. And, if one considers that these action concepts are further connected to the attainment of *'adl* (justice) in society, then the authors shall next show as to how such just actions can be realized. First, through *tarbiyyah*, students are initiated into Islamic teachings in maintaining good relations with both Muslims and non-Muslims and in constructing new knowledge from both rational and theological perspectives in order to harness engaging and just human relationships; second, *ta'lim* requires students to be articulate and critically responsible in their actions geared towards the attainment of deep democratic encounters. In other words, Muslims are encouraged to deeply reflect about their lives in relation to all other human beings without prejudice; and third, through *ta'dib* the goodness of one's actions is reflected within a socially just society often to the mutual benefit of all communities without marginalizing others or excluding them from societal matters.

The authors have argued that *al-Qalam* (educational technology) as a pedagogical activity or practice opens up creative possibilities for educators and students to engage in educational settings both deliberatively and autonomously. In other words, it has the potential to create a democratic environment by bringing educators and students into virtual spaces engendering equal and open deliberative encounters. The notion that the aforementioned understandings of Islamic education could be enhanced through educational technology can be further explained in relation to the work of a “community of thinking” (Derrida 2004, p. 148). Such a way of thinking, in the words of Derrida (2004, pp. 148–150), “must prepare students to take new analyses” and “to transform the modes of writing, the pedagogic scene, the procedures of academic exchange, the relation to languages, to other disciplines, to the institution in general, to its inside and its outside.” Now the pursuit of using such a pedagogical framework of thinking in relation to educational technology opens up the possibility

of enhancing critical and innovative thinking among students. Derrida (2004, p. 153) posits that such thinking is “always risky; it always risks the worst.” A community of thinking with the intent of enhancing such forms of risk taking would become more perceptive to new and unimagined possibilities. Here the authors think specifically of how students could be exposed through the use of educational technology in devising risky Islamic educational contributions that can address issues of racism, inequality, poverty, starvation, abuse, human trafficking, war, and suffering.

Furthermore, a community of thinking demands that reasons be rendered which could appositely be couched as “critique” (Derrida 2004, p. 162). This implies that as individuals, one questions and challenges, opening up new possibilities for diverse interpretations through risk taking, which may lead to the establishment of structures or spaces necessary for others to contribute towards the shaping of imaginative ideas. Hence, educational technology as a pedagogical practice could enhance just relations among students and educators in Islamic educational contexts. Similarly, such a notion of educational technology with its connection to a critical and transformative framework of Islamic education can contribute towards resolving some of the most pressing concerns plaguing humanity. Here, the authors specifically think of using educational technology to encourage communities to address their differences on the basis of deliberation and recognition of the other – an understanding of Islamic education that can be situated within a concept of educational technology that resonates with *al-Qalam* (“the pen”). Such a discourse of educational technology invariably draws on notions of *tarbiyyah*, *ta'lim*, and *ta'dib* to cultivate autonomous, deliberative, and just pedagogical encounters.

Conclusion

In this entry the authors have argued that Islamic education as *tarbiyyah* (socialization), *ta'lim* (critical learning), and *ta'dib* (virtuous action)

intertwined with *al-Qalam* (“the pen”) can enhance autonomous, just, and deliberative pedagogical relations among students and educators. In turn, such a notion of Islamic education that is not remiss of technology can initiate students into a discourse of social justice, whereby they can critically reflect on the most pressing concerns permeating their communities and educationally find ways to address such problems. Moreover, teaching and learning through the use of educational technology have the potential to enhance the notion of a “community of thinking,” and through deliberative democratic encounters, students and educators would be stimulated to act more judiciously in disrupting social injustices.

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Islamic Perspective of Vocational Education

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Synonyms

Action; Religious education; Skills; Social responsibility; Training; Vocationalism; Work

Introduction

In “vocational education,” some have put emphasis on the first part, namely, “vocation,” while others subordinated it to the second part, namely, “education.” The first trend has led to vocationalism that undermines theoretical subject matters, and the second trend has been supported by liberals, among others, who take training as secondary to education having rational as well as social dimensions.

The failure of traditional education associated with old vocationalism to overcome the dichotomy of theoretical/practical some urged some to introduce a new trend in education that blurs the borders between theoretical and practical education. This new trend is differently embraced, for instance, in pragmatism (Dewey 1916/1985) and new vocationalism (Grubb 1996). It is argued in this trend that high-level skills, such as problem-solving and learning capability, require that theory and practice be combined. This combination is called “all aspects of an industry” in Perkins Act of 1990 in the USA (Rosenstock 1991). New vocationalism and its slogan of “competence standards” was supported in Britain in 1986, in the USA in 1994, and in Australia in 1992 (Forster 1996).

The controversy of education versus training is still continuing. Conservatives in Britain, for instance, hold that liberalists who prefer academic over vocational qualifications had education in their hands for too long and this had damaging

effects on the economy of the country. On the other hand, even though new vocationalism has attempted to combine theoretical and practical education, it is claimed (Connell et al. 1994) that working-class students are “trained,” but middle-class students get “educated,” and parity of esteem is continuing to be a problem.

Having these problems of education versus training in mind, this entry is going to address vocational education in the view of Islamic education. In what follows, first human agency is introduced in Islamic view as the basis for dealing with vocational education. Then, relying on it, some principles of vocational education is suggested from an Islamic perspective.

Human Agency in Islam

Human is introduced in the Qur'an as agent who has actions (Bagheri Noaparast 2016). An action is different from a pure behavior in terms of some underlying layers. While a behavior is what it is seen from the outside, an action is a behavior that presupposes some underlying layers and thereby finds certain characteristics. These layers can be different depending on particular action approaches.

As far as the Qur'an is concerned, at least three types of underlying layers are at issue for a behavior to be taken as action. The first foundation of action is cognitive in nature. The following verse, for instance, refers to such a foundation in relation to human action: “As for those who disbelieve, their deeds are like a mirage in the desert which the thirsty takes for water. . .” (Qur'an, 24: 39). Here an illusion which is cognitive in nature is at the root of an action.

The second foundation of action in the Islamic view is inclination. This verse refers to this type of foundation: “We have made attractive to every person their deeds” (Qur'an, 6: 108).

The third foundation of action is will. Cognition and inclination are necessary but not sufficient for a behavior to be an action. The will as a foundation of action indicates that humans have a choice in their deeds. Inclination, even a strong one, by itself does not lead to an action, but it

could be the subject of a choice or rejection. The following verse refers to this point: “Have you considered him who takes his own lust for his god?” (Qur'an, 25: 43)

Human actions with the mentioned foundations have some characteristics. First of all, when done, human actions find an objective feature with internal as well as external consequences that cannot be helped. These consequences are effects of actions, and in this respect, they are real occurrences that cannot be helped. Referring to this point, the Qur'an states: “As a consequence of breaking their promise made to God and telling lies, He filled their hearts with hypocrisy. . .” (Qur'an, 9: 77).

Secondly, actions constitute the core of human identity. The real identity of every person is not but the sum of his or her actions. “That no one who carries a burden bears another's load; that a man [*sic*] receives but only that for which he strives” (Qur'an, 53: 39–40). This is not to say that human identity has no other dimensions, but the point is that some dimensions of identity are accidental as is the case in, for instance, national identity. If I am an Iranian, this is no doubt a dimension of my identity, but it is accidental to my identity. By naming it accidental, it is not meant that it is not important but that it provides me with some opportunities as well as limitations or, one might say that, with a field for action. Then, the core of my identity is shaped by my actions in this field and similar fields.

Thirdly, humans are responsible for their actions: “Every soul is pledged to what it does” (Qur'an, 74: 38). Being based on choice, an action involves responsibility. People are responsible for the intended consequences of their actions as well as the unintended consequences that the person being informed of because they are also part of action.

Principles of Vocational Education

Viewed from the standpoint of Islamic account of action, vocational activities should be taken into account in terms of action and its three cognitive, emotional, and volitional layers. This indicates

that Islamic view of vocational education is not skill oriented. Vocational activity in terms of action is something more than a bundle of behaviors. This is because cognition, inclination, and will are involved in vocational activity. In addition, having the characteristics of action, vocational activity has important roles to play. For instance, in terms of identity-formation characteristic of action, vocational activity has a role in the formation of identity of the person. Depending on of the kind of contents of the layers, an action, including vocational action, can be a desired or undesired action each having its own role in constituting a human identity. Thus, given the foundations and characteristics of action, vocational education needs to go beyond skills.

In order to provide a desired vocational action, Islamic education puts forward some principles in terms of the three internal layers as well as consequences of actions on oneself, people, and the environment. The four resultant principles are explored below.

Principle 1: Giving a Higher Meaning to Vocational Activity

In order to go beyond the behavioral approach and its skill-oriented view, vocational activity needs to find a meaning. Giving a meaning to vocational activity requires that pupils are provided with a rationale for the activity at the level of cognitive foundation of their actions. The rationale that Islamic view puts forward for vocational activity is threefold as follows.

Firstly, vocational activity is taken to remove the obstacles of human development. Human instinctive needs are so strong that if they are not satisfied, they would prevent humans from going ahead on the development ladder and the satisfaction of the needs is dependent on work and vocation. Referring to this role of vocational activity, the prophet of Islam has stated: "A person who finds water and soil and at the same time remains poor, God prevents him from His grace" (Ameli 1993, Vol. 2, part al-Tejarat). God's grace here has a reference to positive developments that people would and should have access to, and this is taken to be dependent on overcoming deprivations. Accordingly, vocational activity has the value of

removing the obstacles of human development. Seeing vocational activity at the light of this rationale is the first dimension of giving meaning to this activity.

Secondly, vocational activity is introduced in Islam as a spiritual endeavor. Spirituality in Islam is associated with getting close to God by worshipping. However, worship is not confined to particular forms of activity such as doing prayer. The criterion of worship is getting close to God, and whatever provides the person with it, it would be a worship. Thus, the prophet of Islam states: "Worship has seventy parts and its highest part is decent (halal) business" (Ameli 1993, Vol. 2, part Al-Tejarat). It is interesting to note that a decent business is the highest part of worship.

But how is it that a vocational activity can be taken as a worship that plays a spiritual role? Given the two aforementioned features of vocation, namely, removing the obstacles of a person's development and providing a source of self-esteem, the spiritual roles of vocational activity are made clear. This is because getting close to God is associated with personal development and self-esteem. God is introduced in Islam as the main source of perfection and pride; then, whoever is closer to this source would be a person with more perfection and self-esteem.

On the whole, in the Islamic education, a meaning is given to vocational activity according to which human development, self-esteem, and spirituality are involved in this activity. Thus, vocational education requires that pupils take such a grasp of this activity.

Principle 2: Transcending Lower Motives in Vocational Activity

The second principle in vocational education is related to the emotive layer of action. According to this principle, the person's lower inclinations should be transcended. In Islamic education, this transcendence involves three realms of inclinations: toward oneself, toward others, and toward God.

As for the inclination toward oneself, greed should be replaced with contentment. Greed is a disease in which the instrument takes the position of the end. Income is an instrument, and no doubt

an important one, for satisfying the needs. However, when providing income turns into an end and is valued for its own self, the vice of greed is going to be established. Thus, in Islamic education contentment in business is valued and greed is undermined. Thus, Imam Ali ibn Abi Talib states: "Deficiency of wisdom is due to wanting the surplus" (Tamimi Amedi 1987, p. 476). This indicates that vocational education involves the management of one's desires in relation to greed.

When it comes to inclinations toward others, Islamic vocational education involves being trustee about others' belongings and sensitive to their deprivations. Concerning the trustiness, the Qur'an mentions approvingly the statement of Ischia's daughter to his father about the employment of Moses because he is trustee and powerful (Qur'an, 28: 26). As for sensitivity to others' deprivations, any urgent social needs is introduced in Islam as a necessity that calls every person of the society to address it. The prophet of Islam, for instance, during the establishment of the first Muslim society in Medina, stated: "Anyone who starts a day while he or she does not attempt to address the affairs of Muslims, he or she is not a Muslim" (Kolaini 1984, Vol. 2, p. 164).

There is an intriguing point in the relation between the two types of abovementioned inclinations. While contentment is desirable in personal inclinations, sensitivity to others' deprivations might require excess work to address social deprivations. This seemingly contradictory relation between the two types of inclinations is in fact one of the most difficult tasks of vocational education. The ideal state is that people be contempt as far as their personal needs are concerned, whereas in their relation to others, it is desirable that they be greedy in addressing social needs. No doubt, the first state of human's inclinations is at odds with this, but the goal of transcending the inclinations is to change the direction.

Finally, in terms of inclination toward God, vocational education in Islam requires that people do not get overwhelmed by desires of sale and purchase so that they forget the remembrance of God. As mentioned above, business itself is taken in Islam as a way of worshipping God. Thus, business should always be compatible and even

identified with worship. However, when it becomes incompatible or worse an obstacle for the remembrance of God, then the business is not the desired one. Referring to this, it is stated: "By men not distracted from the remembrance of God either by trade and commerce or buying and selling..." (Qur'an, 24: 37). That is why in some Muslim countries when the time of prayer comes up, people leave their business and do their prayers. This is to show that their business is compatible and in congruence with worshipping of God.

The upshot of the second principle in vocational education is to transcend pupils' inclinations at the three personal, social, and divine levels.

Principle 3: Supporting the Will to Work

The third principle of vocational education relates to the volitional layer of action. An educated person in the realm of vocational activity in the Islamic view is who has got a will to work. A will to work is different from avoiding laziness and undergoing work. The two latter cases are negative, whereas the former is positive, that is, to say, in those two cases work itself is not desirable, but it is tolerated; however, in the desired state, work itself is valuable. According to this principle, the desirable is to reach the point of will to work, but we usually deal with journey from bottom to top, from avoiding the negative states to embracing the positive state. In vocational education, laziness should be abandoned, and works should be undergone with the hope that the person reach the point where a positive will to work is achieved.

Wooziness and weakness are strongly undermined in Islam. For instance, Imam Ali ibn Abi Talib states: "People whose weaknesses continue their aspirations decline" (Tamimi Amedi 1987, Vol. 5, p. 187). When the will to work is achieved, its important advantage is that it safes the person from alienation. When there is a distance between people and their works, they are alienated from their works, they do not enjoy what they do, and they live in two different and contrasted worlds. However, having the will to work, people are unified with their works. Even though every person prefers one job to the other, when it is not possible to have the preferred job, he

or she having the will to work would do the work with full engagement.

Principle 4: Comprehensive Appraisal of Vocational Activity

So far the internal layers of vocational activity are addressed. However, the consequences of vocational activity are also relevant in achieving the desirable state in vocational education. Without taking these consequences into account, vocational education cannot save the person from being overwhelmed by subjectivity. There are four types of consequences for a vocational activity: an immediate one on the doer, one on other people, one on the environment, and a mediated one on the person through appraising the last three types of consequences.

In Islamic vocational education, the fourth principle concerns a comprehensive appraisal of vocational activity. The comprehensive appraisal concerns the first three types of consequences, and the result of each appraisal or all of the appraisals would affect the action and would lead to the fourth type of consequence. The appraisal in the first type of consequence can show how an action by itself strengthens its foundations. This type of appraisal can show how an activity is constructive or destructive of the person depending on the characteristics of the activity. For instance, a vocation that needs precision, such as pilotage, makes you accurate in the long run as a vocation that involves violence, such as butchery, can make you violent in the long run. It is interesting to note that, when there is a choice, some of the vocations are not recommended in Islam such as butchery and working in a mortuary. The appraisal in the second and third type of consequence makes it possible to see the positive or negative effects of a vocational activity on people and the environment. Having considered the results of appraisals, people can have an opportunity for changing their activities if needed.

Conclusion

An important problem in vocational education has been a skill-oriented view which stems from a

reductive account of education. This trend can also be observed in the so-called new vocationalism in which there is an intention to blur the borders of theoretical and practical education. The remedy of this problem has been sought in the literature by appealing to a distinction between training and education and emphasizing the general education.

This entry addresses the problem of vocational education from the standpoint of Islamic education. There is a potentiality in the Islamic view to deal with the problem of vocational education. This potentiality resides in the agency Islam holds for human being. What distinguishes action from a mere behavior in Islamic view can be sought at least in three sorts of underlying layers of behavior. These layers contain cognitive, emotional, and volitional contents. Relying on this account, four principles are suggested for vocational education. The first principle dealing with the cognitive foundation is concerned with giving meaning to vocational activity. The second principle addressing the emotional foundation holds that motivations of vocational activity need to be transcended from a low personal to high personal and social and divine level. The third principle suggests supporting a will to work in pupils. Finally, the fourth principle deals with a comprehensive appraisal of consequences of vocational activity and enriching it thereby.

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Islamic Philosophy of Education

► [Islam and the Philosophy of Education: The Three Approaches](#)

Issues in the Aesthetics of Educational Administration

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Synonyms

[Organizational culture](#); [Principles of beauty](#); [Sensory experience](#); [Somaesthetics](#)

Introduction

Aesthetics is the fourth branch of philosophy. It has only recently become relevant to practitioners and scholars in educational administration, most presciently with the rise and importance of organizational culture and aesthetics emerging critically to the success or failure of educational change and reform. This entry presents a brief overview of the nature of aesthetics in schools and

educational institutions as well as a description of the actions administrators take of an aesthetic nature.

The Nature of Aesthetics

Aesthetics is grounded in the human body's sensory experiences. It involves taste, touch, smell, perception and sound; the entire human sense-making capacity intimately interconnected to intellectual development and theorizing. It has been called "human world making" (Laird 2013, p. 49). The range of areas of aesthetics began as a focus on theories of art fusing painting, music, dance, sculpture, and poetry into a single field of philosophy in the eighteenth century. Named by Alexander Baumgarten in his *Reflections of Poetry* (1735), aesthetics was derived from the Greek *aisthanomai* which meant "to perceive" (Feagin 1999, p. 12).

Today aesthetics has greatly expanded its purview. Newly grounded theories, called *somaesthetics*, center on the full range of sensory experiences and self-fashioning practices including yoga, martial arts, aerobics, clothing and cosmetic fashions including jewelry and the application of body tattoos (Shusterman 2008). A study of the theory and criticism of such practices consists of *pragmatic somaesthetics*, especially as it relates to specific normative or prescriptive actionable contexts.

The link from this expanded perspective of aesthetics to educational administration surfaced as researchers and policy developers in the field became interested in how schools could be changed. It became obvious that change in educational settings was more than making a rational case for doing things differently. They understood that change was only partially an intellectual and rational process. It also involved how groups worked together and the norms they shared and how those norms impacted their collective behavior. Within such collectivities, individuals would be permitted or bound, overtly or tacitly, by the norms approved by the whole collectivity. This perspective came to be designated by early change agents as "the cultural perspective" (Firestone and Corbett 1988, p. 338). It is now encapsulated by the notion that "The administration of education is

therefore in part the administration of culture that through its construction and allocation of aesthetic, symbolic or culture capital serves to administer and perpetuate social hierarchy. The role of educational administrators is to preside over systems and institutions that structure and allocate access to aesthetic experience in particular socially conservative ways, thus matching the possess of economic capital” (Samier et al. 1999, p. 11). Organizational culture can be considered a kind of grammar in which individual speech actions occur. It represents the “deep structure” of linguistic expression. It shapes the formulation of thought and provides a kind of coded boundary for both linguistic content and possible administrative actions.

Organizational Culture as Aesthetic Expression

Schein (1992) has indicated that there are three levels of organizational culture. Paraphrased they are: (1) artifacts which are the most visible of organizational aspect of organizational life, but which may have multiple meanings and interpretations; (2) espoused values which are comprised of goals, objectives, and philosophies as common justifications; and (3) tacit, unconscious thoughts and feelings which are the springboard of values and ultimately actions.

In schools, some artifacts would be mission statements which are sometimes posted on the walls in staffrooms or in the school’s administration foyer that encapsulate the special function or purpose of the institution. Other artifacts might be a stated educational philosophy that appears in the school’s prospectus or school website. School mottos such as “strive to excel,” “we all smile in the same language,” and “concern, love and justice” send a strong message as to what the school stands for and what it values. Yet some artifacts are hard to decipher although easily visible. For example, the selection of a school mascot or team name. What does it mean when a school says it is the home of the “Fighting Mustangs”? To an outside observer this announcement might connote an aggressive pursuit of victories in some

forms of athletic or academic competition. To an insider it may connote a shared common set of values around a struggle to educate the most difficult of the pupil population being served by the school.

Espoused values usually begin with someone such as the school principal proposing a stance on addressing educational, social, philosophical, or political issues. Indeed, according to Schein (1992), this juncture is the connection between leadership and culture, the indispensable act of the school administrator considered essential for creating a framework for institutional purposing. Such values may be articulated in a vision as a condition that “ought to be” in the world or in the school. They remain simply an individual’s perspective until and unless a group moves to realize the vision to try and bring it into reality. The process of bridging from individual values to shared values involves a transformative process which moves from shared values to shared assumptions. Schein (1992) avers that not all shared assumptions survive an institutional adoption. Only those that demonstrate consistency are able to do that. Those that deal with aesthetic or moral issues are the most difficult to confirm as a shared value to become a common base of shared assumptions. They often lack accurate definition and reside in shades of meaning where ambiguity is present and discernment is slippery. However, when they reach the point where they are no longer questioned and become taken for granted assertions, the organization has worked through the third and final stage of the transformation process. At this stage, members of the group often find any other alternative assumption or value inconceivable. The values supporting these assumptions are extremely difficult if not impossible to change because to alter them threatens to destabilize the entire unit. Challenges of this sort are often considered heresies and met with defensiveness, denial, and/or social ostracism of skeptics, doubters, or violators. Administrators who depend upon the stability of their organization to survive may find their first task is to protect the social stability of their unit. The dissolution of such stability may find the administrative leader thrown into the role of a conformist and chief protector of the status quo.

A more detailed perspective of organizational culture involves the nature of the shared assumptions including how truth is determined, the nature of time and space, the nature of human nature and human activity, and the nature of human relationships. A second and important aspect of organizational culture involves the actions of the educational administrator and how that individual functions and what he/she consistently pays attention to.

There are many ways groups may discern the nature of truth. They range from received dogma based on tradition or religious absolutism, rational-legal mechanisms embedded in bureaucratic functionalism, truth based on scientific method, truth by what works as a kind of temporal pragmatism, and truth as a way of sense or world making of an aesthetic nature. In this latter category, an aesthetic competence is required for the administrator to create and apply images and symbols and to engage in and support rituals, legends, and ceremonies that formulate, fixate, and sustain social coherence and provide a context of meaning for them.

Organizational culture also hinges on shared assumptions regarding the nature of time. Some cultures are centered on the past, some primarily in the present, and some, those of the Western, industrialized world live in the future. This is the reason for such aesthetic constructs as mission and vision statements regarding the future and philosophies centered on desired states of existence or of organized performance that are embodiments of a desired not yet realized state. Such constructs serve to describe a kind of secular *promised land* and are found in some religious doctrines assuring one's arrival in a heaven, nirvana, or some other utopian place. The existence of such a future desired location is then related to a possible range of actions which will result in the arrival at the sought for destination. Inevitably in many cases, the future state is described in aesthetic terms and understood in such terms. They involve perception and feelings of the senses, that is, what it will feel like when one has entered the kingdom of heaven. Such expressions of administrative aesthetics are "all children are learning" or "every child finds happiness and satisfaction

with himself/herself" are sensory statements. Within the perspective of time lie related symmetries such as whether time is considered as a kind of linear ribbon or whether it is symbolically multidimensional. The phrase, "one thing at time" or "tick the box" is a monochromatic conceptualization of time, whereas simultaneous actions are polychromatic and many tasks of a different nature can be undertaken all at once. Likewise whether one is "late" or "early" or "on time" is similarly linked. Being late in monochromatic time is different than in polychromatic time.

Another dimension of administrative aesthetics involves shared assumptions regarding the nature of space. Space has a powerful symbolic meaning in organizations. Consider that the executive space is normally larger as one proceeds up the administrative hierarchy. The enlargement of space often accompanies an expansion of administrative authority. The higher one goes in the organization, the higher the spatial position on the respective floors of the organization. The chief executive often resides on the very top floor of institution. For this reason, one of the most crucial aesthetic decisions made in institutions is architectural. The construction of space is a time honored functional way to convey administrative power, status, and reach. Administrators with the most power often have corner offices with a wide view complete with more expensive furniture and art decorations than lower-paid employees who have smaller offices or perhaps simply cubicles in one large room without the benefit of complete wall to ceiling offices that ensure any form of privacy.

Another form of sensory knowledge concerns how to comport one's body to display forms or rituals of deference and subordinate demeanor as for example who to bow to, how to disagree with a superior, and where to sit at a conference table for a meeting. These are the aesthetic dimensions of organizational life. Another form of aesthetic knowledge is distance and displacement of oneself in a spatial way within a hierarchy of power as well as the tone and loudness of one's voice. There are several types of spatial distance involved with interpersonal conduct. The distance for intimate discourse is much closer than for normal personal discourse. Likewise, addressing a group of people

in a meeting or an audience of a hundred or more is still much more extended. Such distances are not formally taught but learned in social situations. Think of a time when you were in a restaurant and parents of a child had to keep shushing a child who was speaking too loudly or making a fuss. What they are teaching is the proper spatial relationships for different types of social discourse.

Administrative Actions of an Aesthetic Nature

Educational administrators take actions on a broad array of aesthetic dimensions in schools and educational institutions. Some examples are provided below.

1. *Organizational decision and physical structural determinations* (architectural aesthetics) – Schools are “cultural artifacts” that exist long after the individuals who designed them are gone. Schools constructed on the factory model are now being replaced by schools for smaller learning communities supported by collaborative instructional practices and technology (Lackney 2011). This dimension refers to architectural and ergonomic decisions made by educational administrators about how visible, accessible, or private they wish to be to others in the organization and which types of learning/teaching arrangements are to assume priority over others.
2. *Designated systems and routine procedures* – This dimension refers to a set of actions that are not creative but essentially technical and managerial in nature but still essential for the smooth sailing of the organization. Decisions made in this area are called pragmatic aesthetics because they involve normative and prescriptive practices. They may involve such areas as student dress codes, school schedules and classroom manners, courtesies and rules. Other areas may include procedures for budget development and the allocation of resources and the development of various forms of planning, from strategic to monthly or daily.
3. *Organizational rituals, rites, and ceremonies* – In contrast to designated systems and routine procedures, this dimension refers to actions that reveal educational administrators as performers who preside over important rituals and ceremonies, shaping the organization’s purpose. Rituals reveal and communicate a range of cultural assumptions held by individuals and groups, and they serve to reinforce organizational priorities. Sometimes rituals, rites, and ceremonies can be very powerful symbolic exchanges and reinforce deeply held values shared by all.
4. *Organizational myths, stories, and legends about people and events* – This aesthetic dimension refers to the significant and inspirational stories told by educational administrators and others in the organization that celebrate personal and professional triumphs and provide a forum for reflection on challenges and adversity that later become myths and legends. These human centered stories provide a sense of shared meaning and understanding and contribute to an organization’s collective memory, becoming enshrined in its history. This permits newcomers to the organization to gain an understanding of their membership in it and to realize how they fit into longer and more cherished patterns of communal work.
5. *Formal statements regarding philosophy, mission, and visions for the future* – This aesthetic dimension refers to visible artifacts in which educational administrators work with and through others to share and negotiate meanings about the bigger purposes of the organization now and in the future. Such statements, sometimes referred to as an ideology, are necessary to explain and justify the actions of the organization. They are comprised of three essential assertions: (1) statements which illuminate the circumstances in which the organization acts and which rest on its moral values believed to be ultimate; (2) statements about the purpose of the organization and its structure; (3) statements regarding how the purposes are to be attained within the circumstances and context in which it is located. These statements serve to

create unity with the organization, and “they bind the members to the organization and to one another in respect of the fact that they assert, presumably, what each member takes to be the case” (Dunham 1964, p. 17). *Personal role modeling, mentoring, recruitment, and promotion* – This set of aesthetic actions refers not only to educational administrators who mentor and provide support to others by setting an example through their own personal and authentic behaviors but also ensures that key practices valued by the organization are manifested in fair and transparent human resource decisions pertaining to recruitment, selection, and promotion of staff. Leaders are observed both formally and informally by subordinates. Of the two, informal observations are more potent and powerful for others to learn and emulate (Schein 1992, p. 241). The demonstrated behaviors of a leader do much to provide an example of what is actually valued and will lead to advancement in the organization. Those who are congruent with the formal statements of organizational purpose provide visible role models for their realization in the day to day operations of it. Role models are perhaps the most ancient exemplar of aesthetic teaching and coaching in the human social world.

Aesthetic Dimensions of Research in Educational Administration

In addition to the aesthetic dimensions of administrative decision making in schools and educational institutions, certain research methods about educational administration also embrace aesthetics, specifically with ethnographies and portraiture. Ethnographies are attempts at producing contextualized descriptions with the intent of deriving from them an understanding of actions taken by administrators from an insider’s perspective. The idea behind ethnography is to discern situated meaning, that is, understanding within interaction and context. Ethnography begins with observation first and then derives

meaning from those observations secondly. One of the first full ethnographies of an educational administrator was written by Harry Wolcott (1973) entitled *The Man in the Principal’s Office*. This ethnographic mile marker was filled with aesthetic images and messages. For example, there was an entire entry on the principal as a person “behind many masks” as well as the search for stability within role ambiguity of an elementary school principal. A decade later, compelling ethnographic portraits were also produced by Sara Lawrence Lightfoot (1983) on six public and private secondary school principals. The descriptions of these leaders are vivid examples of the fecundity of aesthetic analyses to understand styles of administrative performance and communication, how social relations around ideals, values, and emotions are acted out in the symbolic and linguistic lives of educational administrators, and how their organizations are constructed through aesthetic means and activities.

Cross-References

- ▶ [Aesthetic Education](#)
- ▶ [Heidegger and Wonder](#)
- ▶ [Reconsidering Aesthetics and Everyday Life](#)

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John Locke's Thoughts on Education

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Introduction

John Locke (1632–1704) was a British philosopher, medical doctor, economist, political theorist, psychologist, and biblical exegete who made impressive contributions in many areas of inquiry. In 1693, after writing extensively on topics such as human understanding, government, economics, and toleration, he published his influential book *Some Thoughts Concerning Education*. The book followed an established tradition of British instructional books for parents seeking guidance on child rearing. These books were not philosophical treatises, and it is important to understand that Locke's book was not meant to be a systematic philosophical work. In fact, it is based on a series of letters to his friend, Edward Clarke, who sought advice from Locke regarding his son's education (despite the fact that Locke was a bachelor with no children). To be sure, it has observations that are quite systematic. For example, he delineates stages of educational curriculum and psychological development. But these should be taken as guides for further inquiry rather than dogmatic models to be applied without sensitivity to the particular circumstances. John Locke was

an empiricist – someone who thinks all knowledge must be directly or indirectly derived from sense experience – and as a result he placed the concept of the *particular* at the center of his philosophy. John and Jean Yolton explain the relevance of this concept for Locke's pedagogy:

The centrality given by Locke to particulars in his metaphysical system is reflected in his account of persons and in his work on education. Each child is to be dealt with individually; children have particular traits, biases, humours, tempers, a bent and a tendency of their minds. Locke urged the tutor and the parents to pay careful attention to these natural dispositions, for they must be reckoned with in rearing children. Some can be altered to some extent, others can perhaps be replaced, but by and large the tutor must work around them. (Yolton and Yolton 1989, 14)

So we must keep in mind Locke's empirical effort to be sensitive to context and avoid generalization. As the title of the book makes clear, he is sharing some thoughts on education with us, and these thoughts, appropriately enough, flow from his close engagement with one child. Thus, it is no wonder that he writes in the concluding paragraph "there are a thousand other things that may need consideration; especially if one should take in the various tempers, different inclinations, and particular defaults, that are to be found in children; and prescribe proper remedies." [All textual quotations will be from the 1824 Rivington edition with modernized English.]

It does not take long to see why *Some Thoughts Concerning Education* was one of the most

important and popular books on the topic for over a century in England (it was published in 21 English editions in the eighteenth century alone). Locke's work is full of fascinating examples and rich descriptions that make you want to keep reading. He also addresses education in relation to a wide variety of topics such as health, authority, virtue, trade, travel, the equality of the sexes, play, the social and physical context of learning, and the various subjects of study. No overview can do justice to the complexity of Locke's insights on all these topics. But I think they can be philosophically illuminated if we focus on three more general and fundamental topics: (1) the development of self-discipline through esteem and disgrace rather than force or reward; (2) the significance of developing a good character; and (3) the importance of developing reason in a child by treating the child as a rational being. Locke's thoughts on these topics were quite revolutionary and controversial at the time. For example, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, while acknowledging his debt to Locke's book, argued that children should not be treated as rational beings. Today, of course, these themes may strike us as humane and sensible. Nonetheless, we will see there are still some controversial implications for us to consider. I will focus on one in particular: Locke's belief that the pupil's mind is like a piece of wax that passively receives simple ideas from the active educator.

Self-Discipline

Locke begins his book by noting that a sound mind in a sound body is the formula for happiness. The problem is that nature rarely supplies an individual with both; thus one needs education to acquire physical and mental fortitude. Locke writes in paragraph 33:

As the strength of the body lies chiefly in being able to endure hardships, so also does that of the mind. And the great principle and foundation of all virtue and worth is placed in this, that a man is able to deny himself his own desires, cross his own inclinations, and purely follow what reason directs is best, though the appetite lean the other way.

Locke's "great principle," that which allows one to cross one's inclinations, is self-discipline. But in order to achieve such discipline one must first *be* disciplined: "The great mistake I have observed in people's breeding their children has been, that this has not been taken care enough of its due season; that the mind has not been made obedient to discipline, and pliant to reason, when at first it was most tender, most easy to be bowed" (para. 34). However, parents typically err by being too lenient or too strict. Either extreme prevents a child from growing up as an adult with self-discipline. For a spoiled child will end up having no mastery over inclinations and a severely disciplined child will lose the vigorous, self-confident spirit necessary to amount to something in the world. What is needed is a *balance*:

To avoid the danger that is on either hand is the great art: and he that has found a way to keep up a child's spirit, easy, active, and free; and yet, at the same time, to restrain him, from the many things he has a mind to; and to draw him to the things that are uneasy to him; he, I say, that knows how to reconcile these seeming contradictions, has, in my opinion, got the true secret of education. (para. 46)

But how can we approach this secret? How can we reconcile these seeming contradictions? Well, one approach is physical punishment or *the rod*. This common chastisement is the most unfit of any to be used in education insofar as it: (1) leads to no mastery over our inclination to indulge corporeal pleasure and avoid pain but rather encourages it; (2) leads to an aversion of what the tutor is trying to get the student to be interested in; (3) leads to the development of a "slavish temper"; and (4) leads to a timid creature who has no spirit and will therefore be "useless to himself and others" (para. 51). All four criticisms are united by the same insight: the rod ends up producing and/or strengthening the faulty disposition it was employed to remove. As a result the rod is self-defeating as a means of developing the discipline that leads to self-discipline.

Perhaps children will work and obey if they have some *reward* in view rather than punishment? But then children do not learn the material *for the sake of the material* but for the sake of the

reward. And, insofar as rewards typically play to the appetites, they are inconsistent with the general function of education: to engender a mind that can resist inclinations. Of course, the question arises: “But you take away the rod on the one hand, and these little encouragements, which they are taken with, on the other; how then (will you say) shall children be governed?” (para. 54).

Locke's answer comes to us in paragraph 56: the incentives of *esteem and disgrace*. Disgracing a child entails casting a cold shoulder and using the silent treatment when a child does wrong. It can also entail making a child experience shame in front of others. These methods are effective since children neither want to be left out nor feel ashamed. Conversely, esteem leads to acceptance, recognition, and productive social cooperation insofar as children do not want their actions to go unrecognized. The important thing to grasp is that esteem and disgrace can *indirectly* develop *self-discipline* since children have opportunities to *reflect upon* the consequences of their behavior. And this self-discipline can allow children to begin to *educate themselves*. This is fortunate since the ultimate function of a tutor “is not so much to teach him all that is knowable, as to raise in him a love and esteem of knowledge; and to put him in the right way of knowing and improving himself, when he has a mind to it” (para. 195).

Reason and Character

The second and third themes that run through Locke's work are the development of reason and character. Character is developed by imitation – especially imitation of the tutor who should exhibit the virtues she would impart – and repetition until a task no longer depends on memory or reflection. Locke stresses that such repetition should start at an early age. For when a child is young one can implant all the good habits and rules necessary for further development (para. 64). Of course, we should recall here that Locke is committed to the concept of the particular and was sensitive to what inclinations a pupil brings to any learning experience. Moreover, he believed

there is a set of natural faculties common to all humans such as reason, understanding, memory, and sensation. These inclinations and faculties provide limits an educator must respect. But the fact remains that for Locke the early ages of childhood are when the proper foundations for future growth are most easily established. In order to properly establish these foundations, Locke recommends children stay at home with their tutors rather than going away to boarding school. In doing so, they can learn in a context far more free and pleasurable than the compulsory and burdensome environment of school. Education, for Locke, should not be a matter of force; it should activate the love of learning and make the subject matter enjoyable (para. 72–74). We should note here that Locke always has this tutor/pupil relationship in mind as he writes – a relationship only accessible to well-off families. But with a little imagination we can see how his insights can translate into other pedagogical contexts (Cahn 1997, 144). Indeed, Locke did just this when he investigated how to bring education to the poor in his *Essay on the Poor Law* (1697).

One of the most important habits in the development of self-discipline is the habit of reasoning well. Why? Because it is the habit that allows other good habits to be formed. Of course, the question arises: *can* one reason with a child? Rousseau and other romantics did not think so: to reason with a youth is to impose those adult-like constraints that rob childhood of its innocence and wild freedom. But Locke disagrees:

It will perhaps be wondered, that I mention reasoning with children and yet I cannot but think that the true way of dealing with them. They understand it as early as they do language; and, if I misobserve not, they love to be treated as rational creatures sooner than is imagined. It is a pride should be cherished in them, and, as much as can be, made the greatest instrument to turn them by. (para. 81)

Locke does not expect one to reason with a child like one would with an adult. Yet, he thinks a teacher should find the appropriate level of discourse and situate herself there. The point is to *treat children as rational beings so they become rational*: “The sooner you treat him as a man, the

sooner he will begin to be one: and if you admit him into serious discourses sometimes with you, you will insensibly raise his mind above the usual amusements of youth, and those trifling occupations which it is commonly wasted upon" (para. 95). For children, according to Locke, are curious; therefore, a good teacher will be one who can activate this natural curiosity and satiate it by giving answers that are true, clear, and understandable within the sphere of the child's experience. These answers should be accompanied by *reasons* and, wherever possible, *inspire* a student's desire to learn by discovering more and more reasons.

It is crucial to understand that the development of reason for Locke was a means to understanding the natural moral law, established by God, which serves as the ground for moral prescriptions and natural rights (see his *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, 2.28.8). By becoming rational, the student is therefore humanized and can, on the one hand, participate in a civilized community and, on the other hand, flourish as an individual. But the natural moral law is not only something to be eventually known by students; it also provides the moral imperative to educate students in the first place (para. 34). Children have a natural right to education and the natural law grounds this right. These mutually enforcing factors help us see just how closely connected Locke's thoughts on character and reason are to the natural law tradition and the values of the Enlightenment. It should be noted that these thoughts allowed Locke to see farther than most on the issue of gender equality. In a 1685 letter to Mrs. Clarke, mother of the boy Locke was tutoring, he wrote that the education of her daughter would require no substantial adjustment due to her rational mind's shared capacity for truth and virtue: "since therefore I acknowledge no difference of sex in your mind relating . . . to truth, virtue and obedience, I think well to have no thing altered . . ." (Axtell 1968, 344). In the end, Locke hopes education will develop persons who have virtues such as civility (para. 145), feelings of humanity (117), generosity (110), gracefulness of voice and gestures (143), honor (56), humility (145), industry (70, 94), kindness (139), love of

God (136), love of study (128), modesty (70), politeness (117), prudence (91), reverence (44), self-control (48), self-denial (45), and self-restraint (38, 39). Some vices to avoid developing are domineering (103), hasty judgment (122), hypocrisy (50), indolence (123), lies (131, 133), malice (100), negligence (141), rashness (115), sheepish bashfulness (141), stubbornness (111, 112), and timidity (115) (Yolton and Yolton 1989, 22–23). These insights provide a helpful vantage point from which to understand and connect Locke's various prescriptions regarding the topics mentioned earlier: travel, health, work, play, trade, and so on. In each case, it will be a matter of seeing how certain practices support or thwart the development of virtue. I will let Locke's words, which link this discussion of reason and virtue to the previous overview of self-discipline, close this section:

These are my present thoughts concerning learning and accomplishments. The great business of all is virtue and wisdom.

Nullum numen abest, si sit prudentia.

[No heavenly power is wanting if there is wisdom]

Teach him to get a mastery over his inclinations, and submit his appetite to reason. This being obtained, and by constant practice settled into habit, the hardest part of the task is over. To bring a young man to this, I know nothing which so much contributes, as the love of praise and commendation, which should therefore be instilled into him by all arts imaginable. Make his mind as sensible of credit and shame as may be: and when you have done that, you have put a principle into him, which will influence his actions, when you are not by; to which the fear of a little smart of a rod is not comparable; and which will be the proper stock, whereon afterwards to graft the true principles of morality and religion. (para. 200)

A Few Tensions

It is to be expected that a work proclaiming to be some thoughts on a subject will leave us with internal or implied difficulties a more formal treatise might be expected to avoid. I will quickly mention a few before moving to one in detail. First, Locke thinks reason should have the ability to deny our appetites so we can gain self-discipline. But he also argues in various places

that we are essentially hedonists motivated to seek pleasure and avoid pain (*Essay concerning Human Understanding*, 2.7.3). Can we expect reason to succeed given this hedonistic theory of the good? Second, Locke's strong emphasis on social esteem, social integration, and natural law may foster conservative dispositions potentially at odds with his commitment to a liberal society populated by critical citizens. Third, Locke's vision of education as a means to character development for the sake of citizens in a liberal social order appears to conflict with modern liberal social arrangements that, unlike illiberal ones, try to limit or remove the development of virtue in public education. Fourth, Locke's Enlightenment vision of education forming rational citizens seems, on the one hand, to apply to a relatively few individuals who have the luxury of a tutor and, on the other hand, needs to apply to far more people if it is to be successful. It has been pointed out that Locke's optimism, while not overlooking the inevitability of human bias, habit, and prejudice, seems to have underestimated people's capacity for political evil and fanaticism (Tarcov and Grant 1996, xii). But are not such capacities to be expected given the limited scope of his pedagogical vision? And fifth, Locke's emphasis on the social utility of education led him to be very critical of the arts and humanities if these things are pursued for their own sake. Everything we learn must have a demonstrable use in a social context: no idle metaphysical speculation or mastering archaic languages! This position is understandable given Locke's modern agenda, influenced by Francis Bacon, of sweeping away scholastic metaphysics and emphasizing science and practical skills. But then, the question arises: Was not Locke the one telling us to avoid giving rewards for learning lest we make learning a mere means to an end? It seems clear that Locke's emphasis on reason and utility prevented him from adequately addressing how creativity, imagination, and esthetics, topics more readily embraced in the romantic era, play a crucial role in education. It is remarkable to see how similar issues regarding the value of the arts in education continue to be an important topic of debate.

These tensions can, perhaps, be resolved with the resources of the text and/or by integrating insights on education Locke gives us elsewhere, for example, in a work posthumously published in 1706 entitled *Of the Conduct of the Understanding* (see Tarcov and Grant 1996) or his three other unpublished manuscripts on education (Yolton and Yolton 1989, 67–68). But there is another tension commonly associated with Locke's book that is worth considering in some detail. In Book II of his *Essay concerning Human Understanding* Locke writes:

Our observation employed either about external sensible objects, or about the internal operations of our minds perceived and reflected upon by ourselves, is that which supplies our understanding with all the materials for thinking. These two are the fountains of our knowledge, from whence all the ideas we have, or can naturally have, do spring. (2.2.2)

Unlike philosophers committed to rationalism, Locke argued there are no innate ideas or ideas present in the mind from birth. Ideas come only after we engage in sense experience and reflect on that experience. Now there are, as we have seen, innate *faculties* – such as understanding and memory – as well as personality *dispositions*. Some of these dispositions of character even come from God: “God has stamped certain characters upon men's minds, which, like their shapes, may perhaps be a little mended; but can hardly be totally altered and transformed into the contrary” (para. 66). But in the *Essay* Locke argues that at birth our mind is like a sheet of white paper (2.1.2) or an empty cabinet (1.2.15) as far as *ideas* are concerned. This is not to say that all ideas come ready made into the mind: Locke certainly makes room, contrary to what some commentators have said, for the powers of imagination and creativity in his philosophy of mind: without these powers we could not manipulate the simple ideas given in sense perception and form complex ideas out of them. But it is to say that *all* the elements of our ideas ultimately originate in sense perception. This, of course, calls to mind the famous, or perhaps infamous, *tabula rasa* doctrine – the doctrine of the mind as a blank slate. But it is imperative to note that Locke did not actually use the

phrase “*tabula rasa*” in his *Essay*; it has been attributed to him by critics going as far back as G. W. Leibniz. And, unfortunately, the doctrine typically attributed to Locke states that the mind is without structure, dispositions, and essential nature – and this, as we have seen, is simply false.

Locke's theory of mind and its close connection with his empirical epistemology can have profound pedagogical consequences. Consider this passage from paragraph 167: “It should therefore be the skill and art of the teacher, to clear their heads of other thoughts, whilst they are learning of anything, the better to make room for what he would instill into them, that it may be received with attention and application, without which it leaves no impression.” And: “Keep the mind in an easy calm temper, when you will have it receive your instructions, or any increase of knowledge. It is as impossible to draw fair and regular characters on a trembling mind, as on shaking paper.” At one point Locke actually refers to his pupil as a piece of paper or wax: “I considered [the son] only as white paper, or wax, to be molded and fashioned as one pleases” (para. 216). In the *Essay*, a connection between passivity and simple ideas is made that illuminates these passages. Locke claims that a simple idea is one “in itself uncompounded, contains in it nothing but *one uniform Appearance*, or Conception in the Mind, and is not distinguishable into different *Ideas*” (2.2.2). And, importantly, the mind “is wholly passive in the reception of all its simple *Ideas*” (2.12.1). So we see that learning, given this model of the mind in relation to its acquisition of simple ideas, will be most successful when the paper is clean, the wax is smooth, and the cabinet is empty. Only then can the educator instill simple ideas into the pupil's passive mind leaving a lasting impression.

Now this approach may be appropriate in certain circumstances. But can this model of the active educator stamping the passive mind of a pupil be embraced as a general principle of acquiring ideas? Well, Locke, as we have seen, supported the effort to see each student as a particular individual with various unique and innate traits. And his theory of the mind, as we have seen, does make room for the mind's activity as

it forms complex ideas and applies what it learns. Locke was all for active experimentation, investigation, and criticism – he was not advocating a general passivity in his pedagogical theory. But it appears that his descriptions of the mind fail to do justice to the mind's *active role in acquiring* simple ideas. By way of contrast, consider this passage from John Dewey's *Democracy and Education* (1916) in which Dewey presents the “educational moral” of ideas as anticipations of possible solutions:

It is that no thought, no idea, can possibly be conveyed as an idea from one person to another. When it is told, it is, to the one to whom it is told, another given fact, not an idea. The communication may stimulate the other person to realize the question for himself and to think out a like idea, or it may smother his intellectual interest and suppress his dawning effort at thought. But what he *directly* gets is not an idea. Only by wrestling with the conditions of the problem first hand, seeking and finding his own way out, does he think. (Dewey 1985, 166)

Here, we see that the acquisition of any idea is the outcome of an active and problematic engagement with materials. For Dewey, the mind is active in the acquisition of facts. But it must be all the more active if it is to acquire an idea based on these facts. The pupil's active engagement is the condition for the possibility of an educator indirectly facilitating the grasp of a new idea. If the basic thrust of Dewey's vision is correct – or at least correct in some important cases – then Locke's pedagogical strategies may prove inconsistent with theories of the mind that stress the active acquisition of ideas, even simple ideas.

We can also argue that a pedagogy emphasizing the active acquisition of ideas would prove fruitful in ways consistent with Locke's social and political commitments. Wouldn't this kind of pedagogy have positive political consequences? Locke, of course, was an eloquent and influential supporter of democracy. But at times it can be difficult to reconcile a pedagogy that makes room for minds as passive receptacles with the critical involvement so integral to a thriving democratic society. Wouldn't this form of passive reception, over the years, develop habits more conducive to obeying authority than questioning

it? And wouldn't these habits then thwart the rational development of children? Maybe not if we take into account Locke's overall emphasis on the development of rational autonomy and the many practices to bring it about. It may be that the passive acquiring of simple ideas is not really such a threat given these practices. Whatever the case may be, these are important questions that need to be addressed by any serious consideration of his pedagogy.

Conclusion

Locke should be admired for his holistic, rational, and humane pedagogy that seeks to develop virtuous individuals and productive citizens. His keen psychological insights, sympathy, and common sense can still be used to challenge ineffective pedagogical and parental strategies. Even the limitations and tensions in his work – and there are many as we have seen – can be instructive and can help us think more profoundly about those “thousand other things that may need consideration; especially if one should take in the various tempers, different inclinations, and particular defaults, that are to be found in children; and prescribe proper remedies.” I think it is this searching quality of the book and its detailed commitment to the particular – the particular student, teacher, immediate learning context, and larger social and political environment – that struck a chord with countless laypeople in its wake and earned the admiration of figures such as Rousseau, Sarah Trimmer, and Maria Edgeworth. In 1772 James Whitchurch wrote, in his *An Essay Upon Education*, that Locke was “an Author, to whom the Learned must ever acknowledge themselves highly indebted, and whose Name can never be mentioned without a secret Veneration, and Respect; his Assertions being the result of intense Thought, strict Enquiry, a clear and penetrating Judgment” (Pickering 1981, 12). And it is common in all subsequent time periods to see Locke referred to, whether critically or not, as a powerful influence on educational practices (for some examples, see Yolton and Yolton 1989, 35–43; Cleverley and Phillips 1986). Indeed, this

ability of *Some Thoughts Concerning Education* to generate inquiry and empower so many readers of diverse backgrounds to think philosophically about education is what makes it worth reading today: the book itself is a powerful argument for its view that education is about making autonomous rational agents who can, in turn, help others become more rational as well.

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Judicialization

► [Juridification and Education](#)

Juridification and Education

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Synonyms

Judicialization; Legalization

Introduction

This entry brings together scholarly work on juridification (the systemic drift toward legalism) and education – two strands of research that so far have evolved in largely separate scientific communities and rarely communicate with one another. The strands will be brought together in three steps – first, by presenting a brief overview of research on contemporary conceptualizations of juridification in modern societies; second, by tracing some of the central historical antecedents that inform such juridification; and third, by identifying how the juridification of education proceeds on different paths at different rates, issuing in different relationships to institutional structures in different regions, nations, or societies, thus precipitating different kinds of problems and frictions in different local situations. The article covers all levels, encompassing preschool, K-12 and higher education. Further, it is comparative, involving vignettes from research in several countries. The multiple, complex, and variegated denotations and connotations of juridification are sketched, and their engendering of changes in the education arena is discussed.

Conceptualizations of Juridification

The term juridification – sometimes called judicialization or legalization – is in legal theory described primarily as a growth phenomenon that encompasses both descriptive and normative content. In current research, the term at the most

abstract level designates the spread of legal discourse, jargon, rules, and procedures into the different social and political spheres and policy-making fora and processes (Hirschl 2008). A number of characterizations have been suggested. Niezen (2010), for example, suggests that one form of juridification involves legalistic intensification, i.e., “a widened jurisdiction of legal institutions and increased recourse to formal processes within societies in which law already preponderates in bureaucratic procedure, dispute resolution and governance.” (p. 218). This legalizing aura can be distinguished from what Niezen calls legal substitution, i.e., “the processes by which formal law is introduced to or becomes dominant in societies or communities that have previously relied more exclusively on informal customary institutions and procedures.” (p. 218). In addition to tangible developments in which an entity or activity becomes subjected to legal or legal-like regulation or accommodation, juridification can also encompass a range of intangible developments. Examples of the latter are the individual’s awareness of his status or potential as a legal actor or the less distinct process in which members of institutions increasingly come to define themselves and others in legal terms (Blichner and Molander 2008). As many scholars have noted, there is an ever-greater popularization of legal jargon and an ascendancy of legal discourse in a wide range of areas of modern life. Issues that have previously been negotiated in an informal or nonjudicial fashion have come to be dominated by legal rules and procedures or even quasi-legal ones; reference to a law that does not actually exist or pertain may be seen as a form of juridification (see more of this argument in Blichner and Molander 2008).

The relationship between juridification and the rule of law is complex. There is a scholarly disagreement about whether the two should be harmonized or be kept apart. In advocating the latter, Blichner and Molander (2008) argue that, in descriptive terms, the rule of law represents one type of juridification, whereas in normative terms, it constitutes a standard that may be used to evaluate tendencies of juridification or dejuridification. Indeed, the rule of law can be

seen as something relational and mutable or changeable, serving a particular historical social situation determined by ideological, political, and economic factors. Changes in the rule of law are linked to the processes of change in society at large, purposive or not, and have a political significance in that they deal with what government can do or should do. Seen from such a perspective, the rule of law is not to be understood primarily as a characteristic of a legal system but as a dynamic concept capturing the relationship between the individual and the State (Gustafsson 2002).

While juridification might seem to be a quantitative phenomenon, it is based on features that are essentially qualitative or experiential. These qualitative features, some argue, can be traced to processes in which the traditional “formal” attributes of modern law are increasingly replaced with “material” attributes as the interventionist State seeks ways to legitimate the welfare State and brings about specific changes in order to achieve particular substantive ends (see, e.g., Teubner 1987). The next section will explore this point further.

Historical Roots and Contemporary Branches

Among the most influential analyses of the roots of juridification in modern times are the works of Max Weber (1864–1920) and Jürgen Habermas (b. 1929). Despite important differences, they share an understanding of juridification (“Verrechtlichung”) as something essential to the foundations of political sovereignty and political legitimacy. Weber analyzed the implications of the general processes of secularization and rationalization on the character of modern life in terms of a distinction between “formal rationality,” the strategy of adapting one’s own conduct to the predetermined purposes built into the capitalist system, and “material rationality,” the rationalization of the conduct of the life of the individual with respect to ultimate value positions (Lash and Whimster 1987). Weber (1978) argued that the legal order tended to develop the characteristics of a formal rationality to serve as a normative

foundation for society. According to Habermas, this “colonization of the life-world” – as in the tendency of materialization of formal law that certain historical conditions have brought about – has led to fundamental and far-reaching changes of societal structure.

Habermas (1986) distinguishes between four epochal “thrusts” of juridification in Western industrial nations. Each one of these thrusts is connected to the emergence of various forms of the State and involves specific features of legal functions and normative structures. With references to the bourgeois State, the bourgeois constitutional State (*Rechtsstaat*), the democratic State, and the welfare State, it can be argued that, historically, law has played an emancipatory role of the highest order, partly because all four forms have been freedom guaranteeing, although the freedoms addressed have varied. For the bourgeois citizen, it was important to prevent the State from attacking or even intervening in the rights of private ownership. It was necessary to guarantee by law bourgeois civil rights pertaining to private property, the freedoms of speech, assembly, the press, economic activity, etc. Further characteristics were rules on how to pass and effectuate political acts, limit political power, and protect individual rights, as well as to give one part of a political system’s exclusive competencies. The concept of the rule of law in the bourgeois constitutional State grew obsolete with the emergence of the democratic State and the welfare State. Guaranteeing every person within the jurisdiction of the national State, a protection of a private autonomous sphere against arbitrary government action was no longer an issue. Instead, the State was to manage the task of allocating prosperity and social welfare, which meant the managing of new distributive functions and responsibilities (cf. Gustafsson 2002).

According to Habermas, the thrusts of juridification that followed are to be understood as the gradual constitutionalization of the economic and political systems. These frameworks place the “life world” at the disposal of the market. Universal and equal franchise, freedom of organization for political associations and parties, norms of employee protection, complex networks of

social security, the intensification of company constitutions, and antitrust law interventions on the market can all be seen as part of the latest epoch-making thrust of juridification. In this thrust, the intervening social State uses law as a means of control. Governance through the new juridification is dependent for its legitimation on forms of rationality, which, in turn, depend upon the efficiency of the market, but also of market actors. The next section will consider practices of the “self” as actor in relation to education.

Linking Juridification and Education

Education may be understood broadly as part of the historical process by which the social relationships necessary for societal function are reproduced. While the informal education that goes on in the home and in various contexts outside institutional practices is of crucial importance, this entry concerns only formal schooling, in particular, its development and governance. Changes in the relationship between the internal and external conditions of formal schooling tell us a great deal about the historical struggle between society and the State. The historical record of juridification is worth recounting because it registers the intellectual roots connecting education ideals with citizenship. Weber and Habermas offer a theoretical background against which to understand juridification as an important aspect of the processes of social and cultural formation that we call “education,” which can be qualified by policy challenges posed by educational research.

Formal State schooling and State-prescribed curricula were established in Western nations in the mid-nineteenth century for the purposes of nation-building. Early advocates of common schooling envisioned it as a vehicle for producing a unified citizenry; through schooling, the social foundation of national identity would be laid. In order to understand the connection to juridification, we may consider the initial legal movements in Western nations. The establishment of civil rights in the bourgeois State aimed at protecting the individual from State interference by safeguarding individual freedoms (of speech,

conscience, and religion, along with the right to ownership of property and legal access). The emergent democratic States acknowledged for a growing number of people the right to participate in the exercise of political power. New social groups in society were brought into the political process and suffrage was gradually extended. In this context, schooling gained in importance for instilling in each child the set of values deemed necessary to make them capable of participating in civic and political life.

Alongside preparing new members of society to safeguard the values of democracy, economic prosperity became an increasingly central motive. The rise and expansion of formal schooling, on the one hand, and the development of the modern industrial State, on the other, are tightly interwoven. Education significantly affects labor market outcomes on both for the individual and for the nation. The transformation from agrarian economy to urban industrialization brought about significant changes in societal structure. Urbanization and education became key for the labor market, for individuals, as well as for industries, and this also for the State.

The shift from equal opportunity for an *adequate education* to equal access to *all education* arose in Western nations at different times, but in each case, it was an important step in the historical record of legal movements. In the USA, the question of equalizing educational opportunity pivoted on its 1954 Supreme Court decision in *Brown v. Board of Education*. In order to appreciate the significance of the shift from pursuit of adequacy to the pursuit of equality as it pertains to juridification, it is important to consider the emergence of the welfare State and the State’s task of allocating prosperity and social welfare. The equalization of educational opportunity had become entangled with equalizing access to society’s goods more generally. The democratization of societies in the welfare State was further accelerated by world trade, international competitions, and collaborations boomed in the aftermath of World War II.

What occurred in Western nations has been described as a tendentious shifting from a society-centered tradition of democracy, in

which the starting point was the idea of a sovereign people in which every individual is a member of the collective, to an individual-centered democracy, which starts from the sovereign individual taking responsibility for his or her own future. The specific character of the individual and his freedom to create his own conditions is emphasized in the latter. It has been argued (Englund 1994) that the shift from a society-centered tradition of democracy to an individual-centered tradition of democracy means a shift from education as a “public good” to a “private good.” In a “public good” model, the collective, shared democratic principles and citizenship rights are conveyed via the State. Each child is guaranteed an equivalent right to an education with form and content established in a collective system through democratic processes. In the “private good” model, on the other hand, education is seen as related to the interests of each individual family and its children. In this perspective, parents are to be given greater authority (responsibility) to make decisions regarding the children’s education. The shift to a private good makes it possible to differentiate schooling in relation to the specific desires and aspirations of families. Theoretically and practically, it offers the foundation for starting private and/or charter schools with distinct profiles, values, and/or teaching methods.

With “freedom of choice” as the prioritized value in the governance and development of formal schooling, there was increased advocacy of differentiation, branding, and student and parental rights to choose between alternative school forms, while earlier aims at desegregating society and promoting social equality faded into the background.

The globalization of economic life, together with the ubiquity of information and technology, posed challenges to existing modes of national governance. The advent of the “knowledge society” accentuated the importance of education for a country’s global competitiveness. Behind this specific economic rationale was a plethora of further and more acute issues, rendering nations “at risk.” *A Nation at Risk* was also the title of a major US report in 1983 – a landmark event in modern American educational history.

New forms of standardization emerged as the idea of uniform standardization was discredited. The operation of UNESCO and UNICEF adopted the language of “rights-based” legislation. A rights-based approach calls, among other things, for the translation of universal standards into locally determined benchmarks for measuring progress and enhancing accountability. Since, as it was argued, State control of education should not constrain the potential for finding new ways of meeting or adapting to a changeable society, changes in the way in which education is governed were necessary. Where such inhibiting structures were suspected, processes of regionalization, fragmentation, and decentralization of authority delegated powers downward. How to find new adaptable mechanisms for governance to replace the slow and cumbersome bureaucratic State was of the essence (Segerholm 2007). This forward march of neoliberalism, with its rhetoric of greater choice, accountability, efficiency, consumer empowerment, and privatization of the public sector, has also been seen as undermining the role and authority of the State (Hudson 2007).

A general trend is that greater fragmentation of responsibility between the State, local government, schools, and individuals within institutions (e.g., school leaders, teachers, students, and/or their parents) is accompanied by a move from detailed regulation to framework legislation. Here the role of law is transformed from one of direct regulation of behavior to a more indirect, but no less constraining, regulation of procedures. Put differently, law becomes instrumentalized as a guidance mechanism for the interventions and compensations of the welfare State (cf. Teubner 1987). A transition from detailed legislation to legislative framework often means an increased need for systematic monitoring and follow-up.

Although the exercise of converting a detailed regulation into a legal framework of facilitative arrangements was aimed at hollowing out the regulatory dimension in the shift from a centrally governed to a decentralized system, it has, somewhat paradoxically, encouraged governments in many countries to embark on major legislative programs, such as the “No Child Left Behind” program in the USA, the UK’s “Every Child

Matters” program, and the Schools Inspectorates in Sweden and England, as well as others. The application of framework legislation has thus acknowledged a greater scope for local variations, while evaluation has gained importance as a governing instrument.

The shift from a centrally governed to a decentralized educational system has attracted much scholarly attention. Questions of responsibility, of accountability, and of the means by which schools ought to be governed (with prominence of the control of the output side of education by, e.g., quality controls, standardized testing, evaluations etc., and the introduction of national bodies responsible for carrying out these controls) have been the central political issue and remain a contentious theme in research and debate. At the same time, there has been a change in discourse as a previous strong focus on the obligations of the local government has been replaced with a greater focus on the rights of the student. For example, the significance of the legislative history of the 2010 Swedish Education Act lies in the adoption of the language of “rights-based” legislation (“legislative history” refers to materials such as bills, committee hearings, committee reports, congressional debates, and other documents generated by Congress during the passage of a statute. The legislative history can provide insight into the legislative intent of a particular law or valuable background and factual information on the issue being addressed by the legislation). In the case of Sweden, as well as Norway, a transition has been witnessed from an Education Act that was primarily based on obligations of the municipality to one that operates a legislative enactment concerned with rights of the student. This juridification is horizontal, from one view of the law to another, but the effect may also be vertical, with an increase or decrease in constraint.

In many Western countries, the implementation of common schooling and the subsequent expansion of schooling options through the introduction of the school market have resulted in a complicated system of educational administration and social control. The developments in schooling point to the reorganization of the entire school system in accordance with the market model.

When the *right to choose* is a precondition for the education arena to serve as a market, various educational providers compete for attracting (and keeping) students. This model of governance means that the State leaves the responsibility for adequate education in the hands of the students and their parents. Here, the State’s task is to guarantee individuals the right *to be able to make* choices and regulating and controlling the quality of what is offered on the market. This includes ensuring the individuals’ right to access information so that they will be able to make decisions on solid grounds. The State then allows the market to operate and takes responsibility for the market behaving in a “legally sound” manner, for instance, by conducting output control through inspections, evaluations, and the like and requiring content declarations for education, so that the consumer can make an informed choice on the basis of such information.

Education – and thus prosperity – becomes bound up with individual choices. Inequalities of outcome are partly attributed to the deficiencies of compliance with law, and the problem of structural coupling may then be reduced to a problem of technical effectiveness. Though the practical and technical aspects of managing education is important, it may be equally important to consider how such an inalienable value for democracy as “the rule of law” is changed from protecting the student’s right to an education for active citizenship and civic life to one of economic interest-controlled policy concepts with legal sanctions.

Conclusions

Juridification processes, as understood by many scholars, are embedded in ideas of serving national governments and assume a particular kind of relation among agents and between agents and institutions in society. Juridification is not to be understood solely as a quantitative phenomenon; its essential features are qualitative in the sense that the traditional “formal” attributes of modern law are increasingly replaced with “material” attributes as the interventionist State seeks ways to legitimate the welfare State and brings

about specific changes in order to achieve particular substantive ends. The most recent “thrust” of juridification became actualized through the emergence of new adaptations of democracy and the proliferation of rights discourses globally. While some of the changes are rhetorical rather than substantive, rhetoric has a discursive force in encouraging people to define the(ir) world differently. The role of juridification in framing and constraining the possibilities for contemporary education raises both the general question of the relationship between education and society and specific questions about how schooling serves the interests of the State, enacting particular educational values and posing the State as an icon of values and interests.

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Kaitiakitanga – Active Guardianship, Responsibilities, and Relationships with the World: Towards a Bio-cultural Future in Early Childhood Education

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Synonyms

[Māori \(Indigenous peoples of Aotearoa New Zealand\)](#)

Introduction

The world is a vast family, and humans are children of the earth and sky, and cousins to all living things. Such unity means that nature is the ultimate teacher about life (Royal 2010, p. 9).

For Māori (indigenous peoples of Aotearoa New Zealand) the term kaitiakitanga (pronounced, kye-tee-ah-key-tar-ngah) is often used to refer to the active guardianship and management of natural organisms and their environments. Mātauranga Māori or Māori knowledge positions humans within nature and focuses on ways in which cultural understandings and intergenerational connections between people and their biophysical contexts assist in the retention and protection of biodiversity and ecologically sustainable ecosystems. This entry critically reflects notions of kaitiakitanga and bio-cultural connectivity as important and meaningful contributors for young children and their relationships with and for the world.

Kaitiakitanga

A Māori perspective of the natural world encapsulates a holistic epistemological world view. Māori ways of knowing, being, and doing are

connected with Papatūānuku (earth mother), Ranginui (sky father), and their many children, including Tangaroa (oceans). All of whom act as guardians of the natural world and its domains. The role of *ira tangata* or humans is to act as *kaitiaki* (caretaker), with an obligation to nurture and protect the physical and spiritual well-being of the natural systems that surround and support humankind. *Kaitiaki* are agents that perform the task of active guardianship. They are charged with the responsibility to safeguard and manage natural resources for present and future generations.

Decisions enacted by *kaitiaki* are based on the intergenerational observations and experiential understandings of *mātauranga Māori* or traditional tribal ecological knowledge and *pūkenga* or informed environmental practitioners and experts.

This process ensures the active engagement and retention of bio-cultural information and ecological management practices into the future.

The notions and practices of *kaitiakitanga* have developed over generations of use and the active, sustainable guardianship of natural resources. Intergenerational observations and ecological understandings of species interactions and patterns of use have been accumulated and grounded in the existence of Māori and indigenous cultures, which are intimately bound to residing in one place for many generations (Cheung 2008). All forms of knowledge were directly or indirectly sourced from the environment. The act of observation and information gathering was integral to the range of established sustainable management practices that governed the harvesting and use of natural resources.

However, *kaitiakitanga* is not about ownership or control of the natural world. Ownership implies the position of one who is separated, isolated, and removed from that which is perceived as being owned. For Māori, “the resources of the earth did not belong to man [sic] but rather, man belonged to the earth. Man as well as animal, bird, fish could harvest the bounty of mother earth’s resource but they did not own them. Man had but user-rights” (Marsden 2003, p. 67). The principles of *kaitiakitanga* are derived from an organic epistemological world view whereby the concept of

caring, nurturing, connecting, and safeguarding the natural world is based on understandings of connectivity and relationships with the natural world. Understanding the role of relationships is pivotal to understanding the world (Royal 2006).

Kaitiakitanga takes for granted that all elements of the world are related and it is upon those relationships that survival depends. This ideology suggests that the natural world is an intricate and intimate system, comprised of many interacting and adaptive structures and components. All elements move and interact within a complex holistic framework of relationships both abiotic and biotic, each supporting and benefiting the other. This complex, uncertain, and ever-changing natural world system is encapsulated in predator–prey relationships, adaptation, distribution fluctuations, and hierarchical disputes. Humans are positioned within the world, as an interactive, contributing, and sometimes destructive component. As with all species, human presence and activities have a flow-on effect to other species and systems (Berkes and Davidson 2008). In the natural world, no species or system is an entity unto itself. Everything is connected (Dovers and Hussey 2013). A holistic Māori world view of *kaitiakitanga* considers the well-being of natural resources to be directly related to the well-being of the people.

Kaitiakitanga and Connectivity

A biological-cultural (bio-cultural) perspective positions humans within nature and focuses on the ways in which cultural understandings and interconnections between people and their biophysical contexts produce complex, adaptive, and resilient systems (Morehouse et al. 2008; Rotarangi and Stephenson 2014).

Māori world views are shaped by a relational and conscious connection of humans with and within the natural world (Royal 2010; Marsden 2003). This world view is central to the ways in which humans experience and make sense of the world and our place within it (Mead 2003; Royal 2006; Cheung 2008). Within a Māori context, when people introduce themselves, it is appropriate

to name their whakapapa (genealogical ancestry), which positions their ancestral affiliation with particular mountains, rivers, and land as priority. As an oceanic and seafaring people, it is considered relevant to also name the waka (ancestral canoe) followed by tribal connections, ancestors, and parental lineage. Only after the tribal landmarks and names of the ancestors have been spoken does an individual name themselves (Royal 2010).

For many Māori, it is the tribal landmarks, events, and relationships between humans and the natural world that represent the identities of the people and their connections with the cosmos. Māori tribal senses of identity and belonging are exemplified by the language, stories, songs, rituals, and practices unique to a particular place, by a particular people, over many generations. Notions of identity and connectivity to nature are essential to Māori epistemologies or ways of knowing, being, and interacting with the world.

Part of the process of “knowing” belies a fundamental element which reflects the abilities for survival and enhancing the collective with the knowledge that as a people, Māori are capable of coexisting and making sense of the world, as their ancestors once did. It is the task of the present generation to honor their ancestors by caring for the natural world, as they had before them. In caring for the world, they will in the process strengthen their sense of place and connectivity to their ancestors and histories, ensuring a cultural and environmental future for their grandchildren. Kaitiakitanga identifies the diverse realities of a modern world, and the ability to effectively interweave the past with the future, in accordance with Māori tribal and sub-tribal entities, for the betterment of people and the environment (Hapū, Iwi Working Party 2005).

Cultural connectivity encapsulates the values important for Māori to undertake activities in ways that are meaningful and pertinent to Māori. Providing space for connectivity as it applies to young children’s relationships with the natural world is about recognising that “people are considered to live culturally rather than in cultures, with the generative source of culture being human practices rather than in representations of the world” (Stephenson 2008, p. 129). At its core,

the indigenous experience with the world is one of connectivity and, in particular, the experience of “being” perceives all entities of the world, human and nonhuman, as an interconnected community (Reid et al. 2013). Connectivity is the basis on which the world is ordered, the organizing principle of Māori knowledge, the sources of genealogy, and the origin of all rights and obligations – including kaitiakitanga over the environment (Waitangi Tribunal 2011).

Kaitiakitanga and Taonga

There is no specific term in Māori for the word value. From a “holistic view of the Universe the Māori idea of value is incorporated into the inclusive term ‘taonga’ – a treasure, something precious; hence an object of good or value” (Marsden 2003, p. 38). From a Māori perspective, the word “taonga” as it applies to natural resources or species are identified as those which have been harvested and the populations sustained by generations of Māori. These species are considered taonga as the knowledge and customs pertaining to traditional harvesting practices are still very present and relevant today. Examples include: when to harvest, how to harvest, environmental signs and conditions, preparation for storage, and traditional management practices to ensure the sustainable future. These types of intergenerational knowledge and associated cultural practices are recognized as having survived into modern times, hence the title “taonga” or treasured species.

There are three main categories of taonga. The categories are spiritual, psychological, and biological (Marsden 2003). The three categories are interrelated and are pertinent to understanding Māori principles of and for the natural world. The first category of spiritual or wairuatanga is concerned with mana (prestige, personal power), tapu (sacredness), and noa (unsacred or common). The “importance of mana within Māori society is paramount. Mana is a difficult idea to translate succinctly into English. It embraces virtues such as honour, and prestige but also represents authority and control” (Kearney et al. 2013, p. 9). The second category of psychological denotes the

quest for security, a sense of belonging, of place, whakapapa (genealogy) identity, self-esteem, and dignity. Whakapapa denotes a world view of a vast and complex family, where everything, humans and nonhuman are related. The traditional principle of whanaungatanga or relationships denotes pertinent understandings of the natural world that are important and meaningful to Māori (Royal 2010). The third category of biological pertains to a conscious ethic of and for the environment, survival, resilience, connectivity, and mauri, which can be translated to encompass the life force sustaining capacity of environment and society (Reid et al. 2013).

Kaitiakitanga and Children

Kaitiakitanga acknowledges the role of humans including young children to undertake active guardianship and responsibilities for the ecological communities and environments on which our survival and continued existence depends. As previously stated from a Māori perspective, people are not superior but related through whakapapa (genealogy) to all aspects of the environment. Whakapapa denotes the genealogical descent of Māori from the divine creation of the universe to the living world (Berryman 2008). It informs relationships and provides the foundation for inherent connectedness and interdependence to all things (Cheung 2008). Māori can trace genealogy back through whakapapa to Papatūānuku (the earth mother), therefore they not only live on the land but are part of the land (Ministry of Justice 2001). Humans are not superior but are related through whakapapa to all aspects of the environment, connected to everything in it; therefore it requires respect.

Māori children are intimately connected to the people and land; past, present, and future; and to the spiritual world and the universe (Mead 2003; Te Rito 2007), and gaining knowledge and experience of this connectivity is imperative for active participation in the community. Traditionally this knowledge acquisition sometimes began before birth and continued through life. It was essential that young children acquired the appropriate

knowledge, skills, and expertise to contribute to the community and in so doing support the survival of the present and future generations. Teaching and learning were therefore an important community responsibility (Makareti 1986; Te Rangi Hiroa 1987). Within traditional community contexts, teaching and learning were supported by highly sophisticated knowledge structures, educational practices, and principles. These processes aimed to maintain and extend knowledge and develop understandings of harnessing, sustaining, and extending environmental resource bases (Berryman 2008; Hemara 2000; Salmond 1983).

Living and sleeping in intergenerational environments allowed the transmission of important knowledge from the old people to the young, including knowledge of history, stories, legends, and their environment. In this way intergenerational ecological knowledge, grounded in specific contexts of existence, was handed down through the generations. These elements of a classical education in family and tribal history continued on through adolescence. Education of the Māori child was related to preparing the child to actively participate in Māori society, and to ensure the survival of future generations through coexisting, making sense of the world and protecting the well-being of natural resources. Learning experiences had immediate practical application. As the child matured, the tasks became more complex. Children absorbed cultural mores by following adults and learning through observation, imitation, and practice (Berryman 2008; Hemara 2000; Salmond 1983). There was a fundamental relationship between theory and practice and a requirement that learners demonstrate this in the context of their learning. These understandings are consistent with holism, which has a critical role in the theoretical foundations of contemporary early childhood education practices in Aotearoa New Zealand.

Kaitiakitanga and Early Childhood Education

Te Whāriki is the New Zealand Ministry of Education's early childhood curriculum policy

statement. Te Whāriki: He Whāriki Matauranga mo ngā Mokopuna o Aotearoa/Early Childhood Curriculum (Ministry of Education 1996) is a bicultural, socioculturally conceived curriculum document, written in English and Māori, founded on the aspiration that children “grow up as competent and confident learners and communicators, healthy in mind, body and spirit, secure in their sense of belonging and in the knowledge that they make a valued contribution to society” (p. 9). Te Whāriki translates to “a woven mat” that allows for diverse patterning depending on knowledge bases, beliefs, and values which all may stand upon. Accordingly, “. . .the whāriki concept recognises the diversity of early childhood education in New Zealand. Different programmes, philosophies, structures and environments will contribute to the distinctive patterns of the whāriki” (p. 11).

One of the strands of Te Whāriki, exploration, incorporates the view of the child as an explorer who learns through active exploration of the environment. A number of general goals highlight the importance of respect for the natural environment for all New Zealand children. These include the goal that young children develop:

- A relationship with the natural environment and a knowledge of their own place in the environment
- Respect and a developing sense of responsibility for the well-being of both the living and the nonliving environment
- Working theories about the living world and knowledge of how to care for it (Ministry of Education 1996, p. 90)

The Māori text of Te Whāriki provides more specific, historical, and cultural imperatives in order for young children to develop understandings and make meaningful connections and contributions to the natural world. Mana Aotūroa, the Māori interpretation of exploration, relates to children exploring and seeking knowledge and understandings of their world and their relationships to it. Mana at a basic level can be translated as “authority, control, influence, prestige, power, psychic force, effectual, binding, authoritative

. . . and take effect” (Hemara 2000, p. 68). Aotūroa translates to “light of day” or “this world.” Mana Aotūroa in the context of the curriculum statement refers to metaphysical or intellectual journeys of self-discovery about the world and one’s place in it. Mana Aotūroa highlights teacher’s responsibilities of kaitiakitanga for the natural environment and reflects Māori perceptions of the natural environment, as taonga to be nurtured and preserved. Mana Aotūroa connects the young child to the natural world and everything in it.

The child learns his/her similarities and differences with the natural world. The child is able to see the depth and breadth of the gifts of the world, the trees, the animals, the food, the fish, the stars in the sky, the gifts of creativity. The child’s develops understandings of the shape of the land, the world and people.

The child understands that all living things have a spiritual element. From these understandings the child is familiar with Ranginui (sky father), Papatūānuku (earth mother) and their children. The child develops warmth and compassion for Papatūānuku and works to nurture the land. The child learns about the environment through listening, seeing, hearing, smelling, touching, seeing, and from the heart.

Teachers and families should: research the gifts of the environment, the natural world, utilising the the knowledge of the ancestors and others; develop understandings of the complex nature of Papatūānuku, Ranginui and their children; develop understandings that aspects the world are within the person; develop understandings around the negative effects of pollution on the environment; develop understandings of the signs of when to plant food, when to catch fish to ensure a sustainable sea food resource; develop understandings of the appearance of the insects, birds, stars and fish. In this way the child is strengthened to learn.

(Interpretation of Māori Text – Ministry of Education 1996, p. 37)

While acknowledging the English version of Te Whāriki offers a starting place for the development of connectivity to and understandings of the environment and the natural world, a more purposeful and coherent approach is required for young children and the future well-being of the natural environment. The Māori text of Te Whāriki highlights the critical place of kaitiakitanga in ensuring a sustainable and healthy environment and offers a coherent and sustainable approach to implementation.

Indigenous cultural beliefs are often found to be a key factor in apparent long-term sustainable use of resources by many groups around the world. This is especially pertinent to maintaining the health and resilience of environments and the relevance of integrated human-nature concepts. Cultural diversity is related to biodiversity, and both are important for improving the sustainability of the world's ecological systems (Berkes and Folkes 1994).

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Kakala

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Introduction

In a book entitled, *Education in Australia, New Zealand and the Pacific* (Crossley et al. 2014), The author outline some of the educational problems facing many of the island nations of Oceania and the need for Pacific people to reclaim their education by making the school and university

curricula more relevant and meaningful for learners through incorporating elements of Pacific indigenous and local knowledge skills and values. In the Pacific region, Kakala is a research framework that is sourced from Tongan culture and is being used by researchers as well as graduate students (see Johansson-Fua 2006; Toluta'u 2015).

The movement to better contextualize Pacific research is the result of critical reflection by a number of Pacific researchers and educators upon what has been happening in our region in the name of educational reforms that began in earnest almost 40 years ago. The fact is that in the culturally and linguistically diverse region we call Oceania, there are hundreds of indigenous communities who have their own unique ways of knowing and understanding the world, dating back thousands of years. Those of us who continue to live and are involved in education in Oceania have come to the realization that the best way to address educational challenges of our region is to try and create (alternative) approaches to teaching and research by bringing together the best of Western and Pacific values and ways of knowing and working together in order to better contextualize our work in education in general and in research in particular. The continuing underachievement of many Pacific students at university among other things has also contributed to a more diligent questioning of the value assumptions upon which Pacific school and university education continue to be based. What it was found was that formal education's claim of cultural neutrality is at best naïve and at worst arrogant. The authors also believe that the core values of our various Pacific indigenous communities need to be identified and underpin our education systems in order for more children to learn about their responsibilities to themselves as well as their communities and countries.

The *Rethinking Pacific Education Initiative* (RPEI), established in 2001, is a movement of Pacific educators and researchers who were concerned about the deteriorating quality of education in most of the small islands of Oceania despite heavy investment in educational reforms

by many foreign donors (now known as development partners), including New Zealand and Australia. The Kakala Research Framework (KRF) was borne out of an attempt by Pacific scholars and researchers to contextualize the dominant research paradigms advocated by higher education institutions that the authors attended, in order to make research more culturally democratic and relevant to the needs of Pacific peoples. First described by Thaman (1992) as a philosophy of teaching and learning, Kakala, the research framework, is closely associated with Pacific research, defined for the purposes of this entry, as research that is informed by and embedded within Pacific Knowledge Systems (worldviews, knowledges, practices, and beliefs), involves the active participation of Pacific people, and is relevant and responsive to their needs (see Nabobo-Baba 2006; Taufe'ulungaki 2007). The term Pacific will be used here to denote different Pacific cultural communities who share common values, knowledges, and principles.

Pacific Research Ethics and Protocols

As well as acknowledging and valuing Pacific Knowledge Systems and worldviews, Taufe'ulungaki identifies a number of ethical principles which would help guide Pacific research and researchers as well as provide a foundation for understanding and conducting research activities that engage Pacific peoples and communities. These principles include: relationships, respect, cultural competence, meaningful engagement, reciprocity, usefulness, collective and individual rights, balance, protection, capacity building, and participation (Taufe'ulungaki 2007).

By the mid-1990s, the Pacific research movement had become stronger as more Maori and Pacific Island people found alternative ways with which to engage Pacific communities to deal with serious educational and health issues. Two events in 1996 are important to me personally because they provided opportunities to share my views about education and research with a wider audience. The first was a keynote address, "Reclaiming an education," presented at a

national symposium on Pacific learning in Auckland, New Zealand, organized by the Education and Training Support Agency (ETSA) where the author argued for more culturally democratic learning environments for Pacific students in schools and universities. In the same year, the author was honored by the Polynesian Society of New Zealand with the award of the Rusiate Nayacakalou medal for contribution to Pacific studies. The author again shared ideas about Pacific education in a paper, "Towards a Pacific concept of education for cultural development," and described my philosophy of teaching and research – Kakala – with the society.

More opportunities emerged for sharing Kakala with students outside the Pacific Island region, including teaching a paper on culture and education for the MEd cohort at the University of Auckland in 2000. The course included, among other things, a discussion on alternative Pacific research frameworks and methodologies including Kakala. It was heartening to see a growing interest among Pacific postgraduate students not only in obtaining higher degrees but also developing and using Pacific research frameworks and methodologies. Since then, the author has examined numerous masters' and doctoral theses written by Maori and Pacific university students, using distinctively Maori and/or Pacific research frameworks and methodologies.

The Kakala Metaphor

In fashioning *kakala*, the author draws from both Western and Pacific epistemologies. Kakala, in Tongan culture, refers to a garland or a collection of fragrant flowers and leaves, required for the making of a garland. Many of these flowers are ranked according to their importance, which is often reflected in the finished product, the *kakala*. Three processes are central to the making of a *kakala*: *toli*, *tui*, and *luva*. *Toli* is the gathering of the material needed for making a *kakala* such as different types of flowers, leaves, etc. This process requires knowledge of and experience in picking/gathering the appropriate materials at the right time and the right place and storing them in a

cool and safe place in order to ensure freshness until the *kakala* is ready to be made. For example, the highest-ranked flower in Tonga is the *heilala* (*Garcinia sessilis*) often referred to as the royal flower. There is mythology associated with *heilala* unlike more recently introduced flowers such as the rose or the frangipani. A *kakala* with *heilala* in it is regarded more important than one without.

Tui refers to the actual making of a *kakala*. This too requires special knowledge and skills in making different types of *kakala*, which would depend on the occasion and/or the one who is meant to wear the garland or *kakala*. The *heilala*, for example, is a chiefly flower (*kakala hingoa*) and is often placed on top of the garland, while others that are less chiefly or more common (*kakala vale*) play supportive roles and are placed underneath the more important ones. However, the combined effect of all of the *kakala* ingredients is of paramount importance because it makes a *kakala* complete and appropriate for the next step, *luva*.

Luva, the third aspect of *kakala*, is the gifting or giving away or presentation of a *kakala* to someone else. In my culture, a *kakala* is always meant to be given away as a symbol of two Tongan core values, namely, '*ofa* (compassion) and *faka'apa'apa* (respect)'. For the author, *kakala* has been a useful and culturally meaningful philosophy and framework: It ensures cultural inclusivity and provides for ownership of the process as well as the product, whether we are talking about teaching, curriculum development, or research.

Kakala Research Framework (KRF)

The need for Pacific researchers and scholars to develop, use, enhance, and critique Pacific research frameworks in order to test their relevance and appropriateness cannot be over-emphasized. Toward such ideals, Kakala has been critiqued and used by Tongan and other researchers in the last decade or so. An enhanced and more robust version of Kakala was developed out of self-reflection and critique by colleagues. An enhanced version of Kakala was developed by Taufe'ulungaki and Johansson-Fua (2005), when

planning for a research project, known as Sustainable Livelihood and Education Project (SLEP). They added two new steps to the original Kakala Framework comprising of “*teu*” (to precede *toli*) and *mālie*/*māfana* (at the end after *luva*). *Teu* literally means to prepare for something, a time for conceptualizing, designing, and planning for the work ahead (Johansson-Fua 2014, p. 53). *Mālie* and *māfana* (after Manu’atu 2001) are important after *luva*, to address concerns about monitoring and evaluation and create a better *kakala* the next time around. These additions have made the KRF more robust and may be seen as a self-improving kind of framework.

The KRF as we know it today therefore consists of five steps: *teu*, *toli*, *tui*, *luva*, and *mālie*/*māfana*. *Teu* literally means to prepare for an event or a type of work. In this stage, questions are asked about what type of research that is needed; who is doing the research and why; what is the source of conceptualization; and what is going to happen to the results of the research.

Toli, the gathering and choosing of flowers and other materials for a *kakala*, symbolizes data gathering, a critical stage for research as field researchers would need to know the contexts in which data is to be gathered together with the required (ethical) behavior in order to collect data that is relevant for the research study. During this stage, the Tongan research tools of *nofo* and *talanoa* are further developed and used.

Tui is used to refer to data analysis. Just as in making a garland (*kakala*), flowers are used to provide important motifs or patterns, so in research analysis, patterns, variations, and similarities are often sought from the data gathered. In *tui*, changes and corrections may be done and additional flowers may be sought. The research analysis process is one of negotiation and readjusting of original plans depending on the information received. Questions asked include: Does the information make sense? What is the context behind the context? Where is the solution/answer? Are emerging solutions meaningful or sustainable for addressing the problems?

Luva is the gifting or giving away of a *kakala* underpinned with ‘*ofa*’ (compassion) and

faka’apa’apa (respect). As a research framework, *luva* refers to the reporting and dissemination of the research results which may be gifted back to the people and communities that provided the knowledge in the first place. This is because of a belief that the results of the research must benefit the people who are participants in the study. The reporting needs to be done with care, compassion, and respect for those whose knowledge has enabled the study to be successfully completed and the results useful to the people concerned.

Mālie and *māfana* were first described by Manu’atu (2001) and are the final stages of the KRF. The two concepts are sourced from Tongan dance where *mālie* refers to the overall quality of the dance and the skillfulness of the performer. An audience would commonly call out “*mālie*” during and after a dance, so as to show their appreciation of the performance and provide encouragement and support for the performer(s). For a dance to be “*mālie*,” the music, costume, and performance of the dancer need to be interwoven in a way that successfully tell the story behind the lyrics which contain the poetry that is being danced. According to Johansson-Fua, *luva* is like a stage for evaluating the whole research and questions such as the following are often asked: Was it useful? Was it worthwhile? Who was it useful for and who benefitted from the research process and products? Was it meaningful for the participants and did it serve the needs of the community? The evaluation process occurs throughout the life of the research study as researchers continuously monitor their activities beginning with the conceptualization, data collection, and analysis in order to ensure the achievement of the key ideas of usefulness, applicability, and relevance of the research (Johansson-Fua 2014, p. 55).

The notion of *māfana* (a warm feeling), on the other hand, refers to an emotional response among the audience, to the dance performance and performer. In Tonga, one of the indicators of *māfana* is when people get up and join the dancer and/or gift her with money or goods such as pieces of cloth, a *ngatu* (tapa cloth) or prized mats. This is a time of joy and happiness, exemplifying important connections between and among people

motivated by a special performance. *Māfana* is said to be the final evaluation of the research as well as the KRF itself against the achievement of transformation, application, and sustainability. As Johansson-Fua suggests, it is the stage when the researcher and knowledge giver are transformed and in their transformation create a solution for, or a new understanding of the problem, a stage that is empowering because it provides ownership of the research processes and products. Important questions that are often asked at this stage include: Were the outputs practical and sustainable? Were the participants transformed and empowered to make changes? What was the impact of the research process on the researchers as well as all those involved in the research (Johansson-Fua 2014, p. 56)?

Research Tools Associated with KRF

In Tonga, the use of the KRF is commonly associated with the use of Tongan research methods of gathering data, namely, *talanoa* and *nofo*. Some Pacific researchers have written extensively about *talanoa* and its usefulness as a research tool (see Vaioleti 2010 and Latu 2011). A pan-Polynesian term and concept, *talanoa*, is a conversation where ideas are shared between or among people and a popular tool with many researchers in the past decade or so. *Talanoa* may be formal as when a chief is talking to his/her people or informal as when people get together for a chat over tea, coffee, or wine. Johansson-Fua suggests that when used in conjunction with the KRF, several features emerged, including that of a good tool for qualitative research, operating from a constructivist perspective where knowledge is socially constructed during the *talanoa* process. It is also good for data collection and analysis as it requires participants to muse, reflect upon, talk about, critique, argue, confirm, and express their conceptualizations of cert in phenomena, in accordance with their beliefs and values.

Nofo (to stay) compliments *talanoa* in the sense that researchers actually stay and observe the activities of the participants – including how they live and interact with one another. The

researcher becomes part of the community of knowledge providers, as it were, and freely interacts with the people around her. The actual time spent would vary with the nature of the research problem and the time available to the researchers. *Nofo* is similar to what is usually expected in ethnographic research.

According to Johansson-Fua, a user and advocate of the KR, several features are made obvious when *nofo* is used as a research tool:

- (i) The researcher is engaged in observation and participant observation and, through *talanoa*, is emerged in the research context.
- (ii) The flexibility of *nofo* is such that it can be carried out in a community/village, school, or workplace.
- (iii) It can be done continuously in one place for a period of time or a series of sessions spread over time.
- (iv) *Nofo* often provides additional information to that obtained through *talanoa*, thus enabling the researcher to establish the validity of information from *talanoa* sessions.
- (v) Combined with *talanoa*, the data collected is rich and descriptive, and data saturation is reached quickly in the fieldwork allowing the researcher to have an immediate understanding of the research context through analyzing the participants' experiences.

Nofo however is often a challenge to the field researcher because it is demanding and time-consuming. Despite this, since its pilot in Tonga in 2005, *nofo* has been used in Fiji, Samoa, Marshall Islands, and Nauru by other Pacific researchers (Johansson-Fua 2014, p. 57).

Advantages of the KRF

Although the KRF has been used by some researchers, it was not until 2005 that the revised KRF was used in a joint NZAID/IOE research project on Sustainable Livelihood and Education Project (SLEP) in Tonga. According to the researchers, who were Tongan and used the Tongan language in all aspects of the research, the

following were notable advantages of the use of the KRF:

Data obtained was rich, informative, and robust.

Researchers reported a broader, more fluid, and less structured way of conceptualizing sustainable livelihoods than is commonly assumed in ESD literature.

The importance of human relationships as markers of identity and sustainable development was easy to demonstrate as the design of the Tongan study involved nurturing the relationships among scholars and researchers who were related in both cultural and professional contexts.

The research was conducted using the Tongan language.

The information about sustainable livelihood obtained from SLEP provided an authentic contribution to the global literature on ESD (Johansson-Fua 2006).

Conclusion

Doing anything differently often always has its challenges. In relation to the further development and use of Pacific research frameworks including Kakala, there are still serious challenges including institutional indifference, lack of institutional support, lack of critical examination of the (frame) works developed so far, and lack of advocacy by Pacific people themselves and of Pacific knowledge and value systems as legitimate systems for study and research in the formal sector, including in the academy. Consequently, there continues to be a need to assist more Pacific students to theorize and reclaim their education as a prerequisite to developing personal philosophies of teaching, learning, and research.

The author continue to advocate for the incorporation of Pacific cultural knowledge and values in formal education from preschool to university, based on my belief that intercultural understanding is predicated upon our understanding of our own cultures first. The author also believe that teaching about and studying Pacific cultures is an important activity in itself. Reimagining and

rethinking my own work have helped me to move from protesting the dominating and dominant paradigms to creating something that is more culturally inclusive of my students by drawing from the rich oral literatures of the Pacific as well as the written texts of world writers and thinkers.

Some of these challenges seem particularly insurmountable today given the intensity of the recent revolution created by new ICTs that seems to be causing havoc to social relationships, as well as social institutions such as the family, workplaces, and school. However, Pacific people are using new ICTs to stay connected to one another as evident in the numerous personal and community websites on the World Wide Web. In the context of globalization and the dominance of the imperative of the marketplace in education systems, especially higher education, perhaps the time is now right for Pacific scholars to more seriously work toward the decolonizing agenda in Pacific education in general and in research in particular.

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Kant

- [Langeveld, Martinus J. \(1905–1989\)](#)
- [Philosophical Roots of Gilligan-Kohlberg Controversy, The](#)

KBE, Antihumanist, Humanist, Posthumanist

- [Digital Learning, Discourse, and Ideology](#)

Kindergarten

- [Longing for Innocence and Purity: Nature and Child-Centered Education](#)

Kindergarten: Philosophical Movements in the Nineteenth Century

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Synonyms

[Formation of the idealist and progressive kindergarten movements during the nineteenth century, The](#); [Growth of the kindergarten movement prior to the twentieth century, The](#)

Introduction

Friedrich Wilhelm August Froebel (1782–1852) introduced the term Kindergarten in 1840. The educational institution of Froebel’s design was to

promote family, nation, and mankind, by “encouraging the child’s impulse to activity, investigation and creative work. It will be an institution where children instruct and educate themselves and where they develop and integrate all their abilities through play, which is creative self-activity and spontaneous self-instruction” (Froebel 1967d, p. 92). This project began in 1816 with the establishment of the Universal German Educational Institution – a first experimental school and the intended beginning of a network of institutions. He then focused in on the early years as critical to the success of the whole system (Lilley 1967).

The Crystallization of Experience

It is true that we now seldom see the unspoiled original state, especially in human beings. For that very reason it is all the more necessary to assume it until it has been clearly proved that it does not exist. Otherwise there is the danger that, where it is still to be found, it will only too easily be destroyed. (Froebel 1967d, pp. 52–53)

Lilley (1967) identifies Froebel’s German Romantic influences in Fichte’s philosophy, Hegel’s method, the Naturphilosophie of Schelling, the mysticism of Boehme, and the pedagogy of Pestalozzi. Having spent time with Pestalozzi at Yverdon, he developed a critique of what he considered to be an excessive and unsophisticated empirical approach to education, arguing that education is “the treatment of man as a creature who is developing awareness and understanding of himself” (Froebel 1967d, p. 49). Education is education when the learner learns about their purpose. This wisdom is evident in our ability to educate ourselves (Froebel 1967d). Through his belief in unity, he regards the realization of self as becoming a proper part of the whole.

In answering the question, “What is the purpose of education?” I relied at that time upon the following observations: Man lives in a world of objects, which influence him, and which he desires to influence; therefore he ought to know these objects in their nature, in their conditions, and in their relation with each other and with mankind. (Froebel 1886, p. 69)

In his writings, Froebel claimed that one can observe in childhood the source of all life

experience (Froebel 1887). He recognized his own childhood as the source of this idea. For instance, he regards his mother's death, when he was 9 months old, as the critical event that shaped his life (Froebel 1967a).

Unfortunately, throughout his life, man rarely shakes off the impressions absorbed in his childhood just because his whole being is opened like a great eye and he is wholly surrendered to them. In later life a person's hardest struggles with himself and his most serious setbacks are often grounded in this phase of his growth, and for this reason the care of the infant child is so important. (Froebel 1967d, p. 61)

He wrote that he was poorly prepared for education because of his life experiences, and that his personality was not well suited to contemporary methods of educating the child (Froebel 1967a). For instance, he opposed the limiting of instruction to the passing on of facts and explanations. His early years of occupation are characterized as an "apprenticeship to Nature" (Lilley 1967, p. 6) when, working for a forester, he was given freedom to explore his surroundings. Intent on expanding his knowledge of the Natural world, he attended Jena University, Göttingen, and then Berlin where he was employed as an assistant in the study of crystals at the University of Berlin's mineralogical museum. The study of crystals and their formation revealed the connection between nature and human activity (Froebel 1967a).

Self and Society

Froebel (1967a, p. 33) explained his life as a dedication to "unceasing self-contemplation, self-analysis and self-education." Man is called by nature to search for the "art of living" (Froebel 1967c, p. 44) but does not know how to begin this search. Froebel took his task as being the revealing of the beginning of the path. The clearing of the way is, for Froebel, education.

Education as developing self-consciousness is begun through observing nature's qualities. He focuses on the role of the senses in the early years, because through the senses we come to understand the properties of nature, but then must use this knowledge to transform the self, to

reconnect with nature. Children need to see their family's dedication to God at the earliest possible time and to be a part of that duty and dedication. The child then observes the social world. Like nature, the trades and occupations are also critical to the child's learning.

It is impossible to show all that a child gains by taking part in his parent's daily work. It would be even more advantageous if parents would make more use of this association for the instruction of their children later on. (Froebel 1967d, p. 88)

Observations of the child's physical growth led Froebel to suggest that this should not be inhibited so that she might develop her senses, her knowledge of herself, and of her surroundings. He emphasizes the importance of light, warmth, and fresh air, allowing children to develop according to the laws of Nature (Froebel 1967d). He seeks to highlight the value of all of the child's behaviors, drawing adult attention to recognize evidence of the child's learning about the world and herself through initial sensory exploration, expressions, and use of language, and on to the ways in which the child plays.

The Organization of Play

Based on a view that childhood is the critical phase of human development, Froebel proposed play as the vocation of the child that connects the child to world. He observed: "Why is it that all childhood is unaware of its great riches, which are lost before they can be appreciated?" (Froebel 1967a, p. 37). Play is evidence of the child's innate urge to understand both the world and her own self (Froebel 1967d). Through self-directed play the child becomes aware of the world's properties, leading to an awareness of those properties in her. The role of the adult is then to constrain any urge to burden the child with lessons and objects. The adult observes and offers language to the child for understanding her play in the world (Froebel 1967d).

Froebel developed a set of gifts and occupations to reflect and build upon the stages and patterns of child development. He organized activities into increasingly complex play:

The goal of the gifts was not simply to train and organize the mind but to make the “form or law of mind” the principle of its training and organization. And in the course of such training material objects were transformed into “spiritual” things with moral import. (Cavallo 1976, p. 150).

The gifts are organized and introduced in a sequence from balls to globes, cubes, and cylinders, and then building blocks, with the sphere as the basic and essential symbolic structure. Symbols have a self-educational function, “symbolic statements of the growing consciousness which . . . the child had of the nature of the universe” (Lilley 1967, p. 32) and “metaphysical truths and designs intuitively comprehensible to the child” (Cavallo 1976, p. 150). The sphere is symbolic of unity and perfection or completion. “In their spherical constitution all things remain in connect; they each possess their own centre point, and so retain the capacity for re-union in their essential being with the absolute centre of all” (Lilley 1967, p. 14). We can take as a central concern for Froebel that around him there was a false division of life, a failure to realize and celebrate and to come into being with unity of the world (Froebel 1967a).

Structure is of critical importance to Froebel and so he looks to determine that which is constant in development, the “thread in the labyrinth of living shapes” (Lilley 1967, p. 11). He was convinced of the simplicity of this thread, a unifying pattern, through which beings are naturally equipped.

Stages and Systems

The task of education is to preserve the connection of the child to nature and to support the child’s progress through transformative developmental stages of awareness and relationship. These developmental stages are imbued with a holistic interconnection between the gift, the child’s play, their developing language, sense of self, understanding of the world and the properties of things in it, and their cognition. These different elements of the curriculum reveal the interconnections and purposes of life (Froebel 1912) and are manifestations of a unified pattern, so carefully designed to emphasize this patterned unity.

He warns, however, that the stages of development are not hierarchical (Froebel 1967d). Froebel rejects age as a marker of stage, preferring indications of “intellectual, emotional and physical needs” (Froebel 1967d, p. 64) being satisfied. His views of stages of development were that they were not distinct but rather blended, and this blending is important because of the importance of reflection on each stage. When a child is ready to transition from a developmental stage, she begins to reflect on her experiences to understand them *as* a stage. For instance, the point at which she reflects on her childhood years is the point at which she transitions, with the wise guidance of an adult, into a new phase of development.

He began developing a networked system of educational institutions that would appeal to the German parent and would equip them with an understanding of their roles as mother and father in supporting the child’s developmental progress. The mother, in the protective space of the home, creates in the child a passion for exploring the world, which the father then furnishes through his wider knowledge and contacts. “He called on German women to join in setting up local Kindergartens, and on German men to found educational unions which would start the urgent task of improving infant education as a *preliminary to general reform*” (Lilley 1967, italics in original, p. 22).

In his instructions to parents and kindergartners Froebel told them to be aware of their own life from its early stages, to search into the child’s life so as to establish its present phase of development and its requirements, and to examine the child’s environment in order to see how far it meets his needs. (Lilley 1967, p. 24)

He advised that a proper educational relationship is one in which the teacher and pupil share their journey (Froebel 1967a). Whatever might happen as a result of the teacher and student relationship, the ways in which their interconnection leads is an important message to the educator to be noted; it is the natural unfolding of what should be.

He criticized a behavioral approach to education, arguing that assumptions about the causes and effects of a child’s behavior are often

misunderstood and that these misconceptions inhibit education (Froebel 1967d).

It is difficult for an observer to pronounce with any truth or certainty on the situations which produce and condition a child's behaviour. Therefore a man needs to have the particular details of his remarks and conduct during childhood preserved so that later on he can analyse his experiences and find in himself traces of the causes of early childhood behaviour. (Froebel 1967d, p. 79)

Froebel (1967d) argued that not only the teacher but education in its essence should not prescribe or inhibit the child's learning, but rather create the safe space for nature to take its course. However the educator needs training in order to be this kind of spiritual guide.

While campaigning for a national system of kindergartens, he began training "kindergarteners." Lilley (1967) notes that Froebel had already attracted advocates of his philosophy, and many active kindergarteners became responsible for promoting his work worldwide. In particular, Baroness von Marenholtz-Bülow visited Froebel's institutions, kept a biographical account of his later years, and advocated his work (Lilley 1967). The influence of the Kindergarten Movement is largely attributed to the kindergarteners who ensured a series of ideas would be sustained in practice (Cavallo 1976).

A Movement Abroad

While his work gained little purchase in Germany, his followers took the Kindergarten Movement to England and America where, by the twentieth century, it was influencing public systems. In England, a Froebel Society was set up in 1874 and was involved in the training of teachers and reform of the public education system (Lilley 1967). State schools were using his activities by the turn of the twentieth century, yet with little, and decreasing, attention to the underpinning idealism.

In America, Froebel's principles were taken up by Elizabeth Peabody, Bronson Alcott, William T. Harris, and Susan Blow (Cavallo 1976). Idealists focused on the development of morality in the child, holding that societal wellbeing is established through individual development

(Cavallo 1976). They looked to limit external regulation of the child's moral compass. Education, rather than adding to external influences, should remove these distractions so that the child could look within herself for the proper moral pathway.

In the kindergarten crude materialism, unrestrained individualism, ruthless ambition, and cold-blooded competitiveness would be nipped in the bud by the "motherly" virtues of love, compassion, and cooperation instilled into the child by female kindergartners. (Cavallo 1976, pp. 148–149)

Towards the end of the nineteenth century, a new generation of kindergarten educationalists began questioning the idealists and challenging the spiritual core of the movement. Criticism was aimed at both his apparent mysticism, scholarship, and method. His idealism was contested on the grounds of a lack of philosophical and theoretical coherence (Lilley 1967). Lilley (1967) comments that Froebel did not attempt to enculturate himself in the philosophical and scientific thinking of the time but rather took fragments and strands of thought that appealed to his sense of purpose. According to Lilley (1967) his work did not appeal to a wide audience; his ideas were too radical and so what survived is predominantly a selection of technical and pedagogical ideas without the deeper ideological essence and purpose.

The Age of Behavior

Led notably by G Stanley Hall, John Dewey, and Edward Thorndike, pragmatism and progressivism became the key drivers and the focus shifted to the ways in which the child would be best prepared, rather than rescued, from the new world (Cavallo 1976; Lilley 1967). The movement turned, in contradiction to the work of Froebel, to the Behaviorist theories of Hall and Thorndike. Hall advocated for a connection between physical activity and social responsibility believing that the child would be conditioned through exercise into understanding her role in society. The work of Thorndike pushed the Movement further still from Froebel's intents, regarding

the child as requiring repetitive behavioral intervention.

Cavallo (1976) suggests that a shift to Behaviorism, along with biology, provided the impetus for assimilation of kindergarten's techniques in the public system at the turn of the twentieth century. The curriculum was designed around moral "projects" that "made behavior – the physical act – the sole dimension of the child's moral experience. In the conduct curriculum morality was meaningless outside the context of a shared, group directed, problem solving experience" (Cavallo 1976, p. 159). The progressive reform of society was not resistant to but enabling of industrialization through an interest in increasingly efficient ways to educate children for their society (Cuban 1992). Cuban summarizes:

Begun in the glow of the Progressive urban reform, late nineteenth century kindergartens sought to rescue ignorant children and their parents from poverty and ignorance and bring them into full-fledged citizenship. . . . As decades passed and kindergartens became a regular feature of public schools, pressure rose and fell to get five-year-olds academically ready for the first grade, to ease their transition from play to expression to academic work, and to compress the time taken to transform irrepressible five-year-olds into obedient students (Cuban 1992, p. 173).

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Kinds of Educational Theory

► [Overview of Metatheory of Educational Knowledge](#)

Knowledge

► [Early Childhood Sector](#)
 ► [Phenomenology of Higher Education](#)

Knowledge Based Economy

► [Digital Learning, Discourse, and Ideology](#)

Knowledge, Violence, and Education

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Knowledge is inseparable from processes of its production, reproduction, representation, distribution, reception, and realization. At the same time, it also should not be disconnected from the question of the legitimization of its truth-value.

The control of knowledge, its legitimization, its representation, and its distribution, determines

Ilan Gur-Ze'ev is deceased.

the constitution of normalizing education. The inner goal of any education is normalization of the subject in the service of reproducing the hegemonic sociocultural order and its realm of self-evidence. Within this setting, the legitimization of knowledge as well as the marginalization of knowledge of the other and her legitimization apparatuses is preconditions for social control, economic productivity, and well-protected cultural borders. Traditionally, the protection of these borders was entrusted to educators, teachers, intellectuals, and administrators, who were expected to demarcate and preserve culture from nature, true from false, moral from immoral, nice from nasty, and good from evil.

The protection of the wall of (worthy, true, and legitimate) knowledge is a precondition for social control and cultural productivity and for the prevention of essential change in hegemonic knowledge. It reflects concrete powers, operating in specific historical moments and contexts. With the historical development of certain social power relations on the one hand and of specific symbolic settings on the other, knowledge is changed and transformed. With its transformation, the ways of its legitimization, representation, distribution, and consumption are transformed, too, and the gates are opened for new human possibilities.

Since knowledge relates to the world, to the human subject, and to the knowledge about knowledge, strong linkage exists among changes in the image of knowledge, the stability of the body of knowledge, and the creation of new human possibilities. All these reflect how changes in the image and content of knowledge transform reality, as well as reflecting social changes in undetermined and ever-changing combinations, degrees, and ways. Even the acknowledged borders between fact and interpretation, interpreter and interpretation, are in constant rearticulation and change.

The control of the legitimization, production, representation, and distribution of knowledge makes possible the reduction of the human subject into a "subject" who will function as an object or an agent of "her" system. In this sense, control of knowledge allows much more than the

possibilities of policing social behavior: it provides the means for establishing an unchallenged legitimization for a certain hegemonic version of the production of the "subject," the normalized subject, her possibilities, and limitations. Such control is usually called "education."

Normalized education constitutes and commands the "subject" on four levels: (1) control of the psychic constitution of the "subject," her psychological possibilities, and strivings, as well as the limits of controlling and changing their borders; (2) control of the conceptual apparatus and associations and their integration with the psychic level and its presence on the conceptual level; (3) control of the collective and private self-conscious; and (4) control of the function of the "subject" in "her" reality and the minimization of the possibilities for change in the representation of reality that normalizing education reflects and serves.

In this respect, it is wrong to articulate the Nietzschean question: are there facts about reality or only interpretations (Nietzsche 1968, p. 267)? It is equally wrong to separate controlling knowledge from guarding the walls that protects the (changing) limits of knowledge about deciphering the apparatuses of constituting reality and controlling its representations. This preordained control that normalizing education is posted to guard is to be understood historically and contextually. It is in constant evolution, subject to struggles between conflicting interests and social powers, and influenced by the threatening, actual or expected invasion of new conceptual and psychic possibilities. These are always positioned within changing horizons of a spirit that is determined to prevent the challenges of its external and internal rivals. When a new spirit chances to burst into the relatively protected realm of self-evidence, a new setting and power relations become reality, new ways for control of knowledge are established, and new horizons are opened for education and counter-education. These new horizons incubate new possibilities for the constitution of the "subject" and the representation of reality and its legitimization apparatus (viz., for education as oppression). By the same token, however, it also presents possibilities for cracking the system, for

struggling over the potential autonomy of the subject, for the Utopia of self-constitution, and for life as living prayer, as art of interpretation and responsibility for the otherness of the other and the not yet. Normalizing education, which is committed to prevent this Utopian struggle, is also committed to camouflaging the apparatuses of the control of knowledge, and it hides the systematic attempts to eliminate possibilities of challenging the hegemonic version of the production of knowledge and the normalized “subject.” As such, hegemonic knowledge is committed to preventing what Walter Benjamin called “the messianic moment,” as opposed to “now time” (Benjamin 1972, p. 701) in which “the totally other” than historically legitimate knowledge bursts into the system and challenges the established realm of self-evidence.

Within the Marxist tradition, the issue of the relation between knowledge and power is elaborated in the context of the relations between the economic “base” and the “superstructure” which the hegemonic ideology reflects and serves. Within this tradition, ideology, or false conscience, provides and legitimizes means for controlling the conscious and the performance of people in relation to their class, ethnicity, race, nationality, gender, and sexual preferences. Ideologies of the hegemonic as well as the marginalized collectives affect the ways they conceive and articulate their others, their identity, and their positioning and repositioning. Hegemonic education cannot become neutral, apolitical, or indifferent to ideology, because its central aims are reproduction of the present order and camouflaging the violence of normalizing education relations between interests and the material “base” and knowledge. The naturalization of the violence of normalizing education veils oppression and presents the knowledge, standards, aims, and prepositions of the hegemony as legitimate or self-evident. As such, hegemonic knowledge alienates human beings from their world and domesticated human beings from their (abandoned) otherness, them from their Others, and current reality from possible other, more humane, realities. According to Karl Marx, this relation is not ontological. It only reflects a certain

historical moment in the material production (which includes the production of knowledge). Marx conceives this stage as prehistory. For some Marxists, such as Herbert Marcuse, this alienation leads to a possible historical stage in which the human condition will be transformed. After this tiger jump, there will be no more alienation between reason and reality and work and play, and life will become a living art (Marcuse 1967, p. 864). From the Marxian point of view at this stage, knowledge will cease to be a manifestation of power (in the form of class struggles and alienated work) and will become a manifestation of human reason, freedom, equality, and solidarity, as genuine human emancipated potentials. Until that stage, the quest for true knowledge can appear only as critique of ideology and as the negation of the reality which hegemonic knowledge represents and serves (Horkheimer 1974, p. 27). In different versions, this critical conception of knowledge is present in Western philosophy all the way from Plato to St. Augustine, Marx, Marcuse, and Freire.

A different conception of the relation between knowledge and power is developed within today’s postmodernism. For Michel Foucault, knowledge is one of the manifestations of the presence of power (Foucault 1979, p. 27), which also produces the subjects that will enhance it, change it, and resist it – as one of its manifestations Foucault 1995, p. 210). However, for Foucault, as for Richard Rorty, Jean-Francois Lyotard, and other “soft” postmodernists, the gate is open for human resistance and for struggle against the oppressive uses of knowledge. From Friedrich Nietzsche to Andre Beteille, however, “hard” postmodernists have seen the human subject and her striving for knowledge as a mere relation in linguistic settings or as a manifestation of meaningless, aimless power which is also responsible for possible “resistance” attempts and Utopian quests for transcendence, authenticity, or truth. Yet “hard” and “soft” postmodernists are united against positivistic- and functionalistic-oriented conceptions of knowledge (that look for the facts or the efficient manipulation of facts). By the same token, it also targets what it conceives as the arrogance, naivete, and violence of critical conceptions of knowledge that

combine their critique of hegemonic knowledge with a transcendental dimension: the struggle for “genuine” critique and for human emancipation and demystification of knowledge. The quest for “true knowledge” is irredeemable. Human contingency and the impossibility of reflection, transcendence, and dialogue are conceived, as an ontological must. Within the postmodern discourse, it is normally no less dogmatically presented than those dogmatic and naive presentations that it deconstructs and attempts to replace. However, some postmodernists present their conception of knowledge as a mere rhetorical gesture. Nevertheless within this tradition, there is no longer room for traditional binaric divisions such as true-false, nice-nasty, virtuous-evil, and emancipation-oppression. Within such a cultural setting, there is no room for the quest for emancipation, elevating learning, resistance, and transcendence. Normalizing education cannot be challenged when there is only room for change – not for advancement or emancipation and for a different gaze or representation – not for reflection and critical dialogue. Within such a postmodern setting, there is no room for the promise of the humanist and critical tradition. From a coherent postmodern perspective, only naivete can today offer to resist the hegemonic social powers and to allow a more humane context: that of a critical dialogue which opens new possibilities for the self-constitution of each of its participants.

From the perspective of counter-education, the stance of knowledge is in permanent historical change. With it, it also changes human possibilities for resistance as “subjects” within the system and as part of it on the one hand and the possibilities for struggling for emancipation from functioning as “subjects” and becoming subjects who transcend normalizing education on the other. Technological progress and changes in capitalist production as well as in social organization emphasize the relevance of instrumental knowledge.

In postmodern arenas, knowledge is transformed in seemingly two opposite directions. In one, knowledge is reduced to bits of information, a symbol targeted at successful control in the

service of aims which are produced with their ways of satisfaction. In the other, an alternative is introduced to instrumental rationality, to linear thinking, to hierarchies, to domination, and to aims that were typical in traditional male-oriented phallogocentrist knowledge (Turtle 1993). In both versions of the postmodern conception of knowledge, the tension between knowledge and power is supposed to be dissolved. One can claim, however, that here too knowledge – even as contingent symbolic play and rhetorical gestures – must comply with the demands of the logic of control and the commitment to reduce the subject to a mere “subject” who complies with the imperatives of normalizing education. Postmodern normalizing education, it will be claimed within this line of argument, is neither less violent nor less effective for the system’s need than previous ways of normalization and control. Even when control is not external but is internalized by its victims, who become agents of the system, the mission of education as normalization does not come to its end. It is only being advanced.

Within current globalization processes, symbols become equal to any other commodities, including theological, artistic, and philosophical knowledge. This process of instrumentalization of knowledge also contains the reification of human relations that fabricate and consume this knowledge. Within this reality, there is no room for humanist education, which traditionally was committed to the elevation of the subject by enhancing autonomy, reflectivity, and solidarian human dimensions as a challenge to the self-evidence. The current change in the conceptual possibilities makes this educational aim impossible.

The globalization process is part of the postmodern condition, and within it there is room neither for transcendence, emancipation, and redemption nor for systematic critique of the sociocultural context. There is also no room for the Utopian axis that will enlighten or allow the legitimization of the “ought” and the imperatives of the struggle for emancipating human knowledge. Within these life conditions, the cumulative concept of knowledge and its enlightened emancipatory axis is abandoned. In modernity, the progress of social and cultural knowledge was

supposed to become part of the advance of “hard” scientific science.

In current postmodern discourses, especially in postmodern feminist discourses, it is often asserted that in the postmodern arenas, such as cyberspace, hierarchical, syllogistic, male-oriented knowledge is replaced by nonhierarchical, intuitive, not centralized, kaleidoscopic, “female” or non-phallogocentric knowledge (Plant 1997). This trend is tied to the cheerful abandonment of the quest for truth and human emancipation.

The era of the cyberspace has brought not only a change in the stance of knowledge in the sense of the “emancipation from the quest for emancipation” and from the arrogant claim for an independent, non-contextual view and representation of reality. It has also brought the erosion of other pre-assumptions, quests, and concepts such as the dividing line between the object and the subject, reality and fantasy, syllogism and rhetoric, true and false, good and evil, and man and woman. The educational rhetoric which praises the advance of the possibilities for improved control of information and of the world normally disregards major developments in the postmodern condition: the advance in the possibilities for normalizing the human being in a noncentralist and seemingly nonviolent manner, the centrality of the issue of understanding as a critique and as a challenge to the self-evident and the current order, and the issue of the dialogical self-constitution of human beings as opposed to their construction by normalizing education. The stance of knowledge in postmodern societies does not permit questions that do not have installed answers. There is no room for a secret, for prayer, and for Utopia. The new stance of knowledge makes possible a certain kind of technological advance and effective economic and social control of the system or of imperatives of “the market,” which is of extreme effectiveness yet is of extreme dehumanizing potential. To a certain degree, the truths or imperatives enhanced by the market fashion or the consumers are no less effective in protecting the walls of the self-evident from transcendence than the myths of prehistoric human collectives. At the same time, normalized subjects who are deprived of the critical eros are faced with new possibilities

for counter-education that will challenge the hegemonic production, reproduction, representation, distribution, and consumption of knowledge. Plato and Nietzsche join forces: on the one hand, the individuals jailed in the cave cannot emancipate themselves, and the very problematic of false conscious or genuine knowledge or struggle against dehumanized fabricated knowledge is irrelevant for them. On the other hand, it is an arena where not only the dividing line between fact and interpretation becomes problematic – even identifying the line of separation between myths and the human agents of the system becomes a conservative, sentimental quest for knowledge. Well-adjusted and successful cyborgs can only smile at such an attempt and continue “their” enjoyable postmodern or post-human alternative.

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Knowledge-in-Practice

- [Dewey on Educational Research and the Science of Education](#)

Kohlberg

- [Philosophical Roots of Gilligan-Kohlberg Controversy, The](#)

Labor in the Digital Age

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Synonyms

[Labor: From Industrial to Digital](#)

Introduction

Drawing attention to the striking contrast between Stephen Daldry's *Billy Elliot* and Douglas Rushkoff's *Generation Like* might be a productive way to open this entry. Despite differences in terms of genre, the contrast between these two provides major entry points to discuss the transformation that education, culture, and labor have gone through in the last 45 years, resulting in the consolidation of what Dan Schiller (1999) has described as "digital capitalism." As far as education is concerned, the shift to online platforms is forcefully moving forward, creating the conditions for a globally networked higher education system, paving even the way for discussions of de-tenuring within North American universities, casualization of academic labor, and the emergence of a culture of precarity across the globe (Berlant 2011; Gregg 2011). In contrast to the hard manual labor of the miners and their

resistance against the neoliberal policies of Margaret Thatcher in Daldry's *Billy Elliot*, today's society is marked by the digital natives featured in Rushkoff's *Generation Like*, which narrates the lives of contemporary youth for whom life is experienced fundamentally on laptop screens, smartphones, game consoles, and the algorithms of social network sites. While *Billy Elliot* documented what David Harvey (2005) calls the "restoration of class power," the increasingly visible fragmentation of the white working class, and emergence of new identities, *Generation Like* depicts the completely mediatized experience of contemporary youth, ultimately raising important questions as to what this new digital condition implicates as far as cultural studies of education are concerned. For instance, how does one think of labor and working class culture that Paul Willis (1981) vividly describes in his seminal *Learning to Labor*? Do central concepts of critical theory such as alienation and exploitation still have currency today? What does one make of the question of leisure as far as youth culture is concerned? *Generation Like* provides some answers to these questions, and the goal of this entry is to briefly describe the material world in *Generation Like* and then ultimately come back to the theoretical concerns mentioned earlier.

A comparison between Douglas Rushkoff (2001) *The Merchants of the Cool* and *Generation Like* (2013) would be an appropriate way to reveal the transformation of contemporary youth culture. Rushkoff's former documentary signified a world

where MTV had to conduct ethnographic research to understand the dynamics of youth consumption. *Generation Like*, on the other hand, uncovers how today's young people love to "share," "like," and "tweet" what they find cool and what this means as far as digital leisure is concerned. Indeed, the narratives in the documentary demonstrate how "like's" and "follower's," rather than the prospect for a stable job, are the currency of the digital age. As Jonathan Beller (2006) suggests, this is actually an attention economy where the act of looking itself has become a labor. Post-modern flexible capitalism (Harvey 1990; Jameson 1991) works by interpellating young subjects where, for example, a young woman named Ceili Lynch spends hours to be "retweeted" by Jack Quaid – an actor in *Hunger Games* – and to become "one of the greatest fans" of the famous transmedia franchise. Internet phenomenon Tyler Oakley presents even a more striking case for the online valorization of human desire since Oakley's decision to open a YouTube account in order to communicate with his friends in college now became his job and made him an Internet celebrity, who by now has worked with such brands as Pepsi, Audible, Virgin Mobile, MTV, and Taco Bell.

As these examples illustrate, to be recognized, perhaps a universal feature of human kind becomes the gateway to being cool. In this sense, Trebor Scholz's description of Facebook is appropriate: "Social participation is the oil of digital economy" (2010, p. 242). But, if participation is the oil of this digital economy, who are the workers then? What does work look like in the digital domain?

Even though Karl Marx is mostly associated with constructing work as toil and accused of economic determinism, his earlier writings present a more complicated picture. For Marx, in addition to being the source of misery, work is also a creative process through which human beings activate conceptual thinking, transform the nature, and in turn are transformed by it. As David Spencer summarizes in *The Political Economy of Work*, work for Marx meant "creative fulfillment and self-actualization. . . Human work had a vital role in the expression of activity and

thus was to be regarded as an essential positive activity" (2009, pp. 47–49).

It is important to highlight the connections between Marx's conception of work and the discourse of the youth in *Generation Like* because Rushkoff's interviewees in the documentary make a number of allusions to how their social media participation *empowers* them for *self-expression*. It is this contradictory intersection of play and labor that makes the realm of digital media particularly interesting in terms of thinking about labor in the digital age and raises important questions regarding the status of *alienation* and *exploitation* in relation to the cultural studies of education because while the world of the lads depicted in *Learning to Labor* glorified hard manual labor and rejected school discipline, today's digital media not only highlights elements of youth aesthetics but also intensifies extraction of value.

Two different cases are useful to illuminate the realm of labor in the digital age: video game industry and social media. They demonstrate that exploitation and alienation are indispensable concepts to understand labor in the contemporary moment and that cultural studies of education need to pay more attention to the ways in which pleasure of work intensifies exploitation, as well as how data is valorized at the expense of a disconnect between the user and her online production. In this respect, cultural studies of education should pursue a research agenda that goes beyond the realm of representation and identity and rather work toward a media literacy that takes into consideration the enclosure of play and commodification of personal data (McGuigan 2012).

Play, Digital Games, and Exploitation

Perhaps one classic way of depicting labor practices in the video game industry is to call it "the dream job." When work is conflated with dream in the popular discourse, one cannot but wonder what Charles Fourier, the utopian socialist frequently quoted by Walter Benjamin, would think of employment in the video game industry. When challenging the mythical discourse of equating

industrialization with historical progress, Benjamin refers to Fourier's theory of work:

The distinguishing characteristic of the labor process' relationship to nature is marked by this relation's social constitution. If humans were not genuinely exploited, then one could spare oneself the disingenuous talk of the exploitation of nature. Such talk strengthens the illusion that raw material receives "value" only through an order of production which rests on the exploitation of human labor. If this order ceases, then human labor for its part will cast aside its characteristic exploitation of nature. Human labor will then proceed in accord with the model of children's play, which, in Fourier is the basis of the *travail passionné* [passionate labor] of the *harmoniens* [dwellers in his utopian communities]. To have situated play as the canon of a form of labor that no longer exploitative is one of the greatest merits of Fourier. Labor thus animated by play aims not at the production of value, but at an improved nature. (Buck-Morss 1991, p. 276)

Passionate labor is precisely the same phrase video game industry employees communicate to college or even high school students who "dream" of finding a job in the video game industry. Yet, the cost of passion in this industry is not negligible. Passionate creative labor – or immaterial labor in the lexicon of Autonomist Marxism (Lazzarato 1996) – comes with precarity, self-exploitation, and alienation. Although precarity is often associated with independent studios or so-called "low-skilled" below the line game developers, it is perhaps more appropriate to think about precarization as a process, which depends on the peculiarities of a game studio, its location, and the occupational skills of a particular game developer (Dyer-Witheford and de Peuter 2009; Bulut 2015). And while the materiality of being precariously employed itself leads to a culture of overwork, the dynamics in the industry (Kerr 2011) produce extreme forms of self-exploitation, as well. Doing more with less is almost the default work setting in the industry, leading to domestic crisis (Dyer-Witheford and de Peuter 2006) and creating clashes within game development as collaborative practice (O'Donnell 2014). This culture of self-exploitation is exacerbated by the fact that the workforce is youthful and extremely competitive, while the industry is hard to get into. That is why

willingness to work for long hours and acceptance of frequent layoffs is a major skill set to possess if one would like to get a job in the industry.

While this dark account pertains more to professionals from the industry, the world of skilled amateurs – *modders* – presents a highly fluid terrain as far as cultural consumption of games and labor is concerned. Modders are passionate gamers who use their major programming, art, and design skills to edit narrative structures or characters of the games they love to play. While reminiscent of the more optimistic discourse of "participatory culture" (Jenkins 2006), modding "straddles the lines between professional production and amateur contributions more thoroughly" (Postigo 2010). This blurring of professional and amateur production is actually enhanced and encouraged by the video game industry, which actively reaps profits off of modders' labor of love and their desire to set a foot in the industry by simply giving away Unreal Development Kits in order to "capture modding" and enclose its value-producing mechanisms.

Then, professional production practices and modding in the video game industry reveal a contested terrain for cultural studies of education to explore and intervene, especially by way of drawing on the contributions from scholars operating within the political economy of digital culture (Fuchs 2014). This is especially important within a neoliberal culture, which, through the discourse of creativity, channels youth desire and labor into voluntary mechanisms of surplus value extraction and processes of precarization, mostly handled in quite individualistic ways and without the remnants of the institutions one gets to see in *Billy Elliot* (Neff 2012).

Learning to Labor 2.0: Alienation Strikes Back

In their Foucaultian analysis on digital media, Mark Cote and Jennifer Pybus (2011, p. 170) define the kind of labor that pertains to social networks as "immaterial labor 2.0" and argue that "learning to immaterial labor 2.0 is an integral process to the reproduction of cognitive

capitalism.” Underlining the affective nature of social networks within which contemporary youth rush to participate, Cote and Pybus reflect on the relationship between Willis’s lads and today’s digital youth: “They learn to produce their networked subjectivity on social networks, which offer an unprecedented milieu for myriad forms of circulation and valorization. It is, then, a polyvalent pedagogy. That is, this apprenticeship is not only socially ‘profitable’ for youth, it helps capital construct the foundations of a future of networked subjectivity and affect” (2011, p. 178). Such is the “pedagogical imperative of cognitive capitalism,” to which “linguistic and communicative elements are so integral” (2011, p. 181).

In a sense, then, to like, to tweet, or to communicate in general has become a form of labor. In this “social factory,” everybody is a worker, whose free time is valorized by social media corporations. If the society is all put to work, who are the business owners or the capitalists, then? What does our contract with Facebook or YouTube tell us? And even at a more fundamental sense, do alienation and exploitation still describe the social media presence of contemporary youth?

Although there are striking differences between the miserable world of industrial work described by Marx and the joyful connections youngsters make with their smartphones, alienation and exploitation are still valuable concepts to account for the contradictory mechanisms of digital consumption. To begin with, alienation is useful simply because users grant their rights to social media corporations and are disconnected from their own product: data, texts, images, relationships, and connections. However, the question of exploitation seems to be trickier because if, for example, workers performing hard manual labor in the Foxconn factories are exploited, can one really make a similar case for Facebook users?

A major criticism regarding the utility of the concept of exploitation in the context of social media is the abundance of pleasure and lack of violence in digital networks. To answer these criticisms, Mark Andrejevic argues that “the point of a critique of exploitation is neither to disparage the pleasures of workers nor the value of the tasks

being undertaken” and further states that “the critique of exploitation does not devalue individual pleasure any more than such pleasures nullify exploitative social relations” (2013, p. 153). The crucial point in Andrejevic’s argument is to rather interrogate processes and practices of *coercion* and *freedom* in relation to the constitution of capital-labor relations. While nobody seems to force young populations to join Facebook, their lack of control over data and profits made from their own data makes it clear that “coercion is embedded in the relations that structure so-called free choices” (2013, p. 154). In other words, one does not seem to be making a free choice, just as it is not the case for wage labor. More importantly, there is an inextricable relationship between alienation and exploitation. As suggested by Andrejevic, “alienation subsists not just in the surrender of conscious control over productive activity, but also, consequently, in its product. Exploitation, then, is not simply about a loss of monetary value, but also a loss of control over productive and creative activity” (p. 154). Indeed, what makes social media a total factory is its capacity to harness collective knowledge and information, or “general intellect”: “the general social knowledge or collective intelligence of a society at a given historical period” (Hardt and Virno 1996, p. 262, cited in Cohen 2008, p. 13). As Nicole Cohen suggests, the kind of exploitation is not necessarily to be taken in the strict sense of the Marxist term but rather as “the expropriation of the common” (Hardt and Negri 2004, p. 150, cited in Cohen 2008, p. 14).

Conclusion

A major question cultural studies of education need to consider in the digital age, then, is the dynamics of the network economy within which “affect, intellect, and knowledge are put to work in the form of social labor power for the purpose of capital accumulation” (Dyer-Witheford 1999, p. 79). The practitioners of cultural studies of education especially need to be aware of the neo-liberal discourse and its emphasis on empowerment and choice because as Trebor Scholz (2012,

p. 243) aptly put it, “we all must admit that a big achievement of capitalism, really, is to make workers believe that digital labor does not exist.” Even though participation in social media platforms seems to be voluntary as opposed to the violent form of wage labor, the dynamics of today’s flexible capitalism force diverse populations to be present online 24/7, accomplish human intelligence tasks for almost no compensation (Aytes 2013), and learn to constantly fashion and reinvent themselves. In this sense, the differences of the digital economy from the industrial economy turn out to be less than assumed since the former also “functions through forms of market discipline” (Hearn 2010, p. 423) and claims regarding post-racialism of the new economy are far from truth (Javadev 2001; Noble 2013; Nakamura 2009).

Ultimately, today’s young populations are coming of age in an era within which being indebted and precarious represent the core of being a human being. Unions are dysfunctional and schools do not deliver the job security they used to. Popular culture and specifically digital media have emerged as the haven for the futureless youth, but even this haven is not immune from exploitation and alienation. Still, the dialectics of technology and culture means that human subjects have the potential to create nodes of resistance and alternative modes of labor and being. It is this struggle that cultural studies of education will need to explore in the second decade of the new millennium.

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Labor: From Industrial to Digital

► Labor in the Digital Age

Langeveld

► Langeveld, Martinus J. (1905–1989)

Langeveld, Martinus J. (1905–1989)

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Synonyms

Authority; Autonomy; Child; Freedom; Kant; Langeveld; Maturity/immaturity; Pedagogy; Phenomenology; Upbringing; Utrecht School

Introduction

Martinus Jan Langeveld (1905–1989) was one of the most prominent educational theorists in the Netherlands in the second half of the twentieth century. He was one of the originators of the Dutch tradition of “pedagogiek” (“pedagogy”; but see further, section “[A Note on Translation](#)”) and was the founder of the study of “pedagogiek” at the university in the Netherlands after WWII. During his own years of study he was mentored by the Dutch philosopher and educational theorist Philipp Kohstamm and the Dutch philosopher Hendrik Pos and was taught by such prominent philosophers and scholars as (among others) Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger, Wilhelm Stern, Karl Jaspers, Herman Nohl, and Ernst Cassirer. He obtained his doctorate in 1934 with a dissertation entitled “Taal en Denken” (Language and Thinking), under the supervision of Kohstamm. In 1946 he was appointed Professor of “Pedagogiek” at the University of Utrecht. Not unsurprisingly his own work on education was mainly based on the German traditions in education, philosophy, and psychology. But from the 1950s onwards Langeveld also made contacts in the Anglo-Saxon academic scene with scholars such as Karl Bigelow. He authored more than a dozen books and hundreds of articles and shorter essays. He was a member of numerous associations and boards, one of which was the board of the *International Review of Education*. Intertwined with his academic work, Langeveld also ran a clinical practice for parents and children to help parents deal with (what now are called) “parenting” issues and problems.

For a more extensive overview of the life and work of Langeveld and a broader contextualization of his work (in relation to other scholars, disciplines, positions taken in educational research), see Levering (2012). In this entry, the focus is on Langeveld’s main work, *Concise Theoretical Pedagogy* (but see below, section “[A Note on Translation](#)”) (1945). References are to paragraphs in the 10th revised edition (1965) (All translations are by the author).

Langeveld was deeply skeptical about research based on quantification of qualitative data and

vehemently argued against the reductive propensities of the empirical-analytical paradigm. Instead he consistently propagated a phenomenological approach to studying the child – an approach adopted by what at some point was called the *Utrechtse School*. He wanted to study upbringing as it appears to us in daily and ordinary experience, starting from “a vague notion of upbringing based on common-or-garden experience” (§5). It is a study of upbringing *as such*, “taking account of the phenomenon of upbringing in its form of appearance that is accessible to anyone” (ibid.).

In educational theory, Langeveld is commonly taken to voice the standard position of the traditional, hierarchical account of the relationship between an educator and a child. By educator is meant: any grown-up (usually, but not necessarily, a parent) responsible for raising children to become independent human beings.

A Note on Translation

Saying something about Langeveld in English is undertaking an impossible exercise in translation. (*Concise Theoretical Pedagogy* is used as literal translation of *Beknopte Theoretische Pedagogiek*, but the book itself has never been translated in English.) It is unclear what word to use to translate “opvoeding” (or in German, “Erziehung”) in English: Upbringing? Childrearing? Education? Similar problems arise with the verb “opvoeden” (“erziehen”): To bring up children? To raise children? To educate children? “Education” and “to educate” are problematic translations given its close association with schooling. In Dutch “opvoeding” and “opvoeden” are not normally used to refer to what happens in schools. These are used, rather, to capture the bringing up of children in the context of a family. But then again, the English “educator” does seem to be used not only for referring to teachers but also to any grown-up responsible for raising a child. Further complications abound with the fairly recent use, in English, of “parenting,” for which there is no direct equivalent in Dutch. Remarkably, childrearing and parenting both have a reference

to a person (the child, the parent), something that is not the case in the Dutch words “opvoeding/opvoeden.” Mainly for this reason, “upbringing” will be used here.

To complicate matters further, it is not unproblematic to use “pedagogy” as translation for “pedagogiek.” Pedagogy is more closely related to the concept and practices of teaching than to the concept and practices of bringing up children. Using “pedagogy” would then unduly narrow down one’s understanding of “pedagogiek” to the domain of schooling. But “pedagogiek” refers, first, to something more generic than what teaching is referring to. In its ancient Greek form, the first part of the word, “pedagogie” can be taken apart in “agein” and “pais”: “leading a child.” Originally this refers to the process in which someone (usually a slave) would lead a child to school, but it has come to mean something broader than that, i.e., leading a child into adulthood, into independent or autonomous personhood, a process or activity which comprises anything parents do to help their children grow to become responsible adult human beings. Second, “pedagogy” is conceptually associated more with practice than with theory. The crucial distinguishing marker of “pedagogiek” lies, precisely, in the -k at the end of the word. This denotes to the Dutch “kunde,” which is usually translated as “craft” (as in craftsmanship) meaning not so much a skillful knowing how, but rather an insightful knowing why. “Pedagogiek” entails a reference to something that is “systematic.” It is standing for *logos*, a system of principles. “Pedagogiek,” then, as the *logos* or system of upbringing, is properly understood as the theory of (or behind) upbringing, the “science” of it, if you will.

To complicate things even further still, Langeveld conceives of “pedagogiek” as a “practical science.” This is different from what is ordinarily taken to be an applied science. The latter refers to the situation in which the principles developed in a certain field of scholarship and research are applied in a field that is external to the scholarship (e.g., teaching as applied psychology). “Pedagogiek” as a practical science is expressing the sense that studying upbringing is necessary in order to know how to *act* and on what *grounds*.

The Necessity of Pedagogy for the Educator

The practice of upbringing needs justification. Without justification, it is unfounded, irresponsible. It is pedagogy that provides this justification. Pedagogy, as a science, is a “systematic body of knowledge” (§2) that provides “coherence, meaningful unity and orientation, against which practice can test itself” (§20). Since it concerns upbringing, the justification in play is of a moral nature. Furthermore, pedagogy imposes an *obligation* on the educator. Through theoretical reflection the educator is obliged to justify her actions, to open herself up for criticism, to take a critical look at herself. “It enforces to completeness and thoroughness, it makes possible the self-perfection of the educator.” (§3) Pedagogy does not teach technical control or command but leads to an understanding of meaning and to knowledge of value. Pedagogy helps the educator to determine her place in life, where she finds herself in life. It also helps (and is necessary) “to guard against the infringement of human dignity” (§3).

Upbringing

For Langeveld “[a]ny work that helps a child to find (or provides the child with) the image which enables her to lead the life of a human being, is pedagogical work” (§4). This clearly is work that is “normatively laden” (§4). In the first place, parents are bearing primary responsibility for this. Irrespective of the fact whether or not they are doing a good enough job, parents are assisted by other representatives of what counts as “a desirable or acceptable idea of a human being” (§4). Langeveld speaks of these people as “image-bearers” (§4), such as politicians and priests, not, to be sure, as, respectively, members of this or that party and confessionals, but those who put forward the image of a dignified human life.

For Langeveld, upbringing is

- A relation between grown-ups and those who are not yet grown-up or immature (i.e., children)

- In which a certain kind of influence is intentionally exerted by grown-ups on the immature
- With an eye to helping the immature to become mature (in Dutch: “mondig”) (In Dutch and German the word “mondigheid/Mundigkeit” entails the word “mouth” (“mond/Mund”), which elucidates that being grown-up means being able to speak responsibly, to make good use of one’s ability to speak. In French, this relation between adulthood and speaking can be observed in the Latin origin of “l’enfant” – infans, meaning “mute” and “without eloquence”, and infantia, meaning “the inability to speak,” “lacking eloquence.” Raising a child thus means: helping her to move from being “onmondig/unmündig” to becoming “mondig/mündig,” to become “able to speak,” to make free and public use of her reason.)

Upbringing takes place *in* daily interaction between children and grown-ups. Not all daily interaction between grown-ups and children is upbringing, according to Langeveld. In his view we can only speak of upbringing when it is characterized by a specific finality, that is, when a specific kind of influence is involved, i.e., an influence that is exerted or exercised with an eye to the specific goal to help the child to become mature. Upbringing is that special kind of daily interaction between grown-ups and children that is deliberately aimed at the child’s reaching adulthood. So this daily interaction between grown-ups and children is a “pedagogically preformed field” within which “the phenomenon of upbringing” can arise (§9). “After its completion the relation of upbringing eventually always returns to a relation of daily interaction” (§9). This also implies that not any relationship can be called a relation of upbringing. A relationship between grown-ups among one another, e.g., can never be a relation of upbringing: “a grown-up always is and remains self-responsible” (§5). A relationship between children can also not be a relation of upbringing, not in the least because what is lacking here is a relationship of authority, the presence of which for Langeveld is a necessary condition in order to speak of upbringing (see below).

Adulthood

The goal of upbringing is adulthood: being capable of autonomously fulfilling a task in life worthy of a dignified existence. This clearly involves a normativity since not every single fleshing out of such a task can be called an example of a dignified existence. The criterion against which to test this is what Langeveld calls “self-responsible self-determination.” This entails:

- Having authority over oneself, meaning: being capable of committing oneself to what one has imposed on oneself, not being at the mercy of someone else’s judgments, having personal access to standards of value. In short: stability of character (Cf. §14).
- Being capable of recognizing a form of higher authority whenever that is needed, exerting “normative stability” (§14), meaning: being able to account for one’s actions against the background of a moral order. Langeveld stipulates this as a condition of freedom: being free means being capable of freely obeying that which one has willfully imposed on oneself. Put paradoxically human freedom is “being bound” (§16).
- Being capable of participating in communal life in a constructive way.

Self-responsible self-determination, or adulthood, is thus a form of autonomy. Autonomy derives from the Greek *autos* or “self” and *nomos* or “law” and thus means to impose the law on oneself, to commit oneself to what one imposes on oneself. And, clearly, the “law” one imposes on oneself does not refer to just any arbitrary measure but to the law of moral reason.

The Child: Condition of Helplessness

Compared to a grown-up a child finds herself in a state of “natural helplessness” (§7, 9). In pedagogical terms this is as much as saying that a child cannot grow up to become an adult person by herself. In line with his phenomenological starting point, it is no surprise to see Langeveld saying that

taking the child to be independent and autonomous is clearly in contradiction with the most evident facts. We can all “see” that in the human world children are being raised, in order to become adult persons. What is more, the necessity of upbringing cannot be denied. Denying this necessity is tantamount to positing “born adulthood,” which is clearly an absurdity, Langeveld says (§24), a “contradiction to the most simple facts” (§17). The child is an “animal educandum” (§67), an animal that needs to be raised.

Following the Continental pedagogical tradition from Herbart on, Langeveld conceives of this helplessness in terms of spiritual helplessness or “moral immaturity” (§14). Being a child means being morally irresponsible. A child’s grasp of norms does not rise above self-interest. “Left to her own devices a child is only capable of following her reflexes, instincts and urges” (§24). In accordance with his definition of adulthood, the child’s condition for Langeveld is one wanting for freedom, a condition of being unfree. A child is entirely *at the mercy of* her reflexes, instincts, and urges. Given that the condition of freedom is understood by Langeveld as being able to freely determine oneself after the demands of (moral) reasonableness, the child clearly is unfree for not yet capable of catering to the demands of a higher, moral order. As said, pedagogically this means that the condition of the child requires guidance by a grown-up.

Kant’s Heritage

It is hard to miss the spirit of Kant wandering through Langeveld’s *Concise Theoretical Pedagogy*. “The child nor the educator may be reduced to a thing-like object, upbringing nor being brought up may be reduced to a mechanical process, to a domain that one tries to condition by means of determining forces” (§24). This is more than just vaguely reminiscent of the second formulation of Kant’s categorical imperative, which states the following: “Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never merely as a means

to an end, but always at the same time as an end” (Kant, *Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals*). As human beings we are not only creatures of nature (which we obviously clearly are: subject to all sorts of causal influences from inside and outside our body), but, also and importantly, we have a higher destination, i.e., to become moral beings. As creatures of nature we are subject to the laws of physics and hence unfree. But as moral beings we can overcome our own instincts and urges, through upbringing, and hence experience freedom.

Kant’s famous saying, in *Über Pädagogik*, that a human being can only become a human being through upbringing and that he (sic) is nothing except what upbringing makes of him, may serve as an adagio to capture Langeveld’s understanding of upbringing. As should be clear, for Langeveld the essence of being human is not given naturally from birth on. *Human Beings Are Not Born* (1979) is the telling title of one of his other books. Obviously, Langeveld is not denying here that human beings are born in a physical sense, but he is denying that a human being, when being born, bears in itself some kind of “model” of (a full) human life which a child is somehow spontaneously able to develop. Being (more) fully human is a *task* and one in which upbringing has an important role to play. This is not to say that raising children is a process of molding or “making” them. In this regard, the application of Kant’s famous *dictum* on upbringing to the position Langeveld takes may be misleading because of the use of the verb “to make.” Langeveld is not conceiving of upbringing as a one-directional process. Raising children is something in which children themselves have a very active role to play. Importantly, Langeveld does not conceive of this in terms of some kind of bidirectional or transactional model of parenting (that is so popular these days), for this would render upbringing as a network of interrelated factors having (some) causal influence on one another. It is not causality among (sets of) behaviors that interests Langeveld when saying that the child also has an active role to play in upbringing. His point is that in upbringing we relate not to (the child as) an object but to (the child as) a subject

who engages in a “self-creative process” (§24). The process of becoming (more fully) human, then, is one for which the child herself also bears responsibility and increasingly so while growing up. That is, the child is bestowed with (an increasing sense of) responsibility “for what she *herself* makes of herself *with* her own innate qualities and *with* the upbringing she has received” (§31).


Authority

The condition of the child requires guidance in the form of a relation of authority (§12ff). Exercising authority is not something required of grown-ups out of an ethical appeal; it is, simply, *technically* necessary: it is a necessity implied in the peculiarity of the work that is upbringing. Authority for Langeveld is the inescapable and necessary condition of upbringing, simply because the child, by herself, is not capable of becoming who she is expected or destined to be (a grown-up person). It is necessary so that certain desirable ways of behaving and acting can be pointed or hinted at and undesirable ones can be prevented. The following points about authority in the relation of upbringing need to be taken into account:

1. A grown-up’s authority is justified on double grounds: on the factual condition of the child (immature, irresponsible, not yet grown-up, unfree, etc.) and on the grown-up’s knowledge of the goal of upbringing.
2. A grown-up is not acting on her own personal behalf but on behalf of a higher moral order. Her authority is not founded in her personal choices of what is a dignified existence. As said, a grown-up is accountable to a higher moral order.
3. This implies that what or who the child is *ultimately* obeying is not the concrete person the educator happens to be but the very values and norms this grown-up is representing. This is not to say that the concrete and particular person of the educator is of no matter whatsoever or that the personal bond between educator and child is not important. Clearly in the

beginning (i.e., phenomenologically given) this is of major importance, and the child is behaving in certain ways (listening to the grown-up) because of the fact that it is *this* particular person who is speaking to her (e.g., prohibiting her to do something). Here Langeveld does not speak of the child exerting obedience in a true sense of the word but of “being ‘contaminated’ with the educator’s initiatives and spontaneously joining in” (§13). Not obedience but docility or meekness is in play here. (In Dutch the word is “volgzaamheid,” which contains the verb “to follow” (“volgen”). The connotation at work here is that the child is “following” the grown-up and the example she sets.) But gradually the child comes to realize that who/what she is following/obeying is not just this particular person. Her identification with whom/what she is obeying is gradually being depersonalized until she is exerting true obedience, i.e., complying with self-recognized authority (cf. §15).

Taken together, the second and third points come down to the fact that the structure of the relationship of authority within upbringing is a reflection or representation of the structure of adulthood. As an educator a grown-up places herself under the very values and norms she is representing to the child.



4. This further implies (and clarifies) the following two issues: (a) It is important that the grown-up personally realizes or actualizes the values and norms she is upholding to the child. What she is conveying (by acting and speaking) to the child through a relation of authority is something that should have authority for herself in her own life (Hence also the importance of self-knowledge on the part of the educator; cf. above, the necessity of

pedagogy). (b) The educator is, in the end, merely a connecting-piece, a mediator, or a go-between between the child and her future.

5. As long as the child is not yet capable of placing herself under the authority of a higher moral order, the grown-up takes responsibility instead of the child. The grown-up acts as a substitute for the child. She acts, literally, in the child’s stead as long as the child is not capable of acting herself (i.e., acting responsibly). Clearly this “substitution” is a matter for the grown-up of finding the right balance as the child is growing up, since the child, being active in the process of upbringing, has “an increasing *duty* to autonomously fulfill her task in life” (§15).
6. There is no antithesis between authority and freedom. On the contrary, authority sets up the conditions for freedom, for becoming a free adult human being. Though a child *in principle* is capable of being free (in the sense indicated), she cannot take this freedom herself. Freedom is bestowed upon her by a grown-up. Autonomy as something that belongs to what it means to lead a grown-up dignified existence is granted to the child by the educator, through upbringing. In a sense, upbringing on this account is an act of “violence”: a certain form of coercion needs to be exerted with an eye to the child’s autonomy. “Freedom is laboriously instilled through upbringing” (§16). So, paradoxically, the child’s reasonableness, maturity, responsibility, etc. only comes to fruition through “coercion.”

The Autonomy of Pedagogy as a Science

As should be clear, Langeveld’s account of concepts such as responsibility, freedom, authority, obedience, etc. are derived from the ways in which these figure in the pedagogical relationship itself. The significance of these concepts to upbringing is not shown by first offering a general (say philosophical) account of them, after which these accounts are “applied” in upbringing. Their significance is shown as pedagogical concepts in themselves not as philosophical concepts having

an application (also) in upbringing. In this sense, pedagogy for Langeveld is an autonomous discipline, fully capable of generating a theory of upbringing by itself. To be sure, in generating such a theory, fruitful use is made of other disciplines, such as developmental psychology and philosophy. Specifically the second is important because it offers an account of the values and the order of values which are acknowledged as being part of what it means to lead a human life, and hence offers an idea of the goal(s) of upbringing. It is a matter for philosophical anthropology, not for pedagogy, to reflect upon an account of what is worthy of a human life (Cf. §21). Pedagogy simply accepts this account as one of its most evident starting points for theorizing upbringing. What needs to be theorized by pedagogy is not the goal(s) in itself but the role of upbringing in the process in which a child develops to maturity and how it relates to the goal(s) set out for it. As it comes to the relation between pedagogy on the one hand and philosophy and developmental psychology (and other disciplines) on the other hand, Langeveld operates with a clear division of labor in mind. Put very simply: reflecting on the meaning of life and what it means to lead a dignified existence is a matter to be taken care of within philosophy; reflecting on how to raise children to lead such an existence is a matter to be taken care of within pedagogy. In this regard, pedagogy has a very important task to fulfill, i.e., “to complement what is worthy of a human life with what is worthy of a children’s life” (§21). Pedagogy determines “which values are pedagogically acceptable, meaning: reconcilable with the values that need to determine a children’s life” (§21). Pedagogy may in the end not decide upon the ultimate order of values, it does however have the indispensable task to ensure a kind of harmony or rapport between the goals of upbringing and *this* particular child.

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Language

- ▶ [Edusemiotics To Date, An Introduction of](#)
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Language and Identity in Haiti: Central Issues in Education

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Synonyms

[Créolité Movement and Education in Haiti-Post-colonialism and Education in Haiti, The](#)

Introduction

Haiti is often called the poorest country of the Western Hemisphere, despite having been called the Pearl of the Antilles during the period of colonization. It achieved its independence before any other nation in Latin America, but that independence has been followed by centuries of social, economic, and environmental problems. It was colonized by the French rather than the Spanish or Portuguese, and the remnants of French imperialism found in its society lead to serious tensions between a French-speaking elite and a Creole-speaking minority. This paper will attempt to examine the history of Haiti and its

history of domination compared to its perceived independence as well as the way language plays into these dynamics. I will synthesize writings by various French, Haitian, Martiniquais, and American authors while adding a new perspective on the subject. The majority of information on this history of Haiti comes from *Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies*, a book compiled by the Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress.

The early colonization of Haiti was similar to most other islands in the Caribbean. Hispaniola, the island where Haiti is located, was one of the first identified by Christopher Columbus. The Western third of the island, what is now Haiti, was colonized by the French in the seventeenth century under the name of Sainte-Domingue. During its status as a colony, Haiti was used predominantly for sugarcane production, necessitating immense amounts of slave labor. In 1791, when the Haitian Revolution began, the colony's slave population totaled between 500,000 and 700,000. During this period, the African majority was controlled by an elite French minority, which would set the tone for future relations within the country. The 13 years that followed included mass bloodshed and destruction of infrastructure, but ended in Haiti's declaration of independence in 1804. For the first time, not only had a slave rebellion succeeded, but a slave rebellion had led to the foundation of a nation of former slaves.

Unfortunately, Haiti would not experience the prosperity for which its revolutionaries had hoped. In the years following Haiti's independence, it experienced a division between the north and south as well as decades of instability. This instability continued until the United States occupied the country in 1915, from which point it was permanently involved in Haitian affairs, whether or not it formally occupied the country. The presidencies of infamous dictators François Duvalier and his son Jean-Claude, which included the murder and exile of tens of thousands of Haitian citizens, received millions of dollars of aid from the United States government. Following the fall of Jean-Claude Duvalier, Haitian citizens voted in their first democratic election in 1991 and elected Jean-Bertrand Aristide. However, a

military coup occurred shortly after his election and forced him into exile until 1994 when he was able to return and take his place as president for 2 years. He was elected again in 2000, but was again ousted by a coup in 2004. Many theorize that both coups were orchestrated on the part of the United States government, but this has never been confirmed.

Thus, it seems that Haiti has spent a majority of its history under the thumb of the Northern nations. The first of Latin American countries to achieve its independence experienced years of continued domination by wealthier nations. This led to a population dependent on foreign aid and governed by an elite minority. And semblances of the country's colonization and enslavement remain in the dominance of the French language over the country.

Perspective

The dominance of the French language can be found throughout Haitian society. Creole was not considered an official language of Haiti until the 1980s, despite it being the language spoken by the majority of the population. In fact, it is estimated that only 5% of the Haitian population, at most, is fluent in French. Suze M Mathieu discusses this in her book *Depi Nan Ginen, Nèg Renmen Nèg*. Mathieu's work particularly focuses on the relationship between the Creole language and the democratic society in Haiti. She states that colonial domination was not only enforced using weapons but also using an ideology that values a series of cultural elements that do not coincide with the culture and identity of the population (Mathieu 2005, p. 31). Many different ideologies are responsible for valorizing the colonized over the colonizer. Physical appearance, religion, intelligence, and level of development have all been historically used for this valorization of the colonizer's culture over the colonized. Language is much less often discussed in discourses about colonial and postcolonial domination and ideology. Yet it is through language that we valorize these qualities. Mathieu uses several examples of this specific language of domination including

using words like religion versus superstition, speaking a language versus speaking a dialect, civilized versus primitive, and developed versus undeveloped (p. 32). If associating specific words with a dominated group can have such a drastic effect on a group's identity, then devaluing a group's entire language must have an even more profound effect.

Thus, even after gaining its independence, Haiti remained in a state of domination by the French, incarnated through their language. However, as with any system of oppression, there were those who resisted. Beginning in the 1960s, at the height of the Duvalier regime, a group of Creole speakers formed what was known as the *Sosyete Koukouy* or the Society of the Firefly. This group sought to promote the use of the Creole language as a symbol of resistance and resilience. The group encouraged literature written in Creole as a form of self-expression (Banbou 2000, p. 13). This act of writing in Creole itself also served as a political statement. In a society so adamant about preserving the prestige of the language of its colonial oppressor, writing in the language of the common people served as an act of defiance.

A similar movement occurred around the same time in the French department of Martinique, where Jean Bernabé, Patrick Chamoiseau, and Raphaël Confiant authored *Éloge de la Créolité* or *In Praise of Creoleness*. The three spoke of their situation in Martinique as well as discussing the case of Haiti, asserting, "We have seen the world through the filter of western values, and our foundation was 'exoticized' by the French vision we had to adopt. It is a terrible condition to perceive one's interior architecture, one's world, the instants of one's days, one's own values, with the eyes of the other" (Barnabé et al. 1993, p. 76). Their manifesto sought to express the complicated identity of the Creole Caribbean. "Neither Europeans, nor Africans, nor Asians, we proclaim ourselves Creoles" (p. 75). Through the *Créolité* movement, citizens of Haiti and the French Antilles were finally able to express themselves in their chosen language. The book *Open Gate: an Anthology of Creole Poetry* was published, chronicling decades of

Creole poetry that express resistance movements through Haiti's history. Haitian citizens were encouraged to read and write in their own language, and this literature was made available to the public. And eventually, Creole was added as the second official language of Haiti.

Unfortunately, the stigma associated with Creole remains. French continues to be the chosen language of instruction, administration, and publication in Haiti. While Creole is spoken in the household, it is often seen as lesser than the prestigious French is. Yet the word "creole" is used to describe everything from food to architecture to clothing in Haiti. Thus, this word used to describe the culture of the nation's people is also the name of the language considered to be a mere "dialect" or "corrupted version" of the colonial French. Students were instructed in French rather than Creole. They were unable to learn the grammatical structure of their native language, thus impeding their instruction in any other language, namely, French. Students not fluent in French could not pass the exit exam from high school. Thus, those who only spoke Creole were considered less intelligent than their bilingual counterparts, which was again a mere 5% of the population. Citizens could not properly participate in a democratic society without speaking the language of that society. Mathieu expresses this problem in *Depi Nan Ginen*, stating, "When we speak Creole, everyone is included. Each and every Haitian! They can exercise their rights to participate in any business that concerns them. But because we have chosen to speak French, 95% of the population, at least, is not included. This system is precisely anti-democratic" (Mathieu 2005, p. 35). This language of domination hinders 95% of the population from fully participating in their own society.

However, there is hope on the horizon for Creole to gain a prestige relative to French in Haiti. The 1987 Haitian Constitution called for the State to create an academy for the development of the Creole language. And decades later, this was finally achieved through the Haitian Creole Academy, which met for the first time in December of 2014. This group seeks to encourage

the production of materials in Creole, standardize a written Creole, and valorize the Creole language and identity in every way possible (Akademi Kreyòl Ayisyen 2005).

Analysis

Several factors come into play when discussing the ideological structure in Haiti that continues to keep French as the dominant language in the country. The first of these is perhaps the most obvious reason – French is a language of diplomacy. Learning French gives a Haitian citizen infinitely more opportunities than a monolingual Creole speaker does. This idea alone is not necessarily problematic. It is certain that keeping records in French and having government officials who are fluent in French benefits the nation. However, this is not a form of justification for Creole having a lesser status. Many European nations have their own languages with a similar amount or fewer speakers than Creole – including Greece, Sweden, and the Czech Republic – and these languages are all recognized and valued. Additionally, according to Suze Mathieu's research from 2004, a total of 11.5 people in the Americas speak Haitian Creole or a Creole similar to it, while only 10 million speak French (Mathieu 2005, p. 21). This statistic affirms that French does not remain the official language of Haiti because of its versatility, but because of its perceived power and domination.

A second factor keeping the French language in power in Haiti is the stigma attached to Creole identity in other parts of the world. Evidence of this is dissipated throughout American media. For example, Haiti's native religion is Vodou, which is a synthesis of African religions and the Catholicism brought by French colonizers. Yet American media portrays it as a make-believe black magic full of Voodoo dolls and curses. The only times Haiti is depicted in news segments is to discuss its poverty and need for aid from the American people. Haitian culture, and by extent Creole culture, is reduced to a country in need of aid from the Global North. When visiting Haiti, one would of course

see various signs of poverty, but would also find a rich culture of music, food, and art similar to many cities in the United States. Yet this Haiti, this Creole culture, is not what news outlets choose to portray. Cities in Haiti are full of countless signs of USAID, United Nations troops, and Red Cross relief efforts. These benevolent acts by northern countries also give the Haitian people the idea that they are in need of aid from these countries and continue the cycle of dependence and domination created during colonization. Thus, to be Creole is to be in need of aid. To speak French is to identify oneself with these wealthier nations.

A final factor perpetuating the dominance of the French language in Haiti is the difficulty of identifying a language as a form of oppression. Discourses on oppression often include discrimination based on race, gender, ethnicity, religion, nationality, sexual orientation, and countless other factors. Yet very rarely is language discussed. In 1948 the United Nations published its Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which stated in Article 2 that "Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status" (United Nations). Language was specifically mentioned in this article, but continued to be left out of discourses on oppression. The paradox of this is that any discourse occurring would have most likely occurred in academic spheres of northern nations and in languages that had been used as forms of oppression. This paper is written in the same language that dominated the indigenous people of nations like India, South Africa, and Australia. Thankfully, there are now discourses occurring in Creole about the dominance of the French language in Haiti. This is absolutely necessary to reverse the system of oppression currently in place. Paulo Friere remarks in his *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* (2014) that the oppressed must be involved in bringing about their own liberation. The discourse of groups like the Haitian Creole Academy that occurs in Creole about language and power is indicative of an overturning of this system of oppression.

Interpretation

Various history and language courses in the United States continue to teach that former French colonies, like Haiti, speak the language of their former colonizers. Yet the idea of these countries being completely francophone is false and perpetuates the cycle of dominance in these countries. It is remarkable that Haiti fought so brutally for their independence from the French yet continued to use their language over the language of their own people. This self-imposition of the French language indicates a continuation of colonial dependency. While Haiti gained its independence in 1804, it has remained dependent on northern nations since then. The French language is displayed all over the country. This language of domination and colonization is also used on the Haitian flag that represents its independence. Domination and dependence mask the independence and resistance of the Haitian people. This dependency is engrained in the mentality of the Haitian population. The Haitian author Jacques Roumain wrote the book *Masters of the Dew* (1978) chronicling the symbolic struggle of Manuel who has to save his village by convincing two rival groups to work together. In it, almost every other character embodies the idea prevalent in Haiti that God forgot their country and all they can do is pray for forgiveness. Haiti is constantly receiving aid and missionaries from northern countries, which further perpetuates this idea.

However, as previously mentioned, there is a great amount of hope that the social situation in Haiti will change in years to come. Schools in Haiti have begun teaching Creole classes, and more written publications are being printed in Creole. Courses in Haitian Creole are being offered in universities in the United States. The Haitian Creole Academy is standardizing the Creole language to better facilitate this. It is likely that as the Creole language becomes more acceptable in formal settings, a rise in Creole pride will occur in Haiti. This affirmation that the language of the people is indeed valid also serves as an affirmation that the culture, the identity, and the experiences of the Haitian people are valid. While changing the

status of a language will by no means solve every problem that Haiti faces, it will serve to restore a sense of dignity to the Haitian people that was lost when their language was made subservient to the language of the French colonizers.

There is hope that the case of Haiti will give way to a greater discourse on the way we treat languages in general. The case of Haiti is not unique. Within Latin America, countless indigenous languages were suppressed by the dominant Spanish or Portuguese. Globally, almost all of Africa or Asia has experienced some form of colonial domination exercised through language. This may potentially be one of the next great discourses on postcolonial domination.

Conclusion

Haiti has had a very unique experience with colonization historically. It was the first nation to gain independence in Latin America, the first successful slave revolt, and the first independent black republic. Yet it is also one of the poorest countries in the Western Hemisphere plagued with social inequality and environmental degradation. Language is but one of many issues on the forefront of Haiti's social radar, but it has the potential to transform the mentality of the Haitian population. By giving the Creole language the same level of prestige that French language has, the Haitian government has the ability to give its people a sense of dignity it had previously lacked. People will be able to fully participate in the nation's democratic society and to get an education that will open a plethora of opportunities from them.

This is an issue that is currently undergoing so much advocacy that it is hard to predict exactly how the movement will continue. The Haitian Creole Academy has detailed plans for years to come that will change the face of Haitian society. Moreover, on a global scale, this may change the discourse on postcolonial dependence and domination. While these developments in the status of Creole in Haiti may be unpredictable, they are sure to be a fruitful topic for further research.

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Latino and African-American Social Relations

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Introduction

Latinos and African-Americans are often compared against one another in a contest for which group comprises the “largest minority.” These groups are defined as ethnically and culturally exclusive communities with distinct social and cultural histories and identities. The binary identity that defines Whiteness and Blackness often defines whether you are either Latino or whether you are Black. Forgotten in the binary are Afro-Latinos whose social and cultural history occupies a forgotten and unspoken place in contemporary racial and ethnic relations in the Western Hemisphere.

The term Afro-Latino has been used by international agencies to reference people of African descent in Latin America and the Caribbean. The

terms “Negro,” *afrolatinoamericano*, and Afro-Latino defined the movements and causes gaining social and political momentum throughout the Western hemisphere. Starting in the 1990s, intellectual cross-fertilization between northern and southern scholars ignited focus upon the Afro-Latino experience (Tillis 2008). The “Afro” prefix and other racial markers questioned and challenged the homogenizing and xenophobic social constructs inherent in national and regional identities. Afro-Latino identity soon surfaced in the United States as a strategy to identify the cultural and socioeconomic diversity within the vague social constructs of Latino while shedding light on antiblack racism in Latino communities and institutions.

The “Afro” prefix challenges the African-American and English-only cultural monopoly inherent in the US context of Blackness, thereby redefining its implications throughout the Western hemisphere. Further, it serves to bind struggles by linking communities and their experiences. Importantly, the prefix lays the foundation for the historical and cultural connections to the continent of Africa therein deconstructing the Eurocentric ideologies that have characterized Latin America and Caribbean.

What does the term “Afro-Latino” mean in the context of race formation and racial identity in the United States? First, it refers to Latinos of visible and/or self-proclaimed African descent. It is a self-imposed group identification demonstrating a sense of tradition and shared social and cultural realities connected to African cultural traditions. Since European conquest and early US colonial history and forward through the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Blacks with their first language as Spanish have forged a rich and enduring legacy of cultural beliefs and expressions that have transmigrated national boundaries often differentiating it from the social and cultural experiences of the African-American community. Nativist discourse and xenophobia surrounding Latinos and illegal immigration and a history of institutional racism and structural discrimination against persons of African-American descent characterize a long social and political history in the United States. In spite of this history, the

“Afro-Latino” community offers a unique opportunity to bridge a growing divide between the Latino and African-American.

The term “Afro-Latino” as well applies to a transnational discourse or identity connecting Black Latin Americans and Latinos across national and regional lines. The substantive interactions and intersections between African descendent people in Latin America and among US Latinos remain a significant cultural marker in the North American social context. Afro-Latino clearly signals what some researchers have described as an *ethnoscape* capable of global reach. Therefore, it has become increasingly important to delimit Afro-Latino as a social and cultural phenomenon residing solely within the borders of the United States.

What is particular to the US context is that the Afro-Latino problematic has to do with the cross-cultural relationships between the African and the Latino, which means the relation between Latinos and African-Americans. This is evident in the lives of prominent US Afro-Latinos like Arturo Alfonso Schomburg, Mario Bauza, and Piri Thomas. This relationship is an eminently Afro-Latino phenomenon. Countless biographical narratives make clear that Afro-Latino is at the personal level a unique and distinctive experience and identity ranging among and between Latino Black and US American dimensions of the lived social reality. The Afro-Latino quest for a sense of social identity is often pulled in three directions and shares a complex multidimensional optic on contemporary White Anglo Saxon Protestant culture and society. In the African-American experience, W. E. B. Dubois referred to this experience as triple consciousness.

The presence of Afro-Latinos covers the earliest recorded history of the United States predating the first English settlements of the United States. The cultural influences of Spanish-speaking persons of African descent in Spanish settlements of San Augustine, Castillo de San Marcos, and Gracia Real de Santa de Mose in 1565 reveal forgotten social, economic, political, artistic, religious/spiritual, and linguistic influences of the Afro-Latino community upon the history of the

United States. Afro-Latinos coexisted as both free and enslaved communities subordinated by a caste system as servants, reconnaissance scouts, and militiamen; as intermediaries, attendants, field hands; and as slaves. While Afro-Latino culture was marginalized by Anglo-colonial hegemony, it shaped the formation of North America while unearthing the weaknesses and structured silences of Anglo-American culture and its history of omissions.

Many Afro-Latinos in the United States are predominantly of Hispanic origin immigrating from Cuba, Puerto Rico, the Dominican Republic, Panama, and the coastal areas of Colombia and Venezuela. By the mid-nineteenth century, the centrality of Afro-Latino relations in the war with Mexico coincided with the extension of slavery in Mexican territories and the introduction of Black Cubans to southern Florida supporting the cigar industry. Each of these events brought thousands of Cubans, Puerto Ricans, Columbians, Venezuelans, Spaniards, and Italians to the cities of Tampa, Key West, and Ybor. Between 1870 and the 1940s, Key West, Florida, served as an extension of Havana, Cuba.

Afro-Cubans comprised the majority of the cigar workers in Florida, while White Cuban Spaniards owned and profited from the labor of the tobacco farms and cigar manufacturing. As the cigar industry declined in the 1920s, the Afro-Cuban population also declined. Afro-Cuban workers that transmigrated established cross border cultural and linguistic relationships. In fact, Afro-Latinos enjoyed cross-cultural relations with both the White Cuban and African-American communities. History across the Americas, particularly in the United States, suggests that strong cultural, social, and political bonds existed among Cuban, Latino, and Black communities in response to policies and practices or entrenched xenophobia and antiblack racism often forging opportunities for solidarity between Afro-Latinos and the Black community.

The US occupation of Cuba and Puerto Rico and the migration of Afro-Latinos to New York and to other northeastern cities, occupied by generations of Afro-Caribbean and African-Americans, further fomented a social, cultural,

and political solidarity with a broader African diasporic world. Arturo Alfonso Schomburg, a Black Puerto Rican bibliophile of the Africana experience, made immense educational and intellectual contributions to knowledge about the realities of the African diasporic experience. Schomburg's work resulted in the founding of the Schomburg Center for Research located in New York City. Importantly, Schomburg's activism and intellectual accomplishments illuminate the ambiguities of the Afro-Latino social experience. Puerto Ricans outnumbered Afro-Cubans as the largest Latino group in New York City.

By the end of the 1950s, the Puerto Rican community outnumbered Cubans as the largest and most socially, culturally, and politically vocal community of US Afro-Latinos. The civil rights movement of the 1960s fueled this vocal expression thru literary and cultural expression giving voice and perspective to persons proudly identifying as Puerto Rican and Black. A strong sense of Black cultural identity in its poetry, storytelling, religion, sports, food, and language documented and translated the uniqueness of Afro-Latino culture.

The area of music and performance is where Afro-Latinos made their most visible and lasting cultural influence upon the United States and North America. Renowned Jazz artists like Jelly Roll Morton noted that you cannot play jazz if you are not aware of and understand the Spanish tinge which served as the essential role of Afro-Caribbean music and shaped the unique American musical idiom called Jazz. The Afro-Caribbean influence on the unique art form of Jazz with the Haitian social and musical presence in New Orleans from Caribbean tinged composer and Creole prodigy Louis Moreau Gottschalk. In fact, Jazz was also flourished under the influence of Afro-Caribbean beats and styles.

During the twentieth century, cultural appropriation by the majority through musical fads like the tango, the rumba, the boss nova, the conga, and the mambo originated from Afro-Latino traditions primarily Cuban and Brazilian. The 1940s and 1950s saw cultural and rhythmic interchanges between Afro-Cuban and African-American music with collaborations between Cuban artists

and African-American jazz innovators. The exchange of rhythmic expressions resulted in a musical genre called Cubop while promoting further musical interactions leading to Latin jazz and salsa. This diasporic cultural mingling between Afro-Caribbean, Afro-Latino, and African-American music traditions morphed into the contemporary performance styles and genres of hip-hop while often obscuring the central influences of the Afro-Caribbean and Afro-Latino role in creating and shaping styles in rap, urban graffiti, and break dancing as both artistic expression and social protest.

Race and Ethnicity in the United States: Afro-Latino Population and Identity as Change

According to the report *Black Diversity in Metropolitan America* (2003), the 1990s witnessed sweeping demographic shifts from persons with roots in sub-Saharan Africa and the Caribbean. One of the primary reasons for these massive immigration shifts arises from global trade agreements that destabilized regional and local development in the Caribbean and Africa. Almost 25% of the growth of the Black population between 1990 and 2000 was due to newcomers from Africa and the Caribbean. The number of African-Americans increased 10% to 31 million in the 1990s. But the number of Blacks from Africa practically doubled to 537,000 in the same period. The number of Blacks from the Caribbean increased 63% to more than 1.5 million (Logan and Dean 2003). The report sheds further light on the residential patterns, socioeconomic profiles, and educational backgrounds of these groups.

For the United States, recent immigration has produced sweeping demographic increases in underrepresented populations at a time when vast technological changes have occurred. Horton (1998) states, "the population and structural change thesis holds that changes in the relative sizes of the minority and majority populations interact with changes in the social structure to exacerbate racial and ethnic inequality" (p. 9). While the technological change has affected the professional class, the

blue collar labor force has been affected the most. In short, the privilege of being White and educated is no longer a guarantee of employment. The rise in the minority middle class further exacerbates an expanding and diverse labor force. Hence, underrepresented groups for the first time have become a threat to White middle-class workers (Horton 1998). Traditionally, majority communities have often turned to discriminatory policies and practices to eliminate or reduce underrepresented groups from social, educational, and economic opportunities (Omni and Winant 1994). Therefore, it is not surprising that cries of "reverse discrimination" and legalized resegregation of schools via charter schools and State actions like Proposition 209 in California have served the needs of the White middle class more than the needs of poor and disenfranchised communities.

W. E. B. DuBois' declaration that the problem of the twentieth century would be the "color line" echoed far beyond the borders of the United States and beyond the twentieth century. DuBois' research spoke not just about the condition of African-Americans but the "color line" in other words, the darker and lighter races in Asia, Europe, Africa, the Americas (Canada, United States, Mexico, Central and South America), and island colonies and nations. He recognized that social and cultural differentiation was not solely a national phenomenon but a global one. While the transnational scope of the Black experience is not new, recent attention to the nation's "Black diversity" needs to be understood in relation to the shifting "race" landscape in the United States.

Surprisingly, Afro-Latinos are not counted by the census as part of the growing "Black diversity." So, "Hispanic" is a social construct that is decidedly non-Black and in some ways discursively antiblack. This postcolonial disconnect between Hispanic and Black lends continuity to racial denial in Latin American and Caribbean countries and their communities. Some Latinos even pride themselves in the socially graded Latin American racial formation suggesting it represents an alternative to the Black and White binary in the United States. Not acknowledged by White middle-class Latinos is the historical fact that multiracial Latinos are the social replacements for the category called

“mulattos” quite prevalent in US racial stratification and social order.

This exceptionalism is encouraged by a present-day post-racial discourse in the United States that resembles the dominant ideologies located throughout Latin America and the Caribbean. A reluctance by White Latinos exists to engage any discussion of racism within the Latin Diaspora but rather to “blame the victim” who voices resistance to race-based injustice in the Afro-Latino Diaspora. The invisibility of Afro-Latinos in Latin America and Caribbean reaffirms itself in the population and structural stratification and inequality in the United States.

Consciousness, Miseducation, and Afro-Latinos

History informs the past and the present of how Afro-Latinos identify themselves today, and it assists in defining its path for the future. Afro-Latinos, just like other groups who choose to migrate to the United States, come to the United States in pursuit of economic opportunities and better education for their children. However, assimilating into a society with contrasting demarcations of Black and White and where race is a factor much greater than ethnicity creates culture shock and the need for immediate cultural adjustment of identity. The first level of awareness often occurs during enrollment in public education where children are identified by race or given a classification that may not include Afro-Latino. Undoubtedly, when this identification does not focus on other attributes, other than race, then the identification neither validates the history nor culture of Afro-Latino learners rendering their African identities from Latin America and the Caribbean invisible, nonexistent, or unimportant.

More than two decades ago, the National Census Bureau evolved in its identification of residents and immigrants in the United States, changing to a wider range of classification by race and ethnicity. School districts particularly in border regions and States quickly reflected this wider range and classification, namely, Latino/Hispanic and Afro-Latino/Hispanic communities

and students. Normative classifications of racial classification failed to identify or acknowledge Afro-Latino and Afro-Caribbean communities and students. Florida public schools, for example, require parents or guardians to select and register their child under one or more of five race codes (e.g., American Indian/Alaska Native, Asian, Black/African-American, Native Hawaiian/Other Pacific Islander, or White).

These traditional race and ethnicity classifications do not account for Afro-Latino/Hispanic or Afro-Caribbean communities and students. These students and their communities are often compelled to self-classify as either Black non-Hispanic or Hispanic-Latino rendering the true identity (cultural and social knowledge) of these students and their communities as Afro-Latino/Hispanic and Afro-Caribbean invisible. Afro-Latino students are given little choice but to locate common ground with the group that most closely shares their cultural and social experiences. In brief, Afro-Latino students are forced to assimilate at the expense of living under an alternate identity.

Children who come to the United States from coastal areas off the Atlantic Ocean of Latin America including Colombia, Costa Rica, Panama, and Venezuela and in communities in Veracruz, Mexico, are identified as English language learners. US public schools often define their identities as other than Latinos or Hispanics rarely considering their experiences of African, Latino, and indigenous heritage that is vivid and distinct to the communities from which they came. Families of mixed ethnic identities often prefer to celebrate the unity of family heritage by embracing their diverse cultural Mosaic, versus celebrating based upon the prevalent family physical identity. Even though many of these children qualify as second language learners and will require English language learning, they are required to make adjustments to the larger school culture and the curriculum where their social and cultural knowledge and history is often not valued, not discussed, and not represented.

The supposed invisibility of ethnic differences arises from the melting pot ideology espoused during the immigration of Western Europeans to the United States. The rise in immigration from

non-Western European countries to communities and schools in the United States shifted the paradigm to the salad bowl ideology or cultural pluralism which espoused acceptance of individual differences. Yet, important democratic institutions like US public schools created to assimilate its students versus promote cultural pluralism continue its mission to acculturate students versus acknowledging the wealth of contributions made by these communities to the character of what is the United States.

The opportunity for an inclusive society through schooling might be attained through the acceptance of our differences once differences are viewed in the context of history, life experiences, and culture. Every community has a cultural framework that influences surface cultural action such as the way people dress, foods eaten, holidays celebrated, and other observable behaviors. Yet it is at the deeper level of cultural manifestations where behaviors are not as obvious and lead to misunderstanding and rejection that matters most in building deeper understanding and acceptance of cultural behaviors. Gonzales-Mena (2005) asserts that it is the narrow view of culture that contributes to a cultural perspective of others. According to Mena,

Identity includes more than gender and more than where a person comes from. I may not be thinking of race, class, sexual orientation, religion, and age unless I experience being a target of oppression because of one or more cultural attributes. I'm probably not thinking of how all of these parts of my identity are defined by culture. It may not even consider how my culture and the culture of the group and power are related. But my identity formation isn't the same as everyone else's... When an aspect of a person's identity makes him or her a target of oppression, ignoring that aspect doesn't make the oppression go away. (p. 11)

School socialization brings many challenges for children like Latinos who are part of the underserved ethnic groups within the school community of learners. It presents even greater challenges for Afro-Latino children who may use dialects and idioms and therefore exhibit cultural and social behaviors unlike their Latino peers. The goal for teacher education in a culturally plural classroom, school, and community is the celebration of diversity as the function of

teaching and learning through an inclusive multicultural curriculum in which a wide array to diversity, learning communities is included and embraced. Curriculum and instructional strategies that encourage and invite a learning environment that values diverse ways of knowing the world enriches the learning experiences for students and teachers (Lee et al. 2003).

A responsive and reflective curriculum can be attained, not by adding an additional month to celebrate often the incorrect symbolic culture of students like Afro-Latinos but rather by including topics in the curriculum that educate and challenge Afro-Latinos and all students to value the history, music, artistic expressions, and worldview of Afro-Latinos. Clearly, the goal of diversity in education is to expand and challenge the consciousness of students by making visible the cultures of the diaspora. Therefore, students in public education should experience growth and learning in a community of learners that promotes diversity of consciousness (Lee et al. 2003).

Creating pedagogies that respond to the invisible Afro-Latino student requires an inclusive model that integrates and reinforces the history and culture of Afro-Latinos as significant knowledge in the academic content. The model should encourage the teaching of academic content through literature that leads to the development of didactic materials and activities appropriate for teaching the rich history and culture of this important community. The integrated model, while deliberate in its content, can avoid conflict with standardized curriculum expectations already designed by school districts. The curriculum approach therefore can infuse rather than supplant content already expected at various grade levels. The model can integrate and reinforce the teaching of academic content like Afro-Latino history, society, memory, cultural expression, appropriate teaching methodology, and strategies for second language learners and planning and designing instruction leading to hands-on application.

Embracing an Inclusive Paradigm

A new focus on teaching foreign-born students or students with an identifiable culturally diverse ancestry requires that teachers and teacher

candidates acquire more profound cultural experiences to effectively educate Afro-Latinos and other diverse students in the United States. The efforts to expand the cultural experiences and worldviews of teachers might include intercultural and academic exchanges in which teachers visit diverse student populations like Afro-Latinos in the US schools and when possible in schools in designated countries. It is the deep cultural experiences such as visiting and observing educational practices in schools, community cultural events, and other social contacts within the educational practices and cultural events that provide sound experiences for a true initiation and acculturation of educators.

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- groups of Hispanic origin, for example, native-born Chicanos. Arguably, imitations on their social mobility – especially their legal status as undocumented immigrants – as well as a failure to instill reflexive awareness (Giddens 1991) of the political value of building alliances with other Latinos perhaps may have led to diminished person rights (Apple 1982). That is to say, cultivating both a sense of collective praxis (Mirón 2016) as well as reflexive awareness of their culturally situated material circumstances would in the long run serve their interests to secure improved opportunities such as employment and increased wages. Concretely, for some cultural groups, for example, Central Americans who are more-assimilated minded Latinos, Chicanos conjured images of intensely politically active West Coast residents from dynamic, civic-minded local communities in Berkeley and the California Bay Area, along with the Chicano labor movement in Southern California (Valle and Torres 2000) – all of whom held historical traditions of protest and free speech. Asserting their civil liberties through community organizing and coalition building proved too much of a risk. This example is but one anecdotal evidence in a series of narratives surrounding the question of what constitutes Latino cultural identity. Moreover, the question of the construction of cultural identity for Latinos, as will be shown, has profound implications for a critical pedagogy, of Latino education, critical pedagogy having been historically associated with Latin America (Kirylo 2011).

The contours of these narratives indicated above are such that sociopolitical tensions are embedded in contradictory cultural images of Latinos. On the one hand, Latino cultural identity has often been essentialized within a sociocultural framework known as "pan-ethnicity." In so doing these essentializing images of Latinos in the social imaginary have ignored the usefulness of the "sociological metaphor of hybridity" in the deconstruction of the processes of globalization (Kraidy 2002, 2005). Pragmatically speaking, furthermore, the failure to pose effective rhetorical and political strategies around the issues of cultural diversity and public policy has had negative consequences on the plight of Latinos in this

Latino Praxis

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Introduction and Overview

Until recently, Latino populations in the USA, although often citizens by birth or naturalization, did not regularly associate themselves with other

country and abroad. This essay seeks to fill this intellectual gap, focusing on the implications for a theoretically sophisticated, culturally situated Latino identity and critical pedagogy.

Much of the scholarly and popular literature, I would argue, is further problematized by what Anthony Giddens (1991, p. 16) conceives as the “situatedness of place” within the Project of Modernity, or “spatial markers.” An example of Giddens’ complex theory of self-identity in the context of advanced modernity is the multiple constructions of Latino identity in the continent of North America. For example, within the Chicano social movement, cultural identity is situated within in the plight of Mexican and Mexican American farm workers in the geographic region of the Central Valley in California. The early Chicanos migrant workers, moreover, gave rise to Cesar Chavez’ United Farm workers, whose labor struggles for social justice for grape pickers were often at odds with more assimilated-minded Latinos/Hispanics. A contrasting example is the representation of the ethnic group most prominently identified with cultural assimilation – Cuban Americans, most notably the vehemently anti-Castro refugees who fled to the USA in the 1950s and 1960s. In summary, it is clear that on the issue of cultural identity, it appears that to lump a fragmented cultural group of Latinos, whose only historical commonality is liberation from Spain into a unified Pan ethnic whole, would reproduce an essentialized representation of Latinos. But as I will assert below, unify we must.

The Fluidity of Cultural Identity

As asserted, the term “Latino” is problematic for the understanding of the constitution of cultural identity between a plethora of disparate racial and ethnic groups, the majority of whom in Latin America and the USA situate themselves in multiple discourses, dialect differences, and their individual and collective sense of place. These discourses of Latino cultural identity are often referred to, among others, as “Hispanic,” “Chicano,” or “Mestizo” (the signifier “Latin” is also deployed, but represents a somewhat dated demographic marker, which in the main refers to Latin Americans who migrated to North America post-

World War II). Perhaps more significantly for purposes here is the endemic hybridity (Kraidy 2002, 2005) of Latino cultural identity. Hybridity among Latinos gives rise to conceptual challenges when formulating a theory of action and social change to alleviate historical inequities experienced among the cultural groups described above and other victims of the *Hispanic Diaspora* across continents, which are associated with globalization generally and transnational and internal migration in particular (Mirón et al. 1998). At the end of this essay, I provide implications for global strategies designed to alleviate varying forms of inequality. Hopefully these strategies together build toward a transformative critical pedagogy of Latino education one which is grounded on a profound awareness of difference and seeks to transition beyond the “accomplished fact” of identity, which Hall observes is “always constituted within representation (1990, op cit).” The goal of this transition is the collective fulfillment of the Common Good in the context of global capitalism. The “Common Good” is operationalized as the reduction of inequality writ large (Walker 2015).

On cultural identity, Stuart Hall (1990, p. 222) notes, “[W]e should think. . . of identity as a ‘production,’ which is never complete, always in process. . . .” A contemporary example is the case of Cubans and Cuban Americans, who after five decades are now able to increase mobility and perhaps transnational migration (Mirón et al. 1998) from the island of Cuba to the Florida coast and back. Arguably, prior generations of Cubans who fled the Castro regime in the 1950s, mostly settling in Miami, psychologically abandoned the cultural roots of their homeland. They formed new cultural identities, largely assimilating into US culture. Later generations of Cubans who were born in the USA, however, grew up bilingually and biculturally. These spatially connected identities were “always in process” and provided these second-generation, culturally different Cubans held a grounded sense of place and a vivid sense of self, which was anchored in a “reflective awareness” of their spatial position in relation to US culture (Giddens 1991). These new Cuban Americans experienced a life that was

markedly different than their parents and grandparents. These cultural vignettes provide evidence for Hall's assertion that cultural identity is never a completed product. Rather, cultural identity is always a process of ongoing formation, which is not tied to temporality. It is helpful to probe Hall's theoretical notions of cultural identity more deeply as they relate to the concrete processes of Latino cultural identity at the intersections of globalization and locality (Giddens 1991; Kraidy 2002, 2005).

Cultural Identity and Globalization

For Hall, cultural identity is an ongoing process of *becoming*, never fixed in an eternity of *being*. Rather than looking backward in time to the historical roots of cultural identity, Hall (1990) argues convincingly that while recognizing the impacts that the Diaspora has had on the identity of colonized populations (Blacks, Latinos), theorists of cultural studies, identity, and the formation of subjectivity should gaze toward the future of postcolonial subjects, who creatively participate in the reconstruction of multiple forms of cultural identity in relationship to local communities and other sites of everyday lived experience. Stated differently, the discontinuous impacts of globalization, including locally grounded aesthetic resistance to the excesses of advanced capitalism such as hypermarketing and the "monetization" of art and culture (see McCarthy 2016) – these all combine to potentially alter the global processes that seem to trend toward the reproduction of Otherness in postcolonial contexts. It's with Hall's useful distinctions between the idea of a cultural identity fixed by temporality and the more fluid notions of identity production that I wish to proceed in furthering the understanding of Latino cultural identity in particular and the implications for a culturally situated critical pedagogy more generally.

The Significance of Mestizo Cultural Identity

The idea of Mestizo identity among Central and South American populations is one that theorists can appropriate to the conceptualization of Latino

cultural identity in the social imaginary in North America and across the globe. Put differently, the postmodern cultural "flows" (Mirón et al. 1998) of ideas, capital, and culture render possible on the ground of lived experience Hall's notion of the fluid, ever-evolving theory of cultural identity. Within some Latin American societies, such as Guatemala and Mexico, cultural identity stems from a fusion of indigenous and European (Spanish) racial, ethnic, linguistic, and in remote communities such as Chichicastenango in Guatemala, hybrid religious practices. Demographically, in Latin American societies, Mestizos comprise 50% of the population, having socially "inherited" a mixed European and indigenous influences (Arredondo et al. 2006), which combine to on the one hand, problematize cultural identity and on the other, open up possibility for the transformation of cultural identity across previously fragmented groups marked by profound difference.

In the USA, Mestizos account for approximately 37 million people, 66% of whom self-report Mexican heritage (Arredondo et al. 2006). I will have more to say about the consequences of sociocultural transformation in situ, transformations, leading to Freire's notion of a liberatory pedagogy (King and Swartz 2016), one which I have elsewhere described as "collective praxis" (see Mirón 2016). Underpinning these pedagogical practices of liberation are "generative themes" (Freire 2000), which Paulo Freire theorized from the ground of everyday lived culture in Brazil and, subsequently, across the world. These diasporic themes at once embrace cultural and historical differences, while seeking to reconcile difference with the goal of attacking shared oppression in the name of communitarian values.

I wish to argue that the processual formation of cultural identity emanates from a philosophical perspective of identity that is intersubjective and a pragmatic (Biesta 1994) process, which subjects actively and creatively construct. In Hall's language, cultural identity is an enduring process of becoming. Hall contrasts this conceptualization with the reified idea of a relatively static – and psychologically essentialized, completed product of being.

For example, multiple groups of Hispanic descent in the USA such as Central and South Americans, Afro-Caribbeans, and Mexicans self-identify in varying ways, depending upon their individual history, geography, and political affiliations. These groups share an identity grounded in a shared Latino culture. However, it may be argued that theirs is, nonetheless, an identity that suffers from what Popkewitz (1997) has referred to as a kind of “population reasoning.” As culturally distinct as these demographic groups are, they give rise in one fashion or the other to a sense of self that is personal, which views individuals as pitted against one another across cultural groups, while imagining a shared culture within their groups as “Mexican,” “Cuban,” “Caribbean,” etc. In post-structural parlance, the processes of governmentality, for example, population census reports define even Latino cultural groups, whose self-identity in relation to a powerful connection to family and other representations of collectivity subordinates cultural identity to a kind of atomistic individualism. Elsewhere (Mirón 2016), I have characterized these effects of structuration in the USA as states of hyper-libertarianism. These excessive states of being are marked, in turn, by extreme narcissism, all the while rationalized and politically sloganized in the name of individual liberty and freedom. The question remains: how to transcend these hegemonic trajectories and transition to a Latino praxis and critical pedagogy, which is culturally situated. And on a macro level, pedagogy and praxis are governed by the “cultural logic of hybridity” (Kraidy 2005). I assert that a prerequisite to this transformation of praxis is an embrace of cultural differences within and across multiple Latino cultural groups identified above.

A Struggle for a Postcolonial Cultural Identity for Latinos

At the outset it is important to situate the production of Latino cultural identity, one in which in turn leads to new understandings of critical pedagogy in Latino education, by situation in their manifold social, historical, political, and geographical contexts. To borrow a term, these contexts arise in situ (Reynolds et al. 2001). The struggle for a contextually specific Latino cultural

identity is an incomplete century-old postcolonial process. Despite long-forgotten victories over the colonial empires of Spain Britain, France, and arguably the USA in the case of Cuba, Latinos may yet consistently find themselves in a position of marginality. Their shared revolutionary resistance is often dismissed with a new rhetorical narrative of illegal immigration. Thus their sense of cultural (socially constructed) identity is objectified and reduced to individual pathologies such as rape (Trump 2015). The struggle unfolds along two dimensions: 1. a hegemonic narrative of delinquent behavior (and concomitant victimization) and 2. transcendence of cultural difference in pursuit of the Common Good. It appears that any sense of transcending cultural differences within and across multiple groups seems forever relegated to the self-interests, often political and economic, of the here-to-fore political and economic elites of once colonial empires (witness the emergent, current neofascist ideologies of northern Europe and the border States of the USA).

The struggles, to which I refer, therefore, are concretely human, existential, conflicts – often over cultural and moral-ethical values. These are socially ingratiated practices that operate in a Foucauldian regulatory methodology to socially control the processes of becoming – the production of cultural identity – and fix these processes in an imaginary state of a fictitious eternal being. The “trick” for formulating a sense of Latino praxis and pedagogy in Latino education is a globally construed social movement aimed at the reduction of multiple forms of inequality, which diverse Latino groups collectively share. As stated above, such a transformation of hegemonic narratives (to borrow a term) must be constituted in situ (Reynolds et al. 2001).

A Transition to a Transformative Critical Pedagogy of Latino Education

To move beyond postcolonial struggle within the context of the cultural logic of globalization (Kraidy 2005), the following two global strategies are offered: community empowerment and collective praxis. The normative rationale for these twin

pedagogical strategies are that, first, *communitarian* values must supersede individual ideals – even at the risk of compromising on the fulfillment of person rights (Apple 1982). Letting go hard-fought entitlements, for example, for the gain of the Common Good may in the long run prove fruitful for Latinos who need to build political and moral alliances with African-Americans and other victims of the Diaspora. The latter are situated in the politics of identity germane to the development of social movements such as civil rights and feminism. Second, and related to the first strategy, is that only by embracing “a collectivist orientation” (Kraidy 2005, p. 15) that shares the Latino cultural values of interdependence among kingship and extended friendship can critical pedagogy transition from its Latin American historical roots to North America and beyond.

Community Empowerment

The normative rationale provided above locates community empowerment within an inherently contradictory space. It is paradoxical. I assert that community empowerment may achieve practical utility and functionality by enabling relatively powerless individuals in political institutions – schools and universities – to exercise moral power (Mirón and Elliot 1991). Post-colonial Latinos *must achieve morale power*, that is, open the doors of power left ajar by the vacuum of any notion of the Common Good in a neoliberal culture run amok. This optimism, admittedly, borders on a utopian dream, but that without which the US society in particular must resign itself to a life of moral and cultural nihilism. Theoretically stated, an abundance of Foucauldian mechanisms of social control paradoxically opens up social space for discursive practice, which politically moral agents may exercise to reconstruct conversations about what is culturally and pedagogically possible within the realm of Latino education. After all, as documented above, it is Latino culture that is most historically equipped to pursue moral values that are both spatially proximate to differentially represented populations, as well as able to cross institutional orders (c.f. schools and neighborhoods), embraces extended friendships and a sense of family. All of these cultural assets are

markers of inclusivity. In turn, a value premium on inclusivity is a significant transitional strategic move to achieve community empowerment, leading to the ultimate transformation of critical pedagogy of Latino education and other cultural groups in the USA such as African-Americans. Ideally, this transitional strategy can be “scaled up” to a global scale.

Collective Praxis: The Sum Is Greater Than the Parts

Collective praxis is a kind of politically conscious gestalt, which brings personal, self-reflective, awareness of the historical and contextual conditions that lead to oppressed circumstances need not stop with the individual. Indeed, personal awareness is merely the starting point for a shared theoretical understanding of the conditions that wrought, among other forms of oppression, poverty, racism, the exploitation of women, and homophobia. It goes without saying that, rarely, if ever, solely individuals in isolation experience systemic disenfranchisement. By definition, this understanding of systemic suffering is *holistic*, meaning it affects entire populations of people, local communities, and in some cases, large swathe of cities, for example, Detroit and New Orleans. One data point is sufficient to drive home the fact that these forms of systemic oppression are experienced collectively, the poverty rates in urban centers such as New Orleans whose rate among African American males exceeds 50%. This collective experience of oppression, I would argue, precisely opens space for the ultimate transformation of oppression through praxis.

Affirmatively stated, both individualized and a holistic understanding among communities of systemic oppression morally necessitate an enlightened social action to change the world. I refer here to a global critical pedagogy that originates from a deep understanding – a theory of social circumstances including poverty, sexism, and racism – and culminates in an intense emotional revolt against a sometimes-nameless enemy, while at the same time embracing a deep, compassionate love for the downtrodden. Elsewhere (Mirón 2013) I have described the latter as “armed love.” To be clear my revolutionary

vision here is to move beyond militaristic metaphors to cultural weapons comprised of a sophisticated knowledge of what in a social context often involves socially constructed structures, political institutions, and social practices that embrace putative scientific conclusions. To my mind among the most prominent of these are the proposition concerning the genetically inferior nature of blacks. This deeply flawed logic caused the obvious serious misunderstanding that blacks are genetically less intelligent than whites. To this repugnant image, I add the demagoguery of the representation of Mexican Latinos as rapists and killers alluded to above (Trump 2015).

Summary

In summary, this essay has sought to comprehensively map the nuanced character of Latino cultural identity and the implications for a transformative critical pedagogy of Latino education. In so doing the essay has consistently stressed the fluid, as distinct from fixed and static, conceptualizations of Latino cultural identity, and in particular the usefulness to examine the endemic presence of Mestizo identity in Latin culture in the formation of postcolonial, Latino subjects. It is possible that this map of Latino identity, relying on Stuart Hall and Anthony Giddens, is both culturally grounded and sociologically substantive. It is not inconceivable that this conceptual groundwork may undergird pedagogy and praxis, thus inspiring the dream of “bending the arc of history” toward equality.

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Layered Leadership

- **Social and Restorative Justice: A Moral Imperative for Educational Leaders**

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Leadership and Learning

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Synonyms

[Instructional leadership](#); [Instructional systems](#);
[School improvement](#); [Student achievement](#)

Introduction

While it seems that educational leadership would be a field where scholars investigate the relationship between leadership and learning as a core pursuit, there is surprisingly little work in this area (Mulford and Silins 2011). There certainly is a plurality of approaches to the study of educational leadership, but the field has largely concerned itself with organizational efficiency, development, and administration of policy and sociocultural-political critiques of leadership practice and preparation. That said, there are some notable studies that inform the field on the relationships between leadership and learning and that help establish important conceptual and empirical understandings on which current and subsequent studies can build. This entry organizes extant knowledge into three overarching categories: (a) defining leadership and learning; (b) individuals, leadership, and learning; and (c) leadership and learning as a group dynamic. In doing so, each category considers both literature related to how people learn to lead

and literature that addresses how leaders facilitate (and impede) learning in organizations. This entry concludes with brief points about the strengths and weaknesses of scholarship in this area.

Defining Leadership and Learning

Leadership and learning are both contested areas of inquiry that are conceived and explored differently in all the social sciences (Normore and Brooks 2014). Those who study leadership have developed many ways of conceptualizing and studying the phenomenon and continue to search for definitions that might provide coherence across traditions and lines of inquiry. Northouse (2012) conducted a useful cross-disciplinary review of literature related to leadership theories and identified several approaches that cut across disciplines. His review identified the following perspectives:

1. Leadership as traits
2. Leadership as skills
3. Leadership as behavior
4. Situational leadership
5. Path-goal theory
6. Leader-member exchange theory
7. Transformational leadership
8. Authentic leadership
9. Servant leadership
10. Adaptive leadership
11. Psychodynamic approach
12. Leadership ethics
13. Team leadership
14. Gender and leadership
15. Culture and leadership

Rather than expanding on each, suffice it to say that leadership is conceptualized in a variety of ways that take into account various frameworks and variables that emphasize different individual and group dynamics.

In the subfield of educational and school leadership, the knowledge base has been shaped by a number of eras or movements (Brooks and Miles 2008):

1. **Spirituality and Values Movement.** In the final decades of the nineteenth century and into the beginning of the twentieth, the purpose of schooling was largely about teaching respect for authority and order in society, largely by inculcating youth with religious doctrine. Simple lessons in reading and writing were often so that students could read scripture and carry out basic job functions. Administrators of this era were often also teachers themselves, and they focused on individual discipline as a way of helping to produce an adult in-line with societal expectations.
2. **First Wave of Scientific Management.** Much thinking about administration in the early decades of the twentieth century was shaped by the likes of Ellwood Cubberley and George Strayer, who were heavily influenced by the work of Frederick Taylor. Taylor was focused on efficiency, and this led to a vision of management rooted in Rational Choice Theory that assumed that administrators' or managers' work was essentially to create the proper inputs or stimuli in order to yield the desired organizational results. This line of thinking heavily influenced early administrative practices, which may have provided some direction and improved outcomes in some respects, but also stifled creativity and innovation while championing the notion that there was one best way for an organization to function.
3. **The Theory Movement and the Social Science Movement.** These two mid-twentieth-century movements had related yet dissimilar ends. The Theory Movement sought to create and test theories of administration, management, and leadership that could capture the complexity of the work. The idea was to build elaborate models that might help advance a new science of administration. The Social Science Movement on the other hand sought to make management and leadership an extension of various social sciences – particularly political science, anthropology, and sociology. During this time, scholars adopted, adapted, and explored various theories and methodological approaches. Both of these movements continue to influence the way that scholars and practitioners conceive the work of educational administration.
4. **The Postmodern Turn.** The late 1970s and 1980s saw educational leadership research and practice embrace the notion that there is no “one size fits all” way to study and practice educational leadership. The field saw an increase in the number of scholars employing critical theory, multicultural lenses, feminist theory, and critical race theory as viable ways to interrogate extant inequitable practices.
5. **Second Wave of Scientific Management.** The 1990s and first decades of the twenty-first century saw the field again interested in efficiency, but now it was connected to a heightened emphasis on standardized testing and high-stakes accountability.

More recent developments also include an expansion of the concept of trust in relation to educational leadership practice and an interest in distributed leadership (Spillane 2006). These trends and eras have gone a long way to define the ways that modern scholars and practitioners conceptualize the relationship between leadership and learning. In some ways, certain aspects of all of these eras continue to find traction today, even as contemporary conversations have sought to define these elusive concepts in more precise ways.

Efforts to define learning are likewise varied in their orientation. Theoretical perspectives on learning include social cognitive theory, cognitive information processing theory, neuroscience, content-area learning, and motivational theories and examine issues such as memory, transfer, self-regulation, modeling, metacognition, forgetting, cognitive growth, attribution, and self-concept (Schunk 2008). In the field of educational leadership, it is common for scholars to use aggregate, and in a few instances disaggregated, standardized test data as a proxy indicator for learning, and to accept the notion that leadership has either direct or indirect effects on learning (Leithwood et al. 2006; Mulford and Silins 2011). Certain scholars have explored other perspectives on learning and educational leadership, such as Evers and Lakomski (2000) whose work explores

cognition and learning based on neuroscience and Spillane's (2006) introduction of distributed cognition. But there remains a paucity of perspectives on learning in the educational leadership literature.

Individuals, Learning, and Educational Leadership

Several issues are pertinent to the relationship of leadership for learning. One of the richest areas of inquiry over the past thirty years comes from an interest in educational leadership development. This interest has inspired a plethora of studies examining leadership preparation in school and university settings. Among key findings in this area are:

1. There is no single set of traits that ensures successful leadership – leaders are made or emerged; they are not born. This means that many people who choose (or are chosen) can practice their conceptual, technical, and relational skills, increase their knowledge, and develop their dispositions. That being said, certain traits, particularly those related to communication and relationship building, have shown to be associated with various forms of improved effectiveness (Leithwood et al. 2006).
2. Prior experience with education and with leadership forms an initial mental model that shapes the way that an individual develops skills, dispositions, and new knowledge. It is useful (and perhaps necessary) for people to interrogate their assumptions about leadership in order to learn new ways of thinking and behavior. The process of learning about leadership should be coupled with a process of unlearning erroneous assumptions about leadership.
3. Individuals need to develop both hard and soft skills to be effective as a leader. Leadership includes (at least) affective, technical, and cognitive aspects of personal development. Leadership development programs that neglect one or both of these are less effective than those that include both.
4. There is value in both classroom-based and on-the-job training and leadership development. If designed in concert, these two aspects of leadership development can be complementary, but if learned in isolation they can also create confusion and conflict. It is often the case that preservice leadership development programs work on a high level of abstraction, teaching about theory and purposes of leadership and helping students reflect on their assumptions, while on-the-job training is more focused on the day-to-day work of education and schooling.
5. Socialization and leadership succession are critical for individual growth and success as a leader. This pertains to both school and university settings and relates to the leader's induction and orientation into work roles and their learning with respect to the informal or unspoken dynamics of the organization.
6. Leadership entails ethical and advocacy components that individuals must develop through reflection and practice. Leadership demands that individuals take a stand on important issues and that they work with integrity and ethical practices.

In short, there is ample evidence that individuals can learn to lead (Darling-Hammond et al. 2007). As leadership includes psychological, social, cultural, cognitive, affective, and ethical dynamics that manifest as skills, dispositions, and knowledge, it is possible for people to develop in these areas through both formal programming and on-the-job practice.

Leadership and Learning as Dynamics in Groups and Organizations

Among fundamental questions that educational leadership scholars and practitioners ask is – does educational leadership influence the ways that teams, groups, and organizations learn? In order to explore this question, scholars have undertaken various studies that both deepen and challenge our understanding of leadership in various organizational contexts. In their

influential report, Leithwood et al. (2004) conducted a review of leadership research that led them to suggest that there are seven claims that can be made about school leadership. These seven points serve to frame the discussion about the relationship between learning and leadership in schools:

1. *School leadership is second only to classroom teaching as an influence on pupil learning.* One of the key debates among educational leadership scholars relates to whether leadership has a direct and/or indirect effect on learning. Mulford and Silins (2011) point out that when exploring the relationship between principal leadership and student achievement, teacher practice is a mediating variable, which suggests that the relationship between the two is necessarily indirect. Leithwood et al. (2006) likewise suggested that “leadership is second only to classroom instruction among all school-related factors that contribute to what students learn at school [and that] the total (direct and indirect) effects of leadership on student learning account for about a quarter of total school effects” (p. 5). Other scholars argue that:
 2. *Almost all successful leaders draw on the same repertoire of basic leadership practices.* These practices include (a) building vision and setting directions, (b) understanding and developing people, (c) redesigning the organization, and (d) managing the teaching and learning program. It is important to recognize that these practices are broadly conceived – there are many ways to approach these activities that may or may not work in a particular context or situation.
 3. *The ways in which leaders apply these basic leadership practices – not the practices themselves – demonstrate responsiveness to, rather than dictation by, the contexts in which they work.* Over the past several decades, educational leadership scholars have recognized the importance of context in both leadership preparation and practice. Initially, this manifests in the form of suggestions about shaping school culture, but has evolved into suggestions that leaders must be responsive to contextual dynamics rather than manipulators of said dynamics.
4. *School leaders improve teaching and learning indirectly and most powerfully through their influence on staff motivation, commitment, and working conditions.* Internal and external motivation has been at the heart of leadership studies since its inception. Scholars suggest that while both of these forms of motivation can yield effective results, teacher morale and effectiveness tend to be higher when the primary driver is internal as opposed to external. Positive external motivation in the form of bonuses or other incentives and negative external motivators such as punishments or sanctions can create competition between those who should be in collaboration, reducing the effectiveness of the entire organization. In terms of commitment, this is both individual and organizational. The school leaders must exhibit their own commitment to the school’s goals and help shape them in a way that followers can embrace and find motivation. Leaders are also uniquely positioned to influence working conditions, and indeed poor working conditions and lack of administrator support are commonly cited as reasons that teachers leave a school or the profession altogether.
5. *School leadership has a greater influence on schools and students when it is widely distributed.* Research on distributed leadership suggests that in order to capitalize on the expertise in schools, leadership should be distributed in a fluid manner among leaders, followers in different situations. This means, for example, that it is important for a principal to recognize when they should step forward and when they should empower others who have more expertise in a given situation. Moreover, this distribution should remain flexible so that leaders and followers can adapt to new and changing circumstances

rather than being bound by tradition or rigmarole.

6. *Some patterns of distribution are more effective than others.* Importantly, distribution is not delegation and cannot become leader disengagement. School leaders who share resources and time with followers rather than apportion them as rewards or punishments are more likely to be effective. Authentic empowerment of others is the most meaningful and positive form of leadership distribution.
7. *A small handful of personal traits explains a high proportion of the variation in leadership effectiveness.* It is important for leaders to be adaptable and to have a positive disposition. Indeed, “the most successful school leaders are open-minded and ready to learn from others. They are also flexible rather than dogmatic in their thinking within a system of core values, persistent (e.g., in pursuit of high expectations of staff motivation, commitment, learning and achievement for all), resilient and optimistic” (Leithwood et al. 2006, p. 14).

Strengths and Weaknesses of Current Conceptualizations About Leadership and Learning

As a field, educational leadership has made modest progress with respect to understanding the relationships between leadership and learning. That said, it is important both to critique extant research and to consider ways it might be improved. Broadly speaking, there are two issues that scholars should consider as they move forward with their work related to leadership and learning. First, it is important for scholars to explore new ways of conceptualizing learning. Relying only on possibly flawed student achievement scores is not always an appropriate way of understanding learning. While this certainly fits into many policy frameworks, there are many ways of conceptualizing learning, particularly in a developmental sense, that such scores cannot ascertain. It is important for educational

leadership scholars to begin to explore some concepts related to cognition, developmental scaffolding, memory, and other learning constructs in order to create a more rich and nuanced perspective on the topic (Schunk 2008). Second, it is important for scholars to explore learning and leadership using a variety of research methods. For the most part, this relationship has been explored strictly via quantitative analysis, but it is critical that scholars also explore the relationship using qualitative and mixed-method approaches. Only then will we have a deep understanding of the relationship between leadership and learning.

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Leadership Research and Practice: Competing Conceptions of Theory

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Synonyms

Administration; Epistemology; Habermas; Leadership; Professionalization; Theory

Introduction

A specialized knowledge base is a prerequisite for human enterprises to be considered professions and for the individuals associated with particular professions to be called *professionals*. Professionals are presumed to know things – and, consequently, be able to do things – that ordinary people do not know and are unable to do. So, if we need someone to design a bridge, we turn to an engineer who has scientific knowledge applicable to bridge building, and if we require surgery, we go to a physician steeped in the findings of medical science.

It is hardly surprising, therefore, that those involved with the enterprise of education have expected social scientists to generate specialized knowledge about various aspects of educational practice. Once generated, such knowledge presumably can be disseminated in university programs designed to transform ordinary individuals into teachers, school counselors, and school administrators. Furthermore, given social scientists' emphasis on theory development, it should come as no surprise that the knowledge educational researchers tend to seek – and that normally gets disseminated in education-related programs – is theoretical knowledge. The term *theoretical knowledge*, however, has a less precise meaning in the social sciences than it does in the physical sciences which ground fields like engineering and medicine. This discussion explores different conceptions of theory that

have influenced – and continue to influence – leadership research and practice.

An Organizing Framework

Whenever a topic being discussed is complex and multifaceted, it is helpful to have an organizing framework to structure the discussion. Here a framework first articulated by Habermas in 1968 will be employed. Habermas indicated that the generation of knowledge is influenced by three quite different interests or purposes:

- (a) The interest in predicting and controlling events and situations, which Habermas calls *the technical interest* and associates with the empirical-analytic sciences;
- (b) A so-called historical/hermeneutical interest in understanding and describing people and situations, an interest that is reflected in the work of most social/cultural anthropologists, as well as most scholars in the discipline of history (a discipline normally associated with the humanities rather than the social sciences);
- (c) What Habermas calls *the emancipatory interest*, an interest exemplified in the work of critical theorists and, more recently, by scholars characterized by labels such as *post-modernist*, *poststructuralist*, *feminist*, and *indigenous*.

Theory for Prediction and Control

Habermas (1968) was clear about what the term *theory* means for those who exhibit a technical interest in knowledge generation: "Theories comprise hypothetico-deductive propositions of connections, which permit the law-like deduction of hypotheses with empirical content," he wrote. He added that the "hypotheses with empirical content" he referred to "can be interpreted as statements about the co-variance of observable events; given a set of initial conditions, they make prediction possible" (p. 308). Of course,

once professionals have the power to predict what will happen under specified conditions, they also, in principle, have the power to arrange conditions to produce desired outcomes.

For more than a century, an interest in prediction and control has motivated a substantial number of researchers in the field of education. In the lead article of the inaugural issue of the *Journal of Educational Psychology* published in 1910, for example, Thorndike wrote,

A complete science of psychology would tell every fact about everyone's intellect and character and behavior, would tell the cause of every change in human nature, would tell the result which every educational force . . . would have. It would aid us to use human beings for the world's welfare with the same surety of result that we now have when we use falling bodies or chemical elements. . . . Progress toward such a science is being made. (p. 6)

Similarly, those who founded the educational administration field during the first half of the twentieth century, e.g., Ellwood P. Cubberley and Franklin Bobbitt, frequently compared schools to factories and suggested that the work of educational administrators was analogous to the work of industrial engineers.

By the middle of the twentieth century, many leadership researchers also had discovered theory. The so-called theory movement that emerged in the educational administration field in North America in the 1950s, for example, envisioned a symbiotic relationship between theory, research, and practice. Theory movement advocates argued that empirical work should be rooted in and guided by theory about cause/effect relationships and, equally important, that theory should be validated and, if need be, modified or even rejected based on empirical results. The expectation, in short, was no longer that the findings produced by particular studies should dictate leadership practice; rather, research findings were expected to validate theory and validated theory was to be used by practitioners to predict and control events.

In North America's educational administration field, interest in the theory movement per se waned after a decade or so. Its tenets, however, are still widely accepted by the educational

research community generally as evidenced by the publication in 2002 of the National Research Council's *Scientific Research in Education*. The authors of that small but influential book wrote,

Every scientific inquiry is linked, either implicitly or explicitly, to some overarching theory or conceptual framework that guides the entire investigation. Science generates cumulative knowledge by building on, refining, and occasionally replacing, theoretical understanding. (National Research Council 2002, p. 3)

In other parts of the world, North America's theory movement helped inspire much more sustained and sophisticated attempts to construct a defensible theory of educational administration. Evers and Lakomski's decades-long effort to develop such a theory, for example, went far beyond a narrow concern with prediction and control. However, even as they updated traditional conceptions of science, articulated criteria for assessing the relative worth of competing theories, and tackled a range of other complex issues, Lakomski and Evers (2001) were clear about their bottom-line goal: "We need to develop good theory . . . that makes prediction possible, and thus aids us in the development of guides to action" (p. 496).

Educational leadership/administration researchers' interest in generating theories that can be used for the purposes of prediction and control is understandable. Schools, after all, are expected to produce prespecified outcomes; consequently, it makes sense to try to develop theories about cause and effect relationships that will tell school leaders how to exercise leadership and organize educational environments to generate the outcomes desired.

There was an obvious problem that arose when researchers attempted to produce this sort of theory: Theory is general but schools, classrooms, teachers, and students are inevitably idiosyncratic. So even if a theory is strongly supported empirically by *aggregate* findings, it will not necessarily predict what will happen in a *particular* educational context. Consequently, even well-supported theories that have been developed with a technical interest in mind

might make school leaders more thoughtful gamblers; they cannot, however, function as definitive formulas for either structuring particular educational settings or engaging in specific leadership practices to achieve prespecified goals.

Theory and the Interest in Understanding

The idiosyncratic nature of educational phenomena is not a problem for researchers motivated by Habermas' historical/hermeneutical interest. Indeed, generating and validating general theories that promise the powers of prediction and control in a variety of settings is not the goal of either most historians or most social/cultural anthropologists (or of educational researchers influenced by the thinking and methods found in the fields of history and/or anthropology). Rather, their goal, more often than not, is to understand the idiosyncrasies of particular social settings. To use anthropologist Clifford Geertz's (1983) terminology, anthropologists want to generate *thick description* that explicates the complex (and invariably idiosyncratic) interpretations that members of a cultural group construct to make sense of the world in which they live. Most social/cultural anthropologists' (and, also, most historians') goal, in short, is to generate what Geertz calls *local* (as opposed to generalizable) *knowledge*.

Theory does have a role to play in the generation of thick description and local knowledge, but theory, within this orientation, is no longer the desired end product of the research process. Rather, theory is more a rhetorical tool for bringing some semblance of order to inevitably complex (and always idiosyncratic) social phenomena. To quote Geertz, theory's role is to "make thick description possible" (Geertz 1973, p. 28). Thus, the philosopher of history, William Dray (1966, 1957c, p. 47) noted long ago that when a historian subsumes a historical event under a theoretical construct, e.g., the construct of a *revolution*, the historian's work is far from finished. Indeed, the historian, in most cases, will be more interested in documenting how the particular revolution the historian is studying differs

from other revolutions than in describing how it is similar.

For the historical/hermeneutical researcher, then, theory serves a largely heuristic function. Theory links the idiosyncratic situation or event a researcher has studied with other idiosyncratic situations and events. But, it does so without masking the idiosyncratic elements in the setting that the historian has explored. Geertz, in fact, has noted that, in the field of cultural anthropology, at least,

the major contributions [of an anthropological study]...are very difficult to abstract from...[the details of particular cultures] and integrate into anything one might call "culture theory" as such. Theoretical formulations hover so low over the interpretations they govern that they don't make much sense or hold much interest apart from them. This is not because they are not general (if they are not general, they are not theoretical), but because, stated independently of their application, they seem either commonplace or vacant. (p. 25).

The potential utility of thick description and local knowledge for an applied field like educational leadership is not as obvious as the potential utility of theory that promises to provide the powers of prediction and control. Skeptics inevitably ask: What can an educational leader learn from reading thick descriptions of idiosyncratic organizations that, by definition, are different from the organizational setting in which the educational leader works?

One answer to the above question is that the historical/hermeneutical perspective can serve as an antidote for talk of prediction and control. The historical/hermeneutical perspective's focus on the idiosyncrasy of organizational life, in other words, is a reminder to school leaders to resist both the urge (a) to implement overly choreographed interventions and programs and (b) to require that an intervention or program be implemented with complete fidelity (rather than allowing for sensible adaptation to accommodate the uniqueness of particular schools, classrooms, teachers, and/or students).

Canadian scholar Thomas Greenfield (Greenfield and Ribbens 1993) suggested another answer to questions about the utility of work reflecting a historical hermeneutical interest:

Such work reminds us that educational organizations are, *at base*, more ideational than material and more associated with the meaning organizational members make of an organization's structures and policies than with the structures and policies themselves. Leaders who ignore this fact (and, consequently, ignore or even underplay the interpersonal dimensions of organizational life) do so at their peril.

Both of the rationales for the utility of historical hermeneutical research discussed thus far have more to do with the general perspective of historical/hermeneutical researchers than with the particular findings historical/hermeneutical oriented scholars produce. To understand the potential utility of particular historical or hermeneutical studies – to understand, for example, why it might be useful for contemporary principals (including female principals) to read Harry Wolcott's now classic thick description of a "man in the principal's office" or even anthropologists' accounts of initiation rites in so-called tribal cultures – one must consider efforts to expand the definition of generalizability.

At least one of these efforts suggests that even idiosyncratic findings can be generalizable if generalizability is conceptualized in psychological terms. Much like direct experiences in the world, the vicarious experiences provided by anthropologists' ethnographies and historians' accounts of different places and times can lead to the creation of more integrated and differentiated cognitive schema (Donmoyer 1990). Leaders with more complex and sophisticated cognitive schema at their disposal presumably will be able to perceive the world in more nuanced ways and, consequently, make more thoughtful, better-informed, and more appropriate decisions.

Theory and the Emancipatory Interest

Theory is once again the front and center in scholarship reflecting what Habermas calls the emancipatory interest. Indeed, the emancipatory interest was initially manifested in something called *critical theory*.

There are a number of different types of critical theory, and as was noted at the outset of this entry, other exemplars of the emancipatory interest also have emerged in the social sciences and humanities in recent years. Most of these exemplars bear at least a family resemblance to critical theory, but emerging intellectual and methodological traditions such as postmodern, poststructuralist, feminist, and indigenous research also have their own unique characteristics. Due to space limitations, this discussion will be limited to what, arguably, has been and continues to be the most influential emancipation-oriented tradition in the administration/leadership field: the critical theory tradition that educational administration scholars Richard Bates (1982) and William Foster (1986) imported from the so-called Frankfurt School during the final decades of the twentieth century.

Frankfurt School scholars (including, in the Frankfurt School's later years, Jürgen Habermas) espoused a form of Marxist theory. The Frankfurt School's neo-Marist theory, however, challenged a number of tenets of classical Marxist thought. Despite these challenges, neo-Marxist theory did embrace the Marxist assumption that society is structured in ways that automatically advantage some and disadvantage others. Also retained was the Marxist notion that social class is a determinant of whether one was in the advantaged or the disadvantaged group, though, especially when Frankfurt School thinking was transferred to the educational administration and leadership field, race and gender were added to the list of factors that determine society's winners and losers.

Critical theorists' indebtedness to Marxist thought has led some scholars to conclude that critical theory is less theory and more ideology, and some critical theorists do not dispute this claim. Instead, they argue that all forms of theory are ideological; critical theory is simply openly ideological, while traditional social scientists keep their ideological proclivities hidden, so well hidden, in fact, that those who develop traditional types of theory may not even be aware that theory development inevitably is a political act that benefits some while disadvantaging others. Even if they understand this point, critical theorists argue that traditional researchers normally do not realize

that the impact of their work has less to do with the data they collect than with the a priori framing that precedes data collection. Two brief examples may help clarify this last point, a point that undoubtedly will seem counterintuitive to some.

First, consider a researcher who opts to study the school achievement of students the researcher characterizes as being *culturally disadvantaged*. The researcher's decision to use the term *culturally disadvantaged* rather than, say, *culturally different* virtually guarantees that any problems that are identified in the study will be attributed to the students and/or their families and communities, not to the school or governmental policy.

The second example focuses not on the language used to frame a study but on design choices researchers make that largely preordain what their "empirical" findings will be. Where I live, many children's first language is Spanish rather than English, and, consequently, when they come to school, many are still in the process of learning the school's language of instruction (i.e., English). In addition, when the students participate in the government-mandated testing program to determine how much they have learned and who, in fact, has learned the most, the tests students take are entirely in English. Testing exclusively in English is a choice made by test makers, especially in an era in which many businesses greatly value bilingualism. But the exclusive use of English to write test items guarantees that certain students will be judged the school game's winners (even though they may have learned only one language) and other students will be tagged *losers* (even though many in the loser category have mastered one language and are in the process of mastering another).

Critical theorists in the educational administration/leadership field critique the sort of research and evaluation decisions that were just described in an effort to expose the very unscientific nature of supposedly scientific findings. Their long-term goal is to undermine what Marxist-inspired scholars call false consciousness and insure that biased story lines that inappropriately "blame the victim" and designate some as winners and others as losers do not become self-fulfilling prophecies.

Critical theorists' critiques almost certainly have contributed to the growing concern among school leaders with promoting social justice in schools. Still, skeptics might ask both whether a commitment to critique is sufficient to accomplish the goal of emancipation and whether emancipating school leaders intellectually is sufficient to withstand, in school contexts, forces that critical theory suggests are lodged primarily at the macro-level rather than the microlevels of society.

Conclusion

Educational administration/leadership researchers are often a rather Balkanized bunch. They tend to interact with those who think – and think about theory – as they, themselves, do and seldom associate with anyone who thinks differently. This discussion has explicated a variety of ways that theory has been conceptualized and considered, albeit briefly, both the potential utility of and the likely problems with each conceptualization.

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Learning

- [Deleuze and Learning](#)
- [Inquiry Learning and Teaching in Science Education](#)
- [Phenomenology of Higher Education](#)

Learning Analytics

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Learning and Media Literacy

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Synonyms

[Mobile internet](#); [Social media](#); [Wikis](#); [Weblogs](#)

Introduction

The advent of a multitude of digital sources has massively increased the scope and scale of information available to learners. Therefore, being media literate by having the ability to integrate, evaluate, and produce knowledge effectively from different sources has become a key life skill in the digital age. Being media literate enables individuals to maximize their use of technology across platforms within a range of social, ecological, and occupational contexts. For this reason, an understanding of how learners learn and how they develop the requisite skills to engage effectively with new educational technologies in different

learning contexts is required. This entry outlines the importance of understanding the concept of media literacy in theory and also how these skills develop and are used in practice. The socio-ecological contexts in which they develop and the psychosocial dimensions that underpin the effective application of media literacy skills for learning are considered.

The Development of Literacy Practices in Context

The increasing availability of information from a multitude of sources ranging from traditional expert texts, weblogs, and coproduced wikis focuses attention on how literacy practices change, along with the curation and coproduction of online content in educational and social contexts. Being media literate requires learners to be able to access, understand, and create such content. In turn, being media literate enables individuals to maximize their use of communicative technology across a range of platforms (e.g., Internet, television, games, mobile phones, and wearable communication devices) within a range of social, ecological, and occupational contexts. A bidirectional relationship exists between technology and literacy development: technological advances not only support new means of communication and interaction but also stimulate ways of so doing. Technology influences language itself, with the advent of textese, emoticons, and emojis (digital ideograms): their appropriate use and interpretation requires the appropriate media literacy skills.

Technological advances have had a major impact on learning and teaching across all educational sectors at all levels. Black-/whiteboards have been replaced with smartboards and laptops, and tablets are replacing jotters and notepads. Virtual learning environments (VLEs), initially repositories for information, now support interactive and collaborative activities. Technology is being used to increase access to learning (e.g., via distance learning) and to improve the learning experience by supporting the provision of timely formative feedback. More recently, the benefits of

Web 2.0 are being realized with the increasing use of networked learning, which takes place via, for example, collaborative games, simulations, and other forms of joint activity. This enables learners to develop their autonomy and manage their own learning. Most online content is multimodal, dynamic, context specific, and socially mediated in form (Coiro et al. 2008). Web-based ecologies of learning can be sought out by learners to suit their own learning habits, needs, and behaviors, with greater choice and discretion being afforded to the learner in terms of when, how, and with whom they learn. In summary, the learner is increasingly able to exert their individual agency to their benefit. Such agency, while crucial for deep and enduring learning, must nevertheless be accompanied by a number of skills and literacies, for learning to be effective. Central to these is media literacy, the ability to integrate, evaluate, and produce knowledge effectively from different sources (Ofcom 2015). The importance of media literacy is now examined from a critical perspective and then in relation to a range of new literacies.

The Importance of Media Literacy

A motivation for individuals (and, by extension, societies) to become media literate is that it enables exertion of individual agency, choice, and expression. By becoming media literate, individuals as learners in the narrow sense and individuals as citizens in the broader sense are able to not only identify, interpret, and evaluate sources of information: they, crucially, are in a position to apply their own judgment to both the sources used and the content found. They are able to make choices in digital domains where often a multitude of sources and materials compete for a person's time, attention, favor, money, and use. It is by exercising one's own agency that individuals can mitigate against other bodies and parties, be they social, political, or economic making those decisions for them. Such influences may never be entirely removed; however, they can be weakened by individuals being media literate. Media literacy also mitigates against the technology itself

making those decisions about material on behalf of the individual, e.g., the prioritization of material that is returned by search engines. Literacies of all kinds are practiced within social contexts that are subject to social conventions, broader cultural practices, varying dominant ideologies, social discourses and narratives, differing belief systems, and different regulation and legislation. With the rise of globalization and the global Internet, individuals need to be aware of and sensitive to such differing sociopolitical influences in the multicultural digital world and the way in which these forces shape the nature of information and the manner in which knowledge is constructed. Crucially, critical pedagogies along with critical social theories such as critical gender theory have been instrumental in empowering learners to deconstruct sources and materials. Deconstruction alone, however, is not enough: critical construction and critical reconstruction are at the heart of media literacy. Media literacy distinguishes itself from other literacies, with its inclusion of the ability to generate new content in collaboration with others. The critically analytic media literate scholar is in a position to engage critically with both materials and other people and to challenge them.

Media Literacy and Its Development

The term literacy is conventionally used to refer to the ability to read and write in traditional off-line print contexts. In contrast, the term media literacy was initially used to capture the ability to interpret mass media such as film, the press, and television but has come to reflect the use of web-based technology and expanded to include the production as well as the consumption of content. Media literacy is defined by the United Kingdom's telecommunications regulator as "the ability to use, understand and create media and communications in a variety of contexts" (Ofcom 2015, p. 19). The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), by comparison, views media and information literacy as a composite concept needed for democratic participation. UNESCO (2015) nevertheless shares the

focus on the critical evaluation and production of content. The traditional tight focus of media literacy on the interpretation and response to mass forms of media nevertheless remains, with applications including a range of health-related interventions, to help promote critical thinking and reduce any potentially negative impact of mass media images both online and off. Given the proliferation of digital information available, especially learner-generated content, the ability to think critically about information must remain a key aspect of media literacy.

The Evolving Concept of Media Literacy

Being literate in the traditional sense of being able to read and write facilitates a fuller participation in society, self-development, employment opportunities, and social mobility. The same applies in the global digital world where digital media skills are essential to support digital inclusion. The complexity of technology and its use is reflected in the evolving concept of media literacy. Initially, terms were singular and referred to literacy, e.g., transliteracy (Thomas 2008) refers to the ability to communicate across all platforms, including electronic ones. Increasingly the terms are plural, e.g., multimodal literacy (Jewitt and Kress 2003), media literacies, digital literacies, and information literacies, reflecting an increasing understanding of the complex abilities, skills, preferences, and social norms that shape technology use.

Media literacy distinguishes itself from both digital and information literacy as it refers to the ability to maximize one's use of communicative technology across a range of platforms (e.g., Internet, television, games, and mobile phones) within a range of social, ecological, and occupational contexts. By comparison, information literacy can be defined as the ability to critically appraise the nature of diverse forms of information (JISC 2014), whereas participatory literacy refers to those abilities that enable content generation, especially collaborative production across a variety of online platforms. As formal methods of supporting learning give way to more open, informal, and collaborative methods that support

content co-creation in different contexts, media literacy is therefore the literacy that is of greatest importance in networked learning ecologies. It is by being media literate that the learner will be able to maximize the learning opportunity in these learning environments.

Media Literacy as a New Literacy

Media literacy is one of the “new literacies.” Within education the term refers to those abilities and skills that are required for effective use of digital platforms within and between digital ecologies. Therefore, understanding the reach of digital technologies necessitates input both theoretically and methodologically from disciplines such as computer science, psychology, sociology, and education. However, the stretching of the concept leads to a proliferation of definitions and different uses, leading to a lack of clarity. Focusing on definitions, while necessary, can also prove counterproductive for both policy and practice (Livingstone et al. 2012). Our understanding develops with technological advancement; therefore, working definitions that are open to development are essential.

Perspectives on Media Literacy

The different perspectives on media literacy mirror those relating to traditional print literacy and reflect the debate regarding whether literacy be viewed as an individual skill or as a social practice drawing upon social and ecological perspectives. Outlined below is an overview of the two main perspectives on media literacy: as individual competencies and as social practice. This discussion demonstrates the advantages to be gained by ultimately adopting a conjoint, interdisciplinary perspective that situates individual skills within their socio-ecological contexts.

Media Literacy as an Individual Skill

Despite learners potentially taking differing perspectives on knowledge that may influence their learning (Baxter Magolda 1992) and despite

differences in scope and focus, the definitions of media literacy and the related concepts such as information, digital and participatory literacy, share the common underlying assumption that media literacy is an individual skill. Initially such skills were limited to one's ability to use technology itself, typified by the European Computer Driving License. The scope of these skills has expanded to meet the requirements of evolving online contexts to include not only comprehension of content but also production, especially collaborative production. Much of the pioneering work concerning media literacy in educational contexts has been undertaken by the United Kingdom's Joint Information Systems Committee (Jisc). Their conceptualization of media literacy is broader in scope than most traditional skills-based definitions and is situated within the wider context of digital literacy. Digital literacy is defined not as a single entity but as a global skill set. There are seven elements within the Jisc model: (1) being able to critically read and create content across different media (media literacy); (2) identifying, understanding, and managing information (information literacy); (3) digital participation (digital scholarship); (4) formal and informal effective learning (learning skills); (5) taking up digital applications (information and communication technology literacy); (6) managing one's digital identity (career and identity management); and (7) participating in digital networks in order to learn (communications and collaboration) (JISC 2014).

Evaluation of the Jisc Model

The wider conceptualization of digital literacies proposed by Jisc extends our understanding of the complex nature of the skills required to operate in online contexts. Furthermore, this framework captures the fact that both media and digital literacy skills not only evolve over time but vary across contexts. This indicates the necessity of adopting a broad view of the digital literacy skills that support learning. Media literacy in its narrowest sense of being able to critically comprehend and produce digital content is a necessary, but not a

sufficient, skill to support learning in the digital age. Learners require a range of skills: finding, interpreting, evaluating, and managing information as well as the collaborative generation or production of new digital content in order to maximize their learning. This framework is therefore useful as it acknowledges the influence of context; however, the situated, social dimensions require greater scrutiny than it offers.

Media Literacy as a Social Practice

At the heart of the second perspective is the appreciation that media are used for a purpose within local, global, transactional and transformative, social, and political contexts. With its roots in Bronfenbrenner's Ecological Systems Theory, this perspective draws upon the transactional relationship between individuals (learners) and their context (Bronfenbrenner and Ceci 1994). As such, daily life is recognized as providing learning ecologies which both shape and are shaped by their inhabitants. Given the global nature of these learning ecologies, it is necessary to adopt a multi- and transcultural perspective on the use of social media by its ethnographically diverse users (Livingstone 2015). Sociodemographic factors such as age, gender, and socioeconomic status play an important role in determining one's media-related practice. Age predicts not only Internet use but the likelihood that new online content will also be created. The role of gender is complex, as it is influenced by other psychosocial factors. While women are less likely to post new content, this difference diminishes as the required skill set increases, and students with higher social status have been found to be more likely to generate new online content.

Media Literacy: A Situated Skill

The distinction between individual skills and more sociological situated practices has a long history with respect to literacy which carries over into the discourse on media literacy. Such polarization is unhelpful as it is only possible to understand the nature of media literacy when it is viewed in context. Recognition of the importance

of capturing both the individual skills and the context-dependent dimensions of media literacy skills is paramount. It should be noted, however, that the negative aspect of using the term literacy can be conceptualized from a number of different perspectives (Livingstone et al. 2012), at the level of the individual (i.e., an ability or skill) or at the level of society (sociological or ecological perspective).

The skills perspective recognizes both of these elements and provides a framework that supports the identification of context-dependent digital literacies in each context as required. Future conceptions of the skills required, whether termed media literacy or otherwise, must capture the dynamic and context-dependent nature of the requisite skills. This addresses the need to contextualize skills which is a weakness with traditional skills-based approaches. The Jisc approach addresses some of these weaknesses by highlighting the need to consider the context in which skills are used. However, a full understanding of the nature and application of skills is only possible if these skills are fully situated in their wider ecological context. A *situated skills approach* to media literacy reflects the fact that media literacy skills are shaped by a complex range of sociopolitical factors and a number of psychological factors such as self-esteem, working memory, and motivation and more general socio-technical factors (e.g., social norms, learner experience, and user experience (UX) design). While it is possible to specify which media literacy skill(s) may be required, it is not always easy for learners to develop and utilize these skills when necessary as their application may be shaped by these influences.

Becoming Media Literate

Parental behavior concerning information technology use generally, and behavior, attitudes, and media literacy skills of parents specifically, plays a major role in shaping media literacy skills (Marsh et al. 2015). The development of appropriate media literacy skills might entail parents scaffolding the learning of media literacy skills

by their children. For learners to inhabit rapidly changing, global, collaborative digitally enhanced learning spaces, they need to take charge of both their own learning and their responsibilities to other learners. There is a close relationship between media literacy skills and Internet safety which unfolds over time and with use and expertise. Therefore, knowing how to optimize the benefits of digital life in a secure way is an increasingly essential learning and life skill. Terras and Ramsay (2012) identify a number of challenges that learners encounter when using digital technologies. These include (but are not restricted to) becoming aware that their learning is distributed and situated across people and time and recognizing and accommodating the fact other learners may be in other time zones and locations, with different schedules of behaviors. The media literate learner is the one who becomes aware that learning in mobile contexts may require them to split their attention – the management of cognitive effort when attention is split can be taught (Roodenrys et al. 2012). Such abilities are underpinned by psychological and learning skills such as self-regulation, which involves being aware of what one is learning and how one is learning.

Conclusion

Media literacy is a dynamic and situated skill set that enables learners to produce and engage effectively with information from different sources, and it has become a key life skill in the digital age. Learners need to become more aware of the skills they require. There are a number of digital literacy-enabling policies and plans being developed, e.g., the Jisc framework aims to raise awareness of the necessary skill set that needs to be developed. Developments have been hampered by a lack of an agreed definition of media literacy; however, a situated skills perspective offers a promising way forward as it recognizes the developing nature of such skills and the importance of considering them within their context of use. Contextually situating skills offers a promising way forward for future research to inform the

understanding of the skills that are essential for education and society. Doing so ensures that technology is considered in partnership with the associated skills that are required thus keeping pace with technological advancement. It is in this way that the media literacy skill set will be sufficiently flexible and responsive to accommodate technological developments over time. Promoting an understanding of such skills, how they develop and change across contexts, and their psychological underpinnings offers a promising way forward to empower learners.

Cross-References

- Critical Education and Digital Cultures
- Critical Theory as Metatheory of Education
- Digital Learning and the Changing Role of the Teacher
- Digital Literacies
- Digital Scholarship: Recognizing New Practices in Academia
- Distance Education
- Literacies
- Literacies and Identity
- Massive Open Online Courses (MOOCs)
- Multiliteracies
- Multimodal Literacies
- Networked Learning
- new literacies, New Literacies
- New Media Literacies
- Open Digital Practices, An Overview of
- Open Distance Learning
- Open Education
- Open Education, an Overview of
- Open Educational Resources
- Transliteracies
- Videogaming and Literacies

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Learning and Teaching Practices

- Phenomenology of Digital Media

Learning as Experience

- Phenomenological Theory of *Bildung* and Education

Learning Networks

- [Networked Learning](#)

Learning Outcomes

- [Curriculum as a Governing Device](#)

Learning Practices

- [Open Digital Practices, An Overview of](#)

Learning Through Infrastructures: Cybercafes as Spaces for Digital Literacy

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Synonyms

[Cybercafes](#); [Digital literacy](#); [Economic development](#); [Infrastructures](#); [Internet access](#); [Latin America](#)

Introduction

In recent years, an interest in technological infrastructures has emerged in anthropology and social studies of science. As infrastructures exemplified the complex systems of contemporary society, they became central to understanding the link between technology and culture (Larkin 2013). Several studies follow the process of design and deployment, with special focus on nonhuman actors and the agency of nature. Moreover, infrastructure has been approached as a symbol of societies' development. In this symbolic nature,

the question of how users learn to operate or navigate these infrastructures has been central to studies in the field of human-computer interaction. This field of design has focused on user knowledge, as simplicity and ease of use remain a core value to most designers. However, in the larger systems of infrastructures, such successfully designed interaction cannot be generalized. As in other systems, mediation is necessary to achieve certain goals. It is in those scenarios that research on digital literacy brokers has to offer several entry points to understand how people around the world have been accessing not information but the telecommunication infrastructures of a networked society.

Infrastructures as Cultural Symbols

Infrastructures serve as a powerful symbolic element in everyday practices in modernity. As stated by Paul Edwards (2003) "to be modern is to live within and by means of infrastructures" (p. 186). In the context of developing countries' histories of technology, infrastructures accomplish a complex role of cultural significance. The political address of infrastructure has represented "the possibility of being modern, of having a future or the foreclosing of that possibility and a resulting experience of abjection" (Larkin 2013, p. 333). For that reason, to focus on the histories of infrastructure is to follow a path into the experience of modernity and, more importantly, into its links with local aspirations in a global context.

For Lisa Parks and Nicole Starosielski (Parks and Starosielski 2015), a focus on infrastructure "brings into relief the unique materialities of media distribution – the resources, technologies, labor and relations that are required to shape, energize, and sustain the distribution of audiovisual signal traffic on global, national, and local scales" (p. 5). Methodologically, research on media infrastructure combines discursive, archeological, phenomenological, and ethnographic approaches, where the materialities of things, sites, people, and processes reveal systems of power. Cybercafes, as nodes in these infrastructures, embodied ideas of citizen culture,

transformation on economic practices, representation of access, and connection to the global and changing sense of time in the city.

Central to this approach to materiality is human labor. As media infrastructures “require human labor for their design, installation, and operation,” the introduction of flexible labor policies and ideas of competence in the market reorganized the infrastructure of information access globally. To follow spaces like cybercafés is to consider “the remarkable neglect of the massive continuous work that is necessary to sustain the complex infrastructural systems” (Graham and Thrift 2007, p. 8). Moreover, the caring labor of allowing people to access relied on an emerging network of spaces where new users learn about information and communication technologies.

Cybercafés in Bogota

Cybercafés are addressed here as a case study focusing on their emergence in Bogota, Colombia. The objective, then, is not only to address the role of these spaces for allowing access to telecommunication infrastructures, but also to compare them with government initiatives. From a chronological perspective, the expansion of ICT infrastructure in Bogota followed a geographical pattern. Bogota is the capital city of Colombia. Located on the eastern side of the Andes Mountains in South America, it is Colombia’s main economic and industrial center. Since 1960s, Bogota has increased its population, after people move into the city, mainly because of the violence on the countryside. More recently, the city has reached a population of eight million people. As during the Spanish conquest, the downtown was established, indigenous settlements remained at the south. Local elites preferred the north part, a trend that has continued until recent years. As the city is surrounded by mountains on the eastern side, working-class neighborhoods emerged in the west and south sides of the city. As this process took place, immigrants and displaced people entered into the city in informal settings, until the city had a broader offer of industrial and commercial jobs.

The arrival of Internet cafes in the south of Bogota follows this displacement in the city, driven by different economic forces. Of the multiple nodes of access to the Internet, spaces where people gather together to navigate information automatically raise questions about how individualism functions as a driver of technology. For the case of China, Jack Linchuan Qiu (2009) argues that users of cybercafés could be labeled as the “have less” because “compared to the upper classes, they have limited income and limited influence in policy processes, although they have begun to go online and use wireless phones” (p. 4).

Internet and mobile access augmented in the city after the government introduced several policies to deregulate public services. Other measures, like the flexibilization of labor and State shrinking, characterized policy making in Colombia since the 1990s. Bogota, as the capital of the country, entered into a process of promoting itself as a global connected city. While the government invested in massive public transportation, telecommunication companies started huge campaigns to sell their services. Mobile phone advertisement stressed new ideas of mobility especially for upper classes. Similarly, Internet was advertised as a window to the world. As a way of promoting Internet for middle classes, several Internet cafes were inaugurated to show people the qualities of these new services.

As Nupia (2000) states, “the concept of the Cybercafé also moved to the neighborhood for working-class people, showing the easiness of its penetration and the offer of a service to a younger population, who demand mainly education and entertainment” (p. 60). Although the government initiated an effort to extend public access through the establishment of its own cafes/public libraries, the forces including local entrepreneurship and deregularization in telecommunications, led to the expansion of Internet access.

As cybercafés in Bogota are dispersed across the city, some of their services are aimed to a broad category of “low-income consumers and providers such as rural-to-urban migrants, laid-off workers, retirees, and youth who have gained access to ICT’s since the turn of the century” (Qiu

2009, p. 9). Representative of historical continuities, these spaces have emerged in connection with previous practices of knowledge production and consumption. In Bogota, cybercafés emerged in small businesses called *papelarias*, businesses dedicated mainly to sell supplies for students. If we talk in the computational lingo of update and versions, we can see that such spaces are updated with the introduction of such technologies. Cybercafé names in Bogota reflect an aspiration for global connection. Names like Bogota Ciberpace, Global Works, Cybertown Estudio-Café, Coffeemail Virtual Zone, Enjoyment Internet, and Coffee Shop connect some local references with the language of cyberculture.

In the “move to the south” discussed before, news articles in 2000 started to localize and somehow recommend some practices, to control the use of technology in cybercafés. In an article entitled “Cafe Internet, a trendy alternative,” the journalist describes the innovation introduced by cafe Internet to give their clients more services. According to an article published in *El Tiempo* from April 24, 2000 “Image scanning, text printing, webpage design, office supplies, cd copies, fax, international and national calls, translations,” the journalist expressed their concern when mentioning CD copies, especially for software and music piracy.

One of the most asked services at that moment was e-mail, which according to an interviewed operator “showed people how technology has notably progressed and made them appreciate their benefits.” As writing practices take place in these spaces, cybercafés in Bogota offer their clients templates for certain bureaucratic processes. Among the services are *cuentas de cobro* (letters for payment), *solicitudes* (requests), and *cancelaciones* (cancellations). Such elements contrast with Colombian government’s efforts to shift their services onto digital platforms through e-government. Both in the virtual and actual scenarios, learning the complexities of government and corporations’ legal processes relies on an established network of brokers that inhabit spaces like cybercafes where people find help.

Interestingly, such mediated processes can be traced back to the literacy brokers, described by

Judy Kalman in her ethnographic work on “Mexican scribes in the Plaza of Santo Domingo.” Kalman (1999) follows the interactions of scribes and customers in the process of writing documents and letters to the Mexican State. As Kalman (1999) states, “the scribes and their clients at the Plaza de Santo Domingo in Mexico city provide a case study for understanding the ways literacy is accomplished through intermediaries” (p. 12). The scribe, she adds, functions as a written language broker who allows clients to take part “in those social situations that require the use of writing, situations in which they might otherwise not be able to participate” (p. 12). The use of model letters and the services offered by scribes has connections to the literacy needs of people who visit cybercafés, and their operators assume such literacy broker jobs. As Sarah Harris (2015) demonstrates in Turkey, operators in cybercafés “coordinate, repair and teach in order to fill an infrastructural void for have-less users” (p. 213). Cybercafé operators, she adds, “are essential facilitators who either directly help or passively allow users to navigate around access barriers, decipher unfamiliar interfaces, languages and codes, participate in an Information society that exclude them, and create alternative information networks of their own” (p. 214).

Cybercafes: Between Development and Neoliberal Policies

As some of these actions also are performed in the government-funded spaces called telecenters, comparisons between them and cybercafes stressed the social commitment of the former. In their study of public access centers in Colombia, Luis Fernando Baron and Ricardo Gomez (2014) demonstrate that “cybercafés, not only represent, by far, the greatest number of public access centers, but they are also the preferred spaces by users for their information, communication and educational activities” (p. 10). According to the Ministry of IT, Colombia had in 2012 about 18,306 centers for Internet public access. Eighty-two percent of the access was provided by cybercafés, 15% by telecenters, and 3% by public libraries. For Baron and Gomez (2014),

“cybercafés have been multiplied in an exponential way, and they have achieved to cover broad sectors in cities and small towns” (p. 50). For them, business owners and operators had a great ability to adapt to technological change and to recognize their client needs.

Telecenters, on the other hand, were created to address several government programs. They not only referred to education but also health, local businesses development, and e-government. As expressed by Baron and Gomez (2014), “Telecenters have been a key piece in the development and appropriation of IT in Colombia. They emerged in the country by communication NGOs, alternative providers of electronic mail and internet, and social organizations with cultural, economic and political projects” (p. 60). Literacy projects share institutional infrastructure and ideas of economic change with the economic development that characterized social policies since the 1960s. In this context, the idea of sustainability is connected with investments from the government through World Bank loans or development agencies like IDRC or USAID. For that reason, prioritization depends on an institutional measurement about where these interventions could have more impact.

As they recognize the vivid expansion of cybercafés and their invisibility for the government, they propose to look at them as possible spaces for alliance in terms of government interest to bring access to a broader population. However, Baron and Gomez (2014) characterize cybercafés for their “good service and less social responsibility” (p. 60). In comparison with telecenters, they are mostly “the result of informal alternatives for entrepreneurship and income generation,” as most of them extended previous business of local telecommunication systems. In terms of education, they stressed the lack of more structured or formal proposal of IT training. Moreover, they consider the operator’s mediation in writing, for *cancelaciones* and *solicitudes*, for example, seems to generate laziness and apathy in IT logic comprehension and use (p. 57). Although they criticize the invisibility of cybercafés for the public sector, their approach reduces them for their lack of structure.

In their historical account of the evolution of public access, Gomez and Baron are interested in

following government policies and NGOs effort to create *telecenters*. They follow a side of the story of the “how” of telecommunication, one where Colombian government embraces the development of information technologies. However, they forgot to mention processes of telecommunication privatization and changes in work legislation that affect the people who use public access centers. For that reason, the configuration of practices in the cybercafé show in practice the conformation of an emergent labor force of working-class population connected to the networks. Moreover, the lazy literacy practices described by Gomez and Baron have historical roots on strategies developed to navigate the complex legal systems of the State and corporations. As Virginia Eubanks (2011) states, “interaction with these [IT] technologies provide moments of political learning for poor and working-class women, teaching lessons about the state, operation of government, and the efficacy of making political claims” (p. 83).

Jack Linchuan Qui (2009) emphasizes this change when he demonstrates that in China, “with rising mobility, workers and working families have lost much of the welfare that they previously enjoyed, included job security” (p. 6). As they have to maneuver to “find affordable housing, health care, education and other necessities,” cybercafés are connected to the circuits of commerce, most of them informal, to confront how these services are increasingly privatized and commercialized. In that sense, Alejandro Portes (Portes et al. 2005) shows how although neoliberal reform expectations in Latin America promised better employment, higher incomes and a solid basis for peace and social order, sociological research on informality, inequality, and delinquency revealed other results. The blurring of formal and informal labor, the appropriation of benefits for elites, and higher rates of insecurity characterized the general effects in Latin American urban life, during the years when Colombia finally was connected to the globe. If literacies in cybercafé are so vital, it is because they are grounded in people’s everyday economies, which involve notions of contesting the lack of attention in which they have laid out.

Conclusion

To consider processes of learning through infrastructure includes both designers' understanding of user cognitive process, through human-computer interaction, and the "human labor for their design, installation, and operation." As the case of Bogota shows, the caring labor of allowing people's access relied on a network of cybercafés where new users learn about information and communication technologies. The study of digital literacy includes not only the most evident efforts in teaching about technology but also layers of everyday practices of interacting with infrastructure that are residual in contemporary society and include new literacy brokers for the digitalized world.

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Legalization

► Juridification and Education

Leisure: A Philosophical View About Leisure, Personal Freedom, and Politics

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Introduction

The decrease in the number of hours required for making one's living and the improvement of the tools at man's disposal for everyday needs in postindustrial society leave ever-growing populations with surplus time for additional occupations. What does man do with this spare time?

What happens to a person who completes his obligations earlier than he did in the past? Does this change in the conditions of his existence modify his conceptions and alter his mood? How then does it happen, in spite of this, that people tend to complain that they have no time? How do society's institutions adapt to this state of affairs? "The state must determine a policy for a leisure culture" is a considerably popular statement, voiced by public figures and politicians. What have the State's public and political institutions to do with the fact that its citizens have more free time? Does this time, by its very definition as "free," not enjoy immunity from any kind of interference or attempt at it?

What has the relatively new term "leisure" to do with politics?

In the framework I have been allotted, I will not be able to relate to all the questions that have arisen,

so I will present short definitions of the conceptions of time, leisure, freedom, and politics.

Time

How does man conceive time? Something fleeting that passes like a dream? Something tiresome and burdensome that crawls between the point he is at present to that where the expected event will occur? What does he mean when he says, “I have no time,” “to pass the time,” “to kill time”? I am “racing against time”?

The constraints of schedule pressurize a person during the passing hours until it seems to him that he is caught in a ceaseless current, moving from one commitment to another, from one errand to the next as 1 day follows the next and years go by, years from which only few photographs remain, faraway pictures which seem like a dream.

And in spite of this, on the brink of each new day each of us is faced with precisely 24 h; no one has a minute more or a minute less. Each morning one may ask oneself: What will happen during this enormous time span? How many minutes will a person manage to salvage from the mechanical inertia of routine, minutes in which he will make an effort to remember that he has to look ahead in order to understand what is the purpose of life.

Life is entirety made up of the space of time contained in it, i.e., time and life are synonymous, and “time is never lost, the life of who loses time is lost” (Gonzalez-Pecotche 1953). How much of life is thus lost! How much of life is taken from us by the endless burdens that impinge upon our time, time that we would perhaps allot to some other form of fulfillment?

It happens that one hour is sufficient – an hour free from a predetermined schedule – in order to experience a challenging encounter with ourselves and our lives, with their direction and significance.

At a time like this, there is a chance that our consciousness will record that every approaching minute, every day that once again brings the sun in the sky and sends the birds flying among the branches of the trees, is new time – not a duplication of yesterday’s – time that is waiting, again and again, for man’s decisions. “Life is not

supposed to come to an end like a day comes to its end with the twilight we have to renew ourselves in the past and in the future. In the past, when we continually reconstruct on our mental screen all our strongly felt experiences; in the future, when we think about what is left to be done, what we wanted to fulfill, and in particular what we want to be in this future. And to the extent that man’s feelings of gratitude to the past, towards those happy hours, and to the same extent in relation to the moments of struggle and pain — by their very nature illuminating — so his life will open to new and broad perspectives of self-realization” Gonzalez-Pecotche (1953).

Leisure

Leisure in the antic world, *otium* in Latin, was the privilege and the attribute of free men. To be free meant that all activity done was the expression of own volition. A free man was not constrained to work in order to insure his living. Those who had to deal with some business *negotium*, i.e., *nec-otium*, no free time.

The victory of the bourgeoisie – the negotium’s class – had placed work as the main value of the modern time. In this context, short free time was totally devoted to recreation, i.e., to recover vigor and come back to work. More than 100 years of struggle and technical advance were needed to broaden this recreation, not only for rest.

Nowadays, the reduction of work hours, the increase in traditional vacation time, and the weakening of traditional frameworks really expand leisure time, time that offers alternative experiences, exposure to things that are beyond the expected in man’s accepted and routine life, in other words, free time, a creative and inviting time. However, it would be more accurate to say that it is not time that has become free and which presents opportunities, since this is its nature by definition, but rather it is the individual’s viewpoint that has been freed, to various degrees, from a busy and predetermined schedule that does not allow perceiving alternatives – that were always there – but passed by outside the boundaries of a framework in which the “correct world view” was

confined. There is a well-known saying that describes a person who deviates from accepted norms and anticipated behavior as “he suddenly opened his eyes.”

It is important to remember that the creation of real free time is a relatively new phenomenon that emerged in the Western world in the twentieth century. Until that time, in Europe too, “leisure time” (and also “culture” to some extent) was in the exclusive domain of the elite; the common man’s time was entirely devoted to life’s constraints and the dictates of the community. The measures required for survival flooded and filled the entire space of time, and if few intervals were created, they were all perceived as dedicated to social and religious commitments.

Moreover, in traditional society – no matter what the tradition – man was perceived as part of the society to which he belonged, and as such, his schedule was entirely subjugated to that of the community. The precepts of the Sabbath for instance (Katz 1984), according to which a man desists from all work, do not transform the Sabbath into leisure time. True, the schedule of the Sabbath is different than that of a weekday, but it is not less defined. Sacred matters take up the daylight hours of the Sabbath in the same way that issues concerning making a living inundate almost every minute of the weekday, from morning to night. Even during summer evenings, when the entire family or village gathered together around a bonfire or in the yard to listen to stories and legends, this time cannot be defined as “leisure time” because the individual had to take part and do the things that had been decided upon for the community and by extension for him as well.

Leisure time is time free not only from any work or other tasks but also from any kind of external commitment; it is time in which man examines, as an individual who perceives himself as separate and unique, the various possibilities and selects, of his own volition, with what to fill them, if at all. It is time that is free of commitments and supervision, as well as of an expected and structured future. The reduction of work hours, increased mobility, and weakening of community frameworks over recent decades have extended leisure time, those leisure hours that are the cause

of that obscure sensation of loss of control in all society’s authorities, from parents and teachers, heads of communities through heads of State. This is from where the increasing interest in the issue of leisure time stems, something which is connected, *inter alia*, with the subject of control.

Freedom and Leisure

Being free as a bird

Being free as a bird, as the Beatles son, is an idea that has inspired people throughout the ages.

We see the bird take off elegantly, take off far from the confined topography of human life. We look at it gliding peacefully, so far away from of earthy worries.

How can we, rooted in his life's circumstances, prevent our soul from going after the light movements of the bird?

Long live freedom! Let's reach out for happiness!

What longing! What confusion!

We work so hard, sacrifice a lot, and pays a high price trying to rebel against the decisions of parents, teachers, governors, and their employees who prevent him from attaining what we consider our individualistic happiness.

We haven't discovered yet that our real subjugation is to our beliefs, our prejudices, and the decisive statements that determine life.

Like the bird that gives itself up to the limited space that ensures refuge and food, the individual sees the views commonly held by those around him, as the bars of a mental cage providing a protected but sterile existence.

For the important issue is not the bird but the precious inner being. It is our responsibility to offer this inner being the possibility of rising up above the common life where we splash about, existence captured in mortgaged time.

There, on high, when we attain freedom, we will discover, in our inner and intimate being's landscapes, the virgin spaces of his potential self.

To fly far away to ourselves: that can be also the great lesson of the bird which flies through the landscape of our life, especially when time becomes free.

Leisure by its nature can be a great opportunity for the seeds of our freedom to germinate. Leisure

is this time away, this “time-out,” out of all roles, obligations, patterns.

Beyond any role, I’m aware that every decision I make – including doing nothing – will be no one else’s responsibility but my own. Here I am: me and myself. What an encounter! What an opportunity! Or not? Indeed this new state of mind inspired by leisure can be our second chance, a new opening for our inner self.

We emerge into life in a world already laid down for us, where we understand very rapidly that our survival depends on our appearance in the eyes of relevant others. The main issue will lie in being what I am expected to be, or more precisely, in behaving in harmony with the role I have to play in every scenario in my social life. In the human species’ long and mostly unconscious journey towards survival – in its wide meaning – accustomed to being shaped by life, a common pebble by the flowing water of a river, humanity gets its outline as a result of all the elements acting outside of it. Nowadays we must add the potent factor of the media, which makes of our humanity “a monitor in which are screened the desires, needs, and imaginary worlds fabricated by communications industries” (Touraine 2005).

In other words, we become what circumstances make us into, and we perceive ourselves through the image reflected in these mirrors all around, an image we try to upgrade constantly, at least outwardly. This maintenance demands every available energy, and we generally fall into a subtle and vicious cycle: as much as I invest in showing the personage that circumstances lead me to be, by the same token I remain distant from a large part of my authentic self.

Then something happens unexpectedly and I suddenly find myself pushed off the carousel of life. After an appreciable rest, I discover that there is nothing to accomplish, no role to fulfill, and nobody to satisfy. I sense myself being in the heart of a vaguely defined present, in a kind of “loose” time that stretches out into an infinity of futurelessness in which I am abandoned to myself, *alone* with my freedom.

Before now, I could say that most of the time I paid attention only to what was relevant to my specific roles, decided what was adequate to my

established trajectory – all in a sort of a state of mind that “there is nothing to do” except what I’ve induced myself to accomplish by what is expected of me.

Yet, being alone with myself and with my freedom, I can discover that there are many aspects of actual life normally covered over by disingenuous existence, many things moving inner and deeper chords, unknown to me until the precise instant they appeared. The world now seems to be wider and I am able to hear, to smell, to sense all around, and overall in my essential self. (We all had the opportunity to remark that birds are more present in town on Sunday morning when life around goes at holiday rhythmus.) A magic space emerges to my consciousness: “leisure time” where life springs out of all the old thinking patterns. There we are finally able – at a low price and sometimes at no cost at all – to liberate ourselves from the place assigned to us.

This is a magic space where I can meet my whole self, with all those facets not formerly expressed, because they were not necessary to anyone, not necessary even to my former self. Being free means, now, that I can consider myself and my life as a whole, beyond the straight paths determined by the various tracks of survival; I am no longer just a pile of characters reflected in the eye of others (“The all dram is, I think, in the conscience I have, that every one of us has, that I am ‘one’ while one is ‘hundred’, ‘thousand’ . . .” Pirandello (1921) in Touraine (2005), p. 160) and powered by tasks, missions, obligations, alien expectations, roles, and rules. I am no longer shaped like a river pebble; my freedom consists in being able to preside over my own changes, in becoming “a subject,” that is, “not only one who says ‘I’ but a man who is conscious that he has the right to say ‘I’” (Touraine 2005).

Leisure time is time without rules (Jankélévitch 1963), time that escapes from the molds of conventional thought and moves away from the repertoire of familiar occupations. This is empty time, empty of all of what used to occupy one’s customary mode of life. This is a moment when the void and the nothingness are revealed, in which the unique self will float up. This void is in

fact a pregnant one, pregnant with infinite perspectives and voices whispering from backstage, behind the scenes of “normalized existence.” Charles Baudelaire explained this well (1961, p. 62):

Sometimes one finds an old perfume bottle that still remembers,

From which bursts forth, full of life, a breath of scent.

*A thousand old thoughts, like cold cocoons,
Reverberate heavily in the deep darkness
Then spread their wings and take flight.*

There, in the lack of routine, one can meet the scent of a forgotten perfume that recalls one’s uniqueness, the central point of one’s essential existence – where concern arises. It is from here that one will awaken and a renewed vision will develop, a view that sees, looks, and observes from within, wonders about the unlimited richness of one’s own existence, and of existence as a whole. Here, one will renew a kind of authentic affinity, whose peak will be the awareness of human solidarity, of total responsibility for nature, and the awareness of the spiritual dimension. Here we are no longer in the delimited contours of a ready-made identity, whose narrowness cannot include all the new horizons we begin to distinguish.

The new feeling of freedom rests on the inner courage to face an unpredictable future, a future that draws those weary of the well-worn pathways. This is the space that comes out with the discovery that *freedom obliges* and invites us to be entirely what we aspire to be. Feeling free means then that we can transcend the limits that seemingly determine our existence, seemingly forever, and that we can recover the greatest of all human treasures: the ability to create.

Being free is not a theoretical inference; it is not merely what I pretend, nor only what I desire, to be. To be free is what I intend to be. It implies not merely a series of much needed vacations and breaks from routine, but essentially: creation. “If so, in all domains,” Bergson tells us, “life triumph is creation, we should suppose that human life has its *raison d’être* in a creation which can . . . continue throughout life in every man: the creation of one’s elf by one’s self, the expansion of

personality by an effort that takes much out of little, something from nothing, and adds continuously to what there is of riches in the world” (1966, p. 24).

To be free is not a unique, one-off performance. Realizing freedom is a constant purpose, a thought (– “In order to approach that reality, a thought must be established in one’s mind with sufficient authority to direct all the activities included for the achievement” of one’s unique individuality, “the authority-thought will be, from then on, *the direct representative of one’s conscience*” (Gonzalez-Pecotche (1996), p. 66)) carefully created, carefully crafted; to understand this, it helps to keep an eye on our personal commitment to our part of humanity, as well as being conscious of what we name *freedom obliges*. Keeping an eye on one’s essential purpose includes a serene accompaniment, a continuous dialogue between me and myself. Becoming free is the infinite empowering process of our consciousness, assuming one’s freedom is a lifelong endeavor.

It starts when I focus on my mind, when I succeed in creating some distance between myself and the world – an indispensable space to enable tranquil observation. It is like hugging someone we love, after a long absence – we “must,” the instant after our first embrace, hold him or her off and contemplate, to be sure, to be aware, to be conscious of whether what we really feel is in harmony with what we think. We should likewise hold off facts and events, according to Gonzales-Pecotche (1953), to pay a visit to our sanctuary within the mind, to our ensemble of thoughts. The quality of our life, the breadth of our vision, and the depth of our perception are always the results of the thoughts within us at any given moment and of the degree of awareness we have of their potential impact.

The crucial place for our personal freedom is not in the external theater of life. Rather, it happens behind the scenes, in our minds, where we try to be aware of all thoughts accompanying and entering into our decisions. It includes clear-cut concepts (some not so clear-cut), alien suggestions, conflict between thoughts and feelings, focused attention, or passive inertia. We all

understand and agree that the quality of the performance on stage is the result of all the energy invested during the rehearsals. The rehearsals of our stage acts take place in our mind. To be free means that I am the director, that I know and govern all the “thoughts” involved in every future event, their relative impacts, and the relationships between them. My steadfast, tangible freedom begins in my mind and continues in the concrete alchemy whereby I choose those thoughts able to perform as I want them to.

My mind, then, is no longer a simply given concourse of thoughts, abandoned to indeterminate input from the circumstances surrounding me. It becomes my HQ, where I gather perceptions, discernments, understandings, intuitions, and insights into a personal and deliberate ensemble in harmony with my emerging and free individuality, for which I am responsible.

In the perspective of freedom, one is not only responsible for one’s acts, one is also “responsible for [one’s] thoughts” (C.B. Gonzalez-Pecotche (1953, p. 68), the thoughts dwelling in one’s mind. Though, as we have said before, to be genuinely free – that is, to be conscious of our freedom – is never a final and definitive achievement. It’s a fragile acquisition, needing constant attention and sustained care.

Politics

The Front Populaire won the elections in France in 1936 and Léon Blum’s government gave the workers and employees a paid annual vacation for the first time. The same government, however, hastily established a ministry for leisure time. A government must never lose control.

Control of the population is achieved in two principal ways, the best being a combination of the two:

- An exclusive and self-evident collective identity that comprises beliefs, symbols, customs, mentality, etc.
- A framework of occupation and recreation for an active population and a setup of regulated frameworks for children, the elderly, and those

with special needs; in other words, the controlled promise of fulfillment, to the greatest possible degree, of all the life spaces of its citizens, i.e., the prevention of the creation of real leisure time

The compulsory education law successfully fulfilled, to a great degree, the first task, so long as those who held the dominant conception maintained it and vigorously represented it, not solely in educational institutions. But over recent decades, as a result of the expansion of leisure time, loss of control over an increasing part of the citizen’s time is growing, and with it the efficiency of institutionalized education regarding the formulation of a common identity that is gradually weakening. This is due to the fact that the educational activity during school hours, that does not gain ratification and reinforcement during the remaining hours of the day, can no longer achieve its complete goal.

At all levels of the hierarchy it seems that it is difficult to enforce authority, in other words, a clear framework in which the subordinates “can” do what they are expected to do, within a defined framework that has controllable boundaries.

From this follows the desire to organize and supervise leisure time as well.

Governmental monopolies, or the cartel of the governing and religious institutions, have succeeded in offering recreational frameworks for adults and social activities for children and youth over a long period and have thus maintained reasonable control over leisure time as well. Until a few years ago, monopolistic governmental radio and television programs were expected to fill the audience’s leisure time with contents and messages, the purpose of which was to strengthen national identity and social cohesiveness. However, at the end of the twentieth century, there are no more monopolies and it seems that life has taken a turn, without our being aware of it, from the “grocery store” in the small village of the 1950s, where everyone had to buy what was on offer, with almost no possibility of choice, to the huge and anonymous “supermarket” on the outskirts of the big cities, where the shelves are filled with merchandise, offering everything, an enormous choice

which faces man and where he alone makes his choice, without anyone allegedly interfering with his personal decisions. In the free market, it seems that each one fills his enormous cart with only his own choices. Thus we have moved on to free communications, open skies. Boundaries are being removed everywhere, and loss of control is spreading. In this state of affairs, what can the connection between politics and leisure time be?

Leisure Time and Politics

Life without clearly defined boundaries also means life without strict supervision in the variety of potential encounters which face the individual, even more so if the person is living freely in the spaces of time that have been freed, as mentioned earlier, from commitments and strict supervision. We should remember that every encounter, direct or indirect, of a person with a factor separate from his self-awareness contains an educational potential, i.e., a factor that affects his ongoing shaping process. True, formal education attempts to create a congruence between and within the frequent encounters with students, a congruence whose purpose is to present a unified world picture which may have a cumulative effect, and which will be able to divert potential energy to free will, to the favored direction of the influence generators. But we have seen that there, too, influence is gradually weakening. If school succeeds at all, it is in training the majority of its students for empty conformism. I mean conformism as an adaptive approach to life as it is without relating to a defined form of life. Under these circumstances we have a public that is prepared to adapt itself to any kind of “what we have now” approach and is also convinced that this is what should be because “there is nothing one can do.”

The truth is that the channeling and shaping of man in Western society since the end of the twentieth century is increasingly generated by power administrations and operational systems which duplicate themselves through the power and consciousness of people who are exposed to them and work in their service. The alleged transparency of life and the flood of information supposedly

produced for the benefit of the public actually work as shaping and operative tools.

A comparatively simple example can be found in what is called “the culture of rating.” Program editors supposedly present their audience with what they like in order to win their attention (and a share of advertising revenues), but at the same time these contents affect the same audience and shape it. In other words, those who affect and those who are affected are everywhere. This means that no individual or defined social group necessarily stands behind the influential powers. It is particularly the impersonal aspect of the system that constitutes its source of power and therefore it becomes a challenge for education, training people to face those influences.

This is all too clear to the leaders of the community and those making their living off the groups that have a well-formed ideology and who feel that their power is ebbing away and disintegrating in the increasing waves of that same anonymous forces. This can be seen in the massive efforts they invest in direct educational action (which they regard as a supreme mission), in this case, the overt colonization of the thinking setup and its subjugation to the “correct” viewpoint. In a sophisticated society, it is possible to achieve similar effects without employing direct mental colonization measures; it will suffice to release “market powers” and the people themselves will “voluntarily” complete their own colonization. Albert Camus wrote a play called *The Siege* (1941) at the same time that he researched his novel *The Plague* (1943), in which the plague is a man with an address book containing the names of all the city’s inhabitants. Occasionally he kills one of them by erasing his name from his list. When at last one of the potential victims succeeds in seizing the address book, a commotion arises around him and all join him and begin to “settle old scores” and erase names in the same address book. The figure of the plague then says: “What a wonderful thing. They themselves are doing my work.”

In this process the illusion of “freedom” helps to blur the senses and almost completely disconnect man from the potential powers of his imprisoned self, in a state of unconsciousness, in

a web of invisible oppression. The covertly directive powers cause the directed person to think that no one is actually telling him what to do.

In this state of affairs, political powers are faced with two main alternatives:

- An attempt to reorganize and supervise leisure time with rules and regulations, expand compulsory education to what is called social or informal education, which has already been initiated in the educational institution and may surely be extended to the late hours of the day.
- To be courageous and train the individual, the citizen of the State, to fulfill his freedom so as to actually control his life in general and his increasing leisure time in particular.

This first alternative is undoubtedly more attractive and more tempting for governing systems that toy with the idea that it is possible to return and tighten its governing powers, but the financial investment required may prove to be colossal and the effort Sisyphean.

If we return for a moment to the family, the primary hierarchy of society, every parent knows and experiences every day, and particularly every night, that he has no alternative but to rely on his son or daughter when he or she goes out to meet the “supermarket” of life, to know to differentiate between what nourishes the body and enriches the spirit, and what impairs them, and to have the courage to choose the first alternative.

In a State of open frontiers, open skies, free markets, and free time, man can no longer be unaware of his obligating freedom. “Freedom is either personal responsibility or pathetic clowning” (Buber 1963).

Conclusion

It is hard to expect the political powers not be tempted to cooperate with all those who invite man to spend his newly acquired free time, in other words, to pass the time in momentary excitement and diversion. Rule and *panem et circenses* have always gone hand in hand.

But despite all this, particularly from this sober viewpoint, it is possible to create a training program that will give the individual the ruling focal point of his life in general and his leisure time in particular. His time will then be his, or in other words, it will be dependent on his own decisions, his considerations, an opinion that he must acquire if he wants to have something to consider besides beliefs, fashions, and temptation.

First and foremost, he will have to know the value of time in general, know that it is the principal asset at his disposal, and that he must learn to manage it, not only in order to exist but also in order to give significance to his existence.

Managing the resource of time is, *inter alia*, knowing how to see, and there is no channel more appropriate than the culture of leisure time in order to learn to see how to understand what I see. In other words, to learn to cope with what we see and not be tempted towards what seems to us to be what we see on the surface. This process is also vital to the old issues that are in our consciousness, such as tradition and customs, as well as all the new phenomena that fill our lives.

It is important to know that substituting perception that is the product of long years of tradition, with a shallow and transient viewpoint, is not an expression of freedom but rather of new subjugation. Only courageous coping with the traditions that have been handed down to us and examining them in the light of the mental pictures that time has presented us with ensures a profound viewpoint which is also a look beyond.

Time that approaches man, which is life that approaches our consciousness, does not stop. The congeries of knowledge that is found in infinite forms and which is transferred through infinite channels, the accumulation of human creation which contains intensities of emotion and spirituality, are there waiting for us to look at them, for the vibration of life within us, in order to be resurrected. This might be the most worthy cause of “the culture of leisure”: to teach man to listen, absorb, and examine the multitude of voices and phenomena surrounding him and within him, without pressure, as befits true leisure time, at his own pace, in an enriching and complementing combination of emotions and

thought; a training process which will culminate in man's ability to choose, or in other words, make decisions and not only to be tempted.

The number of decisions that man is required to make today, in comparison with their negligible number 100 years ago, does not leave any alternative other than knowing how to make decisions and understand their meaning. This is the aim of leisure education (Cohen-Gewerc and Stebbins 2007; Cohen-Gewerc 2012).

To paraphrase Hegel and Sartre, one may say that on the brink of the third millennium, man will either become free or he will be sentenced to freedom!

Spending time or fulfilling it within the culture of leisure are the signs standing at the crossroads of our time. It is also the task of those standing among the political powers, in the broader sense of the word, and the prerogative of man in relation to time in general and his leisure time in particular.

However, men of good will would do well if, before making plans, they first tried to cope successfully with the central questions posed at the beginning of this entry.

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Levinas

► Phenomenology of Higher Education

Levinas in the Philosophy of Education

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Synonyms

[Impact of Levinas' Philosophy on Educational Theory, The](#); [Use of Levinas in Educational Philosophy, The](#)

Emmanuel Levinas (1906–1995), one of the most original philosophers of the twentieth century, has not only had considerable influence on several generations of contemporary French philosophers and played a major part in the “ethical turn” in postmodern philosophy but has also significantly influenced educators and educational theorists worldwide in their rethinking of educational theories and practices in the face of political, social, and ethical challenges. Against the modern Western convention that centers human subjectivity on the all-encompassing power of ego and consciousness, Levinas locates the origin of the subject in the pre-ego, preconscious connection with the Other and the world and has worked out an ethical theory of the subject in which the imprint of, and the self's responsibility to, the Other breaks open the enclosed identity and entails a formation of the subject that is open, transcendental, and ethical. Levinas's account of ethics and human subjectivity, his claim of ethics as the “first

philosophy,” and his discovery of the Other as the absolute alterity that cannot be comprehended and assimilated but calls into question and challenges the complacency of the self have all had a significant impact on how we think about ourselves and our relationships with others in the human world. Levinas’s philosophy has addressed many of the problems of modern Western thinking. The profound insights of his work have been enthusiastically embraced by educational philosophers and theorists in recent years and instigated fruitful conversations leading to new ideas and practices in education. This entry starts with a brief history of his life and career and situates his philosophy in a broader philosophical context. After a brief description of Levinas’s writing about education, mainly about teaching, this entry describes the “turn to Levinas” in educational philosophy in recent years, particularly in Europe and the United States. The entry ends with a discussion of the most recent developments in Levinas’s scholarship in the philosophy of education and the new approaches educational theorists have taken in exploring the relevance of Levinas’s philosophy to education.

Life and Philosophy

Levinas was born in 1906 in Kaunas, Lithuania, which was then part of prerevolution Russia, to a Jewish family who spoke both Yiddish and Russian. In 1914, in the wake of WWI, his family moved to Kharkov, Ukraine, and witnessed the Russian revolution there. They returned to Lithuania in 1920, two years after Lithuania gained independence from Russia. In 1923, Levinas went to Strasbourg University, France, to study philosophy and was a classmate to many of the later-known French intellectuals. There he met Maurice Blanchot, who was to become a prominent French philosopher and artist and also his lifelong friend.

In 1928–1929, Levinas went to the University of Freiburg in Germany to study phenomenology under Edmund Husserl. He also took Heidegger’s seminar there. Levinas was deeply influenced by

both masters, and his early work was claimed in France as one of the foremost interpretations of the work of Husserl. While his debt to both Husserl and Heidegger is evident in all his lifetime work, Heidegger’s *Being and Time* had the most profound and lasting influence on his thought. His critique of Heidegger’s being-toward-death was the point of departure for his own philosophical project.

After graduation in 1928 from the Institut de France, Levinas got a teaching job in Paris at the Ecole Normale Israélite Orientale (ENIO), a Jewish school. In 1932, he married Raïssa Levi, who was to be his lifetime companion. In 1940, serving as a French army officer after the outbreak of WWII, Levinas was captured by the Nazis and spent the next 5 years in a labor camp. His family in Lithuania was killed in the Holocaust and his wife and daughter survived by hiding in a French monastery.

After WWII Levinas resumed teaching at ENIO and became the director of the school. He took his first academic position at the University of Poitiers in 1961. From 1967 to 1979, he taught at the University of Paris (Nanterre and later the Sorbonne) and retired from there. He died of heart failure in Paris in 1995.

Levinas’s mature works were developed mostly in the 1950s, after his experiences in WWII. He published his first magnum opus, *Totality and Infinity*, in 1961, a work that attempts to accomplish an ethics apart from ontology, which means an account of personal responsibility to others that is primordial, not based on an exploration of the nature of existence. Like Husserl and Heidegger, Levinas has moved away from Western philosophy’s traditional preoccupation with metaphysical questions about being and epistemological questions about how we know. The face of the other human being is discovered as signifying a radical alterity (difference) that cannot be known and totalized but calls the self into a relationship of responsibility.

In 1974, Levinas published his second magnum opus, *Otherwise than Being*, in which he introduces the idea of alterity into the concept of the self and emphasizes the impossibility of total

appropriation of the self. This work is generally considered his most important contribution.

Levinas's philosophy is deeply rooted in the post-WWII antitotalitarian thought of continental philosophy. After the devastation and upon the wreckage of the last century, continental philosophy mounted a formidable challenge to the totalitarianism, essentialism, and fundamentalism that have dominated modern philosophy since the Enlightenment. German critical thinkers and French postmodern and poststructural philosophers have all traced the root of totalitarianism to false identity thinking (Adorno 1990), or, in Levinas's words, the logic of the same, that presents a picture of exhaustive identity and presence at the cost of difference and absence. In France, this challenge has evolved into the so-called philosophy of difference that concerns itself centrally with difference and its valorization (May 1997). This philosophy is associated with figures such as Jacques Derrida, Emmanuel Levinas, Jean-Luc Nancy, Gilles Deleuze, and, to a lesser degree, Michel Foucault, even though the manifestation of difference is conceived of differently by different thinkers (for Nancy, it is community; for Derrida, it is language; for Levinas, it is human subjectivity; and for Deleuze, it is primary to everything and every idea). While totalitarianism is the movement to reduce the other to the same either by eliminating or by absorbing the other, the philosophy of difference attempts to show the very irreducibility of otherness and the very impossibility of total sameness and presence. As a key figure in this movement, Levinas spotlights the irreducibility of the otherness of the Other both within and outside of the subject and the Other's ability to break out of the grip of knowledge and concepts and its constitutive power that leaves an indelible mark on the very "presence" and "identity" that is to be forged by our consciousness. In many ways, the anti-totalitarianism movement has irreversibly shattered much of the foundation upon which modern Western philosophy was built (Zhao 2016).

This antitotalitarian movement, however, particularly in the form of postmodern and poststructural thought, has also been frequently

criticized as inviting nihilism and relativism and thus as having little application to our social and political lives, including education. But such a critique cannot be launched against Levinas since one's relationship with and responsibility to the other are at the center of his philosophy. Levinas's work has been the driving force leading to the ethical turn in postmodern and poststructural philosophy. An increasing, deep confluence has been noted in recent years among thinkers such as Jacques Derrida, Jean-Luc Nancy, Jean-François Lyotard, and Levinas. Levinas's influence is enabling continental philosophy to participate more forcefully in our social and political lives and in education. Not only does his acute concern with ethics but also his novel idea of human subjectivity makes his work essentially relevant to education – a field that is ultimately concerned with the transformation and alteration of human beings (Zhao 2016).

Levinas on Education

Other than his essays to the male teachers in a Jewish school where he was the director, published in *Difficult Freedom* (1990), Levinas has not written extensively on education. His career as a teacher and an administrator at ENIO, however, has given him an educational language to express his philosophical ideas. Thus, these essays, as well as his mention of teaching and learning, teachers, and students, particularly in *Totality and Infinity*, convey educational ideas that are intimately incorporated into his ethical philosophy. He sees teaching as the Other's confrontation with the self, guiding the self in breaking its interiority and going beyond the confines of its nature. Levinas states, "Teaching is a discourse in which the master can bring to the student what the student does not yet know. It does not operate as maieutics, but continues the placing in me the idea of infinity. The idea of infinity implies a soul capable of containing more than it can draw from itself. It designates an interior being that is capable of a relation with the exterior, and does not take its own interiority for the totality of being" (1969,

p. 180). Thus, teaching and learning are about encountering the new and strange, about being interrupted and called into responsibility to the Other.

Noticeably in Levinas's description of the asymmetrical relationship between teachers and students, he is not reclaiming the traditional, authoritative structure between them. A teacher as a person does not embody power and dominance, nor does he necessarily represent superior knowledge. Levinas writes, "Teaching is not a species of a genus called domination, a hegemony at work within a totality, but is the presence of infinity breaking the closed circle of totality" (1969, p. 171). He is describing a relationship outside of the egological realm of antithesis and calculation, in which the self and other are separate and against each other. Thus, it is not about the teacher as a person having power over students but about the unknown that is being brought to the student that gives the student the opportunity to be in the presence of infinity. In this sense, both teachers and students can be teaching each other.

Levinas also suggests that teaching, like language, is where truth and knowledge are produced and transmitted. Unlike the Cartesian subject that alone is the ultimate determination of truth and certainty of knowledge, Levinas argues that truth has an intersubjective origin, and it is in teaching that knowledge and truth is produced and transmitted. "Teaching is a way for truth to be produced such that it is not my work, such that I could not derive it from my own interiority" (1969, p. 295). Levinas argues that in transmitting meanings and ideas, "I do not transmit to the Other what is objective for me: the objective becomes objective only through communication. . . . What I communicate . . . is already constituted in the function of others" (1969, p. 210). "To thematize is to offer the world to the Other in speech. . . . The basis of objectivity is constituted in a purely subjective process" (1969, pp. 209–210). Knowledge is possible only through, and as a function of, my expression to the other.

All of these ideas, along with his other philosophical and ethical thoughts, have had a

profound impact on educational theorists and philosophers in their rethinking of educational theories and practices.

Levinas in the Philosophy of Education

It has been observed that a "turn towards Levinas's ethical perspective" in educational philosophy has occurred in recent years (Nordtug 2013, p. 250). In 2003, the first special issue devoted to Levinas, based on a 2000 AERA panel presentation, was published by *Studies in Philosophy and Education*. In 2009, the first edited collection specifically to address Levinas and education, *Levinas and Education: At the Intersection of Faith and Reason*, was published by Routledge. Numerous articles on Levinas have appeared in almost all major philosophy of education journals, and presentations on Levinas are frequently featured at Philosophy of Education Society (USA) annual meetings. Several books centered on Levinas and education have also appeared in recent years (e.g., Todd 2003; Strhan 2012).

The welcoming of Levinas to the field of the philosophy of education is situated in the historical context of neoliberalism and the quest for certainty, uniformity, and accountability. Levinas's philosophy gives educational theorists the conceptual tools to resist dominance and to rethink educational theory and practice in ways radically different from modern Western conventions. The areas of education scholars have explored with a Levinasian lens are varied, covering a wide range of educational concerns, from the purpose of education, curriculum issues and pedagogy, teacher-student relations, and the educational aim of autonomy as contrary to heteronomy to art education. Not surprisingly, particular attention has been paid to the ethical implications of Levinas's philosophy in areas related to moral education, diversity issues, multiculturalism, and the politics of recognition. His idea that the knowing subject is interrupted and disarmed by the face of the unknowable Other has been taken up quite frequently by

educational theorists to envision the school as a site of ethics (Zhao 2016).

Throughout the years, there has also been an identifiable trend in the Levinas scholarship in education, developing from an earlier cautious exposition and concern for faithful interpretation to the later more full-blown, critical analysis and creative extension of his ideas. The early concern for faithful exposition came from the fact that while Levinas's philosophy is incredibly rich and extremely refreshing for educational scholars, it ultimately hinges on a disruption of Being and Presence and on the claim of the impossibility of thematization, and his writing is enigmatic and at times elusive. Unlike some other continental philosophers, Levinas does not shy away from the daunting and dangerous task of articulating something irreducible to concepts and knowledge; thus, his text is often, understandably, obscure. And since he locates the origin of human subjectivity in the pre-ego, preconscious connection with the Other and the world, applying his work to educational theories and practices is inherently difficult. Therefore, the first questions educational scholars often have to grapple with are "how to approach the writings of Emmanuel Levinas" (Biesta 2003, p. 61) and how to "think alongside Levinas, to think with his inversion of being as an ethical question" (Todd 2003, p. 3).

Hence, the earlier scholarship on Levinas and education is marked by the struggle to interpret some of his evasive ideas in a way that is authentic to his intentions, and multiple interpretations of the same idea frequently emerge. Distortions or facile readings of Levinas have been claimed, and debates on particular Levinasian themes are part of the scholarship (Zhao 2016).

After more than a decade, the scholarship has become more confident and mature, not in the sense that scholars are able to reach consensus, but in the sense that they no longer tiptoe around Levinas's writings but are more active and comfortable in drawing out Levinas's insights through sympathetic critique and extension to address some of the most pressing sociopolitical and educational issues of our time. Sharon Todd, for

example, suggests that in order for the hidden significance of some of Levinas's ideas to shine forth, we must take a more active role in engaging from the outside in a conversation with Levinas instead of only explicating from within his "tightly constrained systems of meaning" (2016, p. 406). The new trend is to engage with Levinas from outside perspectives, wedding his ideas to other schools of thought or placing social and educational demands on his work, so that clear meanings and logical implications can be elicited from Levinas's system of thought (Zhao 2016).

The recent publication of the special issue of *Educational Philosophy and Theory* on Levinas and the philosophy of education (2016) shows such development and maturity in Levinas scholarship in education. Many of the authors were part of the early "Levinas turn" and have been at the forefront of the Levinas scholarship along the way; therefore, this collection presents disparate and diverse readings and renderings of Levinas's thought to current contexts in education, innovative extensions of his ideas, and the productive blending of Levinas with other thinkers, perspectives, and fields of thinking.

Among the new approaches to extend the relevance of Levinas's philosophy to education is Anna Strhan's attempt at bringing together Durkheim and Levinas to deepen the understanding of education as the site of an everyday ethics and a prophetic politics opening onto more compelling ideals for education than those dominant within standard educational discourses. Another approach is provided by Guoping Zhao, who brings the issue of community and democracy into a conversation with Levinas's ideas of singularity and multiplicity, envisioning a genuine democracy that does not reduce and compromise our subjectivity. Yet another approach is provided by Paul Standish and Emma Williams who extend Levinas's concept of the Other beyond the relation to another human being to the understanding of human thinking. Gert Biesta, a well-known scholar for his writings on Levinas's philosophy and its implications for education, also strikes us with his new metaphor of "robot vacuum cleaners" and reclaims the place of teaching in

education. Clarence Joldersma, on the other hand, through an exploration of Levinas's idea of time, reframes the role of the teacher as the Other and as the transcendent who makes possible the learning of something new and something not yet contained (Zhao 2016).

Besides these more traditional, yet sophisticated and nuanced, renderings of Levinas's thought, there are more creative readings of Levinas through such lenses as feminism and the new materialism. For example, Sharon Todd, following a feminist and Deleuzian orientation to education, proposes that Levinas's views of sensibility and embodiment are quintessentially pedagogical aspects of his thought. Betsan Martin brings in indigenous worldviews and post-anthropocentric ethics to explore and extend Levinas's ethics of responsibility from a human-centered view to include humans as interdependent with nature (Zhao 2016).

The creativity and resourcefulness shown in Levinas scholarship in education demonstrates the deep pertinence of Levinas's philosophy to education. It is expected that his philosophy will continue to inspire new thoughts and ideas for the theory and practice of education.

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LGBTQ

- [Gender, Sexuality, and Marxism](#)

Liberal Arts

- [Liberal Arts Education](#)

Liberal Arts and Sciences

- [Liberal Arts Education](#)

Liberal Arts Education

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Synonyms

[General education](#); [Liberal arts](#); [Liberal arts and sciences](#); [Liberal education](#)

Introduction

Liberal arts education is a model for undergraduate nonvocational studies most commonly practiced in the United States, at residential liberal arts colleges and collegiate universities. Its origins can be traced to the ancient, medieval, and Renaissance practices of *artes liberales*, although modern varieties are deeply affected by and dependent on reforms of higher education in the United States during the nineteenth century. Liberal arts education is associated with a holistic approach to learning, stressing the importance of intellectual, emotional, and moral growth of students. The model includes educational breadth and general education requirements and aims at character formation, critical thinking, communication abilities,

and the development of leadership and good citizenship. Like other forms of college education, liberal arts education in the United States is often preparatory for studies in, e.g., engineering, law, business, and medicine. In the United States, approximately 6.5% of higher education institutions offer baccalaureate programs in the liberal arts and sciences. The equivalent in Europe is less than 1%.

History

Liberal arts education traces its origins to the ancient, medieval, and Renaissance practices of *artes liberales*, a system which, during the fifth century AD, was fully shaped into the *septem artes liberales*, including *quadrivium* (arithmetic, geometry, music, and astronomy) and *trivium* (grammar, rhetoric, and logic) (Kimball 1996). The ancient origin of *artes liberales* is uncertain. One possible equivalent to the medieval system is the *enkuklios paideia* of ancient Greece, a term which can be taken to mean “general education,” i.e., education dedicated to subjects relating to, and intended for, the free citizen. Even during the Middle Ages, the essential function of this educational system was to educate the “free man,” *liberales* thus designating the class for which the education was intended. *Artes liberales* has thus since Seneca come to signify an education intended to liberate the individual, a connotation that has been retained up until today (Nussbaum 1997). During the Middle Ages, studies in the *septem artes liberales* belonged to the Faculty of Arts, i.e., the lower division of the university; *trivium* and *quadrivium*, respectively, were considered preparatory subjects providing basic methods required for studies in the higher faculties of law, medicine and theology. Studies in the liberal arts were thereby subordinate to professional education (Rothblatt 2003). Liberal arts education was modernized in the hands of the Renaissance humanists during the Renaissance and established as the basis for higher education, which it would remain throughout the Western hemisphere until the end of the nineteenth century. Renaissance liberal

education had a less practical and vocational orientation than in the Middle Ages and was oriented toward studies in the Classics as well as toward character formation in accordance with the ethical standards of the Antiquity. For this reason, it was characterized by an increased interest in the study of history, for the practical purpose of building virtue (Kimball 1995).

Modern developments of liberal arts education are largely dependent on the organization of higher education in the United States during the nineteenth century. As institutions of higher education were established in the United States in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, they were modeled after larger collegiate universities in England, e.g., Oxford and Cambridge, where studies in Latin and Greek constituted essential parts of the curriculum. During this period, liberal arts studies were similar to the curriculum offered by the European Renaissance humanists. After the Enlightenment, this changed, and consequently a new understanding of “liberal” emerged. The freedom associated with liberal arts was no longer only understood as freedom within specific cultural norms, or common bonds, but instead took on a more individualistic meaning associated with open-mindedness and freedom from prejudice. In conjunction with the emergence of modern science and the spread of Enlightenment ideals, liberal arts education came to be associated with concerns with human freedom, rationality, critical skepticism, tolerance, and egalitarianism gaining momentum at the time (Kimball 1995).

Changes in the understanding of “liberal” were followed by vital reforms of the college system during the nineteenth century. The Yale Report of 1828 is of special importance, since it formulated the essential principles of the future American college. The Yale Report emphasized the importance of the nonvocational orientation of higher education, just as it advocated the study of Classics and the significance of general knowledge. It thus constituted a vital influence for the liberal branch of higher education in the United States while at the same time other institutions aimed either at more vocationally oriented education or to become pure research institutions. Proponents of the liberal arts were consequently considered to

be “traditionalists,” in sharp contrast to “modernists,” who favored a larger proportion of elective courses while also emphasizing the importance of the progressive natural and social sciences.

One important reason why liberal arts education continued to play an important role in the United States in the latter half of the nineteenth century, despite its nonvocational orientation, was a wave of reforms of the educational system during the post-Civil War period. These reforms aimed at clarifying the roles of the university and college, respectively. The Morrill Acts of 1862 and 1891 are landmarks in the modernization of American college culture and had great influence on the development of the modern liberal arts college. The Morrill Acts included donations from the federal government to States in support of higher education; in exchange for a certain amount of territory, States were compelled to build at least one land-grant college. Since one intention behind this reform was to provide education for the industrial and agricultural classes rather than scholarly studies for gentlemen, the Acts contributed to determining the function of colleges and turned them toward the vital needs of society and the labor market. College education thus became both liberal and practical, oriented toward classical studies as well as professional life, combining the cultivation of character with the development of skills and competences (Lucas 1994).

During the nineteenth century, liberal arts education lost importance in Europe, largely due to the modernist conviction that higher education must become more specialized in light of the rapid developments of the sciences. To some extent, the liberal tradition prevailed in Ireland and Great Britain, and European ideas on higher education still had great impact on developments in the United States. John Henry Newman (1801–1890), the first rector of the Catholic University of Ireland, published a series of lectures called *The Idea of a University*, which influenced ideas on character formation in Great Britain and consequently the training of leadership. Newman also articulated the conservative view that universities should teach universal knowledge, and that research is only a secondary function. This, in

combination with his defense of theology and belief in eternal truths, had a major impact on many of the religious liberal arts colleges that emerged in the United States during the nineteenth century. Newman moreover stressed the essential role of teaching at universities, in contrast to research, an emphasis which still plays a vital role in contemporary liberal arts education.

American liberal arts education was also, to some extent, influenced by Wilhelm von Humboldt’s (1767–1835) vision of a new university. Although Humboldt primarily formulated principles for the modern research university, his vision included ideas of *Bildung*, of the individual and the world citizen, of the importance of teaching and of academic freedom that was of vital importance for the modernization of liberal arts education in the United States.

General Education

An essential part of contemporary liberal arts education is “general education,” a term sometimes used synonymously with liberal education, although the identification of the two is not uncontroversial (Rothblatt 2003). General education, as the term has been used in the United States since the 1920s, is comprised of studies outside of the major and constitutes the main vehicle for the educational breadth associated with liberal arts programs. Normally, general education comprises one third to one half of the 4-year curriculum at a liberal arts college.

There are three basic models of general education: core curriculum, free electives (open curriculum), and distribution requirements. Core curriculum constitutes the traditional form of general education, with a definite set of course units, required of all students. Before the 1960s, core curriculum was the predominant form of general education in the United States (Bourke et al. 1999). It was closely linked to the belief that every educated person should be familiar with a common body of thoughts and values, a view advocated by John Henry Newman in the mid-nineteenth century, for instance. Traditionally, the core contained studies in the Classics, in

the shape of Great Books courses, for example, and it is a clear testimony to the importance of a canon and the value of cultural heritage in American liberal arts education. As a result of the increasing specialization of science and higher education, however, the enforcement of the traditional core has diminished. Currently, less than 10% of liberal arts institutions in the United States practice this traditional form of general education.

The Distribution Model (distribution requirements) is the most persuasive form of general education in the United States. About 90% of all liberal arts institutions apply this model. Distribution requirements were invented in 1909 at Harvard University as a consequence of disagreements among academics concerning the most desirable content of liberal arts education (Kimball 1995). The model is comprised of a diversified core curriculum and as such constitutes a compromise between the traditional core and free electives. Within a diversified core, students choose among a large variety of courses within specified areas of knowledge. An important argument in support of the distribution model is that it satisfies the need for specialization in modern society, as well as the demands of general knowledge and character formation. The model also facilitates for students to delay their choice of major, just as it, conversely, lets them decide their major course of study at an early stage. It is thus a highly flexible model, making early specialization possible, yet within the framework of a common core. It consequently meets the demands of both the labor market and graduate schools.

The use of free electives is a tool for general education only if students actively choose to lay the foundation for educational breadth. Free electives thus often require academic advising as a means for facilitating broad and individually apt learning paths. Academic advising was initiated at Johns Hopkins University already in 1889, however, and it has been an integral part of all modern liberal arts education in the United States ever since. While free electives are important educational pathways even at European universities, they seldom arise within the framework of an articulated liberal arts education.

In the United States, general education is often divided into main areas such as foundation studies, core studies, and integrative studies. Integral parts of foundation studies are frequently a course in first-year writing, foreign language, and mathematical reasoning. Core studies sometimes contain courses in history, multicultural studies, theological studies, or studies in the natural sciences. Integrative studies may include courses in ethics. It is important, however, that the modeling of general education requirements in the United States is very diverse. Liberal arts colleges design their own curriculum in accordance with their academic profile. One reason for the relative absence of similar requirements in European institutions of higher education is the length and content of upper secondary education, where parts of what can be considered as general education, i.e., core subjects, are integrated.

Pedagogy

The holistic approach of contemporary liberal arts education entails close attention to the needs and requirements of each individual student. To some degree, this is reflected in the flexible curriculum provided by the diversified core and the use of free electives, models allowing both breadth and specialization in accordance with the demands and interests of each student. It is also evident in the emphasis of teaching as a cornerstone in liberal arts education (Crimmel 1993). Private liberal arts institutions in the United States often have a low teacher/student ratio, and a variety of teaching structures are applied, such as lectures, seminars, tutorials, preceptorials, and laboratories. Furthermore, teachers are essential as academic advisors to students. The small college atmosphere associated with liberal arts education is moreover very much in line with the holistic ideal. Liberal arts colleges in the United States are often private, small, residential institutions located in the countryside. A liberal arts campus consequently functions as a society in itself, providing learning environments where students face a variety of challenges in a multi- and interdisciplinary setting. In order to facilitate the intellectual as well

as physical, emotional, and ethical growth of students, liberal arts campuses often include theaters, art museums, concert halls, athletic arenas, chapels, broadcasting studios, and libraries. The idea is not only to expose students to a rich variety of cultural activities but also to involve them in a broad range of extracurricular practices, as theater actors, editors of magazines, teaching assistants, etc. Internships and volunteering, in community service, for instance, are other examples of the importance given to activities outside of the classroom and of the orientation to develop a wide set of skills and competencies.

Another important feature of liberal arts education, although not unique for this educational model, is the focus on writing skills. Since the 1970s, many liberal arts colleges in the United States apply writing across the curriculum (sometimes called communicating across the curriculum) (Russell 1991). Basically, WAC contains the use of writing as an educational tool outside communication studies or other fields to which it is considered to belong intrinsically, such as English. Writing assignments in courses that use WAC are designed both as ways of acquiring knowledge in the subject matter and as a means to document knowledge of the content studied. As such, it is an important aid for the development of critical thinking, which, under the influence of John Dewey (1859–1952), has become a central aim for modern liberal arts education.

Liberal Arts Education in Contemporary Society

Historically, liberal arts education has upheld a strong position in the system of higher education in the United States, as a consequence of its commitment to intellectual excellence and its close relationship to ideas of American democracy and citizenship. The quest for specialization and growing demands on the effectiveness of higher education has, however, raised criticism against the model. Utilitarian skepticism was evident already in the nineteenth century and is repeated in contemporary society with regard to high

tuition fees at private liberal arts institutions, the risk of unemployment, and the growing need for professionally, especially technically, trained people in the labor market. The criticism also reflects a traditional battle between the humanities and the sciences, where liberal arts education is considered as an unnecessary leisure.

Defenders of the model, on the other hand, often apply both utilitarian and ethical arguments in support of liberal arts education. Utilitarian arguments often point to the demands among employers for communication skills, honesty, teamwork skills, analytical skills, and ethical awareness, virtues, and abilities promoted by liberal education. It is also maintained that liberal arts education fosters flexibility, an essential capacity in a rapidly changing society and in the face of an increasingly unpredictable future. The ethically oriented support for liberal arts education is often paralleled by arguments for the necessity to reform the model and adjust it to changes in the society and in the world. Alongside with critical thinking, virtues such as civic engagement and social responsibility are put forward as qualities that a liberal education should engender. Martha Nussbaum has furthered this argument by connecting liberal arts education to the development of global citizens in order to sustain deliberative democracy (Nussbaum 2010). The Socratic self-examination that constitutes the core of liberal learning in Nussbaum's sense thus becomes an essential human capacity in order to counteract ethnic and religious antagonism, as well as fear and polarization, both at a national and international level. Accordingly, Nussbaum elevates the significance of liberal arts education to a context much wider than the United States, just as she observes an increased interest for liberal education in other parts of the world.

Although it is true that liberal arts education has attracted interest in parts of Europe and Asia, it comprises a very small part of higher education in these regions. In Europe, this is partly a consequence of the public funding of higher education. Promoters of liberal arts education in Europe often put forward the ideals associated with liberal arts education in the United States, along with

observations that European higher education has suffered from overspecialization and that there is an increasing demand on the labor market for generic knowledge among new employees. Liberal arts education has also attracted interest in Europe as a means to bridge the gap between upper secondary education and the university and to manage knowledge deficiencies among first-year students.

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Liberal Democracies

- [Muslim Education and Gender Equality on Reconstructing a Just Narrative](#)

Liberal Education

- [Liberal Arts Education](#)

Liberation

- [Freire's Philosophy and Pedagogy: Humanization and Education](#)

Liberation Theology, Power of Language, and Preservation of Guaraní: A Paraguayan Context

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Introduction

The final stop of Pope Francis' 2015 three-country trip to the South American continent landed him in Paraguay. And while in the capital city of Asunción, he particularly wanted to visit the Norte Bañado neighborhood, one of the poorest areas in the city that rests alongside the Rio Paraguay. Constantly under the threat of being flooded, where shanties are made even worse by the elements, and where economic deprivation is common place, Pope Francis shared with the people of Norte Bañado, "I have looked forward to being with you here today. . . I could not come to Paraguay without spending some time with you, here on your land" (de Diego et al. 2015, para 2).

A Response to a Colonial Legacy: Preferential Option for the Poor

It was clear that this Latin American sojourn, which also took Pope Francis to Ecuador and Bolivia, reflected his continual emphasis on bringing attention to the notion of making a "preferential option for the poor" as a cornerstone of his papacy. A critical theme that illuminates liberation theology, the struggle of the poor, and God's preferential concern for them is central to both the Hebrew and Christian Scriptures. The point

is not whether God makes a preferential option for the poor because they are better or more loved than the non-poor; rather, God makes a preferential option because of the unfortunate circumstances the poor daily live and experience. The condition in which they live demands immediate attention (Kirylo 2001).

Shortly after Bishop Jorge Mario Bergoglio of Buenos Aires, Argentina, assumed the papacy in 2013 and took the name Francis, one of the first things on his list was to invite Gustavo Gutiérrez to Rome, holding private conversations and concelebrating Mass (Cox 2013). A brilliant theologian from Peru, Gutiérrez is often referred to as the “father” of liberation theology. The significance of his invited meeting with Pope Francis was indeed no small thing.

It is no secret that under the papacies of John Paul II and Benedict, Gutiérrez’s work had been marginalized, and even misunderstood by the Vatican, and though not officially silenced, he was not fully embraced. Thus, Pope Francis’ gesture was historic in its own right, prompting, Gutiérrez, to assert a “change of atmosphere” in the Church under Pope Francis’ reign in which he shines a light on a “poor church for the poor” (San Martín 2015).

As a foundational theme of liberation theology and the vessel that breathes life into Francis’ ministry, the emphasis on the poor emerges from the long continuum of the ongoing activist response to an ecclesial-political system which historically worked to dominate the poor and the different, beginning in 1492. Not only did Christopher Columbus and his men and those thereafter systematically invade the Americas, pillaging, raping, torturing, killing, and taking over the land, but they also calculatingly worked to strip the dignity of the language and culture of indigenous populations.

That is, particularly with respect to the latter, when Columbus arrived to what he thought was the shores of las Indias (Indies), he was greeted with welcome by the Taíno, letting him know that he was disembarking in an area called Guanahani; this important piece of information, however, did not deter Columbus to “rename” this newly encountered land as San Salvador (present day

Bahamas). In this deliberate renaming action, Columbus is not only justifying a position of privilege but is also simultaneously conveying a legitimization of his power and the subordinate role of the other (Banks 2006).

Language Matters

Paulo Freire, who significantly contributed to the thinking of liberation theology and also is well recognized for his worldwide adult literacy work, was acutely aware of how colonization had a tremendous impact on the consciousness level of the colonized. And whether it was his work in Latin America, Africa, or elsewhere, colonization severely worked to strip the culture, language, and person as subject. Through colonization, indigenous languages were marginalized and the colonized were constantly assailed with the idea that their languages were inferior and ugly, and conversely the language and culture of the colonizer was superior (Kirylo 2011).

Along with the unspeakable violence that was inflicted on indigenous populations in Latin America, the deliberate effort of geographically renaming the lands first encountered by the Europeans was part of an effort to systematically marginalize the language, customs, and culture of those populations. This enterprise not only wiped out the oral traditions of numerous indigenous groups but also at the same time Portuguese (in Brazil) and Spanish (all other Latin American countries) eventually became the language of commerce, the language inculcated in school, and the language of the “educated.”

To that end, Freire’s literacy work was not only a focus on the actual mechanics, but he also saw his work as a political act, one that engaged the learner in reading the world and reading the word, all of which was an effort to move toward the complex process of shedding vestiges of a colonized mentality (Freire 1978).

Henri Nouwen (1983) perceptively writes, “Poverty is so much more than lack of money, lack of food, or lack of decent living quarters. Poverty creates marginal people, people who are separated from that whole network of ideas,

services, facilities and opportunities. . .” (p. 118). In that light, therefore, the systematic marginalization of a language works to separate groups of people from fully participating in the network of ideas, services, facilities, and opportunities.

Realizing that historical backdrop, many in the Latin American community – to be sure – have been responding with pushback, diligently working to disrupt the colonizer mentality with efforts to preserve the language and culture of indigenous populations. And the focus here is on the Paraguayan context in which heroic work has proven to bare rich fruit in preserving the language and culture of the Guaraní.

Paraguay: Preservation of the Language and Culture of the Guaraní

Approximately 30 years ago, the powerful motion picture *The Mission*, starring Robert De Niro and Jeremy Irons, was released, bringing worldwide exposure to the aboriginal people called the Guaraní. Based on historical events in the 1700s in Paraguay, Brazil, and Argentina, the film was simultaneously moving and inspiring, yet a disturbing presentation whereby the Guaraní found themselves at the epicenter of a geopolitical, religious conflict between the Crown of Portugal, Spain, and the missionary Jesuits. With the riveting background musical score by Ennio Morricone, the picture ultimately ends with a spellbinding scene where three young naked, surviving Guaraní children board a small canoe heading to start a new life after their community was completely destroyed by the European troops.

Of the nearly seven million people who live in Paraguay, more than half live in urban areas, and most of which live in the surrounding area of the capital city of Asunción. The Paraguay River marks a natural geographic demarcation between the east and the west. East of the river is the Paraneña region where the land is more fertile, and west of the river lies the area known as the Chaco, which is a region that is flat, dry, and not easy to cultivate. Particularly driven by the exportation of soybeans, cotton, sugar, and other natural resources, Paraguay is primarily driven by an

agricultural economy. In addition, Paraguay is one of the largest exporters of hydroelectric power, co-owning Itaipu Dam with Brazil (Canese and Kirylo 2011; Canese 2010).

Indeed, the Guaraní survived the European invasion in Paraguay. But the preservation of their language and culture, however, has been one wrought with struggle. Moreover, unemployment, poverty, and illiteracy remain great challenges, and because most of the land continues to be in the hands of the few, ongoing friction between landowners and the landless is ever present, all of which are the remaining remnants of a legacy of colonialism (Canese and Kirylo 2011; Canese 2010). As a response, over the years, many educational leaders, activists, and others have tirelessly worked to change that tide, particularly – as is the theme here – to preserve the language and culture of the Guaraní.

In Paraguay, there are 17 different aboriginal groups, which are divided into five different linguistic families. The Guaraní is one linguistic family, which is comprised of six different tribes. And like all the various tribes in the Guaraní family, farming and the making of various crafts are the mainstay for survival. In order to assist in bringing more awareness of the important cultural contribution of the Guaraní and help preserve their unique identity and heritage, a monumental effort was particularly led by *Reinaldo J. Decoud Larrosa* in the 1940s, along with the ongoing current-day extraordinary efforts by Professor Almidio Aquino. Called *Proyecto Kuatiañe’e* (Language Notebooks Project), housed in the Institute of Guaraní Linguistics in Asunción, the central mission of this project is to preserve the written form of the Guaraní.

Proyecto (Project) Kuatiañe’e

As it had been, Paraguay did not have measured uniform standards for those children attending aboriginal schools. At best, these schools may have outdated texts for some children; at worst, there are no books available. Though not lacking in effort, standards are essentially determined with what the individual teacher brings to the

classroom with whatever material she can garner.

However, and needless to say, the lack of a combination of integral common standards and limited resources is a recipe for a limited education experience, negatively impacting opportunity and student preparedness for possibly attending the university and/or to meaningfully participate in a postmodern world.

In response to that reality, *Proyecto Kuatiañe'e* has been a concrete, proactive educational endeavor that has significantly served to help maintain and affirm the cultural identity of the Guaraní and to provide a more meaningful curriculum in the schools. Particularly in the case of the Ava, Ache, and Mbya tribes, *Proyecto Kuatiañe'e* has published 68 books in their respective languages, in addition to dictionaries, grammar books, and cassette tapes, all of which are designed to be used in the schools.

Much less children's literature in the conventional sense, the publishing of this material is significant because prior to that accomplishment there were no books available for the Ava, Ache, and Mbya Guaraní children in which their unique cultures and languages were celebrated. Indeed, these books are now used in various schools in the Paraguayan countryside in order that Guaraní youngsters may read, learn, celebrate, and be affirmed by the significant contribution of their own people, the Ava Guaraní.

The books contain and preserve stories told by the elders, some of who have already passed away. The narrations in the respective books were transcribed through numerous conversations that cover an array of topics and themes related to the Ava, Ache, and Mbya Guaraní customs and culture. Topics such as theology, religious rites, cosmogony, the mystery of life and death, anthropology, tribal customs and traditions were the general themes of conversations.

The teachers who are typically Guaraní themselves attend a series of workshops to receive intensive training in both deductive and inductive methodologies so that they can use the *Proyecto Kuatiañe'e* books most effectively. For example, and coming more from an inductive methodology, a teacher may engage students in a discussion

about their reality and background experience as it relates to family, customs, and traditions. Then, making connections to their background knowledge with tribal customs and traditions highlighted in a respective text, the teacher may engage the student in a reading exercise, writing lesson, or a cultural awareness project.

Not only is the above process constructivist in nature, but it also embraces a pedagogical practice that Freire (1990) characterizes as a problem-posing approach. That is, the teacher views the individual student as a unique individual who is given the opportunity to share their wisdom, experience, and creative power in the classroom. Thus, a dialogue will occur between student and teacher, and a partnership unfolds between the two. As Freire (1990) points out, "Yet only through communication can human life hold meaning. The teacher's thinking is authenticated only by the authenticity of the students' thinking" (p. 63–64). Consequently, student and teacher are working together through dialogue, reflection, and engaged inquiry, fostering a process described as *conscientização* (conscientization) whereby participants begin to better understand their reality and move toward a more critical reading of the world.

In addition, because the children live in poverty, the teachers are sensitive to their learning readiness and must also contend with having anywhere between 30 and 45 children in each classroom. With only a light breakfast for sustenance, children walk to school, which begins at 7 a.m., and depending on government funding, they only receive a cup of milk around 10 a.m. to help sustain them until 12:00 noon when school is over. After school, the children walk back home for lunch, a siesta, and then help on the family farm. And despite what seems like insurmountable odds, the impact of *Proyecto Kuatiane'e* is having a reverberating effect.

Significant Impact: Two Official Languages

With hard work and commitment, this project is having a significant impact in perpetuating the rich Guaraní culture and language; indeed,

requests for their books and materials are constant in elementary schools. In fact, the project has also published material for Guaraní group in Brazil's Mato Grosso do Sul.

In the final analysis, *Proyecto Kuatiañe'e* is powerfully contributing to preserve and promote an aboriginal culture and language that is intimately tied to the identity of Paraguay. Indeed, in 1992 both the Guaraní and Spanish languages constitutionally became the two official languages of Paraguay.

While other Latin American countries have worked on efforts in promoting bilingualism, Paraguay is currently the only country on the continent in which it is law that an indigenous language, Guaraní, and Spanish are the languages of commerce, the languages inculcated in the schools, and the languages of the "educated." Given the colonial past, which started in 1492 when Christopher Columbus began a legacy of "renaming," this Paraguayan reality is historic.

In Closing

Pope Francis' trip to Latin America in July 2015 was critically significant and the theme was clear: an emphasis on the poor, the denouncement of colonialism and its reverberating effects, and the lifting up and preservation up of all those who have been historically marginalized. Indeed, endeavors such as *Proyecto Kuatiañe'e* have clearly lifted up and have been one which has worked to celebrate diversity in preserving a language and a culture.

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Life

- [Nietzsche and Morality](#)

Life World (Lebenswelt)

- [Habermas and Philosophy of Education](#)

Linearity

- [Social Imaginaries and Econometrics for Education Policy](#)

Literacies

- [Biliteracy](#)

Literacies and Identity

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Synonyms

[Individuality/Social Category; Reading/Writing](#)

Introduction

Conceptualized within sociocultural theory, literacies are social practices (Gee 2015; Street 1993) and thus implicated in how people negotiate their identities as readers and writers. For instance, coming to view oneself as a literate person in a certain kind of social group (e.g., a *Harry Potter* book club) is dependent on being recognized by others in that group as a person who is like them – one who has read all of J.K. Rowling's fantasy series, perhaps written some fan fiction about Harry and other characters in the series, blogged a critique of the *Harry Potter* films, and so on. Lacking such recognition does not mean that a person is disinterested in other fantasy novels, but rather is simply outside an affinity group that calls itself the *Harry Potter* book club. Yet, within certain school contexts, so-called disaffected readers are often labeled as struggling or having a disability that is in need of remedial instruction. Over time, accepting a label that others have constructed for them, these students may indeed lag behind their peers in most or all of the subject areas. On the other hand, resisting or pushing against such labeling is a means of negotiating one's own subjectivity or personal interpretation of the kind of literate being one is (or is not).

This negotiation process involves constructing ways of being – interacting valuing, believing, reading, writing, speaking, listening, and performing – that will sustain one's membership in a particular group as long as it is mutually satisfying and beneficial. The difficulties associated with the process can range from minimal to a

magnitude that effectively closes down opportunities to identify as being the kinds of readers and writers that individuals envision for themselves.

A closer look at some openings for making the negotiation process less stressful is the underlying theme for this entry. It begins with a definition of *literacies* and *identity* in relation to a methodology for rereading and rewriting one's identity using artifactual literacies. Next is a section on how social media websites serve to encourage projecting one's literate identity into various sites' activities. A concluding section focuses on the role of identity in negotiating the literacies and literate practices among Latin@ youth in an area of the United States increasingly referred to as the New South.

Rereading and Rewriting One's Identity

Until late in the twentieth century, literacy was spoken of in the singular and generally assumed in education circles to be schooled literacy. A mature reader and writer in the context of schooled literacy could comprehend, compose, and discuss printed texts such as the canonical works in English literature, the scientific findings from laboratory experiments, the histories of various countries, and the word problems associated with a mathematics curriculum. Being successful in schooled literacy equated to demonstrating that one had achieved mastery of particular texts and their associated tasks (e.g., passing a standardized test or end-of-course test that assessed a reader's ability to compare and contrast the results of World War I and II). Learning to read the subtexts of both narrative and informational texts was a way to make visible the ideas that authors might have consciously or unconsciously concealed. With few exceptions as a pedagogical process, schooled literacy required teachers to organize class time, materials, and work experiences as though they were separate from everyday reading and writing.

This more limited approach to literacy learning and teaching has gradually given way to the twenty-first century concept of multiliteracies, which acknowledge the social, economic, and

political aspects of reading and writing, as well as the relations of power that are inevitably bound up in identity formation within literacy practices (Cole and Pullen 2010; Cope and Kalantzis 2000). A broader definition of what counts as a literate being has arguably made the negotiation of one's identity a less stressful process for some, but not all. On the other hand, in contemporary society it is common for spoken and written texts to engage readers and writers in situations that are both cognitively and socioculturally demanding. When added to that mix a growing number of multimodal literacies (e.g., still and moving images, sounds, icons, and living performances) discussed elsewhere in this volume, it is little wonder that some people are experiencing relatively more (rather than less) stress in negotiating their identities.

Identity as defined in this entry is a theoretical concept, which while socially constructed (Moje and Luke 2009) is not immune to an individual's pushing back or resisting a particular construction when it conflicts with that person's lived experiences (Hagood 2002). Though once thought to be a stable entity, the most current use of the term indexes multiple and diverse enactments of identities across an individual's lifespan. Thus, being recognized as having a particular identity in a certain kind of discourse community or affinity group does not commit that person to staying within the confines of the group. Rather, as Gee (2015) has argued, a person's identities are fluid in that they change over time in different contexts and for different purposes. In his words, such changes are best when nuanced and not forced for the very reason that "We can harm people just as badly by seeking to fix their identities, even if only to support them, as we do in demeaning their identities in an attempt to diminish them" (p. 248).

A methodology informed by artifactual literacies (Pahl and Rowsell 2014) is one that aims to neither fix nor demean people's identities, especially when the newcomers' ways of knowing and valuing are reflective of what they cherished in the former homeland. Developed from Street's (1995) insights into people's situated meaning making, a methodology of artifactual literacies values

cultural objects that are passed down from one generation to the next. Within this particular approach, artifacts are defined as material objects that embody certain oral language and literacy practices associated with an object's use.

So, for example, a worn suitcase in which a grandmother had carried her postcard collection as a young woman, while moving with her family from one military base to the next, might count as a treasured artifact – one that conceivably could mediate the stress of taking on new identities in an adopted land. Typically of limited monetary worth, artifacts nevertheless carry with them priceless memories of stories told that are part of one's earlier identity. Artifacts need not be old or even passed down among family members to be counted as such; for instance, a digital device consulted on the morning of 9/11 in New York City would likely have cultural value and be viewed as an identity-marker like few other objects in a person's possessions.

Teachers who incorporate artifactual literacies in their planning and instructional routines can serve as a bridge between home and school for children and youth who are learning a second language. There is evidence that L2 learners who make use of valued objects to construct storied worlds rich in literacy experiences that apply as much to their home lives as to their school lives have less difficulty transitioning to formal writing instruction later on. Similarly, it has been shown that when L2 reading and writing instruction takes into account broader community issues, the methodology of artifactual literacies makes the teaching of critical literacy both feasible and effective.

In the broader scheme of things, games are considered cultural artifacts. They have the potential to reveal how shared literacies and identity formation can both ease and raise stress levels among differently motivated and gendered groups. As demonstrated in Thorn's (2013) video of James Gee discussing the 13 learning principles that evolved from his playing video games with his young son, it is evident that "games are very good at creating identity" (n.p.). They can also motivate learners to engage in problem solving that has literacy-related offshoots. To play Minecraft well, one must stay

alert to the value of creating, collaborating, and communicating fully within a community. The sociability index is high – so much so, in fact, that both critics and supporters of Minecraft hint at the possibility of its being a forerunner of what social networking will become in the near future.

Projecting One's Literate Identity in Social Media

Just as Gee (2008) explained projected identity vis-à-vis gamers situating themselves inside simulation-type games through their avatars, so, too, he argues players reveal something about their empathetic selves through their choices of avatar types. To Gee's way of thinking, "Good game design gives an emotional charge to the thinking, problem solving, and learning it recruits. This is sometimes done partly in terms of players' attachment to the identities of their avatars – characters they come to care about" (p. 35). Emotional ties are also a potential outcome of participating in social media. Experiencing a sense of social connectedness while engaging collectively in social media such as Facebook, Twitter, Google+, Medium, and Reddit, among a host of other social networking sites, affords a feeling of belonging as well as an opportunity for projecting one's own literate identity into the mix.

Some social networking venues are designed for specific communities such as LinkedIn (the business community) and Research Gate and Academia (the scholarly community), which enable free sharing of articles and chapters among researchers from an array of disciplines. Specialized online networking sites benefit those whose literacy practices may vary along a continuum from experts to novices. The former attract primarily audiences with high-interest drives, while audiences in the latter group potentially gain from examples the experts provide.

Networking occurs through social media sites devoted to curating and categorizing content of various sorts: images (Pinterest, Tumblr, and Instagram), music (Spotify, Last.fm), videos (YouTube, Vimeo), news (Reddit), and question posing and answering (Quora). Subscribing to one

or more of these social media sites is an invitation for locating affinity groups with which to affiliate or at least identify as having common interests and supports. Subscriptions also provide a steady flow of information that is scaffolding for comprehending more in-depth reporting, which in turn can lead to perceptions of improved self-worth and lessened stress.

Medium.com is a social media site quite unlike other online networking outlets or blogging sites. Medium bills itself as a new way for readers and writers to interact. On its website, a writer's narrative becomes grist for a reader's creative verve and subsequent interpretive moves, such as highlighting words or short phrases in the original narrative. These alterations can influence other readers' interpretations of the story, or even the way authors come to think about what they have written. Readers' responses to a narrative that an author has initially posted on medium build upon each other and can grow an original idea in different and unforeseen ways. This reciprocal process readily lends itself to attracting appreciative audience members who are steeped in their own literacy practices that both shape and are shaped by the digital footprints of others.

Crowdsourcing (Snapwire, Zooniverse) and crowdfunding (GoFundMe, Kickstarter) are participatory online activities that call for volunteers to accomplish goals which at one time, prior to the internet's mediating effect, would have been the domain of more conventionally run businesses, institutions, and organizations. While volunteers can and do contribute monetarily to their favorite projects, they more typically donate their time and expertise to providing services that others need. In return, the crowdsourcers gain experience, self-esteem, and social recognition among their peers – all conditions under which a lessened stress load might be expected in negotiating one's literate identities

Exploring the Role of Identity in Negotiating Literacies

As the previous sections of this encyclopedia entry have shown, literacies and one's identities

are fluid constructs. “Just as the meaning of “tomorrow” becomes “today” every 24 h,” so also do our multiple literacies and identities undergo negotiation (though arguably not every 24 h). An overview of this negotiated process is part of a chapter by Alvermann and Rubinstein-Ávila (*in press*) titled *Latin@s’ Literacy Practices and Identities in the New South*. Their chapter focuses on Latino/a youths’ arrival and settling in over the past decade in a region dubbed the New South – an area roughly consisting of North Carolina, Tennessee, and States in the Deep South (Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia, and South Caroline).

These youths, some of whom have been labeled “undocumented” in some areas of the New South, are re-identifying or re-inventing themselves as student activists. For example, they are using information communication technologies (ICTs) in ways that push against their present exclusion from enrolling in some of the New South’s major public research universities. They are also being mentored by groups of local teachers in some rather complex literacy practices.

For example, Mr. Hicks, an experienced 11th-grade English teacher, helped his students, many of whom were Latin@s from what he described as either undocumented or mixed-status immigration families, to navigate constantly changing State and national policies on immigration (Johnson et al. 2014). Specifically, he taught them to use online social media sites for finding and distributing information on how to apply to colleges and secure financial aid outside the New South. In doing so, the students became increasingly adept at engaging with an array of ICTs, including the use of digital storytelling to create pamphlets that were then distributed to the media on State capital grounds and before small groups of legislators.

In sum, whether through rereading and rewriting one’s identity or projecting it in heavily networked social media sites, the negotiation process is similar. It is one of continually shaping and being shaped by literacies in search of identities, or vice versa. Like a glue stick, the process rolls on and over multiple literacies, assembling them here as related, elsewhere as unrelated, and in

between as literate practices lying in wait for the next turn in the road.

Cross-References

- [Biliteracy](#)
- [Critical Education and Digital Cultures](#)
- [Critical Gender Studies as a Lens on Education and Schooling](#)
- [Digital Literacies](#)
- [Multiliteracies](#)
- [Multimodal Literacies](#)
- [Networked Learning](#)
- [new literacies, New Literacies](#)
- [New Media Literacies](#)
- [Social Emotional Learning and Latino Students](#)
- [Videogaming and Literacies](#)

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Literacies, An Introduction

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Synonyms

Contextualized learning; Meaning making

Introduction

Literacy, as a singular noun, has come to represent traditional understandings of reading and writing alphabetic text. Though this definition continues to help educators and policy makers standardize and determine quantifiable literacy rates and levels, there are other components to meaning making, including but not limited to a variety of other modes (visual, spatial, object-oriented, embodied, aural, and oral), and the pragmatics of context, experience, and history. These additions to, and sometimes substitutes for, alphabetic literacy not only extend what it means to be literate but also impact the ways students take up alphabetic literacy. When students enter a classroom, they bring with them a host of home, school, and community experiences that inform their understanding of academic material, social interaction, and cultural norms.

Twenty years ago, the New London Group (1996) took issue with conventional literacy pedagogy, explaining that it “has been a carefully restricted project – restricted to formalized, monolingual, monocultural, and rule-governed forms of

language” (p. 61). Street (1999) also emphasized how literacy is an “‘autonomous’ variable, somehow divorced from social and ideological contexts that give it meaning” (p. 55). The focus turned to social, cultural, and multimodal representations of meaning and participatory practices, all subsumed under the expansive term, literacies.

With a broadened notion of literacy, critical questions began to emerge, such as, “How do we ensure that differences of culture, language, and gender are not barriers to educational success? And what are the implications of these differences for literacy pedagogy?” (The New London Group 1996, p. 61). An understanding of shifting and complex dimensions of literacies also created an awareness of historical, economic, and technological differences, and there has been a greater emphasis on understanding the nuances of literacies and individuality in learning approaches and experiences.

Despite these philosophical shifts and organizational policies (e.g., NCTE, ILA, AERA) that honor an expanded understanding of meaning making and advocate for closing socioeconomic and linguistic gaps in education, current formal assessments and discussions of literacy rates continue to hinge in the Anglophone world on mastery of reading and writing English. As a result, even when schools recognize the importance of literacies, reading and writing alphabetic text in English continue to be privileged in most classroom settings.

The *Encyclopedia of Educational Philosophy and Theory* entries that specifically attend to literacies, therefore, have two overarching purposes: (1) They represent a range of interpretations and applications of literacy and literacies. Though not exhaustive due to space constraints, the scope and foci of the entries reveal a conceptual evolution, as they call attention to the multiplicity of perception and the nuances of meaning making. (2) They offer readers a variety of lenses to consider when addressing meaning making and pedagogy in light of the ever-changing and porous nature of digital landscapes. In other words, as current and new technologies permeate and transform social and cultural norms, so, too, do understandings of literacies and pedagogy evolve. As such, across the entries readers can explore how various interpretations may inform one another and/or

transform traditional, alphabetical, and standardizing notions of literacy.

A Specific Focus on Literacies

The entries that specifically focus on literacies include foundational concepts, such as multiliteracies, multimodalities, and identities that inform all the other entries. Bill Cope and Mary Kalantzis trace the history of multiliteracies and present a pedagogy of multiliteracies that hinges on reflective, flexible, and contextualized practices that are rooted in the knowledge processes: *experiencing*, *conceptualizing*, *analyzing*, and *applying*. Dane Di Cesare and Jennifer Rowsell provide an overview of multimodal literacies, examining ways modes have been conceptualized to work in different variations and combinations to engender and/or represent texture, culture, intensity, and individuality. Donna Alvermann's discussion of literacies and identities underscores the fluid nature of identities and the ways they can be manifested through and negotiated with technological resources and multiple and multimodal literacy practices.

Just as multiliteracies, multimodalities and identities address interrelated facets of meaning making, so, too, do the entries on new media literacies, videogaming and literacies, and digital literacies present insights into proficiency and interaction in light of new technologies. Justin Olmanson and Zoe Falls identify how new media literacies involve investigatory practices that reveal new information and support collaborative, social learning. Sandra Schamroth Abrams addresses how videogaming literacies involve social, participatory, and fluid practices that span digital and non-digital spaces. Examining socio-technical change in his entry on digital literacy, Christopher Walsh attends to participatory and operational understandings of the term, "digital literacies," and underscores the need to intentionally grapple with "the ethical dimension of digital literacies and how they are fostered (or not) in educational institutions."

With a focus on contextualized meaning making and the need to refine (or perhaps redefine

terminology), the authors of the Academic Literacies, Biliteracy, Transliteracies, and New Literacies entries offer readers a range of perspectives to consider as they contemplate current and future scholarship. Jon-Philip Imbrenda and Michael W. Smith examine three theoretical and pedagogical underpinnings of academic literacies that focus on learning mediated by the individual, the text, and the context. Eurydice Bauer and Soria Colomer's discussion of biliteracy highlights a shift away from single-language-based activities. The authors contend that biliteracy "represents what students are able to do with print across their languages, while recognizing that both of the students' languages are always present even when reading in one of their linguistic codes." Here again, a sociocultural framework and attention to context and the lived experience continue to remain at the fore. Amy Stornaiuolo, Anna Smith, and Nathan Philips present a discussion of transliteracies, which recognizes movement and individuality in meaning making and also offers a language and inquiry process for studying complex interactions among people and things. Finally, in their entry on New Literacies, Chuck Kinzer and Donald Leu offer language to characterize literacies research. More specifically, they suggest that "lower-case new literacies" signify the various studies that examine meaning making through a range of perspectives, methods, and contexts, thereby reconceptualizing the term in light of technological changes. Looking more broadly, the authors also acknowledge how the cumulative and consistent findings across these studies help to generate a larger conversation about New Literacies.

Implications and Applications

The entries addressing literacies represent a range of understandings, but there is a commonality among them. Though some may have a focus on alphabetic interpretations of literacy grounded in applied linguistics, there is an overall acknowledgment of meaning making as highly variable and shaped by a wide range of social and cultural communicative experiences. There is an

expressed need for education to be responsive to participatory practices, contextualized learning, and multimodal representations of meaning making. How students view themselves in relation to the texts they use and to the world in which they live and how students represent themselves in and across digital and non-digital spaces are all central concerns today for an overall domain called “literacies.”

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Literacy and Technology

- [new literacies, New Literacies](#)

Literacy Practices

- [new literacies, New Literacies](#)

Lived

- [Phenomenology, Language, and the Unspoken: The Preverbal Dimension of Children's Experience](#)

Logic

- [Argument Mapping Software: Semiotic Foundations](#)
- [Deleuze's Philosophy for Education](#)
- [Ontology and Semiotics: Educating in Values](#)

Logic of Normative Theory

- [On the Logical Form of Educational Philosophy and Theory: Herbart, Mill, Frankena, and Beyond](#)

Logotherapy

- [Frankl and the Philosophy of Moral Growth](#)

Longing for Innocence and Purity: Nature and Child-Centered Education

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Synonyms

[Best interest of the child](#); [Body of the child](#), [The](#); [Childhood and innocence](#); [Childhood and motherhood](#); [Childhood and nation building](#); [Childhood studies around 1900](#); [Eugenics and education](#); [Female nursery teacher](#); [Gender and education](#); [Holy child](#), [The](#); [Kindergarten](#); [Nature](#); [Original sin](#); [Progressive education](#); [Purity](#); [Religion](#); [Sacralization and romanticization of children and mothers](#); [Salvation and education](#); [Sexuality](#); [Vulnerable child](#), [The](#)

Introduction

The figure of the innocent, pure child permeates the discourse about children and childhoods, family, child-rearing, and education in Western modernity. It is closely linked with questions of religion, nature, and sexuality. At the same time, the discourse is polyphonic and contradictory. In what respect “innocence” or “purity” has been ascribed to children, and what has been meant by “nature,” has varied over the centuries, as

have the child-rearing ideals and educational concepts and practices associated with this.

The article shows how ideas of the innocent, pure child, influential for the history of education, changed from the eighteenth to the twentieth century. They are linked with the concepts of nature, which developed more scientific foundations over the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Moreover, the idea of the innocent, pure, natural child is associated with a normative discourse about motherhood and the mother-child relationship. This also had consequences for educational professions dedicated to the care of small children. The sacralization of children and mothers and the hope of redemption through education are based on the long-term secularization and temporalization of redemptive expectations.

Christian and Religious Traditions and their Transformation in the Eighteenth Century

Evocations of innocence and purity, which are linked with sacralization, refer time and again to the biblical narrative of the birth of Christ, to the baby Jesus and the Holy Family. Visual representations, the iconography of the baby Jesus, the Holy Family, and the Madonna and Child, are elements of this discourse. They supply the references, symbols, and codes of a powerful pictorial tradition, simultaneously invoking and causing emotions. A passage in the Bible frequently cited in the history of Western education, child-rearing, and childhood is Matthew 18:2: “Unless you change and become like little children, you will never enter the kingdom of heaven.” In modernity, however, these visual and textual references are increasingly transferred to secular contexts and the field of education.

In the Middle Ages and the early modern period of Western Europe, interaction with children was strongly shaped by religious practices, e.g., around birth, baptism, or death (Orme 2001). In these periods, and especially in early modern Pietism, the idea of original sin was important for concepts of education and child-rearing. For example, original sin legitimated pedagogical

measures to break the child’s will. It was only in the eighteenth century that long-term secularization gradually attenuated the close connection with religion, and the preoccupation with children’s spiritual salvation. Most notably, in another long-term process, belief in the idea of original sin declined. With this decline, “children were transformed from being corrupt and innately evil to being angels, messengers from God to a tired adult world. They also came to be seen to a greater degree as endowed with a capacity for development and growth the motor for which was more Nature than God” (Cunningham 2005, p. 59).

It was Jean-Jacques Rousseau who subtly challenged the idea of original sin with the first sentence of his novel of education, *Emile* (1762). He begins with the words: “Everything is good as it leaves the hands of the Author of things; everything degenerates in the hands of man. [...] He wants nothing as nature made it, not even man; for him, man must be trained like a school horse” (Rousseau 1979, p. 37). On the one hand, these sentences open up the discursive path for the sacralization and romanticization of the child; on the other hand, *Emile* contrasts nature with culture or civilization. Culture or civilization, Rousseau argues, stifles human nature (ibid.). In his work, nature – in relation to child-rearing and education – has multiple dimensions. Firstly, there is “nature within us,” secondly, nature is expected to play an educative role, and thirdly, “nature itself” is meant to be the goal of education or child-rearing. “Natural man is entirely for himself. He is numerical unity, the absolute whole” (ibid., p. 39). Natural man is contrasted with civil man: deformed, broken, enslaved, miseducated, dependent, and alienated from himself. In this perspective, the child embodies natural man in his natural state; the main agent of education is supposed to be nature, and the desired result is natural man in the state of society.

For Rousseau, the ideal human is not a small child, but a prepubescent boy of about 10–12. “But when I represent to myself a child between 10 and 12, vigorous and well-formed for his age, he does not cause the birth of a single idea in me which is not pleasant either for the present or for the future. I see him bubbling, lively, animated,

without gnawing cares, without long and painful foresight, whole in his present being and enjoying a fullness of life [. . .]. His figure, his bearing, his countenance proclaim assurance and contentment; health shines from his face; his firm steps give him an air of vigor; his complexion [. . .] has no effeminate softness; the air and the sun have already put on it the honorable imprint of his sex. [. . .]. His eyes, which are not yet animated by the fire of sentiment, at least have all their native serenity; long sorrows have not darkened them; unending tears have not lined his cheeks. See in his movements, quick but sure, the vivacity of his age, the firmness of independence, and the experience of much exercise. His aspect is open and free but not insolent or vain. His face, which has not been glued to books, does not fall towards his stomach; there is no need to say to him, "Lift your head." Neither shame nor fear ever caused him to lower it" (ibid., pp. 158–159).

The (male) child is happy, at one with himself, and not yet driven by sexual desire, which constitutes another element of his innocence. This view links human history with individual development and educational with social utopia. The child embodies natural man in the state of society, the noble savage, and at the same time becomes the symbol and cipher for criticisms of society and of education or child-rearing. This is also incorporated into the above-quoted passage: "His face, which has not been glued to books" (ibid.). Thus, the arguments and passages cited contain all the elements that are presented in ever new variations in the critical writings of twentieth-century progressive educationalists. This includes a regime of the body, an emphasis on fresh air, sunshine and exercise, and the ideal of asceticism. The exemplary child's body is described precisely, in terms of figure, movement, face, skin, cheeks, posture of the head, gaze, and feelings. An idea central for many currents of progressive education in the twentieth century, that of removing the child from the city and raising him far away in the countryside, in nature, is already present in *Emile*.

The binary nature-culture opposition, central to Rousseau's work, is a characteristic of

modernity, emerging in the early eighteenth century; until the seventeenth century, "nature" had still been "a more open category," imagined as changeable and flexible (Plamper 2012, p. 16, author's translation). Hobbes conceived "nature" as the condition before the state, and John Locke and Rousseau saw it as preceding society. "Nature" was also associated with the contrast between primitive (natural) and civilized (cultured) nations, as well as with the unchangeable, inner aspects of the human body. And finally, flora and fauna were declared to be part of nature (the environment). Both "nature as body" and "nature as environment" came to be seen as something unchangeable, "a legitimating authority that preceded religion," which eventually – in the process of secularization – became absolute. "Nature was poured into a rock-hard *fundamentum absolutum*, became the new ultimate certainty" (ibid., p. 15, author's translation).

In the nineteenth century, this dichotomy intensified; Francis Galton's eugenics and the natural sciences gave it a new emphasis (ibid., p. 17), which also shaped the history of education and child-rearing. "Nature," though conceived in quite different ways, provided the model and legitimation for educational practice.

The representation of children and educational principles in Rousseau's *Emile* shows all of the above-mentioned elements of naturalization. The child embodies man's condition before socialization, but also symbolizes ancient man (as a primitive or natural people); nature is innate and simply has to develop, and an upbringing or education in nature is conducive to this. In addition, the talk of the child's nature is closely linked with constructions of gender. According to Rousseau, women never lose their similarity to children, they remain "big children" (Rousseau 1979, p. 211.). The nature versus culture dichotomy emerging in the eighteenth century is equally influential for concepts of childhood, child-rearing, and education and for the gender discourses of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Women are responsible for raising and educating small children, to whom they are seen as similar in being (see for example Friedrich Fröbel).

The Innocent Child of Romanticism and the Vulnerable Child in the Nineteenth Century

The Romantic concept of childhood is distinguished by naturalness and proximity to nature, innocence, and sanctity, in other words, a sacralization or mythification of the child. It emerged after 1800, especially in Germany, but also in England, and is expressed in concise, exemplary form by the Protestant theologian and teacher Friedrich Schleiermacher: every child appears as a “revelation of the divine” (Schleiermacher 1989, p. 18, author’s translation), and “every mother is a Mary” (ibid., p. 35). The Romantic concept of childhood is based on challenging the concept of original sin and on the organological notion that all predispositions are already present in embryo in the child and then develop in the process of growing up. The older notion of the child as a *tabula rasa*, a blank slate (still held by Locke), is now replaced by an organological concept of nature. Childhood is declared to be an autonomous phase in life, containing its own meaning and purpose. The Romantic child’s proximity to nature is defined in three respects: children are not yet deformed by society and are therefore natural; they are closer to flora and fauna, as expressed in the visual imagery of Romanticism; and lastly, they have a particular closeness to ancient times, to primitive peoples and “savages.” The latter is explained by way of the parallel between individual development and the development of humanity and owes much to Johann Gottfried Herder’s philosophy of history. The innocence of the Romantic child relates to the absence of original sin and to the child’s whole, unspoiled state, which has not yet been deformed by society (Baader 2016), and which is the focus of longing. Childhood thus becomes the utopian blueprint for a different, better society. Overall, Romanticism produced a concept of childhood that described children as “foreigners” and “others” in relation to the modern world.

“Romanticism embedded in the European and American mind a sense of the importance of childhood, a belief that childhood should be happy, and a hope that the qualities of childhood, if they could

be preserved in adulthood, might help redeem the adult world. In becoming more child-oriented in this way, society had radically changed its ideas on the relationship between childhood and religion” (Cunningham 2005, p. 72). Cunningham notes: “Romanticism, then, was much more influential as a body of ideas than as an active force in day-to-day child-rearing within the middle-class home” (ibid., p. 72).

Nonetheless, the Romantic complex of ideas was directly transposed into pedagogical concepts by Fröbel, with his invention of the kindergarten in the 1840s. This was spread worldwide by the German emigrants of 1848. Fröbel himself acquired the status of an educational hero with these “traveling ideas,” particularly in the USA, where he is read as a precursor to John Dewey (Baader 2004). Fröbel’s Romanticism-inspired pedagogy aimed mainly at creating a protective space in which children’s strengths could develop with as little hindrance as possible. This argument was also the basis for the idea of the kindergarten. Kindergarten is, according to Fröbel, “paradise given back” to the children, intended to give them a “happy childhood.” The key to the educational theory of the kindergarten was childish play, which was meant to encourage the child to self-directed or autonomous activity. The high value ascribed to child’s play as a genuine form of childish expression is partly justified by (natural) religion (Baader 2016). Gardening was also an important element, allowing children to spend time in and become familiar with nature. According to Fröbel, who established the occupation of *Kindergärtnerin* (nursery teacher), women were predestined for childcare and the rearing and education of small children. Fröbel was already using the term “motherhood as a vocation” in the text *Mutter- und Koselieder* in 1844. The phase following early childhood, however, “human education” (*Menschenziehung*, also the title of Fröbel’s work of 1826), was the task of male teachers.

Romantic notions of the innocent child, in need of protection, are also the basis for the idea of the vulnerable child. This is increasingly invoked in the last third of the nineteenth century, in the context of the implementation of child protection rules

and the concept of the best interest of the child. Charitable organizations and the international women's movement helped to establish these between 1880 and 1914. The right to compulsory schooling was also cited in these arguments. Internationally, England took the leading role in child protection. "The romantics had helped to fix in the British mind an idea of what childhood should be" (Cunningham 2005, p. 146). The child in need of protection became a key element of childhood and educational theory. "Childhood is constituted as essentially "vulnerable" in much Western discourse, acting almost as a master identity for children [...]. Children are constituted as essentially vulnerable beings who can only survive and develop successfully if intensely nurtured and protected by adults" (Christensen 1999, p. 3).

Nature- and Child-centered Education in Progressive Education in the Twentieth Century

Progressive educational theories of childhood around 1900 referred frequently to Rousseau, Fröbel, and Romanticism. They are by no means uniform, however, but are as heterogeneous as the international progressive education movement itself. While Romanticism referenced philosophical concepts and forms of natural religion, progressive educational approaches invoked science as well. A representative example is the work of the Swedish progressive educationalist Ellen Key, *The Century of the Child* (1900), arguably the bible of child-centered and nature-centered education. Key invokes Rousseau and Fröbel, but also Friedrich Nietzsche, Charles Darwin, and Galton, the founder of eugenics. She also refers to the international field of childhood studies, which was emerging around 1900. For German empirical childhood studies around 1900, the categories of innocence, naturalness, and individuality were central and thus coincided with the Romantic concept of childhood.

Like the Romantics, Key talks of children as "holy" and emphasizes their autonomy and will-power (Key 1909, p. 44). She famously refers to the child as a majesty, whom adults should serve (ibid., p. 181). Key's child-centered approach

includes eugenic elements, as the child has "a right to choose his parents" (ibid., p. 1). This means that eugenic aspects play a role in conception and that parents should not be alcoholics or mentally handicapped; this should be monitored by community leaders. After this "responsible parenthood," the child should ideally be taught by its mother, based on its individual abilities. A child that has been perfected in such a way is expected to contribute to the "higher development of humanity," as proposed by Nietzsche. According to Key, threats or dangers emanate from the institution of school, the Christian religion, the doctrine of original sin, and the Christian idea of sinfulness. Key speaks of "soul murder in the schools" (ibid., p. 203). She evokes the figure of the child as a "victim" of restrictive pedagogical institutions. The child as "victim" reappears in the work of Maria Montessori, who also saw eugenics as an option and made reference to Key. Both these educators associate the image of the child, suffering from the wrong pedagogical institutions, with the image of the suffering Christ. In a lecture from 1928, Montessori describes every birth of a child as the death and resurrection of Christ.

Key contrasts the strong child, strengthened, vitalized, and activated by the right education, with the vulnerable child as victim: a victim of the institution of school, especially of Christian religious teaching (Baader 2016). Children should spend time not at school, but in nature, exercising and strengthening their bodies. Key argues that they should not only be physically active, but engage in autonomous artistic and creative activities. Above all, however, they should show strong emotions. Key takes the Romantic concept of childhood and adds eugenics, evolutionary theory, social Darwinism, Nietzscheanism, and *Lebensphilosophie* (Baader 2016). Science is an important point of reference here.

The progressive educational concept of child-centered, nature-centered education is reflected in pedagogical practice in forms of physical training, as in the cult of the body within youth movements, and in progressive educational *Landerziehungsheime* (country education homes, i.e., boarding schools) such as the German Odenwaldschule, founded in 1910. The

Odenwaldschule was supposed to correspond to Key's ideas of a "school of the future." The spectrum of practices in the *Landerziehungsheime* includes physical training and toughening up, and the cult of nudity. In the Odenwaldschule, where numerous cases of sexualized violence occurred in the 1970s and 1980s, talk of "child-centeredness" was part of a context of concealment used to protect the institution. In the early twentieth-century youth movement, linked with the *Landerziehungsheim* movement, the ideal of innocence and purity is explicitly related to dealings with sexuality. "Stay pure and become mature" was the motto. The idea of "purity" also has connotations of nationalism and racial hygiene in the youth movement.

In the progressive education, youth and *Lebensreform* movements at the beginning of the twentieth century, the invocation of child-centeredness, proximity to nature, innocence, and purity simultaneously served purposes of nation building. An example is the progressive education compendium *Das Buch vom Kind* (1907), which included contributions from international authors. Progressive educationalists hoped that a "new education," clothing suitable for nature, fresh air, light, exercise, and outdoor lessons would lead to "national renewal." There is a strong focus here on the body of the child. The founding of the Bund für Schulreform in 1908 popularized the terms *vom Kinde aus* (child-centered) and *kindgemäß* (child-appropriate), though these were mainly used to criticize religious education in schools, which was seen as inappropriate for children.

In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the idea of childish innocence included the belief in children's asexuality. This was fundamentally challenged in 1905 by Sigmund Freud, with his *Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality*, but continued to be part of pedagogical concepts into the 1960s and beyond. The educational critique of the late 1960s, linked with transnational protest movements in the context of 1968, makes child sexuality a focus of its pedagogical concepts. Its "bible" was *Summerhill*, the progressive educational work of Alexander Neill about his alternative school. Here it was expected that liberated sexuality and the questioning of children's sexual

innocence would contribute to "redemption through education" and a freer society. Even in 1960, Neill linked the demand for liberated sexuality with criticism of the doctrine of original sin. At the same time, he claimed that his school was "the only school in England that treats children in a way that Jesus would have approved of." "You talk about salvation. We live salvation," declared Neill (1969, p. 374).

Even now, the idea of children's innocence and purity has not disappeared from perceptions of children, child-related iconography, and pedagogical concepts. In modernity, the discourse of the innocent, pure child is simultaneously accompanied by a counter-discourse about the neglected and sexually promiscuous child. Today "child-centeredness" and "child-appropriateness" are central to early childhood education and are mainly justified in terms of educational psychology.

Cross-References

- [Child](#)
- [Childhood and Otherness](#)
- [Childhood Studies, An Overview of](#)
- [Critical Gender Studies as a Lens on Education and Schooling](#)
- [Dewey](#)
- [Early Childhood Education](#)
- [Kindergarten](#)
- [Mothers](#)
- [Nation, Nationalism, Curriculum, and the Making of Citizens](#)
- [Nietzsche and Education](#)
- [Quest for Heroes](#)
- [Religion and Modern Educational Aspirations](#)

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Lyotard and Philosophy of Education

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Jean-François Lyotard is considered by most commentators, justly or not, as the non-Marxist philosopher of “the postmodern condition” (sometimes referred to as “postmodernity”). His

The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge (1984), originally published in Paris in 1979, became an instant *cause célèbre*. The book crystallized in an original interpretation a study of the status and development of knowledge, science, and technology in advanced capitalist societies. *The Postmodern Condition* was important for a number of reasons. It developed a philosophical interpretation of the changing state of knowledge, science, and education in the most highly developed societies, reviewing and synthesizing research on contemporary science within the broader context of the sociology of postindustrial society and studies of postmodern culture. Lyotard brought together for the first time diverse threads and previously separate literatures in an analysis which many commentators and critics believed to signal an epochal break not only with the so-called modern era but also with various traditionally “modern” ways of viewing the world.

The Postmodern Condition as a single work, considered on its own merits, is reason enough for educational philosophers and theorists to devote time and effort to understanding and analyzing Lyotard’s major working hypothesis: “that the status of knowledge is altered as societies enter what is known as the postindustrial age and cultures enter what is known as the postmodern age” (1984, p. 3). He uses the term “postmodern condition” to describe the state of knowledge and the problem of its legitimation in the most highly developed societies. In this he follows sociologists and critics who have used the term to designate the state of Western culture “following the transformations which, since the end of the nineteenth century, have altered the game rules for science, literature and the arts” (Lyotard 1984, p. 3). Lyotard places these transformations within the context of the crisis of narratives, especially those Enlightenment metanarratives concerning meaning, truth, and emancipation which have been used to legitimate both the rules of knowledge of the sciences and the foundations of modern institutions.

By “transformations” Lyotard is referring to the effects of the new technologies since the 1950s and their combined impact on the two

principal functions of knowledge – research and the transmission of learning. Significantly, he maintains, the leading sciences and technologies have all been based on language-related developments – theories of linguistics, cybernetics, informatics, computer languages, telematics, and theories of algebra – and their miniaturization and commercialization. In this context, Lyotard argues that the status of knowledge is permanently altered: its availability as an international commodity becomes the basis for national and commercial advantage within the global economy; its computerized uses in the military are the basis for enhanced State security and international monitoring. Knowledge, as he acknowledges, has already become the principal force of production, changing the composition of the workforce in developed countries. The commercialization of knowledge and its new forms of media circulation, he suggests, will raise new ethico-legal problems between the nation-State and the information-rich multinationals, as well as widen the gap between the so-called developed and third worlds.

Here is a critical account theorizing the status of knowledge and education in the postmodern condition which focuses upon the most highly developed societies. It constitutes a seminal contribution and important point of departure to what has become known – in part due to Lyotard's work – as the modernity/postmodernity debate, a debate which has involved many of the most prominent contemporary philosophers and social theorists (see Peters 1996).

It is a book which directly addresses the concerns of education, perhaps, more so than any other single “poststructuralist” text. It does so in a way which bears on the future status and role of education and knowledge in what has proved to be a prophetic analysis. Many of the features of Lyotard's analysis of the “postmodern condition” – an analysis over 15 years old – now appear to be accepted aspects of our experiences in Western societies.

And yet Lyotard's *The Postmodern Condition* should not be allowed to overshadow or obscure his other works or their significance for educational theory. Lyotard has written in the order of

20 books and many scholarly articles, spanning a range of philosophical fields, themes, styles, and topics. Nor should the focus on one text, however intellectually fashionable, obscure the emphasis on Lyotard's ongoing political and pedagogical engagement in a career spanning more than four decades.

Jean-François Lyotard was born in 1924 at Versailles, and he taught philosophy in secondary schools from 1949 to 1959. He taught at universities in Nanterre and Vincennes. Later he secured a post as professor of philosophy at the University of Paris VIII (Saint-Denis) which he held until his retirement in 1989. He was also a professor of philosophy at the Collège International de Philosophie in Paris and professor of French and Italian at the University of California at Irvine.

Lyotard had been an active member of the radical Marxist group *Socialisme ou barbarie* for some 10 years from 1954 to 1964. Thereafter he joined another radical group, *Pouvoir ouvrier*, only to leave 2 years later. These 12 years represent the years of his active political involvement. From 1955 onward, while a member of *Socialisme ou barbarie*, Lyotard was assigned responsibility for the Algerian section. His accounts of the anti-imperialist struggle in Algeria, as Bill Readings (1993, p. xiii) argues, “provide a useful empirical corrective to charges that poststructuralism is an evasion of politics, or that Lyotard's account of the postmodern condition is a blissful ignorance of the postcolonial question.” After 1966 Lyotard discontinued his active political affiliation with any radical Marxist group, and, indeed, this break, autobiographically speaking, represents intellectually, on the one hand, a break with Marxism and, on the other, a turn to philosophy.

Lyotard's break with Marxism and his turn to philosophy has to be seen against the background of French intellectual life and, in particular, the struggle in the late 1950s and early 1960s against both humanism in all its forms and Marxism. Structuralism, based upon the work in linguistics by Ferdinand de Saussure, Roman Jakobson, and many others, first found a home in a form of cultural anthropology pursued by Claude Lévi-Strauss and developed also in the disciplines of

history (early Michel Foucault), semiotics (Roland Barthes), psychoanalysis (Jacques Lacan), and Marxism (Louis Althusser). Structuralism, at least as it was understood by Foucault, constituted, above all, a reaction against the phenomenological (existential or humanist) subject which had dominated French philosophy in the postwar period. Poststructuralism was inspired by a return to Nietzsche's writings and captured Gilles Deleuze's (1962) influential *Nietzsche et la Philosophie*.

The place of Lyotard's political writings in the corpus of his work is a complex question. Lyotard has remarked that *The Postmodern Condition*, in the eyes of his critics, has occluded his other works; that it was marked by a certain sociology and epistemology rather than philosophy; and that the philosophical basis of *The Postmodern Condition* is to be found in *Le Différend* (1988a). While one can name the specific genres that constitute Lyotard's writings – the philosophical, the epistemological, genres of criticism, linguistics, narrative, intellectual autobiography, and aesthetics – politics, as he says, is more complex than a genre, combining “discursive genres (but also phrase-regimes) which are totally heterogeneous” (Lyotard 1988b, p. 299).

Lyotard (1988b), in an interview with Willem van Reijen and Dick Veerman, suggests that “the essential philosophical task will be to refuse [...] the complete aestheticization of the political” (ibid.) which he maintains is characteristic of modern politics. By “aestheticization” Lyotard means an active fashioning or shaping of the community or polity according to the idea of reason. Lyotard in his *Political Writings*, then, addresses the crisis of “the end of the political,” that is, “of all attempts to moralize politics which were incarnated in Marxism” (Lyotard 1988b, p. 300). This means, as *Readings* (1993, p. xviii) suggests, that Lyotard's political writings are characterized by a “resistance to modern universalism” by an argument against what may be called the “politics of redemption.” What we are presented within Lyotard's work, as an alternative, is a politics of resistance, a form of writing which offers resistance to established modes of thought and accepted opinion. The same form of writing

also registers an ongoing internal struggle or resistance, characterized by the difference between early and later modes of thinking and, crucially, by Lyotard's difference with Marxism itself.

Dick Veerman (1988, p. 271) asserts that Lyotard's philosophical writings are divided into two main periods. The doctoral thesis *Discours, figure* (1971) opens the first period. *Économie libidinale* (1974) closes it. In the intervening period, Lyotard published *Dérive à partir de Marx et Freud* and *Des Dispositifs* (Lyotard 1973a, b), two collections of essays written between 1963 and 1973. From 1975 onward, we can speak of the second period. Among its most important articles and books, I count the following: *Instructions pad'ennes* (1977), *Au juste* (1979; conversations with Jean-Loup Thebaud), *The Postmodern Condition* (1979), “Answering the Question: What is Postmodernism?” (1982), “Judicieux dans le différend” (1982, published 1985), *Le Différend* (1983), *L'Enthousiasme: la critique kantienne de l'histoire* (1986), “Grundlagenkrise” (1986), “Sensus communis” (1987), “L'Intérêt du sublime” (1987), and *Que peindre?* (1987).

We can add to the first period *La Phénoménologie*, published in 1954 and translated into English in 1991, and we can add substantially to the second period: *Peregrinations: Law, Form, Event* (1988c), *Heidegger and “the Jews”* (1990), *The Inhuman: Reflections on Time* (1991), *The Postmodern Explained to Children: Correspondence 1982–1985* (1992), *Political Writings* (1993a), *Lessons of Darkness* (1993b), and *Lessons on the Analytic of the Sublime: Kant's Critique of Judgement* (1994a).

Already in his early works, *Discours, figure* and *Économie libidinale*, Lyotard signaled a conscious shift away from the doctrinaire praxis philosophy which characterized the non-PCF Marxism tradition of *Socialisme ou barbarie*. The former work attempts to develop a metaphysics of truth without negation; the latter attempts to substitute Freud's economy of libidinal energy (and the notion of primary process) for Marxist political economy. In this situation there is no truth arrived at through dialectics: the supposed ethical and social truths of Marxism, based upon

an appeal to a historical ideal, are no better than the falsehoods it wants to overcome. Lyotard (1974) criticizes the underlying notion of the dialectic. He simply does not believe that a political, philosophical, or artistic position is to be abandoned because it is “sublated.” It is not true, according to Lyotard, that the experience of a position means its inevitable exhaustion and necessary development into another position where it is both conserved and suppressed. Veerman (1988, p. 272) suggests that the upshot of Lyotard’s metaphysics in his first period is simply that: “we cannot take one political stand rather than another, since the correct one cannot be decided.”

Lyotard’s difference with Marxism and specifically with *Socialisme ou barbarie* and Pierre Souyri, in particular, is recounted in “A Memorial of Marxism: For Pierre Souyri.” He describes how, in the language of radical Marxism, dialectical logic had become a simple idiom and how “the machinery for overcoming alterity by negating and conserving it” for him had broken down, precipitating a “relapse” into the logic of identity. He writes of his own intellectual biography of the time:

And what if, after all, the philosopher asked himself, there wasn’t any Self at all in experience to synthesize contradictorily the moments and thus to achieve knowledge and realization of itself? What if history and thought did not need this synthesis; what if the paradoxes had to remain paradoxes, and if the equivocacy of these universals which are also particulars, must not be sublated? What if Marxism itself were in its turn one of those particular universals which it was not even a question of going beyond — an assumption that is still too dialectical — but which it was at the very least a question of refuting in its claim to absolute universality, all the while according it a value in its own order? But what then, in what order, and what is an order? These questions frightened me in themselves because of the formidable theoretical tasks they promised, and also because they seemed to condemn anyone who gave himself over to them to the abandonment of any militant practice for an indeterminate time. (1988c, p. 50)

What was at stake for Lyotard after 12 years of a commitment to radical Marxism was whether Marxism could “still understand and transform the new direction taken by the world after the

end of the Second World War” (ibid., p. 49). Capitalism had succeeded in surviving the crisis of the 1930s. The proletariat had not seized the opportunity to overturn the old order. On the contrary, modern capitalism, once its market and production capacities had been restored, had set up new relations of exploitation and taken on new forms. Lyotard lists the following new realities confronting Marxism: “the reorganisation of capitalism into bureaucratic or State monopolistic capitalism; the role of the modern State in the so-called mixed economy; the dynamics of the new ruling strata (bureaucratic or technocratic) within the bourgeoisie; the impact of the new techniques on work conditions and on the mentality of workers and employees; the effects of economic growth on daily life and culture; the appearance of new demands by workers and the possibility of conflicts between the base and the apparatus in worker organisations” (ibid., p. 66).

Lyotard was at the University of Nanterre during the events of May 1968, and his political activism centered on the struggle against the modernizing tendency — new selection methods and changed conditions to the baccalaureate examination — of Fouchet’s reforms, which comprised the demand for democratization and, in doing so, severely underestimated the student’s desire for genuine participation. Themes that were to surface later in Lyotard’s *The Postmodern Condition* find their source here: in critique of a class monopolization of knowledge and the mercantilization of knowledge and education, in an attack on the “hierarchical magisterial relation” of pedagogy, in the refusal of a kind of education under capitalism which merely socially reproduces students to fulfill the technical demands of the system, and in the expression of a moral ideal embodied in non-dialectical forms of dialogue as the ethical precondition for pedagogy.

Lyotard acknowledges his debt to Marx and yet remains within the ambit of a commodification thesis (albeit as a representational system) as one of the main processes of rationalization which guides the development of the system as a whole: the Marxian analysis of commodity fetish as it applies to knowledge and education. He recognizes the way in which the logic of

performance, aimed at maximizing the overall efficiency of the system, generates socioeconomic contradictions, but he parts company with Marxists on the possibility of emancipation or of salvation expected to arise automatically from these contradictions. He jettisons what Readings (1993, p. xxiv) calls the “politics of redemption” based upon “the Marxist desire to identify alienation as a reversible ideological distortion” in order to rethink politics and resistance in “minoritarian” terms, which forgoes an authoritative reading of events based on determinate judgments, to respect the difference and “to think justice in relation to conflict and difference” that admit of no resolution. “Our role as thinkers” in the situation of postmodernity, Lyotard (1993d, p. 27) suggests, “is to deepen what language there is, to critique the shallow notion of information, to reveal an irremediable opacity within language itself.” The issue for Lyotard is one of understanding and providing a critique of capitalist forms of the insinuation of will into reason and the way this is manifest primarily in language.

It is a theme that leads directly to the legitimization of knowledge and education. If the Enlightenment idealist and humanist metanarratives have become bankrupt and the State and Corporation must abandon or renounce them, where can legitimacy reside? Lyotard, in his critique of capitalism, suggests that the State has found its only credible goal in power. Science and education are to be legitimated, in de facto terms, through the principle of performativity, that is, through the logic of maximization of the system’s performance, which becomes self-legitimizing in Luhmann’s sense.

It is this account which has proved so potent in prophesying and analyzing the changes to economic and social policy which have taken place in the Western world with the ascendancy of the so-called new right. Education, not so long ago regarded as a universal welfare right under a social democratic model, has been recast as a leading subsector of the economy and one of the main enterprises of the future “postindustrial” economy. Lyotard’s (1984) *The Postmodern Condition* provides an understanding and critique of the neoliberal marketization of education in terms of

the systemic, self-regulatory nature of global capitalism. His concern is that critical theory, based upon the traditional critique of political economy, has been used as a way of reprogramming the system. Lyotard claims that critical theory has lost its theoretical standing and been reduced to a utopia. In Lyotard’s terms critical theory, especially in the hands of Habermas, is still committed to the universal categories of reason and the subject – albeit the minimal intersubjective subject of communication – based upon the paradigm of mutual understanding. These universal categories, established through the principle of consensus, do not respect the difference. Where Habermas adheres to an ideal of transparent communication, Lyotard investigates the difference inherent in language.

In the Preface to the English translation of Lyotard’s (1984) *The Postmodern Condition*, Frederic Jameson notes how Lyotard’s text was, among other things, “also a thinly veiled polemic against Jürgen Habermas’ concept of a ‘legitimation crisis’ and vision of a ‘noise-free’ transparent, fully communicational society” (Jameson 1984, p. vii). Jameson is alluding to the way in which Lyotard’s *The Postmodern Condition* is, above all, a critique of Enlightenment metanarratives or grand *récits*. Lyotard wants to question the dogmatic basis of these metanarratives and their “terroristic” and violent nature, which, in asserting certain “truths” from the perspective of an authorized discourse, does so only by silencing or excluding statements from another.

Lyotard, in a now often quoted passage, uses the term “modern”:

to designate any science that legitimates itself with reference to a metadiscourse . . . making an explicit appeal to some grand narrative, such as the dialectics of the Spirit, the hermeneutics of meaning, the emancipation of the rational or working subject, or the creation of wealth. (Lyotard 1984, p. xxiii)

In contrast, he defines “postmodern” elliptically as “incredulity toward metanarratives” by which he means to point to “the obsolescence of the metanarrative apparatus of legitimation” to which corresponds “the crisis of metaphysical philosophy and of the university institution. . .”

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Lyotard, Hope on the Dark Side

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Introduction

Education is, in many ways, premised on hope (Bloch 2000/1918; for a more recent treatment, see Papastephanou 2009). Hope for the future;

hope for the next generation. This accounts in part for our willingness to continue to invest in shared practices, even in the face of pressure, disappointment, and pessimism. Our investment in educational practices today is governed by a sense of an uncertain, precarious future, which requires flexibility, mobility, and maximally efficient and effective use of resources. In postmodernity, the grand narratives of modernity – of progress, freedom, and emancipation that drove the development of the nation-State and its institutions – are no longer credible. Lyotard's notion of performativity, elaborated in *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge* (1984/1979), captured the logic of what replaced them.

Lyotard's work often informs critical accounts of education that express pessimism in the face of managerialism, accountability, and economization according to which it is governed today. The notion of performativity “has dominated educational discourse on Lyotard” (Ford 2015, p. 89), and the concept remains highly influential in theorizing the way neoliberalism shapes contemporary education, and higher education in particular, today. But the narrow understanding of performativity (see Munday 2014 for one account of how the term is misconstrued) limits our understanding not only of our current context but also of the pertinence of Lyotard's thought for educational philosophy and theory. There are “several key concepts in his *oeuvre* that have import for but remain largely underdeveloped or absent in the field [of philosophy of education]” (Ford 2015, p. 89).

Nevertheless, within educational philosophy, numerous scholars have sought to show the deeper significance of Lyotard's thought. This chapter provides an overview of recent scholarship and draws out, not an optimism to counter the pessimistic accounts, but a sense of the hope that derives from the aesthetics and politics of Lyotard's understanding of experience, thought, and language. To paraphrase Bearn, Lyotard's philosophy is not “the reassuring black of a glorious tragedy,” as it is not nostalgic (Bearn 2013, p. 232), nor does it celebrate our postmodern condition; performativity is itself a grand narrative, albeit a “hollowed out one” (Munday 2014,

p. 324). Instead, “Lyotard's philosophy is painted a melancholic grey” (Bearn 2013, p. 232).

Knowledge, Performativity, and What Remains

Lyotard was commissioned to write *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge* by the Conseil des Universités of the government of Quebec as a report on the status of knowledge in developed societies. Its important and prescient philosophical and empirical insights into the commodification of knowledge and the implications of this relate to his broader philosophy of language, politics, and ethics. In the opening section, Lyotard outlines the post-war shift toward computerization and the effects of technological development on scientific knowledge. He equates the effects of “the proliferation of information-processing machines” on learning with those of “advancements in human circulation (transportation systems) and later, in the circulation of sounds and visual images (the media)” (Lyotard 1984, p. 4): “The nature of knowledge cannot survive unchanged. . . It can fit into the new channels and become operational, only if learning is translated into quantities of information” (ibid.). That which cannot be translated in to a particular, hegemonic language will be abandoned, silenced, and have no value. In education today, the predominance of market logic, the concern with outputs and metrics, and the “what works” agenda, for example, all testify to the prescience of Lyotard's account. Hence, the notion of performativity – “the optimization of the global relationship between input and output” (p. 11) – remains particularly influential in accounting for this.

Lyotard's diagnosis of the specific character of postmodernity requires him to show how it is different from modernity. There is not only the material shift from manual labor to automatization and computerization but also the shift in the status of knowledge itself and the truths according to which societal development is understood. The modern period was characterized, on Lyotard's account, by the legitimation provided by what are termed meta-discourses (Nuyen 2013, p. 98).

These comprised “universal rules and principles to which we can appeal to resolve a dispute that may arise between the ‘small discourses,’ or language games (*petits récits*) in which different people are engaged” (Nuyen 2013, p. 97). In the production of scientific knowledge, for example, disputes between two conceptual frameworks could be resolved by appeal to a universal principle, the meaning of which was shared. Today, this practice of legitimation fails. The postmodern condition is characterized by an incredulity toward metanarratives: “there are no universal rules or principles” we can appeal to, “only language games, or small discourses, each defined by its own set of rules” (ibid.). Due to his examination of the delegitimation of the grand narratives of modernity, Lyotard is often taken as an exponent of “the relativism and performativity that the Enlightenment makes room for” (Munday 2014, p. 323). But although he assents to the plurality enabled by the demise of grand narratives, Lyotard does not celebrate what replaced them (ibid.). Lyotard’s concern with language, ethics, and justice is in part a response to the nihilism that ensues from the loss of universal, shared values, and principles.

Without a meta-discourse by means to legitimate one position over another, and thus to resolve conflict, there are only separate language games or small discourses (or *petits récits*). Thus, Lyotard points to something that (literally) escapes our attention: the *différend*. To acknowledge this is a matter of justice. The *différend* occurs when someone, or a group, “is divested of the means to argue and becomes for that reason a victim” (Lyotard 1988, p. 9). It refers to what cannot be testified to, represented, in the existing discourse; a new criterion is needed, otherwise it is subsumed within the existing discourse, excluded, or silenced (Crome and Williams 2006). In a conflict, reaching consensus is not necessarily desirable: “To apply the rules internal to one discourse in the case of a conflict is not to resolve it: it is to allow that discourse to dominate others that are in conflict with it, or to allow it, as Lyotard puts it, to ‘totalize the field’” (Nuyen 2013, p. 98). As Lyotard’s opening to *The Postmodern Condition* shows, the need for knowledge

to be translated into the hegemonic system risks the abandonment of other, untranslatable forms of knowledge or thought. To acknowledge the *différend* is to acknowledge what is not represented by the dominant discourse and thus to resist the totalization of performativity.

Here, Lyotard seems to offer a way to counter performativity; his invocation of silencing and excluding, and his attention to the *différend*, finds support in the politics of emancipation and related liberatory pedagogies. His notions of the *différend* and *petits récits* have been taken up in educational research concerned with narrative, voice, and social justice (see, e.g., Griffiths 2003). The concern with representation of the *différend*, through pedagogies and research practices that give voice to it, seeks to reclaim a space dominated by a particular language game or discourse. Lyotard’s notion of the *différend* deepens the notion of justice further, however, to point to the forgetting that is effected by our drive to represent. To try to represent the *différend* risks the forgetting of forgetting: this does not acknowledge that something always escapes representation. Furthermore, the very naming of something, as in the politics of representation – giving voice to some “thing,” a specifically named, subordinated group, e.g., in terms of race, gender, sexuality, and religion (see, e.g., Lyotard 1997) – does violence to the other by this imposition. A similar point can be made regarding promotion of the ideals of autonomy and authenticity, as counter to totalizing narratives. The way that Lyotard “reveals the limitations and problems” of such ideals is less well understood than those ideas that can be more easily assimilated into progressivism. Although these ideals “seemed to offer the best hope of resistance against the encroachments of performativity. . . they are partly complicit with its harms” (Standish 2013, p. 160; see also Hodgson 2009, 2016). To give voice, as seen in life history and narrative research, represents those excluded from the dominant discourse and thus seeks to include them in it. But, it risks not hearing the *différend* itself. Attention to the *différend* is not concerned with inclusion in the form of consensus or representation. Rather Lyotard emphasizes dissensus, that which remains

beyond linguistic representation. We move then from the pessimism of accounts of the totalizing force of performativity to a hope (albeit an uncomfortable one), not of emancipation but of ethics and respect: living “together in difference, but not indifferently, in respect for the irreducibly distinct other” (Smeyers and Masschelein 2013, p. 143).

Lyotard’s attention to the *différend* draws less on the Marxist politics of his early career and more on Kant’s *Critique of Judgment*; in particular he draws on the notion of reflective judgment, which Kant contrasts with determinative judgment:

According to Kant, we make determinative judgments when we fit our experience under an existing conceptual structure, thus determining it. In contrast, we are called upon to make reflective judgments when we cannot subsume our experience under any pre-given conceptual frame, and we instead have to look for a way of conceptualizing that experience, thereby inventing the criteria by which to judge something. (Crome and Williams 2006, p. 10)

This resistance to the assimilation of experience and thought into existing frameworks offers a richer sense of the import of Lyotard’s thought for education today. Lyotard identifies that, in spite of the ways in which education is subject to the input–output logic of maximal efficiency and effectiveness, science – or the production of knowledge more generally – “does not develop in an efficient, orderly way. It proceeds as a search for instabilities that develops in a highly unpredictable way, and thus resists incorporation within a framework that wants to invest in what it predicts it can put to profitable use” (Crome and Williams 2006, p. 10). To elaborate further on the specific politics of justice in Lyotard’s thought, we turn to his understanding of language.

Language Games, Discourses, and Registers

Lyotard uses Wittgenstein’s notion of language games as his “method” in *The Postmodern Condition* and to elaborate his notion of the *différend*. Hence, he has drawn the attention of

Wittgensteinian scholars of education (see, e.g., Peters 2006). Some argue that Lyotard’s discussion of language games misconstrues what Wittgenstein intended, however (see, e.g., Burbules 2013). Whereas Wittgenstein’s concern is with ordinary language, Lyotard’s use of the term reflects his concern with power, exclusion, and injustice. His attention to language, and to the ability of a language to silence another, reflects connections between his work and that of Nietzsche, Foucault, and Deleuze. Thus, his language games may be better expressed as discourses (in the Foucauldian sense) or phrase regimes (Lyotard 1993).

In Lyotard’s characterization of language games and the social bond in terms of the “agonistics of language,” his emphasis on difference and incommensurability leads to the accusation that he – and those who have taken up his ideas – exoticizes otherness (McLaren 1994). But to identify the undesirability of consensus for politics is one thing; to suggest its impossibility is quite another. The emphasis on incompatibility or incommensurability between discourses in Lyotard’s concept of language, society, and communication is based on a “certain view of language connected with a certain politics” (Smeyers and Masschelein 2013, p. 145). Lyotard seeks not consensus, but rather dissensus or paralogy, that is, as support for the legitimacy of small narratives (p. 144). Thus, rather than radical incommensurability suggesting the impossibility of community, instead the concern is with how to “live together in difference, but not indifferently, in respect for the irreducibly distinct other” (p. 143). In response to the demise of grand narratives, Lyotard seeks not to restore “a moral point of view but, as Ophir has it (1997, p. 201), for the recovery of moral response-ability” (Smeyers and Masschelein 2013, p. 143).

Respect for otherness and the maintenance of the distinctiveness of the other may still leave us at a political and ethical impasse. As we saw with reference to Kant’s determinative judgment, the concern with silencing repudiates attempts to name, as “naming is an act of appropriation and ultimately an act of violence” (p. 145). In response, Smeyers and Masschelein write:

“While we can agree that any and all structures of meaning may be deconstructed or reshaped, it is difficult to accept that we should view conceptual structure as hopelessly unjust and terroristic in itself” (p. 146). The “prioritization of difference” and the emphasis on individual uniqueness this entails, which “opens us all to commodification,” remain problematic given Lyotard’s concern with justice (*ibid.*). Nevertheless, Lyotard’s concern with representation, and its resistance, raises important questions for educational theory. This is elaborated in the next section.

Re-presentation: Meaning and Event

Lyotard’s concern with aesthetics (see, e.g., Lyotard 1971) enables a more nuanced account of incommensurability in line with his notion of the *différend*:

What Lyotard offers. . . in his later work especially, is an ethical turn toward aesthetics in judgment with a special emphasis on the significance of the sublime. This is the place of hope that cannot be articulated nor shown by the protocols of reason, of hope that can be felt. It is thus that he avoids an easy optimism – from what has gone before – without succumbing to pessimism or nihilism. It is by way of Wittgenstein and Kant that hope is restored. (Dhillon and Standish 2013, p. 6)

His account of performativity can be seen not only to express a pessimism about what had happened to the status of knowledge and research in the computerized age but also to “shake the mistaken faith that is placed in consensus as if this this were the paradigm of scientific thought” (Dhillon and Standish 2013, p. 4). Lyotard writes: “What all intellectual disciplines and institutions presuppose is that not everything has been said, written down or recorded, that words already heard or pronounced are not the last words” (Lyotard 1991, pp. 90–91). This presupposition leads not only to the desire to record, to codify the world and experience as knowledge, but also to the hope that new thought always remains possible.

The questions Lyotard raises over representation pose a challenge to educational theory, and its presupposition that a representation of what is desirable is a necessary starting point:

But what is left out of the picture is the fact that the coherence of our representations (or phrases) makes us forget the groundlessness or emptiness from which the event irrupts. Acting and thinking are identified with the realization or accomplishment of representation. Lyotard wants to sensitize us to this identification, and this amounts to a fundamental repudiation of educational theory and practice, understood as governed by representations and rules without remainder. (p. 148)

In the face of the crisis of representation – the loss of grand narratives according to which we can judge and the realization that our knowledge and judgments are groundless – Lyotard seeks a different point of departure for critique: situated in ethical experience, outwith the order of representation and language, and sensitive to “the moment in which the injustice [the representation] happens. Being educated here means being able to lend one’s ear to this non-representability” (p. 148). This non-representability, as a source of resistance to the inhumanity of “the system,” rests on Lyotard’s distinction between “the *quod*, the meaning of something as an event,” such as the uttering of a phrase, and “the *quid*, the meaning of something as such,” i.e., as a concept (p. 149). The event precedes language:

That something happens always ‘precedes’, as it were, the question about the what of what happens. More precisely, the question itself precedes. As ‘that something happens’ is the question about the *event*, ‘next’ it asks about the *event* that has taken place. The *event* comes as a question mark ‘before’ it presents itself as a question. (Lyotard 1998, p. 94)

Once the event is realized, it is neutralized, forgotten. This forgetting is unavoidable. But we must not forget this forgetting: this is where the act of injustice lies. Instead, we must remain sensitive to indeterminacy, to that which escapes representation:

For Lyotard it is not less than this that characterizes the educated human being: the person inhabited by a discomfort, by disquietude, restlessness that makes him or her think. The educated person is a distressed human being; the agony of the event marks genuine thinking. The indeterminate, not-thought, ‘hurts’ because one feels good in what has already been thought (Lyotard 1998, pp. 31–32). (Smeyers and Masschelein 2013, p. 150)

Education, on this view, exists not in evidence, outputs, and satisfaction, but in discomfort.

Conclusion: Hope on the Dark Side

The resonance between Lyotard and Wittgenstein is perhaps found not in Lyotard's explicit adoption of the notion of language games, but rather in his writing on aesthetics, politics, and on childhood, in which Smeyers and Masschelein find the real import of his work for educational philosophy. Dhillon and Standish state that it is in relation to Wittgenstein and Kant that hope is restored. This is not, as we have seen, in a utopian sense, but in acknowledgement of the painfully felt existence of what cannot be expressed, what escapes representation, and our ethical obligation to acknowledge this.

We have seen how the predominant reading of Lyotard within educational theory itself illustrates the very risks of injustice that he draws attention to. In the notion of the *différend*, it is Wittgenstein's sense of the groundlessness of our practices and the heterogeneity of meaning that provides the starting point – and so the restoration of hope – from which he restates the possibility of thinking and of education. This entails not only attention to our practices of knowledge production in research or to our ordinary language but also to the event that precedes it, as a permanent attention to the inhuman, that which is not yet said and which may not be sayable.

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M

Mach and Science Teaching

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Synonyms

[Enlightenment](#); [History and philosophy of science](#)

Ernst Mach (1838–1916) was a major contributor to the European Enlightenment tradition, and one of the great philosopher-scientists of the late-nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. He had immediate and continuing influence in European and more generally international physics, philosophy, biology, physiology, psychology, economics, sociology, and much else, including mathematics, art and literature (Blackmore 1972; Blackmore et al. 2001; Bradley 1971; Cohen and Seeger 1970). The first of Mach's five hundred publications – a paper on “electrical discharge and induction,” the subject of his physics PhD – appeared in 1859, the year of Darwin's *The Origin of Species*. His many papers and books appeared up to and after his death in 1916, the publication year of Einstein's *Relativity: The Special and General Theory*. Among his last papers was a 1918 study on “Some Sketches in Comparative Animal and Human Psychology.”

Mach was a major contributor to a revolutionary period of science.

This entry will focus on Mach's less well-known contributions to the theory and practice of science education (Siemsen 2014). It takes up a task announced 100 years ago in a 1916 obituary for Mach written by Alois Höfler (1853–1922) the Austrian philosopher-physicist-pedagogue and friend of Mach who succeeded the latter as coeditor of Mach's science education journal *Zeitschrift für den physikalischen und chemischen Unterricht* (*Journal of Instruction in Physics and Chemistry*):

It is Mach the *educationalist* whom we must here bring to the attention of our readers, particularly the younger ones, and not as someone who has passed on, but as a man whose seed is destined to put down ever further roots in physics teaching, and, with that, in all teaching about real things, and to fructify the whole spirit of this teaching.

It is unfortunate that Mach's contribution to education has been largely ignored in the Anglo-American world because current trends in the practice and theory of science education are in many respects repeating Mach's century-old arguments concerning the purposes and aims of science teaching, the nature of understanding, and the best ways to promote learning. An indicator of this neglect is that Mach's name does not appear in the Index of the popular and scholarly *A History of Ideas in Science Education* (DeBoer 1991).

Mach and the Enlightenment Tradition

All the Enlightenment philosophers were engaged with the promotion of education, both formal (schools, colleges) and informal (societies, journals, newspapers). Such engagement was a defining feature of the movement: If you were not interested in education you could not seriously be interested in the advancement of culture and society. Hence the following appear in all histories of education: John Locke (1632–1704), Baruch Spinoza (1632–1677), Voltaire (1694–1778), Jean D’Alembert (1717–1783), Denis Diderot (1713–1784), Nicolas de Condorcet (1743–1794), Benjamin Franklin (1706–1790), Joseph Priestley (1733–1804), Thomas Jefferson (1743–1826), and Immanuel Kant (1724–1804), to pick out some of the more recognizable names (Parry 2007).

Mach, who aligned with this Enlightenment tradition, was characteristically deeply involved with nineteenth-century Austrian education. He published numerous school and college textbooks, he cofounded the first ever research journal for science education, he taught what might have been the first ever university teacher-education courses, he addressed a multitude of teachers’ meetings, he had ongoing engagements with the reform and restructuring of Austrian high school education especially on breaking the stranglehold that Classics at the expense of Science had on university admission, he contributed to adult and workers education, he contributed to newspapers, he wrote detailed research studies on learning and concept development and linked this research to teaching methods, and as a member of the Upper House of the Austrian parliament (the House of Peers) he made numerous speeches and interventions on education policy. In brief, Mach made important contributions to both the *theory* and the *practice* of education. Although primarily a research physicist and philosopher, his contribution to education put him among the foremost of the Enlightenment-inspired educators.

Among major scientists of his time, and indeed through to the present day, Mach was noteworthy as one of the few who had deep and sustained educational interests and engagements. Another such was Thomas Henry Huxley (1825–1895),

the English polymath, champion of Darwin’s evolutionary theory – “Darwin’s Bulldog,” and educator (Huxley 1893/1964). Despite considerable overlap in the lifespans of Mach and Huxley, and both being champions of Darwin, enthusiasts for the Enlightenment project and energetic education reformers who devoted great energy to the spread of science education and its promotion in workers’ education – it seems that neither was aware of each other’s work. Nevertheless, Huxley can reasonably be labeled “Machian” in both his larger educational theory and his pedagogical directives.

Philosophy in Science Teaching

For Mach, the teaching of science, or any discipline at all, went hand-in-hand with teaching the philosophy of the discipline. For a student to understand the discipline and its claims, they had to appreciate the methodology, epistemology, ontology, and related ethics and goals of the discipline; know how it came to make its claims and how these claims were substantiated; to appreciate the role of internal and external factors in the process of substantiation. And acquiring such philosophical understanding of a discipline meant attending to its history. And this held whether the discipline was science, mathematics, economics, psychology, history, theology, or anything else. An example of Mach’s “philosophy of the discipline” concern is:

I led [during doctoral examinations in Vienna, 1895–1898] candidates into a conversation on general, and even the most general, questions of their special field. I recommended to philologists that they study the writings of philosophers of speech, to historians cultural history and prehistory, and mathematicians and natural scientists normally Mill and Jevons. It often became evident that the candidates did not know the philosophical writings of their own special fields. They were usually very thankful for my suggestions about future study. (Blackmore 1972, p. 139)

For Mach, philosophy was in the weft and warp of science (and indeed of all subjects being taught). Philosophical reflection did not have to be imported into science teaching, it was there in the

textbook, laboratory, and classroom; it just needed to be recognized and taken up.

This is true of all of science, but is especially obvious in Newtonian theory, a staple of all science classrooms (Hanson 1965). Mach had the greatest respect for the genius of Newton, for his “intellectual greatness” (Mach 1893/1974, p. 304), and excused his failure to deeply appraise the foundations of his “system of the world” because: “He that has to acquire a new point of view naturally cannot possess it so securely from the beginning as they that receive it unlaboriously from him” (Mach 1893/1974, pp. 304–305). But Mach says that after 200 years the situation is different and Newton might well have expected those following him to more closely attend to, scrutinize, and philosophize about the foundations of the system they were “unlaboriously” receiving.

This is not just a task for philosophers, Mach saw that the task can begin in science classrooms whenever the Newtonian system (or Einsteinian, Darwinian, Mendelian) is taught. But this rarely happens. Herbert Goldstein, in his popular *Classical Mechanics* book, lays out the standard procedure:

Basic to any presentation of mechanics are a number of fundamental physical concepts, such as space, time, simultaneity, mass, and force. . . . For the most part, however, these concepts will not be analysed critically here; rather, they will be assumed as undefined terms whose meanings are familiar to the reader. (Goldstein 1950/1980, in Assis and Zylbersztajn 2010, p. 143)

Mach might say “familiar, but not understood”; and further would note the missed opportunity to encourage students to put their toe in the philosophical water. The opportunity for basic philosophical engagement is everywhere in science, but is everywhere put off – “later, later, later” – at best this deferment goes on to postgraduate years, but often not even then.

Science teachers have endless opportunity to do this. Whenever “attraction at a distance,” “magnetic fields,” “electron shells,” “inertial mass,” “atomic models” are mentioned, aspects of the phenomenalist/realist debate can be introduced. And so much else of what Mach values as

philosophy, and that is so much a part of science – good experimental design, logical thinking, justified connection of evidence to conclusions, values – warrants attention by teachers.

Philipp Frank and Machian Science Teaching

Mach’s view on the place of philosophy in science education is clearly seen in the writings and teaching of Philipp Frank, the Viennese physicist who studied in Mach’s department, who often expressed his great debt to Mach, and who was a founding member of the “Mach Circle” in Vienna. Frank can be taken as an elaborator of Machian educational ideals (Frank 1950). Mach knew that science developed in conjunction with philosophy, both influenced by it and in turn influencing it; all his historical studies illuminated this connection (d’Espagnat 2006; Weinert 2005). Frank was more explicit about its educational consequences, saying:

Equally, students of science and philosophy should learn exactly what were the issues between Descartes and Newton, and between Newton and Leibnitz. From these disputes has arisen what we now call the classical physics of the nineteenth century, which until today has been the basis of the training in science to get into colleges of engineering or liberal arts. To grasp these issues would help them to understand our present science as a dynamic living being. (Frank 1950, pp. 279–280)

Mach believed that such broad, philosophically-informed teaching enables students to appreciate the engagement of science with philosophical systems, religion, and political ideology. Frank believed the same:

There is no better way to understand the philosophic basis of political and religious creeds than by their connection with science . . . the influence of political and religious trends on the choice of these symbols [metaphysics of science] should by no means be minimized, as is often done in presentation of the philosophy of science. (Frank 1950, p. 281)

Nearly 50 years ago Israel Scheffler outlined the contribution that philosophy can make to education (Matthews 1997), and did so in terms that echoed much of what Mach had written:

I have outlined four main efforts through which philosophies-of might contribute to education: (1) the analytic description of forms of thought represented by teaching subjects; (2) the evaluation and criticism of such forms of thought; (3) the analysis of specific materials so as to systematize and exhibit them as exemplifications of forms of thought; and (4) the interpretation of particular exemplifications in terms accessible to the novice. (Scheffler 1973, p. 40)

Comparable arguments were stated in a 1981 review of the place of philosophy of science in British science-teacher education:

This more philosophical background which is being advocated for teachers would, it is believed, enable them to handle their science teaching in a more informed and versatile manner and to be in a more effective position to help their pupils build up the coherent picture of science – appropriate to age and ability – which is so often lacking. (Manuel 1981, p. 771)

Teaching the Nature of Science

In recent decades there has been a good deal of writing and research on the contribution of history and philosophy of science (HPS) to science teaching (Matthews 2014, 2015). One part of this contribution has been the recognition of the connection of science to other academic and cultural fields. This is constantly pointed to in Mach's historical works. One part of the contribution of HPS to teachers' and educators' understanding is to connect topics within particular scientific disciplines; to connect the disciplines of science with each other; to connect the sciences generally with other disciplines such as mathematics, philosophy, literature, psychology, history, technology, economics, and theology; and finally, to display the interconnections between science and components of culture – the arts, ethics, religion, politics. All of this is obvious in Mach's work and is developed in more detail by Frank and others contributors to the Machian tradition.

At the same time there has been a concerted effort by researchers and curriculum writers to include Nature of Science (NOS) into science programs (Hodson 2014). One problem has been that because HPS is so little taught in graduate

education programs, this NOS research frequently underestimates the complexity of the HPS issues and debates, and presents a too simplified account of the issues. One especially deleterious effect of this underestimation, the more so when it becomes hubris, is the presenting of deeply controversial issues in HPS as settled, and so producing numbered lists that purport to capture the nature of science, and going on to have such lists taught catechism-like in school classes and teacher-education programs. The learning of such lists benefits no one, except when they appear in national and provincial curricula and become required learning for high-stakes exams.

Matthews (1998) argues why teachers should have modest goals when teaching about the nature of science; while Matthews (2011) details the benefits of moving educational discussion from nature of science to features of science. The latter formulation invites discussion and elaboration of multiple features of science in the way that NOS terminology, and associated assessment, does not.

History and Philosophy in Teacher Training

A serious impediment to raising the level of HPS discussion and understanding in both science education research and teacher-education programs is the crushing pressure to publish that is exerted on newly appointed faculty. Successful doctoral students might well say, as Mach's students did, that: "They were . . . very thankful for my suggestions about future study" [of HPS], but upon their first appointment they have to immediately set about meeting tenure-review publication commitments; none of which include wide reading so as to become acquainted with, let alone master, the history and epistemology of their discipline. This task takes years. Indeed on the contrary, taking time out to even begin the task means not getting tenure because the required number of publications have not appeared. Such publications, by definition are going to be juvenile, and contribute little, if anything, to the discipline. Better for young teachers, and far better for their students, that their time be spent doing what Mach suggested. But of course

this is not done and the whole sad problem of the HPS-uninformed leading the HPS-needed continues in science education.

Conclusion

Mach's Enlightenment-informed approach to education, characterized by social reformism, personal knowledge growth, experiential learning, and liberal curricula can be championed without commitment to his phenomenalism. The last was the core of all his scientific and philosophical work, yet his theory of education and his pedagogical style can survive without it. Being a realist is no bar to being a Machian in education. But thoughtful realism does require coming to terms with Mach's own phenomenalist arguments that he so comprehensively advanced.

Unfortunately there is little opportunity in any country's science teacher-education programs, or even graduate education programs, to learn from the life, work, and writings of Mach. The history and philosophy of science is not a part of these programs and neither is the history of science education. With both HPS and history of education missing, Mach does not appear in preservice or graduate education programs that are dominated by other supposedly more practical concerns. But in education, as in science, there is nothing so practical as a good theory, and Mach provides one. And his theory can in-principle be elaborated, revised, and criticized. It is an orientation to education and pedagogy that rewards engagement.

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Major Thinkers

► Quest for Heroes

Making Educated Girls in the Global South: Insights from Educational Anthropology

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Introduction

The education of girls and women has been heralded as a panacea for community and national change in global discourses. Commonsense understandings suggest that changing the human capital potential of girls will inform the economic and moral progress of a nation. As such, girls' education has been centered in reaching international development goals such as the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and, more recently, Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), and through campaigns like *Let Girls Learn* and *Girl Effect*, governments are pressured to make policy changes to increase the number of girls in school. Certainly, the discourses of international development campaigns and policies hold aspirations for what educated girls and women should be like, and as such, girls become objects of reform. These aspirations are articulated through formal and informal educational sites and interface with local constructs of gender and perceptions of femininity. This encyclopedia entry traces the cultural production of educated girls in diverse locations in the global South. I specifically focus on the global South, inclusive of regions in the Southern hemisphere – Africa, Asia, and Latin America – and marked by the political economic legacies of colonization and international development. The entry prioritizes this region because the geopolitical power dynamics of these global conditions have implications for how gender

difference has been constructed and are produced in educational spaces.

I draw on insights from educational anthropologists about the processes of the cultural production of educated persons (Levinson et al. 1996) to consider the production of educated girls. Cultural production is a “theoretical construct, which allows us to portray and interpret the way people actively confront the ideological and material conditions presented by schooling” (Levinson and Holland 1996, p. 15). This entry asks: How have educational ethnographers considered the construction of educated women and girls? How have scholars remarked upon the construction of gendered aspirations, of becoming good mothers, responsible and law-abiding citizens, and modern urban women in diverse contexts? And what do these studies reveal about the limits of becoming educated women? Paying attention to some of the ways in which young women experience marginality in diverse contexts, their lived experiences and affective investments, this entry interrogates the production of educated women. Bartlett and Holland (2002) contend that the “educated person reflects a culturally specific definition of desirable, valued forms of training, skills, and knowledges which may or may not coincide with formal schooling” (p. 14). Further, the cultural production of an educated person has moral overtures and if becoming educated is the equivalent of becoming a “decent and honorable person,” others are considered “intellectually and even morally inferior” (p. 15). As Stambach (2000) and Vavrus (2003) have noted, paying attention to gender in the production of educated persons raises a specific set of questions: what are the performances of morality and respectability that women are expected to aspire towards? If to begin to seem and feel educated, marginalized persons have to counter symbolic violence and construct new social relations (Bartlett 2007, 2010), what aspirational locations are available for women?

Cultural Production

Educational anthropologists drew upon critical theories of reproduction, social reproduction,

and developments in anthropology where culture was resituated not as noun, a static body of knowledge transmitted from one generation to the next, but rather as verb (Street 1993), involving shifting processes of meaning making. Using cultural production as a lens, educational spaces, school-based and otherwise, can be viewed as sites of subject formation occurring through the production and consumption of cultural forms. While dominant discourses that are directed towards building modern nation States and are well-alive in schools, in their edited volume, Levinson et al. (1996) maintain that individuals within schools, teachers and students alike, often occupy the space of school in creative ways where practices and understandings are generated that engage and transform “aspirations, household relations, local knowledges and structures of knowledges” (p. 15). They are not necessarily subjected to dominant discourses schools often carry. For instance, contends that while schools seek to modernize indigenous populations in Ecuador, certain Huaoroni communities resist these State’s attempts. Believing that State schools deskill their children, Huaoroni hold onto their activity-based cultural knowledge. This is their version of the “educated person.” To extend this point, educational anthropologists argue that all cultural and social contexts form frameworks of what it means and how one becomes a fully “knowledgeable” person in that context, endowed with maximum cultural capital (Levinson et al. 1996, p. 21). And as such, the idea of an educated person refers to a culturally specific “definition of desirable, valued forms of training, skills, and knowledges which may or may not coincide with formal schooling” (Bartlett and Holland 2002, p. 14). Anthropologists argue that school is often a site of struggle amongst the value of school knowledges and knowledges from other sites, noting that the “educated person” is produced through/within these uncertainties.

Learning Respectability and Morality

Contemporary schools remain sites where gendered norms of morality and respectability are

taught. The intended and formal curriculum inscribes such gendered ideals. In her ethnography of gender-based in the Mount Kilimanjaro region in Tanzania, anthropologist Amy Stambach (2000) observes how girls are schooled in home economics; the curriculum portrays the mother–child relationship as the core of the African family. The formal curriculum features standards of proper hygiene, bodily care, housecraft, and mothering. Stambach (2000) describes how the syllabus section called General Housecraft combines lessons titled “Good Manner” and “Good Grooming.” The section aims to build the moral character of girls by teaching them that their “attire and manners are indications of their personal worth: by being on time, following instructions, and always appearing neat and clean, girls will embody the social values commensurate with their education” (Stambach 2000, p. 5).

Schools teach girls moral lessons through the formal curriculum as well as the informal and unintended curriculum. In her study of al-Khatwa School, a single sex school in Jordan, anthropologist Fida Adely (2012) focuses on the informal, everyday curriculum in which educators and peers teach gender lessons on what it means shape oneself into a respectable woman in Jordan. Teachers are positioned as moral guides and regulate proper Islamic behavior for young women, albeit differentially. She explains how school is seen as an extension of family, where teachers were entrusted with the upbringing or *tarbiyya* of young women, according to a set of generally shared moral values. For instance, modesty is one particular moral value for young women that was instilled and reinscribed in everyday practices. This attention to modesty was connected to concerns about marriage and, relatedly, respectability. Sex segregation and disciplining students’ attire were two ways of regulation. Furthermore, a girl’s respectability was both monitored and constructed in school as her social status was intertwined with being an “educated person.” Adely argues that respectability was tracked, as particular forms of education such as science and medicine held greater social value than others.

At the same time, these ethnographers illustrate how girls subvert and engage these efforts to

educate them into moral subjects. Adely, for instance, explains that gender segregation did not prevent girls from talking or calling boys and finding time to see them. Girls discussed romance in school when they were away from parental surveillance. Girls differently negotiated their Muslim identity and challenged teacher and textbook interpretations of Islam regarding women's work, conduct, and dress.

In many cases, schools are often perceived to be sites where local ideas of morality are undermined. Therefore, in contexts where localized desires for respectable femininity contrast perceptions of morality etched through schooling, families choose to prevent girls from attending school. Rather, desired femininities are taught and learned through local educative practices. As Naji (2012) illustrates in her study of formal education in Sirwa, a geographically marginal Berber region of southern Morocco, families prefer that girls learn weaving as opposed to schooling. Her study details how girls and young women in the Sirwa come to desire the norm assigned to their sex and become recognized as legitimate members of "female" groups through their participation in weaving and domestic activities. She demonstrates how the education of young women in weaving shapes and marks them as moral subjects. In this context, being a skilled weaver and being a moral woman are conflated. The pedagogical techniques used by mothers and elder sisters in teaching weaving incorporate techniques of humiliation, coercion, and peripheral participation. Craft production implies a work on the body and mind, inherent in mastering the craft. Imposed discipline becomes internalized as women craft a moral and valorized self. And as such, Naji suggests that weaving works on the girl producing an educated girl is morally astute.

As these ethnographers demonstrate, girls are taught to become moral subjects through formal and informal education. At times, school spaces coincide with locally desired values for female morality. In other instances, families choose to teach towards respectability through local educative sites over schooling.

Learning Entrepreneurial Skills and Economic Independence

There are two dominant subjectivities of neoliberalism – the entrepreneur and the consumer or the knowledge producer and the knowledge consumer – according to Nikolas Rose (1999) and Stephen Ball (2008). Rose (1999) details the self-made ideal entrepreneurial citizen in which, "politics must actively intervene in order to create the organizational and subjective conditions for entrepreneurship" (p. 144). This entrepreneurial subject-citizen must develop a will to take initiative, to be motivated, and to realize their potential and their inner drive. Accordingly, moral worth is attributed to responsible individuals who are able to take up the mechanisms of self and familial care and management in arenas that were initially the State's responsibility and demonstrate high levels of productivity. A problem of the entrepreneurial subject-citizen is that it positions the subject-citizen as responsible and able despite constraints of material poverty, a condition intensified by neoliberal policies.

Recent empirical studies on the Nike Foundation's Girl Effect phenomenon (Moeller 2013; Hayhurst 2013) attend the way in which entrepreneurial citizenship is gendered. For instance, Kathryn Moeller's (2013) invaluable multi-sited study on the Girl Effect apparatus investigates how the Nike Foundation's investments represent increased corporate interest in education generally and girls' education more specifically. She describes how adolescent girls become researchable, disembodied objectified data, and how this expert data is used to create universal indicators – age of marriage, pregnancy, and secondary school completion – to manage the young women as subjects and prove the Girl Effect. This assessment enables the foundation to gauge the extent to which the "asset-levels" of adolescent girls have improved. Thus, the Brazilian NGO funded by the foundation is pressed to demonstrate the efficacy of Girl Effect – they recruit for the right type of sexually regulated girls, teach "entrepreneurial" skills, and channel them into

insecure, low-wage employment in telecommunication centers, supermarkets, and bus companies – thereby, illustrating how a nation gains by regulating the productivity and reproductivity of adolescent girls. This “intimate relationship between heterosexuality and economics enables the production of the returns – real or imagined – Girl Effect purportedly creates on multiple spatial scales from the girl to the nation to the world” (Moeller 2013, p. 4).

Drawing on Foucauldian-inspired critiques of neoliberal governmentality, Lyndsay Hayhurst (2013) investigates relationships among non-governmental organizations delivering sport-based girl empowerment programs in the global North with the girls they target in eastern Uganda. She illustrates how these relationships “result in a widespread flurry of entrepreneurial activities for both NGOs and girls in order to help them survive (and eventually thrive) in the current neoliberal order” (p. 298). SGD programs seek to foster self-reliance through social entrepreneurship by training young women to become martial arts instructors, allowing them to earn income, teaching them how to avoid gender-based violence, and encouraging them to take responsibility for their own health and well-being. Hayhurst suggests that through the martial arts program, young women build an “economically vigorous body that is employable and/or fundable” (p. 304). Hayhurst views neoliberal governmentality as hegemonic force, yet illustrates how social entrepreneurship provides avenues for girls to become economically self-sufficient.

Similarly, examining the effects of schooling as a new phenomenon in the Maasai region of Kenya, particularly for girls, Heather Switzer’s (2010) research on Maasai schoolgirls in Kenya provides insights on how education promotes fantasies of independence. Switzer underscores, “what they see and desire is the primary requirement of neoliberal development and the signature aspiration for the neoliberal subject: participation in the wage economy” (p. 148). Employment is seen as the main vehicle for autonomy, and independence emerges as a dominant theme across her interviews with schoolgirls. Hence, in the Maasai

girl’s move from *entito* (girl in Maa) to schoolgirl, she breaks the “bonds of tradition” to pursue her own autonomous dreams and take an independent place as a producer and consumer in the future developed world. Switzer’s findings suggest that the girl-child is re-signified as the schoolgirl through engagement with an individualizing process that positions her as a future producer; the Maasai girls in Switzer’s study aspire to be future producers as they consume new subjective positions.

Learning Proper Consumption

In addition, the ideal neoliberal subject is a consumer, who consumes appropriately. Comaraff and Comaraff (2000) discuss how access to consumer goods and the “freedom to choose” was considered a fundamental political right in the West by the mid-twentieth century. The market is not solely imagined as a space in which subjects are expected to produce, but the subject also has the right and responsibility to consume. Rose suggests, “citizenship is realized through acts of ‘free’ but responsibilized choice in a variety of private, corporate, and quasi-public practices from working to shopping” (p. xxxiii). As part of fashioning citizen-subjects who have autonomy, self-reliance, willingness to learn, and motivation among children and youth in particular, technologies of the self or subjectivity are mobilized through education.

Youth studies scholars have examined how consumer citizenship shapes youth culture (see Lukose 2009). Anoop Nayak and Mary Jane Kehily (2013) call for a specific attention to global femininities and consumption considering the positioning of young women as ideal neoliberal subjects (Harris 2004; McRobbie 2002) and note that cultural flows of particular global femininities such as consumer citizenship converge with local practices offering points of connection and dissonance and providing access to new subject positions. Globalization influences the content, commodities, and ideas that are consumed and the processes by which consumption happens.

Several youth studies scholars attend to the ways in which the consumption of global media produces new femininities (Vidmar-Horvat 2005). For instance, in study of gender and personhood in new South Africa, she illustrates that while motherhood was once regarded as the epitome of femininity, the status given to motherhood declined with the onset of global media. Global media such as soap operas provided young women with new forms of cultural capital, and they were able to imagine “gender relations beyond the narrow choices their mothers proscribed,” (p. 358) which resulted in the provision of new possibilities as well as new constraints. Femininities promoted within educational spaces further crystallize aforementioned neoliberal femininities as illustrated by Ritty Lukose (2009). In her study of a low-caste college in Kerala, Lukose illustrates how young women develop gendered subjectivities through consumer citizen discourses “where globalized patterns of consumption becomes an axis of cultural belonging with implications for how women participate and become citizens” (p. 57).

Conclusion

Anthropologists of education attending to the construction of girlhood unsettle the normalized human capital logic that investment in girls education will further the economic development of their nations. Rather, through careful investigation into how girlhood is culturally produced in educative spaces, ethnographers illustrate how the construction of gendered norms occurs through global norms of morality and citizenship that uphold the discursive logic. Through schools and nongovernmental organization (NGO) programs, young women in the global South interface these global norms around gendered citizenship in neoliberal times. They engage, negotiate, and contest these ideals of girlhood with localized aspirations for future women. This review of ethnographic research emphasizes that the intersection of geopolitical conditions and situated study are needed to best understand the discursive conditions that provide new possibilities and new

constraints in producing educated women and girls in different sites across the global South.

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Mālie Conceptualizing: A New Philosophy of Tongan Education

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Introduction

The terminology, *mālie*, is an indigenous word in Tongan language and culture, one of the many languages and cultures identified in the South Pacific. *Mālie* means good, pleasing, pleasant, interesting, advantageous, helpful, splendid, fine, commendable, admirable, or very satisfactory (Churchward 1953). An initial study of *mālie* in the academy by Manu'atu in 2000 has paved a way of decolonizing the thinking of Tongan people to draw upon their concepts, values, and beliefs in their own Tongan language for ideas to deepen their thinking about their education, pedagogies, and philosophies. Furthermore, the study has opened up an entry from Tongan peoples' wisdoms to talking knowledge and philosophy with people of different languages and cultures in the world. This intellectual work is exciting and challenging, and the conceptualizing of *mālie* is working in progress.

Conceptualizing Mālie from a Tongan Perspective

Mālie can be talked about as a spirit (a philosophy) that enlivens the hearts of people and permeates and enriches their whole world – the social, cultural, economic, political, and physical. As a spirit, *mālie* can be experienced in the heart. In Tongan culture, the heart and the mind are both acknowledged as separate but are intimately and deeply related; both are enablers of knowing and learning to take place, that is, learning the deep knowledge and wisdoms and knowing all kinds of scientific knowledge. When a person experiences this kind of learning and knowing, it is referred to as *mālie* to the person's heart, mind, and body. The happiness and joy of good learning and knowing is spoken about as *mālie*! In this way, learning and knowing are not rote or technical; rather, the spirit of the person is alive and energized (growing in wisdom), and the mind is active in thinking, be it critical or reflective, or soars in imagination.

When a person is willing to learn and know, his or her mind is open, and the person can learn and know almost anything. For example, *loto lelei* (a good heart) is equated with *atamai lelei* (a good/brilliant mind), and a person who is both *loto lelei* and *atamai lelei* is willing to learn, learns well, and will experience good learning that seeks to know and understand.

Other examples that talk about the intimate relationship of the *loto* (heart) and the *atamai* (mind) include *loto poto* (being wise) being equated with *atamai fakapotopoto* (being prudent, sensible, tactful, shrewd, cautious, also economical, sagacious, and thrifty), *loto matala* (open heart) being equated with *atamai puke me'a* and *atamai vave* (comprehending and quick at grasping), and *loto toka'i* (deeply respectful and reverent in the heart) being often equated with *atamai loloto* and *fakakaukau loloto* (in-depth thinking and seeking for depth) Churchward (1959).

The idea of *mālie*, conceptualized from a Tongan perspective, embraces a philosophy of practice, energy, and transformation (Manu'atu 2000a). As a concept, it draws upon Tongan language that provides insights into the cultural

meanings that Tongan people construct to make sense of the relationships they form with people and with the world(s).

The Use of *Mālie* in Tongan Language and Culture

There is no great deal of literature on the notion of *mālie*, but there are unquantifiable lived experiences and stories that are *mālie* and are about *mālie* in activities known to be performed by people – performing arts, thinking, sports, music, arts, storytelling, fishing, gardening, planting, navigation, traditional healing, medicine, church services, and wedding ceremonies, among others. This is not saying that Tongan people's life purposes are hinged on singing and dancing in order to experience *mālie* nor an implication that *faiva* (performing arts) is the only space where *mālie* can be experienced. The point that is made here is that as a cultural way of being and doing, *mālie* is pursued and experienced in *faiva* and in the wholeness of living (Manu'atu 2000a).

The vocabulary created by and derived from the word *mālie* provides insights into the worldview that underpin Tongan language (Manu'atu 2000a, 2014). In grammatical terms, *mālie* is a verb, a noun, an adverb, and an adjective (Churchward 1959). The grammatical feature of the Tongan language is theorized to reflect a language that is underpinned by a worldview that is not rigid; rather, it is about movement. The movement is signified by the verb-based structure of the language, and the verbs are interpreted here as relationships that people create when forming their worldview and knowledge (Manu'atu 2000a).

Mālie can be added (like a suffix) to verbs and/or nouns to enhance or deepen the meaning of the word (Churchward 1953). The words represent concepts of various forms of social relations that can be experienced in a range of contexts. Their meanings and use are significant to show how a philosophy of *mālie* contributes to understanding the cultural milieu and social relations that are emphasized by Tongan people.

Each of these terms (Churchward 1953, 1959) can be discussed, critiqued, and analyzed philosophically.

alomālie (fine beautiful day, a good day for sailing)

auhamālie (totally annihilated)

faingamālie (*fai*, a verb which means to do; *fainga*, a noun which means to do; *faingamālie*, an opportunity to do something with good intention)

*fie**mālie* (*fie* means desiring, *fie**mālie* means in total comfort since the desires are fulfilled)

hangamālie (*hanga* means to face a direction, *hangamālie* means totally focus)

langimālie (*langi* refers to the face of the king; *langimālie* means being healthy, a beautiful, bright face)

laumālie (*lau* means talk, the language spoken; *laumālie* means the language spoken is good since they come from the heart, spiritual)

lavengamālie (*lave* means a slight touch; *lavenga* means being touched on; *lavengamālie* means touch on the heart, connect with the heart, well connected)

maaumālie (*maau* means tidy, *maaumālie* means very well organized)

mahu'ingamālie (*mahu'inga* means important, valuable; *mahu'ingamālie* means deeply meaningful)

mālie'ia (experiencing *mālie*, delighted, to be so pleased)

ta'imālie (to be so blessed)

tokamālie (*toka* refers to the king's disposition, *tokamālie* means peaceful, calm)

tu'umālie (*tu'u* refers to stance, standpoint; *tu'umālie* means prosperity, richness, affluent, wealth)

With these meanings, *mālie* is about the spiritual; it expresses wholism. In quest of philosophical ideas to inform the education of Tongan people and Pacific peoples at large, there is urgency to seek for spiritual wisdoms to guide the heart and mind of the collective and the individual (Manu'atu 2000a, 2014, 2016). *Mālie* is an example of spiritual wisdom in Tongan language and culture.

Mālie in Kātoanga Faiva: Festival of Tongan Performing Arts

In Tongan *faiva* (performing arts) and, in particular, *faiva lakalaka* (Tongan traditional dance), the notions of *mālie* and *māfana* as central concepts are culturally constructed, and they articulate “success.” *Mālie* in *faiva lakalaka* is defined here as a process that produces meaningful connections between *ta’anga* (the context in Tongan language and cultural practices), *hiva* (singing), *haka* (the bodily movements), the psyche and spirit of the *punake* (the poet, also artist), the performers, and the audience, all of which energize and uplift people (Manu’atu 2000a). The expression *tau-e-langi* (literally means reaching the sky) is a reference to the moments and duration of *mālie* people experience. *Mālie* is energy, and upon experiencing it, the hearts and souls of the performers and audience are uplifted to utmost fulfillment. *Mālie* can transform the psyche, emotions, and movements of the body. Members of the audience often get up and dance to show that they cannot contain the movement of *mālie* and *māfana* through them.

[Note that *māfana* is an entry in the encyclopedia. A full discussion of *māfana* can be obtained from that specific entry. Suffice to say that *māfana* and *mālie* are experienced together in *faiva*, Tongan performing arts. *Māfana* is used here to mean warm spirit and energy that is moving through the heart].

Success and achievement as considered within the frame of *mālie* secures relationships between and within everyone who is brought together by the performance. The individual achievement is not an issue here; rather, the “interconnectedness” that is experienced and practiced by the collective is what counts. A person’s “achievement” within the performing group is not denied; rather the persons and the group as a whole are considered together as co-producers of *mālie* and *māfana*. With an audience who can relate and understand the performance, they too can experience the *mālie* and *māfana*. It is known to have happened that some *faiva* have been performed where neither the performers nor the audience have experienced a sense of *mālie*, and both the performers

and audience have recognized this condition. In the event, the *haka* (actions), *hiva* (singing), and *ta’anga* (lyrics) fail to produce the meanings and understandings that move the spirit of the performers. When this happens, usually the performers may demonstrate skills in movements of the *haka*, but the *ta’anga* (poetry) fails to represent the artistic knowledge and skills of creating metaphorical language and meanings. The *ta’anga* in this sense is described to be *pāpafua* (flat) and *hualela* (straightforward and shallow) and does not produce *mālie* and *māfana*. In this way, the *faiva* is fragmented and the performance is one of meaningless techniques. There is no comparison between a performance where performers act with understandings and those where the performers have little or no comprehension of the art. *Mālie* cannot be produced if the performers denied the understanding of the concepts and the connections they have with the art of performance. The mimicking of the *hiva* and *haka* by the performers only reinforces an image of superficiality.

In *faiva lakalaka*, a *ta’anga*, stories are told from a particular standpoint within a framework that is metaphorical, cultural, and political, all in pursuance of *mālie*. As an aim, *faiva lakalaka* is created to produce *mālie* in the art of *ta’anga*, *hiva*, and *haka*. In the hierarchical society of Tonga, *faiva* (as a production of *mālie*) was an activity created by the *punake* (poet, also artist) and performed by the people and some members of the *hou’eiki* (royal family and nobles of the realm) with pleasure called *fakahoifua*.

When a *faiva* is performed and *mālie* is not experienced, then the performance and the audience tend to consider it as just another (unfulfilling) task that has been done. Usually people say that they are glad, it’s all over! The performance is quickly forgotten, and people are usually despised for the poor and uninspiring experience they had produced. A *faiva* that is *mālie* is a success story, and it lives on in the memory of the people. Its greatness is not just talked about, but it becomes a point of reference to the group where their identity is reconfirmed and their social status is reaffirmed. *Mālie* provides a different

philosophy in Tongan language and culture, and upon it success and achievement can be viewed differently.

Mālie: A Philosophy Underpinning Good Pedagogy for Tongan Students and Learners

Pedagogical ideas can be drawn from conceptualizing social relations in real-life linguistic and cultural contexts. The Kātoanga Faiva is one useful source of good pedagogy to draw upon for ideas. In the discussion of Tongan Kātoanga Faiva and its usefulness as a pedagogical site (Manu'atu 2000b), the *mālie* in *faiva*, *hiva*, *haka*, and *ta'anga* is considered useful in theorizing pedagogical practices (Manu'atu 2000a). Good pedagogy is central to successful learning of academic and nonacademic subjects. That is, the pedagogical ideas that are sensitive and appropriate for the students can be drawn from the conceptualization of *mālie*. In doing so, pedagogical approaches can be synthesized from understandings of values and meanings of relationships from a Tongan perspective (Manu'atu 2000a, b). The best pedagogical approaches also mean paying attention to how they promote, hinder, or transform situations to produce successful and worthwhile learning.

Mahu'ingamālie: Mālie in Education for Tongan Students

The word *mahu'ingamālie* is a verb that is translated in the dictionary as “perfectly clear to the mind, stronger than *mahino*” (Churchward 1959, p. 318). The word *mahino* as a verb means to understand. A possible addition which is proposed here is an interpretation of why *mahu'ingamālie* is stronger than *mahino*. A view that is proposed here is that *mahu'ingamālie* is an experience of *mālie* that a person arrives at when she/he makes sense of the meanings as well as the connections between the context, meanings, and the relationships people create himself/herself and with others (Manu'atu 2000a). Hence,

mahu'ingamālie is not just understanding something (*mahino*), but the person also creates connection(s) with the context of what she/he understands. In a way, the understanding is more in-depth and more meaningful.

As a notion, *mahu'ingamālie* is key to an understanding of “achievement” from a Tongan perspective. What is proposed here is that “achievement” from a Tongan perspective is framed around the philosophy of *mālie*. Ability, skills, knowledge, and possibilities are considered in the philosophy of *mālie* as aspects of the relationships that are valued and formed when *mālie* is pursued and achieved. So *mālie* as a process can be considered as relationships that are created within a person in relation to other persons and the collective. A person who perceives the world in a fragmented and mechanistic worldview, for example, may not “connect” with the philosophy of *mālie* easily. However, *mālie* is useful to explain why a Tongan perspective of “achievement” at school can be considered in theorizing about teaching Tongan students in order for the process of learning to be uplifting. In doing so, the achievement of students can also be raised since the learning (ako and education) in their wider sense of use is about processes in which people engage meaningfully in order to draw upon themselves to transcend, to achieve, to engage possibilities in the world, to enjoy, to transform, to inform, to share, to strive, to know, and to understand.

So the achievement that is promoted by the examinations in schools can be theorized from the frame of *mālie* to be the attainment of “connecting with” the concepts or whatever is taught. It means that the students can make sense of the ideas by understanding the contexts of the ideas and their relationships with them. When the students are taught from such a standpoint, then their learning is *mahu'ingamālie*. Hence, they can question, discuss, and develop their interests in learning, and they become *māfana* to learn (wanting to learn more). The notion of *mahu'ingamālie* has pedagogical implications for the education of Tongan students. The value of learning, what is learned, and how it is learned is captured by the notion of *mahu'ingamālie*.

Human beings come to experience *mālie* when they understand something clearly and deeply, and then they further their own learning by contributing to the learning process of others. Further, they can discuss, talk, question and answer, and create knowledge in many ways.

When students do not make sense of what is taught, that is, when they are not connected to the concepts and the contexts in which the subject taught is created, then there is little or no understanding of what is going on. There is no experience of the *mālie* of learning, of coming to know.

What these *mālie* words reflect is the centrality of *mālie* and *māfana* to Tongan people's experiences and living (Manu'atu 2000a). Insights into Tongan values, ways of doing, spirituality, and health provide ideas about pedagogical practices which frame learning as valuing, connecting with, and becoming in the process of understanding. The idea here is to conceptualize *mālie* and *māfana* as key concepts in the critical discussion of Tongan educational experience, expectations, and achievement. In other words, an understanding of *mālie* and *māfana* enables educators to critically reflect on the current pedagogy of Tongan students, question what constitute "good pedagogy" for them, and then act upon the new understandings to transform educational practices toward Tongan students (Manu'atu 2016).

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Management

► Managerialism and Education

Managerialism and Education

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Synonyms

Efficiency; Governmentality; Markets; Management; Power; Privatization

One of the features of contemporary Western society is the tendency under neoliberal philosophy to define social, economic, and political issues, as problems to be resolved through management. Under neoliberalism, there is also a generalized governmental concern to promote efficiency in what were previously non-governmental spheres – i.e., in self-constitution – and that includes redefining the cultural as the economic. During recent decades, these developments have been associated with the introduction of managerialism as a new mode of governance under the restructured public sectors of many Western societies. The restructuring has involved the reform of education in which there has been a significant shift away from an emphasis on *administration* and *policy* to an emphasis on *management*. This form of managerialism is known as *new public management* (NPM) and has been very influential in the United Kingdom, Australia,

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Canada, and New Zealand. It has been used both as the legitimating basis and instrumental means for redesigning State educational bureaucracies, educational institutions, and even the public policy process.

Under NPM, there is an elaboration of explicit standards and measures of performance in quantitative terms that set specific targets for personnel, an emphasis on economic rewards and sanctions, and a reconstruction of accountability relationships. It promotes a reduction in scope for ministerial discretion in the administration of government agencies; it separates the funding agencies from providers of services as well as separating advisory, delivery, and regulatory functions. NPM introduces accrual accounting, capital charging, and a distinction between the State's ownership and purchasing interests. There has been a decentralization of management control toward what is often referred to as the doctrine of self-management. In the interests of so-called productive efficiency then, the provision of educational services has been made contestable; and, in the interests of so-called allocative efficiency, State education has been marketized and privatized.

Interpretations of Managerialism

NPM is underpinned by a tradition of managerialism that can be located within an account of the development of capitalism. Historically, the ownership of capitalist enterprise was separated from its operational function, which was the stimulus for the employment of a professional managerial hierarchy in the organization. The modern business enterprise can be located in this broad institutional context and can be linked specifically with two chronological phases in the development of the capitalist economic system. These two phases are referred to as liberal and State-regulated capitalism, respectively. It was during the development of State-regulated capitalism that managerialism in its current forms came to the fore. Davis (1997, p. 305), who argues that in its latest mode managerialism has "refashioned the world in its image and captures for itself the modern state," reinforces this. In terms of the modern

corporation, managerialism signifies the shift from the owner to the professional manager to legitimate the control of individuals, societies, and their organizations in the interests of capital.

Managerialism has been characterized in a variety of ways. Enteman (1993), for example, describes managerialism as an international ideology on which rests the economic, social, and political order of advanced industrialized societies and from which arises the impoverished notion that societies are equivalent to the sum of the transactions made by the managements of organizations. In this view, social institutions are primarily a function of the practices of management. For Drucker (1974, p. 19), "management has as its first dimension an economic dimension." Davis (1997, p. 305) claims that managerialism has swept aside "an idyllic older bureaucratic world . . . reducing every relation to a mere money exchange." Managerialism has also been characterized as a "set of beliefs and practices, (that) will prove an effective solvent for . . . economic and social ills" (Pollitt 1990, p. 1).

In addition to its technical function, management is . . . an elite social grouping which acts as an economic resource and maintains the associated system of authority. (Child 1969, p. 13)

Managerialism has also been explained as a form of instrumental reasoning where, in the interests of efficiency, value does not inhere in the activity itself. Weber's notion of the "iron cage" of bureaucratic rationality explains the oppressive potential of a society that is increasingly governed by its logic of instrumental reason. He predicted that the modern bureaucratic State would require the extension of means-end reasoning into more and more areas of social life. In this respect Pusey (1991, p. 22) observes that "there can be no quarrel with the notion of efficiency as such. The inherent problem lies instead at another level – with the criteria that define what count as costs and benefits; with the loss of social intelligence; and with the number and range of potentially constructive discourses that have been suppressed." Drucker (1994, p. 193) asserts that "post-capitalist society requires a unifying force . . . a common and shared commitment to values,

onto a common concept of excellence.” In this new rational economic order, social decisions are defined within managerialism, and, consequently, policy, politics, democracy, and ethics disappear. On these accounts, managerialism is emerging as a unifying force in the wake of the predicted breakdown of Fordist notions of production. Taken together, these representations of managerialism imply a transcendent theory that Lyotard (1984) calls a meta-narrative.

It is significant that throughout these accounts, managerialism has remained implicit as a mode of governance, preferring instead to account for itself explicitly as a mode of domination. An alternative characterization of managerialism is as a form of what Michel Foucault (1991) has termed *governmentality*. In this sense, managerialism is a regime of governmentalizing practices rather than a meta-narrative where it is presented as a politically neutral technology under its rhetoric of economic neutrality. Employing governmentality to explain managerialism is different from employing theories of State and is legitimate, because, according to Foucault (Gordon 1991, p. 8), the perceived internal constraints of governmentalizing practices are just as capable as principles of legitimation of carrying normative meaning and content. Foucault sees that the State has no essential properties but is, rather, a function of changes in the practices of the government. Governmentality has a central concern with the legitimate foundations of political sovereignty and political obedience.

This explanation of the new managerialism as a form of governmentality includes, but is not limited to, traditional accounts of managerialism as domination. In addition to the corporatist characterizations of managerialism as the prerogative of managers, governmentality suggests a genealogy of practices about how individuals also implicate themselves in their own governance. In other words, as a form of governmental rationality, managerialism is a form of disciplinary knowledge. Although Pusey may well be correct about suppression of the “other” by economic rationalism, following Foucault, it could be argued that managerialism as a moral technology is not only *constituted by* but also *produces* certain effects on

discourses. These productive effects are ignored in orthodox accounts of managerialism as domination. To the extent that accounts of managerialism employ imposition, they are inadequate because, at the expense of agency, they present a skewed picture of managerialism as domination. Even in nominally democratic societies, explanations of domination as a totality are not rational, and, therefore, agency is implied. Since agency implies a sense of self-governance, a more adequate explanation of managerialism as governance, then, would include what Foucault (1988) calls technologies of self. Although NPM includes corporatist management practices, under democracy, this combination must also be explained in conjunction with a genealogy of the ways in which individuals implicate themselves in their own governance. Self-governance as a form of governmentality occurs at the intersection of technologies of domination and technologies of self. In this mode, agency and domination can both be accounted for. Since this account is a new formulation of managerialism, it might be better termed as the “new managerialism.”

The new managerialism explains public services not as production functions or firms, but as governance structures. What is at stake is not so much the ethos and practice of management as the culture and structure of governance. Here governance means the culture and structure of the relationship between what Weber called legitimate domination and the self-constitution of those who are subject to it. What Weber meant by legitimate domination was justified by an authority structure, which was, in turn, legitimated by legal-rational authority. But governance through the new managerialism is not dependent for its legitimation on Weber’s notion of legal-rational authority, but more on a form of rationality that depends upon efficiency in the market. Although this new managerialism still draws on models of corporate managerialism as well as accounts of NPM, it is also imbued with the practices of self in everyday life. What is new here is recognition of the technologies of self that individuals employ to implicate themselves in their own governance.

Against this account, it could be argued that much of this change is rhetorical rather than

substantive and that educators will simply clothe their actions in new rhetoric while continuing their traditional practices. But rhetoric also has its own discursive force in that it encourages people to define the world differently; as language changes, so too does practice, and vice versa. Language itself could even be construed as a social practice. Education is also a product of the effects of social practices, and its institutional actors are neither solely creatures of neither language nor agents independent of the historical practices in which they engage. Rather, both language and social practices constitute them. While this view displaces the individual as the central actor or agent of social change, it does not dismiss agency altogether. The question it raises is to what extent the individual is free from the coercion of managerialism; that is, to what extent can the individual recapture the center as the originator of thought or action? Paradoxically, managerialism assumes an autonomous, individualistic, transparent, and self-interested, rational individual at its core that is admonished to “take responsibility,” to be “self-motivated,” and so on. Far from assuming a stable autonomous individual, managerialism has not yet demarcated the senses in which an individual might exist as a social actor. Managerialism then leaves us wondering about the “who” that is engaging in its required performances. If the problem is essentially a struggle about practices as well as language, what people say and do within institutions actually matters. Under the previous democratic governance of institutions, the dominant opinion was for the redistribution of educational opportunities and sought to remedy the exclusiveness of education. These same people are now implicated in managerialism. In the interests of “better” education, they (albeit grudgingly) write mission statements, implement strategic plans, design appraisal forms, and measure efficiencies. The result is that the governance of education is transformed under the new managerialism.

Resistance to managerialism as a form of domination is sometimes recommended as something that will enhance autonomy. But because managerialism sees itself as the antidote to chaos, irrationality, disorder, and incompleteness, there are no spaces within such a social order in

which autonomy can be contested legitimately. Managerial definitions of quality, efficiency, improved productivity, or self-management construct a particular version of autonomy. Those who do not desire these managerial constructs of autonomy are simply defined as absurd, as under managerialism, these notions appear as self-evidently “good.” Even the presentation of resistance itself indicates an engagement already within the definitions provided by managerialism.

A Way Forward?

Managerialism – at least as the orthodox account of domination would have it – is a totalizing technology that subsumes education to its discourse through what appears to be legitimate practices (including the language of efficiency and quality, etc.). To find ways of increasing space for living, rather than living within managerial definitions of autonomy, a critique is required that will not simply fall into the trap of resistance within the definitions supplied by managerialist discourse. A way forward for research is outlined in brief below.

Since power is masked as legitimate authority under orthodox accounts of managerialism, an analysis of power is called for if the new managerialism is to be understood. A form of power that could be analyzed is that which Foucault (1978) calls bio-power, which presents us with a form of bipolar technology that generates political counter demands. It provides at the very least the possibility of a “strategic reversibility of power relations” (Foucault 1982, p. 221). That would provide a technology for contesting managerialism. Further analyses could be introduced from a poststructuralist perspective in which there is now a rethinking of possibilities for education that illustrates meanings as shifting, receding, fractured, incomplete, dispersed, and deferred. There is also a Nietzschean approach to a critique of managerialism under which the value of these practices is to be evaluated on the basis of their contribution to survival and health (as metaphors for life) rather than on their contribution to abstract notions of truth and rationality.

For Nietzsche, certain redundant metaphors for the philosophical tradition of “self as truth” have carried over into the present as historical remnants in the form of reified practices. The particular practices in question within the new managerialism are those predicated upon its underpinning assumption of its autonomous, individualistic, transparent, and self-interested, rational individual.

These types of analyses of notions such as power, life, domination, meaning, rationality, and truth suggest research into the worth of a project that revalues the actual value of the new managerialism as the governance of education.

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Māori (Indigenous Peoples of Aotearoa New Zealand)

► [Kaitiakitanga – Active Guardianship, Responsibilities, and Relationships with the World: Towards a Bio-cultural Future in Early Childhood Education](#)

Mapping the Terrain of Political Theory in Education

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Foundations of Political Theory in Education

The domain of political theory in education is too vast to cover in one pass; an Educational Research Information Center (ERIC) scan turns up over 8000 articles related to this topic, showing that educationists often address diverse political issues, using an array of political theories and philosophies at our disposal. Borrowing the theme from the next *Philosophy of Education Society* Annual Meeting (Toronto, 2016) lends focus. Hannah Arendt’s highly influential work, *Between Past and Future. Eight Exercises in Political Thought*, characterized late twentieth century political theory as a subject drawing vital energy from current conflicts and courageous thinking, conducted within a “critically awakening” historical discourse that “pushes from behind and constrains from ahead” (1977, p. 7). A quick scan of the educational philosophy literature grabbing attention today reveals this kind of urgency and commitment – motivated by pressing contemporary issues such as the legacy of colonialism (racism and hegemony) and the spectre of globalization and neoliberalism (audit societies obsessed with risk management) – spanning ancient origins and anticipating future opportunities for liberation. Unable to annotate and reference current publications here, several illustrative

examples set the stage: tracing origins of contemporary conversations in philosophy of educational back to political discourses still lighting our path from the distant past.

In Masschelein and Simons' recent open-source book, *In Defence of the School: a Public Issue*, the ancient Greek concept of *skolē* – as “disinterested” or “pure pursuit of learning” – is revitalized for a modern, tech-savvy audience. Their work culminates in an “Allegory of the school” that recalls Plato’s landmark metaphysical journey to enlightenment in the “Allegory of the cave” (1991, Bk 7). Conversations today about “cosmopolitanism” (see Marianna Papastephanou, Sharon Todd, and David Hansen) – searching for possible salvation from internecine conflicts over our many differences – reach back to Diogenes the Cynic, the first cosmopolite: banished from his city for his critical “truth-saying” (*parrhesia*; see Foucault 2001). Following Foucault’s later movement into the investigation of “arts of the self” and *governmentality* – while building upon his earlier genealogies of bio-power and *games of truth* – many philosophers have addressed the role of pastoral and panoptic supervision, disciplinary power, and dividing practices within governmental structures in education (see Stephan Ball, Jenifer Gore, James Marshall, Tina Besley, Michael A. Peters, and Mark Olssen). The recently emergent school around Rancière’s political philosophy engage in a critique of our fall from Greek democracy, seeking to replace monolithic hierarchies with greater conditions of equality: learning together within “circles of our need” instead of inculcation by the “explicative order” (Rancière 1991, 2006; see Gert Biesta, Sharon Todd, Claudia Reutenberg Jan Masschelein and Martin Simons). Anticonsumerism literature in education (see Trevor Norris) draws on Arendt’s exposition of the public versus private domains of social life, celebrating the *polis* as a place for freedom from the necessities of life in contrast to the marketplace (*agora*). Critiques of corporatism in schools and colleges see the trend as closing spaces for freedom, opened through the liberal tradition of learning, having instead vested interests in reproducing citizens with corporate allegiances. In each of these representative cases, philosophers of

education carry out a dialogue *between past and future* political issues and theories.

In the space allotted I try to map some of the avenues by which this classically inspired discourse emerges onto the present scene. Limiting my survey to Western literature, there is a rich tradition of addressing education within the context of philosophizing on ideal forms of the State. Plato’s *Republic* (1991), defining justice in the soul by first examining its role in the State, sets out a “synopsis” (Bk7) of his curriculum: beginning with gymnastic and music, flowing into arithmetic (based on rhythm) and geometry, pondering the heavens, and then culminating in the study of ethics and politics. The method of educating youth follows the progression described earlier in the “Allegory of the Cave” – the circuit from terrestrial abode to the sun, and the duty to return to the common realm of cave dwellers needing political guidance from enlightened philosophers willing to risk reprisal for their heresy. Such wide-spanning, magnanimous education prepares learners for philosophical contemplation “of things human and divine” (Plato 1991, Bk 6).

During the seventeenth to eighteenth century, enlightenment, philosophers sought to “light the cave,” so to speak, through improved forms of education, but they did so by drawing on Plato’s model. Social contract theorists John Locke (1968) and Jean-Jacque Rousseau (1979) followed in this tradition: Locke’s syllabus is founded on dance and proceeds toward mathematics and science before the humanities, and Rousseau’s *Emile* learns about terrestrial and astronomical science through first-hand exposure to nature, growing beans, and gazing at stars, but culminates in world travel to learn the customs of different people: knowledge useful in commerce and governance.

Aristotle significantly contributed to our inherited framework for discussing politics and education, distinguishing three forms of knowledge: technical, practical, and scientific. Though acknowledging value in thought going into crafting artifacts (*technai*) according to predetermined ends (a *telos*), Aristotle’s tripartite system praises more highly practical wisdom (*phronesis*) and good judgment (*metis*) useful in

politics, and bestows even higher esteem on rational attainment of scientific knowledge (*episteme*) – what he views as the goal or end (*telos*) toward which human flourishing strives. Aristotle explains in the *Nichomachean Ethics* (1962, Bk.1, §3,1094b13–27) that we do not demand the same precision or degree of certainty in ethics and politics as we do in math or science. The axiological scheme has endured, valuing maths and sciences over the humanities, and both over vocational studies. Coupled with this epistemological divide is the political division between free men, entitled to an education along with citizenship (as a birthright), and slaves and women who were denied both. Aristotle's *Politics* (1941) opens with a fallacious, circular argument from nature, suggesting slaves are “slavish by nature” or else they would have freed themselves. Although Plato's *Republic* included women in education (1991, Bk5), after the example of Pythagoras, Jane Rolland Martin offers an insightful critique. Questioning how progressive this move was, she notes that education has always been regarded as part of the reproductive sphere of society. For Plato to say women were eligible to be guardians was like saying they can just as easily as men apply to be tennis players, when in practice they are more likely to have been systematically excluded from preparatory activities like throwing balls, necessary to gaining admittance to this function in society. Following Mary Wollstonecraft (1995), Martin also critiques Rousseau's *Emile* for its disappointing conclusion: the education of Sophie in purely domestic matters, as caregiver for Emile. John Locke and Immanuel Kant also excluded women from the rational pursuit of knowledge, based on a false taxonomy deeply embedded in societies. Wollstonecraft put this division to the test with her experimental girl's school, showing nurture to be the cause rather than nature.

From this classical foundation in Plato and Aristotle we get the notion that “studies suitable to free men” are liberating in that they take us out of the mundane realm of the common people (*hoi polloi*), having no purpose other than the pursuit of pure knowledge. In the Roman (Stoic) system of education, we see this translated into *artes*

ludicrae (technical studies), the *pueriles* (preparatory studies), and *artes liberales* – the complete “circuit of studies” (Lt., *curriculum*; Gk. *encyclopaidieia*) that “rounds” out the pupil and prepares “him” (sic) for philosophical study and leadership. The Stoics referred to these liberal arts as being among the things that “equip” one toward life in accordance with nature, bringing reason into alignment with logic, or as “scaffolding” that builds a character base for pursuing philosophy, politics, and right livelihood.

Digression into this distant past may seem antiquarian, but historical perspective is needed to understand the legacy that political reformers inherited when setting out to build national education systems in the modern era, starting with Germany in the early nineteenth century and culminating in public education movements in France and finally Great Britain and the colonies. Drawing on Michel Foucault, in philosophy of education Ian Hunter and more recently Michael McGarry have conducted genealogical studies of this kind of nineteenth century national education reform movement in Australia and Canada. Immanuel Kant's *Pedagogy* (1904) is an eighteenth century precursor to this movement, seeing in education the means to progressively up-build national character (*bildung*) in step-like fashion (cf. Buchner, “The Philosophical Basis of Kant's Educational Theory,” in: Kant 1904, pp. 29–43). In the form of a philosophical antinomy, Kant acknowledged the paradox of using authority and restraint to generate autonomous and rational citizens.

One of the greatest problems in education is, How can subjection to lawful constraint be combined with the ability to make use of one's freedom? For constraint is necessary. How shall I cultivate freedom under conditions of compulsion? I ought to accustom my pupil to tolerate a restraint upon his freedom, and at the same time lead him to make good use of his freedom. (Kant 1904, §29, p. 131)

Adam Smith also took an interest in public education, seeing moral guidance and math and literacy training of workers as the base of a market-regulated economic system that requires decent, industrious, and frugal citizens. John White has refreshed this conversation (see also

Ken Howe) about balancing “Smithian efficiency with democracy” with respect to educational philosophy in the context of twenty-first century capitalism.

Liberal-Analytic Philosophy of Education

In the early 1970s through the early 1990s there was a movement in academia that took as its point of departure David Hume’s “fork”: the distinction between the contingent (a posteriori) knowledge we obtain through experimentation and synthesis, and the necessary (a priori) knowledge obtained by analyzing the relations among words or numbers (Hume 1910). For many professors working in the humanities it seemed fitting that if the subject matter could not possibly have the rigor of the experimental sciences, it could at least rise to the analytic task of sharpening the tools in use by examining the core concepts of the field. In education this meant “topologies of the teaching concept” (see Thomas Green), mapping our terms like “learning” and trying to find in ordinary language the path to better practice.

The sense in which this was a “liberal” enterprise is twofold (see Michael Oakeshott 1989): the movement tended to be coupled with Kant’s moral stance on rational autonomy and John Rawls’s (1971) efforts to achieve distributive justice in the domain of education as a social-contractual institution (applicable to disability studies); following the civil rights movement, the student rebellions on campus (May 1969) and anti-Vietnam War protests, this included not only equal access to public forms of education but sweeping questions about authoritarianism in education (see Richard S. Peters). Who decides the curriculum, and what is the role of modern liberal arts in fashioning the citizenry to be, not just subjects embossed with national character (after the model of the USSR and France) but critical thinkers with autonomous, rational capabilities to determine their own ends. Lawrence Kohlberg’s attempt to redefine (after Kant and Piaget) stages of moral reasoning, moving away from relativistic, doctrinaire, or nationalistic forms of character

education, has similar motivations: both philosophically and as a reaction to the totalitarian nightmares of World War II. The democratic schools movement (see Clark Power) and “just community” concept emanate from this source.

Paul Hirst took up the task of redefining the liberal arts in terms of his own reading of the later Wittgenstein, drawing Richard Pring’s critical response that again we are focusing value on liberal over vocational studies. The second sense in which they sought to renew the liberal arts was by refreshing the teaching concept, as the rational pursuit of engaging students in assessing – through public tests appropriate to each *form of knowledge* or discipline – the quality of evidence and veracity of truth claims instead of holding views unshakably, as sanctioned orthodoxy. Taxonomies were developed to distinguish teaching – qua “teaching” as a concept we adhere to, value and judge as members of both a language and democratic community – from its concept-cousins, some of which bear family resemblances: training, advertising, conditioning, proselytizing, indoctrinating, etc. A vast body of literature was devoted to what amounted to a veritable cold war on nonrational means of teaching, coincidently at a time that followed upon fears of the domino theory (Korea, Vietnam) and that coincided with an dangerous arms race between the superpowers: USA, Russia, and China.

Hegelian Progeny

One of the other fountainheads of political philosophy in education is George William Friedrich Hegel’s *Phenomenology of Spirit* (1931; cf. 1996): principally the section entitled “On Lordship and Bondage.” Unlike Aristotle, the salve is said to be suffering false consciousness as a condition of his or her servitude: but so too is the master gripped by false consciousness arising from an artificial position of dominion. In order for the master to be freed, the slave must first free himself. The most powerful deployment in education comes through Paulo Freire (1970, 1998). As educational advocate for disempowered workers he strives to help them first articulate and then renegotiate the social conditions

reproducing their servitude, leading to liberation on the level of what Marxists would refer to as the “material conditions” of their lives. Black feminist writer, bell hooks (sic) followed Freire in this tradition of emancipatory educational theory.

The Italian Communist Antonio Gramsci is another prominent thinker inspired by Hegel and Marx. Gramsci (2000) counsels workers to educate their children in the knowledge obtained by the ruling elites, sensing that class warfare is waged on the level of one’s dialect and vocabulary. Pierre Bourdieu (et al. 1965) followed in this tradition (see C. W. Mills on the *Power Elite*) with his critique of higher education as the means of bestowing upon the ruling elites the verbal armature and cultural capital to maintain their hegemony. Boles and Gintis conducted a sweeping survey of class privilege in American education, pointing to the capitalist economic system as the root of inequities and therefore the target of their radical critique.

Other appropriations of the Hegelian master–slave dialectic, as it has become known, come through in feminist critiques of male privilege and systemic inequities, as in de Beauvoir’s appropriation (see James Marshall). Critical theorists in educational theory – notably Henry Giroux, Michael Apple, and Peter McLaren – have taken the lead in bringing this spirit of radical critique to bear on globalized forms of neoliberal education reform and its politically conservative tendency to reproduce social stratification under the guise of providing choice, challenging its contradictory impulse to stifle academic debate, and diversity while speaking about principles of transparency and inclusion. The critical tradition in educational philosophy begins with Socrates, but manifests in populist literature with Ivan Illich and Neil Postman (among others). Infused with a Hegelian/Marxist critique of all forms of “false consciousness,” its educational aim is emancipation.

Conclusion

What these different conversations share is vital concern for the educational formation of citizens,

calling attention to the positive and negative dispositions we produce through our governing practices and policies. Kristján Kristjánsson for instance draws on Aristotle’s virtue ethic in his advocacy of “character education,” which Judith Suissa criticizes for not being political enough. One of the most powerful movements along these lines was Dewey’s progressive movement, combatting the scholastic tradition but also the antidemocratic tendency of an education system that abandons its connections to utility and self-directed inquiry (1966). Dewey’s pragmatist angle drew heavily on Rousseau and Hegel (see James Garrison), finding in arts education (Dewey 1934) the kind of hands-on, cosmopolitan answer to the deep divides between powers in World War II. Reinterpreting Dewey, Martin seeks to redefine education for democracy along nonsexist lines, and those in solidarity with Richard Rorty (1989) into critiques of fundamentalist, Orwellian flights from democracy. The hope is that this “map” helps the reader somewhat in tracing the intricate paths, without distorting the dendrite, canyon landscape by imposing external order from on high.

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Marcuse and Critical Education

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Synonyms

[Critical education](#); [Critical pedagogy](#); [Critical theory](#); [Marcuse](#), [Herbert](#)

Introduction

Herbert Marcuse (1898–1979) was a twentieth century philosopher and critical theorist with a strong commitment to progressive education and pedagogy. He was one of the leading members of the Frankfurt School and its Institute for Social

Research of critical theorists from Germany and, as an émigré scholar, became a leading figure of the New Left of the 1960s and 1970s. Along with Theodor W. Adorno, Max Horkheimer, Erich Fromm, Leo Löwenthal, Franz Neumann, Friedrich Pollock, and others, Marcuse and the Frankfurt School proposed the task of a critical theory of society, one in which education was grounded in culture, in the tradition of *Bildung* (education as culture) in German intellectual thought. As such, Marcuse incorporated the theme of education in his critical works during the portion of his academic career coming after the Second World War, and the theme itself became a major programmatic statement of the New Left, as well as part of movements of progressive reform in German intellectual and cultural thought. This entry examines his formative years, his intellectual development, and his contributions to a critical theory of education.

Marcuse's Formative Years and Intellectual Development

Prior to the rise of Nazism, totalitarianism, and authoritarianism in Germany, Marcuse was one of the Jewish students of philosopher Martin Heidegger at the University of Freiburg, and with the rise of the right wing, conservative thought associated with Nazism in Germany during the 1930s, Marcuse and other Heidegger's Jewish students, such as Hannah Arendt, Karl Löwith, and Hans Jonas, became disillusioned with Heideggerian phenomenology, at which time Marcuse turned to the Hegelian-Marxist socio-philosophical frameworks most apparent in the critical theory of the Frankfurt School and its Institute for Social Research. Marcuse's philosophy doctoral dissertation in Germany was published as *Hegel's Ontology and Theory of Historicity*, to which he turned back with an engagement after experimenting with Heideggerian Marxism early in his academic career. Accordingly, education for Marcuse was a social discourse, one that was grounded in the Hegelian notions of history and historicity and their worldly powers, pursuits that were eternal in the spiritual, Hegelian lifeworld sense of the term *Geist*.

In addition to education, Marcuse and other Frankfurt School's critical theorists attempted to synthesize Hegelian-Marxist dialectics with the works of major figures in continental philosophy such as Friedrich Nietzsche and also drew inspiration from the Neo-Kantian human sciences (*Geisteswissenschaften*) and cultural sciences (*Kulturwissenschaften*) or the emergent social sciences – those that were all distinct from the natural sciences (*Naturwissenschaften*) – as well as from the philosophy of life (*Lebensphilosophie*)/philosophers of life (*Lebensphilosophers*) Wilhelm Dilthey and Georg Simmel, the latter who were Kantian and Neo-Kantian scholars, respectively. Accordingly, these intellectual pursuits represented Marcuse's distinct approach to the humanities, which Frankfurt School scholars such as critical theorist and philosopher of education Douglas Kellner stresses as an approach to the humanities that broached the themes of emancipatory education and predatory culture (Kellner et al. 2009). In Marcuse's intellectual thought, Freudian psychoanalysis was especially pervasive, and he would go on to author *Eros and Civilization: A Philosophical Inquiry into Freud* (Marcuse 1966), which became a foundational text of the New Left during the 1960s and 1970s and which focused on the Freudian psychoanalytic theories of repression and liberation. Marcuse's best known work was *One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society* (Marcuse 1991), in which he proposed his canonical Frankfurt School critical theory of society most prominently. In addition to education, politics, culture, and ethics, other value theory areas that Marcuse focused on in his scholarship included art and esthetics, which led him to author the book *The Aesthetic Dimension*. His work has been taught in sociology departments at many colleges and universities, namely, in courses in contemporary social theory, as his works such as *Reason and Revolution: Hegel and the Rise of Social Theory* (Marcuse 1960) have been especially prominent at theoretical intersections of philosophy and sociology. In political science courses, he is also studied, namely, his works such as *Revolt and Counterrevolution* and other important texts of the New Left.

Marcuse's Work on/in Education

Marcuse taught courses in many different areas at Brandeis University in Waltham, Massachusetts, during the American portion of his academic career, including courses on philosophy, history (history of ideas), social science, and politics. He was a faculty member there from 1954 to 1964. He published a controversial essay in 1965 titled "Repressive Tolerance" that was dedicated to his students there at Brandeis. In Hegel's social and philosophical thought, Marcuse was interested in the notion of negation, which was a central principle of logic and dialectics, which he attempted to expand upon in his scholarly work while in residency at Brandeis. Marcuse also taught at Harvard University and Columbia University. Accordingly, Marcuse's American career in higher education saw him start teaching at Columbia, then moving to Harvard, briefly before settling at Brandeis in a permanent faculty appointment, and finally moving one more time in his academic career to a permanent faculty appointment at the aforementioned University of California at San Diego on the West Coast. The Frankfurt School's critical theorists in America had a storied history of engagement with the West Coast and its culture, with Adorno and Horkheimer spending time in Los Angeles, living in the Pacific Palisades section where so many other émigré German scholars lived during the Second World War (such as Bertolt Brecht, Arnold Schoenberg, Thomas Mann, and Franz Kafka), and writing *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, with its component chapter that theorized of the Culture Industry, while they were staying there in 1944.

Among his most prominent appearances and speaking engagements at institutions of higher education in the portion of his American academic career coming after the Second World War, Marcuse gave a renowned lecture on education at Brooklyn College in New York City in 1968. He then gave another noted lecture on higher education and politics in Berkeley, California, during 1975. In his lecture at Brooklyn College, he argued that the idea of general education was a very recent concept. Moreover, he found that education was not general even at the time of reform

that he was giving his lecture (Kellner et al. 2009). These beliefs of Marcuse fell back on the aforementioned distinct approach of his in the humanities, one that resonated with and was grounded in the interdisciplinary pursuits of the human, cultural, and social sciences in the history of German intellectual thought.

While teaching at Brandeis as an émigré scholar in the United States, Marcuse became one of the well-known scholars at the university's renowned and progressive History of Ideas program. After Brandeis, he moved to, and started teaching at, the aforementioned University of California at San Diego (DeVitis 1974; Reitz 2009, 2015). Marcuse began teaching at the University of California at San Diego in 1965 and was a professor emeritus there through the time of his death in 1979. He was one of the most controversial professors there with his distinct philosophy of critical education, and in 1968 the board of Regents in the University of California System attempted to persuade the central administration at San Diego not to renew his faculty appointment, a move which was unsuccessful. His best known course at San Diego was titled "Theories of Society," and among the most well-known students from San Diego was Angela Davis, who earned an MA under his direction. Marcuse's family is still involved in higher education in America, including with education in the University of California System, as his grandson Harold is a well-respected professor of history (modern German history) at the University of California at Santa Barbara, while his son Peter still is a professor emeritus of urban planning at Columbia University in New York City, the latter academic institution being where Marcuse the Frankfurt School critical theorist originally started teaching at in the United States as an émigré scholar during the Second World War. Throughout his academic career at, and affiliation with, the Frankfurt School's Institute for Social Research, Marcuse worked with scholars in many different fields of the humanities and social sciences, such as the fields of history and planning that his son and grandson are involved with today as university professors, respectively, as these endeavors characterized part of the Frankfurt School's distinct

approach to education that was interdisciplinary, and at times, multidisciplinary.

Marcuse's Influence on a Critical Philosophy of Education

Among critical theory and the philosophy of education, there have been growing amounts of secondary literature on Marcuse concerning radical and revolutionary thought in the context of critical pedagogy. Marcuse was in fact a critical philosopher of education and pedagogy and sought to transform these endeavors through nonviolent revolutionary praxis. He wrote extensively on revolution from a nonviolent perspective, as much of his critical work in this area focused on the dangers inherent in violence, and approached the topic through the lens of Hegelian-Marxist social thought. Accordingly, Marcuse engaged in social critique of traditional and educational institutions and practices. He was not the only member of the Frankfurt School of critical theorists (the Institute for Social Research) to provide such a social critique of conventional education, as this project informed a component part of the overall project of the Frankfurt School's proposal of a critical theory of society, and was carried on in European and American progressive thought by its next generation of scholars such as Jürgen Habermas in his discourse ethics. As such, Marcuse's radical and revolutionary social thought and critique of education have been examined in recent continental philosophy with the frameworks and methodologies of post-colonialism, critical race theory (including radical black thought), and critical philosophies of gender, sexuality, and disability. Various commentators have presented Marcuse's critical social thought in the context of other leading figures in continental philosophy's frameworks and methodologies relevant to philosophy of education, such as that of Martin Heidegger and phenomenology (as studied by philosophical commentators such as Richard Wolin, Andrew Feenberg, and Fred Dallmayr), in the pairing of the phenomenology of Freiburg and the critical theory of Frankfurt with the goal of achieving a critical

ontology, one that takes into account culture and education as *Bildung* in the traditional German philosophical sense. In works of Feenberg especially, who was a graduate student of Marcuse's from San Diego, the philosophy of education in these figures' thought has also been linked to their distinct philosophy of technology. Douglas Kellner has sought convergences in Marcuse's critical educational philosophy and that of the French poststructuralism of Jacques Lacan, as endeavors such as theoretical psychoanalysis were important in contemporary continental philosophical figures' work. Marcuse also had students in philosophy who went on to become major figures in progressive thought and educational reform in their own right, such as the aforementioned Angela Davis.

Themes employed by commentators in recent scholarship on Marcuse, critical education, and radical pedagogy have included these endeavors' relationship with neoliberalism, free market capitalism, and other forms of what has been interpreted and labeled by Marcuse scholars as predatory culture/economics and finance. As such, connections have been made with that of the critical theory of Michel Foucault and his work on neoliberalism in his Collège de France Lectures (published as *The Birth of Biopolitics*). Also with Marcuse's student Angela Davis, connections have been made in his radical pedagogy with critical race theory (as employed in African-American Studies) and critical feminist theory (as employed in Women's and Gender Studies). In addition to critical philosophies of race, gender, and sexuality, Marcuse's radical pedagogy has also been applied to disability studies, as well as to other marginalized groups in contemporary society, including its relationship to citizenship, the commonwealth, and utopia.

Accordingly, part of Marcuse and the Frankfurt School's critical theory of society involved the notion of praxis, more specifically, radical praxis in the context of the utopian nation-State. Marcuse's work in these areas was borrowed from his elder Frankfurt School affiliate Ernst Bloch and his work *The Spirit of Utopia*. This aspect of Marcuse's intellectual thought has been focused on the context of critical pedagogy by

commentators such as Peter McLaren, Douglas Kellner, and, in some cases, Henry Giroux and Paul Gilroy. And the strengths as well as the dangers implicit in such theories of radical praxis and utopia were examined in Marcuse's original intellectual thought with case studies of Soviet Marxism and other totalitarian and authoritarian social movements. As such, these studies have been extended and expanded in philosophy of education scholarship to give theoretical explanations to reschooling and notions of violence and nonviolence (including gun control), as well as those concerned with reschooling and educational reform/policy. Connections have also been made in social theory with Marcuse's theory of education and that of Émile Durkheim and John Dewey. Accordingly, Marcuse, as is/was the case with his Frankfurt School colleagues, offered a distinct social critique of the societal institution of education, in addition to their cultural critique which, as aforementioned, approached education as *Bildung*. As such, these theories of Marcuse's have been applied to the sociology of education (in studies that incorporate the Neo-Kantianism of Max Weber's *Verstehen* thesis in the German social sciences, as well as that of Ferdinand Tönnies notions of *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft*).

Marcuse's radical thought has been applied to avant-garde pedagogies and institutional critique, such as unschooling and unlearning, and finds itself employed in the area of contemporary cultural studies in that manner (Kellner 1998–2014; Kellner et al. 2008). And in the portion of Marcuse's distinct approach to pedagogy and education that has been developed in the context of Black Radical thought, philosophers of race and cultural critics such as Cornel West have acknowledged indebtedness to his work. Marcuse's critical theory of education was influenced by Marxian themes such as reification and false consciousness. Other Marxian themes such as commodification were employed at times, in his development of radical pedagogy among schooling, reschooling, and the reforming of educational institutions. As such, Marxian notions of alienated labor played a role in educational reform for Marcuse. Especially the case with Marcuse and the Frankfurt School was the influence of young

Marx's *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844* (the so-called Paris manuscripts), once they were rediscovered in Germany, which examined these themes (especially commodification). A significant portion of Marcuse's work on *Bildung* and education came after the rediscovery of such manuscripts in Germany. Within the Frankfurt School and its scholars of critical theory, Marcuse was influenced by affiliate Walter Benjamin's reading of Hegel's philosophy of history, philosophy of literature, and philosophy of art. Also influential was Theodor W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer's theory of the Culture Industry from their work *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, Horkheimer's lectures published as *Between Social Science and Philosophy*, his essay "Traditional and Critical Theory" (which was republished in his volume of essays titled *Critical Theory*), as well as his work *Eclipse of Reason*. Other Frankfurt School members whom were also influential in Marcuse's radical thought and pedagogy included Erich Fromm and his social psychology and psychoanalysis from works such as *The Art of Loving*, *The Escape from Freedom*, and *The Sane Society*. Additionally, Adorno's critique of Heidegger's ideology of German existentialism and phenomenology was especially influential, as explicated in works such as the polemic *The Jargon of Authenticity* and the metaphysical treatise *Negative Dialectics*. Marcuse's volume *Negations* was especially relevant to Adorno's *Negative Dialectics*, and both wrote extensively on esthetics from a Hegelian point of view, as published in Marcuse's *The Aesthetic Dimension* and Adorno's *Aesthetic Theory*.

Conclusion: Marcuse's Continental Philosophy and Critical Pedagogy

In contemporary German philosophical thought, the hermeneutics of Hans-Georg Gadamer revisited themes originally investigated in Marcuse's critical theory, such as *Bildung* as education and culture, and the notion of the esthetic dimension (which Gadamer, in turn, had hoped to transcend in his project of a philosophical hermeneutics in published works of his

such as *Truth and Method*). As such, Marcuse and Gadamer's rival methodologies in German continental philosophical thought (once again, the critical theory of Frankfurt versus the hermeneutics of Freiburg and Heidelberg) were both indebted to Hegelian readings of the philosophy of history, which again has been synthesized in recent commentators' works as a critical ontology and critical hermeneutics, the former by the likes of the aforementioned Dallmayr and Feenberg and the latter by Habermas' student from the Frankfurt School's Institute for Social Research Hans-Herbert Kögler. In Marcuse's lectures at American universities, especially relevant was Fromm's social approach to Freudian psychoanalysis, which also reappeared in his work *Eros and Civilization* (Marcuse 1966) and *Five Lectures* (Marcuse 1970). In addition to trying to synthesize Marx and Freud in his work (in an effort to expand upon Freudo-Marxism), Marcuse attempted to synthesize Hegel and Marx (in attempt to expand upon Hegelian-Marxism) in the canonical Frankfurt School sense, as well as Marx and Nietzsche, in turn focusing on in many cases what has today been labeled in continental philosophy as the "hermeneutics of suspicion" in the works of Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud. As such, Marcuse's critical social thought from the Frankfurt School has historically been a major intellectual and theoretical inspiration in the development of critical pedagogy, alongside works by the likes of Paulo Freire and his *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*. This academic area that Marcuse helped lay the foundations in a historical and theoretical manner represents a lacuna in contemporary continental philosophy scholarship and has served as an intellectual inspiration to other marginalized and historically underrepresented approaches to philosophy.

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Marcuse, Herbert

- [Marcuse and Critical Education](#)

Marginality

- [Gender, Postcolonialism, and Education](#)

Marginalization

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Market Fundamentalism

- [Neoliberalism and Education Policy](#)

Marketization of European Higher Education Through Policy

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Synonyms

[Academic capitalism](#); [Innovation policy](#); [Research policy](#)

Introduction

Until the last decades of the twentieth century, “higher education” and “innovation policy” were two publicly financed areas with few organized governmental policy connections. The so-called science and innovation policy regime (Elzinga 2004) that began in the 1990s marked a shift that encouraged a “forced marriage” between these domains. This section focuses on the theoretical background of the marketization of higher education and research and the newly identified double role of the university as provider of two distinct products: research results that can be commercialized and transformed into innovations, on the one hand, *and* of undergraduate and graduate students trained to be useful in business, industry, and society, on the other. The section concludes with a summary of the consequences of marketization for higher education and research.

From Indirect to Direct Utilization of Higher Education and Research

Until the 1980s, higher education and research were in general excluded from direct policy interventions aimed at driving innovation, industrial renewal, and economic growth in Anglo-Saxon countries. Although business and industry interacted with academia to varying degrees in the past, the general approach from governmental policy was to treat higher education and research

as a public good that should be sheltered from direct involvement by economic actors. Governmental policy concerning technological and industrial advances was mainly dealt with through industrial interaction and based on the identification of problems and opportunities related to specific technological areas and businesses. The most powerful instrument then utilized was arguably the public procurement, both military and civil, of technological solutions that did not yet exist but which the commercial and institutional organizations involved were obliged to deliver. The emergence of new technologies and related commercial goods and services in fields such as communication technology, nuclear power, and defense technology benefitted from more or less direct but always substantial State engagement (Mirowski 2011; Rider et al. 2013; Håkansson et al. 2009).

The role of higher education and research was acknowledged by scholars in different disciplines engaged in process-oriented studies of societal and industrial renewal, and it was usually identified as being mainly indirect and thus difficult either to predict or to chart retrospectively. First, when academic knowledge is mediated by people through their education and their research experience, who contributes what, when, and where tend to become hidden. Second, when academic knowledge is mediated through materialized research advances, its utilization in economic and/or social contexts most often occurs indirectly, through gradual adaptations and combinations with established social and material structures and processes in public as well as commercial settings. Third-hand conceptions of scientific advances, as Basalla (1988) notes, can and do serve technology well.

Neoliberal thinking, often spurred by US cold war think tanks, had no particular influence on higher education policy until the 1980s. It was during this period that new ideas about the relationship among academic research and economic actors took hold (Mirowski 2011; Slaughter and Leslie 1997). The aim of the 1990s' science and innovation policy regime was to create a more efficient utilization of public investments in higher education and research through the

establishment of a direct relationship to business and industry. With the OECD as a main exponent, and with EU policy as an early adopter, a new doctrine came to dominate policy discourse about higher education and research, namely, its role as a critical but underutilized source of innovation. The remedy, according to this model, was comprehensive utilization, to be achieved through policy orchestration. New structures to bridge the gap between higher education and the "market" had to be established, including support to educational and research areas identified as important knowledge providers to the latter. The policy was then that the aim of science is first and foremost to make a socioeconomic contribution (Nowotny et al. 2001).

Forces Behind the Changing Relationship Between Higher Education and the Market

Neoliberal policy paved the way for increased governmental reliance on "market forces" to spur industrial and societal renewal. The understanding of the structure and function of the business and industry expected to transform research advances to innovation was markedly guided by conventional market models. The economic landscape was assumed to have the characteristics of a "market," that is, populated by competing companies which, independently from other economic actors *and* from historical and contemporary social and material investments, are free to make decisions about what commercialized goods to exchange. The great obstacle to overcome was identified as the interface between academic research and the market. Academic research advances were considered "sticky information," that is, difficult for the market to access. Thus, policy makers saw the need for a supporting organizational structure of information transfer from the public to the private. The basic idea was that *if* academic knowledge advances corresponding to certain needs were commercialized, the actors of the market would absorb it and transform it into equivalent products and services. Hence, the interface between commercialized research advances

and established social, financial, and material structures would be free from friction and interference (Rider et al. 2013; Håkansson et al. 2009).

The most common approach to policy with respect to innovation and growth is the so-called national innovation system (Lundvall 1988), which actually originated as a critique of neoclassic market thinking; in European policy interpretation, however, it was adopted as a complement to it. A national innovation system is identified in all the factors behind the development, diffusion, and use of innovations, with higher education and research as a basic ingredient. The ability to supply society with relevantly educated and trained people, *and* with knowledge advances that can be commercialized, is seen here as critical for the level of innovation, renewal, and growth for a nation or region. The fact that a nation investing in higher education and research still can have a relatively low proportion of “research-intensive” innovations is described as a “knowledge paradox,” the implicit assumption being that commercialization should follow immediately, both temporally and spatially, from research, and further, that it is possible to identify and quantify innovation by reference to evidence such as patent data. While the national innovation system model underscores the importance of an active user setting for the transformation of research advances into innovations, European policy acknowledges other components: “knowledge production,” “transfer,” and “reduction of hindrances for market forces.” Thus, in line with neoliberal economic thinking, the role of the market forces and the need for related “system components” is seen here as the way to overcome the “knowledge paradox” (Rider et al. 2013; Håkansson et al. 2009).

The adoption of the national innovation system model in European policy entailed that higher education and research came to be considered a central “system component,” which at its best can supply the market and society with both economic and social innovations, leading to solutions corresponding to societal challenges such as environmental and climate threats, as well as yielding traditional benefits such as employment opportunities, economic growth, and improved quality of

life in general. The advice from the OECD *and* the EU was that barriers and regulations restricting interaction between universities and private companies and corporations should be removed and that private-public collaborative arrangements should instead be facilitated. Consequently, an important policy task became to limit all hindrances to interaction between academia and economic actors. This ambition was realized by many means; universities were provided with an extensive transfer system, including judicial arrangements and ownership regulations; quantitative indicators were developed to help assess the functioning of the “innovation system”; individual member States and regions were advised about how to strengthen their general innovation systems, including their economic and social institutions. The core of the advice concerned how higher education and research, in their role as producer of system components, can be stimulated to correspond to the needs of the market and society (Slaughter and Leslie 1997; Mirowski 2011).

The neoliberal thinking about the role of markets also affected European higher education through a number of other direct structural changes. One of the most relevant bits of EU legislation, based on market assumptions, was decisive in making the traditional divide between higher education policy and innovation policy obsolete. When direct national involvement in industry came to be seen as disrupting market forces, the primary means left at the disposal of national governments wishing to maximize the utility of higher education and research was to identify social and economic challenges in advance to be “solved” by universities. Market models were also the underpinnings of “new public management” (NPM) as a way to increase efficiency in publicly financed institutions and agencies, leading to the assessment of educational results, research advances, and knowledge transfer in terms of quantifiable units of measurement.

Market-inspired research and innovation policy, uniting the aims of higher education, research, business development, and innovation, was also reinforced by globalization. At the end of the twenty-first century, technological and

organizational development had given rise to increased commercial specialization; companies utilized external expertise and outsourced many specialized activities. In contrast to neoliberal assumptions about a market populated by independent economic actors, the economic landscape instead faced increasing dependencies across company borders. Furthermore, legal changes made it possible to transfer capital and ownership across juridical borders. Together, these changes fostered an increasing number of visible and invisible alliances, partnerships, and business relationships, stretching across corporate, organizational, and national borders. The organizational changes also included the outsourcing of the most expensive and uncertain part of research and development to publicly financed universities and research institutes (Mirowski 2011; Slaughter and Leslie 1997; Håkansson et al. 2009).

The phenomenon of what has been called “academic capitalism” (Slaughter and Leslie 1997, pp. 8–9) that was the result of political economy, more specifically, policy-driven changes in higher education and research, conjoined with an economic climate that encouraged business and industry to outsource their research expenses to publicly financed research organizations (Mirowski 2011; Håkansson et al. 2009). Mirowski and Sent (2008) stress that what has occurred is not merely an adoption of market thinking in the steering of higher education and research but also, and more importantly, a blurring of the borders between publicly financed knowledge production, a public good, and economic interests (private goods). Global economic actors became an integrated part of publicly financed research and education.

Consequences for Higher Education and Research

If the economic landscape had the characteristics of a “market” as depicted in conventional market thinking, the knowledge advances transferred from the public to the private sector would not have had to be adapted to existing social and material structures; the economic actors would

have been able to decide which commercialized knowledge, corresponding to what needs, to acquire and utilize in new products and services, independently from investments in place. Given a global economy characterized by systemic interdependencies, however, for a new advance in research to add value, it has to be adapted to social and material investments in place. If a direct utilization of research for innovation is going to be achieved, the adaptations must take place during the research process and not, as traditionally, after the fact. This in turn entails that any significant interaction between higher education and the economic landscape has to blur the border among publicly and privately financed activities. The same is true for educational programs. If the students educated are going to be directly useful for different kinds of stakeholders, the content of the programs will have to be adapted to the established activities and the needs of the latter.

The consequences of uniting higher education policy and innovation policy are complex and far reaching. The more advances in knowledge are identified with direct contributions to the innovation system, the more faculty and institutions have to adapt to corresponding commercial and public user interests. This development, in turn, entails also that *certain* research and educational fields will be deemed more useful for innovation than others and will consequently be targeted for funding, from both governmental and private sources (Slaughter and Leslie 1997). The areas of research and education that can benefit from the “1990s research and innovation policy” are those that can adapt to the notion of knowledge as functional components in an innovation system. Research and education that is thought to supply relevant advances and competencies and thus yield added value to social and material investments in place will be allocated resources that will be taken from less productive fields. Both education and research will have to adapt to business and industry as customers; the research advances and education provided will have to correspond to the commercial and societal activities to which they are to add value. Naturally, the knowledge transfer units established at universities to encourage and increase the

commercialization of research advances based on *expectations* of what they can contribute within the “innovation system” will also benefit from current policy.

Resources for research and education programs lacking a simple fit into this system, that is, those engaged in knowledge development and practices, the outcome of which is difficult or nearly impossible to blueprint, will dwindle, as they are increasingly funneled into the innovation system. Basic research, whose potential benefits cannot be predicted or assured in advance, falls outside a system constructed to deliver components for immediate use in business, industry, and society. Thus, change in the relationship between higher education and society is dramatic: the ideal of the university as an autonomous servant of public goods has been replaced with that of a supplier of commercial goods and services on a global market. It is too early to say what the long-term consequences of the disappearance of forms of knowledge irreducible to economic transactions and immediate social utility are.

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Markets

► Managerialism and Education

Martin Heidegger

► Nietzschean Education and Gelassenheit-Education

Marx and Philosophy of Education

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In many ways it is easier to write about the application of Marx’s work within education than it is to write about any strictly defined “educational” import of Marx’s own writing. Regarding the former, *Marxism* has had a dramatic and powerful influence over all aspects of education, not only in the West but across the world. The Soviet Union as was and the Republic of China are two examples of how Marx’s critique of bourgeois economies and social relations were transformed, in different ways, into general programmes of compulsory “State” education which aimed at advancing new forms of social relations and new societies. Also, many poorer parts of the world have used Marxism as an educational tool either to promote revolutionary change or to maintain it.

Of significance in the West has been the Marxism of Brazilian educator Paulo Freire. His book *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* (1972)

continues to be an example of how Marxist revolutionary politics can be worked into educational theory and practice. This kind of education has become known as critical (sometimes dialogical) pedagogy, and it involves teachers using classrooms for a critique of bourgeois ideology or the worldviews of the oppressors. The views of the oppressed themselves, the students, are given a voice and a legitimacy. They are not suppressed by a dominant teacher who tells them “how it is” and “what they must do.” Instead teachers and students seek to challenge traditional models of their relationship, working through together, in a mutual dialogue, how the world is and naming it according to these suppressed interpretations. For Freire this *praxis* is revolutionary because the ideas, language, and concepts of the oppressed will threaten and potentially overcome the bourgeois relations of domination, both in education and in the wider society. At its root, this critical education aims to undermine bourgeois ideology and to transform undemocratic forms of society into free and democratic socialist societies. This kind of critical pedagogy has enjoyed a vitality in the West, particularly in North America, although there are other strains, most notably in Europe from the critical theory of Horkheimer, Adorno, and Habermas. A particular tension in this strain of critical pedagogy, given its origins, is that it concentrates very heavily on the ideological and other obstacles which block revolutionary change, offering a somewhat negative and pessimistic diagnosis. Habermas alone is held to be one critical theorist who maintains a more optimistic vision (see, for example, his two volume book, *The Theory of Communicative Action* 1989, 1991, and R.E. Young’s *A Critical Theory of Education: Habermas and our Children’s Future* 1989).

Another way in which Marxism was applied to education in the West was as a theoretical perspective with its own concepts and frameworks by which the theory and practice of education in capitalist societies could be understood. Marxist perspectives of this kind were prevalent in philosophy, sociology, politics, and economics. What they had in common was a critique of all aspects of Western educational provision, seeing such provision as another superstructural element

which reproduced but never challenged the existing order of inequality and exploitation. Speaking sociologically for a moment, education was identified as one of the key bourgeois institutions – Althusser (1984) remarked that with the decline of the Church it was now the *key* institution – by which the bourgeoisie were able to ensure their continued ownership of the means of production. The values which schools passed on to their students, the attitudes they inculcated, the behavior and respect for authority they demanded, and even the time keeping and regular work practices they imposed were seen as both a preparation of the next generation of laborers for an uncritical and docile acceptance of the relations of production and an ideological reproduction of modern bourgeois social relations as “natural.” Each element of the curriculum was identified as playing its part here. For example, physical education extolled competition among human beings as a true representation of human nature and rewarded those who were successful in overcoming the challenge of their rivals; history sought to ensure a new generation who viewed world events from the perspective of the imperialist masters and not from that of those forced into slavery; home economics gave the impression that housework was the “natural” domain of women. Marxist feminists developed arguments about this patriarchal aspect of the way schools serve as ideological tools of the bourgeoisie.

Marxism as a critical perspective in the social sciences was perhaps at its weakest in two areas. First, many argued that its thesis about the structural features of ideology – that ideology was built into the system and would corrupt all attempts to overthrow it – was overdeterministic. It seemed to suggest that human beings were somewhat helpless in the face of those structures and particularly helpless against the power of capital not only to abstract all objects into commodities but also in a similar way all relations between people. The failure of the working class in most European countries to mount a revolutionary challenge was explained in this way. Second, and contradicting this view, others suggested that a Marxist critique which could see through the process of commodification and its consequent

effects on day to day perception of reality had already in some senses overcome these ideological distortions, and that therefore the production of a different kind of consciousness, one which was potentially revolutionary, was still possible. These two opposing positions have, for us, an educational relationship. If ideology has totally triumphed, then its critique may no longer be possible, reduced to mere repetition of objectified (*bourgeois*) social relations. If ideology can be overcome, then those who say so find themselves in a dominating, more “educated” position than those who remain “unenlightened.” As with any such vanguard, they could be charged with legitimizing a hierarchy of knowledge and a legitimation and of a kind of “intellectual tyranny” whereby they were able to justify themselves as able to make decisions on behalf of those who did not yet understand the world “correctly.”

Viewed in this way Marxism has an educational dilemma at its very core. This comes into view when education is understood not as the accumulation of facts and knowledge – what might be called mere abstract or empirical education – but rather as the experience of the oppositions and contradictions which empirical education generates. This latter can be called a “philosophical” education (after Hegel). As such, the dilemma of authority and legitimation which lies at the heart of Marxist theory and practice is, for us, an educational experience born out of what is called the “dialectic of enlightenment.” In Marxism, “enlightened” theory dominates practice and practice generates experiences of failure and repetition which return us again to (enlightening) theory. This aporia has always been Marxism’s own dialectic of enlightenment. (For details of this see Horkheimer and Adorno’s *Dialectic of Enlightenment* 1979). However, Marxism has been slow to theorize this dialectic of enlightenment in Marx’s own work. I will return to this below, but in short the dialectic of enlightenment in Marx is repeated as the “culture” which is Marxism. That Marxism has consistently failed to recognize itself as a culture explains its repeated failure to explore the nature of modern experience and more significantly how we *learn* from such experiences. Using Hegel’s definition of culture,

Marxism has not understood itself, its “subjectivity,” as a representation of its predetermined relation to universality by and within bourgeois social relations. This failure to learn about itself as representation constitutes an *educational* failure.

Marxism in this sense both represents and misrepresents Marx. In many ways the somewhat crude models of revolutionary consciousness or *praxis* which underpin the intervention of Marxists in the educational process stem from Marx’s own problems in working through the relation between the theory and practice, particularly in regard to subjectivity. To understand this, it is necessary first to rehearse in broad terms Marx’s theory of economic determinism. One brief summary on these ideas is found in his 1859 *Preface to a Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*. There he explains that how people come together in society to meet their needs for food, shelter, warmth, etc. is determined by the resources which are available to them at the time. We do not decide from scratch each time how to do this. On the contrary we inherit all of the achievements (or otherwise) of previous generations. Marx says,

... in the social production of their existence, men inevitably enter into definite relations, which are independent of their will, namely relations of production appropriate to a given stage in the development of their material forces of production. The totality of these relations of production constitute the economic structure of society (1975, p. 425).

At the time Marx was writing, the material forces of production were those left by the industrial revolution, including machinery and factories. The relations of production are determined by these forces of production in that factories demand laborers to work the machines and demand capitalists to own both them and the products that are manufactured. The next step in the argument is that this totality of relations, capitalist and proletarian, appears “natural” and becomes the (economic) base “on which arises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of legal consciousness” (1975, p. 425). In other words, the predetermination of the world as it appears to us according to particular material circumstances and levels of

development is hidden from us. What we see we take as natural and do all our theorizing and philosophizing from this (mistaken) starting point, including our views about the law, about equality, and most significantly about “human nature.” Thus Marx is able to conclude that

The mode of production of material life conditions the general process of social, political and intellectual life. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but their social existence that determines their consciousness (1975, p. 425).

For Marx two things are of crucial importance here. First, the link between doing and thinking, or between the production of objects from nature and the production of ideas about nature, is already established. The species activity of mankind, as Marx calls it, is already a unity of theory and practice. Only under particular conditions does this unity appear to be irreparably severed, most notably those accompanying capitalist relations of production. Thus, and second, when mankind sees through these conditions it comes into conflict with the current relations of production. It sees that private property in particular and the separation of labor power from materialist activity are “fetters” which now prevent a different mode of production of material life. “Then begins an era of social revolution” (1975, p. 425–426) or of a conflict between a species alienated from itself and the bourgeois relations of production which predetermine that alienation. Putting these two aspects together, the proletariat is now setting itself “only such tasks as it is able to solve” (1975, p. 426) for it contains within itself both the development of new forms of material production and new forms of social, political, and intellectual life. In taking this step, in realizing mankind’s nature as truly “social” (or communal) Marx believes that “the prehistory of human society accordingly closes with this social formation” (1975, p. 426).

In employing notions of “seeing through” and “overcoming” Marx’s theory of social revolution can be said to involve notions of “education” or “enlightenment.” As Kant had suggested in the previous century, enlightenment is man’s release from dependence upon another. For Marx there is no doubt that revolution meant a release for the

proletariat from their bondage to a class of owners who represented (and enjoyed) the alienated labor of the workers. In addition one could say that the proletariat, in developing their own class consciousness and seeing through the illusions of bourgeois ideology, enlightened themselves regarding their own nature or *species activity*. But it would be wrong I think to see this (as Habermas has done in his *Philosophical Discourse of Modernity* 1987) solely as an enlightenment based on the philosophy of the rational subject. Marx has no theory of subjectivity precisely because of the difficulties posed by the dialectic of enlightenment within which subjectivity both is and is not its own identity. In Marx’s favor, as he makes clear in *On the Jewish Question*, the idea of the free citizen/subject is itself ideological and one which will be overcome when the political is redefined under new social relations. Exactly what that will look like Marx famously never tells us.

The lack of a theory of subjectivity protects Marx from slipping into bourgeois “natural law” theory but it also inadvertently protects him from realizing the actual significance for “subjectivity” of the dialectic of enlightenment in which subjectivity is both thought and not thought. Marx’s philosophical education is in this sense one sided. It has been hard for the modern consciousness which lives in the illusion of modern subjectivity to find its own voice or expression in Marx’s work. The imperative which subjectivity finds in Marx is to overcome all illusory (bourgeois) representations of itself. The reasons that it has been unable to do so have occupied many twentieth century critical theorists who asked why modern subjectivity was returned again and again to itself in its attempts to change social relations. Yet there is just such an analysis of return in Marx with regard to capital. It is well known that the theory of commodity fetishism reveals how commodities enjoy the social relationships with others that really should belong to human beings. That social relationship, Marx argues in the *Grundrisse* (1973), we carry around in our pockets as money. What is significant here is that when money, our social power, is risked or circulated in the market, the loss of its social nature returns

as capital. If the structure of Marx's analysis of this economy of risk, circulation, and return is interpreted in a Hegelian way then the nature of this return is the philosophical (and spiritual) significance of the dialectic of enlightenment. It is the culture, the self-representation, of the bourgeois subject who is learning about and from the experience of its own illusory status as a person. In such a reading, the "culture" of commodities is return in the form of capital as the culture of reified subjectivity is return in the form of (speculative) experience. One social theorist to have forcefully argued this case is Gillian Rose. She ends her book *Hegel Contra Sociology* by stating that

... to expound capitalism as a culture is thus not to abandon the classical Marxist interests in political economy and in revolutionary practice. On the contrary, a presentation of the contradictory relations between capital and culture is the only way to link the analysis of the economy to comprehension of the conditions for revolutionary practice (1981, p. 220).

In his ambivalence towards subjectivity Marx left open the space for this cultural and educational reading. But much of the Marxism after Marx became the culture which dare not speak its name, refusing or suppressing its own actuality as a culture, and thereby refusing its difficult and contradictory relation to the universal which was and remains its goal. Marx and Marxism without culture and education cannot learn about its own part in reinforcing the forms of bourgeois theorizing and law which it sought to overcome. But as Rose concludes: "this critique of Marxism itself yields the project of a critical Marxism" (1981, p. 220), a project which is avowedly educational.

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Marxism

- [Critical Theory as Metatheory of Education](#)
- [Gender, Sexuality, and Marxism](#)

Marxism and Disability Studies

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Synonyms

[Materialist disability studies](#); [Political economy of disablement](#), [The](#)

Introduction

Disability studies, a discipline that critically examines the meaning and implications of the social construction of dis/ability, provides a useful framework through which to understand the systemic oppression of disabled students, the construction of disability/ability in education, and disability-based oppression more broadly. Disability studies scholars and disability rights activists have long rejected the medical model of disability, which treats disability as an individual deficiency that necessitates medical intervention to "fix." A disability studies perspective, on the other hand, understands disability as socially produced. Disablement is situated within social, political, and economic structures that ascribe its meaning within a particular place at a given historical moment. This framework illuminates how

disability has been forged as an identity by those who share experiences of disability-based oppression or ableism. This entry specifically highlights disability studies scholars' engagements with Marxist theory. A historical materialist perspective highlights that ableism is not just a product of prejudicial attitudes that can be ameliorated through liberal rights-based legislation but is, primarily, the product of a mode of production under which one's value is determined by their exploitability within the wage labor system. Marxist analyses of ableism crucially expose that ending the systemic oppression of disabled people demands dismantling capitalism. As critical disability theories are increasingly taken up by educational theorists and philosophers, it is worth expounding how disability studies analyses that draw from Marxist theory shed light on the ongoing oppression of disabled people within the contemporary landscape of education. After reviewing Marxist analyses of disablement proffered by disability studies scholars, this entry concludes with a discussion of the ideas of educational theorists and critical pedagogues who engage disability studies and highlight the possibility education holds for challenging ableist capitalism.

Materialist Disability Studies

The dominant medical or individual approach to disability views disabled people's exclusion from the labor force as a natural and inevitable consequence of an innate biological deficiency. A disability studies approach rejects this medicalized conception of disability as an individual misfortune and instead understands disability, most broadly, as socially constructed. US-based disability studies scholarship has tended to place greater emphasis on disability identity and to highlight policy issues that reproduce structural ableism, at times at the expense of in-depth class analysis. While early US-based disability studies scholarship did highlight the material conditions of disabled people's oppression, disablement was seldom situated as principally a product of the social relations of production. Much early

disability studies work, which was heavily influenced by disabled activists' struggles, was understandably so directed at specific policy and legislative change precisely because of the degree to which the experience of disability oppression is entwined with bureaucratic governmental systems and programs. The strides made by activists in the disability rights movement on these fronts are vital. Some disability studies scholars, however, particularly those from the United Kingdom, have long advocated materialist analyses of disablement (Meekosha 2004). Marxist-influenced theorizations are distinct in that they view disablement primarily as a political and economic phenomenon and thus understand the construction of disability as principally rooted in the social relations of production (Russell and Malhotra 2002; Russell 2001). This framework recognizes that the dominant logic of disability is indispensable in justifying compulsory unemployment and regulating the labor supply under the capitalist mode of production (Russell 2001).

Disability studies scholar Michael Oliver proffered a Marxist analysis of disablement early on in the discipline's development (Oliver 1992). Critiquing the field's overemphasis on normalization or normalizing disability, Oliver (1999) wrote:

Normalization theory offers disabled people the opportunity to be given valued social roles in an unequal society which values some roles more than others. Materialist social theory offers disabled people the opportunity to transform their own lives and in so doing transform the society in which they live into one in which all roles are valued. (p. 172)

Oliver emphasizes that dominant ideas about normalcy, while relevant, are better understood as ideologies employed to justify the economic conditions of late capitalism. He thus critiqued analyses of the ideological justifications for disability-based inequality that neglected to root its structural basis in a capitalist system.

The work of Oliver and others makes clear that despite the focus on disability identity and normalcy within much disability studies scholarship, Marxist strands – which foreground material conditions and political and economic structures – have long been present within both disability scholarship and activism. The Union of

Physically Impaired Against Segregation, an early network of disabled activists in the United Kingdom whose ideas gave rise to the social model of disability and fueled the disability rights movement, was inspired by Marxism and early on rejected liberal and reformist campaigns (Shakespeare 2010). Disability studies scholars who foreground materialist analyses have attributed the shortcomings of liberal rights-based legislation, like the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), to a failure to recognize disability-based oppression as intrinsic to capitalism (Russell 2001, 2002). In light of the now evident insufficiency of liberal rights-based legislation for dismantling ableism, disability studies scholars are increasingly incorporating analyses of the political economy to explicate how the mode of production disables and devalues those whose labor power is or is perceived to be less exploitable within capitalism (Russell 2002).

It is worth clarifying, in light of commonly waged accusations of reductionism in Marxist theory, that materialist disability studies scholars recognize that disabled people have been marginalized under other economic systems. However, these scholars have compellingly argued that the dominant ideologies around disability that underlie ableism in its contemporary manifestation are principally rooted in the exploitative economic system (Gleeson 1997). In other words, the constant need for capital circulation and accumulation provides the material basis for contemporary manifestations of disability oppression. Many have thus argued that capitalism is far more disabling than prior social forms. Disability studies scholars have specifically pointed to the fact that in contemporary society ability is defined, in large part, in relation to one's exploitability as a worker for the sake of capital accumulation. For example, such analyses highlight how the shift to industrial capitalism and the attendant emphasis on standardization, rationalization, and mechanization produced a new class of disabled people now excluded from the labor force. Disability is thus defined synchronously with the shifting labor needs of capitalist production. At the same time, with this shift conceptions of human value became increasingly tied to economic

productivity and efficiency (Russell 2001; Goodley 2013). Eugenic ideology and the heightened emphasis on normalization and ranking thus emerged concomitantly to legitimize the new status quo and pathologize the newly disabled class (Russell and Malhotra 2002).

Brendan Gleeson (1997), a Marxist geographer and one of a handful of geographers to incorporate a disability studies perspective, describes the social history of capitalism as "a sociospatial dialectic of commodification and spatial change which progressively disabled" the labor power of bodies deemed unfit (p. 195). Both Gleeson and Oliver analyzed institutionalization and the move to deinstitutionalize from a Marxist perspective, highlighting the shifting social relations of production under which deinstitutionalization gained traction. Gleeson and Kearns (2001), for example, situate the shift away from institutions and toward vaguely defined "community care" within the context of the widespread neoliberal restructuring of States. They argue that the deinstitutionalization movement was largely co-opted by late capitalist or neoliberal governments seeking to cut social welfare spending by contracting out services to private care providers.

While disabled people have been systematically excluded from participation in the economic system under capitalism, the commodification of disability, at the same time, has opened up new markets for the expansion of capital through the further pathologization of disabled people. This has been well documented by disability studies scholars who outline the proliferation of diagnoses and categorizations that increasingly medicalize innumerable manifestations of human variation. The proliferation of the "special" industry and the marketing of apparently any activity disabled people engage in as "therapy," for instance, evidence the way in which capital has expanded into the human body and rendered it a highly profitable marketplace. The endless array of new diagnostic categories and concomitant overmedication of students, through which the pharmaceutical industry has accumulated mass profits, can be similarly read through a Marxist disability studies optic (Wiener et al. 2009).

In addition to rendering a new class of people disabled through shifting demands under Fordist and post-Fordist production, many have noted that disability is materially created through the working and broader environmental conditions of late capitalism and imperialism. Among countless other examples, this is evidenced by heightened rates of respiratory conditions among poor Black students and the mass disablement of people globally through imperialist wars. Materialist analyses thus call attention to the way in which capitalism creates disability through exploitative labor conditions and the colonial and imperial practices that sustain it.

While foregrounding critiques of the capitalist mode of production, some materialist disability scholars have urged that Marxist formulations that ignore critical disability analyses are inadequate for developing and enacting liberatory theories and politics around disability. As Abberley (1997) argues, for example, for many disabled people, an analysis “linking impairment to capitalism as a very symptom of its inhumanity and irrationality, is of little use” (p. 29). Indeed, some have disconcertingly argued for a socialist economic system by endorsing socialism as a path toward eradicating disability. Moreover, while the Marxist dictum “from each according to his abilities, to each according to his need” has been suggested to hold liberatory potential for disabled people (Russell 2001), others have argued that while removing the material basis for oppression, this framework upholds a normative disability/impairment binary whereby impairment is still only legible as a biological deficiency within an individual and, thus, fails to challenge taken-for-granted perceptions of disability/ability (Goodley 2013). Abberley notes that “for impaired people to be adequately provided for in the system of distribution, but excluded from the system of production, that is, on a superior form of welfare, would be unsatisfactory, since we would still be in the essentially peripheral relationship to society we occupy today” (p. 32). While rejecting the subordination of use value to exchange value under capitalism, Abberley asserts the importance of labor and of being central in the production of social life. Implicit in his analysis is the notion that

having one’s labor recognized as socially valuable is crucial for self-development and identity formation. Indeed, access to work and accessible workplaces has been a central demand of disabled activists. Certain bodies, though – most evidently those of severely intellectually disabled people – will always be beyond the purview of recognized labor power within the capitalist mode of production. Building off this idea, Marxist disability studies scholars have highlighted the necessity of developing an alternative understanding of labor that allows for the social recognition and attribution of value to disabled peoples’ supposedly “nonproductive” labor power (Mitchell and Snyder 2010). Marxism alone thus fails to challenge a hegemonic conception of ability – perpetuated through schooling practices and policies – and disability studies scholars and activists offer critical insight to this end.

Materialist Disability Studies in Education

Educational theorists and philosophers are increasingly taking up a disability studies framework, and the development of the fledgling field of disability studies in education is particularly promising. For disability studies to retain its transformative potential and build upon and transform critical educational theory, it is crucial that Marxist analyses of disablement be foregrounded. The capitalist ideology of productivism is central to the experience of disablement; dominant norms of who is “able” and accompanying conceptions of certain bodies as disabled and burdensome are inextricable from the social relations of production. Analyses of ableism thus offer a particularly stringent critique of capitalism. Given the way in which dominant ideologies around disability/ability are produced and reproduced through schooling, materialist disability studies offer a critical alternative to educational practices and policies that uphold oppressive ideologies through the continued segregation and marginalization of disabled students. The heightened extension of market and productivist ideology into institutionalized education with the rise of neoliberal

reforms, moreover, renders the development of educational theory and philosophy from a disability studies perspective particularly urgent. A Marxist analysis of disability in education also calls attention to the creation and construction of disablement under capitalism by considering how the uneven distribution of particular disabilities – such as the vastly disproportionate number of Black students labeled with emotional/behavioral disorders – impacts students' ability to learn while in school.

Some liberal theorizations of disability justice appeal to an idea of the able-disabled highlighting disabled people's normative abilities to advocate for accommodations that allow them greater participation in the workforce. By appealing to hegemonic notions of ability, though, this argument further entrenches a conception of human worth tied to economic productivity. This framework will always and inevitably be disabling for those whose labor power is not legible as such within the system of capital. Theorists linking disability studies to education have thus emphasized the need to prioritize use value in order to render legible the labor of many disabled people. Erevelles (2000) writes:

Alternatively, if, within another set of social relations, the laboring body is not commodified but is instead associated with the production of use-value, then in this case it would indeed be possible to explore the usefulness of the disabled body in more creative ways, since usefulness is no longer predicated on generating profits but is, instead, associated with meeting perhaps more affective and other non-monetary human needs. (p. 41)

Erevelles crucially highlights the need for an expanded notion of use that allows for the recognition of the intangible and unquantifiable use value of disabled bodies.

Disability injustices enacted by neoliberal education reforms – such as the heightened segregation of disabled students consequent of charter schools and the implementation of high-stakes tests scored on a so-called normal curve rooted in eugenic science – are usefully read through a materialist disability studies optic. Such an analysis suggests that inclusive education practices, for example, while a necessary and crucial reform for

challenging dominant logics of disability, is wholly insufficient if, in advocating such practices, we fail to ask what exactly it is that disabled students are to be included *in*. That is to say, if schools are understood as ideological State apparatuses that reproduce the social relations of production and if the mode of production is inherently disabling for those whose bodies it renders insufficiently exploitable, inclusion in a fundamentally disabling system can never amount to a liberatory disability politics. In it of themselves, such practices amount to including disabled students in a State apparatus that serves to reproduce the conditions of their disablement. Critical pedagogies that account for the way in which disablement is structurally produced are imperative in combatting this. Such pedagogies ought to not only dismantle dominant logics of disability that devalue particular bodies and ways of thinking and feeling but, moreover, create space for the collective development of alternative systems of value (Erevelles 2000; Goodley 2007). Within an alternative economic system, under which the laboring body is not commodified, more creative ways of valuing people can emerge (Erevelles 2000; Russell and Malhotra 2002). One's usefulness would no longer be predicated on their ability to allow the accumulation of capital, but, rather, usefulness could be thought of in terms of one's ability to fulfill affective or other intangible human needs. By incorporating such pedagogies, educational spaces can become sites for imagining and enacting alternatives to capitalism and the disabling system of value intrinsic to it.

Conclusion

Ableism operates in particularly stark relation to the political economy in that disability/ability is defined and constructed in direct relation to one's capacity to produce under the capitalist mode of production. While some social movements have sought to refute assumptions about particular groups' labor power – for example, debunking racist or sexist assumptions about people's capacity to labor productively – for many disabled people, the inadequacy of this tactic is evident. The disabling perception of their bodies as less

economically productive is indisputable within the presently configured capitalist economy. This has perhaps contributed to resistance to recognizing ableism as a system of oppression. Because ability is defined in direct relation to one's capacity to enable the accumulation of capital and prejudicial attitudes are a by-product of the social relations of production, it is clear that liberation from ableism is not possible within a capitalist economy. A materialist disability studies perspective renders evident that efforts which neglect to address the structural roots of disability oppression in the capitalist mode of production will always and inevitably fall short. A disability optic also expands Marxist analyses by challenging hegemonic conceptions of ability. Marxist-oriented disability studies scholars compellingly argue that capitalism is absolutely incommensurable with liberation from ableism and, further, offer critical analyses that deepen the political project and possibility of Marxist thought.

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Marxism and Student Movements

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Introduction

Students and student movements have played crucial roles in political, cultural, and social transformations since the beginnings of the university (Altbach 1966, 1989; Boren 2001; DeGroot 1998; Lipset and Altbach 1966, 1969; Barker 2008a). Students are characterized for being a heterogeneous group who represent a diverse, pluralistic, and contradictory range of ideologies, grievances, and political commitments. Student movements are as diverse as students are; historically, student movements have not always been progressive or radical in their aims. For example, during the revolutions of Paris 1848 and Russia 1917–1919, students sided with the reactionary bourgeoisie (Barker 2008a). On the other hand, in the student movements of the 1960s and early 1970s in the United States, or Latin American movements in the 1950s and 1960s, student movements played a more revolutionary role (Barker 2008a; Spector 2013). Although the

topic of this entry focuses on the relationship between Marxism and student movements, it is important to point out that student movements have also had (and continue to have) close ties with a range of political philosophies, such as anarchism, feminism, liberalism, conservatism, among others. In short, diversity and heterogeneity of interests and political commitments among students have been the most fundamental markings of student organizing and political action (Gill and DeFronzo 2009).

The relationship between Marxism and student political activism has been marked by complexity and debate. Often student collective action has been disregarded as “bourgeois” or “petit-bourgeois” demands (“Student Movement” n.d.). Student movements have also been framed as simply the politics of a “generational gap,” where student activism has been interpreted as alienated youth rebelling against older generations. On a similar note, student activism has also been downplayed as a youth quest for meaning, at times even a quest for overly idealistic “impossible” ends or pursuits. However, students’ contributions to revolutionary struggles and their roles as organizers and leaders have been recognized (i.e., the Chinese revolution in the 1940s, the Cuban revolution in 1950s, and the Civil Rights movement in the United States in the 1960s, among others). It is also important to recognize that student organizations have also been deeply influenced by Marxism. For example, many members of student movements, either individually or collectively, have been actively involved in the communist or socialist parties in their respective countries (i.e., Zengakuren in Japan, FECH in Chile, among others).

Student organizing is confronted with particular challenges that other types of collective action may not face in the same way. For instance, student political organizations and movements are challenged by the limited time span of student life; once a student finishes his/her studies, he/she is no longer considered to be a student and his/her participation in student political action may be restricted. Student participation in collective action is also restricted by the structure of the academic calendar; periods in between terms are

moments when there is a decreased level of student political demonstrations. Similarly, canceling or suspending classes for extended periods of time is a tactic that university administrations have employed to deter student mobilization on campuses, which often results in an important number of the student body returning or staying at home instead of being politically and academically active on campus. These factors historically have posed important challenges for student mobilizing and have influenced the structure that student movements and organizations have adopted for securing student leadership, guaranteeing recruitment of new students, and assuring continuation of their political action.

Although aspects of student life, like its clearly demarcated temporality and the structure of academic calendars, pose a constant challenge for student movements, there are other aspects that open possibilities for student social mobilization and boost their potential. For example, the arrangement of academic schedules for full-time students allows student activists easier access to possible members who may have time, availability, and interest in being part of the collective action. In comparison with workers or peasants movements, students have less restrictions to organize direct actions and mobilize their peers. Students can protest and gather groups of support, stage walk outs, and sit-ins, using their free time easier than workers, who face different forms of repression. These aspects, however, remain continuously contested and negotiated as neoliberal reforms and capitalist dynamics transform universities and high schools.

Historically, the scope of student movements has been diverse. Some movements have pursued changes beyond the university, school, or academic boundaries, as many students, either individually or collectively, have contributed to revolutionary causes closely tied with communist or workers’ parties and movements to overthrow capitalism, more broadly. Students, both individually and collectively, have had (and continue to have) ongoing relationships with political parties, organizations, and movements of the left in a variety of ways. Students’ experiences in student movements and organizations are formative and

often serve as a path to students' involvement in leftist politics. A number of students, although not necessarily the majority, have also been organizers, leaders, intellectuals, and members of political parties and movements of the left (Boren 2001; Altbach 1989; Lipset cited in Altbach 1966). It is important to note that the relationships between student movements, student organizations, and political or social movements on the left are mutually beneficial. Students who are actively involved in political parties and movements of the left influence, organize, and incite students to collectively mobilize when political unrest arises on campuses. Thus, political organizations and parties have been indispensable for student movements and organizing.

It is also common to find examples of student movements whose agenda has addressed only specific aspects of education reforms (i.e., budget cuts, tuition hikes, privatization, among others) or reforms at institutional levels but has not articulated a critique of capitalism as a whole. The student movement in Quebec in 2012 is an example of such a movement. From a Marxist standpoint, Students have the potential to become revolutionary subjects when they politically integrate their struggles and activism into broader movements from below to overthrow capitalism (For example, the movement in Paris in 1968 articulated a critique of capitalism as a whole). Therefore, student movements that focus on particular self-contained issues have a limited scope and reduced potential and, thus, their possibility for revolutionary transformation would also be restricted.

The reasons to explain current student unrest are extremely diverse. Student movements reflect the contradictions of capitalism. As Lenin and Trotsky argued, students serve as voices for larger systematic injustices present in capitalist societies as they are "the sensitive barometer" (Trotsky 1910) of social unrest. An analysis of student movements grounded within a Marxist framework does not interpret them as separate or isolated movements but rather as part of a larger context of social struggles. As Barker (2008a) argues:

...student movements do not develop in isolation from wider social conflicts... they may possess their own specific dynamics, as a product of their

particular social composition and the situations of their emergence. But they are anything but immune to larger tendencies of development, to which they make their own contribution. (p. 46)

Framing and analyzing student struggles in the context of the contradictions and injustices of a capitalist society allows us to see how they are connected to other areas of social life that are also sources of social unrest and struggle, such as justice, health, the environment, among others. The last two decades have seen the emergence of mass movements against the effects of global neoliberal capitalism on the transnational level. These "social movements from below," which take place in various geographic locations and challenge or resist diverse aspects of global capitalism, are understood not as isolated occurrences but rather as part of a "historic wave" of movements, or, in other words, a "complex 'movement of movements'" (Cox and Nilsen 2014, pp. 2–3). Current movements resisting corporate education reform (from K-12 schools and including universities) are part of this wave of transnational movements.

Marxism and the Critical Pedagogy of Collective Action

Marxism is a contested, pluralistic, and constantly developing political philosophy. In the field of social movement studies, Marxism is being revitalized as a body of theory crafted for and by social movements (Nilsen 2009). Marxism is reengaged as a theory of collective agency and social change that is deeply relevant to activists' struggles and is helpful in carrying movements forward (Nilsen 2009; Cox and Nilsen 2014; Barker et al. 2013, among others). In the field of education, a similar revitalization is taking place, where recent efforts have been made to reunite critical pedagogy with its Marxists roots (i.e., Malott and Ford 2015; McLaren 2000).

Marxism as a philosophy of praxis is deeply connected with social action because it is through collective social action that human beings are involved in a process of self and social transformation. When social groups form, in their process

of forming or *coming to be*, they also transform themselves. Humans, understood both as individual and social beings, develop "... their own selves, their own skills and their own powers through the very process of their collective self-organization (...) Changing society means transforming human beings and their social relations" (Barker 2008b, pp. 8–9).

From a Marxist praxis, collective social action can be understood as inherently pedagogical, since knowledge is produced in collective action. This process is ultimately a pedagogical matter, as pedagogy is understood as going beyond being a repertoire of practices and methodologies. The pedagogy of collective social action not only "enable[s] the creation of collective readings of the world" (Motta and Cole 2013, 2014, p. 193) but it is also an essential element of the recreation and transformation of possible futures through the experience of "coming into being" (Malott and Ford 2015).

A Marxist critical pedagogy is grounded in the unification between theory and practice. As Freire (1970), Hall (1978), and others have argued, humans act upon theories, reflect upon the very action, and engage in this process continually as we organize and struggle to transform the world. On a similar note, Paula Allman (2001) reminds us of Marx and Engels' words when she states that "our consciousness develops from our active engagement with other people, nature and the objects or processes we produce. In other words, it develops from the sensuous experiencing of reality from within the social relations in which we exist." (Marx and Engels, 1846 cited in Allman, 2001, p.165).

Within social movements, political organizations, and diverse types of social struggles, a Marxist critical pedagogy enables the development of a critical reflective consciousness that makes the connection between issues movements face and political economy and acts to disrupt and displace capitalism (Choudry 2015). In other words, a critical pedagogy grounded in Marxism provides a theoretical foundation upon which movements are able to understand the forces of capitalist exploitation and oppression in society, envision themselves and the movement

transcending them, and set out, from the present moment to act upon that vision, creating themselves and the movement anew, engaging in a process of creating new social relations (Freire 1970; Allman 2007; Malott and Ford 2015).

In the context of student movements, it is through participation in social action that students, although for a small glimpse in time, can experience ways of engaging with one another that may challenge and even temporarily transcend everyday capitalist social relations. Through the material experience of these alternative social relations and renewed possibilities of engaging with others, students' consciousness is transformed. This reiterates the central notion of praxis, but it also illustrates the intimate connection between critical pedagogy and social movements.

Current Movements in the Context of Neoliberal Capitalism and Education Reform

A Marxist educational analysis understands corporate education reforms as the reorganization of education by transnational capital to serve the interests of the capitalist class (Hill 2006; Ross and Gibson 2007). The privatization and commodification of education is part of the global capitalist project to further entrench and advance capitalist values and ideas through schools and universities to maintain the power of capital over labor. Schools and universities are constituted as instructional spaces where the principles of market efficiency, competition, and "consumer choice" are taught, learned, and internalized by teachers and students. A Marxist critical analysis places the capital-labor relation, and the exploitation and oppression it produces, in the center of its critique of neoliberal capitalism and the privatization of education (Malott and Ford 2015). The effects of neoliberal education reform on teachers and students include punitive accountability measures, standardized tests, national standardized curriculum focusing on skill development and employment, and the overall defunding of public education, including universities, among others.

At the core of the most recent student uprisings is the struggle against neoliberal education reforms that refocus the purpose of education as ensuring “human capital” in the workforce and advance the privatization of education. Many of these recent movements have been successful in articulating convincing political agendas and reaching public support. Among those student movements gathering mass mobilization and public support are those that have taken place in countries as diverse as the United Kingdom, Canada, Holland, Australia, Mexico, Chile, Colombia, and South Africa, to name just a few. As an example, one of the most well-known recent movements is the Chilean student movement of 2011, the biggest movement in Chile since 1973. At the time of the movement, Chile had one of the most expensive post-secondary education systems in the world (Larrabure and Torchia 2011). This movement demanded free education for all Chileans and an end to profit in education. In early 2015, the Bachelet administration in Chile passed legislation which will eliminate tuition fees, selective enrolment, and profit making in all elementary and secondary educational institutions receiving public money (Achtenburg 2015). Various students, some of them politically organized but many not, played an important part in the coming to be of this movement. The FECH among many other student organizations present in Chilean universities are continuing to lead this movement (Achtenburg 2015) as the battle for free public education that serves the public interest has yet to be achieved with this most recent law.

It is important to mention that many student organizations and factions within today’s student movements maintain ongoing ties with revolutionary movements, radical left political organizations, and communist parties in their countries (i.e., the Federación Estudiantil Chilena (FECH), the Mesa Amplia Nacional Estudiantil (MANE) in Colombia, CLASSE in Quebec, among many others). As we mentioned in the beginning of this entry, student organizations, and more so in the case of student movements, are characterized for being heterogeneous and diverse, as students from all ranges

of political, organizational, and social commitments, tendencies, and beliefs assemble and mobilize even among movements and organizations who openly identify with leftist or revolutionary politics.

On the other hand, many student movements do not use Marxist language, or articulate a critique to capitalism *per se*, and their participants may not necessarily identify as Marxists or communist. However, as social movement scholars Barker et al. (2013) state, “There is, in short, ‘a system’ against which so many of today’s protests are pitched, even if they are not articulated solely, or even at all, in the language of ‘class’ ” (p. 2). In other words, from a Marxist approach to student movements and social movements more broadly, there is an interest in questioning, understanding, and articulating how *all* movements link together and what potentials they have to learn and join efforts. Historically, in Marxism there has been an effort to sustain encounters and dialogues with various cross-class movements (i.e., feminist movements, indigenous movements, Black and Latino movements, among many others). As Marxism continues to engage with various social movements and attempts to make a strong connection between class-based workers movements and other social movements, it is important to inquire and explore what social struggles and student movements all have in common and how they can all gain strength from each other, and realize their potential to become revolutionary together.

To conclude, as we have articulated, students do not have the potential alone to overthrow capital. Nonetheless, through the process of organizing, students transform themselves and their material reality. This means as a social group, students can come to develop a critical consciousness of educational and social inequity within capitalism. It is in this process where there is the possibility (and necessity) for continued dialogues and encounters between workers movements, communist parties, Marxist organizations, and student movements to develop paths of individual and social transformation that can be realized through the collective praxis of becoming communist.

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Marxism, Critical Realism, and Education

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Synonyms

Emergentist naturalism; Social radicalism

Introduction

Marxist educational theory takes a significant but bedeviled place in the history of educational thought and practice. Like Marxism more broadly, it has ridden the contours of history while having been confounded by its own internal (but historically contingent) conceptual tensions. This is due,

in part, to the sheer breadth and incompleteness of Marx's work which has meant be bequeathed future Marxists and radical educators a living project. Marxism and Marxist educational theory are, and can only be, open to ongoing interpretation and epistemological scrutiny.

It is in the service of a living Marxism that critical realism, as developed by British philosopher Roy Bhaskar (1944–2014), lays claim to be of value to radical theory and practice (Brown et al. 2002). While the term critical realism is known among professional philosophers to refer to various species of “realist” approaches to philosophical inquiry, it is only Bhaskarian critical realism that is discussed here. Unlike other critical realisms, Bhaskar's work has been rigorously applied to Marxist praxis (Brown et al. 2002). The intellectual origins of Bhaskarian critical realism have Marxist roots. Not only are Bhaskar's own Marxist and socialist sympathies well documented but also the common emancipatory impulses expressed in both the critical realist and Marxist projects are widely recognized (Banfield 2015, pp. 1–13; Brown et al. 2002). Furthermore, as a philosophy of science, critical realism is understood by its advocates to be well placed to engage in theoretical ground clearing for scientific practice. Its application to a diversity of fields such as ecology, economics, law, religion, management, and organizational studies is well documented. Similarly, critical realism has been employed to address educational problems in their substance (Sarah 2011; Shipway 2010) and theory (Scott and Bhaskar 2015).

While explorations of the intersections of Marxism and critical realism along with education and critical realism are well developed, considerations of Marxism, critical realism, and education are at their infancy. To date, only one significant study brings the three together. The direction of this entry will be toward that work. Because of the limits of space, this will be pursued via a charting of the conceptual development of critical realism while noting its synergies with Marx and Marxism. This itself is not a simple task as Bhaskar's work is extensive. It is common among critical realists to divide his work into early and latter phases. Bhaskar's latter work – transcendental

dialectical critical realism – remains contentious among many critical realists. It is a matter of debate within the field whether it completes Bhaskar's philosophical system or turns upon itself. For this reason, only the early critical realism will be considered in what follows.

Critical Realism and Marxism

It is frequently noted by Marxist critical realists that we find in Marx (and particularly in his latter scientific works such as *Capital*) the early formulations of critical realism (Ehbar, in Brown et al. 2002, pp. 43–56, 2002). Indeed, Bhaskar has described Marx as the first critical realist with critical realism providing “the missing methodological fulcrum of Marx's work” (1989, p. 178). Bhaskar saw his relationship to Marx and Marxism as critical, productive, and clearing “the ground for the unfinished business of Marxism” (Bhaskar and Hartwig 2010, p. 140).

Critical realism had its beginnings with the release in 1975 of Bhaskar's *A Realist Theory of Science* (with subsequent editions: 1978, 1997, and 2008). It elaborated a transcendental realist (TR) philosophy for the natural sciences. In a move similar to Marx setting Hegel's philosophical idealism to place it on a materialist footing, Bhaskar took Kant's transcendental idealism to establish a transcendental realism. He saw the importance of his move against Kant as a challenge to the positivist (i.e., the empirical realist) dissolution of any distinction between philosophy and science. For Bhaskar, the acceptance of Kantianism in the philosophy of science had led to failures in understanding actual scientific practice and in grasping its emancipatory impulse. Taking a transcendental path, Bhaskar did not seek to impose a “master method” on science. Rather, as Marx did in *Capital*, he proceeded from concrete existence (i.e., actual scientific practice) and asked what conditions make it possible.

TR can be considered the conceptual starting point of Bhaskar's philosophical system that would offer (i) a practice-aware philosophy of science and (ii) a vindication of the primacy of

ontology over epistemology. The former claims that to understand science is to grasp it in its practice. In this respect, philosophy cannot replace science. Rather, it can only play a conceptual ground-clearing role that Bhaskar, in borrowing from John Locke (1632–1704), referred to as “underlaboring.” The latter establishes that the natural world does not consist in causal laws but in causality itself. For Bhaskar, science is the ontological search for causality. This was a double move against Kantian idealism and Humean empiricism. Contra idealism, Bhaskar demonstrated that causal laws are about things that exist independent of and, in their objectivity, can be fallibly known. By delineating ontology from epistemology, Bhaskar sought to show that the reality of things consists in their natures which not only determine the ways humans can interact with them but also provide the essential conditions for knowledge of them. Against empiricism, Bhaskar showed that, for science to be possible (and necessary), the natural world had to be structured and differentiated. Consistent with Marx’s realist distinction between essence and appearance or content and form, the objects of science are not actual events and directly observable phenomena but underlying mechanisms consisting in structured and differentiated relations of “vertical” determinacy and “horizontal” co-determinacy. What appears and what is experienced or perceived are only partial and superficial representations of a more deeply stratified reality.

Bhaskarian stratification signifies ontological strata as distinct but emergently real. In other words, the properties of higher order strata are non-predictable forms of the properties of lower, or more basic, strata. As such, relations between strata are taken as emergent. Empirical reality and associated phenomena cannot be accounted for by simply referring to laws governing more basic strata. In this way, emergentist depth realism is seen by critical realists to provide an essentialist conception of ontology (that avoids essentialism and reductionism) while offering scope for spontaneity and uniqueness. TR points to the ontological boldness of scientific practice where causality is understood to rest in the natural necessities of

things existing independent of mind, direct observation, and explanation. It began Bhaskar’s project of illuminating the realist impulse – the “methodological fulcrum” – in Marx’s scientific method.

The extension of TR to the social sciences came with the 1979 release of *The Possibility of Naturalism* (with subsequent editions: 1989 and 1998). It articulated what is now known as “critical naturalism” (CN): a philosophical exploration of the social sciences that takes seriously the possibility that social objects could be studied in the same way as natural ones. Underpinning Bhaskar’s CN is an emergentist depth materialism that describes natural relations as necessary conditions for societal relations and human agency. *The Possibility of Naturalism* set out to resolve the tension between positivist (hyper-naturalist) and hermeneutic (anti-naturalist) tendencies plaguing the history of social science. Bhaskar’s resolution was to unify the natural and social sciences in a transcendental realist method but distinguish them according to the nature of the objects of inquiry. Here we see methodological flesh given to the scientific naturalist bones Marx points to in his *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts*: “History itself is a *real* part of *natural history* and nature’s becoming man.”

Fleshing out his CN for the social sciences, Bhaskar presented Durkheimian structuralism and Weberian interpretivism as paradigm cases of hyper-naturalism and anti-naturalism. With the former tending to structural determinism and the latter to agential voluntarism, both were seen as inadequate for scientific practice. Likewise, to conflate mechanisms of structure and agency was unsatisfactory. Captured in his transformational model of social activity (TMSA), Bhaskar stressed that while society and individuals are mutually dependent, they are also ontologically and analytically distinguishable. CN takes social forms as temporally preexisting human action.

The most productive work in the area of structure-agency relation since Bhaskar has been that of British sociologist Margaret Archer. Her morphogenetic approach – most thoroughly developed in her 1995 work *Realist Social Theory* – emphasizes, and further develops, the

relation as a temporally structured analytic dualism. The analytical separation of structures and agents represents an important limit to Bhaskar's naturalism. It establishes CN as a qualified anti-positivist naturalism distinguishing it from deterministic and reductive forms (to which the "economistic" Marx is often accused of contributing). Just as the social and natural worlds are ontologically distinct in virtue of the former comprising the reasoned action of human beings, so is the case for social structures and agents. Unlike social structures, the power of human agents is understood to include physically structured capacities as well as the ability to act on reasons. Bhaskar's qualified naturalism, endorsed and developed by Archer, takes reasons as causes.

As an extension of Bhaskar's TR critique of Humean empiricism where causality rests in regular succession of events, critical realists argue for a capacity-driven and generatively emergent view of causality. But critical realists do not see positing reasons as causes as falling to anti-naturalism. In contrast to the hermeneutic tradition where nature is presented as an externality to the world of human affairs, critical realism sees the social ontologically grounded in the natural. Mentalistic capacities essential to the making of the social world such as consciousness, awareness of interests, and the formation of reasons are emergent material powers that are only possible because of, for example, neurophysiological structures. To Bhaskar (1989) mind is emergent from matter. He claims to capture this in his theory of "synchronic emergent powers materialism" (SEPM) and to lay the conceptual groundwork for arguing that to advance a separate science for the natural world cedes too much to positivism. Advocates see critical realism offering a scientific base for the elaboration of a radical humanism and the explanation of education as a capacity-building force for human emancipation (Banfield 2015; Sarah 2011).

Identifying human agency and the causal power of reasons as representing a critical limit to naturalism indicated for Bhaskar that the subject matter of the social sciences included not just social phenomena and structures but also belief about them. If an emancipatory science were

possible, it had to include deep critique and causally real explanations of human consciousness. Bhaskar's theory of explanatory critique is most comprehensively outlined in his 1986 publication, *Scientific Realism and Human Emancipation*. It offered a direct challenge to the positivist insistence on a sharp distinction between facts and values. Rejecting Hume's law that "ought" statements cannot be derived from "is" statements, Bhaskar argued that when social science comes to a human-limiting evaluation of structures, phenomena or beliefs rectifying action ought to follow. Explanatory critique entailed taking an ethical naturalist path. Bhaskar also identified a fact-value split in the hermeneutic sociology of Weber. He argued that Weber was misled by his neo-Kantian anti-naturalism to insist upon not just a shallow ontology for social science but also a value expulsion to advance "objectivity."

Bhaskar founded his ethical naturalism on the assumption that truth is a general good. But he was careful to detail that this did not imply an automatic move from fact to value. The unpredictability of context-specific codetermining mechanisms negated this and demanded the need for empirical work: there are no unmediated moves from fact to value or from theory to practice. Social theory for Bhaskar offers a "conditioned critique": "an implication of [Marx's] historical materialism" whereby critique is "realistic – that is, self-reflexively scientific (descriptively and explanatorily adequate) – about its practical impact" (1986, p. 170). Here Bhaskar draws on Marx's famous distinction advanced in *Capital* Volume I between "criticism" and "critique" where the former "knows how to judge and condemn the present, but not how to comprehend it." Critique, for Marx and Bhaskar, demands depth explanation informed by an ethical naturalism that elevates social science beyond "technical rationality" ... [and offers] perhaps the only chance of a non-barbaric, i.e., civilized, survival for the human species (Bhaskar 1986, pp. 180–181).

The emancipatory project of critical realism was dialecticized in Bhaskar's *Dialectic – The Pulse of Freedom* (1993). Dialectical critical realism (DCR) is generally recognized among critical

realists to represent the final stage of “early critical realism.” The defining concept of DCR is “absence.” Building on the TR and CN – that are taken as the first moment of DCR – Bhaskar argued that stratification, nonlinear causality, and emergence were only possible because of the absence of specific causal powers. This was familiar to Marx. The opening chapters of *Capital* establish that the absencing of use values characterizes capitalist commodity exchange. Absences are real and are actualized in their effects. This stands in stark contrast to what Bhaskar referred to as “ontological monovalence” that holds to a strictly positive ontology and cannot account for either real absences or the need to absent social ills. Bhaskar further advanced the dialectization of critical realism by introducing the concepts of “totality” that invites a “break with our ordinary notions of identity, causality, space and time” (1993, p. 125) and “transformative practice” – or, in Marx’s terms, “revolutionizing practice.”

Bhaskar offers DCR as a philosophical critique of Hegel and Marx. Among Marxists, this has had a mixed reception. Some consider it to be broadly consistent with Marx offering rich underlaboring possibilities (Ehbar, in Roberts et al. 2002, pp. 43–56). Others see DCR as a move to far toward philosophical system building that negates its underlaboring capacity. Collier is one who warns that Marxists should be wary of system building: “what Marx has put asunder, let no Hegelian join” (in Roberts et al. 2002, p. 162).

Marxist Education and Critical Realism

Banfield’s *Critical Realism for Marxist Sociology of Education* (Banfield 2015) currently sits as the only in-depth exploration of critical realism and Marxist education praxis. It claims to offer a critical realist underlaboring of Marxist sociology of education for the purpose of establishing conceptual and methodological bases to inform “revolutionizing practice.” The broad brush of the project’s method situates what Bhaskar had identified as the persistent problems of social science – “naturalism” and

“structure agency” – as the “central problematics” of Marxist Sociology of Education. Banfield operationalizes these via three field-specific “animating moments”: significant texts that established and continue to resonate within Marxist Sociology of Education. These are M.F.D. Young’s 1971 hermeneutically inspired *Knowledge and Control*, Bowles and Gintis’ 1976 structural functionalist offering *Schooling in Capitalist America*, and Willis’ 1977 radical culturalist ethnography *Learning to Labour*.

In his consideration of naturalism, Banfield shows that historical materialism can be understood as a species of anti-positivist and non-reductive naturalism. He does this via a critical naturalist underlaboring of the “base-superstructure” model: a well-known expression of Marx’s naturalist inclinations that has long haunted Marxism and brought with it accusations of, for example, economic (i.e., class) reductionism, evolutionary determinism, and tendencies to positivist science. The underlaboring proceeds via Marx’s material dialectic drawing on Ollman’s (2003) respectful Marxist engagement with critical realism. Banfield argues that, properly understood, the base-superstructure model expresses an array of mechanisms stratified by kind and not, as conventionally understood, representing structured relations of concrete phenomena. A new depth naturalist tripartite model is offered consisting in dialectical abstractions of codeterminacy (“horizontal” historical contingency), determinacy (“vertical” natural necessity), and vantage point (ontological and epistemological “standpoints”). Bringing the new model to a critique of *Schooling in Capitalist America*, Banfield claims to show a significant limit to the animating moment’s radicalism residing in anti-naturalist structural functionalist inclinations.

Attending to the problem of structure and agency, Banfield draws on Margaret Archer’s morphogenetic approach to develop an interest conception of agency. Taking reasons to be causes, the roots of those reasons are argued to lay, in historical materialist terms, in objective class-based interests. As such, interests are shown to provide not only a bridgehead between structure and agency but also the basis of an ethical naturalism for revolutionary educational

practice. Banfield suggests that this was the theoretical intent of *Learning to Labour*. Willis pushed against the overly socialized and excessively agentized approaches of the other two animating moments. While Banfield identifies depth realist tendencies in *Learning to Labour*, he demonstrates that Willis ultimately falls to an ontological shyness – a retreat toward ontological monovalence – that compromises the explanatory power for which he was searching.

The point of Banfield's project is that the animating moments together with the problematics they contain still find expression in various forms in the field of Marxist Sociology of Education. In what he describes as his projects limited and modest underlaboring of the field, there is an invitation to both scrutinize and further develop the work. Firstly, at the level of theory, the project prompts both the necessity of its critique and the importance of exploring its extension to fields beyond Marxist Sociology of Education. Secondly, at the level of practice, the dialecticized base-superstructure model and interest-based approach to radical change are to be tested in research and pedagogical applications.

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Masculinities

► [Constructing Spaces for Diverse Black Masculinities in All-Male Public Urban Schools](#)

Massive Open Online Courses (MOOCs)

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Introduction

Massive open online courses (MOOCs) are one of the most high-profile education and technology developments in recent years and have attracted a wealth of responses from researchers, educators, social commentators, and the media. In order to approach a comprehensive understanding of what the MOOC is, as this entry will try to do, it is not only a technological and pedagogical timeline of developments that has to be established, but also an insight into the ways these prominent courses have been described and understood in public discourse. This entry will therefore comprise three sections: *early experimentations*, *mainstream platforms*, and *responses*. These sections will outline the key individuals and organizations involved and the dominant channels through which MOOCs have developed, diverged, and become established.

Following the acronym, MOOCs might be classified as courses that are designed for large numbers of participants ("massive"), free to access ("open"), delivered entirely over the web ("online"), and structured and assessed ("courses"). However, definitions which seek to cover all aspects of the many different forms of the MOOC are useful, but tend to be too general. The difficulties in providing a precise definition of MOOCs derive from the different initiatives and approaches that have made use of the term, but also the significant precedents in the field of

e-learning and distance education that often challenge the uniqueness and exceptionality of this prominent educational initiative. One key difference is how the “open” in the acronym MOOC tends to be understood, a point which will be elaborated below.

Multiple characterizations of the MOOC are flourishing. Nevertheless, while MOOCs have never been consistent and new forms continue to emerge, prominent definitions and designs have had significant effects on how these courses have been understood. Most pronounced has been the suggested distinction between two different types of MOOC: the “cMOOC” and the “xMOOC,” the former referring to more experimental courses designed with the proposed theory of “connectivism” (see Siemens 2005) and the latter used to denote the more mainstream platform-based offerings from organizations such as *Coursera*, *edX*, and *Udacity*. While useful however, this is a distinction largely circulated by proponents of connectivism who have been critical of more mainstream initiatives. Furthermore, the division has been criticized as overly simplistic in assuming particular kinds of pedagogy, and increasingly redundant as MOOCs develop (see Bayne and Ross 2014). Nevertheless, it is a distinction that has gained considerable authority and reveals some of the key ideas that shaped the design, development, and promotion of the MOOC.

Early Experimentations

The acronym “MOOC” was proposed in response to a course called *Connectivism and Connective Knowledge* offered in 2008 by George Siemens and Stephen Downes. Known as CCK08, this course is often considered the first MOOC, with the convenors frequently recognized as pioneers of the format. However, importantly, Siemens and Downes also credit prior influences in the work of David Wiley and Alec Couros, signaling just some of the broad range of preceding work in this area. CCK08 and other MOOCs in this early period were developed as testing grounds for the proposed learning theory of connectivism: a

specific articulation of networked learning that foregrounds the network as a central model for understanding how individuals and groups learn. Prominent examples of cMOOCs include *Online Learning for Today... and Tomorrow* (known as eduMOOC), *Personal Learning Environments, Networks and Knowledge* (PLENK10), *Change: Education, Learning and Technology* (Change11), *Learning Analytics and Knowledge* (LAK12), *Digital Storytelling* (DS106), and *MobiMOOC*.

These MOOCs emphasized a style of self-directed, student-led learning, which foregrounded collaborative practices and often sought to diminish the role of the teacher. Such an approach was realized through the use of the web and social media services, offering prospective students free admittance to course spaces, as well as providing the means for multiple channels of communication between participants. This approach encouraged and permitted considerable numbers of participants, often in the thousands. The processes involved in cMOOC social interaction were often emphasized over formal assessment and accreditation, with the underlying rationale for these courses being proposed as one of networking with participants, openly sharing activity, and working toward individually determined aims. As such, early MOOC approaches were often positioned as a challenge to the educational orthodoxies of didactic teaching, institutional inaccessibility, and the emphasis placed on formal and standardized assessment. However, cMOOCs, and the underlying claims of connectivism, have not been without critique, which has often questioned the extent to which such approaches depart from already established theories and practices in online education and networked learning. Furthermore, some cMOOCs have been critiqued for relying on already-motivated participants with prior experience of the methods of engagement.

The kinds of structures informed by this underlying approach to MOOC pedagogy are key to understanding the differences attributed to the cMOOC category. While not all of the courses claiming to be informed by connectivism are consistent, there is a tendency to utilize distributed

social networks and multiple online spaces, encouraging participants to make their own decisions about where to engage in course activity. Importantly, rather than predefining course structures or environments, the cMOOC approach has often been able to specify modes of student participation, such as “aggregate, remix, repurpose, and feed forward” defined in the Change11 MOOC (Downes and Siemens 2011). These methods for taking part can thus be enacted in different spaces and with different web technologies. A central idea among advocates of the early MOOCs has been the Personal Learning Network (PLN), defining a set of guidelines for self-directed interaction (Cormier 2010). However, despite an emphasis on distribution, cMOOCs activity has frequently tended to cluster around specific spaces, such as central websites for course announcements, blog aggregation systems, and popular social media services such as Twitter. Furthermore, while it is important to note these general structural tendencies, those courses identified as cMOOCs have varied considerably in terms of their emphasis on centralized or distributed spatial arrangements.

A fundamental ethos of the early MOOC structure has been the promotion of openly accessible materials, stemming from association with the wider open educational resources movement. Therefore, not only is course content usually hosted in the public domain, but the suggested processes by which students reproduce and distribute this content emphasize the cultures of “remixing” and sharing prevalent in open educational practices. This generation of student-created material augments and expands core course content, often producing large amounts of material compared to more centrally controlled structures. While this approach has often resulted in students being overwhelmed by the volume of information to engage with, advocates of the cMOOC style have emphasized individual, self-directed choice as a foundational mode of navigation through these courses, such that digesting everything is not necessary. This structure is founded on a pedagogic model that privileges the *process* of forming personalized links between sources of information, rather than access to the

course content itself. Thus, the “open” in this style of MOOC is generally understood in terms of a multifaceted practice, involving admittance to the course, but also the free sharing and adaptation of content.

Mainstream Platforms

Stanford University played a significant role in the “mainstreaming” of the MOOC, shifting the provider of these courses to elite institutions and attracting unprecedented numbers of students. In 2011, Stanford professors Sebastian Thrun and Peter Norvig offered a course entitled *Introduction to Artificial Intelligence*, which attracted 160,000 enrollees, far exceeding that of the earlier connectivist-informed courses. Significantly, the course centralized resources within a single webpage, provided video lectures as the primary content, and incorporated automated multiple-choice questions as a form of assessment. These features contrasted significantly with the cMOOC model and reflected a much more orthodox pedagogical approach, despite the novelty of the online format and the unprecedented and remarkable number of course enrollees. Following considerable media interest, the course led directly to the founding of *Udacity* in February 2012, a for-profit organization headed by Sebastian Thrun. Udacity offered MOOCs under their own branding rather than direct affiliation with any educational institution.

The other two principal US MOOC providers were soon to follow. *Coursera* launched in April 2012, founded by Stanford computer science professors Daphne Koller and Andrew Ng. A for-profit organization, Coursera, has announced venture capital funding from corporate financiers and partner institutions somewhere in the region of 85 million and emerged as the biggest player in the MOOC space. At the time of writing, Coursera is partnered with 127 institutions and offers 1,340 courses. The organization has also announced revenue of one million US dollars, deriving from their “Signature Track” service (outlined further below). May 2012 saw the formation of *edX*, a partnership between Harvard University and the

Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and a consolidation of the previous “HarvardX” and “MITx” projects launched by each of these institutions, respectively. Significantly, edX publicized their nonprofit status, being funded by the two institutions themselves, and announced their platform software as open source, a position intended to distance their organization from the for-profit initiatives of Coursera and Udacity. At the time of writing, edX has partnered with 80 institutions and offered over 500 courses.

In September 2013, a UK consortium coordinated and owned by the Open University launched the for-profit *FutureLearn* platform. A couple of years behind the earlier initiatives, FutureLearn was perceived as a UK response to the US dominance of mainstream MOOCs, seeking out high-ranking British institutions as partners. However, this initial approach appears to have changed, with the organization forming more international affiliations. At the time of writing, FutureLearn is partnered with 50 educational institutions, a significant number of which are international but not US based. It has also partnered with “specialist organizations” such as the British Library and the European Space Agency. FutureLearn has offered over 70 courses.

These mainstream MOOC organizations established the model of centralized platform software, and all of their course offerings largely conform to similar arrangements. This involves three principal features: course content, chiefly in the form of video lectures; automated assessment, usually manifest in multiple-choice quizzes or facilitated peer feedback and grading; and space for communication, typically threaded discussion fora. This model, emphasizing teacher instruction and formal assessment, has been underpinned by behaviorist approaches to pedagogy and thus differs significantly from the cMOOC approach. The core principle of the mainstream MOOCs has been to provide *access* to the prestigious content of elite universities, an approach not only evident in the marketing and corporate promotion of the organizations themselves but also in the design of the platform structure. Thus the “open” in the xMOOC tends to be understood primarily in terms of admittance to content. In this model, it

is the video lectures from established academics that are positioned as the focus and value of participating in the course, alongside the formal recognition participants receive for completing the required assessment tasks. This emphasis toward content and assessment reflects a more established educational model than the process- and participatory-focused approach of the cMOOC.

The typical platform-based MOOC is structured around a series of video lectures, embedded within the platform, and in most cases featuring the course instructor speaking to the camera, referring to slides, or writing on a visible surface. This is content usually produced by the institutions involved and frequently branded with institutional watermarks. While these video lectures are often made publically available on social media, the centralized production of content is a trend more characteristic of the mainstream MOOCs. Video lectures are frequently interspersed with multiple-choice quizzes, intended to provide formative assessment of the course content and which often need to be completed before the remaining sections of the video can be watched. This further demonstrates the behaviorist ideas that tend to underpin the design of the mainstream MOOC platforms, using participant responses to control the pace of delivery.

Formal assessment and recognition is the other key focus of the MOOC platform design. Accreditation has been a prominent topic of discussion surrounding the emergence of the high-profile platforms, and the lack of uptake in this area has tended to position MOOCs outside of the core provision of institutions. At present, Coursera and edX do not offer credit themselves, and only a small minority of partnering institutions have experimented with formal credit models. Instead of formal academic credit, the principal platform-based MOOC organizations offer bespoke certificates: for example, Coursera’s “statements of accomplishment” and edX’s “certificates of achievement.” Significantly, however, all of the mainstream MOOC platforms offer alternative documents of recognition, at a cost to those wishing to purchase them. Coursera, edX, and Udacity frame this process as one of identity verification such that the cost is attributed to the authentication

procedure and the supposed authenticity of the participant is highlighted on the certificate itself. Such “verified” certificates are promoted as a superior form of recognition, premised on the idea that the individual undertaking the assessment is the same person in receipt of the document. FutureLearn has adopted a slightly different strategy by framing their fee-incurring “statement of attainment” in terms of undertaking an examination. At present this involves attending an exam center in person, a service provided in association with Pearson VUE. These “paid certificate” models are currently the leading revenue generation strategy of the mainstream MOOC organizations.

Recent developments by the mainstream MOOC organizations include the combination and sequencing of multiple courses within particular disciplines. Termed “specializations” by Coursera, and “XSeries” by edX, these developments entitle participants to a supposedly superior form of certificate. Udacity have also announced a service termed “nanodegrees,” focused on the accumulation of micro-credits that build toward more comprehensive evidence of vocational skills. Another significant development has been the shift toward so-called “on-demand” courses, notable in many current Coursera MOOC offerings. This development has been to structure courses so that enrollment and participation can happen continuously, rather than being limited to specific and delimited periods. This shift has considerable implications for both the pedagogical strategy and student experience of the mainstream MOOCs, necessarily structuring in more automated and self-directed modes of engagement.

Also significant is the change of direction announced by Udacity in 2013, in which the organization stated that it was no longer seeking to provide a broad higher education curriculum and was focusing instead on vocational courses, specifically aimed at the technology industry. Frequently cited as a figurehead in the mainstream MOOC project, Thrun’s subsequent retreat from the earlier claims of widespread educational disruption was publicized widely and interpreted by many as a signal of the failure of the platform

model. However, this change of direction has led to Udacity developing more in the way of accreditation models, for example, the offering of a master’s degree in partnership with the Georgia Institute of Technology and AT&T. It is perhaps the more vocational trajectory undertaken by Udacity that has allowed such specific qualification pathways to be developed.

Responses

The divisions in development that have shaped the pedagogic design and structure of MOOCs continue to influence the ways universities, media organizations, governments, educators, and researchers understand the emergence of these high-profile educational offerings. Following the emergence of the MOOC platforms, many responses sought to declare a profound disruption of established educational models. Media interest is particularly notable here, propelling the MOOC, and also the wider e-learning and distance education field, into mainstream attention. This is a crucial part of the MOOC narrative, because it fueled public interest and contributed to a culture of hyperbole in which institutions and even governmental organizations were compelled to respond. Key terms among the zealous media reporting were *disruption*, *revolution*, and *innovation* (see, e.g., Adams 2012; Friedman 2013), powerful terms that framed the MOOC in terms of dramatic and devastating change for the educational sector. These responses were bolstered by prominent figures such as Clay Shirky, who propagated the analogy of the music industry, comparing the intervention of MOOCs in higher education to the disruption caused by the MP3 file format (Shirky 2012). This extremist narrative influenced more formal reports, such as *An Avalanche Is Coming*, published by the UK-based think tank the Institute for Public Policy and Research (Barber et al. 2013). The report maintains the idea that the current higher education system is malfunctioning, and that radical changes are required so that the transformative and emancipatory potentials of the MOOC can be widely adopted.

While these responses have tended to sensationalize the narrative in largely unproductive ways, later, more measured reactions also reveal important aspects of the MOOC narrative. In reply to the swirl of intense media interest, a concerted effort has been apparent to evaluate and classify the MOOC, often in ways that situate and relate recent developments to more established institutional practices and research fields. Sir John Daniel, a long-time advocate of open and distance education, exemplified this response, with the influential report *Making Sense of MOOCs: Musings in a Maze of Myth, Paradox and Possibility* (2012). Similar high-profile reports have sought to moderate the claims of imminent disruption with more sober accounts of funding issues, prospective business models, and institutional approaches to widening provision through MOOC offerings. Another prominent issue here has been retention rates in MOOCs, which research has shown to average at 10%, a figure frequently derided as incommensurate with acceptable institutional standards. However, retention figures have also provoked debates about what constitutes appropriate engagement with university provision, with many claiming that “dropouts” also demonstrate valuable interaction with higher education.

These responses represent the standardization and institutionalization processes that have shaped the broad project of the MOOC, principally by positioning and adjusting the terms of the debate around established higher education sector issues. Assimilation, rather than disruption, is therefore how the contemporary MOOC might be understood. Nevertheless, critical responses to this strategic integration remain, no less from those working in long-established fields of education technology, e-learning, and online and distance university provision, which has in many cases been overlooked in the rush to operationalize an institutional MOOC strategy. Martin Weller’s *The Battle for Open* situates this debate within a broader open education movement, highlighting the problems arising from mainstream interest in “openness” (2014). The benefits of unprecedented institutional and governmental uptake of online education, wrought through the promotion of the large platform

organizations, exist in tension with the pedagogical orthodoxies and market values now built into the MOOC brand.

Conclusion

MOOCs are one of the most prominent developments in education technology in recent years and have achieved extraordinary media, institutional, and governmental interest. MOOCs have a lesser-known history as the experimental course format for “connectivism,” an emerging theory which foregrounds the network as a model for learning. These courses were distributed over the web and emphasized a process of self-directed and personalized course engagement. MOOCs entered a more mainstream phase following developments at Stanford University and the forming of high-profile organizations *Coursera* and *edX* who formed partnerships with elite higher education institutions. These organizations centralized MOOCs within platform software and adopted video lectures as the primary form of course content. Responses to the MOOC are also central to understanding how these courses are understood. Media responses were often exaggerated, claiming the imminent collapse of the traditional university. However, while this often overlooked long-established work in distance education, online provision, and e-learning, media hyperbole had the effect of propelling open educational issues into the mainstream, bringing both advantages and disadvantages for the project of the MOOC.

Cross-References

- [Defining Openness in Education](#)
- [Distance Education](#)
- [Higher Education](#)
- [Neoliberalism and Education Policy](#)
- [Networked Learning](#)
- [Open Distance Learning](#)
- [Open Education, an Overview of](#)
- [Open Educational Resources](#)
- [Openness and Power](#)

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- Marxism and Disability Studies

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Mathematics Education as a Matter of Achievement

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Introduction

Achievement in school mathematics is defined in relation to the goals of mathematics education, which are stated in curriculum frameworks, debated in research, or assumed by educational policy actors. Assessment of performance creates both, criteria for what it means to be successful in mathematics and students who achieve below and above a minimum standard or at a range of levels. Achievement (here used synonymously with academic performance or attainment), as an outcome of assessments after conclusion of an instructional unit, is commonly expressed in the form of course grades or scores on school examinations and other achievement tests. In school mathematics it appears comparatively easy to create large achievement differences between individuals. Because mathematics education has a long-standing function as a “gatekeeper” for entering a range of professions and higher education, there is a comparatively high economic value attached

to good grades or test scores. In addition, in popular culture high achievement in mathematics is often associated with cleverness, which may increase its symbolic value.

In education policy, measurement and comparison of mathematics achievement at individual and institutional level is seen as important for comparability when certifying students' competencies, for differentiating the curricula for previously comparatively low or high achieving students (often categorized as "students at risk" or "gifted students," respectively), for use of student achievement data as a measure of the quality of educational provision and teacher accountability, and for supporting or evaluating curriculum reform.

The conceptualization of successful mathematics education as a matter of measurable gains in achievement at individual or institutional level does not only dominate policy discourse but has also been the focus of many research studies and large-scale surveys. In particular, in the context of cross-national comparative achievement tests conducted by supranational organizations, rankings of students' average achievement in mathematics are used in discourses about the importance of sustaining or increasing economic competitiveness of nation States. Aggregate achievement scores are then interpreted as an indicator of technological and economic growth. Because mathematics is not only perceived as a privileged competence for the labor force but also seen as important for citizenship, high average achievement with a comparatively small gap between low-achieving and average students is assumed to bring with it benefits beyond enhancing students' individual careers or satisfying labor market demands, such as those of civic participation and social cohesion.

A central argument to consider is that assessments of mathematics achievement, which aim at ordering individuals in terms of their performance, insinuate success or failure for various social groupings of students. The argument stresses the functioning of achievement tests in the (re)production of social positions, which is reflected in the aggregate mathematics

achievement scores for those groups. The constitutive effect of the very principles of test construction for (inadvertently) bringing about this effect needs to be acknowledged. Hence, from this perspective, test outcomes cannot be taken as objective descriptions of mathematics achievement, neither at individual nor at aggregate level. Further, international comparisons of aggregate measures of mathematics achievement, complemented by national analyses and evaluations, have attracted considerable media reportage and contributed to the use of national achievement data as a tool for justifying education policy decisions. Then, mathematics achievement outcomes are taken as an indicator of the quality of educational provision at national as well as school and classroom level. Achievement outcomes so assume a central function in the language used to describe mathematics education.

In line with these considerations, a discussion of measurement including a brief excursion into the origin of academic achievement tests is presented first. The next section examines mathematics education as a matter of achievement for students affiliated with various social groupings. The third section discusses mathematics education as a matter of achievement at national level and the associated establishment of student scores as a management tool. As these are all complex issues, their outline in a synoptic form here inevitably results in considerable simplification. Nevertheless, these are key elements in conceptualizing mathematics education as a matter of achievement.

Measuring Students' Mathematics Achievement

Achievement in school mathematics is measured by seemingly neutral tests that most often reflect only a limited range of intended outcomes of mathematics education and are constructed to maximize differences between individuals. Wiliam et al. (2004) point out that mathematics achievement tests *produce* and objectify the constructs they purport to measure. They also

demonstrate that the principles of test construction demand to exclude items that assess the common learning experiences of students across schools and can be solved by many, as these would not sufficiently discriminate between test-takers. The requirement of a test to disperse individuals' results along a continuum on a one-dimensional scale amounts to a construction that aims at producing frequencies of scores that approximate a normal (bell-shaped Gaussian) distribution. At the same time, such a distribution is also particularly attractive for the functioning of tests as an instrument for selection. The distributions of empirical data from achievement tests, however, exhibit a variety of shapes and forms.

A look at the origins of the construction principles for achievement measures helps in further illuminating their functioning. Based on a short outline of the history of tests in the USA, Levine (1976) shows that a focus on test-construction had significance for psychology as well as education in support of their aspiration to gain the status of a science. In psychometrics, measurement of cognitive ability or scholastic aptitude preceded that of academic achievement, which led to an initial transfer of rationales and methods used for the construction of standardized achievement tests. As one aim of the introduction of achievement tests, in addition to evaluating teaching efficiency, was to create comparability of educational assessments and substitute or complement school-based examinations, the norms for achievement are based on the age-grade system of school organization. This strategy affords essentialist interpretations of what children at a certain age should be able to achieve in a school subject to be considered "normal," i.e., to achieve scores around the center of an imagined Gaussian distribution. Further, as Levine points out, the construction of cognitive aptitude tests originally aimed at predictive validity for differentiating between academically successful students and those likely to struggle, in order to solve the problems arising from introducing compulsory school attendance. As a consequence, the "natural" criterion for the age-scale of aptitude tests reflected the background of successful middle class students who profited from the compulsory school law and the

curriculum and against which to measure the others who did not. Hence, these tests do not only order individual students but also social, economic, and cultural positions.

In general, the more mathematics achievement is described as a set of generic competences (such as problem solving or reasoning, in contrast to mastery of specific techniques and grasp of specific concepts), the more any test that aims at ordering individuals in terms of these constructs will resemble the construction principle of a generic cognitive aptitude test in regard to the rather unspecific knowledge base and the vagueness of an assumed set of shared experiences that could help the test-taker in solving the tasks. Indeed, the point has been made that the achievement tests used in the Organization of Economic Co-operation and Development's (OECD) Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) resemble such a construction (Rindermann and Baumeister 2015). Consequently, the potential effects of distributing different test-results to different student categories can be anticipated. The outcomes of a range of tests are actually often used as evidence to show exactly this effect, with varying and competing interpretations for the causes.

Validation of tests tends to be dominated by technical considerations and production of complex statistical analysis. Concerns about validity of achievement tests are commonly conceptualized as pointing to deficits in test-construction that may be overcome by refinement and technological advancement in the future. Awareness of the bias of apparently neutral assessment instruments resulting from the principles of construction of achievement measures, including prevalent imaginations of unidimensionality and age-grade related normal-like distributions, tends to be absent in the public discussion.

Differentiating Achievement for Various Groups

As indicated above, at the level of various social groupings, differential achievement in mathematics has been shown to relate to students' social

class or socioeconomic status, ethnicity or race, linguistic background, cultural affiliation, immigrant status, and gender, with varying sizes of gaps and changes over time in different contexts. Valero and Meaney (2014) point out that which social grouping is of interest in research studies (and figures as independent variable) indicates the classifications used in a particular society for differentiating types of people from normality, based on expectations constituted by the dominant groups at different points in time. Besides a cross-national interest in gender, social class and race have been a particular focus in the USA (Secada 1992). In China, for example, Zhao et al. (2012) examined differentiation in relation to levels of economic development in five regions in rural and urban settings by modeling mathematics achievement data from primary schools in relation to parents' occupation and possession of household items taken to reflect wealth (such as a TV-set, refrigerator, washing machine, and computer). In Germany, since the inception of the OECD's PISA, the achievement data produced by the survey have been analyzed with attention to students from immigrant families.

As has been argued above, the constitutive effect of any particular selection of substance and format of mathematics tests for creating achievement differences needs to be acknowledged. Regarding gender differences, Wiliam (2003) discusses some of the complexities in constructing mathematics achievement tests. Some tests may contain more of the type of tasks that turn out to favor males, while others more that favor females. Depending on these choices, one group then may outperform the other "on average." A similar point concerns the (re)production of social class differences in mathematics achievement tests. As Cooper and Dunne (2000) have found, mathematics tasks in UK tests that contained elements from some everyday practices that looked familiar to students from working-class families, disadvantaged these students as they (mistakenly) drew too much on their experience from those practices. Similarly, the substance and form of conducting mathematics achievement tests in Australia has been shown to contribute to achievement disparities between particular

groups of Indigenous students and other students (Meaney and Evans 2013).

In contrast to curricula-based assessments of mathematics achievement, the OECD's PISA and the Programme for International Assessment of Adult Competencies (PIAAC) claim to provide competencies-based assessments that measure mathematical literacy or numeracy. Jablonka (2015) emphasizes that these tests expand the discourse about mathematics education through which aspects of achievement are articulated. Reports from these studies typically describe achievement in terms of levels and with a range of new attributes of test-takers for constructing hierarchies between students or adults, schools, regions or countries achieving at or below these levels.

Hence, apparently objective national or supranational achievement measures not only define what counts as "normally" expected mathematical performance but also create differential outcomes for various categories of students. They produce "truths" about low-achieving or mathematically illiterate and innumerate groups and causes for their potentially unsuccessful participation in a range of practices that exclude alternative explanations.

Monitoring National Achievement

International comparative mathematics achievement studies, such as the OECD's PISA and the Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS) by the International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement (IEA), have attracted some critical response in regard to methodology, usefulness, purpose, and function from the outset. In response to the First International Mathematics Study (FIMS) conducted more than 50 years ago by the group that became the IEA, Freudenthal (1975) expressed concerns about the lack of attention to differences and similarities in curricula and the deficient collaboration between the IEA and mathematics educators. He also alerted to the dearth of criticism of the statistical methods used in the study and pointed out that attention to

details prevailed where principles should have been the target. While there have been methodological advances, these points still hold. In a profound critical review of the potentials and problems of international comparative mathematics achievement studies, Clarke (2003) *inter alia* points to their unintended effects. These include imposition of a global mathematics curriculum against which a system's performance will be judged and the disapproval of teaching practices that were never designed to achieve the goals implicated in it, as well as the appropriation of the agenda and dissemination by those countries or bodies responsible for the design and conduct of a study. As documented in the edited volume by Jahnke and Meyerhöfer (2007), both appears to have happened with regard to PISA. Despite these concerns, the expansion and cyclical repetition of international comparative mathematics achievement studies over the last decades has contributed to conceiving mathematics education as a matter of national achievement. While these studies also provide a wide range of potentially valuable data in addition to achievement scores, only relatively few analyses of disaggregated data have been published in mathematics education. For example, in their inspection of proceedings from two recent major conferences, Kanes et al. (2014) found that the outcomes of PISA are mostly cited uncritically as part of the rationale for the research.

In many contexts, the rankings of entire nations in descending order of the mean mathematics scores have consistently attracted wide attention from the media and politicians. In reports and commentaries, the achievement rank is articulated as a particular form of evidence about the state of mathematics teaching and learning, which forms the basis for public arguments and rationalization of political decisions about education. For instance, a recent report presents findings and figures from an analysis of measures of economic growth and scores on international mathematics and science tests, understood as the "collective cognitive skills" or "knowledge capital" of nations (OECD 2015, pp. 25–27). Achievement in mathematics, together with science in the form of aggregate student scores, then assumes a

central function. It is taken as a symptom of a nation's innovative capacity that leads to relative competitive advantage. On the other hand, data from PISA-2000 and TIMSS-1999 have also been used for articulating concerns about equality of opportunity.

Hence, scores from achievement tests are not only taken to indicate a particular level of mathematical skills and knowledge of individual students but also used for diagnosing improvement or decline in the quality of an education system and consequently for public accountability of the service provided.

Accountability by means of student test scores includes their use for evaluating teachers and schools. The idea of using student achievement data in core subjects for scrutinizing the quality of educational provision, however, was already propagated by forerunners of achievement testing in affiliation with scientific management and behaviorist psychology. Suggestions included the use of students' scores derived from standardized tests for particular skills (e.g., in arithmetic and algebra) as an index of teaching efficiency with the purpose of evaluating and comparing teachers; or the use of a generic "achievement quotient," a construction that claims to differentiate between a student's unitary capacity to learn and their actual achievement in particular school subjects. This distinction persists in discourses of "underachievement" in relation to "(academic) potential," in particular for groups of students whose participation in mathematics education and reaction to the curriculum is viewed as problematic. An early example of a test that was used to demonstrate the effectiveness of instruction and so counteract political assaults on US schools in the second decade of the twentieth century is a speed test in arithmetic developed by an educational psychologist who used it to demonstrate regular grade-by-grade increments in New York City (Levine 1976).

Measures of teaching quality derived from student achievement data have not only remained prominent in the USA but have also more recently been exported to other countries. One example is the use of value-added scores for rationalizing reward or remediation of teachers or for

evaluating the performance of schools. Jablonka and Bergsten (2016) argue that the OECD's comparative mathematics achievement studies provide a particular form of "scientific evidence" about mathematics education, which constitutes what counts as a basis for public arguments and political decisions. Governments recruit what looks like a purified expertise of education researchers who produce such evidence about students' mathematics achievement in order to demonstrate accountability and rationalize and legitimize political decisions. This evidence relies on the production of quantitative measurements for student learning. A conception of mathematics education as a matter of achievement in terms of measurable academic performance, however, restricts recognition of the diversity of teaching and learning practices and overshadows a broader debate of associated goals.

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Mathematics Education as a Matter of Cognition

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Introduction

The word *cognition* is defined in most dictionaries as (1) process of knowing, (2) something that is known, (3) thinking, (4) perception, and (5) study of the mind. There are numerous other meanings

that can be found in the domains of psychology, biology, philosophy, sociology, linguistics, and phenomenology. However, for mathematics education the primary focus has been on psychology and secondarily on biology, philosophy, and sociology. Therefore, an exploration of mathematics education as a matter of cognition implies describing and analyzing the domain of mathematics education as evolving in its notion of cognition from its roots in psychology and moving onto domains that broaden the notion of “cognition” for mathematics education researchers. There are three objectives:

- (a) To determine a “starting point” (if any) for research on cognition in mathematics education.
- (b) To unfold the development of mathematics education as a field of research based on its interaction with psychology, particularly the role of operational definitions in research on cognition.
- (c) To describe the different schools of thought currently found in mathematics education as they relate to research in cognition.

Determining a Starting Point

A watershed moment for cognition research in mathematics education in the latter part of the twentieth century was the publication of the book *Critical Variables in Mathematics Education* (Begle 1979), which surveyed existent research in the field based on high standards of scientific inquiry. Inquiry defined at this point in time was empirical research based on paradigms in experimental psychology. This can be attributed to methodologies advocated by funding agencies in the USA in the post-Sputnik era (late 1950s and 60s) where the notion of certainty of results was transposed from the physical sciences (physics, chemistry, etc.) to mathematics education. As a consequence, early researchers in mathematics education adapted operational definitions from cognitive and experimental psychology into their work. One sees a preponderance of Aptitude-Treatment-Interaction (ATI's) studies in the time

period 1960–1985. At this point in time, study of cognition was concerned with the mental processes of perception, thinking, memory, and learning. Theories that were invoked to guide research or development activities at this time were borrowed from educational psychology such as: Benjamin Bloom's *taxonomy of educational objectives*, Robert Gagne's *behavioral objectives* and learning *hierarchies*, Jean Piaget's *stage theory*, David Ausubel's *advanced organizers and meaningful verbal learning* – and later Vygotsky's *socially mediated learning*, and finally Herbert Simon's *artificial intelligence* models for cognition (Lesh et al. 2014).

As a contrast to this Anglo-American view of the development of mathematics education as a matter of cognition, a different view is obtained from Europe. In the early part of the twentieth century, mathematicians like Felix Klein (1849–1925) became interested in the teaching and learning of school mathematics. In this era, one finds increasing interest in studying the psychological development of schoolchildren and its relationship to the principles of arithmetic. The *International Commission of Mathematics Instruction* (ICMI) was founded in 1908 with Felix Klein as the first president. One of the founding goals of ICMI was to publish mathematics education books accessible to both teachers and their students. First published in 1908 but still printed today is the book “*Elementarmathematik vom höheren Standpunkt*” (Elementary mathematics from an elevated viewpoint). It clearly illuminated Klein's paradigm of school mathematics: *scientific foundation of school mathematics* and *accessibility through elementarization*. The question is how did this process of elementarization of higher mathematics work? Klein borrowed from the psychological theories of that time which claimed it was important to (1) provide an access to students by concentrating on the core of a mathematical topic; (2) add views from neighboring fields; and (3) recognize and activate the students' previous knowledge or by changing the means of representation (Törner and Sriraman 2006).

Another view of the influence of educational psychology in general and cognition in particular

to the field of mathematics education is obtained in the *Handbook of Educational Psychology* (Alexander and Winne 2006). In the foundations section of this book, the beginnings of modern educational psychology are attributed to the writings of Johann Friedrich Herbart (1776–1841), the pragmatists William James (1842–1910), G. Stanley Hall (1844–1924), John Dewey (1859–1952), and finally Edward Lee Thorndike (1874–1949). This suggests that it is erroneous to attribute the birth of mathematics education in the experimental psychology and behaviorism of Thorndike or to Begle or to Klein. Indeed, it is the school of pragmatism that can be attributed as a starting point for cognition research as seen in the work of William James who unlike his student Thorndike was already aware of the dangers of over-simplifying the study of the human mind/behavior into operational and quantitatively measurable constructs (Berliner 2006). Pragmatism is viewed as a philosophical position and one that is congruent with the shift from aptitude-treatment-interaction studies that characterized mathematics education to qualitative inquiry that recognized human beings as cognizing subjects different from each other. The former strand of mathematics education was based on cognition viewed from a behaviorist viewpoint which resulted in psychometric studies (ATI's), whereas the latter embraced methods from the human (e.g., anthropology) and social sciences.

Operational Definitions in Mathematics Education as It Relates to Cognition

The notion of “operational” definitions formed an important basis for studies of mathematical cognition as seen in the extensive canon of work produced by Piaget, which influenced the field of mathematics education extensively. In the hard sciences like physics and chemistry, theoretical definitions arise as a result of repeatedly observing invariance in operations represented by physical measurement devices. In other words, operationalization means to “define something” in terms of “a process” that measures *it*. According to Dietrich (2004) in physics, terms

have to be defined operationally (in terms of theories) provided experimentation can back up notions occurring within the theories. Piaget applied this to the study of cognition in children by defining operations as “internalized actions,” which were derived directly from the subject’s physical actions as enacted in sensorimotor behavior. The focus of cognition in Piaget’s work stemmed from adapting biological theories of organization, development, and adaptation to study children’s understanding of number, quantity, space, time, causality, and relations of invariance. Piaget’s developmental theory consisted of sensorimotor, preoperational, concrete operational, and formal operational stages. One of Piaget’s claims was the posited link between mathematics and biology where cognition was characterized as a form of biological adaptation as one moved through the stages outlined in his stage model. Piaget in fact said that “the whole of mathematics be thought of in terms of creation of structures” (Beth and Piaget 1966, p. 70). These constructions are of course not physical ones but operations carried out in the conceptual and idealized world of the mathematician. The passage from sensorimotor actions to formal thinking, in Piaget’s account, is one of increasing abstraction and generalization. Piaget compared his operator structures of thinking to the structures espoused by the Bourbaki. The Bourbaki identified three fundamental structures on which mathematical knowledge rests. They are (1) algebraic structures; (2) structures of order; and (3) topological structures. Piaget claimed that there existed a correspondence between the mathematical structures of the Bourbaki and the operative structures of thought. In terms of Dietrich’s (2004) analysis, Piaget took the observed regularities in children’s cognition and attempted to describe them as phylogenetically evolved mental cognitive operators.

Piaget’s theory of cognitive development in children formed the cornerstone of numerous longitudinal studies in North America funded by the National Science Foundation. Based on Piaget’s body of foundational work, mathematics education researchers empirically validated models within, for example, the Rational Number Project (Lesh et al. 1988) that explained how proportional

reasoning develops in children that by and large cohere with Piaget's stage theory. Some of the findings from the last two decades also suggest that when Piaget's experiments are repeated with age appropriate materials, the stages proposed by him are not as discrete as they seem but more porous with the possibility of children being able to reason at a more advanced level given contextual play materials (Sriraman and English 2004). Zoltan Dienes' six stage theory of learning mathematics bears resemblance to that of Piaget with a somewhat different conceptualization of what "operational" means (Sriraman and Lesh 2007). If mathematics education researchers pointed to one topic area where they believe theory development to be strongest, they would point to the substantial work on mathematical cognition in the areas of (a) early number concepts or (b) early algebraic reasoning or (c) rational numbers and proportional reasoning (Lesh et al. 2014). Evidence of this theory development in learning is found in the literature related to Piaget-like cognitive structures (Steffe 1995); cognitively guided instruction which focuses on task variables; the focus on counting strategies; Vygotsky's socially mediated views of development; and focus on computer-based embodiments which are in some ways similar to those used Dienes (Sriraman and Lesh 2007).

Learning Theories in Mathematics Education

The problem of "learning" in mathematics education was reformulated as a problem of "mathematical cognition" and such a view became dominant in defining what the core of mathematics education was about. As a result, debates on different theories of learning reached a crescendo in the 1990s with mathematics education researchers arguing for and against constructivist theories of learning in which cognition was at the center, either individual or social. Radical constructivism as proposed by Ernest von Glasersfeld took an extreme view of human cognition best captured in the phrase "every person is an island" and meaning was an individual construction; whereas

social constructivism as proposed by Paul Ernest argued that conversation between people was the underlying building block in creation of meaning. Theorists like Paul Cobb and Heinrich Bauersfeld attempted to bridge radical and social constructivist theories by emphasizing the role of culture and language and classroom discourse. Other researchers who valued the emphasis on culture built on Vygotsky's cultural-historical psychology in what has become known as cultural-historical activity theory (see Radford's *Mathematics Education as a Matter of Joint Labor*). Finally, a theory of thinking was proposed by Anna Sfard which extended and synthesized the ideas of Vygotsky and Wittgenstein to propose commognition (cognition and communication) as a theoretical basis for analyzing discourse from the informant's point of view (see Morgan's *Mathematics Education as a Matter of Discourse*). A full treatment of these different theories is found in the *Theories of Mathematics Education* (Sriraman and English 2010). This book documents a shift beyond theory-borrowing toward theory-building in mathematics education, and that relevant theories in mathematics education now draw on far more than psychology.

Newer developments that address cognition in mathematics education are constantly occurring. Furinghetti and Radford (2002) traced the evolution of Haeckel's (1874) *law of recapitulation* from the point of view that parallelism is inherent in how mathematical ideas evolve and the cognitive growth of an individual (Piaget and Garcia 1989). In other words, the difficulties or reactions of those who encounter a mathematical problem can invariably be traced to the historical difficulties during the development of the underlying mathematical concepts. The final theoretical product (namely, the mathematical theorem or object) is the result of the historical interplay between phylogenetic and ontogenetic developments of mathematics, where phylogeny is recapitulated by ontogeny. Beth and Piaget's (1966) claim that there was a correspondence between the Bourbakian structures of mathematics, and operator structures of thought were conjectural at best. However, when analyzed from the perspective of Haeckel's law the correspondence can be

conceived of as Bourbakian ontogeny recapitulating individual mathematicians' phylogenetic contributions against the backdrop of history. Furinghetti and Radford (2002) argue that psychological constructs as well as the study and formation of intellectual mechanisms are not as tenable as the clearly dated and archived transformations of mathematics in its historical development. The use of Haeckel's recapitulation theory as a link between the psychological and historical domains offers better insights into the evolution of cognition as opposed to the one-to-one correspondence conjectured by Beth and Piaget (1966). It is important to note that Haeckel's law in its original form was rejected by the community of biologists but has been transformed numerous times by some over the last 100 years to better explain the relationship between phylogeny and ontogeny in different species. However, in mathematics education unlike biology, we are referring to psychological recapitulation.

In a similar vein, a neo-Lamarckian perspective of recapitulation is also available to mathematics education in any discussion of biological metaphors that capture mathematical cognition. Jean-Baptiste Lamarck's recapitulation cannot be applied or transposed directly to the study of didactical problems in mathematics education because it does not take into account the influence of experience (or more broadly culture). However, just as Lamarck proposed in vain to his peers in 1803, that hereditary characteristics may be influenced by culture, mathematics education increasingly takes into account how culture influences the mutation of historical ideas. The teaching and learning of mathematics bears strong evidence to this Lamarckian nature. Indeed, what took Fermat, Leibniz, and Newton collectively a hundred years to develop is taught and often digested by students in 1 year of university Calculus. Any higher level mathematics textbook is a cultural artifact which testifies to rapid accumulation and transmission of hundreds (if not thousands of years) of knowledge development. So, evolutionary epistemologists have now begun to accept the fact that for humans, cultural evolution in a manner of speaking is neo-Lamarckian (Callebaut 1987).

Conclusion

To summarize, different "starting points" for research on cognition in mathematics education are given and then traced by analyzing the role of operational definitions and theories of learning that were developed. The work of Piaget, Haeckel, and Lamarck are examined, particularly in the use of metaphors from biology to study and understand cognition from an individual to a collective historical perspective. Other readings of "cognition" in line with Vygotsky and communication and, more recently, neuroscience are alternative readings present in mathematics education. Neuroimaging studies are increasingly used to reveal individual learning differences and to design targeted interventions to remedy learning difficulties. Neuroscience also has revealed its diagnostic value in identifying children with dyscalculia and interventions to prevent long-term learning disabilities (Ansari and Lyons 2016).

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Mathematics Education as a Matter of Curriculum

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Introduction

A curriculum studies perspective on mathematics education acknowledges the broadest possible views of curriculum, including content and organization of school mathematics and the social

context in which mathematics is situated in and out of schools, as well as formal and informal processes of mathematical enculturation and acculturation. Beyond scope and sequence of mathematics skills and concepts, it is valuable to question basic assumptions and metaphors implicit in current practices and to generate alternatives. For example, instead of tweaking pedagogy to improve test results related to problem solving, this perspective explores alternatives – learners posing their own problems, categorizing problems or critiquing them instead of solving them, or judging the importance of a problem in terms of its implications (Brown 2001). Or, instead of identifying the best sequence of skill objectives, it creates opportunities for administrators and families to share their knowledge of the kinds of mathematical activities that learners experience in different life moments. It also considers how mathematics may perpetuate colonialist privileges and the erasure of indigenous mathematics. Curriculum studies pay particular attention to those dimensions absent from typical curriculum decision making, prioritizing issues of equity, access, and voice. Translating this priority into the various practices of mathematics education leads, for example, to several key questions:

- What (mathematical) knowledge is of most worth?
- Who gets to decide?
- How does the second question matter?

Curriculum Theory

Eisner (1985) described the explicit or officially stated curriculum, the implicit or hidden curriculum, and the null or excluded or neglected curriculum. A school curriculum might officially include topics in algebra, geometry, number theory, probability, and so on. The hidden or unintended curriculum without anyone intentionally making the effort might include an overwhelming message that girls or Roma children – or other marginal groups – are not natural learners of mathematics, or that

mathematics is a set of procedures to memorize, or that mathematics has no relationship to everyday life. The null or excluded curriculum might include the importance of learning mathematics for obtaining positions of power in society, the use of statistics to understand social policies, the application of mathematics to the solution of global crises such as the plight of refugees, the extreme weather conditions resulting from global warming, and so on. Research in this area is expanding and invites new projects. Appelbaum (1995, 2009) and Gutstein and Peterson (2005) describe changes in the use of community projects and interaction with audiences outside of school as initial efforts in this direction. Similarly, Larry Cuban (1995) differentiated among the official, taught, learned, and tested curricula, each of which might differ in myriad ways from the others. Jahnke and Meyerhöfer (2007) illustrate such differences through their analysis of international comparisons accomplished through PISA tests as generating a global industry of assessment products, need for analyses of results, materials and professional development programs tied to improving performance, etc. without evaluating the curriculum as intended or directly influencing classroom practices.

What is left out by the Eisner and Cuban categories? *Historical studies* provide genealogies of the assumptions about what is possible and what is appropriate for mathematics teaching and learning, in both enabling and constraining ways. *Political studies* interrogate the ways that mathematics education supports or challenges relations of power locally and globally. *Philosophical studies* untangle how mathematics education policy and practice perpetuate modernist assumptions and make it possible to redesign curriculum or pedagogy to be aligned with postmodern notions of power, knowledge, and practice. They also study the ways that mathematics curriculum continues to reestablish expectations and categories of understanding that legitimize only some forms of power and knowledge relationships. In particular, learners' experiences – mathematical or not – and how these experiences come to define for them what is (not) mathematical, what is (not) possible, and indeed what is, might be, could be,

should be, and is unlikely to ever be part of their world comes together in “landscapes of learning.” Such landscapes also include family, media, religious, and other community experiences that are part of the mathematics curriculum. For example, Leonard and Martin (2013) provide a critical historical perspective on the education of Black children in the USA. They show how notions of lack of ability are formed in multiple arrangements of policy, learning, ethnomathematics, student identity, and teacher preparation. They make visible “counter-narratives” about mathematically successful Black youth to advocate for a mathematics curriculum grounded in African-American culture and the “brilliance” of Black children.

Mathematics curriculum is further open to discursive analyses reflecting broad characteristics of human experience. As an *aesthetic text*, mathematics curriculum examines the landscapes of learning and the lifeworld connected to criteria of value, conceptions of morality and ethics, dispositions to explore or deny beauty and harmony, and so on. Curriculum as *theological text* looks for the ways that mathematics curriculum does, can, or might bear explicit, implicit, or null curriculum of religious ideas. For example, Rotman (1993) described interaction with infinity, and in particular, enculturation into an understanding of the number system, as perpetuating reliance on a divine power. On the other hand, Brown (2001) addressed the ways that school mathematics often subjects learners to a morality that denies rights and privileges of the individual. Curriculum as *institutional text* leads to a focus on the relationships between particular social institutions and the landscapes of learning mathematics that are associated with them, as well as the interactions among the various institutions in terms of mathematics. For example, it is possible to study or introduce practices based on the understanding of schools, churches, mosques, families, popular culture, social media, television, and street life. Each can be taken as a social institution with a concomitant mathematics curriculum, constraining and enabling various landscapes of learning mathematics. The particular ways that one institution enacts a mathematics curriculum, attempts to make one more like another, the

relative influence of various social institutions on the life trajectory of individuals, efforts to intervene in the interaction of some of these institutions, or struggles by constituencies to counteract the influence of one or more of these over the others, might become central to a curriculum studies perspective on mathematics education.

From Objectives to Complicated Conversation

Despite the possibilities mentioned above, mathematics education as a matter of curriculum remains largely undertheorized and marginalized in policy, research, and practice. Such scholarship contrasts with the dominant, ameliorative approach to designing mostly school programs based on models of curriculum *development* that ignore the potential of cultural and institutional resources for learning outside of school. In this way, dichotomies are maintained between formal and informal (mathematics) knowledge and furthermore between theory (designers, scholars) and practice (implementers, teachers), making it possible to privilege one end of a constructed dichotomy over the other. More specifically, however, the debasement of curriculum development to the efficient, backward sequencing of experiences has tended to ignore the important questions of how to go about deciding which knowledge is of most worth, who makes these decisions, and the implications of the null curriculum for learners and for society as a whole. It further constructs pervasive invisibility throughout the whole of mathematics education of the ramifications of such debasement, relegating issues of equity and diversity to notions of differentiated instruction, simplifying the curricula that unfold outside of schools as “funds of knowledge” brought into the school to be capitalized upon by a program of instruction, and characterizing aesthetic, political, and interdisciplinary mathematical activity as external to a neutral set of skills and concepts. The result is school programs that serve mostly as sorting tools amplifying inequality and disempowerment rather than as resources for meaning, pleasure, and entertainment, methods of

understanding and responding to community and global issues, opportunities for democratic empowerment, or tactics of resistance to oppression.

According to the commonsense rationale, experts first create a collection of objectives based on the needs of the content, the learners, and society. They then identify experiences that can help learners move toward the objectives using several clever techniques that experts have assembled. Then the design of the curriculum is carried out using themes and threads to create sequences of activities that efficiently intend to move students toward the objectives, along with plans for ongoing assessment of the program so that modifications can be made in process to maximize efficiency. In this process, important questions remain unasked: How do we choose which objectives? What is not included in the objectives? How does our creative and idiosyncratic choice of activity sequence matter? What if we based a program on something other than objectives that allows for taking advantage of serendipitous and spontaneous opportunities for learning? How can we effectively create forms of assessment that accurately communicate whether or not learners are progressing toward objectives? For that matter, how do we know that learners should and can progress toward objectives in such an efficient and universally applicable manner, let alone that learning mathematics happens, or always happens, in such short-term, efficient modules of experience?

One way in which the commonsense approach has been reconstructed *ex unguem leonum* as the entirety of mathematics curriculum is to posit (incorrectly, it turns out) that program planning really can address all issues of curriculum, not by faulting the process of starting with objectives but by expanding the possible sources of objectives. For example, different sets of educational philosophies have guided the construction and enlargement of objectives:

- *Humanist/consummatory*. Strongly and deliberately value-saturated in order to support self-integration and self-actualization. Curriculum provides personally satisfying consummatory

- experiences and emotional encounters. Education fosters autonomy and personal liberation.
- *Social reconstructionist*. Emphasis on the role of education and curriculum content within a larger social context, stressing social needs. Social reform and responsibility for the future of society are primary. Clearly based on social values and political positions, the school responds to its role as a bridge between what is and what might be; school is the process through which society changes itself.
 - *Technicist*. Curriculum is about the how, not about the what. Curriculum finds efficient means to a set of predefined, non-problematic ends. It is concerned with the communication of knowledge rather than its content.
 - *Academic rationalist*. Enables learners to acquire the accumulated tools for participation in Western cultural traditions and with providing access to the greatest ideas and objects humans have created. Curriculum emphasizes traditional disciplines. Curriculum aims to exemplify intellectual activity at its best.

Other categories have also been used for building objectives:

- *Training for work*. Gaining basic mathematical skills, habits, and attitudes necessary to function in the workplace and to adapt to changing work needs
- *Connecting to the canon*. Acquiring core mathematical knowledge, traditions, and values from the dominant culture's exemplary moral, intellectual, spiritual, and artistic resources as guidelines for living
- *Developing self and spirit*. Learning mathematics according to self-directed interests in order to nurture individual potential, creativity, and knowledge of the emotional and spiritual self
- *Constructing understanding*. Developing fluid, active, autonomous mathematical thinkers who know that they themselves can construct knowledge through their study of the environment and collaborative learning with others

- *Deliberating democracy*. Learning and experiencing deliberative skills, knowledge, beliefs, and values necessary for participating in and sustaining a democratic society with and through mathematics
- *Confronting the dominant order*. Examining and challenging oppressive social, political, and economic structures that limit self and others with and through mathematics curriculum and to develop mathematically informed beliefs and mathematical skills that support activism for the reconstruction of society
- *Making subjectivities*. Accepting cultural and ideological truths that make it easier to be manipulated by governing institutions and market forces

Tinkering with curriculum as merely a matter of expanded or clarified objectives leaves the fundamental questions unaddressed. In the process, these questions remain unarticulated for the field of mathematics education. Rather than apparent “solutions” to the complexity of this cultural-historical moment of transition and reconceptualization in mathematics education, trends within curriculum studies emphasize “deliberation” (Sack 2008) and “complicated conversations” (Bratton et al. 2005). This suggests frequent collaborative meetings of teachers, students, community members, and others to engage in important discussion, always ready to respond to the likely realization that some possible perspective on the learning experiences has been and should no longer be excluded (Gutiérrez 2012).

Even Mathematical Knowledge Is Now Questioned

Curriculum studies center interdisciplinary study of the *experience* of mathematics education in the unfolding processes of always becoming mathematical and always being subjected to mathematical aspects of culture, power, and equity. “Until we are able to see that *mathematics needs people* as much as *people need mathematics* [. . .], we risk tinkering with education in a way that fails to address power issues or true transformations in

society” (Gutiérrez 2012, p. 30). Because curriculum studies is not widespread, with few representative examples in research or practice, and because it is grounded in generative metaphors and critique, a common technique of curriculum is to create mind experiments of alternative practices and then to explore the implications of the contrast with commonsense practices. Building on the importance of deliberation and complex conversations, it is possible to imagine a school or other social institution organizing ongoing deliberation opportunities. All members of the community would be understood as mathematical learners – students, teachers, staff and administrators, business and policy representatives, etc. Guided by wisdom and traditions of indigenous elders, these groups would locate their conversations and the work of the institution in the history, present, and future of the place in which they come together.

The conversations and (mathematical) programs of the institution would be characterized by the analysis and critique of the relationships among perspectives, language, power, social groups, and social practices by the learners. A mathematics curriculum could in this way be organized around the exploration of how it became possible to think/be/feel/act the way people do with/because of/or in spite of mathematics. It could be possible to question the implications of the systems of belief about mathematics because of the mathematics known, and how such systems relate to power, social relationships, and the distribution of labor and resources. Mathematics education could in this way become at the same time something to resist and something that can be co-opted for social change, as in, for example, the struggles of the Landless Peoples’ Movement in Brazil (Knijnik 2002).

Furthermore, complicated conversations could be characterized by a form of global citizenship, a citizenship that honors the dignity of all human beings, always learners of mathematics. Because there is no universal recipe or approach that will serve all contexts, it is important to recognize that a “soft” global citizenship informed by multicultural approaches or minimal awareness of the importance of culture is appropriate to certain

contexts and can constitute a major step. But mathematics as a matter of curriculum cannot stop there: If educators are not “critically literate” to engage with assumptions and implications/limitations of their approaches, they run the risk of (indirectly and unintentionally) reproducing the systems of belief and practices that harm those they want to support. Skovsmose and Valero (2005) make a similar point when they demonstrate the possibility that a curriculum designed for a specific population addressing issues of equity might produce further forms of exclusion. Attention to the micro levels of power relations that turn global issues of ethics and oppression in normal teaching practices, however, can contribute importantly to the cultivation of such a sensitive literacy. And one key curriculum question that can no longer be pushed to the side is how very narrow, Western, “rational” conceptions of what mathematics “is” have continued to be wielded implicitly as tools of epistemicide, obliterating alternative epistemologies of number, size, quantity, possibility, shape, algorithmic problem solving, analogic representation, and other extended components of mathematical thinking and living.

Curriculum Provokes New Directions

Mathematics education as a matter of curriculum reveals the ethical and political aspects of mathematics education in three particular ways: (1) Null and hidden curricula, when ignored or left unexplored, are powerfully implicated in maintaining the status quo and its associated forms of inequity and oppression. On the other hand, specific search through questioning assumptions for what has been routinely acting as a null or hidden curriculum is a tactic of social and political change. (2) Mathematics curriculum reflects relative power relations on a global geopolitical scale. Some regions of the world rely on models of ideal mathematics programs from abroad, whether out of desire to emulate dominant cultures or forced to do so, by development institutions and international funding sources. The adoption of non-indigenous programs that ignore

different conditions and overlapping ideological targets has unforeseen consequences that are ripe for future research and related political action. (3) The expectation that school programs are the source of inspiration and questions for mathematics education research neglects the potentially more important scholarship of curriculum as *experience* in all of its forms. Schools, like all social institutions, primarily reflect their role as sites of contestation and social reproduction and in this way limit the possibilities for understanding education as the ongoing cultivation of mathematical sensibilities, subjectivities, desires, fears, hopes and dreams. Stepping away from school programs toward the ongoing co-development of mathematical enculturation, acculturation, social practices, and forms of knowledge, is the promise of the newly emerging subfield of mathematics education as a matter of curriculum.

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Mathematics Education as a Matter of Discourse

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Introduction

What does it mean to conceive of mathematics education as “a matter of discourse?” This question can be answered in several ways, varying according to theoretical understanding of the nature of discourse and according to the scope of what is taken to be mathematics education. At a basic level, discourse is sometimes defined as verbal interaction. Taking this definition, it is hard to dispute the claim that mathematics education *involves* discourse and there is substantial agreement among researchers and curriculum developers that verbal interaction has an important role to play in learning. In this entry, however, discourse is taken to involve not only use of language but also its functions within the social practices of mathematics education. These practices involve distinctive ways of seeing the world and acting in it, forms of identity and relationships among participants, and sets of values and expectations, all of which shape and are shaped by language use. The discursive component of a practice involves the distinctive patterns of

language and other forms of communication that participants use to construe their experience of the world. Considering mathematics education as a matter of discourse, therefore, entails studying the patterns of language use: the objects and actions that are spoken of, the relationships between them, and the values attached to them; the subject positions that are available and the ways these may be taken up or contested; and what kinds of things can be said and which participants in the discourse are able to say what.

The epistemological and ontological foundations of discursive approaches to mathematics education can be traced to various sources, including in particular to Wittgenstein's notion of language games, to Foucault's discursive formations, and to the tradition of ethnomethodology that underpins discursive psychology. However, a common fundamental principle is that the "meaning" of a word, utterance, or text is always constituted in social practice; interpretation of any text must therefore take into account the form of activity and the context in which it plays a part. Furthermore, use of language is itself constitutive, producing the phenomena we experience rather than reflecting some objective "reality" (though theorists differ as to the material basis of experience). Analysis of discourse thus entails analysis of the processes by which objects, ideas, and social actors come into being.

In an article reviewing the use of notions of discourse in mathematics education research, Ryve (2011) provides a useful overview of a range of theoretical perspectives on discourse, their disciplinary origins, epistemological assumptions, analytical focus, and methods of analysis. It is worth drawing attention to the distinction made by Gee (1996) between *discourse*, the language-in-use in particular instances of social interaction, and *Discourses*, the patterns of language use that mark membership of a particular social group or participation in a particular specialized practice. References here to, for example, "the discourse of mathematics" may be considered instances of a *Discourse*, while analysis of an extract of "classroom discourse" is an analysis of *discourse* (though this may also involve

identifying how one or more *Discourses* – of mathematics or psychology or everyday practices – are implicated in the discourse).

It should be noted that both linguistic and non-linguistic modes of communication function discursively. While linguistic communication is often seen as having priority because of its scope, flexibility, and power, other modes such as diagrams, algebraic notation, gesture, and the dynamic images of computer graphics also play important roles in the ways participants in mathematics education practices construe their experience.

Mathematics as a Matter of Discourse

One of the characteristics that distinguish mathematics from other forms of knowledge is the nature of mathematical objects. There is some dispute about whether objects such as *function*, *average*, or *derivative* have an independent existence, but it is clear that we cannot work with them or even think about them without using some form of communicative resource, whether words, visual images, or symbolic expressions. We cannot even have direct access to geometric objects such as *triangle* or *square*, but only to specific concrete (and approximate) representations or realizations of these ideal objects. This entails that doing mathematics is a discursive activity, involving the manipulation of discursive objects. Anna Sfard (2008) goes so far as to claim that mathematical thinking is a form of communication, whether with oneself or with others. From this perspective, there are no absolute mathematical "concepts" (of *function*, *average*, *derivative*) that are represented by linguistic, symbolic, or diagrammatic means. Rather, for any individual, the mathematical "concept" of, say, *function*, is constituted by the set of words, symbolic expressions, and other visual forms that the individual identifies with *function*, together with the relationships he or she forms between these various "realizations" of *function*.

Sfard argues that mathematical objects are entirely constructed by discursive means. One such discursive move is the naming and defining

of new objects. The growth of mathematics, however, is also characterized by the discursive move of “reification,” that is, the transformation of processes into objects. For example, the object *derivative* is a reified object that encapsulates the process of differentiating. The significance of this move is that the thus formed reified objects can have or can be assigned properties (*the derivative is positive for all values of x*), can be related to other objects (*the derivative of e^x with respect to x is e^x*), and can be manipulated or operated upon in order to construct further objects (*differentiating the derivative gives the second derivative*).

But considering mathematics as discourse involves more than just characterizing mathematical vocabulary and the other semiotic systems commonly used in mathematics. In the first place, the distinctive ways that language and other communication modes are used in mathematical contexts include specialized kinds of statements and forms of argumentation. These ways of speaking and writing in order to do and communicate mathematics constitute the mathematics *register* and have identifiable features at the level of words, statements, and whole texts (Pimm 1987). Sfard’s characterization of mathematical discourse includes *routines*, repeated patterns such as algorithmic methods or forms of proof, and *endorsed narratives*, statements or sequences of statements such as theorems that are subject to endorsement or rejection by “discourse-specific endorsement procedures” (2008, p. 134).

However, expanding the scope of the description of features of mathematical communication is not enough. Critically, it is necessary to ask how we know that a given example of spoken interaction or written text is mathematical and where “discourse-specific endorsement procedures” come from. A purely descriptive linguistic analysis will not allow us to answer these questions. On the one hand, many components of the mathematics register are also found in other spheres of activity, and many instances of communication in mathematical contexts mix aspects of the mathematics register with less specialized forms of language. On the other hand, there is a risk of

arguing in a circular fashion that we recognize a text as mathematical or we know the types of procedures necessary for endorsing a theorem because we know mathematics. It is at this point that the notion of discourse as the patterns of language use *within a social practice* becomes crucial. Mathematics is not an objective body of knowledge but a form of social practice – or, rather, a family of related practices including, for example, the scholarly mathematics of academia, various varieties of school mathematics, recreational mathematics, etc. It is through participation in these practices that agreement (and disagreement) is constructed about what counts as mathematics, what kinds of reasoning are accepted as legitimate forms of endorsement, and who is able to make and evaluate claims about mathematics.

Even within academia, mathematicians may be seen to engage in different forms of discourse (though some discourse theorists would call these *genres* within a single discourse of academic mathematics). In particular, Richards (1991) has distinguished between “Journal Math” – the discourse of academic research articles – and “Research Math” – the everyday discourse of doing mathematics and communicating about this with colleagues. A critical difference between these discourses is in the forms of reasoning used to endorse new statements. Research Math makes use of a “logic of discovery,” mapping out a path that may include inductive reasoning and guess work as well as deduction, hypotheses, uncertainty, false steps, and dead ends, a temporal and personal narrative of messy, nonlinear processes, while Journal Math overwhelmingly involves “reconstructed logic,” presenting only the product of the research activity: theorems and their proofs. The Journal Math discourse constructs a mathematical world in which mathematical knowledge is absolute, endorsed by well-structured logic and independent of human agency. The academic mathematicians who participate in both these discourses have to learn to move between them and to position themselves both as authors and as colleagues, as collaborators and often as teachers, drawing on different discursive resources as they do so.

From Mathematical Discourse to School Mathematics Discourse

Conceptualizing mathematics as discourse and mathematical thinking as communication leads to conceptualizing learning mathematics as learning to participate in mathematical discourse, using the specialized patterns of language that are recognized as mathematical. Yet, just as the practices of mathematician involve different sets of language patterns, the discourse of mathematics in school is also complex. Richards (1991) notes that "School Math" discourse shares with Journal Math a tendency toward reconstructed logic, obscuring the messy human origins of mathematical discovery and constructing a mathematical world of unquestionable absolute knowledge to be acquired and reproduced by students. But mathematics education consists of more than just mathematics.

Mathematics education can be conceived of as a network of practices, including those of teachers and students in mathematics classrooms but also practices of curriculum development, international assessment, educational research, etc. We are generally able to recognize texts from each of these practices; a classroom interaction or written homework task is clearly distinguishable from a curriculum document, conference presentation, or research article. Yet there are also relationships between them. The discourse of a mathematics classroom draws on features of discourses originating in other practices, though these are transformed in the course of moving from one practice into another. We are likely to find ways of speaking about mathematics that bear some *family resemblance* to those used in the academy, but the interactions between teachers and students are also likely to include relationships and ways of being that are related to those found in curriculum documents, in psychology, sociology, or education research as well as in everyday discourse.

Bernstein's (2000) notion of *recontextualization* offers a way of thinking about the interdiscursivity of school mathematics (the way school mathematics makes use of resources from multiple discourses). Mathematics is produced in

the academy, and, as it moves into the school context, it is transformed for a new, pedagogic purpose. This involves not only selection of what is to be taught but also changes in the functions of discursive elements and in the relationships between them. For example, factorizing an algebraic expression in school mathematics is often an end in itself, as part of an exercise in which students perform multiple similar yet logically discrete operations, aiming to develop and consolidate a skill. In contrast, in the practice of mathematicians, factorization is far more likely to be a single step in a series of different but logically connected operations, aiming toward solution of a problem or proof of a theorem. Moreover, in the school context, mathematical discourse is brought into relationships with discourses from other specialized fields and from the everyday practices that teachers and students bring from outside the classroom. For example, a teacher may justify her choice of a given task for her students by drawing on discourses of mathematics (the task involves an important piece of mathematics), of psychology (the task is designed to produce cognitive conflict), of curriculum and policy (the task will help students prepare for statutory tests), or of everyday practices (students will find the task fun).

Because schooling is a practice that aims not only to transmit academic knowledge but also to form students into particular kinds of social subjects, Bernstein argues that the discourse of the classroom consists of an *instructional discourse* (the recontextualized discourse of mathematics) that is always embedded within a *regulative discourse* that shapes the kinds of behaviors, identities, and relationships available to students and teachers. The kind of mathematical knowledge that students acquire is a function not only of the mathematical instructional discourse they encounter but also of the opportunities to acquire this that are afforded by the regulative discourse.

Discourse Analysis as a Means of Understanding Mathematics Education

As indicated above, mathematics education may be seen to involve a wide variety of practices both within the classroom and beyond

Mathematics Education as a Matter of Discourse, Table 1 Questions about mathematics classrooms – as a matter of discourse

Concerns of mathematics educators	Reformulated concerns from a discursive perspective
What mathematics do students learn?	What are the forms of mathematical communication that are established in classroom interaction?
How do students learn (or not learn) mathematics?	How do classroom interactions lead (or fail to lead) to the development of students' fluency in mathematical patterns of language use?
What problems do individuals and groups encounter in the classroom?	What are the discursive demands of the mathematics classroom, and how do these relate to the experiences, expectations, and discursive resources that students bring with them into the classroom?
What are the effects of a particular form of teaching or classroom organization?	How does this form of teaching or organization frame the opportunities for students to come to participate in mathematical forms of discourse, and how are students and teachers positioned as subjects?
What are the effects of use of a particular textbook, visual or material resource, or technological tool?	What kind of mathematics (objects and actions, forms of reasoning, values, etc.) may be construed through use of this resource, and what kind of participation may a student construe for herself/himself?

Mathematics Education as a Matter of Discourse, Table 2 Questions about implementation of mathematics curriculum reform – as a matter of discourse

Concerns of mathematics educators	Reformulated concerns from a discursive perspective
How do teachers implement a given reform?	What Discourses are implicated in the reform?
Why do reform efforts often result in different outcomes from those anticipated by the reformers?	How do these constitute mathematics, teaching and learning, and teachers and students? What Discourses do teachers draw on in their practice and when describing, explaining, and justifying their practice? To what extent are the ways these constitute mathematics, teaching, and learning consistent with the reform or in conflict with it?

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it. Conceptualizing these practices as a matter of discourse provides a means of gaining new insights by focusing on the patterns of language use and reframing some of the traditional questions faced by the field of mathematics education in discursive terms.

At the level of the classroom, mathematics educators are concerned, for example, with what children learn and how they learn it, with the problems individual learners or members of particular social groups encounter, with the effects of various forms of teaching and classroom organization, and with the effects of use of textbooks, manipulatives, technologies, and other resources. Table 1 offers some possible reformulations of each of these concerns from a discursive perspective, beginning to “bridge the individual and the social” (Kieran et al. 2001), seeking to understand individual learning as part of a social practice.

Of course, “social” involves more than just interactions within the classroom. Shifting focus

toward the wider social practices within which classrooms are situated, further concerns of mathematics educators include movements to reform curricula, pedagogy, and assessment practices and the design, outcomes, and consequences of international testing. Table 2 suggests some ways of reformulating concerns about mathematics curriculum reform from a discursive perspective. While the questions in Table 1 were largely focused on *discourse*, shifting focus to wider practices demands attention to Discourses, whether the object of study is the implementation in the classroom or the nature of the reform itself.

Many researchers and educators who adopt a discursive perspective on mathematics education have a strong concern with issues of equity and identity (see Black et al. 2009; Herbel-Eisenmann et al. 2012), a concern that may be addressed through critical discourse analysis (Wodak and Meyer 2009). As social identities and relationships are constructed in discursive practices,

Mathematics Education as a Matter of Discourse,
Table 3 Questions about disadvantage in mathematics
education – as a matter of discourse

Concern of mathematics educators	Reformulated concerns from a discursive perspective
Why do students of color, from working-class families, learning in a second language, etc., achieve less success in school mathematics?	How do the discourses drawn on in educational practices position these students? How does the discourse of the school and the mathematics classroom relate to the values and ways of construing the world afforded by the everyday discourse in their homes and communities, including everyday discourse about aspects of mathematics?

studying and understanding how patterns of language use contribute to this construction provide opportunities to critique, challenge, and even transform practices that produce undesirable (from some point of view) identities or inequitable experiences and outcomes.

Across the world, students from socially disadvantaged groups achieve lower levels of attainment in mathematics and participate less in advanced mathematical studies. This is often explained in ways that locate responsibility for lower achievement with the individual students (they are less intelligent and less motivated and lack prerequisite skills, knowledge, or dispositions), their families and communities (which provide less support or the wrong kind of environment), or their teachers (who lack high expectations of their students or are under-qualified, prejudiced, and unable to communicate with or motivate these kinds of students effectively). Rather than considering these explanations as objective descriptions of students, families, and teachers (whether true or false), they can be considered as discursive constructions, construing the world in ways that serve to maintain the dominance and advantages of high-status social groups. Table 3 suggests how this perspective might redirect the focus of those concerned with disadvantage.

Concluding Reflection

To be consistent, conceiving of mathematics education as a matter of discourse must also entail conceiving of other work that takes a discursive perspective as examples of discursive actions. It has been argued that texts such as curricula, teacher guides, classroom interactions, or research articles create descriptions of the world by constructing particular sets of categories, relationships, and values rather than by objective representation of an external reality. Equally, it must be recognized that this entry does the same thing. Adopting a discursive perspective on mathematics and mathematics education does not make a truth claim about the world but enables particular forms of action in the world. Like any other theoretical perspective, it makes it possible to speak about mathematics and mathematics education in some ways and makes other ways of speaking impossible.

Cross-References

- [Digital Learning, Discourse, and Ideology](#)
- [Mathematics Education as a Matter of Curriculum](#)
- [Mathematics Education as a Matter of Identity](#)
- [Mathematics Education as a Matter of Policy](#)
- [Wittgenstein](#)

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Mathematics Education as a Matter of Economy

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Synonyms

Credit system; Equity; Mathematics for all

Introduction

Economy is one of the modern sciences that relies on mathematics to develop its models and results. It is also one of the main pillars of the modern State. A solid grounding in mathematics is considered invaluable for understanding the complexities of real-world economic problems. The more professionals are equipped with mathematical knowledge, the better is the service they provide to the economic organization of societies. In the last four decades, however, mathematics education researchers have been calling attention to the importance of mathematically educating not only the future professionals who will use this science in their work but also *all* the students. It is assumed that people need mathematics in their daily lives to participate as actively engaged citizens. Mathematics is thus posited as a valuable

resource to the social and economic progress of society. As a result, mathematics education has become highly assessed through global instruments like TIMSS and PISA. The results of these international measurements not only determine curricular changes across the globe, but they function as a barometer for the economic wealth of a country. Countries that perform less well in these evaluations are perceived as being compromising their status in world economy (which is increasingly becoming a “knowledge economy”). This approach to mathematics education and economy rests on a liberal and unproblematic understanding of society, where knowledge is seen as neutral and economic progress as a goal in itself (Woodrow 2003).

Critical approaches to mathematics education have been problematizing these ideals of progress and neutrality. Mathematical knowledge might be important to the economic wealth of societies; however, the recognition that economy is a contentious field, with inequality and social injustice always lurking in the background, has led to research that criticizes the role mathematics has in establishing systems of knowledge and control that favor market-oriented economies. Their arguments rest on the importance for citizens to be mathematically informed about the way in which mathematics formats reality, in particular, the economic reality of the current world. Since most of the mathematics modeling our world is hidden behind complex formulae or technological hardware, students need to critically deconstruct the way in which mathematics formats reality, so that they can socially participate as informed citizens. In this way, the relation between economy and mathematics education is one that posits mathematics as an important knowledge both to enhance current economic models and to raise (critical) awareness of the inherent workings of these same models. The latter has been one of the aims of critical mathematics education, which advocates an exploration of real-life situations in school mathematics and highlights the importance of mathematical modeling for economy and policymaking (Ernest et al. 2016).

Another way to envisage the relation between mathematics education and economy concerns

not the education of students, but the influence that economic tenets have on school mathematics. Education has become an increasingly commodified social space. It is a commonplace in critical educational studies to assert how education has become merchandise and schools some kind of corporation. Studies on ethnomathematics, in particular, have been criticizing contemporary schooling for mimicking market-oriented rationales, turning people into components of a big machinery that aims at uniformity (D'Ambrosio 2003). Educational industries, from publishing houses producing textbooks to computer firms developing technology, see schools as a profitable market. Administrators and politicians use the metaphor of schools as companies to envision ways of managing education. Governments attribute primordial importance to results in high-stake tests as a means to do school evaluation and make grades and scores a matter of profit. The labor market and industries demand the production of the highly qualified people needed. All these are few examples of how education has become capitalized and thus progressively contaminated by the capitalistic structure of society. Implicitly in this view, there is the assumption that education is something originally pure based on humanistic ideas such as education being the place to learn the cultural heritage, to free people, to do formative assess (instead of summative assessment), etc. The "solution" for the problems of current education would be a decapitalization of education, a return to its original purity. The purpose is to keep the capitalist logic of production/consumption outside the educational enterprise.

This position is aligned with liberal-democratic approaches to economy and to education. It recognizes the unfairness of schooling and its tendency to reproduce inequality of all sorts (social, racial, economic, etc.). Yet, these are seen as empirical problems, which can be solved through the efforts of well-intended human beings engaged in the amelioration of their praxis. In the effort to create a meaningful mathematics education for all students, one that is not damaged by dubious economic interests, researchers need to think about schools as places of equality,

emancipation, and progress (e.g., Radford 2012), that is, as a place at odds with today's economic reality. This liberal approach to education has thus been criticized for positioning schools as something outside the remaining society, with its economic mechanisms and political frames (e.g., Pais 2012).

However, the characterization above does not exhaust the relationship between economy and education, nor is it the crucial aspect. The problem is that school itself, more than just being contaminated by some capitalistic ideas, is the crucial ideological State apparatus in the reproduction of a certain economic system, namely, *capitalism* (Althusser 1994). Education in its scholarized form has in its kernel the capitalist logic. From a strictly economic perspective, schools have been performing a crucial role, without which our current modes of living could not be possible. Schools guarantee a place where children could be deposited when their parents go to work. But it is not just a matter of "guarding" children. It is also a matter of sorting them, by means of stipulating who is capable of performing specific roles in society. Mathematics education research is fertile in research showing how mathematics is involved in processes of credibilization and social selection, in excluding groups of people considered to be disadvantaged, in providing a clear social mechanism of accountability, or in fostering the appropriation of behaviors and modes of thinking and acting that make every child governable (see Valero and Meaney 2014) for an account of the socioeconomic influences on mathematical achievement). Therefore, school performs three crucial economical functions in our societies: it guarantees a space where parents can put their children so that they can work; it keeps children away from production; and it sorts them.

It is against this background that education, and mathematics education in particular, can be conceived not as being contaminated by capitalism, nor a part of capitalism, but as sustaining the capitalist system itself, by assuring its reproduction. Education is not just a product (education as a piece of a profitable market) but a means of (ideological and material) reproduction. As such, as a matter of economy, instead of conceiving

mathematics education and economy as separate entities that influence each other, the role that current mathematics education plays *within* capitalist economics will be considered.

The Economy of Schooling

A mathematical object in a school is not the same as a mathematical object in the working sheet of a mathematician. What makes them different are the different worlds they inhabit. A student is first and foremost a student, frequenting a specific place called school, with particular rules and organization of labor. To assume that the inherent properties of mathematics are a sufficient source for students' engagement with mathematics is to neglect the place this school subject occupies within the economy of schooling. From the moment mathematics comes into school, it becomes part of an economy, where students are organized into classes and subjected to classification through criteria of evaluation. Certificates are the final prizes. With higher or lower pressure, this system is the fundamental organization of schools at all levels and all around the world (Baldino and Cabral 2013).

Within mathematics education research, Shlomo Vinner (1997) was the first to call attention to what he named the school's *credit system*. Contrary to the assumption that mathematics empowers people because it provides them with some kind of knowledge or competence, authors, following Vinner, have suggested that this empowerment has instead to be understood in the field of value (Pais 2014; Baldino and Cabral 2013; Lundin 2012). Mathematics allows students to accumulate credit in the school system that will allow them to continue studying and later to achieve a favorable position in the labor market. In this (economic) perspective, mathematics empowers people not so much because it provides them with some kind of knowledge or competence, but because it is posited as an economically valuable resource. Accepting this condition, Roberto Baldino and Tânia Cabral use the Marxian categories of use value, exchange value, and surplus value – the credentials which represent the

surplus products of learning – to show how in schools students learn, above all, to participate in and accept the conditions of production and seizure of surplus value. The value of the ones who fail is appropriated by the ones who pass as surplus value. As posed by Baldino and Cabral (2013, p. 11):

[I]n the social practices that occur at school, students, teachers and the administrative personnel participate in a process of transformation of students' labour power, initially simpler and less qualified, into a commodity of higher value, to be sold in the future for a higher salary, which is expected to pay off the investment of muscle and nerves of students as well as salaries of teachers and staff. In the process of qualification of their labour-power, students exert a double function: while actively engaged in the work of raising the quality of their labour-power, they function as labourers; while owners of the commodity in process of increasing quality, they function as capitalists.

Against this background, the problem of failure in school mathematics can be better understood if it is not posed as a problem affecting particular groups of students but as an endemic feature of current schooling, thus affecting *all* students. Failure is properly speaking a political and economic problem having to do with the way schools are structured as credit systems, where year after year teachers are asked to mark students with a grade that will determine their future possibilities. Failure in achieving a meaningful mathematics education is not a malfunction which could be solved through better research and a proper crew of well-educated teachers and of accurately designed tests. Rather, it is an endemic characteristic of capitalist schooling (Pais 2012).

The Economy of Students' Desire

Researchers have been recently connecting elements from political economy and psychoanalysis, informed by the work of Lacan and Žižek, to understand students' learning not in terms of the inherent properties of mathematics but in terms of the role this school subject plays within political economy (e.g., Pais 2015). What does it make a student desire mathematics? For many people

who come across school mathematics, engagement in this subject does not derive from a will to learn the subject itself, but from a will to satisfy some Other's demand (say, parents' demand for good grades, teachers' demand for learning, academic or professional demands, etc.). As Lacan repeatedly asserted, desire is the desire of the Other. That is, far from coming from some inner will, desire comes from raising the question: What does the Other want from me? Strictly speaking, it is the Other what causes our desire. The question about students' desire can be formulated thus: who is the Other who causes students' desire to learn mathematics? For sure, it is the dream of many mathematics educators to conceive mathematics itself as this Other: to believe that mathematics as an object has already in itself the properties that will trigger students' desire for learning. However, if we follow Lacanian theory, we are instigated to posit credit as the cause of students' desire. Mathematics, with its attributed qualities of power, utility, beauty, and the like, is the necessary ideology masking the real object of schools' credit system. This encourages us to take a certain critical distance toward the object mathematics, a distance enabling us to see mathematics not in itself but as being articulated in the field of the Other – capital. The crucial insight from Lacanian psychoanalysis is that the cause of students' desire is not articulated in terms of culture but in terms of economy.

The Disavowal of the Economy of Schooling in Mathematics Education Research

Apparently, there is no way of getting out of such an accreditation system, and mathematics education research ends up taking it for granted. The struggle against inequity is then elaborated in terms of what is called “identity politics,” concerning the emancipation of particular groups of people considered to be in disadvantage or by addressing issues of power. To struggle not only for a change of mathematics education in terms of what Marx called the *superstructure* – culture, politics, and discourse as emphasized by sociopolitical

perspectives – but also a change in the economy of schools seems to be out of reach. Indeed, by noticing that exclusion is something inherent to school, we realize that ending exclusion implies suppressing schooling as we know it. In the current myriad of world social organization, this does not seem possible. The problem of equity requires a fundamental economic and societal change, which we experience as impossible. The question is, thus, how can the community continue to develop research after acknowledging that exclusion is an endemic feature of current schooling?

At stake here is the role of ideology in providing a meaningful narrative to justify the unequal reality that constitutes the economy of schooling. Mathematics education research partakes in an ideology set on avoiding the necessity of failure within current schooling. A fantasy provides a rationale for failure. When confronted with the worldwide problem of failure in school mathematics and the societal demand for “mathematics for all,” research establishes an explanatory scheme within which an approach to the problem is proposed. Although the particular constellation of the ideological narrative changes from one research trend to another, the figure of “mathematics” functions as that which simultaneously thwarts the realization of the ideal goal of a universally meaningful mathematics and compels the articulation of an entire discourse concealing the necessity of failure (hence providing researchers a frame within which to develop their work).

Although an ideology, with few resemblances with the concrete circumstances of schooling, research has real effects (Lundin 2012). It creates an entire research industry, outlines school curricula, prescribes classroom work, and is the main informant for the constitution of international comparative assessment programs like PISA and TIMSS. Researchers often see these instruments as corrupting positive developments originated from research (Pais 2014). We have thus two opposite positions. On the one side, we have governments and international agencies privileging economic interests and suspicious political agendas in education, and, on the other side, we have researchers who are perceived as struggling against this educational reductionism. However,

could it be that these two positions are not opposite but part of the same whole, each one performing a complementary role?

From Knowledge to Economy

By positing the importance of school mathematics in terms of knowledge and competence, research provides an ideological screen against the role school mathematics plays within capitalist schooling. While presenting school mathematics as an important subject in terms of knowledge and competence – that is, in terms of what Marx called the use value – the other surreptitious functions of mathematics, its exchange value, can actually become operative. We can however conceive the importance of mathematics not in terms of mathematics itself, but in terms of the place that this subject occupies within a given structural arrangement, that is, to conceptualize the importance of mathematics not in terms of its inherent characteristics – problem solving, utility, beauty, cultural possibilities, etc. – but in terms of its attendant submissions to political as well as economic criteria and goals. In short, an economic approach to mathematics education invites us to posit mathematics as a crucial element in the accreditation system, instead of conceiving its importance in terms of a precious knowledge aimed to empower people and to enable societal development.

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Mathematics Education as a Matter of Identity

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Synonyms

Agency; Discourse; Identity; Identity-work; Positioning; Selfhood; Subject; Subjectivity

Introduction

“Mathematics education as a matter of identity” is an emergent field where selfhood and the mathematical subject are being theorized as the effect of

lived experiences in institutions such as family, school, media, or church. Identity and its associated term subjectivity are embryonic in varied theoretical and activist arenas ranging from socio-cultural psychology, psychoanalysis, cultural studies, poststructuralism, postcolonialism, new materialisms, or arts-based research. Emphasis on the “question of the subject” facilitates the problematizing of a “knowing self” as the effect of politics of difference, diversity, language, discourse, body, power, authority, agency, justice, and emancipation or as the product of affective politics connected to consumption habits and entertainment desires.

Up until today, “identity” persists the status of a ubiquitous concept in social sciences, resists clear-cut definitions, and subjects itself to critique. Despite being unsettled as a robust concept, mathematics education researchers embrace identity and/or subjectivity for analyzing, discussing, or interrogating how selfhood becomes inscribed through mathematical practices; how certain subject positions are constructed as normative, deficient, or marginal; and how a reconfiguration of mathematical subjectivity is potentially possible as part of cultural, discursive, material, corporeal, or affective renewals. Moreover, “mathematics education as a matter of identity” is key toward understanding the reciprocal relation among a burgeoning free-market economy, neoliberal governing, increased socioeconomic crisis, vulnerable environmental sustainability, loss of security and safety, forced migration, etc. and the risky process of fabricating (by means of mathematics) the rational, reasonable, and yet fragile, fragmented, or indebted subject.

Lines of Identity Research in Mathematics Education Practices

An explosive interest in discussing *mathematics education as a matter of identity* has been recently realized among researchers, educators, curriculum designers, and policymakers. The turn to *identity* signifies primarily a concern for the quality of life experienced by learners or teachers through a complex availability of discursive and material

mathematical practices. It also expresses an intent to capture, perform, or alter imageries of “who” is the mathematical subject. As such, identity research is geared toward the social, cultural, discursive, affective, ethical, and political underpinnings of mathematics education by being alert on how self and subject enact mathematical institutions (Martin 2006; Solomon 2009; Walshaw 2010; Chronaki 2009, 2013).

Most identity research marks a dissatisfaction with restrictive representations of the mathematical subject as the myth of the active, rational, autonomous, white, able, male, middle-class learner. It pursues to explore how marginalized or excluded subject positions are being constructed through racial, socioeconomic, ethnic, cultural, linguistic, or disability/ability discourses. It seeks not only to interpret or deconstruct normative mathematical subjectivities but also to reconfigure alternatives. At the same time, a focus on mathematical identity and subjectivity exemplifies (and sometimes disrupts) how imperialism, modernist thought, and neoliberal governing are being built on predominant ideologies of a certain, objective, predictable, measurable, and calculable selfhood. Equally, the turn to identity signals a discontent with conceptions of learner participation, access, and engagement as simply a matter of individual beliefs, attitudes, views, values, or of an enculturated, socialized, or self-regulated behavior. Instead, it gestures attentiveness to a more rigorous theorizing coupled with a deliberation toward problematizing equity, social justice, and emancipatory politics.

How is then identity being discussed and used in relation to mathematics education? Two distinct lines of thought, in contemporary social sciences, approach “identity theory” and “theories of the subject” from almost incongruent standpoints. On the one hand, “identity theory” with antecedents in structural perspectives of cultural or social psychology, sociocultural theory, and sociology strive toward a coherent language of “identity” clarifying relational mechanisms among social structures and subject positions. In this line, researchers in mathematics education exploit mostly sociocultural theory and search for

operational tools that discuss identity as a precursor to learning (Sfard and Prusak 2005), to design participatory learning activity (Cobb 2004), or to create sustainable communities of practice (Lerman 2012). On the other hand, “theories of the subject” bring together scholars from the broader field of cultural studies including critical psychology, psychoanalysis, gender and queer studies, discourse theory, poststructuralism, new materialisms, or postcolonial theories. They discuss identity politics in relation to subjectivity in the realm of contemporary changing times as a complicated matrix of fluid relations, bodies, and spaces forming loci of immense dynamism, resistance, and creation. By and large, researchers in mathematics education who identify with a “theory of the subject” line of inquiry focus on how mathematical subjectivities are being produced discursively or materially and explore disruptions or reconfigurations of normative identity.

In particular, psychoanalytic perspectives based on Freud and Lacan capture the subject as “split” or as “polymorphous perversity” denoting that gender, race, and ability are already instilled in us as part of our corporeal encounters with biological species. Foucault-based post-structuralism develops a view of the subject as the workplace of power, struggle, will, and resistance where the self becomes governed through education to identify with society as organized in fixed categories around rationalized discourses of truth and knowledge. Laclau and Mouffe advance a discursive post-Marxist position based on the Althusserian notion of the interpellated subject via ideological State apparatuses (such as family, school, media, religion, law) and Lacan’s theory of the split subject as fundamentally fragmented and constantly struggling toward becoming whole. This struggle to “whole,” although always imperfect and incomplete, is crucial for identity-work where individuals strive to articulate meaning via chains of equivalence/difference, myths, social imaginaries, and bodily action functioning as “surfaces of inscription.” Butler’s queer theory further problematizes the discursive limits between subject, body, and identity tied into materializations that produce ideal constructs of selfhood and discusses the politics of “troubling”

hegemonic identity. Deleuze and Guattari’s new materialism, allying with a Foucauldian analysis of the subject’s relation to discourses of power and truth but departing from a psychoanalytic view of an esoteric subject, conceives subjectivity as a continuous “being” and “becoming.” The subject is constituted in an extrovert process of affective encounters with the surfaces and rhizomes of a socio-material assemblage seeking mostly connections rather than predetermined identities as patterned structures of eternal or generalizable truths.

Reviewing the literature on identity research in mathematics education, Lisa Darragh (2016) points to a growing body of research with an increased peak in the last 5 years. A distinction is often made among two ways of conceiving identity, on the one hand, as “representing,” “acquiring,” or “appropriating” drawing on theories that frame learner qualities in socialization, culture, or biology and, on the other hand, as “performing,” “resisting,” or “troubling” predominant self-categories. Yet, the terrain might be more complicated as, despite urges for shared definitions of identity, a proliferation of terms such as narrative, enacted, leading, fragile, fragmented, or hybrid identity marks how researchers strive to capture aspects of a complex process of identity-work in which individuals struggle to perform norms or resist stereotypes. At the same time, there is a notable realization on how the concept of identity is more and more grounded in diverse and often conflicting theoretical frames without discussing their epistemological and ontological underpinnings making it more and more difficult to consider potential synergies. Methods are mostly drawn in qualitative studies (e.g., ethnographies, interviews, teaching experiments, genealogies of knowledge) focusing on the discursive analysis of moment-to-moment classroom talk, classroom episodes, workshop or leisure activity, narratives of student and teacher learning trajectories, career choices, and future aspirations as mathematics learners or educators.

Despite the absence of clear-cut definitions, one might appreciate a cartography of empirical outcomes produced by a growing research body designating how identities mediate learner

cultures, influence educators' pedagogic acts, and inform the choice and design of adequate materiality as spaces where mathematical subjectivities become performed or resisted. As such, "mathematics education as a matter of identity" can be discussed in relation to (a) learner identities including children and students in primary, secondary, and tertiary domains; (b) educator identities including preservice, novice, and teacher professional development; and (c) material identities including texts, textbooks, resources, technologies, media, and varied genres of pop culture. It is within these spaces where discourses of truth and power unfold around gender, race, ethnicity, social class, language, or body politics and fabricate (or not) the self as the subject of mathematics.

Learner Identities

The bulk of identity research in mathematics education concentrates on how young children and students in primary, secondary, or tertiary domains experience mathematics as part of continuous changing social, cultural, and linguistic contexts. In particular, researchers tend to focus on how learners fabricate themselves as mathematical subjects while they relate to genres of formal or informal mathematical activity; become involved in transitions from primary, to secondary, and to tertiary education; make choices for studying mathematics or opting out STEM careers, or, even, migrate across geographical territories due to socioeconomic or environmental crisis, war, and religious and political conflicts. Of major concern is how students adopt, appropriate, conform, reproduce, or resist normative mathematical subjectivities and how categories of race, gender, class, religion, or ethnicity influence learning, knowledge access, and engagement with mathematics. Identity is often seen as the "missing link" for exploring learning as the distance between actual and designated identities (Sfard and Prusak 2005). It becomes a lens to explore how normative mathematical identities become construed or constrained via learning design, curricula reforms, and innovation (Cobb 2004). It is as well the hybrid space for opening up

entries to "dialogicality" between West and subaltern positions of the mathematical subject (Chronaki 2009).

Learner identities tend to become affective spaces that govern a complex political work where traditional disciplinary dichotomies are entangled with curricular reform, innovative pedagogy, or educational policy. However, a number of issues need to be confronted. *First*, identity as a static, core self, or individual trait that contributes toward the construction of the "real" or "universal" mathematical learner has been problematized, and a figuration of the child as changing, growing, and always in flux is becoming endorsed. *Second*, there is an increased awareness of youth mathematical identity as constituted at the intersections of race, gender, social, linguistic, cultural, religious, and ethnic subject positions. And *third*, a configuration of learner identities in relation to youth and childhood spaces, mathematical agency, learning, and design for learning is progressively considered in the realm of sociomaterial, semiotic, and discursive practices of mathematical activity.

Educator Identities

Identity has equally been a construct for discussing how educators live through the changing sociopolitical dimensions of institutional teaching cultures as part of their initial education courses or in-service training, their encounter of pressing requirements to implement and mediate curricular reforms, and their responses to increased transcultural contexts of schooling. While some resort on how mathematics education practices work toward producing and reproducing certain teacher identities in the realm of regulatory strategies, cultural habitus, and reform demands, others emphasize how teachers resist, negotiate, transform, and, eventually, change identities as part of official policy requirements to implement curricular reforms or as the effect of market forces for innovative products or creative skills and capacities. They are based on the assumption that "traditional" and "reform" pedagogies are distinct worlds. "Traditional" is often implied as

restrictive or primitive, while “reform” mathematics as always developing new professional identity by encountering innovative tools, novel ways of constructing mathematics, or new governing strategies for designing, organizing, representing, testing, assessing, evaluating, and marketing.

Educator identity research focuses primarily on the interplay among “traditional” versus “reform” or “innovative,” “progressive,” and “creative” practices that circulate through varied regulatory strategies in which educators position themselves as they struggle to articulate meanings among hegemonic and marginal discourses. Teacher identity-work does not reveal a pre-existing fixed mathematical subjectivity but a complex discursive construction of self and subject at the thresholds of macro and micro educational levels. As Brown and McNamara (2005) argue that the potential reconfiguring of mathematical subjectivity of either novice student-teachers, who start anxious when they lack a solid background in mathematics, or expert teachers, who resist reform curricula implementation, lays primarily in making accessible creative experiences or sharing innovative mathematical activity with children and less within official regulatory frameworks for teacher training. Still, the recurring theme of mathematics teacher as autonomous subject, flexibly moving across territories of expertise, constantly changing and adapting, or always being the locus of thought, action, and ideology, needs further discussion. Some research interrogates how the neoliberal politics of a free-market economy exploits “educator identity” as the alibi for promoting particular products, skills, and competences that will turn into governing technologies of the self. Current demands for effective media or technology use and for responsive postures to social justice and cultural, religious, racial, gendered, and linguistic diversities in mathematics classrooms exemplify how identity becomes a crucial space toward governing teachers as agents for change. At the same time, teachers and educators fall into being identified as the “indebted” subject, unceasingly responsible for change, innovation, and creativity and, instantaneously, guilty of not being able to, finally, meet these goals.

Material Identities

Researchers have devoted attention on how socio-material and semiotic practices including a variety of texts such as textbooks, literary books, curricula resources, media, technologies, or popular culture genres represent, signify, or mediate certain mathematical identities and provide a textural basis for crafting mathematical subject positions. Walkerdine (1989) analyzed how textbooks employed in the UK have served to limit female agency with regard to mathematical knowledge. This has proved a lasting and consistent pattern throughout primary-school while becoming more grievous in secondary-school textbooks across nations up until today. Specifically, women and girls are still represented in textbooks as mostly passive and inferior to men or boys, frequently in need of help, support, or guidance, and, often, in positions that do not accord with serious mathematically rooted professions. On the contrary, masculine images in texts are comparatively more in demand for power and action identifying the genius, quick, and clever problem solver.

Gendered, racial, and class dichotomies prevail along with discursive constructions of ethnic identity not merely in textual representations of mathematical content and historical accounts of mathematicians and mathematics but also in the ways specific written speech acts and visual images of word problems address the reader into mathematical activity. Recently, Hottinger (2016) discusses gender reconstruction of mathematical subjectivity in the US context by means of a popular series of mathematics textbooks authored by glamorous actress and mathematician Danica McKellar who addresses middle-class adolescent girls (e.g., *Girls Get Curves*, *Kiss My Math*). Although her storied problems attempt to shift the masculine discourse of mathematical ability and to align mathematics with femininity, gendered representation is conflated with heterosexual identity and femininity norm is fixed around specific notions of sexuality (Raubel 2016). Such material identifying of mathematical subjectivity can be problematic since the textual narratives of “real-life” problems unfold around fixed categories of gender, sex, and sexuality but also social

class and neoliberal governing. Thus the process of mathematical activity ignores diversity across gender identity, sexual orientation, and ideology positioning.

Of significant importance is how learners, teachers, or spectators identify selfhood and configure mathematical subjectivity by conducting multiple narratives, storied problems, modeling, thematic contexts, and problem-based activity in textbooks or media. Findings indicate that mathematical content selection and representation is not only rarely in accordance to youth cultures but appears to limit motives for participation and intensities for successful participation. The tenacious presence of normative identities has also been documented in genres of stereotyping the presence of mathematics and mathematicians in popular culture texts such as movies, TV series, youth magazines, etc. Prevailing images of mathematics and mathematicians construct, by and large, negative or alienating relationships with audiences not appealing to the complexity of life (Moreau et al. 2010). In addition, normative mathematical subjectivity is configured not only as incompatible with femininity but also in close relation to constructions of West identity as superior. This is evident in how narratives of the mathematical hero in most representations, varying from textual historiographies to visual portraits in postage stamps, tell the story of mathematical knowledge growth as mainly a racial, gendered, and cultured achievement where the West as imperial power is revisited without being interrogated (Hottinger 2016). As such, the civic disposal of mathematical material identities in relation to mathematical activity is often trapped around particular norms that do not fit with contemporary struggles toward discursive shifts related to racialized, cultured, or gendered subjectivities and, thus, cannot identify with the public at large including educators and learners.

Concluding Remarks

“Mathematics education as a matter of identity” lures the question of “the subject” as crucially political. It serves to interrogate the relation

between subjectivity and identity politics and to problematize normative assumptions around categories such as women, age, ability, masculinity, sexuality, patriarchy, social class, West, or indigenous as consistent across regions and historical periods. A number of studies in mathematics education agree that stereotyped categories of identity persist in the cultural spheres of education. At the same time, there is a noted absence of research that sheds light on alternative identity-work that pursues reconfigurations of mathematical subjectivity. It is apparent that more attention is required in relation not only on how mathematical identity mediates the construction of specific subject positions as success or failure. It is equally important to think about how material, textual, and corporeal mathematical subjectivities can queer, trouble, or disrupt essentialist identities and can contribute into creating alternate spatial and embodied constellations of both representing and performing subjecthood.

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- increasing awareness that to come to grips with the complexity of contemporary societal demands, mathematics education can no longer be fruitfully formulated either as an epistemological or as a psychological matter – not even as epistemological *and* psychological.
- Sociocultural theories developed in the fields of sociology and anthropology (from Émile Durkheim to Pierre Bourdieu and beyond) have provided new perspectives by which to consider mathematics education. In particular, sociocultural theories have provided mathematics educators with new possibilities to conceptualize the students, the teachers, and the school and to better understand the political, economic, social, and cultural dimensions that shape mathematics as a scientific discipline and mathematics education as a social-political-pedagogical project.
- Sociocultural theories differ categorically from the individualist idealist approaches to the mind and the rationalist epistemologies that have informed mathematics education since the early twentieth century. The individualist approaches to the mind understand the production of meaning and ideas as a mere subjective endeavor. Rationalist epistemologies understand it as an abstract, nonhistorical, a-cultural process. Sociocultural theories, by contrast, understand the production of human beings and the ideas and meanings that humans produce as embedded in the individuals' cultures. The common denominator of sociocultural theories is the claim that human beings are *consubstantial* with the culture in which they live their lives. In other words, cultures are not merely a constant source of stimuli to which humans adapt. On the contrary, the way in which human beings think, take action, feel, imagine, hope, and dream is deeply entangled in the historically constituted forms of thinking, sensing, feeling, and interacting that they find in their culture. To a great extent, differences between sociocultural theories appear according to the manner in which the aforementioned consubstantiality is understood and theoretically thematized—and so is the case of sociocultural approaches to mathematics education.
- Historically speaking, the differences between sociocultural theories did not appear all of a

Mathematics Education as a Matter of Labor

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Introduction

During the twentieth century, mathematics education was predominantly conceptualized either as the diffusion of mathematical contents or as the facilitation of the students' development of mathematical cognitive structures. In the first case, the emphasis was generally put on the organization of the mathematics curriculum and the efficient management of the learning environment. In the second case, the emphasis was often put on mental structures and the understanding of students' mathematical conceptualizations. In the first case, the underpinning theoretical orientation was essentially *epistemological*. In the second case, the theoretical orientation was *psychological*. Although the aforementioned conceptualizations of mathematics education have shown their merits, in the past few years, there has been an

sudden. Nor did they appear clearly formulated. They turned around the problem of the individual and the social, and the subjective and the objective. It is in this context that, in the works of Wilhelm von Humboldt, Ernst Cassirer, and Valentin Voloshinov (or Vološinov), language came to be considered the link between cultures and their individuals. Voloshinov (1973), for example, turned to the *word*. Noticing that the word is implicated in every act and contact between people, Voloshinov found in the word the ontological connection between the individuals. Drawing on this conception of the word, Voloshinov, as well as Bakhtin, came to see literature not just as one of the fields of aesthetic experience and cognition but the central field through which the other cultural fields are refracted. It is ultimately through language and literature that reality is produced and interpreted. The problem of the individual and the social, and the subjective and the objective, is resolved, in Voloshinov's account, in the dialectical tension between the relatively stable centripetal forms of culture (epitomized by the *novel*) and the centrifugal forms of resistance and novelty (epitomized in Bakhtin's idea of *carnival*).

Language-oriented sociocultural research (e.g., research based on Bakhtin's and Vygotsky's work) has had an important influence on current mathematics education. For instance, inspired by the work of Vygotsky (1987) and discursive psychology, Lerman (1996) has studied the role of language in the constitution of intersubjectivity. Barwell (2014) has turned to Voloshinov's and Bakhtin's work to understand mathematics classroom discourse, while Sfard (2008) has drawn on Vygotsky's ideas to develop an educational discursive approach to mathematics teaching and learning. This research area has recently led to questions of ideology, agency, gender, and power in the mathematics classroom (Radford 2009 and Barwell 2016).

In the following another sociocultural way of theorizing mathematics teaching and learning is described, where the primacy is not given to language but to human activity.

Mathematics Education as a Matter of Activity

To consider mathematics education – and in particular its teaching and learning – as a matter of *activity* means to place oneself within a different perspective from the one in which language, discourse, and literature appear as the ultimate field of aesthetic experience and cognition. To think of mathematics education as a matter of activity is not to dismiss the role of language in the processes of knowing and becoming but to assert the fundamental ontological and epistemological role of matter, body, movement, action, rhythm, passion, and sensation. To think of mathematics education as a matter of activity is an invitation to consider teaching and learning mathematics in accordance with the way in which teachers and students engage in classroom activity. It is an invitation to attend to the sensuous manners in which teachers and students bring mathematical ideas to the fore and produce mathematical meanings. Those sensuous manners include perceptual activity, gestures, kinesthetic actions, posture, language, and the use of artifacts, symbols, graphs, and diagrams (Radford 2009).

Behind the idea of mathematics education as a matter of activity rests a specific anthropological conception of the human. Humans, following Marx's (1998) Spinozist stance, are considered to be part of nature: they are *natural beings*. That humans are natural beings means that they are sensible beings, unavoidably *affected* by the other parts of nature. In this context, sensations and passions are conceptualized as ontological affirmations of the individual's nature as a natural being. One important consequence of this theoretical stance is that the individual's existence cannot be conceived of as a substantial entity, produced from within, as articulated by the humanist trend of the Enlightenment. The individual's existence is *relational* through and through. It appears to be profoundly linked to an ensemble of relationships with other parts of nature – including social relationships – and is based on culturally and historically constituted conditions of life. In this

line of thought, to be a natural being means also that, like other natural living beings, humans are *beings of need* who find their satisfaction in objects *outside* of themselves.

To meet their needs (needs of survival and also artistic, spiritual, intellectual, and other needs created by/in society), humans engage themselves actively in the world. They *produce*. What they produce to fulfill their needs occurs in a social process that is at the same time the process of the *individuals' inscription in the social world and the production of their own existence*. In dialectic materialism, the name of this process is *activity*. Sensuous, material activity is considered the ultimate field of aesthetic experience and cognition.

This conception of activity is very different from usual conceptions that understand activity as a series of actions performed by an individual in the attainment of his or her goal. In dialectical materialism, activity is something else. It is precisely the specific form in which the individuals *express* their life. “As individuals express their life, so they are. What they are, therefore, coincides with their production, both with *what* they produce and with *how* they produce” (Marx 1998, p. 37). Activity, in short, is a social form of joint endeavor that comprises self-expression, intellectual and social development, and aesthetic enjoyment. It is a process in a system of social relations that realizes the societal nature of human beings (Roth and Radford 2011).

In articulating a psychological approach based on the dialectic materialist idea of activity, Leont'ev (1978) suggested a basic structure of activity. An activity for him is characterized by its object and its motive. The object and motive of an activity are the engines that keep activity in motion. In practice, in the pursuit of the activity's object, individuals break down the object into a sequence of goals to which actions are associated. In the “Supplement” to his important 1978 book – a supplement dedicated to educational matters – Leont'ev discusses the conditions under which a certain theoretical learning content can be meaningfully perceived or attended to by the student. He contends that

in order that the perceived content be recognized, it is necessary that it occupy the structural place of a direct goal of action in the subject's activity, and thus that it appear in a corresponding relation to the motive of this activity. (Leont'ev 1978, p. 153)

It is hence through activity and the structural interconnection between motive, object, goals, and actions that the learning content becomes disclosed to the student's consciousness.

Activity theory, as this sociocultural approach has come to be known, has had an important impact on education in general and mathematics education in particular (see, e.g., Jaworski et al. 2012; Roth and Radford 2011). Yet, in focusing on the *procedural* aspect of activity, activity is reduced to its *operational* and *functional* dimension, eradicating from it the aesthetic and political dimensions of action and creation. The account of activity culminates, unfortunately, in a technological dull analysis of what was originally thought of as the sensible experience of human *life*.

The idea of mathematics education as a matter of joint labor is discussed below. The idea of joint labor seeks to restore to activity its most precious ontological force, namely, the dynamic locus where human existence creates and recreates itself against the backdrop of culture and history. Yet, with its utilitarian and consumerist orientation, contemporary mathematics classroom activity tends to produce and reproduce alienated students. It is argued that the search for non-alienating classroom activity requires a reconceptualization of the classroom's forms of human collaboration and its modes of knowledge production. The section ends with a view of classroom activity as joint labor, that is, a collective, critical endeavor of mutual and self-fulfillment, and a discussion of the communitarian ethic that supports it.

Mathematics Education as a Matter of Joint Labor

In dialectic materialism (see, e.g., Ilyenkov 1977), knowledge (mathematical, scientific, artistic,

legal, etc.) is considered to be constituted of forms of human action that have become historically and culturally synthesized. They are synthesized forms of action and reflection bearing, in sedimented ways, the political tensions and contradictions of human life. They are always in the process of continuous movement, constantly born and reborn, incessantly transformed in practice. Knowledge belongs to an immaterial sphere of culture that is intertwined with the material world of objects and human actions. This immaterial sphere of culture is part of what Marx (1998) called the nonorganic realm of nature and is also part of the conditions out of which human existence is crafted.

Instead of being conceptually neutral, knowledge already conveys a specific *ideology*. That is to say, unavoidably, knowledge allows one to always see the world in a *certain* way. The symbolic algebra of the Renaissance, for instance, conveys the theoretical stance of the instrumental reason of the Western sixteenth century and the social abstractions brought forward by the emerging mercantilist capitalism. And it is under the theoretical stance of practical reason and calculation that contemporary school mathematics conveys, through the curriculum and other institutional mechanisms, an instrumental and technical view of the world of objects and humans.

The instrumental and technical view of the world of objects and humans is produced and reproduced through a utilitarian orientation of classroom activity. This is what traditional (or direct) learning does. In it, mathematics appears as a disembodied realm of truths, and the students' work is reduced to passively receiving information, repeating and memorizing it (Freire 2004). The students cannot *express* themselves in the products of their learning. In traditional learning classroom activity is the expression, not of a fulfilling life but of an alienated one. The so-called reformed learning and its student-centered Piagetian pedagogy has sought to find in the student's work an escape to the technical view of the world of objects and humans. To do so, it has promoted an individualist and romantic pedagogy that emphasizes the

student's freedom and autonomy. In this pedagogy, the students are left to their own cogitations, interacting among themselves, yet moved by their own interest. In this approach, the students do express themselves but remain imprisoned within the confines of their subjective universe, living a one-sided existence in a chimerical taken-as-shared world, cut off from cultural and historical perspectives at large, and, hence, alienated from them. As a result, classroom activity is again the expression, not of a fulfilling life but of an alienated one (Radford 2016).

Mathematics education as a matter of joint labor is an attempt at restoring the idea of activity in general and classroom activity in particular as a non-alienating form of life. It is inscribed within an understanding of mathematics education as a political, societal, historical, and cultural endeavor. Such an endeavor aims at the dialectic creation of reflexive and ethical subjects who critically position themselves in historically and culturally constituted mathematical practices and ponder and deliberate on new possibilities of action and thinking. To avoid confusions with other meanings, and to emphasize the idea of activity as a historically produced aesthetic form of life where matter, body, movement, action, rhythm, passion, and sensation come to the fore, activity, in this approach, is termed *joint labor*.

The concept of joint labor, which plays a central role in the theory of objectification (Radford 2008), offers a reconceptualization of teaching and learning. In joint labor, the students are not reduced to a role as simple cognitive subjects. They do not appear as passive subjects receiving knowledge or as self-contained subjects constructing their own knowledge. In the same vein, teachers are not reduced to a role as technological and bureaucratic agents – guardians and implementers of the curriculum. They do not appear as possessors of knowledge who deliver or transmit knowledge to the students either directly or through scaffolding strategies. The concept of joint labor suggests an educational perspective in which to envision teaching and learning not as two separate activities but as a single and same activity: one where teachers and the students, although without doing the same

things, *engage together*, intellectually and emotionally, toward the production of a *common work*. *Common work* is the *sensuous appearance* of knowledge (e.g., the sensuous appearance of a covariational algebraic or statistical way of thinking through collective problem posing and solving and discussion and debate in the classroom). *Common work* is the bearer of dialectic tensions because of the emotional and conceptual contradictions of which it is made. Through it, knowledge appears sensuously in the classroom (through action, perception, symbols, artifacts, gestures, language), much in the same way and, with similar aesthetic force, that music appears aurally in a concert hall through the common work of the members of the orchestra.

The joint labor-bounded encounters with historically constituted mathematical knowledge materialized in the classroom *common work* are termed *processes of objectification*. Through these social, material, embodied, and semiotic processes, the students and teachers not only create and re-create knowledge but they also coproduce themselves as subjects in general and as subjects of education, in particular. More precisely, they produce subjectivities, that is to say, singular individuals in the making. This is why, from this perspective, processes of objectification are at the same time processes of *subjectification*.

The concept of joint labor resorts to (a) specific collective forms of classroom knowledge production and (b) definite modes of human collaboration that rest on critical community *ethics*. The ethical forms of human collaboration are driven by a general attitude toward the world and serve to configure the teachers' and students' *joint labor* in the classroom. These critical and community ethical forms blur the borders that separate the teachers from the students. Teachers and students labor *in concert as one*. The classroom appears as a public space of debates in which the students are encouraged to show openness toward others, responsibility, solidarity, care, and critical awareness. The classroom indeed appears as a space of encounters where teachers and students become *presences in the world* (Freire 2004). That is to say, the classroom appears as a space of encounters, dissidence, and subversion, where teachers

and students become individuals who are more than in the world – they are individuals with a vested interest in one another and in their joint enterprise; individuals who intervene, transform, dream, apprehend, suffer, and hope *together*.

Cross-References

- [Language](#)
- [Marxism](#)
- [Mathematics Education as a Matter of Cognition](#)
- [Mathematics Education as a Matter of Curriculum](#)
- [Mathematics Education as a Matter of Discourse](#)
- [Mathematics Education as a Matter of the Body](#)

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Mathematics Education as a Matter of Policy

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Synonyms

Governmentality; Mathematics; Policy; Reform

Introduction

Mathematics is a subject that makes part of compulsory schooling, vocational education, and also a wide range of further higher studies. It is an area that became highly regulated by policies in the past and in the current functioning of massive education systems. Citizens' mathematical knowledge and competence are considered fundamental for the maintenance of modern forms of life. More recently, mathematical achievement is taken to be an important indicator of school success and, with it, individual and social progress. Thinking of mathematics education as a matter of policy posits pedagogical and educational processes related to mathematics in the terrain of biopolitical technologies for the governing of teachers, students, and school administrators (by the others and by themselves) and, in ultimate instance, populations. This means

conceiving of mathematics education in terms of *governmentality* (Foucault 2014).

The analytics of governmentality explores the practices of government in relation to the ways in which truth is produced in social, cultural, and political practices. Thus, it provides a way of thinking about how power is effected through educational policies that generate forms of reasoning and related taken-for-granted truths. Such truths set the limits for what counts as school mathematics, how to organize it, for which purpose, and with which effects of power for people engaging in/with it. When mathematics education is considered an issue of policy, the broad network of people and practices involved in relationships around the teaching and learning of mathematics in society enters in the double operation of governing populations and subjectivities. Educational policy has been long conceived as a political process that connects, on the one hand, the activity of an authoritative body generating consciously articulated rules and frames with expectations of certain behavior and, on the other hand, the activities of bringing these expectations into the life and practices of administrators, teachers, students, parents, etc. (Bascia et al. 2005).

From a perspective of governmentality, policies can be thought as a technology of power over a population that inscribes differentiation and ordering on groups of people, which Foucault called *biopolitics*. Such technology, exercised through biopower, is “considered as a kind of anatomo-politics of the human body and control of the population at large” (Besley and Peters 2007, p. 81). This form of government puts into action control mechanisms on the mathematics knowledge that will be taught and learned by teachers and children, on how it should be taught and learned, and on what should be achieved. But at the same time, policies set in operation technologies of the self that *subjectify* teachers, students, and parents alike, in conducting their conduct so that they freely surrender to the will of mathematical learning. In the doings of policy, individuals are positioned – by others and by themselves – as (un)able and (un)successful learners of mathematics. In other words, the processes of subjectivation work on the school subjects, conducting them in

specific directions in what concerns who they are/could be, the place they assign to mathematics and school mathematics in society, and, in the limit, what kind of society they desire to build. In this way, educational policies govern in the two ways pointed by Foucault.

The discussion of the meaning of mathematics education as a matter of policy is guided by the question of how mathematics education research conceptualizes and relates to the political desires of steering curricular organization and pedagogical practices in mathematics through either national or supranational educational policies. The first step in the discussion is a contextualization of the desire to regulate mathematics education through policy. Then, three identifiable conceptualizations of the effects of power produced by policies in and for mathematics education are examined.

The Will of Educational Policy in Mathematics

Even if there are people who have documented the existence of forms of instruction in mathematical topics in different times and places since Antiquity, the structured and planned inclusion of mathematical topics in programs of education is characteristic of the modern organization of education. Education as an effective tool for the making of desired citizens became a privileged area of government and with it an issue of State policy. The “educationalization” of social problems, as formulated by Tröhler, manifested among others in the desire of having political control over educational offers that would provide citizens with the knowledge, skills, and competences needed to address the problems and challenges of society. The increasing transfer of the management of education from religious orders to the State is part of its strengthening the political possibility of steering populations through the organization of curricula containing what people should know and be able to do.

With respect to mathematics, the inclusion of basic arithmetic and diverse forms of calculation was frequently argued as important knowledge

and skills to be learned in basic schooling. More advanced and varied forms of mathematics were part of the training in particular trades and colleges such as the military and its diverse forms of engineering during the second half of the nineteenth century. In many Western countries around the world, the beginning of the twentieth century brought the discussion of whether mathematics and science were needed areas of study for the making of the virtuous citizen in new industrializing societies. It is argued that such a view gained broad support and started being part of the ways of thinking about contemporary education in the post Second World War and the Cold War.

The conditions of the possibility of such view were the political, the economical, and, specially, the technological optimism of the Cold War epoch. The Sputnik launch in 1957 justified the strengthening of mathematical and scientific education for an ideological, military race and for the production of all kinds of technologies for changing social, economic, political, and cultural relations in Western societies. The international New Math movement was not only the result of the mobilization of mathematicians for the making of a new strong mathematics curriculum, it was also the articulation of economic interests represented in the OECD to support human capital development through education for economic growth. The emerging new international comparative studies of assessment started building measurements of school (mathematics) achievement and monitoring its development in different countries. All together, educational improvement was considered to be all too important and strategic to be left on the hands of educators. Experts and policy makers were necessary for steering the need of more and higher mathematics for all (Valero 2017).

New crises and social problems have triggered new political actions for the adjustment of education and, with it, mathematics education. In the configurations of the globalized neoliberal capitalism of the turn to the twenty-first century, mathematics curricula have not only been revised through several local and national policies and related reforms, they have also been the target of large-scale, evidence-based, supranational

interventions such as OECD's PISA. The promise of delivering solutions to education so that countries can enter the "highway of educational development" is a manifestation of the tight connection between the policies that govern school (mathematics) achievement and the making of the modern, worker-citizens desired in a current neoliberal world. Almost all aspects of education have become an object of policy and with this both populations and individuals are made objects of the calculations of power. So is the case in mathematics education.

Perspectives of Mathematics Education Policies

In research there has been a long-standing call for engaging with the study of how policies affect mathematics education and how research also can impact on policy and serve policy maker's needs for improving mathematics education (Hoyles and Ferrini-Mundy 2013). To the issue of how mathematics education research conceptualizes its connection to policy, there can be identified at least three understandings.

A *technical perspective* adopts the view that mathematics education research has the main goal of improving teaching and learning practices and that therefore it should have something of relevance to say to policy makers about the direction in which policies should direct school practices. At the same time, researchers are to be instrumental in the implementation of policies. Policy formulation and implementation at the level of the curriculum organization – the contents and pedagogies of school mathematics – are seen as the arena in which researchers, policy makers, and practitioners can join forces in fulfilling the desire of leading the new generations toward a better performance in mathematics that would result in the creation of a qualified labor force. Here the central point is the efficiency in devising evidence-based pedagogies and techniques that can show an increased learning of locally or nationally prescribed contents, for reaching students' desired, defined levels of achievement.

More often than not, researchers adopt the stated formulations in local, national, or supranational policies as statements of a desired, ideal state to reach. And from it build a comparative logic between the state of affairs in learning/teaching for learners and teachers in classrooms and schools and the assumed situation that would be desirable to reach according to policy. Research is about trying to close the gap between the often deficient state of affairs and the ideal. In the process, improved realizations of how to engineer practices emerge as results on how to increase implementability of policy.

There exist numerous examples of this conceptualization in a field that perceives itself in constant need of reform, given the systematic underachievement of the majority of students. Research programs investigating the details of mathematics education pedagogies, such as the French school of didactical situations and its related didactical engineering (Margolinas and Drijvers 2015), have fed into teacher education to make possible a support of improved teaching and thus learning. Such a view was implemented systematically in the creation of the *Instituts de Recherche sur L'enseignement des Mathématiques* (IREM) in France as a strategy for providing a new, research-based teacher education since the 1970s.

Internationally several projects intend to bring researchers together to comparatively and collaboratively think of best practices to implement and realize particular pedagogical models. For example, bringing inquiry-based learning into the different levels of mathematics education with the purpose of creating more student-centered, scientific practice-inspired ways of working in schools and teacher education has been the aim of several European projects wanting to address the lack of interest of European youth to pursue STEM-related studies, which is a top policy priority for many countries in education (Maaß and Artigue 2013). From detailed design-research projects to large international studies, the view of research and researchers as the devising of technical solutions for the implementation of policy has been productive in advancing educational agendas in mathematics.

An *emancipatory perspective* takes a critical stance toward the systematic negative effects of existing policies on the possibilities of access of certain groups to achieve the desired results in mathematics. It is a fact that in different countries and regions, there exists a differential participation of students to quality teaching and learning, what leads to systematic low school results as measured in comparative national or international measurements (Atweh et al. 2011). Such differences in mathematics school results are distributed in categories such as ability, gender, race, language, ethnicity, religion, nationality, etc. The existence of the differentiation is seen as a threat to individual success, democracy, and social justice. It is also a problem to the active and successful incorporation of people to a qualified labor market and, with it, the possibilities of individual and social economic success. An emancipatory perspective sees the role of mathematics education research as providing evidence on the effects of policy, as well as devising strategies of wealth redistribution, as well as recognition of cultural differences.

This perspective has gained strength since the 1980s when the supposed neutrality of mathematics education started to be questioned. A key example of this view is represented in many of the mathematics education research carried out in post-apartheid South Africa where issues of poverty, gender, race, linguistic difference, and changes in the organization of mathematics education have been strongly conceived in relation to the making of a democratic transition (Vithal et al. 2005). But this is not only a view in the so-called “developing” countries. Indeed, the Introduction and the six chapters that form the section “Policy Dimension of Mathematics Education” of the *Second International Handbook of Mathematics Education* (Bishop et al. 2003) adopt this perspective. Different mathematics education policies around the world are analyzed from a critical standpoint. The policies are questioned in their emancipatory possibilities for those who had/have unequal access to cultural and material goods, thanks to the many discriminations that mark the current globalized world.

A *governmentality perspective* adopts the view that mathematics education is a set of “practices and strategies that individuals in their freedom use in controlling or governing themselves and others” (Besley and Peters 2007, p. 139). The political effects of the assemblages of policy and research are to be traced and uncovered in their productive making of notions of populations and individuals as mathematically (in)competent, (un)able, (un)productive, and thus economically, socially, and culturally (ex) included. Both policy and research, as expert knowledge, “do things” on teachers, students, and school administrators. In connection with the increasing will to policy-regulate education, mathematics education researchers have also built the desire to improve and reform mathematical instruction and to help addressing educational inequalities. At the same time as research brings direction to practice in alignment or critique to policy, it also desires to inform and influence policy and policy makers with better ways of improving instruction for both individuals and populations.

While other perspectives may assume that the connection between practice, policy, and research is weak because these do not seem to align in achieving expressed desired changes of behavior, a governmentality perspective links them tight together in the generation of accepted truths on why it is necessary to be a high mathematics achiever, on how it benefits individuals and national economies, and on why and how certain students are meant or not meant to become mathematically competent.

The take of this perspective has been recent in mathematics education research. The technologies of mathematics education are not simply neutral tools for the betterment of learning, but also and at the same time they contribute to the constitution of learners’ subjectivities and of those of the many other participants in the broad network of mathematics education practices. Some studies direct their gaze to the power effects of research in the fabrication of subjectivities. Valero and Knijnik (2015) describe the set of practices and strategies related to ICT research in mathematics education in the

contemporary neoliberal globalized world. As part of pedagogical practices, the artifacts of ICT are more than mediating tools for cognition and knowledge objectification. They have an effect on the self and research devises effective technologies for governing groups and individuals with and through ICT: “Mathematics education research conducts the conduct of school subjects, in order to fabricate the desired rational, techno-scientific and entrepreneurial subjects of education” (p. 37).

Some other studies focus on the power effects of policies in educational practices. Knijnik and Wanderer (2015) discuss two educational policies in mathematics addressed to rural multigrade schools in Brazil. These policies are connected to different, disputing projects of society: the first is aligned with neoliberal hegemonic logic, while the second is attuned to the struggles of the landless movement, in opposition to World Bank guidelines. In a longitudinal study in New Zealand, Walls (2009) shows how children became mathematical subjects in the assemblage of teaching, testing, and discourses in schools, families, and society about notions of mathematical ability. Diaz (2014) examined the Maths for All reform in the USA since the 1960s and their assumption on the learning of the equal sign. Notions of equality embed notions of sameness, which operate classifications and differentiations among those children who have learned the “right” equality and those who have failed to do so.

With respect to the effects of international comparative assessments on governing countries and managing their educational systems to produce desired national and international levels of achievement in mathematics, Kaner et al. (2014) argue that PISA has formed a regime that has been taken uncritically by researchers who justify their activity as offering insights and solutions to the problems evidenced in its results. PISA, an OECD machinery, and in general the system of reason that they together constitute have produced regimes of veridiction (Foucault 2014) about what counts as mathematical competence and how it connects to global economy and social growth that are hard to challenge.

Concluding Remarks

Conceiving of mathematics education as a matter of policy allows focusing on the governing of populations and individuals toward expected and desired behavior, namely, the acquisition of mathematical knowledge, competence, and expertise, since these are valued as indispensable qualifications of modern, rational, economically productive citizens. Such theorization highlights the operation of mathematics education as part of current dispositives of power in society. The three understandings traced above are not necessarily discrete categories. They can operate simultaneously as analytical perspectives, as well as ways for researchers to engage in and with educational practice and educational policy. Finally, a Foucault-inspired governmentality perspective also opens lines of flight, movements of resistance, or counter-conduct toward new not-yet-imagined possibilities of mathematics education in relation to policy.

Cross-References

- ▶ [Educationalization of Social Problems and the Educationalization of the Modern World](#)
- ▶ [Incredible Years as a Tool of Governmentality: A Foucauldian Analysis of an Early Years Parenting Program](#)
- ▶ [Mathematics Education as a Matter of Achievement](#)
- ▶ [Mathematics Education as a Matter of Discourse](#)
- ▶ [Mathematics Education as a Matter of Economy](#)

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Mathematics Education as a Matter of Technology

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Introduction

Mathematics education, like mathematics, has always been a matter of technology. Whether it is the compass -and -straightedge or the

blackboard, both the doing and teaching of mathematics have always featured tools or devices of some kind. While much attention is currently given to whether or not contemporary digital technology improves teaching and/or learning, the focus here will be on the changing understanding of technology over time and its relation to ontological, epistemological, and even axiological stances at play in mathematics education. The following three sections thus, respectively, explore the shifting terrain of technology, the ongoing dance between mind and matter in which technology is inscribed, and the evolving functions of technology in mathematics education.

The Shifting Terrain of Technology

As befits this kind of inquiry, it is useful to reflect upon what people mean when they use the word “technology” and how this has changed over time in mathematics education. The ancient Greek etymology suggests that the word, which combines *techne* and *ology*, refers to the study of craft. One online dictionary defines technology as “the collection of techniques, skills, methods and processes used in the production of goods or services or in the accomplishment of objectives, such as scientific investigation” (Wikipedia). Within the scope of this definition, it is entirely defensible to see algebra as technology – albeit a symbolic one – since it contains a collection of techniques and methods for solving equations.

In the French mathematics education tradition, the word “technology” reflects the above etymology as it is seen as the “discourse which is used in order to both explain and justify” a technique, whereas a technique is a manner of solving a task (Artigue 2002, p. 248). In the Anglophone tradition, however, the word is most often used to refer to the thing that solves the task and *replaces* the human being. The pencil can be seen as a technique within the French tradition (as a means of performing a particular algorithm such as long division) and as a technology in the Anglophone tradition (as a thing used to solve a task). One could say the same thing for the

Babylonian square root tables, the abacus, the calculator, and even our fingers (arguably the earliest and greatest technology for calculating)!

In modern usage within the international mathematics education community, the word “technology” would typically be used to refer only to a calculator in the above list. A technology has thus become a digital device of some kind and almost always one that is pedagogical: a thing used to solve the task of teaching and learning mathematics. Indeed, like most non-digital technology found in classrooms (Dienes blocks, Cuisenaire rods, tens frames), the digital technology of mathematics education, such as graphing calculators, the computer language Logo, and most stand-alone software, is often restricted to the mathematics classroom. The framing of technology as pedagogical in mathematics education is part of what makes non-pedagogical technology – like pencils, graph paper, and rulers – more invisible in terms of how it contributes to formatting mathematics.

As the functions of the computer diversified, the phrase “information and communication technology” (ICT) became widely used. Nowadays, with the prevalence of portable, auxiliary devices, the word “technology” on its own is likely to become outmoded, being replaced with “mobile technology” or “Web 2.0 technology” or “virtual technology.” One benefit of such diversification may be the concomitant acknowledgement that the word “technology” – as it is used in mathematics education – may have lost relevance, especially when one considers the ways in which things that run on electricity (an online test, an animation, a word or symbol processor, a 3D pen) may have less in common with each other than the variety of rectangular objects (textbooks, worksheets, screens) that are used in the mathematics classroom. Indeed, one of the most significant insights from mathematics education research is that difference matters: asking the question “does technology work?” makes no more sense than asking “is food good?” It depends not only on the particular technology in question – be it a coding language, a dynamic geometry environment (DGE), a touchscreen app, an educational game, or immersive

glasses – but also on the particular instantiation of it (the teacher, the classroom context), as well as the particular educational aims.

Despite these new names, the word “technology” has become synonymous with the digital, thus obscuring the fact that, as Rotman (2008) shows, mathematics has been engaged in a two-way coevolutionary relationship with devices since its inception. Technology has always mattered in mathematics. In mathematics education, however, post-1970 digital technology is seen as extraneous and epiphenomenal, which may contribute to its relatively slow and greatly resisted uptake (Mullis et al. 2004).

The Ongoing Dance Between Mind and Matter

Mathematics tends to wish away its entanglement with devices. Indeed, the Aristotelian injunction that clearly separates the physical from the mathematical necessitates that what is material and mobile must eventually be extracted from something if it is to become or remain mathematics. This produces invisible technology like the sand in which Greek diagrams were drawn, the compasses with which circles were made, and the pencils with which words and symbols were written. There is invisible technology of the mathematics classroom, such as the blackboard, which is a relatively recent invention (for a history, see Kidwell et al. 2008). The blackboard is a very successful technology for making public and for replacing the oral with the written, one which radically changed mathematics education, but few people consider the blackboard as technology or question how it matters to mathematics education. Similarly, the rectangular piece of paper on which notes are taken, exercises completed, exams written, and journals maintained is a technology whose particular permanence, shape, and dimensionality matter greatly in mathematics education – consider how mathematics education would change with the lack of permanence, the change in shape (not so linear?), and the increase in dimension (not so flat).

Another invisible technology, which Ruthven (2008) examines, is graph paper, a physical technology that almost seamlessly inserted itself into the mathematics classroom, thus providing an ideal case study for understanding the culture of mathematics education, at least in terms of its ontological, epistemic, and axiological natures. When graph paper arrived, a century ago, mathematics education was in the process of “taking over” geometrical drawing from art education and technical drawing and was seen as part of a descriptive, experiential geometry that was not strictly linked to the theoretical geometry of Euclid. In trying to explain why graph paper succeeded as a technology, when so many others had failed, Ruthven proposes the following four reasons: (a) alignment with trends in mathematics (for a more functional approach to mathematics, promoted by Felix Klein), (b) currency both outside of and within the mathematics classroom, (c) alignment with current classroom practices and the curriculum, and (d) the wide range of pedagogical benefits – across a variety of topics including geometry, algebra, and statistics – that considerably outweigh concerns.

In addition to the reasons cited by Ruthven, there is another aspect of the invisibility of both the blackboard and graph paper, which is that they do not change long-standing ontological assumptions about mathematics nor about who is doing it (the mathematician). By contrast, with digital devices, the agency shifts toward the computer, which can calculate, evaluate, render, and so on. As Shaffer and Kaput (1998) have argued, from an evolutionary perspective, if pre-digital technology served to off-load or distribute information, which leaving the mathematician free to act on that information without having to memorize it, the computer off-loads or externalizes the *processing* of information. This leaves the mathematician in a very different position, as the computer not only does the processing faster and more reliably, but also does processing that the mathematician could never do. Computers change mathematics and they change mathematicians. While this situation has caused some concern within the mathematics community, particularly in relation to computer-based proofs, the parallel

implications for mathematics education – how school mathematics might change and how the student might change – have yet to be addressed. Indeed, a computer can carry out most of the standard school curriculum tasks, which disturbs the traditional scope and order of school mathematics, especially the idea that the learning of mathematics *must* begin with (some version of) “the basics.” Current developmental theories, which are still very influential in mathematics, also belong to the technological culture of paper and pencil, further challenging research efforts aimed at understanding what students with technology might be doing and learning in the mathematics classroom.

Returning to the ontological issue, the computer changes the actual and perceived nature of mathematical objects. If the Aristotelian preference – and here there are also axiological issues at play, such as preference for the ideational over the material, the perfect mental image over the imperfect tool – is for abstract, disembodied concepts, then the computer screen pulls the mathematics back into the physical world, albeit a virtual one. This can be exemplified by a dynamic geometry triangle, which can be constructed using three segments that are straighter than any segment drawn in the sand or on a piece of paper, seemingly making it more ideational.

However, the triangle can be dragged into any number of configurations in a continuous way, thus newly inscribing the triangle in time, keeping it connected with the hand that moves, and gesturing toward the infinite generality that is “triangle.” Instead of being separate from the mathematician who contemplates it, the triangle depends on the mathematician in such a way that the agent and the object – and also the screen – are now intertwined. The boundary between the materials thus becomes re-drawn, changing not only what a triangle is but how a triangle might be conceived.

The example above highlights the way in which technology in mathematics education not only changes the mathematics, but also changes the mathematician in terms of her sensory engagement with mathematics. Dynamic geometry environments (DGE) grew out of an interest, both

among mathematicians and mathematics educators, in visualization, which co-opts the eye in new ways, but it also offered the motor system as a new potential organ for mathematical thinking (one DGE, *The Geometer's Sketchpad*, also offers sound as another sensory mode of interaction). The quite recent emergence of touchscreens co-opts the fingers and hands in new ways as well. The resulting sensory practices defy the image of the cerebral, ascetic mathematician by both recruiting and extending the body of the mathematician.

Very few philosophically grounded theories in mathematics education have been made that disturb the ontological assumptions about mathematics. Learning theories related to constructivism, social constructivism, and even constructionism, as well as tool-based theories such as instrumental genesis and the theory of semiotic mediation, are more or less silent on ontological questions, perhaps because they all conceive of mathematics as a fixed endpoint toward which learning aspires to reach. This has circumscribed mathematics education as a matter of technology in certain ways in which the main goal of digital technology is apparently to enable students and teachers to learn mathematics as defined by the hybrid technologies of paper and pencil. Recent philosophical work that insists on the material nature of mathematics, both within mathematics and mathematics education (de Freitas and Sinclair 2013), may provide ontological grounds on which it would be possible to theorize the entanglement of mathematics and matter in such a way that mathematics as well as mathematics education could become reconfigured by and through technology.

Evolving Functions of Technology

Technology has been and continues to be intertwined with mathematics, both by offering new ways to solve problems, but also by providing a source of new concepts and questions. But what is the function of technology in mathematics education? It has long been a vehicle for intuition

and experimentation, which places it primarily in the domain of functioning *for student learning*. This has been true for the early work of Papert (1980) and colleagues (Noss and Hoyles 1996) around the use of Logo, which was certainly a programming language aiming to promote intuition and experimentation. Also for student learning, however, were computer-assisted programs (which started even earlier than Logo and persist today) that aimed for direct instruction and often procedural learning through drill and practice. These very different kinds of digital technologies shared a common, albeit sometimes only implicit, assumption that the computer could replace the teacher.

In their characterization of technology trends in school mathematics, Jackiw and Sinclair (2005) describe first-wave digital technology as being almost exclusively focused on learners' interactions with technology (such as Logo) and second-wave digital technologies, such as spreadsheets, graphing calculators, computer algebra systems, and DGEs, all of which are more transparently related to the school mathematics curriculum. In this shift from first to second wave, the function of the technology was *for student learning of the curriculum*. While dynamic geometry environments and graphing calculators could certainly promote intuition and experimentation, school mathematics content was foregrounded. Indeed, the primitives in these second-wave digital technologies (functions, variables, segments, circles, etc.) are recognizably from school mathematics content.

Second-wave technologies have persisted, though less as vehicles for intuition and experimentation. Indeed, as reported in the ICMI study *Technology Revisited* (Sinclair et al. 2009) and more recently Sinclair and Yerushalmy's (2016) overview of the past 10 years of PME research, a didactic transposition – that is, a transformation of mathematics into school mathematics – has taken place in which the primary function is *for classroom and curricular practices*. Open-ended, exploratory environments have undergone two transformations: (1) toward task embeddedness, which directs the actions with and uses of the

technology toward more specific purposes, and (2) toward *evaluative technologies*, which provide external feedback on students' responses and actions. These effectively serve the teacher or the institution, thereby transforming the function of these digital technologies from being *for learning* to being *for teaching*.

Third-wave technologies again shift the functionality in that they are *for classroom mathematics*. Socially sensitive, third-wave technologies, such as networked calculators, recognize that multiple learners are customarily involved in a classroom, all of whom could be able to communicate with each other, as well as with the teacher, and even beyond the classroom. These technologies, as with the blackboard, help make mathematics public and shared, aiming to encourage collaborative work that can be distributed across different devices and geographical locations. They emerged during a period of time where mathematics education research also shifted focus to the teacher, acknowledging – among other things – that first- and second-wave technologies do not replace the classroom teacher and do not fit easily within existing classroom practices. If first-wave digital technologies foregrounded the digital tool and second-wave digital technologies foregrounded school mathematics, then third-wave technologies foreground interaction. In this third wave, mathematics education as a matter of technology folds into mathematics education as a matter of distributed interaction.

In 2005, third-wave technology was in its infancy, but has in many ways been taken over by social media technology (which has heretofore received scant research attention) and mobile devices such as tablets and smartphones. We might call these fourth-wave technologies, but, more importantly, they are distinctive in their function in that they are *for everyone*. This is obviously true for social media, which, like the internet, is not particularly about mathematics. For mobile devices, however, especially those that enable touchscreen interactions, computer interaction now only requires fingers or gesture-based movements, which are much more widely accessible than keyboards and alphanumeric

interactions. Indeed, Rotman (2008) speaks of cultural *neotony* whereby adults “come to resemble the young of their evolutionary forebears” and in which speech becomes reconfigured, remediated, and transfigured, as it did in the advent of alphabetic writing, “into a more mobile, expressive, and affective apparatus by the nascent gesture-haptic resources emerging from the technologies of motion capture” (p. 49). Interestingly, such new gesture-haptic resources can also minimize the distance between the human body and the mathematics, so that the dynamic geometry triangle describe above – an almost -Platonic object – can literally be at one's fingertips. The assumed boundary between matter and mind thus further shifts and weakens.

Conclusion

Mathematics education as a matter of technology has been caught up in a meliorist view in which technology is expected to improve teaching and learning. This is a reasonable expectation, given the economic impact of purchasing and maintaining new technologies at an institutional level and the concomitant challenges of access and equity. Artigue's (2002) influential paper argues, however, that comparative studies showing how a device such as the graphing calculator was “better” than paper and pencil were fundamentally flawed, not only because comparison is almost impossible (since the measure of success would have to be within the “old” technology), but also because it neglects to account for the pragmatic and epistemic values of technology, where pragmatic values focus on “their productive potential (efficiency, cost, field of validity)” and epistemic values on how they “contribute to the understanding of the objects they involve” (p. 248). But technology is also assessed according to axiological values (especially aesthetic ones). This relates not only to considerations of beauty, significance, and truth, but also to disciplinary decisions about what is to count as mathematics and, indeed, what counts as *good* mathematics. In as much as technology changes

sensory interactions in mathematics education, such as what can be seen, heard, or touched, it also circumscribes how mathematics is made to matter in the world.

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Mathematics Education as a Matter of the Body

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Synonyms

Biopolitics; Body; Embodied; Materiality; Neuron

Research into the various ways that the human body factors in mathematics education has recently expanded, as new theoretical developments and innovative research methods have introduced significant insights about the material dimensions of teaching and learning.

Embodied Mathematics

A catalyst for much of this work was the embodied mathematics paradigm proposed by Lakoff and Núñez (2000), who argued that the semantic content of mathematical concepts can be understood in terms of the way human bodies function in the world. Many scholars criticized this approach to mathematics for how it downplayed the role of the social, political, and material environment more broadly, while treating the body as simply the carrier of the brain and treating the brain as the seat of the mind. Indeed there are problems with the term “embodied” and “embodiment” precisely because they suggest that the body is only the container or vehicle for the thinking/acting self, rather than an active force of its own. For instance, Sheets-Johnstone (2009) criticizes the phrase “cognition is embodied” because of the way it demotes the body to being merely the vessel or container of some higher act of cognition. Such an approach continues to support a mind/body split, even as it attends more carefully to the role of the body in teaching and learning. Such work frequently involves interpreting the material actions of students and teachers as

external “simulations” of some prior or primary *internal* conceptualization.

Theories of material phenomenology (Hwang and Roth 2011) aim to overcome this tendency to split mind/body. They argue that certain phenomena that are usually described as “mental” (in the brain) might be better thought of as “corporeal.” Such an approach dissolves the dichotomy of the mind/body at the heart of the metaphor-based theory of Lakoff and Núñez and follows instead Merleau-Ponty and the tradition of phenomenology. This tradition has strongly influenced many different studies of embodied mathematics education, suggesting that “mathematical insights developed by learners are expressed in and constituted by their perceptuo-motor activities” (Nemirovsky et al. 2012, p. 311). This work shows us how micro-ethnographic facets of experience impact and partially shape the ways we teach and learn. Phenomenological approaches, however, tend to treat the material conditions of learning in terms of the human “body schema” and stop short of a more expansive treatment of the distributed agencies across the learning environment.

Research drawing on complexity theory, enactivism, and systems theory (Davis and Simmt 2003) has attempted to address this tension by defining the body as an ecological system sustained through boundary negotiations. These mathematics education scholars attend to bodily activity as enactments or performances of emergent characteristics of the material-cultural system. More recently, one finds attempts to argue that mathematical concepts be considered a kind of evolving biological species. Complexity theory in this application taps into biological images of the organic body as a dynamic system, as well as cybernetic images of an information-based society organized around goal-oriented behavior and controlling forces. This cybernetic image of the body is newly emphasized in the widespread interest in “computational thinking” in national policy documents, reflecting changes within the field of mathematics itself, as the field turns increasingly to computing techniques.

Some of these trends seem linked to a growing awareness that a systems or network approach to mathematics education can extend studies of the

human body to a more inclusive study of materialism more generally. This direction needs to be further developed using the powerful insights of social theorists in this area. New materialist philosophers pursue this direction, stretching studies of the body into more inclusive studies of the environment or matter more generally (Coole and Frost 2010). Working in this vein, de Freitas and Sinclair (2014) advocate for a more than human “inclusive materialism” in the study of mathematical activity, allowing researchers to address the way that diverse material agencies are at work in teaching and learning. They analyze mathematical activity – be it expert or novice, State-sanctioned, or renegade – as a material practice that produces specific kinds of bodies (or transmaterial assemblages) that incorporate particular kinds of mathematical concepts.

Sense, Sensation, and Perception

The philosopher of science and mathematics Michel Serres (2011) suggests that there is a “material mimicry” that needs to be better studied in teaching and learning. Serres (2011) describes this aspect of learning as unconscious and sometimes trance like: “The teaching body dances its knowledge softly so that the audience will, like it, go into a trance and so that, through virtual mimicry of its gestures, a few ideas will enter their heads via the muscles and bones, which though seated and immobile are solicited, pulled towards the beginnings of movement, perhaps even by the written work’s little jig” (Serres 2011, p. 96).

This is a body that is enmeshed or mixed with other bodies, continuously altering the way it participates in assemblages.

How do we define a body given over to so many poses and signs: when and under which form is it itself? How do we get beyond so many differences according to the person: when and under which form is it us? These multiple postures prevent us from saying. My body and our species don’t exist so much in concrete reality as “in potency” or virtuality. (Serres 2011, p. 52)

Serres (2011) suggests that we study mathematical activity for how it demonstrates the

body's fluidity and "indefinite capacity to transform" its material relations (p. 94). Mathematical activity, he argues, depends on "infinitesimal intuitions" or "petites perceptions" when consciousness submits to the impersonal pre-individual mobility of material entanglements. This approach allows one to study mathematical invention for how the material configuration – of body, word, and technology – is newly configured through bodily activity, opening up new ways of sensing and making sense. He suggests that we attend to the material habits of the human body as it partakes in these mathematical practices, not for justifying (school) mathematics because of its relevance or necessity, but in order to help researchers better understand our convictions about that necessity. Such an approach is both (1) an exploration of the nature of inventive and creative processes and (2) a description of material relationships which condition the emergence of the new. By attending to the body at such moments, and its changing relationship with other moving bodies, we come face to face with the contingency of mathematics.

The focus on the body in mathematics education has led to a proliferation of research on the "multimodality" of mathematical activity. Multimodality, however, often treats each modality (gesture, vision, speech, etc.) as a *language* with coded meanings and thereby imposes a linguistic model on all bodily activity. But the recent "ontological turn" and "affect turn" suggest that language-based models of analysis (such as those that spring from linguistics, Lacanian analysis, and some semiotics) fail to grasp the diverse ways that bodies *matter*. For instance, Massumi (2011) suggests that perception isn't so much packaged or bundled into different modalities, but is a process of suffusion and speculative investment in movement. He suggests that the senses are always already fused – not correlated nor merely coupled, but literally fused together: "The senses only ever function together, fusionally, in differential contrast and coming-together" (p. 75). The radical implication of such work is that a purely fusional sensory system – if examined at the micro level – points to the occurrence of immanent and amodal sensing. In other

words, a great deal of sensing is outside of modality. It is neither this mode nor that one. It is a lived-in sensing that is preperception and pre-apprehension (insofar as these are conceptualized in perception studies or semiotics).

Research on the role of movement in perception has shown that the *proprioceptive potentialities* of the body are continuously reconfigured as one moves, as are the relative locations of objects in the foreground and background. Sheets-Johnstone (2009) argues "not only is our perception of the world everywhere and always animated, but our movement is everywhere and always kinesthetically informed" (p. 113). Kinesthesia refers to the ability of the human body to feel its own movement and states and thereby contributes to the sense that "one-self" is the source of such action. Rather than essentialize this sense of willfulness or intentionality, or attribute it to intuition, more research is needed on how the proprioceptive potentialities of the body are provisional and indeterminate. There is increasing interest in a post-phenomenological approach to the study of perception, so that researchers might better attend to the body as part of a sensory surround environment.

Disability/Ability

We tend to think of bodies as physical objects, some more animate than others. This typically directs our attention to how bodies are individuated and *possess* particular abilities and disabilities. Mathematics ability is profoundly linked to everyday material embodied practices that configure what is taken to be visible, touchable, and sayable. In other words, sensing and making sense in mathematics education are political practices precisely because they are the "common" practices by which "the distribution of the sensible" is made to correspond to what is valued within a community. This distribution has socio-political consequences for how teachers and others conceptualize disability/ability in mathematics classrooms. The human body becomes differently abled when contemporary distributions of the sensible – through technology, curriculum, and other media – are altered.

Thus regimes of perception in mathematics education actually produce the limits of what is sensible and what is potentially embodied for those who are within that elite community of practice. In a mathematics curriculum focused on the alphanumeric rather than the spatial and the tactile, particular bodies will be disenfranchised, and they are likely to be the ones diagnosed as different. The ways in which mathematics is represented, communicated, and explained tacitly privileges certain sensory capacities (Healy and Fernandes 2011).

The literature in critical disability/ability suggests that disability/ability be redefined as “[t]hat in the body which exceeds deterministic efforts to predict a life trajectory” (Snyder and Mitchell 2001, p. 377). Such an approach opens up the question “what is a body?” for discussion. These developments in disability/ability theory are studying how a body becomes individuated with a provisional set of organs open to constant reorganization. Organs are contracted and sustained *over time* and are thus de-essentialized. It is not that the organs themselves are unimportant, but the particular arrangement of the organs known as the organism is not a biological given. Such an approach allows one to study how flows of capital reconfigure the borders around bodies and produce new kinds of laboring bodies. It also allows one to study the way that bodies are provisionally and temporarily enabled, directing our attention to the temporal contingency of disability/ability.

Neuroscience

Brain research is becoming increasingly influential in the field of education policy. “Brain friendly” approaches to education proliferate in the popular press, and funding agencies support large-scale international studies of brain activity in mostly clinical studies of teaching and learning. Within mathematics education, there has been a radical increase in neurocognitive approaches to the study of number sense in the last two decades (Nieder and Dehaene 2009). Popularized by Dehaene’s (2011) book *The Number Sense*, in which the term “number sense” referred to the “sense of approximate

numerical magnitudes,” the concept of “number sense” is now used extensively in neurocognitive research to describe arithmetic skills. Dehaene (2011) traces current cognitive tests of number sense back to 1886 when the American psychologist James McKeen Cattell designed an experiment to test participant’s response time during tasks of enumerating the number of black dots on a series of cards, studying how humans can enumerate *without counting*, which is known as “subitization.”

With the advent of brain imaging technology, cognitive neuroscientists have continued to use these, and similar tests to show that a particular group of neurons in the brain – in the intraparietal sulcus (IPS) – are always “activated” whenever humans, and many other animals, are given a calculation task (Nieder and Dehaene 2009). These scientists are searching for the “number neuron” where they believe number sense resides or, in the least, upon which number sense is “based.” This research is important for how it centers affect, or preconscious perception, and a kind of knowing in the body. But research on brain activity also lends itself to reductionist and deterministic claims about neurobiology as the basis of learning. The impact of this research on education is potentially profound, as many cite it as evidence that number sense and “dyscalculia” are biologically innate.

Through neurocognitive research, and related policy, the student’s body is being reconfigured and reassembled. As number neurons take on a more significant role in assessments of student achievement, the question as to what or who is doing mathematics is raised. There is a need to resist simplistic images of neuronal activity that reduce the capacities and potentialities of the human body to the brain, but also a need to find a way to better understand how neurons participate in bodily activity. Researchers must find new ways of studying how the neuron participates in learning events, not simply as a biomarker of disability/ability. As a counter to such reductionist work, Sheets-Johnstone (2009) underscores the plasticity of the brain and the fact that mirror neurons are contingent on morphology and corporeal-kinetic tactile-kinesthetic experience. Thus the entire activity of mirror neurons is

actually conditional on kinesthetic activity and sociocultural factors. In related efforts, recent work in the social sciences has turned to the study of “biosocial becomings” and “bio-culture” in order to better understand how the social and the biological operate at all scales, beneath and beyond the human (Papoulias and Callard 2010). Recently, de Freitas and Sinclair (2015) have taken on this challenge by exploring how neurocognitive research into number sense neglects the arithmetic concept of ordinality. The aim is to show how particular kinds of mathematics, and not others, are implicated in this research.

Biopolitics

The biopolitics of mathematics education is an important research focus, precisely because the body is the subject of the medical and life sciences while playing such a powerful part in all teaching and learning. Inspired in large part by the philosophy of Michel Foucault, scholars in the 1990s critiqued scientific theories that essentialized the body, especially reductive approaches that explained social behavior with reference to gendered or raced bodies. Feminist philosophers and other scholars fought hard to show how the body was a product of sociocultural forces, directing our attention away from the materiality of the body and toward the performative nature of identity. These approaches to the body pushed the discussion of embodiment beyond the reductive positivism of behaviorist research from previous decades (see for instance the excellent work of feminist philosophers such as Judith Butler and Elizabeth Grosz).

Both Butler and Grosz emphasized the psychological dimension of embodiment and the power of discourse in shaping embodied experience. The body, according to Grosz, becomes a human body when it coincides with the shape and space of a psyche. She argued that bodies become bodies when they are validated or recognized in particular social networks and that there was no *essentialized body* before it was inscribed with socially coded meanings. She emphasizes discursive constructions of dominant body images, whereby the

body is treated as an amorphous material onto which cultural meaning is projected. In the 1990s, this allowed for strong critiques of dominant and normative body images.

Much of the work on gendered and raced identity in mathematics education inherits this kind of stance toward the body, focusing on how mathematical ability is not innate to particular bodies, but instead emerges within particular sociocultural formations through discursive construction. The sociocultural approach to studies of mathematics education has been hugely influential, but it has produced certain blind spots with regard to the body and its role in teaching and learning. A theoretical shift away from “identity politics” and language-based approaches has led to recent attempts to more adequately take up the material dimensions of the body in a more expansive biopolitics (Coole and Frost 2010).

This new materialist development finds inspiration in the work of Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari who offer a way of thinking the political at diverse scales, tracking traits and flows of capital across the molecular and the molar. In their claim that “every politics is simultaneously a *macropolitics* and a *micropolitics*,” they shift focus to the molecular and imperceptible forces that operate beneath and beside the human subject. This molecularization of politics has the potential to radically open up our research to new ways of attending to the biopolitics of embodied mathematics. If previous theories of labor and capital reflect previous images of the individuated human body, then there is a need to revamp these theories in order to deal with the emergence of a disassembled human body *becoming molecular*. By attending to processes of *dividuation* (rather than or in addition to individuation), Deleuze and Guattari underscore the way in which advanced capitalism extracts value at all scales and speeds, whether it be from human identities (race, gender, sexual orientation, etc.) or from the labor of nonhuman molecular bodies like the neuron. Precisely for this reason, more research on mathematics education *as a matter of the body* is crucial today, as education policy becomes increasingly global in its reach and increasingly biomaterial in its governance.

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- [Edusemiotics To Date, An Introduction of](#)
- [Ethics and Significance: Insights from Welby for Meaningful Education](#)
- [Metaphor and Edusemiotics](#)

Meaning and Teaching

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Synonyms

[Context](#); [Intention](#); [Mind](#); [Subsidiary awareness](#); [Truth](#)

Plato in the *Theaetetus*, (1892, 198a) spoke of knowledge as something one could not just possess passively. To retrieve and use knowledge, one needs reason. Philip Phenix (1958) similarly wrote that rote memorization is relatively inefficient if the symbols learned are not significant to the learner. For Phenix, significance depends less on reason than on meaning.

Michael Polanyi (1969) agreed, saying that all human thought comes into existence by grasping the meaning and mastering the use of language. To grasp meaning, one has to interiorize external things or pour oneself into them. Meaning arises either by integrating clues in our own body or by integrating clues outside. We cannot learn to ride a bicycle by memorizing the laws of physics that govern its balance. The laws have to be made meaningful by getting on the bike and trying the different actions that keep it upright and heading in the direction we want it to go. The language of

physics is less necessary to bike riding than is an understanding of balance, which is learned physically and socially at the same time. Helen Keller in 1908 spoke of how meaningless her world was without language. She did not know that she was blind or deaf. She lived in a world that was a no-world. Since she had no power of thought, she could not make the separations and connections that would allow her to compare one mental state with another.

Polanyi illustrates the necessity and insufficiency of language for meaning with an example of how we learn to detect pulmonary disease in X-rays. As the student listens for a few weeks, examining pictures of different cases, a rich panorama of significant details will be gradually revealed of physiological variations and pathological changes, of scars, and signs of acute disease. The X-rays begin to make sense. At the very moment when he has learned the language of pulmonary radiology, the student will also have learned to see the X-rays meaningfully. The immediate experience of the X-ray's meaning is coincidental but not identical with the focal awareness of it that is present in thought. Knowledge is focal awareness, what we are conscious of and can talk about. Knowing is the tacit integration of knowledge. We slide from knowledge to knowing effortlessly.

According to Polanyi, it is our subsidiary awareness of anything that endows it with meaning, with a meaning that bears on an object of which we are focally aware. The tacit knowing that gives us meaning consists in subsidiary things bearing on a focus by virtue of an integration performed by a person.

Without this integration, we could not formulate strict laws for deriving general laws from individual experiences because each instance of a law will differ in every particular from every other instance of it. To form class concepts essential to meaning, we must presume that indeterminate and global process of tacit knowing. In applying our conception of any class of things, whether pains, pronouns or persons, how can we identify objects or feelings which seem to be different in crucial respects?

Tacit knowing cannot be reduced to its explicit articulation because it can be articulated through an indeterminate number of language systems. When the student looks at an X-ray, he may focus on it with an artist's eye and see it in forms of light and shade, or as a psychologist, he may transform it into a Rorschach blot. His medical experiences are part of the subsidiary knowing that will inform his focusing on it as an X-ray.

How do we get meaning from unfamiliar sequences of words and letters such as "Bullets are earnest lullabies" or the "The spot is moving from left to right." We involuntarily make sense of the data, proceeding on the assumption that there is a text to be recovered. We must move beyond the sense stimuli to treat the uttered noises as things people wanted to assert for various reasons. We reason that the utterer wanted to find some way of reinforcing the irony that death, even by gunfire, might be welcomed by some or that they must have meant "left to right."

To understand unusual meaning in language, we have to put the statement into some context, to try to understand why the speaker would have said it. What someone means by an utterance depends not only on what she believes, but also on what she intends and on the rich fabric of experiences from which the intention emerges. We have to adopt a holistic approach that conceives of a speaker as a person, as a single interconnected and interdependent self. Any interpretation requires us to adopt the intentional stance: that is we must treat the noise-emitter as an agent whose actions can be explained or predicted on the basis of the content of his/her beliefs, and desires and other mental and physical states (Dennett 1991).

Similarly when we say we understand other minds or actions or understand an unfamiliar object placed before us, our meaning is dependent on our assumption that the world can make sense, that it can be read in meaningful ways. We recognize our deliberate actions as the product of processes that are reliably sensitive to ends and means. They are thus reasonable, but not necessarily in the sense of being the product of serial reasoning. The reasons might well be the

experiential schema that Lakoff and Johnson (1999) claim lie behind our daily use of metaphor. Meaning could not get off the ground without this principle of charity, as Davidson calls it, without the assumption that the world and other people do make sense.

The requirement of context makes it virtually impossible to locate the meaning of meaning precisely. It cannot be understood by being reduced to some other notion such as that of the speaker's intentions or to reference, nor can the meaning of words be understood in isolation from a language, a speaker, a community, or a world. It can be understood only in terms of its interconnections with other notions.

Donald Davidson (1980) says that meaning forms a basic, interdependent triad with beliefs and truths. In interpreting a speaker, beliefs and utterances are identified, certainly in the first instance, in relation to the objects and events in the speaker's environment – that is, in relation to the world in which both speaker and interpreter are located. But in doing this, the interpreter is also relating those utterances and beliefs with her own beliefs and utterances. The overall truth of our beliefs, and the overall agreement of those beliefs with the beliefs of others, is thus a presupposition of the very possibility of interpretation of meaning – of being able to make sense of ourselves and other speakers.

Dennett warns us that even though meaning requires mind and intention, we should not assume a single Boss that focuses our subsidiary awareness. The ultimate “point of view of the conscious observer” does not have to be a single self in control of organizing meaning, but it is probably a temporary set of highly structured but flexible regularities that give the physical hardware of the brain a huge interlocking set of habits or dispositions that enable it to interact with or make sense of the world, like the doctor or artist viewing the X-ray.

On Dennett's view, the number of selves that provide meaning is indeterminate, as is the number of possible interpretations of meaning. Of course he does not want to assume an organizing mind apart from a physical brain, and it may be

that meaning is more metaphysical and contextually dependent than he believes.

We cannot suppose that we could first determine what a speaker believes, wants, hopes for, intends and fears and then go on to a definite answer to the questions that his words refer to. For the evidence on which all these matters depend gives us no way of separating out the contributions of thought, action, desire, and meaning one by one. Total theories are what we must construct, and many theories will do equally well. (Davidson 1980, pp. 240–41)

Other philosophers, particularly W.V. Quine (1973), agree that truth and meaning are paired, but they approach the problem from a different perspective. They must believe that whatever there is to meaning must be traced somehow back to experience, the given of sensory stimulation, something intermediate between belief and the usual objects our beliefs are about. Once we take this step, however, says Davidson, we open the door to skepticism, for we must then allow that a great many of the sentences we hold to be true may in fact be false. We cannot separate out the world from the way we see it. There is no separation between seeing something and then seeing it as something, the seeing of a fact and then interpreting it. Its significance to us allows us to see it – we see it through its meaning. This means that there is not a separate level of meaning.

There is rather a change in the appearance of written or spoken words when their meaning is established. The meaningful use of a word that causes it to lose its physical character makes us look through the word at its meaning.

An A becomes an A or an H depending on its meaning in the word C_T or T_E. In the sentence “The bag was split so the notes were sour” while the individual words make sense, together they have no meaning outside the context of a Scottish bagpipe.

One of the consequences for teachers is that they need to be sensitive to the tacit connections that construct meaning. For the teacher to know whether students have learnt or understood, he or she must be a very active listener for their unique ways of making connections. A child's hearing of a psalm as “I'd rather be a Dawky Bird” reveals not her inability to make words meaningful, so

much as an ignorance of doorkeepers. And in an open community of inquiry where every student and teacher together are operating on a principle of charity that presumes everyone is making sense, there is ample opportunity for everyone, including the teacher to learn and exchange new meanings.

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Mediatization

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Mentoring and Decolonization

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Introduction

What is the intent of mentoring university students from marginalized groups: students of color, first-generation, low-income, LGBTQ, and disabled students? Is it merely to increase their numeric representation in higher education and atone for past wrongs? This would serve only to assimilate marginalized and minoritized students into academic norms, values, experiences, and dominant knowledge systems that are the heritage of European colonization. However, given that these students can bring unique perspectives to bear on the deeply pressing social and scientific concerns of our times, mentors might take a decolonizing approach that could transform the academy by introducing powerful subjugated knowledges and new research methodologies.

Because mentors teach Eurocentric disciplinary norms and knowledge bases – the rules of the game, so to speak – they risk alienating students from marginalized groups; this is especially so when mentoring occurs across social differences. However, some mentors seem to have an innate ability to develop transformative relationships with their protégés. They help students attain a degree of comfort in the academy, teaching disciplinary content and methods while maintaining students' personal, scholarly, and cultural integrity. These tasks are deeply complicated, but the

answer is not simply for students to seek mentors of a similar background: given the dearth of faculty from underrepresented groups, this is not a practical solution, neither would it necessarily provide the best academic fit for the student.

Decolonial mentoring brings together several areas of study each of which has its own deep and broad literature: decolonial theory, the sociology of education for marginalized groups, and the traditional work on mentoring. Examining these strands of inquiry can reveal fruitful ways forward, especially for mentors who work with underrepresented students.

Colonialism and the Academy

Mary Louise Pratt might describe the contemporary university as a “contact zone” between marginalized students and the dominant academic culture: it is a “[social] space of imperial encounters” (Pratt 2008, p. 8) where “cultures meet, clash, and grapple with each other, often in contexts of highly asymmetrical relations of power, such as colonialism, slavery, or their aftermaths as they are lived out in many parts of the world today” (Pratt 1991, p. 34). Indeed, Sylvia Hurtado, director of UCLA’s Higher Education Research Institute, once wrote that university faculty often act as academic colonizers (Hurtado 1992). This may seem like an unusually strong claim, unless we take a moment to reflect on the scarring legacy of the voyages of discovery (Hinsdale 2015).

Pratt describes how exploratory expeditions of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries shaped “European elites’ understandings of themselves and their relations to the rest of the globe” (Pratt 2008, p. 15). Scientific travel narratives written by explorer-scientists communicated the results of these expeditions to the European elites, and she reveals how through this form of writing “...science came to articulate Europe’s contacts with the imperial frontier and to be articulated by them” (Pratt 2008, p. 20). By employing the classifying and descriptive methods of natural history to create a new understanding of both knowledge production and global social relations, European

elites organized the world around themselves and to their sole benefit. She suggests that this new consciousness “is a basic element constructing modern Eurocentrism, that hegemonic reflex that troubles westerners even as it continues to be second nature to them” (Pratt 2008, p. 15).

Maori scholar Linda Tuhiwai Smith provides additional insight into the troubling legacy of imperialism and colonialism in our knowledge practices. She writes:

From the vantage point of the colonized... the term ‘research’ is inextricably linked to European imperialism and colonialism. The word itself, ‘research,’ is probably one of the dirtiest words in the indigenous world’s vocabulary... The ways in which scientific research is implicated in the worst excesses of colonialism remains a powerful remembered history for many of the world’s colonized peoples. (Smith 2012, p. 1)

But Smith is also careful to note that “[i]mperialism still hurts, still destroys, and is reforming itself constantly” (Smith 2012, p. 20). Normalized educational practices provide pathways through which imperialism reconstructs itself.

Here, Nelson Maldonado-Torres’ description of coloniality is helpful for understanding the difficulty in creating conditions for minoritized perspectives to thrive in the academy. Coloniality “refers to long-standing patterns of power that emerged as a result of colonialism, but that define culture, ...intersubjective relations, and knowledge production.... It is maintained alive in books [and] in the criteria for academic performance” (Maldonado-Torres 2007, p. 243; Quijano 2001). Resonating with Pratt’s idea of the “hegemonic reflex,” Maldonado-Torres writes that for those who are descendants of colonizers, coloniality is part and parcel of their very being, and it is “characterized by a permanent suspicion” (Maldonado-Torres 2007) toward the colonized. In the context of higher education, academics of any background must guard against what Maldonado-Torres describes as an imperial attitude, because the bodies of knowledge in many disciplines, as well as our academic bureaucracies, developed hand in hand with colonialism. An imperial attitude might lead even well-intentioned mentors to doubt their students’

abilities or the validity of their outsider perspectives. Academic suspicion implicates professors in imperialism's destructive tendencies when they allow the boundaries of "acceptable" knowledge to marginalize or exclude other viewpoints. An unexamined imperial attitude can lead university faculty and administrators to question or outright ostracize the knowledges that outsiders wish to bring into the academy, thus reaffirming and normalizing Western knowledge systems (see, e.g., Margonis 2007).

This problem exists across the curriculum. As Smith explains, the traditional academic disciplines are based on "various classical and Enlightenment philosophies...grounded in cultural world views which are either antagonistic to ... or have no methodology for dealing with other knowledge systems" (Smith 2012, p. 68). The result? When histories and perspectives from indigenous peoples and the Global South do appear in the curriculum, they are generally seen as "add-on" courses that fulfill diversity requirements. The same can be said for academic work that focuses on social class, sexuality, gender, or ability.

Microaggressions

Microaggressions are defined as "brief and commonplace daily verbal, behavioral, and environmental indignities, whether intentional or unintentional, that communicate hostile, derogatory, or negative racial slights and insults" (Sue et al. 2007, p. 273), but microaggressions do not target only racial and ethnic groups. The sociology of education makes clear that they also take a toll on first-generation, low-income, LGBTQ, and disabled students. The pervasiveness and thematic consistency of microaggressions across groups and institutions points to the systemic nature of the problem they pose; they are a living, generally unconscious, expression of the academy's history of actively excluding marginalized students. Coupled with the long and complicated histories of exclusion from, and barriers to, higher education that marginalized students have experienced, it is no wonder they often have inherently tense relationships with the academy (Hinsdale 2015).

The steady streams of microaggressions experienced by marginalized students, as well as the imperial attitude often unintentionally assumed by faculty and staff from more dominant social positions, are contemporary resonances of colonialism. From assumptions that if they are on campus they must be cafeteria workers and maintenance workers to assumptions that they are athletes rather than academic scholars, underrepresented students are given constant reminders that they are outsiders who do not belong.

Most higher education faculty continue to be members of dominant social groups (white, middle class, straight, abled, etc.), even as the population of students from marginalized groups increases. Given this context, it is important to understand that professor/student relationships may be troubled by a number of factors that can become particularly acute in mentorships: the student's personal history of educational barriers and negative interactions; the exclusionary history of higher education that is alive in an institution's campus climate; the mentor's unexamined academic and social expectations regarding her field of inquiry and her own socialization into the field (how does one mentor differently from how she was mentored?); and the mentor's assumptions about students from marginalized groups and relationships with them. Because faculty have been socialized into their academic fields and most have received a Eurocentric training, even faculty with marginalized social identities may not consider what it would mean to decolonize their relationships with students (Hinsdale 2015).

Traditional Mentoring Literature

To better understand what will enhance mentoring relationships, it is first helpful to consider concepts that much of the traditional mentoring literature holds in common. Although this literature often leaves the word "mentoring" undefined, a good working definition is useful: "Mentoring is a personal and reciprocal relationship in which a more experienced (usually older) faculty member acts as a guide, role model, teacher, and sponsor of a less experienced (usually younger) student or

faculty member” (Johnson 2007, p. 20). Commonly, the relationship is based on “some level of mutual interest. . . and endures through several phases or ‘seasons’” (Johnson 2007, p. 21). Over time, a mentor gives “counsel, challenge, and support in the protégé’s pursuit of becoming a full member of a particular profession” (Johnson 2007, p. 20). There is an implied hierarchy in this definition, but relationship and trust are of utmost importance. As opposed to advising, mentoring is “defined by the presence of a bonded personal relationship” (Johnson 2007, p. 21).

Developing trust is acknowledged as the foundation for forming mentor/protégé relationships but doing so is portrayed without its complications. When a mentor follows the advice mentoring handbooks give for nurturing trust (keeping promises, being consistent and reliable, confronting problems with honesty), disconnections between mentor and protégé can still occur. Indeed, mentoring is often reduced to a list of traits and behaviors, and when relational problems arise, they are usually ascribed to a deficiency in the “at-risk” student. If the relationship breaks down, most guides look first to the student: did she fulfill her part of the mentoring contract? If not, is it due to some personal or cultural deficit? Further, diversity is generally viewed as an issue to “handle” (Hinsdale 2015).

Deficit understandings lie at the heart of traditional mentoring programs: the student lacks academic and social skills; the mentor’s work is to teach these and instill confidence. The student is blamed for lack of any success. Mentors seem to be at fault only when they have selected poorly or broken the rules: when the ethical contract between the mentor and protégé as individuals has been breached by an inappropriate sexual action, for example. In the end, the advice for mentors who work across difference is often to encourage underrepresented students to develop secondary mentorships: peer-to-peer and team mentoring relationships or to seek a same-group mentor in a different department or within a professional organization. A same-group mentor in another department may provide vital social and emotional support, but students deserve and need a mentor who can guide them to success in their

chosen field. And just because a person has a similar background, it does not necessarily follow that he or she is thoughtful about mentorship and its effect on the student across the desk.

Traditional mentoring practices rarely recognize the tensions marginalized students feel in the university. Nor do they question the problematic social context that constructs marginalized students in opposition to power and historical norms; diminishes their academic capabilities, their backgrounds, and families; and asks them to assimilate to dominant academic and social norms to be successful. The more powerful position held by faculty implicates all mentors in its history of social and academic violence, even though they may attempt to work against it or they may themselves be newly arrived “outsiders.” By and large, the traditional mentoring literature ignores the complicated historical, social, discursive, and academic contexts that demand a decolonial approach to mentorship, and little attention is given to relational qualities of the mentor/protégé bond.

Toward Decolonial Mentoring

Primary research in which graduate students and young professionals responded to questions about their most meaningful mentoring relationships has yielded some indications for decolonizing mentorship practice. Each of the participants was from a group that has experienced barriers to higher education and they worked with mentors whose identities were different from their own. Many mentor/protégé pairs worked across differences in race, ethnicity, class, or sexuality. Often, there were multiple differences. The importance of this should be clear: there is still a dearth of underrepresented faculty in higher education, and mentors from more dominant backgrounds need to fill in the gaps as a more diverse professoriate develops. Certain themes were apparent from the protégé narratives. Relationship, reciprocity, respect, vulnerability, trust, and confidence were mentioned repeatedly.

The participants with strong, fruitful mentor relationships worked with faculty who took responsibility for deeply reciprocal and respectful

personal and academic relationships. They understood the complicated nature of nurturing trust across difference: even though they did not necessarily understand or share their students' background, they managed to communicate their regard in such a way that the protégés felt strong connections with their mentors. These mentors took, as much as possible in the academic setting, a nonhierarchical approach. They desired not only to understand their students' stories but to honor their knowledge and gifts in a manner that did not reinforce the academic hierarchy. Instead, they offered their own stories and became vulnerable to their students, a very unusual step in an academic setting. The mentors' ability to decolonize the relationships with their protégés grew out of self-reflection, listening, signaling openness, sharing power, and staying connected (see Hinsdale 2015).

Self-Reflection and Listening

Self-reflection and listening are crucial mentorship skills that are deeply interconnected. And although it goes against the grain of most academic training, when the situation calls for it, mentors must share more of themselves than they might generally do in a student/teacher relationship. Thus, they destabilize academic social norms and create openings in which decolonial mentorship can flourish. Mentors must be willing to engage with the discomfort that arises when they reflect on the ways they might be privileged by race, ethnicity, gender, heteronormativity, ability, or by their position in the academic hierarchy. Doing so prepares them to listen across difference by nurturing a disposition toward dislodging comfortable assumptions and attitudes. As Lisa Delpit writes, communicating across difference requires open "hearts and minds. We do not really see through our eyes or hear through our ears, but through our beliefs. To put our beliefs on hold is to cease to exist as ourselves for a moment – and that is not easy" (Delpit 2006, pp. 46–47). She encourages educators to become vulnerable, "to allow the realities of others to edge themselves into our consciousness" (Delpit 2006, p. 47).

It is vital to listen to students' lived experiences, but also to listen for silence and silencing in the classroom or mentoring context. "Listening

for silence includes listening for missing conversations and overlooked perspectives, and . . . for the moments when students are actively silenced by individuals and institutions" (Schultz 2003, p. 109). Disciplinary borders and alienating academic norms are forms of institutional silencing. To open themselves to protégés' experiences and create space for marginalized perspectives and knowledges to enter the academy, decolonial mentors allow their worldviews to be disrupted.

Decolonial mentorship begins with an inquiry stance: listening to the context of a student's life, and the effect this has on her in the classroom. It includes "noticing when students take critical or risky stands and supporting them to articulate these positions" (Schultz 2003, p. 118). The mentors described in the study were self-conscious practitioners in their academic communities, and they accepted the limits of their knowledge. They reflected on the meaning of such moments and maintained an open, responsive attitude. They sought more equitable, reciprocal relationships with students, and although each of these mentors was surely aware of the inherent imbalance of power in the teaching relationship, they worked against it by allowing their students to change them.

Signaling Openness

Research also indicates that mentorship will usually grow out of a meaningful classroom relationship. Students often choose mentors they feel respect and appreciate their questions and classroom contributions, including those that arise from their outsider status. Yet, they may still feel unsure about approaching the professor to ask about deepening the existing relationship into a mentorship. In the classroom, faculty set the scene for their students to feel safe enough to enter a mentoring relationship; therefore, they should openly communicate that they value diverse students and welcome their intellectual contributions. Faculty who have reflected on their own skin, class, and gender privileges can give their students hope enough to trust them by voicing their critical understanding of whiteness, power, and privilege in all its guises. Making a conscious, political decision to try to create a space for something new to arise in the classroom signals

receptivity and openness to students who might be looking for a mentor (see Margonis 2011).

Sharing Power

Decolonizing mentors are able to overlook the accepted boundaries of their fields. They do not rush to judgment when presented with ideas that come from outside their discipline's accepted boundaries. Rather, they share power and encourage students by responding to the student's ideas (see Beyene et al. 2002), teaching her how to put new content into existing academic forms to push their disciplines' traditional limits. This process is harder, perhaps, in the natural sciences, where an apprenticeship model of mentoring still dominates; the same is often true in the social sciences. Students will frequently take up a piece of a mentor's ongoing project through which they learn laboratory procedures and research methods that follow disciplinary norms. Even so, their interests can be included by assisting them to learn the techniques they will need to answer the research questions they might ask in the future that are driven by their outsider status. For example, a psychology mentor might support her protégé through a research project that is informed and driven by the student's social and historical position. The student's research proposal and methodology would follow disciplinary norms, but forge into new content guided by personal experience. Decolonizing mentors assist their students to learn the protocols of their chosen field, but allow them to have an emotional and political connection to the questions they ask.

Staying Connected

A mentor's role is to not merely to guide a protégé through the research protocol, but to stay connected and encourage the student to remain in conversation. In the academy, there is a strong tradition of not developing personal relationships with advisees: maintaining boundaries is considered of great importance, and to do otherwise is inappropriate. Mentors described in this study violated social norms and reached out to their protégés on a personal level; they were emotionally and socially bonded to their students.

The students all tested the relational waters by dropping personal information into conversations.

When their mentors responded with genuine interest and it was clear they wanted to better understand their protégés on more than a scholarly level, the students felt supported. In decolonial mentorship, such relational curiosity goes hand in hand with academic curiosity: the protégé brings something new and unseen, something that calls the mentor to deepen the relational bonds (see Oliver 2001).

Conclusion

Admittedly, decolonial mentoring is difficult. How does one honor the mentor/protégé interconnection and deep mutuality in which each learns from and is bonded to the other, yet provide direction for a successful academic and professional life? Such a relationship has both hierarchical and reciprocal aspects. Students described mentors who were intentional, but who understood that good intentions were not enough. The mentors considered their own social position and educational history before entering the relationship, and they listened to the student in ways that also demanded them to be constantly vigilant and self-reflective. They understood their students' often complicated and painful educational histories, and they acknowledged that developing trust takes time because the relationship was colored by all of the student's previous interactions with more dominant faculty. To decolonize mentorship, faculty must be explicit about the fact that they are asking students to walk in two worlds in order to transform the academy: they do not want students to merely assimilate into dominant academic society but to learn how to navigate it while retaining their own scholarly identities.

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Meritocracy

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Introduction

The term “meritocracy” was coined in a 1958 dystopian novel, *The Rise of the Meritocracy*, written by Michael Young (Young 1958). This novel was intended to serve as a critique of the term it introduced. Much to Michael Young’s chagrin, the term has since become a social and

political ideal (Young 2001). As such, it is used to justify the distribution of jobs, opportunities, and resources in societies claiming to be both liberal and democratic in orientation. Meritocracy has come to represent a positive ideal against which social institutions and societies are judged. They are measured and compared according to how “meritocratic” they have become. Meritocracy is here viewed as a progressive alternative to other more ancient systems of distribution such as patronage, where jobs, opportunities, and resources are allocated according to *who* one knows rather than *what* one knows. A meritocratic society, by contrast, operates with the principle that merit should be rewarded according to the formula: *merit = effort + ability*.

Coinage

In *The Rise of the Meritocracy 1870–2033*, Michael Young combines a more conventional history of the recent past with a history of the near future. Though the book is undoubtedly satirical, it is also a serious, sociological text as indicated by the book’s subtitle: *An Essay on Education and Society*. Written from the perspective of 2033, the book makes a series of predictions. These predictions were intended to warn Young’s contemporaries in 1958 and reflect Young’s sociological understanding of Britain in the 1950s. This context is important, since the dangers outlined by Young in *The Rise of the Meritocracy* may no longer be the only or indeed the most important dangers faced by a “meritocratic” society operating in a different social and historical context.

Confining ourselves to Young’s history of the future (1958 onward), we find that he predicts the eventual defeat of British comprehensive education, an educational movement involving schools that do not select their intake based on academic achievement or aptitude. These “nonselective” schools are accused, in Young’s satire, of encouraging “mediocrity,” of being prey to a sentimental egalitarianism. Instead, a more rigid partitioning of the school-age population is enforced, with intelligence tests so developed and perfected that

they become the principle machinery for enforcing educational and social division. Irrespective of whether or not “intelligence” exists as a distinct entity, statistical correlation between high performance in intelligence tests and high performance in school is used to justify the productivity and pragmatic sense of dividing pupils according to their intelligence quotient, or IQ. Gradually the predictive accuracy of IQ tests is improved so that children can be divided into meritocratic categories at an earlier age. Initially, retesting every 5 years takes place to ensure that placements remain accurate, but eventually this system is abandoned as accuracy improves. By the year 2000, children are reliably and absolutely positioned in the social hierarchy based on tests at 9 years of age. By 2015 they are reliably positioned at 4 years of age. By 2020 this is reduced to 3 years. Segregation according to intelligence is now complete, with children divided into a hierarchy from nursery to university and into their employments beyond. Indeed, segregations by intelligence are so assured that incremental workplace promotion is abandoned. The social and economic order no longer needs to “correct” itself in this way, Young narrates, with talent being recognized late in life and rewarded by promotion. Indeed, competition itself is viewed as an unnecessary evil, as being symptomatic of an imperfect social order. Hence competition between employers for the best employees and between employees for the best jobs is gradually eliminated by better and ever more accurate testing. A highly administered society will eventually remove the need for competition, which is judged to be a wasteful method of social distribution. Once a meritocratic society reaches maturity, so it goes, competitive rivalry together with the ambition it encourages becomes an unnecessary, destabilizing influence.

Despite the considerable effort expended to achieve a fully meritocratic society, Young predicts that such a society, perfected though it may be from an administrative perspective, will not manage to completely eradicate ambition and convince all its members that it is socially just and desirable. A society of this kind would, he suggests, place such absolute judgments on

people that it would be experienced as intolerable by those at the bottom of the social order, however “reasonable” these judgments may be from an administrative perspective. The “lower orders” would not accept an administrative order that confines them without hope of escape to a subordinate position. Hence, *The Rise of the Meritocracy* is followed by its inevitable fall; the book ends with social unrest, insurrection, and the death of its narrator.

Meritocracy and Aspiration

The subsequent history of meritocracy in Britain bears out only some of Michael Young’s predictions. Comprehensive education did indeed fall into decline, and yet, the highly administered society Young foresaw did not arrive. Instead, meritocracy became a social ideal that came to operate in a very different social context, one that had become increasingly suspicious of social engineering (see Allen 2014, 2011).

The transparency of administrative systems in *The Rise of the Meritocracy* arguably resulted in their downfall since meritocracy provided an obvious target against which to revolt. Subsequent to the publication of Young’s book, however, the operations of meritocracy have become far more diffuse. This transformation in the operations of meritocracy is connected to changing patterns of governance in the second half of the twentieth century. Direct intervention from government, of a sort that seeks to administer social issues by way of agencies immediately attached to government, has been replaced, increasingly, by indirect modes of government that operate through multiple agencies enjoying a certain degree of autonomy (and profiteering). Meanwhile, citizens are encouraged to take greater responsibility for functions once reserved for the State. In this context, the meritocratic ideal is serviced more through individual effort than it is through institutional intervention, where the administrative assurance that meritocratic distributions will be perfected has given way to the injunction that all members of a meritocracy must “do their best” to reposition themselves.

Competition for good schools and good jobs remains a decisive factor, and ambition is to be encouraged, as meritocracy becomes a *personal* as well as social ideal. Meritocracy is no longer a simple logic of social administration to be imposed from above. Its principles are to become internalized, absorbed into the practices of aspiring social subjects. Crucially, this personal labor involving self-fashioning, self-improvement, and self-promotion is to become permanent. And it is not only expected of those with “unrealized potential.” The effects of this transition can be observed in today’s university, where even professors no longer feel entirely secure in their personal “chairs.” The selective process that resulted in their esteemed positioning at the top of the educational hierarchy must, increasingly, be repeatedly affirmed by the continued achievements of those professors themselves, in writing papers of continued high esteem (for purposes of institutional ranking), in securing ever more research funding (for the institutional coffers), and in better managing those beneath them. Meanwhile, a little lower in the hierarchy, those aspiring to a “chair,” or tenure, or merely the hope of tenure, must constantly adapt themselves to a changing climate of demands and expectations, proving that they can excel at whatever benchmark is placed before them. This logic operates more widely. Individuals throughout the social order must take up the task of repositioning themselves according to the latest logic of advance. They are to remain optimistic that their dreams of advance may be realized, yet pragmatic in their attempts.

Conclusion

Meritocracies are opposed by default to social orders where there is an explicit commitment to patronage and where talent has no opportunity to rise. Within these limits, however, a term once coined with satirical intent has come to operate as a social ideal. Meritocracy functions as an implicit good to which appeal is made across diverse contexts. This is despite the fact that

meritocracies may operate very differently in practice. The term “meritocracy” may be used to describe societies that are radically opposed in other respects, where, for example, there may be considerable disagreement concerning how exactly “talent” should be allowed, or made to rise, and who has the responsibility, and indeed the right, to make this happen. It would appear that since Michael Young wrote *The Rise of the Meritocracy*, in the British context at least, the political and institutional commitment to achieve social justice and social efficiency through a deliberate administrative repositioning of talent has, through shifts in governance, given way to a situation where the governmental task is now chiefly pedagogic and moral. It is to encourage students and citizens to take up the task of social repositioning themselves, and on an individual basis, as they labor to constantly repackage and reposition themselves in the educational, social, political, and economic hierarchy. As a descriptive term, and as an educational ideal, meritocracy exhibits remarkable and perhaps dangerous fluidity.

Cross-References

► [School Development and School Reforms](#)

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Merleau-Ponty

► [Phenomenology of Higher Education](#)

Merleau-Ponty and Somatic Education

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Introduction

As a tradition that is explicit about the circularity of philosophy, what is decisive in many ways for phenomenology is entering that circle in what Heidegger calls “the right way” (Heidegger 1962, p. 195). One might pose the following question to that sort of commitment: what, if any, is the descriptively analytical bearing that such an entrance could have on critical perspectives concerning education? This entry is guided by the investigation of a possible answer to that question. Three critical tools concerning the entrance into philosophy are taken from Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s final work, *The Visible and the Invisible*, and their pedagogical benefits are explored (Merleau-Ponty 1968). These critical tools are included in the hyper-reflective process through which what will be called “pedagogical choreographies” reveal his notion of chiasmi and “chiasmic faith.” To illustrate the educational capacity of these critical tools, their pedagogical efficacy is exhibited outside of strict phenomenological research in an example which happens to concentrate on the writing process.

The Phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty

The critical tools that Merleau-Ponty offers can be best understood if his ontological entrance into the circle of philosophy is first expounded and distinguished from the approaches he rejects. The circular nature of philosophy that Merleau-Ponty borrows from Husserl and Heidegger begins with a critique of the predominantly Cartesian philosophy of reflection. For Merleau-Ponty, all

the variations of this approach take judgment as their point of departure in order to establish the philosopher’s domain of tacit, pre-reflective contact with his or her Self. This introduces a partition between being and truth which generates a philosophy that ends in either one of two ways. In the first, the binary uproots the philosopher from being and truth by relegating philosophy to a totally exterior world judged only according to logical criteria. Alternatively, the world is forgotten because it is described only in terms of an experience from within. Thus, the world is reduced to a noema in a transcendental field of representations originated by the subject in whose perception and consciousness these phenomena are displayed. Moreover, thought is equivocated with the reflecting “subject,” imposing a sharp division between every subject’s private representations, and philosophy is left to operate on significations and their relations.

Ultimately, neither the externalization of philosophy into logical judgments nor the internalization of it into a pure language succeeds in recovering the origin of reflection because the origin must be unaware of itself in order to begin, which contradicts the degree of self-awareness that distinguishes reflection. What is more is that if the origin of reflection is itself a reflection, the linearity of the distinction between original and derived is disrupted by the demand for a reflective origin that is supposed to justify the derivation of reflection from it. The linearity bends viciously into circularity, which shows that the reflective reduction is incomplete.

For Merleau-Ponty, the incompleteness of its reduction is indicative of an “origin” in the pre-reflective lived experience that precedes it. What is crucial is that the phenomena that philosophies of reflection take as the “data” for judging between being and truth must first be presupposed at the outset rather than judged. This allows for a fuller appreciation of the symbiotic circularity between the perceived and the exercise of perceiving. Merleau-Ponty describes this pre-reflective unity as “the openness upon the world” in which there is the Gestalt perception of

a whole greater in depth than the summation of its parts (Merleau-Ponty 1968, p. 35). The incalculability of the whole is owed to the prolongation of the profiles which are saturated by the completed totality that exceeds them. This constitutes the transcendence that perception involves, which Merleau-Ponty renames as the “miracle of a totality” (Merleau-Ponty 1968, p. 8).

The miraculous transcendence of perception can be grasped by the body because the body is coextensive with it as a Gestalt itself. The flesh of the body is irreducible to a piecemeal concatenation either materially, substantially, or psychically; rather, it is the transversal of many “little subjectivities” of sensibility, each of which objectifies the other precisely because it is conscious of being For Itself (Merleau-Ponty 1968, p. 141). At the same time, the flesh of the body is not an object; rather, it is the cluster of these little consciousnesses through which one tangibility of experience is constituted, like the “cyclopean vision” of both monocular eyes (Merleau-Ponty 1968, p. 141).

First Critical Tool: Pedagogical Choreographies

He finesses his argument for the body’s coextension with perception as a Gestalt through the first critical tool that he offers emerges: a series of *exercises* of the unity that he describes. In order to emphasize the mobilization of the body, bodies, or physical space that these involve, let these physical thought experiments be called “pedagogical choreographies.” This accentuates the way in which pedagogical choreographies differ from mere examples of physical experiences in that the choreographies gesture toward a chiasmus which cannot be thought by philosophies of reflection or the examples they give. This suggests that the detour through pedagogical choreographies is a necessary condition for grasping the chiasmi.

Before this suggestion can be explained in full detail, his choreographies need to be recounted. Let the first of these that he rehearses be referred to as “the auto-touch.” Here, his first movement is

the touching of his right hand with his left. Next, he decides to apprehend with his right hand his state of being touched. But this “reflection of the body upon itself” never delivers the tactility of touching simultaneous to that of being touched (Merleau-Ponty 1968, p. 9). The sentient and the sensed cannot be apprehended all at once; rather, there is a lag between the two, a fundamental asymmetry. What allows for this asymmetrical lapse between the two otherwise simultaneous exercises is what Merleau-Ponty calls “the untouchable” (Merleau-Ponty 1968, p. 254). The tactility of the right hand cannot touch the tactility of the left because each comprises a reversible side of sensibility.

An example analogous to the auto-touch can be called “the handshake,” in which, unsurprisingly, two people shake hands. The handshake is phenomenologically tantamount to the auto-touch because the reversibility that is active in both cases is qualitatively identical as different tokens of the same type of reversal. In each choreography, the hand that is being touched or shaken is the reversibility of the sensibility of the one doing the touching or the shaking insofar as both experiences involve the lapse of the untouchable.

A similar lapse can also be witnessed in vision. Just as the auto-touch revealed one’s own inability to touch their tactility, so is one unable to see themselves seeing. Without the assistance of any devices, Merleau-Ponty tries and fails to see the entirety of his face under his eyes. His vision of himself is only partial, or, in other words, the entire visibility of his face is invisible. The wholeness of his face is completed only when the profiles that are visible to him are prolonged into the profiles of his body that are seeable from the perspectives of the things or the other seers that he sees. This is no different in principle than the totality of a cube, which is visible despite the hiddenness of some of its faces whose profiles can only be viewed from elsewhere. Because of this similarity, let this pedagogical choreography be named “the cubic face.”

The cubic face shows that vision is scoped by that which surrounds the seer, who visually takes things in with regard to the reference that they cannot help but *be*. For this reason, the seer is in

their own visibility, so that their vision is exercised on themselves as much as it is on the profiles of everything else that they see. Furthermore, each seer reciprocates the visible, so that the recognition of another seer is also an objectification of one's own body as a visible for another so that the encounter with another shows each seer to be a reciprocal horizon of the same Being.

The negativity involved in the untouchable and the invisible is not an inaccessible perceptible that is elsewhere nor is it an opacity of consciousness; instead, it is a *de facto* and a *de jure* pure negativity. There is a *de facto* failure of the two touches to coincide, which implies that embodiment is irreducible *de jure* to mere empirical fact. What exceeds empirical observation here is the way in which the untouchability facilitates an understanding of the sentience of each hand as reverse sides reciprocating the sensibility of the greater fleshy whole to which they belong. When these observables operate simultaneous to one another, they cannot both be perceptible because they are the reciprocals of their whole. The lack of an overlap between the sentient and the sensed results from the fact that the two hands are a part of the same body that is prolonged in the movement from one lived experience, say, touching, to another, that is, to being touched.

The Second Critical Tool: Chiasmic Faith

The purity of the negativity that is discovered through the pedagogical choreographies reveals a type of reversibility distinct from an oscillation between discrete localities. What Merleau-Ponty purports is a notion of reversibility more akin to the reciprocity of a chiasmus in which the process of the differentiation of little sensibilities is generalized as elemental flesh. For instance, he cites choreographies like the cubic face as suggestions of a generality of visibility between seers or between the seer and the seen which prevents any of these from being strictly distinguishable. Thus, the perceptual field is a tangibility that is neither factually body nor world, but rather a general visible “midway between the spatio-temporal individual and the idea, a sort of

incarnate principle” (Merleau-Ponty 1968, p. 139). This midway, elemental generality of the flesh constitutes what he considers to be the miraculous integration of the parts into the whole that transcends them through the prolongation of its perceivable profiles. He crystallizes this by way of an analogy in which two mirrors face each other and indefinitely produce images of reflections that do not properly belong to either mirror. This metaphor shows that for him the generalization of flesh ultimately requires an abandonment of the notion that sensibility can only belong to one (little) consciousness.

In lieu of such isolatable entities, the new point of departure is the “ontological relief” of always already finding oneself in a world that opens upon a positive field of appearances whose negativity is consequently introduced when it is broken up or crossed out by another, apparently truer perception (Merleau-Ponty 1968, p. 88). Yet, even if the perceived whole is reduced to a nothingness, the recognition of illusions implies a registration of a greater truth over and against which the first may be deemed illusory. As a result, the ground of the world can never be completely nullified.

What the ability to make perceptual corrections suggests is that philosophy interrogates the openness onto the world not in terms of the possibility of the existence of the world but rather what it is for the world to already exist. Evidently, the unique world exists for us as “entirely irresistible” in perception (Merleau-Ponty 1968, p. 11). The certitude of seeing the true that it so miraculously produced is an unjustifiable “adherence that knows itself to be beyond proofs” as a sort of perceptual faith (Merleau-Ponty 1968, p. 28). Yet, it is also propositionally “absolutely obscure” (Merleau-Ponty 1968, p. 11) according to its pre-reflective nature as something “taken for granted, rather than disclosed, it is non-dissimulated, non-refuted” (Merleau-Ponty 1968, p. 29).

In conjunction with this perceptual faith, Merleau-Ponty also argues that one's perceptual view is always complemented by a “pseudoworld of phantasms if I let it wander” (Merleau-Ponty 1968, p. 28). The obvious givenness of a world in conjunction with its susceptibility to correction haunts the propositionally obscure certitude of

perceptual faith. However, the wanderer's perceptual agnosticism cannot radicalize into absolute skepticism because doubts concerning the world must postulate one from which it borrows the content for its skepticism. It presupposes a true against which it juxtaposes falsity, thus revealing its implicit faith in the world prior to and throughout its renunciation of it.

At most, skepticism can only go so far as to nominally relegate the world to a linguistic domain in itself, beyond the perception of it, since all the worlds without oneself that one can imagine would still be one's own imaginations and therefore, for that person, a world. Consignment of the world to nominalism employs language in order to resist the inexactitude of openness onto generality by manipulating the opacity of the body into a transparent but empty linguistic presence to oneself. The impossibility of total skepticism means that the type of possibility for doubt that is appropriate to perceptual faith must be rethought as "a continuous interrogation" of the world (Merleau-Ponty 1968, p. 103). The world itself demands the perpetuity of interrogation in that it exists for us in this very mode of questioning according to the miraculous totality witnessed in pre-reflective perception. Furthermore, the interrogative nature of the world generates the circularity of philosophy, which itself requires that philosophers ought not to expect typical answers to their questions, but remain interrogative.

Perceptual faith as the stand-in for typical answers fosters an "internal paradox" that negotiates between the two concurrent yet mutually exclusive impossibilities of pre-reflective certainty and interrogative doubt (Merleau-Ponty 1968, p. 28). Nevertheless, perceptual faith is not a pendulum that swings between two antinomies; rather, it appeals to the phenomenal understanding of the self who *lives* these experiences. This reinforces the necessary role that pedagogical choreographies play in grasping the chiasmus, for when reflection passes through the process of these exercises, it becomes capable of upholding the lived nature of these experiences.

In principle, there is no reason to presume that the chiasmic negotiation of this tension on a

perceptual level could not be applicable to different cases existing on other modalities, just one of which will be proposed at the end of this entry. Ultimately, the pedagogical utility of the chiasmic structure of faith as a critical tool is an open question that could be well worth exploring. Nevertheless, it suffices to say that the chiasmic form of faith as an internal paradox is at least relevant to the entrance into philosophy that Merleau-Ponty describes. For this reason, let this tool be referred to as "chiasmic faith."

Third Critical Tool: Hyper-reflection

Because chiasmic faith in perception is exposed only through pedagogical choreographies, reflection is thus no longer taken as a circuitous thought of seeing or feeling the self with whom one identifies. Rather than establishing identification, the choreographed movement of the chiasmus allows reflection to reiterate the "prolongation of the body's reserve" in which all the profiles of the unthinkable nothingness belonging to perceived, unperceivable wholes totalize as the horizons of a lateral notion of Being (Merleau-Ponty 1968, p. 203). This newfound capacity of reflection maintains the pre-reflective bond between perceptual faith and the perceived without effacing the transcendence of the whole; instead, the whole is registered not as the concatenation of its parts but as a perceivable imperceptibility constituting a pure, negative nothingness. This is what constitutes his third critical tool which Merleau-Ponty calls "hyper-reflection."

Hyper-reflection implies that philosophy cannot enter the circle by one sole entry because the absolute accessibility that that offers effaces the transcendence of the incalculable wholeness of the flesh. Likewise, there cannot be multiple entries all available to the philosopher, as it would amount to there being one sole entry insofar as it offers absolute accessibility. In this case, the copresence of the Gestalt in both the perceiver and the sensible would be neglected. Moreover, hyper-reflection shows that there is no cohesive, static unit called "the Self" who could enter another cohesive, static unit called "the World" by either one or many

entrances completely transparent to the philosopher. In fleshy laterality, the self consists in the non-difference of the self as encapsulated by the generality of the flesh. This amounts to a reconstruction of the “I” according to a more “corporeal schema” in which “I can” contact self with self in the non-difference of the generality of elemental flesh (Merleau-Ponty 1968, p. 255).

All in all, hyper-reflection is relevant to critical pedagogy according to two ways which together go to make up a flat-footed instantiation of Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological commitment to explicit circularity. First, hyper-reflection marks the articulation of the entrance into the circle of philosophy as an educational experience in and of itself by virtue of the *hyper-reflective movement* through the choreographies into the chiasm. Secondly, a phenomenological education on this entrance as finally achieved through hyper-reflection provides the critical tools discussed herein. Furthermore, these tools may very well be applicable elsewhere, especially given the way in which one’s entrance into philosophy is capable of conditioning how the business of philosophizing gets carried out.

An Application of These Critical Tools

A hyper-reflection exemplifying the pedagogical utility of these critical tools in other discourses may be realized by choreographing the writing process of, say, a piece of academic literature. It is not an outlandish claim to postulate that there is almost always a lapse between the hypothetical suspicions embedded in the first draft of a piece and the much more confident conclusions of the final one. This asymmetry between them which develops during the many phases of editing can be considered as the “untouchable” of writing. More specifically, there is a thickness to the unrefined, bulky hunches of the earlier versions that cannot be grasped at first.

The palpable asymmetry between the first draft and the final is the pure negativity that belongs neither to the first draft nor to the final. This negativity, which can count as a sort of phenomenological “unwritable,” is consistent with the other negativities Merleau-Ponty provides as something

“midway between the spatio-temporal individual and [their] idea, a sort of incarnate principle” (Merleau-Ponty 1968, p. 139). The unwritable accomplishes this by lateralizing for the repetition of the depth of the problem of the first draft with its refinement in the last draft. In this way, the first and the final drafts materialize the strange circularity inhabiting the chiasmic reversibilities between them. Here, the writing process is capable of choreographing the hyper-reflection of the unwritable development of the writeable. The evident physical differences between each draft, when taken as a whole, choreograph the pure negativity of the unwritable as the totality of the development from the first draft to the final. In this way, the unwritable work maintains the lived nature of the experience of writing it.

There are two writers who capture this experience well. First, Flannery O’Connor, compelled by the mass of clumpy speculations belonging to first drafts, admits: “I write [because] I don’t know so well what I think until I see what I say; then I have to say it again” (Flannery 1979, p. 5). Secondly, Annie Dillard maintains O’Connor’s notion of repetition in her description of the choreographic movement toward the final draft, which, to her, is “like something you memorized once and forgot. Now it comes back and rips away your breath. You find and finger a phrase at a time; you lay it down cautiously, as if with tongs, and wait suspended until the next one finds you; Ah yes, then this; and yes, praise be, then this” (Dilliard 1989, p. 76).

Conclusion

In conclusion, the question taken up in this entry explores the extent to which the descriptive analysis of Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology articulates an entrance into the circle of philosophy in a way that is pedagogically relevant. Three critical tools emerge as both the means to and the results of this articulation. Pedagogical choreographies, chiasmic faith, and hyper-reflection have important functions in the exposure of the entrance into philosophy, which is an educational experience in itself as well as a condition on the way in which one philosophizes. Although the full scope of the

pedagogical potential of these critical tools is not explored here, one example of the applicability of these tools outside of strict phenomenology is offered.

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Metaphor

- [Early Childhood Sector](#)
- [Metaphor and Edusemiotics](#)

Metaphor and Edusemiotics

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Synonyms

[Communication](#); [Discourse](#); [Governance](#); [Meaning](#); [Metaphor](#); [Narrative](#)

Introduction

As the science of signs, sign systems, signification, and communication, semiotics is integral to contemporary understandings of education, with both discourses converging in the new field of

edusemiotics. Metaphor undoubtedly occupies prime space in this territory, its social dynamics impacting on communication in education, blurring the lines between what we perceive as real and what we consider mere representation.

After a brief introduction to metaphor as a semiotic modality, this entry focuses on representation and interpretation practices in education. It begins with a survey of some common metaphors about education, each suggesting something about education, yet none fully capturing its essence. The word “education” is seen as a semiotic signifier for a concept without an agreed meaning and metaphor as a way of producing new meanings as much as a form of communication.

The entry then explores a number of ways metaphor functions in education. It may assist in reducing complexity as an aid to understanding. It may be used to selectively conceal and/or reveal information. It may be used as a persuasive device – with both positive and negative effects. It may generate new ways of thinking and new knowledge. It may also serve as a form of narrative for categorizing and making sense of information and experiences in the world. Together these functions render metaphor significant in education – significant in all senses of the word.

The entry concludes that a semiotic understanding of metaphor brings to light subtle nuances constantly shaping our social discourse and is thus a strong base for deconstructive critique and for creative reformulations of existing approaches to knowledge.

Metaphor and Edusemiotics

Contemporary theory expands the realm of metaphor from language and thought, to encompass the social dynamics of metaphor and the impact of communication – the way metaphors are developed and processed among individuals and groups within and across discourse events (Steen 2011). Although semiotics is a study of both communication and signification, this entry focuses more strongly on the latter – on the practices of representation and interpretation. Examining the power of metaphor in education, then, is clearly

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Metaphor and Edusemiotics, Table 1 Some common metaphors for education

The metaphor	Represented by
Acquisition	Gaining knowledge, reaching understandings, acquiring skills, achieving qualifications, cultural and social capital (Bourdieu, Putnam)
Art	Teaching as a creative skill (Steiner), creating ideas, expressing individuality, adopting perspectives, artistic connoisseurship and criticism (Eisner), the student as a creation or canvas
Botanical growth	“Kindergarten” as a garden (Froebel), cultivation/nurture of young minds (Rousseau), propagation of ideas, roots of learning, rhizomes (Deleuze)
Building and development	Scaffolding (Vygotsky), stages of readiness (Piaget) and moral development (Kohlberg), progress through various taxonomies, e.g., skills (Bloom), levels of learning (Gagné), stages (Erikson)
Experience	Experiential learning (Kolb), contextual experience (Dewey), skill practice
Food	Students as consumers, being spoon-fed, digesting facts
Imprinting	Memory training, the mind as tabula rasa (Locke), attachment theory (Bowlby)
Initiation	Cultural initiation, study of the great works
Managerial production	Linear models of curriculum planning (Tyler), the objectives movement (Mager), massed lectures for efficiency, standardized testing for quality control, knowledge management (Drucker, Davenport)
Marketplace	Institutions as providers, students as consumers, consumer satisfaction surveys, contestable funding, competition
Preparation	For professional practice, life, work career, adulthood, democratic citizenship
Remediation	Diagnostic testing, remedial teaching, “catch-up” classes; cure for ignorance, poverty, joblessness; correctional treatment for criminals
Searching	Research, discovery, pursuit of truth, seeking higher purpose/universal rules
Shaping and sculpting	Eliciting desirable behavior by rewarding successive approximations (Skinner), modeling (Bandura), Socratic method to shape further analysis and research
Socialization	Respect for authority, compliance with rules, democratic participation, competitive achievement, work habits and attitudes, reward and punishment, gender roles, social skills, acceptable speech patterns
Transmission	Lectures, rote learning, memorizing, passing on traditional skills, cultural competence, curriculum as a body of knowledge to be transferred to learners, traditional education as “banking” (Freire)
Travel	Undertaking a journey, “bridge” courses, accelerated learning, moving up through the grades, embarking on a course, qualification pathways, taking the reins, heading toward a destination

within the field of edusemiotics, in which education is an intentional (or, at times, unintentional) engagement with signs, both linguistic and extralinguistic, both in culture and in nature (Stables and Semetsky 2015).

Before looking at the way metaphors function in education, it is illuminating to traverse some existing metaphors about education (Table 1), each suggesting something about popular conceptions of education, yet none fully capturing its essence.

Many of these metaphors have become so commonplace as to seem literal in describing the process, nature, and purposes of education, although each has a different nuance, emphasis, and prescription. The word “education” is, thus, a semiotic signifier for a concept without a stable or agreed meaning, so its definition is always a

matter of interpretation. This is especially the case in philosophy of education as a discourse that entertains constant redefinition of what counts as education, frequently through innovative metaphorical allusion. A metaphor, then, is not always a way of *communicating* meaning but frequently a way of *producing new* meanings.

Lakoff and Johnson popularized conceptual metaphor theory (CMT), claiming that even our ordinary conceptual system, in terms of which we both think and act, is “fundamentally metaphorical in nature” (2003 [1980], p. 3). Over thirty years later, CMT is still recognized across academic disciplines as the dominant perspective on metaphor, having a major impact in the humanities and cognitive sciences. Significant work in metaphor emanated from the field of cognitive linguistics and

expanded to include a cross-disciplinary exploration of metaphor in language, thought, culture, and artistic expression, in embodied cognition, and specifically in educational discourse.

Set out below are a few significant functions of metaphor in education.

Metaphor as Simplification

Metaphor has the power to reify abstract ideas, assisting with conceptual analysis, drawing our attention to particular features of an idea. It can simplify often complex ideas through the efficient use of medical, engineering, molecular, or computer models, connecting to the familiar to assist with assimilating new ideas to fit within known constructs. Any form of representation does not duplicate or capture the essence of the original – the copy is not the work of art – but frequently serves as a simplification intended to limit, shift, or expand the focus without “cutting away” too much of the original sense. Politicians, for example, talk about “the public” or even about their electorate; transport timetables represent whole transport systems and their destinations; symbols and illustrations are used to aid understanding, logos and icons to symbolize whole organizations, and familiar jargon to speed up communication. For academics, in-text citations and reference lists represent original texts, their authors, and sometimes whole systems of thought. Some of these examples may be more metonymy than metaphor (the use of a specific attribute of something to stand for, rather than being viewed as, the thing itself) but function similarly in focusing our attention on specific aspects of the original. The word “education” has no referent object but signifies a whole set of discursive and changing practices.

Through metaphor, ideas can be condensed and simplified, so that even complex ideas can be made intelligible, when any attempt to explain them otherwise could easily be meaningless. It is a particular strength of metaphor that it can convey the essential without excessive oversimplification, representing complex new ideas in terms of familiar patterns of thought, thus reducing their perceived complexity.

Metaphor as Selective Revelation

Talk of revelation here is not about inspiration or surprise but about disclosure, i.e., revealing, and, by association, concealment or even censorship. Lakoff and Johnson emphasized the selective loading of metaphor as involving a “coherent network of entailments that highlight some features of reality and hide others” (2003 [1980], p. 157). Particular representations, then, impact on what we take to be true, an observation not lost on Foucault in pointing out the economic and political role occupied by a “regime of truth.” “Truth” is portrayed as “a system of ordered procedures for the production, regulation, distribution, circulation and operation of statements” (Foucault 1980, p. 133). Technologies for the governance of people depend on the ability to define what constitutes truth and thus to shape how we become subjects with a certain view of ourselves. In constituting truth, metaphor holds the trump card.

In education, controlling what is revealed and what is concealed is fundamental to the art of expository teaching and various modes of instruction, in the selection and ordering of the most appropriate content, in embellishing imagery for maximum impact, and in the timed release of key ideas to enhance learning by eliminating distractions and intensifying focus. To master the use of metaphor as a form of selective concealment in education may, then, serve to facilitate more effective methods of teaching. But such concealment may inadvertently promote a false sense of harmony, concealing the disparate and the contradictory, masking what in essence may be chaos and disorder – from minor social and political upheaval to explorations of the cosmos. Understanding how metaphor functions, then, allows for deciphering the discursive work done in its name, perhaps as a counter-hegemonic technology. Such motivation underpins much of the work done in educational areas like media studies, discourse analysis, and critical theory, sometimes to the point of political activism.

Metaphor as Persuasion

It was noted above that managing concealment is a legitimate didactic tool – assuming, of course, a

teacher with good intentions, operating without the use of coercion or undue influence. The idea of concealment underpins the persuasive power of metaphor, in generating motivation and enthusiasm for educational endeavor through selective presentation of appropriate significations and models, frequently through the power of poetic imagery.

Persuasion, though, is less defensible in the form of indoctrination or in some forms of advertising. Despite the freedom implied in individual interpretation, metaphors may still be used to assert particular points of view and influence our perceptions, our understandings, and our communication. It is problematic, therefore, for such influence to operate at an unconscious level. Inherent in education is a focus on bringing awareness to our personal and social situations, a focus that may be undermined by the insertion of metaphorical elements in the education discourse, without consideration or evaluation in terms of their possible effects. Just as important as learning the art of persuasion in enriching one's own delivery, then, is the ability to critique the various forms of propaganda posing as information – to decode the metaphorical structures and associations that underpin their effectiveness. Critique might encompass such things as exposing the degree to which OECD-driven policy makers capture the public imagination by representing as educational what is essentially political or economic or the way promoters and advertisers use metaphorical associations to peddle their wares. Metaphor might then be used to deconstruct a given representation to reveal hidden possibilities, leaving the subject in a better position to choose appropriate action and/or meaning. Similar critique may be necessary for learners to unpack the metaphorical baggage underpinning the constant stream of messages received as part of their ongoing educational engagement.

Metaphor as Creation

Ricoeur (1977) argues that metaphors are more than tropes of language; they have the power to redescribe the world. Not just mere substitution of one name for another, metaphors create tension

between literal meaning and attributed meaning. They create new relationships between ostensibly incompatible ideas, combining elements that have not been put together before. Once characterized as merely a linguistic decoration, metaphor is indispensable in generating and understanding discourse, from the poetic through to the scientific. Metaphor can give new meanings to words already in common use, as when a “virus” has infected one's computer system – clearly not a biological virus but an encoded algorithm that behaves like one. Through metaphor, we can attach particular features of our knowledge about real viruses to this new phenomenon, allowing us to reconceptualize a transmitted piece of computer code in terms that apply to a biological virus.

The power to construct creative possibilities through redescription was explained in Donald Schön's notion of the *generative* power of metaphor – a “special version of *seeing-as* by which we gain new perspectives on the world” (Schön 1993 [1979], p. 138). In dealing with social problems, he argues, solutions are very much mediated by the metaphors underlying the stories which frame the problem. Social services, for example, are sometimes described as fragmented (like a vase that was once whole but is now broken), for which the solution has to do with coordination or integration. Yet the same real services could be described differently – as autonomous perhaps, in which case there may be no problem at all. Metaphor is, thus, not always a way to grasp meaning but frequently a way to create it.

In reimagining the future of education, Kieran Egan elaborates on our fertile capacity for metaphor as fundamental to language: all sentences made up of metaphors we have usually forgotten were metaphors. Being able to see these invisible metaphors, he argues, offers a creative tool in that it allows us to play with what otherwise we are constrained by – to enrich both our expression and our understanding, enabling flexible and creative thinking.

One of the costs of failing to develop our metaphoric capacity is the kind of literal thinking that never gets beyond its starting assumptions and pre-suppositions. It is thinking that is closer to calculating than to anything critical or imaginative:

thinking not only condemned to remain “in the box” but not even knowing there is an outside to one’s box . . . one role of education is to least to expand the box and make clear that it does have an outside that may be worth the struggle to occasionally visit. (Egan 2008, p. 57)

Metaphor as Narrative

An interesting theme to explore as the final section in this entry is the relationship between metaphor and narrative, each serving discrete functions in some respects, but both characterized as nonliteral mechanisms for interpreting/constructing experience. Serving as a frame for this brief exploration is the dual depiction of “metaphor as compressed narrative” and “narrative as extended metaphor” (Hanne 1999, p. 35). Bougher further develops the link between narrative and metaphor, suggesting a symbiotic relationship between the two as “structuring guides” for each other (2015, p. 255), sometimes substituting for each other, with metaphor providing a strong frame of reference for subsequent narratives – but only when included early on in a text. So, for example, mention of genocide in stories of war evokes powerful memories of past atrocities, with little need for further elaboration throughout such a story.

Clearly, both narrative and metaphor provide mechanisms for categorizing and making sense of information and experiences in the world – metaphors elaborate particular points in a narrative, and narrative provides meaningful connections between apparently unrelated metaphors. For example, referring to a politician as Robin Hood implies that the candidate is an advocate of the poor. However, Bougher acknowledges the difference between metaphor and narrative, pointing out the need for more research about their relationship – whether metaphor helps citizens deal with political issues, events, and situations; whether narrative helps to link metaphors across different social domains (health, family, work, etc.); and to what extent narrative and metaphor facilitate or inhibit each other’s roles in political learning and comprehension.

Conclusion

Says T. S. Eliot (1982), “There never was a cat of such deceitfulness and suavity.” *Macavity the Mystery Cat* is the elusive trickster responsible for much deception and depravity, but never able to be caught in the act. *You may seek him in the basement, you may look up in the air – but I tell you once and once again, Macavity’s not there!* Such is the elusive quality of good metaphor at work, true to its name, avoiding visibility, resisting literal definition, and capturing our imagination as it diverts attention to specific aspects of the real. Within the process of *semiosis* as the eternal transformation of signs, metaphor is clearly implicated in constructivist theories of learning, establishing meaningful and effective connections between the known and the yet-to-be known, and animating what might otherwise be quite dreary prosaic communication. Metaphor is, thus, a powerful semiotic tool in creating and transforming knowledge.

Over time, metaphors lose their freshness and sparkle and become worn out – clichéd to the point that we no longer recognize their metaphorical nature. To “follow an argument”, to “grasp an idea,” and to “see the point” have all become so commonplace in our daily language as to mask their original metaphorical content and their accompanying entailments. *Understanding* the function(s) of metaphor brings to light subtle nuances constantly shaping our social discourse and is thus a strong base for deconstructive critique and for creative reformulations of existing knowledge.

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Method

► [Dewey on Educational Research and the Science of Education](#)

Methodological Issues in Science Education Research

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Synonyms

[Methodology](#); [Research methods](#); [Research traditions](#); [Research programmes](#); [Paradigms](#)

Introduction

The selection of research methodology in any field should be principled so that the approaches used allow the development of evidenced knowledge

(Drawing on Taber, K. S. (2014). Methodological issues in science education research: a perspective from the philosophy of science. In M. R. Matthews (Ed.), *International Handbook of Research in History, Philosophy and Science Teaching* (Vol. 3, pp. 1839–1893): Springer Netherlands.)

claims, but in an educational field linked to a teaching subject there may also be an expectation that research methods should match or reflect methodologies used in the parent discipline(s). Research in science education is often conceptualised with reference to how research is undertaken within the natural sciences. Many working in science education would wish to consider research in science education to be “scientific” research. This entry considers the range of research methodologies used in science education and how these might be most productively characterised.

The Range of Educational Methodologies

Educational research encompasses a broad range of methodologies, and many of these have been adopted within science education research (Taber 2014). Common methodologies include:

- Experimental methods: exploring the effects of interventions (or observing “natural experiments” when existing conditions offer the basis of comparisons) to examine the relationship between variables determined in advance
- Surveys: for example, of teacher attitudes or of student knowledge in a topic area
- Case studies: exploring and describing individual cases in some detail (the case could be a lesson, a school, a learner’s understanding of a topic, a textbook, etc.)
- Ethnography: seeking to understand a particular educational context in terms of how those teaching/learning within that cultural context understand it
- Grounded theory: building up a detailed explanatory account of a particular situation using concepts selected or developed to best fit the research focus through an iterative process of data collection, analysis, and conceptualisation

There are also forms of “research and development” such as action research which prioritises practical outcomes over theoretical knowledge claims though cycles of intervention and

evaluation, and design research and lesson study which similarly seek to iteratively improve practice but with a greater focus on formally theorising and documenting the research.

Within these methodologies, a wide range of data collection tools are used. The most common are forms of interview, observation, and questionnaire, but each of these general categories of technique reflects diverse practice, in particular in terms of whether data collection is intended to be open-ended to support inductive research aimed at developing theory or is designed to provide data within predetermined categories to deductively test hypotheses deriving from existing theory.

Characterising Research Methods in Education

The different research methodologies commonly used in educational research can be classified according to a number of characterisations. Introductory research methods texts commonly highlight a distinction between quantitative and qualitative methods, often suggesting the former follow a more scientific model, and sometimes implying that scientific and humanistic approaches offer competing and incompatible notions of truth (a discourse sometimes labeled as the paradigm wars). Unfortunately, these terms are sometimes used to refer to the nature of data collected and sometimes to imply a more fundamental distinction – quantitative restricted to research applying inferential statistics or mathematical models and qualitative to refer to research where the nature of data collected, such as accounts of people's experiences, is considered to necessarily require the involvement of the researcher as an (inherently subjective) interpreter of intersubjective interactions. There is also potential ambiguity in another commonly adopted term: mixed methods, which can variously mean collecting distinct types of data; using a range of methods within a methodology such as case study; or combining fundamentally distinct methodologies in a single study (Taber 2014).

More useful distinctions (Taber 2014) relate to whether research is:

- Nomothetic or idiographic – whether the research purpose concerns identifying general patterns or understanding particular cases
- Objectivist or constructivist-interpretivist – whether it is sensible to see knowledge developed as independent of the observer (e.g., if exploring class sizes or levels of laboratory resource) or inevitably influenced by intersubjectivity between researcher and participants (e.g., in-depth explorations of learners' perceptions of science lessons)
- Confirmatory or exploratory – whether the study is testing a hypothesis based on an established conceptual position or seeking to find out the most productive way to make sense of a research focus and potentially develop new theory

While these approaches may be seen as competing in the context of what is most appropriate in a particular study, they are better seen as complementary (for example, exploratory phases of research precede confirmatory phases) and having compensating strengths and limitations (so nomothetic approaches may miss significant individual differences while idiographic studies have limited generalisability).

Comparing Research in Natural Science and in Education

Social phenomena are often complex, and may need to be studied naturalistically, in situ, when removing them from their context changes them fundamentally. That is quite different from how much research in, for example, physics is undertaken using controlled experimental methods in the laboratory. However, the natural sciences do also encompass studies of complex systems and naturalistic research undertaken in the field.

Another feature of much research in education is that whereas natural science is typically nomothetic, seeking general laws, research in education often explores individual cases for their own sake,

more akin to the idiographic tradition in history. However, even when cases are considered inherently worthy of study (so-called intrinsic case studies), and when direct generalisation to other cases cannot be assumed, and true replication is not possible (due to the idiosyncratic nature of a case), it is usually intended that findings will offer the basis of potential insights into other cases.

One perceived feature of the social sciences that is often considered to make them distinct from the natural sciences is the nature of social phenomena compared to natural phenomena. Educational research often concerns constructs that rely on self-reports of individuals – such as their attitudes to learning science or their degree of confidence in their understanding of subject matter. These constructs are inferred from responses to instruments including items designed to reflect the assumed underlying construct (e.g., self-efficacy).

Most phenomena studied in science – earthquakes, pulsars, the flight of birds, eclipses, etc. – would occur just the same regardless of the presence of people to observe, measure, name, and conceptualise them. This is not the case in the social sciences. Schools, lessons, curriculum, and so forth only exist as social inventions and institutions. *Notions of earthquakes or pulsars, etc.*, are human constructions (where what counts as an earthquake or pulsar and how such concepts are to be understood are decided through the conventional discourse processes of science and are potentially open to review). Yet there are observable phenomena in the world that are labeled earthquakes that would exist despite the label and criteria for class membership.

While there are also phenomena in the world labeled schools (or bullies or successful lessons) which exist regardless of the label and conceptualisation, these observable phenomena could conceivably be changed (albeit indirectly) by changes in the conventional labeling and conceptualisation. As an example, an institution which was recognised as a school and so legally entitled to certain financial support and other entitlements in a particular national context might well cease to exist as a consequence of a decision to declassify it as a school – especially in a context

where children were legally required to attend a (recognised) school.

This may not be an absolute distinction as there are many examples of natural phenomena that might change substantially as an indirect result of human conventions: for example, labeling an organism as an endangered species, or alternatively as an agricultural pest, could well have indirect consequences for its population, range, or even survival. As another example, the scientific case for considering climate change as at least in part anthropogenic (a scientific classification) is considered important for the potential for influencing policy that may in turn actually change the rate of climate change.

This links to another potential difference between scientific and educational research. Scientific research is usually considered to be morally neutral (except in the sense that there is a clear inherent scientific value that knowledge is better than ignorance). Scientists seek to form knowledge of the natural world, rather than judge it. Such a distinction is sometimes less clear in social research as the foci of research are often bound up with ideologically informed policies (e.g., to increase participation in higher education) or axiologically driven research questions (e.g., regarding equity of opportunity, discrimination, transforming lives, etc.). Again, in practice, such a distinction is not absolute – as for example in research to eradicate smallpox, where medical research was guided by a judgment that it was morally good to completely eliminate a naturally occurring virus.

Another potential difference between natural science and educational research is the ethical concern that must be shown to participants in studies in education. A hypothesis that a certain level of stress might damage an aircraft wing can be experimentally tested under laboratory conditions, whereas a parallel hypothesis about the effects of stressing a science teacher can only be considered in terms of observations of existing cases. If one method of protecting metal objects from corrosion is found to be more effective than another under some condition, then this might suggest a programme of research to explore the range of conditions under which this finding

would apply. However, if research suggests that one approach to teaching is more effective than another, it becomes ethically dubious to test whether the same result would be found in another educational context if this requires deliberately subjecting some learners to teaching reasonably expected to be inferior.

Additionally, people (unlike aircraft wings or laboratory rats for example) are considered to have rights of self-determination and can only be included in educational research after offering voluntary informed consent – that is freely agreeing to partake, under no extraneous pressure to do so, and in full knowledge of what they have agreed to. Although this is also true in medical experiments, researchers are often able to use double blind techniques (for example in drug trials) such that neither participants nor researchers directly engaged with them are aware which condition particular subjects have been assigned to.

These types of safeguards are seldom feasible in educational research. In intervention-versus-control design studies, students, their teachers, and observers, will generally find it obvious which group experiences the standard treatment and which is subject to some innovation. This admits sometimes powerful effects due to researcher or participant expectations, as well as reactions (positive or negative) to the contextual novelty of a treatment rather than its inherent nature. In research into teaching approaches, this is exacerbated by the general tendency for teachers to improve in their application of any curriculum or pedagogy after some experience of enacting it in the classroom, so that studies which compare novel and traditional approaches cannot generally be seen as comparing like-to-like.

Educational Research Is Scientific if Systematic

One pertinent question is whether educational research can be scientific, given the difference between natural and social phenomena as foci of interest. Scientific research is commonly associated with experimental methods, although this does not reflect the full range of approaches used

across the natural sciences, where naturalistic, observational studies are common in some disciplines (such as astronomy for example). In education, experimental research tends to be subject to a raft of complexities and potential confounding factors which often compromise its application.

The range of methodologies dawn upon in science education is varied then because different tools are needed to respond to different research questions, and because: (i) educational research foci are often complex and embedded in context, (ii) logically straightforward approaches may be excluded on ethical grounds, and (iii) people are aware of and may react to being subjects of research (regardless of the treatment itself).

It has been argued that selecting from diverse methods “could . . . be considered scientific” providing that “the [research] design directly addresses a question that can be addressed empirically, is linked to prior research and relevant theory, is competently implemented in context, logically links the findings to interpretation ruling out counterinterpretations, and is made accessible to scientific scrutiny” (National Research Council Committee on Scientific Principles for Educational Research 2002, p. 97). This might be considered a systematic perspective – that a scientific research study is a system with internal coherence.

Research Traditions in the Natural Sciences and Educational Research

Another perspective suggests research that is scientific not only links to “prior research and relevant theory” but moreover takes place within clearly established and bounded research programmes. There is currently a strong focus within both policy and scholarship in science education on the nature of science. Curriculum policy in many national contexts has emphasised teaching about the nature of science, teaching science through enquiry approaches, and offering educational experiences that are “authentic” to the nature of science itself. Issues regarding the natures of scientific knowledge, scientific evidence, and argumentation processes in science have received a good deal of attention, as has the

question of how scientific method (or methods) should be understood or taught within science courses.

The demarcation of science – what can and should be considered as a science – has been a key issue in the philosophy of science and some particularly influential analyses have focused on the nature of research traditions. Particular sub-fields of scientific disciplines commonly develop traditions that encompass methodical approaches that have been honed in response to the canonical theoretical account of the subject matter and the recognised epistemological challenges in that area of research. This is reflected in Thomas Kuhn's (1974/1977) notion of the disciplinary matrix, and the idea that induction into the specialism is a form of cognitive apprenticeship involving learning the conceptual framework of a paradigm and the observational and analytical tools conventionally used to solve puzzles in that area of science.

This happens because most scientific activity is focused on convergent research that investigates details of a scheme already posited in outline, rather than offering some completely new conceptualisation that sets up a novel direction for research (Kuhn 1970). Imre Lakatos (1970) argued that what made work scientific was the existence of recognised research programmes (similar in some ways to the traditions Kuhn describes) which on being established posited particular metaphysical commitments (to the nature of what was being studied and to the kinds of knowledge it would be possible to develop about that research focus) that channeled a positive heuristic indicating the way research should proceed.

Arguably this means that induction into scientific research generally sidesteps the explicit focus on ontological and epistemological questions common-place as a prelude to refining research questions and selecting a congruent methodological strategy in the social sciences. In a sense, the disciplinary matrix into which the novice scientific researcher is being inducted, and the experienced scientist has established a career path, already presents the conceptualisation of the research focus and the recognised methods to apply to that problem. Creativity is primarily

limited to making iterative developments within an established framework. As a less mature field, science education research is more often exploratory (divergent) in nature, and this is reflected in the profile of methodologies employed (Taber 2014).

Often in social research, such as in education, there is a range of potentially relevant theoretical perspectives that might be drawn upon to develop a conceptual framework as a starting point for a research project (Taber 2014). These perspectives may sometimes compete for explanatory space but can also be complementary so that the choice is about which perspective is likely to offer most insight in relation to particular research objectives.

For example, research to explore why student learning of some science topic seems to be particularly problematic might be informed by a range of quite different perspectives, including:

- A curriculum perspective considering how the scientific concept is represented (in effect, modelled) in the formal curriculum
- A pedagogic perspective concerned with the way teachers approach the sequencing and presentation of the material (e.g., using examples, narratives, analogies, similes, models, demonstrations, etc.) and the learning activities they set up
- A cognitive perspective considering the “information processing” demands of the topic, such as working memory loading
- A conceptual perspective that explores students' own ideas to see if learners hold suitable prerequisite knowledge to make sense of the topic and whether there are common alternative conceptions that may interfere with understanding and learning the canonical account
- An affective perspective that explores student engagement with the topic in terms of its perceived relevance to them

It is quite possible that a full account would explore all these aspects (so a pluralistic conceptual framework is needed), but in specific curriculum topics, certain factors identified within particular theoretical perspectives may be

especially important. For example, widely recognised difficulties in learning Newtonian mechanics seem to be especially influenced by students' implicit (tacit) knowledge, whereas learning difficulties in some core areas of chemistry (related to bonding, stability, and reactions) seem to be linked to common curriculum models and pedagogic approaches.

As research traditions become more firmly established within science education, it is likely that research in the field will become increasingly programmatic and induction into that work more akin to that found in the natural sciences. However, given the nature of educational research foci, the positive heuristics within research programmes in science education will continue to embrace diverse methodologies that offer complementary strengths and limitations.

Cross-References

- [Bachelard and Philosophy of Education](#)
- [Constructivism](#)
- [Theory Building and Education for Understanding](#)

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Methodology

- [Methodological Issues in Science Education Research](#)

Micropolitics

- [Educational Leadership, Change, and the Politics of Resistance](#)

Mind

- [Meaning and Teaching](#)

Mindfulness

- [Social Emotional Learning and Latino Students](#)

Mobile Internet

- [Learning and Media Literacy](#)

Modal Competence

- [Educational Semiotics, Greimas, and Theory of Action](#)

Modal Learning

- [Multimodal Literacies](#)

Moderation and Assessment

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Synonyms

Consensus moderation; Consistency of teacher judgement; Professional dialogue; Quality control; Social moderation; Verification

Introduction

In this entry moderation is conceptualized as a social and holistic practice. Moderation is discussed, in particular, with reference to systems of standards-referenced curriculum. In this context, the connection between assessment, curriculum, and standards needs to be understood for moderation to be effective. Significantly, the purposes, roles, processes, and practices of moderation are presented as beneficial to professional learning and necessary as a mechanism of quality control; however moderation viewed as a social practice presents important challenges which are also analyzed and addressed here.

Definition

Moderation involves teachers in discussion and debate about their interpretations of the quality of student work situated within a particular context. These processes require teachers to articulate their interpretations of the assessment criteria and standards in terms of a grade, or a particular standard assigned to student work, or a portfolio of evidence. Consensus or social moderation as opposed to statistical moderation is the focus in this entry which is presented from an interpretivist

perspective. Moderation and assessment viewed as social practice imply an understanding that judgments are mediated by one's cultural context, beliefs, and values.

Linn (1993, p. 97) defined social moderation in terms of “consensus moderation, auditing and verification” which he claimed relied “primarily on judgment.” He went on to describe this type of moderation as “performances on distinct tasks . . . rated using a common framework and interpreted in terms of a common standard.” The descriptor of “social” before “moderation” distinguishes between moderation used for quality control through purposeful discussion, from the statistical understanding of moderation through scaling tests. The enactment of “social moderation” aligned with Linn’s definition involves teachers from different schools, institutions, or classes meeting to discuss and negotiate the judgments that have been made on samples of student work that have been assessed using teacher judgment. It is through discussion and debate that teachers negotiate a shared understanding of the qualities of the work in terms of the standards (Klenowski and Wyatt-Smith 2014). Or as defined by Maxwell (2002, p. 1), social moderation is “a process for developing consistency or comparability of assessment judgments across different assessors, programs and schools.” Maxwell’s definition directs discussion to the purposes of moderation rather than the practice. Maxwell uses the term “social moderation” in a more refined way in terms of “peer moderation” in contrast to “panel moderation.” Both involve discussion among teachers with the latter being a bureaucratic expectation, and the former focused on teacher learning and the development of shared understanding. This shift from a more technical and individual view of moderation has occurred as our understandings of learning have become more focused on the social. While a purpose of moderation is to ensure consistency of judgment decisions as an end-of-semester practice, moderation is also understood as an important part of teacher professional learning that informs future teaching practice. Current views on moderation

perceive it holistically as a practice that commences at the beginning of a teaching period during the planning phase. At this stage, teachers need to develop deep and consistent understandings of the qualities in student work that would provide evidence at different levels of performance. This understanding informs teaching practice where standards are shared with students and are used formatively when feedback to the student can be directed at the standard achieved with further feedback provided about how the student might progress to the next level. Moderation, as an end-of-semester activity upon which understanding of the standards has been developed throughout the semester, is a refined and focused discussion involving complex judgment decisions.

Purposes

In education systems which include teacher-based assessment and teacher professional judgment, moderation is a form of quality assurance, increasing the dependability and comparability of the assessment results. From the various definitions and contexts in which moderation is used, it is possible to organize the purposes into two major categories (Klenowski and Wyatt-Smith 2014). The first of these categories relates to the aim of achieving consistency in the interpretation of the standards and related qualities in the assessment of student work together with the comparability of the judgments made. Comparability refers to the judgments in terms of their consistency, with one another, and with the performance or achievement standards. Assessment against common criteria and standards as provided by a subject syllabus or other frame of reference requires assessors to be consistent in the application of the standards and comparable in the judgments that they make (Maxwell 2007, p. 2).

The second category of purposes involves the function of achieving quality control to improve assessors' assessment and pedagogy for improved learning. Quality assurance is a related function of moderation and refers to the methods for establishing confidence in the quality of

moderation procedures and outcomes. Together these purposes ensure public confidence in the quality, equity, and fairness of an assessment regime. The purpose of moderation is to ensure that assessments align with established criteria and standards and are equitable, fair, and valid and that judgments are consistent, reliable, and based on evidence within the task response or assessed work. To achieve these purposes, teachers are involved in developing a shared understanding of assessment requirements, standards, and the evidence that demonstrates different qualities of performance. This process of moderation involves discussion of assessment tasks, evidence of learning, criteria, standards, and judgment decisions to ensure the validity and reliability of assessments and to improve the quality of the teaching and learning experience. It is from engagement and regular participation in moderation discussions at different phases of a teaching period that has led to a conception of moderation as important professional learning that can help to improve teaching practices to enhance student learning.

Moderation Processes and Practices

Moderation processes provide the basic structure for the enactment or practice of moderation in situated contexts. Education systems that are based on standards-referenced curriculum and assessment often view moderation as a holistic process that commences with the planning phase and continues in differing degrees and ways through the teaching and assessing phases until the final moderation meeting. This is a cyclic process where one phase informs the next with the outcome of the moderation meeting informing the next planning phase.

A shared and deep understanding of the standard is necessary before teaching commences as this focuses the teaching and learning activities and the design of the assessment task. This can be accomplished by teaching team members negotiating evidence of the standard through moderating previous or prepared work samples or through the process of collaborative annotating of a work

sample (Adie and Willis 2014). A clear understanding of the standard ensures that the curriculum, teaching and learning activities, and the assessment are aligned. The assessment task needs to provide opportunities for evidence of the standard at multiple levels of performance (e.g., at, above, and below standard descriptors), and the criteria sheet must be designed to capture critical features of performance at each level. If critical features of the curriculum and achievement standard are not captured in the assessment task or criteria sheet, then the final moderation practice is jeopardized. Questions asked during this planning phase will lead teachers to consider the qualities that they are valuing within the curriculum and as represented in an assessment task and the teaching and learning activities that can explicitly develop these skills and understandings for their students. During teaching, the teacher can then support their students to come to understand the standard that they are working toward and to self-assess their progress. Judging assessed work is based on the common understanding of the qualities that denote the standard developed through discussion from the commencement of the planning phase.

Making judgments and moderating student work come together in a variety of ways that have been described as conference, calibration, and expert moderation. A number of other descriptors for these procedures exist (e.g., consensus moderation and consistency of teacher judgment), as well as variations in performing and combining each basic procedure (e.g., a form of calibration that concludes with an external expert checking and endorsing the awarded grades). Within each procedure, judgments are based on an agreed achievement standard. In conference moderation teachers mark all of their assigned assessments and then select a sample to represent each of the graded levels, whether these be at, above, and below standard, numeric or alphabetic grades. These samples are taken to the moderation meeting. If the consensus in the moderation meeting is that the evidence in an assessment task does not align with the standards and thus the grade awarded, a teacher may need to remark their assessments. Calibration moderation

involves teachers marking a small number of common tasks prior to marking their class set. The standard is negotiated over this common set of graded work samples. At the conclusion of this moderation process, it is assumed that the teachers have a common understanding of the standard which they will then draw from when marking their own class set. Expert moderation describes those situations where one person, the expert, reviews the marked assessments, normally through a sampling process, and agrees, or not, with the judgments.

For moderation to be an efficient and effective practice, it is necessary that there are clear guidelines, dependent on the procedure that is being followed, on how to prepare for the meeting, including collecting and deciding on samples. Some moderation may involve work samples that are representative of the awarded grade, while other meetings may focus on borderline cases or atypical cases.

Expectations and Protocols of Moderation Meetings

Moderation meetings are based on protocols for conduct. These may include expectations such as:

- Participants in the moderation meeting come prepared to the meeting. In some cases this may involve having student work samples marked and annotated to illustrate justifications for the grade; in other cases, the moderation meeting will involve working with clean samples that do not have any annotations or grades.
- Teachers are willing and open to share the rationale for their judgments, as this links to the designated standard.
- Participants remain open and respectful to others' perspectives and are cognizant of the tacit beliefs that can interfere with the judgment phase.
- Only the evidence of student learning contained within the work sample can be considered in judgment decisions, that is, knowledge that teachers have of student

circumstances or previous work outside of the evidence in the student work sample does not bear on the judgment decision.

- When teachers present work from their class within the moderation meeting, the following sequence allows for clarity, critique, and the development of shared understanding of the standard:
 - Accounting of – in which the assessment context is described by the presenting teacher
 - Accounting for – in which an explanation and justification of the judgments are provided by the presenting teacher
 - Critique of evidence – in which other teachers participating in the moderation meeting question to seek clarification of judgment decisions and propose alternate views based on the evidence in the student work sample and the standard descriptors
 - Response to critique – in which the presenting teacher responds to questions regarding their judgment decisions and considers alternative perspectives in terms of the standard descriptor
 - Co-construction of a shared understanding of the standard – the process of negotiation, deliberation, and discussion continues until agreement on the standard is reached
- Teacher reasoning for the awarded grade is recorded based on the critical evidence that is indicative of the standard. Key questions include:
 - What is the evidence in the assessment task that demonstrates a standard?
 - Why this standard?
 - Why not the standard above or below?
 - Is there sufficient evidence to justify a judgment being made?

Often a facilitator is appointed to the moderation meeting to progress the meeting in a timely manner, to ensure that all perspectives are heard, and, at times, to make final judgment calls in cases where agreement cannot be reached.

Of importance for the moderation meeting is that the critical evidence is matched against a standard descriptor. Dialogue in the form of purposeful conversations that critique and interrogate the qualities in student work that denote a standard is the essential component of the moderation meeting. It is anticipated that as a result of such discussions, teachers gain a deeper insight into the standards and the qualities that provide evidence of the standards, as well as knowledge of quality assessment tasks and criteria sheets. This knowledge will inform the next iteration of planning and teacher pedagogic practice. Moderation, in the form presented here, is viewed as a professional learning activity.

Challenges of Moderation

Moderation and judgment making is a subjective process which can result in a number of challenges to reaching consensus among participants. Socio-cultural theories of learning highlight the multiple influences on the reading of any text. Prior knowledge and understanding, cultural and social background, attitudes and beliefs, school culture, work colleagues, and experience are some of the factors that combine to impact on judgment making.

A number of interpretative processes are involved when teachers interact with one another in the social practice of moderation to “deprivatize” their judgment practices. These interpretive processes include “noticing, interpreting, and constructing implications for action” (Coburn and Turner 2011, p. 177) which are affected by a teacher’s beliefs, knowledge, and motivation and by how interaction takes place in the moderation meetings. Too often in the assessment of student work, teachers search for, or notice, qualities in the student work that support their beliefs, assumptions, and experiences which can result in overlooking aspects of the student work that might contradict their judgment. This is why in a moderation meeting explication by a teacher of his or her understanding of how the standard is met is required.

Teachers' perceptions of themselves as an assessor and the interplay of power in judgment making and critique of judgments can impact on participation in the moderation meeting and the co-construction of meaning. Teachers' identity as an experienced or graduate teacher or as a particular type of assessor, for example, as a hard or easy marker of student work, should not be used to justify awarding a grade. An experienced teacher may bring more subject, pedagogic or student knowledge, to the moderation discussion; however, this should not influence the matching of evidence against the standard descriptors. Identity and the differential power of participants should not influence the process of negotiation or impact on judgment decisions.

Teachers' perceptions of the purpose of moderation can also influence their interactions in the moderation meeting. Moderation can be viewed as a mechanism to ensure equity, to justify judgment decisions, and to meet systemic accountability or as professional learning that informs pedagogic practice. One challenge arises as teachers with different purposes for attending a moderation meeting are brought together in the same meeting. This can lead to differences in the interrogation of the standards and time spent on discussion regarding the implications for practice and on reaching a decision. The process of negotiation among all participants within the moderation meeting and the established protocols and procedures for the moderation practice can act to guard against the potential errors and bias that may be evident in individual teachers' judgments and that may be influenced by the challenges of identity, the perception of differential power relations, and the perceived purpose of the meeting.

Within systems of standards-referenced curriculum and assessment, it is important that all stakeholders share a consistent understanding of the standard. However, achieving consistency beyond the local context of the school or district is difficult to achieve. While consistency in judgments may be enhanced through annotated work samples or exemplars, text alone is insufficient to establish shared meaning. This is a challenge for

quality control within particularly large and diverse education systems. Synchronous online social moderation is a possible solution to engage teachers across districts (Adie 2013). Online moderation, which occurs in real time as a dialogic practice, can connect dispersed communities to share their judgment decisions and develop common understandings of a standard. The value in online moderation is in developing an understanding of a construct and the various ways that standards may be demonstrated, across diverse contexts where teachers might not always meet and talk with each other. This is linked to equity issues in terms of supporting teachers in rural locations who often lack colleagues in their year level and discipline to develop shared understandings of the standards. The challenge for education systems is to develop the technological conditions and practices that will enable teachers to view, annotate, and discuss work samples in efficient and effective ways with others regardless of location.

Conclusion

This entry has presented a sociocultural view of moderation in which moderation is understood as a social and dialogic practice that is influenced by and influences context, participants, and participation. While moderation may be performed in a variety of ways, its purpose within systems of standards-referenced curriculum and assessment is to achieve consistency in interpretation of the standards and as a form of quality control that aims to ensure equity and fairness on judgment decisions. Moderation is most effective when teachers are involved in deep engagement and negotiation of the standards. This occurs when moderation is viewed as a holistic and cyclic practice that progresses through each phase of planning, teaching, and assessing. As a social practice, moderation involves challenges that include the interplay of identity and judgment making and the difficulty in achieving consistency across diverse areas and large and dispersed

populations. Synchronous online moderation has been presented as one future option to progress moderation as a social practice involving critique, negotiation, and the development of a deep appreciation of standards as descriptors of quality.

Cross-References

- [Fairness in Educational Assessment](#)
- [Improvement and Accountability Functions of Assessment: Impact on Teachers' Thinking and Action](#)

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Mollenhauer, Klaus (1928–1998)

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Introduction

Klaus Mollenhauer (1928–1998) is one of the most important German theorists of education of the postwar era. Mollenhauer is renowned for his contributions to critical pedagogy and educational social work (*Sozialpädagogik*) in Germany. His late philosophical work, *Forgotten Connections: On Culture and Upbringing* (2014), has been translated into multiple languages including English and deals in a highly original and accessible way with education in its most basic elements.

Biography

Klaus Mollenhauer (1928–1998) was born the son of a prison teacher and a social worker in Berlin. Like others born at the end of the 1920s (e.g., Jürgen Habermas or Niklas Luhmann), Mollenhauer was forced to join the German army in his early teens at the end of the Second World War. After being captured and imprisoned for almost 4 weeks by the British Army, Mollenhauer returned to school in 1946 and then attended the College of Education in Göttingen.

Mollenhauer studied under Herman Nohl and Erich Weniger, representatives of human science pedagogy (*Geisteswissenschaftliche Pädagogik*, sometimes simply referred to as *Pädagogik*, pedagogy, or even “pedagogics”). This tradition can be traced back to the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl and the historical hermeneutics of Wilhelm Dilthey and Friedrich Schleiermacher. Mollenhauer was also greatly influenced by Helmuth Plessner, whose “philosophical anthropology” – the study of the “meaning of being human” – synthesized critical, historical,

and hermeneutic impulses together with the more particularistic possibilities of phenomenology.

In the tumult of the late 1960s, Mollenhauer, working at the Goethe University in Frankfurt, stood out as a rare older ally or “big brother” of dissatisfied youth, providing assistance to the likes of Gudrun Ensslin and Andreas Baader, later key members in the Baader-Meinhof terrorist group. His 1968 book *Education and Emancipation: Pedagogical Sketches* was eagerly taken up by students and activists and is the text for which he is still best known in Germany today.

In 1972, Mollenhauer returned to Göttingen to accept a position at his *alma mater*. Influenced by Habermas and other social and psychological theorists, he published his second monograph in the same year: *Theories of Educational Processes: Towards an Introduction to Educational Problems*. His 36 years in Göttingen were marked by great academic productivity (e.g., the appearance of over 100 articles and anthologies, as well as his third and final monograph, *Forgotten Connections*), as well as by a concern with questions of aesthetics and culture, and by an explicit return to philosophical anthropology and human science pedagogy of his student days. When asked about the underlying theme in his life’s work, Mollenhauer responded by reiterating what one very early human science scholar had identified as the central question of education: “I can only say with Schleiermacher: ‘What does the older generation want of the younger?’” (1991, p. 85).

Frankfurt am Main: Critical Pedagogy, Sozialpädagogik


Mollenhauer began his career with a nuanced critical analysis of the tradition of human science pedagogy in the light of the events during and after the Second World War – and also in the context of the subsequent emergence in West Germany of an Americanized consumer welfare State. He famously writes in *Education and Emancipation* that “the years since the Second World War have shown [the tradition of] human science pedagogy

to have limited capabilities to shed light on the situation that is now constitutive of educational reality” (1968, p. 9). Education, in short, could no longer be adequately conceptualized and practiced in terms of traditional, elevated notions such as *Bildung* (formation, cultivation; e.g., see Wilhelm von Humboldt 1998) or the “pedagogical relation” (e.g., see Spiecker 1984).

However, this did not lead Mollenhauer to an uncritical embrace of the psychologies of learning or sociologies of management and efficiency coming from Anglo-America. In a 1961 essay simply titled “Adaptation” (*Anpassung*), Mollenhauer teases out the various meanings of “adaptation” and its derivatives (e.g., adjustment, assimilation, accommodation) in biology, cognitive psychology, and sociology: It is the response of an organism to its environment, the adjustment of an environment to one’s needs, and a change purposefully brought about by oneself, upon oneself (as in today’s self-regulation and metacognition). Mollenhauer insists that education must go well beyond these conceptions, saying that as it is conventionally defined, “adaptation is entirely one-sided; its pedagogical obverse is *autonomous subjectivity*” (1961, p. 359, emphasis added). Apparently harking back to both Kant’s notion of enlightenment (as the emergence from self-imposed dependency) and Romantic understandings of reflection (as a progressive transcendence of perceptual immediacy), Mollenhauer emphasizes that the educated person is by necessity *not* adapted or that, “paradoxically” in our modern “cultural context, only a reflective [i.e. maladapted] person can really be said to be ‘adapted’” (p. 357).

Education and Emancipation clearly betrays the influence of the Frankfurt School or Institute for Social Research, while still referencing more conservative notions of human science pedagogy. This is evident in Mollenhauer’s definition of *Bildung* in this context; Mollenhauer was led to define this historically-charged term specifically as “political *Bildung*” and as “political enlightenment,” with a clear urgency and specificity: “*Bildung* – as opposed to education – is enlightenment regarding the conditions of one’s own existence and the concretization of singular

Mollenhauer, Klaus (1928–1998), Fig. 1 The “pedagogical field” *pace* Bernfeld (Mollenhauer 1972, p. 26)



individuality to the degree that it is possible under such conditions” (1968, p. 65). A second central concern in *Education and Emancipation* is the “problem of authority” in both educational theory and practice: “Pedagogical authority,” Mollenhauer emphasizes, “is in reality the authority of domination” (p. 62). Citing the canonical figures of “pedagogical thinking” in Germany – Rousseau, Pestalozzi, and von Humboldt – Mollenhauer invokes critical rationality and empirical verification as *the* criteria for a pedagogy that would be emancipatory not only for those thus educated, but for society in general:

If it is true that our society is not simply the product of its own reproduction, this means that [existing] social determinations are not simply to be reproduced through education. [It further follows that] ... as both theory and practice, pedagogy has the task of *producing in the new generation the potential for social change or transformation (Veränderung)*. (1968, pp. 66–67)

Harking back to his paper on adaptation, Mollenhauer underscores priorities and examples that could readily be regarded as “maladaptive” – all the while drawing from canonical figures of pedagogy and pedagogical thinking.

Göttingen: Culture and Upbringing and the Science of Examples

Mollenhauer’s second monograph, published shortly after his arrival in Göttingen, offers a curious mixture of the psychoanalytic educational

theory of Siegfried Bernfeld (1973), the theory of communicative action of Jürgen Habermas (1984), human science pedagogy (again), as well as critical theories of social reproduction and hegemony. This book has been characterized as a “theoretical explication along the lines only coarsely sketched in *Education and Emancipation*” (Aßmann 2015, p. 158) and also as an investigation – using a new sociological “terminology” and complex “social models” – of “the pedagogical relation” beloved of human science pedagogy (Hopmann 2014, p. 58). The conceptual vocabularies of sociology, psychology, and the human sciences are combined to form models of social reproduction through intergenerational educative processes (Fig. 1).

The pedagogical relation is recast in this model as the “pedagogical dyad,” which – in opposition to traditional insistence on its social “autonomy” – is very explicitly interrelated with social and institutional factors. The intergenerational dynamics central to Schleiermacher’s question about “what the older generation wants of the younger” are expressed here in the form of “an ensemble of expectations for social reproduction.”

However, as the 1970s progressed, Mollenhauer came to see that he could not integrate the pedagogical relation and other concerns of human science pedagogy to form a grand sociological synthesis. Mollenhauer realized that any person’s experience of their own upbringing and *Bildung* is not just the result of indifferent

sociopolitical structures and processes, but is particular and embedded in one's own biography, culture, and history, often decisively shaped, for example, through a relationship with an especially engaged teacher, parent, counselor, or grandparent. This understanding of *Bildung* as a biographical and experiential "way of the self" (Mollenhauer, as quoted in Winkler 2002, p. 7) means that Mollenhauer's attention in his third monograph, *Forgotten Connections* (1983/2014), is directed to particular instances of these ways of and toward selfhood – and it articulates them using a language clearly different from that of the social sciences:

In order to find another language, I had to realign my object of study. I found I was able to arrive at a better language for studying education and upbringing when I read more, say, of Franz Kafka's educational text [*Letter to his Father*]. Or the extraordinary care that Augustine takes in his writings. These are exercises in the *Bildung* of the self [*Selbstbildung*]. (Mollenhauer 1991, p. 81)

When considered in this very general way, this type of language allows Mollenhauer to powerfully illustrate some of the most basic commonalities and patterns relevant to education and upbringing (*Erziehung*): that it is, as Schleiermacher suggests, a confrontation between older and younger generations, about which the older should be reflective; that adults "educate" both involuntarily and unsystematically, through their ways of life, and also quite deliberately, through curriculum and instruction; and, paradoxically, that adults should passively give space to a child while actively engaging with the emergence of his or her individual character and *identity*. Mollenhauer brought such insights into connection with key notions from human science pedagogy. The result can be described (Wivestad and Andersen 1997) in terms of six foundational questions and keywords that also form the overarching structure of *Forgotten Connections* and its six chapters:

1. Why do we want (to be with) children? Theme: *Erziehung* and *Bildung*
2. What way of life do I present to children? Theme: Presentation (everyday "upbringing")

3. What way of life should we systematically represent to children? Theme: Representation (formal "education")
4. How can we respect and draw out a child's inherent character? Theme: *Bildsamkeit*
5. How can we give children space to be active and solve their own problems? Theme: Self-Activity
6. Who am I? Who do I want to be, and how do I help others with their identity problems? Theme: Identity

In these questions, keywords, and organizational structures, *Bildsamkeit* refers to the inherent willingness and readiness of the child to learn and to the process of drawing the child into the world through adult engagement; Self-activity refers to projects and activities taken up by children and youth, from learning to walk to learning to paint or play basketball. These projects, in turn, also manifest the development of children's *identities* as emerging autonomous adults (see Friesen 2014, pp. xxvi–xlvi).

Mollenhauer not only uses biography or biographies to explore these questions and concepts but also develops a kind of hermeneutic and phenomenological "science of examples" (a phrase from van den Burg 1955, p. 54). This is an examination that focuses on cultural documents, on artifacts, and, above all, on *works of art*, as Mollenhauer's biographer, Alex Aßmann (2015), explains:

[It] amounts to the hypothesis that educational thought, through the examination of [literary, visual and other] works of art, can. . . read and understand how the self-formative and embodied relationship of the individual [engaged in learning] . . . is given sensually. After all, art is the representation of aesthetic figurations in which the embodied relationship of the forming self to itself is symbolically expressed. (p. 268)

Art, illustration, and historical accounts provide examples which at once preserve their historical independence and also offer an embodied immediacy and even intimacy. From Renaissance portraits through early modern engravings to medieval diaries and legal records, all of these are used in *Forgotten Connections* to richly illustrate the relation of the expressive and formative

self to itself (and to others) in a context that is concrete, not only in social and historical terms but also aesthetically and phenomenologically. In addition, Mollenhauer explores these examples in such a way as to delimit what might be regarded more generally or even cross-culturally as “pedagogical” – bursting the cultural bounds of the traditional conceptions of human science pedagogy. Aßmann asks:

Had any pedagogical author engaged in this way with the embodied structures of education and upbringing? Through aesthetic perception, embodiment shows itself not only to be something [*pace* Plessner] that we as humans both *have* and *are*, but also shows that in every experience of embodiment. . . there hides a memory of “the pedagogical” as something common to all peoples. Our entire culture [Mollenhauer showed] is pedagogical. (p. 280)

Mollenhauer develops the considerable possibilities offered by this method further in a late collection of essays titled *Detours: On Bildung, Art and Interaction*. He also provides a very general outline of this method in a 1997 paper that invokes a particular kind of pedagogical “seeing:”

Pictures that show explicit educational constellations are not the only ones of pedagogical interest. Pedagogy is concerned with the way that [all] adults see those who are being brought up, and also with how adults see themselves. This is the starting point for engagement with children and youth. As “educators,” we cannot erase ourselves, and we necessarily bring our own narrative self-understanding (*Lebensentwurf*) into play. . . .consequently, one can say that serious engagement with the widest variety of images and their worlds is a necessary part of educational research. (1997, p. 253)

Although many were inspired by Mollenhauer’s work to make use of examples and images (see below), no detailed explication of this method, and exploration of the broader, “anthropological” interpretive possibilities it presents, has yet been undertaken.

Scholarly Reception

The influence of Mollenhauer’s earlier work in critical pedagogy and *Sozialpädagogik* is palpable in a range of important but untranslated

publications by critical educationists in Germany. These include Wolfgang Klafki’s (1996) *New Studies of Theories of Bildung and Didaktik*, former student Andreas Gruschka’s (1988) *Negative Pedagogy: Introduction to Pedagogy Through Critical Theory*, and Katarina Rutschky’s (1977/2003) *Black Pedagogy: Sources for a Natural History of Bourgeois Upbringing*. However, it should be noted that Mollenhauer’s influence on his numerous student followers from his time in Frankfurt was neither unproblematic nor uninterrupted. Many viewed his later turn toward culture and tradition as a “retreat” or, worse, as personal abandonment (Aßmann 2015, pp. 260–261).

However, this did not prevent some of these same students (and many others) from taking up the “science” of cultural and aesthetic “examples” that Mollenhauer developed later in Göttingen. This is betrayed in many important works in the philosophy of education, ranging from the image on the cover of Max van Manen’s *The Tact of Teaching* (1991, taken from the cover of *Forgotten Connections*) through the acknowledgments and examples in Dietrich Benner’s book, *General Pedagogics* (2005, *Allgemeine Pädagogik*) and extending to a 2004 book-length study by Andreas Gruschka of the eighteenth-century French portraiture: *Determinate Indeterminacy: [Jean-Baptiste-Siméon] Chardin’s Pedagogical Readings*.

Conclusion

Any discussion of Klaus Mollenhauer must address what in the opinion of many remains the key theme or even mystery of his career: his almost obsessive concern with human science pedagogy and specifically with the pedagogical relation. As mentioned above, this relation can be interpreted the central theme of *Theories of Educational Processes* – a book which itself is seen as an elaboration of earlier sketches in *Education and Emancipation*. Finally, according to Aßmann (2015) and also Benner (2012, personal communication), Mollenhauer’s *Forgotten Connections* itself presents an attempt to work out the issue of

the pedagogical relation still further (Bas Levering [1987] goes so far as to render the title of Mollenhauer's text in English as *The Forgotten Relation*). "In this sense, *Forgotten Connections* recapitulates earlier versions of the pedagogical relation as well as [seeking] its current whereabouts, asking for what seems to be unavoidable, namely [the] anthropological ingredients for responsible education" (Hopmann 2014, p. 48).

Cross-References

- [Bildung](#)
- [Critical Theory](#)

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Moral Development

- [Hegel on Moral Development, Education, and Ethical Life](#)

Moral Education

- [Ethics and Values Education](#)
- [Ontology and Semiotics: Educating in Values](#)

Morality

- [Muslim Education and Ethics: On Autonomy, Community, and \(Dis\)agreement](#)
- [Nietzsche and Morality](#)

Motherhood

- [Mothers and Mothering in Education](#)

Mothering

► [Mothers and Mothering in Education](#)

Mothers

► [Mothers and Mothering in Education](#)

Mothers and Mothering in Education

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Synonyms

[Motherhood](#); [Mothering](#); [Mothers](#); [Parenthood](#);
[Parenting](#); [Parents](#)

Introduction

In its early years as an academic field, philosophy of education distinguished “childraising” from “education,” and little was said about mothers, fathers, and the part they play in education. In the 1970s and 1980s, mothers and motherhood were important topics in a flourishing feminist conversation about aspects of children’s education that had previously been treated by philosophers of education as unworthy of the field’s attention. By the late 1980s, this conversation was being subjected to criticisms that it essentialized and romanticized women, reiterated problematic gender binaries, and ignored relevant differences among women. Mothers and motherhood remained a live topic for some, but a scan of journals that publish philosophical work on education shows relatively few articles directly concerned with motherhood/mothers in the past decade. Yet questions about mothers and mothering are alive and well in the popular media, with

cover articles in magazines and best-selling books dedicated to the enduring question of how gendered aspects of work and homelife can be arranged to support the flourishing of children, who need to be raised, and their parents, who have claims on meaningful engagement with both the public world of work and citizenship and the private world of the home. Philosophy of education has recently taken up some of these issues under the subject of “parenting,” a language shift which acknowledges that any conversation about mothers needs also to involve fathers yet obscures the extent to which “parents” are gendered subjects.

In claiming to address “you, . . . tender and foresighted mother,” Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s *Emile* (1799) broke from previous philosophical writing about education by placing mothers at the heart of his educational and philosophical project. Earlier educational treatises addressed to parents, such as John Locke’s *Some Thoughts Concerning Education* (1693), treated education as properly the concern of fathers. Locke’s book, addressed to Edward Clarke of Chipley, Esquire, follows the practice of the early modern era in presuming fathers responsible for children’s moral and intellectual education. This education was distinguished from the physical care of the body deemed the province of mothers. In treating education and childcare as a seamless whole and designating it the responsibility of mothers even more than fathers, *Emile* opened an ongoing modern conversation about motherhood, parenthood, and education. Among the questions *Emile* raises about mothers and education are these: Does women’s ability to give birth and breastfeed infants give them a special intimacy with their children that leads to a unique, invaluable perspective on their own children’s education? If it exists, does this maternal good judgment extend to other children? Does women’s socialization into caretaking roles as mothers and wives also, or alternatively, give them a unique and invaluable moral perspective on their own children’s education, and/or on the education of children generally, and/or on broader issues of human well-being? Does the romanticization of the maternal role inflict harm on mothers? On other women? On

fathers and men? On children? If elite mothers turn over the care of their children to paid employees, do their children suffer? Who else suffers from this practice? Should children be educated in a family-like environment, or does education properly lead children out of their families into the public sphere? And what are the political implications of the answers to all of these questions?

In the early years of philosophy of education as a distinct academic field, these questions received little attention. The analytic approach of most postwar Anglo-American philosophy, including philosophy of education, lent itself to making sharp conceptual distinctions between “education” and “childraising” rather than to considering how such terms might be fruitfully run together. Because analytic philosophy eschewed the relevance of personal experience to philosophical inquiry, it could disregard the fact that in the nineteenth century, schoolteaching had been re-gendered as women’s work, in part through the popular construction of teaching as a job-like motherhood. Schoolteaching, like being a mother, was considered a task that required expansive capacities for love and patience but limited knowledge and skills. Over the course of a century and a half of industrialization, as public schooling expanded, as the home was more starkly divided from the world of paid employment, and as the family was romanticized as a haven in a heartless world, motherhood was idealized as the most admirable project for a woman to undertake as a full-time occupation, even as children spent more of their time than ever before in schools, under the care of teachers. The analogy between mothers and teachers was ideological insofar as it legitimated material circumstances and reinforced gender, social class, and racial hierarchies. It was widely accepted, even as it was mostly ignored by philosophers of education.

By the 1970s, however, with the feminist movement attending to issues of gender in new ways, inside academia and out, philosophers brought motherhood back into the spotlight. Susan Moller Okin argued in *Women and Western Political Thought* (1979) that women’s association with motherhood and family had, throughout

the history of Western philosophy, been the grounds for philosophy’s exclusion of women from the rights and responsibilities of citizenship. Sara Ruddick argued, in *Maternal Thinking* (1989), that raising a child was a practice with associated aims, skills, and values, rather than the series of low-skilled tasks it had generally been taken to be. Furthermore, Ruddick suggested that the practice of mothering qualified those who engaged in it – men as well as women, if and when men served as primary caretakers – for citizenship because it gave them an understanding of the importance of the lives and flourishing of other human beings. Maternal thinking, she claimed, was the basis of a politics of peace.

In philosophy of education, two seminal texts were Carol Gilligan’s *In a Different Voice* (1982) and Nel Noddings’s *Caring* (1984). Gilligan’s book, a work of psychology but influential in philosophy of education due to its implications for moral education, was inspired by Nancy Chodorow’s argument in *The Reproduction of Mothering* (1978) that girls, through their gendered identification with their mothers, develop a relational perspective that contrasts to boys’ development of autonomy. At the time, Lawrence Kohlberg’s stage theory of moral development, which treated an impartial, justice-oriented perspective as the pinnacle of moral maturity, dominated research on moral education. Gilligan’s research challenged this approach. She argued, on empirical grounds, that girls and women frequently treat the maintenance of relationship, rather than impartial standards of justice, as the sine qua non of ethical problem-solving. The relational ethics many girls and women espouse, rooted in the relationship between mother and child, are as central and valuable an aspect of morality as the impartiality Kohlberg celebrated, she contended.

In *Caring*, Noddings provided specifically philosophical grounds for treating care as the basis of ethical decision-making and action. Like Gilligan and Chodorow, Noddings considered the relationship between a mother and an infant a powerful precursor of ethical development, but she built her argument using the resources of existentialism and John Dewey’s progressive

pedagogy. *Caring* abstracted the mother-infant relationship, making it an analogy for the ethical relationship of one caring to cared for. The one caring, like a mother, attends to the needs of another person in order to support the other's growth, personhood, and well-being, always with an interest in maintaining relationship. The cared for, like an infant, responds with joy and growth. In reciprocal and egalitarian relationships such as friendship, Noddings says that the positions of one caring and cared for overlap, such that each person both acts with care and responds to the care enacted by the other. In the pedagogical relationship, however, the teacher must be exclusively the one caring, while the student is cared for. Through such caring relationships with their teachers, Noddings argued that children are best able to learn the subject matter and to become ethical adults. Noddings emphasized that care, in her analysis, is an ethical stance, rather than a feeling or the provision of material resources. It involves an attunement to the other and the demands of relationship, rather than to particular needs of a dependent. As such, it differs from the kind of loving care a mother would offer a child. Because human beings experience care first as infants, however, and because she considers the mother-child relationship the paradigm instance of caring, Noddings used motherhood as an analogy throughout *Caring* and her subsequent writings.

Gilligan's and Noddings' work gave rise to a flurry of debate about care as the basis of ethics. Gilligan's critics and supporters considered the empirical merits of her claims. Did mothers' relationships with their sons and daughters in fact cause boys and men to reason from a position of autonomy, while girls and women grounded their reasoning in relationships? (Gilligan herself argued for a less polarized account, in which both autonomy and relationship represent moral maturity and are accessible to men and women.) Noddings' argument coincided with a new interest in virtue ethics, and philosophical scholarship examined the possibilities that care was a virtue, that care was the most important virtue, that care was not a virtue but was the basis of ethics, and that care was, in spite of Noddings's arguments,

ultimately commensurable with a deontological ethics of justice.

However those questions are resolved, the foundation of care ethics on the mother-infant relationship gave rise to a different set of critiques from philosophers thinking about race and social class. Women of color had criticized the mainstream feminism of the 1970s for assuming a hegemonic White perspective, and women attuned to the dynamics of working class life had charged feminism with privileging the concerns of middle- and upper-class women. In philosophy of education, care ethics, with its celebration of an idealized mother-infant dyad, was an important focus of this general charge. The mother-child relationship that served as a crucial trope in philosophical work on care ethics, critics argued, represented a white, middle- and upper-class idealization of maternity. Full-time motherhood, and the intensive immersion in the experience of caring for a growing child that it made possible, had only ever been available to privileged mothers, these critics pointed out. Working class mothers, immigrant mothers, and mothers of color had had to work for pay, sharing the care of their children with others, including grandmothers, sisters, and paid childcare providers. (Often, lower-class women worked as the unacknowledged care providers for the middle- and upper-class women who were, nonetheless, proclaimed the angels of the house.) The dispersed responsibility for childcare that typified working class families and families of color, these scholars proudly claimed, was a benefit to all concerned, rather than an inadequate version of care ethics' tight dyad.

A related charge came from philosophers in the growing area of queer theory and LGBTQ studies. Not only did care ethics devalue cultural diversity in childraising, but it also reiterated the long-standing association of female personhood with maternity. Two related problems were raised. For one, care ethics was charged with devaluing the femininity of women who are unable to bear children, who choose not to, or who simply define their personhood in terms unrelated to motherhood. In other words, it essentialized womanhood and characterized women's essence as motherhood. Second, care ethics had promised to

reconfigure gender by placing mothers and children at the center, rather than the bottom or periphery, of ethical discourse. But in doing so, some scholars contended, it maintained the hegemony of a heterosexual perspective on family life. Supporters of care ethics have responded to the charge that early care theory neglected family diversity by affirming that care celebrates relationships of all sorts, not just those between mothers and infants. In any case, care ethics, an important arena of ethical discussion in the 1980s and early 1990s, has since become a less prominent subject in philosophy of education journal publications and conference proceedings.

Newly prominent in philosophy of education is scholarship that turns to continental theory. Contemporary conference presentations and journal publications on the topic of relationships and education have, in the past 10 years, been more likely to cite Levinas and Derrida than explicitly feminist theorists of relationality. Yet the new French feminism of Helene Cixous, Luce Irigaray, and Julia Kristeva contain resources for scholarship on motherhood and education that philosophers of education have recently started to tap. Drawing on Freud, Marx, and post-structural linguistic analyses, these feminist philosophers place women's embodied experiences, including the experience of motherhood and mother/daughter relationships, at the center of philosophy, but with nuanced attention to the ways language functions. In philosophy of education, scholarship based on their ideas is a new and exciting field open for further exploration.

The above approaches to motherhood and education, from Gilligan and Noddings to Cixous, Irigaray, and Kristeva, all derive argumentative force from post-Freudian interpretations of mother-child relationships. Another approach is to bring into philosophy the insights of sociology, empirical and theoretical. Sociologists of family life have drawn attention to several currents of change directly relevant to education. As women, including mothers with small children at home, increased their presence in the workforce in the 1970s and 1980s, fathers picked up some of the tasks of childcare and housework. Women continued to work a second shift at home,

however, and in fact *increased* the amount of time they spent with their children, even as their total work hours outside the home increased. Sharon Hays explored what she calls "intensive mothering," i.e., the notion that mothers bear primary responsibility for their children's care and that therefore a mother's life needs to be structured around the best interests of the child, in *The Cultural Contradictions of Motherhood* (1998). Hays found widespread popular support for this notion, which perhaps explains why mass market books about mothers and education, as well as articles about motherhood in newspapers, magazines, and blogs, continue to attract readers, even as philosophers of education have turned away from motherhood as an important topic. As Hays and other sociological scholars, especially Annette Lareau, have pointed out, maternal commitment to children plays out differently along lines of social class, with elite mothers able to perpetuate (and even expand) inequalities by channeling cultural, social, and financial capital to their own children. Meanwhile poor mothers struggle in an age of decreasing federal support for mothers and children. At the same time, marriage rates are declining, and therefore many children, including well over half of all Black children, are being raised in single-parent households, which sociological research suggests puts children at an educational disadvantage. When mothers of small children work for pay, either by choice or necessity, someone else needs to pick up the work of raising children, and this labor has been shifted to immigrant women who are often forced by economic necessity to leave their own children thousands of miles away. Few fathers have taken up the slack by committing themselves to full-time fatherhood, though in spite of popular campaigns that criticize fathers (especially poor fathers of color) for their neglect of children, fathers are more involved in childraising than they had been for several generations. In sum, the sociological picture is complicated, with many cross-cutting trends that increase equality between mothers and fathers in some respects but simultaneously increase inequality among children whose families are unequally privileged. Given the connections between family life and inequality, there is

still much for philosophy of education to say about mothers, fathers, and education. The question Rousseau raised two and a half centuries ago is as relevant as ever: What are the political implications of family arrangements? In particular, how do the childraising and educational practices of mothers and fathers perpetuate or counteract existing inequalities?

In order to avoid essentializing women, neglecting or seeming to discourage paternal engagement in childraising, and falling into the culturally blinkered and heteronormative assumption that all families include a mother, contemporary scholars tend to speak of “parents” rather than “mothers.” In their recent book *The Claims of Parenting* (2012), for instance, Stefan Ramaekers and Judith Suissa discussed “parenting” and explicitly included fathers and mothers within diverse family arrangements as their subject. Ramaekers and Suissa criticized the discourse of “parenting” that is currently widespread in educational policy rhetoric, as it tends to overlook the deeper meaning of raising a child. Whether philosophers of education select the gender neutral language of “parents” or directly engage with the ongoing issues of gender and sexuality by using “mothers and fathers,” the raising of children remains an important topic for philosophers of education interested in the ethical, political, and educational aspects of family life.

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Motto

- [Quest of Educational Slogans, The](#)

Multiculturalism

- [Dewey on Public Education and Democracy](#)

Multiliteracies

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Definition and Introduction

The term *Multiliteracies* refers to two major aspects of communication and representation today. The first is the variability of conventions of meaning in different cultural, social, or domain-specific situations. These differences are becoming ever-more significant to the ways in which people interact in a variety of social contexts. As a consequence, it is no longer sufficient for literacy teaching to focus, as it did in the past, primarily on the formal rules and literary canon of a single, standard form of the national language. Rather, the sociolinguistic conditions of our everyday lives increasingly require that we develop a capacity to move between one social setting and another where the conventions of communication may be very different. Such differences are the consequence of any number of factors, including, for instance, culture, gender, life experience, subject matter, discipline domain, area of employment, or specialist expertise.

The second aspect of language use highlighted by the idea of Multiliteracies is multimodality. Multimodality arises as a significant issue today in part as a result of the characteristics of the new information and communications media. The asynchronous meanings across distance that

were once the principal preserve of the written word are now made in conditions where written linguistic modes of meaning interface with recordings and transmissions of oral, visual, audio, gestural, tactile, and spatial patterns of meaning. For these reasons, the Multiliteracies case is that we need to extend the range of literacy pedagogy so that it does not exclusively privilege alphabetical representation and communication. In today's learning environments, we need to supplement traditional reading and writing with these multimodal representations and particularly those typical of the new, digital media.

Background

By the mid-1990s, the singular connotations of the term "literacy" were beginning to work not so well. The mass media and then the Internet spawned whole new genres of text which meant that narrowly conventional understandings of literacy were fast becoming anachronistic. Also, the forces of globalization and manifest local diversity increasingly juxtaposed modes of meaning making that were sharply different from each other. The challenge of learning to communicate in this new environment was to navigate the differences, rather than to learn to communicate in the same ways. Moreover, it was becoming obvious that traditional literacy pedagogy was not working to achieve its stated goal to provide social opportunity. Inequalities in education were growing, suggesting that something is needed to be done in literacy pedagogy to address this.

It was in this context that the New London Group came together to consider the current state and possible future of literacy pedagogy. Convened by Mary Kalantzis and Bill Cope, the group also consisted of Courtney Cazden, Norman Fairclough, Jim Gee, Gunther Kress, Allan Luke, Carmen Luke, Sarah Michaels, and Martin Nakata. The group's initial deliberations – a week-long meeting in September 1994 – produced an article-long manifesto (New London Group 1996) and then an edited book (Cope and Kalantzis 2000) which included the original article. In 2009, in consultation with other members of the

group, Cope and Kalantzis published a paper reflecting on subsequent developments (Cope and Kalantzis 2009); then in 2012 they produced a book outlining the theory and the practice in greater detail (Kalantzis and Cope 2012; Kalantzis et al. 2016). This encyclopedia entry draws upon several more recent iterations of the Multiliteracies argument (Cope and Kalantzis 2015c; Kalantzis and Cope 2011, 2015).

To capture the essence of the changes that the group felt needed to be addressed, we coined the term "Multiliteracies." A Google search 20 years later shows 196,000 web pages that mention the word. Google Scholar says that 12,700 scholarly articles and books mention Multiliteracies. Amazon has 193 books with the word in their title.

The broader context for the Multiliteracies work was the development at the same time of the New Literacy Studies, prominently involving Brian Street (1995), James Gee (1996), and David Barton (2007). The idea of Multiliteracies also represents a coming together of related ideas developed before and since by members of the New London Group: Courtney Cazden (1983, 2001, "Gee, James Paul. (2014). *A unified approach to the discourse analysis of language, worlds, and video games*: Unpublished Ms."); Luke et al. 2004), Mary Kalantzis and Bill Cope (Cope and Kalantzis 1993; Kalantzis and Cope 2012), Norman Fairclough (Fairclough 1995a, b, 2001), Jim Gee (2003, 2004, "Gee, James Paul. (2014). *A unified approach to the discourse analysis of language, worlds, and video games*: Unpublished Ms."), Gunther Kress (1993, 2003), Allan Luke (1994, 1996a, 2008), Carmen Luke (1995, 1996b; Luke and Gore 1992), Sarah Michaels (2005; Michaels et al. 1993, 2005), and Martin Nakata (2001a, b, 2007). A burgeoning literature has also emerged in the area of multimodality, most prominently in the work of Gunther Kress (2009; Kress and van Leeuwen 1996), Theo van Leeuwen (2008), and Ron Scollon (2001). Our own account of multimodality is to be found in our forthcoming book, *Making Sense: A Grammar of Multimodality* (Kalantzis and Cope 2017 (forthcoming)). This encyclopedia entry draws upon a number of publications, some recent, others in press (Cope and Kalantzis

2015a, c; Kalantzis and Cope 2011, 2015, 2017 (forthcoming); Kalantzis et al. 2016).

Design

In Multiliteracies theory, we use the word “design” to describe the patterns of meaning and action that constitute representation, communication, and interpretation. We use this word because it has a fortuitous double meaning. On the one hand, any meaning that is made has a design. Its parts can be identified, and these parts fit together in distinctive ways – nouns and verbs, hyperlinks and navigation paths, and visual frames and focal points. Design in this sense is the study of form and structure in the meanings that we make. This is “design” used as a noun.

On the other hand, design is also a sequence of actions, a process motivated by our purposes. This is the kind of design that drives representation as an act of meaning for oneself, message making as an act of communication oriented to others, and interpretation as a process of making sense of communications. “Design” now refers to a certain kind of agency. It is something you do. This is “design” used as a transitive verb.

In this conception of meaning as design, we move away from meaning as artifact, either intrinsic to the world or attributed to it by persons. Rather, it is about making-making as an activity. It is an act of agency. In this activity, we use our minds as well as our bodies (for instance, to speak, to see, to move, to use media). We use socially inherited cognitive tools (for instance, language, imagery, gestures, spatial movement). And we use physical media (for instance, voices, text-entry tools, cameras). The result is an effect on the word, a transformed meaning, and a transformed world.

These meaning-making activities can serve a range of purposes. One is to communicate – we are by nature social creatures. Another is to represent without necessary communication – to undertake these activities and use these meaning-making tools as a kind of cognitive prosthesis, either as a preliminary to communication or simply to provide support for our thinking. Still

another activity is to interpret or to add re-represent communicated meanings so they make sense to oneself. Still another is to refigure oneself as an agent, as someone who can change the world in small ways and participate with others to change the world in larger ways.

A Grammar of Multimodality

What, then, are the designs of multimodal meaning, in both these senses – design (n.) as morphology and design (v.) as agency? In creating a “grammar of multimodality,” we revise Halliday’s three semiotic metafunctions – ideational, interpersonal, and textual (Halliday and Matthiessen 2004), extending them with two more. All meaning making, across all modes, operates at five levels, with five purposes. We *refer* to things, events, processes, and abstractions (Halliday’s “ideational” function). We *dialogue*, with ourselves and others (Halliday’s “interpersonal” function). We *structure* our meanings in ways which are both conventional and always innovative to the extent that every remaking is uniquely modulated (Halliday’s “textual” function). We *situate* our meanings in contexts or at least find that they are situated by default (what we call a “contextual” function). And we *intend* when we position and/or encounter meanings in webs of intention or agency (a metafunction we call “interest”). We frame these levels as “five questions about meaning.”

What do meanings refer to? Referring may delineate particular things, in writing or speaking in the form of nouns to represent things or verbs to represent processes. In images, particular things may be delineated with line, form, and color, in space by volumes and boundaries, in tactile representations by edges and surface textures, and in gesture by acts of pointing or beat. Referring may also be to general concept for which there are many instances: a word that refers to an abstract concept, an image that is a symbol, a space which is characterized by its similarity with others, or a sound that represents a general idea. Referring can establish relations: prepositions or possessives in language or collocation or contrast in image. It can

establish qualities: adjectives or adverbs in language or visual attributes in images. It can compare, including juxtapositions or metaphors of all kinds, in words, image, sound, or space.

These are some parallels. “The mountains loomed large,” says the sentence; then the image provides an entirely similar yet entirely different expression of the same thing – complementary, supplementary, or perhaps disruptive. However, we also want to highlight the irreducible differences that account for the variations and disruptions and offer evidence of the complementary value of multimodality. Writing, for instance, consists of sequential meaning elements, moving forward in English one word relentlessly at a time, left to right, line to line. It requires of us a composing and reading path that prioritizes time, because the progression of the text takes us through time. The image, by contrast, presents to us a number of meaning elements simultaneously. Its viewing path prioritizes space. When we do both, we may attain a fuller, more nuanced meaning or, for that matter, a less settled meaning.

How do meanings connect the participants in meaning making? Here we establish roles: speaker/listener, writer/reader, designer/user, maker/consumer, gesturer/observer, and sound-maker/hearer. We direct or encounter orientations: in language, first/second/third person and direct/indirect speech; in image, placement and eyelines; and in gesture, pointing to self, others, and the world. We also encounter agency: in language, voice, mood, and transitivity; in image, focal planes of attachment and engagement; and in space, openings and barriers. And we discover a range of interpretative potentials: open and closed texts, realistic and abstract images, directive or turn-taking gestures, spaces which determine flows deterministically, and others that allow a range of alternatives.

How does the overall meaning hold together? In response to this question, we analyze the devices used to create internal cohesion, coherence, and boundedness in meanings. Each mode composes atomic meaning units (morphemes, picture elements, physical components, structural materials in the build environment, strokes in gesture) in a certain kind of order. This order is both


conventional (using what we call “available designs” for meaning) and inventive (the process of “designing”), a consequence of which no two designs of meaning are ever quite the same. There are internal pointers: pronouns or connectives in language, keys and arrows in images, wayfinding markers in space, and cadence and rhythm in sound. There is idea arrangement: sequence in text, positioning of picture elements in images, and the functional mechanics of tangible objects. And there are the tangible forms of media: handwriting, speaking, drawing, photographing, making material objects, building, making music, or gesturing. Here we also want to highlight some of the enormously significant and underplayed differences between the grammars of speaking and writing, as well as the hybrid forms of speaking-like writing and writing-like speaking that emerge in the new media.

Where is the meaning situated? Meaning is as much a matter of where it is, as what it is. To the extent that context makes meaning, it is a part of the meaning. A label on a packet points to the contents of the packet and speaks to the supermarket where it is for sale. A text message speaks to the location of the conversants and the images that are posted with it. A kitchen relates to living areas in a house which in turn fits into larger patterns of everyday suburban life. Bells and electronic “dings” can mean all manner of things, depending on their context. Across all modes, meanings are framed. They refer to other meanings by similarity or contrast (motif, style, genre). They assume registers according to degrees of formality, profession, discipline, or community of practice.

Finally, whose interest is a meaning designed to serve? Now we interrogate the meanings we encounter or make for evidence of motivation. How does rhetoric work, in text, image, or gesture? How does subjectivity and objectivity work in written and visual texts? In these and other explorations of interests, we might interrogate meanings for their cross purposes, concealments, dissonances, or a variety of failures to communicate. We can explore the dynamics of ideologies, be these explicit or implicit or propagandistic or “informational.” For this we need critique, or the methods used to uncover interests that may have

Multiliteracies,

Fig. 1 Multiliteracies pedagogy: knowledge processes



been left unstated or deliberately concealed in text, image, gesture, sound, or space.

This multimodality also involves process of mode shifting or transitions in our meaning-making attentions from one mode to another: oral, written, visual, audio, gestural, tactile, and spatial. We use the word “synesthesia” to describe this mode shifting, defining the word in broader sense than is commonly the case in psychology or neuroscience (Ramachandran 2011). We conjure up an image, and then we say the word for the same thing. We describe a feature of the natural world in scientific language, and then we show a diagram of that process. Each time, the meaning is both the same and irreducibly different by virtue of the affordances of each mode (and to that extent, each mode supplementary or complementary to others). Mode shifting is an integral part of our thinking. It is also an invaluable thinking tool when used in support of learning.

If the cognitive business of switching modes is to be called synesthesia, then the practical process of transferring meaning from one mode to another is called “transliteration.” To be practical, the logistics of transliteration are now central for

students reading and writing in science, designers creating products that “speak to” their users, teachers who want to develop and implement contemporary academic pedagogies, web designers and web users, etc., indeed, in all manner of meaning-making situations in today’s deeply multimodal communications environment.

A Pedagogy of Multiliteracies

Pedagogy is the design of learning activity sequences. Two key questions arise in the process of pedagogical design: which activities to use? and in what order? The Multiliteracies pedagogy suggests a classification of activity types or the different kinds of things that learners can do to know. It does not prescribe the order of activities, nor which activity types to use. These will vary depending on the subject domain and the orientation of learners. Multiliteracies pedagogy makes several gentle suggestions to teachers: to reflect up the range of activity types during the design process, to supplement existing practice by broadening the range of activity types, and to plan the sequence carefully.

In the original formulations of the New London Group, the following major dimensions of literacy pedagogy were identified: *situated practice, overt instruction, critical framing, and transformed practice*. In applying these ideas to curriculum practices, we have reframed these ideas somewhat and translated them into more immediately recognizable “Knowledge Processes”: *experiencing, conceptualizing, analyzing, and applying* (Cope and Kalantzis 2015b; Kalantzis and Cope 2010; Fig. 1).

Experiencing:	<i>The known</i> – learners bring to the learning situation perspectives, objects, ideas, ways of communicating, and information that are familiar to them and reflect upon their own experiences and interests. Human cognition is situated. It is contextual. Meanings are grounded in the real world of patterns of experience, action, and subjective interest. Learners bring their own, invariably diverse knowledge, experiences, and interests into the learning context. These are the subjective and deeply felt truths of lived and voiced experience. Cazden and Luke call these pedagogical “weavings,” such as between school learning and the practical out-of-school experiences of learners (Cazden 2006)
	<i>The new</i> – learners are immersed in new situations or information, observing or taking part in something that is new or unfamiliar. This entails immersion in new information or situations, careful observation, and reading and recording of new facts and data. Learners encounter new information or experiences, but only within a zone of intelligibility and safety, of what Vygotsky calls a “zone of proximal development,” sufficiently close to the learners’ own lifeworlds to be half familiar but sufficiently new to require new learning (Vygotsky (1978 [1962]), p. 86)
Conceptualizing:	<i>By naming</i> – learners group things into categories, apply classifying terms, and define these terms. In child development, Vygotsky describes the development of concepts in psycholinguistic terms

(continued)

	(Vygotsky (1986 [1934])). Sophisticated adult thinking equally involves naming concepts (Luria 1976). Conceptualizing by naming entails drawing distinctions, identifying of similarity and difference, and categorizing with labels. By these means, learners give abstract names to things and develop concepts. Expert communities of practice typically develop these kinds of vocabularies to describe and explain deep, specialized, disciplinary knowledges based on the finely tuned conceptual distinctions. Conceptualizing by naming is not merely a matter of teacherly or textbook telling based on legacy academic disciplines, but a knowledge process in which learners become active concept creators, making the tacit explicit and generalizing from the particular
	<i>With theory</i> – learners make generalizations by connecting concepts and developing theories. This requires that learners be concept and theory makers. It also suggests weaving between the experiential and the conceptual. This kind of weaving might be characterized as a movement backward and forward between Vygotsky’s world of everyday or spontaneous knowledge and the world of science or systematic concepts or between Piaget’s concrete and abstract thinking
Analyzing:	<i>Functionally</i> – learners analyze logical connections, cause and effect, structure, and function. This includes processes of reasoning, drawing inferential and deductive conclusions, establishing functional relations such as between cause and effect, and analyzing logical connections
	<i>Critically</i> – learners evaluate their own and other people’s perspectives, interests, and motives. For any piece of knowledge, action, object, or represented meaning, we can ask the questions: Whose point of view or perspective does it represent? Who does it affect? Whose interests does it serve? What are its social and environmental consequences?

(continued)

Applying:	<i>Appropriately</i> – learners try their knowledge out in real world or simulated situations to see whether it works in a predictable way in a conventional context. Such action could be taken to meet normal expectations in a particular situation. For instance, objects are used in the way they are supposed to be, or meanings are represented in ways that conforms to the generic conventions of a semiotic or meaning-making setting
	<i>Creatively</i> – learners make an intervention in the world which is innovative and creative, distinctively expressing their own voices or transferring their knowledge to a different context

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Multimedia Literacies

► Digital Literacies

Multimodal Literacies

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Synonyms

[Communicative practices](#); [Diverse meaning making](#); [Modal learning](#); [Social semiotics](#)

Introduction

While literacy in its most narrow sense has always meant learning to make sense of language, there is so much more to literacy than simply an acquisition of language skills. With many diverse ways of communicating, literacy researchers have expanded their definitions and interpretative frameworks for literacy work by applying a *multimodal literacies* perspective to literacy teaching and learning. Multimodality maintains that communication is a combination of modes of representation and expression within text designs (with the term *text* referring to communicative acts beyond but including print or writing). Modes can be oral through talk or public speaking; modes can be dramatic through role-playing and improvisations; modes can visualize content in drawings, paintings, and film; and of course modes can exist in print in books, newspapers, and magazines. Modes serve a variety of functions and speak to audiences in different ways. Expanded definitions of communication to account for multiple modes of expression and representation are certainly not a new perspective within disciplines like media studies, rhetoric, composition, and digital humanities, but the notion of multimodal literacies in education remains a nascent way of thinking about meaning making within institutional contexts like schooling. Though it is fairly obvious that there is great and rich diversity of modes in the textual landscape, it is challenging to shift curricular

frameworks. This entry presents the field of multimodal literacies starting with historical perspectives and concluding with a look ahead to the future of this productive and generative research area. To structure our account of multimodal literacies, this chapter is framed around the following key multimodal concepts: the motivated sign, modes, timescales and the multiplicative effect of modes, transmodality, synesthesia, modal density, and transduction, and we conclude with some future trends evolving within the field of multimodal literacies.

For the purposes of clarity, modes are units of meaning that inherently carry certain affordances and constraints. Affordances represent the possibilities or what is unrestrained based upon the materiality of a mode, whereas constraints indicate what may be difficult or impossible to express. Speech carries the affordance of sequence as sounds are produced sequentially – becoming words, which make up sentences to ultimately form a speech or monologue. Though not impossible, a single image can say things that language finds hard. Consequently, the use and selection of modes are governed by their affordances and constraints, influencing what we choose to value and express.

History of Multimodal Literacies

The roots of multimodality come from a few disciplines; prominent among these are linguistics and semiotics. Within linguistics, there have been a number of linguists who have taken up the challenge of dealing with tremendous shifts in the communicational landscapes by providing broader interpretative frameworks for meaning making. Linguists like Halliday (1979) have argued convincingly that language is often used to fulfill actions or practices that serve a particular function such as directive language or analytical language or instructional language and the list goes on. This functional language falls naturally into three core metafunctions that he describes as ideational, textual, and interpersonal. The ideational metafunction inherent to language use and embedded in semantics of texts concerns the

ideas, meanings, and thoughts that circulate as people engage with the world across different contexts. This can occur in the physical world as well as in digital worlds. For instance, a child who designs particular types of buildings and environments while playing *Minecraft* is engaging with the world and composing a text design built around a particular set of ideas, thoughts, and beliefs. This is an example of the ideational function enacted within the everyday. The textual metafunction accounts for design choices that are made and understood within language use and the semantics of texts. Keeping with the *Minecraft* example, a player will make specific, deliberate choices about materials to use in their design and what kinds of tools to use to fulfill a task such as a diamond pick ax or a wooden shovel. These representational choices that he or she makes represent the textual metafunction. Finally, the interpersonal metafunction describes the audience or viewer dimension of communication. Texts communicate with a desired audience, and the thought devoted to the ideas and designing of texts tailored to an audience represent the interpersonal metafunction. Once again, with *Minecraft*, a player might be designing a world with an audience in mind and making choices dictated by the needs, interests, and habits of the audience. Halliday's three metafunctions were fundamental to the evolution of multimodal literacies to what it has become today. Theorists like Kress (1997, 2010) drew significantly from Halliday's work to develop a language of description and a framework for multimodal literacies.

Much of the history of multimodal literacies relies on semiotics and social semiotics. Linguists and semioticians who explored how signs are used to convey meaning worked on the principle that anything can be a sign as long as one derives meaning from it. There are a variety of semioticians who developed theories which argue that people use semiotic resources at hand to communicate. Semiotic resources can be viewed as modes that mediate and navigate meanings implicit to text content and designs. In the late 1980s, a variety of theorists elaborated on the intricacies of social semiotics as a more nuanced way of thinking about communication. That is, signs do not exist

in a vacuum, without an audience or context; signs are contextualized units of meaning that speak across an audience and that are shaped by the contexts in which they exist. While accounting for how modes of communication are actually used, a number of researchers working in linguistics and social linguistics developed flexible terms and concepts for ways that people use different materials and invest parts of themselves in their text making. Across contexts and situations, individuals choose which modes to privilege. This kind of intellectual work and writings opened up the field of literacy studies to research that accounted for subjective and social mediation of content.

Key Concepts to Multimodal Literacies

Implicit to multimodal literacies are a series of concepts and design properties that require extrapolation to fully understand the nature and substance of multimodal literacies to the field of literacy studies. In this section, core components of a multimodal literacies paradigm, will be presented.

The Motivated Sign

To account for the subjective and social mediation of content, Kress (1997) developed the concept of the *motivated sign*. A child's drawing, a Facebook page, an advertisement, and endless other types of texts are all motivated signs as within texts that people design and produce which are motivated by the subjectivities of the sign maker. Texts carry the traces of the text designer/sign maker, and the pathway that a designer takes and the materialities that they embed can reveal important information about how they learn and understand the world. Focusing on the processes behind sign making first followed by the meanings presented in the signs, Kress (1997) refers to the motivated sign as the process by which individuals must decide which modes to privilege in sign making. At any given moment in sign creation, individuals are faced with a myriad of choices, as there are countless options that can be decided upon. It is in this moment that they must focus on the specific

features deemed essential and most appropriate for the given situation. Kress built on these ideas when he talked about sign making as a metaphor for the ways that meanings are multiplied in texts. Offering quite radical (for the time) conceptions of composition and meaning making, such as motivated signs, Kress maintained that when a child or meaning maker composes a text, the text design and content are driven by the interests and the motivations of this sign maker. This process is complex, as it is shaped at the individual and social levels, informed not only by prior experience but also by the immediacy of the moment. Additionally, psychological, emotional, cultural, and physiological factors also influence and direct the process, and they strongly inform sign production.

Modes and Timescales

Given that signs are motivated and come to fruition through subjectivities that can be emotional, cultural, and even physiological, their design sometimes draws on what Lemke (2000) calls longer and shorter timescales. Connected more with the objects or artifacts that people value, Lemke posits that semiotic signs and/or objects may have a longer timescale for meaning makers because they have had them or been familiar with them since childhood. Take, for example, an individual who has drawn since he or she was a small child and then eventually becomes an illustrator; images and image creation for this individual would carry longer timescales. In contrast, someone might have just learned how to play the guitar and there is a shorter timescale with the guitar and the act of playing the guitar. Lemke has argued that the semiotic potential of an artifact is linked to its timescale. By linking objects to timescales, the links from the local to the global can be brought to life. Stories can emerge from these links – for example, explaining why a child would need to describe his mother's country of origin using a bead map (Pahl, 2004). This child might not have the language to talk about his mother's birthplace, but he can use the resources that he has at hand to show the shape of the country and perhaps another signifier that carries a longer timescale for him.

Multiplicative Effects of Multimodality

In combining modalities, such as text and image, the combination represents one possibility out of any number of possible combinations. Since each modality has unique affordances (i.e., text cannot produce the exact same set of meaning as image and vice versa), the combination results in new, enhanced meaning that is deeper and more complex than that conveyed by the text or image alone. This represents the multiplicative effects of multimodality; as modalities are combined, more enhanced and greater meaning is possible (Lemke 2002). An image can be combined with text, which in turn can be further integrated with music or sound. Each added modality adds depth, and combinations can take advanced, layered forms. Digital texts strongly illustrate the multiplicative effects of modes because there are usually a number of modes in play when working in digital environments.

There are varied combinations of modes that change the meaning of texts. To be specific, there are instances when modes exist as separate units of meaning in texts, but there are links between modes. For instance, in film, sound or music can exist as separate modes to work alongside visuals. In *The Godfather Part 1*, there is a well-known scene when Al Pacino shoots Sollozo and McCluskey, and sound is fundamental to the scene. Resurrecting the scene, there is a train in the background with the sound of the train leading up to the shooting and the sound of the train on the tracks builds suspense. This kind of *intermodal* work navigates meanings and viewer/reader/audience interpretations. In addition, there are *intramodal* designs where modes combine to create an effect. For example, clothing designers can combine color with the texture of fabrics to create a visual and aesthetic effect in clothing designs. Finally, there are *transmodal* texts where there is more interdependence between modes. The next section elaborates on transmodal work within the area multimodal literacies.

Transmodality

Even before Lemke's (2002) analysis of the multiplicative effect of modes, Siegel (1995) focused early on in her career on the generative

possibilities when moving across modes (e.g., from writing to drawing). She relied heavily on semiotic interpretative frameworks to explain how sign use is an expansion of meaning, which elucidates the organizational rules of different sign systems. One of her greatest contributions to the field has been her ability to explain and illustrate how meaning makers, particularly children, move across two or more sign systems (e.g., from words to images and then to gesture) and, importantly, how meaning makers invent relationships between modes which enrich their understandings. Siegel argued that children use these generative potentials more fully as they move more easily across modes in their early play, until they learn how to work within more valued modes such as print. She connects the potential of transmediation, or cross-modal movement, with the turn in educational arenas, toward inquiry rather than transmission models of formalized learning. By complicating and nuancing meaning making in this way, she demonstrated how young children represent agency in their learning.

Synesthesia

Common assumption regarding sense modalities is that each one is concerned with a specific and isolated faculty. From this perspective, hearing would only be concerned with sound and sight with color. Howes (2006) challenges this notion through discourse on synesthesia, an extremely rare medical condition in which individuals have crossed or combined senses. Synesthetes may perceive letters or numbers to have colors and find that shapes have a taste or that sounds have texture. He positions this condition as a more effective model for conceptualizing sense modalities, providing a blended, unified approach. In this perspective, we may blend sound and color, when referencing the intense yellow jolt of a sharp clap. A child blends taste and color when indicating a particular candy tastes blue. Additionally, cultural practices and technologies may produce different blended modes based on what may be valued across particular cultures and history. For instance, color-grapheme synesthesia may be more common in traditional Western cultures where visuals/literacies are more highly valued.

Modal Density

In social situations, individuals are often involved in constructing multiple higher-level actions. Norris (2009) refers to this construction as modal density, involving both the intensity and complexity of modes individuals construct during higher-level social interactions. Modal density is linked to the amount of attention paid and awareness given by the individual performing actions and cannot be separated from his/her conscious mind or actions. For example, a teenager may text a friend while simultaneously conversing with family members at a gathering. In this situation, the teenager may be utilizing high modal density involving modes related to texting (i.e., object handling, gaze, language) and medium modal density related to the conversation (i.e., posture, language, gesture). More attention is given attending to texting than to the conversation, though both occur simultaneously. This attention is not fixed and the amount paid may shift throughout the interaction. At any point the teenager may shift focus, giving more attention to the conversation than texting. Consequently, modal density is configured through the investigation of simultaneous actions taking place in social interactions. There is also the issue of modal separations such as performances whose modalities are restricted such as miming or texting. It is important to acknowledge modal density when working with students to ascertain the complexity of some literacy practices that are less visible in school and equally, when there is sustained attention during modally dense actions. These kinds of everyday happenings point to competencies that may not be present within a schooling paradigm, but which are sophisticated, complicated, and should be accessed more formally.

Transduction

Meaning making is seldom confined to a single mode, and Kress (1997) coined the term *transduction* to refer to the process of transferring meaning-making processes from one mode to another. As indicated earlier, modes carry certain affordances and constraints and unique materiality associations. This could prompt meaning makers to transfer to alternate modes. Ultimately,

a rearticulation of meaning is necessary; the materiality changes as meaning shifts from one mode to another. If the written word eventually becomes gesture, as may be the case in a stage direction in a screenplay, certain decisions regarding movement and expression accompanying the gesture would need to be considered by the actor for the meaning to stay consistent from page to stage.

Future Trends

Future understandings of multimodality need to continue to be grounded in both offline and online worlds (without dichotomizing these) and need to consider the affordance of modalities (e.g., visual vs. auditory modes). As well, future understandings and applications of multimodal literacies need to explore in finer ways, the complexity of modes that come together in multimodal literacy moments, events, and representations. Over the past decade, multimodal scholars have broadened the ambit of their research to combine with other, related fields.

Multimodality and Immersive Worlds

With digital worlds research, there will be more and more research studies that focus on how, why, when, and with whom people engage with immersive worlds. Gee's work features prominently in immersive worlds research. Gee (2006) highlights the strength of video games in fostering new literacy practices. There is a large repository of gaming research that examines wide-ranging topics that are profoundly multimodal from convergence to role-play and identity to gendered assumptions about video game play. Researchers are devising different methodologies for conducting microanalysis of video segments that slow down the passage of time and embodied participation in virtual worlds.

Multimodal Literacy, Emotions, and Embodiment

Contemporary research has emerged, exploring the role of emotion and embodiment that come alive during identity production. The work of Lewis and Tierney (2013) explores emotion as

an action, how it is mediated by language, and how language, in turn, can mobilize emotion in a racially and ethnically diverse high school setting. They also explore the affordances and constraints involved in production of identity, as it relates to emotion and embodiment. In addition, Leander and Boldt (2013) explore youth identities, investigating emotionally saturated multimodal literacy-related activities. With the physicality of embodiment, these researchers draw upon the perspective that the human body not only produces signs but can also function as a sign system. With emotion so closely tied to humanity, and notions of what it means to be human, the role it plays in identity formation and sign transformation can be critical. Multimodal literacies as a field of inquiry have been moving in more of a phenomenological direction as in studies that examine the essence of a multimodal experience. For instance, in Leander and Boldt's article, they meticulously detail and theorize several hours in middle schooler Lee's day at home with a friend. Leander and Boldt describe digital play, physical movements, gestures, drawing, writing, and then more moving – in other words, Lee's meaning making is very much “in the body” drawing out a host of emotions, materialities, and different timescales.

Multimodality and the Materialist Turn

Work that closely examines materials and artifacts accessed and used as resources during meaning making can be viewed as having a life and presence of its own. That is, materials are entangled with humans and activities and practices that take place are intra-active. There are growing numbers of studies that adopt a post-human, materialist perspective on multimodal meaning making, and this kind of work will become more prominent in the coming years. Research situated within a materialist paradigm is the notion of artifactual literacies (Pahl and Rowsell 2010) which focuses on artifacts as signaling identities and as laden with stories and contexts as well as with an increased focus on modes, materials, and technologies post-human work by researchers like Kuby (2013) who look at children's material worlds in sophisticated ways theorizing through new

materialism and embodiment with the work of Barad (2007) and Deleuze and Guattari (1980). The focus of this work is on what humans do to materials in literacy learning.

Concluding Thoughts

One of the most important facets of multimodal literacies as a lens for research and practice is its capacity to uncover aspects of identity and epistemology. Often, within more formal contexts like schools, aspects of identity get hidden from view. A final thought that we wish to add is that a view of multimodality that keeps critical perspectives, equity, and social justice at the forefront is one that can potentially lead to educational change and considers how multimodal perspectives allow for one to see what is happening differently and for one to recognize and value the potentialities of various modes and modal compositions.

Cross-References

- [Digital Literacies](#)
- [Multiliteracies](#)
- [new literacies, New Literacies](#)
- [New Media Literacies](#)
- [Videogaming and Literacies](#)

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Muslim Education

► [Muslim Education and Gender Equality on Reconstructing a Just Narrative](#)

Muslim Education and Ethics: On Autonomy, Community, and (Dis)agreement

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Synonyms

[Dissensus/consensus](#); [Islamic education](#); [Morality](#); [Self-directedness](#); [Ummah](#)

Introduction

Conceptions of ethics lay claim to offering both a reasoned and reasonable account of actions constituted either along a continuum of right and just action or along a continuum of wrong and therefore reprehensible action. Using practical reasoning – that is, the ability to think and act with compassionate imagining – it would be apposite to conceive of and distinguish between that which is morally good and that which is morally bad. Muslim education, as shaped through the sources and teachings of the Qur’ān and the life and practices of its Prophet Muhammad (*Sunnah*), offers particular guidelines and preferences around which those who lay claim to being Muslim ought to conduct themselves – morally, as an individual, and as part of a collective community (*ummah*) Schweiker (2005). And yet, as is evident in the multiplex interpretations of Islam, as depicted in the (often questionable) actions of Muslims, questions need to be asked about what Islam is and does, what it advocates and cultivates through its foundational sources, and how it conceives of and delineates between that which is right and just and that which is not. Indeed, what constitutes an ethical framework of Muslim education?

Ethical Concepts as Enunciated Through Muslim Education

Ethical theory, explains Fakhry (1991, p. 1), is a reasoned account of the nature and grounds of right actions and decisions, as well as the principles underlying the claim that they are morally commendable or reprehensible. What is morally commendable and reprehensible is generally understood by Muslims to be coherently encapsulated in the revealed text of the Qur’ān as enacted through the life experiences of Prophet Muhammad (the *Sunnah*). As such, the Qur’ān is understood to offer the basis and the medium through which to understand and practice all moral, religious, political, and social obligations. Al-Hasan et al. (2013, p. 11) explain that because the Qur’ān generally speaks about universal concepts, the

specificity of conduct and behavior expected of Muslims is reflected in the life example of the Prophet Muhammad. To this end, Muslims consider the *Sunnah* (lived example of the Prophet Muhammad) as a critical factor in the sustenance of their faith and the preservation of their identity. Similarly, Ramadan (2001, p. 78) clarifies that the Qur'ān, together with the lived example of the Prophet Muhammad, defines the points of reference for all Muslim spheres of life – the individual, the social, the economic, and the political. In Islam, differentiation between what is right and what is wrong cannot be left to a particular society, because society or the individuals, who constitute a society, have inherent weaknesses and might be inclined toward behavior which is convenient, regardless of whether it is right or wrong (al-Hasan et al. 2013; al-Qaradawi 1985). From a Muslim perspective, state al-Hasan et al. (2013, p. 2), ethics is related to several Arabic terms, such as *ma'ruf* (approved), *khayr* (goodness), *haqq* (truth and right), *birr* (righteousness), *qist* (equity), *'adl* (equilibrium and justice), and *taqwa* (piety), as well as most commonly *akhlāq* (virtuous conduct). They continue that ethics in Muslim education can be understood and categorized in relation to the individual (acting with integrity, modesty, and restraint), family (relations between spouses, caring for the elderly, regard for parents), and society (acting fairly, justly, and compassionately) (2013, p. 11). That is, ethics has both an individual and social dimension.

To Muslims, the Qur'ān is considered as an ethical text par excellence as the need to validate any human practice is invariably connected to a Qur'ānic injunction. To illustrate the ethical impetus of the Qur'ān, we refer to chapter 49, verse 13: "O humankind, indeed We have created you from male and female and made you peoples and tribes that you may know one another. Indeed the most noble of you in the sight of Allah is the most righteous of you. Indeed Allah is Knowing and Acquainted." This verse explicates, firstly, gender equality (humanity having evolved from male and female); secondly, it intimates that human equality and coexistence depend on how humans engage with one another; and thirdly, the verse advises humanity to discern people by piety rather

than by any other criterion such as status, wealth, or lineage. As an ethical text, this verse lucidly accentuates the Qur'ān's preference for an ethical code that is commensurate with equality and diversity, pluralism and dialogical engagement, and moral virtue – all aspects of religious ethics that invoke the virtues of recognizing otherness, tolerance, peace, and dialogue. Moreover, the Qur'ān is replete with verses that prioritize consciousness of the Divine Creator (*īmān*) and the enactment of good actions (*al-sālihāt*) as significant ethical practices that should become the priority of humanity. To this end, God consciousness coupled with good actions are considered as Muslim ethical dispositions and enactments as enunciated in the Qur'ān and expressed through the *Sunnah*.

And yet, says Fakhry (1991, p. 1), although the Qur'ān embodies the whole of the Muslim ethos, it does not, strictly speaking, contain any ethical theories. Likewise, Hourani (1985, p. 25) contends that one cannot speak of Qur'ānic theories because the Qur'ān by its nature and purpose is not a book of theology and therefore does not presume an explicit position on a number of questions. There are, however, explains Hourani, assumptions presupposed in the way that the Qur'ān expresses ethical messages, which govern the conduct and behavior of the individual in relation to him or herself and to others. In this regard, Muslims are initiated into codes of belief, which include, fundamentally, a belief in the oneness of God (*tawhid*), belief in the Prophets and their revealed Books (Torah, Bible, and the Qur'ān), and belief in the Day of Judgment. In turn, Muslims are expected to fulfill specific obligations relating to prayer (*salāh*), fasting in the month of Ramadan, or giving charity (*zakāh*). Underscoring these foundational constructions of Muslim identity is a thematic emphasis on the responsibility of Muslim vicegerency – as God's trustee on earth. In this sense, Muslims enact their responsibilities to God and embody the virtues of God – as encountered in the 99 names of God (*asma-ul-husna*) by treating themselves and all those around them with respect, love, kindness, fairness, compassion, empathy, and justice.

In order to gain insight into how Muslim education is constituted, it is necessary, states Fakhry (1991, p. 11), to take cognizance of Qur'ānic passages that have bearing on three fundamental categories. These relate to the nature of right and wrong, divine justice and power, and moral freedom and responsibility. Of particular interest to us, in this entry, it is the construction of moral freedom and responsibility. While Muslims, on the one hand, are encouraged to live their lives, based on the primary source codes of the Qur'ān and the *Sunnah* (the example of Prophet Muhammad), they are, on the other hand, implored to contemplate and reflect on what they believe and do. In this regard, Wadud (1999, p. xv) explains that the Qur'ān 1999, p. xv) "is not just descriptive; it is prescriptive, with a goal of achieving some response from readers as part of the process of surrender and belief. This responsive efficacy increases in proportion to the complexity and totality of human motivation, which extends beyond mere rational cognition to include emotive impact." In this regard, Muslims are instructed to not only seek knowledge as a moral injunction but are implored to use their intellect (*'aql*), to contemplate and reflect (*fakara*) so that they might come to their own conclusions about God, their existence, and their existence in relation to God and others: "Why do they not reflect on themselves? God did not create the heavens and the earth, and everything between them, except for a specific purpose, and for a specific life span" (al-Qur'ān 30: 8). Significantly, the Qur'ān deplores those who do not use their faculties, since it would imply a blind and unquestioning submission to God, rather than an informed and reasoned response: "The worse creatures in God's eyes are those who are (willfully) deaf and dumb, who do not reason" (8: 22). The Qur'ān's numerous appeals for contemplation clarifies that when it speaks of, and to, a "Muslim," it has in mind someone who subjects both the Qur'ān and him or herself to critical thought and reflection, which, in itself, is considered to an ethical practice. And because the Qur'ān advocates that Muslims ought to be reflective, contemplative, and attuned to critical judgment, it clearly distinguishes between "those who know" and "those who reflect" from the heedless people.

Now that we offered some insight into a few ethical enunciations which inform Muslim education, we turn our attention to individual or autonomous moral action intertwined with communal action in order to achieve goodness and justice – which, to our minds, is the foundational purpose of Muslim education.

On Autonomy, Community, and (Dis) agreement

Generally, autonomy is commonly associated with conceptions of independent thought and action. As an ethical principle, it speaks to the individual's inherent ability and right to think and decide for him/herself – without the interference of others. In terms of Qur'ānic exegeses, the principle of individual autonomy is made apparent in chapter 95, verse 4: "We have indeed created man (and woman) in the best of moulds." And again in the decisive verse, "Let there be no compulsion in religion: Truth stands out clear from error. . ." (al-Qur'ān, 2: 256), which exemplifies the paradigmatic foundational ethic in Islam that the decision to be Muslim and to accept the trust of the covenant is entirely an individual's decision. Because coercion undermines human freedom and advocacy and cannot be associated with just action, just human action implies that non-coercion – *Lā ikrāha fī al-dīn* – is a condition of such relations. As we shall show, the provision of *ijtihād* (individual autonomy) in Islam is not only in relation to the individuals' right to make his/her own choices but also sets the context for measures of engagement and deliberation. Inasmuch as the notion of individual autonomy is aimed at affording a Muslim her positive right to exercise her freedom in the pursuit of knowledge, such autonomy cannot be left unconstrained.

Unconstrained individual autonomy invariably undermines the concept of community (*ummah*). A Muslim community (*ummah*) constitutes individuals who advance socioeconomic and political aspects of life on the basis of mutual cooperation, coexistence, and active deliberative engagement. The Qur'ān in chapter 4 verse 95 admonishes that

passivity cannot be deemed equivalent to striving actively and deliberatively in Allah's course. The Prophet Muhammad also elucidated in the *Hadith* (statements of the Prophet) that a person becomes a renegade if he/she fails to engage in community (al-Rahim 1987, p. 10). And, if individuals act indifferently and unresponsively to societal affairs, their autonomy to act passively ought to be constrained. In this regard, Muhammad al-Ghazali (1961, p. 157) cautions individuals not to remain passive toward injustice and iniquity (*fusuq*). Instead, as noted by Abu Hamid al-Ghazali (in Musalam 1996, p. 177), individuals should exercise their *hisba* or inalienable right and responsibility to oppose oppression, tyranny, and offensive displeasures. In other words, unconstrained individual autonomy whereby people passively fail to act against injustices is not only deeply offensive for a Muslim community but also ethically irresponsible. By implication, Muslims are obliged to exercise their responsibility to criticize. Consequently, the Prophet advocated that "The best form of *jihad* [striving] is to utter a word of truth to a tyrannical rule" ('Abd al-Baqi n.d., p. 1329). What follows from the aforementioned is that constrained individual autonomy is connected to the notion of opposing forms of societal injustice.

Moreover, opposition to injustice on the grounds that individual Muslims' actions should not be left unconstrained should also be validated in relation to communal action, more specifically mutual consultation (*shura*). In this sense, practicing *shura* becomes an act of community. Rahman (1986, p. 91) posits that *shura* among Muslims is a Qur'anic procedure that obliges them (Muslims) to act with critical judgment and mutually informed deliberation. Central to *shura* is the notion that ethical concerns in Islam ought to be resolved on the basis of deliberative engagement and an attenuation to justice. Muslims are consistently encouraged to seek clearer understandings on the basis of exercising their individual autonomy as a positive pursuit for critical judgment and reflection and finding out things through mutual consultation – a matter of acting with collective understanding. And, considering that ethical concerns require intensive

deliberation and critical judgment (*ijtihad*), it is not inconceivable that disagreement (*ikhtilāf*) might ensue. In this regard, al-Alwani (1994) posits that disagreement is an acceptable practice in deliberative engagement among Muslims – for the very reason that it takes into account the different opinions of individuals. It is important to note that while a consensus of ideas (*ijmā*) is a desirable outcome of engagement, it is not necessarily an enabling condition for engagement. In this way, the possibility is always there that others' thoughts can interrupt one's independent judgments on the grounds that more credible arguments perhaps ensue that in a way urge one to reconsider an individual's ideas derived through *ijtihad*. In this regard, Kamali (1997, p. 215) clarifies that "The essence of *ijmā* lies in the natural growth of ideas. It begins with the personal *ijtihad* of individual jurists and culminates in universal acceptance of a particular opinion over a period of time. Differences of opinion are tolerated until a consensus emerges and in the process, there is no room for compulsion or imposition of ideas upon the community." In this sense, *ijmā* is a form of autonomous collective action that requires interruptions from others.

Individual autonomy in community, therefore, is constitutive of an ethics of Muslim education with the aim to achieve justice in human affairs. Described by Fakhry (1998), along Platonic lines Mahdi (1969), as the "harmony" of the three corresponding virtues of wisdom, courage, and temperance, the ethical pursuit of justice of all kinds is indeed the *raison de trait* of Muslim education – "Be just; that is nearer to righteousness" (al-Qur'ān, 5: 8). And, the attainment of justice is underscored by a deep form of critical judgment, consensus, and disagreement. In our consideration, individual autonomous action will only be enhanced through collective action, as judgments will be reconsidered in light of what is more tenable and even desirable. For instance, the existence of different jurisprudential schools of thought in Islam, namely, Hanafi'ism, Shafi'ism, Hanbali'ism, and Maliki'ism, is a testimony of the presence of disagreement (*ikhtilāf*). In this regard, both the leaders of Shafi'ism and Hanafi'ism, respectively, purported "My opinion

is right, and may yet be proven wrong; while the opinion of my opponent is wrong but may yet be proven right” (Imam Shafi’i) and “This knowledge of ours is a matter of opinion, but is the best we could come up with; and whoever comes with something better we will accept it” (Abu Hanifah) (in Al-Majid 1962, p. 82). Hence, the pursuit of Muslim education is inextricably connected to the ethical manifestations of disagreement, critical judgment, and autonomy vis-à-vis the notion of communal action. And, communal action, as a form of merging individuals in acts of justice and intellectual autonomy (*ijtihad*), offer tangible ways through which various manifestations of dystopias can be counteracted. In turn, communal action, governed by ethical ways of thinking and being, is fervently oriented to cultivate justice in every sphere of human experience in quite an unbounded fashion – so that an individual does not have to remain bounded to a community when he or she is in disagreement with that community.

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Muslim Education and Gender Equality on Reconstructing a Just Narrative

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Synonyms

Gender equality; Liberal democracies; Muslim education; Muslim women; Narrative; Normative traditions; Qur’anic exegeses

Introduction

While the contentious positioning of Muslim women is not necessarily new within Islamic paradigmatic discourses, the increasing debates surrounding their (expressed) identity has, by all accounts, placed Muslim women at a (in)hospitable intersection of belonging and assimilation. That traditional/normative Islam has historically recognized Muslim women by largely *not* recognizing them in terms of their agency and autonomy has, in many instances, offered irrefutable sanctioning of the non-visibility and invisibility of Muslim women in most of the Muslim-majority countries. What is relatively new, however – if only, in its political institutionalization – are the

parallel discourses emerging from Muslim-minority countries. In what appears to be a juxtaposed argument against the veiled invisibility of Muslim women comes the call for an unveiled visibility. Any (mis)conception that the continuum between veiling and unveiling is a divergent one should immediately consider that, in both instances (i.e., of veiling and unveiling), Muslim women are subsumed into subjective descriptors of their religion – whether by the Taliban or by the Parisian police. As such, embedded in both discourses of veiling and unveiling is the suffocated silence of Muslim women, who are subjectified by, on the one hand, normative traditions (which are not to be confused with Islam) and practices of liberation (which are not to be confused with democracy). Who, then, are Muslim women, and what makes her so important to both foundational paradigms of Islam, and liberal democracies? Secondly, what would a just narrative of Muslim women – not in relation to the interpretations by and from others – but from themselves, look like?

On Interpretations of Muslim Women from a Qurānic Perspective

I would like to start this discussion by clarifying that the often conflated understandings between conceptions of Islam and Muslim are located in the fusion between the revealed text (i.e. the Qurān) and the interpretation thereof. The impression created from such understandings is that interpretation is somehow objective, and Islam is therefore a monolithic religion. Yet, any advocacy of a monolithic Islam is immediately brought into contention by its foundational source, in which it is clearly stated, “O humankind, indeed We have created you from male and female and made you peoples and tribes that you may know one another” (Chap. 49, verse 13). The Qurānic recognition of diversity contextualizes, as Moosa (2003, p. 114) observes, the proposition of a multiplicity of “Islams,” and hence many discursive traditions through which Muslims imagine themselves – that is, how they understand themselves and how they enact those understandings. In this regard, Moosa (2003, p. 115) and Wadud

(2006, p. 19) are in agreement that Islam is what Muslims do, and Islam therefore cannot be imagined without Muslims. In this sense, if Islam is manifested through what Muslims do, then Muslims ought to take responsibility for and respond to any disjuncture which might arise between the foundational text and its interpretation.

Muslim women, for instance, are not only centrally positioned in the Qurān but are described as equal participants within the prophetic traditions (Ahmed 1992; Barlas 2002; Wadud 2006). To this end, as Wadud (2002) points out, the fact that there are more passages in the Qurān that address issues pertaining to women, than all the other issues combined, provides some insight into not only the Qurān’s response to a deeply patriarchal Arabian society but ensured the reformation of women’s status in relation to marriage, divorce, and inheritance (Esposito and DeLong-Bas 2001: 4). It is therefore significant to note that the far-reaching changes ushered in by the foundational text of Islam are seemingly irreconcilable with patriarchal, hegemonic interpretations thereof. According to Wadud (2006, p. 22), not only are women and women’s experiences mostly excluded from historical and current methods of interpretive reference, but the applications of Qurānic interpretations when constructing laws to govern personal and private Islamic affairs, as well as public policies and institutions, are based on male interpretive privilege. As such, it becomes imperative to consider historical accounts of Muslim women – of engaged and active participation – in relation to the contemporary discourses of disengaged subjectivity. Ahmed (1992, p. 47) explains that a number of accounts of the Prophet Muhammad – that subsequently came to constitute the Sunnah (the example of Prophet Muhammad) – were recorded and related on the authority of women. Ahmed continues (1992, p. 72) that the women of the first Muslim community were not “docile followers but were active interlocutors in the domain of faith as they were in other matters.” Historical accounts of Muslim women attending study circles and institutions of learning, while studying with men and other women, bring into contestation, states Afsaruddin (2005, p. 164),

constructions of sexually segregated spaces that are commonly presumed to be a defining feature of medieval Muslim society.

Seemingly, the above depiction is notably incompatible with normative constructions and associations of Muslim women in relation to ideas and images subjugation, seclusion, domesticity, and hence passivity (Stowasser 1994). And perhaps this incompatibility is acknowledged (albeit unknowingly) in contemporary debates that continue to locate questions about Muslim women in relation to parameters of the greater search for Islam's identity and role in the modern world (Stowasser 1994, p. 5). To this end, Stowasser (1994, p. 7) describes Muslim women as fighting a "holy war for the sake of Islamic values where her conduct, domesticity, and dress are vital for the survival of the Islamic way of life. Religion, morality, and culture stand and fall with her." Similarly, Okin (1997, p. 12) points out that the personal, sexual, and reproductive spheres are commonly centrally located in cultural or religious groups. As such, states Okin (1997, pp. 12–13), the defense of these spheres is likely to have a much greater impact on the lives of women than on men, since much more of women's time and energy goes into preserving and maintaining the personal, familial, and reproductive side of life. How these spheres are defended are through her conduct, her domesticity – symbolizing her commitment to her family through her seclusion – and her dress code, and more specifically, a dress code that conceals and secludes. That this same dress code of Muslim women has become the dominant focus in which liberal democracies have chosen to engage, some would say disengage, with Islam might remind one of Michael Walzer's prudent observation that the "gender issue" would prove to be the most "divisive" in multicultural theory and politics (Walzer 1997, p. 60).

On Reinterpretations of Muslim Women from Other Perspectives

While Moosa (2003, p. 115) and Wadud (2006, p. 19) are in agreement that Islam is what Muslims do, Manji (2004, p. 204) observes how the Qurān

"is allowed to be interpreted – and how it isn't – has become everybody's business." In this regard, liberal democracies have taken it upon themselves to offer their own interpretation of the Qurān – certainly insofar as it has deemed the specific dress code or *hijāb* (head-covering) as oppressive to Muslim women. Underscoring this judgment is an implicit argument that Muslim women would not willingly choose to wear *hijāb* and that they must be doing so under duress and is therefore symbolic of their repressed identity and role within Islam. Ironically, by assuming the role of the emancipatory voice of Muslim women, liberal democracies seemingly slip into same monolithic discourse of patriarchal-normative Islam – that is, they treat Muslim women as a monolithic collective. In this sense, says Okin (1997, p. 12), the attention is on the differences between Muslim women, as the minority group and the majority group of liberal democracies, rather than on differences among Muslim women. Consequently, argues Okin (1997, p. 12), little or no recognition is given to the fact that, inasmuch as Muslim women occupy gendered communities, liberal democracies are themselves deeply entrenched in gendered constructions and practices – with substantial differences of power and advantage between men and women.

If the argument, therefore, is that patriarchal-normative interpretations of the Qurān have been undermining of Muslim women, then one has to ask whether what liberal democracies are attempting to do is any less undermining. If normative/traditional interpretations of Qurānic exegeses have ensured the exclusion and seclusion of women through layers of veiling – private or public – then what is different about a liberal democratic insistence that Muslim women unveil in order to access the public sphere? While not the focus of this submission, liberal democracies might also wish to consider how the suppression of religious/personal rights reconciles with its own liberal principles. For the purposes of this discussion, however, it remains important to understand why liberal democracies, which are in principle committed to equal representation, have chosen to focus their agendas of integration, participation, and democratization on Muslim

women, and not on Muslims. And to address this we have to consider the “gender issue” (Walzer 1997). In this regard, Wolf (1994, p. 75) submits that while the predominant demand for recognition in multicultural contexts is one of the cultural identity recognitions, the question of whether, how significantly, and with what meaning one wants to be recognized as a woman is itself a matter of deep contention. The recognition or misrecognition of women, therefore, is problematic partly because there is not a clear, or a clearly desirable, separate cultural heritage by which to redefine and reinterpret what it is to have an identity as a woman. The failure to recognize women as individuals, with ideas, talents, skills, and values of their own has meant, maintains Wolf (1994, pp. 76–77) that “The predominant problem for women as women is not that the larger or more powerful sector of the community fails to notice or be interested in preserving women’s gendered identity, but that this identity is put to the service of oppression and exploitation.” In this sense, the deliberate regulatory responses by liberal democracies to the dress code of Muslim women reveal a misplaced fixation on that which is visible, while simultaneously discounting, on the one hand, Muslim women’s autonomy in deciding their own dress code and, on the other hand, the reality of differences among Muslim women.

Toward a Just Interpretive Narrative

In the Qurān, issues of gender and gender equality are implicitly tied to concerns about justice and just action:

Indeed, the Muslim men and Muslim women, the believing men and believing women, the obedient men and obedient women, the truthful men and truthful women, the patient men and patient women, the humble men and humble women, the charitable men and charitable women, the fasting men and fasting women, the men who guard their private parts and the women who do so, and the men who remember Allah often and the women who do so – for them Allah has prepared forgiveness and a great reward. (Chap. 33, verse 35)

Ahmed (1992, p. 64) describes the above verse, in which the essence of equality between

men and women is clearly expressed, as balancing not only virtues and ethical qualities in one gender with the precisely identical virtues and qualities but also as emphasizing the common and identical spiritual and moral obligations placed on all individuals regardless of gender. In turn, the recognition of the autonomy of Muslim women is made apparent not only in the Qurān’s emphasis on *ijtihad* (individual autonomy) but also in its enunciations, explains Stowasser (1994, p. 21), that a woman’s faith and righteousness depend on her own will and decision. The advocacy of *ijtihad* is, however, immediately connected to the Qurānic injunction that to be just is to be nearer to righteousness (Chap. 5, verse 8). Following on this, it becomes apparent that any subversion of notions of gender equality is intrinsically incommensurable with Qurānic exegeses.

As to whether normative Islam is wrong about insisting that Muslim women should veil or whether liberal democracies are erring in its call for them to unveil serves only to further submerge the real concerns about Muslim women’s autonomy. While normative Islam constructs veiling as the preservation of Islamic values, liberal democracies construct it as backward and counter-accessible to modern democracies. And this is not the only ironic collision between normative Islam and liberal democracies. Because normative Islam constructs domesticity as the primary domain of Muslim women, they are more likely to experience oppression within that private space. And because liberal democracies insist upon unveiled Muslim women within public spaces, those Muslim women to whom veiling matters might be less likely to leave their private space. What neither normative Islam nor liberal democracies take into account is that meaning does not reside in what is visible or not; meaning derives from interaction and engagement. On the one hand, therefore, the decision by Muslim women to veil is not synonymous with oppression, seclusion, or exclusion. On the other hand, the decision not to veil is not a refutation of Islamic values. How Muslim women choose to enact their identity, and whether they consider wearing the hijāb as a necessary expression of that identity, is, in terms of Qurānic exegeses, their reasoned prerogative.

What the tug-of-war between what and how the identity of Muslim women is constituted reveals is an undermining and curtailment of Muslim women's rights to autonomy and, hence, human dignity. If one, therefore, were to consider a just narrative of gender equality in relation Muslim women, then such a narrative would have to take its cues from Muslim education, which, in turn, is derived from the source code of the Qurān. In this regard a just narrative has to take into account Muslim women in relation not only to their gender but also in relation to their spirituality. This is because when the Qurān addresses and clarifies the issue of gender equality (Chap. 33, verse 35), it does so not only by establishing equilibrium between men and women but also, more importantly, by embedding gender equality within similar and equal spiritual and moral obligations. To this end, gender equality is not understood only in relation to what is obviously evident – that is, the physical condition of men and women. Rather, gender equality takes into account the spiritual dispositions of women, inasmuch as it does men. As such, the equality of the corporeal nature of men and women are created equal, because both have been brought forth through the grace of one God.

In conclusion, gender equality, as enunciated through Muslim education, necessarily finds its conception and articulation within the interrelated epistemological practices of Muslim education itself – that is, *tarbiyyah* (socialization), *ta'lim* (critical engagement), and *ta'dīb* (social activism). Firstly, to understand the equality between men and women is to be immersed into particular social practices (*tarbiyyah*), which discount any notions and practices of prejudice based on gender. Whatever socialization practices and obligations are placed on Muslim men are placed on Muslim women. Secondly, to recognize that Muslim men and women face equal obligation and equal accountability for their actions is to critically engage (*ta'lim*) with the fundamental refrain of the Qurān, which is to enact justice. Any critical considerations of practices, which promote the prejudicial or oppressive treatment of another, are irreconcilable with the Qurān and, hence, Islam. Thirdly, it is not enough to lay claim to

being socialized into particular practices of ways of being and thinking, if one is not prepared to enact what one knows (*ta'dīb*). In this regard, Muslims are obligated to act when they witness a wrong. In fact, to merely bemoan the condition of something, without endeavoring to actively change it, is considered as the weakest form of faith. Following on this, it becomes evident that the cultivation of gender equality, in terms of Muslim education, is not a separate endeavor in need of remedial or political reform. The issue of gender equality emanates from the same source as all other forms of just and equal regard for oneself and others. To advance gender equality, therefore, is to advance not only the ethical enunciations of the Qurān but to act as an ethical human being.

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Muslim Women

► Muslim Education and Gender Equality on Reconstructing a Just Narrative

My Perspective on Philosophy of Education and Educational Practice(s)

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Introduction

I studied Philosophy of Education with Professor James D. Marshall at the University of Auckland at various times during my teaching career, and Philosophy of Education became an integral part of my approach to education. I think of myself not so much as a philosopher of education so much as a member of a community of philosophers of education. My understanding of the discipline has evolved, but it still reflects family influence and the input of my teachers and others. This (requested) paper is a personal view and does not pretend to be anything more than that.

When I talk about “education,” I do not limit the point of reference to schools, or other formal institutions of learning, but include the whole complex arena of human interactions which have educative intent or results. So fishing in Kiribati or visiting New York, or indeed piracy off Somalia can all be included (to the extent that someone learns something) in my understanding of “education,” and consequently the philosophical field appropriate to education is vast indeed.

For me the charm of philosophy of education is its ambivalent position between the world of “pure” philosophy and the world of practice. I’m not claiming that this is unique – there may well be other institutions or disciplines which can claim the same. But to the extent that they mediate between theory and practice, I suspect that most of

these institutions would have an “educational” role – like science advisors, or, at their best, art critics; so they too perhaps could be taken into the vast hall, that is, philosophy of education.

We could well interrogate that “of” in philosophy of education: not because we will learn anything decisive but because such an interrogation might well add an anteroom to our structure. When we talk about “philosophy of education,” we do not mean that we are necessarily examining educational practice, in order to find out what philosophy informs it, although that is a valuable (and too seldom done) exercise. We are also likely to be talking about “philosophy for education,” that is, about philosophy which might be useful if it were applied to educational practice.

Note that I insist on “educational practice.” I do not think that “philosophy of education” extends to philosophy as a curriculum subject, at any level of schooling, although I do think that it is legitimate to include philosophical concerns in the content of teaching and learning and that the content, like the content of any subject area, should be subject to intense (and philosophical) scrutiny. My interest in philosophy of education and its relation to practice is more to do with pedagogy than with curriculum. Why do we teach the way we do, and are there other ways of engaging students in learning? What traditions can we call on, what traditions should we reject? In order to answer such a question, even tentatively, we need to define the practices we use in terms of the traditions they represent. To use a crude example, strapping children relates to a primitive form of Christianity – “spare the rod and spoil the child.” So long as we are unaware of this tradition we are likely to assume the efficacy of the practice, as built up over years of “experience” rather than to question it as an artifact of a particular way of seeing the world and of a particular ontology based on a notion of sin. Practice is already informed by, structured by, understood through, theory, even if the theory is implicit, unspoken, and perhaps not recognized. So philosophy of education in this sense is about making explicit bringing to light, existing theory already embedded in practice. This is the “deconstructive” role of philosophy of education, illustrated at its best

by Michel Foucault's genealogies of practice and Jean-Jaques Derrida's careful definitions and philosophical/etymological analyses of the origins of many of our practices and their supporting assumptions.

When I deconstruct my own priorities in relation to philosophy of education, as laid out above, I'm struck by the fact that although I do not use the term, the idea is essentially Marx's idea of "praxis." This notion of the expression of theory in practical form takes on life in the work of Freire and Patti Lather, and it brings with it several other ideas: that of "emancipation" and the idea that the theory – generally Marxist theory – comes first, and appropriate educational practices can be developed from there. I am a little bit shy of "emancipation" and even more so of the Freirean term "empowering," but at heart, I think that my games with philosophy in the educational field are meant, in some way, to free the student/teacher/thinker/myself from the psychic or intellectual ties that bind us to ways of thinking that no longer serve us well – that is, to "empowerment," "emancipation," or "agency," depending on which of the Marxist/post structuralist discourses seem to work best at the time. And to me, this "emancipation" is largely about shaking off, in my own mind and practices, the assumptions of the academic world about ways to practice learning and teaching, and the way I go about this is to use, as Foucault calls it, "submerged knowledges": the knowledges of those who have not become assimilated to the western project and who can therefore cast a critical doubt on my own way of seeing things. I am very grateful to the thinkers and writers I have met from Pacific countries and the Maori communities of New Zealand for some insights which allow my own assumptions to be thrown into high relief, to become visible, and therefore to become subject to critique.

Philosophy does provide ideas for educational practice: for instance, teachers still use forms of Socratic questioning. Applied Behavior Analysis and Behavior Modification stem from a positivist form of thought epitomized by Ernst Mach – that science should deal with things that can be measured and counted, not the ineffable. Unfortunately, such a process of actualizing ideas tends

to be associated with a certainty of thought that sits uncomfortably in the varied, diverse, pragmatic arena of education even though the ideas may be, at least in their originary form, very useful. Behavior modification for instance was originally quite humanitarian in its intentions but became associated with the kind of individualism and contractualism of neo-classical economics, so that what had been a psychological theory of association and conditioning became a bargaining theory of behavior, results, and consequences.

Philosophy of education then is about learning processes, about the ontology of learners (and educators), about knowledge and knowing, and also a study of the politics and ethics which surround and are inherent in the practices of education. To be able to account for these with an informed, critical eye is also to perform the work of philosophy of education, with – I confess it – emancipatory aims.

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N

Narrative

- [Educational Semiotics, Greimas, and Theory of Action](#)
- [Metaphor and Edusemiotics](#)
- [Muslim Education and Gender Equality on Reconstructing a Just Narrative](#)

Narrative Assessment: A Sociocultural View

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Synonyms

[Evaluation](#); [Formative assessment](#); [Story](#)

Introduction

From our earliest time stories have played a critical role in recording events, providing insight into ideas, rallying support, and entertaining us. In different ways, all stories serve a purpose, even if to simply relay a message. We can think of examples from, for example, the paintings in the Lascaux Caves in the Pyrenees mountains in southern France (15,000 and 13,000 BC), to the Epic of

Gilgamesh carved on a stone pillars (700 BC), to the oral traditions that kept Aesop's fables alive (Aesop lived in 500 BC and his stories were written down in 200 BC), the parables in the Bible, Shakespeare's plays (as text and performed), Martin Luther King's speeches, and Steve Jobs' keynotes to launch new products. As this selective overview reminds us, stories can be communicated and passed from person to person through a variety of modes and media, often in combination. Their power lies in their capacity to capture complexity, evoke emotion, and create empathy, drawing us into a situation and helping us to see ourselves and to see others in new ways. It is this diversity of representational means, purposes, and consequences that underpins the use of stories as assessments in narrative format.

The essence of a narrative assessment is that it belongs to and is embedded in a particular context – national and local community, families, school, and early childhood center. However, a thoughtfully crafted assessment narrative can transcend the original context or place through the way it affords engagement and perspective taking in another place, particularly when it is shared with families at home. Assessments in narrative format can offer plotlines that are designed to resonate with other situations and circumstances and to illustrate multiple possible actions and futures. Sociocultural views of learning and assessment enable us to take account of this complexity.

In this entry we set out the possibilities that narrative assessment offers in documenting,

supporting, and reporting the breadth of children's learning. We ground these possibilities in a sociocultural view of learning and assessment. Sociocultural views of learning acknowledge the extent to which learning is entangled with, and made possible through, the material, social, cultural, and historical features of the context for learning. This view of learning highlights the need for assessment to focus on the learner in context and over time (Gipps 1999; Moss 2008). This view, as Gee (2008 p. 200) reminds us, expands what counts as knowing to include the special ways of acting and interacting a community uses to produce and use knowledge and their special ways of seeing, valuing, and being in the world.

Sociocultural views of assessment also acknowledge that assessment shapes learner identity – how learners come to see themselves as learners and knowers and how they are seen by others. In Stobart's (2008) terms, assessment plays a crucial role in "making up people" (p. 1). Thus, a sociocultural view of assessment includes consideration of the development over time of a person's knowledge and expertise, of their affiliation with a particular domain of interest, and of their dispositions and strategies for learning. This breadth of foci is important when the goal is to foster the development of people who can learn and participate productively in society as an individual and as a productive member of the various communities they encounter across the course of their home life, work, and leisure activities. If all these various aspects of learning and being an effective learner are not reflected in assessments, then we can be sure that the enacted curriculum will not pay attention to them.

In the remainder of this entry, we pursue the implications of a sociocultural understanding of assessment through a focus on (i) narrative assessment as a way of acknowledging the distributed nature of learning, (ii) narrative assessments as improvable objects and opportunities for developing a learning journey, and (iii) narrative assessments as boundary-crossing objects that mediate conversations across interested communities:

Narrative Assessments as a Way of Acknowledging the Distributed Nature of Learning

Assessments as narratives can represent, conscript, and engage all the various resources and people who are entangled in the context of an episode of learning. When learning and knowing are understood as distributed (Salomon 1993), the context is not just a source of stimulation and guidance, but a genuine part of the learning – in terms, the unit of analysis is the "person-plus." Recognizing this, Gee (2007) describes three interlinked elements as involved in a sociocultural-situated view of language, learning, and the mind: an acculturated, socialized, embodied *actor*, within a *situation*, coordinating him- or herself with other people and objects, tools, or technologies (*mediating devices*). He adds that no element in this triad can be defined or dealt with in isolation, because "each simultaneously and continuously transforms the others throughout the action or thought" (p. 367). Wertsch's (1991) notion of the learner as a person-acting-with-mediational-means provides a complementary perspective on the distributed nature of learning with similar implications for assessment. Barab and Roth (2006) propose the notion of an *affordance network* as a means of conceptualizing what supports and provides opportunities for learning. Affordance networks can include helpful resources, sensitive adults, friendly peers, and technology of various kinds. The inclusion of the mediational means or affordance network in the assessment narrative is valuable for formative assessment. The learner who reads the assessment story is privy to both what is being learned and how the surrounds supported this learning. They can use this knowledge to help them recognize and seek out these supports on other occasions and contexts.

A narrative assessment itself can be distributed across different modes and media. Enhancing the text, digital narratives in particular frequently include photographs (of children's work and interactions with others and of the context), audio, video, blogs, and examples of children's drawing and writing. In practice, an assessment in narrative format offers distinct opportunities to engage the

learner. Learners from a young age can be supported to coauthor stories of learning (Carr and Lee 2012). This capacity for learners, including young children, to story what they have achieved is central to the twentieth-century goal of developing citizens who are able to learn throughout their lives (Gordon Commission 2013). Storying by the learner not only demands that learners analyze what they have accomplished, but it also produces an artifact that can act as a mediational means. Thus, the task of assessing can be distributed across stakeholders – learners, teachers, and, often, families – who add a comment to a portfolio from home. Learners can use narratives of learning, in portfolios, to revisit and review their understanding in ways that inform their reflection on the context of and resources they have employed to accomplish this learning and to consider what they could do next.

Narrative assessments can tell an individual story, a collective story, or the story of an activity. Individual stories about learning can be tucked inside a collective story of a group of learners, the school/early childhood center, or the community. Narratives as wall displays, exhibitions, and/or performances of group work are a feature of many early childhood and schooling settings. These displays can include children's three-dimensional constructions (e.g., clay, wire, and paper) and panels of photographs, drawings, paintings, and writing. Teachers may choose to construct a narrative about how a group/class/community participated within an activity. Here the assessment goal is not necessarily formative or summative but rather to make visible, value, and share what has been achieved. Such documentation also acts to acknowledge the people and resources that have contributed to this achievement.

We summarize here an example from an early childhood center in which a 4-year-old dictated a story about photographs of her block building. This story became a co-constructed narrative assessment for her assessment portfolio when the teacher added a commentary entitled "What learning is happening here?" The co-construction was accompanied and inspired by ten photographs of the block-building episode (Carr and Lee 2012,

p. 50). Emma's dictation is of the construction of the block building as a volcano, describing the assistance of two other children and a book on volcanoes as well as the storyline of the block-building event. The teacher added comments on the contribution of Emma's prior knowledge: her interest in lava rocks during a recent visit to the local mountain. She also notes the assistance that an adult, a book, and other children gave and adds an acknowledgment of Emma's curiosity on this occasion; her confidence to express her thoughts, ideas, and theories; and her display of the dispositions to think critically and imaginatively.

Narrative Assessments as Improvable Objects and Opportunities for Developing a Learning Journey

A narrative assessment has the potential to support learning over time. As Bruner points out:

Our self-making stories accumulate over time, even pattern themselves on conventional genres. They get out-of-date, and not just because we grow older or wiser but because our self-making stories need to fit new circumstances, new friends, new enterprises. (Bruner 2002, p. 65)

Here Bruner highlights the role of stories in identity work, highlighting that these stories are tentative and soon become out-of-date. The implication of this for assessment is that any judgment of what children know or can do should not be based on a one-off snapshot. What a child can achieve in one setting with one set of resources (people, ideas, and physical artifacts/tools) will not necessarily be the same or look the same as that achieved in another setting at another time. Consequently, a key challenge for teachers is to provide varied opportunities for children to develop and use what they know already in a different setting and to ensure that any assessment sets up further opportunities for children to learn.

A formative view of assessment (Black and Wiliam 1998) is consistent with the notion that any one narrative assessment, by a learner or teacher, needs to be understood as a moment in time and as "an improvable object" (Bereiter and

Scardamalia 1996). Wells (1999) has observed that teachers often encourage students to construct representations that capture something of what is being said and suggested that these representations can function as improvable objects or objects that are in state of development and always being negotiated and renegotiated. Narratives that document learning can play this role because they can be reviewed, rethought, and revised through discussion (Wells 1999). A series of stories can construct a narrative about both continuity and change – the development and expression of a quality or a skill in different situations and over time. The compilation of a cumulative narrative in a portfolio can offer a way for children to appreciate and connect together what they have already achieved, the relevance of the current achievement, and what might be desirable and possible in the future: recognizing and re-cognizing their learning as a journey that takes place over time. It is these connections that transform a sequence of stories into a learning journey. These sequences illustrate an individual student's efforts, progress, and achievements across time and contexts for those interested in and responsible for his or her learning.

In a learning story entitled *Practice Makes Perfect*, the early childhood teacher writes the following comment to the child:

Charleeh-Blu, the arts of drawing, collage, writing and painting are all continuing to be a big interest for you. . . . It was awesome to hear you again link practice to learning to get better at drawing more detailed whales. It's taken a while, Charleeh-Blu – learning can and does take time and practice – however, your words “...Because I PRACTISE and PRACTISE. Because I couldn't do it at home. And then I PRACTISE and PRACTISE . . . now I can draw a whale”. The latest whale drawing is included, together with the child's explanation of each of the parts. (Carr and Lee 2012, p. 107)

Narrative Assessments as Boundary Crossing Objects that Mediate Conversations across Interested Communities

Narrative documentation about learning, including that collected in portfolios, can travel between

a center or school and the home providing a forum for teachers, parents, and children by themselves or in consultation with others to recall learning events and author possible pathways for learning. Seen this way, assessments as a physical or virtual object create a need and a forum for various stakeholders to come together and talk. That is, they serve as boundary objects through the way they enable communication and cooperation across the different stakeholders in children's learning (Moss, Girard and Greeno 2008). Star and Griesemer (1989) introduced the concept of boundary objects, defining them as objects that are plastic enough to adapt to the needs and constraints of several different communities but robust enough to maintain a common identity across settings. When narrative documentation as a collection of records and artifacts moves between and is contributed to by children, teachers, and parents, it not only depicts the multiple perspectives of children and teachers; it also offers a democratic possibility for informing the public of what is happening in a school/early childhood center. More than this, as part of acting as a boundary object, narrative assessments can provide opportunities for agency and coauthoring between children and between families and children as well as teachers. When narrative assessments are shared across communities, this provides an opportunity for additional comment, explanations, and collaborative discussions about forward planning. It also enables the construction of a sense of belonging in the new community. Emma, a teacher in a new-entrant school classroom, writes the following about the use of a portfolio of narrative assessments as an object that crossed the boundary between kindergarten and school:

(This boy) didn't speak a word for probably a week or so and then he brought his Kindy book [*portfolio of Learning Stories*] in and it was like a new child emerged and it was like ‘This is me and this is who I am’ and even though I don't necessarily have the language to tell you, I can show you with pictures. And I would turn around at all times of the day and hear little murmurings and laughing and there would be pockets of children sitting around with this little boy with his Kindy book. (Carr and Lee 2012, p. 83)

Assessment as narrative has resonance across cultures. It can reference the wider cultural values and norms while at the same time telling a personal, local, and/or collective story. In New Zealand, for instance, Māori cultural valuing of the collective and viewing the child always in a web of relations are richly reflected in cultural traditions and stories. This worldview is reflected in the assessment narratives that are developed by teachers in Māori immersion educational settings in New Zealand (New Zealand Ministry of Education 2009). *Te Whatu Pōkeka* was the name given to the project that developed this narrative approach.

We have named this project “Te Whatu Pōkeka”. A whatu pōkeka is a baby blanket made of muka (fibre) from the harakeke (flax) plant. Carefully woven into the inside of the blanket are albatross feathers to provide warmth, comfort, security, and refuge from the elements. The pōkeka takes the shape of the child as it learns and grows. It is a metaphor for this project, the development of a curriculum that is determined and shaped by the child. Our principle focus in this project is the assessment of Māori children in a Māori early childhood setting. (p. 1)

Concluding Comment

Like the paintings in Lascaux Caves, assessments as narratives communicate messages about learning, achievement, and contexts; they make visible what is valued in a community. We have argued here that this visibility can engage all the players in an education practice, enabling a sharing of the authoring and an expanding of the perspective. Furthermore, when stories add up to more than a summary of the parts, they describe a learning journey that can be revisited and reviewed; they take on assessment’s role of “making up people” in a transparent way. Assessments as narratives can initiate conversations about learning and a learner self. These stories about learning insist on a sociocultural interpretation of learning, one that adds context and facilitates resources to an assessment of the learner’s endeavors and achievements; this lens enhances a “built-in” formative purpose, one that provides some direction to the learner and the teacher (and the interested wider community of family) about the

mediational means that were useful so far and some suggestions about the way forward.

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Narratology

► Educational Semiotics, Greimas, and Theory of Action

Nation, Nationalism, Curriculum, and the Making of Citizens

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Synonyms

[Nation-state](#)

Introduction

Following the eighteenth-century political revolutions in North America and Europe – which were followed by the emergence of modern constitutional States – public education has been seen as a *conditio sine qua non* for integrating a linguistically and ethnically heterogeneous population into one nation. In 1792, for example, the French politician Louis-Michel Lepeletier de Saint-Fargeau (1760–1793), in his plan for national education, stated that the immortality of nations is ensured by three “monuments”: a constitution, the rule of law, and public education. A constitution and laws were important because they established the State on a formal level, defined its organizational form and institutions, and set the rules for peaceful domestic coexistence. Certain eighteenth-century philosophers and politicians argued that being a citizen was more than simply having legal status

and following laws; being a citizen also meant being intellectually and emotionally attached to the cultural and ethnic entity called the nation. In this sense, it was – and still is – public education’s task to make individuals into national citizens.

Nation and Nationalism

There is no comprehensive definition or theory of *nation* or *nationalism*. Phenomenologically, nations appeared over time in different forms and in various places, as did nationalism. In medieval universities, nations were groups of students speaking the same language who sat together at the dinner table. The notion that multilingual Switzerland is a federation of nations still exists. Other concepts of the nation focus on ethnicity (e.g., the First Nations in Canada), religion (e.g., Zionism), or cultural homogeneity (e.g., the German *Kulturnation*). Accordingly, notions of nationalism also differ. Certain theorists such as the Germans Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762–1814) and Johann Gottfried Herder (1744–1803) suggested an “ethnic” nationalism by tying the nation to allegedly objective facts such as race, faith, and language. Others such as the French writer, historian, and philosopher Ernest Renan (1832–1892) understood nationalism as a shared national identity. This so-called “civic” nationalism is more integrative than “ethnic” nationalism in that the former is open to everyone, whereas the latter is based on a shared heritage, language, and faith. In a famous address to the University of Paris in 1882, Renan stated that a nation is constituted by citizens’ desire to live together: a nation is “a large scale solidarity” (Renan 1990, p. 19). A nation’s existence, in Renan’s famous words, is “a daily plebiscite” (ibid.). Nationalism is therefore not only based on a preexisting nation (i.e., a country and its population) but is also the ongoing construction and self-reassurance of the existence of a nation, whereas in the absence of nationalism, no such thing exists. Or, in Ernst Gellner’s (1925–1995) words, “Nationalism is not the awakening of nations to self-consciousness: it invents nations where they do not exist” (Gellner 1964, p. 168). Reflecting on Renan’s and

Gellner's thoughts, the Irish historian and political scientist Benedict Anderson (1936–2015) suggested that nations be understood as “imagined communities” (Anderson 1983). According to Anderson, a modern nation-state is an imagined community because as a community it is not based on personal experiences and relationships. Due to the nation-state's large territory and population, it is likely that most citizens will never meet one another nor will they see all regions of the nation with their own eyes. Anderson therefore argued that the nation, of which the individual citizen only knows a small part from his or her own experience, is largely imagined. This idea of nations as abstract communities that are the result of (intentional or unintentional) imagination, interpretation, and even invention has proven very fruitful for understanding the complex relationships between nations, nationalism, and public education (e.g., Sobe 2014).

National Identity, Curriculum, and the Making of Citizens

Citizenship in legal terms is acquired by birth (or naturalization), whereas national identity is not. The latter results from learning processes such as enculturation, socialization, and – last but not least – informal and formal education. The building and safeguarding of nations have been seen as a political, a juridical, and a pedagogical task. From early on, modern nation-states have established symbols to prove their existence and sovereignty against the outside and to provide their citizens with symbols to identify the nation and themselves. Although national currencies, national weights and measures, and postage stamps, for example, were first and foremost introduced for economic and administrative reasons, there was always a pedagogical agenda also. Through national symbols, people are expected to become emotionally and intellectually attached to the nation. This process was also the reason for building national libraries, national museums, and national theaters and ballets and for establishing national flags and anthems, holidays, and memorial days. Throughout the nineteenth and

twentieth centuries, the nation became the most important point of reference for answering the question of who “we the people” are. Today, national symbolism remains a part of the concepts of national teams, national histories, and even national license plates.

Since the nineteenth century, public schools have been viewed as particularly good institutions for familiarizing children with national symbols and evoking national sentiments. Integrating as many national symbols into the curriculum as possible has been viewed as the most promising way of making children from various social, cultural, ethnic, religious, and linguistic backgrounds into national citizens. However, the curriculum had to be primarily secular and under public control so that other points of reference would not interfere with nation building.

One Nation, One Language

One of the most important school subjects has been language instruction. Language, both spoken and written, is the basis of most human communication. Language is also a very important part of the concepts of the nation and the nation-state. Long before the emergence of the nation-state, nations were identified with people speaking a single language. However, most modern States included more than one language group or, in the case of the United States, were confronted with immigrants speaking many languages. If a country wanted to be a “true” nation-state, it needed to harmonize the use of languages within its borders. France is an early example where this ideology of “one nation, one language” found its way into the curriculum. As early as 1794, Abbé Grégoire (1750–1831) asked the National Assembly to introduce French as the standard language in the new republic. Throughout the nineteenth century, French curricula were based on the maxim that every student should learn to use the *langue d'oïl*, i.e., standard French. However, Eugen Weber (1976) noted that it took more than a century to accomplish this task. Although it took some time, linguistic adjustments via schooling were viewed as one of the most-promising integration

measures. Stephen Harp (1998) noted that in Alsace-Lorraine, a region whose national affiliation changed between Germany and France several times in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, integrating the population into France or the German Reich mostly meant teaching French whenever Alsace-Lorraine was part of France and teaching German whenever it was part of Germany.

However, teaching children to use the national language was not the only task language education had to fulfill regarding national integration. In reading and writing classes, children were also familiarized with national idiosyncrasies regarding spelling, vocabulary, and typography. These idiosyncrasies distinguish two nations that share a single language. For example, the letter ß is used in Germany but not in German-speaking Switzerland; British English and American English differ in grammar and spelling as do French and Québécois.

Throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, most nation-states adopted the “one nation, one language” ideology in their curricula, and many of them have retained it to this day. Therefore, the right to teach a local or regional language or to use such a language for instruction is a strong symbol of local autonomy (e.g., the use of Catalan in Catalonia). In many nations, minorities still strive for the acceptance of their language as a language of instruction. However, not all modern States adopted the “one nation, one language” ideology. Some States, for example, Canada, Belgium, Luxemburg, Finland, Afghanistan, and Switzerland, deliberately chose not to adopt one national language. In many cases, this situation is also mirrored in the curricula in different languages and in their content regarding language education. National identities apparently can also be multilingual (e.g., in Switzerland and Canada), although this multilingualism can also be a cause of internal friction (e.g., in Belgium).

Civics, History, and Geography

Language instruction was not the only subject that was intended to shape the students’ identity as

national citizens; civic education was another important subject matter in that regard. In many countries, one of the first actions to make individuals into citizens was to publish a new type of textbook: the civic catechism. Religious catechisms were well established in early modern schools and were often the only textbooks that children used. Books of this type, which were initially intended to make children into devout and obedient Christians, were revised with the goal of creating citizens who possessed basic knowledge of the constitution, State institutions, civic virtues, the rights and duties of citizens, and the moral principles and values that were held in high esteem in a State (e.g., Tosato-Rigo (2012) and Viñao (2011) describe instances in Switzerland and Spain, respectively).

History is another subject that has been greatly involved in shaping national identities. National histories began to appear at the end of the eighteenth century and flourished in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. These histories traced the origins of nations back to ancient times and legitimized their existence through an allegedly long development. Narratives related the actions of heroic figures whose patriotism, virtue, courage, and self-sacrifice were expected to ignite readers’ love of the fatherland or motherland. The narrative centered on how the nation was forged in heroic and mostly victorious battles against oppressors or invaders (e.g., the “German” Arminius against the Romans, the Swiss William Tell and Arnold Winkelried against the Habsburgs, and the Frenchwoman Joan of Arc against the English). Such stories were often folk myths rather than documented historical events, and given the rising standards of academic history, many of them were deconstructed by professional historians over time. Nevertheless, the stories long remained the centerpieces of history textbooks. History as a school subject was not so much about “how it really was” in the past as it was about the assertion of a proud national heritage.

Another important subject was geography. Geography textbooks and maps were intended to provide children with an image of what their nation looked like. Textbooks were organized in the form of a tour of the nation. Through

descriptions of various regions and their inhabitants, children were familiarized with their compatriots, whom they probably would never meet in person. State borders were also important for imagining the nation. They were often depicted as natural borders such as seashores, rivers, and mountain ranges to give students the impression that the national territory was a product of nature (or perhaps God even) rather than one of men. Geography was also connected to history by showing that heroic historical deeds had occurred in a particular place that could therefore also become a place of remembrance. Finally, geography placed the nation among other (neighboring) nations and assigned it a place on the map of the continent or the world. Maps published in a particular nation always showed this nation-state in the center.

The Whole Curriculum

However, important language, civics, history, and geography allegedly were in the process of making citizens; all other subjects were also involved in the task. To give but one example, mathematics teaches students to think logically and rationally, as the French philosopher and mathematician Marie Jean Antoine Nicolas de Caritat, Marquis de Condorcet (1743–1794), noted at the end of the eighteenth century. In contrast to the early modern period, when people acquired mathematical skills and knowledge regarding specific tasks such as buying or selling on a farmer's market, measuring timber for construction, or keeping the accounts of a warehouse, mathematics was introduced into modern curricula in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries as a tool to train the students' mental abilities in general. Rational thinking was purportedly the basis for acting as a modern citizen. Furthermore, in mathematics lessons, children learned to use national currencies and weights and measures, which were – as mentioned above – important symbols of national sovereignty and identity.

The rationale of the rational citizen was stressed again in the 1960s and 1970s, when many countries introduced “new math” into their

curricula. New math aimed to teach students the modern ways of mathematical thinking (such as set theory, Boolean algebra, and bases other than 10) instead of the old-fashioned, decimal elementary arithmetic. The main agenda of new math, however, was no different from Condorcet's plan, which was to generate logical-thinking, rational, virtuous citizens who were well equipped for living in a modern democratic State (see Phillips 2015). Although the introduction of new math was anything but a success story (actually new math disappeared from the curricula after a few years), the intentions behind this endeavor clearly show that mathematics is not a neutral subject. Mathematics conveys, as any other subject, an idea about the learning child, the (future) citizens, and the (moral order of the) State.

Nations at Risk

The alleged importance of public schooling to the nation has been a particularly prominent topic of discussion during times of national crisis. Most modern nation-states have experienced several crises. They were threatened either by other nations or States or by internal friction such as ethnic, religious, linguistic, or social tensions that could have led to turmoil, revolution, civil war, or secession – in short, to national collapse. Indeed, most modern nations were born from wars of liberation (or wars of secession, depending on the point of view) and revolutions (or rebellions). Throughout the nineteenth century, nation-states became increasingly involved in national rivalries, competitions, and belligerent confrontations. These conflicts also led to changes in the notion of nationalism. Nationalism was increasingly meant to spread and consolidate the idea of a “we” among the people of a nation-state. This “we” was contrasted with a “they”: people in other nations and those within the particular nation-state who did not share what was commonly viewed as the national identity. When nation-states faced war or internal turmoil (e.g., the Revolutionary War and Civil War in the USA, the French Revolutionary Wars, the Austro-Prussian War, the Franco-Prussian War,

World War I, World War II, and the Cold War), this sense of national identity more than ever was distilled down to patriotism, allegiance, and the willingness to serve (and to risk one's life for) the fatherland or motherland. Two institutions were charged with making young men into citizen-soldiers (*soldat-citoyen*): military and public schools. Although the idea of the citizen-soldier disappeared in most nations during the twentieth century, the tight connection between national security policy and public schooling (or public investment in schooling) remained because nation-states – whether presently at risk or not – wanted to foster patriotism and allegiance through informal and formal education. They also were – and still are – interested in providing students with advanced scientific knowledge that could one day be useful in defending the nation through advanced civil and military technology. Several examples demonstrate this motive. Following the Franco-Prussian War of 1870–1871, a rumor in European newspapers held that as a result of superior public education in Prussia, German soldiers were better oriented on French territory than the French themselves. It is no wonder that nation-states such as Switzerland increasingly emphasized geography and map reading in public schools in the late nineteenth century. Additional examples from the twentieth century illustrate this relationship between education and national security. Only a year after the Soviets launched their satellite Sputnik in 1957, which revealed a technological gap between the Eastern and the Western Blocs, the US Congress passed the National Defense Education Act. In 1983, a report of the US National Commission on Excellence in Education argued that national security depended on the educational system. However, the threat this time did not come from outside but rather from within: “If an unfriendly foreign power had attempted to impose on America the mediocre educational performance that exists today, we might well have viewed it as an act of war” (National Commission on Excellence in Education 1983, p. 5). Following the report, the allegedly poor American education was not only threatening the well-being of individual Americans but also threatening the State itself by

weakening the nation's main source of strength, i.e., its well-educated, loyal, and competent citizens. Although the twentieth century has been labeled the “century of the child” – with education focusing primarily on children's physical and psychological needs – this example shows that the making of virtuous citizens remains one of the basic tasks of public schooling in modern nation-states.

Cross-References

- ▶ [Educationalization of Social Problems and the Educationalization of the Modern World](#)
- ▶ [Formation of School Subjects](#)
- ▶ [Global English, Postcolonialism, and Education](#)
- ▶ [Religion and Modern Educational Aspirations](#)
- ▶ [School Development and School Reforms](#)

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Nation-State

► [Nation, Nationalism, Curriculum, and the Making of Citizens](#)

Naturalism

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Nature of Educational Theory

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Nature of Science in the Science Curriculum

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Introduction

The earliest example of nature of science (NOS) focus in school science education is Henry Armstrong's heuristic approach, published in

1898, which involved students conducting the experiments, making the observations, and following the reasoning of the scientists who first generated the scientific knowledge being studied. It is important to note that Armstrong's promotion of NOS was mainly pedagogical and motivational; the real purpose was to acquire and develop scientific knowledge. In contrast, John Dewey argued in *Democracy and Education* (published in 1916) that familiarity with scientific method is substantially more important than acquisition of scientific knowledge, particularly for those who do not intend to study science at an advanced level. Some 45 years later, similar rhetoric formed the basis of Schwab's (1962) advocacy of a shift of emphasis for school science education in the United States away from the sole concern of learning scientific knowledge towards an understanding of the processes of scientific inquiry and the structure of scientific knowledge – a line of argument that eventually led to a string of innovative curriculum projects such as PSSC, BSCS, and CHEM Study. Parallel NOS-oriented developments in the United Kingdom included the Nuffield Science Projects (with an emphasis on “being a scientist for the day”) and the Schools Council Integrated Science Project. Mainly because of their reliance on an impractical pedagogy of naive discovery learning, these courses failed to deliver on their initial promise, prompting a shift to the so-called process approaches to science education such as *Warwick Process Science* and *Science in Process*, both of which envisaged scientific inquiry as the application of a generalized, all-purpose algorithmic method. Similar shifts had occurred earlier in Australia and the United States, with the publication of the *Australian Science Education Project* and *Science – A Process Approach*.

Interest in NOS continued to grow throughout the 1980s and 1990s, with the publication of numerous opinion pieces and commissioned reports, culminating in the incorporation of NOS into the National Curriculum for England and Wales and the publication of the highly influential *Science for All Americans* and *National Science Education Standards*, both of which promoted NOS as a key element of scientific literacy.

Later, NOS became firmly established as a key component of the *Programme for International Student Assessment* (www.pisa.oecd.org) and the *Next Generation Science Standards* (www.nextgenscience.org) and is now a major explicit focus in the science curriculum of most countries around the world.

Establishing NOS Priorities

Throughout the long battle to establish NOS in the school science curriculum, concern was often expressed by researchers and educators about distorted or over-simplified views of science, scientists, and scientific practice promoted by science textbooks, sometimes explicitly and sometimes implicitly – notably, observation provides direct and reliable access to secure knowledge; science always starts with meticulous, orderly, and exhaustive gathering of data; scientific inquiry is a simple algorithmic procedure comprising discrete, generic processes; experiments are decisive; science is procedural more than creative and its methods can answer all questions; science is a value-free activity; scientists are driven solely by logic, rational appraisal, and the pursuit of truth; and science is an exclusively Western, post-Renaissance activity. By the end of the 1990s, the urgent task for teachers and science curriculum developers keen to implement NOS in the science curriculum was to produce a consensus view of science that avoids these myths and falsehoods. According to McComas and Olson (1998), the authors of important reform documents such as *Science for All Americans* and *National Science Education Standards* are in reasonable agreement on the elements of NOS that should be included in the school science curriculum: scientific knowledge is tentative; science relies on empirical evidence; observation is theory laden; there is no universal scientific method; laws and theories serve different roles in science; scientists require replicability and truthful reporting; science is an attempt to explain natural phenomena; scientists are creative;

science is part of social tradition; science has played an important role in technology; scientific ideas have been affected by their social and historical milieu; changes in science occur gradually; science has global implications; and new knowledge claims must be reported clearly and openly.

Seeking to shed further light on this matter, Osborne and colleagues (2003) conducted a Delphi study to ascertain the extent of agreement among 23 participants drawn from the expert community (scientists, historians, philosophers and/or sociologists of science, science educators and teachers, and science communicators) on ideas about science that should be taught in school science. With minor variation, there was broad agreement on nine broad themes: scientific method and critical testing, scientific creativity, historical development of scientific knowledge, science and questioning, diversity of scientific thinking, analysis and interpretation of data, science and certainty, hypothesis and prediction, and cooperation and collaboration. A comparison of these themes with those distilled from the science education standards documents in McComas and Olson's (1998) study reveals many similarities.

A broadly similar but shorter list that has gained considerable currency among science educators can be found in Lederman and colleagues (2002): scientific knowledge is tentative, empirically based, subjective (in the sense of being theory dependent and impacted by the scientists' experiences and values), socioculturally embedded, and, in part, the product of human imagination and creativity. Moreover, there is a distinction between observation and inference; there is no universal recipe-like method for doing science, and there are key differences in the functions of and relationships between scientific theories and laws. This view, reinforced by a purpose-built assessment regime (the *Views on Nature of Science* Questionnaire), has become very influential and has gained ready acceptance in many countries around the world as a template for curriculum building and research into students' and teachers' NOS understanding.

Some Problems with the Consensus View

A disarmingly simple specification of NOS items, especially when allied to an assessment protocol, can quickly become established as the norm for building a curriculum and designing teaching and learning materials. Items in the approved list can become oversimplified by busy teachers and taught as truths about NOS. In consequence, criticism of the so-called consensus view of NOS has been mounting.

At a general level, the decision to restrict the definition of NOS to the characteristics of scientific knowledge and exclude consideration of the nature of scientific inquiry is highly problematic, given that the status, validity, and reliability of scientific knowledge are inextricably linked with the design, conduct, and reporting of the scientific investigations that generate it. At a more specific level, there are several items in the consensus list that are problematic. First, the naïve proposition that there is a crucial distinction between observation and inference is singularly unhelpful to students trying to make sense of investigative work. When theories are not in dispute, when they are well understood and taken for granted, the language of observation is infused with theoretical assumptions. Terms such as reflection and refraction, conduction and non-conduction and melting, dissolving and subliming, all of which are used regularly in school science as observation terms, carry a substantial inferential component rooted in theoretical understanding, without which further progress is impossible.

Second, too literal an interpretation of statements about the tentative character of science can be counterproductive. There is little value in encouraging students to doubt every scientific proposition they encounter. While it is sensible to regard quantum theory, string theory, and accounts of dinosaur extinction (one of the items in VNOS) as tentative, it would be absurd for students to regard the heliocentric view of the solar system or our understanding of the human circulatory system as tentative. Much of the

scientific knowledge that students encounter in class is no longer tentative. Rather, it is well established, taken for granted and used in building further knowledge. Indeed, if scientists did not accept some knowledge as well established, they would be unable to make further progress.

A further concern is that the consensus view fails to acknowledge some very substantial and significant differences among the day-to-day activities of scientists in different subdisciplines, including the kind of research questions asked and the investigative methods employed to answer them, the kind of evidence sought, the technologies used for its collection, the standards by which investigations and conclusions are judged, the kinds of arguments constructed to justify those conclusions, and the extent to which mathematics is deployed. In practice, the specifics of scientific rationality change between subdisciplines, with each playing the game of science according to its own rules.

A number of critics conclude that it is time to replace the consensus view of NOS, useful though it has been in promoting the establishment of NOS in the school science curriculum, with a philosophically more sophisticated and more authentic view of contemporary scientific practice.

Alternatives to the Consensus View

Matthews (2012) argues that we should consider NOS “not as some list of necessary and sufficient conditions for a practice to be scientific, but rather as something that, following Wittgenstein’s terminology, identifies a ‘family resemblance’ of features that warrant different enterprises being called scientific” (p. 4). To that end, he advocates a shift of terminology and research focus from the “essentialist and epistemologically focussed ‘Nature of Science’ (NOS) to a more relaxed, contextual and heterogeneous ‘Features of Science’ (FOS)” (p. 4). Such a change, he argues, would avoid many of the pitfalls and shortcomings of current research and scholarship in the field – in particular, the confusing conflation of

epistemological, sociological, psychological, ethical, commercial and philosophical aspects of science into a single list of items to be taught and subsequently assessed, the avoidance of debate about contentious issues in HPS, the neglect of historical perspective, the failure to account for significant differences in approach among the sciences, and the assumption that students' NOS understanding can be assessed and judged by the capacity to reproduce a few declarative statements about scientific knowledge. Features of science included in the consensus list should be elaborated, refined, and discussed, not simply learnt and assessed. A number of additional features should be addressed: experimentation, idealization, modeling, mathematization, theory choice and rationality, realism versus instrumentalism, and values and the impact of world views.

The great strength of the family resemblance approach is that there is no one definition of science; rather, a cluster of related features that many sciences share, although a particular scientific discipline may lack one or more of them. In elaboration of the family resemblance notion, Irzik and Nola (2014) draw a distinction between "science as a cognitive-epistemic system of thought and practice" and "science as a social-institutional system." They describe the former in terms of four categories: (i) *activities* (planning, conducting, and making sense of scientific inquiries); (ii) *aims and values*; (iii) *methodologies and methodological rules*; and (iv) *products* (scientific knowledge). They address key historical, social, cultural, political, ethical, and commercial dimensions of scientific practice also in terms of four categories: (i) professional activities; (ii) the system of knowledge certification and dissemination; (iii) the scientific ethos; and (iv) social values. Recently, Erduran and Dagher (2014) have provided a detailed discussion of the implications of Irzik and Nola's theorizing for curriculum content, pedagogy, and learning outcomes.

For Allchin (2011), the key to a broader and more functional view of NOS is the ability to judge the trustworthiness of scientific knowledge, that is, knowing whom to trust and why. His version of NOS curriculum priorities, which he calls "Whole Science," is designed as a

framework to guide students as they investigate socioscientific issues, conduct scientific investigations, and engage with case studies. It seeks to specify the dimensions of reliability and trustworthiness in science in terms of three major dimensions: *observational evidence* (issues of accuracy, precision, investigative procedures, and instrumentation), *issues of conceptualization* (patterns of reasoning, historical dimensions, and human dimensions), and *sociocultural aspects* (institutional characteristics, biases, economics, and effective communication). There is a very strong echo here of Ford's (2008) research examining differences in the ways scientists and non-scientists react to scientific claims. Scientists scrutinize the ways in which data were collected and analyzed and focus strongly on whether the evidence is sufficient to justify the conclusion(s). Non-scientists rely less on how the claims are constructed than on personal anecdotal experiences that reflect their opinion of the claim (i.e., whether they agree with it or not). They are also much more inclined towards uncritical acceptance of authoritative statements by scientists. Ford's conclusion is that the key to confident and successful evaluation of scientific claims is "a firm grasp of practice".

Hodson (2009) uses the similar term *Understanding Scientific Practice* to describe the NOS knowledge and the understanding needed to achieve satisfactory levels of cultural and civic scientific literacy: the distinctive language of science and ways of thinking about, investigating and explaining phenomena and events (especially the linguistic conventions for reporting, scrutinizing, and validating knowledge claims); the capacity to access and interpret information conveyed through symbols, graphs, diagrams, tables, charts, chemical formulae and equations, 3-D models, mathematical expressions, photographs, computer-generated images, body scans; the characteristics of scientific inquiry (including its range of subdisciplinary variants and strategies for generating new knowledge and solving problems relating to further development); the role and status of the scientific knowledge generated and the modeling that attends the construction of scientific theories; the community-regulated and

community-monitored rationality for scrutinizing and evaluating all new knowledge claims; the social and intellectual circumstances of significant scientific achievements and developments; and how scientists work as a social group (including the conventions and underlying values guiding the continuing practice of science) and the ways in which science impacts and is impacted by the social context in which it is located.

Other NOS-Related Developments

Argumentation and modeling are two aspects of scientific practice that have been subject to remarkable growth in research attention and curriculum development in recent years. Both raise important questions about students' knowledge of how these processes are used by scientists and how students can develop the ability to use them appropriately and productively for themselves. There has also been a substantial growth of interest in engaging students in addressing socio-scientific issues (SSI), which has precipitated the need for a much richer and more robust understanding of NOS.

Because scientific literacy entails a robust understanding of a wide range of scientific ideas, principles, models, and theories, students need to know something of their origin, scope, and limitations; recognize important differences between speculative models and well-established theoretical structures; understand the role of models in the design, conduct, interpretation, and reporting of scientific investigations; and recognize the ways in which a complex of cognitive problems and factors related to the prevailing sociocultural context influenced the development of key ideas over time. They also need to experience model building for themselves and to give and receive criticism in their own quest for better models. Current research interest can be categorized into three principal areas of concern: the particular models and theories produced by scientists as explanatory systems, including the history of their development; the ways in which scientists utilize models as cognitive tools in their day-to-day problem solving, theory articulation, and theory revision;

and the role of models and modeling in science pedagogy.

Students need to understand the standards, norms, and conventions of scientific argumentation in order to judge the rival merits of competing arguments. In particular, they need a robust understanding of the form, structure, and language of scientific arguments; the kind of evidence invoked; how it is organized and deployed; and the ways in which theory is used and the work of other scientists cited to strengthen a case. In recent years, a vigorous research agenda has been developed, focusing on why argumentation is important, its distinctive features, how it can be taught, the strategies available, the extent to which particular strategies are successful, the problems that arise, and how difficulties can be overcome. Much of this research utilizes variations on Toulmin's (1958) description of the structure of an argument in terms of six components: claim, data, warrant, qualifier, backing, and rebuttal.

Because much of the information needed to address SSI is of the science-in-the-making kind, rather than well-established science, and may even be located at or near the cutting edge of research, it has to be accessed from the primary literature rather than textbooks. Hence, students need to know how to evaluate the quality of scientific reports and research papers, including the validity of a knowledge claim, how it was generated, communicated and scrutinized by the community of scientists, and the extent to which it can be relied upon to inform critical decisions about particular SSI. They need to know what constitutes a well-designed inquiry and a well-argued conclusion. They need to be able to interpret reports; make sense of disagreements; evaluate knowledge claims; scrutinize arguments; distinguish among facts, arguments, and opinions; make judgments; and form personal views on issues. Because of the social, political, and economic dimensions of SSI, students also need the capacity to access material from magazines, newspapers, TV and radio broadcasts, publications of special interest groups, and the Internet, thus raising important issues of *media literacy*.

One final point relates to equipping students with some intellectual tools for addressing and

resolving contentious issues that cannot be solved solely by scientific or economic considerations, those situations in which students ask “What is the *right* course of action?” or “What *ought* we to do?” Recent developments in biotechnology, for example, raise many important questions and concerns about whether certain lines of research should be permitted. This is not to suggest that students be required to follow a rigorous program in moral philosophy, but it is to suggest that they need some basic understanding of egoism, consequentialist notions (including utilitarianism), deontological ethics, social construct theory (or social contract theory), and virtue ethics if they are to get to grips with such problematic issues.

More detailed discussion of issues arising in the long struggle to establish NOS as a key component of the school science curriculum is provided by Hodson (2014).

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Nature-Based Education

► Environment and Education

(Neo-) Marxism

► Critical Race Theory: A Marxist Critique

Neoconservatism

► Neoliberalism and Environmental Education

Neoliberal Discourses: Toward a Deeper Understanding and a Global Latino Education

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Introduction

David Harvey, the political economist and geographer, has written that neoliberalism is not a recent social phenomenon, dating at least to the

policy eras of Thatcher/Reagan in the 1980s. Although not explicitly suggesting that the current fascination with neoliberalism is linked to the promises and perils of globalization, a close reader of Harvey might reasonably infer this. writings on the subject *contextually* link neoliberalism as a “hegemonic discourse” to global capitalism or what the author refers to as the world economic system (Mirón 2016; Wallerstein 2011; Featherstone 1990). In what follows this entry hopes to establish that, analytically, globalization and neoliberalism are separate and distinct social-economic phenomena. As such, researchers need to carefully keep these analytic categories separate, keeping in mind that within the social imaginary, they are frequently conflated.

Harvey (2007, p. 146) defines neoliberalism as a “theory of economic practices proposing that human well-being is best advanced by the maximization of entrepreneurial freedoms within an institutional framework. . . .” Furthermore, Harvey asserts that such a framework is characterized by the following: (1) private property rights, (2) individual liberty, (3) unencumbered markets, and (4) free trade. The text below will illustrate these institutional properties of neoliberalism with examples taken from a mini case study of New Orleans’ (see Mirón 1992, 2016) post-Hurricane Katrina. In particular the social analysis focuses upon the intentionality of one social sectors and the reforms they aggressively advanced the semi-private education sector (or charter schools). First, this encyclopedia entry proceeds with an elaboration of Harvey’s depiction of the social practices and institutional properties (design elements) of neoliberalism and then illustrates these with concrete social practices in the US context – and the consequences for marginal groups left behind in the midst of these two phenomena.

Neoliberal Discourses

At the outset one should note that Harvey’s conception of neoliberalism as a dominating, common sense discourse (“creative disruption”) suggests that State actors, and indeed the State apparatus overall, *intentionally* exact these

discourses to serve specific, dominant class and State interests, for example, political and financial elites, as well as State bureaucrats. These multiple discourses – neoliberalism does not constitute a monolithic, abstract narrative – play out in concrete contexts that restore a perceived loss of “class dominance to sectors that saw their fortunes threatened by the ascent of social democratic endeavors in the aftermath of the Second World War” (2007, p. 145). In the sphere of post-structural discourse practices, this restoration does not proceed overnight. Specific State actors and members of the heretofore disaffected classes launch a hegemonic narrative to accomplish this goal. Put differently, varying actors across the economic sector generally, and within the State apparatus in particular, coalesce to form a hegemonic social movement (Laclau and Mouffe 2001) to ingrain an everyday, common sense understanding: neoliberalism is “good” for society as a whole. The hegemonic ideology, which elites launch, entails a profound nostalgia over the loss of individual freedoms, allowing State bureaucrats to impose taxes upon middle- and upper-income groups and, in the process, to administer social benefits to lower social-economic groups. A sense of entitlement among the lower classes results purportedly in slowing economic growth and curtailing individual freedom and liberties.

Design Elements

Private Property Rights

Perhaps the single most historically significant design element advancing the restoration of class stature among the groups designated above is the preservation of private property rights. In political-economic terms, the designation of “property” extended, globally, to slaves who provided free labor to subsidize profits in the British Empire, as well as in the antebellum South in the USA. Following the Civil War, in the abstract, slaves no longer constituted the “property” of their plantation-owning masters. In actuality, however, “Free People of Color,” emancipated slaves (Lincoln 1862), or constitutionally protected US citizens, blacks, did not enjoy full rights

of citizenship in the USA until the passage of the *Voting Rights Act* in 1965.

Although the above is an extreme example of the historical context of the concept of private property rights – the entitlement by virtue of global colonization and subsequent auctioning, to purchase and to trade slaves in the USA and globally prior to the Civil War – contemporary practices of “entrepreneurial freedoms” are only slightly less pernicious when situated in local contexts (see below). These hegemonic discourses include the perceived entitlement of the ownership of private space to open new markets and exploit the social-economic space of the Internet for private consumption and profit. In a digital age, what might be branded “consumer slavery” holds the possibility of extending social bondage for a lifetime owing to potential financial losses in the stock market and beyond. The point is that the protection of individual property, when placed in a global economic context, has its historical roots in both modern forms of neoliberalism, as well as in the institution of slavery. Indeed one need look no further than human trafficking/slavery to grasp the reality of modern-day slavery, a practice far astray from Harvey’s concept of (economically centered) entrepreneurial freedoms. The present discourses have roots in the distant past. Both discourses help construct social practices that are connected to globalization, but neoliberalism is a relatively new political-economic category.

Individual Liberty

Doubtlessly, the emotional and materialistically driven protection of private property could not proceed in the absence of the assumption of individual liberty. Taken in its most fundamental terms, individual liberty (or freedom) is the taken-for-granted notion that in a free and open democratic society, individuals – translated: voting, tax-paying citizens – have the legally protected right to live life as she or he chooses – the enjoyment of protection from the intrusion of government. In common sense, everyday terms, “I” as an individual is free to do what I want – provided I do not interfere with another human being’s autonomy and freedom to

act as well. What does this mean at the level of social practice?

Across the globe but especially acute in the USA and Western Europe contexts, gentrification provides an apt example. The Brooklyn neighborhood of Williamsburg, the Gold Coast of Chicago, London’s North End, the Mission District of San Francisco, and post-Katrina New Orleans, working-class neighborhoods replete with the lack of affordable housing, public transportation, and amenities such as accessible grocery stores, pharmacies, and, prior to the suburbanization of US cities, retail shopping – all have apparently given way to upscale redevelopment (The “New Urbanism”). Within this discourse practice, economic development means that urban planners and private-public partnerships incorporate design elements including upscale condominiums. For example, in Chicago and Williamsburg, fewer than 1,000 ft² units can easily range in the \$1 million + purchase category. The analysis of gentrification as social practice sheds light on the meaning of individual liberties in the local urban context, which arguably is a direct consequence of “global flows” (Inda and Rosaldo 2008). The two phenomena are linked, although distinct depending on place. And in the mini case of post-Katrina New Orleans, gentrification occurs in the broader context of the downsizing and decline of the public sector (government) under the hegemonic umbrella term of the remaking of the city for the purported benefit of all of its citizens. As the discussion below will illustrate, however, this rebranding may have unintentionally exacerbated inequalities.

Unencumbered Free Markets

Related to the social practice of gentrification, unencumbered markets arise “naturally,” that is, organically, when common sense suggests that strategies to help the economy such as economic development render possible the occupation of market space, heretofore unavailable. The Airbnb entrepreneurial initiative is a prominent case in point. Recently introduced in New Orleans, and now flourishing in the newly opened Cuban housing market, it enables visitors traveling to new destination sites such as New Orleans, Brooklyn,

Havana and Shanghai, Singapore, and New Delhi to enjoy hotel-style occupancy at times at rates far lower than the standard in these cities. Clearly Airbnb is both a global economic practice of world economic system (witness the global markets cited above), as well as emerging local social phenomena that are embedded in globalization. Although space does not permit a discussion of the local-global dialectic, suffice to say that in the case of New Orleans (below), the unique local context, arguably, is perhaps a mere reflection of the discourses of globalization, namely, neoliberalism.

On balance, this is a positive aspect of entrepreneurial freedom, as it allows a potentially larger number of travelers to engage in short-term stays (rentals) at lower prices. On the other hand, the wealth that entrepreneurs such as the founders of Airbnb rapidly reap is startling, currently valued at \$24B, according to the *Wall Street Journal* (2015). (It is worth noting that this multi-billion company start-up began operations in 2009.) Such profits, computer engineering, and marketing resources are rendered possible only to the top 1% of the economic class spectrum. The rest are left behind, metaphorically “enslaved” through a dilemma: garner the financial resources necessary to enjoy their short-term stay in previously closed international social environments and artistic havens, such as Havana – or stay home. Although theoretically, such a dilemma constitutes freedom of consumer choice, in effect it operates as an ethical quagmire, either reluctant resignation for fear of being denied freedom of mobility or seemingly undue harsh punishments in taking a lonely ethical stand. The choice does not bode equivalent ethical consequences. To live as a global citizen implies, at least temporarily, turning away from the economically downtrodden.

In summary, this cursory review of neoliberalism as “creative destruction” has generally examined the major tenets, or intellectual properties (design elements) in the context of the processes of globalization generally, and the world economic system of capitalism in particular. To repeat, these two concepts, though closely related,

are not equivalent: globalization provides the economic context and descriptive processes of capital accumulation for a host of discourse practices embedded in Harvey’s theory. In the paragraphs above, what this author characterizes as the “design elements” of these socially constructed practices are concretely highlighted, thus rendering the possibility that human and political agency can exploit the potential economically constructive aspects for the common good (furthering equity and the equality of social classes). This is best accomplished intentionally, for example, placing progressive constraints upon the displacement of affordable housing owning to gentrification (see Mirón 2016).

In the remainder of this entry, a vignette in the context of post-Katrina New Orleans – universal school choice (charter schools) – serves to capture a social “portraiture” of the distinctive social practices characterizing the centrality of *place* in the unfolding of actual neoliberalism hegemonic ideology, an unfolding that renders this ideology visible, as well as “disaster capitalism” (Klein 2007). The purpose in analyzing this vignette is to argue that although embedded in globalization, neoliberalism indeed manifests itself locally, at times with staggering unintended consequences as in when societies recovering from disasters such as Haiti, Detroit, and New Orleans. For example, disparities in health outcomes indicate that minority residents in neighborhoods recovering from disaster have an average life expectancy of 57 years, while similarly recovery neighborhoods that are overwhelmingly white have a life expectancy of 80 years! This is shocking disaster capitalism in its extreme.

The Privatization of the Public Interest in New Orleans

Following previous writings from this author (Mirón et al. 2015; Mirón 1992) and subsequent theorizing on the effects of hegemonic neoliberal ideology (Kamat 2004), the microlevel social analysis presented below vividly foretells how discourse practices matter. Hegemonic ideologies

(Laclau and Mouffe 2001) have material, concrete effects on everyday lived experience. In the case of New Orleans and elsewhere as other scholars have identified (Kamat 2004), public goods such as education and affordable housing are commandeered by State actors and entrepreneurial elites who engage in privatization, a hallmark of neoliberal ideology. Put simply, private interests are able to use public goods to further an unrestrained free market, whether the market is the global free flow of goods and services or public education. Clearly, Latinos and other poor people of color, who have previously benefited from public education, are impacted by the move toward privatization in the name of school choice (charter schools and vouchers). For example, in New Orleans, though the Latino population has nearly doubled post-Hurricane Katrina, charter schools do not routinely employ bilingual teachers or guidance counselors (Faust 2016).

A Case for Microlevel Social Theory and Analysis

In New Orleans, there is a congruence of discourse practices that are decidedly neoliberal in character, both in their hegemonic formations and their material (economic) impact on marginalized populations who are already economically hurting from global inequalities stemming from the world capitalist system. The most visible of these is school reform/choice, which in the analysis that follows moves the meta-theoretical abstractions summarized above to the microlevel of everyday lived experience. Moreover, it is an assertion of this entry that without an existential connection to lived experience, macro-level abstractions such as globalization are simply that: unspecified concepts that appear remotely related to ordinary lives. This vignette seeks to bring to everyday life these meta-abstractions.

Universal school choice began in 2005 with the unilateral dismissal of approximately 4,500 classroom teachers, the majority of whom were African-American. Coupled with the governing school board's dissolution of collective bargaining – in effect, ending insurance coverage, pension benefits, and other labor rights – discursively treated school

employees (overwhelmingly black and lower m an example of neoliberalism *par excellence*.

The Free and Open Educational Marketplace: Exemplifying Privatization of a Public Good

At well over 90% “market share,” the educational landscape in New Orleans constitutes, by far, the largest percentage in North America of independently operated and semiautonomous, charter schools. No city nationally comes close. Its entrepreneurial leaders characterize the neoliberal discourse in the city, which flows directly from neoliberal ideology in the form of the abolishment of traditional neighborhood schools in favor of charter schools that are often located far from students' residences. Within the configuration of multiple charter schools populating the city, the shared meaning of universal school choice is such that, in theory, any student in the city of New Orleans enjoys the personal freedom to enroll in any public school of her or his choosing. Put simply, place of residence (neighborhoods) need not determine the educational and economic future of the citizens of New Orleans. In the rhetoric of charter school leaders, “students should not be limited by their zip codes.”

Practitioners of school choice have largely realized this ideal. That is to say, by and large, parents and their children enjoy the relative freedom to select schools of their choice, unencumbered by where they live. With few exceptions – and there are significant policy constraints – students may choose from a plethora of school organizational configurations, ranging from the arts, to math and science, to military-style academies. Although families are free to choose any school using the centralized enrollment system, there are a few, highly ranked charter schools that, to date, have opted not to abide by the school enrollment methodology, which is known as *OneApp*. Indeed the highest performing charter schools admit very few Latinos as they are viewed as in special need of language services and even remedial instruction. These attributes, charter leaders fear, would drag down student achievement.

Lusher Charter School, which enjoys a reputation as one of the highest student achievement rankings in the State, has, along with a few other select high-performing schools, have steadfastly resisted the centralized open enrollment system, arguing that in so doing it would be forced to lower academic standards. For the most part, however, the OneApp process enjoys success and, while cumbersome to many parents (see Mirón and Boselovic 2015), appears fair and equitable. The majority of white families who participate in the system consistently succeed in landing a school in their list of top three choices. On the other hand, Latinos and families of undocumented Central American immigrants often struggle to navigate the fairly cumbersome application process in a language they have not mastered. Speakers of Spanish are often left behind in the reimagined public school system.

Finally in 2016, most school-level administrators enjoy professional and individual liberties – hallmarks of neoliberal design elements. For example, they can hire and fire school employees at will and setting customized teacher salaries a marked difference from collective bargaining contracts that protected person rights. As a neoliberal discourse practice, *autonomy* for school-level administrators means the liberty to set their own budgets, unrestrained from the central office, or micromanagement from the perceived corruption of the locally elected school board. Widely known charter operators, such as KIPP (Knowledge is Power Program), are able to operate mission-driven school organizations, in effect functioning like private schools. They are quasi-private in operations yet remain State funded. KIPP and other charter schools are publicly funded schools whose only accountability is to standardized tests that are used to renew operating licenses. Their mission remains void of the common good in the form of racial equity.

Conclusion

In conclusion, this entry has asserted that neoliberalism and globalization are separate analytical

categories, the latter a disruptive hegemonic ideology in Harvey's conceptualization. Although related, globalization characterizes the economic and social contexts in multiple societies wherein neoliberal discourse practices are embedded. What is needed, this author suggests, is a deeper understanding among marginal groups, especially Latinos, of these complex phenomena. Latinos now constitute the fastest growing population in the USA, its language spoken by nearly 6% of the world's population. In the vignettes above, Latinos represent one fourth of the student enrollment in suburban New Orleans and, in Orleans Parish (county) proper, approximately double previous levels (Foust 2016). Latino education, thus, is best understood globally, with this population in clear need of both a theoretical understanding of the twin concepts of globalization and neoliberalism. It is only within this paradigm shift that a relevant praxis and politics to address the inherent inequities, and the historical enslavement and racism of minority populations may effectively proceed.

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Neoliberal Globalization and Educational Administration: Western and Developing Nation Perspectives

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Synonyms

[Ideology of neoliberalism](#); [Political theory of neoliberalism](#)

Introduction

The political philosophy of neoliberalism has become pervasive, both in its effects in government and on societies, and in the academic literature. Equally, globalization has reshaped political agendas, the configuration and practices in social institutions, and is a common topic in several disciplines, currently reshaping both the university systems providing education in the West and those in the developing world receiving their services. However, there is considerable controversy over their positive and negative attributes, spawning a large and widespread critical literature. Most of the discussion originates in the West, but increasingly critique of neoliberalism and globalization are emerging from the developing

world, which has been the recipient of these socio-economic and political developments, ones that have also had an impact on the cultural-educational sectors internationally.

This entry provides an overview and discussion of the origins and characteristics of neoliberalism and its economic expression through globalization as well as the effects they have had on education and its administration. Just as neoliberalism affected the entire public sector and, in turn, influenced the private sector, globalization leaves untouched no aspect of society – its influence is pervasive through all social institutions, including social welfare, health, education, including causing issues of sovereignty through internet technology and multi- and transnational corporations (Held 2004). The entry also identifies critiques that have been raised in Western and developing parts of the world, especially as they affect education in the inequalities produced and the cultural (re)colonization taking place in many countries creating dependence and the silencing of intellectual traditions.

Neoliberalism and globalization will be traced from their theoretical origins to the forms they take in restructuring and reshaping educational organizations, their governance, roles and patterns of social interaction, curriculum, and pedagogical practices, including the values that are promoted, their effect on knowledge and its creation through research, reshaping of policy, and the institutionalization of neoliberalism through think tanks, institutes, and intellectual movements promoting its application globally. Both have been approached through a variety of disciplines – history, political science, sociology, cultural studies – therefore the definitions and critiques vary depending on the disciplinary focus used, but all of these have significance for the interdisciplinary fields of education.

The Nature of Neoliberalism

Neoliberalism is the term applied to a shift to the political right asserting economic ends, in the form of free markets, over political ends that began in the early 1980s in the UK, the USA,

Canada, Australia, and New Zealand that was accompanied by a public administration ideology called the New Public Management (NPM) which was inspired by private-sector practices consonant with the neoliberal return to market principles as a fundamental approach to government. The general change is the abrogation of the State's responsibility for education by abandoning it to the market-place and the introduction of corporate "universities". The historical origins, though, originate in eighteenth-century "cameralism" which was aimed at economic efficacy and scientific management, followed by the international scientific management movement in the 1910s, 1940s economic institutionalism theory, led primarily by Friedrich Hayek and Milton Friedman, and accompanied in its NPM formation by the 1980s corporate culture doctrine and a political embracing of public choice theory based on economic maximization of self-interest (Saad-Filho and Johnston 2004).

Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the NPM was systematically applied to all public sector areas, although primarily aimed at privatizing, deregulating, and downsizing of public bureaucracies in social welfare, education, and healthcare along market principles, in other words, rationalizing through the following main changes in practices:

1. From senior administrative responsibility grounded in policy development to a managerial style typified by cost-consciousness producing a "scientized" managerialism ideology affecting role, structure, and staffing
2. Decentralizing organizations based on a monopoly system into corporatized units, internal markets, and rivalry, accompanied by a more centralized control over policy and civil service monitoring
3. From planning and public service welfarism to cost-cutting and labour discipline, producing deregulation and downsizing
4. From administrative processes adhering to policy initiatives to an emphasis on output through control and accountability mechanisms, producing quantitative methods of performance and efficiency measurements
5. Turning over permanent public bureaucracy provision of services to the private sector production of public services for "consumers" through term contracts, the use of consultants, contracting out, quasi-governmental organizations, and privatization

A broad-based critique of neoliberalism is its persistent erosion of the welfare state (see Bourdieu and Chomsky), the commodification of human activity, and the reduction of human experience to economic value (Peters 2011). Foucault's concept of governmentality is a more effective critique of neoliberalism, since this concept is not confined to formal governmental or governance structures but includes all discourses and practices (intellectual technologies) that regulate human activity – reflect particular modalities of speaking, how "truth" is formed, who is authorized to speak the "truth" (epistemological structures), who generates it, moral forms, and which consonant actions are legitimated, together constituting the exercise of power. In this broadened conception, all organizations yielding to neoliberal practices are implicated.

Globalization

To many, globalization is seen as a benign, or even positive, development in which transnational connections and interactions have been formed on civic levels, between companies, and between nations that are primarily an economic phenomenon aimed at increasing international trade and investment. It is also associated with, or seen as dependent upon, advances in information technology that allows for its characteristic broadened and more rapid interconnectedness (Held 2004). Its scope is far beyond that of manufactured goods, extended to include social, cultural, and education "production" evident in the many branch campuses of Western universities in developing parts of the world. The less benign view, from an international perspective, regards globalization as the dominance of Western nations over much of the rest of the world in which the human and material resources of the developing world are used to feed Western economic development, resulting in greater exploitation, a growing gap

between rich and poor nations (Bourguignon 2015), and in the spread of a world “culture” predicated upon Western, mostly American, values and norms.

Implications for nations and their sovereignty vary from accounts that globalization is eroding and fragmenting nations’ political integrity, to those who argue that global connections are not historically unprecedented and that the greater international intensity reinforces or even strengthens State powers, and finally to those who regard globalization as a new set of economic, political, and social circumstances that are transforming the nature of the State. Many negative effects of globalization include structural unemployment, social exclusion, increased urban and national insecurity, and the proliferation of drug and weapons trafficking (Held 2004). These changes are accompanied by higher levels of human migration, asylum seekers, refugees and displaced persons, as well as labor migration and higher degrees of multiculturalism in part caused by the rise of international and transnational corporations, branch operations in foreign countries, and, in the case of education, larger numbers of foreign students from transitional and developing countries to Western university systems.

The nature of national and international structures is changing with the emergence of transnational governing bodies (e.g., the EU) and the increase in intergovernmental organizations and international non-governmental organizations, many of which have strong policy making influence such as the World Trade Organization, the OECD through establishing international standards and rankings, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank, all of which have influenced the cultural and educational sectors of countries through the spread of neoliberalism (Hoogvelt 2001). Transnational regional bodies also have influence like the GCC, APEC, ASEAN, etc. and the emergence of cosmopolitan law out of twentieth-century international law developments. Globalized neoliberalism also shapes social institutions through its structural and operational formal rules that use Western principles and standards. These developments are reshaping national powers, policy making,

governance structures, and organizational practices (Burbules and Torres 2000). Social institutions, including the educational sector, are also affected by increasing militarization and securitization as actors in the research and development of systems and as sites of surveillance are linked through multilateral arrangements and increasing export markets.

The Western Educational Critique

The Western critique of neoliberalism focuses mostly on the impact of neoliberalism on their own educational systems examining how corporate capitalism and its competitive free market model has changed the nature, role, and aims of higher education to a handmaiden of the politico-economic sector as a source of economic strategy development, first explored in depth by Slaughter and Leslie in *Academic Capitalism*. For many jurisdictions, higher education is intended to assist in the transition from a manufacturing to a “knowledge” economy. Effects of neoliberalism on universities are associated with market practices as they are applied to a reshaping of the institution: rational management; performance assessment (often quantitative and positivistic) that is not adapted to university teaching and scholarship; and deregulation, which has been applied to raising tuition levels in more regulated environments and allowing for a greater range of private universities and online services. These include the increasing commercialization and commodification of education, changing roles of faculty, through proletarianization, from semi-independent professionals into employees with an entrepreneurial character, in competition with one another (e.g., through bonuses), the privatization of scientific and technical research, removing barriers to university-industry alliances through changes in legislation and government policy, change of curriculum into an emphasis on labor preparation in programs and courses, and the increasing role of think tanks and institutes with a strong capitalist focus that are used to research and justify the neoliberalization of the educational sector by governments (Burbules and Torres 2000). From a Weberian perspective, disenchantment is well underway in this model, contributing

to an even tighter “iron cage” modernization, and in Habermasian terms, it is a further and more comprehensive technical rationalization of the university, in other words, a further colonization of lifeworld by system.

These initiatives have been accomplished through the proliferation of “Centres of Excellence” and science parks to host university-industry collaboration, the use of patents to privatize knowledge (where intellectual property policies in some universities require the assignment of the patent to the university and not individuals), and a shift from foundational and primary discipline programs to applied studies, marketable product development, and a constant emphasis on innovation oriented towards the economic sector. Universities also have been transformed into revenue-generation machines, one effect of which is the commitment of significant university resources in attracting a lucrative foreign student recruitment, where disciplines like engineering and sciences are heavily dependent and an importance placed on faculty and university time and resources spent on marketing activities and spin-off firms.

The main problems associated with this transformation of higher education is a concern about academic freedom and the capacity for civil society activism, increasing student numbers with declining funds, the emergence of technologies in the form of networks that bind the university to “triple helixes” of university-industry-state linkages, including the military-intelligence-industrial complex. Of importance to the university as an institution is its declining role as a distinctive institution to protect and promote intrinsically-valued knowledge, free intellectual inquiry, and the community of scholars, with its own collegial governance system. Universities are increasingly being restructured to operate under university administrations that are built on a Chief Executive Officer model rather than as a scholarly leader who is first among equals. Universities now have divisions that structured to pursue the private sector, do market modeling, and which are staffed with people who are recruited from industry without the values, sensibilities, and social interaction knowledge of higher education organizations,

changes that deeply transform organizational culture. The stresses and strains of these factors have also increased the intensity of organizational politics and conflict leading to a widespread phenomenon of academic mobbing. At the same time, the scholarly actors in this process are not wholly victims of an externally imposed change, but many themselves are complicit, ontologically complicit in Heideggerian and Merleau-Pontyan terms, or strategic game players in Bourdieuan terms.

The Non-Western Educational Critique

The globalization of Western education has resulted in a transmobility of scholars and the creation of branch or off-shore campuses, some through affiliation agreements, and “liaison” offices in foreign countries (although the last has raised concerns about free access to Western science and technology). These developments also contribute to fierce competition among Western universities in “penetrating” foreign educational markets.

There are many issues for non-Western countries in the globalization of Western educational programs, practices, and teaching staff modeled on a neoliberal agenda. The influence of corporate capitalist mentality creates many of the same commercializing and commodifying effects; however, there are also some differences in degree if not kind (Bauman 1998). In many developing and transitional countries, there is a low level of public funds invested in building a higher-education capacity, both forcing even public universities to operate as revenue-generating enterprises with few resources to invest in the building, libraries, laboratories, and highly qualified academic staff necessary in quality education but also creating an unregulated market-place in which business operators with no higher education experience set up inexpensive operations expecting to receive a return on investment in a short turn-around time.

One of these is the assumption, on the part of Western organizations and many in developing countries, that their values and practices are a norm to which developing countries must strive, regardless of the institutional arrangements in the country, legal and political system, and economic

system. This effect is part of a general homogenization of culture occurring under globalization – a “world culture” (and neo-institutionalist) model based predominantly on American norms as a global ideal (Bauman 1998; Spring 2014; Zajda 2005). One example is the “knowledge” society model that is predicated upon transferring manual labor activities to the developing world while reserving “knowledge work” for the West, a model that often developing countries adopt without an understanding of its logic and without national capacity to change from a necessary production economic sector to that of a knowledge-based one. One feature of this is using “benchmarking” from Western universities in evaluating a developing country still in an institution- and nation-building mode and which has different social patterns and culture, and which also may have very different security requirements. These principles are enforced through credentialing instruments like accreditation that privilege Western knowledge, structures, and roles, requiring that non-Western educational systems conform to a unified neoliberal model (Burbules and Torres 2000; Saad-Filho and Johnston 2004) in order to qualify, not only through so-called “quality assurance” regimes but also in enforcing Western curricular models and intellectual traditions, which, under neoliberalism favor positivistic knowledge traditions over many critical and interpretive ones. These features are also part of a “world systems” perspective that examines “core” global zones like the USA, the EU, and Japan who attempt to legitimize their power and domination of “periphery” nations by actively inculcating its values into them (Appelbaum and Robinson 2005; Spring 2014).

Contrastingly, a postcolonial critique views globalized education as a cultural imperialist vehicle for imposing economic and political agendas on other nations by wealthy nations to increase their power and privilege (Appelbaum and Robinson 2005; Hoogvelt 2001). These practices constitute a new form of colonialism from that of nineteenth-century and early twentieth-century forms through IGOs, multinational corporations, trade, and globalized education through corporate

publishing, research and professional organizations, and international testing. A related critique is that of culturalist theory which takes an equality position that all nations can benefit from borrowing and lending educational values and practices and emphasizes local borrowers rather than externally imposed education (Appelbaum and Robinson 2005; Spring 2014).

There are also underlying values that are contrary to many systems of thought and belief, not wholly those from outside the West: a materialist orientation that follows from a consumerist view of the world; secularization; a progressivist fallacy that Western, more particularly American, development is inherently superior; an anti-historical disposition that excludes shared traditions and beliefs, for example, the reliance of several Western intellectuals traditions on classic Islamic scholarship through a number of transmissions into Europe; and a dualistic view of the world (instead of, for example, a dialectic view of human history) – the “clash of civilizations” concept that permeates much more than just security and political oppositions that have spawned negative stereotyping and overgeneralizations about Islamic values and standards of social practice, the role of women, etc. One of the consequences of importing foreign curriculum and professional training is a loss of culture by affecting negatively cultural and national identity formation, for example, in providing leadership models that are contrary valuationally from many Western models (Zajda 2005). All of these effects can be seen as cultural imperialism (Appelbaum and Robinson 2005). Even though supporters of globalization see it as a force of democratization internationally tend to ignore democratic features of other systems, for example, the representative and consultative practices of Islamic administration inherent in its leadership model, or even many European configurations of democracy, assuming often that American-style democracy is a “default” position.

The main areas of critique include the impact on institutions in home countries where it began, in other developed countries where it migrated to, and the developing world where it serves as a recolonizing force. It is also associated with the

rise of multinational and transnational corporations and the increasing role for international organizations like the OECD and UNESCO in spreading globalization, for example, the IMF and the World Bank through conditions attached to loans requiring the adoption of neoliberal-type austerity measures (Hoogvelt 2001). This is accompanied by an increasing political influence by foreign powers and multi- and transnational corporations over politics in developing countries, and direct influence in shaping educational policies and practices.

One of the major problems, not only for developing countries but also for Western countries most involved in globalization is the way in which it privileges education predicated upon market values and the forms of managerialism that come with it, over both a traditional Western university ethos and that of other rich and deep traditions of the developing world. For many critics, business-style management and efficiency models are diametrically opposed to the life of the mind, of the humanistic development of the human being, the pursuit of knowledge of intrinsic value, and even the quality of education itself.

Cross-References

- [Critical Education and Postcolonialism](#)
- [Education and Political Theory: Prospects and Points of View](#)
- [Educational Leadership, Change, and the Politics of Resistance](#)
- [Educationalization of Social Problems and the Educationalization of the Modern World](#)
- [Educational Policy](#)
- [Foucault and Educational Administration](#)
- [Global English, Postcolonialism, and Education](#)
- [Ideology](#)
- [Managerialism and Education](#)
- [Neoliberalism and Education Policy](#)
- [Neoliberalism and Globalization](#)
- [Neoliberalism and Power in Education](#)
- [Postcolonialism, Development, and Education](#)

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Neoliberalism

- [Deleuze and Guattari: Politics and Education](#)
- [Freire's Philosophy and Pedagogy: Humanization and Education](#)
- [Political Economy of Charter Schools](#)
- [Social Imaginaries and Inclusion](#)
- [Teacher Education at the Intersection of Educational Sciences](#)

Neoliberalism and Education Policy

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Synonyms

Educational choice; Free markets; Market fundamentalism

Introduction

Neoliberalism and the neoliberal social imaginary have become the dominant way in which people conceptualize society and, in particular, the economy and education. Its dominance reflects the ability of the wealthy to assert their power to restructure society and government to their benefit (Harvey 2005). They have transformed the political decision-making process from one which was primarily public and hierarchical to one in which the distinction between the public and private decision-making processes is now blurred and where private interests influence the political process through various means. In education, for example, Bill Gates, the world's wealthiest individual who heads the largest philanthropic organization, the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, uses his wealth to promote his neoliberal vision of corporate control over education, to place people in influential governmental and nongovernmental positions, and, not coincidentally, to increase Microsoft's earnings and his own wealth. Similarly, Teach for America and its 36 franchises in 25 other countries prepare teachers and promote policies that undermine teachers' professionalism, teachers' unions, and public schools. Lastly, Pearson, the world's largest education corporation, aims to control education globally, from curriculum development to assessment and professional development. Neoliberals have changed the nature of governance and, therefore, transformed who and how education policy is made to the advantage of the rich and powerful and the detriment of everyone else.

A Brief History of Neoliberalism

Neoliberalism has become the dominant economic policy across the globe, while remaining a term unknown to many people. However, people are more likely to be familiar with the notion that we have no alternative than to embrace the neoliberal principles that economic and other decisions should be market rather than government based and that public services should be, as much as possible, privatized. These ideas have

become so dominant that they now compose the social imaginary, the way in which people look at the world not based on theory, but their lived experience regarding the role of government and the nature and scope of political authority. Many perceive that there are no alternatives to free markets and privatization, to neoliberalism.

Neoliberalism, as a term, is less well known among the public, in part, because neoliberalism differs by place and time, continues to evolve, and is contradictory and contested. Therefore, we need to begin by asking: what is meant by *neoliberal*? In the United States, but less so elsewhere, the term neoliberal is often confusing because it is often thought of as a new version of liberalism in the tradition of Franklin Roosevelt and the rise of governmental social welfare policies in North America and Western Europe following World War II. In that form of liberalism, often referred to as social democratic liberalism and sometimes as the welfare State, governments intervened to direct the economy through spending and tax policies and increased spending on social welfare, including education at all levels. In addition, laws were passed to promote social equality, such as voting rights, and protect individuals from harm, such as environmental protection (Harvey 2005).

Instead, *neoliberalism* harks back not to the social democratic liberalism of the 1930s but to the liberalism of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in which the working and emerging middle classes pushed back against the power of the monarchy and the church. Liberalism, then, stood for the individual's right to own property and freedom from religious and political constraints. Neoliberalism, then, more closely resembles conservative ideologies emphasizing individualism and economic freedom (e.g., see Locke's *Two Treatises of Government* and Adam Smith's *The Wealth of Nations*) than the postwar social democratic liberalism that elevated the common good over the individual.

However, neoliberalism emerged partly in response to the social democratic liberalism of the 1930s and the economic theories of John Maynard Keynes, the most influential economist of the Great Depression. For Keynes, government

had three functions: to supply the goods and services that could or should not be supplied privately (education, utilities, law enforcement, the military), to alleviate and regulate the failures of the market, and to arbitrate between competing groups and social classes. Keynesian policies are reflected in Roosevelt's policies increasing federal spending during the Great Depression by increasing employment through projects such as the Works Progress Administration and the Civilian Conservation Corps, initiating social security to protect the elderly and regulating the banks through acts such as the Federal Deposit Insurance Company and the Glass-Steagall Act. Keynesian economic policies sought to increase the economic resources of the unemployed and poor, in part so that they could purchase goods and services and contribute to economic growth, but also as an issue of social justice (Peck 2010).

Neoliberal thought emerged during the Great Depression, expanded after World War II, was first put into place in Chile in the 1970s under the dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet and was realized during the Reagan and Thatcher administrations in the 1980s. The two centers for neoliberal theorizing were in Europe and the United States. In Europe, the center of the neoliberal movement was what came to be known as the Mont Pelerin Society, named for the city in Austria where its proponents met. In the United States, neoliberalism's center was the economics department at the University of Chicago, which subsequently became known as The Chicago School of Economics.

Of the scholars who met in Mont Pelerin, the most renown was Frederick von Hayek, an Austrian and British economist and philosopher best known for his defense of classical liberalism. Hayek feared that the rise of democratic socialism and Keynesian economics in Europe as it rebuilt after World War II was the first step toward tyranny and totalitarianism. Therefore, in Hayek's 1944 book, *The Road to Serfdom*, he extolled the virtues of markets and competition and warned of government intervention undermining the efficiency of markets. Hayek assumed that markets were inherently more efficient at allocating resources and goods than individuals. In fact,

Hayek described markets as having knowledge that individuals could not possibly possess and as knowing better than any individual what is best for them.

Hayek also viewed social democratic liberalism as dangerous because it aimed to reduce inequality. For Hayek, economic and political inequality is not only necessary but also beneficial. He understood inequality is a necessary characteristic of the market system and any effort to alter the outcome would violate the natural order of the market and, therefore, be counterproductive. For neoliberals, individual competition within unregulated markets is the best way to promote efficiency and social welfare.

In the United States, Milton Friedman, from the University of Chicago, was the most vocal and well-known proponent of neoliberal thought. Like Hayek, he promoted markets, privatization, competition, and individualism. Unlike Hayek, his ideas were well promoted by the political and economic elite and well received by the public as indicated by the sales and ubiquity of his publications, *Capitalism and Freedom* (1962) and *Free to Choose: A Personal Statement* (1980).

Friedman was also vocal regarding the policy implications of his economic theories. He argued that the purposes and processes of education should not be decided through public discussion but should be determined through competitive markets. He proposed eliminating public schools, which he denigrated as "government schools," and suggested that students' parents/guardians be provided with vouchers so that they could choose the private or religious school that best reflected their values. Consequently, people would be free to individually choose what kind of education they wanted and, therefore, "vote with their feet." The market would determine what kind of education to provide as those schools that best responded to the public's demands would thrive while those that attracted too few students would close.

The emphasis on individual choice has, for neoliberals, the further advantage of shifting responsibility for the individual's welfare away from society and onto the individual. Under neoliberalism, if an individual falls short

of his or her goals – if they end up in less- or ineffective schools or un- or underemployed or underpaid – they have no one other than themselves to blame and cannot demand that government alter the situation.

Neoliberalism, then, changes the relation between the individual and society. It conceptualizes the individual as not only making choices, but as an autonomous entrepreneur responsible for his or her own self, progress, and position and responsible for his or her own success and failure. Individuals are transformed into entrepreneurs of themselves and those who succeed are seen as successful entrepreneurs.

The *neoliberal social imaginary* has become so dominant that for most people, it is natural and unquestioned. Under neoliberalism, the welfare of the community has been replaced by the welfare of the individual, democratic deliberation by market choices, and qualitative messiness by quantitative “certainty” (Ball 2012).

Moreover, and perhaps more insidious, neoliberalism has become dominant while at the same time, it is often not even recognized or named. Rather, neoliberal theories are often referred to as free markets or market fundamentalism, which, while similar, vary in meaning. In the United States, “free markets” is the term more likely to be used by the general public, including journalists, politicians, and some academics. The term “free markets” may be preferred because it emphasizes freedom, as in free trade and choice, and references some, but not all, of the other characteristics of neoliberalism, in particular, decreasing the size and role of government in society and privatizing public institutions and agencies, such as prisons, airports, highways, and, of course, schools.

Market fundamentalism (Block and Somers 2014) is heard less often, but refers to what is described as an unfounded faith in markets as the best and most efficient way to make decisions. However, markets are hardly self-regulating and cannot account for values or input that are other than monetary. A moment’s reflection that the lack of regulation almost caused, in 2008, the collapse of the financial system reminds us that not only does self-regulation not work but also minimal

regulation is required. Furthermore, the rise of neoliberalism and the dominance of markets are neither natural nor inevitable.

Neoliberalism and Education Policy

Education has been profoundly transformed under the ascendancy of neoliberal principles. The emphasis on markets transforms how government’s role is conceived and policy is made. Neoliberals aim to decrease the size of government by, as much as possible, privatizing governmental services, including education. Furthermore, since government’s role is decreased and local control undermined, corporations, nongovernmental organizations, and philanthropic organizations play a larger role in setting policy. Lastly, education and other governmental organizations are to be transformed into market-based institutions.

Moreover, how schools are administered is transformed as the new public management replaces the older bureaucratic structures that are deemed to be too slow to respond to market pressures. New public management shifts the focus from inputs and processes, including funding and standards, to output and performance, to be achieved efficiently through standardized exams and other quantifiable measures. New public management provides the rationale and means for using standardized exams to hold teachers and students accountable, what is sometimes referred to as “governance through numbers.”

Neoliberals also aim to replace government, which is hierarchical and carried out through bureaucratic methods, with governance, which is the authority of diverse and flexible networks. Hierarchical public policy making had been replaced by the rise of networks and heterarchical and often private policy making. Moreover, decision-making has shifted from the local and the provincial scales to the national and international scales, making it easier for the wealthy and connected to impact and benefit from the decision-making process (Ball and Junemann 2012).

The rise of heterarchical networks has enabled a shift in how and where policy decisions are

made, advantaging individuals and organizations that are economically and politically powerful. For example, in the United States, up until the turn of this century, policies were generally made at the lowest levels appropriate, generally either the local, community, or the State, with the federal government intervening only where necessary. However, policies now tend to be formulated and made at the national and international levels not by citizens or elected representatives, but by officials from organizations that are unelected and unaccountable, including philanthropists, such as the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation; corporations such as Pearson; nongovernmental organizations, such as Teach for America or Teach First; and global organizations, such as the Organization for Economic and Cooperative Development (OECD).

The Gates Foundation, which may have the greatest influence of any individual or organization over US policy, achieves their influence through who and what they choose to fund, their access to people in powerful places, and their ability to place their own personnel in administrative positions elsewhere. As one example, Bill Gates is largely responsible for the development and adoption of the Common Core State Standards by providing billions of dollars to nongovernmental and educational institutions who support Common Core. They also fund numerous nongovernmental organizations that support creating more charter schools and have managed to place administrators from those programs in senior positions in the US Department of Education.

Likewise, nongovernmental organizations like Teach for American (TFA) do not merely train and place teachers in positions to teach for 2 years. TFA often contracts with urban school districts to replace the more highly paid unionized teachers with TFA teachers who are underprepared, unorganized, and underpaid. TFA's influence does not stop there as TFA organizes their alumni to lobby governments to expand school privatization and support standardized testing and other neoliberal reforms.

In addition, Pearson Inc., which is now the world's largest education corporation, aims,

according to their web page, to be an "integrated education company" that provides digital content and service globally. Their business portfolio provides textbooks, texting and assessment products, online learning and software solutions, and customizable and integrated services. They currently operate in more than 80 countries and have more than 40,000 employees. In the United States, they own most of the textbook companies and produce and administer most of the standardized tests. Pearson's goals include dominating the education market by collaborating with Microsoft to deliver the Common Core curriculum and assessment on Microsoft technology.

Using standardized exams to hold teachers and students accountable shifts the way in which teachers are controlled. Rather than controlling teachers directly through rules and regulations enforced at the local level, teachers are controlled indirectly from a distance. Teachers do not need to receive specific directives but, instead, know that their task is to prepare the students for the standardized exams.

Lastly, neoliberals aim to privatize or eliminate services, such as transportation, healthcare, and education and, where possible, subject them to the discipline of the market. Therefore, as Friedman advocated decades ago, neoliberals seek to privatize public schools by converting them into charter schools or eliminating them altogether in favor of private and parochial schools or providing vouchers to pay for part of the cost of tuition to a private school. The Obama administration, under Race to the Top regulations, has required that States support the creation of charter schools and increase their number by eliminating any limits (Hursh 2011). New York State's Governor Andrew Cuomo, echoing Friedman, "aims to end the public school monopoly" by increasing the number of and funding for charter schools (Hursh 2016).

However, charter schools are increasingly supported not only or even mostly because they might improve educational outcomes for students but because they are perceived as places in which administrators receive exorbitant salaries and investors' excellent monetary returns. In New York, ostensibly philanthropic organizations, like

the Gates and Walton Foundations, have worked with hedge fund managers to develop a lobbying strategy to increase the number of and funding for charter schools. Other groups, such as Education Reform Now, Students First NY, Families for Excellent Schools, and NY for a Balanced Albany, have contributed millions of dollars to Cuomo's election campaigns and the campaigns of other legislators with the aim of influencing legislation (Hursh 2015).

Neoliberals claim to desire reducing the size of government, in part by privatizing much of what the government does. However, many of their policies result in increasing the size of government. For example, charter schools would not exist if the government did not create a process to award charters and a means to divert public funds to charter schools. Furthermore, while standardized testing provides a means for governments to control teachers and steer schools from a distance, developing and administering the standardized tests and assigning scores to schools and implementing disciplinary measures require a large bureaucracy and significant funding.

Therefore, neoliberalism is less about reducing the size of the State and more about reorganizing the State in the service of capital. Therefore, we can investigate how and what education policy is made in terms of who gains power and benefits financially. As described above, the beneficiaries have been large corporations and philanthropists who use their philanthropic wealth as investments, heads of nongovernmental organizations, hedge fund managers and other Wall Street brokers, and politicians willing to implement the policies. At the same time, educators, parents, students, and community members are increasingly marginalized and teaching becomes de-professionalized.

While neoliberals claim that markets, high-stakes standardized exams, and privatization will improve education, there is little evidence to support their claim. Charter schools perform no better than traditional public schools. Moreover, since privatization is touted as the solution to improving education outcomes, underlying societal problems such as poverty, lack of meaningful and

decent paying work, and inadequate healthcare are dismissed as irrelevant.

Further, high-stake testing as required under No Child Left Behind and Race to the Top has reduced the curriculum to what can be measured on a standardized test. Subjects like science, social studies, and the arts are slighted and interdisciplinary learning becomes nonexistent. Topics that are complicated, which have no one right answer, such as how should we respond to climate change, are unlikely to be addressed because they will not be tested. Education is reduced to what is known, eliminating what is unknown but crucial to explore.

That neoliberalism favors the already rich and powerful and results in schooling that fails to examine central social and environmental questions is becoming increasingly apparent to parents, students, teachers, and community members who are pushing back against standardized curriculum, testing, and schooling. Critics of neoliberal policy are also working to implement social democratic processes encouraging dialogue and debate over the purposes and methods of education, which results in the process of developing education policy becoming educative in itself.

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Neoliberalism and Environmental Education

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Synonyms

Advanced liberalism; Ecological literacy; Ecopedagogy; Education for sustainable development; Neoconservatism

Introduction

While environmental education (EE) has long been framed by proponents as a challenge to the type of mainstream economic thinking contributing to ecological degradation, increasingly such education has begun to integrate the very logic of neoliberal economics to achieve its aims. This entry summarizes a small but growing body of research that has recently arisen to document this trend. The genesis and characteristics of neoliberalism in general, understood both as a historical political-economic project (see esp. Harvey 2005) and associated form of discourse or ideology (Peck 2010), have been described at length elsewhere, including in other entries of this volume (see [Cross-References](#) below). The growing influence of neoliberalism in educational policies around the world, consequent to widespread cut-backs in State funding and increasing emphasis on accountability and quantitative measurement in student performance, has been thoroughly discussed both in this volume (see [Cross-References](#)) and elsewhere as well. Researchers

have also documented a growing trend toward neoliberalization within global environmental politics as a whole in recent years, expressed in promotion of so-called market-based instruments such as ecotourism and carbon markets to address ecological degradation in terms of which non-humans are primarily valued as providers of “ecosystem services” and repositories of “natural capital” (see esp. Büscher et al. 2014).

This entry builds on these discussions to describe the ways in which neoliberalization has gained increasing traction within EE and closely associated education for sustainable development (ESD) fields in particular. It draws on recent research characterizing neoliberalism as a confluence of a neoliberal political economy pursuing accumulation through dispossession (Harvey 2005) and a neoliberal governmentality that seeks to influence stakeholders’ decisions throughout the social sphere via creation and manipulation of external incentive structures (Foucault 2008; see also [Cross-References](#)). These two dynamics come together in environmental education and related mechanisms that seek to harness neoliberal forces in the quest for sustainability.

Neoliberalizing Environmental Education

Essentially, EE seeks to encourage “pro-environmental behavior” on the part of program participants in support of environmental protection and sustainable natural resource management. The closely associated ESD approach pursues this same aim within the framework of sustainable development specifically. As with the overarching global environmental movement, researchers describe a general historical trajectory within EE whereby what originated as a largely oppositional practice challenging dynamics of industrial capitalism contributing to environmental degradation has been increasingly superseded by the more recent trend to incorporate elements of neoliberal capitalism and discourse into EE curricula and delivery. The rise of ESD in

particular is seen as part and parcel of this trend in its promotion of a sustainable development perspective that many view as itself an expression of neoliberalization within the global environmental governance apparatus.

In part, this transformation is attributed to the need to attract financial resources within a neoliberal climate in which approaches conforming to the dominant paradigm are privileged in funding decisions. In addition, a neoliberal perspective within EE delivery has been increasingly promoted by organizations whose overarching missions have themselves become progressively neoliberalized, particularly so-called big non-governmental environmental organizations (BINGOs) such as The Nature Conservancy (TNC) and Conservation International (CI) as well as private sector firms pursuing corporate social responsibility (CSR) agendas. Further, however, neoliberalization within EE is viewed as part of a more general process whereby neoliberal reason has so permeated the global political imaginary that it has become conventional wisdom in many spheres (Peck 2010). As Hursh and coauthors describe, “neoliberal ways of thinking about and acting in the world have become so prevalent, naturalized, and internalized that we are often unaware of how neoliberalism constrains our thinking and practice, such that it is difficult in both thought and deed to imagine a society proceeding on different principles” (Hursh et al. 2015, p. 300). Within this climate, indeed, “neoliberal ideology is so pervasive that Margaret Thatcher’s truism ‘there is no alternative’ takes on new dimensions as alternative projects literally (re)produce neoliberalization” (Weissman 2015, p. 361). From this perspective, environmental educators may unwittingly adopt elements of neoliberalism in their very efforts to advance an ostensibly oppositional practice.

As previously noted, an extensive body of research has documented how “neoliberal tenets have formed the core principles for primary, secondary, and higher education reform in many countries over the last two decades” (Hursh et al. 2015, p. 306). Assessing this trend from a Foucaultian perspective, one could conclude with Pierce that:

What has clearly emerged over the past 30 years is a distinct model of neoliberal governmentality of education where, through state and corporate strategies and practices, schools are increasingly in the business of disciplining and regulating the nation’s educational resources (as human capital stock) in order to maximize potential for high-yield crops of twenty-first century skilled students. (2015, p. 461)

Within EE in particular, neoliberalization has been identified in various forms of delivery, both formal and informal, at different levels from postgraduate through preschool, including such diverse modalities as teacher training workshops, business school curricula, university sustainability policies, rural development projects, incarcerated student programs, ecotourism excursions, and urban farming initiatives. Discussion of this trend in terms of EE reflects the core neoliberal principles – decentralization, deregulation, privatization, marketization, and privatization – standard to all work on the theme yet are seen to be expressed in particular ways within EE specifically. As with most studies of neoliberalism, researchers are sensitive to processes of “variegation” in how general neoliberal principles are expressed in different contexts and forms of practice (Peck 2010). Notwithstanding such variegation, elements of neoliberalization commonly identified within EE include the following:

- Emphasis on individual rather than collective action as the basis for pro-environmental behavior
- Promotion of entrepreneurship as the economic and social form appropriate to sustainability
- Endorsement of a model of environmental citizenship centered on privatized and individualized activities
- Advocacy of economic growth to address both poverty alleviation and environmental protection
- Promotion of new public management (NPM) strategies in both educational and environmental governance
- Emphasis on quantitative measurement as the basis for transparency and accountability in environmental management
- Related promotion of standardized testing for learning assessment

- Embrace of rewards systems to incentivize participation and learning
- Advocacy of superficial participation without concrete decision-making power or equitable resource sharing
- Focus on the economic value of “ecosystem services” as justification for environmental protection
- Promotion of market-based instruments for environmental governance

The Dangers of Neoliberalism

Overwhelmingly, researchers express strong reservations concerning the implications of this trend. In explaining his approach to social analysis, Foucault once stated, “My point is not that everything is bad, but that everything is dangerous, which is not exactly the same as bad” (1984, p. 343). In this sense, researchers view the trend toward neoliberalization within EE as dangerous for a number of reasons. First and foremost, this perspective commonly promotes, either explicitly or implicitly, a growth-based capitalist economy that many consider antithetical to the sustainability that EE ostensibly champions. In so doing, consequently, it turns away from problematization of this very economy as one of the principle obstacles to environmental protection. Consequently, neoliberal approaches to EE threaten to “reduce the political to the personal” (Hursh et al. 2015, p. 309) and thereby “help to form neoliberal subjects who will not challenge the status quo but instead focus on individual responsibility” (Weissman 2015, p. 360). In this way, “Under neoliberalism, failure to achieve environmental sustainability is equated with the aggregate failure of individuals to incorporate rationality into their private sphere environmental decision-making rather than with a failure of the state” (Schindel Dimick 2015, p. 394) or of capitalist markets.

Essentially, in sum, critics contend that neoliberal capitalism is itself largely responsible for much of the environmental degradation the system is now increasingly called upon to correct within a neoliberal governance framework (Büscher et al. 2014). By neglecting to address

(or even more directly obfuscating) this dynamic, “neoliberal environmental education fails to question neoliberal ideologies and structures that promote an unsustainable economy, individualism, entrepreneurialism, and consumerism” (Hursh et al. 2015, p. 313). Hence, a neoliberal approach to EE may end up reinforcing the very problems it seeks to address.

Alternatives and Future Directions

In leveling critiques of this nature, researchers advocate forms of EE that not merely depart from but directly confront neoliberal processes and their consequences. Huckle and Wals summarize the general consensus on this issue in calling for EE that:

encourage[s] students to consider issues of justice and the desirability of sustainability citizenship. They should learn about structures of power and the processes at work in the capitalist world economy; the rise of neoliberalism and its social, environmental and cultural impacts; and the contemporary ‘crisis’ and the need for more sustainable forms of development. Such development requires public/collective as well as private/individual actions, and students should recognize that a focus purely on individuals’ values and lifestyles serves to depoliticize and privatize a very political and public issue, and thereby contributes to the reproduction of the status quo. (2015, p. 494)

In addition to such confrontational critique, commentators call for alternative forms of pedagogy and practice that embody progressive principles contrary to neoliberal doctrine, focused on inspiring collective and directly political action that pursues decommodified and common pool resource management and commonly drawing on Freirian philosophies of grassroots conscientization and organizing (see [Cross-References](#)). In this spirit, researchers have identified a variety of current and potential practices that can serve as models for such alternatives, from conscientization activities among campesino organizations in Brazil to urban renewal programs in the US city of Detroit. This research is just beginning, however, and constitutes a particularly fruitful avenue of future investigation and activism in this field.

Other potentially productive directions for further research include devoting more attention to exploring how participants understand and respond to neoliberal forms of EE, given that to date analysis has focused primarily on delivery rather than reception. In particular, examination of the ways participants (as well as educators) may resist and/or subvert such practices would be quite interesting. Similarly, rather than treating neoliberal EE as wholly and uniformly negative, researchers might explore how ostensibly neoliberal perspectives and approaches are or could be productively employed in the service of alternative projects as well. As is clear from an all-too-brief review of this emerging field, investigation of the relationship between neoliberalism and environmental education is only just beginning and will likely pursue these and many other fruitful new directions in the coming years.

Cross-References

- [Conscientization, Conscience, and Education](#)
- [Environmental Education](#)
- [Foucault and Educational Administration](#)
- [Foucault and Educational Theory](#)
- [Marx and Philosophy of Education](#)
- [Neoliberal Globalization and Educational Administration: Western and Developing Nation Perspectives](#)
- [Neoliberalism](#)
- [Neoliberalism and Education Policy](#)
- [Neoliberalism and Power in Education](#)
- [Neoliberalism, Hayek, and the Austrian School of Economics](#)

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Neoliberalism and Globalization

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Introduction

The last three decades of the last century – especially with the advent of Reaganism/Bushism and Thatcherism/Majorism in the United States and England – may well be considered profoundly structural for the transformations that were about to occur in the world (Harvey 2005; Steger 2005; Sousa Santos 2006; Apple 2009; Giroux 2004; Conversi 2010; Torres Santome 2005; Paraskeva 2009, 2010). The staggering economic experiences in post-Allende Chile, the great *contemporary* revolution in the People's Republic of China (who took the *Xiapingian* formula *one nation two states*), and the elections of Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan in the United Kingdom and in the United States, respectively, coined the emergence and development of a “new world economic configuration—often subsumed under the term [neoliberal] globalization” (Harvey

2005, p. 2). Neoliberal globalization needs to be understood within a complex ideological framework that hegemonically stabilized a new radical center, paving the way for a new conception and praxis for the State and in so doing naturalizing the economic crisis and the subjectification of debt.

Neoradical Center

Given the inefficiency and inoperance of the political and economic architecture determined by the Bretton Woods agreements achieved after World War II, which established a kind of *embedded liberalism* that imposed inconvenient restrictions and regulations to a greedy market, the succession of non-accidental social events described above must be seen as the harbinger of a new world order that advocates the liberation of the market and its mechanisms from the shackles of State dynamics. As Harvey (2005) accurately claims, neoliberalism is a creative destruction “not only of prior institutional frameworks and powers, but also of divisions of labour, social relations, welfare provisions, technological mixes, ways of life and thought, reproductive activities, attachments to the land and habits of the heart” (p. 3). The survival of capitalism depended on a new model of internationalization and, in this context, globalization as well as the consequent unregulated and senseless internationalization that calls into being, the newer financialization of capital, as Foster (2008) coined. Žižek (1989) is quite insightful here:

Far from constricting [capitalism limits] is the very impetus of its development. Herein lies the paradox proper to capitalism, its last resort: capitalism is capable of transforming its limit, its very impotence, in the source of its power—the more it ‘putrefies’ the more its immanent contradiction is aggravated, the more it must revolutionize itself to survive. It is paradox that defines surplus enjoyment: it is not a surplus which attaches itself to some ‘normal’ fundamental enjoyment because *enjoyment as such emerges only in the surplus*, because it is constitutively an ‘excess’. If we subtract the surplus we lose enjoyment itself, just as capitalism, which can survive only by incessantly revolutionizing its own material conditions, ceases to exist if it ‘stays the same’, if it achieves an internal balance. (p. 52)

Such pretentious limitedness fuels a very concrete ideological (and cultural) battle(s) that is the very DNA of what Sousa Santos (2008) calls globalizations. That is an intricate multifarious social terrain in which nonmonolithic hegemonic and counter-hegemonic forces – or what Sousa Santos (2008) calls insurgent cosmopolitanisms – collide vividly before, among other issues, social and cognitive justice, equality, freedom, democracy, human rights, and common good. Whereas the first is usually understood as “neoliberal, top-down globalization or globalization from above” (Sousa Santos 2008, p. 396), the latter consists of “the transnationally organized resistance against unequal exchanges produced or intensified by globalized localisms and localized globalisms” (Sousa Santos 2008, p. 397).

Neoliberal globalization involves the “intensification, and acceleration of social exchange and activities [that] does not occur merely on an objective material level [and] involves the subjective plane of human consciousness” (Steger 2009, p. 12). Neoliberal globalization – in its multiple forms – did (and it is) not happen(ing) in a social vacuum. Actually, “it is precisely in its oppression of non-market forces that we see how neoliberalism operates not only as an economic system, but as a political and cultural system as well” (McChesney 1999, p. 7; Olssen 2004), which creates endless intricate tensions between cultural homogenization and cultural heterogenization (Appadurai 1996).

In analyzing the latest metamorphosis of *New Rightist* policies, Mouffe (2000, p. 108) stresses that both Blair and Clinton were able to construct a “radical center.” Unlike traditional political groupings, the “radical center” is a new coalition that “transcends the traditional left/right division by articulating themes and values from both sides in a new synthesis” (Mouffe 2000, p. 108). However, Fairclough (2000, pp. 44–45), unlike Mouffe (2000), stresses that the “radical center” strategy does not consist only in “bringing together elements from these [left and right] political discourses” but also in its ability to “reconcile themes which have been seen as irreconcilable beyond such contrary themes, transcending them.” Fairclough (2000) also argues that this

strategy is not based on a dialogic stance. That is to say, the “radical center” achieved consent within the governed sphere “not through political [democratic] dialogue, but through managerial methods of promotion and forms of consultation with the public; [that is to say] the government tends to act like a corporation treating the public as its consumers rather than citizens” (Fairclough 2000, p. 129). While such radical centrism targets the State, it is actually the State that has been paving the way for the market (Sommers 2000; Paraskeva 2003, 2009, 2015). Recent bailouts to banks, insurance companies, and car industry bore testimony to our claim. Such State actually fosters “new privatized legal regimes [and it is] a state that has itself undergone transformation and participated in legitimizing a new doctrine about the role of the state in the economy” (Sassen 2000, p. 59).

State sovereignty has never been in jeopardy within the contemporary global cultural flows (Appadurai 1996). In fact, such radical centrism, while searching for the dissolution of old contradictions between “right” and “left” (Fergusson 2001), was able to lay the solid foundation for the gradual emergence of a new concept of the State (especially with regard its role) anchored in a need to modernize government at almost at any cost. Democratic forces have been colonized by managerial insights in such a way that governments end up being weak executives of a *Res plc* (Ball 2007), which operates with the blessing of an anemic popular vote (Fergusson (2001).

We argue that such mercantilist neo-fundamentalism has paved the way for what Agamben (2005) called a “State of exception” – the embryo of what I have called neoradical centrism. While radical centrism claims to offer a broad managerial concept for the public good by showing new managerial dynamics in and of itself (Newman 2001, p. 46), *neoradical* centrism actually refines the entire commonsense cartography edified and sutured by radical centrism (Hall 1988). What is at stake nowadays for the neoradical centrists is not the rapacious need for modernizing forms of governments but precisely the unbalanced tension between force and law. In short, force transcends

law, paradoxically, in the so-called democratic nations. In fact, neoliberal globalization “is having pronounced effects on the exclusive territoriality of the nation state, that is its effects are not on territory as such but on its institutional encasements” (Sassen 2000, p. 50).

Nowadays the issue goes well beyond the creation of mixed economies of welfare, or the emergence of a new public management, of transforming citizens in consumers, or even the emergence of forms of entrepreneurial government (Clarke et al. 2001); it goes beyond the tension(s) welfare without a State (Clarke and Newman 1997).

In the midst of nowadays *welfarecide* – orchestrated and paved by the so-called radical centrism policies – neoradical centrism emerges as an answer to a compound framework of needs prompted precisely as the consequence of such *welfarecide*. While radical centrism cannot be seen as a crises but an answer to the crises (Apple 2000), neoradical centrism cannot be seen as a need but the only answer to address ever more pressing needs. As Agamben (2005) argues – anchored in Schmitt’s approach (1922) – “the necessities transcends the law” (p. 1). In this way, and to rely on Agamben’s approach (2005), neoradical centrism is able to overcome the multifarious tensions prompted by “state of exception vs. state sovereignty” and edifies a “point of imbalance between public law and political fact” (p. 1). In fact, Agamben (2005) claims the state of exception “appears as the legal form of what cannot have legal form” (p. 1). Neoradical centrism is “ambiguous, uncertain, borderline fringe, at the intersection of the legal and the political” in its layout, making it conveniently well situated in coded no man’s land and quite juicy for marketers (Agamben 2005, pp. 1–2).

The state of exception reinforces the conditions that anchor societal development to a pale economic equation. In fact, “the state of exception is not a special kind of law (like the law of war) [quite conversely] it is a suspension (in our understanding *ad eternum*) of the juridical order itself” (Agamben 2005, p. 4; Todorov 2003). Territorial sovereignty, Falk (1999) claims, “is being diminished on a spectrum of issues in such a serious manner as to subvert the capacity of states to

govern the internal life of society and non-state actors hold an increasing proportion of power and influence in shaping of world order” (p. 35). We are experiencing a process that entails

much ‘creative destruction,’ not only of prior institutional frameworks and powers (even challenging traditional forms of state sovereignty) but also divisions of labour, social relations, welfare provisions, technological mixes, ways of life and thought, reproductive activities, attachments to the land and habits of the hearth. (Harvey 2005, p. 3)

Why then, despite almost three decades of distressing effects on society and attacks on “the even more localized rest” (Bauman 2004, p. 3), does a hegemonic bloc continue to dominate? As Jessop et al. (1984) and Apple (2000, p. 23) remind us, one must question, “How is such an ideological vision legitimated and accepted?” It is undeniable that neoradical centrism is not exactly a pure detour from the orthodoxies laid out by the radical centrism. It is actually a moment of complexities, and in some ways it is a platform that, as Hall (1992) would put it, goes toward radical centrism by taking advantage of particular kind of contradictions within the very marrow of neoliberal globalization. Neoradical centrism should be seen as the latest capitalist metamorphosis of righting the left. Such aim cannot be detached from the politics of the commonsense and the role that the media plays in building a particular yarn of meanings.

Such state (of exception) (Agamben 2005) and the need to marketize everything (Harvey 2005) are two sides of the same coin, a devastating currency for sectors such a public education, a currency that pushes societies to a state of permanent economic emergency, functioning as part of a neoliberal praxis.

Permanent Economic Emergency

One cannot understand a neoliberal philosophy of praxis without viewing it as an attack on the State and its resultant deregulation and austerity policies. Austerity policies and practices play within the very core of the wrangle Fordism-post-Fordism-neoliberalism; they are cause and consequence.

Rationales about neoliberalism’s crisis-driven modus operandi by Žižek (2010) as well as Foster

and McChesney’s (2012) deserve to be highlighted. While the former places the emphasis on state of permanent crisis, the latter focuses on the need to understand the crisis between the pendulum of financialization and stagnation as the tout court framework of the current economic havoc. Foster and McChesney (2012) subscribe that “the world capitalist economy is facing the threat of long-run economic stagnation” that fuels conditions for slow economic growth, high unemployment, and financial instability (p. 1). Moreover, “the defining characteristic of such depressions was not negative economic growth, in the trough of the business cycle, but rather protracted slow growth once economic recovery had commenced” (Foster and McChesney 2012, p. 2). One of the reasons for such a puzzled state is what Foster and McChesney (2012) refer to as the explicit “denial of history” and in particular the history of economic crisis, a denial that supports models that positively excluded the very possibility of a crisis (p. 4).

It is actually such take that we see in Amin (2013) when he argues that the current monopoly-financial capitalism is imposing ever-demanding yet unsustainable changes within the civil archeology that puts the system in a kind of self-destruction mode since it is incapable to find the right formula to address its owns unsuitable demands. The system is exhausted because it exhausted its very social matrix. Needless to say, the impact of such conflictive state has serious implications on education. Education and educators are under the gun to come up with answers for a problem that is beyond their jurisdiction. Education and educators are kept with a permanent tourniquet on them in order to maintain and revitalize an economy that shows daily signs of unsustainability, which is beyond their power of saving. More than ever before, education is playing a crucial part in the new equation of the current political economy (Lipman 2011). The best way to address such crisis is to unravel the rampage of austerity politics. Disconcertedly, the idea is to rescue the system, not the people.

Žižek (2010, p. 85) presents a similar position when he describes the current crisis as “a permanent economic emergency.” Relying on the Eurozone as

plus qui parfait scenario to examine austerity politics, Žižek (2010) argues that the draconian measures imposed on nations, such as Greece, Italy, Ireland, and Spain (and we would add Portugal), deepened the unfathomable abyss between two complex perspectives. The first is the self-proclaimed neutral mainstream that “proposes a de-politicized naturalization of the crisis [that is] the regulatory measures are presented not as decisions grounded in political choices, but as the imperatives of a neutral financial logic—if we want our economies to stabilize, [then] we simply have to swallow the bitter pill” (Žižek 2010, p. 85); and second is the position led by social groups, such as “protesting workers, students and pensioners, [that] see the austerity measures as yet another attempt by international financial capital to dismantle the last remainders of the welfare state” (Žižek 2010, p. 85).

As the stagnation (Foster and McChesney 2012) or permanent economic emergency (Žižek 2010) keeps growing, or as we would say instability stabilizes, democracy keeps shrinking to a point that, for instance, in the case of Europe, “the true message of the Eurozone crisis is that not only the Euro, but the project of the united Europe itself is dead” (p. 86). While identity is at stake here, such challenges need to be seen as an opportunity for new utopias or, as Sousa Santos (2006) would argue, alternative ways to *build* more coherent *alternatives*. That is, in the face of all the de-politicizing attempts, the current social terrain frames the strategies to address the crisis as “neutral” or, as Žižek (2010) argues, “a re-politicized Europe, founded on a shared emancipatory project” (p. 86). Such a trend needs to “avoid the temptation to react to the ongoing financial crisis with a retreat to fully sovereign nation-states, easy prey for free-floating international capital, which can play one state against the other. More than ever, the reply to every crisis should be *more* internationalist and universalist than the universality of global capital” (Žižek 2010, p. 86). This is the best way to address the new period facing dominant and counter-dominant trenches.

I am not claiming here an economic reductive approach. In fact, neoliberal globalization is much more than economics. Thus, it would be a critical mistake to deny globalization as a form of cultural

politics, thus producing greater cultural and economic rewards (Strange 1996; Mennell 2009) for the globalized few, as Bauman (1998) would put it. To think that all of these economic, cultural, and social transformations would not interfere and affect the consulate of the public policies and politics is a mistake. In fact, education is one of the crucial apparatuses that have been used to foster one of the key arguments developed by neoliberal global policies, especially after the fall of the Berlin wall – the fading of the “iron curtain of ideology and the vigorous emergence of the velvet curtain of culture” (Žižek 2007).

Thus, “far from condemning people to ideological boredom in a world without history, the opening decade of the twenty-first century has become a teeming battlefield of clashing ideologies” (Steger 2005, p. 4). As Žižek (2007) adamantly claims, “the (Huntington’s) clash of civilizations is politics at (Fukuyama’s) the end of history” (p. 2). Neoliberal globalization, as the practice of corporate populism, carries in itself an ideological scaffold – neoliberal globalism (cf. Kaplinsky 2005; Rapley 2004; Conversi 2010). No one has unmasked in a better way the ideological backbone of neoliberal globalization than Harvey (2005):

[neoliberal globalization] is particularly assiduous in seeking privatization of assets. The absence of clear property rights . . . is seen as one of the greatest of all institutional barriers to economic development and the improvement of human welfare. Enclosure and the assignment of private property rights is considered the best to protect against the so called tragedy of the commons. Sectors formerly run or regulated by the state must be turned over to the private sphere and be deregulated. Competition—between individuals, between firms, between territorial entities—is held to be a primary virtue. Privatization and deregulation, combined with competition, it is claimed, eliminate bureaucratic red tape, increase efficiency and productivity, improve quality, and reduce costs both directly to the consumer through cheaper commodities and services and indirectly through reduction of the tax burden. (p. 65)

Privatization and deregulation policies paved the way for the crisis and for the answer for the crisis in the form of austerity politics, and, in so doing, it ferment a state of bewilderment and rusty perplexity gradually normalizing debt as a new form of cultural politics.

The Subjectification of Debt

Neoliberal answers to the current fabricated global crisis that Varoufakis (2011) claims “put even Lenin’s post 1927 exploits to shame” (p. 2). We are living a collective *aporia* – that is, a “state of intense puzzlement in which we find ourselves when our certainties fall to pieces; when suddenly we get caught in an impasse, at a loss to explain what our eyes can see, our fingers can touch, our ears can hear . . . At those rare moments, as our reasons valiantly struggle to fathom what the senses are reporting, our *aporia* humbles us and readies the prepared mind for previously unbearable truths” (p. 1). This violent attack on an educational system that promotes well-informed and critical citizens has been taking place over the last four decades and has fostered a school system that produces uncritical citizens and an apathetic citizenry that has contributed greatly to the current global *aporia* described by Varoufakis (2011). In fact, one of the most lethal dimensions of this *aporia* is that schooling is profoundly engaged in promoting and endorsing a particular coloniality of being, power, knowledge, and labor (Quijano 1992; Mignolo 2000, 2011; Maldonado-Torres 2003, 2008; Grosfoguel 2010, 2011).

Lazzarato (2011) approach helps us understand neoliberal economy as a process of subjectification. Neoliberal economy, Lazzarato (2011) argues, is a “subjective economy” (p. 37) framed within the wrangle “creditor-debtor,” a wrangle that relies at the very core of social relations. Such relation(ship)s objectively subjectifies “everyone as a debtor” (Lazzarato 2011, p. 7) within a finance matrix increasingly dominated by the totalitarianism of the concubinage creditor-debtor. Lazzarato (2011) states:

Viewing debt as the archetype of social relations means two things. On one hand it means conceiving economy and society on the basis of an asymmetry of power and not on that of a commercial exchange that implies and presupposes equality. On the other hand, debt means immediately making the economy subjective, since debt is an economic relation, which in order to exist, implies the molding and control of subjectivity such that labor becomes indistinguishable from work in the self. (p. 33)

Needless to say that such wrangle “creditor-debtor” is a power relation – or fuels and it is fueled by power relations – “since it is itself a power relation, one of the most important and universal of moder-day capitalism” (Lazzarato 2011, p. 30), thus “intensifying the mechanisms of exploitation and domination at every level of society” (Lazzarato 2011, p. 7).

The neoliberal economy is not a finance economy but a debt economy. To be more precise, within the complex neoliberal global mantra, “what we call finance is indicative of the increasing force of the relation creditor-debtor relation” (Lazzarato 2011, p. 22). The *subjectification of debt*, Lazzarato (2011) claims, is cultivated daily and it is ultimately an ideological position (p. 31).

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Neoliberalism and Power in Education

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Introduction

At the same time that it restructures education policy and narrows prevailing forms of pedagogy and curriculum, neoliberalism enacts a specific set of power relationships with important consequences for the meaning and experience of schooling. These are continuous with wider effects of neoliberalism beyond the field of education. This entry considers how power in the neoliberal context is articulated through processes of control, ideology, subjectivity, and punishment. Meanings and implications of school-based resistance to these processes are also considered.

Power as Control

In the neoliberal context, power is articulated in the first instance through the process of control. Specifically, neoliberalism works to shift decision-making over schooling from teachers and local administrators to business and political elites. This shift away from democratic forms of educational governance participates in the larger global wave of neoliberal deregulation, privatization, and demolition of social welfare systems beginning around 1980. Just as the spread of neoliberalism writ large was articulated as a counter to postwar Keynesian forms of governance and institution building, neoliberal control in education pits itself against State bureaucracies, teacher unions, and “impractical” progressive school projects. Neoliberals gain control over schools by positioning them in the following ways: (1) as rigid State institutions lacking streamlined management allowing for efficiency and accountability, (2) as failing markets in need of modernization, and (3) as economic institutions tasked with producing human capital in the context of globalization.

On this basis, control over public schools is transferred into the hands of political and business elites whose expertise at turning a profit is seen as transferable toward the goal of raising student achievement. From the federal to the local level, neoliberalism gains control of education through accountability-based compliance systems and school choice initiatives. The decision-making power of teachers and administrators is appropriated by reorganizing schools around standardized curriculum and high-stakes testing, ostensibly governed by principles of scientific management. Neoliberal policy uses testing outcomes to promote school takeovers, often through the expansion of charter schools. Under the No Child Left Behind Act, for example, public schools in the USA that fail to make “adequate yearly progress” (AYP) for 5 years are eligible for charter conversion. These “failing” schools, marked as inefficient institutions, are then effectively repossessed and relocated into a quasi-market system. In this way, forms of organization granting communities, teachers, and school administrators local power over school decisions are dismantled as new

forms of governance and test-based accountability systems threaten once-guaranteed forms of public support, such as federal funding.

As neoliberals take power over school management, they reframe local schools as economic sites expected to cultivate globally competitive human capital. Elite businesspeople, politicians, and technocrats in the public and private sector have aggressively implemented school management models designed to foster global economic competitiveness, individual accountability, and consumerist logics of choice and free markets. It could be said that these models rely on a process of neoliberal *structural adjustment* (which generally refers to the reorganization of national economies) when schools fail to produce high returns in the form of student achievement. This process of structural adjustment can include the dismantling of traditional forms of school governance, the imposition of merit-based pay systems for teachers, increased surveillance, diminished worker protections, teacher layoffs, and school closures.

Neoliberalism also views entrepreneurial control of schools as a modernization project. This project places urban areas and communities of color with high concentrations of poverty most at risk for takeover, as they are often labeled as in greatest need of improvement. Under the rubric of “conscious capitalism,” local political and fiscal crises are framed as legitimate reasons for top-down restructuring of districts and schools (Buras 2011). The rhetoric of elite reformers exploits the difficult educational conditions in schools serving students of color and poor students, casting the neoliberal agenda in terms of social justice, and in this way seeking to rationalize the restructuring of these communities and their schools. In the USA, these opportunistic corporate reform projects have targeted urban public school systems in Chicago, New Orleans, Philadelphia, and elsewhere.

Power as Ideology: Common Sense and Ritual

The processes and practices of neoliberal power were established as a counter to the Keynesian

consensus that had previously dominated US and global forms of governance. The recasting of social, political, and economic life in market terms under neoliberal ideology imagines public schools, students, and knowledge as private businesses, consumers, and products, respectively (Saltman 2014). The prevailing common sense of neoliberalism suggests that as free persons, individuals are responsible for securing their well-being by making good choices, developing marketable skills, and competing to accumulate personal resources and property. Neoliberal institutional frameworks mirror these ideological principles, generally viewing State intervention in markets as an authoritarian infringement upon civil liberties. In the educational context, power works through neoliberal ideology to (1) rationalize market-oriented common senses that place the State and public under suspicion and situate the corporate model as the only viable design for education and (2) enact new practices and rituals of accountability that impose market discipline within everyday aspects of education, orienting social relationships in schools around individual responsibility and economic competitiveness.

Viewing State management as inherently corrupt and inefficient, neoliberal educational reform justifies the transfer of power from the public to “experts” and corporate turnaround specialists. Centralized observation, measurement, and evaluation are said to increase objectivity; above all, standardized assessments that test student knowledge of common curricular objectives are valorized. Redirecting attention from the inherent contradictions of a process of neoliberal deregulation that ultimately produces a new centralization of power, this *audit culture* reorients individuals to only consider valid those forms of evidence that indicate whether schools are operating “efficiently.” In this process, community solidarities are eroded as the corporatization of education is celebrated for its ability to eliminate or reorganize schools, districts, and teachers who do not cohere with business-friendly norms. Exploiting anxieties about student performance on international assessments that quantify differences in national achievement rates, neoliberals argue that corporate-style school management is

necessary to meet the demands of global competition (Hursh 2007).

Power in neoliberalism also asserts itself by constructing an enclosed ideological universe which is maintained through everyday rituals and practices (De Lissovoy 2013). In this process of *enclosure*, a competitive and entrepreneurial determination of education is secured through the very structure of the experience of school, even before the promotion of market-oriented forms of common sense. The basic identities of teachers and students, and the limits of collective imagination, are in this way set by the rituals of test taking, the pervasive monitoring of behavior, and the application of labels, such as “failing” and “at risk.” Individual scores on standardized tests are used to rank students among their peers, and the aggregate scores of student populations are used to position schools in competition with one another. Regimes of testing and accountability also encourage the development of scripted curricular programs that reduce teaching and learning to a set of prescribed tasks and performances. Ideologies of efficiency, accountability, and productivity, as they are encoded in standardized curricula, often require teachers to enact stripped-down and behaviorist pedagogies. In all of these processes, human creativity and potential are captured and absorbed by the neoliberal imperative to produce and perform. In sum, ideologies of accountability drastically narrow the range of types of social relationships that are allowed to flourish in contemporary schools and classrooms.

Subjectivity: Performativity and Responsibilization

Power in neoliberalism works not only through ideological processes proper but also through the forms of subjectivity within which individuals become intelligible to themselves and others. In the first instance, neoliberalism divorces senses of self from forms of social solidarity and insists on an individual versus a collective frame for understanding experience and identity. Furthermore, neoliberalism cultivates an entrepreneurial and

competitive relationship to the self. In this regard, Michel Foucault's (2008) analyses of neoliberalism and governmentality have been very influential for scholars investigating forms of neoliberal subjectivity. Foucault explains that for neoliberalism all aspects of life can in principle be understood in terms of an economic calculus. This is best exemplified in the notion of human capital, which seeks to comprehend the range of human capacities within the context of economic processes of investment, production, and competition. Power in neoliberalism reaches in this way to the most intimate levels of the self, constructing not only shared understandings but even ways of being. Neoliberalism also encloses and commodifies the shared creativity which links together individual subjectivities in common social spaces. In this way, neoliberalism works to capture the potential of both individual and collective imagination.

In schooling, neoliberal governance has important effects on the subjectivities of both teachers and students. For teachers, neoliberal reforms have led to a proliferation of processes of review and assessment, within which there is an important emphasis on self-evaluation. In the first place, this has produced a generalized condition of anxiety, as teachers' skills and knowledge are incessantly interrogated. In this way, the broader social and economic precariousness which characterizes life in the neoliberal era expresses itself in increasing insecurity for teachers, not just with regard to continuity of employment but also in relation to senses of professional competence. Furthermore, studies have shown that as the accountability regime is internalized by educators, their senses of self may come to be characterized by a condition of *performativity* to the extent that they must embody values and identifications that cohere with the entrepreneurial ethos of neoliberalism, a process in which they simultaneously identify with and are alienated from the goal of maximizing learning as measured by standardized assessments (Ball 2003).

The recasting of education as the production of human capital has deep effects on students' experiences and subjectivities. Not only is learning reconceptualized as accumulation as opposed to

inquiry, but in addition students are made responsible for managing and optimizing their developing portfolio of skills. Education in this way is linked to the process of *responsibilization* in neoliberalism, in which social purposes and problems are individualized. This deeply embeds an entrepreneurial relationship to the self in the learning process, a relationship which must be preserved beyond schooling itself, since work life increasingly demands continual learning in the form of investment in one's own stock of skills – that is, one's own human capital.

However, this process works differently for differently positioned students. In schools serving affluent communities, in which rich curricular offerings and a range of extracurricular activities are made available, the entrepreneurial spirit that students are invited to internalize helps them to market the academic capital they acquire in school in the transition to higher education. On the other hand, for those attending schools in low-income communities, there are fewer opportunities for the acquisition of high-status skills and experiences, and so students' identification with neoliberalism's entrepreneurial ethos may be troubled. In this case, the moral pedagogy of neoliberalism generally constructs these students as responsible for their own marginalization. Thus, the same principle of governmentality, in the context of the stark material inequalities characteristic of neoliberal society, has different effects on the subjectivities of different students.

Power, Punishment, and Racism

Neoliberalism has been marked by a turn to punishment in schools and society more broadly. As the social welfare functions of the State have been deemphasized and downsized, the coercive arm of the State has been strengthened. Globally, and in the USA especially, the prison population has grown dramatically in the neoliberal era. In the context of the global war on terror and as a reactionary response to increasing immigration from the Global South, new categories of detention and detainees have been created. Abuse and torture have been normalized and in many cases

rationalized, both in international conflicts and in domestic incarceration.

In education, the stigmatizing of “low-performing” students and schools on accountability measures works as an implicit form of punishment. In addition, recent decades have seen the proliferation of zero-tolerance disciplinary systems, in which students are suspended or expelled for minor infractions, the expansion of security and surveillance infrastructures in school facilities, and a tightening of the links between schools and law enforcement. The turn to punishment in schools, and its connections to the prison system, have been described in terms of a *school-to-prison pipeline*. In education and beyond, the targets of penal and disciplinary actions are disproportionately people of color.

Some theorists consider the turn to punishment in neoliberalism as a means of disciplining workers to the difficult conditions of the post-Fordist economy. On this view, the prison system works to intimidate (and contain) a potentially restive surplus population faced with persistent poverty and insecurity (Wacquant 2009). In the same way, aggressive disciplinary policies in schools have been understood as both socializing students toward submission to authority and as increasing their vulnerability in relation to the State and capital. On the other hand, scholars have also analyzed the punitive character of contemporary society in terms of *biopolitics* or the politics of population management. From this perspective, the material and symbolic violence experienced by marginalized communities marks them as disposable, as representing a kind of “bare life” (Agamben 1998). The biopolitical dimension of punishment can be seen both in its official rationales, aimed at the defense of society from putatively dangerous elements within both populations and individuals, and in its persistent racialization.

Indeed, stark racial disparities argue for a centering of race in analyses of the turn to punishment and neoliberalism broadly. For instance, in the USA, African-Americans are incarcerated at a rate many times greater than that of Whites; likewise, Black students are expelled at rates far out of proportion to the percentage of the school population that they represent. In addition, scholars

have pointed to the punitive texture of instruction that is experienced by many students of color, which is immediately demoralizing at the same time that it reduces their long-term economic competitiveness (Duncan 2000). In this context, it is important to consider the way that forms of material and psychic exploitation intersect in the structural racisms of the present. Neoliberalism sharpens these effects, as a result of its marked polarization of wealth and life chances as well as through the masking of racism produced by the color-blind discourse that it privileges in public life.

Resistance

Against the reconstruction of education that power has undertaken in the neoliberal era, teachers, students, and communities have initiated a variety of forms of resistance. Globally, there have been important movements of protest against the privatization and marketization of educational systems, including the mass movement of Quebec university students in 2012 against tuition hikes and the long-standing struggle of high school students and allies in Chile for greater support for public education. Many urban centers in the USA have seen protests by students and teachers against local school closures and chartering. Movements against high-stakes testing have also grown. In some cases, teachers have refused to administer standardized tests that they consider harmful to students. Likewise, a call to opt out of standardized assessment has found increasing numbers of followers, as parents organize groups promoting this message and as students refuse to submit to persistent testing. These movements are often explicit in noting the link between the effects of the top-down reforms that are the target of their protests and the broader neoliberal turn in society. In addition, teachers and teacher educators have experimented with a range of critical pedagogies in response to neoliberal reforms, aimed at preserving spaces of dialogue and critique in the classroom. Furthermore, as neoliberalism’s effects have become more widely felt, it has become a topic that is often explicitly

confronted in teacher education classrooms and by teachers themselves in their work with students.

Traditionally, critical educational scholarship has understood movements of resistance on the terrain of pedagogy, curriculum, and policy as representing incipient forms of *counter-hegemony*, or counterpower, locked in a struggle with dominant forces over basic understandings, practices, and resources. From this perspective, contemporary conflicts in education can be seen as renewing an age-old battle between conservatives, liberals, and radicals over the purposes of schooling. On the other hand, some contemporary theorists have argued that the enclosure of spaces of work and education in late capitalism calls for a process of *exodus* that does not aim to democratize these spaces but rather to depart from them and to build new pedagogical forms outside of familiar systems and struggles (see Lewis 2012). These theorists are less hopeful that existing public institutions, including schools, can respond to the needs of communities in the era of globalization. Finally, some scholars and activists argue that the public sphere and public schools remain indispensable and must be protected from privatization and marketization, as contemporary educational movements argue, but that they must at the same time be reimagined as a shared *commons* built from the collective imaginations and desires of the people they serve. From this perspective, State support and infrastructure around education should be preserved, but in the context of a larger struggle against neoliberalism that would transform the State itself.

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Neoliberalism, Hayek, and the Austrian School of Economics

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Introduction: Hayek and the Austrian School

Friedrich von Hayek (1899–1992) is probably the single most influential individual economist or political philosopher to shape what is now understood as neoliberalism, although he is best regarded, and considered himself, as a classical liberal. Hayek's own theoretical direction sprang out of the so-called Austrian School established by Carl Menger, Eugen Boehm-Bawerk, and Ludwig von Mises during the first decade of the early twentieth century. What distinguished the Austrian School from the classical school of political economy pioneered by Adam Smith and David Ricardo was their "subjective," as opposed to the "objective," theory of value. Leon Walras (1834–1910) of the French Lausanne school presented economics as "the calculus of pleasure and pain of the rational individual," and Carl Menger,

developing the “subjective” theory of value, launched what some have called a “neoclassical revolution” in economics (see Moser 1997). Menger questioned the notion of perfect information that was seen to underlie *homo economicus* by both classical and neoclassical economists.

It was Mises’ strong anti-socialism that informed the corpus and theoretical direction of Hayek’s work, particularly his work on business cycles. Hayek became the director of the Institute for Business Cycle Research, which he and Mises set up, in 1927. Shortly thereafter in 1930, Hayek was invited to the London School of Economics (LSE) to lecture on trade cycles, where he was soon after appointed to a chair in economics and statistics. While at the LSE, Hayek was involved in two famous debates, first, with Keynes over interventionism (and, in particular, Keynes’ alleged failure to understand the role that interest rates and capital play in a market economy) and, second, during the early 1920s, with Oskar Lange and others over the nature of socialist planned economy. However, Keynes star was on the rise during the 1930s and Hayek’s criticisms were downplayed by the international economic community.

Hayek addressed himself again to the problems of the nature of the planned socialist economy in one of his most famous and populist works *The Road to Serfdom* (1944), a book that suggested that the absence of a pricing system would prevent producers from knowing true production possibilities and costs. It also warned about the political dangers of socialism, in particular, totalitarianism, which he thought came directly from the planned nature of institutions. After the Second World War in the year 1947, Hayek set up the very influential Mont Pelerin Society, an international organization dedicated to restoring classical liberalism and the so-called free society, including its main institution, the free market. Hayek was concerned that even though the Allied Powers had defeated the Nazis, liberal government was too welfare oriented, a situation, he argued, that fettered the free market, consumed wealth, and infringed the rights of individuals. With the Mont Pelerin Society, Hayek gathered around him a number of thinkers committed to the “free market,” including his old colleague Ludwig von Mises as well as

some younger American scholars who were to become prominent economists in their own right – Rose and Milton Friedman, James Buchanan, Gordon Tullock, and Gary Becker – and went on to establish the main strands of American neoliberalism: the Chicago School (see, e.g., Friedman 1962), public choice theory (see, e.g., Buchanan and Tullock 1962), and human capital theory (e.g., Becker 1964). Hayek’s liberalism was also very influential in Britain, especially with the Institute of Economic Affairs and with Margaret Thatcher, who came to power as the leader of the British Conservative Party, in 1979. We might say that neoliberalism, historically, was at its strongest during the era of the transatlantic partnership between Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher, during the decade of the 1980s, and its dominance began to wane in the 1990s.

In 1950, Hayek moved to the University of Chicago, where he wrote *The Constitution of Liberty* (1960), his first systemic treatise on classical liberal political economy. In 1962, Hayek moved to the University of Freiburg where he developed his theory of spontaneous order. The market, he argued, was a spontaneously ordered institution that had culturally evolved in the same way that the institutions of language and morality had evolved. They were not the product of intelligent design; such social institutions, like their counterparts in the physical world (crystals, snowflakes, and galaxies), had evolved as spontaneously ordered institutions. The market, then, while the result of human actions over many generations, was not the result of human design.

Hayek, then, emphasized the limited nature of knowledge: the price mechanism of the “free” market conveys information about supply and demand that is dispersed among many consumers and producers and cannot be coordinated. In addition, Hayek’s liberalism emphasized methodological individualism; *homo economicus*, based on assumptions of individuality, rationality, and self-interest; and the doctrine of spontaneous order.

It was during the decade of the 1980s that Hayek’s political and economic philosophy was used by Thatcher and Reagan to legitimate the neoliberal attack on “big government” and the bureaucratic welfare State with a policy mix

based on “free” trade and the establish of the “open” economy: economic liberalization or rationalization characterized by the abolition of subsidies and tariffs, floating the exchange rate; the freeing up of controls on foreign investment; the restructuring of the State sector, including corporatization and privatization of State trading departments and other assets, “downsizing,” “contracting out,” the attack on unions, and abolition of wage bargaining in favor of employment contracts; and, finally, the dismantling of the welfare State through commercialization, “contracting out,” “targeting” of services, and individual “responsibilization” for health, welfare, and education. On this view there is nothing distinctive or special about education or health; they are services and products like any other, to be traded in the marketplace.

These policies, sometimes referred to as “the Washington Consensus,” were designed to “restructure” or adjust national economies to the dramatic changes to the world economy that have occurred in the last 20 years: the growing competition among nations for world markets, the emergence of world trading blocs and new “free trade” agreements, an increasing globalization of economic and cultural activities, the decline of the postwar Keynesian welfare State settlement in Western countries, the collapse of actually existing communism and the “opening up” of the Eastern bloc, and the accelerated worldwide adoption and development of the new information and communications technologies.

Martin Carnoy (1995, p. 653) comments that “structural adjustment is normally associated with the correction of imbalances in foreign accounts and domestic consumption. . . and with the deregulation and privatization of the economy.” He suggests that, therefore, such policies are identified with a fiscal austerity program designed to shrink the public sector and, in some countries, with growing poverty and the unequal distribution of income. Yet, as Carnoy observes, the practice of structural adjustment followed by the high-income OECD countries and the newly industrializing countries (NICs) of Asia does not conform to this picture. He suggests that the focus in these countries has been on

...increased exports, reduced domestic demand, various constraints on government spending and some privatization; with a few notable exceptions, it has not entailed policies that greatly increase inequality or poverty. Rather, many of the richer economies have focused on “self-adjusting” mechanisms to rationalize production and the public infrastructure that serves productive and social functions. Their educational systems have not suffered and, in general, their education professionals have made income gains. In the best of cases, education has improved and teachers have participated in making that improvement happen. (Carnoy 1995, p. 654)

Drawing upon this difference in practice, Carnoy surmises that there are several categories of structural adjustment and that in the case of the richer nations, the term stands for *a set of policies* which originated in the USA during the 1970s as the dominant view of how economies in crisis, typically those of developing countries characterized by high indebtedness, should reorganize to achieve growth. Such policies called for cuts in public expenditure on services, including education, precisely at the point when a shift to a global information economy required massive public investment in an information infrastructure – with an attendant emphasis on mass education – necessary to take advantage of changes in the nature of the world economy.

Carnoy attributes the emergence of the dominant view to two factors: the richer nations of the OECD already enjoyed favorable conditions which allowed them to self-adjust and to respond positively to rapidly changing technology, and the paradigm shift from Keynesianism to neoliberal monetarism led to “a dramatic increase in real interest rates to reduce inflationary tendencies. . . and to sharp cuts in foreign loans” (p. 655). The neoliberal monetarist paradigm also became the dominant view at the international level, shaping the outlook of world institutions such as the International Monetary fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB), which imposed structural adjustment policies (SAPs) on developing countries as a response to their continuing and exacerbating debt problems.

Neoliberalism has been associated most in the popular imaginary with policies of privatization. Indeed, it is privatization that has provided the

basis for strategies to reduce the size of the State (while, paradoxically, often strengthening its constitutional powers), to reduce the accumulated national debt, while at the same time encouraging foreign investment and, advocates claim, inaugurating the age of popular capitalism. Privatization can be a complex phenomenon. Le Grand and Robinson (1984, p. 3) comment, "... any privatisation proposal involves the rolling back of the activities of the state." Privatization, thus, involves three main kinds of activity which parallel the three main types of State intervention: a reduction in State subsidy, a reduction in State provision, and a reduction in State regulation. Privatization can take many forms: schemes differ not only in the type of State intervention whose reduction or elimination they require but also in what is proposed in its stead and the replacement of the State by the market, by another form of State activity, or by nonprofit-making organizations such as charities or voluntary organizations which are neither private firms nor State enterprises (Le Grand and Robinson 1984, p. 6).

A number of commentators have pointed out privatization does not take only the form of the sale of State-owned assets and enterprises: other parallel forms include contracting out, deregulation, user fees, voucher systems, and load shedding. Others (e.g., Heing et al. 1988) have concluded on the basis of comparing recent experience in Britain, France, and the USA that privatization is more of a political strategy than an economic and fiscal technique. While the case for privatization is based upon well-known theories, the drive for privatization is more complex and often involves political factors such as reducing public sector borrowing or reducing government financial risk. Pitelis and Clarke (1993, p. 6) note that the case for privatization policies is often strong on a priori theorizing and weak in empirical confirmation.

The Main Elements of Neoliberalism

For neoliberals the commitment to the free market involves two sets of claims: claims for the efficiency of the market as a superior allocative

mechanism for the distribution of scarce public resources and claims for the market as a morally superior form of political economy. Neoliberalism as a political philosophy involves a return to a primitive form of individualism, an individualism which is "competitive," "possessive," and construed often in terms of the doctrine of "consumer sovereignty." It involves an emphasis on freedom over equality where freedom is construed in negative terms and individualistic terms. Negative freedom is freedom from State interference which implies an acceptance of inequalities generated by the market. Neoliberalism is both anti-state and anti-bureaucracy. Its attack on big government is made on the basis of both economic and ethical arguments (see Peters and Marshall 1996).

In the following list, I have identified 12 features of neoliberalism from a viewpoint heavily influenced by Michel Foucault's (1979) notion of governmentality. Foucault uses the term "governmentality" to mean the art of government and, historically, to signal the emergence of distinctive types of rule that became the basis for modern liberal politics. His starting point for the examination of the problematic of government is the series *security, population, and government*. He maintains that there is an explosion of interest on the "art of government" in the sixteenth century which is motivated by diverse questions: the government of oneself (personal conduct), the government of souls (pastoral doctrine), and the government of children (problematic of pedagogy). Foucault says that the problematic of government can be located at the intersection of two competing tendencies: a State centralization and a logic of dispersion. This is a problematic that poses questions of the *how* of government rather than its legitimation and seeks "to articulate a kind of rationality which was intrinsic to the art of government without subordinating it to the problematic of the prince and of his relationship to the principality of which he is lord and master" (Foucault 1991, p. 89). It is only in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries that the art of government crystallizes for the first time around the notion of "reason of state," understood in a positive sense whereby the State is governed

according to rational principles that are seen to be intrinsic to it. In charting this establishment of the art of government, Foucault thus details the introduction of “economy” into political practice (understood as “the correct manner of managing goods and wealth within the family”). In line with this analysis, Foucault defines governmentality in terms of a specific form of government power based upon the “science” of political economy, which over a long period, he maintains, has transformed the administrative State into one fully governmentalized and led to the formation of both governmental apparatuses and knowledges (or *savoirs*). In elaborating these themes, Foucault concentrates his analytical energies on understanding the pluralized forms of government, its complexity, and its techniques. Our modernity, he says, is characterized by the “governmentalization” of the State. He is interested in the question of how power is exercised, and, implicitly, he is providing a critique of the contemporary tendencies to overvalue the problem of the State and to reduce it to a unity or singularity based upon a certain functionality. This substantive feature – the rejection of State-centered analyses – has emerged from the governmentality literature as it has become a more explicit problematic.

In outlining the main features of neoliberalism, it is important to realize that there are affinities, continuities, and overlapping concepts as well as differences and theoretical innovations with classical liberalism:

1. Classical liberalism as a *critique of State reason*: A political doctrine concerning the self-limiting state; the limits of government are related to the limits of State reason, i.e., its power to know; and a permanent critique of the activity of rule and government.
2. *Natural versus contrived* forms of the market: Hayek’s notion of natural laws based on spontaneously ordered institutions in the physical (crystals, galaxies) and social (morality, language, market) worlds has been replaced with an emphasis on the market as an artifact or culturally derived form, and (growing out of the “callaxy” approach) a *constitutional*

perspective that focuses on the judicio-legal rules governing the framework within the game of enterprise is played (see Buchanan 1991).

3. The politics-as-exchange innovation of public choice theory (“the marketization of the state”): The extension of Hayek’s spontaneous order conception (callactics) of the institution of the market beyond simple exchange to complex exchange and finally to *all processes of voluntary agreement* among persons (see Buchanan and Tullock 1962).
4. The relation between government and self-government: Liberalism as a doctrine which positively requires that individuals be free in order to govern; government as the community of free, autonomous, self-regulating individuals; “responsibilization” of individuals as moral agents; and the neoliberal revival of *homo economicus*, based on assumptions of individuality, rationality, and self-interest, as an all-embracing redescription of the social as a form of the economic.
5. A new relation between government and management: The rise of the new managerialism, “New Public Management”; the shift from *policy* and *administration* to *management*; the emulation of private sector management styles; the emphasis on “freedom to manage”; and the promotion of “self-managing” (i.e., quasi-autonomous) individuals and entities.
6. A “degovernmentalization” of the State (considered as a positive technique of government): Government “through” and by the market, including promotion of consumer-driven forms of social provision (health, education, welfare), “contracting out,” and privatization.
7. The promotion of a new relationship between government and knowledge: “Government at a distance” developed through relations of forms of expertise (expert systems) and politics, development of new forms of social accounting, an actuarial rationality, referendums and intensive opinion polling made possible through the new information and computing technologies, privatization and

- individualization of “risk management,” and development of new forms of prudentialism.
8. An economic theory of democracy (“the marketization of democracy”): An emerging structural parallel between economic and political systems – political parties have become entrepreneurs in a vote-seeking political marketplace; professional media consultants use policies to sell candidates as image products; voters have become passive individual consumers. In short, democracy has become commodified at the cost of the project of political liberalism and the State has become subordinated to the market.
 9. The replacement of “community” for “the social”: The decentralization, “devolution,” and delegation of power/authority/responsibility from the center to the region, the local institution, and the “community”; the emergence of the shadow State; the encouragement of the informal voluntary sector (and an autonomous civil society) as a source of welfare; and “social capital.”
 10. Cultural reconstruction as deliberate policy goal (“the marketization of ‘the social’”): The development of an “enterprise society,” privatization of the public sector, the development of quasi-markets, marketization of education and health, and a curriculum of competition and enterprise.
 11. Low ecological consciousness (Anthony Giddens): “Green capitalism,” “green consumerism,” linear as opposed to ecological modernization, “no limits to growth,” and market solutions to ecological problems.
 12. Promotion of a neoliberal paradigm of globalization: World economic integration based on “free” trade; no capital controls; and International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank (WB), and World Trade Organization (WTO) as international policy brokers.

By the 1980s neoliberalism both as a political philosophy and policy mix had taken deep root. During that decade many governments around the world supported the modernizing reform thrust of neoliberalism, particularly the exposure of the State sector to competition and the opportunity

to pay off large and accumulating national debts. By contrast, many developing countries had “structural adjustment policies” imposed upon them as loan conditions from the IMF and WB. The reforming zeal soon ideologizes the public sector per se and ended by damaging key national services (including health and education). By the mid-1990s, the wheel had turned again – this time toward a realization that the dogmatism of the neoliberal right had become a serious threat to social justice, to national cohesion, and to democracy itself. Large sections of populations had become structurally disadvantaged, working and living, on the margins of the labor market; rapidly growing social inequalities had become more evident as the rich had become richer and the poor, poorer; companies were failing and underperforming; public services had been “stripped down” and were unable to deliver even the most basic of services; many communities had become split and endangered by the rise of racism, crime, unemployment, and social exclusion. National governments throughout the world looked to a new philosophy and policy mix – one that preserved some of the efficiency and competition gains but did not result in the forms of social splitting and exclusions.

One model advocated by the current British prime minister, Tony Blair, and the US president Bill Clinton, called the “Third Way,” aims to revitalize the concern for social justice and democracy while moving away from traditional policies of redistribution, to define freedom in terms of autonomy of action, demanding the involvement and participation of the wider social community. Some commentators see nothing new in the “Third Way,” regarding it as a return to the ethical socialism of “old labor.” Other critics see it as a cover for the wholesale adoption of conservative policies of privatization and the continued dismantling of the welfare State. Still others suggest that the “Third Way” is nothing more than a spin-doctoring exercise designed to brand a political product as different from what went before. Sloganized as “market economy but not market society,” advocates of the “Third Way” see it as uniting the two streams of left-of-center thought, democratic socialism and classical liberalism,

where the former is said to promote social justice with the State as its main agent and the latter said to assert the primacy of individual liberty in the market economy. Understood in this way, the “Third Way” is a continuance of classical liberalism, born of the same political strategy of integrating two streams as the New Right (neoliberalism and neo-conservatism), but this time the “other” stream is social democracy rather than conservatism.

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Neo-pragmatist Philosophy of Education

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Synonyms

Edification; Holism; Instrumentalism; Problem-centered view; Redescription

Introduction

Neo-pragmatism refers to the developments of pragmatism of the early twentieth century originated by Charles Pierce, William James, and John Dewey. These developments are introduced by people like Nelson Goodman, Willard Van Orman Quine, Richard Rorty, Donald Davidson, Hilary Putnam, and Richard Bernstein. Neo-pragmatism shows an important development of the early pragmatism because of the emphasis that neo-pragmatism puts on language, which shows its accommodation to the linguistic turn in the philosophy of the twentieth century. While according to pragmatism action is what should be at stake, neo-pragmatism shows the importance of language in dealing with action. Thus, neo-pragmatism draws our attention to the roles description and redescription play in the actual change of problematic situations.

What makes neo-pragmatism important for education is the very emphasis it puts on language in addition to action as the language is a pivotal point in educational relationships. While the early pragmatist philosophy of education put action at the center and analytic philosophy of education replaced it by language, neo-pragmatism can be considered as a middle way in integrating both action and language. Among the abovementioned figures, Quine and Rorty are chosen exactly because of the importance language has found in their views even though in different ways. This is not to say that the other figures' views do not have

significant implications for philosophy of education. Even though I use the famous term “philosophy of education,” it should be noted that the term turns to be rather infamous in the hands of Quine and Rorty. This is because both of them oppose the view that philosophy, philosophy of education included, is a distinct branch from science or other human interests. As Wain (2001, p. 173) aptly points out, we should take it that Rorty (and Quine as well) talks about education philosophically: “The important distinction needs to be made here between writing about education philosophically and having this discipline called philosophy of education.”

Rorty has been at the center of attention in philosophy of education compared to Quine (e.g., Peters and Ghiraldelli 2001). However, Quine’s ideas have also been inspiring in the realm of philosophy of education (e.g., Walker and Evers 1988). In what follows, implications of Quine’s and Rorty’s versions of neo-pragmatism will be explored briefly.

The Main Concept of Education

Each one of the two philosophers would have his own insight on what education is. In dealing with Quine’s view, it is better to say first what education is not. Regarding Quine’s rejection of analytic/synthetic distinction, as well as his dissatisfaction of necessity in modal logic, one can conclude that any kind of definition of education in terms of some necessary components will not be acceptable in neo-pragmatism. Thus, essentialist and quasi-essentialist definitions of education should be excluded from a neo-pragmatist philosophy of education. Such definitions can be found in the works of analytic philosophers of education such as Richard Peters. Looking for some necessary conditions of using the word education, he states that it would be a logical contradiction to say that a person is educated while no positive change has occurred to him or her (Peters 1966, p. 25). In other words, Peters considers the positive change as a necessary condition for a true usage of the word education.

Quine, however, would not accept such a definition because, on the one hand, it rests on the analytic/synthetic distinction since Peters is looking for a priori characteristics of education. On the other hand, he appeals to the modal logic where he talks in terms of necessity.

Now, what definition would a Quineian suggest for education? Quine’s holistic stance requires that a definition is understood in terms of the theory that includes the definition. Even though, accordingly, a particular definition can be compatible with more than one theory, it does not follow that the definition is theory-free; rather, one should only conclude that the definition can have more than one theoretical position.

According to Quine’s holism, the analytic adequacy in defining education is dependent on the empirical adequacy of the theory in which the definition is advanced (Evers 1979). For instance, the behaviorist theory defines education in terms of “shaping” behavior by means of the so-called conditioning laws. One cannot decide about the adequacy of this definition independent of the fate of the behaviorist theory as an empirical theory.

Rorty’s contribution in defining education is inspired by Gadamer’s (1989) concept of *Bildung*. According to Rorty, while it was a dominant view in the Western philosophy to consider knowledge as the aim of thinking, Gadamer takes the aim of thinking as *Bildung* or education and self-formation. Even though speculation about *Bildung* dates back to the eighteenth century, Gadamer, following Hegel who has had special influence on Gadamer, gave an epistemological dimension to *Bildung*; what, according to Gadamer, thinkers of that century were “unable to offer any epistemological justification for it” (Gadamer 1989, p. 15). Gadamer brings *Bildung* to the same point where he makes horizons meet (“fusion of horizons”) and thereby opens up a less biased sphere for human thought:

That is what, following Hegel, we emphasized as the general characteristic of *Bildung*: keeping oneself open to what is other — to other, more universal points of view. It embraces a sense of proportion and distance in relation to itself, and hence consists in rising above itself to universality. To distance oneself from oneself and from one’s private purposes means to look at these in the way that others

see them. This universality is by no means a universality of the concept or understanding. This is not a case of a particular being determined by a universal; nothing is proved conclusively. The universal viewpoints to which the cultivated man (*gebildet*) keeps himself open are not a fixed applicable yardstick, but are present to him only as the viewpoints of possible others. Thus the cultivated consciousness has in fact more the character of a sense. (Gadamer 1989, pp. 15–16)

This Gadamerian step toward opening up ways for closed minds in order to relate to one another provides Rorty with a new glass to look at education in terms of “edification”:

Since “education” sounds a bit flat, and *Bildung* a bit too foreign, I shall use “edification” to stand for this project of finding new, better, more interesting, more fruitful ways of speaking. The attempt to edify (ourselves or others) may consist in the hermeneutic activity of making connections between our own culture and some exotic culture or historical period, or between our own discipline and another discipline which seems to pursue incommensurable aims in an incommensurable vocabulary. (Rorty 1979, p. 360)

Thus, by suggesting edification, Rorty intends to consider education as a process by which we can save ourselves from a dominant paradigm and its normalcy and approach other paradigms and thereby innovate ourselves. Rorty holds that Gadamer rightly differentiated instruction from education because the former by looking for objectivity goes under the dominance of normal science, whereas the latter by taking distance from objectivity can save us from normalcy:

Gadamer’s attempt to fend off the demand (common to Mill and Carnap) for “objectivity” in the *Geisteswissenschaften* is the attempt to prevent education from being reduced to instruction in the results of normal inquiry. More broadly, it is the attempt to prevent abnormal inquiry from being viewed as suspicious solely because of its abnormality. (Rorty 1979, p. 363)

Rorty’s drive in embracing Gadamer’s view is due to Rorty’s pragmatist tendency to undermine representation in knowledge and to look for communication, understanding, and solidarity as the aim of knowledge. When communication, rather than truth, becomes the aim of knowledge, then risk taking in approaching other paradigms turns to be a component of education as edification.

That is while Rorty (1989) takes the first phase of education as socialization, he considers the second phase, namely, the period of university, as an opportunity for individuation and irony in undermining current norms. Rorty considers the two elements of solidarity and individuation as two parallel aspects of education that need to be taken as incommensurable. In the meantime, the first element is a necessary background for the second element. According to Rorty, irony and critique requires that something is assimilated and accepted in the first place. Thus, along with Gadamer, he would consider the initial biases and prejudices during the first phase of education, namely, socialization, as inevitable. However, when it comes to the second phase, the educated person would be expected to take an ironic standpoint against the very norms assimilated in the first phase. In the second phase, Rorty is somehow different from Gadamer. While Gadamer talks about “fusion of horizons,” Rorty’s ironist is subversive and ruthless in undermining the norms assimilated in the first place.

Educational Research

One of the questions a philosopher of education should deal with concerns the natures of educational research. Walker and Evers (1988) state that a Quineian would reject both “oppositional diversity thesis” and “complementary diversity thesis.” By the former, they mean the research strategy inspired by Thomas Kuhn in which paradigms, being incommensurable, are the bases for doing a research. The latter is an integrative research strategy in which different views are accepted side by side as complementary. Integration of quantitative and qualitative research strategies is an example.

However, according to Walker and Evers, a Quineian would embrace a “unity thesis” as the research strategy. This is due to Quine’s holistic view according to which the unit is the total of science. For Quine, philosophy, logic, mathematics, physics, etc., are interwoven as a “seamless web.” Quine’s view, as a pragmatist orientation, puts the emphasis on problem-solving capability of a theory. Being a materialist, Quine tends to

naturalize any mentalist conceptualization as it is clear in his tendency to naturalize epistemology. In this way, however, any belief can in principle be used in the structure of a theory in so far as it can lead a theory to a more capable one in solving problems. According to Quine, Homer's Gods and electrons are "posits" and in this regard are at the same bar. The vital point is whether a theory being inclusive of its own posits becomes more capable in dealing with problems.

These general lines of Quineian view pave the ground for realization of the characteristics of educational research. Accordingly, there is no basic difference between an educational and non-educational research. What is important is to use the guidelines such as providing coherence within a theory as well as between a theory and evidence in a bilateral way (adjust the theory to evidence and vice versa) and, at the top priority, empirical adequacy in problem solving.

This top priority for problem solving is also acceptable for Rorty. As a pragmatist, he also tries to get rid of representation as the aim of research and, instead, evaluate beliefs in terms of their consequences in providing a better condition for living.

As far as research "method" is concerned, Rorty takes the stance of "against method" along with Gadamer and Feyerabend. Rorty prevents us from the obsession of objectivity and invites us exclusively to communication and solidarity and looks in it for every desirable thing expected in doing research. Thus, while epistemology undermines the usual dialogue, Rorty undermines epistemology by emphasizing on research as a usual dialogue: "From the educational, as opposed to the epistemological or the technological, point of view, the way things are said is more important than the possession of truths" (Rorty 1979, p. 359).

Curriculum

Quine's holistic view of knowledge has also implications for curriculum. While an analytic philosopher of education can talk about curriculum in terms of forms of knowledge that leads to providing distinct subject matters for curriculum,

a Quineian neo-pragmatist would reject it by relying on Quine's view on the web of knowledge as a seamless web. A neo-pragmatist can of course accept different subject matters in so far as they fulfill a pragmatic purpose, but this would be no more than a division of branches of knowledge that a librarian uses in providing a practically useful library. However, any kind of essentialist view on knowledge branches will be rejected in a neo-pragmatist curriculum:

Names of disciplines should be seen only as technical aids in the organization of curricula and libraries; a scholar is better known by the individuality of his problems than by the name of his discipline. (Quine 1981, p. 88)

Even though ironically Quine talks about the organization of curricula in terms of disciplines, this should be understood as referring to the current way of organizing curricula. However, taking note of the neo-pragmatist's conception of knowledge, one can conclude that what is preferable for a neo-pragmatist is to organize the curriculum around problems without committing oneself to disciplines. By putting problems at the center, a neo-pragmatist would recommend more an interdisciplinary approach than a disciplinary one.

Rorty will surely support this preference for problem solving in organizing curriculum because he also understands subject matters in terms of practical matters:

The line between novels, newspapers articles, and sociological research get blurred. The lines between subject matters are drawn by reference to current practical concerns, rather than putative ontological status. (Rorty 1982, p. 203)

But what is notable in the case of Rorty's view is his suggestion for providing a new language in the second phase of education, namely, in university:

One way to change instinctive emotional reactions is to provide new language which will facilitate new reactions. By "new language" I mean not just new words but also creative misuses of language—familiar words used in ways which initially sound crazy. Something traditionally regarded as a moral abomination can become an object of general satisfaction, or conversely, as a result of the increased popularity of an alternative description of what is happening. Such popularity extends logical space by making descriptions of situations which used to seem crazy seem sane. (Rorty 1994, p. 126)

Examples of Rorty here are homosexuality and extirpation of minorities. While the description of homosexuality as expression of devotion was considered crazy in the past, the scene changes in the present. Likewise, the description of extirpation of minorities as purification is taken at most times as crazy, but at certain times, e.g., under the Nazi, it sounds sane by using a new language. Rorty's emphasis on providing a new language in education is in line with his insistence to include individuation and irony in education.

Conclusion

To conclude, neo-pragmatism pushes the early pragmatism toward either a stronger holism, as is the case with Quine, or a more linguistic orientation in dealing with action as Rorty urges us to believe. The holistic trend in the realm of education lessens the entire emphasis on changing "the world" during problem solving and shows the importance of "the word" in line with Quine's "semantic ascent." The holism invites us to understand the concept of education in terms of the encompassing theory, as it shows the vital role the coherence between theory and evidence plays in educational research and blurs the boundaries among subject matters in curriculum. The linguistic trend, in its turn, undermines any "final vocabulary" and embraces redescriptions and "new languages." Thus, the concept of education needs to be understood in terms of edification, as educational research should be carried out in the way of a dialogue and consensus and curriculum should be saved from rigidity due to the illusion of objective differences among subject matters.

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Networked Learning

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Synonyms

[Connected learning](#); [Learning networks](#)

Introduction

Networked learning is a research area concerned with the relationship between digital, networked technologies and education and learning. The depth and range of ideas informing networked learning can be explored in a number of

publications (Steeple and Jones 2002; Goodyear et al. 2004; Dirckinck-Holmfeld et al. 2012; Hodgson et al. 2014; Carvalho and Goodyear 2014; Jones 2015; Jandrić and Boras 2015).

Networked learning is:

...learning in which information and communications technology (ICT) is used to promote connections: between one learner and other learners, between learners and tutors; between a learning community and its learning resources. (Goodyear et al. 2004, p. 1)

The key term in this definition is connections and the emphasis is on the technology-mediated interactions between people and between people and resources. Connections include interactions between people and material technologies and resources. However, interactions with technologies and resources are not sufficient in themselves to constitute networked learning. Networked learning requires some element of human-human interaction even when mediated through digital networks.

There are differences of emphasis about the nature of the field and how networked learning should be defined (see, e.g., Dirckinck-Holmfeld et al. 2012, Chap 17); however the definition has provided a consistent point of reference for an international conference and a book series. The papers from the international ► [Networked Learning](#) Conference are freely available in an online archive from the first conference held in 1998.

Synonyms for Networked Learning and Related Areas

An alternative term that has greater currency in North America has been learning networks (Hiltz et al. 2007). Originating in the work by Hiltz and Turoff in the late 1970s, learning networks and asynchronous learning networks have developed into an area that overlaps with networked learning but has its own distinct approach. Learning networks and networked learning are both terms that have informed the development of the idea of connectivism and cMOOCs in the work of Siemens and Downes from Canada (Jones 2015, p. 65). A useful distinction has been drawn by

Carvalho and Goodyear (2014) who use the term learning networks to identify specific instances of networked learning. These can be investigated and analyzed to inform future designs with the aim of generating a repertoire of properly understood examples illustrating the complex processes and assemblages in which networked learning takes place. This distinction suggests that networked learning can be used as the term describing the general phenomenon and learning networks to describe with greater precision the various ways that networked learning is enacted.

Connected learning is another term that covers a similar area to networked learning, but it is largely focused on young people of school age (Jones 2015, p. 7). In contrast networked learning has traditionally focused on adult learning, higher education, and professional or lifelong learning. The difference between connected learning in compulsory school age settings, even where these involve informal learning, is important. Networked learning has generally been applied to adult learners who are learning in formal settings that are generally voluntary and not as prescribed as school age activities. Adult learners can also be considered as being different in character to those who are school aged. In terms of informal activities, school-aged learners are often more free to engage in a range of voluntary activities than adult professional learners who are more often constrained by their primary work activities.

Networked Learning

A distinctive feature of networked learning is its clear research focus and a willingness to draw on a wide range of disciplines for theoretical inspiration. Networked learning can easily be confused with other approaches, but networked learning is not simply another term that equates with e-learning or technology-enhanced learning (TEL). For networked learning the connectivity enabled by digital networks and the potential for interactions between people, and between people and their resources, is absolutely central. Learning technologies are a means to this end rather than the primary focus of research. Although


networked learning does not subscribe to one particular learning theory or pedagogy, networked learning is an approach underpinned by a set of pedagogical values, whereas TEL or e-learning is a broader area with multiple and heterogeneous theoretical views and pedagogical practices. Furthermore networked learning is not restricted by the normative position suggested by terms such as “enhancement.”

Networked learning has a close relationship with computer-supported collaborative learning (CSCL), in that both fields have a keen interest in collaborative orchestrations of learning. However, CSCL tends to focus on smaller groups, including dyads, whereas networked learning extends to medium- to large-scale groupings. Also CSCL has a strong connection with formal learning in education, whereas networked learning has been picked up in a wider context, for example, lifelong learning, professional development, and organizational learning.

Social learning and communities of practice are other areas close to networked learning. Although communities and networks are often thought of as two different types of social structure, networked learning thinks of community and network as two aspects of social structures in which learning can take place (Wenger et al. 2011). Network refers to the set of relationships (see below) such as information flows, helpful linkages, joint problem solving, and knowledge creation. Community is a special case of networks and refers to the development of a shared identity around a topic or set of challenges. It represents a collective intention – however tacit and distributed – to steward a domain of knowledge and to sustain learning about it. Networked learning differs from other related fields because of its research focus on networks, critical pedagogy, and learning.

Networks

Networked learning understands networks specifically in relation to digital technologies and the networks associated with them. In mathematical terms networks can be described as nodes (vertices) connected by links (edges). A basic



Networked Learning, Fig. 1 Simple network of nodes and links (Source – <https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:6n-graf.png> – Public Domain. Created by User: AzaToth)

representation is included below (Fig. 1); vertices or nodes are the numbered circles and the edges or links are the straight lines.

The mathematical approach to network analysis can provide a number of tools for the analysis and description of large networks and flows of data, such as those generated by large online and distance courses and massive open online courses (MOOCs).

Social networks can be described in various historical periods and differing social contexts, but networked learning is concerned with learning in relation to the digital and networked technologies developed in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. Networked learning draws on several different theories and intellectual traditions concerned with networks including social network analysis (SNA). SNA builds on the principles of analysis from network or graph theory and on sociology and communications theory. SNA explores how relationships between people and organized groups of people form networks and how these networks affect access to opportunities such as jobs, knowledge, and information. Haythornthwaite and De Laat (2011) identify the basic building blocks of SNA as actors, ties, relations, and networks. An actor in these networks can be organized groups and they are not necessarily individual people or even people at all. Actors in SNA can sometimes be computer agents and relationships can be mediated forms of human-human interaction or hybrid human-machine configurations. Currently there is no settled position in networked learning on this question. Haythornthwaite and De Laat (2011) are cautious about the inclusion of inanimate and

hybrid actors because currently there has been little work that has applied SNA to include objects or to develop interpretations of the social aspects of networks to include hybrid actors and/or inanimate objects. To settle this question further, analysis drawing on actor-network theory and related sociomaterial and post-human approaches will be needed to examine the role of these kinds of actors in SNA (Jones 2015).

Learning

Networked learning has no unique theory of learning but it is not neutral with regard to existing theories. Networked learning argues that learning cannot be understood in isolation and that it has to be appreciated in its social and material (technological and physical) context, as well as from an organizational and policy-level perspective. Networked learning researchers argue for a relational view of learning which suggests that learning cannot be reduced either to the person and individual cognition or to a social view of learning that ignores the already established characteristics of the learner (Haythornthwaite and De Laat 2011; Carvalho and Goodyear 2014). Networked learning theorists argue that networked learning pedagogies are closely affiliated with critical theory, critical pedagogy, dialogical learning, and inquiry-based or problem-based orchestrations of learning (Hodgson et al. 2014; Jandrić and Boras 2015). Emerging from this broad theoretical landscape, Dirckinck-Holmfeld et al. (2012, p. 295) have outlined a set of pedagogical principles they argue most networked learning practitioners value:

- Cooperation and collaboration in the learning process
- Working in groups and in communities
- Discussion and dialogue
- Self-determination in the learning process
- Difference and its place as a central learning process
- Trust and relationships, weak and strong ties
- Reflexivity and investment of self in the networked learning processes
- The role technology plays in connecting and mediating

From a pedagogical point of view or a design perspective, networked learning takes an indirect view of learning and argues that learning can be designed *for* but never directly designed (Jones 2015; Carvalho and Goodyear 2014), i.e., that there is no direct and causal relationship between teacher's or designer's intentions and what will then happen in actual practice or the learning that might result from that practice. Goodyear's work (Fig. 2) establishes a set of relationships between tasks and activities, space and place, and organization and community. The elements (tasks, space, and organizations) open to design have a distinct if indirect relationship to those aspects which can be designed for but are not open to direct design: activities, places, and communities. While organizational principles to facilitate community building can be designed (e.g., by a teacher), the community that emerges cannot be designed. Likewise tasks can be set up, but the activities that will emerge from students' interactions with the set tasks are not directly designable.


This view of learning is in sharp contrast to the tradition of instructional design and various forms of learning design which assume that learning is open to more direct interventions. Although learning itself cannot be designed, existing learning networks can be analyzed so that they can inform the future designs of those elements (tasks, spaces, tools, and organizations) open to design activity (Carvalho and Goodyear 2014).

Issues and Trends

Initially networked learning studies were preoccupied with various forms of open distance online learning in higher education, e.g., in courses where students would sit at home and connect and discuss resources with tutors and other students mediated by conferencing systems or virtual learning environments (Hiltz et al. 2007). This was how and when networked learning technologies entered higher education (Steeple and Jones 2002; Goodyear et al. 2004). It is now clear that networked technologies are much more than the desktop computers we use to connect to virtual classrooms. Education today is saturated with omnipresent and pervasive access to digital networked technologies, via various devices

Networked Learning,

Fig. 2 Indirect approach to learning (Adapted from Goodyear in Steeples and Jones 2002, p. 65)



(phones, tablets, etc.) and in various locations (at home, on public transport, on campus, or in the lecture hall). Contemporary networked learning actively crosses the boundaries of traditional settings to understand how mobile and ubiquitous technologies can allow learners to couple learning and everyday lived contexts and how participants though colocated (face to face) can simultaneously collaborate online.

A major issue for networked learning is the relationship between technologies understood as material entities and the social life and learning related to these material forms. Technology is generally understood in networked learning as a complex sociomaterial entity involving a history of design, a social pattern of adoption, and a complex hybridity of humans and machines (including code and software) in technologies, such as the Internet, the Web, and a range of local networks and infrastructures such as a learning management system (LMS). The idea of affordance has proved useful to understand these socio-technical relationships between technologies and those that make use of them, but this term is slippery and there are continuing debates about how best to use it, and indeed whether to use the idea of affordance at all (Jones 2015). Because technologies are designed with

purposes in mind, they embed properties and features that are intended to be taken up in particular kinds of use. Some argue that technologies “possess” affordances, but networked learning theorists argue that the properties of technologies are not determinant of the uses made of them, even though they act as limits to them. Thus, affordances can be thought of as relational properties that emerge from the interactions between different elements, and they are not essential characteristics of any object, technology, artifact, or system.

Networked learning is an emerging perspective in the area of professional development that aims to understand social learning processes by asking how people develop and maintain a “web” of social relations used for their learning and development (Goodyear et al. 2004; Haythornthwaite and De Laat 2011; Steeples and Jones 2002). The reasons for this development are the increasing complexity of work and the constant change of knowledge and procedures that stimulate professionals to work together to actively cocreate and innovate their domain and practice. This is related to the take-up of social (business) media which allows professionals to connect and interact with peers inside and outside their organizations to learn, to solve work-related problems, and to

innovate. A networked learning approach helps organizations and professionals to understand knowledge management from a learning perspective and provides ways in which professionals can be supported.

A developing area of research in networked learning concerns ways that digital world is different because it relies on code, the lines of instructions, and algorithms that combine and generate complex digital functions which produce real and tangible effects. Code is the “governing power” of digital networks because it makes things happen and shapes future actions through self-governing feedback loops which give code a co-constituting and shaping role in networked learning (Jones 2015, p. 141). Networked learning research is interested in tracing activity within educational settings and it is interested in these at various levels of scale. Interactions within small groups, modules, and courses have previously been studied using a number of different methods. The newer kinds of data, often summarized as “big data,” are being subject to various kinds of analytics, including learner analytics or learning analytics. This means that there are new opportunities for insights into levels of activity of significantly larger groups, in institutions, large organizations, and dispersed social networks. The use of this kind of data will require careful development by ethically informed researchers who will need to explore the detail of data collection and data manipulation to ensure that the data they use is fit for research purposes and does not harm participants. This also requires close scrutiny from a critical perspective and a continuous questioning of: Who will benefit? Who will such analytics empower? And who – or which understandings of learning – might be marginalized? These are the kinds of questions that have been asked within networked learning in the past – and will be in the years to come.

Cross-References

- [Critical Education and Digital Cultures](#)
- [Digital Learning and the Changing Role of the Teacher](#)

- [Digital Scholarship: Recognizing New Practices in Academia](#)
- [Massive Open Online Courses \(MOOCs\)](#)
- [Open Digital Practices, An Overview of](#)
- [Open Distance Learning](#)
- [Open Education, an Overview of](#)
- [Open Educational Resources](#)
- [Openness and Power](#)
- [Wikilearning](#)

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Neuron

- [Mathematics Education as a Matter of the Body](#)

New Education Fellowship (NEF)

► [Social Imaginaries and the New Education Fellowship](#)

New Education Movement

► [Teacher Education at the Intersection of Educational Sciences](#)

New Language of Learning

► [Teacher Education at the Intersection of Educational Sciences](#)

New Literacies Theory

► [new literacies, New Literacies](#)

new literacies, New Literacies

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Synonyms

[Digital Literacies](#); [Digital Literacy Environments](#);
[Literacy and Technology](#); [Literacy Practices](#)
[New Literacies Theory](#)

Introduction

How new literacies are defined and perceived, and how they are addressed, has important implications for both how to educate and what to include

in educational curricula. This entry explains how definitions of literacy have changed, provides views and definitions of new literacies, and argues for a need to see new literacies from the perspective of a dual-level theory.

Defining literacy has always been challenging and controversial. For example, earlier definitions related to literacy have defined reading as a psycholinguistic guessing game (Goodman 1976), a transaction between reader and text (Rosenblatt 1994), a building up of skills-based, mechanical processes (Flesch 1981), or a fusion between readers and writers (Shanahan 1990). While these and other definitions can be applied to our changing world of literacy, they come largely from a predigital time when literacy was conceptualized within static, print-based environments. They do not adequately address the personal role one now has in manipulating and merging different media as authors and readers, communicating in digital environments that require skills beyond those required in traditional texts, and necessitating search and evaluative strategies in electronic environments.

Individuals no longer interact mainly with static print materials when reading and writing. Rather, they interact with moveable text, images, audio files, links, digital search engines, virtual keyboards, touch screens, motion-based and haptic interfaces, and other input and output devices as they communicate, create, and consume information. This is true even for very young children across socioeconomic status demographics. In a cross-sectional study of 350 children aged 6 months to 4 years in an urban, low-income, minority community, Kabali et al. (2015, p. 1044) found that 96.6% used mobile devices, and most started doing so before age one. Most 3- and 4-year-olds used devices without help, one-third engaged in media multitasking, and child ownership of device, age at first use, and daily use were not associated with ethnicity or parent education. Clearly, what it means to be literate, and how literacy is defined, continually changes based on available technology, social needs, and expectations surrounding communicative and collaborative practices. This has caused some to call “literacy” a deictic term – one that

changes continually depending on the frame of reference in which it is used (Leu 2000).

Links from Old to New Literacy Practices

Simply reading alphabetic text on a computer screen does not appear to require “new literacies.” However, new literacies would be required to bring the to-be-read text to the screen, to save the text if a return to it is desired, to extract parts of the text and move it into a new document, to highlight and insert comments within the text, to send a message about the text, perhaps with a copied section, to someone else, to add video to the text based on someone else’s suggestions, to post the text to a social network, to allow the text to evolve as others add information and links to the original post, and so on. While the actual processing of the alphabetic or image-related information on screen is not substantially different from its processing on paper, the new literacies required to find and use a text, to author multimedia documents, and to communicate about texts through online and digital tools is different from the literacies required in earlier times when copying parts of the message or communicating about it required a different set of literacies than needed in digital environments.

New literacies are, in a sense, unique to an individual. The high school student who has grown up with and is facile in using social software and social media, the Internet, and video on their personal digital devices would not feel that they are using new literacy skills and practices in their lives. These skills *are* part of their lives. The young child, however, who is unfamiliar with the letters and sounds that make up words or the toddler who is trying to create an audio-voice message for the first time are learning new literacy skills, as those are as yet unfamiliar communicative practices to those individuals and, once learned their lives change. While based in individual practices, however, the term “new literacies” is generally used to describe how digital technologies and environments are used, and how these technologies have changed individuals’ lives and society as a whole.

New literacies are also related to the specific devices and software tools within which they function. Each device has its own demands, features, and affordances. Each device and software, when upgraded, provides a new set of affordances and results in new practices and skills. For these reasons, functioning within a new literacies perspective requires the ability to adapt to these continuous changes.

Wilber (2012) reinforces and discusses the notion that new literacies should be both ontologically and paradigmatically new. They should allow individuals and groups to do things that were not possible before, and establish a new ethos or “ways of being,” (Lankshear and Knobel 2011), perhaps in how personal and academic identities or social networks are formed and differ both in scope and application of social capital. Yet, definitions of new literacies must also acknowledge that people often act alone in such spaces, and that new literacies encompass an individual’s knowledge, acquisition, and use of skills and abilities in communicating and understanding the various digital modes that are common in developed countries.

Accepting the view that new literacies allow us to do things that were not possible before (Lankshear and Knobel 2011; Wilber 2012) leads to acknowledging that devices, interfaces, software, and their changes and upgrades influence what we do and how we do them. For example, the literacies required to search for and access content with a mouse linked to a desktop computer rather than a multitouch screen on a small-screen mobile phone result in different Internet search capabilities, how search results are displayed, and how they can be manipulated. Even within a given technology category, different features result in different possibilities and experiences. When force touch became available on Apple mobile devices, more sophisticated users could access searched-for content more quickly and efficiently, thus separating their experience and the amount of information they could access in a given amount of time from less knowledgeable users or those with older touch-interface devices. Of course, as we discuss later, evaluating and using searched-for items requires different,

higher-level literacies than those required to simply use a device.

Literacies, Then and Now

One might say that the impetus for thinking about new literacies came from the seminal publication of the New London Group (1996), who recognized that the world and literacy landscapes were changing and argued for new pedagogies to address teaching and learning within the “multi-literacies” that were required for communication and the demands of the shifting workplace (e.g., see Cope and Kalantzis 2009). Yet the term “new literacies” is itself deictic – the multiliteracies that the New London Group highlighted have changed dramatically, as have the pedagogies needed as technologies evolve.

Studies relating to new literacies have often examined the skills and dispositions required to use, interact with, create, and understand messages largely through the Internet (e.g., Castek et al. 2014; Coiro and Dobler 2007). Other researchers have examined what various age or demographic groups do with digital technologies and tools (e.g., Black 2005; Ito et al. 2009; Leu, et al. 2015b). Still others apply new literacies to the study of new discourses or semiotic contexts (Kress 2003; see also Abrams 2015) or literacy practices in various text genres, from traditional books to comics, to videogames (Gee 2007; Kinzer et al. 2011; Kinzer et al. 2012). Thus, new literacies means different things to different people and has been used to describe research and perspectives that, while different, are all informative and important.

To resolve the important yet diverse conceptions to which the term new literacies is applied, Leu et al. (2013) have proposed a dual level theory of new literacies in an attempt to resolve the difficulties in conceptualizing a single theory of new literacies. They argue that explanatory theories have difficulty keeping up with and encompassing all that “new literacies” implies at any given point in time because new literacies has become a deictic term. Thus, definitions and perspectives relating to it can’t be pinned down for all

time. A dual level theory addresses this problem and, in doing so, does not privilege one framework, methodology, research context, or perspective over another, while acknowledging the importance of multiple perspectives and lines of work in the area.

This dual level theory consists of lower case new literacies and uppercase New Literacies. Lowercase new literacies encompass research that addresses specific areas of new literacies or new and emerging technology, such as examining new literacies and social implications of Twitter use (Greenhow and Gleason 2012) or Internet search and comprehension strategies (Leu et al. 2015). Lowercase new literacies also includes research and scholarship focused on specific disciplinary foundations such as the semiotics of multimodality in online media (Kress 2003), the formation of identities and youth cultures (e.g., Moje 2015), the ethos and materiality of new literacies pedagogy (e.g., Vasudevan 2014; Skinner et al. 2014), conceptual approaches to new literacy studies (Street 2003), or studies that explore specific populations or underrepresented groups (Black 2005; Warschauer and Matuchniak 2010). Lowercase new literacies thus allows the inclusion of many perspectives, methods, and contexts within which new literacies are studied and applied and allows an inclusionary perspective to bear on the field. It also provides the flexibility to encompass research and conceptions of new literacies that will change as new technologies and their applications appear and evolve, thus acknowledging the deictic nature of new literacies while providing the flexibility to include future research in areas yet unknown. Each of the studies, methodologies, and perspectives within lowercase new literacies is important, because they provide a piece of the puzzle as we learn about new literacies in all of its present and future contexts and connotations. These diverse foci allow learning from each other as the field grapples with what might become the core or prototypical features of a general theory.

Uppercase New Literacies theory allows looking across the new literacies studied in various contexts and from different lenses. It facilitates recognition of consistent patterns that evolve

from the many new literacies that are being studied and has the potential to ultimately lead to what might be called core features of New Literacies theory. Uppercase New Literacies theory includes the consistent findings from many lowercase new literacies studies. Such a dual level approach allows scholars from different fields and perspectives to study literacy as technology changes while informing New Literacies theory, facilitating the study of alternative and competing theories of new literacies while continually modifying New Literacies theory as consistent findings emerge. As stated by Leu et al. (2013, p. 1158)

By assuming change in the model, everyone is open to a continuously changing definition of literacy, based on the most recent data that emerges consistently, across multiple perspectives, disciplines, and research traditions. Moreover, areas in which alternative findings emerge are identified, enabling each to be studied again, from multiple perspectives. From this process, common patterns emerge and are included in a broader, common, New Literacies theory.

While consistent patterns from lowercase new literacies have begun to emerge and inform an uppercase theory of New Literacies, a complete theory of New Literacies is not yet possible. Indeed, because of the changing nature of technology and the literacy uses that these provide, a static, “complete” New Literacies theory may never be appropriate or completed because new literacies will continue to be studied within new contexts and technologies, continually providing new results and insights over time. Yet, at any given point in time, the patterns across available new literacies research can provide general principles within New Literacies theory that are based on consistencies seen from new literacies research at that time. At present, several principles of New Literacies appear to be common across the research and theoretical work currently taking place (Leu et al. 2013, p. 1158):

1. The Internet is this generation’s defining technology for literacy and learning within our global community.
2. The Internet and related technologies require additional new literacies to fully access their potential.

3. New literacies are deictic.
4. New literacies are multiple, multimodal, and multifaceted.
5. Critical literacies are central to new literacies.
6. New forms of strategic knowledge are required with new literacies.
7. New social practices are a central element of New Literacies.
8. Teachers become more important, though their role changes, within new literacy classrooms.

Uppercase New Literacies and Implications for Pedagogy

While many researchers have discussed new literacies in terms of behaviors exhibited by users of digital technologies, or the social networks and possibilities that results from such uses, discussion around teaching the practices, strategies, skills, and dispositions required within a new literacies framework is less visible. Yet, there are differences in the abilities across children who come to school in their knowledge about digital technologies, how such technologies might be used, and how to position oneself in relation to digital technologies in ways that result in a continuum of learning within the technological space as new technologies appear. These differences and the understanding that principle seven in New Literacies theory notes that new forms of strategic knowledge are required with new literacies mean coming to understand the necessary knowledge and how to teach it.

This is not to suggest teaching a narrow use of a specific tool, except to facilitate understanding of what using such a tool allows. That is, learning about the specifics of a given tool is less important than knowing what the tool “buys” – what power it might provide for the user, whether it be for information gathering, constructing and communicating a message, collaborating to solve a need, or networking for social change. For example, teaching the use of a keyboard or touch interface may be required, but done in combination with teaching that an interface allows one to search the Internet, how to conceptualize search strategies, how to evaluate the content that comes back from

a search request, how to merge information from search “hits” into a document, how to transmit that document to others, and so on.

Teaching the technologies available and how to use them, as a lower-level goal to meet higher-level goals, addresses both the technology and the ethos of new literacies as discussed by Knobel and Lankshear (2014). But doing so requires new ways of teaching and materials of instruction (Kinzer 2010; Watulak & Kinzer 2012). Classroom spaces need to be reorganized to facilitate uses of technology. Classroom management that enables working groups within and beyond classrooms, linked through digital tools, needs to be conceptualized and implemented. Digital spaces where learners can try out and rapidly prototype their ideas – from drafts of writing to simulations of experiments – and iterative discussion and feedback on those ideas require sharing and networking spaces. Assignments that demand the use of technology, and the technology to do so, need to be provided. In short, children cannot learn about digital tools and new literacies by talking about them – they must be able to try them, experiment with them, apply them, and work in social spaces.

One must acknowledge, however, that placing digital technologies and the social spaces and dynamics created in such spaces into schools and school curricula do not automatically parallel (or have the same motivational value) as out-of-school uses. Leander and Bolt (2013), in a study of Lee, a 10-year-old who engages with manga throughout a day, remind us that emphasizing texts (broadly defined) produced and designed in school through teachers’ well-intentioned strategies and intervention perhaps “does little to address the reality that children . . . may well be resistant to such teaching, no matter how well intentioned, how thoroughly it is argued that it is for his own future good. Even if manga had been one of the resources used in school, it would not have been the raucous, playful excessive manga he loves. It is likely that . . . in that domestication of manga, something key is lost.” (p. 43). However, Jacobs (2013) points out that Leander & Bolt’s criticisms of multiliteracies as applied in schools could be viewed best as a criticism of

schools and their current structures and restrictions rather than as a criticism of providing a multiliteracies curriculum in schools. Reconceptualizing those structures and restrictions, however, is difficult, although there are some promising efforts underway attempting to do so (e.g., Rose 2012; Salen 2011).

Core pedagogies now take into account the multimodal nature of communication and social interaction, and the pedagogies involved to find information and to think critically about it continue to evolve as well. For example, Leu et al. (2015) point out specific teaching strategies within new literacies to enhance Internet search and comprehension strategies, as well as approaches to writing within digital environments. Also, and at minimum, schools may need to provide the following components in their classrooms, in order to educate individuals to be literate in today’s and, hopefully, tomorrow’s world:

- Opportunities to use and learn about the affordances and challenges of a variety of digital tools that are linked to curricular goals by allowing a variety of digital tools into the classroom. These tools might include wikis, search engines, podcasts, productivity software, games and media. This can facilitate learning and prepare for future learning (Bransford and Schwartz 1999; Reese 2007; Dede 2009).
- Opportunities to share knowledge and respond to each others’ work through experiences that maximize social practices in digital spaces. Distributed problem solving and collaborative activities through technology tools allow children to learn that digital tools can be powerful, and that they allow collective knowledge and effort to solve problems or complete assignments in ways that move beyond individual efforts alone.
- Opportunities to showcase ideas in multimodal forms and with multimodal tools. Assignments that use video and audio, mash-ups, and remixes of a variety of sources to communicate a message or opinion can provide opportunities to teach the use of such tools and also teach effective ways to structure messages across multimodal texts.

Conclusion

This entry has argued that definitions of literacies, including “new literacies,” has evolved and should be considered deictic. With this in mind, definitions and perspectives of literacy were presented, showing how these definitions as well as initial conceptions of “new literacies” have changed as technology and its uses have evolved. It provided arguments that a dual level theory consisting of lowercase new literacies that encompasses different perspectives, methodologies, and contexts leads to guiding principles within an uppercase theory of New Literacies and argued that a dual level conception is best able to adapt to studies of current technologies and literacies, as well as studies yet to come, based on technologies as yet unimagined. It concluded with general recommendations for teaching based on New Literacies guidelines.

New Literacies and new literacies remain in constant flux, and the affordances of technology, including the Internet and the increasingly social nature of digital environments, present challenges to educators. However, studying new literacies within a framework of New Literacies has the potential to facilitate understanding and reconceptualizing pedagogy within an increasingly digital world. Knobel and Lankshear (2014, p. 101) remind us that “Ultimately, a concern with “new literacies” is a concern with preparing students as best we can for a world in which there are few constants and the near future will involve artifacts, social relations, processes, routines, and practices barely imaginable now. Studying new literacies offers useful footholds for thinking about how and why extant literacy practices are changing and new ones emerging in the present, why others are remaining constant, and what’s to be done about it.”

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New Materialism

► [Edusemiotics](#), [Subjectivity](#), and [New Materialism](#)

New Media

► [New Media Literacies](#)

New Media Literacies

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Synonyms

[New Media](#); [Web 2.0](#)

Introduction: Media and New Media

While the Merriam-Webster online dictionary traces the first known use of the word *media* in the English language to 1841, tools that facilitate the storage and delivery of human expression have existed for 40,000 years. From Pleistocene-era cave drawings to texts produced via movable type, to on-demand video content accessed via personal mobile devices, the means of message production and distribution has expanded from exclusive and local to inclusive and international. During the same period, media have evolved from one-way monomodal communication to interactive, multimodal, social experiences (Kress and Leeuwen 2001).

Though media differ in terms of the types of discourse they support, the way they can be designed, and the means of their production and distribution, it is the extent to which they bridge distance and support multidirectional interaction that largely determines if they are counted as *new media* or not (Flew and Smith 2011). Media that primarily transmit in one direction (e.g., academic journals, broadcast radio and television, printed novels and newspapers) constrain access to the means of designing, producing, and distributing expression and generally exist outside the umbrella of new media. Digital platforms that simultaneously facilitate the democratized design, production, and distribution of interactive expression over networks are counted as new media (Beavis 2013). This, however, is not to suggest a rigid binary. While, in some ways, new media have supplanted other forms of media, their emergence has also led to multiple levels of convergence and overlap among the range of media platforms wherein features, users, and content are shared within and across groups, modes, and platforms (Jenkins 2006).

Print Media Literacy and New Media Literacies

Historically speaking, an ability to decode and encode the standardized form of print media is said to make an individual literate (New London

Group 1996). In languages like English, literacy is commonly characterized by an awareness that written symbols correspond to spoken sounds which, when combined and read from left to right, create words, phrases, and sentences.

This traditional view of literacy often operates from the standpoint that there is a central, singular mode of expression used by those who are literate. Communicative practices that don't follow the rigid conventions of schooled texts are often positioned as informal, less important, or incorrect (Gee 2004). This can affix a deficit perspective and/or transgressive value judgment to the literacy practices of individuals who – despite being active members of other discourse groups engaged in complex expressive practices – struggle with or reject schooled literacy as inauthentic (Steinkuehler et al. 2005).

Researchers and philosophers have recognized that the societal practices of different groups rely on different literacies (Kress 2003). Thinking of literacies as overlapping sets of fluid multidimensional meaning-making abilities, relationships, and identities aligns with the ways groups and organizations continually cocreate communicative practices that follow unique conventions based on the needs of the group and the affordances and constraints of the expressive platforms available to them (Kalantzis and Cope 2012).

Participating in groups that exist for the purpose of planning and executing World of Warcraft raids, grassroots organizing for social justice in South Texas, staying connected with a sibling living abroad, or writing and reviewing federal US NSF or IES grants each requires a different combination of understandings and practices about how to interact and communicate using a range of expressive channels – many of which happen over new media platforms. These combinations of understandings and practices each constitute a literacy (Kalantzis and Cope 2012). These literacies overlap in many ways, yet differences between social groups, the communicative tasks they undertake, and the platforms and modalities they use to interact produce variations in communication, understanding, and participation.

Acknowledging the fluidity and multidimensionality described above shifts the

perspective from thinking of literacy as a set of general skills related to a fixed body of words and rules toward a multiplicity-of-literacies perspective wherein each discursive context requires a set of communicative abilities – each with overlapping discursive practices, new and old media networks, social groups, and identities (Gee 2004).

Growth and Convergence in New Media Literacies

While not all literacies use networked digital platforms, a large portion of groups employing new literacies do so via new media. The growing ubiquity of networked devices and the rapid emergence, low cost, and inclusive nature of new media have supported unprecedented growth in literacies (Gee 2004; Kalantzis and Cope 2012).

Though new discourse groups with their own practices and new media with their own affordances are both emerging at such a rate that one cannot hope to learn to successfully engage with all of them, several factors support the development of an individual's new media literacies (Gee 2004). A focus in the last 20 years on human computer interaction, particularly interface usability as well as the stabilization – if not market-driven standardization – of how emerging communication technologies support the design, manipulation, and exchange of a range of modal artifacts has created a level of portability or interchangeability of new media literacies practices (Thomas et al. 2007). Understanding how text, image, and video are created and used by a group on one platform typically affords users translational insight into the communicative conventions of how text, image, and video are created and used by distinct groups or on distinct new media platforms.

In the ways described above, participation within and between multiple discourse groups that use new media platforms builds a sort of *funds of [new media literacies] knowledge* (Schwartz 2015) based on the discrete features of the digital platforms and the interactional practices of the discourse groups of which one is a

member. For instance, joining a group that advocates for refugee rights via memes, videos, and public Twitter chats may require one to develop an awareness of a specialized subset of content knowledge and communicative conventions, as well as multimodal design and new media dissemination practices in order to successfully participate in the group. However, for many people living within networked societies, their current and past social experiences often act as bridges toward learning to successfully participate with new groups such as the refugee rights advocacy group or via new technologies.

For example, a junior at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln who interacts over the mobile messaging app WhatsApp with fans of the British soccer team Chelsea FC and also interacts with members of a Facebook climate change awareness group by creating environment-related memes and infographics would be able to leverage a number of her existing literacies in support of the refugee rights group. Specifically, her existing practices related to identifying reliable sources, making sense of the data and information in those sources, and creating messages based on her synthesis would transfer from her work with climate change awareness to the refugee rights group. While she may have to learn a great deal about specific challenges faced by refugees as well as the international, national, and local support to which refugees are entitled by law, her new media literacies include practices for learning about and navigating within new domains of knowledge. Furthermore, even though she may be new to Twitter, her literacies of multimodal instant messaging via WhatsApp and her Facebook status updates would support her in learning how to use the unique affordances of Twitter. Finally, interaction with other groups, including the climate change awareness group, would support her in picking up on and adapting to the nuances associated with interacting with members of the refugee rights group.

Marshaling technical and discursive literacies in order to successfully participate in new groups, use new digital platforms, or move fluidly between both groups and platforms represent the type of multiliteracies, metaliteracy, and/or

transliterations necessary for full participation in early twenty-first-century communication environments (Kalantzis and Cope 2012; Thomas et al. 2007). Not only does prior interaction with new media-supported groups facilitate successful interaction with other groups – and thus the acquisition of additional literacies – but also the asynchronous interaction patterns that characterize much of new media combine to create dozens of gateways toward literacies acquisition.

For example, a plumber living in Western Nebraska in the mid-1980s diagnosed with kidney disease who wanted to better understand his illness would be limited to brief conversations with his doctor, a trifold pamphlet, and whatever his public library had on the subject – most likely a few children's books on kidneys, a general anatomy book, some encyclopedia entries, and, possibly, Seldin's 1985 book on the physiology and pathophysiology of the kidney. While his plumbing literacy could potentially support an understanding of the urinary system and his print media literacy would support his general use of books and pamphlets, he would be on his own in terms of making sense of and making connections between the specialized communicative practices found in the medical and reference sources he could access. In other words, with no kidney disease or kidney-related groups with which to interact, he would likely feel shut out of even the modest level of information available to him.

Conversely, in an environment that includes networked new media, developing literacy around kidney disease would be a much different experience. In 2016, a plumber in Western Nebraska would likely have a touchscreen smartphone with some level of Internet access. He may also be a part of social or professional groups that interact via new media. Even a modest level of new media literacies would serve as a bridge to using his phone, tablet, computer, or a computer in the public library to connect with and discern from among any of dozens if not hundreds of online support and affinity groups. Additionally, identifying reliable sources is a more distributed endeavor between increasingly aware new media users and more sophisticated search engine algorithms than was the case 15–20 years ago.

A Google search of *kidney disease* offers the [US] National Kidney Foundation, the Mayo Clinic, and WebMD as three of the top four links. These organizations offer information via text, images, and video designed to help the uninitiated develop their understanding of kidney disease and interact via new media (e.g., message boards, meet ups, video and image repositories).

The asynchronous collaborative nature of these and other groups results in a stream of multimodal artifacts that persist through time and are accessible via apps and Internet searches. Instead of 1985s five-books-and-a-pamphlet bootstrapping approach, the gateways for developing literacy around kidney disease in the early twenty-first century include scores of groups that have generated hundreds of relevant community forum threads, thousands of graphics and images, tens of thousands of videos, and millions of webpages – not to mention webinars, simulations, and virtual reality experiences. In other words, with an abundance of groups interacting over new media – resulting in a wide range of multimodal artifacts – the twenty-first-century plumber would have a spectrum of groups and a host of accessible, familiar gateways over which to interact with others who care about understanding kidney disease.

New Media Literacies in Schools

Options for social interaction in the early twenty-first century look very different from the options of 30 years ago. Over the past decade, rising levels of new media access among youth and adults within *massively networked societies* (Steinkuehler et al. 2005, p. 99) have increased the likelihood that members of such societies spend considerable time involved in a number of affinity-based social groups that use new media to express themselves and interact (Perrin 2015). The frequent, multifaceted, and voluntary nature of new media-supported interaction not only facilitates youth development of new media literacies but also is recognized as a potential source for increasing youth engagement in, and understanding of, school-based literacy.

New media platforms are often identified as opportunities for schools to leverage the popularity and features of technologically mediated networks for educational purposes. Since the late 1990s, teachers have worked to integrate new media and aspects of new literacies into the curriculum. The range of integration rationales includes an interest in leveraging platform affinity and novelty to inject excitement into content areas (Olmanson and Abrams 2013), rethinking student participation in learning spaces (Vasudevan 2010), encouraging the expression of student identities (Rust 2015), closing the digital divide, and mirroring collaborative ecologies of the twenty-first-century workplace and better facilitating the inclusion of multimodality in academic texts to fulfill evolving State and national expectations (Olmanson et al. 2015).

These integration efforts have historically forefronted academic literacies without meaningfully incorporating the social practices of outside groups that use new media platforms (Sims 2014). For example, a middle school English teacher in South Chicago might integrate new media into a lesson plan that has students analyze and respond to texts and videos that describe Abraham Lincoln's place in history as emancipator, opportunist, and white supremacist. She might have her students use a blog platform to create and display a 1000-word analysis wherein students individually evaluate each author's claims, share their perspective, and, in a sidebar, consider the affordances and constraints of the different mediums used. She might require her students to respond to the analysis of their peers via the blog post commenting feature and invite history majors at a local university to read her student's posts and make comments. In completing this assignment, students would likely be able to leverage aspects of their new media literacies such as an understanding of the affordances and constraints of blogs, the design of multimodal texts, and the technical side of how to give and receive peer feedback on their ideas.

While the scenario described above supports the development of critical literacy, improves evaluative authenticity, integrates new media, aligns with the US Common Core State

Standards, and allows student work to become part of the global networked conversation about history, the use of youth new media literacies is constrained to elements that directly align with developing academic literacies in academic ways (Greenstein 2016). In other words, the affordances of the digital platform – but not students' new media practices, artifacts, identities, and affiliations – are valued and seen as the target for classroom integration (e.g., Alvarez et al. 2013). Though all discourse groups adapt the platforms they use to their needs, the experience of new media in support of academic literacy often looks very different from typical new media literacy practices undertaken by youth (Sims 2014). This tendency toward the teaching of academic literacies on new media platforms via a leveraging of student technical literacies without meaningfully engaging the range of new media practices used by youth leaves the role identity plays in literacies development unutilized (Gee 2004).

While the explicit instruction of academic literacies via new media has had some success in terms of increasing authenticity, ensuring a baseline exposure to twenty-first-century skills, and improving attitudes toward academic literacy, new media use in the classroom has not led to a viral increase in youth engagement with academic literacies outside of school. Pressure to ensure that students acquire academic literacies creates dynamics wherein pedagogies of direct instruction are selected over other approaches based on the perceived likelihood that they will lead to incremental, measureable gains. Similar to Ladson-Billings' (1995) critique of how educational institutions try and inject cultural elements of marginalized groups into the curriculum instead of working to connect curricular elements to practices within non-dominant cultures, schools largely assimilate new media toward their purposes. The multitudinous, heterogeneous, shifting, voluntary, affinity-driven nature of youth new media-supported discourse groups creates a great deal of curricular potential but is often seen as incongruous with instructional practices that rely heavily on uniformity of purpose, process, product, and outcome.

Making the effort to meaningfully connect the school curriculum to learner literacies – many of which take place over new media – requires a commitment on the part of teachers to allow in, learn from, and integrate a range of nonacademic discourses into the classroom curriculum as a way to meet learners where they are. For example, students in a high school social studies class in North Omaha might be invited to offer up examples of texts from within their out-of-school interactions and group affiliations. For a teacher to identify a student-submitted transcript of an emoticon-rich adolescent group-text interaction about Beyoncé as an example of an argumentative text about systemic patriarchy requires that the teacher understand Beyoncé's impact on youth culture, her lyrics, videos, and comments regarding women and society, the practices of adolescent group SMS chat, and the conventions of emoticon use. Additionally, using the group chat as the sole in-class text would require not only the teacher to build her understanding but also confirm that the other students in the class were familiar with Beyoncé so as to meaningfully participate from the interaction.

Furthermore, a willingness to embrace learners' new media literacies in non-reductive ways seems to align with nonlinear pedagogies that accept the gap between academic literacy and the literacies learners experience at home and in their peer groups (Schwartz 2015). In schools the rationale for focusing on conventional literacy skills includes the notion that such cognitive practices support all forms of communication and underpin future academic and societal success. While these effects may be real – with skills such as an ability to make sound-symbol connections enabling a wide range of communicative interactions – alternative pathways toward becoming literate and developing literacies exist within a spectrum of sociocultural practices (Gee 2004; Orellana and D'warte 2010).

Conclusion

Unlike schooled literacy, which is explicitly instructed, new literacies are acquired via

interaction, affiliation, and identification with others within particular discourse groups – many of which take place over new media. Though institutions of education tend to position an individual's academic literacy as an internally held measurable cognitive asset, sociolinguistic ways of framing literacies involve understanding how an individual interacts and exists within particular communicative contexts. A capacity to interact with a wide range of social groups does not emerge from an instructed source but rather from engaged experience within authentic discursive contexts that align with how individuals see themselves or would like to see themselves in terms of group affiliations and identities (Gee 2004).

New media platforms provide educators with the means to connect academic literacy with learner literacies. A growing body of new media literacies research highlights some of the ways educators have integrated new media literacies into learning spaces without colonizing learner practices to align solely with conventional literacy goals and neoliberalism (Alvarez et al. 2013; Orellana and D'warte 2010; Schwartz 2015; Sims 2014). For these educators, the challenge comes in designing ways for learners to meaningfully use their new media literacies within educational systems that continue to privilege psycholinguistic skills and particular print media practices as the source of academic capital.

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New School in Brazil

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Synonym

Progressive School

Introduction

New School is an expression that usually means ideas and practical principles identified with renovation of mentality and pedagogical practices of educators. To make a more accurated definition, with cronological limits, we must remember that there were projects like this since the beggining of Brazilian Republic; but our researchers consider that New School was introduced in Brazil through School Reforms made in some States in 1920s. In that period, the new educational ideas grew up; they became solid in 1930s, when other important Reforms were made (Nagle 1974).

Relevant facts in this process were the foundation of Associação Brasileira de Educação (Brazilian Association of Education) in 1924 and the IV Conferência Nacional de Educação (IV National Conference of Education) in 1931, when there was the dissidence between liberal and catholics leaders. The first group, in which Fernando de Azevedo, Lourenço Filho, Anísio Teixeira, and others were, published in 1932 a document with their political, social, philosophical, and educational ideas – the Manifesto dos Pioneiros da Educação Nova (Manifesto of the Pioners of the New School) (Cury 1988).

A definition of New School must consider it was a movement, whose dinamyc nature do not let us make any final characterization, just like some New School leaders admitted. According to Lourenço Filho, New School is not “an only kind of school or method of teaching but a whole principles against the traditional school.”

It arises in Europe and EUA in the end of XIX century, under the influence of scientific progress in biology and psychology that revealed “a new comprehension of the childhood.” These knowledges were increased by a lot of principles about “the functions of school in face of the new social demands” (Lourenço Filho 1974, p. 17).

According to Fernando de Azevedo, New School – or New Education – includes “a whole projects and experiences with new ideas and techniques (like active methods, psychological and pedagogical tests, adjustment of pedagogy to individual development and variance) or new plans to remodel the school administration.” The expression New School is “vague and inexact” because it can include any “modern pedagogy based on the child development.” In this variety, it is possible to delineate two tendencies, at least: the first was “inspired by the new biological and psychological ideas about children and by the new functional education” and put the student in the center of school and the second, “linked to the evolution of social theories and to the definition of school like a social institution,” put the society requirements above the individual freedom (Azevedo 1958).

In Brazil, the New School ideas were grouped in this last tendency. The history of Brazilian New School was developed inside projects that included modernization, democratization, industrialization, and urbanization of society. Individual would be inserted in the rising society process by school. Knowledges about individual and society, resulting from various fields, especially from psychology and social sciences, were transposed to pedagogical practices. The New School common ideas emphasized intensive use of the scientific and rationality resources in school administration and in pedagogy. Their goals were to increase the efficiency of teachers’ work, to discipline, and to normalize the school physical space (Cunha 1995; Mate 1988).

Meanwhile, in this history there was a great variety of discourse. Side by side the trend above, there was a mentality in which the situation of man in society was considered and the socialization means was discussed too. These ideas look out for the relevance of individual in the social

order – not the individual like a psychological and abstract being but the individual like a collective and participative one. In this tendency, the moral and social problems were put in order to guide the modernization of society (Cunha 1995; Cunha 1988).

So, the era of New School can be characterized like the one in which these two orders of questions were present: to insert individual in a modern society and, at the same time, to respect the individual singularities. On the one hand, functionality ideas predominated; the school was inspired in an industrial efficiency model. On the other hand, the society was considered like a building process; the school was guided by democratic and free experiences.

This era finished in the end of 1950s, beginning of 1960s, when the pedagogic ideas resigned the conciliation of this two poles and the planning theories predominated (Horta 1982).

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Nietzsche

► Nietzsche and Morality

Nietzsche and Acoustics

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Introduction

Friedrich Nietzsche's interest in acoustics, auditory perception, and musical experience – while not pedagogical in the conventional sense – lead to some of the philosopher's most trenchant critiques of institutional education and proposals for its reform. The most extended discussions of education are contemporaneous with his tenure at the University of Basel from 1869–1879. In works from subsequent years, focusing more generally on German culture and the quality of German scholarship, his observations are often framed in terms of acoustics and musical experience. And shortly before his collapse, Nietzsche's acoustical thinking assumes a material form with his proposal to philosophize with a hammer.

Sources for Nietzsche's Acoustics of Education

Many of Nietzsche's early reflections on education depend on the appropriation, adaptation, and extension of the German word *Stimmung*. In the study of acoustics, *Stimmung* refers to vibration, frequency modulation, and oscillation. In the musical lexicon, it designates resonance, voice, and intonation. And in psychology it denotes mood or disposition. Out of the varied meanings of *Stimmung*, including suggestive associations among various fields of knowledge, Nietzsche forges a hermeneutic constellation – as versatile as it is incisive – for his critique of education.

By the middle of the nineteenth century, *Stimmung* already occupied a prominent position in German thinking and was frequently associated with the topics of education [*Erziehung*] and

maturation [*Bildung*]. In his *Critique of Judgment* (1790), Kant describes the free play of imagination and intellect characteristic of aesthetic judgment as the proportionate attunement [*proportionierte Stimmung*] of the higher faculties (2002, p. 197). Schiller, in the *Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man* (1794), explains that only those with an aesthetic disposition [*aesthetische Stimmung*] can apprehend the “revelation of reason in the sphere of the sensuous” (2004, p. 97). And in the essay “Thinking for One's Self” (1851), Schopenhauer describes an active education growing out of the student's experience and reflection, rather than the passive reception of words read aloud by the teacher. The indispensable mediator between experience and understanding, in Schopenhauer's view, is the formative power of the student's disposition [*Stimmung*]. Moreover, all subsequent reflection is guided by principles analogous to those governing melodic invention and elaboration (Schopenhauer 1974, p. 22).

Jacob Burckhardt, professor of history at the University of Basel and friend to Nietzsche during his time there, frequently uses musical terminology in thinking about history and historiography. Burckhardt formulated these ideas in lecture courses, attended by Nietzsche, on “The Study of History” (1870) and “Greek Cultural History” (1876). In these, Burckhardt described the history of the ancient world as “a fundamental chord [*Grundton*] heard in all fields of learning.” Furthermore, only the study of ancient history can dispel the “acoustic illusion [of] thought and argument multiplied to ubiquity by the press [...] whose noise drowns out any voice of the past” (Burckhardt 1965, p. 91).

A fourth source for Nietzsche's acoustic evaluation of education is Hermann von Helmholtz who, in *On the Sensation of Tone* (1863), describes the ear as a mechanism whose cilia vibrate, in sympathy, with the frequency modulations produced by the sounding object. Additionally, Helmholtz argues that our perception of differences in timbre when the same musical tone is sung by different voices or played on different instruments, results when auditory perception combines the fundamental pitch and the

harmonics, or overtones, idiomatic to the different sources of production. While we apprehend the result of this combination rather easily, hearing the individual harmonics is more challenging however, by withdrawing one's attention from other parts of the combination one can learn to hear them (Helmholtz 1954, pp. 65–74).

Nietzsche, Education, and Acoustics

In a series of public lectures on education delivered in 1872, subsequently published as *On The Future of Our Educational Institutions*, Nietzsche finds the curriculum and pedagogy in contemporary gymnasia unacceptable. Echoing Schopenhauer, Nietzsche champions an acroamatic, or spoken, pedagogy through which students are connected to the educational institution “by the ear alone,” instead of one where the teacher, who reads when speaking, aims to reach as many students as possible. Nietzsche believes the “strange speaking-and-listening procedure” of an acroamatic pedagogy constitutes an “education toward culture” and exemplifies true academic freedom, inasmuch as “even the listening and the selection of what is listened to is left to the independent decision of the liberal student” (2007, p. 96). A fuller discussion of acoustics in these lectures may be found in my “Nietzsche’s Acoustic Philosophy of Education and the Designation of Genius.”

A similar concern with the deficiency of contemporary education, and the consequent impoverishment of German scholarship, is found in all four of the *Untimely Meditations* (1873–76). In “David Strauss the Confessor and the Writer” (1873), Nietzsche considers the erosion of scholarly standards in the midst of a “philistine” culture. In the prose style of Strauss, Nietzsche detects an ear no longer able to hear “the aesthetically subtle and powerful laws of tone that govern the life of the writer indentured to good models and strict discipline” (1990, p. 63). Strauss is esteemed because in his work fellow scholars find a reflection of themselves. Even a reader who might disagree with Strauss, nevertheless “feels so certain he is hearing the echo of his *own voice*, that a false sense of unity is created” (1990, p. 45).

The second *Untimely Meditation*, “On the Advantages and Disadvantages of History for Life” (1874), includes a devastating critique of contemporary historiography and the teaching of history. Throughout, Nietzsche argues for an understanding of history and a reform of its pedagogy in acoustic and musical terms. Nietzsche describes the typical historian as “an echoing passivity” from whom only the “overtones” of “the original, basic historical tone” can be heard. In short, the contemporary historian is nothing more than “an echoing passivity” (1990, p. 114). This especially acerbic characterization results from Nietzsche’s wedding of Burckhardt’s metaphor of history’s *Grundton* to Helmholtz’s explanation of sympathetic vibration.

As a remedy, Nietzsche posits a “republic of genius,” an idea borrowed from Schopenhauer, where great historical voices of the past speak in tones audible only for the true historian, one with an appropriately tuned and sympathetic disposition. The scholarship of those possessing such a disposition “reformulates a well-known, perhaps common-place theme, an everyday melody, [. . .] making the familiar sound like something wholly new” (1990, p. 118). As an educator, the true historian transforms the student’s “unconscious resistance” to “traditional education” into an “outspoken and loudly sonorous awareness” (1990, p. 145). For an extended discussion of musical acoustics in this *Untimely Meditation*, see my “Nietzsche, Beethoven, and the Composition of History” (Mosley 2014, pp. 24–40).

In the third *Untimely Meditation*, “Schopenhauer as Educator,” Nietzsche recounts how reading Schopenhauer introduced him to education as the cultivation of genius. However, Nietzsche finds a fundamental contradiction in the “two educational precepts in vogue today.” One he calls inner education, “the recognition of the powers of each student,” while the education of the outer demands “all of a student’s abilities be brought into a harmonious relationship.” He finds a resolution to this opposition in the figure of Benvenuto Cellini – the sixteenth century goldsmith, sculptor, draftsman, soldier, musician, and poet – in whom “everything – all insight, desire, love, hatred – converge in a single career.” Like a

composer, the “radical strength” of Cellini’s character shapes the strains of inner and outer into “a polyphonic unity” (Nietzsche 1990, p. 167).

The contribution of music to a vibrant culture is the topic of the fourth *Untimely Meditation*, “Richard Wagner in Bayreuth” (1876). For Nietzsche, the reciprocity of tone and word in Wagner’s *Gesamtkunstwerk* is an answer to a “crisis which by now spread throughout the civilized world,” namely, “language is everywhere diseased [and] as far removed as possible from the strong emotions it was originally able to arouse with greatest simplicity” and “express in the domain of thought”. To bridge the gap requires the “inspiring soul of music.” However, education in music is “most shameful lack” of contemporary education (Nietzsche 1990, p. 270). Nietzsche believes the disposition of those who experience Wagner’s combination of tone, word, and gesture – like Athenian citizen whose disposition relied, to a significant extent, on the cultivation of musical taste – might once again be fit for responsible participation in matters of State (1990, p. 278).

From Nietzsche’s first years in Basel to his collapse in Turin, the contrasting character of Apollo and Dionysus, and the genius of their uneasy “marriage” in Attic tragedy, was central to Nietzsche’s thought. If *The Birth of Tragedy out of the Spirit of Music* (1872) is concerned, to some degree, with the pedagogical significance of Greek tragedy, then the same can be expected from the rebirth of tragedy in the music-dramas of Richard Wagner. Central to each, according to Nietzsche, is the “aesthetic listener” attuned to the primal dissonance heard in the Dionysiac dithyrambs (Nietzsche 1999, p. 108). Moreover, just as the critical human beings belonging to the Socratic community signaled the end of Greek tragedy, the “critical historical spirit of contemporary education” has produced abstract and “mythless” human beings “deaf to tragedy’s music” in Wagner’s music-dramas (Nietzsche, 1999, p.109).

Human, All too Human (1878), Nietzsche’s first book length work since *The Birth of Tragedy* took shape in the years just before deteriorating health ended his academic career. During this time, Nietzsche reassessed his earlier works and

found in each the same unexamined idealism responsible for the decline of contemporary culture. In *Ecce Homo* (1888), Nietzsche describes the book as a “monument to a crisis [. . .] I used it to liberate myself from things that did not belong to my nature. Idealism is one of them: the title says ‘where you see ideal things, I see – human, oh, only all too human!’ [. . .] The tone, the sound, has completely changed” (1995, p. 6).

As might be expected, *Human, All too Human* includes Nietzsche’s rejection of music as the most adequate representation of the will he found so attractive in Schopenhauer and, along with it, his loss of faith in Richard Wagner’s aesthetic vision. Nevertheless, acoustics and musical experience remain essential to education and the creation of a vibrant culture. For example, in §242 Nietzsche explains that the exceptional student is formed not so much by institutional education, but in spite of it. For such students, “the greatest disorder, confusion of objectives, and unfavorable circumstances” are harmonized by “an inborn, indestructible strength” whereby “the individual is set in place within the counterpoint of private and public culture” (Nietzsche 1995, p. 6)

The acoustic properties of language and its rhetorical formulation are essential features of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* (1883–1884), regarded by Nietzsche as his most important book. Here Nietzsche recounts the life of an *acroamatic* teacher who speaks and sings with the voice of a prophet. When Zarathustra announces the coming of the “overman” his words are met with silence because of the audience’s pride in German education. Zarathustra concludes, “I not the mouth for these ears” (Nietzsche 2006, p. 9). Later, when Zarathustra enters the so-called Land of Education he encounters beings “baked from colors and paper slips glued together” and “written over with signs, and even these are written over with signs.” Zarathustra’s response, seemingly the only response he finds appropriate, is to laugh (Nietzsche 2006, p. 94). And later, tired from travelling in foreign lands, where “everyone talks” and “no one knows any more how to understand,” Zarathustra retreats to a “home in solitude.” There, “being wants to become word” and

“becoming wants to learn from me how to speak” (Nietzsche 2006, p. 146).

In the *Gay Science* (1882–87), which is contemporaneous with *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, Nietzsche joins laughter – a vocal expression without semantic content – to poetry and dancing in the attempt to reframe philosophy as a *gaya scienza*. However, so Nietzsche contends German education lacks this “one great means of education; the laughter of higher men; for in Germany, these do not laugh” (2001, p. 137). When assessing the quality of German speech, the philosopher makes the hauntingly prescient observation: “Just listen to the shouted commands that positively surround German cities [...] what presumptuousness, what raging sense of authority, what scornful coldness reverberates from this roar! [...] The Germans are becoming militarized in the sound of their language” (Nietzsche 2001, pp. 101–103).

Nietzsche provides a brief phenomenology of musical experience when he describes how we learn to love. At first, he explains, we must simply “learn to hear a melody or figure at all”. Then, with “effort and good will” we “stand it despite its strangeness”. Finally “comes the moment when we are used to it; when we expect it; when we sense we would miss it if it were missing [and] it continues to compel and enchant us until we become its humble and enraptured lovers, who no longer want anything better from the world than it and it again [...] It is in just this way that we have learned to love everything we now love” (Nietzsche 2001, p. 186).

In works from 1886–1888, Nietzsche frequently alludes to philosophizing with a hammer. This is not, however, his first use of the metaphor. It first appears, some 25 years earlier, in *Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks* of 1873, followed by references in *The Gay Science*, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, *Beyond Good and Evil*, and *The Genealogy of Morality*. Nietzsche uses the hammer for new tasks and it yields more refined results in *Twilight of the Idols, or How to Philosophize with a Hammer* from 1888. In the Preface to *Twilight*, written three months before the philosopher’s collapse, Nietzsche’s speaks more definitively about his philosophical hammer.

Forged from the complementarity of musical acoustics and philosophical judgment, it is a hermeneutic-pedagogic instrument. Just as the physician determines health or illness according to the sounds elicited by tapping the patient’s body – a procedure known as auscultation [*Abhören*] – Nietzsche’s hammer taps the most revered thinkers and influential ideas of the past to sound out [*aushorchen*] their resonance in the present. The hammer also acts as a tuning fork [*Stimmgabel*] in reference to which instruments are tuned prior to a performance. In the same way a pleasing performance relies on members of the ensemble playing in tune with one another, Nietzsche’s tuning fork tests the attunement of one mode of thinking with another (2005b, pp. 135–136).

Conclusion

While Nietzsche’s acoustic critique of education borrows from earlier sources and adapts ideas from other domains of thinking, his (re)formulation and deployment of them is both novel and incisive. As a consequence, Nietzsche introduces new values for the appraisal of teaching, learning, and thinking about education. These include sympathy between the speaking voice and the listening ear; a musical disposition informed, in part, the acoustic properties of language; the deafness induced by critical-historical scholarship; laughter as the most adequate response to philistine culture; and the necessity of an education in music for a living connection to myth, an aesthetic attitude toward life, and the creation of a vibrant culture.

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Nietzsche and Atomism

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Introduction

Although he was not a systematic philosopher in the mold of Kant or Hegel, Nietzsche worked toward developing a theory of will to power. Nature, man, and society served as important dimensions of the will to power in his theory. He recognized higher and lower forms of this will to power. The highest expression of will to power is the will to knowledge. And science is the highest expression of will to knowledge. Of special interest among the sciences, for Nietzsche, stood physics, which he interpreted to be the will to

knowledge about nature. Physics expresses a will to power by attempting to reduce all things to atomistic explanations. Physics would be, then, the will to atomism. As science, the will to atomism is a type of honesty, an intellectual honesty. Consequently, the spirit of science marginalizes morality as an explanation of the world. And so Nietzsche exclaimed, long live physics! All forms of education in the atomistic sciences, physics, and chemistry, among others, possess the greatest potential for a breakthrough in the understanding and utilization of new forms of *Macht* (Ger., energy, power, or force).

Nietzsche had very specific recommendations for programmatic research and education in physics and atomism in particular. He advised that physicists abandon Newtonian atomism and investigate the point-particle theory developed by Roger Joseph Boscovich.

Boscovich's Theory of Natural Philosophy

Boscovich's theory may be expressed in a relatively brief set of distinct principles:

- (1) Matter is composed of perfectly indivisible, non-extended, and discrete points.
- (2) No two material points can occupy the same spatial, or local, point simultaneously.
- (3) Nothing happens per saltum.
- (4) Between all points of matter, there is a mutual force depending on the distance between them, and changing as this distance changes, so that it is sometimes attractive, and sometimes repulsive, but always follows a definite continuous law ("Boscovich's law").
- (5) There is conservation of force rather than entropy.
- (6) Macro-objects are composed of centers of force.
- (7) Perception relies on relations of force.
- (8) Centers of force are absolutely nonpersistent.
- (9) There is no "rest" for centers of force.
- (10) There is no "empty space."

- (11) Time and space are relative in a Leibnizian sense.
- (12) "Laws of physics" are abstractions.
- (13) Science aims at a unified theory rather than "laws of nature."
- (14) Properties are dynamic, not mechanical.
- (15) There are a definite number of centers of force at any one time.
- (16) Centers of force have a definite magnitude
- (17) There is no matter, only force.
- (18) Centers of force are separated off into pairs.
- (19) A center of force cannot be represented "in itself."
- (20) Physicists project their own properties onto matter.
- (21) There is no continuum.
- (22) The substratum of force is space.
- (23) There is no movement in mechanical sense.
- (24) Effects of force must be distinguished from force itself.
- (25) The total amount of force in the universe is finite.

Boscovich's revolution against the senses maintains that one of the most common phenomena of macroscopic objects, collision, does not occur at all at the particle level of reality (Boscovich 1922). Instead repulsive force increases exponentially to infinity as the atomic particles draw closer. Despite all appearances with visual objects, the objects at atomic scales do not come directly into contact whatsoever. Instead all physical action is at a distance. Boscovich's revolution is paired with an equally counterintuitive notion that ultimate particles of matter are not corpuscular extended atoms at all but rather unextended points of force. Boscovich's atoms were not atoms at all but rather point particles. According to Boscovich, atoms are mathematical points with atmospheres of force. The atoms of common materialist imagination are corpuscular extended chunks of matter not unlike billiard balls. The materialist notion generally teaches that such atoms undergo direct contact and collision. It accepts for its atomism the common sense notion embedded in perceptual macroscopic objects and their interactions. Newton, Locke, and Dalton accepted such atoms in different

forms, but Boscovich went against material atomism by suggesting that the billiard ball image of atoms was incorrect in general and specifics. He rejected the sensible judgments of collision, contact, and corpuscle with his notions of non-compenetration, action at a distance and force points. Even though phenomena of the senses appear to validate collision and so on, Boscovich denied any direct contact between ultimate particles, which for him again, are mathematical points, not solid chunks of matter. What could be more certain and common to the senses than that bodies have contact and collide, like, when we release our shot with the cue stick, the force it imparts to the cue ball seems to roll into direct contact with another ball, colliding violently enough to set off a complex set of further collisions? So all sorts of bodies collide with each other in the world of experience. Yet Boscovich denied the senses in this fundamental way. Of course macroscopic objects appear to collide or even destroy each other through impact, but this does not occur whatsoever at the point-particle level of reality. And this Boscovich could prove by rational and analytical geometric proofs.

Boscovich in Beyond Good and Evil

The most extended public pronouncement Nietzsche made on Boscovich occurs in section 12 of *Beyond Good and Evil*:

As for materialistic atomism, it belongs among the best-refuted things there are: perhaps no scholar in Europe today is so unlearned as to still grant it serious meaning other than as a handy device (namely, as an abbreviated means of expression) – Thanks above all to the Pole Boscovich, who, along with the Pole Copernicus, has been the greatest and most victorious opponent of appearances. While Copernicus has persuaded us, against all senses, that the Earth does *not* stand still, Boscovich taught us to renounce belief in the last thing of earth to "stand fast," belief in "substance," in "matter," in the last remnant of Earth, the corpuscular atom [*Klumpchen-Atom*]: it was the greatest triumph over the senses achieved on Earth to this time.

The Dalmatian natural philosopher is credited here with refuting the "earth residuum" or

corpuscular atom of the “older atomism,” from Democritus to Newton:

... It was pretty much according to the same schema that the older atomism sought, besides the operating ‘power,’ that lump of matter in which it resides and out of which it operates – the atom. More rigorous minds, however, learned at last to get along without this “earth-residuum,” and perhaps someday we shall accustom ourselves, including the logicians, to get along without the little “it” (which is all that is left of the honest little old ego). [Section 17]

Atomism and the logicians share a superstition: the object. Boscovich refuted the object of atomists; the logician’s belief in an object suffered the same fate. Yet belief in a logical subject still stands as a widespread superstition. The belief “it thinks” encapsulates the subjective model of consciousness, but it misinterprets the process of thought in which thoughts come to the thinker, not the reverse. A thinking “subject” is part of the misinterpretation of the process. Even those revolutionary thinkers against materialistic atomism preserved the fiction of a logical-psychological subject. Grammar hypostatizes the subject and establishes the superstition firmly in mind – even Boscovich maintained a naive belief in minds and souls. It proves easier to dissuade the mind from belief in solid particles of earth than from belief in the ego (this being no surprise to Cartesians). Yet the ego is as much superstition as matter; taking this step beyond the Boscovichian revolution presents us with the very origin of will to power as a theory. Boscovichian “force” must, through criticism, give way to the force of will and more exactly the “will to power.”

It is not long in *Beyond Good and Evil* after the first mention of Boscovich before Nietzsche deduces his own theory of reality distinct from Schopenhauer, Berkeley, and Boscovich: the primacy of neither mind nor matter but rather *drives*. This notion of drive has as much to do with Boscovich as Schopenhauer and perhaps even more to do with Spinoza than Schopenhauer; for while Boscovich lent Nietzsche a physics of force not requiring matter, even Schopenhauer’s notion of will was directly borrowed from Spinoza’s idea of *conatus*. Boscovich did not go quite far enough in his inversion of Spinozism: for he did not give

conatus to his force points and quite explicitly boasted of not doing so (Whitlock 1996; Whitlock 1999). Leibniz did not refrain from attributing thought to force points, however, and this presents us with a moment in which Boscovich more closely resembles Newton’s position than that of Leibniz. Boscovichian force points do not think, requiring the strained admission of minds and souls into his new model of the world. Nietzsche found his own position when he drew the necessary conclusion that points of force must also be points of will (having *conatus*); thinking becomes a relation of the drives exerted from these points. They do not exert a Spinozist-Schopenhauerian will to live, but a will to power. Will power depends on active force. Will can act only upon another will, never on matter (as Schopenhauer would have will directly acting on the thing-in-itself). *Beyond Good and Evil* 36 is decisive as an introduction of the theory of will to power; it namelessly evokes Boscovich’s theory of force as the parent notion while then showing the birth of “my proposition,” as Nietzsche calls the theory of will to power; it also calls for the performance of a thought experiment previously carried out in the “time atomism fragment” of 1873, which can be shown to synthesize the ideas of Boscovich, African Alexandrovich Spir and Johann C.F. Zöllner (Schlechta and Anders 1962; Whitlock 1997; Whitlock 2000). That thought experiment leads directly to his theory of will to power and the idea of eternal recurrence.

Time Atomism

Ironically, Nietzsche’s time atoms are sensate monads, centers of time perception, rather than true atoms. Time atoms are more monads, the smallest point of subjectivity, but open to all other centers. Centers of force are points of sensation, which are simultaneously centers of time perception and points of conation. Time atoms are instants of observation occurring so rapidly as to be virtually instantaneous in ordinary experience. Since light travels at a finite speed, observation always takes a finite quantum of time. Temporal comparisons require a subject capable of judging

simultaneity or succession. Time exists only relationally. At its most infinitesimal level, it exists as the finite instantaneous observation at the speed of light between two relatively closest points of force. Quantum observations allowed Nietzsche to consider centers of conation as points of perspectival interpretation. Dynamic time points can be points of sensation only if they are centers of time perception, that is, time monads. Time atoms are not in time; time is in them. In time atomism, there are temporal particles, clocks, and minds. Each particle is a mind, and every mind is a clock.

Crucially, Nietzsche did not believe in objective duration nor in objective time as a continuum (Nietzsche 2001). Time atoms exist for an observer but not in themselves. While we can never completely leave the naive metaphysics of natural language, retaining any amount of it lands a thinker in contradiction. Every quantum of force/time/observation constantly actualizes its potential, expressing its power. Time atoms are atomic clocks with rhythms that are thermodynamic in origin. Time is not a continuum comprising points. Rather than the recurrence of moments of objective continuous time, centers of time perception recur with definite, finite, but ever-fluctuating quanta of power. There is no absolutely smallest moment. Every perspective has its limiting points. Rates of perception determine what is called “real.”

These points of time perception, or time atoms, are centers of will to power. Further, time atomism is Nietzsche’s special theory of time, while eternal recurrence is his general theory of relativity. Thus time atomism developed into his theories of will to power and eternal recurrence. Boscovich, advancing on Newton in some regards, delivered a unified single theory of force; Nietzsche argued that all force is will, and further, will to power. *There is no matter, only force*, Boscovich declared against Newton, but Nietzsche continued, *all force is will to power*. In his own time, Boscovich was eclipsed by Newton and Leibniz, even though he enjoyed a widespread reputation in the sciences.

Boscovich had become obscure by Nietzsche’s time, though, due to the rise of experimental and instrumental sciences. Even though the Dalmatian contributed to instrumental science in astronomy, Boscovich himself witnessed only the early

moments of the scientific revolution. “Natural philosophy” was quickly forgotten. Mechanistic physics came to hold sway, with its powerful discoveries of electricity and chemistry. Many of the leading scientists of the mechanistic sciences lauded Boscovich and understood his place in the history of science, but in the scientific community at large, names like Faraday, Maxwell, Davy, Lord Kelvin, and others obscured the figure of natural philosopher Boscovich.

After Nietzsche’s time, Boscovich’s point-particle physics was eclipsed by the De Broglie-Schrödinger wave-particle theory. The problem plaguing science for some time had been the nature of light, and Boscovich’s points did nothing toward a solution. Wave-particles washed away his sand castle of homogenous grains. Point-particle theory did not enjoy a long day in the sun, located between Newtonian corpuscularism and wave-particle theory.

Nietzsche lived in a brief period of time when the distinct advantages of point particle theory could be appreciated by speculative types disinclined toward mechanistic physics, without knowledge of the imminent solution to a problem unsolved by force points, i.e., the dual behavior of light as wave and particle. He was hardly the only thinker who sought out Boscovich as an advance over Newtonian corpuscular atomism and Spinozistic metaphysics; Herder the mystic did so, just as did Vogt, Priestley, Faraday, Davy, and others. Each approached Boscovich’s particle theory in a mood of pragmatism, if not opportunism. For the hard scientists, the advent of De Broglie and Schrödinger robbed the motive to research Boscovich’s theories. To some philosophers, metaphysicians, mystics, and rationalists, Boscovich still maintained importance vis-à-vis Leibniz and Kant, but only as a footnote. To historians of science, the importance of Roger Joseph Boscovich, however, was not lost.

Many of Nietzsche’s views on education and atomism have come about. Atoms are no longer thought of along Newtonian lines, meaning the corpuscular atom. Dynamism won over mechanics, for a while. Boscovich and zero-dimensional force points became part of Slavic science and atomic research. Quantum mechanics and even

string theory have a Nietzschean flavor, as they are rather Dionysian insights behind appearances. Naive realism is forever gone. And educational institutions are no longer medieval in the way he had lamented. Experimentation has replaced speculation.

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Nietzsche and *Bildung*/Paideia

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Synonyms

Bildung; Education; Individuation; *Paideia*; Self-cultivation; Totality

Introduction

For a philosopher who has widely been regarded as bad, or mad, or even dangerous to know,

Nietzsche has a surprisingly wide and rich variety of things to say about education. In his early career as a professor of philology at the University of Basel, Nietzsche saw himself first and foremost as an educator; after retiring (on grounds of ill-health) from education after only 10 years, he pursued different strategies of education through his philosophical writings. The purpose of this entry is to trace Nietzsche's view of education throughout his writings and, in conclusion, to link it with the German tradition of *Bildung* and, beyond that, to the Greek concept of *paideia*.

Nietzsche as Professor of Philology

On 12 February 1869, Nietzsche learned from the Cantonal Government of Basel that, 2 days earlier, the Small Council of the City of Basel has decided to appoint him as Extraordinary Professor of Classical Philology at the University of Basel. This appointment was a remarkable achievement: at the age of only 24, Nietzsche had attained a professorial status which, for most others, it took many years to reach. So it is even more remarkable that, as critics and biographers are usually quick to point out, after about 10 years in post, Nietzsche tendered his resignation from his professorship at Basel in 1879.

What critics and biographers frequently overlook, however, is the extent of Nietzsche's hands-on, practical educational activity during his tenure at Basel, at least in the years immediately following his appointment. For his teaching duties included responsibility not just for lectures at the University but also courses at the Gymnasium in Basel, the Pädagogium located on Münsterplatz. So in the summer term of 1869, Nietzsche gave lectures at the University on Aeschylus and on the Greek lyric poets, as well as classes at the Pädagogium on Plato's *Phaedo*, Homer's *Iliad*, and the development of Greek drama, Greek meter, and Greek grammar. As Nietzsche wrote on 10 May 1869 to Friedrich Ritschl, his former tutor in Leipzig, he had "enough to do to stop him getting bored": every weekday at 7 o'clock in the morning, he gave a three-hour-long lecture (from Mondays to Wednesdays on the history of Greek

lyric, from Thursdays to Saturdays on *The Choephoroi* by Aeschylus); on Mondays there was a seminar as well, while on Tuesdays and Fridays, he taught two classes at the Pädagogium, on Wednesdays and Thursdays, just one. These classes, which Nietzsche taught “with pleasure,” operated at a high pedagogical level. When reading the *Phaedo* with his students, he told Ritschl, he tried to “infect” his students with philosophy: “through the technique, unheard of here, of extemporalia” – a teaching method, whereby a teacher reads out a text, which the pupil must immediately translate into Greek – “I am shaking them very roughly from their grammatical slumber” (Nietzsche 1986, vol. 3, p. 7). True, the number of students involved was, by today’s standard, often small: around seven students in his lectures, for instance, “with which I am told I should be content,” he told Ritschl.

At the same time, there is evidence of deep personal engagement on Nietzsche’s part as a teacher. In his seminars on Nietzsche’s *Zarathustra*, the psychoanalyst C.G. Jung alluded twice to a story he had heard about Nietzsche and one of his students:

In one of his lectures [Nietzsche] was talking about Greece and Graecia Magna in most enthusiastic terms, and after the lecture a young man who had not understood something he said [...] went up to the professor to ask him about it. But before he could put in his request, Nietzsche said: “Ah now, you are the man! That blue sky of Hellas! We are going together!” And the young man thought: “How can I go with this famous professor and how have I the money to do it?” — and he receded further and further, Nietzsche going at him and talking of the eternal smile of the skies of Hellas [...], till the young man backed up against the wall. Then suddenly Nietzsche realized that the fellow was frightened by his enthusiasm, and he turned away abruptly and never spoke to him again. (Jung 1989, vol. 1, pp. 16–17; cf. vol. 2, pp. 1361–1362)

As well as doing a lot of actual teaching, Nietzsche did a lot of reflecting on teaching. The fruit of these reflections was a series of lectures which Nietzsche gave to the Academic Society in Basel in the winter and spring of 1872 under the title *On the Future of our Educational Institutions* – or has it has been recently retranslated, on *Anti-Education*.

The text of these lectures nearly became Nietzsche’s second book, after *The Birth of Tragedy*; in the end, Nietzsche abandoned the plan to rush them into print and the lectures appeared posthumously.

In these five (of an originally planned six) lectures, Nietzsche presents a sobering and, in some respects, devastating critique of education – in his day and in our own. In his introduction, Nietzsche states as his central thesis the view that two opposing drives rule contemporary educational institutions: first, “the drive toward the highest possible *widening of education*” and, second, “the drive toward the *diminution and watering-down* of education”; these drives, he argues, succeed in producing “a culture founded on lies” (Nietzsche 1999, vol. 1, p. 647). What this kind of education ends up producing is, Nietzsche says, a specific kind of “barbarism,” a kind of barbarism that makes nineteenth-century Germans – and, by extension, us today – “different from the barbarians of other ages.” From the outset, Nietzsche makes it clear that, in these lectures, he does not propose a discrete set of policies or curriculum plans. Rather, he is trying to reactivate the notion found in Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics* (1123a34 – 1125a35) of *megalopsychia* or “high-mindedness” (*Hochsinnigkeit*) (Nietzsche 1999, vol. 1, p. 650).

His correspondence with, among others, Erwin Rohde strikes a similar note of disappointment in regard to something that became a constant theme in Nietzsche’s writings: the relationship between scholarly, academic activities and the tasks of the “real world,” ultimately, the relation of knowledge to life. His answer to this problem both returns Nietzsche to the tradition of philosophy conceived as *exercices spirituels*, as Pierre Hadot has called it, and marks him out as inaugurating, along with Schopenhauer, the body of thought known as *Lebensphilosophie*. For the wrong answer to the knowledge-life problem lay, so Nietzsche believed, in scholarly activity *for its own sake*. As he put it in one of his *Untimely Meditations*, “I consider every word written to be useless, unless it contains a call to activity” (Nietzsche 1999, vol. 1, p. 413), and in *Ecce Homo*, he was even more trenchant, describing “the scholar” as “a decadent”: “His instinct of self-defence has become soft; otherwise he would defend himself

against books”; time and again, Nietzsche emphasized that his reflections were based on what he had himself seen: “Gifted, generously and liberally disposed natures ‘read to ruins’ in their thirties, mere matches requiring to be struck to make them emit sparks – or ‘thoughts’” (Nietzsche 1999, vol. 6, p. 293).

Indeed, in his notes for a never-completed essay, provisionally entitled “We Philologists,” Nietzsche went further: “Classical philologists are people who use the hollow feeling of inadequacy among modern people in order to earn money and put bread on their table. I know them, I’m one of them” (Nietzsche 1999, vol. 8, p. 76). The reverse side of this dissatisfaction was his ideal of a secular monastery; a plan to build one of these in the Swiss *canton* of Graubünden came to nothing (but the idea survived in Nietzsche’s mind.) In contrast to the sad figures of conventional academics (of which, as he acknowledged, he himself was one), he opposed two men, a philosopher and a composer – Schopenhauer and Wagner.

It was to these figures that Nietzsche dedicated the third and fourth (of what had been planned as a series of thirteen) essays under the umbrella title, *Untimely Meditations*. In his second *Untimely Meditation*, “Schopenhauer as Educator” (1874), Nietzsche’s encomium demonstrates the principle enunciated in his essay: “I profit from a philosopher only inasmuch as he can be an example” (Nietzsche 1999, vol. 1, p. 350). It is also an essay that contains in nuce Nietzsche’s theory of education, not least because it is clear that what Nietzsche says about the genius is intended to apply to himself.

The principle underlying Nietzsche’s argument about education is that “your true being does not lie hidden in you, but immeasurably high above you” (Nietzsche 1999, vol. 1, pp. 340–341). On this basis, Nietzsche argues that “your educators can be nothing other than your liberators,” consequently defining education precisely as “liberation,” that is, as “the clearing away of weeds, debris, and vermin that want to attack the tender buds of plants, a pouring-forth of light and warmth, the gentle patter of rain at night” (Nietzsche 1999, vol. 1, p. 341).

Nietzsche distinguishes between two approaches to education, one of which involves recognizing the real strengths of pupils and trying to help that one excellence attain full maturity, the other of which involves developing and cultivating *all* the pupil’s faculties in order to bring them into a harmonious relationship (Nietzsche 1999, vol. 1, p. 342). Yet in the end, he concludes, these two approaches are not opposites but rather complementary: “That educating philosopher of whom I dreamed would not just discover the central power, but also know how to prevent it from acting deliteriously on the other forces,” and he uses the following striking image to capture the task of education: “To transform the entire human being into a living, moving solar and planetary system and to discover the laws of its higher motion” (Nietzsche 1999, vol. 1, p. 343).

By contrast, however, Nietzsche cannot suppress his lament for the reality of education as it is practiced: he offers a searing critique of tutors (“what sort of people will do, even among our noblest and best-instructed people”), of grammar schools (“what a hodgepodge of warped minds and antiquated institutions”), and of universities (“what are they not content with – what leaders, what institutions”) (Nietzsche 1999, vol. 1, p. 343)! In short, Nietzsche was looking for “the ethical exemplars and people of distinction” among his contemporaries “to serve as the visible embodiment of all creative morality” – and searched in vain (Nietzsche 1999, vol. 1, p. 344).

Nietzsche’s Middle Period

On 2 May 1879, Nietzsche resigned from his post as professor at Basel and, supported by a pension from his former university employer, began a new life – as a philosopher in exile from his home country and from academic institutions. Yet the topic of education remains central to Nietzsche’s thinking. Indeed, the entire question of “disciplined schooling” is closely bound up with the emergence of the notion of “free spirit” in his thought (Mintz 2004).

For instance, in *Human, All Too Human*, vol. 1, §265, in an aphorism entitled “Reason in school,”

Nietzsche suggested that “schools have no more important task than to teach rigorous thinking, cautious judgement, and consistent reasoning” (and hence would have no time for religion) (Nietzsche 1999, vol. 2, p. 220). Subsequent aphorisms noted the “undervalued effects of grammar school-teaching” (§266) and questioned the value of “learning many languages” (§267). In the second half of the second volume entitled *The Wanderer and His Shadow*, Nietzsche denied there were any real educators (§267) and argued that, “as a thinker, one should only talk of self-education,” going so far as to talk of the teacher as a “necessary evil” (§282): he blamed “the surplus of teachers” for the fact that “one learns so little and so badly” (Nietzsche 1999, vol. 2, p. 677).

Then again, in *Dawn* (§297) Nietzsche suggested that “the surest way one can ruin a youth is to teach him to respect those who think the same as he does more highly than those who think differently from him” (Nietzsche 1999, vol. 3, p. 221), and in *The Gay Science* (§366), he offered an excoriating critique of academic writing in an aphorism entitled “Faced with a scholarly book” – “I closed a very decent scholarly book, gratefully, very gratefully, but also with a sense of relief” (Nietzsche 1999, vol. 3, p. 614).

Thus Spoke Zarathustra marks a stylistic break, but there is a strong thematic continuity between Nietzsche’s early and later thought; correspondingly, in this work the long-standing concern of education is treated in a new way. For while critics have disagreed about the attitude toward education in *Zarathustra*, the work’s central (and prophetic) figure is explicitly presented as pedagogical in his mission. After all, as Martin Heidegger pointed out (Heidegger 1985, p. 65), Zarathustra presents himself as “the advocate of life, the advocate of suffering, the advocate of the circle,” the circle being a symbol for a doctrine of which Zarathustra is “the teacher” – “eternal recurrence,” while at the outset of the work, Zarathustra declares: “I teach you the Superman” (Nietzsche 1999, vol. 4, pp. 271 and 275 and 14). While such chapter headings as “Of Reading and Writing” (in Part 1) and “Of the Land of Education” and “Of the Scholars” (in Part 2) gesture

toward the theme of education, it is clear that Zarathustra’s ambitions as a whole should be understood in the light of Nietzsche’s earlier writings. When Zarathustra says of himself, “And this is all my creating and striving, that I create and bring together into one what is fragment and riddle and dreadful accident” (Nietzsche 1999, vol. 4, p. 179), and when in his *Nachlass* notes Nietzsche says that Zarathustra is “the great synthesis of the creative, the loving, the destroying” (Nietzsche 1999, vol. 11, p. 360), it is evident that Nietzsche is restating his great theme of totality. Seen in this light, his remark made in his essay on Schopenhauer about a human being who “feels himself perfect and boundless in knowledge and love, in vision and power, and in his completeness is at one with nature as the judge and yardstick of things” (Nietzsche 1999, vol. 1, p. 385) can be seen as an anticipation of the later ideal of the *Übermensch* or Superman.

Later Writings

In the texts written in the final few years of his philosophical activity before his collapse in 1890, Nietzsche continued to offer a vigorous critique of education in his day. In *Twilight of the Idols*, Nietzsche summarizes his entire outlook in an aphorism entitled “From the military school of life”: “What does not kill me makes me stronger,” while he repeatedly returns to the theme of education in the sections entitled “What the Germans Lack” and “Expeditions of an Untimely Man.” What the Germans lack, it turns out, is above all education – in the Nietzschean sense (§4; Nietzsche 1999, vol. 6, pp. 60 and 107). He laments (in §6) the absence from education of a sense of “noble culture,” reflected in learning to see, to think, and to speak and write (Nietzsche 1999, vol. 6, p. 108). As for learning to think, he believes (in §7) that “schools no longer have any idea what this means,” while in universities “logic as theory, as practice, as a *craft*, is dying out” (Nietzsche 1999, vol. 6, p. 109). The German universities arouse some of Nietzsche’s strongest condemnation: “What an atmosphere prevails among their scholars,

what a barren, what a self-contented and lukewarm intellectual outlook! [...] For 17 years I have not grown tired of exposing the intellect-stripping influence of our contemporary scholarship” (Nietzsche 1999, vol. 6, p. 105). That exposure found its most memorable expression in the following dialogue presented as part of a doctoral viva:

“What is the task of all higher education?” — To turn the human being into a machine. — “By what means is this done?” — He must learn how to be bored. — “How is this achieved?” — Through the concept of duty. “Who serves as a model?” — The philologist: he teaches how to *graft*. — “Who is the perfect human being?” — The state bureaucrat. — “What sort of philosophy provides the best formula for the state bureaucrat?” — Kant’s: the state bureaucrat as thing-in-itself set up as a judge over the state bureaucrat as phenomenon. (Nietzsche 1999, vol. 6, pp. 129–130)

Were it not for the fact that Nietzsche had been an academic *Wunderkind*, it would be easy to read this criticism of education as an expression of resentment or bitterness. It is not; rather, it is the conclusion Nietzsche reached after having gained access to the inner sanctum of academia. At the same time, one does not have to regard Nietzsche as a case study in “suffering and self-cultivation,” as “a man who, heroically, continued to transform his physical torments and spiritual abysses into what is one of the most life-embracing and ‘yea-saying’ philosophies in the Western world” (Hillesheim 1986, pp. 177–178). Instead one can read Nietzsche as returning to the conception of education as *Bildung* promoted by, among others, Wilhelm von Humboldt (1767–1835). Common to this tradition and to Nietzsche alike is an emphasis on the potential holistic totality of the individual. In its turn, this conception of *Bildung* draws on the older ancient Greek notion of *paideia*. This frankly aristocratic conception of *kalos kagathos*, “the beautiful and the good,” placed an emphasis on the excellence of perfection as a combination of ethics and aesthetics. So while it may at first glance seem surprising that the multivolume study of *Paideia: The Ideals of Greek Culture* (1933–1947) published by Werner Jaeger (1888–1961) does not draw more frequently on Nietzsche, this is largely because Jaeger views Nietzsche through the prism of *The*

Birth of Tragedy’s anti-Socratism and not in the light of Nietzsche’s critique of education.

Conclusion

As early as 1900, one critic expressed dismay that so little notice had been taken of Nietzsche’s contribution to pedagogics (Havenstein 1900, p. 93), and it remains the case that such other themes as the Superman, eternal recurrence, and will to power tend to obscure Nietzsche’s work in this area. Yet is his critique still valid? Or could it be even more valid now than it was in Nietzsche’s day? At a section on teaching philosophy to teenagers at a philosophy conference held in Cilli in 2000, one speaker argued that “this watering-down in the name of equality and the utilitarian submission of school education to the demands of a moral-political correctness legitimized by the state” is “the situation as we find it today” (Zeder 2001, p. 13), and in 2006 and 2014, the Austrian philosopher Konrad Paul Liessmann strongly confirmed this analysis (Liessmann 2006, pp. 60–64, 2014, pp. 8 and 127–128). Nietzsche, who declined in his lectures on educational institutions to produce new timetables and statistics (Nietzsche 1999, vol. 1, p. 648), would doubtless reject any utilitarian approach embodied in teaching objectives and learning outcomes of the kind found in pedagogical theory and practice today.

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Nietzsche and Education

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Friedrich Nietzsche was born on October 15, 1844, in Röcken, Prussia. After excellent studies at Pforta College, known for its teachings inspired in the humanist tradition, Nietzsche took up theology at the University of Bonn. In 1865, he abandoned theology and took up philology at the University of Leipzig. Recommended by his professor, Ritschl, Nietzsche was nominated professor of classical philology at the University of Basel, in Switzerland, where he taught from 1869 to 1879. In 1879, he was forced to resign from his post due to a serious illness. From then on, he lived an errant and lonely life, living in small boarding houses and always searching for more favorable climates due to his delicate health. The books *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* (1883–1885), *On the Genealogy of Morality* (1887), and *Ecce Homo* (1888) were written at this time. In 1889, after a mental breakdown in Turin, Nietzsche ended his activities. He died on August 25, 1900, in Weimar.

Nietzsche's lifetime concern was education and culture, but it was during his first years as a professor at elementary school, and at the University of Basel, that he began to look into the concrete problems of elementary and university

schooling. He observed that the system had abandoned the humanist outlook in exchange for the scientific. Education was consequently vulgarized, its objective having become to form useful and profitable men, not harmoniously matured and developed personalities. Alert to everything regarding education, Nietzsche decided to denounce the “unnatural methods of education” and the tendencies that undermined it.

Before we approach Nietzsche's thoughts about education, we must make a series of observations. As this is the study of a philosopher that joins thought to life, that has his own way of philosophizing, and that finds joy in search and in transitoriness and therefore does not fear to see, from different points of view, the contrasts that life offers so as not to lose the coherence of his thoughts, we will limit our analysis to the moment in which Nietzsche explains in greater detail the problems regarding education and culture. We will therefore favor his work produced between 1870 and 1874, especially his lectures *The Future of our Educational Institutions* (1872), *Untimely Meditations – On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life* (1874), and *Schopenhauer as Educator* (1874).

In Nietzsche's thoughts, education and culture are inseparable. There can be no culture without an educational project nor education without a culture to support it. Education in German schools springs from a historicist conception and gives origin to a pseudoculture. Culture and education are synonyms of “selective training,” “the formation of the self”; for the existence of a culture, it is necessary that individuals learn determined rules, that they acquire habits, and that they begin to educate themselves against themselves or, better, against the education forced upon them.

In his lectures on *The Future of Our Educational Institutions*, Nietzsche examines the entrails of the educational system of his time. He perceives that the State and businesspersons are primarily responsible for the impoverishment of culture. They block the slow maturation of the individual, the patient formation of the self – that should be the finality of every culture – demanding a rapid formation so as to have efficient employees and docile students at

their service, youngsters that will learn how to earn money rapidly. But this is not all. When they demand a more profound education, allowing for in-depth specialization, they do so in order to make even more money. But this is not all. This indecorous haste leads students, at an age when they are not mature enough to ask themselves which profession they should pursue, to make bad choices.

Nietzsche detects, in the educational system of his time, two tendencies that do nothing but work for the impoverishment of culture – the “maximum amplification of culture” and the “maximum reduction of culture.” The first tendency, “maximum amplification,” intends that the right to culture be accessible to everyone and demands that the dogma of economic policy be followed: “as much knowledge and culture as possible; hence, as much production and demand as possible; hence, as much happiness as possible: this is more or less the formula” (*Ueber die Zukunft unserer ildungsanstalten*, p. 667). The second tendency, “reduction of culture,” intends that individuals devote their lives to the defense of the interests of the State and demands that its servants seek specialization that they be “faithful to little things” and to the State.

Linked to these two tendencies, according to Nietzsche, there is the journalistic culture. It is the confluence of the two previous tendencies, the place where they meet and hold hands. Amplified culture, specialized culture, and journalistic culture complete one another to form one “unculture.” The journalistic culture, according to Nietzsche, gradually substitutes true culture. The journalist, “the master of the moment,” is a slave to the present, the ways of thinking and fashion. He touches topics quickly and lightly. He writes about artists and thinkers and slowly takes their place, destroying their work. But, while the journalist lives off the moment, thanks to the genius of other men, the great works of great artists emanate the desire to survive and surpass time though the power of their creations.

With the purpose of restoring German culture, Nietzsche examines the educational institutions responsible for the different stages of scholastic formation – gymnasium (the equivalent to

junior – school and high school), technical school, and university – and denounces the evil that poisons them and indicates remedies to combat this evil.

Nietzsche has a lot to say about the gymnasium. In his mind, nothing was done for this stage of the students’ formation – possibly the most important one of all – for it reflects in all the coming stages of learning. Therefore, the renovation should begin in the gymnasium. He acknowledges the need for a greater investment in the learning of the native language and in the art of writing – the most essential chores of secondary school. The German language, at that point in time, was contaminated with the “deceptively elegant style” of journalism. The access of the semi-literate to power had provoked a drastic reduction in the wealth and dignity of the language. The question, however, was not only the poverty of vocabulary but also the ill use of the resources offered by the language. The chore of a high-quality school should always be to lead the student to understand the importance of studying his native language in depth, for if it loses its vital strength, culture itself will tend to degenerate. If the professor is not able to impress on his young students, a physical aversion to determine words and expressions which journalists and bad novelists have grown them accustomed to, it is better – according to Nietzsche – to renounce culture. Therefore, it is imperative to analyze the classics – line by line, word by word – as well as to stimulate the students to try to express the same thought several times, improving this expression each and every time.

Education begins with habit and obedience, with discipline. To discipline the youngster linguistically does not mean to overburden him with historical knowledge about the language but to make him build determined principles from which he can build on, both internally and externally. It means to turn the student into the master of his language and to give him the possibility to construct an artistic language, starting from the works that preceded him. This, according to Nietzsche, is the only way to revive German education and culture.

The growing disregard for the humanistic formation and the increase in the scientific tendency

in school; schooling guided by historical and scientific questions and not by practical teachings; the abandonment of teaching that aims to form an individual in an artistic sense of language, in favor of a doubtful journalistic style; and the emphasis given to professionalization that aims at forming people prepared to make money – all of this prevents the educational system from turning itself toward culture.

One must point out that Nietzsche is not hostile toward the implementation and proliferation of technical schools in Germany. There, individuals learn to calculate conveniently and to dominate the language of communication. They acquire natural and geographical knowledge. In a way, these schools accomplish their objectives: to form businessmen and women, civil servants, officers, agronomists, doctors, and technicians. What Nietzsche censors when he states that culture is not a servant of livelihood and need is the fact that the gymnasium and university have turned toward professionalization, even though they continue to believe that they are temples destined to teach culture, when in fact they are not much different from technical schools and their objectives.

Nietzsche also spares no criticism for university schooling: “A mouth that speaks, many ears and less than half the hands that write – this is the apparent academic mechanism, this is the culture machine of university put into activity.” The professor speaks. The student listens and writes as he listens. “These are the moments when he is linked to the umbilical cord of university. He can choose what he is going to hear, he does not need to believe what he hears, he can cover his ears when he pleases” (Nietzsche 1988, p. 740).

“Academic liberty” is the name given to this double autonomy: on one side, the autonomous mouth; on the other, the autonomous ears. Behind these two groups, a relative distance away, is the ever-present State, reminding the student that the State is “his final objective, the end and the essence of these proceedings of speech and hearing” (Nietzsche 1988, p. 740).

The “achromatic” style of teaching that privileges the oral exposition of the professor and the students’ hearing is the opposite to what

Nietzsche understands should be university education. There, where one ought to demand rigorous training from the student, autonomy was invented. This autonomy is nothing but the domestication of the student, to turn him into a docile creature, one that submits himself to the interests of the State and the rich bourgeoisie.

It is necessary, according to Nietzsche, to contain this historical, scientific, and professionalizing tendency in the university – a tendency that demands swift teaching, deep enough only to transform individuals into efficient servants. These institutions should turn their attention to the problems of culture or, better, the essential questions posed by the human condition.

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Nietzsche and Morality

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Synonyms

[Dionysian](#); [Earth](#); [Ethics](#); [Life](#); [Morality](#); [Nietzsche](#)

Introduction

Friedrich Nietzsche developed a morality based in the earth and life in an attempt to overcome the devaluation of life by religious belief. As a grounding for his new morality, he advocates emphasizing the value of the senses of immediacy and eternalization which he associated with Dionysianism.

Nietzsche is well known for his critique of religiously based morality; however, it is less

well known that he also produced a naturalistic morality grounded within life and which is completely affirmative of life. As the grounding of his affirmative morality, he identifies a “shuddering” or “shivering” moment of intoxication which he calls a “Dionysian” event, occurring as an overwhelmingly powerful compulsion originating outside consciousness to acknowledge the priority of articulate otherness. He chooses the name of the Greek god of intoxication, symposia, and festivals as a figurehead for his morality due to the overpowering nature of the event. In doing so he joins a line of philosophical thought which has recognized the importance of “Dionysian” or divine “madness” (ASC 4 reference to Plato, *Phaedrus*, 244a–d), referring to a powerful affective event considered as an obsession or possession. This event is found to be the limit and ground of thinking and to give consciousness its dynamic force, and as such it is considered to be of the highest value for humanity. Plato described the event as beginning with an engagement with another person, considered in terms friendship, with its ultimate goal being a capacity for the love of wisdom, but understood as a consolation for the finitude of life. The intoxicating engagement is taken by Plato to signify the possibility of the “soul” encountering a supersensible essence beyond the flux of earth and life, but accessible to reason within life, similar to later philosophical descriptions of the experience of the sublime.

Unlike Plato and others, Nietzsche argues that an interpretation of the event as signifying a transcendent or immanent principle or essence – and on this basis attributing the highest value to gods, metaphysical substances, essential human qualities, or essential qualities in nature – is a denial of the value of life. In particular, he argues against attributing any negative moral quality to natural existence as a whole, especially that of “evil” and also argues against those who consider that abandoning transcendent or immanent truth will leave nothingness as the only alternative grounding for thinking. He proposes a complete revaluation of all European values in terms of the “Dionysian” event considered as a rejection of the grounding of philosophy in the thought of death. Instead, he turns to the preeminence of

articulate otherness and sees the value of this moment of engagement as an expression of a form of life that affirms both the finite present and the infinite future of the earth and life. In doing so, he rejects the argument that moral values could be derived from an intuition of a transcendence of life and instead grounds moral values in the interactions of finite human beings. The necessary preeminence of otherness in the Dionysian event is found to occur as the articulate resistance that another person presents to our interpretation of their own unique interpreted world.

The requirement for those who would like to take up this morality is that the empirical and theoretical aspects of the event become instinctively felt and thought at the highest level possible at the time. In this way, the affirmation of the resistance that others pose to our interpretation of existence, considered as underlying all aspects of each person’s unique interpreted world, can be developed into a personalized ethos or practice of life considered as an affirmative engagement with life. In developing this ethos, Nietzsche is guided by two fundamental imperatives: to “be true to the earth,” which is to restrict interpretational responses to the sensible world and to “create beyond oneself,” which is to create for others beyond our own lives (Nietzsche 2006a 1, Prologue, 3). In addition, Nietzsche advocates a number of virtues, especially straightforwardness (or honesty) (*Redlichkeit*), truthfulness (*Wahrhaftigkeit*), and the love of wisdom (*Liebe der Weisheit*), each associated with a sense of the need to develop the courage and consistency required for generosity or “gift giving” in any thinking (Nietzsche 2008a, p. 295). On the basis of this dynamic ethical force, Nietzsche claims to provide a “healthy morality” which is “governed by an instinct of life” (Nietzsche 2006b, “Morality as Anti-Nature,” 4). He argues that his morality thinks through an “optics of life” (Nietzsche 2006b), with the naturalistic life-affirming ethos particularly concerned with the creative expression of one’s unique ethical perspective on friendship and community.

In relation to ethical generosity, Nietzsche requires a broadly inclusive ethics, which affirms all humanity and is true to the materiality of the

earth and life. The trials undergone by Nietzsche's character Zarathustra provide an extreme example of someone who dedicates their life to the advocacy of such a morality, believing in the universal worth of living and dying well on earth, struggling and suffering from himself and others in order to achieve ethical integrity, and undertaken as the practice of one's own life as an ethical educator. This is an extremely difficult role to take on, and Zarathustra has problems developing the courage and the coherence required to communicate a teaching which undermines the logic and sense of truth associated with both the scientific and religious values of modernity. In this context, he uses the analogy of the sun as an example of the selfless giving of a being which must also one day pass away. In another example in his early work, he discusses the "heat death" of the sun as a future limit for human life itself, but argues that apocalyptic theories only have logical force in the context of particular cosmological interpretations projected over incredible time spans which could lose their sense of certainty with any new discovery (Nietzsche 1997). He decides that such theories predicting destruction harbor a religiously based pessimism and nihilism concerning human existence and need to be reevaluated using the optics of life to determine the underlying moral choices in play. He ultimately adopts the cosmology of eternal recurrence as a model best suited for the affirmation of an eternity of life and material existence. In this way, he argues for an expansive ethico-critical view of scientific materialism and an ethically based naturalism for our interpreted worlds in order to overcome the belief in scientific or religious grounds for human certainty.

Despite using many naturalistic metaphors associated with the earth, sea, sky, and life to evoke a sense of the resistance to interpretation occurring in the Dionysian event, Nietzsche warns against projecting our capacity for articulate resistance onto other life or material forms or locating a connatural essence or principle in life or matter which we share and which could be articulated by us as a first principle in moral theory. He differentiates humanity from nature on the basis of the capacity for articulate resistance using gestures

and language. In relation to human beings, he finds powerful examples of the Dionysian event in aesthetic experience, especially in performances of drama and music. However, these aesthetic performances are found to imitate or draw upon the gestures and language that occur preeminently in compelling articulate engagements with other human beings. In such engagements the other person is found to resist the interpretation which has been presented to them, whether on the grounds of its content, intention and/or logical coherence. The experience of the resistance to one's interpretation is followed by an attempt to broaden the interpretation to compensate for its lack of inclusiveness. This expansive attempt at inclusion is found to be the fundamental dynamic force of thinking behind the development of consciousness, understood as each person's interpreted world (Nietzsche 2007, p. 354).

Such interaction – the articulation of resistances to interpreted worlds – is considered to mark all human engagements, but with differing degrees of straightforwardness and acceptance. In any case, an interruptive force exerts constant pressure on the interpretation, occurring most simply as the articulation of a combination of "yes" and "no" by the other person – an articulation which can range from shared laughter with friends to harsh censure and which can be ambiguous or crystal clear (Nietzsche 2006c, p. 6). In other words, the articulation of resistance can be felt by the self as an affect of pleasure and/or displeasure. For Nietzsche, these are fundamental and simultaneous forms of compulsion experienced in the shuddering event. In all cases, the resistance can be attributed to the incommensurability in time and space of the self "present" as interpretation and the other person, who withdraws from this presence into their necessarily unique space of difference. Nietzsche thus refers to the recognition of a "pathos of distance" and a "great separation" between people which cannot be overcome by a reductive interpretation.

We cannot establish precisely what is unique about the other person, and there are also problems with our capacity to accurately communicate our response in words. However, reflecting on this inability to comprehend the other leads to the

consideration in general terms the conceivable extremes in perspectives within the ethical or moral context. It is possible to describe our response as an instance of the affirmation of “alterity” – insofar as this is an attempt to do justice to the other person as necessarily different and unique – at a fundamental level of immediacy and, at the same time, involving an affirmative sense of naturalistic eternity. The other person questions our capacity to provide an ethically sound interpretation of their existence, or in other words, asks that in our response we do justice to their unique existence within our interpreted world.

As well as the separation from others and their resistance to our interpretation, the event can be interpreted in general terms as our response to the impossibility of being indifferent to the other person, who thus also offers *irresistible resistance* to our interpretation. It is possible to reject or try to ignore the event, but only after the fact. For Nietzsche, this irresistibility is central to the identity of Dionysus. The unavoidable affective undergoing of resistance can be affirmed as a sense of a shared undergoing of life, including its senseless suffering, and a working in the present (of immediacy) and, at the same time, for eternity, considered not as a promise of an afterlife in which I participate, but as an indeterminable future of humanity after one’s death. As such, the Dionysian event can be considered as a *compulsion to ethics* (opposed to and rather than a desire for metaphysical truth), which is found to remain operative even when one is faced with life’s sternest problems, but which favors the affirmation of the existence of others despite any suffering this might entail, for the sake of a future for humanity.

There is a compulsion to acknowledge that, beyond the uniqueness of another person, incommensurable differences in space, time, and interpretation are also communicated by all others. In relation to the legislator, creator, and educator, the consideration that in one’s engagement with an actual other person one is apprehending a universalized sense of human otherness forces the creative self to remain aware of the necessary injustice of all interpretation and communication. In this way, one is led to question how it is possible to be

just to all others without an all-encompassing concept of justice and, on that basis, how it is possible to be ethical or just at all. Once again, such a thought is found to be similar to the notion of reason’s capacity to engage with the sublime, precisely that which exceeds it, in this case, to remain open to the infinite possibilities of human identity. Thus, if this event is to be used as a basis for the legislation of ethical laws, one’s own uniqueness as an ethical creator who can endeavor to assume responsibility before this infinite becomes the basis for acting justly. Nietzsche uses the mythological figure of Atlas holding up the universe (Nietzsche 2008a 9) to indicate that responsibility to create a just future must be able to accommodate such an infinity of otherness. On this basis, the work of philosophy for the future is found to encompass, as a goal, the capacity to envisage these extremes of justice and the extent to which one is responsible for one’s interpreted world.

For Nietzsche, there is a need to be true to the dynamic play of resistance and response and to give it the highest value in terms of the earth and life. It has been argued that responsibility for creating beyond oneself extends to the temporal extreme of eternity. In addition, in examining to the fullest extent the significance communicated by the other person through their resistance to our interpretation, we can assume that they ask for justice to be done to an integrated sense of existence at the immediate and eternal extremes of the earth and life, which includes reflective consciousness, pre-reflective consciousness (which could be called “psyche” or “soul”) and, in addition, every aspect of their bodily existence. The latter can be extended in accordance with modern science to deeper levels at which interpretive engagement may be effective. Nietzsche’s term for existence at this extended bodily level of self in its resistance to others is called “will to power,” which can be extended to neuronal levels of the body, where language first forms (Nietzsche 2008c, p. 144), but also to one’s interpretation of external forces, such as gravity, which are thought to affect the body at subatomic levels but exist in the broadest scope. On this basis, other people can be said to evoke, exhibit, and articulate, in each

moment, the empirical immediacy of the earth and life.

The parameters of one's responsibility to the other person are stretched to a breaking point in this expansive spatiotemporal model of human signification, while also fully applied to the unique historical existence of the other person. One's theoretical guarantee of respect for the uniqueness of the other person and sense of a need to articulate a perspective with the broadest temporal framework are insufficient as an ethics if it is not also possible to guarantee the well-being of others in relation to one's projection of a future for humanity in general on earth beyond one's own unique physical life.

The Dionysian event transmits an underlying veracity concerning the worth of life that can be called an "ethical sensibility." This demands a thinking that has evaluative strength and questions from the outset the truths associated with objective knowledge. It is also possible to translate the requirements for ethics presented by the other person into a responsibility to act for nature. The Dionysian event can be seen as an affirmative thread running through relational human existence and, as will to power (occurring as justice), substantiating the net of consciousness (Nietzsche 2007, p. 354) with respect to both earthly and eternal justice. The request for justice made by the other person is a dynamic force in thinking – like a thread or a trace of meaning that guides responsibility – to which Nietzsche gives the highest value. As such, the other person can be seen to be speaking for the infinite otherness of the immediacy of the natural earth and life and at the same time requiring that the highest level of practical empirical justice are incorporated in ethical decision-making with a sense of working for a future beyond our era. In relation to all fields of knowledge, there is a need to consider which logical and scientific hypotheses best suit an ethics which is affirmative of life in the context of such a future.

Since Nietzsche, the recognition of the problems associated with European-Christian ethical thinking in modernity has continued through the generations,

with a process of secularization combined with eco-ethical concerns, along with various calls for the rethinking of the neoliberal economic model, which advocates a dynamism arising principally from first-world consumption. The priority of an ethical mode of thinking found in Nietzsche's work can be utilized to achieve greater levels of justice for others, the earth and life. Rather than seek to limit or even annihilate the encroaching-expanding difference which is faced, it is possible to begin to seek in others this irresistible resistance – as what is valuable in any attempt to expand our own historicizing interpretation – and which, in resisting domination, offers the promise of higher levels of self-reflection and creation for the sake of others. It has been argued that the affect undergone by the self is for the other, considered in terms of both aspects of the Dionysian scale of affectedness, and that, on this basis, the other person, through their resistant questioning of one's right to be a creator of meaning, lifts one out of an ambivalence felt toward justice, into ethical and political activity.

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Nietzsche and Rhetoric as Self-Education

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It is well known that the secondary literature on Nietzsche covers the widest possible range. It goes from Nietzsche as a proto-Nazi to Nietzsche as aristocratically and aesthetically apolitical to Nietzsche as a possible constitutionalist and democrat. This spectrum of interpretations is often said to be consequent to inconsistencies or confusions or mistakes in his thought. One might, however, also note that it seems to be the lot of great thinkers to permit such a wide range of interpretations – one thinks of Plato or Rousseau.

How and by what are we to be educated in reading Nietzsche if no one can say finally what he means? This diversity leads one to ask if one can – or should – take all of Nietzsche's writings seriously. Are there not what one might call "rhetorical" exaggerations? It is clear that no one can fail to recognize the rhetorical quality and concerns of his work. Aside from his published writings, he lectured regularly about rhetoric and related matters; it is worth noting that Nietzsche is explicit that this work forms a "background" to the *Birth of Tragedy*, even if, as he notes in a letter to his friend Rohde in February, 1872, he had consciously left it out of that book. (These lectures are in the second set of volumes from *Werke Kritische Gesamtausgabe* (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1966ff), henceforth *WKG* (and are not in the paperback *Studienausgabe*). Other citations from this edition.) The analysis of rhetoric underpins the argument of his first book as it does the rest of his work.

Some scholars have taken his rhetoric very seriously and find Nietzsche's style to be the source of political danger. Heinz Schlaffer has argued that Nietzsche's style has had the effect of hyperbolizing contemporary political

understandings. Thus, after Nietzsche, when one speaks of leadership in a political context, one thinks of a "super"-leader, a leader of leaders. Nietzsche may have thought of such a person as a philosopher (as Heidegger was shortly to do), but when that possibility fades away, Schlaffer remarks, the "word is unbound" but the rhetorical idea of what a leader ought to be remains. This can have, he argues, deleterious political consequences (Schlaffer 2007).

Schlaffer's is a serious argument, but it is notably *not* that of most of those who take note of his rhetoric and style. Most of those who do generally point to his rhetoric as a way to *excuse* Nietzsche from one or another claim or to point out a philosophical "mistake," an "unacceptable" political stance. This is often phrased as his "rhetorical excesses." The general presumption of this claim is often that behind or besides such rhetoric there is an argument that one should reconstruct: an attempt to get something "out" of Nietzsche. This has led to a multitude of readings that seek to *excuse* him from some apparent implications of his writings on the grounds that "Nietzsche certainly did (really) not believe X."

After the Second World War, Walter Kaufmann was the first great master of the apology based on rhetoric. Aside from interpretive choices, there were political-historical reasons for his approach: not only had the First World War been tagged by British journalists as "Nietzsche's War," not only had a copy of *Zarathustra* been standard issue to each soldier in the *Wehrmacht*, but the subsequent appropriation of Nietzsche by the Nazis required a rehabilitation for him to be granted admission to the philosophical host. Nietzsche could appear to be responsible (in some sense of the term) for the horrors of the century. To distance him from these events, Kaufmann generally proceeded by suggesting that when Nietzsche praised, for example, war, he only meant a war like the Franco-Prussian war: his praise was "just rhetoric." To his apparently derogatory remarks about Jews, Kaufmann adduced counter anti-anti-Semitic quotations with the explicit or latent assertion that any offending words elsewhere were

consequent to youth, the spirit of the times, or Wagner's baleful influence.

This approach lead to much work that sought to present what Nietzsche *would have said* had he been writing to publish in a contemporary philosophical journal. We are given what *would have/should have* been Nietzsche's arguments, which are then subjected to the kind of critical analysis that philosophers are good at. While there is sometimes material of interest in such work, it generally skirts the question of the importance of rhetoric.

Relatively few commentators have taken his rhetoric seriously and positively, denying that Nietzsche's style and rhetoric are centrally important to his philosophical teaching. Although he is far from the only one, exemplary here is Brian Leiter who argues in his contribution to the *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* that Nietzsche's "penchant for hyperbolic rhetoric and polemics often leads him" to "overstate" his case. Such a judgement is, I think, seriously wrong.

To start with, Nietzsche does not separate "rhetoric" from language itself. In a 1874 lecture course he writes: "There is obviously no unrhetorical 'naturalness' of speech to which one might appeal: speech itself is the result of nothing but [*lauter*] rhetorical arts [,] the power – which Aristotle names rhetoric – to discover and make expressive [*geltend*] that which works and makes an impression on each thing and this is at the same time the essence of language [*Sprache*] . . . it does not wish to instruct but rather to transmit a subjective arousal [*Erregung*] and acceptance to another person." If language is then ineluctably rhetoric(al), what does that mean in terms of one's inevitable use of language?

Nietzsche's concern with rhetoric is continuous. Aside from his courses, in 1872, for instance, he sketches an outline for a book "Considerations on Reading and Writing." In 1875 he prepares a document on style for two of his students. The most important elaboration, however, comes in "The Doctrine of Style," ten notes or commandments presented by letter to Lou Salomé in August, 1882. Nietzsche sends her this:

1. The first necessary matter is life: Style must *live*.
2. Style must in retrospect be appropriate for you in relation to precisely the particular person with whom you wish to confide. (The law of *double relation*).
3. One must first be quite clear about this: thus and thus do I wish to speak and *express* myself – before one has the right to write. Writing must be an impersonation (*Nachahmung*).
4. Because many of the means of those who speak (*Vortragenden*) are missing to those who write, the person who writes must have an overall highly developed expressive ability to present speech as a model: the presentation of that which is written must necessarily turn out as much paler.
5. Wealth in life betrays itself as *wealth* in *gestures* (*Gebärde*). Everything, the length and brevity of sentences, punctuation, the choice of words, pauses, the sequence of arguments – must be learned to be understood as gestures.
6. Be careful about the use of periods [full stops – TBS]. Only those beings that have a lengthy breath in speaking have the right to periods. For most, periodizing is an affection.
7. Style should show (*beweisen*) that one believes in ones thoughts and does not only think them but rather *feels* them.
8. The more abstract is the trust that one wishes to teach, the more must one bring (*verführen*) sense (*Sinne*) to it.
9. In the choice of its means, the rhythm of a good writer of prose (*Prosaiker*) approaches that of poetry, however, without ever surpassing it.
10. It is neither proper nor intelligent to anticipate the small objections (*leichteren Einwände*) for ones readers. It is very proper and very intelligent to leave it to ones readers to express themselves the essential point of our wisdom.

Each commandment is worth pondering. To pick out a few: "Style must in retrospect be

appropriate for you in relation precisely to the particular person with whom you wish to confide (*der du dich mitteilen willst*).” He calls this the “law of the double relation.” This is an educational concern: one must shape what one says according to the particular qualities of the person or persons one is addressing and the circumstance. One recalls a phrase of Emerson’s: “Eloquence is the power to translate a truth into language perfectly intelligible to the person to whom you speak.”

At the end, he urges that it is the reader (in each case the person for or with whom the writer wishes to speak) who must come to express for himself or herself these claims; they must, that is, become part of the assessment the reader has of the world. He had insisted: “Wealth in life betrays itself in a wealth of gestures. Everything, the length and brevity of sentences, punctuation, the choice of words, pauses, the sequence of arguments – must be learned to be understood as gestures.”

What this “everything” entails is that Nietzsche *crafted everything that he published with great and purposive rhetorical care* and with central attention to its educational impact. If one takes this claim seriously, it means that *everything* in his published texts is there for an educational or therapeutic purpose, including that which appears as “excessive.”

This is a strong claim – it is a bit like saying that there is *nothing* in da Vinci’s *La Gioconda* (the “Mona Lisa”) that is not essential to that painting and that there is nothing that is not there that could have been part of that painting. It is like saying that *every* word in Robert Frost’s “Stopping by the Woods on a Snowy Evening” is exactly necessary to the poem. Or it is like Schumann’s response when asked, upon finishing a piece, as to its meaning. His response was to play it again, every note. Presumably not even Nietzsche was able to attain perfection in all of his writing, but it is significant that this is what he sought to do and this means that dismissing some aspect of his writing as “overblown rhetoric” will most likely proceed from an unrecognized prejudice.

In the *Phaedrus* (274e–275b), calling upon the story of the presentation of the art of writing by the

god Theuth to the Egyptian king Thamus, Socrates instantiates Thamus’s distress with the written word: writing reminds but does not remember; it gives the simulacrum but not the reality of wisdom. As if responding to Plato, the reading of one commandment (the fourth) indicates that Nietzsche is pressing Lou Salomé on how to write in order that one’s writing *acquire the quality of speech* – with all its hesitations, gestures, embodiments, and so forth. This is the importance of rhetoric. In analyzing Nietzsche’s work, one must then proceed very carefully and slowly – one must *listen* to it – for writing is always a temptation to conclude. Note for instance number six above: the point about periods means that you have to have done a lot to be entitled to put an end to a thought.

As such his work is also meant to be a temptation and to be experienced as such: the rhetorical tropes are of utmost importance, of a necessity embedded in our very use of language. In the 1874 lecture course “Presentation [*Darstellung*] of Ancient Rhetoric,” he continues with “there is in fact no unrhetorical ‘naturalness’ of speech to which one might make appeal. . . . To sum up: tropes do not attach themselves now and then to words, but are their most particular nature.” Tropes are not a “special meaning” applying only in special cases. “In fact all that is called ordinary speech is figuration.” It is worth noting here that this does not mean that Nietzsche thought that “everything is metaphor” – which would make the idea of metaphor impossible – but that the concept of metaphor allows him to deal in a complex manner with the relation between language, mind, the natural world, and the body.

Importantly, he calls rhetoric “an essentially republican art,” because one has to be “used to bearing the strangest opinions and outlooks and even be able to feel a certain pleasure in their conflictual play (*Widerspiel*).” He indicates that rhetoric was the culmination of the education of the men of Antiquity: “the highest spiritual activity of a well-educated (*gebildeten*) political man.” This is, he says, an “odd notion for us,” and proceeds to quote Kant’s *Critique of the Power of Judgment* to

the effect that “the speaker gives notice of a matter to be considered and, in order to relate to (*unterhalten*) his listeners, presents it as if it were a play with ideas.” Rhetoric permits thoughts to be addressed to a wide range of individuals, with different formations and understandings – it is thus educational and political.

What difference then does it make to pay attention to rhetoric? Here is an example where a translator has paid insufficient attention to a rhetorical trope (I borrow and extend this example from Babich 2006). In the Kaufmann edition of the *Genealogy of Morals*, one finds that all of the sections in the first essay begin with a capital letter. If, however, you go to the German edition, you will find that sections 1, 4, 7, 8, 9, 12, 13, 14, and 17 begin with a dash, in German a *Gedankenstrich* – a “thought-stroke.” Just to make matters more complex, Kaufmann does give the dashes at the *end* of several paragraphs (8 has a double dash) but does not give the two dots at the end of 6, nor the three at the end of 7, 10, 11, 12, and 16.

What to make of this? From the strictures to Lou von Salomé one can say that the dots indicate an *ellipsis*, the rhetorically intentional omission of something from an original thought. I am unclear why there is an ellipsis with only two dots. The dashes, however, mark an *aposiopesis* – the word means “becoming silent” and is a rhetorical device indicating the presence of something has not been made explicit, as in Darth Vader’s “I sense something, a presence I have not felt since—.” Here at the *beginning* of a section, they seem to me to indicate that what follows is addressed to a particular person and that the following text is a response to this person. (A clue comes from the fact that sections 14 and to some degree 15 are in fact explicit dialogues.)

To what it is a response is for us to determine. In section seven Nietzsche appears, and is often taken, to contrast the noble with the base. Larry Hatab, for instance, speaks of it as providing the oppositional framework between the warrior and the priestly. Brian Leiter reads it as the “marked” contrast of “the values of ‘the warrior caste’ with the ‘priestly caste.’”

Nietzsche writes in the first part of the section:

You will have already guessed how easily the priestly way of evaluating can split from the knightly-aristocratic and then continue to develop into its opposite. Such a development receives a special stimulus every time the priestly caste and the warrior caste confront each other jealously and cannot be one with the other as to the prize. The premise of the knightly-aristocratic value-judgments is a powerful physicality, a radiant [*blühende*: Diethe (Cambridge University Press) gives “blossoming”; Kaufmann, “flourishing”], rich, health that overflows the self [*selbst überschäumende*: D, “even effervescent”; K, “even overflowing”], which includes all that it needs to maintain itself, war, adventure, the hunt, the dance, combat games [*Kampfspiele*: D, “jousting”; K, “war games”] and above all contains in itself all that is strong, free, happy activity.

This sounds pretty much like the standard vision of Nietzsche’s master/aristocrat. Yet what about that little dash (omitted from Kaufmann, unmentioned in Hatab or Leiter)? Rhetorically the passage as addressed to someone. To whom? One answer would be to Christian anti-Semites. They might read the part of the section quoted in the passage above and respond with something like: “Yeah! That’s us knights! *Jüden ‘raus!’*” Yet what one finds later in the section is that these Jews give rise to the Sermon on the Mount. Much of the last half of the section is in fact a paraphrase of Matthew 5.13. “We know now,” says Nietzsche – who here is the “we”? – “*who* became heir to this Jewish revaluation.” Those who became heir to the “Jewish revaluation” are the Christian anti-Semites who had been lapping up the first part of the section. So: apparently Christian anti-Semitism is itself consequent to the “Jewish revaluation.”

The next section (eight) begins with another dash, now presumably the voice of the author of the above paragraph responding to the readers. He writes there: “But don’t you understand that? You don’t have eyes for something which needed two millennia to achieve victory?” “Two millennia” and “you” obviously orient the designation to contemporary Christianity and Christians, thus confirming that the addressees are in fact Christian anti-Semites. One should continue through all sections asking who is talking to whom. In anticipation of and in an improvement on Sartre’s *Antisemite and Jew*,

Nietzsche is telling us here that the distance between anti-Semites and Jews is constructed by Christian anti-Semites to serve their advantage. The passage first seduces that group and then turns back on it.

Nothing in Nietzsche (at least in what he published) can be read properly without hearing the rhetorical resonance that any section of a sentence sets up, both with the rest of the sentence and with the rest of the entry of which it is a part, and with those that are around it. (You cannot just pick passages at random as some commentators have averred.) Nietzsche's writing thus calls up (or can call up) a *critical relation between what the reader wants and what the text makes available and requires of the reader*. His writing calls into question precisely the desire to assume that one's understanding is correct. Nietzsche's rhetoric reverses the traditional picture of the reader and the text: *it is as if the text has become the analyst and the reader the analysand*. We are not to interpret the text but to allow ourselves to be available to the text for nothing should stand between. (In a like manner, Tynedale and other early Protestants urged a direct ["literal"] engagement with Scripture.) In reading Nietzsche or any (philosophical?) text, one should/can come to call into question precisely what one wants to make of it – and that teaches one something about oneself. The rhetoric of the text is intended to produce a "self-critique" – an education of one own self by one's self. This critique is what Nietzsche in his preface to *Twilight* calls "sounding out idols," idols which function here as "eternal truths," that is, as truths that claim for themselves a permanent moral standing. To "sound out an idol" means rather to produce a *dissonance*, the contrast between the tuning fork and the sound the idol makes when struck. An understanding of the role of his rhetoric shows why, at the end of his first book, Nietzsche says that the human being "becomes dissonance."

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Nietzsche and Schooling

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Synonyms

[Education](#); [Instruction](#); [Pedagogy](#); [Teaching](#); [Training](#)

Introduction

Friedrich Nietzsche's *Human, All Too Human* contains a striking statement about education: "The school has no more important task than to teach rigorous thinking, cautious judgment and consistent reasoning" (Nietzsche 1986, p. 125). Can this be Nietzsche that most radical and iconoclastic of thinkers, one wonders? Yes, it is. At any rate, it is the Nietzsche of 1878, the year that begins what commentators call the "middle" period of his published work. Whether it is the Nietzsche of poststructuralist citation and interpretation is another matter. The passage points toward a tension between two aspects of Nietzsche's thinking relevant to education, that is, between a radical vision of personal development and chosen means that seem to imply a far more conservative agenda. The following discussion locates this problem within a broader context, not in order to eliminate the tension but rather to show that, for Nietzsche, it can act as a productive force within education.

Human, All Too Human is the manifesto of Nietzsche's commitment to thinking that is both naturalistic and historical in its approach to philosophical themes. A common view among interpreters has been that this was an untypical phase, preceded and followed by periods in which his individual voice and mode of thinking were far more in evidence. In fact, Nietzsche was a "realist" before this time and remained a realist after it ended, despite the apparently skeptical character

of his thought (Small 2009–10). One piece of supporting evidence is the consistency of his thinking about education. Its general drift is best expressed in a sentence placed at the head of his most thoughtful essay on the subject, *On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life*. It is not his own formulation, but a remark of J. W. von Goethe: “In any case, I hate everything that merely instructs me without augmenting or directly invigorating my activity” (Nietzsche 1983, p. 59). The relation between knowing and living is the concern that is central to all Nietzsche’s thinking on the problems of education (Small 2016), and we can see in surveying his writings how this concern becomes steadily more radical in its effects.

What Nietzsche Seems to Say About Education

In considering Nietzsche’s views on education, should we focus on what he says about schools or universities? Not necessarily. For one thing, most of his explicit opinions on the subject occur within a particular project which occupied him for several years. Its aim was to reconsider the nature and meaning of one discipline: classical philology. To do this was to question the school whose curriculum centered upon the learning of ancient languages and literatures. It was also to undermine his own situation as both university professor and school teacher, since his responsibilities at Basel University included teaching at senior level in the city’s *Pädagogium* (i.e., high school for boys). For a successful young scholar, identified as a future leader in his academic discipline, to query its value so publicly was rather unusual. Part of the motivation was a weakening of Nietzsche’s commitment to an academic career by the attraction of a broader mission of cultural reform. Education was an important aspect of German culture and, given his starting point, a readily accessible one.

During his middle period, Nietzsche often attacks the prevailing model of education. In *The Wanderer and His Shadow*, the role of the teacher is simply denied: “Now that self-education and

fraternal education are becoming more general, the teacher must, in the form he now normally assumes, become almost redundant. Friends anxious to learn who want to acquire knowledge of something together can find in our age of books a shorter and more natural way than ‘school’ and ‘teacher’ are” (Nietzsche 1986, p. 353). But hopes for establishing such study groups (or “secular monasteries,” as he sometimes put it) proved hard to realize. Outside educational institutions, personal factors tended to exert greater influence than idealistic intentions. In default, Nietzsche took pride in his capacity for self-education. Writing in this vein of rejection, he even states categorically: “There are no educators.”

As a thinker one should speak only of self-education. The education of youth by others is either an experiment carried out on an as yet unknown and unknowable subject, or a levelling on principle with the object of *making* the new being, whatever it may be, conform to the customs and habits then prevailing: in both cases therefore something unworthy of the thinker, the work of those elders parents and teachers whom a man of rash honesty once described as *nos ennemis naturels* [‘our natural enemies’: a remark attributed to Stendhal]. – One day, when one has long been educated as the world understands it, one *discovers oneself*: here begins the task of the thinker; now the time has come to call on him for assistance – not as an educator but as one who has educated himself and thus knows how it is done. (Nietzsche, 1986, p. 374)

The teacher, he explains further on, is at best a necessary evil. He stands between the creators of knowledge and those who need it and, like every middleman between producer and consumer, acts for his own profit at the cost of both sides. Thus the teacher in the present system can only damage those he purports to serve. The problem with schools and universities, Nietzsche concludes, is not that we have too few teachers but that we have too many: “It is on their account that so little is learned and that little so badly” (Nietzsche 1986, p. 379).

These reflections add up to a highly skeptical attitude toward education in the usual sense. Is there such a thing? Can the development of an individual person be affected in anything but a harmful way by interference from outside?

Certainly Nietzsche considers that claimed benefits are generally debatable and that education as usually practiced is indeed bad for the individual:

The environment in which he is educated seeks to make every man unfree, inasmuch as it presents to him the smallest range of possibilities. The individual is treated by his educators as though, granted he is something new, what he ought to become is a *repetition*. If a man at first appears as something unfamiliar, never before existent, he is to be made into something familiar, often before existent. (Nietzsche 1986, p. 110)

Education in general is “the means of ruining the exceptions for the good of the rule” (Nietzsche 1968, p. 492). In Nietzsche’s eyes, mass societies are dominated by the principle of democracy in one or another form, whether they acknowledge it or not. Modern culture, with its government bureaucracy, its money system, its mass press, and its public education, is in every way an example of this tendency. According to Nietzsche, it displays a drive for more education in the sense of a wider distribution of schooling – but also a drive for *less* education, since that provided is narrowly defined by aims which are not those of education itself but of some different “way of life” (*Lebensform*). They belong to forces which intervene in education for their own purposes and in their own interests: the State, business, “good society,” and scholarship (Nietzsche 1983, pp. 164–174). For Nietzsche, as for most conservatives, “more means worse.” These two tendencies, toward a widening of education and a narrowing of its content, are inseparable from each other, and each reinforces the harmful effects of the other.

Nietzsche’s discussion takes on a more individual character when it turns to “science” (*Wissenschaft*, a word that here means scholarship). By now, his academic career was already past its peak. He had moved away from his academic discipline, making no further contributions to classical philology, and was trying to redefine himself as a cultural commentator. His attacks on scholarship are largely an attempt to imitate a completely different model, provided by his friend Richard Wagner, always a dangerous example for others. Wagner was not only uneducated

(and blamed his Leipzig school teachers for the gaps in his knowledge) but positively hostile to academic culture, although happy to have a university professor as a prominent supporter. Hence, the many passages like this in Nietzsche’s writing of the period:

As long as what is meant by culture is essentially the promotion of science, culture will pass the great suffering human being by with pitiless coldness, because science sees everywhere only problems of knowledge and because within the world of the sciences suffering is really something improper and incomprehensible, thus at best only one more problem (Nietzsche 1983, p. 169).

The pointed reference to the “great human being” reflects Nietzsche’s efforts to recruit supporters for Wagner’s ambitious Bayreuth Festival project. The passage does touch on a genuinely Nietzschean problem, one that remained central to his thinking to the very end, well after its departure from any Wagnerian model. It is the problem of learning and life, prefigured in the words of Goethe. The scholarship Nietzsche is describing is a withdrawal from real life, where knowledge is – or should be – no impersonal and abstract matter but rather a passionate cause, even an adventure. In *The Gay Science*, he speaks of “the age that will carry heroism into the search for knowledge and that will *wage wars* for the sake of ideas and their consequences” (Nietzsche 1974, p. 228). This search for knowledge is never disinterested. Rather, it involves a deeply personal commitment; and instead of being a withdrawal from real life, it is a determination to participate in it as fully as possible – to “live dangerously.”

What Nietzsche Really Says About Education

But how do we get from living dangerously to rigorous thinking, cautious judgment, and consistent inference? These look like the virtues of a conventional or traditional form of education. As an individual’s dispositions, they suggest the typical personality of the self-disciplined professional scholar, who is “orderly, parsimonious and obstinate,” to borrow an often quoted formulation of Freud (1953–75, vol. 9, p. 169). Freud was describing what he called the “anal” personality, and, as that label implies, his account of

these traits is rather different from Nietzsche's analysis of academic culture. Even so, the picture is quite similar.

Nietzsche's later writing takes this emphasis even further. It tends to refer not to education but to "training" (*Züchtung*). He chooses to use a simplified vocabulary, with a strong bias toward biological concepts, including a version of evolutionary epistemology. As a result, the schooling that he advocates looks more like a course of conditioning than of education. At times military discipline is proposed as an apt model for the scholarly vocation. "The same discipline makes both the good soldier and the good scholar," he writes (Nietzsche 1968, p. 483).

One late note surveys the conditions for good learning. Nietzsche suggests that unforeseen circumstances might provide a kind of training: through the need to overcome sickness, for instance, or some other challenge to the powers of the individual.

The most desirable thing is still under all circumstances a hard discipline *at the proper time*, i.e., at that age at which it still makes one proud to see that much is demanded of one. For this is what distinguishes the hard school as a good school from all others: that much is demanded; and sternly demanded; that the good, even the exceptional, is demanded as the norm; that praise is rare, that indulgence is nonexistent; that blame is apportioned sharply, objectively, without regard for talent or antecedents. (Nietzsche, 1968, p. 482)

What about education *for philosophy*? This is arguably the theme of Nietzsche's most important single discussion of education. It occurs in *Twilight of the Idols*, one of the last books that he completed. There he strips the aims of education down by specifying "the three tasks for which educators are required. One must learn to *see*, one must learn to *think*, one must learn to *speak* and *write*: the goal in all three is a noble culture" (Nietzsche 1954, p. 511). He then spells out each "task" in turn. One can say that Nietzsche is speaking of education for philosophy in these explanations, because they consistently emphasize the most universal aspects of thinking. He confirms this reading by remarking that learning to think is not found "even in the universities, even among the real scholars of philosophy" (Nietzsche 1954, p. 512).

The first of his three tasks for educators is the most unexpected one. Philosophers of education often consider the need to learn to think and write, but few mention "learning to see." So, what does it involve? First and foremost, Nietzsche explains the strength of will that enables one *not* to follow any impulse or react immediately to any stimulus but instead to postpone judgment about the content of one's experience. Doing this enables one to consider it from different and opposing perspectives, a capacity that Nietzsche particularly prizes. "Learning to see" is also a promotion of truthfulness or integrity, although the link is not self-evident. In another work from that final year, *The Antichrist*, Nietzsche writes, "By lie I mean: wishing *not* to see something that one does see; wishing not to see something *as* one sees it" (Nietzsche 1954, p. 640). Clearly he means what we call self-deception. Lying to oneself, he suggests, is more common than lying to others. He identifies its immediate cause as having "convictions" – that is, as being tied to particular interpretations of the world and of past history in particular – convictions being, as one of his best-known aphorisms puts it, far greater enemies of truth than straightforward lies (Nietzsche 1986, p. 179).

"Learning to see" also has a positive sense: it is identified with *objectivity*. Now, one might argue that this term is so compromised by careless use and idle talk that it may be wiser simply to give it up and use a different vocabulary for issues of epistemic validity. Still, Nietzsche makes an attempt to reclaim the concept, although he undermines his own case at times by using the same word for something that he altogether rejects: a passive approach to knowledge that simply accepts any fact that presents itself to observation, however trivial. No doubt this is an exaggerated picture, even for the routinized kind of academic research that Nietzsche repudiates. Still, it provides a sharp contrast with his declared approach to knowledge, which involves actively testing ideas and theories: "I favour any *skepsis* to which I may reply: 'Let us try it!' But I no longer wish to hear anything of all those things and questions that do not permit any experiment" (Nietzsche 1974, p. 115).

Such experimenting is what “learning to think” consists in, with the suggestion of a playful and creative use of concepts. The clue provided by the allusion to “scholars of philosophy” points to a convergence of thinking about education and a conception of philosophy or at least of philosophizing. Hence, to know what Nietzsche has to say about education, one has to focus on his conception of education *for philosophy*, because that is where he thinks the central purpose of education is seen most clearly.

Conclusion

An education for philosophy is, if not the essence of education in general – for there is no such thing if, as Nietzsche puts it, “only that which has no history is definable” (Nietzsche 1969, p. 80) – the key to understanding education in terms of three basic tasks: learning to see, learning to think, and learning to speak and write. Within each of these, the tension between self-discipline and creative freedom is a central feature and even a driving force. Any impression of a conservative position given by Nietzsche’s remarks on education comes from their emphasis on self-discipline, and from his bold simplified curriculum for types of learning which at first sight resemble the three Rs. What makes this a radical vision, looked at more closely, is its connection with Nietzsche’s most challenging doctrines: in particular, with his project of a “revaluation of values” that, in the aftermath of the “death of God,” sets out to replace morality and religion with a new “tablet of values.” That can be achieved only by the “philosopher of the future,” a further development of the middle period’s “free spirit” (Nietzsche 1966, pp. 53–54).

The ultimate task of education, then, is just to make such a figure possible. What is needed to achieve that goal? Despite his praise of self-education and mutual education, Nietzsche recognizes a crucial role for teachers and schools in promoting the skills and dispositions without which independent learning is difficult or impossible. “Rigorous thinking, cautious judgment, and consistent reasoning” are not held up simply as

ends in themselves, as in a traditional education, but as strengths that will enable the philosopher “of tomorrow and the day after tomorrow” (Nietzsche 1966, p. 137) to create different ways of knowing and living.

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Nietzsche and Self-Education

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Friedrich Nietzsche held that education, or the kind of it that concerned him, is self-education in a particular sense of the phrase. As he succinctly put it, “there are no educators,” and it is a point that it would profit us to examine (Nietzsche 1996, p. 132). What, in the final analysis, can one mind teach another? Who, for instance, taught Nietzsche how to write books of philosophy? Not only

did Nietzsche write eloquently on the concept of self-education, but his own education as a philosopher exhibits rather well this very theme. Nietzsche was one of the greatest philosophical writers of his time and likely the greatest. His doctoral studies were in philology, not philosophy, and he did not complete them since, having gained a position at the University of Basel, this was not required. He was a professor there for a relatively short time until his medical leave allowed him to live the life of a wandering solitary, which is the period in which he wrote his greatest works. He did it without institutional support (aside from a modest pension), tenure, research grants, assistants, and the various academic “dignities and respectabilities” which he held in contempt (Nietzsche 2003, p. 147). It was by no miracle that he “became what he was,” as he liked to put it, and it was also not due to having had good teachers in the conventional sense.

What was Nietzsche’s own formal education like, and to what extent can it be credited with producing the thinker that he became? To the latter question, the answer is not zero, but it is not so far from this, at least if we trust Nietzsche’s own word on the matter (which we should not do uncritically). Some of Nietzsche’s fondest childhood memories were of his father’s and grandfather’s studies and the world of books which they opened up to him. As he wrote at the age of fourteen: “Our house was built in 1820 and so was in excellent condition. Several steps led up to the ground floor. I can still remember the study on the top floor. The rows of books, among them many picture-books and scrolls, made it my favorite place.” A biographer notes that “already in prepubescent days he liked nothing better than fossicking around in Grandfather Oehler’s library and visiting the Leipzig bookshops with him. As [his younger sister] Elizabeth reports, it was in fact Grandfather Oehler who first spotted Fritz’s unusual gifts, telling Franziska [Nietzsche’s mother] that he was the most talented boy he had ever seen, more talented than his own six sons put together” (Young 2010, pp. 8, 17). [I cite Young’s text somewhat reluctantly and am mindful of the controversy that surrounds it.] “I was never happier than when I was in grandpapa’s study,

browsing through the old books and magazines.’ Once again he was in a pastor’s study in a country parsonage, surrounded by books: this was as close as he could come to re-enacting the experience of being with his father at Röcken” (Hayman 1980, p. 26). Nietzsche’s father having died during the boy’s fifth year of life, the responsibility for his education fell to his mother and maternal grandparents who sent him at the age of five to a primary school for boys and the following year to a private school in preparation for entry 3 years later to a Cathedral Grammar School. This he attended between the ages of 10 and 14, following which he earned a scholarship to attend a small and prestigious boarding school named Pforta. By this time, he had acquired a strict work ethic in spite of ill health and was able to impress the teachers – most of them – of this self-contained institution which stood at some remove from town life and to which parents relinquished virtually all rights over their children for a period of 6 years.

According to Julian Young’s (highly controversial) biography, “Nietzsche never doubted that Pforta made him. And he was always loyal to the school and grateful, not only for the magnificent education in the humanities but also for the character ‘formation’ it had given him. Twenty-four years after leaving, he wrote, ‘The most desirable thing of all . . . is under all circumstances to have severe discipline *at the right time*, i.e., at the age when it makes us proud that people should expect great things from us. For this is what distinguishes hard schooling from every other schooling, namely that a good deal is demanded; that goodness, nay even excellent itself, is required as if it were normal; that praise is scanty; that leniency is non-existent; that blame is sharp, practical, and has no regard to talents or antecedents. We are all in every way in need of such a school; and this holds good of physical as well as spiritual things – it would be fatal to draw distinctions here! The same discipline makes the soldier and the scholar efficient; and, looked at more closely, there is no true scholar who has not the instincts of a true soldier in his veins.” At Pforta Nietzsche absorbed the ethos of the Prussian State and took to it like a duck to water. In later years even his physical bearing would give

many the impression that he was an army officer (he had served a short time in the military). The curriculum at the exclusive secondary school consisted in the main of Greek and Latin as well as the classics of German literature (plenty of Goethe and Schiller) while mathematics and the natural sciences were not emphasized and, for the most part, poorly taught. It was the world of Rome and especially Greece into which the students were initiated, renaissance humanism being as essential to the Pforta philosophy as Prussian militarism. Here Nietzsche would remain until his twentieth year when upon graduation he began his university studies first in Bonn and, the following year, Leipzig. To please his mother, he began his studies in theology – a discipline for which he had no passion but which held out the promise of a career. “As a scholarship boy from a poor background he had no option but to think seriously about bread-winning,” and the clerical profession had been his father’s career until his premature death (Young, 2010, pp. 25–26, 31). Unable to stomach this for long, he switched to classical philology, for which Pforta had well prepared him and again which led readily to a career.

At Leipzig Nietzsche found suitable teachers in the noted philologists Otto Jahn and (especially) Friedrich Ritschl, although his interests were turning increasingly in a most impractical direction. Philosophy was his new love, owing not to any formal studies in this discipline or the philosophy professors at Leipzig but to his own reading, in particular of Arthur Schopenhauer’s *The World as Will and Representation* which he discovered in 1865 at the age of 21. Significantly, while Nietzsche read widely in these and subsequent years, he was not formally trained as a philosopher and had no complimentary words for the professors in this field whom he encountered in his school years or later. In “Schopenhauer as Educator,” for instance, he would write in 1874: “One has only to recall one’s own student days; in my case, for example, academic philosophers were men towards whom I was perfectly indifferent: I counted them as people who raked together something for themselves out of the results of the other sciences and employed their leisure time in reading newspapers and going to concerts, and for the rest were treated

by their own academic comrades with a politely masked contempt. They were credited with knowing little and with never being at a loss for some obscure expression with which to conceal this lack of knowledge” (Nietzsche 1996, p. 188). In later years, his assessment would become harsher still. A typical example reads: “Like those who stand in the street and stare at the people passing by, so they [philosophical scholars] too wait and stare at thoughts that others have thought” (Nietzsche 2003, p. 146). When as a professor of philology at Basel, Nietzsche requested a transfer to philosophy; it was not without reason that he was denied.

While he continued to have high praise for Pforta, not only did Nietzsche discover his vocation independently but the whole story of how he became the thinker that he was must be told largely apart from his schooling. His studies at Pforta, Bonn, and Leipzig did not produce the philosopher he became. What did was a drive for knowledge that was nourished not by teachers but by an appetite for reading that was voracious in spite of the severe eye strain that it caused him. “Nietzsche’s headaches,” a biographer reports, “... were likely exacerbated by his extreme short-sightedness and by the strain imposed by prodigious amounts of reading. (Often he read through an entire night, his foot in a bucket of freezing water to prevent him falling asleep.)” (Young 2010, p. 32). No Prussian schoolmaster could have imposed the level of discipline that he imposed on himself or the passion for ideas that was awakened in him through his reading in various disciplines over a good many years. True education, he came to believe, far transcends any utilitarian end or vocational training but is a higher cultivation or formation (*Bildung*) that emerges from within. This does not entail that one pursues an education alone, and in the account Nietzsche would provide an important role is assigned to “teachers,” but in a sense of the word that is distinctive.

The vital matter in education, Nietzsche argued, is to find a vocation and, inseparable from this, a teacher. In his own case, the pursuit of truth constituted the former, while the latter was a less straightforward matter. Nietzsche’s doctoral supervisor, as noted, was a philologist who did

little to encourage his student's growing fascination for philosophy and in no way served as a model of the kind of thinker Nietzsche was aspiring to become. In these days, as he put it, "I believed that, when the time came, I would discover a philosopher to educate me, a true philosopher whom one could follow without any misgiving because one would have more faith in him than one had in oneself." This youthful idea he would abandon and replace with "the terrible effort and duty of educating myself," and it was an effort that included the difficult matter of finding himself not a master but an exemplar (Nietzsche 1996, p. 130). This is what a teacher in the highest sense of the word is, for Nietzsche: one who demonstrates in their own person and work that which the student aspires to learn and become. An educator in this sense is not assigned by an institution or by anyone but is chosen by the student. An essential part of self-education on his understanding of the term is the task of finding the teacher who can impart by example what the student needs to learn. "The education of youth by others," in his words, "is either an experiment carried on by an as yet unknown and unknowable subject, or a leveling on principle with the object of making the new being, whatever it may be, conform to the customs and habits then prevailing." If we would speak of education in a higher sense, and of the thinker in particular, then "one should speak only of self-education" (as cited in Babich 2010, p. 144).

In "Schopenhauer as Educator," Nietzsche recounted his failed attempts as a young man to find the teacher he was seeking in the universities of Germany. It was an apprenticeship that he sought, not (or no longer) a master at whose feet he could sit but a philosopher who could model what he wished to become. He found this in none of his teachers in the institutional sense, men whom he largely held in contempt for mediocrity and especially laziness: "When the great thinker despises mankind, he despises its laziness: for it is on account of their laziness that men seem like factory products, things of no consequence and unworthy to be associated with or instructed. The man who does not wish to belong to the mass

needs only to cease taking himself easily; let him follow his conscience, which calls to him: 'Be your self! All you are now doing, thinking, desiring, is not you yourself.'" The educator one seeks properly teaches one not to be them but to be oneself, and one becomes this through imitation. One is not oneself; one becomes it, or one might, and not by scrounging around in an interiority that may not even be, but by finding an exemplar (s) who is worthy of a kind of selective and critical imitation. The student imitates the teacher, but it is oneself that one becomes. For Nietzsche, "your true nature lies, not concealed deep within you, but immeasurably high above you, or at least above that which you usually take yourself to be. Your true educators and formative teachers reveal to you what the true basic material of your being is, something in itself ineducable and in any case difficult of access, bound and paralysed: your educators can be only your liberators" (Nietzsche 1996, pp. 127, 129). It is hardly without significance that the subtitle to *Ecce Homo*, Nietzsche's "autobiography" – although the scare quotes are an understatement – is *How One Becomes What One Is*.

There is no metaphysics of human nature at work here. Nietzsche was speaking of a process of formation in which one becomes what one is by aspiring to an ideal that is self-chosen and that is modeled by a teacher who is also self-chosen. This is a version of the "role model" argument, with the crucial difference that the teacher is not charged by an institution with exhibiting particular traits of mind or character but instead it is the student who must find the teacher who can impart less by instruction than example what it is that the student needs to learn. Becoming educated is a difficult task indeed, and not only for the usual reasons but because the student is not being acted upon but is driving a process that originates within their own being and that requires a kind of agency that far surpasses what is usual in our institutions of learning. The question for the student is: "what have you truly loved up to now, what has drawn your soul aloft, what has mastered it and at the same time blessed it? Set up these revered objects before you and perhaps their nature and their

sequence will give you a law, the fundamental law of your own true self. Compare these objects one with another, see how one completes, expands, surpasses, transfigures another, how they constitute a stepladder upon which you have clambered up to yourself as you are now.” (Ibid., p. 129) No academic counseling is possible here, no guidance from without, for what one is choosing is not only what one will know or do for a living but who one will become or perhaps fail to become. One becomes what one is in the company of like-minded souls, both peers of similar inclination and especially an exemplar who has succeeded in some measure in accomplishing what one aspires to accomplish for oneself.

For the young Nietzsche, it was Schopenhauer who served in this role – a man he never met but whose writings lit a veritable fire in the student or, more likely, fanned an existing flame. Schopenhauer was no Kant or Hegel but a thinker in an entirely different and, in the student’s eyes, more Greek mold. What did Nietzsche see in this writer? The answer appears to bear less upon Schopenhauer’s philosophical doctrines than upon stylistic and affective – one might say spiritual – matters. Schopenhauer was an accomplished stylist, to be sure, but it was his sense of life still more that spoke directly to Nietzsche and that inspired him to follow in kind. What the young philosopher was in search of was himself and, as Babette Babich states, “Schopenhauer is Nietzsche’s exemplar on the way to finding himself (and losing Schopenhauer in the process, as Zarathustra enjoins his followers to lose Zarathustra)” (Babich 2010, p. 139). A philosopher, Nietzsche came to believe, is not a disciple, nor does one become what one is in a vacuum. Even the solitary Zarathustra left his mountaintop from time to time for the town in the valley below. Here is how Nietzsche described the effect that reading Schopenhauer first had on him: “I am one of those readers of Schopenhauer who when they have read one page of him know for certain they will go on to read all the pages and will pay heed to every word he ever said. I trusted him at once and my trust is the same now as it was nine years ago. Though this is a foolish and

immodest way of putting it, I understand him as though it were for me he had written.” “As though” is a crucial phrase here; Schopenhauer never lived to hear the name Friedrich Nietzsche, but in the student’s mind, *The World as Will and Representation* spoke to him as the Bible speaks to a believer and as Nietzsche also wished to write, which is to say directly, personally, and honestly. One can read every page of Schopenhauer’s magnum opus looking for formal arguments and positions that Nietzsche would make his own and one will find little. It was not the arguments that mattered primarily but a quality of thought that is more resistant to analysis. There is an honesty in the great pessimist’s writings that spoke to Nietzsche directly, an intellectual candor and an inwardness that the young philosopher had never seen before (he never read Kierkegaard). “Schopenhauer never wants to cut a figure: for he writes for himself and no one wants to be deceived, least of all a philosopher who has made it a rule for himself: deceive no one, not even yourself!” (Nietzsche 1996, pp. 133–134). Honesty and writing for oneself, Nietzsche believed, are rare in a writer, and it was these qualities that he wanted to emulate in his own work. There was no learning this from the rank and file professors of his time who were more interested in striking a pose – including one of perfect objectivity – than thinking in a manner that is intellectually forthright, personal, and existentially urgent.

Schopenhauer, in Nietzsche’s youthful eyes, was an “untimely” figure: fearless, independent, forever swimming against the current of his times yet also cheerful in the way of one who is unconcerned with others’ estimations of his work. In an era of naive optimism Schopenhauer’s truthfulness was untimely, heroic, and isolating. Only one with an iron constitution could write in this way, and it was this rare combination of honesty and cheerfulness that the young philosopher was endeavoring to develop. “I know of only one writer,” Nietzsche stated, “whom I would compare with Schopenhauer, indeed set above him, in respect of honesty: Montaigne. That such a man wrote has truly augmented the joy of living on this

earth. Since getting to know this freest and mightiest of souls, I at least have come to feel what he felt about Plutarch: ‘as soon as I glance at him I grow a leg or a wing.’” He added: “Schopenhauer has a second quality in common with Montaigne, as well as honesty: a cheerfulness that really cheers” (Ibid., p. 135). Thinking at its highest reaches requires a free-spiritedness that was lacking in the nineteenth century, dominated as it was by ponderous notions of rationalism, empiricism, and positivistic science which constituted not only false conceptions of knowledge but a profoundly dishonest view of philosophy. Nietzsche always understood philosophy in a basically Greek way, as a relentless pursuit of truths that are forever elusive. In the end, wisdom is had by the gods (who, for Nietzsche, are dead), not human beings. The latter can at best love it in the sense of pursue it, but the thing itself eludes us. It is best sought, Nietzsche believed, with the right attitude of mind – one that is Apollonian and Dionysian at the same time and in equal measure. It is a joyful wisdom that philosophy properly seeks, not the formal certainty of modern epistemology but something roughly intermediate between science and poetry and that partakes of both. Philosophy should inspire as art does, seduce the senses at the same time that it persuades our reason, the gap between the two being more apparent than real.

This is what Schopenhauer achieved, for Nietzsche. Here was a writer who could teach the young thinker what he most needed to learn and what no school could impart, “that magical outpouring of the inner strength of one natural creature on to another.” The terms of Nietzsche’s praise reflect his own highest aspirations: Schopenhauer “is honest because he speaks and writes to himself and for himself, cheerful because he has conquered the hardest task of thinking, and steadfast because he has to be. His strength rises straight and calmly upwards like a flame when there is no wind, imperceptibly, without restless wavering” (Ibid., p. 136). When he encountered Schopenhauer’s work, Nietzsche reported that he had been existentially lost, “devoid of fundamental principles,” having rejected the religion of his youth and having found nothing with which to replace it. In November of 1865 “I

came across this book [*The World as Will and Representation*] in old Rohn’s second-hand bookshop, and taking it up very gingerly I turned over its pages. I know not what demon whispered to me: ‘Take this book home with you.’ At all events, contrary to my habit of not being hasty in the purchase of books, I took it home. Back in my room I threw myself into the corner of the sofa with my booty, and began to allow that energetic and gloomy genius to work upon my mind. In this book, in which every line cried out renunciation, denial and resignation, I saw a mirror in which I espied the whole world, life, and my own mind depicted in frightful grandeur” (as cited in Young 2010, pp. 81, 87). Here were large existential themes being spoken of in the boldest way possible and with an independence of mind seldom found in the philosophy of the day. Immediately the young philosopher became a “Schopenhauerian,” as would a famous composer with whom Nietzsche would form one of the most important friendships of his life.

Richard Wagner, a man 31 years Nietzsche’s senior, fit Schopenhauer’s definition of a genius – or so it seemed to Nietzsche at the time (and to Wagner for a while longer). The composer was a “brother in spirit” to Schopenhauer, as Nietzsche came to see himself, although his devotion to both figures was destined to be fleeting (as cited in Young 2010, p. 124). The philosopher Nietzsche was becoming far too original to be a “Schopenhauerian” or devotee of any kind, and in time both Wagner and Schopenhauer would become more like influences than the idols they had been in his younger days. As Young notes, “Nietzsche needed the ‘space’ to be his own man, to escape from the overpowering presence of ‘the Master’” whom Wagner had been to him and Schopenhauer had been on a more imaginary plane (Young 2010, p. 158). These two figures were not the philosopher’s only influences. That the young Nietzsche was a voracious reader has been noted, and among the writers he admired most were Goethe, Montaigne, Epicurus, Baruch Spinoza, Ralph Waldo Emerson, and Fyodor Dostoyevsky. Although he often accessed philosophers via secondary literature, Nietzsche’s admiration for each of these writers was bound

up with an affinity of spirit that he shared with them. All were exemplars or teachers in his sense, with whom he felt a personal connection and from whom he could appropriate less their philosophical positions than a sense of life or deep attitude of mind. What he saw in Dostoyevsky, for instance, was not the Christian moralist but the psychologist and proto-existentialist, a commonality of spirit that is more profound than any doctrine.

The self-education of this philosopher consisted in an independent reading of authors selected with the aim of finding models from whom he could learn not “what a professional philosopher must know” (whatever that is) but what he himself needed to know: what kind of writer was it possible for him to become and how could he become what he was in the world of thought. He needed, as anyone who is serious about creative work does, to learn from the masters, masters chosen in light of personal affinities and who had achieved something comparable to what he envisioned for himself. The highest aim of education, on his view, is the cultivation of genius and cultural leadership. This is what the thinker strives to become, and if no pedagogical method imparts it, then one must teach it to oneself by immersing oneself in the work of one’s exemplars. One educates and indeed becomes oneself by studying, imitating, and ultimately leaving behind one’s self-chosen teachers. One climbs the ladder that one must, then throws it away.

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Nietzsche and Solitude

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Introduction

Friedrich Nietzsche’s philosophy of education can best be understood as the backdrop or foundation of his larger philosophical project. That said, outlining the philosophy of education presents a fairly unique set of problems. First of all, he did not write a work devoted to that topic other than the romantic analysis of education which he gave in a series of public lectures called *On the Future of our Educational Institutions*, which played a significant role in his early departure from education, and second, two of the three concepts that make up his pedagogical philosophy are at best elusive and tend to defy a positive definition. The first problem means that a Nietzschean philosophy of education must be pieced together from many of his major works and combined with some of his earlier works. Part of his thought on the topic suggests that contradiction has a role to play, such that many attempts to put together his philosophy of education have often fallen prey to the allure of the “doctrines.” But by remaining open to the development of his thoughts, we can both avoid that allure and bring about a coherent picture of his philosophy of education.

Born on 14 October in 1844, Nietzsche lived in Röcken and Naumburg before attending Schulpforta. After completing his studies there, he matriculated at the University of Bonn in classical philology, but moved to Leipzig after his first year of study due to what he felt was the overly political atmosphere of the Bonn seminar. This point was confirmed later during his inaugural lecture to the chair of philology in Basel in 1869 when he declared that “the estimation of philology in public opinion depends upon the weight of the personalities of the [individual] philologist!” (Nietzsche 1909, p. 146). This problem was something that

he increasingly saw as an endemic not just in philology but in higher education in general.

Nietzsche saw this problem as manifesting itself in what he called the Philistine culture of the day. He had a great deal of concern for the stagnation of intellectual life in the form of overly specialized scholarship, in the fragmentation of society and culture through what he called “an inordinately stupid ease and comfort doctrine for the benefit of the ego” (Nietzsche 2007a, §6). His critique of contemporary culture based itself on what he saw as the denigration of education, the push toward greater professionalism and specialization and the rising State control over both education and culture. These conditions, largely the result of the Humboldtian reforms in education in the early part of the nineteenth century, led to what he felt was the most damaging result: the democratization of education. As such, Nietzsche’s so-called aristocratism and elitism are usually cited as reason enough to stop looking for a philosophy of education in his thought, since modern sensibilities take the latter to be anathema to the former. And in literal terms, this may be true, but that sentiment betrays a deeper issue first identified by Nietzsche which is the nihilism which results from the continued assertion of a set of values which we know to be baseless. Specialization speaks to exclusivity while democratization to its opposite. Nietzsche felt that this kind of contradictory yet universally accepted attitude was symptomatic of the age: *plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose*.

Underlying his philosophy of education is a conception of “higher” culture and “true” education. The dilettantism and commodified nature of the Philistine culture was something he sneered at on account of its incoherent desire “to create entire philosophies: the sole proviso was that everything must remain as it was before, that nothing should at any price undermine the ‘rational’ and the ‘real,’ that is to say, the philistine” (Nietzsche 2007a, §2). Given the choice between the nihilism and philistinism or the higher culture of true education, he can hardly be blamed for his choice. But we must be careful here because Nietzsche’s elitism has nothing to do with “the people” or “nation,” but with the nobility spirit required for true education and

culture. The ultimate objective of Nietzsche’s philosophy of education was the development of true culture through the nurturing of the sovereign individual who is characterized by the three concepts that make up Nietzsche’s pedagogical thought, namely, the pursuit of authenticity, inward directed competition and struggle, and finally sublimation.

Authenticity

The concept of authenticity is an understandably elusive subject. It is nonetheless useful to talk “about” authenticity in the face of the fact that we may not be able to talk about it. The distinction made by the addition of the quotation marks is that an irreducible definition of the word authenticity is impossible but what we can do is develop our understanding of the conditions that make authenticity possible. Nietzsche’s philosophy of education does precisely this. The concept of authenticity does not comprise an objective list of irreducible values or characteristics, but describes one’s comportment and attitude toward life. If the end of education is the nurturing and promotion of Nietzsche’s higher types and free spirits, then authenticity must be understood as the individual’s solicitude for himself or herself rather than the attainment of a set of external qualifications. Nietzsche’s free spirit is the person who understands their perspectival role in the creative production of the conditions for their life. Such an individual recognizes their view as a falsification of the Philistine’s “real” and “rational” world and that the illusions thus created are the necessary fictions fit only for their life. They are able, as he says, to exercise both their pro and con in the service of that creation rather than in the service of unthinking dogma and blind following a tradition for their own sake.

The pursuit of authenticity then means that the individual must question the traditional authority of concepts such as truth, logic and morality, and values such as honesty, sincerity, and humility. Its achievement requires acceptance of the world as the incessant movement of becoming, self-transcendence, and “self”-creation. This is ultimately a question of freedom end of rejecting the

current ethic in order to understand it as an external measure that force quantification of what is ultimately only to be defined or understood by its quality, which is to say, life. Authenticity must be descriptive of creating possibility rather than prescriptive of practice.

In *Authenticity And Learning*, David E Cooper points out that after this rejection Nietzsche wondered "... how the individual shall live in the era of history after the 'death of God?'" (Cooper 2011, p. 1). His answer, now that the shabby origins of our values have been uncovered, was to question the value of those values in order to understand the function they served in the development of the human type. Their function was to nurture the all too human capacity of solicitude and "self"-concern. This allows us to reflect upon our actions, beliefs, intentions, and values for the purpose of analyzing and, when deemed appropriate, annihilating them in an effort to improve the quality, but not necessarily the comfort, of our lives. Avoiding the responsibility of this capacity for solicitude can only result in nihilism and the leveling of meaning, which results from the loss of the ability to posit value. The incongruity of following policies or asserting values in which we no longer believe, Nietzsche might say, is what has created the modern crisis in education and culture. In order to avoid this, one must "live in the full awareness of the possibilities of action, belief, and purpose that are in fact open to him and which anyone concerned with his existence as an issue must consider" (Cooper 2011, p. 15). For an indication as to how one goes about achieving this, we must look at what Nietzsche offers as the model of a "true educator," the philosopher/artist and their embrace of agonism and inward directed competition as that applies to the individual.

Nietzsche says that what is truly important about the philosopher/artist is *how* they educate. In the series of public lectures that he gave at the University of Basel in 1872, Nietzsche created an archetype of the old philosophy professor, really just a thinly disguised portrait of Arthur Schopenhauer, to explain what he means. The philosopher/artist educates not through their philosophy, but through the lives they lead. Although Nietzsche ultimately rejected Schopenhauer's philosophy, in

the *Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks*, he had to admit that "the only thing of interest in a refuted system is the personal element. It alone is forever irrefutable" (Nietzsche 1998, p. 25). And it is this personal element that distinguishes a teacher from a true educator. In *Schopenhauer as Educator* he reminds us:

A scholar can never become a philosopher; for even Kant was unable to do so but, the inborn pressure of his genius notwithstanding, remained to the end as it were in a chrysalis stage. He who thinks that in saying this I am doing Kant an injustice does not know what a philosopher is, namely not merely a great thinker but so a real human being; and when did a scholar ever become a real human being? (Nietzsche 2007b, §7).

To educate means to create meaning, value, and culture, but as with authenticity, this cannot be done *for* the student. They must be shown how to do it for themselves. Kant, as far as Nietzsche was concerned, is the quintessential systematizer in that he, like many before and after him, attempts to leave no question unanswered or critique unaddressed. And while this may be noble as an objective, we are led to believe, through the quantity of effort, that we have achieved the quality of truth, though all the while the ground under that truth is shifting. Nietzsche sees this as a vice, not a virtue, that "the will to system is a lack of integrity" (Nietzsche 2006, §26). This is because this will to system seeks only to bring struggle to an end, and this, for Nietzsche, is the death of education, of philosophy, and of culture. "The philosopher as we understand him, we free spirits – as the man with the most comprehensive responsibility, whose conscience bears the weight of the overall development of humanity" (Nietzsche 2002, §61). This responsibility and conscience are born in agon or struggle which, for Nietzsche, must be directed toward one's "self" and is perhaps the most far reaching of the benefits of true education.

Contest

Nietzsche points to contest as the central activity in the process of life; all that lives does so because they struggled. The level of the struggle is determined by the degree of will to power possessed by

a given individual. The contest is with one's self and is directed at whatever we feel we "really" are. It is not directed outward, toward some external, alien, and ultimately arbitrary standard, but toward knowledge. In Nietzsche's pedagogical thought, there are two senses of the word "knowledge" operative which tie into the idea of struggle. The first exhausts itself in the content of knowledge and is subject to the externally directed form of agon. Modern education is essentially a process of indoctrination into particular bodies of facts and accepted ways of presenting such facts. The second sense of the word is knowledge as the process of knowing. In this sense of the word, knowledge is a process of directing the individual's attention inward at their unique development as a knower. It is integral to the pursuit of authenticity and that very Nietzschean notion of self-overcoming. To make oneself better today than yesterday and still better tomorrow again to borrow a sentiment from Protagoras may be a good way to put this since it is only the individual who can know if this has been achieved or not. Knowledge in the sense facilitates the creation of meaning and value. It creates the truths by which one's unique existence is possible. But such truths will not be of the objective, disinterested sort. Rather it creates truths that are felt in the blood and bone and are the necessary condition of life.

It follows then that if the internal contest is to be recognized as a fundamental to life, to the process of living, so too it will be a fundamental part of education, true education. This education must focus on method over content, but if the educator is to be an example, they must be actively engaged in their own pursuit of authenticity such that method in this context becomes the creation of "a unity of style" rather than a set of techniques adopted during teachers' college. Moreover, we can now see how Nietzsche's self-overcoming will involve not just the individual desire to become better and to reject the dangerously normative influence of the concept of a self-in-itself but also the overcoming of the guide, that is to say, the teacher. One's true educators can only be chosen from a specifically perspectival awareness of one's formation as an individual,

involving a critical awareness of the decisions one makes because for Nietzsche "the most desirable thing is still under all circumstances a hard discipline at the appropriate time" (Ferrer & Nietzsche 2012, 14 [161]). There is in all this a certain degree of subordination of the student to both educator and education, but this subordination remains under the control of the individual through the process and practice of sublimation.

Sublimation

In *Twilight of the Idols* in a section called "My Idea of Freedom," Nietzsche says that "[sometimes] the value of a thing is not what you get with it but what you pay for it – what it costs" (Nietzsche 2006, §38). A modern audience may be forgiven for wondering what novelty there is in this sentiment, but that is itself an indictment of modern education and culture. What one pays with is the effort one must put in, the blood, sweat, and tears. Indeed there is, where education is concerned, nothing that one can get with it since, contrary to the student handbook from just about every institution of higher learning today. The cant about the relationship between education and jobs, for example, is, well, cant. Education, if it is to be valued at all, must be seen as an end in itself. Nietzsche of course saw education as feeding into the higher culture, but in reality education and culture are hand in glove. This idea has all but been banished from the modern educational institution resulting in the reality that "the better the state is established, the fainter is humanity," as he says in a note from 1875. The remedy comes in the educational process itself through sublimation which is perhaps the most difficult task since in order to achieve it one must apply on "at least one of these instinct systems with iron pressure so that another could gain force, become strong, take control" (Nietzsche 2006, §41). Sublimation is directed at the instincts in the first instance in order to make room. In its common use, instinct is taken as the set of irreducible inclinations basic to the type, but we do well to remember that not such irreducibility is possible since we are wholly

nature and nature is dynamic. Rather, “[the] best we can do is to confront our inherited and hereditary nature with our knowledge, and through a new, stern discipline combat our inborn heritage and implant in ourselves a new habit, a new instinct, a second nature, so that our first nature withers away” (Nietzsche 2007b, §3). And they do this through sublimation.

As with authenticity and contest, sublimation is directly related to the creative capacity of the human type and the infinite possibilities that life represents for it. This involves the domination and redirection of the instincts in the service of creative potential, which will require a certain degree of “self”-destruction, which does not shy away from the many harsh truths and inherent tragedy of life. “To make the individual uncomfortable, that is my task” (Nietzsche as cited in Kaufmann 1988, p. 50).

If sublimation is to become an effective tool in the educational process, of becoming free and “who we are,” then it must include the highest degree of responsibility. For Nietzsche the normal practice of subordinating one’s will and strength to society or the State is apiece with the ease and comfort attitude of Philistine culture and philosophy. It is the highest degree of abrogation of responsibility, allowing everything, even their own thought to be judged by external metrics with the most damaging consequences. Without taking responsibility for how we create ourselves, we can lay no claim to our own development, expression, or creativity. On the other hand, should we embrace the responsibility brought on by this process of “self”-domination, we at least gain the potential to create the present and author the past and future from a position of life-affirming confidence, joy, and ebullience.

Conclusion

Nietzsche’s philosophy of education is about the creation of an environment wherein the free and sovereign individual is born out of their being guided through the flux of reality not to fit into a predetermined place, but rather to show them the

world of infinite perspective, authentic living, self-creation, and self-governance. This means obedience to one’s chosen path, the subordination of the instincts and drives that would draw one away from that path, a “hard discipline,” and a willingness to serve the higher goals of true education and culture. In other words, the individual must stand for something or they will fall for anything. And in this falling, there is a great deal at stake because the *laissez-aller* attitude to self and society precipitates mediocrity, blind conformity, and the leveling of meaning, with the result that “excellence and differentness become non-existent, and the capacity for reform within society disappears” (Sharp 1975, p. 102). In the final analysis education is about, well, education as is Nietzsche’s whole philosophical project.

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Nietzsche, Friedrich (1844–1900)

► Nietzschean Education and Gelassenheit-Education

Nietzsche's Schopenhauer and Education

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Education as Liberation of the True Self

A key role for the Nietzschean educator is to reveal or liberate the true self. This is not a focus on the humanist subject but rather an exhortation to break free from conventionality, to be responsible for creating our own existence, and to overcome the inertia of tradition and custom:

...for your true nature lies, not concealed deep within you, but immeasurably high above you, or at least above that which you usually take yourself to be. Your true educators and formative teachers reveal to you what the true basic material of your being is, something in itself ineducable and in any case difficult of access, bound and paralysed: your educators can be only your liberators. (Nietzsche 1983, p. 129)

The true self could be revealed and one's acquired identity overcome, not by introspection but by examining our revered objects and educators of the past, as stepladders upon which we have climbed so far; in other words, how have we become who we are. Examining those held in high esteem was for Nietzsche the path to our true selves.

Nietzsche frequently refers to Schopenhauer as his "true educator," a topic explored fully in his essay "Schopenhauer as Educator," published in 1874 as one of the *Untimely Meditations*.

Although a reader can be forgiven for believing that it is the earlier philosopher in person that Nietzsche is referring to, the image is more a metaphor for Nietzsche's own self-educative process, and his description of Schopenhauer an attribution based on his perception of his own life. He was to write many years later, "...in Schopenhauer as Educator my innermost history, my becoming is inscribed. Above all, my promise! ..." At bottom it is admittedly not "Schopenhauer as Educator" that speaks here but his opposite, "Nietzsche as Educator" (Nietzsche 1967, "The Untimely Ones", p. 3).

In the light of Nietzsche's own admission, an analysis of his *Untimely Meditation* is more likely to reveal his own philosophy of education rather than that of his mentor. Nietzsche's depiction of himself as Schopenhauer's opposite is his retrospective attempt to reject Schopenhauer and the pessimistic response to life. However, at the time of writing, Nietzsche obviously saw himself in Schopenhauer (or Schopenhauer in himself), and Schopenhauer's ideas permeated much of Nietzsche's later writing as well.

Schopenhauer as Nietzsche's True Educator

Nietzsche identifies two maxims for the successful educator: on the one hand, to recognize and develop particular strengths in a pupil; on the other hand, to draw forth and nourish all the aspects in harmony. Schopenhauer was a philosopher who for Nietzsche was capable of achieving this balance. It is worth noting that Nietzsche does not ascribe to Schopenhauer any intentionality in his educative task. Rather he sees Schopenhauer setting a moral example to be emulated. The educative function seems to be one that is determined by the pupil, who adopts the challenge of achieving the standard set by his exemplar.

Three qualities of Schopenhauer stood out for Nietzsche: his originality and honesty in a period of German philosophy that he saw characterized by conformity; his cheerfulness emanating from courage and strength; and his uncompromising steadfastness. Nietzsche also followed

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Schopenhauer in his contempt for scholars in their limited search for "pure knowledge." He saw Schopenhauer as liberating philosophy from the control of State and society.

Nietzsche's early infatuation with Schopenhauer is evidenced in his psychological positioning of himself in relation to Schopenhauer as

...a son being instructed by his father. It is an honest, calm, good-natured discourse before an auditor who listens to it with love. (Nietzsche 1983, p. 134)

Janaway (1994) details the Schopenhauerean themes that impacted on subsequent musicians and philosophers, among them his aesthetic theory, his philosophy of music, his recognition of the unconscious, his treatment of the overpowering sexual drive, his pessimism, and his questioning of the value of human existence. Nietzsche believed life was more important than knowledge, and that art and music could provide the pathway to a joyful and creative existence. He followed Schopenhauer in his view that non-rational forces were at the heart of reality.

The period of German Nationalism in the mid nineteenth century was characterized by Bismarck's reliance on imagery of "iron and blood" and left little room for dissidence or free speech. Nietzsche distanced himself from German Nationalism and had a high regard for independent thinking and untimely men. What he found in Schopenhauer was this independence, a man not bound by conventional thinking nor by social etiquette.

Nietzsche, in line with Schopenhauer's contempt for Hegel, often denounced Hegel's idea of the State as the highest goal for mankind. He argued that under the power of the State the moneymakers and the military held power; that serving the State was a lapse into stupidity, counterproductive to culture; instead he saw it as the duty of philosophers to concern themselves with the world of culture, so that the spirit of humanity could be preserved. It was important therefore for Nietzsche to theorize the nature of this "spirit" and it was in Schopenhauer's image that he found his clues.

There were for Nietzsche three inspirational images of man in the modern era: the man of

Rousseau, full of fire and ready for revolution; the man of Goethe, committed not to action but to contemplation; and the man of Schopenhauer, who reconciles action and contemplation, voluntarily taking upon himself the suffering involved in being truthful, destroying his earthly happiness through his courage, and frequently remaining misunderstood. Nietzsche's image of Schopenhauerean man describes the self-overcoming inherent in his later formulation of the *Übermensch*.

Schopenhauer had interpreted Kant's ideas, to depict the world in terms of two aspects: that of representation, or the way we experience things, and that of will, an unconscious, irrational force, blind and constantly striving throughout all nature. The human condition was one of being constantly torn between the rational process of the conscious mind and the underlying all-pervasive will. Since the will had no element of space and time, it therefore lacked individuation. There being no plurality of individuals, all there was in itself was Will.

Nietzsche acknowledges that Kant's thought could easily lead to skepticism and relativism, resulting in an eventual nihilism, a destination that was anathema to Nietzsche's whole philosophical project. Schopenhauer's educative value seems to rest for Nietzsche in his ability to face the profound depression he feels at the valuelessness of his existence, and to transform it through contemplation. Aesthetic experience, Schopenhauer claimed, could provide a perception of the world uncluttered by subjective desires. What made Schopenhauer even greater for Nietzsche is that he grappled with the issues of life in an era that would limit his freedom to do so, and yet still emerged the genius.

Schacht (1995) argues that Schopenhauer's radical stance did not fit easily with Western religious and philosophical thought. He clashed with the Christian interpretation of divinity, with contemporary beliefs about rationality and historical progress, and with belief in the possibility of human happiness. The image of a solitary thinker issuing a challenge to accepted tradition is one easily associated with Nietzsche as well, so it could be argued that Nietzsche has assimilated not only Schopenhauer's ideas but also his style

of philosophy, and according to Janaway, "even his nuances of voice and terminology" (1994, p. 101). Other commentators go further:

His writings, all of them, are full not just of quotations and paraphrases from Schopenhauer, but of phrases allusions and rhythms both conscious and unconscious. Nietzsche breathed Schopenhauer and cannot be understood without him (Young 1992, p. 3)

Rather than an enlightenment quest for happiness and truth, life was a continuous struggle. This pessimistic description of life, however, was not an end point for Nietzsche but rather an ideal beginning for his counternihilistic philosophy.

Nietzsche challenges himself to derive a practical morality from his Schopenhauerian ideal – what he calls a "chain of fulfillable duties." In other words, he wants to demonstrate how the Schopenhauerian ideal educates. The practical duties deriving from this picture involved the advancement of culture through the production of Schopenhauerian man.

For we know what culture is. Applied to the Schopenhauerian man, it demands that we prepare and promote his repeated production by getting to know what is inimical to it and removing it – in short, that we unwearily combat that which would deprive us of the supreme fulfillment of our existence by preventing us from becoming such Schopenhauerian men ourselves (Nietzsche 1983, p. 161)

Culture and the Genius

Schacht (1995) argues that for Nietzsche, culture is the sphere in which human animality takes on a spiritual dimension. What is to be promoted is the introduction to, and participation in, cultural life; and Nietzsche's exhortation to become yourself is to be understood not as a call to return to nature or to intensify one's subjectivity but rather as an appeal to ascend to culture, and to contribute what one can to its enrichment.

What distinguishes man from animal for Nietzsche is our ability to catch a glimpse of ourselves on the path toward man as something high above us. Nietzsche sees nature as needing knowledge for its own redemption and self-

enlightenment – the intellect in the service of the will – and yet man spends most of his time trying to escape awareness of his wretched predicament, by focusing on the State, on science, on making money, or on being sociable.

It is only rare men who emerge from the dreamlike state and lift us up. These rare men are for Nietzsche no longer animal but true men – the philosophers, artists, and saints. It is they who create the new metaphors of life; it is through them that Nature is transformed, through the promotion of the culture:

It is the fundamental idea of culture, insofar as it sets for each one of us but one task: to promote the production of the philosopher the artist and the saint within us and without us and thereby to work at the perfecting of nature. For, as nature needs the philosopher, so does it need the artist, for the achievement of a metaphysical goal, that of its own self-enlightenment, so that it may at last behold as a clear and finished picture that which it could see only obscurely in the agitation of its evolution – for the end, that is to say, of self-knowledge. (Nietzsche 1983, p. 160)

While not denying that individuals must learn to take part in the struggle for existence, he argues that all the present institutions are engaged in producing currency rather than culture and that there is a need for a new type of institution, one that can focus on culture.

The role of the new educational institution would be to provide support and protection for those committed to his idea of culture. He talked of a new order of schools as the "consecrated home of all higher and nobler culture," where the dedicated few could prepare within themselves and around them for the birth of the genius and the ripening of his work. What this meant in practice was to assemble the free spirits of the age together and introduce them to Schopenhauer's (or Nietzsche's?) philosophy. That required withstanding social opinion and religious dogma, and becoming aware of the political distortions embedded in normalized concepts such as "progress," "universal education," "national," "cultural struggle," and the "modern state."

Again we find Nietzsche trying to liberate man from the strictures of fashion and convention, this time through his awareness of the defining power

of language as a cultural medium. He criticized the ornate style of literary men and the elegance of journalists as unsuitable for the cultural leadership role they were trying to play, as they were merely “servants of the moment.” There was no hope for a higher notion of education through State-funded efforts either. In his early lectures on education (Nietzsche 1909), Nietzsche saw the State as necessarily furthering its own interests in terms of maximizing the utility value of its citizens and promoting a culture that would enhance government.

Tanner (1994) observes that one of the characteristics of nineteenth-century German philosophy was the idea of adversarial opposition, in which the outcome is more fruitful than anything that could be produced by either of the opponents going it alone. Nietzsche was no exception, and for him life involved opposition between the instinctual, amoral energy of Dionysus and the ordered and beautiful form of Apollo, the non-rational versus the civilized, the wild versus the refined.

Of special importance to him was his notion of overcoming adversity. Commentators suggest that his philosophy may have been driven by a lifelong personal struggle against illness, against convention, and against his eventual insanity. It is this personal struggle and self-overcoming that typifies Nietzsche's later formulation of the *Übermensch* or “overman” concept. Kaufmann (1974) dispels the myth of Nietzsche's overman as any sort of outwardly focused bully, preferring instead the explanation of *Übermensch* as a repudiation of conformity to any single norm and the antithesis of mediocrity and stagnation, in other words an attempt to realize his own unique individuality. Man who has overcome himself and his adverse conditions is the overman.

Nietzsche describes among the adverse conditions of Schopenhauer's life his “culturally pretentious” mother, and notes among the positive qualities that allowed Schopenhauer to rigorously maintain his path: the rugged manly character of his father; his focus on men rather than books; reverence for truth and not government; his international experience; his dislike for a strong State; his refusal to be involved in politics; his ability to

recognize the genius in himself and others; his financial independence, and especially his freedom. His lack of training as a scholar was also celebrated by Nietzsche. These qualities not only allowed Nietzsche to celebrate Schopenhauer as *Übermensch* but also described much of the predicament Nietzsche himself had to overcome to find freedom in his own life.

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Nietzsche's Spiritual Exercises

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Spiritual Exercises

Nietzsche's third *Untimely Meditation*, composed in 1874, *Schopenhauer as Educator* (Nietzsche 1983a), reflects upon and describes a "spiritual exercise" not unlike the spiritual exercises of St. Ignatius of Loyola, detailing tactics and including practical advice. Thus Nietzsche's "spiritual exercises" correspond to the traditional practice of self-cultivation, self-education, characteristic of the Stoic philosophers but also influential for the Hellenistic neo-Platonic tradition, the church fathers, and St. Augustine, author of *De Magistro* and the *Confessions*. Beyond Antiquity, spiritual exercises refer to a theological practice of self-cultivation and self-discipline. As a classist by training, Nietzsche notably offered a series of reflections on self-cultivation usually associated with the phrase he adopted as his own from the 7th Century BCE lyric poet, Pindar: "Become the one you are!" emphasizing that one only assumes but does not know oneself and must undertake to seek to come to know and then and on this basis to perfect oneself. In this same spirit, Nietzsche's *Untimely Meditations* reflect on a project of self-discovery and discipline. In particular, *Schopenhauer as Educator*, illustrates the project of finding the ideal educator *for oneself*: inasmuch as and ultimately, so Nietzsche writes, education can only be "self-education" and for the sake of, like the Stoics, attaining liberation: "your true educators can only be your liberators." Here, it is well worth reviewing Ignatius of Loyola's (1986) own *Spiritual Exercises*. (For a philosophical discussion, in addition to Patrick Aidan Heelan, S. J. 1986, see Antonio de Nicolás's, articulation of spiritual technique (1986a). A former Jesuit, with all the training of the same, de Nicolás' highly programmatic rules for the direction of sainthood, as it were, are detailed in the second and third chapters of the first part of his book, *Powers of*

Imagining, entitled, respectively, *Imagining: Primary Text*, *Primary Technology* (1986b) and *A Text for Reading*, *A Text for Deciding* (1986c)).

Such spiritual exercises or practices as we may speak of these following Pierre Hadot or Michel Foucault, correspond to is "the secret" of education in Nietzsche's essay, *Schopenhauer as Educator*, the third of his *Untimely Meditations*, the first three of which were published, seriatim, from 1873 through 1874. (The fourth essay of the *Untimely Meditations*, *Richard Wagner in Bayreuth* would not appear until 1876.) If the second essay, *On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life*, has rightly commanded attention, the first essay is especially significant if only rarely discussed in its own right: a diatribe on the theologian and popularizer David Strauss, concerned with the same theme that occupies Nietzsche in his second essay, that is, concerning the use of historical philology (Strauss popularized the so-called 'historical' Jesus) along with the challenges of popular reception and not less with the question of an author's style.

Here in *David Strauss, the Confessor and the Writer* (Nietzsche 1983b), Nietzsche begins by examining the "appeal" of popular appeals as such, starting with Strauss's theological philological (or classical) scholarship, as Nietzsche criticizes this, along with his 'use' of history, for the sake of the convention of an historical Jesus, thus articulating a putatively 'scientific' but in fact conventionally rather than critically historical account, drawing on Darwin and Hegel in addition to Schleiermacher and the mechanics of cosmology, including a "philistine" relation to historical context as indeed to then-contemporary politics and war.

By contrast with such broadly philological concerns, *Schopenhauer as Educator*, offers an intimate address to the reader, beginning very nearly as Descartes begins his own *Meditations on First Philosophy*, including – recall Hadot's references to Pierre Courcelle on Augustine (Hadot 1995, pp. 50–52) – the trappings of the genre of "meditation," talking about travel and distant lands, as of different peoples, space, and time—all the ingredients of personal communication.

Thus, we begin with an overall impression confided by an experienced traveler who confesses to us that most people in most lands share the following common traits: they are lazy, fearful, and herdlike. The herd quality is already familiar to the reader of Nietzsche's *Untimely Meditations* not only after the first meditation's emphasis on popular edification and the second meditation's bucolic reference to the ahistoricity and forgetfulness of the herd animal at the start of *On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life*, contrasting the animal with the human condition to praise the human being's distinguishing excellence and capacity for memory, defining as "true men, those who are no longer animal, philosophers, artists and saints" (Nietzsche 1983a, p. 159).

From this perspective, at once conspiratorial and sympathetic, Nietzsche's first line epitomizes the famously misanthropic Schopenhauer:

When the great thinker despises mankind, he despises their laziness; for it is on account of their laziness that men seem like factory products, things of no consequence and unworthy to be associated with or instructed. (Nietzsche 1983a, p. 127)

Nietzsche's familiar tone invites the reader to suppose himself both like and unlike the "great thinker." Thus a more complicated reflection on this essay might highlight a certain contradiction, Nietzsche seems to take the reader's side, seeming to advocate on behalf of anyone who does not wish to be lumped in with "the herd" Schopenhauer seems to "despise." "Be yourself!" is the invitation, with the complicated explanation that "All you are now thinking, doing, desiring, is not you yourself" (Ibid).

In what follows Nietzsche invites the "youthful soul" (and almost every reader is able to respond to such an invitation, the young and the young at heart alike) to reflect along with him. The scope of the invitation to the soul is irresistible, promising "a happiness allotted it from all eternity," a "happiness," available to anyone who can break free of "the chains of fear and convention" (Ibid).

Of all of Nietzsche's writings, *Schopenhauer as Educator* exemplifies and justifies David B. Allison's striking and beautiful reflection in his preface to *Reading the New Nietzsche*:

Perhaps more than any other philosopher who readily comes to mind, Nietzsche writes exclusively for you. Not at you, but for you. For you, the reader, only you. (Allison 2000, p. vii)

Note that the titular reference to the 'New' echoes Allison's own earlier book collection (Allison, ed. 1985). Such a "New Nietzsche" is a properly "continental" Nietzsche, read together with, and through, Heidegger, Deleuze, Granier, Derrida, Birault but also Lingis and one can say, Allison as well (for a discussion, see: Babich (2005–2006)). As Allison's point here suggests, Nietzsche, as author, gives *everything* away, including the reader's convictions: telling the reader that everything he or she is or has done or had lived through, gone through, *is not* what he or she is, *not really*. Instead, the reader's real or true self corresponds to his or her "higher" self. Not only that but Nietzsche tells us that the experience of *true education* is and "can only be" *liberation*.

This is very exhilarating language.

And Nietzsche does more as he goes on to offer techniques, real ones, very accurate, very traditional techniques, for what he promises us here: in search of an educator. Instructively, to do this Nietzsche describes a memory palace: telling the reader of his day how to make one and explaining to the reader the purposes of such a palace, given the very contemporary, then and now, modern, all-too-modern project of "finding oneself." As always, if we mean to understand Nietzsche's meaning, we cannot dispense with Nietzsche's discipline of ancient philology (Classics) but we also need, more generally, a method of hermeneutic reading, including situating a text in its own and not less in our own historical context (cf. on Nietzsche and hermeneutics, Babich 2014).

Thus with explicit reference to the classical study of education, Nietzsche's description of the construction of a memory palace in his *Schopenhauer as Educator* should be taken together with Aristotle's practical philosophy of self-perfection. The method in each case involves self-examination, meditation, and reflection:

Let the youthful soul look back on life with the question: what have you truly loved up to now, what has elevated your soul, what has mastered it and at the same time delighted it? Place these

venerated objects before you in a row, and perhaps they will yield for you, through their nature and their sequence, a law, the fundamental law of your true self. Compare these objects, see how one complements, expands, surpasses, transfigures another, how they form a stepladder upon which you have climbed up to yourself as you are now; for your true nature lies, not hidden deep within you, but immeasurably high above you, or at least above that which you normally take to be yourself. (Nietzsche 1983a, p. 129)

As with any comparison of different aspects, bracketing prejudices and societal convictions, the point is to find a common aspect that does not change: this is what mathematicians, physicists, and phenomenologists call *the invariant*.

The project is classically archaic, the heart of philosophy, in utter accord with the wisdom of the Delphic oracle – *gnothi seauton* (know thyself). Nietzsche adds to this what he took from Pindar's poetic challenge to hold faith with and to be true to yourself, having learned, both as students *begin to learn* and as educators *have learned*, who you are, that is, to say *in potentia*: what you are capable of. (I discuss the complexities of Nietzsche's motto, as indeed of translating Pindar's phrase: Babich 2009.)

Nietzsche's Ladder

The project in Nietzsche's meditation is that of discovery. The treasure chest of the heart is less to be memorized than sounded out, discovered in its compass and depth, and a scaffolding to be constructed not for a descent into the depths of this treasure chest but for an ascent as we shall see. Nietzsche's project in *Schopenhauer as Educator* allows the reader to construct a *studiosum*, a study chamber of the heart. The result is a guide not to the arts as such but the self; again, we recall the method: "Place these venerated objects before you in a row, and perhaps they will yield for you, through their nature and their sequence, a law, the fundamental law of your true self" (Nietzsche 1983a, p. 129).

Using the things you love to descry yourself, you, the reader, are invited to study their relation to one another. Once again:

Compare these objects, see how one complements, expands, surpasses, transfigures another, how they form a stepladder upon which you have climbed up to yourself as you are now; for your true nature lies, not hidden deep within you, but immeasurably high above you, or at least above that which you normally take to be yourself. (Ibid)

Education is a triumph of emancipation or liberation. Thus Nietzsche's comparative phenomenology of the heart reveals not only an inner ideal but a progress, inasmuch as the self-searching "youthful soul" already stands and leans on them in order to have attained the vantage point already attained.

Here there is a turn around, a reversal. For what one discovers is just and only that one cannot be educated. This means that the point of seeking an educator brings one face-to-face with this same ineducability. In consequence, one does not need educators for the sake of education as much as one needs them to "free one" from education:

Your true educators and formative teachers reveal to you what the real raw material of your being is, something quite ineducable, yet in any case accessible only with difficulty, bound, paralyzed: your educators can be only your liberators. (Ibid)

This ideal echoes Nietzsche's great sympathy for both Baruch Spinoza and Blaise Pascal, and it hints at what he ultimately believes will be the grace or "light of art":

it is the perfecting of nature when it prevents her cruel and merciless attacks and turns them to good, when it draws a veil over the expressions of nature's stepmotherly disposition and her sad lack of understanding. (Ibid)

In this way Nietzsche discovers or "finds" himself as he reads, as he writes, *Schopenhauer as Educator*.

Telling his own story to himself in this way, Nietzsche suggests that before finding Schopenhauer, he engaged in a kind of educational "cruising," as Tracy B. Strong is calculatedly fond of this risqué and deliberately erotic language. (Tracy Strong varies Nietzsche's sampling selection of different philosophical offerings – "I tried this one and that one" (Nietzsche 1983a, p. 133) – in (Strong 2000, p. xxx).) By contrast, with this more modern invocation, Nietzsche's exemplar is deliberately antique: it is Pindar's

you are to, you ought to, you should become the one you are. (For a discussion, see Pindar (and Alexander Nehamas) in Babich 2009.)

In connection with Augustine's own *Confessions* and Pierre Courcelle's hermeneutic re-reading of those confessions as related in Pierre Hadot's *Philosophy as a Way of Life* which reflects on the same charms and the same dangers (see, again, the first chapter of Hadot 1995), the seductiveness of Nietzsche's confessional expression obscures the urgency of the task Nietzsche sets for himself at the start of his call to teach at the University of Basel in Switzerland. Owing to this urgency, Nietzsche titled his meditations *Untimely*. Thus Nietzsche challenged his own educational institutions much as Ivan Illich likewise challenged education in his book, *Deschooling Society*. Illich's parallel is a complex one, but his point (which Illich also argues to illustrate the role school plays as an instrument of globalization) is offered on the backdrop of cooption and cultural imperialism especially as this is evident in underdeveloped countries but which can also be seen at any level in society, especially in the contrast between high and low. As Illich notes in his own context which focuses on the former: "With very rare exceptions, the university graduate from a poor country feels more comfortable with his North American and European colleagues than with his non-schooled compatriots, and all students are academically processed to be happy only in the company of fellow consumers of the products of the educational machine" (Illich 2000, p. 34).

Nietzsche outlines the disparity of the scholar's vocation in pedagogic practice as opposed to the ideal which he takes to a reflection on the differences between one scholarly expert and another, not unlike the reflections Max Weber will later offer with respect to both science (*Wissenschaft*) and politics as vocation.

Nietzsche argued in his *Untimely Meditations* and overall that the great majority of scholars could be compared to machines churning automatically, eager to toe the latest trend and unwilling to question much less to offer a critique, anxious to avoid rocking the boat and so to risk being disturbed in their path to conventional

security. Thus Nietzsche reflected on the scholar in terms of the dryness of his element, the dust of books, the "grayness" of their thinking.

In his inaugural lecture, Nietzsche had argued that claims to expertise were founded on nothing other than scholarly taste, in other words, sheer personal judgment or mere convention. As Nietzsche went on to argue in a related passage in *Schopenhauer as Educator*, such conventions offer a hiding place for both the narrowly competent and the incompetent in addition to the malformed, adding that once decadence begins in our educational institutions, it can only grow.

The parallel instantiation Nietzsche draws upon varies Augustine's voice of the friend, angel, or messenger: *tolle lege*, take and read. To this extent the account that we have from Nietzsche of his discovery of Schopenhauer's books in a bookshop gives us a similarly parallel Augustinian atmosphere. No fig tree, to be sure (thus the relevance of Courcelle's challenge to the literality of Augustine's related facts of Augustine's life in his *Confessions*), no word from a nearby angel, Nietzsche was very literally surrounded by books, trying this one and that.

For Nietzsche, as for Allison who tells us how to read Nietzsche, what is telling is a spiritual, affective, and intimate connection with an author, Schopenhauer, who wrote as if what he wrote were directly addressed, in this case, to Nietzsche himself as reader. It was, Nietzsche tells us, seemingly embarrassed by the audacity of the claim, however "foolish and immodest a way of putting it, *as though* it were for me he had written" (1983a, p. 133).

The personal affinity worked only because by contrast with David Strauss, "confessor" and "writer," Schopenhauer's style was exactly not *popular*. Schopenhauer's style is not that of the Strunk and White variety or the sort of style US writing clinics might counsel for today's undergraduates, "writing across the curriculum," or the sort of journalistic inoffensiveness that might permit one to write a novel or a screenplay for the next television miniseries. In other words, Schopenhauer, who took extraordinary care with his writing, did not write in a way that would have guaranteed literary or scholarly fame, and

accordingly Schopenhauer never attained market success as a classic. Thus what Nietzsche found exemplary was less Schopenhauer's writerly success or fame, much less his timeliness, than that Schopenhauer wrote for himself. Nietzsche could thus characterize Schopenhauer's specifically non-stylized stylization or *artless artfulness*, saying that "Schopenhauer never wants to cut a [rhetorical] figure: for he writes for himself. . ." (Nietzsche 1983a). The intimate vocative address, as Nietzsche writes on the educator he found for himself, in his own encounter not with the man but with his writings, calls to the reader *as if, as though*, no one else were intended apart from the reader.

I mentioned the contrast with Strauss, but note again that the point can easily be overlooked if one has not first read Nietzsche's *David Strauss, the Confessor and the Writer*, the first of the *Untimely Meditations*. We recall that Nietzsche criticizes Strauss in terms of his philology and owing to his conspicuously writerly his style, that is, "as a *writer* recognized as a classic" (Nietzsche 1983b, p. 37). This assessment provokes Nietzsche's ire, but what is instructive is that Nietzsche makes the point with reference to German education and not less to the public confidence in its enduring value. This confidence:

seriously convinced of the superiority of all German educational institutions, especially the grammar schools and universities, never ceases to recommend them to foreigners as models, and does not doubt for a moment that they have made the German people into the most educated and judicious nation in the world. (Ibid)

The focus here is on what Nietzsche calls the philistine and the philistine's ideal, by contrast with Strauss' Schopenhauer. As Nietzsche writes in his essay on Schopenhauer, the difference between them is far from neutral: "Of all the offence Schopenhauer has given to numerous scholars, nothing has offended them more than the unfortunate fact that he does not resemble them" (Nietzsche 1983a, p. 182).

Here Nietzsche is quite conspicuously challenging extant university education, reflecting first on the oddity of paying people to practice an ancient tradition, philosophy, which was defined precisely in its opposition to payment. Historically,

Nietzsche recalls, "the sages of ancient Greece were not paid by the state but at most were, like Zeno, honored with a gold crown and a monument in the Ceramicus" (Ibid, p. 184). As Nietzsche argued in his reflections on the forces that drive what he called *misemployed and appropriated culture, the greed of the money-makers* (Ibid 164) inevitably leads to the institutionalization of education as a commercial industry:

as much knowledge and education as possible, therefore as much demand as possible, therefore as much production as possible – that is the seductive formula. (Ibid, p. 164)

Indeed nothing could be more timely in our own time's than Nietzsche's reflection, the growing acceleration of education:

A speedy education so that one may quickly money-earning being, yet at the same time an education sufficiently thorough to enable one to earn a very great deal of money. A man is allowed only as much as it is in the interest of general money-making and world commerce he should possess, but this amount is also demanded of him. (Ibid, p. 165)

Nietzsche adds a note on the implausibility of a professor as a civil servant, of in fact realizing "to the full the whole gamut of duties and limitations imposed upon him" (p. 185), but also the sheer improbability of making appointments of excellence to such salaried posts to begin with. Nietzsche argues that this presupposes the real competence or at least "the appearance of being able to distinguish between good philosophers and bad ones and, even worse, it presupposes that there must always be a sufficiency of good philosophers to fill all its academic chairs" (p. 185). Here the point is not only about assessing value, good and bad quality, but the role of any given authority, in this case the State, to make just distinctions. Nietzsche continues his reading of the role of university philosophy and concludes that it is as if the goal were to require instruction in philosophy, and Nietzsche uses language that echoes in Illich's *Deschooling Society* (2000), to the point that one might wonder about Nietzsche's likely influence on Illich, as Nietzsche observes that university schooling compels the educators as much as the educated:

to reside in a certain place, to live among certain people, to undertake a certain activity: they are

obliged to instruct every academic youth who desires instruction, and to do so daily at certain fixed hours. (1983a, p. 186)

For Nietzsche the project cannot succeed because it assigns the imparting of wisdom on demand, and supposes that one have, just at those hours, wisdom to impart, never mind that it also assumes interest on the part of the student just then, just when. For Nietzsche:

the only critique of a philosophy that is possible and that proves something, namely trying to see whether one can live in accordance with it, has never been taught at universities: all that has been taught is a critique of words by means of other words. (1983a, p. 187)

Nietzsche considered the effect of this, magnified in a curriculum, on “a youthful head, not very experienced in living” and concludes “what a desert, what a return to barbarism, what a mockery of an education in philosophy” (Ibid). Here Nietzsche cannot refrain from concluding that maybe this result is exactly desired: “education in philosophy only a means of deterring from philosophy” (Ibid). And so on.

Thus *written by* our own educator: this is Nietzsche as we encounter him not as a contemporary but, and just, through his writings. In this way, it can make all the difference that we tend to skip Nietzsche's original educators; thus we miss the second century AD Lucian who wrote the satirical dialogues *Philosophies for Sale* and *The Dead Come to Life or the Fisherman*. And we tend to forget Pindar and Archilochus in addition to, as both Thomas Brobjer and Jonathan Barnes have written on the relevance of the same like-wise second century, Diogenes Laertius in whose writings Nietzsche specialized, telling us that he prefers reading such ancient commentators to contemporary philosophical commentary, ergo choosing Diogenes Laertius above the Tübingen historian, Eduard Zeller, “because the former at least breathes the spirit of the philosophers of Antiquity, while the latter breathes neither than nor any other spirit” (1983a, p. 186).

We always also need to raise questions about Nietzsche's first book and his investigation of the presumptions and presuppositions of his own discipline of classics with respect to the “Homer

question” and even more with respect to his concern with ancient Greek music drama or tragedy and lyric poetry.

If we “knowers” do not know ourselves, as Nietzsche suggests, it is first of all because we do not seek ourselves. (The term in *On the Genealogy of Morality*, Nietzsche's polemical follow-up to *Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future*, is *wir Erkennenden*. Cf. Nietzsche 1967, p. 15.) It is for this reason that we need genealogical, philological, historical hermeneutic thinking.

Reflecting on acquiring an educator, reflecting on the pursuit of education or what the French call formation (the German term is *Bildung*), Nietzsche details an array of difficulties involved in coming to know ourselves. Thus we began by emphasizing his mnemonic art as a practical hermeneutic phenomenology of the self; a spiritual exercise that must animate all learning and therewith any chance of finding ourselves. We turned to a reflection on our choice of exemplar in order to climb Nietzsche's “ladder” to ascend our “own true selves,” always highly personal, but always also in the context of a culture that has always already taken over education as an institution and a prescription, as Nietzsche invites us to recall at least a modicum of that condition of liberty in which Greek philosophy developed: “freedom: that wonderful and perilous element in which the Greek philosophers were able to grow up” (1983a, p. 182). At the end of his essay, Nietzsche invokes the signal characteristic of the philosopher in his capacity to “unhinge” us, to disturb us. This is, and can only be, liberation.

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Nietzschean Education

► [On Some of Nietzsche's Ideas That Inspired Postmodernist Educational Thinking](#)

Nietzschean Education and Gelassenheit-Education

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Synonyms

[Academic freedom](#); [Education](#); [End of philosophy](#), [the](#); [Nietzsche, Friedrich \(1844–1900\)](#); [Gelassenheit education](#); [Martin Heidegger](#)

Unborn, but given the choice I would now pick some other culture. African, Chinese, European is exhausting, its people skilled in causing pain and ill-equipped to endure it. Last night we went to say goodbye to Gudrun, Thorsteinn, Vedhis, and the cat, and the Bishop dropped by and said: “The only solution to our problems would be for us all to change into cats.”

Philosophical Introduction

Friedrich Nietzsche was elevated to the status of one of the most important philosophers by Martin Heidegger. In his Nietzsche lectures, Heidegger (1977, p. 179) declares that philosophy has reached its end and that Nietzsche was the one who completed it. For Heidegger, traditional philosophy is synonymous to metaphysics. The philosophy does not simply end, stop, or vanish but attains its ultimate potential, which is the beginning of thinking. This possibility allows for the emergence of something new, which Heidegger refers to as *Ereignis*. This kind of new beginning is not based on the traditional understanding of the history of philosophy but thinking itself. According to Heidegger, the sciences have been separated from the ideas of philosophy. Philosophy comes to its end upon the completion of the separation between philosophy and science. Philosophy becomes transformed into a science and a technology. Heidegger describes this moment as *Gestell* (see Taminaux 1998, pp. 183–201). Also education becomes transformed into technology, and Nietzsche's statement of education of masses represents this idea.

Nietzsche, the philosopher of *The Will to Power*, is the last metaphysician of the West. The age whose consummation unfolds in his thought, the Modern Age, is a final age. The Modern Age is an age in which at some point and in some way the historical decision arises as to whether this final age is the conclusion of Western history or the counterpart of another beginning. According to Heidegger, Nietzsche's thinking and his five fundamental expressions belong to the end of philosophy. These expressions are nihilism, the revaluation of all values, the will to power, the eternal return of the same, and the overman (*Übermensch*). Heidegger argued that these five expressions are fundamental

for understanding our time as the end of philosophy, and they are the key to understanding science and technology. Heidegger claims that Nietzsche's philosophy represents the ultimate objectification of being as the end of philosophy. Heidegger refers to the opposing idea as meditative thinking and Gelassenheit (releasement, letting-be) (Heidegger 1991, p. 8, 2003, pp. 89–94).

Nietzsche and Education

What can Nietzsche contribute to the modern democratic concept of education? My answer is that nothing, unless we apply some philosophical counter-perspectives to his ideas. A number of truly embraced ideas, which allude to Nietzsche and his notion of self-realization, have been presented with regard to how to teach and educate (see, e.g., Lambert and Smeyers 2003). It is quite tempting to adopt those aspects of Nietzsche's philosophy that serve one's own purposes and to smooth over or ignore whichever aspects contradict them (see Rosenow 2004, p. 200; Cooper 1983, pp. viii–ix). However, there has never been a clear explanation of what the famous phrase “to be who one is” actually requires according to Nietzsche. My argument is that Nietzsche's demands are excessive. My perspective is Heideggerian, and from this perspective, the Nietzschean idea of education is really education with a hammer in the negative sense. We might even go so far as to argue that we do not even need the Heideggerian argument of the end of metaphysics in order to see it. It is education with a hammer if we view it through the traditional concept of education, the concept of philosophy, or just common sense. (Nietzsche's lectures *On the Future of Our Educational Institutions* can be said to have had at least one influence, namely, on Heidegger's program for university reform and the “leadership principle” he outlined in the Rectoral Address. Heidegger's later complaint that “Nietzsche ruined me!” takes on quite an interesting meaning in this context. I can see some contradictions between my Gelassenheit thesis and Heidegger's Rectoral Address, although identifying them also requires a close

reading of Heidegger's deposition to the Committee on De-Nazification. See Thomson 2005, pp. 43–44; Heidegger 2003, pp. 2–12; Peters 2002, pp. 27–43; Huttunen 2003.) My argument is that if we interpret Nietzsche in a Heideggerian way, we are able to reconstruct the notion of education that is referred to as Gelassenheit-education. This reconstruction follows Heidegger's own example of aesthetics. In his Nietzsche lectures, Heidegger presents a new understanding of the work of art and the end of aesthetics. He uses five of Nietzsche's arguments and presents counterarguments to them from the standpoint of his philosophy. I am presenting five counter-expressions to Nietzsche's five expressions concerning the end of philosophy (Heidegger 1979). These fundamental counter-expressions will provide the foundation for what we might refer to as *Gelassenheit*-education. This kind of education would also be the result of the thinking of education and not just the science of education. I will begin, however, by clarifying Nietzsche's teachings on education and educators.

Nietzsche as an Educator

There are three main literal sources concerning Nietzsche and education. The most well known is *Schopenhauer as Educator* (Nietzsche 1983). The second source is *The Will to Power*, which includes virtually any Nietzschean idea one could imagine. *The Will to Power* is comprised of a total of 1067 paragraphs (Nietzsche 1968) (on the editions of *The Will to Power*, see Kaufmann 1968, pp. xxvii–xxix). The third source is Nietzsche's five lectures entitled *On the Future of Our Educational Institutions*. It is a philosophical dialogue that is over 100 pages long. It consists of six public lectures held in the auditorium of the Museum at the University of Basel. Actually, only five lectures were delivered in the spring of 1872. The sixth lecture was never held and Nietzsche withdrew his offer to have the book published by writing:

I had to make a serious and important decision. This touches upon our business insofar as it in any case delays it. My lecture should still be completely

reworked and will be cast in another form; wherefore I require above all time. (Nietzsche 2004, p. 124, Appendix A: Letters)

Nietzsche's thinking on education is very anti-democratic and conservative, which is why it is education with a hammer. This becomes quite clear when we read the following quotation from his notebook:

General education is only a preliminary stage of communism: education will be so weakened down in this way that it can no longer bestow privilege at all. Least of all is it a means against communism. General education, i.e., barbarity, is just the presupposition of communism. Education "according to the times" degenerates here into the extreme of education "according to moment": i.e., the raw seeing of momentary utility. (Nietzsche 2004, p. 133) (The quotation is from Nietzsche's Notebook 8, not from the original lecture. Notebook 8 is thought to have been written from winter 1870–1871 to autumn 1872.)

I see very little possibility for Nietzsche to serve as a source of critical thinking in terms of education. Surely, his educational thought is not radical in the sense of critical pedagogy. From Heideggerian perspective, Nietzsche really is the last representative of the metaphysics, which should be overcome. For Nietzsche, culture and education are inseparable, and his primary concern is with the attainment of culture (Kaufmann 1974, p. 416). Nietzsche claims that culture distinguishes us from animals and makes us something more than mere things of nature. The purpose of education is to elevate us above nature (translation of the German words *Erziehung* and *Bildung*; see Cooper 1983, pp. 31–31; Grenke 2004, p. viii).

In the preface of *On the Future of our Educational Institutions*, Nietzsche demands three qualities from the reader. Firstly, he must be at rest and without haste and understand how to read the secret between the lines. "Such a human being has still not unlearned how to think while he reads" (Nietzsche 2004, p. 19). Secondly, he demands that the reader should not think his own education. Thirdly, the reader should not expect as conclusion "tables and new curricula for Gymnasium and Realschulen" (Nietzsche 2004, p. 18). These qualities required of the reader

are briefly condensed into the word "high-minded," and Nietzsche refers to Aristotle's *Megalopsychia*, the great-souled man (Aristotle 1989, pp. 1123a34–1125a35; Kakkori and Huttunen 2007). Therefore, worthy readers are extremely exceptional, but so are those who are worthy to educate or to be educated. I will return to this point later in more detail.

The Barbarism of Education

In the first lecture, Nietzsche recognizes two main drives that rule educational institutions:

1. The drive toward the highest possible *extension* and *broadening* of education
2. The drive toward the *decrease* and *weakening* of education itself (Nietzsche 2004, p. 36)

The second drive is the consequence of the first. The State lies behind these drives, because the State reserves education for itself. This is why education gives up its highest, noblest, and most elevating claims and resigns itself to the service of the State. It is for this reason that utility serves as the goal and purpose of education. In Nietzsche's view, the main goal of education thus becomes speed. In other words, students are encouraged to complete their education as quickly as possible in order to become money-earning beings. From Nietzsche's elitist point of view, the masses are almost like animals, who only seek immediate satisfaction and the release from senseless suffering. Nietzsche writes in *Untimely Meditations*: "And it is, truly, a harsh punishment thus to live as an animal, beset by hunger and desire yet incapable of any kind of reflection on the nature of this life" (Nietzsche 1983, p. 157). He claims that the most general education is barbarism. Is it barbarism because the education is a means to an end, utility? And we can read between the lines that Nietzsche (2004, pp. 36–38) considers it barbarism, as his view is that most people are not worthy of education.

These two drives also have fatal consequences for higher education and the study of science. The field of science has expanded to the extent that it is

possible to specialize exclusively in one particular narrow field. It is possible for a scientist to master one specific area of one specific discipline and become the most respected scientist in that field. Nietzsche (2004, p. 39) sees no difference between this kind of scientist and the factory worker, who makes nothing more than a specific screw or handle for a specific tool. Here, once again, Nietzsche's arrogance is visible. Not all humans are valued equally but only according to what they do and what position they hold.

One Proper Language for German Spirit

The main point of the second lecture is Nietzsche's concern with spoken and written language and the defense of classical education. He calls his age newspaper German, and only remedy to this is to put gifted youth with force under rigorous linguistic discipline. Moreover, if this does not help, there is always the possibility to return to Latin. "Take your language seriously!" (Nietzsche 2004, p. 44), demands Nietzsche. Nietzsche advocates *Hochdeutsch*, which is only spoken by the upper class, and rejects colloquial language, which he refers to journalism. He thinks that it is impossible for a student to have good taste if he does not speak the right language and if he does not speak correctly. The classical education begins with right language and with the correct manner of speaking, and it provides the possibility to become part of the German spirit. The exaltation of the German spirit begins at this point and persists throughout lecture series, remaining vague in terms of its meaning.

The Teachers and the Student

Nietzsche states that there is one major problem with classical education. There are so few adequate teachers and hardly any worthy students.

But we must be of one mind, that by nature itself only infinitely rare human beings are destined for a true course of education, and that even a far smaller number of higher educational institutions. . . . The same holds now with regard to the teachers. (Nietzsche 2004, p. 65)

The third lecture ponders the question of who and what a true teacher is and how to identify such a fabulous being. We learn from the text *Schopenhauer as Educator* that the true teacher is a philosopher (Nietzsche 1983). For Nietzsche, the ultimate true teacher was Schopenhauer, although there are interesting interpretations that he is actually not referring to the image of Schopenhauer himself but rather to his own process of self-education (Aristotle 1986). Being one's own philosopher teacher comes very close to the idea of a superman.

Nietzsche declares that the education of the masses cannot be the goal. Rather, it must be the education of individual, selected human beings, in other words geniuses. Moreover, we can conceive of the education of the genius through the metaphor of the mother. The genius must ripen and be nourished in the mother's lap of the culture of a people, from which he receives all the warmth and shelter he needs (Nietzsche 2004, pp. 71–72).

The bad philosopher is also a very bad teacher, and in the worst case scenario, he works for the State, because he teaches university philosophy. True teachers are great philosophers who teach the truth about things. These great philosophers do not give lectures every day, because they know that they cannot always speak about truth and true things. They also know that there are days when they cannot think of anything. A true teacher can also select his students, so he does not have to speak to the masses. According to this idea, lecturing on the history of philosophy is not speaking of truth. Nietzsche refers to those university philosophers who must teach every day and who cannot choose their students as learned as opposed to philosophers (Nietzsche 1983, p. 186).

The True Education

Nietzsche declares that there are no real educational institutions and no true education, although there is an urgent need for them. Either institutions have become nurseries of dubious culture or they produce sterile scholarship. In order for this to change, Nietzsche claims that our philosophy and education must begin not with wonder

(Erstaunen) but with horror (Schrecken). What he actually means by philosophical horror remains unclear to me, but the source of this horror is the opposite of the culture, namely, nature and natural needs. Nietzsche also referred to this horror earlier in the lecture series: “Whomever it is not able to bring horror is asked to leave his hands from pedagogical things” (Nietzsche 2004, p. 42). Nietzsche stresses that there are two sorts of things which should not be confused with one another. A human being must learn a great deal in order to be able to live his life. He is referring here to things that we usually teach children, namely, basic skills and basic knowledge. This vast work is not education for him, because he sees it as belonging to the world of necessity and utility. The true education begins in a stratum that hangs high above that world of necessity, of the struggle for existence, and of neediness. True education is aimed toward culture. We need instructions as to how to live our every-day lives, and Nietzsche admits that receiving these instructions is crucial. But those institutions which enable human beings to cope with the every-day struggle are not cultural institutions, but “institutions for the overcoming of the necessities of life, whether they promise now produce civil servants or merchants or officers or wholesalers or farmers or doctors or technicians” (Nietzsche 2004, p. 83). Here, culture is seen as something higher and something above the average person. Nietzsche goes so far as to claim that *Institutions of Culture* and *Institutions for the Necessities of life* are in direct opposition to one another, and he prefers to speak of the former (Nietzsche 2004, pp. 80–85).

Education has nothing to do with either children or the majority of adults. The goal is to educate those few decorous students who are not members of the vast group of students and who understand the importance of following and committing themselves to the power of the genius-teacher. Nietzsche describes this concept through the analogy of two kinds of travelers: mass travelers and the rarer lone travelers on the way to education. If you chose to follow the path of the smaller group, the road will be more difficult to follow, it will be steeper and more winding. Here, Nietzsche, our antichrist, speaks with biblical

tones, which he later repeats in *Schopenhauer as Educator*. The first path is quite easy to follow, which is perhaps why most of us chose it. And as you travel along this path, you are sure to encounter many likeminded souls travelling both in front of and behind you. The other path will offer less companionship, and, as I mentioned above, will be more difficult to follow, steeper, and often dangerous. Three types of people belong to this smaller group: first and foremost, the teacher-philosopher, i.e., the genius; secondly, the students, who are likely to become geniuses, the first-rate talents; and thirdly, the group of students who are needed in the process of the birth of genius, assistants, who are second- and third-rate talents. It is clear to me that Nietzsche himself considered himself to be a philosopher in this elitist group. Moreover, in the text *Schopenhauer as Educator*, it is Nietzsche who is the hero, not Schopenhauer, because he understands Schopenhauer’s brilliance and genius, which elevates him to Schopenhauer’s level and even beyond it. This is very human, but not humanistic (Nietzsche 2004, p. 96, 1983, pp. 175–176).

Academic Freedom

In the fifth lecture, Nietzsche describes his conceptualization of the university student and presents his views on academic freedom. He begins by criticizing the typical lecture hall scenario, in which the professor reads from notes and speaks to the students while they listen to and write what he is saying.

One speaking mouth and very many ears with half as many writings hands – that is the external academic apparatus, that is educational machine of the university in action. (Nietzsche 2004, p. 106)

It is in this academic apparatus that academic freedom lies. The professor says what he or she wants, and the students hear what they want. The State hovers somewhere in distance and reminds us that there is a purpose behind this action. Academic freedom implies the lack of a leader, the Führer, and poses the illusion of freedom, which actually makes the student powerless, lost, tired,

lazy, fearful of work, terrified in the face of everything great, self-contempt, and hateful.

Nietzsche does not reveal the potential consequences of this wrong kind of education and institution. The only thing that he does make clear is that in them the German spirit vanishes. So what happens to it then? What is this German spirit? Is it high culture, Wagner, Schiller, Goethe, and so on? From the postmodern point of view, this type of German spirit has died out, and it is not missed by many. Educational institutions must be rooted “in an inner renewal and excitation of the purest moral powers” (Nietzsche 2004, p. 117). These powers are geniuses, who are also leaders. These leaders must be obeyed, as all forms of education begin with obedience, as well as with subordination, discipline, and servitude. To put this another way, education begins with everything that we understand as being the opposite of academic freedom. The leader-philosopher-teacher must have certain abilities and freedoms in order to come into existence. He must possess manly characteristics and an early knowledge of mankind (whatever that may be), he must lack any kind of academic education, must not be narrowly patriotic, have no necessity for bread-winning, and no ties with State (Nietzsche 1983, p. 182). In other words, he needs to be Aristotle’s ideal of a virtuous man in the slave society of ancient Athens.

The Conclusion and Five Counterarguments

Nietzschean education is education with a hammer or, in Heideggerian terms, the education of enframing (Gestell) and calculative thinking. I have condensed Nietzsche’s idea of education based on his lectures into five arguments:

1. Culture is inseparable from education and is the highest goal of true education. Utility is not the goal of education. Nature is in absolute opposition to culture and is thus the source of our horror.
2. There is only one right and proper language for education – *Hochdeutsch* – the literary language.

3. Only a select group of people are worthy of being educated and even fewer are capable of educating.
4. Academic freedom as part of education means obedience, servitude, and submission to the educator-leader.
5. Educator has the truth in his power.

As the alternative to this idea of education in the time of the end of metaphysics, I summed up the Gelassenheit-education as five counterarguments. Gelassenheit-education or letting-be education must not be confused with O. Niell’s free education. Gelassenheit-education is based on the Heideggerian concept of human being. This concept is not Dasein, the famous slogan from *Sein und Zeit*, but is based instead on Heidegger’s *Zollikoner Seminare* (1987). (I disagree with Iain Thomson’s interpretation of *Sein und Zeit* and Heidegger’s philosophy of education. The basic problem is his interpretation of Dasein as human being. See Thomson 2004.) A human being is always already in the world, and the world opens up to her at a certain historical time and place. And one of the most important aspects of being-in-the-world is to be-with-others. The world opens up to us as something, because our basic mode of being is to understand the world. This understanding reveals the world as language and everything in the world is something either present-at-hand or ready-to-hand. There is nothing without language or names. For this reason, there is no distinction between the manmade higher culture and wild nature or the higher and lower needs of human beings. From this point of view, I have reconstructed five counterstatements as principle of the Gelassenheit-education:

1. Instead of pedagogical horror, there is a wondering, natural curiosity, and ability to ask questions. There is no dichotomy between nature and culture.
2. The language is the world. There is not one proper language that supersedes all others.
3. Education is itself the occurrence and it belongs to everyone. There is no distinction between the educator and the educated.

4. Freedom is those possibilities that we encounter in our own being in the world with others.
5. Truth is an occurrence and an historical event. No one can claim that she has exclusive access to the truth.

These five statements are just a brief outline of the principles of Gelassenheit-education. Heidegger speaks about learning and teaching in his lecture *Was Heisst Denken?* that supports these five statements (see Heidegger 1954, pp. 1, 48, 50). Learning and thinking are very important for Heidegger, and he sees them as belonging together. Learning and thinking form an hermeneutical circle; we know what thinking is once we are ready to learn how to do it and we learn it while we are thinking. Heidegger (1977, p. 346) poses the question of what learning is and answers: “Man learns when he disposes everything he does so that it answers to whatever addresses him as essential”. According to Heidegger, teaching is even more difficult than learning, and I generalize this idea by stating that to educate is also more difficult than to be educated. It is difficult because real teaching is *to let learn*, and the teacher must learn to let her students learn, *dasLernen-lassen* (Heidegger 1954, p. 50). We might go so far as to say that this means that the teacher is less sure of her materials than those who learn are of theirs. There is no room for the authority of the “know-it-all” in the genuine relationship between teacher and learners and educator and those who are educated. To become a good teacher is completely different than becoming a famous professor.

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Nietzschean Nihilism

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Nietzschean Perspectivism

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North American Critical Pedagogy

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Synonyms

[Critical education](#), [American](#), [Canadian](#); [Radical pedagogy](#)

Introduction

Beginning in the late 1970s and early 1980s, a group of North American scholars (including Henry Giroux, Peter McLaren, Bell Hooks, Ira Shor, and Donaldo Macedo) began, in Paulo Freire’s words, “to reinvent my writings and research on literacy and pedagogy so that they may be applied to North American struggles for liberation in schools, the workplace, the home, and universities and colleges” (Freire 1993, p. ix). In a sense, then, Joe Kincheloe is right to demand that Freire “and his South/Latin American colleagues and progeny” be recognized as the originators of critical pedagogy (Kincheloe 2007, p. 11). In another sense, however, it is this “translation and reinvention” of Freire’s work into a North American context itself that has come to form the core of critical pedagogy – indeed, the very term “critical pedagogy” does not appear in Freire’s *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, but was coined by Henry Giroux in 1983 (in an article appearing in *Harvard Educational Review* that August, which also formed the bulk of chapter 3 of a book, *Theory and Resistance in Education*, appearing a month later). Regardless of whether one considers North American critical pedagogy

to be the “core” of the discipline or merely an offshoot of Freire’s work, it is clear that Freire’s work could not simply be imported wholesale into the North American context; as Freire himself has said, “It is impossible to export pedagogical practices without reinventing them” (Macedo 2007, p. 394). This work of adaptation, translation, and reinvention thus marks out a North American “Freirean tradition” of critical pedagogy that is distinct from both its inspirations and its international cousins. This entry will identify the key themes and concepts of North American critical pedagogy and place them within the specific context of the political, institutional, and theoretical conjuncture of North America in the 1980s and 1990s, the key decades for critical pedagogy’s development.

The Theoretical Context

Seehwa Cho (2013, p. 20) suggests that North American critical pedagogy is best understood as a critical offshoot of earlier, mostly neo-Marxist, theories of education. Giroux’s *Theory and Resistance in Education* was presented nominally as a contribution to a preexisting field known as “radical pedagogy,” rather than as the inauguration of a new field. Giroux seems to have coined the term “critical pedagogy” for three major reasons. First, Giroux’s book is devoted to criticizing predominant trends within radical pedagogy, and his chief suggestion is that these theories need to be more *self-critical*; hence, a “critical pedagogy” would be a radical pedagogy that is more critical.

Second, Giroux’s main major source of inspiration – the theorists he turns to for resources to rebuild radical pedagogy – is the Frankfurt School; the term “critical pedagogy” seems to have been coined above all to draw the connection with critical theory and above all the work of two theorists, Herbert Marcuse and Jürgen Habermas, whose work Giroux cites most extensively. Like Freire before him, Giroux looks back to Marcuse for the latter’s blending of psychology and Marxism. In Habermas’s work, it is above all the analysis of the public sphere that interests Giroux, and *Theory and Resistance in Education* ends with a

suggestion that schools ought to function as a form of public sphere (allowing for open and critical discussion) as a way to revitalize democracy.

Finally, Giroux seems to have coined the term “critical pedagogy” because the major new task he outlines for radical pedagogy in his 1983 work is the incorporation of ideology critique into pedagogy. And so “critical pedagogy” is radical pedagogy that is not only self-critical and inspired by critical theory, but is also a pedagogy *of critique*. Following Frankfurt School theorists Adorno and Horkheimer’s theory of the “culture industry,” critical pedagogy develops an ideology critique through critical engagement with popular culture. By helping students to think critically about their own culture, critical pedagogy aims to develop critical consciousness, or “conscientization” – this is North American critical pedagogy’s translation or reinvention of Freire’s *conscientização* (itself a translation of Fanon’s concept of *conscienciser*).

In this early work, Giroux is also already drawing upon the other two major theoretical sources of North American critical pedagogy: British Cultural Studies and French Theory. While Giroux’s 1983 text engages mostly with Althusser and Bourdieu, the full range of French Theorists have been regular reference points for critical pedagogy over the last 30 years; Giroux’s introduction for the 2001 reprint of *Theory and Resistance in Education* begins with a quote from Bourdieu and ends with a quote from Derrida (Giroux 2001, pp. xix, xxxi). Of particular importance for critical pedagogy have been two major theoretical “imports” from the French: the notions of *power* and *reproduction*. Drawing mostly upon Foucault’s work, critical pedagogy has made use of a notion of power that is both restrictive *and* productive – not as two opposing possibilities of power, but as two sides of the same coin. Power in this sense is what subjects students *to* the status quo, but *also* makes them subjects empowered to meet, challenge, and even overthrow it. This dialectic is important for critical pedagogy’s engagement with the theory of reproduction – borrowed from both Foucault and Bourdieu. Schools have been presented by most radical theories of education as institutions engaged primarily in

reproducing the status quo and relations of domination. Critical pedagogy is animated by the attempt to find resources *within* the school and schooling for resisting, interrupting, and even undoing this process of reproduction. *Theory and Resistance in Education* devotes significant space to developing a theory of resistance – and this in turn has been followed up by the work of Giroux (e.g., 1997a), McLaren (e.g., 1997), Hooks (e.g., 1994), and others to develop a pedagogy of “hope,” “dissent,” and “transgression.”

The engagement with British Cultural Studies grew directly out of both the attempt to find resources for resistance within the theory of reproduction and the engagement with popular culture as a privileged site of ideology critique. The most significant influence of British Cultural Studies upon North American critical pedagogy has been the turn to Gramsci. Antonio Gramsci of course had some things to say directly about education, but it is the neo-Gramscian theory of *hegemony*, read through the lens of Cultural Studies, that has been most significant for critical pedagogy, as a way of analyzing the intertwined forces of culture, ideology, domination, and consent.

To flesh out Cho’s picture, then, we could say that North American critical pedagogy has emerged out of neo-Marxist education theory by way of these four major theoretical “supplements”: Freire’s Brazilian school (including Augusto Boal); first- and second-generation Frankfurt School critical theory; British (Birmingham-school) Cultural Studies; and French Theory. But theoretical development does not happen in a vacuum; it is driven by material conditions, and the specific ways in which these sources have been drawn upon and brought into dialogue cannot be fully understood without examining the political and institutional context of North American critical pedagogy’s development.

The Political Context

Freire’s inspirational works were written in the context of the radical uprisings of the late 1960s, and the Frankfurt School works that have proven most influential on critical pedagogy – Marcuse’s

late work and Habermas’s early work – both arose in dialogue with and even response to the student movement. By contrast, critical pedagogy emerged in North America during the ascendancy of the “Conservative Restoration” (Shor 1992). By the 1980s in North America, there was neither a revolutionary organization nor a radical counterculture left to carry the hope of a genuinely oppositional politics. The development of critical pedagogy – and especially of the “language of hope” – must be understood within this context. Critical pedagogy was from the beginning framed as a critical response to the “pessimism” of reproduction theories in sociology of education; the complaint was that such theories provided no resources for individual human agency – especially the agency of teachers – for radical social change. Critical pedagogy’s search for a “language of hope” is an attempt to find a theory that will empower teachers and students to overturn the status quo, an attempt to revitalize resistance and agency in the face of the retrenchment of radical politics during the 1970s. But the North American political context has not only shaped critical pedagogy’s demands for optimism, it has also had a substantial effect on the content of critical pedagogy.

A century and a half of red scares, violent repression, and covert manipulation has all but eradicated any organized tradition of communism, socialism, or anarchism in North America (and especially the USA); but – despite institutional resistance and even violent, organized suppression – the twentieth century saw the increasing strength and diversity of non-class-based oppositional politics in the USA, including political movements organized around feminism, racial equality, and LGBT issues. Within this context, it is perhaps natural that the theoretical-political basis for critical pedagogy has shifted from Marxism toward “post-Marxist” critical theory. But these movements are also testament to the realization that the struggle against economic exploitation is by no means incompatible with other forms of exploitation and discrimination – and, more generally, that struggling against one form of domination is no safeguard against the reproduction of other forms. For critical pedagogy, this political context has been reflected in theoretical debates; starting in the 1980s, critical pedagogy has been criticized by

feminists (e.g., Luke and Gore 1992), postcolonial and critical race theorists (e.g., Ladson-Billings 1997), and so on. While some of these criticisms have been presented as attacks on the tradition of critical pedagogy from the outside, most have situated themselves firmly *within* the tradition. The work of Bell Hooks (1994, 2003) is exemplary in this regard: unflinching in her criticisms of critical pedagogy with respect to both race and gender, Hooks nonetheless makes it clear that she sees her own work as falling within the Freirean tradition. In turn, other “canonical” figures within North American critical pedagogy – like Henry Giroux (1997b) and Peter McLaren (1997) – have taken the challenges of feminism, critical race theory, and other “marginalities” very seriously. This has meant above all reinventing Freire’s pedagogy, which (especially in his earliest work) framed oppression in the fairly orthodox Marxist terms of class and economic exploitation. The turn to postmodernism within critical pedagogy (including the neo-Gramscian theory of hegemony and the Foucauldian theory of discourses and regimes of truth) can be seen as a response to the need for post-Marxist critical tools.

The North American political context has also meant that critical pedagogy tends to frame its positive vision in terms of *democracy* rather than *socialism* or *revolution*. This democratic frame has in turn allowed critical pedagogy to reach back beyond Freire and the Frankfurt School to embrace the work of early American progressive education theorists like John Dewey. Dewey’s vision of education as the preparation for free, democratic life has become a founding tenet of critical pedagogy, and his conception of inquiry as communal problem-solving has been productively blended with Freire’s problem-posing method (if not without a certain creative violence to both theories). The embrace of Dewey’s democratic vision alongside the postmodern, diversified conception of domination has come to form the ethical “core” of critical pedagogy: its positive politics are best and most cohesively framed in terms of the aims of flourishing democracy and universal freedom.

At its best, critical pedagogy thus reframes the notion of revolution in terms of democracy and

equality and links the fomentation of student critical consciousness with the radical democratic reform of society. At its worst, however, critical pedagogy becomes a rehashing of identity politics, a reaffirmation of liberal-American individualism, and even a student-centered teaching method stripped of all political content. And so dissatisfaction with post-Marxist, postmodern politics has arisen among certain critical pedagogy theorists. Gregory Martin (2007, p. 339) charges that “critical pedagogy in its current manifestation has been scrubbed clean of its social consciousness and is no longer a material force for social change.” And no less central a figure in North American critical pedagogy than Peter McLaren (1998, p. 448) now claims that critical pedagogy is no longer a viable platform for social change. This group, following language proposed by Patricia Allman (2001), has started referring to itself as “revolutionary critical pedagogy” – or, more simply, “revolutionary pedagogy.” Will revolutionary pedagogy split off from critical pedagogy as a new discipline, the way critical pedagogy split away from radical pedagogy? Or will this be another internal(ized) critique, similar to the debates about feminism, race, and culture in the 1980s and 1990s? It may yet be too early to tell; but McLaren seems to suggest in his recent writings that he already considers revolutionary pedagogy to be a new discipline, distinct from critical pedagogy: “There is, for lack of better terms, left-liberal critical pedagogy, liberal critical pedagogy, conservative critical pedagogy, and variants of each of these. In opposition to these there is revolutionary critical pedagogy, which myself and others have been trying to develop” (McLaren 2010, p. 6).

The Institutional Context

While the political and theoretical context sets critical pedagogy radically apart from its inspirations, it is the difference of institutional context that has had the biggest influence on how Freire’s work has been “reinvented” or “translated” within the North American context and explains much of the way the theoretical context has unfolded:

While Freire and his colleagues went out to rural areas to work with adult, illiterate farmers, North American critical pedagogy has been predominantly taken up within secondary and post-secondary schools.

The most immediate consequence of this institutional setting is that critical pedagogy was immediately pulled into debates about curriculum and school reform. The Culture Wars that raged in academia in the 1980s coincided with the first growth and development of North American critical pedagogy within education and humanities departments in colleges; critical pedagogy was thus informed by, and in turn contributed to, debates over “the canon.” Michael W. Apple’s notion of a “hidden curriculum” (Apple 2004; Apple draws the term from Philip W. Jackson) has become critical pedagogy’s most significant novel contribution to this debate. The “hidden curriculum” refers not only to the values that are implicitly imparted through curriculum choices, but also to the lessons imparted by environment, forms of discipline, classroom structure, etc. Of course, Apple (2004, p. 46) is quick to add that “historically, the hidden curriculum was *not* hidden at all, but was instead the overt function of schools during much of their careers as institutions.” By expanding focus beyond the content of the *explicit* curriculum, critical pedagogy’s concept of “hidden curriculum” is a way of setting the Canon Wars into a larger context.

Finally, critical pedagogy’s development within the institutions of secondary and post-secondary education in North America means that it has had to grapple with issues of compulsory education in a way that Freire’s work never did. Children in the USA are required by law to attend school until the age of 16, and whereas Freire and his team taught farmers to read as a way of enfranchising them, North American critical pedagogy has been predominantly focused on educating students who are already nominally enfranchised and who have some baseline literacy. Thus, critical pedagogy’s focus has shifted toward questions of critical *cultural* literacy, the “hidden curriculum,” and the role of educational institutions in the reproduction of social relations. But this context has also had the important yet

ambiguous effect of pulling critical pedagogy into debates about school reform. The push in education over the last few decades toward standardized, high-stakes testing, the assault on teachers’ unions, and the deprofessionalization of teaching are all obviously antithetical to everything critical pedagogy stands for. But in this context, it has been easy to champion Paulo Freire’s work as a set of teaching *methods* and as an opposing proposal for school reforms. It remains highly questionable whether critical pedagogy could inform a national project of school reform without becoming domesticated as a set of student-centered teaching methods and dropping most of its political content. But nor does it seem that critical pedagogy can simply watch from the sidelines as neoliberals dismantle public education in the US-A. And so Henry Giroux, among others, has attempted to lay out critical pedagogy’s position within the contemporary educational context. His introduction to the 2007 collection, *Critical Pedagogy: Where Are We Now?* cites the danger of what Giroux calls the conservative “attack on higher education” and exhorts his peers to “mobilize to protect the institutionalized relationships between democracy and pedagogy” (Giroux 2007, p. 4) – a relationship which Giroux has of course been championing since his earliest work on universities as a form of the public sphere. While the terms of the debate remain problematic for critical pedagogy as a practice, Giroux’s work has been uncompromising in the demand that critical pedagogues act as public intellectuals, and not merely as teachers within their respective (institutionally recognized) classrooms.

Conclusion

Critical pedagogy today is an international and diverse movement. Though undeniably a part of this international movement, and in constant dialogue with its international peers, North American critical pedagogy can be seen to form a relatively coherent subset, staked out through its application of the general principles of critical pedagogy to the specific political and institutional conjuncture of the USA and Canada. For the reader who is

entirely unfamiliar with critical pedagogy, the goal of this entry has been to lay out the key concepts in a way that briefly indicates how they have been put to work. For the casual reader of critical pedagogy, the major goal has been to clear up the hasty assumption that authors like Giroux, McLaren, Hooks, Shor, etc. are simply “importing” and directly applying the work of Paulo Freire; rather, the Freirean tradition of North American critical pedagogy must be seen as an attempt to *reinvent* Freire’s work within the North American context. This context was dominated during the first two decades of North American critical pedagogy’s development by the Culture Wars and the Conservative Restoration. Today, in addition, the neoliberal war on education (including the school reform movement at the primary and secondary levels, and the corporate takeover of the university at the postsecondary level) has come to dominate the landscape. In response, critical pedagogy has followed the general trajectory of critical theory: from Western Marxism into post-Marxist multiculturalism, and now into schisms between left-liberal, radical, and even conservative factions. While the temptation is to follow one of these streams as the “genuine” expression of critical pedagogy, the split itself must be seen as expressing the truth of the movement; as an ongoing conversation between public intellectuals and committed educators, and as a movement devoted to overthrowing hierarchies (of oppressors and oppressed, but also of leaders and the led, teachers and students), the fragmentation of critical-pedagogical “schools” is a reflection of the various and conflicting demands of the social and political situation upon education and democracy today.

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Number

- Deleuze, Ontology, and Mathematics

On “the Temptation to Attack Common Sense”

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Synonyms

Common sense; Education; Rule following; Science; Verificationism; Wittgenstein

Introduction

Education happens all the time, in all places, and during all our lives. We all know that. However, the moment we hear the word “education,” our minds wander back to school. Schools and other educational institutions offer formal education and thus formalize the concept, turning it into a quasi-technical term that goes well with “policy,” “criteria,” “evaluation forms,” and all the rest of the modern educational vocabulary. The growing formalization of concepts is in line with a verificationist ideology that thrives in formal education: methods and outcomes need to be tested; we need a *scientific* language that measures what students learn in a scientific way; science is a priority anyway, for it informs us of what lies beyond our ordinary conception of the world.

Among the goals of education after all is to teach us a more accurate way to describe the world, leaving vulgar common sense behind.

Wittgenstein, however, argues against the temptation to attack common sense. In the following sections, the Wittgensteinian idea of common sense will be explored and then applied in education. Wittgenstein defends common sense as a guide for our thinking and as a relief from mental discomfort. It is the starting point and the final destination of our encounters; yet the process requires that people are able to walk their way through puzzlement. Such a defense of common sense might stand as a powerful educational ideal. Education should not teach us to hide confusion behind technicalities; it should rather enable us to embrace and dismantle it.

Wittgensteinian Common Sense

Philosophers often appeal to common sense as a criterion that can help address philosophical problems. It supposedly provides some kind of *consensus* about what it is sensible to say, ask, or mean (Gasparatou 2010). Thomas Reid is among the pioneers who use *common sense* to refer to sound judgment or to the views of plain men, for both can help undermine the absurd claims of the philosophers. In twentieth-century philosophy, Moore (1993) gives the most well-known “defense of common sense.” His appeal targets the skeptic; he argues that there is a large set of

propositions, such as "There exists at present a human body, which is my body" (p. 107), which, even though they are contingent, we all know with certainty; the skeptic also is certain of them. Common sense then refers to a list of truisms, to beliefs held by all.

When Wittgenstein talks about common sense, he has Moore in mind. Wittgenstein opposes the view that common sense can provide an answer to skepticism or any other philosophical problem (Gasparatou 2009a). And, yet, he agrees that common sense needs defending:

There is no common sense answer to a philosophical problem. One can defend common sense against the attacks of philosophers only by solving their puzzles, i.e., by curing them from the temptation to attack common sense; not by restating the views of common sense. (Wittgenstein 1958, pp. 58–59)

Wittgenstein's point of view in fact opposes most traditional appeals to common sense. Philosophy threatens common sense; but this is not reciprocal: common sense cannot threaten philosophy, for it cannot answer its questions. Just like it cannot answer scientific questions:

A philosopher is not a man out of his senses, a man who doesn't see what everybody sees; nor on the other hand is his disagreement with common sense that of the scientist disagreeing with the coarse views of the man in the street. That is, his disagreement is not founded on a more subtle knowledge of fact. We therefore have to look round for the source of his puzzlement. And we find that there is puzzlement and mental discomfort, not only when our curiosity about certain facts is not satisfied or when we can't find a law of nature fitting in with all our experience, but also when a notation dissatisfies us -perhaps because of various associations which it calls up. ... (Wittgenstein 1958, p. 59)

According to Wittgenstein then, stepping out of common sense amounts to mental discomfort. And one is forced outside its realm for two reasons. First, they may need to explain some fact that common sense does not explain. Subtler knowledge is called for. This is the realm of science. The second source of misunderstanding has to do with some conceptual knots that are created within ordinary language. Certain terms are used carelessly and lose their ordinary meaning; certain phrases are metaphorical and if taken out of

context, they project false images. If, for example, one says "I don't know what is going on in your head," this expression may be taken to imply that the mind is some sort of private room where things happen. But if we clarify this phrase, it will become evident that all one means is "I don't know what you are thinking." In such cases *grammatical investigation* clears misunderstandings away and brings clarity of meaning in context. This is the realm of philosophy. Now, one should not take Wittgenstein's distinction between science and philosophy or between factual and conceptual confusions as sharp. There can be conceptual confusion within science; furthermore, concepts may evolve as new scientific information is brought to light (Wittgenstein 1969, §94–99; Gasparatou 2009b). In any case, philosophy is a conceptual or grammatical investigation (Wittgenstein 1968, §89–133).

Wittgenstein's use of *philosophy* has both negative and positive connotations; none refers to just academic philosophy. In its negative use, it signifies our temptation to go *deeper* than ordinary language, with the result that we violate it somehow. In its positive use, philosophy is the activity of clarifying language, so that misunderstandings will be resolved. Each of us can be a philosopher in both senses; everybody can potentially give into the temptation to overstep ordinary language usage, in which case, they can potentially work to dismantle the misunderstanding. The only way to cure such mental discomfort is to pay close attention to ordinary language and uncover the rules of our language games.

The term *language game* has no clear definition. Wittgenstein resists definitions and all attempts to amend language or create an ideal metalanguage; these are attempts to arrive at some hidden essence. But there is no such essence; a term gains its meaning by its actual use in actual contexts, i.e., by the many language games people play with it. The game analogy opposes the view that language has a prioritized function: to *describe* the world (Wittgenstein 1968, §1–38). Description is only one language game among many. Each game involves rules. Rules are contingent: they could be otherwise. Yet they are also necessary: if they change, the

game changes. It would be plain nonsense, then, to believe that the many language games, like *promising*, *obeying*, *playacting*, etc., could be reduced to a single one, i.e., *describing*. You cannot reduce one game to another; if you change its rules, you alter the game. And indeed sometimes rules change: old language games die and new ones are born all the time.

Speaking of *language games* and *grammar*, Wittgenstein emphasizes the normativity of language. Language is a rule-governed activity; and grammatical investigation uncovers rules in order to clear misunderstandings away. At a minimum, rules are inner standards of correctness and meaningfulness. We grasp such rules by participating in the activities of our community. In fact, Wittgenstein expands the notion of language to cover all human practice; the totality of human practice is rule governed. *Rule following* then is a central theme (Wittgenstein 1968, §138–242). It presupposes some regularity in behavior, but it is not automatic; it is intentional. In fact, I follow a rule only if I intend to follow a rule, consciously or unconsciously. Intending does not require me to justify, explain, articulate, or even think about the rule as I follow it. But I need to have grasped the correct application of the rule by being brought up within a community of fellow rule followers. For example, people learn to shake hands in certain contexts. This is a human practice, involving language games and gestures, all of which are normative. The rules slightly change depending on the occasion. Grasping the normativity of this gesture within the context, we can apply it on different occasions without thought; we can also change the rules of this activity over the course of time. Yet it is always an intentional gesture that carries some normative habitual implications.

It is the task of philosophy to unravel rules *whenever confusion is created* (Wittgenstein 1968, §119, §125–133). The point is not to clarify all language or explain all rules. That would be impossible since rules change and new language games are created. Moreover, it would be a case of philosophical – i.e., conceptual – confusion: an overall all-purpose clarity does not make sense. To clarify is to dismantle some specific misunderstanding *to some specific end* in some specific

context. In cases of puzzlement then, we need to practice grammatical investigation and *return* to common sense:

... for as soon as we revert to the standpoint of common sense this general uncertainty disappears. (Wittgenstein 1958, p. 45)

Wittgenstein then invites common sense as an ideal. It is our ideal home: our starting point and our final destination. Starting from the language games we play, confusions arise, and we may need to clarify them so that we again revert to a common ground of contentment. This is the ground of sanity, the time when discomforts are put to rest. It is also a *common* home; it implies a worldview and a set of practices common to us all. After all, no language and no rules are private (Wittgenstein 1968, §243–275). Common sense is necessarily sharable too. And if Wittgenstein is right and philosophical problems arise from our everyday use of language, this is a nonstop guiding norm for philosophy, not for the academic philosopher but for the philosopher inside us all.

Educating for Common Sense

Wittgenstein's philosophy is full of insight about how we learn language and how important the social activity of sharing a language is for all other types of learning (Standish 1992; Smeyers and Marshall 1995; Peters and Marshall 1999; Smeyers et al. 2007). We share the grammar of our practices, and we *understand*, *mean*, *feel*, and *act* using a variety of language games. Growing up in a community, we learn to share rules or even come up with new ones (Burbules and Smith 2005; Smeyers and Burbules 2006). Wittgensteinian philosophy can explain how education, formal and informal, includes us in a *form of life* and even enables us to change it from the inside (Peters et al. 2008). The Wittgensteinian notion of *common sense* can add up to such discussions. In fact, it could serve as a game-changing educational ideal. Wittgenstein's plea for common sense demands that we learn to dismantle conceptual confusions. Since confusions arise in all human practices, education should teach us to deal with

them. Yet in order to do that, educators need to address their own discomforts.

Philosophers of education have pointed out instances of such discomforts in educational contexts (Winch 2006; Davis 2009; Standish 2012). Among the concepts in desperate need of clarification is the use of *criteria* in formal education today. Much of educational policy, research, and practice have blurred our discussions of *criteria* with a preoccupation with *data*. Here lies a Wittgensteinian-textbook conceptual confusion that relates to an ill-conceived verificationism. *Verificationism* is roughly the idea that to say something meaningful is to be able to back it up with verifiable data. This idea was once proposed by logical positivists. It somehow declined in philosophy of science decades ago. Yet it is still prevailing in education: whatever we do needs to be describable, documentable, measurable, and assessable by objective data (Standish 2004). For example, if we want to see if a teacher teaches well, we don't just go and watch them teach; we fill assessment forms, give them self-evaluation forms to fill, and since these practices are not considered objective enough, we also document how well their students perform in tests. So we no longer talk about the *qualities* of a good teacher, but rather about their *scores*. Any decision in education today about who to hire, which method is optimal, or which curriculum we should prioritize turns on data, measurements, and assessment forms. Instead of discussing the qualities we ought to embrace and promote, we are preoccupied with data.

Educators' obsession with data implies that some language games are given more priority than others. Within the verificationist ideology, *describing* is the prioritized language game; its superiority derives from science; science supposedly describes how the world operates on a deep level; hence, educational policies today prioritize science not only in curriculum design but also as a method for all disciplines, including educational practice itself. The implication is that any practice worth educating for would be reducible to the descriptive game. However, even if science *did*

objectively describe the world, this would not be a reason enough to stop all the other things we do with language. It makes no sense to eliminate *arguing*, *teaching*, *advising*, and all the other things we do with words in the fantasy that this would leave us free to *describe*. Wittgenstein's arguments against the idea that there is some linguistic function that stands above all the other functions of language are indeed relevant here.

Moreover, science does not merely or *objectively* describe the world. Scientific research is as much a social, cultural, normative, and imaginative practice as any. It is a mainstream concern in science education research today to attack naïve depictions of science as merely descriptive of nature. Effort is being made to inform teachers, students, and policy-makers of the true nature of science and to dismantle conceptual, factual, and historical confusion about the distinction between data and their interpretation, the role of the community, culture, creativity and imagination in the creation, and evolution of scientific theories (Lederman 2007). Then, it is not just that we cannot eliminate all other language games in order to describe scientifically; we actually *need* a vast variety of language games for science itself to evolve. Policy-makers struggle to ground their decisions on a misunderstanding of scientific method.

In education, science, and everyday life practices, to judge which methods are optimal is to exercise a normative power. This involves values, emotions, interpretations, and rules. And indeed we do exercise this normative power: we judge what kind of data is relevant or how to interpret it. Evaluation forms or metrics are blind unless we put them in the perspective of an overall discussion of the dispositions or the qualities we want to promote. For example, teachers' favorable evaluation is taken to suggest that their students understand them: *that is why* they do well in tests. Academics' high metrics scores are taken to imply that their work is influential. However, this is an interpretation of the data in the light of ideas and norms, which are debatable. Not everybody thinks that good teaching means "teaching

to the test" (Standish 2016) nor does everybody think that *influential* research necessarily means *highly cited* research or *good* research. The idea that there might be some objective database that could spare us the process of judging is thus incoherent. Databases depict underlying norms and values. However, in education today instead of doing the hard work of clarifying and refining such norms, we undermine them by fixating on technicalities. Educators misidentify the normative for the descriptive, diminish rules into formulas, portray rule following as blindly complying with procedures, and reduce inner-yet-social standards of excellence to external metrics.

Contrariwise, we should be more confident of our natural rule-following practices. Wittgensteinian philosophy can remind us that, as natural rule followers, we comply with criteria for every single practice or habit of ours from handshaking to scientific research; we explore new ones, we initiate others into our normative practices, etc. Within this flux, it is hard to formalize criteria. We employ more that we realize, we create new ones every day, and we impose them differently depending on the context. We judge by using our criteria while debating over such criteria at the same time. Thus, our criteria are never *subjective*: they are sharable. Neither are they *objective*, not if by "objective" we mean automatic or causal. Imposing criteria is an intentional and intersubjective practice that is open to revision, just like all human practices. There is nothing mysterious about it.

The current use of *criteria* in educational settings today shows that the use of a concept may hide a series of implications that need to be explicitly addressed through Wittgensteinian investigation. Furthermore, it is a key example of how the formalization of a concept makes a whole practice seem more obscure than it really is. Formal education claims its authority by working against common sense. The aim is to present educational research and practices as *scientific*, when in fact scientific practice is misrepresented too. For even science has its home in common sense.

The Wittgensteinian notion of *common sense* should be an educational ideal altogether. Wittgenstein would not suggest we rest content with our common beliefs or silence the philosopher – or the scientist – within us. It is part of our human nature to try alternative viewpoints or wish to go deeper into a better understanding of our worldview, to live better and to create new language games for all to play, and to have a more accurate knowledge of the facts and incorporate it into our practices. All the more reason why we should embrace philosophical discomfort, practice grammatical investigation, and learn to make our way through confusion, puzzlement, and distortion, back to an enlightened clarity of mind. Education should enable us to move this circle from common-sense-point one through grammatical investigation and back to common-sense-point two and then all over again when another discomfort arises. This temporal equilibrium he would call *common sense*.

Educators can start incorporating this ideal by solving their own conceptual perplexities. This would require policy-makers, administrators, and teachers who *engage* with confusions rather than succumbing to them or obscuring them. The catch is that only such educators can truly promote this ideal. Grammatical investigation is – or should be – one more practice among the many normative human practices we grasp while growing up. Yet one can only learn to play the game while actually playing it with others in formal and informal educational settings.

Wittgensteinian *common sense* has one more advantage: it is a vague and elusive ideal. There can be no formula and no clear-cut prescription; it is partly a matter of social initiation and negotiation and partly an individual endeavor; it includes a lot of disappointment (Standish 2004; Smeyers et al. 2007); and in the end, just like any other practice, one can only learn how to do it while doing it. We do not need formulas from education; we need to learn to notice *differences*, to uncover *pieces of nonsense* (Wittgenstein 1968, §119), and to assemble *reminders for particular purposes* (Wittgenstein 1968, §127).

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On Heidegger on Education and Questioning

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Introduction

Discussions of Heidegger and education take a number of perspectives as thematic foci. Questioning is key to Heidegger's thinking from the start of *Being and Time*, calling into question the foundations of what we suppose ourselves to know. Thus questioning involves a reflection on education, that is: both teaching and learning. Heidegger himself thematizes education, significantly so in the light of the political circumstances of his 1933 “Rectoral Discourse” as well as, in an inventive mode which would, as we shall see have been better had it been identified as such, as a reconstruction of his postwar reflections on the “Art of Teaching” and, most importantly, *What is Called Thinking?* Heidegger's reflections on questioning also include a meditation on both phenomenology and hermeneutics in “The Question Concerning Technology” in which he famously describes “questioning as the piety of thought.”

On Heidegger and Education

A number of contributions to Heidegger and education may be found throughout discussions of Heidegger, not only on education and pedagogy but also in terms of Heidegger's specifically didactic style. [Consider, quite conspicuously, Peters (2009) as well as the contributions to Peters and Allen (2002), Ehrmantraut (2010) as well as Mayer (1960) as well as Meyer-Drawe (1988) and Nießeler (1995). On Eugen Fink's social-hermeneutic theory of education in particular, see Meyer-Wolters (1992)]. There are approaches to Heidegger and education that look specifically at Heidegger's reflections on technology drawing implications for newer forms of education, be it

distance learning via and including computer-mediated/digital education, or else for today's interactive museum and science "learning centers" (Standish 1997; Waddington 2005). Still other considerations of Heidegger and education are concerned, some positively, some not so positively, with "authenticity." [See Nießeler (1995), once again, as well as Brook (2009)].

Many reflections on Heidegger and education begin with a reading of Heidegger's "Rectoral Address" [Heidegger (1985); the initial lecture was originally published as *Die Selbstbehauptung der deutschen Universität Rede, gehalten bei der feierlichen Übernahme des Rektorats der Universität Freiburg i Br. am 27. 5, 1933* (1933)], just where Heidegger specifically highlights the role of the university (à la John Henry Cardinal Newman or, indeed, à la Wittgenstein who also thematizes the university), and some go on to consider Heidegger's postwar reflections on the same National Socialist context, while other approaches review Heidegger's reflections after his return to university teaching in his 1951–1952 lecture course, *What Is Called Thinking?* inasmuch as Heidegger there too explicitly raises questions of education, specifically adverting to both teaching and to learning.

But Heidegger's concern with education is a broader one than may be indicated by word-search-specific remarks on education alone. Hence the attention Heidegger pays to learning as to learning to think and to questioning runs throughout his work, characterizing his style of philosophizing. Indeed, Heidegger's reflections on questioning in *Being and Time* mark a hermeneutically styled, phenomenological philosophy in general: hence its value for a specifically Heideggerian philosophy of education. [See Peters (2009), Gordon (1998), and Fink (1979) as well as his (1970) and overall Gallagher (1992)].

Heidegger's point of departure in *Being and Time* is classically instructive, highlighting the opposition between what we take ourselves to know, on the one hand, and what knowing ultimately is on the other. In this way, Heidegger's introductory quote from Plato's *Sophist* meditates on knowing unknowing: supposing oneself to know – "For manifestly you have long been

aware of what you mean when you use the expression 'being'" – which Heidegger conjoins with the unsettling disquiet of the recognition that one does not know, "We, however, who used to think we understood it, have now become perplexed" (Plato, *Sophist* (244a)).

This Platonic or Socratic reticence contra the presumed knowing that is characteristic of the sophist (by contrast with the philosopher in Plato in general) already offers an illustration of the revelation not of facts confidently assumed but attests to reflective breakdown. By contrast with presumed and long-standing knowledge ("you have long been aware of what you mean when you use the expression 'being'"), and precisely where one, that is singularized in the second person, plural in this case, *anyone* who, had not thought to question, questioning is prescribed as needful remedy for us, in the first person plural: "We, however, who used to think we understood it, have now become perplexed."

Heidegger's illustration of the breakdown of the ready to hand in the case of a tool like a hammer, defective or broken, or even simply missing, works as a halt, be it brief or longer lasting, in a given undertaking with which one has to do with the (now) problematic hammer. If we articulate an unspoken algorithm of problematization, the deficit calls the overall project as such into question. One can ask, must it be done? Now? What else might serve in place of a hammer? Where can a hammer be found? Such an array of reflections can in turn remand the project into an ad hoc stage, using work-arounds and substitutes – not only a hammer can be a hammer – or may initiate a stage of still further "preparation": anything worth hammering is best secured with the appropriate hammer for the job.

Philosophy itself is inherently of such a "work-around" character in some cases or else it is more classically of the preparatory and reflective variety. Undertaking to reflect on a given theme, we may ask ourselves what we know, and if we remember our Plato (as Whitehead once celebrated, we are all so many footnotes to Plato and as Ricoeur further emphasized, the goal of scholarship is ultimately to be a footnote), it often transpires not only that we do not know but

much rather, as in the famous case of the son, Euthyphro, who, supposing himself to know what piety is, undertakes to bring his own father to court on the grounds of impiety, or else of Thrasymachus, who tells Socrates that he, Thrasymachus, knows justice to be no more than the interest of the commanding powers that be, and so on.

The Socratic (Nietzsche would correct us here and say the Platonic) lesson of knowing our own unknowing calls on us to reflect upon our long-standing and recalcitrant habit of presuming to know what we do not know.

Thus, again, we recall that Heidegger begins his *Being and Time* with the above-quoted citation from Plato's *Sophist* reflecting not on piety (like the *Euthyphro*) or justice (like the *Republic*) but precisely to raise the question of what we mean by being. By asking a classically Platonic question, Heidegger makes a phenomenological move, simultaneously hermeneutic, reflecting on the reflection and so bracketing the assumption with which he begins. We are to question whether we know what being is, but to this end, prior reflection is required.

Do we know what we are doing when we put something into question? What is questioning? What are we doing when we question?

This style of questioning is familiar to us as characteristic of Heideggerian philosophy. And just this questioning makes Heidegger essential reading for anyone reflecting on education, that is: on the nature of teaching and the nature of learning.

Heidegger routinely recalls us to such a starting point: as if philosophy were the proper project of the perpetual beginner. What, he asks us to ask, is the origin of the work of art? What is metaphysics? What is the relation of being and thinking, that is, the relation between what is and what is thought? What is the essence of, that is to say, what is the nature of, technology? How can we come to a free relation to it? What is the uncanniest of the uncanny? What is the danger? What is a thing? What is called thinking? Do we think? More subversively still, presuming the height of what we suppose human thinking to be to be science, does science itself think?

Here it must be noted that not all readings of Heidegger attend to the hermeneutic dimension proper to his phenomenology. Indeed a standing problem with traditional Anglophone readings of Heidegger and education, especially given the above-noted attentions to the *Rektoratsrede*, etc., corresponds to the analytic character of these readings (importantly, Thomson 2004, but see also Tubbs 2004 as well as many of the contributions to Peters and Allen (2002), a character compounded by the fact, shades of the above-noted Euthyphro parallel (and we will return to this below), that such analytic approaches not only take themselves to be superior to other readings but also insist on describing themselves as "continental" and not, heaven forbid, as "analytic." The analytic tactic of refusing to be described as analytic works (not at all coincidentally) to resolve the analytic-continental divide on the side (as it were) of the angels: the Anglo-Saxon, the analytic, today the "dominant" side, proving its dominance by excluding other approaches altogether by denouncing them as "bad" or even mocking them. The institutional insularity of such a tactic (this is already a done deal) is less significant than the political dimensions of many readings today. For in reading Heidegger on education, it is traditional (and reasonable enough) to begin as already noted at the outset where Heidegger himself thematizes education, just as Michael Peters, likewise, has very insightfully shown [See Peters introduction to his co-edited collection 2002]. Yet to begin with Heidegger's address as a university administrator under the Nazi regime and to continue with Heidegger's postwar appeal to be permitted to continue to teach [Heidegger 2000; Hodge 2015 might have profitably drawn on some of the essays in Peters and Allen 2002] and to go on to reflect on his attention to teaching as such in the context of his return to the university in 1951–1952 [this is the point of departure for and organizing principle of Peters and Allen (2002), but for an insightful situating of this approach and including a useful bibliography including Michael Bonnet's contribution, see Peters' own chapter, "Introduction: Heidegger, Education, and Modernity," pp. 1–25] is to read Heidegger under the

sign of Nazism and in the wake of the publication of the *Black Notebooks* that is also consequently under the sign of at least a certain anti-Semitism. [See not only my essay (Babich 2015a) which looks at education and the all-too-ontic instaurations of formation, inclusion and exclusion, but also the several contributions in English, including my own, to Malpas and Farin (2015)]. There are quite a few problems with this, none of which are served by a lack of hermeneutics or indeed a lack of an as yet unattempted Heidegger-specific philology.

When the *Trivium* Is No Longer Trivial: On Things that No Longer Go Without Saying

From the outset, even with his earliest works, were this a discussion of history (rather than questioning), Heidegger reflects that what has transpired in the university is the displacement of pedagogy. This shift does not merely affect scholars and teachers – and this has been true for some time and is becoming ever more serious in a digital age but also in an age that focuses on the student as opposed to the teacher [consider Rancière’s wonderful return to Jacobin who taught that one need not be learned at all to teach at all (Rancière 1991)], given current culture where the student but so too the ever and ever younger scholar, is valued with more grants, more initiatives, more support, more discussions/thematizations by contrast with the increasingly devalued professor [including breaking professorial appointments into several junior positions, at other times more egregiously so as in the replacement of tenured appointments with adjunct or time-limited appointments, inevitably reducing qualification]. At the same time, Rancière’s celebratedly ignorant schoolmaster is increasingly more descriptive than prescriptive: newer “profs” routinely have never (quite) learned what it is they are supposedly engaged to teach. Some might argue that today’s enthusiasm for digital humanities as for the flipped classroom or what we may call the wiki-teaching model betrays a confidence that sets adjuncts equal to tenured professors, only

given that they might be, as they now are not, simply better paid: money makes the teacher and competence correlates to remuneration. Education works if and only if the result of education is employment.

These are contemporary concerns, as relevant for Ivan Illich as they were for Michael Oakeshott. For Heidegger, already and nearly a century ago, what is lost is the prerequisite “art” of teaching, that is: *formation*, or *Bildung* as such. Thus, Heidegger’s concern is not the eons-old plaint of the older scholar vis-à-vis the young (as if this complaint were baseless, as it is not [Oakeshott is useful on reminding of this as is Illich and indeed Nietzsche and many others all in addition to Heidegger. I highlight a discussion of Oakeshott in a discussion of the Harry Potter films, specifically Professor Severus Snape, Babich (2016)]). Ignoring both practical pressures, and without appealing to popular culture, as I have just done by referring to Alan Rickman’s Snape, Heidegger refers to the supposedly classical components of the *trivium*, in his application to the rehabilitation committee that would have permitted him, as it ultimately did not permit him, to continue teaching after the war, i.e., grammar, dialectic, and rhetoric, are ordered, each of them, one to the other.

To quote Valerie Allen’s and Ares D. Axiotis’ reconstruction (less than clearly identified as a reconstruction, this essay is presented by the editor of the collection, *Heidegger, Education, and Modernity*, and on the publisher’s website as a ‘translation’ of Heidegger’s de-Nazification “deposition,” here cited from Allen and Peters 2002 in the context of education, and by way of what I take to be an analogy to Plato’s reconstruction of Socrates’ ‘defense’): Heidegger is here supposed to employ the conventionalities of traditional rhetoric. Thus we learn and are to learn:

first from grammar which teaches us to speak aright, then to dialectic, which teaches us to reason aright, and finally to rhetoric, which teaches us to speak and reason well. *Trivium*, although a singular word, already points to the multiplicity within — *tri-via-um*, three roads made into one (Allen/Axiotis 2002, p. 32)

It is worth noting the ordinarily unadverted to classical dissonance: in a classical modality, one

departs from convention by conventionally, formulaically, calling attention to this departure – *the Jury may ignore the remarks of the witness* – as Socrates famously does in his own *Apology*. In the face of a judicial hearing on Nazi guilt as a university professor, a hearing deciding whether Heidegger would or would not have the right to continue to teach, that is to say, to be “rehabilitated” after the war (the German text would highlight the play on *Habilitation* that is entailed), again, facing a committee empowered to decide whether to suspend his *venia legendi* or else to grant him the right to rejoin the members of the university teaching corps, Heidegger in just this circumstance is presented as spending his time talking about teaching.

That this would have been a dissonant thing to do is important to note. For, like Heidegger, every other professor subjected to this process [including, with the sole exception of Heidegger, every other Nazi rector in Freiburg (Babich 2015a)] *had* supported the Nazi regime and *had* taught under its auspices during the war. Almost all of the other affected rectors, administrators, and other academics comported themselves in their own denazification hearings by doing all the conventional things academics do: the very things Heidegger begins by listing as recommended to him (he was coached, as his colleagues were coached: all with good advice). [Again, I list those academics who succeeded Heidegger at Freiburg, all of whom were, successively, inevitably yet more involved with the Nazi regime than was he, and I note their fates after the war, fates which in most cases led to a straightforward continuation either in university governance or in research (Babich 2015a). Unlike his fellow Nazi academics, his co-professors, Heidegger conspicuously opted not to follow but to depart from protocol (the authors speaking in Heidegger’s place use the word *Scheideweg*, a term used in 1955 by Dietrich von Hildebrand, to make Heidegger’s choice plain). As Heidegger is here imagined as saying and this too follows the rhetorical tactic of the *Apology*: “I am admonished by earnest supporters to seize this occasion publicly to recant any offending words and deeds and to promise to do the same in future lectures and

publications” toward the end of a patent rehabilitation (Allen/Axiotis 2002, p. 29). This odd circumstance, and it has been noted that Plato’s Socrates offers a parallel instantiation of this sort of fatally “rhetorical” display, has been detailed by my own teacher Hans-Georg Gadamer, not with too much sympathy in his: “Back from Syracuse” (Gadamer 1989).

Where Socrates undertook to “teach” the jury who would decide his life (and his death), so too Heidegger here is supposed as being minded to instruct his committee (a tone consistent with that adopted in the 1966 interview with *Der Spiegel*). And like Socrates, that means expectedly (of course the results of the trial are known in each case), Heidegger was not successful. As Plato wrote the *Apology* (on Socrates’ behalf and it is owing to this writerly reason that Nietzsche will speak of the pre-Platonic as opposed to the pre-Socratic philosophers), the description was largely ideal. Heidegger’s enactment of a similar didacticism, written as if on his own account, is no exemplar for the aspiring academic.

Instructing his questioners on the “art of teaching,” Heidegger is represented as detailing grammar and dialectic, using, that is to say, taking up the role of logic and of subjection (as he discussed this in two senses), including the risqué language that Allen and Axiotis opted to set into Heidegger’s mouth (as if we might ever be allowed to forget that he was a farmer woman’s son) belongs to the conception of the *logos spermatikos* [Heidegger is here depicted as speaking of “putting the mare beneath the stallion” (Allen/Axiotis 2002, p. 29) and so on) (Ibid., p. 35; for useful if approximately analytic and non-Heideggerian discussion of the *logos spermatikos* (a term that is not here employed although what Allen and Ariotis do insert into their essay surely glosses it), see Nye (1990)], and goes on to characterize rhetoric, the third in the series of the *trivium*, as “the bastard son of academe” (Allen/Axiotis 2002, p. 35).

The current Black Notebooks scandal brings this very “bastard son” into the light, not that we are all that happy to consider it, and a number of readers have urged that we banish it or at least bracket it (see for a discussion of these rhetorical recommendations: Babich 2015b). Still others,

habitually antagonistic to Heidegger, like Emmanuel Faye and Richard Wolin, and to a lesser degree, those concerned to reduce the question of the meaning of Being to meaning as such, like Tom Sheehan, argue that it is less rhetoric as such than it is Heidegger who must be regarded as metaphorical bastard: Heidegger is to be jettisoned, stripped of any rightful claim to teach philosophy in the academy, let alone instruct us on education, much less philosophy of education.

Questioning

Being and Time begins as a book in the way all monographs begin: we read a cover or title page and then a table of contents with a structural outline of themes. Detailed in the table of contents is a breakdown of the lineaments of the investigation, both promising and didactically useful to the reader.

An epigraph in Greek is featured on a single page, affixed as prefatory to the text, complete with an explanatory gloss. This is further augmented, if we are reading the English translation, with footnotes adverting to the translators' troubles with Heidegger's terminology:

For manifestly you have long been aware of what you mean when you use the expression 'being'. We, however, who used to think we understood it, have now become perplexed.

Heidegger glosses this in what is already his characteristic style as we know from the early writings: he updates the point in its current relevance and he intensifies it: "Do we in our time have an answer to the question of what we really mean by the word 'being'?" Elsewhere I describe this rhetorical style as *cadence*, letting fall; *intensification*, heightening or worsening a certain readerly anticipation; and *retrieve*, recovering or reprising an unadverted to meaning or philosophical advance (Babich 1993). Heidegger immediately answers his own cadence by intensifying its immediate purchase and persistence, do we have an answer? "Not at all." Heidegger thus goes on to vary and thus intensify Plato's own remark, "it is fitting that we should raise anew the question of

the meaning of Being. But," Heidegger asks again, "are we nowadays even perplexed at our inability to understand the expression 'Being'? Not at all" (BT, [19/1]).

Heidegger thus begins *Being and Time* with a question posed to those of us, that would be philosophy in general, then and still today, who are persuaded that no question need be raised with regard to being. So regarded, *Being and Time* is nothing less than a questioning of a series of heretofore non-question-worthy questions regarding being. Instructive is Heidegger's way of approaching and hence of getting to articulate and thus to frame this kind of questioning.

We then read *introduction* 1 followed on the next line by *exposition of the question of the meaning of being* and we move to the first section of the first part – I: *the necessity, structure, and priority of the question of being* – all in majuscule in the English edition, where the first paragraph section is plain enough. The project to begin with declares "¶ 1. The Necessity of Explicitly Restating the Question of Being" necessary above all because "*This* question has today been forgotten" (BT I:1). Indeed, Heidegger goes on, the question is forgotten with a perfect good conscience. What is more, note the intensification, its oblivion is justified: there is no question; there is no need to question; there is, in fact, no kind of obscurity at all:

On the basis of the Greeks' initial contributions towards an Interpretation of Being, a dogma has been developed which not only declares the question about the meaning of Being to be superfluous, but sanctions its complete neglect (BT I:1 [21/2])

Here, not unlike the accounts given by Glenn Most and John Hamilton detailing the ancient lyric poet, Pindar as not at all (not really) obscure (and so too or ditto Heraclitus), in today's very current university trend in a German context that is also to be named a "scientific" trend, "that which all ancient philosophers found continually disturbing as something obscure and hidden has taken on a clarity and self-evidence such that if anyone continues to ask about it he is charged with an error of method" (ibid.).

We hide the obscure in plain sight as obvious and ordinary, that is, as not worth asking about.

But exactly this spells out what will be the project of Heidegger's undertaking:

By considering these prejudices, however, we have made plain not only that the question of Being lacks an answer, but that the question itself is obscure and without direction. So if it is to be revived, this means that we must first work out an adequate way of formulating it (BT 1:1 [24/4])

In this way, Heidegger proceeds in the next section to reflect on the need to illuminate and to clarify the "formal structure of the question of Being" (Cf. BT I:2).

There is a good deal to say about the prelude to this clarification just because, as it turns out, the prelude itself concerns our presuppositions or presumptions. This focus, of course, is the key to phenomenology. Contra these prior assumptions, contra the everyday knowledge one supposes oneself to have to begin with, just as Descartes begins his own *Meditations* by reflecting on things one takes oneself to know, we find our assumptions hinder the acquisition of founded knowledge. Husserl likewise deploys the same method: conscientiously setting aside, or bracketing, "prejudices" (as Heidegger and, later, as Gadamer will speak of them) for the sake of knowledge but also for the sake of any possible epistemology.

It is not ignorance, non-knowing, nescience that stands in the way of knowledge for philosophy. Thus Nietzsche ironically, provocatively emphasizes the origin of logic in illogic, that is, as he argues (the point is a critical one for Nietzsche) (Babich 2014), philosophers and educators alike assume the development of knowledge, or the constructive creation of knowledge, on the ground of learned ignorance.

We need to acknowledge our non-knowing, our ignorance. Where one already has knowledge, one does not undertake, just because one need not undertake, to seek knowledge. What one takes oneself to know stands in the way of learning as it also stands in the way of questioning as such. When we "already" know, when the answer is given, questioning can only be supererogatory: unneeded, or pointless.

Contra presumptive knowledge, convinced as we are by our "convictions," to use Nietzsche's term, Heidegger "formulates" nothing less

obvious than the question of his project as a question. Thus Heidegger offers a preliminary hermeneutic phenomenology of what "belongs to any question whatsoever" (BT I:2), in order to make "the question of Being" manifest in "its own distinctive character" (ibid.).

Heidegger continues in this second section to articulate a phenomenology of questioning and because this phenomenology details a reflection on questioning, the phenomenological method is essentially hermeneutic:

Every inquiry is a seeking [*Suchen*]. Every seeking gets guided beforehand by what is sought. Inquiry is a cognizant seeking for an entity both with regard to the fact *that* it is and with regard to its Being as it is (BT I:2)

Questioning is fundamentally intentional, most evidently when one reflects on questioning. For Heidegger, a "cognizant seeking" may be framed as an investigation: questioning "can take the form of 'investigating' [*Untersuchen*], in which one lays bare that which the question is about and ascertains its character" (BT I:2). In this sense, every questioning is also always (and already) a phenomenological reflection, directed to itself and raising a specifically hermeneutic question. This is what Heidegger calls, *qua* "inquiry about something," that express directedness to "that which is asked about [*sein Gefragtes*]" (BT I:2). And even here further reflection is significant because "all inquiry about something is somehow a questioning of something [*Anfragen bei. . .*]" (BT I:2).

In other words, one does not question in an arbitrary fashion but with intentional specificity concerning what is asked about, even when, especially when, the question is empty or *pro forma*. In addition to what is thus thereby queried, an inquiry has that to which the questioning is directed: "that which is interrogated [*ein Befragtes*]" (BT I:2). Already "formal indication" is at work and Heidegger explains "specifically theoretical" questions of investigation, be they specifically philosophical or scientific, or, just for the instructive sake of an example, in terms of police work, as represented in popular crime fiction as "detective work". Here the example of the detective can be useful for understanding

Heidegger's questioning in a way that lays bare both its pedagogic value in practice and its theoretical contribution to the philosophy of education.

It is already the specificity of questioning that "determines" and conceptualizes what is asked about. "Furthermore," Heidegger goes on to say, "in what is asked about there lies also that which is to be found out by the asking [*das Erfragte*]" (BT I:2). The question articulated already delimits as such or outlines the answer sought. Hans-Georg Gadamer will emphasize this as the dialectical, dialogical character of hermeneutics. Here the example of the detective is appropriate as an investigation seeking "what is really intended" (ibid.). Once one finds this that is "really intended" in the case of a murder mystery, one has uncovered the intended "goal." One knows, in questioning suspects and eliminating possible alternatives, the answer to the mystery of the question of the "who" (who committed the murder?), and therewith, also, one knows, and this in advance, some part of the why question and some part of the how of it.

A hermeneutic phenomenology of questioning is useful in a further, more properly reflexive fashion. As Heidegger underlines, the investigator is not a neutrally objective subject or "immaculate perceiver" to use Nietzsche's language. Much rather: "Inquiry itself is the behaviour of a questioner, and therefore of an entity, and as such has its own character of Being" (BT I:2 [24/5]). Hence, if we keep to the murder mystery or detective instantiation of questioning, the literary (and in the interim also filmic and television) personage of Hercule Poirot goes about his inquiry differently than does (the variety of actorly types exemplifying) Sherlock Holmes or else Agatha Christie's heroines, be it on the page or on the screen, and so too television's Peter Falk with his Socrates-like Detective Columbo by contrast, say, with Basil Rathbone's or Benedict Cumberbatch's Sherlock Holmes. Thus Heidegger, himself almost anticipating Falk's Columbo, easy given philosophy's paradigm investigator in the person of Socrates and his style of questioning, as we may recall this style in either the *Euthyphro* or the more educationally reflective *Meno*, reflects

thematically that "When one makes an inquiry one may do so 'just casually' or one may formulate the question explicitly" (Ibid.). In either case, the fashion in which one frames the question as a particular questioner will make a difference.

What matters is both the logical framing that is the question and the very pre-given orientation toward what is sought that is also entailed in and by and through the question. This means that the question is indispensable in every way, and reflection on the question as such is not a merely formal reflection but exactly hermeneutico-phenomenologically *essential*: Here we pay attention in the following quote to the exigent character attributed to what *must* be:

Inquiry, as a kind of seeking, must be guided beforehand by what is sought. So the meaning of Being must already be available to us in some way (BT I:2 [25/5])

Heidegger, we recall, began by framing this point as not specific to the Being question as such but as holding generically for all questions, formally: "Every seeking gets guided beforehand by what is sought" (BT I:2 [24/5]).

Ask and It Shall be Given, Seek and Ye Shall Find

It is the 'Being question' which permits us to unpack the character of questioning:

We do not know what 'Being' means. But even if we ask, "What is 'Being'?", we keep within an understanding of the 'is', though we are unable to fix conceptionally what that 'is' signifies. We do not even know the horizon in terms of which that meaning is to be grasped and fixed. But this vague average understanding of Being is still a Fact (BT I:2 [25/6])

In other words, the Being question, what is is, *presupposes* an understanding of what is is. That is, and this is also the logical question of reference, as of indication, as of signification, we need to know in some way (even prethetically as Heidegger will say) what we are talking about just in order to pose a question about it. And this is most particularly so in the case of the supposedly vague and general and for these reasons typically taken

to be needless or pointless question of Being, just because the theme itself is being, i.e., is isness, what it is for something to be, that is, for it to be said of anything that it is. "What we seek when we inquire into Being is not something entirely unfamiliar, even if proximally, we cannot grasp it at all" (Ibid.).

The difference here with respect to Being is that we are not reflecting on the "origin" of a thing, whether in particular or in general. At issue then is not a question of genesis or genealogy, birth or mythology, i.e., "telling a story" to use Heidegger's language as he puts it, just to the extent that Being, of which we speak, Heidegger's *Sein*, and about which we seek to inquire, is not an entity or particular being and hence cannot be explicated as entities can be, that is, "by tracing them back in their origin to some other entities" (Ibid.). Rather as Heidegger explains:

Since Being is asked about, and since beings are constituted in their Being, all the conditions of questioning as articulated in this section turn out to be available. In so far as Being constitutes what is asked about, and "Being" means the Being of entities, then entities themselves turn out to be what is interrogated. These are, so to speak, questioned as regards their Being (BT 1:2 [26/6])

Paraphrasing Brentano on Aristotle, Heidegger reflects that "there are many things which we designate as 'being' [*seiend*], and we do so in various senses" (BT 1:2 [26/7]). Key to this overall involvement and to this very multiplicity, the questioning itself is also included as a reflection on Being, still more critically, as a reflection on the inquirer as well: we, ourselves, are as questioners to be implicated. Thus we are also to be put in question. This last point is decisive as the questioner turns out in this case to be quite singular, just given the inquirer's preoccupation both with him- or herself, reflexively and existentially, *concerned*, as Heidegger will explore this concern, with the very real and immediate question of its own being as such. Thus Heidegger logically locates Dasein in terms of questioning and with respect to the Being question as such:

to work out the question of Being adequately, we must make an entity — the inquirer — transparent in his own Being. The very asking of this question is

an entity's mode of Being; and as such it gets its essential character from what is inquired about — namely, Being. This entity which each of us is himself and which includes inquiring as one of the possibilities of its Being, we shall denote by the term "Dasein" (BT 1:2 [26/6])

If it is clear that this is as such specific to the kind of question that constitutes the so-called Being question, it ameliorates what can appear to be a kind of circularity. Heidegger thus pays attention to what he calls the "clue" of "the formal structure of the question as such," noting that "we made it clear that this question is a peculiar one, in that a series of fundamental considerations is required for working it out, not to mention for solving it" (BT 1:3 [28/8]).

Heidegger does not raise the question of questioning in order merely to frame the thematic of Being as such or even Dasein. Rather he is and remains concerned with exploring the notion of the question as such, as a question: noting that the "distinctive features" of the Being question as a question can only be illuminated fully once we "we have delimited it adequately with regard to its function, its aim, and its motives" (Ibid.).

Perhaps the most significant point then in Heidegger's sustained reflections in *Being and Time* and elsewhere is the difficulty of setting oneself on the path of actual inquiry. In other words, questioning as such, really questioning, turns out to be elusive. The problem, as Heidegger also writes in his *What is Metaphysics?*, coincides with authenticity, *owning* the question as one's own question and as such. That is the challenge of actually posing, framing, engaging, and putting the question as such, in other words: really questioning.

After reflecting on this challenge as his point of departure in *What is Called Thinking?*, Heidegger emphasizes that what is most thought-provoking of all is that we continue to fail to think: we are (still) not thinking. The point bears on the project of education. One can imagine Heidegger meant this statement to be heard in context, in this particular lecture course, as a vindication of his return to the university and in the wake of his failed efforts to impress the denazification committee that had instead withdrawn his *venia legendi*.

For Heidegger, once restored to his university post, speaking to his students as they set out on what he tells them will be required of them in order to follow the path of those who mean to “learn to think” (Heidegger 1976), what must for Heidegger be underscored contrasts bridges, specifically, what must be presupposed to build and to use bridges, with what must similarly be presupposed for the sake of the leap. The metaphor is replete with references to the (very parodic) challenges of Nietzsche’s *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* and Nietzsche’s *Übermensch* (or overhuman). [I discuss this in a number of places; see most recently Babich (2013)]. For Heidegger, there can be no bridge and thus he underscores the necessity of the leap, to be distinguished from the “make-shift ties and asses’ bridges by which humanity today would set up a comfortable commerce between thinking and the sciences” [Heidegger, *What is Called Thinking?*, p. 8].

With the example of the leap, Heidegger emphasizes that we can learn “only if we always unlearn at the same time” (Heidegger, *What is Called Thinking?*, p. 8). That same unlearning entails the need to let go. This is a kind of *Gelassenheit* – letting be or releasing what we think we know. [I explore some of the complexities of this notion using an aesthetic metaphoricity in Babich (2015c)]. The enemy of thinking, the enemy of learning, is nothing other than our original formation: what we have learned. Heidegger thus invites his listeners in his first lecture course given upon his return to teaching at the university to “radically unlearn what thinking has been traditionally” [Heidegger, *What is Called Thinking?*, p. 8]. And to that end, there is nothing but that same releasement that would “allow ourselves to become involved in questions that seek what no inventiveness can find” [Heidegger, *What is Called Thinking?*, p. 8].

Here Heidegger reflects – and just this is often quoted in essays on Heidegger and education – that “Teaching is even more difficult than learning” (Heidegger 1976, p. 15). The “even” in this articulation is to be foregrounded inasmuch as what is at issue in teaching is above all a letting learn. Just such a “solicitude” (as we remember the elusive because very compact

discussion of solicitude [*Fürsorge*] in *Being and Time*) (Babich 2015d) is “difficult” precisely because “the real teacher lets nothing else be learned than – learning” (Heidegger 1976, p. 15). The teacher has to be more teachable than the one who learns, and at the same time, the teacher has to be able to allow the student to learn, whereby Heidegger offers his own version of Nietzsche’s Zarathustran remonstrance: one repays a teacher badly if one remains a student or a follower much less an acolyte, reflecting that the teacher has, just in order to be a teacher, to withdraw as such: like the pointer that Heidegger had already noted as part of the human condition of adverting to what is revealed as it obscures itself, as it withdraws. So too the teacher’s comportment “often produces the impression that we properly learn nothing from him” (Heidegger 1976, p. 15). Said otherwise: a teacher to be a teacher must get out of the way. But what this means is *not* that the teacher is not important but that we do not know our teachers. As Nietzsche would say, we do not recognize them. This is ineluctable and it means that our true teachers, “true” as Nietzsche would say, are not honored with teaching awards: like Schopenhauer, as compared with Hegel or Wilhelm von Humboldt, they are not singled out as the great men and women of our educational institutions. Indeed, they are not likely to be known as such. The withdrawal in question for Heidegger, who prefers to speak of reticence, is not a matter of the initially noted focus on the student (as opposed to the professor), on the young (as opposed to the old). The teacher’s withdrawal is not for the sake of support, that would be a kind of unsettling *Fürsorge*, that is a disrupting leaping-in for or on behalf of the other, no matter how well-intended the mentorship or how positive the encouragement (although this is certainly how many teachers institute their own successors). Much rather and by contrast, for Heidegger, what is incumbent on the teacher as teacher is letting learn. That means the teacher has to free the learner for his or her ownmost possibilities of and in being, including one’s ownmost projects, concerns, challenges, and limitations. What is here at stake is Being as such.

Just as “the sign stays without interpretation,” as Heidegger writes just before he turns to reflect on Hölderlin’s *Mnemosyne*, the human being himself (or herself and this should always be said when we are speaking of Heidegger’s or of Hölderlin’s *human being*) is a sign, an indication pointing toward what is already withdrawn, revealed, and obscured, in eclipse. “We,” he repeats this, “are a sign that is not read” (Heidegger 1976, p. 18).

“We are trying to learn thinking” (Heidegger 1976, p. 16), so Heidegger teaches. *What is Called Thinking?* is a class, specifically: a written set of lectures for a class, and, exactly par for the course, he begins Lecture I of Part Two by reprising his reflection on the question: “What is it to which we give the name thinking?” (Heidegger 1976, p. 113). In the case of science, the investigation seeks to frame the query in a characteristic way, specific to the regional specificity of the science in question, and Heidegger also speaks of this more generally in terms of the age of “world picture.” [I am of course referring to Heidegger’s essay of the same name, but it is also part of his reflections in *Being and Time*: “Scientific research accomplishes, roughly and naively, the demarcation and initial fixing of the areas of subject-matter. The basic structures of any such area have already been worked out after a fashion in our pre-scientific ways of experiencing and interpreting that domain of Being in which the area of subject-matter is itself confined” [BT 1:3, 29/9)]. The scientist is interested in a certain representation of the world, and, as Heidegger also points out, the modern, technologically advanced scientist is interested rather less in attaining a theoretical understanding of a specific subject field than in being able to challenge forth nature productively in a specific, experimental, instrumentally calculable way. In part, this is all about the kind of query specific to science which, as Immanuel Kant had already pointed out in his own phenomenological reflection on the method of scientific understanding, follows a very specific questioning tack: by setting specific questions that nature is compelled to answer, instrumentally articulated. This is the experimental project of science, not an objective or neutral undertaking and often quite violent, sometimes, in the case of

animal research, a very bloody, fatal matter of interrogative compulsion and torture. But by this kind of questioning, one finds, this is the specialized nature of modern science, just and only the answers one wishes.

Here, a phenomenological hermeneutics is invaluable as one can recognize that the kind of inquiry thereby scientifically deployed is exactly non-neutral, utterly subjective: one challenges forth toward quite specific ends not only of explanation but for the sake of technologizable prediction and, ultimately, for the sake of calculatively specific and indeed manufacturable control. What one has thereby is a techno-scientific picture of the world just to the extent that the means, the how, and the whereby and the ways of this interrogation will always be part of the scientific image presented. This eliminates the innocent idea of simply going up to nature, as it were, and figuratively, in the case of science, asking neutral or objective questions. For Heidegger by contrast, to return to the question of questioning, we note the relevance of what he calls, at the conclusion of his *Question Concerning Technology*, “the piety of thought” (Heidegger 1977, p. 35).

We only can ask after the means of our interrogation in the case of science (and in the case of the technology that we use to advance science), if we mean to question in such a way that we call our own presuppositions into question. In other words, we take ourselves to know in the case of modern, i.e., scientific, technology that we *know* what technology is (an instrument or a tool, a human undertaking or preoccupation); our presumption is that technology in its essence is already available to us in advance of any questioning after it. Here, we may now recall, this conviction stymies inquiry, getting in the way of any kind of questioning, superficial or genuine/authentic: why ask where we already know? In the case of technology, the problem is and remains that we seek to control technology. But where we do not see the problem, where we already know what technology is (it’s a tool, it’s a means: it’s neutral, it’s fundamentally human), control remains elusive. Heidegger later suggests in his lecture celebrating the local Messkirch composer, Conradin Kreutzer and published as *Gelassenheit*, what he had already

pointed out in the *Question Concerning Technology*, namely, it is enough, if it is also hard enough, to reflect on what is needed to gain a “free relation” to technology as part of any philosophical inquiry that would ask after the nature of the essence of technology as of anything in particular.

A determination is already at work when we put the object of inquiry into question in a specific way, for a specific purpose, and in terms of a given disciplinary project or undertaking. We ask philosophical questions as we ask scientific questions, economic questions, political questions, religious questions, and spiritual questions, and we also ask idle questions and in no case are these questions themselves unspecified even in their non-specificity but require further reflection or thinking. As Heidegger says in *The Question Concerning Technology*, questioning is anything but nondirective: questioning is utterly intentional. Questioning is the phenomenological *epoché* articulated in a sentence: “questioning builds a way” (Heidegger 1977, p. 3).

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On Marxist Critical Ethnography

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Introduction

First of all, my sincere thanks to the editorial team for inviting me to submit this chapter for publication in the present volume. In this entry, I will try to explore the connections between research and practice from a critical pedagogical perspective. Such connections are less frequently commented on than they should be, and this entry aims to make a contribution. It concerns policies regarding education research and its drivers, and pertains

specifically to one mode of inquiry, that of educational ethnography, and its potential to provide a powerful critique of the operation of power and intentions to control societal and cognitive rhythms through dominant (i.e., white supremacist, hegemonic) ideologies emanating from the standardized knowledge industry and values of Anglo-centric capitalism (Malott 2010). The argument of this entry is that it is this kind of critique of how power is infused into education that should be the main democratic driving force of educational research, including educational ethnography. This entry considers some criteria for this kind of research in the interests of Malott (2010) names as a possibility of empowerment for all (also McLaren 2000).

From Ethnography to Marxist Critical Ethnography

As Hammersley wrote in 2006, educational ethnography has many driving forces, interests, and advantages and as a practice has been influenced by a diverse range of theories and methodologies ranging from phenomenology and existentialism to symbolic interactionism, ethnomethodology, Marxism, feminism, and semiology. Moreover, it has also developed within different disciplines and fields, such as anthropology, sociology, and cultural studies influenced by both modernist and postmodernist epistemologies (also Jordan and Yeoman's 1995). Young's (1971) "new sociology of education" has played a very important role in developments in the past 40 years however, particularly in the UK where ethnography of education has been particularly developed (Troman 2006). This tradition foregrounded both neo-Marxist and interactionist perspectives in the analysis of education and schooling and presented in this way different possibilities and reasons for opening up the "black box," misrepresentations, and symbolic violence of schooling processes (Bourdieu and Passeron 1970). In the Marxist tradition, the intention was toward a critical examination of education processes without abandoning the political core of class analysis in social and civic institutions that reproduce civil

society through the workings of asymmetric power relations (Malott 2010; McLaren 2000). A key point here though is that society and social reproduction in school is filled with both acquiescence and cultural struggle at one and the same time (Malott 2010; Foley 2002; Willis 1977).

The Marxist tradition of critical ethnography offers a particularly interesting means to explore the social relations and practices of contemporary capitalism in terms of these coincidences, as they materialize within the everyday world. It is particularly valuable in critical analysis due the unique capacity ethnography offers for getting up close to sites of exploitation and oppression through participant observation and learning about how they are lived and experienced by subjects themselves. It does this by endowing the researcher with first-hand experience of what forms acquiescence, exploitation, and symbolic violence take in the world and how they are organized on a daily basis in face-to-face interaction (Jordan and Yeoman's 1995). The study of classes as the social relations of production is transformed in this way into the study of class cultures with unique, self-valorizing, and expressive (symbolic) cultural practices with material consequences (Foley 2002; Willis 2000). In the formulation of these new interests, various sites of cultural contestation and everyday cultural practice are interrogated to enable a more complete and micro-contextually sensitive understanding of societal forces of power in terms of how dominance and change are both mutually possible within any given moment of struggle.

The concepts of social class and social class relations are still however a central watermark in this research, which involves the development of detailed textured investigations of the complexity of everyday life and an attempt to establish a clear theoretical understanding of the political economy of capitalism as the methodological framework within which to construct a critical ethnography (Beach 2014). This involves a shift from ethnography, as a systematic study of people and cultures designed to explore cultural phenomena by observing and partaking in social practices from the point of view of the subject of the study herself, to Marxist critical ethnography, as

ethnography with a political purpose to change things in the interests of the presently exploited classes, groups and individuals in society. It is done by re-inscribing critique in ethnographic analyses informed by Marxist theory to address processes of unfairness or injustice within particular lived domains, to paraphrase Madison (2012).

By its connections to Marxism, there are certain specific understandings of social class embedded in and essential to this critical ethnography. In Marxism and Marxist ethnography, social class is much more than a socially constructed category (Beach 2010b). It refers to materially real-class positions in the hierarchical relations of material production in capitalist society. This makes the concept ontological with some epistemological injunctions and a cultural, historical, and material category, not an imaginary social relation. This forms a main difference between Marxist theories of class and other theories (Foley 2002; Malott 2010; McLaren 2000; Postone 2003). Marx put the issue similarly in chapter 5 of *Capital* in his writing about wage labor.

Understanding class as a deep and ontologically real feature of capitalist social formations is a key aspect of Marxist critical ethnography (Jordan and Yeomans 1995) that derives directly from the Marxist historical materialist conception of the organization of society that operates in respect of productive relations when people secure the material means for their survival. The concept of the economic base is central here, as is the idea of State administrative surveillance systems (Althusser referred to the ideological and repressive State institutions) and the hegemonic discourses that expand and conceal formations of social control based on economic advantage and interests (Malott 2010). Classic Marxian notions of class struggle and cultural critique become standard key research organizers on the basis of the importance of the above concepts even in ethnography (Banfield 2004; Foley 2002). This applies as class refers to an ontological relation and an aspect of structured reality in the production of material life itself not despite this.

Class is still a socially ontological category from the perspective of a Marxist view of history

in this respect even in ethnography, but it is still also always a relative concept as well, as classes exist in relation to each other and/as an aspect of the development of capitalism and capitalist (Bourdieu and Eagleton 1992). It is also studied in this way too. It does not become a freely floating concept that exists outside of the conditions of production; there is always a dialectic relationship between the mode of production and class formation (Postone 2003) and this is also a subject of investigation in Marxist critical ethnography, which will also include in its comprehension of things an affirmative recognition both of existing states of things and of their negation (Beach 2010b).

The position of Marxist critical ethnography in relation to class and history thus takes into account and will analyze the transient nature of history, the formational characteristics of which were initially described by Marx, in chapter two of the *German Ideology*. What this means is that the ethnographies will look for the causes of developments and changes in human society in relation to the means by which humans collectively produce the necessities of life. Social classes and the relationship between them, along with the political structures and ways of thinking in society, are founded on and reflect this contemporary economic activity. These form the relations that determine society's other relationships and ideas, which are described as its superstructure. What individuals become and may become coincides with production in terms of both how and what is produced, wherewithal the nature of individuals depends on the material conditions determining their production.

The critics of Marxism often forget these basic premises: or perhaps they are not aware of them (Bourdieu and Eagleton 1992) or deliberately misrecognize and misrepresent them (Beach 2010b). What the premises mean of course are, as succinctly put by Marx, that although people are the makers of their own history, they do not make this history under conditions they have made for themselves or which they may have freely chosen. They make their histories collectively under circumstances and conditions that have been inherited from the past and that may

weigh like a nightmare on their intentions and interactions.

This position is fundamentally important to critical ethnography and its concepts of structure and agency (Beach 2010b, 2011, 2014), and without them it would be grossly unclear what power relations are constituted by and in terms of as well as what role various socioeconomic factors can play in the configuration of these relations (Wolfrey 2000), as the emphasis on symbolic aspects of relations of production alone prevents the economy from being grasped as a system governed by the laws of interested calculation, competition or exploitation separate to other systems, and without this it becomes very hard to see either what gives rise to domination or how forms of domination may change in different societies. Commodities have an intrinsic value which is expressed in exchange value, and disclosing how this operates in concrete circumstances and on the basis of what forms of power and microcognition is, as stated earlier, a main aim of critical ethnography and indeed critical pedagogical research more broadly as well (also Malott 2010; McLaren 2000). In Marxist analyses, capital is not just a resource to be acquired; it is intrinsic to a system of relations based on the exploitation of labor (Beach 2010b). In other words, it is not the exchange of commodities that regulates the magnitude of their value but rather the magnitude of their value which controls their exchange proportions, whom or what controls the magnitude of this value and by what means becomes the key analytical questions here in Marxist critical ethnography (Beach 2010b).

These latter points are not merely academic ones. They have significant implications for an understanding of causality, and they concern ways of grasping and changing the world that elude bourgeois thinking. Marx' materialist view of history posits causality as consisting in *vertical and determining* and, simultaneously, horizontal and codetermining relations (Banfield 2010). Social formations that are dominated (determined) by the capitalist mode of production are codetermining features (horizontal relations) within the limits of a historically material and specific (i.e., capitalist and vertical) class relationship where all other social relations are rooted.

In other words, class cannot be evaded or talked or written out of fashion (Foley 2002), at least not from a Marxist perspective and not without the loss of grasp on the social totality as suggested above (*ibid*). This is an important point in relation to the ethnography of education as it tells you what to look for in complex social interactions as well as what the status of what you are registering as data or findings actually is (Jordan and Yeomans 1995). In other traditions, such concerns with class ontology such as this tend to be dismissed and everything tends to become epistemologically relative (always), subjective (always), symbolic (only), and reducible to discourse, which is a delusion that is often held and voiced with strong conviction by postmodern relativists, despite superior evidence to the contrary (Beach 2010b, 2014).

Important Points in Marxist Critical Ethnography

One element of critique of ethnography generally that is commonly expressed, and that has been voiced extremely well by among others Martin Hammersley in an article in the *Journal of Ethnography and Education* in 2006, is that ethnography is often weak in terms of using and contributing to the development of theory. However, what we can hopefully see above is that this critique cannot and does not apply to Marxist critical ethnography, where theory is central. Marx was after all a philosopher, theorist, and historian whose main intention was to analyze and critique social organization in a scientific way by creating a methodology for social science. This theory and method perceives human history to consist of a series of struggles between oppressors and oppressed as the ultimate driving force of cultural development, which is also empirically and scientifically investigated. There is thus therefore always of necessity a clearly articulated and distinctly dialectical relationship between data production and theory.

In Marxist critical educational ethnography, the value of theory is often described and written about in at least two different ways. These were described

in Beach (2010b). They are on the one hand, and as suggested already, a tool for teasing out the patterns of exploitation in a given setting from the general texture of everyday life, and, on the other, compositions of a semiotic system that can signify the main organizing features, principles, or outcomes of education, within contemporary society and in relation to the vertical dimensions of the relations of production. They do this with the help of empirical data that has been produced through a planned and conscious theoretically informed engagement with the researched setting. As also Beach (2010b) has pointed out, these ideas have a stabilizing effect on research and counteract under-theorized understandings of key aspects of the kind that can lead to normalized assumptions.

In making this statement, and specifically in relation to critical ethnography, I agree with Banfield (2004, p. 53) in his recognition of the primary importance of the economic field and the need to attend to it to avoid the risk of falling into an empiricist fallacy of thinking that data can speak for itself, or an assumption that that field-work always lacks the foundations for generalization, whatever you do (Foley 2002). In Marxist critical ethnography, none of these circumstances apply. Data is not assumed to speak for itself and generalizations are possible. They are made from data from long-term participant observation from participating in historically real material, economically productive conditions with other people. We analyze and generalize from these analyses on the role class plays in terms of how social conflicts materialize and how social characters experience and overcome oppression. The intention is to contribute to the development of concrete and abstract practical and theoretically based solutions to the problems encountered by exploited groups of people.

This is thus not about only focusing on actor perspectives and meanings. The world of action is more than a universe of interchangeable possibilities and totally devoid of objectivity, but this is not to say that subjectivism has no place in critical ethnography at all, for as Bourdieu's work makes clear it certainly does. What is said instead is that the aim should not only be to show acts as understood, interpreted, and articulated from the actor's

perspective but also to suggest something of how these acts are culturally produced under specific historically given material conditions of production of late capitalism, with a view to also changing these very relations (Beach 2010b).

There is a parallel again here to Banfield (2004). It is about taking a point of departure in actual behavior to show regularities between individual (psychological) conditions and external (social-material) circumstances (Malott 2010), and then establishing dialogue with people in an attempt to penetrate behind surface conditions to grasp and reveal hidden motives and causes to create new forms of understanding from experience and to help to change hegemonic blind commitment into more rational forms of action (Beach 2010a). This aim is similar to Freire's (1970) notion of conscientization. It treats practical common sense knowledge as a subject of critical reappraisal in terms of its relationships to the world of production and as the starting point of a social transformation or revolution (Allman 1999; McLaren 2000).

Conscientization is an important concept in Marxist critical ethnography (Beach 2010b; Soyini Madison 2012), where it is seen as a counter hegemonic strategy that uses Marxism and other critical theories, not in order to assert a set of partisan practices and ideologies (Hammersley 2006), but rather in order to open up the analysis toward the processes through which actors carve out and stabilize spheres of rationality, and the processes through which such rationalized spheres can be recognized and challenged so they may ultimately be actively changed (Carr 1995). This form of ethnography thus seeks to establish critical communities who will engage in processes of discussion, argument, action, and debate toward the rational development of practices that can contribute to social transformation (Postone 2003).

This is a statement that is among other things again about the relations of base and superstructure in terms of the primacy of vertical aspects of determination acting prior to and "above" horizontal ones of codetermination (Beach 2011). But it is at the same time a statement about the need to

study and theorize in terms of both (Foley 2002). There is an emancipatory intent and an aim for establishing a kind of catalytic validity (Lather 1991) that challenges the status quo. There are distinct validity forms for this kind of research (Beach 2010b). These are located in forms of pragmatic (Kvale 1995) and as stated above catalytic validity (Lather 1986), where knowledge is valid if it is integrated with and or instigates change that is sustainable and beneficial to ideologically disadvantaged and materially exploited groups. Banfield (2004) drew out implications for methodological practice of a critical ethnography of this kind. This ethnography must:

- Hold to a stratified emergent ontology with a materialist view of history
- Take structures and generative mechanisms as its object of inquiry
- Advocate a standpoint epistemology
- Acknowledge the fallibility of knowledge
- Accept the openness of the social world
- Understand events as the outcome of multiple causal processes

Banfield used Bhaskar's (1991) identification of the common failure of social analysis to maintain the distinction between ontology and epistemology as his starting point (Beach 2010b). However, as I try to do, he then pointed out that this results in two fundamental errors: the ontic fallacy where what is known is reduced to what is, and the epistemic fallacy, where what is collapses into what is known and reality collapses into text where all claims to truth are equally valid, and the only way to settle disputes is through the "practical exercise of power" in the form of symbolic (or even worse) forms of violence (Foley 2002).

Adopting a Marxist theory in ethnography does not make it impossible to fall into these traps, but it does make it difficult to, and it can help one to find a way out (Beach 2010b). This involves providing a challenge to the foundations of conventional modernist science as a critical tool for change, by developing a commitment to make science and reflection as available to everyone as possible within a globalization of thinking and of

affirmative action toward maximizing social and educational equality (McLaren 2000). It is interested in understanding how the ruling bloc builds civic consent through the State and its cultural/educative institutions and what the ability to control these institutions rests upon beyond legal and moral force (Foley 2002; Willis 2000).

Civic consent is never secure and there is always the possibility that the working class may create a progressive, counterhegemonic culture, through collective cultural identities that are produced in(side) various cultural struggles (McLaren 2000). Marx's notion of alienation is broadened here to include objectifying, alienating, everyday cultural practices through communicative or expressive cultural practices in various cultural sites in much the same way that laboring in commodity-producing factories does (Foley 2002). Marxist critical ethnography is a means to uncover intimate knowledge about what makes these social processes and how they can be undone (Beach 2010b).

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On Some of Nietzsche's Ideas That Inspired Postmodernist Educational Thinking

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Synonyms

Nietzschean education; Nietzschean nihilism; Nietzschean perspectivism; Nietzschean responsibility

Introduction

It is fashionable these days in the wave of the criticism of poststructuralism and postmodernism to blame Nietzsche for nihilistic tendencies in educational theory and to reproach his nihilism for being subjectivistic and relativistic (see, e.g., Arcilla 1995, p. 45). Thus, Johnston (1998) too argues that a total break from education as it is currently practiced is what would be needed if one were to adopt a thoroughly Nietzschean stand on education. And he further holds that Nietzsche castigates the interpersonal values that education promotes in favor of an intrapersonal, intrasubjective, and individual emphasis: "For Nietzsche, though, there is no question of a reconciliation between the realms of the individual and social. One simply has to overcome the social if one desires in turn to self-overcome" (Johnston 1998, p. 81). Clearly, it is easy to show that Nietzsche has been misinterpreted in ways both sinister and potentially dangerous, for instance, where he was posthumously adopted as the approved philosopher of the Nazi Party, but the fashionable criticism concerning his subjectivism and relativism is another and equally important matter. In this chapter I will first deal with nihilism (and perspectivism) in general and the particular position Nietzsche holds concerning this. Then I will

sketch some of the ways Nietzschean insights have found their ways in the context of educational theory. His thoughts have inspired many so-called postmodern philosophers and philosophers of education (for a further development of these ideas, see, e.g., Blake et al. 2000).

Nihilism and Perspectivism

According to Nietzsche, the nihilist despairs because he longs to value something but in good faith cannot, for he believes that only values believed to be objective can in good faith be professed (and he no longer believes in objective values). The particular form of nihilism in which Nietzsche is interested should however be understood as the state one may be in when nothing truly matters to one. Overcoming this nihilism is not so much a matter of replacing old values with new ones, as it is of coming to value something where previously one valued nothing. Roughly what he means is that we must take a certain sort of responsibility for what we say about the world and accept that we cannot lean on something else when values are concerned. Sense can no longer be made of the idea that the ways in which we view the world are justified by something standing above, beyond or behind the world itself. Neither nature, nor reason, nor revelation can provide the moral standards for the governance of life. He holds that as there are no objective values, as all values are the creation of human beings, they typically serve the needs of their creators – understanding why they were created requires therefore investigating the (historically and psychologically conditioned) needs of their creators.

Nietzsche teaches that we are free to adopt the perspective that proclaims the value of creating subjective value. This creation should not be understood as a kind of subjectivism, as if the subject could create values *ex nihilo* or could impose or project values into the world. What Nietzsche means is that we have to take responsibility for having to take responsibility, rather than trying to deny the fact of such responsibility by means of a fantasy of access to the world's nature that would be wholly independent of our "human,

all too human" interests and aims. His interest lies in the loss of the world: more specifically how humans create and do not *find* a world. He wants to transcend the reaction of those who seek compensation in imaginary revenge (instead of a real reaction, i.e., a deed) or those who nostalgically restate values; for him Christian moral values are not objective. Failing to take responsibility characterizes what he calls "the herd" and threatens the very possibility of individuality in the present age.

The error that Nietzsche thus diagnoses at the root of Socratism is a matter of treating obedience as interpretation, as accepting one's culture's interpretation of itself, of its members, its world, as something that presents itself as a candidate for philosophical justification. Unless we have good reasons to rule out alternative interpretations, we cannot be said truly to mean anything at all by our moral judgments, since judgments guided only by instinct are blind. Though he is not trying to rule out the possibility of all rational inquiry whatsoever, he is concerned to understand the nature of what he thinks of as specifically *philosophical* resistance to the ordinary conditions that govern the employment of any concepts at all. His claim is not that we must learn to live without reasons but rather that we must come to see where it no longer makes sense to ask for reasons, because a search for reasons ends in discovery of the conditions for whatever we want to explain.

From this it follows that "perspectivism" cannot be a *view* with which Nietzsche intended to replace the traditional epistemology he rejected. In the same vein, there is his denial of the thing in itself: this presupposes a particular essence, a metaphysical system or ontology that gives once and for all the *eidos*, the nature of something and associated normative implications. One should be careful here: we do not impose interpretations on the world so that we are responsible for the sense we make of the world in this sense; rather what is at stake is a fundamentally *practical* matter. As he denies that we can make good sense of the idea of the *object* of such an imposition, the concept of imposition itself makes no sense. Two different senses of "responsibility" are at work here. On the one hand, responsibility is a matter of articulating one's (Socratic) standards of judgment, standards

which must be sufficiently independent of one's actual practices of judgment to have the required kind of objectivity and justificatory status. On the other hand, there is responsibility in an existentialist vein, where one either accepts or disowns responsibility for what one says and does and is, just because there is no one and nothing else to bear that responsibility (this would constitute an absence of standards). But as for Nietzsche, the conception of standards being appealed to here is incoherent, and he therefore finds the notion of responsibility incoherent. Rather than claiming that we should take responsibility for the meaning we *impose* on the world, Nietzsche seems to show us how we resist the meaning we find in the world and how we are inclined to hide in the herd. Thus he seeks to replace the Socratic notion of *responsibility*, which in his view expresses philosophical dissatisfaction with life, with a notion of *responsiveness* understood in terms of the notion of commitment, a form of passivity, an openness to what matters to us.

Nietzsche intimates the possibility of a new relation to things, a relation in which we have learned to leave them be. On the one hand, we accept them in their pristine and unsayable integrity; on the other we transform them through continually renewed mythic and artistic renderings. The tragic form of art is for Nietzsche a way to overthrow nihilism by the discovery of the special value of what is near to us, the value of what seemed to be unimportant:

My formula for greatness in a human being is *amor fati*: that one wants nothing to be other than it is, not in the future, not in the past, not in all eternity. Not merely bear what is to endure that which happens of necessity, still less necessary, still less to dissemble it—all idealism is untruthfulness in the face of necessity—but *love* it. (Nietzsche 1979, *Why I Am so Clever*, § 10)

The things around us are wonderful because they are fragile. One can love them; they can become precious and things we care for, because they are not immune from the uncertainties of life. When we realize this, the little things of life acquire a new significance for us, and this may lead to a better attunement to the world. The latter is however not to be taken as equivalent to "resting in

peace”: this cannot be reconciled with his idea concerning self-realization and the emancipation of the creative will. It is however meant to temper the ambitions of reason itself by focusing on its limitations and its presuppositions. Obviously, the Enlightenment and all that goes with it were for Nietzsche neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for the justification of a particular individual stance. Like its metaphysical predecessors, it had lost its credibility and could no longer convince.

At a deeper level living in accordance with nature prescribes an ideal of human perfectibility. Schatzki (1994) characterizes the *Übermensch*, being the fullest expression of the will to power, by the pursuit of a single goal, freedom (the ability to harmonize the divergent inclinations and instincts within one into a coherent force directed toward one's ruling goal), discipline (the struggle required in order to attain freedom), the creation of values, and the affirmation of all elements of reality. The return to nature is thus not a return to an unbridled, instinctual beast of prey, rather “. . . it is a rising up to a harmonized existence that focuses on an achievement, affirms what is, and creates the values according to which it operates” (Schatzki 1994, p. 158). Evidently this creation of values and ends is not a free arbitrary willing, it is not a matter of whim; rather it involves the unrepressed flowering-forth of the necessity that is a person's own nature, one of the products of the overflow of which are the values and goals that govern his life. In the same vein, creativity is neither the apotheosis of the modern idea of individual self-assertion nor an imitation of nature; rather it is the focused expression of the nature in us, which at least partly varies from person to person. It is art alone that would seem to have the power to do this. Art does not harden and solidify phenomena into new metaphysical determinations. Images, symbols, and metaphors can affirm and enhance the presencing of the phenomena in ever new and renewed configurations.

Education and the Nietzschean Legacy

One of the themes that attract attention is the matter of the real essence of man, not to be

found deep inside himself but rather far above himself and able to be revealed to man by his true educators. The search for freedom is thus a search for man's authentic being resulting from a deep feeling of responsibility on man's part. This is a freedom man can achieve only by himself, only by struggling with himself. It is not to be equated with lawlessness but rather a “freedom for.” This involves for man a mastery over himself and a full responsibility for his own good and bad actions. The heavy price to be paid for this is his loneliness and isolation from society. A person must be willing to burden himself with his personal destiny, a willingness that can be developed by learning to live in solitude and by finding friends who will confront him with difficult truths. It is important to understand this correctly: the idea of “being” and “becoming” is not about finding a personal essence or destiny but about becoming a free, authentic creator of values (understood in other than in subjectivistic terms), purposes, and perspectives for oneself (a version of child-centered pedagogy does not fit with Nietzsche). It is thus about *being* a destiny rather than having one. Thus Rosenow (1989) argues that Nietzsche's concept of “self-overcoming” is a revision and revaluation of the traditional concept of self-mastery or self-control. Here the focus is on the social and cultural mechanisms, including education, that adapt man to human society, repress his nature, and deny his freedom. It explains Nietzsche's rebellion against established norms and values, the overcoming of his socially defined personality, and his lack of reverence for scholars and philosophers who advocate the supremacy of reason.

It will be clear from the above that Nietzsche's position is different from the extreme relativism and skepticism that claims that because all the traditional groundings for value and knowledge were an illusion, we are now faced with the “nothingness” of these values, a position he refers to as “nihilism” and which in his opinion is the fundamental character of our age. Both modern nihilism and traditional western values have the same logical relation to the world: they judge it negatively and hence devalue it. He wants to reinstate the value of phenomena such as birth, death, human

illness, and suffering, the sensory, i.e., the human body. By offering a psychological account of notions such as guilt, sin, and redemption, he tries to undermine the traditionally sharp distinction between human beings and other animals. He argues that the fact that we feel both responsible for what we do and yet ultimately powerless to do other than we do, that we feel, as it were, victims of ourselves, is a feature of our lives that has a complicated psychological and sociological history. Here, speaking is seen as a form of promising, i.e., a social activity. In obeying the laws of the community, the individual member is keeping what Nietzsche considers to be a promise, a "pledge," in order to enjoy the advantages of society. To say of someone that she has the right to make promises then means that she speaks intelligibly, that she takes responsibility for what she says. This is different from a community that fails to make sense (the herd). To give one's word (as the sovereign individual has the right to do) is to incur an obligation to let oneself be understood, an obligation to overcome one's unwillingness to do so, to renounce one's desire to remain opaque.

What the teacher has to teach simply is not transmissible to a crowd; and education is not the determination of who the student should be but of how she might become who she and only she is. It is not about liberating the potential but instead about confronting her with various demands that enable her to give shape to her life herself. The educator serves as a living exemplar of what this can mean, as a beacon for her student of what it is to be enthralled by a subject. The authority and discipline the subject commands are indeed indispensable. The true educator celebrates success when her students become worthy of demanding their independence. The disciplined training that allows the student to end her servitude to custom (including morality) ultimately results in the achievement of maturity and individuality and thus in the end of her servitude to higher persons. The true educator is she who successfully demonstrates a solitude to her students. She serves as the model of how one may escape herd life and bear one's individuality heroically. Only she who has attained her solitude is worthy of being an educator, a catalyst in the formation of other solitaires,

prompting the sort of response that may foster the enhancement of our life. Throughout she is alone; even the relations she has with others are further affirmations of this and of her independence. But this kind of solitude is not that of the hermit: what has significance in her life, what gives her life meaning, necessarily refers to others. Her relations toward others are therefore not conceived in terms of what is useful (for her); instead they form the necessary background for her own self-overcoming, for her finding for herself an answer to the question of the meaning of life.

Education as a *process*, for Nietzsche, ultimately does not assist a self-overcoming individual to overcome hitherto accepted valuations. It can quite evidently not supply the task of overturning valuations that education itself comprises; it necessitates a movement away from the social ideal to an individual one, in favor of intrapersonal, intrasubjective, and individual values. Such a self-overcoming requires something that education as normally understood ultimately cannot provide "a moment-to-moment, hour-to-hour, day-to-day self-realization of one's strengths and weaknesses, together with a profound ability to suffer well" (Johnston 1998, p. 77). This kind of individual cannot be disseminated but rather must be self-taught. This is the reason why it is not correct to attribute to Nietzsche the ideal of an aristocratic education for a few rare individuals. The mission of all education in the end is that it should pass into (what is perhaps not best expressed by the concept of) "self-education." Though education holds an important function for the masses (passing on acceptable values from one generation to the next), for the self-overcoming individual this kind of education too has to be overcome. In the end one must be able to distance oneself from the means of one's education, even, as Schacht argues "... if we must initially be seduced and induced to engage with it and take it seriously enough to be affected by it" (1998, p. 330). As one finds in the connotation of the German word *Erziehung*, the object of this education is to "draw us out" and up toward becoming what we are, thus providing us with a way of facing and coming to terms with the terror and horror of existence.

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On the Logical Form of Educational Philosophy and Theory: Herbart, Mill, Frankena, and Beyond

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Synonyms

Logic of normative theory; Normative philosophy of education; Philosophy of social science; Practical reasoning

Introduction

The investigation into logical form and structure of natural sciences and mathematics covers a significant part of contemporary philosophy. In contrast to this, the metatheory of normative theories is a slowly developing research area in spite of its great predecessors, such as Aristotle, who discovered the sui generis character of practical logic, or Hume, who posed the “is-ought” problem. The intrinsic reason for this situation lies in the complex nature of practical logic. The metatheory of normative educational philosophy and theory inherits all the difficulties inherent in the general

metatheory but has also significantly contributed to its advancement. In particular, the discussion on its mixed normative-descriptive character and complex composition has remained an important part of research in educational philosophy and theory. The two points seem to be indisputable. First, the content of educational philosophy and theory is a complex one, connecting different disciplines. Second, these disciplines are integrated within the logical form of practical inference or means-end reasoning. On the other hand, the character of consequence relation in this field, although generally recognized as specific, represents an unresolved problem, a solution of which requires a sophisticated logical theory and promises to influence the self-understanding of educational philosophy and theory.

Kant, Herbart, and Mill: From a Noble Ideal to an Art

Immanuel Kant (1724–1804), who occasionally taught the course on pedagogy at the University of Königsberg, in total four times after receiving his professorship, envisaged the theory of education as a most desirable but difficult aim.

An outline of a theory of education is a noble ideal, and it does no harm if we are not immediately in a position to realize it. One must be careful not to consider the idea to be chimerical and disparage it as a beautiful dream, simply because in its execution hindrances occur. (Kant 2007, p. 440)

In 1809, Johan Friedrich Herbart (1776–1841) was elected to the chair of logic and metaphysics, formerly held by Kant. Herbart outlined the form and content for the “noble ideal” of educational science:

Pedagogics as a science is based on ethics and psychology. The former points out the goal of education; the latter the way, the means, and the obstacles. (Herbart 1901, p. 2)

The quotation shows that educational theory is formed by the disciplinary integration, not disciplinary differentiation. Although in Herbart's works no explicit analysis of the logical form of the science of education had been given, several important aspects of it became clearly visible.

Firstly, the science of education (SE) is a logical consequence of ethics (E) and psychology (P). Secondly, the consequence relation connects normative or “ought to-be/ought to-do” statements (goals) and factual or “is” statements (ways, means, obstacles), as premises, with a normative statement in the role of conclusion. Thirdly, this connection is instrumental.

The exact content of the Herbartian science of education remains underdetermined since it can be conceived in different ways. If taken in the wide sense, the science of education (SE_W) encompasses both ethics and psychology, together with their logical consequences: $SE_W = Cn(EUP)$ where $Cn(X)$ is the set of all and only those sentences that are logically implied by the set X . The set $X \cup Y$ is composed of all and only those sentences that belong to the set X or the set Y ; the set $X - Y$ has all and only those sentences that belong to the set X but not to the set Y . If understood in the narrow sense, the science of education (SE_N) includes only the proper educational content: $SE_N = SE_W - (Cn(E) \cup Cn(P))$. If conceived in the intermediate sense, the science of education (SE_M) comprises, in addition to proper educational content, only those parts of ethics and psychology that are logically relevant, i.e., required for obtaining an educational conclusion: $SE_M = SE_N \cup \{p: p \in (EUP) \text{ and there is a } q \text{ such that } q \in SE_N \text{ and } q \notin Cn((EUP) - \{p\})\}$.

John Stuart Mill (1806–1873) differentiates science from art: the former consists of assertions on matters of fact, while the latter gives precept and is thus characterized by the prevalence of imperative mood (J. S. Mill 1858, p. 588). Education is an art and, as such, inherits its logical form.

The art proposes to itself an end to be attained, defines the end, and hands it over to the science. The science receives it, considers it as a phenomenon or effect to be studied, and having investigated its causes and conditions, sends it back to art with a theorem of the combination of circumstances by which it could be produced. Art then examines these combinations of circumstances, and according as any of them are or are not in human power, pronounces the end attainable or not. The only one of the premises, therefore, which Art supplies, is the original major premise, which asserts that the attainment of the given end is desirable. Science then lends to Art the proposition (obtained

by a series of inductions or of deductions) that the performance of certain actions will attain the end. From these premises Art concludes that the performance of these actions is desirable, and finding it also practicable, converts the theorem into a rule or precept. (J. S. Mill 1858: Book VI, Ch. XI, p. 589)

In Mill's account, art is identified with means-end reasoning, in a way which closely resembles Aristotle's description of deliberation (*bouleusis*) in *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1112b. Mill's concept of art and Hebart's concept of the science of education agree in view of instrumental connection between the conclusion and the “major premise” but diverge in regard to the source of normative force. According to Mill, any art, including education, supplies the goal by itself, while, according to Herbart, the goal of education is borrowed from ethics. The science of education in Mill's sense is a normative theory or art (SE_A) which has two distinguishable parts: educational goal(s) (G) and logical consequences following from educational goal(s) conjoined with a relevant descriptive science (S). The problem of exact determination of theoretical content is left unresolved, like in Herbart; a plausible interpretation may be that Mill conceives education in a narrow sense, i.e., excluding the descriptive science: $SE_A = Cn(GUS) - Cn(S)$.


Frankena, Brezinka, and Suppes: Philosophical and Practical Unity Versus Openness

Aristotle's distinction between theoretical and practical reasoning (the first one leading to the formation of a new belief and the second to a new desire or intention) was reactualized in the twentieth century, and the research into practical syllogism (more accurately, practical inference for it need not have exactly two premises) has been under way since 1950s. Elizabeth Anscombe (1919–2001) deemed it as one of Aristotle's best discoveries, but the one whose true character has been obscured. Georg Henrik von Wright (1916–2003) went even further in recognition of its theoretical value and assigned to practical inference a dominant position in the methodology

On the Logical Form of Educational Philosophy and Theory: Herbart, Mill, Frankena, and Beyond,
Table 1 A semiformal example of practical polysyllogism

(P1) Value V ought to be the case.	(P2) Disposition D is a necessary condition for value V.
(C1)=(P3) Therefore, disposition D ought to be the case.	(P4) Action A is a sufficient condition for D.
(C2) Therefore, action A ought to be done.	

On the Logical Form of Educational Philosophy and Theory: Herbart, Mill, Frankena, and Beyond, Fig. 1 A modified depiction of the Frankena’s model. A node lying immediately below heads of arrows is a joint consequence of nodes above tails of arrows. The dotted line connects premises. The two parts in the minimal structure have been termed here as “educational philosophy” and “educational theory”



of social sciences and humanities as the source of their methodological autonomy.

Practical reasoning is of great importance to the explanation and understanding of action. (...) the practical syllogism provides the sciences of man with something long missing from their methodology: an explanation model in its own right which is a definite alternative to the subsumption-theoretic covering law model. Broadly speaking, what the subsumption-theoretic model is to causal explanation and explanation in the natural sciences, the practical syllogism is to teleological explanation and explanation in history and the social sciences (von Wright 1971, p. 27).

Practical inference plays a pivotal role both in normative theories and in descriptive sciences of man. It was in the context of revived interest in practical inference that William (Wiebe Klaas) Frankena (1908–1994) reopened the discussion on the logical form of normative philosophy of


education. According to Frankena (1965), its minimal logical structure is given by a chain of two practical syllogisms, i.e., by a practical polysyllogism; an example is given in Table 1. Although Frankena (1965), p. 9 refers to Mill as the source of his inspiration, his “two-tier model” presents a reconciliatory synthesis of Herbart’s and Mill’s account. Frankena, unlike Mill, does not take the goal as self-imposed by the art of education but, like Herbart, as derived from wider theoretical context in which ethical considerations provide the normative source. A diagrammatic representation of the Frankena model is given in Fig. 1.

The “complete normative philosophy of education” (PE), as Frankena called it, covers normative educational philosophy (EP) and educational theory (ET). Its logical form is given by the formula $PE = EP \cup ET$, which can be further analyzed.

Educational philosophy is the consequence of basic value statements or goals (V) and scientific nomological statements (S): $EP = Cn(V \cup S)$. The reduction of educational philosophy to only those consequences that do not belong to initial sets gives the set $(EP|D)$ of normative statements on valuable dispositions, $EP|D = Cn(V \cup S) - (Cn(V) \cup Cn(S))$. Educational theory uses the reduced educational philosophy $(EP|D)$ and couples it with relevant scientific nomological statements (S^*) in order to deduce statements about valuable instrumental actions (precepts, in Mill's terminology), $ET = Cn(EP|D \cup S^*)$. It is an interesting fact that Frankena takes educational theory to be determined not by three but by four sets: the set of basic value statements, the set corresponding to the reduced educational philosophy, and the two sets of relevant scientific statements. Therefore, he does not presuppose that the practical consequence (Cn) is a strongly transitive relation allowing for the removal of intermediate conclusions, i.e., the relation where $Cn(Cn(X) \cup Y) = Cn(X \cup Y)$ holds. If the consequence relation were transitive, then a complete philosophy of education would be determined by the set of value statements and the two sets of nomological statements, i.e., then $PE = Cn(Cn(V \cup S) \cup S^*) = Cn(V \cup S \cup S^*)$ would hold.

The science of education takes different forms depending on their presupposed philosophical background. There have been, inter alia, hermeneutical, critical, and empirical theoretical orientations. According to Habermas (1972), p. 308, this is not a pluralism of competing theories but of knowledge types, exemplified by empirical-analytic, historical-hermeneutic, and critically oriented sciences, constituted by the three types of cognitive interests: technical, practical, and emancipatory.

For Wolfgang Brezinka (born 1928), a representative of the empirical orientation, it is only descriptive use of language that is permitted in the science of education. The prescriptive use of language characterizes normative philosophy of education and practical pedagogics, both of which consist of "mixed normative-descriptive" statements. Frankena's concept of a "complete normative philosophy of education" results in a huge theory, the one reminiscent of Dewey's



On the Logical Form of Educational Philosophy and Theory: Herbart, Mill, Frankena, and Beyond, Fig. 2 In Brezinka's view, a practical pedagogics (PP) is a consequence of a normative philosophy of education (NP) and science of education (SE), but without a complete theoretical unification; (PP) is a proper subset of $Cn(NP \cup SE)$ but not identical to it: $PP \subset Cn(NP \cup SE)$

identification of philosophy with general theory of education.

If we are willing to conceive education as the process of forming fundamental dispositions, intellectual and emotional, toward nature and fellow men, philosophy may even be defined as *the general theory of education*. (Dewey 2001, p. 316).

In contrast to Frankena's all-encompassing view on the philosophy of education, in Brezinka's fragmented, three-partite composition of educational knowledge, it is neither philosophy nor science but only educational practice that can act as an integrative force (cf. Fig. 2).

To the extent that an epistemologically justified synthesis of actual knowledge and normative demands is sought, this can only be achieved in practical pedagogics. Practical pedagogics, however, cannot be said to be a unified theoretical system of pedagogical knowledge, but can rather be viewed as a praxis-oriented selection of existing theoretical knowledge on the one hand and possible valuations and norms on the other. (Brezinka 1992, pp. 243–244)

Patrick Suppes (1922–2014) points out the existence of conflicting normative principles. For example, the "antinomy of method" (Suppes 1971, p. 286) is an inconsistency of principles, one of which requires the maximization of learning and problem-solving techniques, while the other demands the maximization of content. The discovery of jointly unsatisfiable normative

principles is the major task of analytical philosophy of education.

An examination of inconsistencies [in implicit principles] can be, I believe, one of the more fruitful avenues of progress in the philosophy of education. Consistency of principles is a necessary condition that almost all men accept. It can be imposed and exploited without further analysis of the epistemological status of the principles. The close articulation of principles in the philosophy of education can have the kind of beneficial effects found in other philosophical endeavors, ranging from the foundations of mathematics to contemporary formulations of decision theory and normative economies. (Suppes 1971, p. 285.)

Suppes's discussion of antinomies reveals that a conclusion arrived at by a piece of practical reasoning can be defeated by adding a normative premise. This fact sheds doubt on the claim that the conclusion corresponds to a stronger type of normative judgment like a directive, precept, recommendation, instruction, advice, etc. Typically, the conclusion of a practical inference is a weak suggestion (Žarnić 1999).

Practical Consequence Relation: An Open Question

The content of action-oriented educational philosophy and theory is of "mixed normative-descriptive" type. This is not the only difference that divides them from empirical sciences. Another, equally prominent difference lies in the nature of consequence relation.

The properties of consequence relation were for the first time explicitly defined in 1930s by Alfred Tarski (1901–1983). The Tarskian consequence relation fits the language used in empirical sciences and mathematics. It is a relation between sets of sentences of a denumerable language and its "structural properties" are reflexivity, weak transitivity, monotony, compactness, and "explosiveness." It has been argued by a number of researchers that the consequence relation underlying the practical inference is not a Tarskian one. In particular, the non-monotonic character of practical consequence relation (the defeasibility of conclusion by premise addition) has been widely

acknowledged and discussed in philosophical logic.

Instead of reporting on results achieved, let us turn toward an open question of the non-transitivity. Consider Frankena's "two-tier model"! If the consequence relation is strongly transitive, then the complete normative philosophy of education is determined by the three sets: the set of basic values (V) and the two sets of scientific statements (S and S^*); the set of intermediate conclusions on valuable dispositions (cf. C_1 in Fig. 1) is superfluous and can be left out. Weak transitivity, $Cn(Cn(X)) = Cn(X)$, together with monotonicity, $Cn(X) \subseteq Cn(X \cup Y)$, implies strong transitivity, $Cn(Cn(X) \cup Y) = Cn(X \cup Y)$. In the shorthand notation, if the practical consequence (Cn) is not strongly transitive, then it is possible that $Cn(Cn(V \cup S) \cup S^*) \neq Cn(V \cup S \cup S^*)$. This possibility shows that different normative philosophies of education can be built upon the same basis; it also demonstrates, assuming that normative value is inherited from basic values, that the practical conclusion must be weaker in its normative force than the basic normative premise.

There are at least two reasons for claiming non-transitivity of the consequence relation in the normative context. Texts from the normative philosophy of education usually display enthymematic arguments, and enthymematic consequence is not transitive. Nevertheless, enthymematic arguments can be expanded to their complete form where omitted premises are explicitly stated. Therefore, we must turn to another, irremediable property to account for non-transitivity.

In its typical form, action-oriented practical inference consists of three sentences: the "major premise" stating which disposition ought to be cultivated, the "minor premise" about a kind of causal relation between a type of action and the disposition, and the conclusion stating which token of an action type ought to be performed or omitted. Causal relation is usually conceptualized in terms of sufficient and necessary conditions. Consider the minimal structure of a chained instrumental reasoning (such as the one in Table 1)! Firstly, a basic value is connected to a

valuable disposition via an assertion that the disposition is a precondition for the value realization. Secondly, the valuable disposition is connected to an action that ought to be done via an assertion that performance of the action is a precondition of attainment of the disposition. The transitivity of consequence relation will hold only if the two causal preconditions create a chain, but this need not be the case. For example, concatenation of a necessary condition for a value with a sufficient condition for a disposition does not yield a sufficient or a necessary condition for the value, and, so, the direct transmission of normative force from the value to an action will fail. Further research should reveal whether transitivity can be preserved against the background of a theory of causality that takes into account the nexus of the more fine-grained relations such as the relation of INUS condition (the concept has been introduced by John Leslie Mackie), which is an insufficient but necessary part of a condition which is itself unnecessary but sufficient for the result, or the relation of SUIN condition (introduced by James Mahoney et al.), which is a sufficient but unnecessary part of a factor that is insufficient but necessary for an outcome. For example, suppose the following hold: the communicative rationality is valuable; the self-reflection is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the flourishing of communicative rationality; the use of Socratic method is a sufficient but not a necessary condition for the development of self-reflection. The Socratic method would then stand in a weak condition relation to the communicative rationality, and this relation, resembling but not identical to the SUIN condition, might provide a channel of value inheritance from the communicative rationality to the Socratic method.

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On the Paradoxes of Nietzsche and Education: Perspectives

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As an aesthetic phenomenon existence is still *bearable* for us. . . art furnishes us with eyes and hands and above all the good conscience to be *able* to turn ourselves into such a phenomenon. (GS §107)

To speak of “Nietzsche and education” invokes an irreconcilable paradox: do we refer to what Friedrich Nietzsche “intended” to teach or “to

mean” or do we assess his pedagogical value on the basis of his “interpreters?” Nietzsche courts *contradiction* as an inescapable component of human nature, which attests both to his capacity for cosmic self-criticism and to his philosophical humility in the face of human finitude. In those moments when Nietzsche contemplates the world as an artwork – to be sure, an “all-embracing artwork” – he sees the universe and philosophy as an engagement, a collaboration that addresses – Ave Wagner! Ave Mozart! Ave Dante! – a *dramma giocoso*, a “Divine Comedy” (Hales and Welshon 2000, 10). The *literary-musical* analogy should be noted as particularly pertinent: if Nietzsche’s apperception of the universe remains predominantly *aesthetic*, in the manner of a conductor’s reading of a symphonic poem, will any particular realization prove “definitive?” Could any one “truth” emerge from the plethora of possible interpretations of a score, which proves an elusive “fable,” construction, or “architecture” of the human imagination as it encounters a world in perpetual, affective flux? One ought not ignore Nietzsche’s repeated self-assessment as an *ironist*, a philosopher whose capacity to exact at once the sublime seriousness and irrational absurdity of existence, so that a “final” accountability of his thought – and any interpreter’s having imbued that thought accurately – eludes “finality” by nature.

It might be argued that Nietzsche’s cosmology derives from an ontological, power-based perspective, particularly if we concentrate on the writings of his third or “synthetic” period. But such a claim does not belie Nietzsche’s consistent declaration, which we find in *Ecce Homo*, that his valuations derive from an *aesthetic* viewpoint, which, as pianist Edwin Fischer testifies, evolves from *great models*. For Nietzsche, the power of “models” beckons to a “nexus of influence” that embraces every aspect of the Romantic Era, an enormous fund of Imaginative fertility which systematically addresses – and attacks – the usual distinctions of “opposites.” Nietzsche “teaches” us, as had his intellectual and imaginative kindred – Schopenhauer, Goethe, Beethoven, Schumann, and Wagner – to embrace that Manichean sense of eternal dualism, between darkness

and light, matter and spirit, fact and fiction, and destruction and creation. Even “theory” and “practice” might serve this duality, for “in the beginning was the deed,” as Goethe tells us. Or as Wagner told Liszt in his letter of 20 July 1850, the “true artist is the performer. Whatever we may create as poets and composers, it expresses nothing more than a wish, not an ability; only the performance . . . reveals that *ability* – that art.” Nietzsche, in his persistent pursuit of mental “experimentation,” approaches the rationalist impulse with the same vigor that he had devoted to myth and humanism. But he retains his keen sense that while a scientist discovers a world, a poet creates one. World building, meaning building, and metaphysics once more regain their status as essential forms of recreation. Nietzsche never forgets the power of imagination, its capacity to reify being and to *transcend* it, at once, to “become what it is.”

Nietzsche may be said to attempt “a mythico-transcendental reflection perhaps unique to the history of philosophy” (Kofman 1993), which entails a sustained attack on traditional notions of ontology, epistemology, logic, causality, consciousness, science, knowledge, and truth. If ever a philosopher synthesizes virtually every rationalist and imaginative impulse in Western – and occasionally Eastern – thought, Nietzsche does. Never has Pontius Pilate’s eternal query from *John* 18:38 “What is Truth?” received such a bold, radical extension into man’s thinking world, his very attempt to fulfill the Delphic injunction: “know thyself.” While difficult to “reduce” Nietzsche’s philosophical energies to one mode or perspective, we might posit him as compelled by *axiology*. A persistent inquirer into value – and “the value of values” – concomitant with his exploration of the relation of man’s aesthetic-moral evolution to a higher pitch of knowledge and self-fulfillment, we then may claim that Nietzsche proposes to educate “the overhuman.” That the world and the value of the world remain a necessity, Nietzsche does not doubt, but who has *earned the right* to stipulate that value he questions most severely and rigorously, and the resultant expression of that value must, for Nietzsche, entail a proposition – an

interpretation – that asserts the bond or relation between aesthetic judgment and moral obligation.

What then, does Nietzsche purport to teach: what constitutes his “educational” curriculum? Nietzsche gathers from his reading of the pre-Socratic Heraclitus that reality remains protean, an ambiguous flux comprehensible only as an indeterminate world of ever-shifting, *agonistic* relationships between dynamic, often competitive, forces: “Thus the dark Heraclitus compares the world-building force to a playing child that places stones here and there and builds sand hills only to overthrow them again” (Nietzsche 1962, p. 142).

When men demand that reason alone can make reality intelligible, they encounter an impasse: the change, becoming, and mutation of the empirical world – and thus, the basis of science – fail to conform to the ontological demands or dictates of systematic thought, a desire for an orderly and *fixed* world of being. The urge or impulse to “system” and orderliness, as required by reason, Nietzsche avers, evolves merely as a *utilitarian* value, its efficacy in aiding in the accomplishment of desired goals, a “will” to an exertion of power:

A morality, a mode of living, tried and *proved* by long experience and testing, at length enters consciousness as a law, as *dominating* — And therewith the entire group of related values and states enters into it: it becomes venerable, unassailable, holy, true; it is part of its development that its origin should be forgotten — That is a sign [that] it has become master — Exactly the same thing could have happened with the categories of reason: they could have prevailed after much grouping and fumbling through their relative utility — There came a point when one collected them together, raised them to consciousness as a whole — and when one commanded them, i.e., when they had the effect of a command — From then on, they counted as *a priori*, as beyond experience, as irrefutable. (Nietzsche 1968a, WP §514)

The analogy to and from Heraclitus transfers the *ontological* conflict of value – between impermanent reality and a need for reliable, certain fixity – to a *psychological* reaction: man must *anthropomorphize* or reify being so as to predict, codify, and control it. The world of metaphor thus suits man’s “interpretative” purposes. Once more, we intuit Nietzsche’s veneration of Goethe, whose

own biography declared an indivisible bond of *Dichtung und Wahrheit*, Truth and Poetry. Nietzsche would appear to have taken as his “textual” reading of experience the grandiose claim of Goethe at the conclusion of Part Two of *Faust*: “*Alles Vergängliche ist nur ein Gleichnis.*” All that passes away is only a symbol, a *simile*. Few entities could be more ephemeral, more transitory than a “drive,” an “impulse;” and for Nietzsche “thinking itself is merely a relation of [such] drives to each other” (Nietzsche 1989, §36). Nietzsche must assess the *value of thought*, terribly, even tragically, aware that his perspective, too, must pass away.

Since the world in and of itself does not require *justification*: its “truth,” if any, lies in its immanence, its infinite, ongoing possibility. To attempt to make statements about the world, to posit “interpretations” of the world’s *facticity*, would demand the role assigned to the philosopher – or Nietzsche’s philologist – to explore the genealogy of the declaration, or proposition, of any hypothesis on the nature of being and its claim to “truth.” Nietzsche will declare those who do demand existence *justify* itself to be decadent, ascetics who fear the ascendancy of becoming and wish to establish a fixed reality on a par with Plato’s *Forms* or Kant’s *noumenon*. Life remains infinite and open to an infinite number of hypotheses or “experiments” in character. The hard truth, the “ugly” truth – in defiance of the John Keats equation that “Beauty is truth, truth beauty” – remains the absence of truth, a living, enduring *uncertainty* that itself demands a “tragic courage” of the seeker of truth, a strength of will and personality that Nietzsche calls *Redlichkeit*, integrity. Armed with the moral courage to face an ambiguous reality, the superman may declare *Amor fati!* to life, a *positive evaluation* that affirms and beautifies the necessity of existence in all of its apparent contradictions:

In so far as the word “knowledge” has any meaning, the world is knowable, but it is *interpretable*; otherwise, it has no meaning behind it, but countless meanings. (Nietzsche 1968a, WP §481)

Science itself, contends Nietzsche, harbors a desire to transcend the secular limits of empirical

observation. By asserting the primacy and definitive character of *truth*, science betrays its moral failings, its essentially *ascetic* priority, impoverished by its reliance on a mechanistic view of the world:

Do we really want to permit existence to be degraded for us like this — reduced to a mere exercise for a calculator and an indoor diversion for mathematicians? Above all, one should not wish to divest existence of its rich *ambiguity*: that is a dictate of good taste, gentlemen, the taste of reverence of everything that lies beyond your horizon . . . an interpretation that permits counting, calculating, weighing, seeing, and touching, and nothing more — that is a crudity and naivete, assuming that it is not a mental illness, an idiocy. (Nietzsche 1974, GS §373)

Ever skeptical of ossified, complacent ideas, Nietzsche investigates the bases of what has passed for knowledge, the various philosophical canons of rationality, logic, and truth. “Logic,” asserts (1968a, p. 512), “does not spring from a will to truth”. In his attack on “rational thought,” Nietzsche categorizes the impulse to reason as “an interpretation of a scheme that we cannot throw off” (1968a, p. 522). Reason expresses “the will to be master over the multiplicity of sensations” (1968a, p. 317) that invest our lives. Nietzsche, following David Hume, questions our notions of causality as the basis for “legitimate” experience. Causation, for Nietzsche, will “reduce” to a species of psychological habit:

The question “why” is always a question after the *causis finalis*, after the “what for?” We no “sense for the *causa efficiens*.” here Hume was right; habit (but not only that of the individual!) makes us expect that a certain often-observed occurrence will follow another: nothing more! (Nietzsche 1968a, WP §550)

But Nietzsche goes further than Hume, exploding the very notions of “deeds” and “objects” conditioned by “will” and “intention.” In *Twilight of the Idols*, Nietzsche identifies as one of the “four great errors” our tendency to connect an event, a deed with a doer.

We had made a nice misuse of that ‘empiricism;’ we had created the world on the basis of it as a world of causes, as a world of will, as a world of spirit. The oldest and longest-lived psychology was at work here — indeed it has done nothing else: every

event was to it an action, every action the effect of a will, the world became for it a multiplicity of agents, an agent (‘subject’) foisted upon itself upon every event. (Nietzsche 1968b).

Objects, for Nietzsche, become constitutionally perspectival, according to their functional utility. “Knowers” have a vested *interest* in what they perceive: they build up and organize the objects of their knowledge. Debunking Kant’s notion that objects are transcendently conditioned, Nietzsche posits that knowledge must be regarded only in an “anthropocentric and biological sense” (1968a, p. 480). Given the nature and limits of human finitude, with its lack of omniscience and of Kantian things in themselves, man remains compelled to reify the nature of those objects required by a human perspective, for human needs and aspirations. That empirical objects assume a “fictional,” subjective – even “mythical” – identity becomes inevitable. Human knowledge, predicated on our ability to express it – that is, reliant on the conventions of language – results from a successful imposition of concepts and utilitarian conventions upon segments of reality (Hales and Welshon 2000, 76). Ergo, a logical perspective, need not capture an alethic perspective. With his patented cynical aplomb, Nietzsche suggests in *Twilight of the Idols* that “logic and rationality are merely necessary for thinking, and that life might be possible without them” (Nietzsche 1968b).

So far as logic, rationality, and science depend upon and are constituted by the syntax and semantics of formal language and its relationship to ontological verification, Nietzsche remains a radical skeptic. “One and the same text permits innumerable interpretations – there is no ‘correct’ interpretation” (Nietzsche in Bertram 2009, p. 98). Even more, Nietzsche postulates that *error* remains an inevitable component of truth, a necessary constituent for life itself, so that the active species might endure, thrive, and master its environment:

“Truth:” this according to my way of thinking, does not necessarily denote the antithesis of error, but in the most fundamental cases only the posture of various errors in relation to one another. (Nietzsche 1968a, p. 535)

Increasingly, as Nietzsche explores his radical, ontological perspective, he casts away “appearances” [*Erscheinungen*] and stipulates “appearance” [*Schein*] as a first precept of his epistemic, perspectival framework. If “fact” no longer satisfies the quester after knowledge, then illusion, “lies,” and *metaphor* – Goethe’s *simile*, which the great poet himself claimed as “unapproachable” and “irreducible” in the next few lines of his *Faust* – must serve as the basis of experience.

With this word [appearance] ...nothing is expressed other than the *inaccessibility* [of reality] to logical procedures and distinctions. . . I do not set appearance in opposition to reality, but on the contrary I take appearance as reality which resists conversion into an imaginative ‘World of Truth.’ (GOA XIII 1896, 121)

Much in the tradition of Leibniz, Nietzsche must postulate new *monads*, or quanta of force, that resist further genealogical causation. The prime mover in Nietzsche’s new ontological perspective shall be *will to power*, which becomes a veritable Proteus for Nietzsche, both a normative and descriptive valuation, providing the basis of action, especially of *meaningful* action – Hamlet’s very dilemma, as posited in *The Birth of Tragedy*, §7 – following Goethe’s “In the beginning was the Deed.” Dawn announces the burgeoning of a new intellectual conscience – a new integrity [*Redlichkeit*] – whose spiritual disposition demands a *passion* for knowledge. The new knowledge rejects the traditional distinctions, such as subject and object, declaring “there is no causality, no correctness, and no expression; there is, at most, an *aesthetic* relation: I mean a suggestive transference into a completely foreign tongue” (Nietzsche 1979a, p. 86). This “foreign tongue” of reified being will, perforce, assume an *aesthetic* character, analogous to a conductor’s *knowledge* of a musical composition that embraces a synoptic – what musician’s would call “agogic” – apperception of the myriad forces that constitutes the music at hand, to be “realized” as palpable, empirical sound from a written “text,” the printed score. The music “appears” before the musicians but only as a potential entity that must be “willed” into experience *for that moment*, i.e., its interpretation:

[*Schein*] itself belongs to reality: it is a form of its being; i.e., in a world where there is no being, a certain calculable world of identical cases must first be created through appearance: a *tempo* [*italics mine*] at which observation and comparison are possible, etc. Appearance is an arranged and simplified world, at which our practical instincts have been at work; it is perfectly true for us; that is to say, we live, we are able to live in it: proof of its truth for us — (Nietzsche 1968a, §568)

Consonant with an aesthetic, musical will to power, the test of knowledge, the “litmus” of comprehension lies in one’s *tempo of knowledge* and the *tempo of one’s style* in communicating that “joyful wisdom” (Lemco 1992, pp. 91–103). Bruno Walter (1886–1962), a conductor and Wagner acolyte himself, provides us Wagner’s *own definition* of the relation between tempo and musical knowledge, which Nietzsche assumes as a matter of course:

...the question of a tone-work’s right performance in a word...is this: Has [the conductor] given throughout the proper *tempo*? For his choice and dictation of that tells us at once whether he has understood the piece or not...only through a knowledge of the correct rendering, in every respect, can that proper tempo itself be found. Seeing, however, that in the course of a piece of music its content, mood, and technical requirements change incessantly, the tempo has to be adapted to remain always *right*... The right delivery, which is to be made feasible by the choice of the right tempo, demands a feasible continuity of tempo — let us call it ‘apparent continuity.’ (Walter 1961, pp. 29–31)

So, music captures the Heraclitean essence of ontological, *reified flux*: a powerful musician, by nature, has assimilated and absorbed the mechanics, the syntax, and means of his craft; his response has become “automatic,” or *pre-conscious*, according a phenomenological perspective on his art. His knowledge, as such, has become a *bodily* phenomenon, especially as Nietzsche tends to denigrate “consciousness” as an *epiphenomenon* (Hales and Welshon 2000, pp. 130–156). At times, Nietzsche indicates a kind of “somatic” will to power at work, working in tandem with a musician’s “ideas” of a piece of music – so that “freedom” and “necessity” merge indistinguishably – which literally *dictate* the nature of art, music, and dance. But we must recall

that each performance, each interpretation, and each “experimental realization” remain entirely *provisional* and perspectival in nature, existing in and for the moment and passing away, aware that any number of variations and options remained and remain possible.

When we finally consider Nietzsche’s attempt to impose a *hierarchy* of values – given that “man is the creature that measures values. . .the ‘valuating animal as such’ (1968c, II, p. 8) – we may wonder if Nietzsche has not had recourse to an *objective criterion* of truth, in violation of his own perspective, when he posits the *higher man* as the *telos* of humanity’s development, an extension of the “artist, philosopher, and saint” whom he lauds in his *Untimely Meditation on The Use and Abuse of History*. As Zarathustra proclaims, “Man is something that shall be overcome.” Even in *The Dawn*, there appear those remarks suggesting that “the venerable art of philology . . . that achieves a *lento*. . . teaches us to read *well* . . . slowly, deeply, cautiously” (Nietzsche 1982, §v) in its quest for a rigorous, unbiased interpretation. In spite of his skepticism of academic pedagogy, Nietzsche asserts that “schooling has no more important role than to teach rigorous thinking, careful judgment, logical conclusions” (Nietzsche 1986, §265). But if the teacher, philologist, and the philosopher themselves remain prone to error and exist merely as the sum of their perspectives, who then may assert “truths,” if all claim to absolute value, including God and doctrines, merely exhibits mendacity in their assertion of a “final” or “definitive” meaning? Nietzsche’s answer lies in a series of *ad hominem* arguments: those individuals who affirm life, who enhance and organize experience in the service of life’s *totality* and so retain their intellectual moral conscience, have gained the right to will according to their subjective lights. The “worthiness” of such an individual derives from “the strength of a spirit [measured by] how much of the truth one could . . . endure” (1968d, p. 39). Nietzsche bestows the title *Dionysos* on such a spirit, he who “fixes” man and creation within an orbit of *artistic* meaning, however ephemeral, for which he takes, as certified by Nikos Kazantzakis – full *moral* responsibility.

What had this prophet (Nietzsche) done? What did he tell us, above all, to do? He told us to deny all consolations – gods, fatherlands, moralities, and truths – and, remaining apart and companionless, using nothing but our own strength, to begin to fashion a world that would not shame our hearts. Which is the most dangerous way? That is the one I want! Where is the abyss? That is where I am headed. What is the most valiant joy? To assume complete responsibility (Kazantzakis 1966, p. 329)!

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Ontological Issues in Educational Administration: The Ontological Status of Educational Organizations

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Introduction

This entry aims to elucidate some of the ontological assumptions, questions, and debates that have emerged in the field of education and, more

specifically, educational administration. Ontology, in its most basic formulation, has been defined as the study of “being,” namely, the nature, constitution, and manifestation of reality. This entry examines one salient example of this type of inquiry in the field of educational administration: the question about the ontological status of educational organizations.

From its very beginnings, educational administration, as a field of study, has been concerned with questions about “being,” particularly regarding the nature and constitution of “reality” in educational organizations. Oplatka (2009) indicated that while theoretical tensions, conversations, and debates in the literature are diverse, they are necessary in order to critically interrogate the questions, problems, areas, and objects of study of researchers and practitioners alike. “Theories offered tentative explanations of reality that helped administrators grasp the order and regularities of social behavior in organizations, gaining insights informed by theoretical knowledge, and changing the reality adequately” (Oplatka 2009, p. 21).

One reason to theorize about the nature of the social world relates to the explanatory capacity of the theoretical constructs used by researchers and practitioners alike. When we talk about influences, causes, effects, and other relations between phenomena in the world, we are making assertions about how things come to exist, the nature of their properties, and how they relate to each other. While philosophers generally see the notion of “existence” as primitive, that is, as a precondition to ascribe properties, there is much disagreement about what actually “exists.” Most philosophers would agree that the proposition “something exists” is true. Where they would disagree is on what “something” refers to.

Explaining, describing, and including entities in a theory about the world requires some form of “ontological commitment,” which is the adoption of a discourse or conceptualization about the type of entities that exist in the world. An ontological commitment is fundamental for theorists in the natural and social sciences, that is, a theory must be committed to the entities that would be required for its affirmations to be true. An

examination of the theory's assumptions about reality would offer key insights about the theory's capacity to explain and describe phenomena in a given disciplinary field. Ontological commitments vary across theoretical perspectives in the natural and social sciences, and in particular, they differ across theoretical approaches to educational administration. In this entry, we will not attempt a thorough description or inventory of these approaches. Instead, we make use of a commonly accepted taxonomy of ontological perspectives to exemplify how theorists in educational administration have considered the question about reality.

Traditional accounts of the ontological debate established a distinction between nominalism and realism. The doctrine according to which abstract objects exist independent of human meaning, action, and intention is known as "realism." Plato is perhaps the most notable historical example. In his theory of forms, Plato argued that the particulars we enter in contact with through experience are nothing but imperfect exemplars of ideal types that must be real in order to guarantee the continuity and permanence of our experience.

Nominalism is the doctrine according to which abstract concepts or terms do not refer to real entities or, in other words, abstract entities do not exist, only particulars. For instance, while nominalists believe that persons are real, they would deny that there is such a thing as "social class." For nominalism, abstract nouns are only names that refer to characteristics attributed to individuals; they do not denote existing entities. Weber argued that functional and organismic notions used to describe organizations were just metaphors or idealizations used to make sense of the individuals' institutional behavior.

An influential contemporary approach to the constitution of social reality is known as "constructionism." In this view, both our scientific and everyday understandings of reality are produced and maintained through symbolic interactions between social actors. In their view, different categories of meaning related to the nature and constitution of the "real" have been developed historically through processes of meaning negotiation. The constructed significations about the world are "institutional" in the sense that they are

considered "givens" about the world. In their view, the notion of "objective reality" is a convention that provides the background for social practices. This conventionalist account of social reality relies on the notion of "institutional facts," that is, socially structured practices and objects that contribute to the enactment of social life. For conventionalism, reality is created through intersubjective interactions between social actors.

More recently, the term "anti-realism" has been adopted by philosophers to indicate a position according to which there is no "fact of the matter" that would allow us to decide between competing ontological frameworks. This perspective may lead to varieties of ontological relativism that contend that ontological commitments depend on the context created by discourses and social relations. While ontological constructionism has gained widespread acceptance among academic communities in the social sciences and, as we will see, in the study of educational administration, some criticisms that have been presented in recent times by realists propose a nonrelativistic account of reality that would serve as the foundation of scientific explanation and truth.

Constructionist perspectives about the social world could include "realist" elements. In their view, while the concepts of "race" or "gender" are constructed through historical processes of meaning negotiation, their effects on social actors are "real" in the sense that they create identities, affect social relations and structures, and inform social action. In the following section, we discuss and situate these ideas in the context of the question about the ontological status of educational organizations.

The Ontological Status of Educational Organizations

The distinction among realist, nominalist, and constructivist ontological commitments would provide the backstage to discuss different understandings of organizations in the literature. Realist models situate organizational transformation within the structure; thus, roles, hierarchies, and processes become the focus of the analysis. In contrast, nominalist approaches situate

organizational change in the actors, their beliefs, or the discourses they use to describe the organization. Research in this area tends to emphasize the role of sense making, cognition, and/or subjectivity in the construction of organizational reality. Constructivist approaches tend to present organizational reality as a symbolic product of intersubjective interactions.

Realist Approaches to Educational Organizations

Early realist approaches to the study of educational organizations were interested in establishing a clear separation between actors and structures. By focusing on the structure of the system, these embryonic realist ontologies aimed to analyze the system's functioning and assign causal efficacy to its components. Gunter (2005) noted that these "instrumentalist" approaches to educational organizations tended to portray schools and other institutions as real mechanisms that have causal effects and power. In realist-instrumentalist models, educational organizations exist independently of the actions and practices of school actors. One example of this realist perspective could be seen in the "theory movement" in educational administration. The theory movement adopted the ideas of positivism and applied them to the study of educational organizations; it portrayed organizations as systems that process information, respond, and adapt to their environments. Research from this perspective aims to understand the flow of information, the preservation and change of the organizational structure, and the study of the adaptation of people to the organizational goals.

Recently, Blackmore (2013) has noted that concurrent with the rise of the School Effectiveness and Improvement (SEI) movement, schools have become subject to intense accountability regimes that aim to measure and predict educational outcomes. In order to accomplish this goal, schools have been reified in the policy and academic discourses, where they are portrayed as "learning organizations," that could be measured, controlled, and transformed, to become more efficient and effective. In this model, schools are

thinking adaptive systems that learn and, as such, could be treated as entities on their own.

Hartley (2010) argued that these forms of organizational realism correspond to the functionalist paradigm in the social sciences, that is, an approach that assumes general stability and objectivity of the social world, as well as the foundational role of the natural sciences in the measurement and prediction of social action. The outcomes of organizational realism have been manifested in several forms in the literature on educational administration, from the early studies by the theory movement to more contemporary approaches to school effectiveness and improvement.

An alternative to the conventional instrumentalist and functionalist approaches to realism could be seen in critical realism. Mueller (2015) argued that critical realism offers an alternative to the dichotomies of realism/nominalism. In her view, there are three principles that distinguish this approach from traditional realist accounts: first, its ontological account of objectivity as an *a priori* existence, a logical and material precondition to social phenomena; second, the acceptance of the idea that social reality (e.g., educational organizations) is socially constructed along with the idea that social reality precedes, in an objective sense, human action and experience (this could be evidenced when social actors are introduced to organizations and social institutions that historically precede them, such as schools); third, the belief in the existence of unobservable causal mechanisms that account, in a logical and material sense, for the regularities observed in the social world.

Nominalist Approaches to Educational Organizations

Nominalist approaches would emphasize the discursive or subjective character of educational organizations. As noted above, notable scholarship in the field of educational administration has given primacy to the study of meaning, action, and intention in the constitution of organizational realities. From these perspectives, human intention and action are essential constituents of organizational goals. This means that the interweaving

of meanings generate organizational realities, not as independent entities but as abstractions that nonetheless guide and frame the actions of individuals. Gunter (2005) characterized approaches centered on the study of subjective experiences and narratives as “humanistic,” where “the perceived realities of doing the job, combined with how the tensions and dilemmas that are encountered and worked through in real time, can be revealed” (p. 96). Hartley (2010) argued that in these approaches, organizational action “is a construction, contingent upon time and place. It is negotiated, and therefore is open to asymmetries of power in its definition and in its expression” (p. 278). From this perspective, organizational realities are produced in action and cannot be understood in isolation from the lives and experiences of social actors. Authors in this area see action and intention as the unit of analysis, avoiding the reification of organizations as entities on their own. Nominalist views defend that the only way we can access organizational realities is through the actions, perceptions, meanings, and intentions of social actors.

Constructivist Approaches to Educational Organizations

In the process of investigating the connections between meaning and social action in the context of educational institutions, researchers have turned to discourse-oriented approaches as ways to capture the fluidity and complexity of organizational realities in education. In these approaches, reality is seen as text and discourse; the real is constructed in as an effect of power, ideology, and/or hegemony. Blackmore (2013) describes this positioning from a feminist perspective:

Feminist theorists see difference as socially constituted through organizational structures, processes and cultures and not just something individuals bring with them into organizations such as schools and universities. Feminists thus identify the historical processes and practices of the racialization and gendering of leadership. (p. 149)

In Blackmore’s view, organizational identities emerge in the intersection of hegemonic

discourses. Gender, race, ability, social class, and sexual identity are examples of these intersections. This suggests a view of organizations as dynamic and discursively constructed, not as static and permanent entities that exist with independence from human action, intention, and desire. Hartley (2010) noted that perspectives that consider emancipation and radical change, such as the one presented by Blackmore (2013), aim to reveal the oppressive character of power structures, emphasizing the relational character of practices and identities in education. By “relational,” these approaches mean that entities (identities, practices, objects, etc.) appear or emerge as a product of the interactions between discourses, structures, and actors. In the following passage, Blackmore (2013) highlights the way contemporary feminisms frame issues of ontology:

Feminist post-colonial perspectives of leadership argue that leadership is not only situated, but that the nature of knowledge and the ontological position of white-Western leadership are also contested [...]. Post-colonial research on leadership contextualizes leadership within wider relationships between education, economies and societies around issues of globalization, educational inequality, poverty and cross-cultural relations. (Blackmore 2013, p. 150)

Realism in Educational Administration Reboot

In recent educational scholarship, realist approaches to the study of educational institutions have emerged in two primary forms: (1) a large body of research and scholarship fueled by the evidence-based education movement or data-based decision-making approaches and (2) emerging theoretical works responding to a preponderance of nominalist approaches in educational research. Research of the first form tends to large-scale quantitative studies, effect size research, and systems for the establishing of quality criteria for educational research (e.g., the What Works Clearinghouse <http://ies.ed.gov/ncee/wwc/>). This type of work has been termed “naïve realism” or “instrumental realism” by critics (Eacott 2015). Scholarship of the other form is diverse;

however, it might be characterized as a variety of responses to the dominance of nominalism and constructivism in academic educational research and the dominance of instrumental realist research in the policy maker and practitioner communities. Some theorists have reasserted ontology as a central concern in the study of educational organizations. A variety of forms of realism and ontological examination are grounded in sociological analysis (Eacott 2015), cognitive science (Evers and Lakomski 2000; Riveros et al. 2012), and the philosophy of science (Evers and Lakomski 2012).

Returning to a central concern of ontology in education, some scholars have renewed interrogation into the ontological status of educational organizations. For example, in Colin Evers and Gabriele Lakomski's influential work, the ontological status of organizations receives attention through the lens of contemporary cognitive science and is argued to be ontologically real as a cognitive system – in the same way that an individual's cognitive system is ontologically real. Similarly, other scholars, in interrogating the growing popularity of leadership as a phenomenon, have argued for an ontological reorienting toward organizational analysis and situated practices (Newton and Riveros 2015). This work and the work of other scholars similarly engaged in a critique of leadership discourses in education promises to bring renewed emphasis on the ontological features of educational institutions and research in educational administration.

Cross-References

- ▶ [Field of Educational Administration and Its Coevolving Epistemologies](#)
- ▶ [Leadership Research and Practice: Competing Conceptions of Theory](#)
- ▶ [Sociological Approaches to Educational Administration](#)

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Ontology

- ▶ [Ontology and Semiotics: Educating in Values](#)
- ▶ [Phenomenology of Higher Education](#)

Ontology and Semiotics: Educating in Values

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Synonyms


[Consciousness](#); [Deleuze](#); [Dewey](#); [Human development](#); [Logic](#); [Moral education](#); [Ontology](#); [Peirce](#); [Semiosis](#); [Unconscious](#), [The](#); [Values](#)

Introduction

This entry brings together the philosophies of Charles S. Peirce, John Dewey, and Gilles Deleuze, crossing over the continental and pragmatic divide to demonstrate their analogous approach to the action of signs in the world. They conceived of philosophy as proto-science, *natural* philosophy; yet embedded in cultural life and human experiences. This relation between nature and culture, traversing the Cartesian schism, is a province of semiotics, the study of signs. Genuine signs have a triadic structure and conform to the a-signifying logic of included middle. Further, the article discusses reality according to Sir Roger Penrose (who is Professor Emeritus of Mathematics at the University of Oxford) positing it as having a semiotic structure where matter and spirit, body and mind are not dualistic categories but form one organic whole. Values which are traditionally inculcated in schools as abstract concepts acquire semiotic reality: Values are signs situated in life; as such they can be interpreted and created anew in the process of experiential learning. These signs partake of universal Platonic ideas at the level of the unconscious and virtual, rather than conscious, particular, and actual. The task of bringing them to consciousness, to construct a semiotic bridge between actual and virtual, is challenging, yet it is achieved by edusemiotics and elicits some important implications for moral education.

Peirce and Dewey as Precursors to Edusemiotics

Dewey's logic as a theory of pragmatic inquiry posits learning as a progressive capacity for intelligent revaluation of lived experience. Experience is rendered meaningful by means of multiple transactions between the knower and the known (or, rather, knowable). Knowledge is not reduced to fixed facts but is a dynamic process of constructing meanings embedded in life. Contrary to the spectator theory of knowledge grounded in Cartesian dualism, it is active participation encompassing the triad of the observer, the



Ontology and Semiotics: Educating in Values, Fig. 1 A genuine sign

observing, and the observed that ensures continuity traversing the presupposed binary opposites. In Dewey's educational philosophy, values are not indubitable and set in stone judgments but represent experiential and experimental outcomes of revaluation or reorganization of experience leading to "widening and deepening of conscious life – a more intense, disciplined, and expanding realization of meanings" (Dewey 1916/1924, p. 417).

The world of values, from the perspective of edusemiotics, is complementary to both subjective and objective worlds: They form the third world embedded in the ternary process~structure of semiosis. According to Peirce, semiosis is a relational process of the action and transformation of signs perfusing the universe as a whole. Values reside in the world outside of the individual consciousness of the Cartesian subject; they represent multiple potentialities that become actualities when we realize them in ethical action at the physical, material level. Genuine signs are triads (Fig. 1) by way of relation between a sign and its referent via an interpretant (Peirce's term); it is the chain of semiotic interpretants, in thought and action alike, that enables signs to become other signs in an evolutionary process that is irreducible to the biological evolution grounded in Darwinian natural selection.

Signs are patterns of coordinated relations, and interpretive activity necessarily leads to embodied knowledge. It is by means of interpretants as the included thirds between the otherwise opposite terms in a dyad that signs acquire their meanings and enrich human experience with value in

addition to conceptual understanding; this process affecting our habits of thinking and acting in the world. Peirce's triadic semiotics posits matter as effete mind, and mind has to be entrenched in habits so as to eventually congeal into matter with "inveterate habits becoming physical laws" (Peirce, CP 6.25). It is mind hidebound with incorrigible habits that may be called physical matter. As related to human experience, habits represent our unconscious dispositions to act in a certain manner under specific circumstances. The transformation of habits – both intellectual and moral, at the levels of intelligent thought and ethical action – is the aim of edusemiotics. By interpreting and thus reorganizing experience, human subjects acquire the opportunity to learn, develop, and grow in the manner of genuine signs.

As embedded in semiosis, logic can be conceived of in terms of an ethics of thinking which is inseparable from human action or ethics as the logic of doing (Deely 2001). Logic as semiotics is not a prerogative of human consciousness but represents *ratio* in praxis and in nature. A purely cognitive (conscious) process is enriched with an affective, bodily (unconscious) dimension and makes learning from experience a function of a coordinated relation between the unconscious and consciousness (cf. Dewey 1991). The libidinal economy of the unconscious represents a significant factor that influences human development. Edusemiotics posits holistic education and affirms the relational dynamics between all dualisms: nature and culture, body and mind, consciousness and the unconscious, public and private, cognition and affect, etc.

The edusemiotic approach to moral reasoning, an embodied reason capable of entering the background of implicit meanings and values "hiding" in the unconscious, leads to a model grounded in Peirce's logical category of abduction that borders on an uneducated – read: as yet unconscious of itself – guess. Psychologically, abductive inference functions as insight, intuition, or imagination; yet it exceeds *direct* Cartesian intuition and represents a paradoxical mediated immediacy as all cognition is mediated by signs. Abduction is colored by feelings and emotions. It expresses multiple ontological possibilities that Peirce,

borrowing from Shakespeare, called *airy nothings*, surpassing empirical sense data. Abduction belongs to "more unconscious and tentative methods" (Dewey 1991, p. 113): It jump-starts cognition while staying out of conscious awareness. At this level there are physically efficient ontological *generals* as a set of possibilities or hypothetical ideas which are "already determinative of acts in the future to an extent to which [we are] not now conscious" (Peirce, CP 6.156). These unconscious ideas affect our moral judgments amid what Dewey called problematic and obscure situations that call for the revaluation of values and the creation of new values in novel experiential contexts. Edusemiotics fully supports the pragmatic thesis that our best teacher is lived experience, not formal instruction.

Deleuze's A-signifying Semiotics

Deleuze's semiotics is a-signifying, that is, defying a simple dyadic relation between signifier and signified, between content and expression. Opposite terms are connected by a third element forming a conjunction in a manner analogous to Peirce's and Dewey's logic. Philosophers, as well as creative artists, are semioticians and symptomatologists or *apprentices* who read, interpret, and create signs as symptoms of life. In accord with a-signifying, triadic, semiotics, signs enter into self-referential relations (dubbed circular, hence begging the question, in analytic philosophy). This geography of relations transcends the dualistic split of nature and mind by establishing a bond between them. The conjunction "and" is a feature of the logic of signs (multiplicities), the defining characteristic of which is the relational dynamics of becoming in contrast to static being.

The included middle puts to flight the direct representations of analytic philosophy of language. The representational system presupposes a class of things as represented but not themselves being representations; they are posited outside language and outside thought. But from the perspective of semiotics, language and the world form a single extralinguistic fabric. Signs indeed perfuse the world, and meanings are conferred by

virtue of mediation in the relational network constituting a sign process, resembling the growth of a rhizome as Deleuze's new image of thought, in contrast to the dogmatic Cartesian image. Rhizome is a metaphor for an acentric network of signs that are "regulated" not by mechanical laws but by organic growth. Rhizome as a biological notion defies the primacy of classical physics as a scientific model for all other discourses, including education that tends to be "located" in social sciences where the research methods are often borrowed from the outdated paradigm of classical (Newtonian) mechanics with its direct linear causality.


New concepts, meanings, and values are created experimentally as "interpretants" expressing multiple contingencies and contexts embodied in actual events. The interpretive process includes involuntary, virtual or unconscious, memories, similar to those of which Proust's protagonist in his novel became aware when he actually experienced the taste of madeleine. Such is the process of experiential learning and becoming conscious of the unconscious. The creative aspect pertains equally to concepts and values because the focus is on practical evaluations from which the very "value of values" arises. The virtual field of unconscious disembodied ideas produces effects embodied in actual experiences due to the process of learning as interpretation, revaluation, and becoming aware of the unconscious. The conjunction of the unconscious and consciousness – of the world of ideas and the mental world – takes place in the material, sensible, world at the level of empirical reality. Deleuze's empiricism is transcendental, bringing together different series of signs. Such a conjunctive, apparently mystical, event constituting a participative encounter, in contrast to detached observation, is exemplary of edusemiotics. At the ontological level, such an event is akin to the actualization of the virtual: "from virtuals we descend to actual states of affairs, and from states of affairs we ascend to virtuals, without being able to isolate one from the other" (Deleuze and Guattari 1994, p. 160). Both levels are metaphysically real, and the difference between them is bridged by a transversal, semiotic, connection.

The Triadic Nature of Reality

The process of semiosis and the absence of mind-body dualism at the ontological level presuppose what contemporary physicist and mathematician Sir Roger Penrose defined in terms of some contact with the Platonic world of ideas (Penrose 2004). The relation between the three worlds (Fig. 2) – the physical world, the Platonic world of abstract ideas, and the mental world – is usually considered a mystery.

From the perspective of semiotics, however, such a relation is not mysterious but is isomorphic to the dynamic structure of signs (Fig. 1) that perfuse the universe as a whole. Analogously, Peirce's category of abduction sheds its share of mystery. Abduction functions as some sort of Geiger counter, equated by Penrose with a bridge connecting the "small" and "large" worlds even if, according to Penrose, we do not understand the nature of such an included, mediating, element in the framework of currently available scientific theories. But semiotics as the *science of signs* leads us to understand such an unorthodox expanded reality: Signs are intrinsically such bridges and interconnections comprising the tri-relative, nonlinear, and self-referential process of semiosis. It is the ontological primacy of relations that ensures the correspondence or coordination between empirical facts and (supposedly) transcendental values.

Importantly, what "inhabits" the Platonic world is not only the True but also the Good and the Beautiful as "non-computable elements – ... judgement, common sense, insight, aesthetic sensibility, compassion, morality" (Penrose et.al. 1997, p. 125). These elements populate the virtual plane, and the Platonic world mediates between



Ontology and Semiotics: Educating in Values, Fig. 2 Three worlds

the conscious mind and the actual, physical world. Unconscious ideas express themselves nonverbally, at the level of feelings, emotions, and instinctive actions bypassing representation in consciousness, hence cannot be articulated or deliberated upon in propositional language. Still, abduction is a mode of inference. Proceeding below awareness, it enables an intuitive grasp of moral meanings. Naturalistic ethics recapitulates ontology, but the natural world exceeds its reductive description by the laws of Newtonian mechanics. Nature includes a semiotic, or value, dimension related to the human experiences from which we learn. The abstract *universals* of the Platonic world always already exist in a semiotic relation to the *particulars* of our actual existence: They are not strictly universal but reflect the particularities of events that, upon interpretation, acquire new meanings and values. The “contours” of the presupposed universals are therefore dynamic and fuzzy: New meanings and newly created values are the outcomes of learning inscribed in the unlimited process of semiosis.

Conclusion

Human development as the semiotic process of becoming is thus theoretically unlimited, and moral education as experiential learning continues throughout a lifespan. It is by means of semiotic interpretation as practical learning that the “man-sign,” as Peirce said, can acquire information and come to mean more than it did before. The information “written” in signs exceeds sense data and must come to us in a fully Platonic manner, both as the intelligible and the sensible. Structured by sign relations, human experience is an expression of a deeper semiotic process. Any object of experience contains potentialities as virtual or implicit meanings, even if they are not yet actualized or made explicit. Edusemiotics as a novel conceptual framework affects the widespread top-down model of formal moral education reduced to teachers directly inculcating values to students. At the informal, cultural, level such inculcation may easily turn into ideological indoctrination. Still, considering that many of our moral judgments are abductive and

subconscious, it is not enough to consciously deliberate on moral dilemmas or make a decision of right versus wrong even when applying our best critical skills to such reasoning. Critical reason and verbal deliberation are complemented by clinical and creative aspects that cannot be “computed” or analytically deduced but are intrinsic to the value dimension of edusemiotics. By discarding the presupposed centrality of an independent self-centered Cartesian *Cogito* versatile in analytic reason, we are stepping into the semiotic process of learning and evolution. Being non-computable (at the level of conscious mind), our moral judgments strongly depend on insight, intuition, and imagination, which are the psychological counterparts of abductive inference peculiar to logic as semiotics and which enable some contact (as Penrose would say) with the third, quasi-Platonic, world. In the framework of edusemiotics, learning is irreducible to the accumulation of facts but encompasses education in values as the creation of meanings in lived experience. The triadic, self-referential, structure of signs leads us to understand that the level of moral ideas as potential meanings and values must exceed the steady references already present in the conscious mind because true intelligence encompasses our thinking (mental world) as coupled or integrated with our doing (physical world, the world of action).

Not all signs are symbols, such as in verbal language that directly represents reality (read: objective reality, excluding its semiotic dimension); signs include “pictures or diagrams or other images (. . . Icons) [and those] more or less analogous to symptoms (. . . Indices)” (Peirce, CP 6.338) that need to be read and interpreted in practice just like physicians who read current symptoms and provide diagnosis and prognosis in each clinical situation. The edusemiotic task of educating in values poses a challenge of learning languages other than verbal. It is the language of images (Semetsky 2011, 2013) that expresses unconscious ideas and values implicated in human experiences. In contrast to the conscious propositions of an individual mind, the language of images belongs to what Carl Jung called the collective unconscious. An expanded consciousness, in which the unconscious has been *integrated*, can transcend the limitations of the present and let in various

opportunities afforded by an open future. An apparent closure of a semiotic triangle each and every time opens new possibilities (the process symbolized by the dotted line in Fig. 1). When complemented by the language of images in addition to linguistic signs, edusemiotics – by realizing virtual meanings in practice – can compute the essentially noncomputable. Such paradoxical computation is not, however, a rule-based algorithm. It amounts to the revaluation of experience mediated by signs and includes Peircean abduction as a hypothetical conjecture enabled by insight into the Platonic realm of ideas.

The ontology of three worlds grounded in recursive interconnections has serious implications for education. A relation that is ontologically basic decries the notion of an autonomous agent. “Self” and “other,” teachers and students, form a single unit, a sign; individual character building is not all there is to moral education. Edusemiotics posits the ethics of integration as a follow-up to the feminine ethics of care in terms of harmonious relations between all binary opposites, thus also promoting the value of intercultural dialogue (cf. Besley and Peters 2012). To maintain balance and ensure communication between different semiospheres (a term belonging to the famous semiotician of the Moscow-Tartu school, Yuri Lotman) at both individual and social levels is a challenge. Ultimately, moral education demands creating a field of shared meanings and values of which both sides in a relation partake. Meanings, as the outcomes of the learning process, lurk in the future, and edusemiotics represents a future-oriented philosophy of education. It teaches us how to evaluate options in the future evolution of signs and subsequently choose a course of action among many possibilities. Human decision-making is informed by signs: Our actions in the world are also semiotic interpretants that punctuate the nonlinear process of semiosis. Life goes on, and there is always room for more experience. Learning never ends.

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Open Digital Practices, An Overview of

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Synonyms

[Digital practices](#); [Learning practices](#); [Open educational practices](#)

Introduction: Open Digital Practices Defined

Open digital practices are developed, enacted, and iterated on by individuals to support engagement or their learning activity through digital technologies, defined as being devices, software, platforms, and other digital resources capable of producing and conveying digital material. Digital space is the space generated as a result of these digital technologies and material in which open digital practices are enacted. Digital spaces can be closed or open in a variety of ways (access, code, language, community practices), but it is important to note at the onset that open digital practices can move between, often problematically, open and closed spaces. Digital material refers to the generative or referenced work of the open digital practices; digital material ranges considerably text, images, audio recordings, video, and the attendant compositions that may emerge as a result of the open digital practices.

Open digital practices are largely an artificial categorization, one designed to encompass the larger space of digitally enhanced methods and activities across a range of categories; it does pose questions about the nature of digital engagement as being reproductive or responsive of the digital space itself, of the practices themselves as being adaptations or appropriations, and of the nature of open overall. These questions become increasingly important as the digital influence over the academy, and society more generally, continues to grow. Open digital practices sit within, are responding to, and are shaped by the context of an increasingly digital society. Each of these questions and points will be addressed in this entry.

Open digital practices involve the use of open or freely available online tools (e.g., search engines) and resources (e.g., Wikipedia) for learning across a range of communities, fields, and learning activities. Open digital practices are designed to enact an open inquiry about the lived world of the individual using any number of digital tools, materials, and digital spaces available to them. They are digital manifestations of practices as defined by Bourdieu and Nice (1977) in that they “tend to reproduce the regularities

immanent in the objective conditions of the production of their generative principle, while adjusting to the demands inscribed as objective potentialities in the situation.”

Open digital practices, as such, are *re-producing* the digital space in which they are being enacted and *responding* to the opportunity provided by the digital space itself. This is important to note as it suggests that it is problematic to see these open digital practices as inherently stable or replicable. While they are in some way reproducing the digital space in which they are being employed, they are also iterating on that digital space in search for opportunity. With each application both the digital space and the opportunity presented therein shift, requiring a constant iteration on the open digital practices themselves. For example, the non-fixed structure and visual form of microblogging platforms, for instance, surrounding the character limit and opportunity to include emoticons, images, links, and GIF embeds, mean in turn that opportunities for constructing and communicating knowledge also evolve. Microblogging evolves to meet the changing patterns of individuals, while in turn bringing about further changes. A further aspect requiring constant iteration is chronology. For example, a tweet in 2008 and one in 2016 will potentially be rendered and received differently, and the digital space, in this case the Twitter interface, in which it is rendered will vary dramatically. A further example might relate to how the nature of information sharing itself among academics or in particular communities evolves over time and influences the reception of the work under observation.

For the purpose of illustration, let us use the example of how open digital practices enable us to share details of some recently published work or a piece of ongoing research being undertaken alongside colleagues. Assuming we are able to articulate what it is that makes our work distinctive and interesting, it is with considerable ease that we can enter words into a publishing platform or online web. The preprogrammed templates and functionality of these online platforms present our work that it is polished and professional as the research whose merits are being conveyed. A few

clicks and a small number of characters later, the website has been shared through a microblogging platform to an expectant audience. However, we do need to stretch the memory too far to recall a time when the responsibility of “getting the work out there” fell to the member of the team who had shown an interest in HTML, a talent that was often being nurtured through his or her own personal website. Most of us will be familiar of occasionally encountering these sites and, after reducing the brightness of our screen, noting how starkly they contrast with the clear sophistication and built-in eye-for-design of contemporary web spaces. On these occasions, we have to work hard to avoid concluding that the research described in a wall of bold Times New Roman on a yellow background is not similarly outdated. The point here is not to diminish the efforts of some of the earlier pioneers of open digital practices, but simply to say that as we draw on emergent digital spaces to convey knowledge, the way our content is received will be influenced by the rapidly changing representation environment in which it is encountered.

These open digital practices are methods for enacting learning across fields of digital activity. Yet, open digital practices extend beyond socialized digital learning theories (discussed in Jonassen and Land 2012) to account for solitary practices of meaning-making: the selfie, the informal path of leisurely discovery through hyperlinks, the curation of digital content, and the methods employed in generating multimedia remixes all involve open digital practices in varying degrees of sophistication. Some of these solitary practices lead to socialized interaction and the myriad practices involved in managing digital social engagement: the understanding and proper use of the digital community vernacular, constructing and iterating on one’s avatar, and collaborative online research and composition are all socialized open digital practices again in varying degrees of sophistication. Yet, it is important to note that open digital practices are methods for digital engagement across the spectrum of socialized and solitary activity.

Open digital practices involve both digital engagement and the development of digital

literacy, positioned here as the ability to locate, evaluate, employ, iterate, and reflect on digital tools and materials and their impact on understanding. Open digital practices are cyclically linked to digital literacy and digital engagement; they require digital engagement to be enacted, and feedback received from this engagement in turn feeds into the learner’s digital literacy. As such, open digital practices should be viewed in concert with digital literacy and digital engagement. As open digital practices are iterative – they are both **reactive** in terms of feedback received from digital engagement and **proactive** in terms of developing practices to engage the space – they involve some degree of reflective practice.

Open Digital Practices: Context, Education, and Material

The concept of open digital practices emerges from, is influenced by, and subsumes several parallel concepts. It is through these parallel concepts that we see open digital practices visibly on display. Concepts such as open education and open learning, which both assume broad opportunities for learning and access to material, are engaged through open digital practices. Open learning is defined here more broadly than open education as a learner-centered activity where relative, but not unproblematic, autonomy exists to pursue learning through closed or open, formal or informal, digital activities. Open learning does not assume an instructional agent in the learning process. Open education is defined through the role of the instructor in the learning process, assuming that instructors guide or model learning through adherence to a structured or formal curriculum. Open digital practices are used to engage both open learning, emphasizing student autonomy, and open education, emphasizing the role of the teacher. Both provide opportunities for identifying and iterating on open digital practices.

Open education and open learning, in particular, have evolved from their initial conflation with distance learning (Rumble 1989) and, more recently, with a complex, conflated association with massive online open courses – MOOCs

(Yuan and Powell 2013). MOOCs are generally defined by their large number of participants, often in the thousands, that require students to develop or iterate on their open digital practices to navigate and interact within the digital course space.

Open education and open learning account for informal and formal digital learning practices, for networked learning, for the open learning spaces in which this open learning takes place (Land and Oliver 2012), and for open practices for assessment and reflective practice (Camilleri and Tannhäuser 2013). As such, open digital practices, as positioned here, are partly the methods for enacting digital engagements in open education and open learning. Yet, open digital practices can exist outside formal educational structures like courses, curriculum, and instruction; they are not exclusive to education or learning. Rather, they are methods for the individual to engage digital space across the formal and informal and across the socialized and solitary spaces. Some of these engagements can and often does occur within educational or learning structure: with open education, open courses, and open learning being the most visible.

Open digital practices are presented here more broadly than many of its parallel concepts. For example, open digital practices share many structural elements of open educational practices, which involve the production, use, and reuse of open educational resources (OER) to stimulate open education and lifelong learning. Open educational practices suggest “the combination of open resources use and open learning architectures” (Ehlers 2011); open digital practices, when positioned in this way, become methods for engaging those open resources and open learning architectures. Tangential concepts that support this position include open courseware (OCW), open textbooks, digitized public domain material (made available through national libraries, museums, or cultural institutions, for example) with open access, and the aforementioned OER.

Open digital practices nominally diverge from open educational practices insofar as they assume neither an instructional agent in this process nor unfettered access to open educational resources.

This is an important distinction. As stated before, open digital practices can be adaptations applied in closed spaces, often with closed material. They can be enacted as solitary digital engagements. As such, open digital practices span the informal and formal fields of activity, the solitary and socialized fields of activity, and movements between these. They can be enacted within an educational context or outside it.

Open Digital Practices: Constraints

This definition of open digital practice places the emphasis of open on the digital practice rather than the digital space or digital material being used in their enactment, a deliberate attempt to avoid spatial or material determinism. By doing so, open digital practices become rhizomatic methods for engaging digital space. They avoid or ignore, insofar as is possible, the structural, legal, or educational constraints of the attendant space and material. Structural constraints include the limits of the code presented in the digital space itself or the functionality around or access to the material in the digital space. Legal constraints exist primarily at the material level but extend to open digital practices: copyrighted works, orphan works, and public domain content being governed by fair use or fair dealings legislation. Educational constraints include inquiry related to the subject under investigation or the adherence of these inquiries to the curricular or disciplinary content. Many open digital practices lead to digital engagements that fall outside the boundaries of disciplinary practice, for example.

Yet, open digital practices can pass through these constraints, often problematically, toward digital engagements. For example, a digital engagement might involve using copyrighted material with a series of open digital practices: downloading the copyright material, editing the material, remixing, and disseminating the new representation via blogs or social media. Depending on the context in which it is enacted, such use of open digital practices and copyrighted material can be illegal, as copyright is balanced by fair use or fair dealing; structurally impermissible

in that the downloading of the original copyrighted content is blocked; or both, as removing the software that prevents the copying of copyrighted material – DRM – or “jailbreaking” a mobile device to remove the software that restricts activity. These activities are all manifestations of open digital practices themselves. They allow the individual to make an open inquiry or seize an opportunity presented by their digital engagement. Looking beyond issues of copyright, the practice of harvesting and then hybridizing content from the open web challenges conventional notions of authorship. As Kathleen Fitzpatrick argues in her 2011 discussion of the digital future of authorship, the remix culture that we propose is a feature of open digital practices and challenges us to revisit some of the established ideas we hold around originality and plagiarism within scholarly practice. Without proposing that the ability to draw a range of content into a single text is confined to texts created within digital environments, it is the ease with which this can be achieved, alongside the vast world of resources on which we can draw, that call for us to reflect on what we mean when we talk about authorship and originality within educational settings.

While not advocating illegal activity, it is important to note that attendant practices, digital spaces, and even communities have emerged from these legal and structural constraints. For example, returning to Bourdieu and Nice (1977), hacker communities employ open digital practices to both recreate the digital space and seize opportunity within closed digital spaces. These hacking practices inevitably change as digital spaces shift in response to their hacking and opportunities evolve as a result. The open digital practices involved in those wishing to mitigate or pass through legal or structural constraints further include those privacy or anonymity practices (such as Tor) or those wishing to access material that is not actively being “crawled” by search engines (such as that found on the dark web). These examples serve to illustrate that open digital practices are often responses to the structure of the digital space itself, whether open or closed; they are open inquiries structured at least partly by

openness and closure. Yet, openness itself is problematic as the next section identifies.

Open Is Problematic: Openness and Closure

While open digital practices can be positioned with relative clarity as digital methods for enacting open inquiry, the term open itself is challenging in that it suggests unrestricted space, mobility through that open space, as well as “unproblematic self-direction and autonomy” (Knox 2013). The position of open digital practices advanced here contests that suggestion. “Openness is neither neutral nor natural: it creates and depends on closures” (Bayne et al. 2016). Open digital practices allow the learner to create closures to engage open digital space: a copy and paste from Wikipedia, a remix of digital content posted to social media, a curated image board, a blog post, and the selection criteria for an audio playlist are all ultimately closures structured by open digital practices. Open digital practices challenge the pervading binaries of open learning insofar as many of these digital practices are enacted in what might be perceived as closed spaces. Closed digital spaces are positioned here as being either proprietary or spaces where the individual has little or no control over the structure of the space and the data they have generated as a result of their digital practices. For example, an open digital practice for participating in a discussion board in a gated, closed learning management system (LMS) is open practice in a closed space. The practice itself, composed of the methods for engaging in discussion online, is ported from, or influenced by, the open digital practices of the learner emerging from the more open, or less explicitly closed, spaces of digital activity.

However, open and closed exist in tandem; they are not binaries in the sense that the existence of one does not exclude the existence of the other. As mentioned, open digital practices can exist within closed digital spaces, just as closed spaces can exist within, or are indeed structured by, larger open spaces.

Open Digital Practices: Adaptation and Appropriation

The definition positioned here, that of digital methods for enacting inquiry across informal, formal, solitary, and socialized fields of activity, suggests that open equates to fluid. Open digital practices are fluid, iterative responses to and engagements with the lived world of digitally enhanced space. They evolve, not unproblematically, through iterative and reflective practice. This definition does not presuppose that all open digital practices are inherently fluid in their structuring; some are indeed sedentary insofar as they move unaltered from one digital space to another. For example, the use of less formalized vernacular from an informal affinity group (a Facebook page dedicated to amateur history and genealogy, for example) ported to a more formal digital space (an online and assessed course in history from an accredited university) will likely produce less than favorable results. Yet, the feedback received from their application in this new digital space triggers their iteration and, as such, their openness.

As such, a further distinction to be made is that open digital practices are often structurally fluid (an *adaptation*) or spatially fluid as in the use of an open digital practice from one community in another (an *appropriation*). Their openness depends on their movement and iteration across digital engagements. Building on the example described in the previous paragraph, an adaptation of an open digital practice might involve the adjustment of vernacular language used in one digital community to the context of another: the removal of emoticons and the use of (or nonuse) of abbreviations, for example. It suggests a familiarity with the digital space itself, a familiarity with the practices employed by its members, and a familiarity with the constraints provided by its structure. An appropriation might involve the porting of a vernacular language employed by one digital community in another without adjustment. For example, using emoticons in a formal disciplinary digital engagement suggests familiarity with aspects of digital practices without a fully realized digital literacy in respect to their digital

space. While likely producing less than favorable results, it will generate feedback that may in turn stimulate iteration on these open digital practices. This feedback might involve criticism from members within the digital space or merely be ignored by the larger community, but both provide some measure of feedback that can be used to stimulate further iteration.

This distinction between adaptation and appropriation is important as it demonstrates the openness in open digital practices itself. Adaptations are attempts to both recreate the digital space in which the engagement is taking place while maximizing opportunity presented by their use. As such, they are sophisticated and iterative manifestations of digital literacy, an understanding of how digital engagements are to be constructed and what will be produced as a result of those digital engagements. Appropriations are less sophisticated in how they align with the recreation of digital spaces and their accompanying opportunity. Yet, both are open, insofar as the open digital practices are employed at will and with agency by the individual.

Open Digital Practices: Technology and Attendant Practices

Further, open digital practices do not restrict activity to a particular digital technology. While the digital engagements generated by mobile phones, laptops, and other digital technologies vary considerably in terms of the open digital practices used therein, the practices themselves remain open and digital. This immersiveness contributes to the interactional context that structures the digital engagement.

For example, an open digital practice used to navigate an urban space through an application on a mobile device will not ascribe to the same level of digital immersiveness as that of an open digital practice used to engage in a discussion forum from a desktop computer, yet both are fluid, iterative responses to digital engagement. Recording audio comments to a collaborative document via a mobile application is an open digital practice, yet one with a different contextual structure than

providing feedback to that same document via a desktop computer with text. However, they bear the same characteristics of open inquiry of the lived world presented above. As such, they are incorporated into the definition of open digital practices presented here.

In summation, open digital practices are digital methods for enacting open inquiries in and about digital spaces through the use of digital technologies. While largely an artificial categorization, one designed to encompass the larger space of digitally enhanced methods and activities across a range of categories, open digital practices problematize the nature of digital engagement as being reproductive or responsive of the digital space itself, of the practices themselves as being adaptations or appropriations, of the digital material generated as a result as being plagiarized or authored, and of the nature of what open means in the digital overall. Open digital practices sit within, are responding to, and are shaped by the context of an increasingly digital society yet remain idiosyncratic as they are responses to the lived worlds of the individuals employing them.

Cross-References

- ▶ [Critical Education and Digital Cultures](#)
- ▶ [Digital Learning and the Changing Role of the Teacher](#)
- ▶ [Digital Literacies](#)
- ▶ [Distance Education](#)
- ▶ [Learning and Media Literacy](#)
- ▶ [Massive Open Online Courses \(MOOCs\)](#)
- ▶ [Multiliteracies](#)
- ▶ [Networked Learning](#)
- ▶ [Open Distance Learning](#)
- ▶ [Open Education, An Overview of](#)
- ▶ [Open Educational Resources](#)

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Open Distance Learning

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Synonyms

[Distance education](#); [E-learning](#); [Online learning](#); [Open universities](#)

Introduction

The term open distance learning, or open and distance learning (ODL), is contested and combines two different concepts which are often related both in theory and in practice. This entry will review the potential differences between “open” and “distance” learning and how the terms have been used. It will then examine the

changing applications of ODL, the ways in which it is intended to increase inclusion and social justice, and the issues relating to its application. The advent of e-learning and its incorporation within the term “open, distance, and e-learning” (ODEL) in the twenty-first century leads to a brief review of ODL in relation to the most recent developments in open educational resources (OER) and massive open online courses (MOOCs).

Definitions

Open distance learning (ODL) combines aspects of two separate concepts, “open learning” and “distance learning,” and these are also sometimes conflated with “distance education.” While these are often connected in theory and in practice, they are essentially different concepts. “Open learning” is an educational philosophy that emphasizes openness in terms of learner’s choices, most frequently in relation to access, flexibility, and time and place of study. In its fullest sense, it can include choice of curriculum and assessment method, though these have not so far been implemented in practice very frequently or successfully.

The term “open learning” originated in the 1950s and 1960s and gained impetus from the foundation of the Open University, UK, in 1969. It occasioned much debate in the 1980s and 1990s as a slogan applied to a variety of different educational and training initiatives, many of which were not “open” by most of the criteria listed above, for example, in the UK, to in-house training initiatives that were restricted to employees (Gaskell 2007).

Openness is thus a value-laden concept with a social justice agenda. But it is rarely found in a “pure” form, and most educational programs fall within a continuum between “open” and “closed.” “Open universities,” for example, take many different forms, most of which do not fulfill all the conditions for “openness”; The Open University, UK, is relatively unusual in its lack of entry requirements for undergraduate programs but has a structured curriculum and fixed assessment and

exam timetables, whereas the Indira Gandhi National Open University (IGNOU) requires some entry qualifications although these are not as high as in conventional universities in India.

“Distance learning” relates more directly to the modes and media through which students and teachers interact, while “distance education” emphasizes the methods and processes of the delivery of learning and teaching to students. “Distance learning” may also include some face-to-face provision, such as in the University of South Africa (Unisa).

UNESCO (2015) summarizes the differences as:

Open learning is a philosophy founded on the principle of flexibility concerning when, where and how the learner studies. This approach is especially relevant for learners who are physically and/or geographically challenged.

Distance education is the use of specific instructional techniques, resources and media to facilitate learning and teaching between learners and teachers who are separated by time or place.

However, the two terms are not directly opposed and are usually interrelated: open learning is particularly suited to delivery at a distance, and distance learning and education very frequently reduce some of the barriers to openness that are faced in conventional campus-based contexts. For these reasons, the combined term “open and distance learning” became particularly popular from the late 1980s to the early 2000s with reference to a philosophy of openness within a system that used multiple media for delivery. In 2002, for example, UNESCO combined the terms:

The terms open learning and distance education represent approaches that focus on opening access to education and training provision, freeing learners from the constraints of time and place, and offering flexible learning opportunities to individuals and groups of learners. Open and Distance Learning is one of the most rapidly growing fields of education, and its potential impact on all education delivery systems has been greatly accentuated through the development of Internet-based information technologies, and in particular the World Wide Web.” (UNESCO 2002a, p. 7)

The reason for the combination of terms was that “The use of the term *open* is intended to highlight this key feature of the theory and practice of distance education.” (UNESCO 2002a, p. 22)

The growth of the World Wide Web encouraged an explosion in the number of terms used to describe open, distance, flexible, blended, online, and other structures and media for learning, and ODL is sometimes used as an umbrella term to describe a range of approaches. For example, in 2015 the Commonwealth of Learning (COL) issued a summary of “Open and Distance Learning: Key Terms and Definitions” which includes 21 different entries – those above and others such as “flipped classroom,” “learning technologies,” “open schooling,” and “virtual education” (COL 2015).

The inclusion of “open schooling” is a reminder that ODL is not restricted to higher education, although it is used extensively in this context. It can be used to support school-age children, for example, by the National Institute of Open Schooling in India (NIOS), which uses ODL methods to provide education to remote areas for secondary and senior secondary exams and enrolls about 35,000 students annually. ODL has also been very important in training and supporting teachers in developing countries, for example, through the OU UK’s Teacher Education in Sub-Saharan Africa programs.

Characteristics of ODL

ODL is generally characterized by the separation of teacher and learner for most, if not all, of the teaching and learning process. This distance is mediated by the use of various technologies and pedagogies. Some of the earliest examples of ODL, such as the University of London’s external system, originally developed in 1858 (now the International Programmes), initially involved sending packages of printed material to distant students. They studied the materials, often in isolation, for as long as they wanted and then registered to take the University of London’s exam when they felt prepared to do so. However, not all students were confident distant learners, so during the twentieth century, particularly with the development of the Open University, UK, from 1969, great emphasis was placed on the provision of learner support to enable students to

succeed. Learner support has been characterized by Tait (2000) as comprising three main elements: cognitive, the design and mediation of high-quality printed materials by academics and learning technologists to provide the core teaching materials of a particular course or affective, a supporting and interactive environment; and systemic, an efficient infrastructure. All these elements are core to student support in ODL (Tait 2000).

The affective element of learner support has often been developed by the growth of student services departments which provide a range of support services, including telephone and now online response to queries, and also by the employment of part-time staff (or adjunct faculty). These staff are often allocated a group of students, mark their assignments, and respond to student queries, but are not otherwise expected to undertake the usual faculty occupations of original research, scholarship, and publication. They are often on short-term contracts and are paid considerably less than tenured faculty.

The systemic infrastructure of ODL was seen as one of its great strengths in the twentieth century because of its cost efficiency. Peters, originally in 1967, compared distance education to an industrialized form of teaching and learning in which there is a division of labor, for example: “planning, developing and presenting the subject matter and correcting assignments was now done by different persons, at different times and at different locations. ... Where teaching [previously] had been individualized to a great extent by the personality of the teacher, it was now *standardized, normalized* and *formalized*” [sic] (Peters 1998, p. 110). This has implications for ODL pedagogy but also for ODL costings. ODL generally has high fixed costs, in relation to the creation of materials, usually by course teams, but low variable costs per student as they all receive the same material, and there is the potential for huge economies of scale through the numbers of student enrollments. This can be compared with the conventional costing structures of face-to-face teaching which involve low fixed costs, high variable costs (dependent on student numbers), and not much scope for economies of scale (Rumble 2014).

The Application of ODL

ODL has been welcomed by many countries and individuals for its potential to reduce costs and for its provision of educational opportunities. It can provide high-quality, flexible education to those who are unable to attend conventional educational establishments, for example, people in full-time employment, carers, women (in some cultures), remotely located students, and students with some disabilities. In this way, ODL can enhance an individual's prospects of employability and contribute to a country's human resource capital, capacity building, and sustainable economic development. In many countries, for example, Nigeria and India, there is no possibility for many to attend campus-based universities because there are too many people competing for limited places. In these cases, ODL can be an answer.

ODL's popularity and success in some contexts is well documented. In terms of inputs, US enrollment statistics in 2012 indicate that over 2,500,000 students were studying solely distance education courses – 12.5% of the total enrollment that year – and a further 2,810,000 students (13.3%) were studying some, but not all, of the courses in their programs online (NCES 2015). In terms of outputs, the University of South Africa (Unisa), a single-mode distance teaching institution, claims that about 35,000 students annually obtain degrees and diplomas from their programs.

However, there have been concerns that the levels of “dropout” from ODL programs are too high and that more should be done to support students to successful outcomes. Generally, retention rates on distance learning programs are lower than in campus-based universities, but this can be relative. In the UK in 2011–2012, for example, 43.6% of the OU UK's part-time students were not continuing 2 years after entry, compared with 2.3% of part-time students at Durham University. However, the OU's dropout rates here compare not unfavorably with the same data for part-time students at Plymouth University (42.9%) and the University of Dundee (48.1%) (HESA 2011–2012 Table T3e). Complex interrelated factors influence the level of dropout from any

program, particularly for those studying part time with other commitments, and the media and processes of ODL are not the sole factor in the equation. Other concerns about ODL include the view in some countries that the quality of distance learning and the outcomes from study are not comparable with conventional university standards, and so ODL qualifications are regarded as of limited value.

The Introduction of Online and E-Learning

The development of information and communication technologies (ICTs) during the 1990s and twenty-first century, and their application in online and e-learning, has expanded the reach and impact of ODL and had a profound impact on many of the original concepts, processes, and costings, such that a new acronym emerged: open, distance, and e-learning (or ODeL). Indeed, the term “ODL” is increasingly subsumed within terms relating to online learning or education. While UNESCO's Paris Message on June 2015 combines the terms “Online, Open and Flexible Higher Education for the Future We Want” and covers both online and open learning, in other contexts the term “open” is omitted. This is potentially of some concern, because it emphasizes the method of delivery, whether distance or online, rather than the open access and social justice principles originally embodied in the term “open learning.” It may also have contributed to a lack of awareness of, or attention to, the long traditions of research into ODL among some new e-learning enthusiasts.

The affordances provided by ICTs have the potential to break down the original divisions of labor within ODL and encourage much more communication and interaction between all the participants in the teaching and learning process, through, for example, online forums, email, and social media. Wider pedagogical implications include the increase in learner-managed learning and, more recently, learner-created content. Campus-based universities are also increasingly offering distance and online learning programs,

and this has caused a rethink of higher education pedagogies and structures generally. Among concerns raised by faculty are that they are overloaded by student email and forum queries and are also obliged to update their own technological expertise in the attempt to match that of their students. Professional and technical development of teaching staff has never been more essential. From an institutional perspective, online learning was initially welcomed by many who thought it would provide as a cheap solution to all education, but in fact the cost structures of online learning can be far closer to face-to-face education than to traditional models of distance education media delivery (Rumble 2014, p. 207). For students, the impact of ICTs has varied, depending on their access to the internet and ability to use any resources available.

The Impact of ODeL

The increasing use of e-learning has had two major and different impacts on the provision of ODL. In the first place it has opened up access to millions of learners through the development of online resources that are made freely available to anyone who has internet access and is interested in learning something new. This has encouraged a move from formal education to more informal learning. The earliest example of this kind is the OpenCourseWare initiative of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) which in 2002 made all the material from 50 courses freely available online. UNESCO then coined the term “Open Educational Resources” (OER) to refer to: “the open provision of educational resources, enabled by information and communications technologies, for consultation, use and adaptation by a community of users for non-commercial practices” (UNESCO 2002b, p. 1). Many OER were intended to be adapted or included within wider programs, but they have not been used as widely as hoped and are often largely stand-alone “bites” of information. To meet some of these gaps, massive open online courses (MOOCs) were developed from 2011. These “massive” open online courses enable anyone to study a particular

subject without any cost and so are extremely valuable and popular for personal information or informal updating; however, they do not as yet provide much formal accreditation, and their business model could be difficult to sustain.

The second major impact of online aspects of ODeL is that, while aiming to increase access, it has in fact reinforced some of the barriers to open and distance learning, particularly in developing countries. What was intended to open up access to all has the potential to reduce participation for many. Some of the main issues are the lack of infrastructure, such as a reliable electricity supply, and the professional expertise and experience of those trying to teach in an unfamiliar context. Provision of large quantities of additional computers to developing countries is not the answer; many will lie unused because of a lack of an appropriate infrastructure. Online learning has also emphasized the concept of the “digital divide,” that is, the gap between those who have access to computers and the Internet and those who do not. This is very clear from the World Bank data about Internet users 2015: whereas 78% of the European Union population are internet users, only 19% in sub-Saharan Africa and only 8.6% in the least developed countries use the internet. Without the ability to access online learning materials, potential students are excluded from many of the new ODeL developments.

Additional barriers to open access and ODL are the cultural, linguistic, and pedagogical paradigms inherent in many ODeL resources. The resources have so far mainly been created by developed nations in the northwestern hemisphere, and their usage in other contexts is contested. The majority of OER, MOOCs, and even Wikipedia entries are written in English, so that those who have English as a second, third, or fourth language may well find difficulties in learning from their content. Pedagogical expectations of teachers and learners, which tend to be transmissive in many Eastern cultures, are very different from those in many Western cultures, which encourage interaction. The dominance online of the Western view of ODL has thus created tensions and even accusations of “neocolonialism.”

Conclusion and Future

Open distance learning is a fluid term, combining two different concepts, and so has been used in different ways. It has been and continues to be used in contexts that aim to emphasize a social justice agenda in education and open access to the provision of learning opportunities. The term has developed alongside that of “distance education” although their emphases are different. Both terms are increasingly subsumed within “online learning” or “e-learning,” but these emphasize the media used rather than the underlying principles of openness.

ODL has supported millions of students, who would not otherwise be able to attend conventional educational institutions, to gain their educational ambitions. There are legitimate concerns about, for example, students’ access to ICTs, cultural agenda, the quality of some ODL programs, and student “dropout” rates. Nevertheless, ODL has a major place in international development agenda in the future, as UNESCO indicates:

Lack of infrastructure and professional competence in open and distance learning remain important barriers. Nevertheless, these forms of educational delivery have come to stay, and many countries are looking at open and distance learning as a major strategy for expanding access, raising quality and ensuring cost-effectiveness. (UNESCO 2002a, p. 10)

Cross-References

- Distance Education
- Massive Open Online Courses (MOOCs)
- Open Educational Resources
- Open Universities

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Open Education

- Open Educational Resources

Open Education (OE)

- Defining Openness in Education

Open Education and Education for Openness

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Introduction

Open education involves a commitment to openness and is therefore inevitably a political and social project. The concept of openness in regard

to education predates the openness movement that begins with free software and open source in the mid 1980s with roots going back to the Enlightenment that are bound up with the philosophical foundations of modern education with its commitments to freedom, citizenship, knowledge for all, social progress, and individual transformation. Yet in another way political, social, and technological developments have taken place in parallel alongside the history of the movement of open education that have heightened certain political and epistemological features and technologically enabled others that emphasize questions of access to knowledge, the coproduction and codesign of educational programs and of knowledge, the sharing, use, reuse, and modification of resources while enhancing the ethics of participation and collaboration.

Open education as a movement sits within the broader framework of the history of openness that brings together a number of disciplines and fields to impact directly upon the value of knowledge and learning, their geographic distribution and ownership, and their organization (Peters and Britez 2008; Peters and Roberts 2012; Deimann and Peters 2015).

Openness is a concept that has come to characterize knowledge and communication systems, epistemologies, society and politics, institutions or organizations, and individual personalities. In essence, openness in all these dimensions refers to a kind of transparency which is the opposite of secrecy and most often this transparency is seen in terms of access to information especially within organization, institutions, or societies. Certainly, this is part of the meaning of openness in relation to politics and societies – openness implies a form of open government which demands that citizens have access to official information and that reasonable grounds are advanced for withholding information from the public domain. This is the basis for the movement of freedom of information that led to the passage of legislation concerned with rights to information beginning with the Freedom of Information Act passed in the USA in 1966 and then by 70 countries around the world since then. Freedom of information means that the public has enforceable rights to access records and

information held by government or public bodies. Such freedom of information is seen to be integral to democracy considered as a form of open government where government decision-making at all levels is transparent, public records are open to public scrutiny, and individuals have rights of access to such information. The doctrine of open government is related to the theory of free inquiry and the free expression of opinion based on traditional freedoms such as freedom of speech, freedom to publish, and freedom of the press. It originates in Enlightenment philosophies that are the basis for modern theories of rights and stands against State secrecy and the use of State secrecy against its citizens.

In organization and institutions openness has come to mean a certain mode of operation characterized by cooperative or collaborative management motivated by the belief that democracy provides a set of principles not only for civil society but also for public and private organizations. Often this mode of organizational openness is associated with features of democratic procedure including open meetings, free debate, elected positions, and voting as a means of decision-making. Most often open meeting procedure is followed. Such organizations and institutions make use of flat hierarchies and consensus decision-making.

The political and organizational levels are given direct application, philosophically speaking, in the concept of the “open society” which the French philosopher Henri Bergson (1956) first used to identify those dynamic societies no longer tied to a static kind of tribalism and the Viennese philosopher Karl Popper developed in the Cold War context as a concept for defending liberal politics against communism and State totalitarianism (closed societies). Karl Popper’s (1947) notion of the open society also, at least implicitly, is associated with his epistemological doctrine of critical rationalism or “falsificationism” that holds that science progresses through criticism and that claims to knowledge should be open to empirical testing and falsification. In a clear sense then, openness can also be construed as an epistemological doctrine that also implies a central role for science and philosophy as one of the central

means for achieving a rational society based on its openness to criticism. Stated in this general way Popper's doctrine is consonant with principles of criticism that begin the modern project dating from Kant's (1998) *Critique of Pure Reason* or Descartes' (2005) *Discourse on Method* insofar as criticism is the source of rationality and modernity both in its literary-historical as well as its scientific-technological senses.

This sort of account in its general form also allows for counter-Enlightenment strands of thinking such as Romanticism that wants to criticize and question the very commitments of modernity by pointing to the pitfalls of rationalism and forms of rationalization in modern society that have compromised freedom and led to excessive regimentation and bureaucratization of society. The ecological critique of industrialism might also be seen to belong to this counter-Enlightenment form of criticism as might some forms of postmodernism.

Open education in terms of its most recent developments cannot be separated from the development of open systems and the history of open source, open access, open archiving, and open publishing. Education has always been dependent to some degree on changing information and communication technologies from the abacus and stone tablet to the blackboard and computer. The more critical question is to understand how these new technologies, and especially Web 2.0 platforms and protocols, promote a ubiquitous learning that collapses spaces between school and home, work and school, work and personal interest, teacher and student, and so on, transforming formal education and the market and creating new forms of social production that are essential to the knowledge economy.

Openness also has a line of thinking that directly ties it to individuals and their psychological make-up. Openness is one of the five personality traits empirically established in research dating from the 1930s that has come to serve as a model of personality (along with conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness, and neuroticism). Openness is sometimes interpreted as "intellect," seen as "openness to experience" and associated with appreciation of art, curiosity, adventure, and the imagination. Open people who are regarded as experimental, creative, curious, less thrown by

complexity and subtlety, are contrasted with closed people who may be more conservative, less flexible, more bound by habit, resistant to change, and tied to the security of a familiar environment. We might even talk loosely here of open personalities as "global" personalities. Openness in this context has a great deal to do with education for it has been argued since days of Rousseau and "philosophers of free play" for children (Pestalozzi, Froebel, Montessori, and even Dewey) that openness to experience is an educationally important value and that unstructured play (freedom) is one of the best ways of encouraging curiosity and experiment.

It is clear that there is a vital historical and political framework that embraces a variety of perspectives of freedom and openness that are part of the commitments of open education – commitments that lie deeply woven into the fabric of modern education as it developed during the Enlightenment and thereafter. Part of the project of education for openness is to identify and to recognize these deep commitments and to provide a theoretical context for viewing and understanding claims to openness and freedom in education within this context. Education for openness is about a meta-awareness of the political, social, economic, and technological frameworks that enable and permit greater world democratic use and reuse of educational resources and programs through new technologies enhancing the virtues of openness such as the ethics of participation, collaboration and coproduction, codesign, and coevaluation of all aspects of education. In this way education for openness is also about exploring the possibilities of open education in both its historical and future perspectives, and the encouragement of greater dialogue across all boundaries. In this sense the project has a world-historical component that is visionary in its commitment to principles of open inquiry, open access, open collaboration and leadership, and to education's role in promoting open democracy at a grassroots level, that is, through the everyday actions of students and teachers who communicate and exchange ideas and resources across time and space.

Open education and education for openness are related projects and perhaps one of the most significant educational movements to surface in the twenty-first century.

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Open Education, An Overview of

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Synonyms

[Openness](#)

Introduction

Open Education: The Very Basic Idea

Openness and education represent a perfect couple or “kindred spirits” (Deimann 2013) because they are inherently linked to each other. As for

openness, an open mind-set is a necessary prerequisite to discover the world in its fullest degree which is a process of enculturation or education or – to put it more philosophically – *Bildung*. This special conception has risen to prominence with the work of German philosopher and diplomat Wilhelm von Humboldt who described it as a free, dialogical, and dialectical interplay between the person and the world in such a way that all the individual’s potentials are unfolded (self-realization). In this regard, the child is made acquainted to the world in schools by means of a standardized curriculum to ensure that all relevant fields are covered. Moreover, in educational psychology, curiosity is understood as one of the major determinants for learning which reflects again an open mind-set as expressed, for example, by the child’s desire to approach foreign objects and person as soon they are within the field of view. In later years, as adults continue their engagement with other, openness becomes of the Big Five personality traits (among conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness, and neuroticism) and is described more precisely as open to experience which is then expressed, for instance, in a general interest in learning.

In order to help children and adults strive for interacting with the world, teachers are also required to manifest a certain understanding of openness and to approach students not as a piggy bank that need to be filled with predefined and validated content but as individuals with an innate desire to explore the world. In this regard, open education can be depicted as the idea of providing an alternative mode of delivery which is based on an enlightened understanding of teachers and learners (i.e., both are autonomous and yet involved in an interdependent relationship). In contrast to standardized concepts of education which follow a predetermined curriculum with predefined lessons and assignments, open formats seek to leverage a higher degree of freedom in terms of access to educational content, resources, and programs. There is also more choice available such as what to learn or how to study a certain subject (“self-regulated learning”) and is aimed at the principle of personalization (student-centered

learning in contrast to teacher-led education). Yet, for a very long time, alternative modes of delivery in schools and universities have been limited to the engagement of single teachers who deliberately opposed the standard curriculum or who – as Robert Owen (1771– 1858) – provided special educational treatments such as infant schools for the children of the workers in his New Lanark Mill. Most of these efforts failed because of the continued struggle between progressive movements most often triggered by technological innovations and the power of established clerical providers (Peter and Deimann 2013).

This situation has changed tremendously during the last decades because of improved conditions to disseminate materials and to reach out for potential learners. It seems that the promise of the Internet – connecting people and resources worldwide – has finally become a reality. The educational utilization has started with the open educational resources (OER) movement in 2001 when the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) decided to publish a large portion of its content under a free license. Some years later, the first massive open online course (MOOC) took place in Canada as another significant open education format which in 2012 bifurcated into a conservative xMOOC version and a progressive connectivistic (cMOOC) style. Although there is a quantitative increase in terms of open courses and OER, there is also a heated debate regarding the quality of openness in education as the title of Martin Weller’s (2014) book “The Battle for Open: How openness won and why it doesn’t feel like victory” suggests. The military language is used on purpose because open education has gained significant influence in the discourse on educational policy, and several actors now propose their open education initiatives as nothing less than a revolution of education. Yet, there is no common agreement on the underlying understanding of openness because of conflicting interests (economic vs. educational). Thus, the degree of openness can vary considerably as the kind of liberty that is attached to it. Many commercial MOOC providers market the free and open access as an attempt to democratize education and dissimulate that the resources are restricted by

copyright law. In contrast to that are open educational practices that capitalize on the power of the Internet (global interaction among peers) and the opportunities of OER, i.e., the rights to reuse, revise, remix, and repurpose material within a legal framework. Therefore, it is important to stress that it is the open licensing of resources that constitute the decisive factor for true open education, i.e., the version that comes closest to the philosophical tradition of *Bildung*.

These and other indicators make it safe to assume that open education will continue to play an important role as a “simple idea,” a philosophy, and a practical concept. The next sections will review significant developments and discuss several points of friction that have become apparent in recent discourses.

Institutionalized Forms of Open Education

While the basic idea of open education is relatively plausible – education is fundamentally dependent on an open approach of teaching and learning – the realization is quite a challenging endeavor. An explanatory account of the troublesome issues that can occur in the process of implementing ideas from a philosophical perspective is provided within the context of secondary schools during the 1960s and 1970s which represents a major proponent of the open educational movement. Open schooling, open learning, or open curriculum are just three of a multitude of terms that tried to convey a certain feeling or spirit of openness in education but failed to substantiate them on a microlevel. All these approaches can be subordinated under a certain zeitgeist that shaped the perception of the role of education for children. More specifically, as the Plowden Report laid out, education was conceived as a major force “(…) in determining the individual’s ultimate position in the occupational hierarchy of industrial societies” (Blackstone 1967, p. 291).

It therefore was about time to rethink the role of schools as they seemed no longer able to provide opportunities for children to develop their potentials. Ivan Illich (1971) was one of the most

provocative voices when he claimed that we should deschool the society as there was a bulk of literature with similar attempts. Yet, it was the Plowden Report which acted as a catalyst for reforms with its detailed review of best practices. One of the major goals of open education during this period was the shift from predefined content and rigid curriculum to practices that seemed to be conducive of bringing out the best of children. Therefore, content, methods, and social interactions could greatly vary between open schools, but the ultimate purpose was always the same. It was about the aforementioned concept of *Bildung*, i.e., an abstract idea of connecting the person and the world in a way that all his/her innate talents can unfold. The process of *Bildung* never ends and cannot be measured with formal degrees but only in philosophical terms such as autonomy. Sure enough, the implementation of abstract norms is on a different layer than the social reality around and within the institution. That is a lesson which Wilhelm von Humboldt painfully had to learn during his days as a policy maker trying to realize the “theory of *Bildung*” in formal schooling.

By the same token, open schooling was informed by theory, more specifically psychological theories that describe how children learn (and it was on a similar level of abstraction as the theory of *Bildung*). Many learning theories that have been adopted by advocates of open education portray the individual as an active agent and a self-motivated maker of meaning. The child is thus not a passive vessel or an empty piggy bag waiting to be filled with content. But how can a child be educated to become an active agent and how can an educational institution ensure that each child is treated in a responsible manner?

It was not only open schools that attempted to fulfill the promises of open education. In the area of higher education, the foundation of the Open University, UK, in 1969 has been another milestone as it functioned as a role model for many other institutions around the globe. Open education became an institutionalized stand offered as an alternative to conventional higher education provisions. While open schools fell victim to a

changed zeitgeist in the 1980s as a conservative turn took over in politics, open universities evolved and kept on playing an important role in the distance education movement. However, as has become apparent during the MOOC hype, there were not many connections between distance and traditional education providers, and therefore commentators from outside distance education glorified the projects of people like Sebastian Thrun or Daphne Koller as tremendous achievements of teaching learners worldwide not knowing that there were many initiatives in open and distance education that have paved the way for MOOCs.

With the rise of ICT, another important driver became more and more apparent which was linked to the natural promise of the Internet: the free and unrestricted flow of information across an ever-expanding network. The Internet made possible what thereto was the privilege of professional distance education providers which is to scale up education using a decentral network and advanced technologies.

Grassroots Developments: OER and Early MOOCs

Started as an initiative within a well-known institution, open educational resources have then ushered into a grassroots development that invites everybody who wants to be part of a global movement. The least common denominator of OER is to commit oneself to apply open licenses such as Creative Commons but without a strict give and take principle (“I can use an OER only then if I provide another OER produced by me”). Instead many practitioners argue for the “sharing is caring” principle which is a bold hope because it avoids formal regulation and relies on the belief of common goods. OER is thus built on a social motivation which ideally works perfectly, and the pool of open educational resources continuously evolves and is refined by an engaged community. On the contrary, only a small amount of producers are feeding a large crowd that does not care about

the deeper meaning of OER. This has happened in a somewhat related way when commercial social media services market their products with the sharing attribute to convince their users to upload as much content (videos, text messages, pictures, etc.) as possible on the platform. This is not to say that social media has little value for human interaction and communication but to stress the imbalanced relationship between producers and platforms in terms of the right to utilize the content. To produce such a vast amount of digital media and giving it for free to YouTube, Facebook, and Twitter is not the most troublesome problem but the fact that the material once it is uploaded falls under copyright regulations.

There have been major OER sponsors like the Hewlett or Gates foundation that helped to establish a remarkable pool of resources by funding a lot of projects. With this support, OER could gain more and more influence in educational practice and policy making. As it relates to working with OER, there is evidence that having a closed community with a descent level of trust is a big advantage.

As more and more OER were produced and spread all over the world, it became clear that this does not automatically usher in open educational practices – a term that is deliberately used to convey the need for a change in teaching practices from teacher led to student centered. In fact, it is a rather naive assumption to believe in the “transformative power” of OER as it neglects the inner power relations in educational contexts such as the “hidden curriculum.” A move toward transforming traditional practices which is also akin to the idea of OER has been undertaken in 2008 with a massive open online course (MOOC), called Connectivism and Connective Knowledge (CCK08). The concept was aimed at overcoming the centralized structures of learning management systems (LMS) and virtual learning environments (VLE) that were perceived as closed and isolated silos in a walled garden. A central issue in the new approach is its emphasis on ownership of content, i.e., learners who are using their own blog or a wiki are regarded as vital parts in the teaching

process as they provide open and free access. In addition to that, the course CCK08 proposed a broad range of open-source software tools (some of them were suggestions by users). Both the open access to the course and the open technologies are critically for the third open component which is open knowledge, i.e., a transparent process of gaining and sharing knowledge throughout the course.

The idea underlying the MOOC was thus to connect learners with all kinds of digital tools and services and to create an open learning space that is closely related to the benefits of the Internet. Interaction and collaboration among participants in highly different relationships are thus the new default in contrast to the traditional one-to-many model with a predominant “sage on the stage.” As the MOOC is framed as an open online space in which knowledge is collaboratively produced, shared, and disseminated, utilizing digital tools can be seen as an informal learning activity that contributes to the development of digital literacy.

There have been several MOOCs following the blueprint of the CCK08, but they were all received and discussed inside the small ed-tech community. This has altered dramatically when two Stanford scholars in 2011 decided to open their course “Introduction to Artificial Intelligence” to the general public because what follows was according to the media nothing less than a tsunami with 160,000 participants from 190 countries.

The xMOOC: Replacing, Reproducing, and Augmenting Higher Education

With the hype around MOOCs from Harvard and Stanford, a new institutionalized form of open education emerged: commercial platforms providing free access to high-quality lectures from US or European universities. Learners can log into these 6–8-week long courses and apply for a certificate which is not free of charge and one of the only stable revenue streams. The rapid increase of courses on MOOC platforms attracted hundreds of thousands of learners and inevitably raised the

question whether there is still a need for brick-and-mortar colleges, and there were bold claims of “the end of the university as we know it.” Consequently, attempts of replacing traditional (offline) courses by online offerings soon started to spread. In this regard, the Senate Bill 520 which was intended to require 145 public colleges and universities in the State of California to grant credit for MOOCs from third-party providers represented a landmark case. The automatic transfer of credit acquired in MOOCs was a simple strategy to bypass the problem of over-enrolled lower level classes and to help students move forward in a faster pace. It would also save State resources, and for the providers it would allow for production-scale effects as one MOOC could be broadcasted on multiple campuses.

With the focus on technological aspects, pedagogy was less important and regarded as a sure-fire success but would backfire after evaluations revealed inferior learning results. MOOC participants performed worse than students in regular classes which is an indicator of the special affordances of learning in online courses. Described as the Matthew effect, MOOCs systematically advantage those learners who already have a high level of competence. Ironically, those learners who were portrayed as the target groups (e.g., socially underprivileged) would be disadvantaged by the mode of operating in a xMOOC, i.e., being exposed to video-based instruction without a proper support taking care of the special needs.

What then happened was that xMOOCs more or less reproduced the existing structures of higher education and fell short of being a transformative power. Many of the xMOOCs have also become valuable source for prospective students who get a chance to see how professors typically teach a class and for current or lifelong learners who are given the opportunity to refresh their knowledge.

Conclusion

Open education has been introduced as a simple but powerful idea which is about helping the

human to become an educated, self-reflected, and autonomous person by providing access and opportunities to resources and peers. Whereas on this philosophical level there is quite an agreement, the implementation of open education in educational settings has proven to be a rather challenging task. In the earlier movement, the lack of a common definition and a set of guiding principles was the main reason that open schooling vanished into thin air in the 1980s. A changed zeitgeist could thus relatively easily ban open practices and favor traditional instruction. With the emergence of OER, a clear definition was given to the movement which is based on licensing. Only those materials that follow an open license are eligible as OER and allow for open educational practices such as the early MOOCs.

Interestingly, the later MOOCs deliberately altered the criteria for openness insofar as it was now only open (i.e., cost-free) access instead of open licenses. This is a different move compared to what happened in the open schooling phase. Here there was an implicit agreement and commitment to openness that would not need to be transformed into a formal definition. The xMOOC advocates are aware of the formal criteria as outlined in the OER projects but for economic reasons refuse to apply them in their courses.

Surely, there will be other lines of conflict in the future as open education keeps on playing a significant role in educational policy.

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Open Education, Privacy, Security, and Safety: Call to Action

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Synonyms

[Control](#); [Digital pedagogy](#); [Open pedagogy](#);
[Ownership](#); [Surveillance](#)

Introduction: Privacy, Security, and Safety in Open Education?

In online education and especially in open online education and connected learning scenarios, learners and teachers are vulnerable. Their thoughts, their questions, and their learning progress are exposed to the public. Their statements might be archived and indexed by search engines and preserved over years and decades. They produce data points and they interact not only with a small group of peers but with a greater public. Often, learners and teachers in open education have to rely on proprietary software that they pay for either with licensing fees or with their personal data. To date, privacy, security, and safety are not a priority of policy makers, institutions, or single educators in the realm of Open Education. This needs to change.

In his 2016 article, Cory Doctorow states that societies around the world have reached “Peak Indifference (Doctorow 2016).” Doctorow argues that, from the date of publication in the summer of 2016 onwards, the group of people on our planet who are indifferent to systemic data collection, its (mis-)use, and the potential consequences for individuals and society as a whole will not become larger but smaller. Doctorow also draws upon a comparison to the perceived risk of smoking and its effect on people’s behavior: as with smoking,

consequences of infringed privacy and security are often not perceived immediately. Therefore, both smokers and users are not inclined to change their behaviors as these changes are rarely rewarded instantly. This line of argument can easily be transferred to the behavior of online educators, their learners, institutions, and policy makers.

National governments address issues around privacy, security, and safety differently. While Germany and its federal States follow a more strict policy regarding storage and analysis of learners’ and educators’ data, other educational institutions experience more freedom with regards to public-private partnerships for the purpose of data analysis and data sharing. Different standards and their application to different (open) educational formats sometimes call for a distinction between “users” and “students” and most laws were not written with digital or online education in mind (Hutchens et al. 2016). As with all other questions of online governance, the impact of a single nation or even a supra-national union is limited due to the interconnectedness of the web. Supra-national policies like the European plea for Open Access and Open Science (European Commission Research and Innovation 2016), national initiatives like the German call for use of Open Educational Resources (OER) (European Commission EPALE 2016) and the US policy forming around #GoOpen (Office of Educational Technology 2016) should be saluted and simultaneously critically examined for potential societal benefits, possible negative impacts on educational systems’ stakeholders. Lock-in effects might loom ahead – the recently announced cooperation between the US Department of Education and Amazon is an example – and they should be proactively examined as well as threats regarding the privacy, safety, and security of both educators and learners.

Open learning formats like [ds106 Site](#), [Phonar Site](#), and [Phonarnation Site](#) are breaking ground for new ideas around Open Education. They form around the idea of an open web and they use tools and software that are available, both proprietary and Open Source. Among others, formats like these clearly address the need for privacy, security, and safety in open education. Initiatives form [University of Mary Washington](#) around concepts

like the “Domain of One’s Own” and they make strong claims regarding the ownership of a personal space on the web, of control over one’s digital identity. However, the number of educational institutions invested in these initiatives and the number of learners represent only a small percentile of the overall online education “market.”

Simultaneously, end-to-end encryption technologies in messaging apps like WhatsApp or iMessage are on the rise. These developments are rooted in the increasing adoption of alternative messaging systems like Signal, Telegram, Wickr, or Threema by users, and they reflect a slight consumer trend towards privacy. Again, this serves as a supporting argument for Doctorow’s thoughts on “Peak Indifference” from 2016.

It is startling that neither technologies nor larger issues like privacy, security, safety, and surveillance are on top of the agendas of policy makers, educational institutions, educators, and suppliers of educational technology. This has several reasons: a lack of expertise among policy makers, a lack of lobbying for privacy and security with regards to online education, a lack of interest from suppliers of technology due to the supposed lack of a business model, but also a reluctance to question and change practices as well as user behavior at large (Gibbs 2016).

On the contrary: educational institutions and policy makers see digital and online education as a chance to implement Learning Analytics software that enables them to personalize learning (or better: personalize teaching) in order to address a learner’s weak spots. Learning Analytics is supported by various trends, of which a few shall be named here: a Big Data hype, a growing concern of rising costs, an increasing number of learners, and the idea of predicting a learner’s success before he or she has even started his or her studies (The New Media Consortium 2016). Learning Analytics can serve as a canvas for more encompassing questions with regards to the interdependency of Open Education, surveillance, privacy, and security: Are educators, learners, and society willing to give up personal information and data on sensitive issues like their learning processes and intellectual progress? For what

purposes and under which regulations? Who do they trust with handling and securing their data against possible infringements? For how long should this data be stored and by whom? Which security measures need to be applied and who is data being exchanged and shared with? Which business models are deemed acceptable? How can educators provide private, safe, and secure spaces for discourse, for open questioning and learning in an increasingly privacy-infringing learning environment? How can one teach and learn openly while maintaining safety and security? How are spaces for “stupid questions” provided, and how is the “right to be forgotten” maintained in a world where every data point, every interaction, and every wrong answer can be indexed, archived, linked, tracked, and potentially associated with a learner’s digital footprint? Following up on these questions is complex and messy and there seems to be an endless pool of perspectives, opinions, and scientific disciplines that can contribute meaningful insights and findings. To bundle and cluster these findings alongside Open Education and safety, it is proposed to follow three strands of inquiry and questioning:

1. Privacy, Security, and Safety: Content and Resources
2. Privacy, Security, and Safety: Infrastructure and Technology
3. Privacy, Security, and Safety: Governance and Strategy

These proposed strands of inquiry draw upon a workshop the author co-facilitated at the Open Educational Resources conference #OER16 Conference Site in April 2016 in Edinburgh, Scotland. They reflect conversations and findings from the conference as well as comments and results of a follow-up workshop at the Disruptive Media Learning Lab at the University of Coventry.

Privacy, Security, and Safety: Content and Resources

Questions around openness, privacy, safety, security, and surveillance can be posed from various

perspectives and angles. Many of the discourses in the realm of openness revolve around content and courseware – the emphasis of Open Educational Resources is exemplary. The availability of well-edited, factual content seems to be less and less an issue. The community dedicated to the ideals of an open web works relentlessly on making content and resources available online. Wikipedia, with all its questions around governance, community, equality, and equity, is among the most-cited examples for this trend, but there are countless initiatives in the realm of Open Data, Open Science, and Open Access that work on making content and resources accessible to Open Education and society as a whole, both regarding their content and their technical forklability.

However, questions remain regarding content, resources, and safety: What has a content-driven approach to safety in Open Education to offer? How can content be used as a lever to promote safety, security, and privacy in Open Education? What endangers Open Education and safety from this perspective? The most prominent answer might be that content and topics of education should never ignore issues of privacy, safety, and security. Any educator and her institution should address questions on safety and raise learners' awareness of them. In every Massive Open Online Course on computer science or coding, there should be a module on ethics, surveillance, privacy, and security. In every open class that is held online, there should be remarks regarding exposure, hints at both the risks and the threats of working collaboratively online, but also of the potentials and gains that this practice can entail. Privacy, security, safety, and surveillance need to be embedded in every online offering just as there is a fire escape plan with clear signage and instructions in every classroom. This cannot exclude content.

Educators around the world need to share and research good practices of how content-driven initiatives for safety, privacy, and security affect their learners' percipience and behavior with even more rigor and intensity. Which content and which resources were proven to affect behavior? Which resources had a counter-effect and why?

Any open educator should feel and respond to an obligation of pointing their learners to these issues, of course not only via content and resources but also in everyday behavior. Anyone funding research in the realm of educational technology and resources needs to include aspects like privacy, security, and safety in their calls.

Also, following Doctorow's concept of "Peak Indifference," the Open Education community should not stop its efforts to educate stakeholders and policy makers on these issues on the one hand but to also act on their emphasis of learners' safety. Surveillance, safety, privacy, and security cannot be separated from any other topic in the realm of the "digital,"- so why should they be separated from content and resources in education?

A reduction of openness and safety on content alone is neither sufficient nor practical, but content and resources can be leveraged especially when dealing with issues like privacy, safety, security, and surveillance. As with many other ideas of openness, content and resources can serve as Trojan Horses to foster dialogue and critique in the realm of Open Education and safety.

Privacy, Security, and Safety: Infrastructure and Technology

Questions on Open Education, privacy, safety, and security cannot be separated from issues around infrastructure and technology in teaching and learning, both regarding software and hardware. Learners and educators produce and provide sensitive data, they expose themselves to educators and institutions, they trust their learning communities and, in open formats, they are exposed to the public. Especially in open online education, learners often lose the right to be forgotten, the right to be wrong, and the right to a learning curve even though all of these are essential elements of learning themselves. Technology and infrastructure must be designed in a way that provides an appropriate amount of safety, security, and privacy (as a counterpart to surveillance). Still, there is a large potential in learning and teaching

openly, in networks and rhizomes, and in exchange and negotiation, which can only be tapped if learners interact with and expose themselves to their learning community. Related questions then are: How can educators and learners interact and co-create using online infrastructure but still retain the right to safety, security, and privacy? What are good practices in using software and hardware for purposes of teaching and learning openly without giving up control over safety, security, and privacy? What can software, hardware, and infrastructure provide to ensure and foster both learning in open communities and safety of individuals? How can an open and safe online learning environment be shaped?

Educators and educational institutions need to have the right and the ability to fork and adjust learning environments as their role in Open Education entails responsibility for the learning community and their learners' safety. Educators and their institutions need the capacity and agency to decide on issues related to infrastructure, learning environments, and safety. They need trusted independent bodies to advise and guide them in this process, in which there so often is no clear right or wrong answer but rather shades and nuances.

Learning and teaching software infrastructure needs to be thoroughly documented and transparent so that both educators, their institutions, and learners are put in a position from which they can consciously decide on risks, potentials, and possible outcomes. Educators have the agency to answer questions on ownership of content (both provided by the educator and the learner) and on ownership and processing of learners' data and without being at the mercy of the software industry and software providers' inconsistent business models. How can educators be provided and supported with expertise, agency, and time to consciously position themselves in this context?

Ignoring questions around infrastructure and technology leads to learning environments that facilitate discrimination and judging, that put learners in a position that they regret later on. Certainly, these issues can be resolved and handled responsibly and in a way that enables all educators to learn from one another. It is the

responsibility of all open educators and their institutions to bring these solutions forward, to foster dialogue around them, and to jointly collaborate in order to offer safe, secure, and private infrastructure which enables open teaching practices. The education community should not seek refuge under the umbrella of education technology corporations whose main responsibility is seen in the quest for a business model. Rather, the Open Education community needs to exchange concepts, ideas, and research as well as software that enables educators to teach and facilitate in open educational settings without putting their learners and themselves in the risk of exposure, discrimination, and setbacks by a choice of software and technology. How can we use software and information technology to teach and learn openly and still be safe from discrimination, exposure, and indexing?

Privacy, Security, and Safety: Governance and Strategy

Governance and strategy, legal frameworks, and ethical guidelines play major roles in the context of Open Education, privacy, security, and safety. Neither issues around Open Education, content, and resources nor issues around Open Education, infrastructure, and technology can be resolved without elaborate and well-reasoned governance structures and strategies on supra-national, national, federal, local, and institutional levels. Openness, security, safety, and privacy are not binary – one can only reason, judge, and work towards states of openness and safety. It therefore becomes clear that there is a dire need for fair and responsible governance and strategy making in the realm of Open Education. While governance and strategy can describe and advise on procedural levels there are also moral and ethical arguments and principles to be considered in the realm of Open Education and privacy.

Ethical and moral arguments are reasoned for with a specific set of cultural values and norms as starting points while governance is often understood as a standardization of norms, processes, and desired outputs and outcomes. However,

both areas, governance and ethics, can and should be analyzed for potentially transferable key findings. If generalizations of good practices are detectable, these might then be transferred to other areas and implemented in different contexts. In Open Education, there might be much to be learned with regards to safety from developments in the realm of open source software, from community management in large social networks, from the collection of personal biometric information in countries all over the world, from different models of democratic governance, or from ideas and concepts related to open governance. Especially from a safety- and security-perspective, governance models around the world might provide valuable insights; they might trigger new approaches to governance and strategy making on all levels related to (open) education.

Especially on an institutional level, governance and strategy for Open Education potentially serve as protection of educators who teach openly. One should not expect open educators to understand every detail of infrastructure and software, of data security, or of potential discrimination as they remain experts in their field and will most likely not convert to become IT security specialists. Governance, institutional strategy, laws, regulations, and ethical guidelines can provide a reasonably safe and secure scenario for educators in their efforts to offer an open infrastructure.

When Open Education, safety, security, and privacy are not explicitly mentioned in governance guidelines, strategy papers, and funding criteria, this ignorance exposes educators, their institutions, and consequently their learners to a position of uncertainty and risk. Researchers and educators as well as policy makers on all levels have a mandate and an obligation to collaborate and collect practices and findings around governance and strategy in order to assist future efforts in this realm. How can governance and strategy support Open Education and safety? How do we govern and still create open spaces for learning and teaching? How much governance is needed in order to provide safe, secure, and private Open Education scenarios and protect those participating in them?

Call to Action

In 2013, a “Bill of Rights and Principles for Learning in the Digital Age” was introduced by online educators (Corcoran 2013). Three years later, it is up to educators and researchers to foster and facilitate a debate around Open Education, safety, security, and privacy and to exchange practices, research, and ideas that work towards goals in Open Education. Especially with a narrative of privatization and commercialization in mind that presents many formats and courses masked as Open Education, it becomes clear that a community of open educators should keep on trying to balance the scale at least. By failing to address issues around safety, security, and privacy in the realm of Open Education, educators will exclude those who desperately seek exactly that and any failure to address these issues is in conflict with the principles of Open Education. Open Education has the potential to enable, empower, and connect educators and learners to exchange and debate openly, to collaborate and to co-create, and to transfer learnings to new subject areas and problems. In failing to address safety, security, and privacy, educators will fail Open Education.

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Open Educational Practices

- [Open Digital Practices, An Overview of](#)
- [Open Educational Resources](#)

Open Educational Resources

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Synonyms

[Creative commons licensing](#); [Educational technology](#); [Open access](#); [Open education](#); [Open educational practices](#); [Pedagogy](#)

Introduction

For many in education, the term Open Educational Resources or OER probably translates functionally as “free resources on the Internet.” But this shorthand provides only a partial definition which obscures some of the key features and questions of interest that drive the “OER movement,” as the community of practitioners and

scholars who are engaged with OER are often described. For example, how can educational resources be “free”? What is the significance of their “openness”? How do they get on the Internet? Also, what should we make of the fact that there is a “prehistory” of openness in education which predates current digital versions?

Along with their parent category, Open Education, OER belong to a pantheon of technology-enabled “opening” movements, including Open Source Software and Open Access that act as drivers for openness, collaboration, and transparency, yet tend to operate as “silos”, with each aiming to act upon a specific domain of knowledge and practice. Adoption of open approaches can make an enormous contribution in education but challenges, barriers, and threats abound. While the sharing and reuse of open resources is widely accepted as a “good idea” (and promoted by prominent international organizations such as UNESCO and the OECD), this has not yet led to widespread adoption. Education rests upon the communication, exchange, and critique of ideas, so to advocate for “openness” in this space is, in a sense, rather uncontroversial. Yet, although few would say they are against openness in principle, specific forms of openness can struggle to gain traction, and OER has arguably been one of these.

Research into the use of OER by educators and their students also suggests engagement can be hampered in various ways, for instance by inequitable access to connectivity and bandwidth; technical and skills barriers; restrictive or unclear institutional policies; and lack of time or reward (Windle et al. 2010; Browne et al. 2010; Rolfe 2012; Atenas et al. 2014; Schuwer et al. 2014; Havemann et al. 2014). While awareness of these issues and concerns is important, they are not the focus of this entry. Instead my aim is to contextualize and then closely examine OER, so as to provide an overview both of what they are and why educators should take an interest in them.

Educational Openness

Openness in education is not fundamentally digital, although increasingly in the current era,

educational practices labeled as *open* are technology enabled. Yet it is worth noting that discussions of “open learning” and initiatives to make education more accessible did not originate with the OER movement. As Peter and Deimann (2013) indicate, popular movements to democratize access to knowledge have taken historically specific shapes. They trace the roots of what we might today refer to as “open education” back to the late Middle Ages, when the rise of literacy kindled a public desire for access to knowledge and discuss a series of historical phenomena, including the development of correspondence schools, which can be understood as precursors to today’s digitized forms of open education.

Educational adoption of the term *open* came into common use in the second half of the twentieth century, when institutions such as the UK’s Open University were created specifically with a mission to open up access to formal higher-education qualifications. Such institutions have tended to waive or relax the usual prerequisite entry requirements and typically offer programs through distance and part-time modes, making study accessible to groups such as working adults, stay-at-home parents and caregivers, and those who live far from campuses. By offering the option to attain a traditional qualification via non-traditional routes, these institutions have played a key role in widening access and participation, thereby fostering the intellectual development and economic opportunity of their students (Peters et al. 2012).

Following the development of the World Wide Web, the idea of being *open* (in education and elsewhere) has increasingly become associated with digital content and practices. Through the 1990s, Open Source Software (which the web itself had been built upon) began to challenge the preeminence of the business model of the corporate software vendor. In academia, an emergent Open Access movement was beginning to question why research outputs, particularly those from publicly funded institutions, should be locked away behind publisher paywalls. The Budapest Open Access Initiative (2002) summed up their position as follows:

An old tradition and a new technology have converged to make possible an unprecedented public good. The old tradition is the willingness of scientists and scholars to publish the fruits of their research in scholarly journals without payment, for the sake of inquiry and knowledge. The new technology is the internet. The public good they make possible is the world-wide electronic distribution of the peer-reviewed journal literature and completely free and unrestricted access to it by all scientists, scholars, teachers, students, and other curious minds.

Meanwhile, the idea that educational content could be digital and freely available had been trialed in the form of Reusable Learning Objects (McGreal 2004). At the same time, the new ubiquity of desktop computing (at least, in First World academic institutions) enabled rapid expansion in the production of digital content by individual educators, as well as institutional initiatives, which potentially might be easily shared online.

In 2001, one such institution, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), took the bold step of announcing it would be releasing much of its digital learning content, packaged up as self-study “courseware,” under the auspices of the MIT OpenCourseWare (OCW) initiative. While OCW was widely characterized as “putting courses online,” MIT made it clear that OCW is content only and does not include “teaching” (communication with, or assessment by, MIT staff). This content was simply being made freely available for noncommercial use by students, teachers, and anyone else with an interest, anywhere. This, more than any other single phenomenon, provided a template for OER.

OER Definitions and Debates

In 2002, UNESCO convened a “Forum on the Impact of Open Courseware for Higher Education in Developing Countries” to discuss how MIT’s approach could be scaled up into an international network of open content redistribution that would be inspired by, but not restricted to, OCW. The delegates at this event coined the phrase “Open Educational Resources” and stated this term should be understood to mean:

The open provision of educational resources, enabled by information and communication technologies, for consultation, use and adaptation by a community of users for non-commercial purposes (UNESCO 2002, p. 24).

The OER movement was thus officially born and has since been making the case for educational materials to be available “to all” and assisting educators to locate content which they can freely adapt without “reinventing the wheel” (Smith and Casserly 2006; OECD 2007; Caswell et al. 2008).

Significantly, the concept of OER that the UNESCO forum participants defined encompasses much smaller-scale forms of content, as well as the OCW model of whole courses’ worth. Weller (2010) has usefully characterized and contrasted these subsets as “*Big and Little OER*.” This expanded scope is significant. Larger-scale projects such as OCW and, more recently, Massive Open Online Courses (MOOCs) and Open Textbooks typically are made possible through provision of dedicated institutional resourcing and expertise. Conversely, individual educators, often lacking both the significant time and technical skills necessary to develop larger-scale resources, nonetheless produce a wide array of learning resources. The decision to include such small-scale resources therefore reflected a large-scale ambition: the OER movement would seek to engage individual educators (as well as institutions) in sharing their own resources and reusing and repurposing those of others. This set the stage for definitions and discussions of the nature and purpose of OER to proliferate.

Each element of the phrase *Open Educational Resources* contains potential for differences in interpretation and emphasis. Working back from the noun *resources*, one can note that OER definitions frequently include lists of examples of the types of things that are considered a resource. Here the main differences hinge upon the question of how inclusive the definition wishes to be; so educator-produced learning materials, such as slidesets, videos, or documents, are always “in” but granular-level units of content, such as photographs, may not be. Resources that are primarily

provided for the use of other educators such as syllabi and lesson plans are only sometimes mentioned but probably uncontroversial inclusions. Datasets are rarely listed in definitions but can certainly be viewed as a type of educational resource, while software and systems, which might reasonably be understood as things of a different kind from *resources*, are also sometimes present. The meaning of *resource* is furthermore contingent on the way the qualifying term *educational* has been interpreted. Although *educational* can suggest something produced specifically for the purpose of education, in the context of OER it is perhaps more usual, and useful, to include any resource that is put to educational use: therefore, any list of examples can never be exhaustive.

Notwithstanding OER scholars’ propensity for generating new definitions, there is widespread agreement with the key points of the original UNESCO definition. That is, it is generally understood that the term OER should refer to *freely available digital resources*, which have been released under some form of *open license* (in practice, almost always one of the Creative Commons licenses) that explicitly grants permission for both *use and adaptation*.

Assuming then that OER is best understood as a diverse category, we could say its contents are united by both educational use and *openness*. But openness itself is not an entirely obvious attribute. As Pomerantz and Peek (2016) note, the polyvalence of the term *open* has experienced rapid expansion in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. Consequently, the meaning of *open* in any given usage tends to be both contextual and contested. The particular use of *open* in OER reflects deep concern with good practice in intellectual property and authorship, and therefore in licensing resources and granting of nonrestrictive permissions. The use of such licenses removes the ambiguity of permission that occurs when resources are simply made available without explicit licensing – which may or may not confer tacit permission to link to, or re-upload elsewhere, but cannot be assumed to imply any permission to adapt, translate, or mash up.

Open therefore, crucially, does not equate to completely unrestricted, and what it means in the

context of a given resource will depend on exactly which open license is in effect. Wiley's (n.d.) Open Content Definition has been highly influential in this regard. Wiley proposed that open content such as OER should permit the "5 Rs":

1. *Retain – the right to make, own, and control copies of the content (e.g., download, duplicate, store, and manage)*
2. *Reuse – the right to use the content in a wide range of ways (e.g., in a class, in a study group, on a website, in a video)*
3. *Revise – the right to adapt, adjust, modify, or alter the content itself (e.g., translate the content into another language)*
4. *Remix – the right to combine the original or revised content with other material to create something new (e.g., incorporate the content into a mashup)*
5. *Redistribute – the right to share copies of the original content, your revisions, or your remixes with others (e.g., give a copy of the content to a friend)*

From this perspective, *open/closed* is best understood as a continuum rather than a simple binary; the greater the restrictiveness of the license used, the fewer permissions are granted, and therefore the less open a resource becomes (Wiley 2009).

The Creative Commons (2016) licensing framework has become the gold standard for the OER community as it provides a comprehensive range of options, from completely open (public domain) through open but *requiring attribution* and various combinations of attribution with the addition of one or more of the further restrictions: *non-commercial*, *no derivatives*, and *share-alike*. In accordance with Wiley's principles, content released under licenses which include the *no derivatives* restriction are not seen as truly open, as this restriction prohibits revising and remixing. The widespread acceptance of Wiley's 5 Rs and adoption of Creative Commons licensing together provide a "fleshed out" sense of exactly how openness should operate across the OER lifecycle.

Although broad agreement has therefore been reached in the OER community on how openness

applies in the context of OER, this has not, as yet, effected truly widespread transformation of educators' practices. This is not to deny that educators frequently do share resources online, but this is often done without explicitly licensing, or else applying the default license (typically, "all rights reserved") when using social sharing platforms. Assuming their intention is for these resources to be reused or adapted by others, this perhaps reflects a need for greater awareness of copyright and licensing practices. But this also may reflect a tension around the nature of openness that the OER movement has found difficult to resolve.

Educators who share or reuse "without a license" are, arguably, already aligned with the wider purpose of the OER movement and yet are seen as operating outside of it. For Amiel and Soares (2016), there are two notions of "the commons" in play here: the legal and the social. While it is true that open licenses provide a robust solution for contributing works to a legal commons, this is not the primary motivation for sharing. Perhaps (in addition to the challenges associated with selecting licenses and platforms that sometimes make licensing complex or unclear) sharing is more likely driven by a commitment to the social commons. This issue, amongst others, points to the need for a greater understanding of educational practices in relation to OER and, potentially, for more fluidity in the way we understand and discuss openness.

The Turn to "Open Educational Practices"

Much of the discussion about OER in its initial decade has tended to be "resource focused." Perhaps inevitably, as a movement for opening content, OER has tended to put content at the centre of the discussion. Thus, much attention has been paid to practical questions regarding the wider resource lifecycle: sharing, storing, discovery, enabling use and reuse, leading on to subsequent sharing of the repurposed version, and so on. Another significant strand of research has considered the quality and sustainability of open resources and how these might be ensured.

While these are important topics and pose questions that are by no means resolved, this resource focus has, at times, tended to obscure the complexity of human endeavor involved in resource creation, discovery, modification, and consumption – and indeed, in the process of education generally, which after all, consists of much more than resources. While enrolled students undeniably benefit from access to a variety of copyright and open resources via their library (and indeed, Google), curriculum, context, assessment, and credentials also matter, as do conversation, collaboration, and the forging of relationships with intellectual peers and mentors. In response to these concerns, OER scholars have argued for adoption of the term “Open Educational Practices” (OEP), in order to place the focus on the open educational activities of individuals and communities (Andrade et al. 2011; Cronin 2016; Ehlers 2011). However, this new concept is perhaps even more slippery than OER to define, as OEP gives rise to the same issues with the polyvalence of the term *open*, only more so.

The turn from OER to OEP is less of a question of licensing and more one of ethos. This does not represent a radical break with the OER movement; indeed, OEP is often discussed in close relation to OER. However, the value of OEP as a concept is in its more wide-ranging remit. An influential definition has been given by Andrade et al. (Andrade et al. 2011) who state:

OEP are defined as practices which support the (re) use and production of OER through institutional policies, promote innovative pedagogical models, and respect and empower learners as co-producers on their lifelong learning path (p.12).

This suggests OEP is most usefully understood as a lens for looking at practice rather than an itemized list of relevant activities.

OEP consist not only of creating and reusing OER but also of other forms of transparency around academic practice, such as blogging, tweeting, presenting, and debating scholarly and pedagogic activities, in ways that promote reflection, reusability, revision, and collaboration. OEP can be tactics for developing and strengthening communities of practice and disseminating positive ways of working, as well as leveraging open

resources and innovative pedagogies. The initial wave of MOOCs provide an illustrative example, as they were driven by a connectivist pedagogy, which assumes that learning should be driven by interaction, debate, and reflection amongst participants (McAuley et al. 2010). Assessment practices can also be opened, for example, by asking students to create work to be shared beyond the usual audience of the assessor(s), and sometimes classmates, and thereby “adding value” to the wider world (Wiley 2013; DeRosa 2016; Hendricks 2015). In inviting us to revisit educational openness in all its forms, OEP helps us to understand and leverage the benefits specific forms of openness confer, to seek synergies between them, and to ask “why not open this?”

The concept of OEP therefore constitutes more than a fresh take on working with OER. It seeks to frame considerations of how and why people choose to author and learn with open resources, and the practices involved in their selection and modification, but also, importantly, to direct attention to practices that are less about resources; that instead act to open educational spaces or open other spaces *for* education.

Conclusion

In attempting to build a bridge into a future where educational resources are freely and openly available to all who seek knowledge, whether this might be for the purpose of self study, for learning collaboratively with others, or for teaching, the OER movement has presented us with an important vision. But a resource-focused vision of education can only see pieces of a larger puzzle. Without integrating a sense of the complexity of practice, and of the history and commitments underpinning forms of educational openness, there is a risk that advocating for resources to be open is seen as an end in itself. That said, articulating the overarching goal of the OER movement is not straightforward.

Certainly, the argument has been made that educational resources in digital form can and should be made openly and freely available and that this contributes towards a wider project of

opening access to education. But it is important to recognize that providing access to OER, in itself, increases access to educational material, rather than “education.” The recent shift of focus to consider *practices* is recognition that it is not only resources that can and should be opened. Licensing and resource lifecycle management concerns must not overshadow the more fundamental discussion about why resources should be open in the first place. Returning to Weller’s distinction between big and little OER, big OER continues to thrive, even if OCW has ceded its place in the spotlight to MOOCs and Open Textbooks. But mainstream adoption of sharing and reuse of little OER has proven a tougher nut to crack. To achieve its desired ends, there needs to be wider recognition that openness in education is not a movement for the emancipation of resources but of people and practice. Through this improved understanding, it is hoped that the cause of open education – to disseminate knowledge, strengthen communities of practice, and promote innovative pedagogies – can be further advanced.

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Open Educational Resources (OER)

- [Defining Openness in Education](#)

Open Learning

- [Defining Openness in Education](#)
- [Distance Education](#)

Open Pedagogy

- [Open Education, Privacy, Security, and Safety: Call to Action](#)

Open Politics and Education

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Introduction

The educational dimensions of Openness elicit very strong and impassioned responses. On the one hand are Open activists and advocates, who see the promises of open, especially those arising with digital and distributed networked technologies, as the panacea to a lot of contemporary challenges at building just, fair, and safe educational platforms. Openness, for them, encompasses a wide spectrum of processes, values, and ideologies, ranging from calls for dismantling the classroom to the augmentation of existing pedagogic practices that would change the inequalities of power and inequities of ownership that are identified as key critiques of the modernist-capitalist university framework. On the other hand are the Open skeptics, who point out that the unbridled celebration of openness is both utopian and unsustainable. Eschewing the idea of the Open as an alternative, they are quick to point out that open is equally constructed by positions of power and can often be exclusionary and discriminatory, toward those who do not offer themselves to be opened up. Openness, in these discourses, emerges as a powerful force but not innocent of the erosion of agency and engagement that it seeks out to correct. The conversation between these two factions is often heated and confrontational. However, taking sides necessitates the production of Openness as a black box, where instead of being a method and an instrument to achieve larger principles and ideals, Openness becomes the very object of inquiry and the lens through which it is studied. We need to rescue Openness from this mystical status and map it at various levels of lived and embodied reality to produce it as an intersectional standpoint that addresses the promises and perils of Openness in education.

Main Text

Openness has been one of the most ubiquitous characteristics, attributes, and promises of the emerging digital technologies. The “Open Everything” movements that have come to symbolize the alternative possibilities and the democratic potentials of the Internet and digital computation have heralded Openness as a prerequisite for building fair, just, equal, and safe societies. Especially as we move toward networked realities that are governed by the invisible presence of algorithmic governance and big data descriptors, there is a clear idea that the only sustainable future of our digital ecosystems and the contingent orders of social, political, and economic structuring is in building open systems. Open Data, Open Hardware, Open Software, Open Societies, Open Governance, Open Access, Open Education, Open Governance, Open Content, and Open Science – the list is almost endless, and there seems to be an easy and reasonable presumption that sufficing almost any process of knowledge production, information governance, informatics processing, and meaning making by “Open” would result into a more egalitarian system that is inclusive, affordable, and nondiscriminatory. So strong is this rhetoric of the Open as Good, that Openness easily gets conflated with other desirable ideologies of free, simple, moral, accountable, transparent, responsible, responsive, equal, equitable lives. Almost militantly, Openness has emerged as a space for resistance, as a strategy for appropriation, as a moment of experimentation and innovation, as a process of construction, and a metaphor for participative, democratic, and inclusive practices of living.

The educational potentials of building open systems are often presented as commonsense to those who believe that information is a public resource and should not be commodified for private profits by informatics corporations. The social promise of Openness in education allows activists to conjure utopias where existing problems of discrimination and exclusion could be reconfigured to create equal and tolerant learning spaces for the future. The economic entrepreneurs have persistently argued that open systems offer

new spaces for social, political, and personal interaction and action, allowing alternative currencies, markets, values, worth, and commodities which can be created for the betterment of educational structures. Across a variety of disciplines ranging from law and medicine to humanities and arts, it has been found that open as a methodological process of reaching decisions is more robust and less prone to error than specialized knowledge created by the institutionally appointed fountainheads, thus destabilizing the very core of “expert-driven knowledge” that our current educational models are premised upon.

The landmark experiment conducted by *Nature* magazine in 2005 that showed how, in a random sample of entries selected from Wikipedia and the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, the rate of error was so comparable that the difference was negligible has most significantly shown the power of collaborative knowledge production (Giles 2005). Experiments with crisis and disaster mapping across the world, where communities have been able to report news that is otherwise censored or made invisible, have shown that when it comes to new curricula building, user-generated content through social media can offer a scope and scale that is unprecedented in hidebound academia. The emergence of open-source movements has shown that the “wisdom of crowds” is more reliable when it comes to forming complex, iterative, recursive, and self-learning systems of computation and networking. Sociologists point out that the emergence of social media networks and sharing economies has changed the ways in which people think of themselves, but also, most tellingly, how they think about the worlds that they occupy – be they the virtual connections with strangers on Facebook, or the chance encounters in the augmented reality of Pokémon Go, where they intersect with others wandering in search of mythical monsters on the streets. In arts and culture productions, open movements have now created YouTube celebrities who garner more influence and power than certain academic canons. The rise of file-sharing networks driven by peer-to-peer technologies has destabilized the primary capitalist models of knowledge economies and is forcing for an ever-increasing demand for

open repositories of knowledge to be built and be made available for free like other natural and fundamental resources. The rights to universal access and ironically the right to be forgotten are both being championed as a part of the third generation of human rights, dramatically impacting the geopolitics of knowledge consumption, production, and interaction (Davidson and Goldberg 2010).

Even as it is easy to empathize with the Openness advocates who promise that opening up data and information, processes and practices, structures, and systems of life and living will create the worlds that we want to stand for, there are also strong voices that exercise caution when it comes to this unbridled celebration of Openness. The obvious detractors of universal openness and open education have been the older social, political, and economic centers who have been trying to adapt to these rapidly changing landscapes by evolving as well as putting limits on the scope and scale of Openness. Thus, while governments across the world are signatories to various treaties that promote openness, they put a very clear statute of limitations on information that needs to be protected and policed, giving us the exemplary stories of the persecution of Edward Snowden and the continued suspicion of spaces like Wikileaks. Social media have faced a severe backlash from the traditional structures of fundamental beliefs, where the emergence of new bodies with new voices, sprouting hashtags ranging from #BlackLivesMatter to #EverydaySexism, has led to extreme bullying, intimidation, and violence which has now been embodied in predatory practices of slut shaming and the systemic intolerance that was exhibited in #GamerGate. The emergence of alternative currencies and peer-to-peer connectivity has had the older forms of knowledge capital and social worth challenged so that learning is more amorphous and eccentric. Opening up individual data can be exploited by private companies like Google and Amazon that are able to build predictive futures based on minute and often invisible information that is harvested from an individual without their consent. The neoliberal university often finds itself in cohorts with these companies, thus

exposing their students to data capture without consent. Learning spaces where this data is available for public consumption without any restrictions can also lead to the rise of social vigilantes as we have seen in the case of public mobbing in human flesh search engines in Northeast Asia and in bullying and doxing on queer teenagers on physical and virtual campuses.

However, even outside of these obvious resistances, there is another set of voices that warns us that Openness is a privilege rather than a natural state of data reality – Open activists who work with heavily underserved social and political groups have told us stories of people being persecuted, threatened, and identified through open geo-location data that puts the vulnerable populations in conditions of immediate extinction. The recent dismissal of academics in Turkey, following their alleged involvement with the coup against a dictatorial government, or the suspension of students who participated in Occupy Movements from New York to Hong Kong, reminds us that the walled gardens of learning are fiercely being protected by punishing the people who seek to transgress the boundaries. Openness critiques have also pointed out that openness is an affordance that can only be granted to individuals who can be sure that opening their lives through data and information is not going to put them into conditions of danger or threat – a massive infrastructure of law, legislation, intermediary responsibilities, and checks and balances to curb totalitarian takeover of data and information needs to be put into place before we can bask in the glory of open systems and structures (Rajadhyaksha 2011). Unfortunately, more often than not, open data makes unsuspecting learners, with minimum or reduced digital literacy, to be at the mercy of those who can abuse their open data in the absence of clearly spelled protections for the individuals and the communities. Openness, as has been pointed out in the examination of State-sponsored mandatory biometric database citizen systems, or in the instance of private companies exploiting user data through ICT4D initiatives like Internet.org that harvests the next generation of global south users under the guise of providing them with free but limited access to

data connectivity, often forces people into being opened, without agency or consent, often leading to monopolizing the conditions of access and quality of education for those who do not understand what it means to be dwelling in the open (Luchs 2016).

On both the sides of the debates, there are disagreements and obviously different imaginations of the forms, formats, and functions of openness in education. It is fruitful to be not partisanly in these discussions and recognize that while openness is a principle that needs to be promoted, it is also a value that needs to be accompanied by protections for those who are made open. It is necessary to realize that at the heart of these debates is the unquestioned truth that Open is political. In many descriptions and deployment of open education movements, the idea of open is often reduced to mechanics, aesthetics, design, and development of open systems, pretending that Openness is a benign, neutral, or a technological principle. In these cases, the call for Openness is decoupled from the ambitions, intentions, and uses that are mounted on the opening of things and thus might often be counterintuitive to the basic impulse of Openness which is a manifesto – a call for actions oriented toward particular ideologies of better human life and governance. Openness is reduced to a process, an interface, a design principle, a tweak, and a blueprint of prescriptive tokenism that works through the rhetoric of access, presence, and interaction without actually enabling engagement and equity for the end users. The depoliticization of openness, in fact, works as an “Opaque Metaphor” (Chun 2008) where it pretends to have a descriptive relationship with the new futures that it is imagining, while it is a prescriptive process that seeks to stabilize and strengthen the invisible power structures that inform and shape it. It replaces politics with presence, accountability with transparency, action with access, rights with terms of services, and interaction with interface, thus producing a seeming agency of choice at the cost of freedom.

This ironical openness, which performs exactly appositionally to what it purports, is often facilitated by making Openness into a panacea black

box, where Openness appears as a mystical value that hides the actual actors, networks, and affects that operationalize it. This is when Openness, instead of becoming a means toward a particular aim, often becomes a goal unto itself. In many of the technocentric discussions of Open Education, there is a clear focus that the reward of building an open system is to have an open system. Little attention is paid to the potential abuses, pitfalls, dangers, and precariousness that these systems produce for all the stakeholders of learning. When critical questions are asked of these openness calls, the concerns are deflected by changing the site and location of openness.

Thus, a question about open processes in education – referring to exclusion, limited access, conditions of censorship, and unequal geopolitical safety – is addressed by talking about open principles, giving abstract buzzwords like participation, collaboration, engagement, and transformation.

A critique of open principles – drawing from material reality and the flawed operation of these principles that serve to strengthen the privileges of those who are marked by the affordances of digitality – is countered by evidence from material practices and lived realities, offering anecdotal responses to a structural critique.

Investigations on consequences of data on embodied lives – the infinite memory of the web, the additional responsibility of rhetorical debate, and exposing of one’s ideas beyond the scope of the immediate peer group – get transported to thinking about data objects as self-contained and simulation rather than representation, thus making openness a lab space rather than a lived system.

Openness, then, for both sides of the spectrum, remains a wicked problem where the nature, location, and intention of openness in education cannot be pinned down because it has condensed so many different modes and modalities into an inscrutable all-encompassing ethos. Openness, as is discussed in these instances, is the object of inquiry, the site of investigation, the lens of meaning making, and the location from which the question is asked.

One of the ways in which Openness can be examined against the political touchstones that

necessitated these Open Education movements is to triangulate it through three distinct standpoints that reify Openness. This capacity of Openness to be this moving target that changes its form and meaning in the very act of understanding it and engaging with it can be broken by thinking of Openness not as an abstract principle, but as residing in and bearing material and physical consequences on **objects, processes, and people**.

Thus, when faced with the question of Openness, it is important to realize the objects that would demonstrate openness. In the case of universities advocating for OpenCourseWare, for instance, the presence of closed hardware or proprietary software that ties the educational public resources to non-scaling and static infrastructure as we repeatedly see in the “Googlization of the world” (Vaidyanathan 2011), is counterintuitive to the principles of Openness. The objects that would be required to facilitate Open Education – code, protocols, platforms, and software – would have to subscribe to the ethical and technological standards of Openness, thus increasing the scope of OpenCourseWare beyond course content.

Similarly, when thinking of open processes, we could take the case of open access discussions. It is crucial to realize that open processes cannot merely be about end-user engagement with a finished result. The principles of openness would advocate that the openness has to be at the level where the communities that are being served by these processes, be involved at the very conception and inception of these open promises rather than as beta testers for the models that already foreclose the possibilities that might be the needs of the community. An open access process that builds a repository of privileged access for a selected public while promoting intellectual property rights regimes that penalize and punish unauthorized entries – like in the case of Aaron Swartz in his struggles with MIT, JStor, and the US Federal Government – cannot be deemed acceptable (Swartz et al. 2015).

On the third standpoint, it becomes important to realize that Openness is not just about information but about lived reality. Thus, in the case of open data, those who do not have the agency,

capacity, or the discretion to control and monitor how data about them is being used need to be protected. Students from contested geographies, when forced to enrol in the never-forgetting archives of the social web, can be put into condition precariousness and abuse, as gendered, racial, and sexual identification might subject them to regulation and stigma (Worth et al. 2015). Opening up people against their will and without their consent can damage our fundamental faith in the human rights to life and dignity. As we have seen repeatedly in cases of online surveillance, those who question the status quo and dare to resist the forces of neoliberal governments and universities are often identified and punished through massive surveillance systems that build continued profiles of these activists and protestors.

In the construction of these standpoints, what remains crucial for us is to understand that Openness is a powerful force that helps reconfigure several educational movements of life, labor, and language. However, the formulation of “Openness and Education” often leads to a skewed attention on the conditions of being open rather than the implications of Openness on education. Thus, Openness becomes an object of study rather than a toolkit of change making. It posits Openness as separated and discrete from the realm of educational impulses that transcend classrooms and shape our material and lived reality. Open Education, in this framework, becomes the object of technocentric solutionism that seeks to construct conditions of Openness in innovation and experimentation labs and sandboxes, excluding the politics and poetics of learning and reducing the Open in “Open Education” to merely a question of infrastructure and design (Irani et al. 2010). It is an imperative to think about Openness and its materiality to see how it can operationalize the critique and configuration of contemporary education – Openness as a standpoint where the ideas, ideals, and ideologies of the Open are in close syncopation with the logics, logistics, and logos of the educational structures that we occupy. Openness thus becomes intersectional, interdisciplinary, and reconciling the contradictions and the multiplicity of Open movements without

resolving them. Open Education becomes a space where we start to conceptualize Openness on a spectrum, mapping it on to the objects, processes, and people and transforming it into a material reality of learning rather than an administrative strategy of resource management.

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Open Universities

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Synonyms

Distance education; Distance teaching universities; E-learning; Online learning; Online universities; Open and distance learning

Introduction

Open universities is a collective term that encompasses higher education institutions that only operate a distance education model (referred to as using a single mode) rather than only, or also using, a traditional campus-based education model (institutions that use both are known as dual mode rather than single mode). They use communication technologies and large-scale operations and aim to offer greater flexibility and/or openness to studying at tertiary level to largely mature adults. Not all open universities carry open in their title and many universities offer distance teaching alongside campus-based teaching. Most students of open universities study part time compared to most campus-based students studying full time. Open universities are also driven by social idealism, economic pragmatism, and technological innovation and have been seen by some as disruptive innovations and necessary for the future of higher education. This is reflected in the fact that the majority are the product of national or regional government policy and planning in the last 50 years as part of the broader drive to widen participation in higher education and doing so by providing an alternative to the existing higher education institutions and their practices.

Origins

Distance education has a long and varied history. It was originally conceived and operated as correspondence teaching using the postal system to deliver teaching materials and convey assignments between students and tutors from the mid-nineteenth century onward. There was then some experimentation in the use of radio and television broadcasts for educational purposes in the early to mid-twentieth century (Peters 2008).

The concept of an “open university” as the second generation of distance education was developed through the establishment of the first university to use open in its title, The Open University (although first conceived of as a University

of the Air – Weinbren 2014). Also known as the British Open University or the United Kingdom Open University (UKOU), it was granted its Royal Charter by the UK Government in 1969 and admitted its first students in 1971. The initiative of a Labor Prime Minister, it arose out of three main, often long-standing, influences and philosophies, many of which have also been central to the establishment of subsequent open universities by regional or national governments.

The first, socioeconomic influence was the expansion of the higher education sector in the UK following the Robbins Report in the early 1960s, which coincided with worldwide moves to firstly widen access to, and secondly widen participation in, higher education as a means of social and economic advancement in a technological age, a trend which continues to this day. This desire to widen access was aimed not only at those already deemed qualified to enter higher education direct from secondary education but also to provide educational opportunities for those who did not have traditional secondary-level qualifications necessary to enter most universities and wanted to study later in life (which can be broadly framed as *lifelong learning*). In this respect the Labor movement was probably influenced by the setting up of Ruskin College Oxford in 1899 which has ever since aimed to provide campus-based university-standard education for working class people to empower them to act more effectively on behalf of working class communities and organizations.

A second influence was the prevailing debates throughout the twentieth century about the nature of (higher) education. This included reflections on previous models of distance education, which included correspondence courses, the establishment of the University of London External program in 1851, and the success of distance education initiatives in Russia in the 1920s and 1930s and UNISA in South Africa in the 1940s. It also included the debates that largely began in the 1960s about open education, open learning, and open schooling (an influence shaped by several different discourses around *open and distance education* over the following decades, much of which has taken place within a growing number of

books and journals devoted to open and distance education).

A final influence was the advent and widespread adoption of new communication technologies throughout the twentieth century, initially broadcast radio and television and latterly personal computing, mobile telephony, and the Internet, which led people to experiment and innovate around pedagogies based on many types of technology. While these technological developments were available to all universities, it has often been open universities that have been at the forefront of their use in higher education because they supported their large-scale industrial teaching model (e.g., the UKOU began using computer-mediated communication in some modules from 1988 and presented its first large-scale online module in 1999 – Weinbren 2014), although that is now changing as all higher education institutions use such technologies in one way or another (this is often described as *technology-enhanced learning*).

Next Steps

Since the establishment of the UKOU, around 70 single mode “open universities,” 55 with open in their title (e.g., Open University of Sudan, Madhya Pradesh Bhoj (Open) University in India) but some without (e.g., Athabasca University in Canada and Anadolu University in Turkey), have been set up in over 50 countries. Most are publicly funded and the product of governmental planning, but a few are private enterprises (e.g., Wawasan Open University in Indonesia). In some countries open universities have been set up as an umbrella organization that works with a number of dual mode universities (e.g., Open Universities in Australia); in one case an open university has been designed to serve the population of several countries (the Arab Open University), while a few universities are dual mode but with distance education being a significant part of their activity (e.g., Thompson Rivers University in Canada and Deakin University in Australia).

Most countries have a single open university (e.g., the UKOU is one of about 130 higher

education institutions in the UK); some large population countries have more than one (e.g., India has a single national open university and also 15 state-based open universities). Lastly, there is one global association (International Council for Open and Distance Education) and several regional associations (e.g., European Association of Distance Teaching Universities, Asian Association of Open Universities, etc.) to which the various open universities or distance teaching universities belong. Thus the organizational form of open universities varies (see Shale 1987, for an early typology) and continues to vary as higher education itself adapts to changes in economies and societies. However all have been hugely influenced by the evolving policies and practices of the UK Open University which set an ideological rationale, a pedagogical template, and an organizational model for the modern single mode distance teaching university.

The ideological rationale was encompassed by the UKOU's first Chancellor, Lord Crowther, who first gave meaning to what openness might mean for the UKOU (and possibly other open universities) when he said it would be "open as to people, places, methods and ideas" in his inaugural speech. This is still reflected in its mission, although how these four "opens" and openness in general are interpreted in practice by the UKOU (and other institutions) has changed and is changing further with the advent and discourse around open educational resources, open educational practices, and massive open online courses (McAndrew et al. 2010).

The pedagogical template was one of course teams of academics and media staff creating multiple media teaching materials (although print materials dominated) that addressed specified learning objectives, with groups of 15–25 students on a course allocated to a local tutor who provided some face-to-face tutorials supplemented by telephone tutorials, regular tutor-marked assignments with extensive feedback on them, and some courses having embedded 1-week residential schools (Peters 2008). The balance of media and modes of communication have since changed as technologies have evolved.

The organizational model was an "industrialized" one shaped by, and helping to shape, the pedagogical template. It aimed to produce teaching materials for courses through teams, use the existing communication infrastructure (postal service and telephony service), and employ tutors to teach groups of students so that in principle any number of students could study the same course presentation (Shale 1987). It also relied on "the organisation of the operating technological system: course creation, production and distribution, student services, management of tutors and counsellors, and quality control" alongside the more traditional university function of organizing research and teaching (Peters 2008).

Lifelong Learning

The overriding purpose of most open universities, often expressed in their aims or missions, is about providing greater educational opportunity for all in the name of personal and national development (Tait 2008). As noted earlier, the vast majority of them have been established by national or regional governments to provide an alternative route into tertiary education to the more numerous public and private campus-based universities. This has meant that they have contributed to the global desire to increase the participation rates in higher education as higher levels of national gross domestic product are correlated with higher levels of participation in higher education. At the same time this demand for wider participation in higher education globally is deemed to be unachievable through the expansion of traditional universities and that open universities should be part of the solution to meet that demand (Daniel et al. 2010).

Open universities have also been seen as principally serving mature students more than secondary school leavers, serving groups in society that have not traditionally attended campus-based universities, and enabling students with tertiary-level qualifications to take another such qualification to change career. Through all this time, open universities have been seen as important players in the policy and practice around the concepts of open learning, lifelong learning, flexible learning,

credit transfer, and the recognition of prior learning. They have also been central to defining openness in higher education as open entry, with just over half of open universities operating no entry requirements to (some of) their courses.

Open and Distance Education

While open universities might see open entry as a key feature of open education, what is meant when people talk about open education and distance education in the scientific and popular literature has varied over the past 50 years. Most recently these debates have been influenced by the emergence of open licensing (e.g., Creative Commons) kick-starting the open educational resources and practices movements and the advent of digital technologies promoting online or e-learning which has achieved global recognition through massive open online courses (MOOCs). In both cases open universities have not necessarily been the first movers in these innovations but have played a significant part as some of the distinctions between traditional universities and open universities have become more blurred, as noted by the many authors in Illyoshi and Kumar (2008). Two developments illustrate how issues of openness and education for all are bringing open universities and traditional universities closer together. The first was the establishment of the Open CourseWare consortium, latterly the Open Education Consortium, as a global body bringing a diverse set of higher education institutions, including some open universities, together and also involving bodies such as UNESCO and thus acting as a counterpoint to the specialist International Council for Open and Distance Education, which has consultative partner status with UNESCO. The second has been the genesis of MOOC platforms (e.g., Coursera, EdX) through which different universities, some dual mode, can run these “distance education” courses (many early MOOCs were designed with little reference to, or acknowledgment of, the long-standing research and experience in distance education and were often based on video lectures). While platforms based in the USA (where open

universities have not particularly taken root) were the front-runners in establishing MOOCs in the public eye, in Europe it has been FutureLearn (wholly owned by the UKOU) that has partnered with a significant number of traditional universities and is gaining more attention, while equally research into and experiences with MOOCs around the world are rediscovering the lessons learned by distance teaching institutions. Interestingly, the current “education for all” impact of extra mural or outreach activities, such as open education resources and MOOCs with their millions of subscribers, is an echo of the ongoing massive public reach of some open universities that (partly or almost wholly) teach through radio and television broadcasts.

Technology-Enhanced Learning

Open universities are reliant on technical media and communication technologies to operate their industrial teaching models. The most common media used for teaching purposes over the years are print, radio, television, audio and video cassettes, computers, correspondence, email, telephone, and fax. These equally rely upon a technological infrastructure provided by postal systems, telecommunication systems, and the Internet, all means by which teaching materials can be delivered or accessed remotely and by which there can be mediated communication (one-way, two-way, multi-way) between faculty and students. The balance and acceptability of these media and technologies have meant that the pedagogical approaches of open universities have changed and continue to change. It has also led to some open universities being named differently to reflect the prevailing technology (e.g., Egyptian E-Learning University), but equally some have gone the other way with the University of the Air Japan becoming the Open University of Japan. The greater accessibility, availability, acceptability, and affordability of technical media and communication technologies are making an ever greater impact on all higher education institutions, not just open universities or dual mode universities. Technology is clearly seen as

having a big role in the future of higher education; it is yet to be seen whether that is as an enhancement to the traditional campus-based model or through more universities becoming de facto, open universities.

Impacts

It is fair to say that open universities have received a disproportionate amount of attention compared to dual mode universities (Kaye and Rumble 1991), but it is equally fair to say that despite the constant and continued increase in their numbers, open universities have received significantly less attention than traditional universities from policy makers, the news media, and the public. Partly it is because they are very new institutions. Partly it is because there are far more campus-based higher education institutions and some countries still do not have an open university as such. Partly it is because much higher education policy focuses primarily on school leavers rather than mature adults and even where open universities are established to offer such opportunities to mature adults, retention and completion rates can be much lower than for campus-based institutions even though enrolment levels can be very much higher (Daniel (1999) coined the term Mega Universities for those with student populations greater than 100,000; most in this category are open universities). And, partly it is because cultural acceptance of distance education varies significantly around the world, both in terms of comparisons with traditional universities and in terms of how teaching and learning are viewed; and throughout there is questioning of the quality of distance education over campus-based education.

The different mode of operation of open universities and a stronger focus on their teaching rather than research missions means that they are not often included in national or international “league tables” or labeled as being different. Comparisons do happen sometimes and in some countries. The UKOU did feature in the 401-500 band in the Times Higher Education 2015-16 ranking of the top 800 universities globally, was generally placed in the top 50 UK universities for

the quality of its research under the Research Excellence Framework in 2014, and has also achieved a rating of 90% or higher every year in the UK-wide Student Satisfaction Survey and is one of only three higher education institutions to have achieved this consistently since it started in 2007. However this has been achieved after 45 years of operation and most open universities have much shorter track records. Although notably the Open Universiteit Nederland was proclaimed as “best university 2015” in the Netherlands, in the Dutch university guide, “Keuzegids Universiteiten” 30 years after it started teaching students. In some cases new open universities have built upon the UKOU’s global reputation to help build their own locally. For example, the Arab Open University has a number of degrees that both heavily draw upon UKOU modules and teaching materials but also has those degrees validated by the UKOU.

Teaching and learning cultures around the world are often dominated by the perception that face-to-face, classroom-based, and teacher-led lessons are better than reading teaching materials. This is often because some cultures venerate their professors and students would never dare to question them and their academic authority and may be wary of materials written by someone else whose academic authority is less well known. This is coupled with a strong behaviorist approach to teaching and learning in universities in many parts of the world, focusing on knowledge and understanding, rather than the constructivist approach to teaching and learning more prevalent in other cultures whereby students are expected to develop critical skills and questioning attitudes toward their subject. Because of these cultural views, some countries have statutory requirements for significant minimum classroom-based teaching times for courses that open universities must also abide by; and even in countries where distance education operates, the students prefer broadcast lectures over text-based teaching materials. However there can also be good reasons to use broadcast media in some countries due to the differences between the spoken and written language, where, for example, the pronunciation of words in Chinese or Japanese cannot easily be

presented in print because of the ideographic characters of their scripts.

Open universities are part of the higher education landscape and are likely to remain so given their origins in governmental policy. They have not displaced traditional campus-based universities but added an alternative model. It remains to be seen if open universities will play a greater role than they currently do, either nationally or internationally, as governments grapple with the growing costs of higher education and the changing expectations of their citizens in general and students in particular. While more and more higher education institutions do run distance education programs, mostly this is at postgraduate level, where there is less need to invest in the mechanisms to scale up these programs to large numbers of students. As well as avoiding the challenge of widening participation at scale, few dual mode institutions also operate open entry to their undergraduate courses as the most prominent open universities do. It is this philosophy of providing educational opportunity for all adults who can afford to register that is likely to remain the defining feature of open universities throughout the twenty-first century.

Cross-References

- ▶ [Defining Openness in Education](#)
- ▶ [Distance Education](#)
- ▶ [Educational Technology](#)
- ▶ [Educational Technology \(I\)](#)
- ▶ [Educational Technology \(II\)](#)
- ▶ [Open Distance Learning](#)
- ▶ [Open Education and Education for Openness](#)

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Open Works, Open Cultures, and Open Learning Systems

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Open Works

The idea of openness as a political, social, and psychological metaphor has been part of a set of enduring narratives in the West since the time before the flourishing of modern democracy, scientific communication, and the rise of the knowledge economy. Principally these narratives have been about the nature of freedom, the primacy of rights to self-expression, the constitution of the public sphere or the commons, and the intimate link between openness and creativity. The core philosophical idea concerns *openness* to experience and interpretation such that a work, language, and system permit multiple meanings and interpretations with an accent on the response, imagination, and activity of the reader, learner, or user. The classic work that philosophically develops this central idea is the *Philosophical Investigations* by Ludwig Wittgenstein (1953) who draws a close relationship between language as a set of open overlapping speech activities or

discourses he calls “language games” and a “form of life” (or culture). Wittgenstein of the *Investigations* demonstrated that there was no such thing as a logical syntax or metalogical language considered as a closed system of rules that acts as a hard and fast grammar for any natural language. The “language games” conception seems to deny the very possibility of a logical calculus for language such that there are no necessary and sufficient conditions (or logical rules) for use of a word. In Wittgenstein’s account of rule-following, we see a view of openness to language and to the text that permits multiple interpretations and the active construction of meanings. This emphasis on the openness of language, of the text, and, indeed, of “openness to the other” as aspect of subjectivity, which rests on the values of multiplicity and pluralism, is in part a reaction by Wittgenstein against the logical empiricist understandings of logico-linguistic rules that allegedly allow for only pure and single meanings unambiguously correlated with words that depict the world.

Wittgenstein’s *Tractatus* addressed the central problems of philosophy concerning the relations between the world, thought, and language. He presents a solution that is grounded in logic and in the nature of representation such that thought or proposition picture or represent the world by virtue of shared logical form. In the *Investigations* Wittgenstein shifts his emphasis from logic to ordinary language which works to appreciate the openness of language and the language-user while disabusing us of the fallaciousness of traditional approaches to the question of language, truth, and meaning. He begins this new philosophy by asserting that the meaning of a word is its *use* in the language, and he demonstrates that there are multiple uses that are part of the activity of language games that comprise a culture or “form of life.” In a famous passage in the *Investigations* (paragraphs 65–69), Wittgenstein argues there is no feature common to all games that constitute the basis for calling them “games”: they are tied together through a set of *family resemblances* that unite them. In philosophical terms this constitutes at one and the same time the openness of both language and culture. Others following him have appealed to Wittgenstein’s concept of

openness to protect the nature of language, thought, and art.

Morris Weitz (1956) in his famous essay “The role of theory in aesthetics,” for instance, appeals to Wittgenstein to claim that art is an *open* concept in that it is possible to extend its meaning in unpredictable and completely novel ways in order to apply the concept to new entities or activities that were not included in the original concept – thus, no necessary and sufficient conditions for something to count as art can be provided. (A closed system in this instance is one for which both necessary and sufficient conditions can be stated.) Following Wittgenstein, he says we should ask not “what is art?” but “how is the concept of ‘art’ used?” Weitz (1956, p. 31) notes also that sub-concepts of art like “novel,” “painting,” “tragedy,” “comedy,” and “opera” are likewise open, suggesting that “A concept is open is its conditions of application are amenable or corrigible, i.e., if a situation or case can be imagined or secured which would call for some sort of decision on our part to cover this, or to close the concept or invent a new one to deal with the new case and its property.” He asks, is Dos Passos’ *U.S.A.*, V. Woolf’s *To the Lighthouse*, or Joyce’s *Finnegans Wake* a novel? These works require an extension of the concept to cover the new case, and thus, the decision turns on our decision to enlarge the conditions for applying the concept. As he puts it:

“Art,” itself, is an open concept. New conditions (cases) have constantly arisen and will undoubtedly constantly arise; new art forms, new movements will emerge, which will demand decisions on the part of those interested, usually professional critics, as to whether the concept will be extended or not. . . the very expansive, adventurous character of art, its ever-changing changes and novel creations, makes it logically impossible to ensure any defining properties. (p. 32)

The multiplicity and radical openness that Wittgenstein finds in language and thought, then, seems to intimate a pluralistic world. This openness seems to apply also to other forms of expression such as music as well as to culture and human nature. The emphasis on radical openness distinguishes the late Wittgenstein as someone who overcomes the postmodern condition and

provides a constructive and positive response to disintegration of culture, language, and the self (see Peters and Marshall 1999). He is also a philosopher who understands the emerging nature of information systems and networks (Blair 2006) and anticipates the Internet as a system platform for language, communication, art, and self-expression (Hrachovec and Pichler 2007). (see in particular the work of Kristof Nyiri who in a variety of papers including “Wittgenstein as a Philosopher of Secondary Orality” (1996), “The Humanities in the Age of Post-Literacy” (1996), and “The Picture Theory of Reason” (2000) examined the problem of machine consciousness, post-literacy, and the new unity of science. See his website with full text papers at <http://www.hunfi.hu/nyiri/>.) Even Wittgenstein’s own compositions were radically open to interpretation encouraged by the “hypertext” nature of his writings (Picher 2002). Others have followed in his footsteps or arrived at the value of multiplicity of meanings and the plurality of interpretation somewhat differently but drawing on similar source and motivations.

Three Forms of Openness

In 1962 Umberto Eco, the Italian novelist and semiotician, published his *Opera aperta* (*The Open Work*). (the book has been googled with Introduction and parts of the first chapter available here: http://books.google.com/books?id=7jroM0M8TuwC&dq=the+open+work&printsec=frontcover&source=bl&ots=s-XHUVdCck&sig=YZjd9kj2R58K_Gbo0HoWsqkW-vcw&hl=en&ei=a_VGSvD4DpGsNuTHgJcB&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=8.) which while belonging to his pre-semiotic writings nevertheless utilizes the underlying notion of a linguistic system to discuss the development and values of open works where openness stands for multiplicity of meaning, freedom of reader, and the plurality of interpretation. As David Robey makes clear in his Introduction to the Harvard release of the modern classic:

Opera aperta in particular is still a significant work, both on account of its enduring historical usefulness of its concept of “openness”, and because of the

striking way in which it anticipates two of the major themes of contemporary literary theory from the mid-sixties onwards: the insistence on the element of multiplicity, plurality, polysemy in art, and the emphasis on the role of the reader, on literary interpretation and response as an interactive process between reader and text. (p. viii)

In “The Poetics of the Open Work,” Eco begins by noting that a number of contemporary avant-garde pieces of music – Karlheinz Stockhausen’s *Klavierstück XI*, Berio’s *Sequenza I* for solo flute, Henri Pousseur’s *Scambi*, and Pierre Boulez’s third *Piano Sonata* – differ from classical works by leaving considerable autonomy to the performer in the way he or she chooses to play the work. He traces the idea of “openness” in the work of art from its beginnings in Symbolist poetry focused on Mallarmé and the Modernist literature of the early part of the twentieth century exemplified by James Joyce. Citing Henri Pousseur, he defines the “open” work as one that “produces in the interpreter acts of conscious freedom, putting him at the centre of a net of inexhaustible relations among which he inserts his own form” (p. 4). Eco’s openness is a response to the aesthetics of Benedetto Croce who was a product of Italian fascism and strongly emphasized the idea of pure meaning and authorial intent.

Eco distinguishes between three forms of openness in the work of art in terms of interpretation, semantic content, and the “works in movement.” While all works of art are capable of bearing a number of interpretations, the open work is one in which there are no established codes for their interpretation.

For Eco, the openness of Modernist literature (such as Symbolist poetry) is distinguished from medieval openness by the absence of fixed interpretative registers, which he gives, quoting Dante, as the literal, the allegorical, the moral, and the anagogical. In medieval literature, no interpretations may exist beyond these four registers – that is the code by which writings were interpreted. Modernist literature has no such preestablished codes by which it is to be interpreted, and indeed, what marks the Modernist artist out from the pre-Modernist artist is the artist’s awareness of the artwork as inevitably giving a “field of

possibilities” of interpretation. Rather than seeking to limit those possibilities (through an established code of interpretation and so on), the artist actively seeks the openness that is implicit in all artworks. Eco gives as an example of this active seeking of openness of interpretation in the absence of preestablished codes the poetry of Verlaine and Mallarmé and the novels of Kafka, which have been described (especially by Lukács) as “allegorical,” but which yield, says Eco:

no confirmation in an encyclopedia, no matching paradigm in the cosmos, to provide a key to the symbolism. The various existentialist, theological, clinical and psychoanalytical interpretations of Kafka’s cannot exhaust all the possibilities of his works.

The second form of openness Eco describes is on the level of the semantic content. This is a somewhat problematic idea as applied to music, since it is proverbially uncertain what the semantic content – what the “real-world meaning” – of music may be. Nevertheless, Eco uses serial music as an example of this semantic openness, comparing it to the verbal puns of Joyce’s *Finnegans Wake*, by which two, three, or even ten different etymological roots are combined in such a way that a single word can set up a knot of different submeanings, each of which in turn coincides and interrelates with other local allusions, which are themselves “open” to new configurations and probabilities of interpretation.

Serial music is composed using a particular arrangement usually of the 12 possible semitones as the organizing principle and hence often implies several continuations or contexts at once. Henri Pousseur describes the listener to contemporary music (i.e., contemporary with the late 1950s and early 1960s), which disrupts the usual “term-to-term determination” of music, placing himself “in the midst of an inexhaustible network of relationships” and choosing for himself his own “modes of approach, his reference points and his scale.” Leaving aside the difficult problem of whether “logical-sounding continuation” of musical material can be compared with the semantic content of language – in other words, whether music’s meaning lies in the apparent logic of its continuation – we should also recognize that the

difference between the first two forms of openness in the work is one of degree: Kafka and the Symbolists may disrupt our normal sense of narrative form, or of logical continuation, through the use of unorthodox symbolism, or ambiguity, but this is not a difference in kind from the kind of disruption which occurs in Joyce’s use of pun. This recognition will help us to develop a theory of the open work applied to Kurtág’s own musical symbolism.

The third kind of openness Eco perceives is that of the “work in movement” [*opere in movimento*], which he identifies at the start of his book. This is exemplified by Mallarmé’s *Livres*, in which the order of the poems in this unfinished – both serendipitously and intentionally “unfinished” – work is left undetermined, and also by two of the pieces of music he referred to at the start of *The Open Work*. Stockhausen’s *Klavierstück XI* requires the pianist to choose between a number of groupings of notes, to create a sequence of his own devising from among these notes. And in Boulez’s third *Piano Sonata*, the first section of which is made up of ten different passages on unordered sheets of paper, which may be freely reordered, although not all permutations are permitted.

Open Cultures

As many scholars and commentators have suggested since the “change merchants” of the 1970s – Marshall McLuhan, Drucker, and Alvin Toffler – first raised the issue, we are in the middle of a long-term cultural evolutionary shift based on the digitization and the logic of open systems that have the capacity to profoundly change all aspects of our daily lives (work, home, school) and existing systems of culture and economy. A wide range of scholars from different disciplines and new media organizations have speculated on the nature of the shift: Richard Stallman established the free software movement and the GNU project (see the GNU site <http://www.gnu.org/gnu/initial-announcement.html>, a 2006 lecture by Stallman entitled “The Free Software Movement and the Future of Freedom” and Aaron Renn’s

(1998) “Free,” “Open Source,” and Philosophies of Software Ownership (<http://www.urbanophile.com/arenn/hacking/fsvos.html>); Yochai Benkler (2006), a Yale law professor, has commented on the wealth of networks and the way that social production transforms freedom and markets; his colleague, Larry Lessig (2004, 2007), also a law professor, has written convincingly on code, copyright, and the creative commons and launched the free culture movement designed to promote the freedom to distribute and modify creative works through the new social media (see his best-seller *Free Culture* <http://www.free-culture.cc/freeculture.pdf>); Students for Free Culture (see the website here <http://freeculture.org/>), launched in 2004, “is a diverse, non-partisan group of students and young people who are working to get their peers involved in the free culture movement”; Michel Bauwens (2005) has written about the political economy of peer production and established the P-2-P Foundation (see the foundation http://p2pfoundation.net/The_Foundation_for_P2P_Alternatives and the associated blog: <http://blog.p2pfoundation.net/>); Creative Commons (see <http://creativecommons.org/> | Creative Commons) was founded in 2001 by experts in cyberlaw and intellectual property (see Wikipedia: <http://blog.jimmywales.com/>); the world’s largest and open-content encyclopedia was established in 2001 by Jimmy Wales, an American Internet entrepreneur, whose blog is subtitled *Free Knowledge for Free Minds* (see *Free Knowledge for Free Minds*: <http://blog.jimmywales.com/>).

One influential definition suggests:

Social and technological advances make it possible for a growing part of humanity to access, create, modify, publish and distribute various kinds of works - artworks, scientific and educational materials, software, articles - in short: anything that can be represented in digital form. Many communities have formed to exercise those new possibilities and create a wealth of collectively re-usable works.

By *freedom* they mean:

...

- the *freedom to use* the work and enjoy the benefits of using it,
- the *freedom to study* the work and to apply knowledge acquired from it,

- the *freedom to make and redistribute copies*, in whole or in part, of the information or expression,

the *freedom to make changes and improvements*, and to distribute derivative works. (See Definition: <http://freedomdefined.org/Definition>)

This is how the Open Cultures Working Group – an open group of artists, researchers, and cultural activists – describe the situation in their Vienna Document subtitled *Xnational Net Culture and “The Need to Know” of Information Societies*:

Information technologies are setting the global stage for economic and cultural change. More than ever, involvement in shaping the future calls for a wide understanding and reflection on the ecology and politics of information cultures. So called globalization not only signifies a worldwide network of exchange but new forms of hierarchies and fragmentation, producing deep transformations in both physical spaces and immaterial information domains... global communication technologies still hold a significant potential for empowerment, cultural expression and transnational collaboration. To fully realize the potential of life in global information societies we need to acknowledge the plurality of agents in the information landscape and the heterogeneity of collaborative cultural practice. The exploration of alternative futures is linked to a living cultural commons and social practice based on networks of open exchange and communication. (See Vienna Document: <http://world-information.org/wio/readme/992003309/1134396702>)

Every aspect of culture and economy is becoming transformed through the process of digitization that creates new systems of archives, representation, and reproduction technologies that portend Web 3.0 and Web 4.0 where all production, material and immaterial, is digitally designed and coordinated through distributed information systems. As Felix Staler (2004) remarks:

information can be infinitely copied, easily distributed, and endlessly transformed. Contrary to analog culture, other people’s work is not just referenced, but directly incorporated through copying and pasting, remixing, and other standard digital procedures.

Digitization transforms all aspects of cultural production and consumption favoring the networked peer community over the individual

author and blurring the distinction between artists and their audiences. These new digital logics alter the logic of the organization of knowledge, education, and culture spawning new technologies as a condition of the openness of the system. Now the production of texts, sounds, and images is open to new rounds of experimentation and development providing what Staler calls “a new grammar of digital culture” and transforming the processes of creativity which are no longer controlled by traditional knowledge institutions and organizations but rather permitted by enabling platforms and infrastructures that encourage large-scale participation and challenge old hierarchies.

The shift to networked media cultures based on the ethics of participation, sharing, and collaboration, involving a volunteer, peer-to-peer gift economy, has its early beginnings in the right to freedom of speech that depended upon the flow and exchange of ideas essential to political democracy, including the notion of a “free press,” the market, and the academy. Perhaps, even more fundamentally free speech is a significant personal, psychological, and educational good that promotes self-expression and creativity and also the autonomy and development of the self necessary for representation in a linguistic and political sense and the formation of identity. Each of these traditional justifications of free speech and their public communication firmly relate questions of self-governance to questions of democratic government, the search of truth, and personal autonomy. Yet the modern discussion of free speech from Milton’s *Areopagitica* and John Stuart Mill’s *On Liberty* has also drawn attention to *limiting* conditions to emphasize that freedom is not an independent value but in liberal society exists in a tight network of rights and constraints that limit it in various ways (Mill and Van 2002). As Momigliano (2003) comments:

The modern notion of freedom of speech is assumed to include the right of speech in the governing bodies and the right to petition them, the right to relate and publish debates of these bodies, freedom of public meeting, freedom of correspondence, of teaching, of worship, of publishing newspapers and books. Correspondingly, abuse of freedom of

speech includes libel, slander, obscenity, blasphemy, sedition.

Openness has emerged as a global logic based on free and open-source software constituting a generalized response to knowledge capitalism and the attempt of the new mega-information utilities such as Google, Microsoft, and Amazon.com to control knowledge assets through the process of large-scale digitization of information often in the public domain, the deployment of digital rights management regimes (May 2008), and strong government lobbying to enforce intellectual property law in the international context.

Two long-term trends are worth mentioning in this context. First, the Internet and open technologies, defined as open source, open APIs, and open data formats, are in the process of formation developing from the Web as linked computers to the Web as linked pages and linked *things* (the so-called semantic Web) (see Kevin Kelly’s presentation on TED on the Internet on the next 5000 days: http://www.ted.com/talks/kevin_kelly_on_the_next_5_000_days_of_the_web.html). In this respect “open cloud computing” is a recent development that signals the next stage of the Internet.

The key characteristics of the cloud are the ability to scale and provision computing power dynamically in a cost-efficient way and the ability of the consumer (end user, organization, or IT staff) to make the most of that power without having to manage the underlying complexity of the technology. The cloud architecture itself can be private (hosted within an organization’s firewall) or public (hosted on the Internet). These characteristics lead to a set of core value propositions (including scalability on demand, streamlining the data center, improving business processes, and minimizing startup costs) (see The Open Cloud Manifesto, <http://gevaperry.typepad.com/Open%20Cloud%20Manifesto%20v1.0.9.pdf>, and open cloud computing, <http://gevaperry.typepad.com/>).

Second, the Internet is a dynamic changing open ecosystem that progressively changes its nature toward greater computing power, interactivity, inclusiveness, mobility, scale, and peer governance. In this regard and as the overall system develops, it begins to approximate the complexity of the architectures of natural ecosystems. The

more it develops, one might be led to hypothesize, the greater the likelihood of not merely emulating Earth as a global ecosystem but becoming an integrated organic whole. Open cultures become the necessary condition for the systems as a whole, for the design of open progressive technological improvements and their political, epistemic, and ontological foundations.

Intellectual Property and the Global Logic of Openness

The rediscovery of openness in the information society, as Chris May (2006) notes, is the end of a period when intellectual property seemed to be the dominant paradigm for understanding how knowledge and information might fit into the contemporary information society. He usefully charts the ways in which the emerging realm of openness is challenging the global regime of intellectual property and the extension of intellectual property into areas previously unavailable for commodification, including claims over aspects of the “public domain” and “knowledge commons.” The State as the guarantor of intellectual property finds itself writing, articulating, and enforcing intellectual property laws that attempt to mediate interests of capital and different publics that structure the new media ecologies. In this context openness increasingly stands against forms of individualized knowledge property in the global digital economy (May 2008). Indeed, the strong argument is that openness challenges the traditional notion of property and its application to the world of ideas. May suggests that openness can act as a countervailing force to balance the expansion of property rights under informational capitalism in an ongoing dialectical relationship. He writes:

Openness is the contemporary manifestation of an historical tendency within the political economy of intellectual property for resistance to emerge when the privileges and rights claimed by owners inflict onerous and unacceptable costs (and duties) on non-owners.

The shape of culture as a digital artifact, the formation of a deep ecology of human communication, and the emergence of a new social mode of (peer-to-peer) production depend on the outcome

of this ongoing struggle for openness and the assertion of its logics of global dispersal, distribution, and decentralization. This struggle is many-sided and not only takes many different forms against multinational knowledge capitalism and its expansion of claims to intellectual property into new public and cultural domains but also involves struggles against the surveillance panoptical power of the State and the corporation that threatens to create all-encompassing citizen and customer databases that rest on information-sharing, search algorithms, and the compilation of consumer characteristics and behaviors.

Viral Modernity?

A viral modernity challenges and disrupts the openness of a free distribution model as well as distributed knowledge, media, and learning systems. The celebration of hacker culture of the 1980s was based on the heroization of the disruption of computer security and the main activists and enthusiasts such as Steve Jobs, Steve Wozniak, and Richard Stallman focused on cracking software leading to the development of the free software movement. As Tony Sampson (2004) indicates the virus flourishes because of the computer’s capacity for information sharing and the computer is unable to distinguish between a virus and a program. The alterability of information allows the virus to modify and change information, providing conditions for self-replicability. In these circumstances

viral technologies can hold info-space hostage to the uncertain undercurrents of information itself. As such, despite mercantile efforts to capture the spirit of *openness*, the info-space finds itself frequently in a state far-from-equilibrium. It is open to often-unmanageable viral fluctuations, which produce levels of spontaneity, uncertainty and emergent order. So while corporations look to capture the perpetual, flexible and friction-free income streams from centralised information flows, viral code acts as an anarchic, acentred Deleuzian rhizome. It thrives on the openness of info-space, producing a paradoxical counterpoint to a corporatised information society and its attempt to steer the info-machine.

This situation leads Fred Cohen to advocate the benevolent virus and friendly contagion as a foundation of the viral ecosystem instead of the

corporate response to securitize and privatize all open systems through sophisticated encryption.

Digital Selves, Open Selves

The numerical representation of identity that is involved as an aspect of new digital media in forms of reading and writing the self through these media has a sinister downside through the application of new information technologies to security and identity issues with the linking of government and corporate databases. Biometrics is responsible for the shift from identity politics to I.D. policies considered in relation to the question of security, verification, and authentication. The Identity Cards Bill introduced in the British Parliament in the 2004–2005 session provided for the Secretary of State to establish and maintain a national register to record “registrable facts” about individuals (over 16 years) in the UK in the *public interest*, which is defined in terms of national security, prevention or detection of crime, enforcement of immigration controls, prevention of unauthorized employment, and for securing the efficient and effective provision of public services. “Registrable facts” pertain to “identity” (name, previous names, date of birth – and death, gender, physical identifying characteristics but *not* ethnicity), residence and history of residence, “numbers allocated to him for identification purposes and about the documents to which they relate” (passports, driver’s license, work permits, etc.), information from the register provided to any persons, and information recorded by individual request. I.D. cards will store 49 different types of information (for the full list, see the BBC website: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/4630045.stm). In terms of the Bill, each individual is required to allow fingerprints other than biometric information, signature, and photograph, to be taken with penalties for not complying. This information is recorded on a renewable I.D. card for which the individual is responsible. Information on individuals may be provided for purposes of verification on consent. Public services may be conditional on identity checks, although it will be unlawful to require an individual to produce an I.D. card except for specified purposes, e.g., of public authorities and uses connected to crime

prevention and detection, including antiterrorism. In certain cases information may be used without the individual’s consent. National Identity Scheme Commissioner will be responsible for ruining the scheme and making annual reports. Various offenses are stated in relation to giving false information, unauthorized disclosure of information, tampering with the register, false use, etc.

The House of Lords Select Committee Report (see Report: <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200405/ldselect/ldconst/82/82.pdf>) published on 17 March 2005 had a brief to consider the constitutional implications of the Identity Cards Bill and concluded that “it adjusts the fundamental relationship between the individual and the State.” It is worth quoting the report on the significance of what the Bill proposes:

Our own concerns are not founded on the [EU] Convention [of Human Rights], but rather on the fact that the Bill seeks to create an extensive scheme for enabling more information about the lives and characteristics of the entire adult population to be recorded in a single database than has ever been considered necessary or attempted previously in the United Kingdom, or indeed in other western countries. Such a scheme may have the benefits that are claimed for it, but the existence of this extensive new database in the hands of the State makes abuse of privacy possible.

The Report expressed the primary concern to ensure an adequate legal and constitutional infrastructure for the maintenance of a National Identity Register, with appropriate separation and limitation of powers. In particular, while recognizing the Bill as enabling legislation, the report expressed concern about the concentration of power and responsibility for the national register in the hands of the Secretary of State, calling for an independent registrar with a duty to report directly to Parliament.

The Identity Cards Bill was passed by MPs by a small majority in late June 2005, after the failure of the first bill which is known as the Identity Cards Act 2006. While it is aimed at preventing illegal immigration and working, as part of anti-terrorist measures and to prevent identity and benefit fraud, there are critical issues around altering the relationship between the individual and the

State including the loss of privacy, the potential for harassment of ethnic minorities, and its “function creep,” not to mention fears of the surveillance society. In the United States, the Defense, Homeland Security, Interior, and Veterans Affairs departments and NASA have implemented smart-card programs that includes setting up identity proofing, registration, and issuance processes. The Real I.D. Act was introduced in 2005 to protect against terrorist entry and improve security for drivers’ licenses and personal identification cards. (see http://www.epic.org/privacy/id_cards/real_id_act.pdf.)

These concerns are not at all removed from the politics of space and new science of networks or, indeed, from education as I.D. cards are now mandatory in many US schools that have set up their own security systems. Pitted against the postmodern view that considers identity to be both dynamic and multiple, a discursive construction reflecting an ongoing and open-ended process of forming multiple identifications in the face of globalization and media cultures is the *mathematization of identity* for State, educational, and business purposes – the nexus where biometrics meets smart-card technology and the ultimate basis for applications in telecommunications (GSM mobile phones, DirecTV), financial services (electronic purses, bank cards, online payment systems), transportation, travel and healthcare (insurance cards) industries, computer/Internet user authentication and non-repudiation, retailer loyalty programs, physical access, resort cards, mass transit, electronic toll, product tracking, and also national ID, drivers license, and passports.

The other side of the State and corporate digital reproduction of identity is a tendency that emphasizes the relation between openness and creativity as part of a networked group. The “open self” is self-organizing and is formed at the interstices of a series of membership of online communities that shaped spontaneous self-concept and self-image. Openness to experience is one of the five major traits that has shaped personality theory since its early development by L.L. Thurstone in the 1930s and is strongly correlated with both creativity and

divergent thinking (McCrae 1987). Sometimes referred to as the “big five” personality traits, “the five-factor model” trait theory emerged as a descriptive, data-driven model of personality based on openness, conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness, and neuroticism. Openness is associated with creativity and the appreciation of art, emotionality, curiosity, self-expression, and originality. Meta-analysis reviewing research that examines the relationships between each of the five-factor model personality dimensions and each of the 10 personality disorder diagnostic categories of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 4th edn (DSM-IV) reveals strongly positive (with neuroticism) and negative associations (with the other factors) (Saulsman and Page 2004). One of the limitations of personality theory is its focus on the individual and in the age of networks this centeredness might seem somewhat misplaced. There are close links between open content, open science, and open collaboration that make collaborative creativity sustainable. Openness to experience is probably the single most significant variable in explaining creativity, and there is some evidence for the relationship between brain chemistry and creative cognition as measured with divergent thinking (Jung et al 2009). Openness also can be defined in terms of the number, frequency, and quality of links within a network. Indeed, the mutual reinforcement of openness and creativity gels with Daniel Pink’s (2005) contention that right-brainers will rule the future. According to Pink, we are in the transition from an “Information Age” that valued knowledge workers to a “Conceptual Age” that values creativity and right-brain-directed aptitudes such as design, story, symphony, empathy, play, and meaning.

Open Learning Systems

If the e-book has failed at least up until the introduction of the new e-book readers such as Amazon’s Kindle DX (2009) and Sony’s Reader, then it was because e-books in the main became simple

digitized versions of books. The new generation of e-book readers sought to overcome these problems and to focus on advantages of hypertext, mobility and mobile data connection, adjustable font size, highlighting and annotation, text-to-speech facility, and readability based on electronic ink. Amazon's Kindle DX released June 10 features a 9.7 in. display, improved pixel resolution, built-in stereo speakers, 4 GB storage capacity, holding approximately 3500 non-illustrated e-books, extended battery, and support for PDF files (see here: <http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/B0015TCML0>). Amazon announced partnerships with three major textbook publishers representing 60% of the market, and Amazon will test the Kindle DX with five universities this year. Kindle titles now represent 35% of books' sales within Amazon. The company now offers 275,000 books in Kindle format and received a huge sales demand when it launched Kindle 2 earlier this year (see the live launch). Amazon's Kindle DX is one of a range of e-readers available including i-Rex's iLiad, Sony's Librie and Song Reader, mobile java devices such as Wattpad, Bookeen's Cybook Gen3, Polymer Vision's Radius foldable eBook, COOL-ER by Coolreader, eSlick by Foxit Software, Ganaxa GeR2, and Jinke's Hanlin V3 eReader (see the full list: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_e-book_readers). Plastic Logic, a spin-off company from Cambridge University's Cavendish Laboratory, is a flexible A-4-size and robust plastic electronic display with a thickness of a credit card that is the core element of a soon to be released eBook reader.

The e-book reader has come a long way since Michael Hart launched Gutenberg Project in 1971 and the first digital books were offered in 1993. The e-book has arrived, yet it still suffers disadvantages: the e-book still requires an electronic device and electric power; it is more fragile than the paperback and more prone to damage, loss, and theft; there is arguably a loss of book aesthetics; the full range of printable material is not available; and due to digital rights management and protection, e-readers are not easily shared.

One of the fundamental issues concerns digital rights and various technical attempts to prevent users from sharing or transferring ownership. Often e-book purchase agreements prevent copying, restrict usage and printing, and limit the right to distribution, thus privatizing information or knowledge.

The first expanded books began with The Voyager Company in 1991. Founded in 1985 Voyager developed interactive laserdiscs pioneering home video collections of classic films. In the early 1990s Voyager sponsored a conference on digital books that attracted multimedia and hypertext experts who helped to shape the first expanded books adding a search method and the capacity to change font size as well as other navigation features (drop-down menus) and margins for annotations and marginalia. The first three expanded books were released in 1992: *The Hitchhiker's Guide to the Galaxy*, *The Complete Annotated Alice*, and *Jurassic Park*. In 1992 Voyager came out with the The Expanded Books Toolkit, which allowed authors to create their own Expanded Books. (see the entry on expanded books in Wikipedia: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Expanded_Books.)

Other experiments have taken place after Voyager was sold. Perhaps the most long lived is Sophie, a project of the Institute for the Future of the Book.

In 1996 a group of Voyager employees formed Night Kitchen with the intent of creating an authoring/reading environment that would extend the Expanded Books Toolkit concept to include rich media. The result TK3 never officially came to market, but teachers in high schools and colleges used it in their classrooms and with their students created some remarkable projects. The Mellon Foundation approached some of the TK3 team and asked them to build a new multimedia authoring program which would be open source and would extend TK3 by enabling time-based events (e.g., a timed, narrated slide show or embedding links at specific points in video clips). That became Sophie (for demonstrations of Sophie, see here and for a useful history of multimedia, see "When Multimedia was Black and White").

Bob Stein, the cofounder of Voyager, is the founder and a director of The Institute for the Future of the Book which has carried through the experiment of the expanded book with Sophie. The Institute's mission is stated as: "The printed page is giving way to the networked screen. The Institute for the Future of the Book seeks to chronicle this shift, and impact its development in a positive direction." It goes on to make the following claims:

The Book

For the past five hundred years, humans have used print – the book and its various page-based cousins – to move ideas across time and space. Radio, cinema and television emerged in the last century and now, with the advent of computers, we are combining media to forge new forms of expression. For now, we use the word "book" broadly, even metaphorically, to talk about what has come before – and what might come next.

The Work and the Network

One major consequence of the shift to digital is the addition of graphical, audio, and video elements to the written word. More profound, however, is the book's reinvention in a networked environment. Unlike the printed book, the networked book is not bound by time or space. It is an evolving entity within an ecology of readers, authors and texts. Unlike the printed book, the networked book is never finished: it is always a work in progress.

As such, the Institute is deeply concerned with the surrounding forces that will shape the network environment and the conditions of culture: network neutrality, copyright and privacy. We believe that a free, neutral network, a progressive intellectual property system, and robust safeguards for privacy are essential conditions for an enlightened digital age.

Tools

For discourse to thrive in the digital age, tools are needed that allow ordinary, non-technical people to assemble complex, elegant and durable electronic documents without having to master overly complicated applications or seek the help of programmers. The Institute is dedicated to building such tools. We also conduct experiments with existing tools and technologies, exploring their potential and testing their limits.

Humanism & Technology

Although we are excited about the potential of digital technologies and the internet to amplify human potential, we believe it is crucial to consider their social and political consequences, both today and in the long term.

New Practices

Academic institutes arose in the age of print, which informed the structure and rhythm of their work. The Institute for the Future of the Book was born in the digital era, and so we seek to conduct our work in ways appropriate to the emerging modes of communication and rhythms of the networked world. Freed from the traditional print publishing cycles and hierarchies of authority, the Institute values theory and practice equally, conducting its activities as much as possible in the open and in real time.

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"Openness" and "Open Education" in the Global Digital Economy: An Emerging Paradigm of Social Production

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Introduction

On February 14, 2008, Harvard University's Faculty of Arts and Sciences adopted a policy that requires faculty members to allow the university to make their scholarly articles available free online. The new policy makes Harvard the first university in the USA to mandate open access to its faculty members' research publications (see Peter Suber's blog) and marks the beginning of a new era that will encourage other US universities to do the same. Open access, to use Suber's definition, means "putting peer-reviewed scientific and scholarly literature on the internet, making it available free of charge and free of most copyright and licensing restrictions, and removing the barriers to serious research." As Lila Guterman reports in *The Chronicle of Higher Education News Blog* "Stuart M. Shieber, a professor of computer science at Harvard who proposed the new policy, said after the vote in a news release that the decision 'should be a very powerful message to the academic community that we want and should have more control over how our work is used and disseminated (see <http://chronicle.com/news/article/3943/harvard-faculty-adopts-open-access-requirement>).'" Open access has transformed the world of scholarship, and since the early 2000s with major OA statements starting with Budapest in 2002, movement has picked up momentum and developed a clear political ethos. Harvard's adoption of the new policy follows hard on the heels of open access mandates passed within months of each

Openness

► Open Education, An Overview of

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other – the National Institutes of Health (NIH) and the European Research Council (ERC). As one blogger remarked: “open archiving of peer-reviewed journal literature [is] now on an irreversible course of expansion” (see the comment by Ray English on the same site) not only as US universities follow Harvard’s lead but also as open archiving makes available learning material to anyone including students and faculty from developing and transition countries. Harvard’s adoption of the open archiving mandate is similar in scope to the step taken by MIT to adopt OpenCourseWare (OCW) in 2001. These initiatives are part of *emerging knowledge ecologies* that will determine the future of scholarly publishing challenging commercial publishing business models and raising broader and deeper questions about content development processes as well as questions of resourcing and sustainability.

The Ithaka Report, *University Publishing in a Digital Age* (2007), indicates that there have been huge changes in creation, production, and consumption of scholarly resources with the “creation of new formats made possible by digital technologies, ultimately allowing scholars to work in deeply integrated electronic research and publishing environments that will enable real-time dissemination, collaboration, dynamically-updated content, and usage of new media” (p. 4). As the report goes on to mention alongside these changes in content creation and publication, “alternative distribution models (institutional repositories, pre-print servers, open access journals) have also arisen with the aim to broaden access, reduce costs, and enable open sharing of content” (p. 4). (The Association of College and Research Libraries (ACRL) recently released their research agenda for scholarly publishing around eight themes: the impact and implications of cyberinfrastructure, changing organizational models, how scholars work, authorship and scholarly publishing, value and value metrics of scholarly communications, adoptions of successful innovations, preservation of critical material, and public policy and legal matters. See here.)

We can consider open publishing, open access, and archiving as parts of the wider movement

called *open education* that builds on the nested and evolving convergences of open source, open access, and open science and also emblematic of a set of still wider political and economic changes that ushers in “social production” as an aspect of the global digital economy, an economy that is both fragile and volatile as the current world credit and banking crisis demonstrates so well.

Consider the recent writer’s strike in Hollywood held by the Writers Guild of America (WGA) which voted to settle its 100-day strike against the Alliance of Motion Picture and Television Producers (AMPTP) on the basis of a 3-year contract that gives the WGA jurisdiction over projects created specifically for the Web, provides payment for “ad-supported streaming” over the Internet, increases payment for residuals on downloaded movies and television shows, and includes a two percentage of the distributor’s Web stream revenue. As Michael Wolff, media commentator and contributing editor for *Vanity Fair*, puts it:

The epochal point is that Hollywood, which has been the center of the culture, the coolest place, the ruler of the Zeitgeist, is out of it. It’s on the industrial sidelines. It’s just a bunch of crabby managers and a sullen workforce in a dysfunctional relationship in a declining industry, quarreling over an ever smaller piece of the pie.

Why? Because the value of the story keeps going down and the era and cult of the Hollywood writer is over.

Cheap production technology, no-barrier-to-entry distribution, and a Niagara of “product” (65,000 new videos are uploaded on YouTube daily) mean the entire Hollywood story-development complex is now in a daily competition with do-it-yourself writers. Hollywood product itself is remade, reduced to clips, bites, fractals, and mixes. Sitting through an entire feature film more and more feels like an unreasonable commitment. (We use DVRs to fast-forward, to pause, to hold for some other time-anything not to have to watch something from beginning to end.) The narrative is disposable. Video games, whose 2007 receipts of \$8.7 billion rival Hollywood’s \$9.7 billion box-office take, are anarchically unplotted. And while Hollywood is getting larger and larger fees from licensing its characters (born of those tortured three acts) for video games, the more video games become the

entertainment model, the less patience my son and his friends will invariably have for conventional story lines. Not only is reality TV a network solution for lowering costs, but it works too because it busts scripted, plotted formulas. Movies as displays of visual virtuosity more and more become pure technology plays. The *Zeitgeist* is expressed through engineering (most of which is not created in Hollywood), not through the story. If you don't have story, that great collaboration of writers, re-writers, directors, producers, agents, executives, publicists, managers, stars, and the retinues-however painful and abusive and exploitive that process might be-do you have Hollywood?

The present decade can be called the "open" decade (open source, open systems, open standards, open archives, open everything) just as the 1990s were called the "electronic" decade (e-text, e-learning, e-commerce, e-governance) (Materu 2004). And yet it is more than just a "decade" that follows the electronic innovations of the 1990s; it is a change of philosophy and ethos, a set of interrelated and complex changes that transforms markets and the mode of production, ushering in a new collection of values based on openness, the ethic of participation, and peer-to-peer collaboration. In a fundamental sense it also represents the continuation of a meta-story, albeit in a new register, of freedom. In the postscript to *Building Knowledge Cultures: Education and Development in the Age of Knowledge Capitalism* (Peters and Besley 2006), we made the argument that

there has been a shift from an underlying metaphysics of production—a "productionist" metaphysics—to a metaphysics of consumption and we must now come to understand the new logics and different patterns of cultural consumption in the areas of new media where symbolic analysis becomes a habitual and daily activity. Here the interlocking sets of enhanced mobility of capital, services, and ideas, and the new logics of consumption become all important. These new communicational practices and cross-border flows cannot be effectively policed. More provocatively we might argue, the global informational commons is an emerging infrastructure for the emergence of a civil society still yet unborn.

We also emphasized the link of this new logic of consumption to a classical concept of freedom:

Information is the vital element in a "new" politics and economy that links space, knowledge and

capital in networked practices. Freedom is an essential ingredient in this equation if these network practices develop or transform themselves into knowledge cultures. The specific politics and eco-cybernetic rationalities that accompany an informational global capitalism comprised of new multinational edutainment agglomerations are clearly capable of colonizing the emergent ecology of info-social networks and preventing the development of knowledge cultures based on non-proprietary modes of knowledge production and exchange.

Since publishing that book I have been involved in a number of courses, journal issues, and publications that explore the dimensions of "open knowledge production systems," a term I first used in 2007 in an introduction to a symposium in *Policy Futures in Education* to discuss John Willinsky's (2006) excellent book *The Access Principle: The Case for Open Access to Research and Scholarship* (see (2007) Review symposium. *Policy Futures in Education*, 5(3), 401–423. <http://dx.doi.org/10.2304/pfie.2007.5.3.401>). As editor of *Policy Futures*, I have also published Cushla Kapitzke's special issue on the ethics of copyright and patents with Willinsky and Richard Stallman, director of the Free Software Foundation, as contributors among others. This issue was later published in revised form as *Global Knowledge Cultures* (Kapitzke and Peters 2007) together with an essay I wrote. This year the journal has published a special issue on "Digital Libraries" with Ruth Rikowski and Isaac Hunter Dunlap as guest editors (Vol. 6 No. 1); a symposium on Yochai Benkler's (2006) *The Wealth of Nations: How Social Production Transforms Markets and Freedom* with contributions from Philippe Aigrain, Leslie Chan, Jean-Claude Guédon, and John Willinsky and with a response by Yochai Benkler (Vol. 6, No. 2); and, forthcoming, an issue called "Commercialisation, Internationalisation and the Internet" by Chris Armbruster (Vol. 6, No. 4). I followed up *Building Knowledge Cultures* with a book entitled *Knowledge Economy, Development and the Future of the University* (Peters 2007a) that reflects on the role of the modern university in a global networked economy and a variety of published papers including "Opening the Book" (Peters 2007b), a keynote address at the Spanish Research Council's

sponsored Conference on the Book held in Madrid in late 2007 where I discuss one aspect of messianic line of thinking about e-texts that I have called simply "openness" going back to Walter Benjamin and entertain the concept of "open knowledge production systems" that in my view will not mean the "end of the book" but its radical subsumption in a new electronic textual system involving a set of changes in all aspects of the "culture of the book" including all phases of its creation, production, and consumption as well as its practices and institutions of reading and writing. (*Ubiquity* magazine has received permission to publish an excerpt (Introduction and Chapter 11). The excerpt is available at http://www.acm.org/ubiquity/views/v8i18_peter.html. *Ubiquity* associate editor A. Triptahi writes of it:

Prophetically, almost 30 years ago Jean-François Lyotard forecast the end of the modern research university based on Enlightenment principles. He envisaged the emergence of technical institutes in the service of the information-rich global multinationals. This book reflects on the post-war Western university and its discourses charting the crisis of the concept of the modern university. First, it examines the university within a global networked economy; second, it adopts poststructuralist perspectives in epistemology, politics and ethics to appraise the role of the contemporary university; third, it introduces the notion of 'development' in a critical fashion as a way of explaining its potentially new regional and international learning roles; fourth, it analyzes the rise of global science and the disciplines in the context of the global economy; and, finally, it raises Lyotard's "logic of performativity" and the assessment of research quality within a neoliberal economy, linking it firmly to the question of freedom and the republic of science.

In terms of courses and teaching, I have held a number of Advanced Seminars, as they call them, since starting at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, including: "Knowledge Futures in Higher Education: Knowledge, Freedom and Development" which included a linkup to World Universities Network's (WUN) *Horizons Virtual Seminar Series: Global Knowledge Futures* (2005) (see <http://www.wun.ac.uk/cks/teaching/horizons/horizons.html> for the six presentations in the series); "Education and Development in Higher Education" (with Fazal Rizvi) (2006); "Knowledge Systems, Scientific

Communication, and Academic Publishing in Higher Education" (with Bill Cope) (2007); as well as a number of online-only classes at the masters level using Moodle and Elluminate, including "School-based project in Internationalization" (2007), "Open Source, Open Access, Open Education" (2008), and "Global Citizenship Education" (2009). I mention these classes because for me as for most academic there is a very strong link between teaching and research and working with graduate students, I use these class sessions to theorize much of the work that later appeared in published work. The experience and practice of e-learning, online teaching, and e-publishing work is a necessary part of the ability to theorize. (This course, perhaps closest to the concerns of this paper, theorizes the emergent paradigm of open education (OE):

first, by setting the scene briefly outlining the challenges of higher education represented by globalization, the knowledge economy and the development of e-learning; second, by reviewing and concept and contemporary forms of 'openness', including open source, open access and the 'open society'; third, by providing a grounding in the state of the field of open education, including related topics like copyright, licensing and sustainability; and, fourth, by encouraging innovation concerning current practices and possible alternative practices in open education. (Course description).

This paper builds on those experiences, embodies a variant of the same story, and continues the same line of argument by theorizing the emergent paradigm of open education (OE). A term that was used in the phrase "open educational resources" first came into use at a conference hosted by UNESCO in 2002, defined as "the open provision of educational resources, enabled by information and communication technologies, for consultation, use and adaptation by a community of users for noncommercial purposes." As the OECD report (2007, pp. 30–31) comments:

The definition of OER now most often used is: "open educational resources are digitised materials offered freely and openly for educators, students and self-learners to use and reuse for teaching, learning and research." To clarify further, OER is said to include:

- Learning content: Full courses, courseware, content modules, learning objects, collections and journals.

- Tools: Software to support the development, use, reuse and delivery of learning content, including searching and organisation of content, content and learning management systems, content development tools, and online learning communities.
- Implementation resources: Intellectual property licences to promote open publishing of materials, design principles of best practice and localise content.

(OECD 2007, pp 30–31).

This paper first plots the dimensions of the emerging paradigm of open education by reviewing four major reports that have been released during the last year or two; second, it provides a very brief history of "openness" in education linking it to a successive series of utopian historical moments based on a set of similar ideas stemming from core enlightenment concepts of freedom, equality, democracy, and creativity; third, it relates the concept of "openness" to a set of three political theorists – Bergson, Popper, and Soros – who have theorized the "open society" as a defense and celebration of liberal democratic societies; fourth, and in related fashion, the paper backgrounds and develops the notion of "social production" as developed by the Harvard law professor and liberal theorist Yochai Benkler; and finally, I make some glancing observation and conclusions.

The Emerging Open Education Paradigm

What is now called simply "open education" has emerged strongly as a new paradigm of social production in the global knowledge economy. In the last year or so, four major reports have documented existing developments and new tools and technologies, heralded the utopian promise of "openness" in global education extolling its virtues of shared commons-based peer production, and analyzed the ways in which it contributes to skill formation, innovation, and economic development.

The powerful Washington-based Committee for Economic Development (see the website <http://www.ced.org>) released its report *Open Standards, Open Source, and Open Innovation:*

Harnessing the Benefits of Openness (see http://www.ced.org/docs/report/report_econ_openstandards.pdf) in April 2006 examining the phenomenon of "openness" in the context of today's digital economy highlighting the key attributes of accessibility, responsiveness, and creativity and commenting on the relevance of three areas of open standards, open-source software, and open innovation. The report by The Digital Connections Council of the Committee for Economic Development built on three earlier reports dating from 2001: *The Digital Economy and Economic Growth* (2001), *Digital Economy: Promoting Competition, Innovation, and Opportunity* (2001), and *Promoting Innovation and Economic Growth: The Special Problem of Digital Intellectual Property* (2004). (Digital versions are available on their website at <http://www.ced.org/projects/ecom.shtml>.) These reports emphasized intellectual property issues involved with file-sharing and peer-to-peer networks and the way that "heavy-handed enforcement of intellectual property rules and reliance on business practices designed for the trade of physical goods can stifle the collaboration and innovation that is vital to the growth of the digital economy." What is perhaps of greatest interest in the present context is the emphasis in the new report on what they call "open innovation" – new collaborative models of open innovation, originating outside the firm, that results in an "architecture of participation" (Tim O'Reilly) – and to a lesser extent their definition of "openness." This is what the report says about "open innovation":

Open innovation can be seen in the growing use of digital software tools tied to computer-controlled fabrication devices that allow users to design an object and then produce it physically. As the costs of these digital design tools decrease, users are able to innovate, breaking the model of manufacturers being the source of innovation and customers simply consuming them. The openness model, the antithesis of a "not invented here" attitude, encompasses not only manufacturers and users, but suppliers whose innovations should be welcomed by the companies they supply (Executive Summary).

The report goes on to mention "the extraordinary increase in 'peer production' of digital information products" which are produced by

individuals without any expectation of monetary gain and commenting that "sophisticated commercial firms are harvesting the benefits of openness." In this same context they mention the movement of "open science" promoted by the National Institutes of Health (NIH) and the model of OpenCourseWare on which they comment:

Advocates for more openness contend that openness will result in greater innovation than would be achieved by restricting access to information or allowing first creators to exert greater control over it. Such a belief in the value of tapping the collective wisdom is profoundly democratic.

What is remarkable about this set of statements is the link between firm innovation, what we might call open education, and the emergence of the paradigm of social production (more about this concept later).

In 2007 three substantial reports were released that reviewed open education as a movement and assessed its benefits: The OECD's (2007) *Giving Knowledge for Free: The Emergence Of Open Educational Resources* (available electronically at http://www.oecd.org/document/41/0,3343,en_2649_201185_38659497_1_1_1_1,00.html); Open eLearning Content Observatory Services (OLCOS) project and report entitled *Open Educational Practices and Resources* (available at http://www.olcos.org/cms/upload/docs/olcos_road_map.pdf); and *A Review of the Open Educational Resources (OER) Movement: Achievements, Challenges, and New Opportunities* (Eds. Atkins et al. 2007), a report to The William and Flora Hewlett Foundation (available at http://www.oerders.org/wp-content/uploads/2007/03/a-review-of-the-open-educational-resources-oer-movement_final.pdf). These three reports share similar emphases each focusing on "openness" and the promise of the new technologies and their educational benefits. The OECD report focuses on four questions:

- How can sustainable cost/benefit models for OER initiatives be developed?
- What are the intellectual property rights issues linked to OER initiatives?

- What are the incentives and barriers for universities and faculty staff to deliver their materials to OER initiatives?
- How can access and usefulness for the users of OER initiatives be improved? (pp. 3–4, Foreword)

The Executive Summary gives us a flavor of the potential of OE (I prefer the term OE to OER because it embraces the notion of practices as well as the notion of sharing educational resources and also because it gels with open source, open access, and open science (as well as open innovation)) and the utopian educational promise that graces these three reports:

An apparently extraordinary trend is emerging. Although learning resources are often considered as key intellectual property in a competitive higher education world, more and more institutions and individuals are sharing digital learning resources over the Internet openly and without cost, as open educational resources (OER) (p. 9).

The report then concerns itself with the following questions: What are open educational resources? Who is using and producing OER and how much? Why are people sharing for free? What are the provisions for copyright and open licenses? How can OER projects be sustained in the long run alongside a set of policy implications and recommendations?

The OLCOS report, by comparison, focuses on: policies, institutional frameworks, and business models; open access and open content repositories; and laboratories of open educational practices and resources, warning against instituting open education within the dominant model:

OER are understood to be an important element of policies that want to leverage education and lifelong learning for the knowledge economy and society. However, OLCOS emphasizes that it is crucial to also promote innovation and change in educational practices. In particular, OLCOS warns that delivering OER to the still dominant model of teacher centred knowledge transfer will have little effect on equipping teachers, students and workers with the competences, knowledge and skills to participate successfully in the knowledge economy and society. This report emphasises the need to foster open practices of teaching and learning that are

informed by a competency-based educational framework. However, it is understood that a shift towards such practices will only happen in the longer term in a step-by-step process. Bringing about this shift will require targeted and sustained efforts by educational leaders at all levels (p. 12).

In chapter "Competences for the Knowledge Society," the report opines "priority must be given to open educational practices that involve students in active, constructive engagement with content, tools and services in the learning process, and promote learners' self-management, creativity and working in teams" (p. 37) and "introduces the idea of value chains of open educational content which emerge when teachers and students re-use available content and make enriched and/or additional material (e.g., use cases, experiences, lessons learned, etc.) available again to a larger community of practice" (p. 37). The report defines a competency-focused, collaborative paradigm of learning and knowledge acquisition where "priority is given to learning communities and development of knowledge and skills required for tackling and solving problems instead of subject-centred knowledge transfer." For the purposes of this paper and the audience, I quote further from the report:

We believe that, to acquire the competences and skills for personal and professional achievement in the knowledge-based society, the learner's autonomy, personal mastery and self-direction must be acknowledged and innovative approaches implemented that foster self management, communication and team skills, and analytical, conceptual, creative and problem solving skills. However, there is of course a huge difference between identifying required competences and operationalising them for inclusion in the concrete practices of teaching and learning at different educational levels (p. 39).

The report then lists the following skills of "digital competence":

- Ability to search, collect, and process (create, organize, distinguish relevant from irrelevant, subjective from objective, real from virtual) electronic information, data, and concepts and to use them in a systematic way.
- Ability to use appropriate aids (presentations, graphs, charts, maps) to produce, present, or understand complex information.

- Ability to access and search a website and to use Internet-based services such as discussion fora and e-mail.
- Ability to use ICT to support critical thinking, creativity, and innovation in different contexts at home, leisure, and work (p. 39).

The report to The William and Flora Hewlett Foundation is perhaps the most comprehensive even although it follows similar lines of investigation to the others but frames the report in terms of Amartya Sen's work with the plan to develop "a strategic international development initiative to expand people's substantive freedoms through the removal of 'unfreedoms.'" What is impressive about this report is not only the inventory of open education projects (the incubation of high-quality specialized open resources) but also its attempt to conceptualize the issues and to move to a new understanding of openness in terms of an ethic of participation (and the design of "open participatory learning infrastructure") that supports the role of technology in emphasizing the social nature of learning and its potential to address questions of the digital divide in developing countries.

There is much else that deserves attention in these reports. While they touch on conceptual issues to do with openness, they do not make the necessary theoretical links to the wider literature.

The History of "Openness" in Education: From the Open Classroom to OCW

We can group "openness in education" around a successive series of utopian historical moments based on a set of similar ideas stemming from core enlightenment concepts of freedom, equality, democracy, and creativity. The early history of open education consists of political and psychological experiments conducted in special schools established in the early twentieth century. The movement from the very beginning thus was shaped by contemporary political and psychological theory that attempted to provide alternatives to the mainstream that was connected to and

exemplified a form of society and set of institutions that was seen as politically desirable. These early ideas that also significantly involved an analysis of the space and architecture of schools and the associated idea of freedom of movement underwent considerable refinement and development over the course of the twentieth century. An important aspect concerned not only the analysis of architecture but the overcoming of distance in a form of distance education that began in the late nineteenth century through correspondence and progressed through various media eras including that of radio and television. Open education consisted of several strands and movements that often coalesced and overlapped to create a complex skein that despite the complexity was able to rapidly avail itself of new communication and information technologies in the last decade of the twentieth century and to identify itself more broadly with the new convergences among open source, open access, and OpenCourseWare movements. It was as though the open education movement in its infancy required the technological infrastructure to emerge as a major new paradigm rather than a set of small-scale and experimental alternatives or a form of distance education. We can chart these utopian moments in terms of five historical moments:

- The Open Classroom
- Open Schooling
- The Open University
- OpenCourseWare
- Open Education

The movement for openness in education was anticipated by a range of models after those of Homer Lane and A. S. Neill and, to a lesser degree, Bertrand Russell's libertarian school, all established in the early twentieth century. All three thinkers were wedded to the classical enlightenment doctrine of freedom and autonomy in education even though they tended to give its expression through then contemporary psychological theory influenced by Freud concerning child rearing. Lane established Little Commonwealth at Evershot, Dorset, in 1913. Influenced by the group therapy movement, he emphasized "shared responsibility" and freedom of "self-

expression." A. S. Neill, a follower of both Lane and Wilhelm Reich, the controversial psychoanalyst, established Summerhill in 1921 on the basis of a concept of personal freedom and equality that he held were important for learning and the development of self. Ideas of freedom and democracy also figured in Carl Rogers' (1969) *Freedom to Learn* written under the influence of the therapeutic movement including Otto Rank and existentialist philosophers like Martin Buber and Søren Kierkegaard. Rogers emphasized "self-directed learning" and facilitation rather than teaching as he entertained strong doubts about the necessary connection between teaching and learning. In the same environment Everett Reimer's and Ivan Illich's influential works during the 1970s, most famously in *Deschooling Society* (Illich 1972), argued formal education had confused schooling and education and created a kind of psychological impotency that delivered a stultified and non-creative uniformity.

In a broad sense these ideas were also given a concrete expression in the "open classroom" movement which originated in Leicestershire and was based on freedom of movement, the importance of "play," and a novel analysis of the space and architecture of schools. In Britain the movement became known as "informal education" based on "learning by doing" in home-like settings or "learning centers" where pupils were encouraged to be self-directed and creative in "schools without walls." The Plowden Report (1967) in the UK outlined a philosophy of primary schooling based firmly on Piagetian stage theory that emphasized children as individuals and supported a move to child-centered methods and curricula suited to the "needs of the child." Open schooling as "informal education" – informed by both Romantic thinkers like Rousseau, Pestalozzi, Froebel, and later, of course, Dewey – emphasized process over structure, dialogue rather than formal instruction, democracy rather than control, and freedom and self-expression over teacher-directedness and authority. A number of texts of the time explored the relation between open education, freedom, and knowledge (Nyberg 1975) and the relation between the open school and the open society

(Puckrose 1975) or emphasized the link with "community" and the move away from hierarchy (Easthope 1975).

Informal education tended to emphasize alternatives based on opening up traditional processes and structures of the school and decoupling the school from specific location or internal architecture, an age cohort, or depending upon a single source of authority. The unschooling, homeschooling, and community-schooling movements, for instance, focused on self-direction (autodidacticism) and harnessed community institutions and resources found in museums, local libraries, and even mass media. The informal education movement also had strong links with "'adult education' and, later, the concept of life-long learning."

Distance education began in the late nineteenth century and was initially based on correspondence, a tradition based on early international science that survived in "correspondence schools" where children were isolated in rural areas and separated from local schools by great distances. Instructional radio was introduced much later though its utopian promise was never fulfilled, similar to when instructional television began transmitting courses in the early 1930s. The model of technology-based distance education really received its impetus in the 1960s when the Open University in the UK was established founded on the idea that communications technology could extend advanced degree learning to those people who for a variety of reasons could not easily attend campus universities. It is interesting that the Open University really began with the BBC and ideas for a "wireless university" or "teleuniversity" that could combine broadcast lectures with correspondence texts and visits to local universities. From the start the idea of the "Open University" was conceived as a response to the problem of exclusion. The Open University advertises itself as based on "open learning" which is explained in terms of "learning in your own time by reading course material, working on course activities, writing assignments and perhaps working with other students." The Open University has around 150,000 undergraduate and more than 30,000 postgraduate students. 10,000 of our

students have disabilities. It has been immensely influential as a model for other countries, and distance education flourished in the 1970s and picked up new open education dimensions with the introduction of local area network environments (see, e.g., the Indian Open Schooling Network (IOSN) at <http://www.nos.org/iosn.htm>, the National Institute of Open Schooling at <http://www.nos.org/>, and Open School BC (British Columbia) at <http://www.pss.gov.bc.ca/osbc/>).

OpenCourseWare (OCW) is very much a feature of the twenty-first century. MIT, one of the first universities to introduce OCW, announced its intention in the *New York Times* in 2001, formed the OpenCourseWare Consortium in 2005, and by 2007 published virtually all its courses online. This is how the MIT website expresses the history of OCW:

MIT OpenCourseWare is an idea - and an ideal - developed by the MIT faculty who share the Institute's mission to advance knowledge and educate students in science, technology, and other areas of scholarship to best serve the world. In 1999, the Faculty considered how to use the Internet in pursuit of this goal, and in 2000 proposed OCW. MIT published the first proof-of-concept site in 2002, containing 50 courses. By November 2007, MIT completed the initial publication of virtually the entire curriculum, over 1,800 courses in 33 academic disciplines. Going forward, the OCW team is updating existing courses and adding new content and services to the site (<http://ocw.mit.edu/OcwWeb/web/about/history/index.htm>).

OCW does not grant degrees nor provide access to faculty. Site statistics show that 49% of users are by self-learners, 32% by students, and 16% by teachers. The OpenCourseWare Consortium (at http://www.ocwconsortium.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=15&Itemid=29)

is a collaboration of more than 100 higher education institutions and associated organizations from around the world creating a broad and deep body of open educational content using a shared model. The mission of the OpenCourseWare Consortium is to advance education and empower people worldwide through *opencourseware*.

On November 28, 2007, MIT celebrated the initial publication of the entire MIT curriculum on OpenCourseWare with a conference called

Unlocking Knowledge, Empowering Minds with a keynote by Thomas Friedman and a symposium panel on the future of OCW and education with Harold Abelson, (moderator) professor, Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, MIT; Charles Vest, president, National Academy of Engineering, president emeritus, MIT; John Seely Brown, former chief scientist, Xerox Corporation; and Sam Pitroda, chairman, National Knowledge Commission, Government of India. (The videos are available for viewing at <http://ocw.mit.edu/OcwWeb/web/about/milestone/index.htm>.) Steven Lerman, dean for Graduate Students, MIT, in his presentation mentioned that MIT OpenCourseWare has reached 35 million people and another 14 million in translation. MIT is of course only one example of the OpenCourseWare movement, an important player, but nevertheless, only one institution among many (see the OpenCourseWare Consortium for the full list of participating countries and list of courses at <http://www.ocwconsortium.org/>). Most recently The Cape Town Open Education Declaration subtitled "Unlocking the promise of open educational resources" arose from a meeting convened in September 2007. The Declaration begins:

We are on the cusp of a global revolution in teaching and learning. Educators worldwide are developing a vast pool of educational resources on the Internet, open and free for all to use. These educators are creating a world where each and every person on earth can access and contribute to the sum of all human knowledge. They are also planting the seeds of a new pedagogy where educators and learners create, shape and evolve knowledge together, deepening their skills and understanding as they go.

This emerging open education movement combines the established tradition of sharing good ideas with fellow educators and the collaborative, interactive culture of the Internet. It is built on the belief that everyone should have the freedom to use, customize, improve and redistribute educational resources without constraint. Educators, learners and others who share this belief are gathering together as part of a worldwide effort to make education both more accessible and more effective.

The Declaration mentions the expanding global collection of OCW as the basis for this development, although in terms of its history, it is clear that origins and strands of the movement go back much further. The document also

mentions the variety of openly licensed course materials, including lessons, games, software, and other teaching and learning materials that contribute to making education more accessible and help shape and give effect to a "participatory culture of learning, creating, sharing and cooperation" necessary for knowledge societies. Perhaps, most importantly, the Declaration indicates that open education

is not limited to just open educational resources ...[but] also draws upon open technologies that facilitate collaborative, flexible learning and the open sharing of teaching practices that empower educators to benefit from the best ideas of their colleagues. It goes on to provide a statement based on a three-pronged strategy designed to support open educational technology, open sharing of teaching practices and other approaches that promote the broader cause of open education.

(The full declaration can be found at <http://www.capetowndeclaration.org/read-the-declaration>.) The open education movement and paradigm has arrived. It emerges from a complex historical background, and its futures are intimately tied not only to open source, open access, and open publishing movements but also to the concept of the open society itself and its meanings.

Bergson, Popper, Soros, and the Open Society

To exist is to change, to change is to mature, to mature is to go on creating oneself endlessly – Bergson.

Henri Bergson's (1859–1941) philosophy of time and concepts of multiplicity and creative evolution, was among the first to theorize the origins of the open society. He contrasted it with the closed society in the book *The Two Sources of Morality and Religion* (Bergson 1977 [1935]). With closed morality, religion is static and concerned primarily with social cohesion and social order, whereas with open morality, religion is dynamic and concerned with progress and creativity. The source of the latter is what Bergson calls "creative emotions" which are intuitions that overturn accepted ideas and practices and the source of *elan vital*, one of the two competing life forces.

George Soros (2006) who wrote "*Europe as a Prototype for a Global Open Society*" said:

The concept of open society was first used by the French philosopher Henri Bergson in his book *The Two Sources of Morality and Religion* published in 1932. One source is tribal and that leads to a closed society whose members feel an affinity for each other and fear or hostility toward the other tribes. By contrast, the other source is universal and leads to an open society which is guided by universal human rights and seeks to protect and promote the freedom of the individual (see http://www.soros.org/resources/articles_publications/articles/europe_20061120).

Bergson's work has been revitalized at the hands of Gilles Deleuze (1991) who has used his concepts of multiplicity and creative evolution as the source of his "becomings" and ultimately for being itself.

Karl Popper, a German-Jew escapee, wrote *The Open Society and Its Enemies* (Popper 1945) in two volumes *The Spell of Plato* and *The High Tide of Prophecy: Hegel, Marx and the Aftermath* while in political exile at the University of Canterbury in New Zealand from 1937 to 1943. While Popper's concept of the open society is *epistemological* rather than political, in essence the work is a critique of historicism and an attack on the origins of totalitarian societies and a defense of liberal democracy as the open society. In the Preface to the second edition, Popper (1966, p. xi) writes:

I see now more clearly than ever before that even our greatest troubles spring from something that is as admirable and sound as it is dangerous – from our impatience to better the lot of our fellows. For these troubles are the by-products of what is perhaps the greatest of all moral and spiritual revolutions of history, a movement which began three centuries ago. It is the longing of uncounted unknown men to free themselves and their minds from the tutelage of authority and prejudice. It is their attempt to build up an open society which rejects the absolute authority to preserve, to develop, and to establish traditions, old or new, that measure up to their standards of freedom, of humaneness, and of rational criticism. It is their unwillingness to sit back and leave the entire responsibility for ruling the world to human or superhuman authority, and their readiness to share the burden of responsibility for avoidable suffering, and to work for its avoidance. This revolution has created powers of appalling destructiveness; but they may yet be conquered.

Popper's work was written during the war years largely as an attack on Marxism, totalitarianism, and fascism, the predominant forms that he saw as threatening the so-called free world. He argues that Hegel's and Marx's historicist philosophies are characteristic products of their time, philosophies in response to tumultuous social change, and he goes on to argue:

there can be no history of "the past as it actually did happen"; there can only be historical interpretations, and none of them final; and every generation has the right to frame its own. But not only has it a right to frame its own interpretations, it also has a kind of obligation to do so; for there is indeed a pressing need to be answered. We want to know how our troubles are related to the past, and we want to see the line along which we may progress towards the solution of what we feel, and what we choose, to be our main tasks. It is this need which, if not answered by rational and fair means, produces historicist interpretations. Under its pressure the historicist substitutes for a rational question: "What are we to choose as our most urgent problems, how did they arise, and along what roads may we proceed to solve them?" the irrational and apparently factual question: "Which way are we going? What, in essence, is the part that history has destined us to play?" (p. 268).

For Popper history has no inherent meaning that can be read. His philosophy of science, laid out much more fully in a range of works dating from *The Logic of Scientific Discovery* (Popper 1959 [1934]) and including *Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge* (1963), *Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach* (1972), and *The Open Universe: An Argument for Indeterminism* (1982), spelled out a doctrine of critical rationalism (critical "open-mindedness") with falsifiability (as opposed to verification) as the hallmark, demarcation, and criterion of science. (It is not the place here to enter into the complex history of postwar philosophy of science although it is important to recognize that Popper's ideas were contested both internally by his students like Imre Lakatos and externally by Thomas Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend, among others.)

Popper was a "Cold Warrior" like Friedrich von Hayek, his countryman, who wrote the fiercely anti-socialist tract *The Road to Serfdom* (1949) and was responsible for inviting and

securing a place for Popper at the London School of Economics (LSE). Hayek and Popper together formed a formidable twin opponent to socialism and strong defense of the principles of liberal democracy and the "free market" in the postwar period. (Popper's and Hayek's combined influence as defenders of the Austrian school of liberalism was exerted not only through their interlocking ideas – Hayek referenced Popper's critical rationalism and Popper accepted Hayek's evolutionary epistemology as a basis for his own thinking – but also through the Mont Pelerin Society that Hayek set up after WWII as a basis for the "open society." Popper was present at the inaugural meeting in 1947. For a statement of aims, see <http://www.montpelerin.org/home.cfm>.)

George Soros, born in Budapest, Hungary, in 1930, emigrated to the UK in 1947 to study at the LSE where he became first acquainted with Popper's thought and then a devotee, strongly influenced by Popper's critique of totalitarianism and the concept of the open society. As a philanthropist who made his fortune as a trader in the USA during the 1960s and 1970s, he established the Open Society Institute in 1993 to help develop democratic institutions throughout Central and Eastern Europe. A strong critic of neo-conservatism and especially the presidency of George W. Bush and the inherent instability of unregulated global finance capitalism, Soros wrote a series of books on these and related topics such as *The Bubble of American Supremacy* (2005), *Open Society: Reforming Global Capitalism* (2000), *The Crisis of Global Capitalism: Open Society Endangered* (1998), *Underwriting Democracy* (1991), and *Opening the Soviet System* (1990).

The New Paradigm of Social Production

Benkler's (2006) recent book *The Wealth of Networks* develops a vision of the good society based on access and distribution of information goods in a global networked information economy that places a high value on individual autonomy where within the public information space of the Internet and the information commons people

have the individual means to pursue their own interests. Benkler (2006, p. 1) begins:

Information, knowledge, and culture are central to human freedom and human development. How they are produced and exchanged in our society critically affects the way we see the state of the world as it is and might be; who decides these questions; and how we, as societies and polities, come to understand what can and ought to be done. For more than 150 years, modern complex democracies have depended in large measure on an industrial information economy for these basic functions. In the past decade and a half, we have begun to see a radical change in the organization of information production. Enabled by technological change, we are beginning to see a series of economic, social, and cultural adaptations that make possible a radical transformation of how we make the information environment we occupy as autonomous individuals, citizens, and members of cultural and social groups.

He indicates that a set of related changes in the information technologies entailing new social practices of production has fundamentally changed how we make and exchange information, knowledge, and culture, and he envisages these newly emerging social practices as constituting a new information environment that gives individuals the freedom to take a more active role in the construction of public information and culture. As he writes:

This new freedom holds great practical promise: as a dimension of individual freedom; as a platform for better democratic participation; as a medium to foster a more critical and self-reflective culture; and, in an increasingly information dependent global economy, as a mechanism to achieve improvements in human development everywhere (Benkler 2006, p. 2).

The emergence of the global networked information economy made possible by increasingly cheaper processors linked as a pervasive network has created an information economy based on the production of information and culture that enables social and nonmarket or peer-to-peer production and exchange to play a, perhaps even the, central role.

Benkler's arguments chime with a number of others who have been working in the same area of the intellectual commons as a newly defined public space or laid the groundwork for doing so:

Richard Stallman, John Perry Barlow, Larry Lessig, James Doyle, and Pamela Stephenson. Stallman's (2002) collected essays in *Free Software, Free Society* originally written a couple of decades ago provide a discussion of the philosophy underlying the free software movement, including the GNU project and manifesto, the difference between "free" and "open" software, the concept of copyleft, and the GNU General Public License. As Larry Lessig (2002, p. 10) writes: "Every generation has its philosopher . . . who captures the imagination of a time." The philosopher who best captures our time, Lessig asserts, is Richard Stallman, who began as a computer programmer designing operating systems and came to define the freedom of code as the central pressing issue confronting a computer society. Free software is Stallman's answer to the question of control—"free" as in "free speech," that is, free from control, transparent, and open to further development, change, and innovation. Such freedom, then, is the basis of "free laws," an economy of free code and the "free society." The principles demand openness and transparency that form the basis for control of code, for laws that guarantee this freedom, and for government itself. Stallman argues that copyright is not defined as a natural right in the US Constitution, and he seeks to reduce it, arguing also for the distribution of scientific publishing in non-proprietary formats.

John Perry Barlow (1994) raises perhaps the central enigma in an article called "The Economy of Ideas":

If our property can be infinitely reproduced and instantaneously distributed all over the planet without cost, without our knowledge, without its even leaving our possession, how can we protect it? How are we going to get paid for the work we do with our minds? And, if we can't get paid, what will assure the continued creation and distribution of such work?

The fact is, as Barlow points out so well, the accumulated canon of patent and copyright law applies well to things but faces insuperable difficulties when applied to nonmaterial goods. Information increasingly separates itself from the material plane to exist merely in the ideational

form as pure ideas. Digital technologies tend to eliminate the distinction between the idea and its expression in some physical form also "erasing the legal jurisdictions of the physical world." Barlow (1994) argues:

Notions of property, value, ownership, and the nature of wealth itself are changing more fundamentally than at any time since the Sumerians first poked cuneiform into wet clay and called it stored grain.

This led Barlow to examine the nature of information and to investigate a number of underlying "hypotheses":

- Information is an activity.
- "Information is a verb, not a noun; it is experienced not possessed; it has to move; it is conveyed but propagation, not distribution."
- Information is a life form.
- "Information wants to be free; it replicates into the cracks of possibility; it wants to change; it is perishable."
- Information is a relationship.

Barlow ends his meditation on information by suggesting that everything we know about information as intellectual property is wrong and we are going to have to rethink it. He suggests "The protections that we will develop will rely far more on ethics and technology than on law," and "Encryption will be the technical basis for most intellectual property protection." He goes on famously to maintain:

The economy of the future will be based on relationship rather than possession. It will be continuous rather than sequential. And finally, in the years to come, most human exchange will be virtual rather than physical, consisting not of stuff but the stuff of which dreams are made. Our future business will be conducted in a world made more of verbs than nouns.

Barlow's prophetic work on the nature of information predates much of the attention it received later from scholars in law such as Lessig, Benkler, and Boyle. Lessig (2004), building on earlier work (e.g., Lessig 2001), argues that for an underlying conception of freedom and its protection as the basis for "free culture," at the same time

warning of the dangers of "big media" in colonizing public media space. He emphasizes the way the Internet makes possible the efficient spread of content through peer-to-peer (p2p) file-sharing in a way that does not respect traditional copyright, and he warns us of the dangers to the kind of creativity that is the basis of cultural innovation. In *The Future of Ideas*, Lessig (2002) describes how the Internet counterculture has encouraged an explosion of innovation and creativity and the legal architecture protecting it as a public space is now under threat.

In the same context we can also talk of James Boyle and Pamela Stephenson. Boyle is a law professor at Duke University and the cofounder of the Center for the Study of the Public Domain established in 2002 with the mission:

to promote research and scholarship on the contributions of the public domain to speech, culture, science and innovation, to promote debate about the balance needed in our intellectual property system and to translate academic research into public policy solutions.

Boyle (1997) argues that that we need a political economy of "intellectual property." Likening the Net to an environment and drawing on the politics of environmentalism, he suggests "our intellectual property discourse has structural tendencies towards over-protection, rather than under protection." He claims that the "public domain" is disappearing:

in an IP system built around the interests of the current stakeholders and the notion of the original author, around an over-deterministic practice of economic analysis and around a "free speech" community that is under-sensitized to the dangers of private censorship.

He argues that a pay-as-you-read architecture will be inefficient and that such a system will "Lead to extraordinary monopoly and concentration in the software industry, as copyright and patent trump antitrust policy" and possibly legitimize the extension of "intellectual property rights even further over living organisms, including the human genome, transgenic species and the like" as well as privatizing "words, or aspects of images or texts that are currently in the public domain, to the detriment of public debate, education, equal access to information. . ." (Boyle 1997, n.p.).

Boyle is one of a number of scholars working in this area including Michael Carroll, Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, and Larry Lessig, along with the filmmakers, Eric Saltzman and Davis Guggenheim, the computer science expert Hal Abelson, and CEOs like Jimmy Wales (founder of Wikipedia), Laurie Racine (founder of DotSUB), Joi Ito (founder of Neoteny), and John Buckman (founder of Magnatune) and all members of Creative Commons. Pamela Samuelson has also completed work on intellectual property and the public space. Stephenson (1996) in Wired's "The Copyright Grab" warned that President Clinton's white paper on intellectual property was a sellout of the public and a reward of supporters in the copyright industry.

"Henry" in the Crooked Timber seminar on Benkler's *The Wealth of Networks* indicates how this recent literature maps onto "to a broader tradition of thought; that of people like Jane Jacobs, James Scott, Richard Sennett and Iris Marion Young." He acknowledges that the Internet enables us to engage with each other in new creative ways and "to form networks of collaboration and of conversation, creating possibility conditions for the kinds of diversity and critical thinking that democratic theorists prize." The essential point emphasized here, especially for the Left, is that these newly enabled forms of "community" or "conversation" are non-constraining and occur without central planning or the heavy-handed agency of the State. Henry suggests that three key norms – linking, attribution, and authenticity – structure the blogosphere creating an economy built on "gift exchange." He contemplates how self-regulatory solutions tend to rigidify over time to reduce spontaneity and tend to introduce more formal rules and hierarchies.

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Openness and Power

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Synonyms

Agency, authority and open education; Agency, authority and openness; Political economy of open education, The; Political economy of openness, The; Politics of open education, The; Politics of openness, The

Introduction

Openness as a set of practices has received less attention from practitioners and researchers than the specifics of producing and distributing open

educational resources (OERs) or engaging in open education through innovations like massive online open courses (MOOCs). As a result, openness as a philosophical position and its relationships to power inside and outside formal educational contexts has also remained relatively undeveloped to date. However, it is possible to identify key arguments that enable the relationship between openness and power to be framed.

1. Who defines openness, and what remains open or closed, inside and outside formal educational contexts? This includes the relations of power between transnational bodies, State agencies, education providers, corporations, and individuals.
2. How does the political economics of openness reveal relations of production that are themselves rooted in power? This includes work on ideas like the commons, the public university, MOOCs, open data, information justice, and free culture.
3. These associations also map onto discussions of openness, in terms of scholarship, authentication, publishing and access, data, and so on. How do these commodities of openness relate to social relations of power?
4. The associations between openness and power map onto a number of terrains grounded in the self, including: the rich history of open education in community, cooperative, adult, and workers' education; pedagogic research focused upon personalization, collaboration, and networks; critical or radical pedagogy around emancipation and self-actualization; Marxist critiques of education as it is restructured through processes of commodification and valorization. Can these terrains be brought into relation?
5. Is it possible to scope a future for openness as it relates to power? In particular, how does current research and practice enable thinking about openness in terms of utopias or dystopias?

This entry will pick up on each of these areas in turn, in order to frame the social nature of openness in educational contexts. As a result, its

relationship to concerns of democracy, social justice, and freedom, through processes for knowledge consumption, production, and distribution, will be developed.

Openness and Power

A starting point for understanding openness and power is the question of "who decides?" in terms of what is made open and who has the power to open up a specific context. In the process of opening up a particular context, a connected issue is what is then closed or closed off as a result? These questions bring a range of actors, with a range of different forms of agency into relation, including: transnational bodies like UNESCO and the World Bank that set global agendas for open access as a means of encouraging economic growth and social justice; State and governmental agencies that scope national policy for open data and quality assurance; education providers that wish to widen access to their knowledge, skills, and practices; corporate bodies partnering with education providers to deliver educational services; and individuals who are producing, distributing, and consuming open educational artifacts.

Both transnational and State agencies support open approaches to education through policymaking related to open data, open licensing frameworks, and open standards. A key strand has been to move beyond raising awareness of key open education issues, in order to focus upon sustainable, social, and economic development. This has then tended to open up debates about licensing, copyright, and intellectual property law, with alternate positions being developed around copyleft and copyleft, which are themselves rooted in libertarian politics. This adds to the complexity of the analysis of openness and power, which at times sees left and right-wing politics converging on specific issues concerning the relationship of the State to the individual and the community, while doing so from both free market and democratic perspectives.

One further criticism of transnational agendas for open practices has emerged from the global South and from marginalized voices in the global

North, who have viewed the promotion of strategies for open educational resources as a form of commodity dumping. Moreover, the argument has been that openness often legitimates established anglophile, colonial logics embedded within education systems and sees them transposed across the globe. This then questions the relationship between open educational processes and indigenous approaches to learning. A further critical question is whether openness enables the reproduction of historical power rooted in policies and practices of assimilation, surveillance, and regulation? (Weems 2013).

Inside the State, educational institutions, including private providers, have been encouraged to develop institutional strategies and policies for openness, through work on open licensing, open data frameworks, OERs and open repositories, open scholarship and research, and MOOCs. Strategies that focus on incentivizing the development of open educational products and services have been rooted in building *both* internal capability *and* capacity to reach new markets. Beyond the issues of transnational power noted above, the emergence of openness as a potential growth area has affected higher education providers, which are forced to compete on a national and global terrain for student numbers. Here, national and corporate demands for flexible labor markets have challenged the design and delivery of educational contexts, in order to generate on-going employment and economic growth. This has led to fundamental questions about the role of universities as gatekeeper institutions for society's knowledge and the relationship of the educator/researcher to her public, her institution, and her discipline area. These questions demonstrate that openness has disrupted boundaries between the contexts in which educators/researchers operate. Moreover, it questions the identities of the institution and its educators/researchers in the face of the power of the market.

There is an increasing focus on how such boundaries are clarified through policy and strategy, which themselves reinforce the social relations of power between institutions and individual educators or students. Here policies for the development of OERs, open licensing, and social and

public media are critical in either enabling or removing agency for educators/researchers and students (Hall et al. 2014). Research has then attempted to address the ways in which the boundaries of structure and agency, governed through institutional policy, has underscored cooperative learning agendas or radical collegiality between educators/researchers. A first counterpoint is the institutional need to develop the digital capabilities of its workforce, in order to compete, so that issues of coercion and performance management shape the relations of production of MOOCs, OERs, open data and scholarship, and so on. A second is the power relations that exist inside the classroom, in particular where students and citizens are encouraged to engage in the production and distribution of open educational artifacts, for instance through citizen science or documentary media projects. At issue here is the democratic relationship between educator and student in the governance, design, delivery, and assessment of any curriculum that is becoming open.

One emergent area of research has been the extent to which the opening or closing of contexts, including data, teaching content, research, and scholarship, can function as a tool of disciplinary power (Johnson 2013). Understanding the power that exists to open up a context or set of contexts raises three questions. First, is governance defined deliberatively or is it imposed? Second is openness used to reproduce or challenge a specific set of societal norms? Third, in the process of opening up, which contexts or possibilities are closed off? For researchers, educational openness needs to consider issues of social and educational justice, as specific pedagogic practices and policies are validated and legitimated, and reproduce or challenge power.

While openness as a philosophical position is related to the structural forms through which agency and power flow, the flows between ideas of "open" and "closed" continue to shape any analysis of power. Where openness is not seen be the opposite binary to closedness, theoretical and methodological positions emerge that describe openness as emerging from certain closings, and vice versa (Edwards 2015). This underpins discussions of the governance of the

educational commons, as it emerges through: institutional academic commons; spaces like Wikipedia or Wikileaks; and in national projects like the Free Libre Open Knowledge (FLOK) Society's attempt to create an open infrastructure for Ecuador's National Plan for Good Living (FLOK Society 2014). In thinking about how opening up/closing down in one context materially affects another, questions emerge of what forms of openness are worthwhile and who has power to decide? What specific pedagogic approaches, forms of assessment, or types of educational resources are opened up, and as a result, which are closed off or delegitimized?

The legitimization of openness ties into broader analyses of the political economics of education, which are themselves rooted in social relations of production and power. For instance, some researchers have described open education as a liberal project that focuses upon the freedom of things rather than the freedom of people (Winn 2012). This discourse amplifies critiques of the relationship between educational labor and intellectual property and therefore of the power relations that openness or closedness reproduce. This includes a critique of the labor of educators/researchers and of students in open environments, where data, content, curricula, assessments, scholarship, and so on are being openly produced, distributed, and consumed. However, such open production and circulation does not necessarily reveal the social relations of production and power. These relations of power question the nature of the material wealth that is created: is this a social use-value or should it be made available for exchange and trade? Here the boundaries between openness as a public or communal good are ruptured by the commodification of open data and knowledge for exchange value, which reinforce specific forms of agency. One outcome is that enforced openness, designed for the production of educational value, may reinforce relations and regimes of power that are shaped technologically, financially, and intellectually.

One domain in which agendas that promote openness run up against established power structures is in free culture movements. This highlights where freedom of action is potentially enabled/

disabled by opening or closing *either* access to educational material *or* the ability to reuse or remix such material. Here the power of educational publishers and the operation of transnational legal terrains militate against the immediate opening up of access to content, for making modifications in the face of copyright law, or for invoking copyleft or copyfarleft as an educational practice. However, free culture as a function of openness is also opposed by some educators who fear that open licensing may underscore intellectual and reputational damage through the erosion of academic norms. This leads to critical questions related to the power of academics to leverage their intellectual capital. First, if educators who receive a salary are not required to sell their work, why can they not give that research or teaching material away? Second, if academics are not required to sell their work, why do they require all of the protections of copyright and specifically those protections that exist for financial benefit? The idea of openness in publishing is therefore uncovers a complex and contentious set of relations (Eve 2014).

Throughout these questions of political economy in both open and closed educational contexts, relations of power are defined by the interrelationships that emerge between, established networks of publishers, policymakers, technology firms, and so on and educators, educational institutions, and citizens. Issues of legitimization or empowerment are amplified by the relationship between open data and education. This is an area of economic growth that affects national industrial strategies for the development of new markets and which enables private providers to design and sell new educational services as commodities in established markets. Openness is framed by the power of corporations to use transnational policy, in order to leverage institutional and personal data as business intelligence and new services, rooted in learning analytics. Potentially, the governance of open approaches then empowers those who are already empowered, because they have better technological access, data management infrastructures, and analysis skills. At the boundary of corporate enterprise, educational provision and individual learning, different levels of social

and political power and intellectual capital affect the interpretation and legitimation of what is opened up or closed down. As a result, researchers question the application and value of openness under conditions of unequal capabilities.

A resultant issue is whether a standardized view of openness is then developed and imposed, and which normalizes judgements about the educational performance of individuals, including in contexts that were previously closed. While digital technologies have generated energy around the possibilities of openness in education, they risk reinforcing pedagogic selections and exclusions because they are built upon and reproduce certain normative, ontological architectures. This raises important questions about the politics of knowledge and links back to issues of social and educational justice in the design of open education or in framing education through enforced openness. In this case, there is the risk that observable behaviors become a form of dressage or conformity, irrespective of the circumstances of that behavior. As a result, the impact of policies for openness may materially affect marginalized groups or those who do not adhere to institutional norms. Such norms reflect historical and material relations of power, which themselves have an effect on social justice. This might be explored in light of the experience of groups who demand safe, autonomous spaces for working, for instance some feminist and activist groups, through participative methodologies.

Such explorations develop the Self as a critical domain for discussing legitimized open practices. Relevant research maps onto a number of terrains, including: the rich history of open education in community, cooperative, adult, and workers' education; pedagogic research around personalization, collaboration, and networks; critical or radical pedagogy focused upon emancipation and self-actualization; and Marxist educational analyses of the structuring reality of value inside the social factory. Open education projects can be analyzed in terms of how the Self is represented or reproduced, from each of these theoretical positions. Such projects include those which focus upon: lifelong, community-based learning; peer-to-peer learning; open educational cooperatives;

federated MOOCs like FutureLearn in the UK; or connectivist approaches to pedagogic development (van Mourik Broekman et al. 2014).

One practical issue that arises is the extent to which these theoretical positions overstate the democratic potential of openness and whether the conceptions of learning and self-organization that are developed are determinist. The politics of the wider educational ecosystems with which any open education system interacts is crucial. Here the realities of open/closed systems and their interrelationships, alongside the variable human and corporate capital of the actors in those systems, need to be addressed. Methodologically, this work has been undertaken through community-oriented approaches that enable grounded analyses of the impacts of open/closed educational structures on agency, through participative action research, grounded theory and constructivist grounded theory (Anderson et al. 2015). There has also been an engagement with actor network theory and network analysis in uncovering relations of power in specific ecosystems. In part, these approaches have been important because open education practices and philosophies support wide-ranging agendas: first, progressive and liberal agendas for democratic inclusion; second, radical and critical engagement with emancipatory, communal self-actualization; and third, free market and economically liberal tendencies.

A final area that enables openness and power to be scoped is open educational futures, in particular as they relate to social justice, democratic engagement, and self-actualization. Extant research into governing networks that maintain hegemonic power in the domain of public policy, alongside the role of network governance models for policy implementation, offer one potential mirror for critiquing open educational contexts. For some researchers, the apparent democratic possibilities of openness are subsumed under forms of *openwashing*, which give the appearance of openness, while sustaining proprietary practices and established norms (Watters 2014). In this context hegemony becomes central, and impacts the role of actors like the educator/researcher, quality assurance agencies, and

corporate educational publishers, in reinforcing or challenging forms of power. These emerge through sociocultural codes, educational policies and strategies, open data architectures, innovations like MOOCs, and so on. A central question for researchers and educators is what might openness look like in practice? Any response might reflect issues of freedom of educational action, related to: public, communal or private value; openness defined for use or for exchange; equality or equality of opportunity; and democracy and social justice.

These points are rooted in freedom of educational action, though which claims made for openness might be grounded through a discussion of the sociopolitical binary of utopia/dystopia. Here technological and sociocultural forms of determinism that are rooted in the potentially revolutionary nature of openness can be challenged. The relationship between hegemonic and *both* counter-hegemonic *and* delegitimized positions reveals how openness relates to socioeconomic privilege. A second issue surrounds what is normalized through openness in specific educational contexts, and whether it is possible to enable deliberative responses to the governance and implementation of open educational projects and practices. Such responses address the material and historical effects of open practices and how they impact specific individuals or groups. This highlights the complex power relations that emerge from an analysis of openness and how the theoretical frameworks used to develop understanding are immanent to the practical, political, and educational forms that openness takes.

Cross-References

- ▶ Dewey on Democracy
- ▶ Digital Learning, Discourse, and Ideology
- ▶ Education and Big Data
- ▶ Educational Leadership, Change, and the Politics of Resistance
- ▶ Expertise and Educational Practice
- ▶ Global English, Postcolonialism, and Education

- ▶ Human Capital Theory in Education
- ▶ Knowledge, Violence, and Education
- ▶ Labor in the Digital Age
- ▶ Latino and African-American Social Relations
- ▶ Latino Praxis
- ▶ Neoliberalism and Education Policy
- ▶ Neoliberalism and Power in Education
- ▶ Open Education and Education for Openness
- ▶ Openness and Power
- ▶ Praxis
- ▶ Social Imaginaries and Democratic Teaching and Learning
- ▶ Universities and the Politics of Autonomy

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Ortega y Gasset, José (1883–1955)

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Introduction: Thinking the Present

Strictly speaking, José Ortega y Gasset (Madrid 1882–Madrid 1955) is not a “theorist of education” in the modern and specialized sense of the concept. He is, however, a “thinker of education,” a “philosopher of education,” and in his own way an “educator.” Careful reading of his pedagogical writings reveals a line of thinking that continually problematizes the idea of education, thereby generating new concepts and enlightening metaphors. Ortega’s pedagogical vocation is geared mainly to the cultural regeneration of the Spain of his lifetime. Although he once said he dared not harbor any particular pedagogical ideas himself, he was concerned with how the younger generations were being educated. For instance, in *Biología y Pedagogía* (1920), he wrote “elementary teaching should ensure and foster a primary, spontaneous life of the spirit, which is exactly the same today as 10,000 years ago, and which must be defended from the ineluctable mechanization of life itself by its creating specific organs and functions” (Ortega y Gasset 2007, 105). The point is to teach not for a ready-made life but for the *creative life*: first to strengthen living life – *natura naturans* – and only afterward civilization and culture, *natura naturata*. These ideas are encouraged by the “vitalist philosophy” that characterizes Ortega. Having taken shape in the neo-Kantian philosophy during his stay in Marburg (1906–1908),

Ortega's pedagogy belies a philosophy that places life as "radical reality."

Taken all together, Ortega's written output may lack a systematic structure, but it is highly suggestive nonetheless. He makes frequent use of "thought exercises" or *meditations*; "Meditation is at the same time both walking and forging one's way," he states in *¿Qué es La Vida?* (1930–1931); "it is coping with each thing as it comes upon us" (J. Ortega y Gasset, VIII, 413), i.e., thus making thought become present in the act of thinking. His written work is an open-ended program, an example of which is the eight-volume set of *El Espectador* (1916–1934) (J. Ortega y Gasset, II), in which he makes insightful comments on a wide range of topics.

At first, the neo-Kantian philosophy he picked up during his stay in Marburg showed him the possibility of *Europizing* Spain. As he stated in *La Pedagogía Social como Programa Político* (1910), "Spain's current reality is becoming a problem, [...] so Spain is a problem" (J. Ortega y Gasset, II, 88). A particularly decisive year was 1914, which he perceived as a radical breakdown of enlightened ideals. It was the year his *Meditaciones del Quijote* (1914) was published, a youthful but important work featuring his well-known phrase: "I am myself plus my circumstance, and if I do not save it, I cannot save myself [...]: 'keeping up appearances', the phenomena" (J. Ortega y Gasset, I, 757).

That same interest in thinking in the present and its contradictions led him to give a number of conferences in Buenos Aires under the title of *Meditación de Nuestro Tiempo*. In *Introducción al Presente*, he states: "The discovery that we are fatally assigned to a certain age group and lifestyle is one of the melancholic experiences that every sensitive man sooner or later feels. A generation is an integral way of existence indelibly fixed on the individual" (J. Ortega y Gasset, VIII, 58 and VI, 385–397). By bringing his audience into the present, Ortega highlights its constituent dramatics, since it is cohabited by three "presences in the present": three vital dimensions together in each present, in unavoidable conflict and hostility. This means different things to a youth of 20, a man of 40, and an old man of 80. Consequently, each of

us makes ourselves felt in the present depending on which generation we each belong to. In pedagogical terms, for Ortega, education is always the result of different generations meeting in the common affiliation of time. Every generation settles in and "sees" the present in its own way, i.e., from its particular point of view.

Spectator Pedagogy

Two of the common denominators we find in Ortega's work are *perspectivism*, a philosophical current in which the different conceptions of the world depend on the individual's point of view and circumstances, and *vital reason* ("razón vital"), which is an attempt at moving beyond the pure reason and practical reason of idealists and rationalists. Truth can be found by juxtaposing partial views, fundamental to which is the ongoing dialog between man and life. Reality "is offered in individual perspectives [...]. The visual perspective and the intellectual perspective are further complicated by the perspective of evaluation. Instead of disputing them, we integrate our visions in generous spiritual collaboration, and much as the two independent banks of a river merge into one broad river bed, so we compose the stream of what is real" (J. Ortega y Gasset, II, 163). Or as he says in *El Tema De Nuestro Tiempo* (1923): "Each individual is a point of view on the universe" (J. Ortega y Gasset, III, 614).

In sharp contrast to most of the philosophical tradition prevailing in the West, which soon gave up on analyzing the sphere of human affairs, what mattered most to Ortega y Gasset is life, not theory: "The only thing I am stating is that, from time to time, spontaneous life should give rise to theory, its obvious pupil, and then, theories should be made in utmost purity, with utmost tragedy" (J. Ortega y Gasset, II, 163). As he said in *Principios de Metafísica Según la Razón Vital* (1932–1933), life is *radical reality*, the root from which all human realities spring and the project each person must undeniably "carry forward": "Life is what we do and what happens to us" (J. Ortega y Gasset, VIII, 570). The life each of us is given is, however, not given *ready-made*: it

must be *decided*. Life is always what we are doing, which is why it is so important to analyze *why* we are doing one thing and not another. Thus, the importance of philosophy is that it helps orient us. In *Los que estudian filosofía como profesión y los que buscan una claridad sobre la vida* (1934), he makes his case clear: “To start with, philosophy is but the sensation that life is invisible unless it has a certain something that it lacks on its own but must instead be sought out. This certain something is insight into itself” (J. Ortega y Gasset, V, 314).

On this backdrop, Ortega’s *El Espectador* project leans toward the theoretical and vital as well as a certain kind of pedagogy or what amounts to the same thing, a *problematization* of the specifically human endeavor we call “education.” The spectator, as Ortega notes, “speculates, looks, but what he wishes to see is the life flowing within him” (Ortega y Gasset 2004, II, 162). This “spectator pedagogy” is a pedagogy of seeing. If “looking” is “seeking” among everything that matches up with our utilitarian concerns, then “seeing” is letting our mind fill with the landscape and all its nuances, objects, and elements. In *Pedagogía del Paisaje* (1906), he then said that *the landscape teaches better than the most skillful pedagogue*. Ortega, who had studied with Paul Natorp, would say that his admirable “social pedagogy” would have to be complemented by a “pedagogy of the landscape.” Seeing is having to learn to get around in the landscape, to travel: “it is having to integrate each and every possible vision” (García Morente 1975, 76).

On educational matters, Ortega always takes a new point of view, critical with the often mechanized pedagogy of his time. And when he negates or rejects something, he does not do so lightly. Rather, it is more a matter of focusing his vision. Thus, the spectator aims in one direction: for instance, he proposes a new educational ideal whose solution does not rely on pedagogy, since neither pedagogy nor its skills are what determines the ideals of education; in every time period, the ideals of education are determined by civilization and culture, by individual and social aspirations, and by man’s general preferences. The meaning of education is therefore not the

domain of pedagogy or its discourses. And, therefore, pedagogy would do well to engage in fruitful dialog with other disciplines (especially philosophy).

To speak of pedagogy and education necessarily requires having to speak of childhood, and Ortega makes a number of different considerations about childhood. For example, in *Biología y Pedagogía* (1920), he suggests that “the problem of education is always a problem of elimination, and the problem of elementary education is the problem of essential education” (Ortega y Gasset 1985, 426). The essential, he says, is “to foster the spontaneous, primitive life of the spirit, precisely so as to ensure and enrich culture and civilization” (Ibid., 438). In that vein, Ortega fervently advocates the need to respect a child’s childhood: “Pedagogy always tends to act against the child’s childhood, striving to cut back on its childishness by inserting as much adulthood into it as possible” (Ibid., 467). He adds: “maturity and culture are creations not of the adult and the wise man, but rather, were born of the child and the savage. Let us make perfect children, imagining in our mind’s eye as much as possible that they will become adults; let us teach children as such, guided not by an ideal of exemplary man but by a standard of childishness. The better man is never the one who was less a child, but the other way around: the one who, by the age of thirty, finds in his heart the splendid treasure of his childhood” (Ibid., 467). For Ortega, therefore, “a great deal of pedagogy today, the undeniable processes starting with Rousseau and Pestalozzi notwithstanding, is more like hunting a child, a cruel method to infringe upon childhood and produce adults who harbor a gangrene childhood inside.” For Ortega, the essential point is therefore to attend to the child’s present as far as being a child, i.e., a pedagogy that does not force out of him what is already in his own (present) time of childhood.

Pedagogy of Contamination

Ortega is well aware that many of the problems concerning the lack of clarity in pedagogy stem from the lack of a philosophy of education. In

Pedagogy and Anachronism (1923), for example, in which he remarks on some of Kerschensteiner's pedagogical ideas, he states that "pedagogy is merely taking a way of thinking and feeling about the world, i.e., a philosophy, and applying it to educational problems. [...] The important point is that the pedagogue has almost never been the philosopher of his pedagogy" (J. Ortega y Gasset, III, 515). In a late piece of writing, *Apuntes Sobre una Educación para el Futuro* (1953), Ortega says "the idea of education inevitably leads to the idea of a theory of education, which in turn logically and inescapably necessitates a general theory of human things" (Ortega y Gasset 2007, 225), in other words, a general philosophical clarification in which the theory of education may find its firm underpinnings.

The main problem in the progress of education, he notes, is that of making a "general philosophical clarification", but, at the same time, this requires a deal of clarity on the "philosophical diversity" of our time" (Ibid., 226). Ortega seems to agree with this statement, but he is also clear about his priorities: "The practical method of achieving a philosophy of education is not to start by working out a 'philosophical clarification' based on set of questions that are difficult to specify beforehand. In my opinion, what is needed first and foremost is to achieve a clear view of what makes Western man today" (Ibid., 237). Indeed, one of the original aims of education is above all to constitute a system for teaching future generations: "Is it not inescapable to feel in possession of a clear idea regarding what will be, along general lines, the structure of the life those future generations will find themselves in?" (Ibid., 237).

It is important to have clear ideas on this matter, since, as he points out in *Misión de la Universidad* (1930), "we are our ideas" (Ortega y Gasset 2007, 36): "It is compulsory to live up to the times, and especially, up to the ideas of time" (Ibid., 36). Rather than a kind of "idealistic sanctimoniousness," he says, we have to reassess the relationship between contemplation and action and between theory and practice, which means fostering culture over specialism: the contemporary professional is a "new barbarian" (Ibid., 36).

Ortega postulates the need to give young people a "specifically synthesizing" talent (Ibid., 69), so "in the organization of higher education, in building the University, it must start with the student, and not with knowledge or with the teacher. The university must be the institutional projection of the student, the two essential dimensions of which are: one, what he is: scarcity of his acquisitive faculty of knowing; and the other: what he needs to know to live" (Ibid., 49). Indeed, because the knowing that must be acquired contrasts with the limitation in the faculty for learning, it is vital to split up the science of teaching based on what Ortega called the "principle of the economy of teaching": "the child or teen is a disciple, an apprentice, and this means that he cannot learn everything he should be taught" (Ibid., 49). We should only teach what can in fact be learned.

In his conference *Pedagogía de la Contaminación* (1917), a text reflecting ideas akin to those of the Institución Libre de Enseñanza, Ortega said that "nothing truly worth learning can in fact be taught" (Ortega y Gasset 2007, 87). What our schools call "teaching science" is in fact nothing more than a mere "release on the soul of the disciples of a burden of pre-made scientific doctrines or a ready-made doctrinal of research methods" (Ibid., 88). As a result, what gets taught in modern schools is "frozen science, immobilized, supplanted, dogmatized" (Ibid., 88). Moreover, commonly used pedagogy is missing the essential element of science, "the movement of thought floating in an atmosphere of problems [...] People do not want wisdom, but recipes: recipes for manufacturing locomotion devices and alkaloids and serums" (Ibid., 89). The current relevance of Ortega's musings is astonishing. Where in contemporary pedagogy is there room for teaching what cannot be mechanically taught? Where is the space for "that unique reality of science that is the tragic behavior of thought raising itself" (Ibid., 90) in endeavor, while refusing to receive anything rote, whether by inheritance, tradition, or authority? Pedagogy lacks something. And that "something" is the "conscience of culture [...], none other than philosophy" (Ibid., 94), which is precisely what cannot be taught: philosophy is not taught; "at most, it

is contaminated” (Ibid., 94). “In opposition to mechanized pedagogy I say that the only true and un-hypocritical pedagogy is the pedagogy of contamination” (Ibid., 94).

The Falsehood of Study

As a whole, Ortega’s ideas on education revolve around an essential question: what does it mean to “study” and “to be a student”? He brings up this question in the first lecture in the course “Principios de Metafísica Según la Razón Vital” (1932–1933), in which he points out the *constitutive tragedy of pedagogy*: “By putting man in the position of being a student, it forces him to do something false, to pretend the student feels a need he does not feel” (J. Ortega y Gasset, VIII, 559). This first lesson is very important because it constitutes a real exercise in philosophy of education that problematizes some consolidated ideas of pedagogy on study and being a student.

Ortega begins thusly: “We are going to study Metaphysics, and therefore, what we are going to do is a falsehood” (Ibid., 555). The falsehood does not refer to the discipline but to the *studying*. What is false is *having to* study something without feeling any *intimate need* to study it. Ortega insists on an idea: “A truth does not exist on its own, but for the one who has need of it” (Ibid., 556). Unless we are in a particular state of need – which surely implies disorientation and puzzlement – we seek out nothing. It is not the object of study that comes first and then curiosity afterward; rather, it is quite the opposite: because we have an intimate need (and thus concern and care) for something, we feel curiosity and we seek. We do not need anyone to “motive” us. The only thing required to study and therefore to learn what we call philosophy is not an outstanding talent but a *real need* for it. It is not necessary to have special talents but to pay attention. The need Ortega writes of is an intimate, inner need. Thus he states: “The student is a falsification of man. Because man himself is only what he genuinely is, by intimate and inexorable need. Being a man is not being, or doing

(which amounts to the same thing) just anything, but being what one cannot help but be” (Ibid., 561).

That is where the “constitutive tragedy of pedagogy” comes into the picture: in the fact of not acknowledging the falseness of the “doing” that pedagogical knowledge attempts to analyze (i.e., study), something that is in and of itself artificial and therefore false with respect to what man is essentially. Ortega is not claiming that no one should study; rather, he suggests radically reforming the way of doing: “Teaching needs to be turned the other way around, saying: teaching is primarily and fundamentally nothing but showing the need of a science and *not teaching* the science whose need is impossible for the student to feel” (Ibid., 693).

At the bottom of this intimate need is the *radical disorientation* of man. Man needs *orientation*, since living is having to wonder *what to do* next at every step of the way. Life is a project one does by going forward. Ortega goes on to tell us that as an activity, studying is rather artificial, because the human condition cannot be reduced to the condition of man as a being who studies. In other words, the life of human beings is not limited to any of its uses, because there are myriad uses to be made of life. All in all, it hints at something important: since human life is disorientation, man looks to philosophy for a bit of what he lacks, and in doing so, he can only *stop* to think. He has the need to think and he has the need to *learn how to think*; he slows down his pace: he stops, pays attention, and learns to see.

These ideas are of interest because in his discourse, Ortega highlights the extent to which *curiosity*, which always issues forth from a state of need, of necessity, and of radical disorientation – and therefore cannot be presupposed beforehand in the student – is associated with the *amateur* who dedicates himself to something he truly loves (*amat* in Latin). Thus he states: “A curious man is a careful man, i.e., a man who does what he has to do attentively, extremely rigorously and exactly. He is not unconcerned with what concerns him; quite the contrary, he is concerned about his own concerns” (Ibid., 560).

Conclusion

What interest today can there be in the educational ideas from a philosopher the likes of Ortega y Gasset? One way to approach this question is to emphasize the fact that Ortega y Gasset's writings constitute the kind of tentative, essay-like *exercise of thought* needed for theorizing on the human affairs of education that – while taking nothing for granted – help us situate our activity as thinkers, with utmost *attention* to present-day events.

As the lines above have tried to make clear, Ortega y Gasset saw human life as an ongoing *project* carried out in a specific time and place, i.e., in a given set of circumstances, leaving us no choice but to *decide* at each moment on *what to do*. Therefore, thinking is something that we human beings must always do, at all times, to decide on our life, especially when, as Ortega y Gasset insists, the human condition itself involves a radical *disorientation*.

This, then, is where we justify the need for pondering what philosophy actually consists of and philosophy understood not as a professional, academic, or more or less specialized undertaking but as a way of life, as a vital, existential choice. It is a way of life that commands our gaze and our attention to the present and a way of life that catches and piques our curiosity and puts us in relation to ourselves as beings that form part of a world of relations: we are beings in the world we live in, in relation to things and other human beings. In that sense, education is concerned with the art of learning how to be in the world, how to invent and create new ways of being in it, and how to contaminate each other in contact with culture – culture being cultivation and care – because nothing truly worthwhile in preparing for human life can in fact be taught so directly or mechanically.

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Overview of Metatheory of Educational Knowledge

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Synonyms

[Kinds of educational theory](#); [Nature of educational theory](#); [Second-order study](#); [Verification of educational theory](#)

Introduction

Metatheoretical study is a second-order study that deals with the nature and characteristics of theory. Metatheory of educational knowledge, thus, takes educational knowledge and theory as its object of study. The questions this study involves are: What is the nature of educational knowledge? What is the relation of educational knowledge to other kinds of knowledge? Is there a unified or different kinds of educational knowledge? How is an educational theory verified? Naturally, there are different answers to these questions given by different metatheoretical accounts. In what follows, these metatheories are reviewed briefly.

Metatheories of Educational Knowledge

As far as philosophy of education is concerned, in an earlier attempt, Hary Broudy (1969) put forward a conception of metatheory of educational knowledge in terms of philosophical inquiry. According to Broudy, since philosophical inquiry deals mainly with speculation and theory critique, these two sorts of inquiry are essential in philosophy of education. He holds that speculation itself might be advanced in two ways. The first is a problem-centered endeavor as Dewey and pragmatists in general do. In the eyes of pragmatists and neopragmatists, educational theory, like any other theory, does not deal with uncovering some laws and realities but is a plan of action for removing and solving the problems of human life. Thus, the validity of educational knowledge can be achieved mainly by its workability. The second way, according to Broudy, for speculation is applying a philosophical view in relation to educational problems deductively. On the other hand, theory critique is also conducted in two ways: either in terms of the logical form of a theory or in terms of its content appraised by means of philosophical and scientific knowledge.

In a more elaborated way, William Frankena (1969) divides philosophical inquiry into three types: speculative, normative, and analytic. In the speculative inquiry, a combination of scientific, moral, aesthetic, and religious experience is

put forward in order to provide people with meaning. In the normative inquiry, the aim is to suggest some standards for human actions. Finally, the analytic inquiry concerns with examining the assumptions of concepts and statements.

Equating knowledge with true statements, Wolfgang Brezinka (1994) has put forward his view on the metatheory of educational knowledge in terms of the kinds of true statements. Somehow similar to Frankena's suggestion, he distinguishes three kinds of knowledge: analytic, normative, and scientific. Thus, there would be three types of knowledge in education. Analytic knowledge give people true analytic statements. While these statements do not give people informative knowledge, they provide them with elaborated awareness of the concepts and statements that might be unnoticed in the first confrontation with them. In the case of the normative knowledge, Brezinka parts with positivists who put a sharp contrast between normative and informative statements. Even though Brezinka accepts the differences between these two statements, he nevertheless takes a moderate position with regard to the normative statements according to which some normative statements are more convincing than others because they provide people with more satisfactory consequences in solving their problems. Still, by talking about scientific educational knowledge beside the normative knowledge, one might think that Brezinka embraces the sharp contrast that he rejected. The question is: Is it possible to have a pure scientific educational knowledge in which statements are void of any normative components? In other words, is it possible to reduce human "actions" in educational circles to mere mechanical behaviors as behaviorists held? Brezinka holds that in scientific knowledge of education, one does not deal with merely facts; rather, a framework of end-means is presupposed because people have an aim and look for proper means to achieve the aim. Thus, he takes educational science as a teleological-causal-analytic science. However, the compatibility of teleological and causal-analytic aspects remains controversial.

An important step in metatheoretical endeavors is no doubt taken by critical views. In

this respect, the most significant role of an educational theory is to critique what is going on in educational centers in the name of knowledge and truth whereas, in the real fact, they have a hegemonic function. Critique being concerned with human finitude goes back at least to Kant. However, there are different accounts of the human finitude than what Kant held. Two important contemporary accounts of critique can be found in the Frankfurt School and post-structuralism. The former has mainly suggested the ideology-critique conception and the latter the problematization (to mention just Foucault) conception of critique. In what follows, a brief exploration is given of them respectively.

In the Frankfurt School there are two conceptions of critique: immanent and transcendental. The former is supported by Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno and the latter by Karl-Otto Apel and Jurgen Habermas among others. In the immanent or negative critique, one attempts to find out the limits and contradictions of the existing condition of the society and avoids the imagination of a desired or positive order which is taken essential in the transcendental view. The proponents of negative critique deal solely with particular things and conditions of the society because they hold that the positive view appeals to abstract and absolute categories which make it difficult to evaluate and this can pave the ground for despotism. The negative dialectic deals mainly with ideology critique. In this kind of critique, one attempts to discover different hidden features of false consciousness that is used to justify the constraints of the existing condition of society. Criticizing the hidden curriculum has been one of the famous features of ideology critique in the educational circles.

On the other hand, in the transcendental or positive critique, it is held that negative dialectic is not enough and a positive aspect is also needed. In dealing with the Kantian transcendental question of the conditions of the possibility of human knowledge, Apel goes beyond the Kantian individualistic account and introduces "the community of communication" as the condition of the possibility of knowledge. This is an a priori condition as any meaningful claim presupposes this

transcendental language game (Apel 1987, p. 281). This view paves the ground for Habermas to talk about communicative action and the "ideal speech situation." By appealing to the ideal speech situation, as Habermas holds, it would be possible to reach a logical and rational consensus. The concept of ideal speech situation has led to talk about an "emancipatory" education. Klaus Mollenhauer uses this phrase under the influence of the positive aspect of Habermas's view. An emancipatory education provides people with overcoming the constraints of rationality in the society (Young 1989, pp. 58–59).

In poststructuralism, language has come to the fore in delineating the nature of inquiry. Michel Foucault, for instance, gives the central position to language. Language is not, however, taken here in terms of subjectivity, as was the case in phenomenology, nor in terms of "profound" meanings as it is understood in hermeneutics or in terms of the signifiers used to be the touchstone in structuralism.

In dealing with language, Foucault starts with statements but goes beyond them by looking for the presuppositions of statements, or the positivity of the discourse, and then to the archive. In discursive analysis, what is at stake for Foucault is the social reality of discourse which is taken to bridge the gap between thought and things. By introducing the emergence of discourse as the problematic, Foucault takes a critical view on any conception of theory and knowledge which takes the consciousness and thought as the pivotal point as well as any representational conception that concentrates on things. Foucault's problematization conception of critique undermines consciousness-centered accounts, on the one hand, and attempts to show the impact of unconscious elements in the social reality of discourse. Discursive formation, then, cannot be achieved by anthropologized accounts. Instead, Foucault appeals to events, discontinuities, chance, and, in a word, the relations among the forces. On the other hand, Foucault critiques representational accounts by showing how discourse interposes itself between people and things. According to him, "man and life and nature, are none of them domains that present themselves to the curiosity

of knowledge spontaneously and passively.” (Foucault 1973, p. 72).

The critical core of Foucauldian inquiry appears at two levels. At the first one, by appealing to discursive analysis, Foucault problematizes a state of affair by introducing the hidden discourse that nourishes it or makes it possible. At another level, Foucault deals with the negative aspect of discourses, namely, with what a discourse makes impossible. Here, he introduces his Nietzschean concept of self-creation to show how people might override the requirements of a discourse and think about their self-creation.

This notion brings one to a controversial dimension of Foucault’s thought. While some hold that Foucault rejects truth in inquiries altogether, others believe that he not only deals with immanent truths with regard to different discursive formations but also that in his later works he alludes to a context-transcendent conception of truth (Healy 2005, p. 79). The latter view attempts to show how Foucault’s overemphasis on the “subjugated knowledge” in different discourses has made his interest in a context-transcendent truth invisible.

The hermeneutic approach to inquiry, in its turn, brings to the fore the human understanding. Even though the distinction between “explanation” and “understanding” was once conceived as a crucial matter, after Heidegger and Gadamer this obsession with “method” has been undermined as a sign of the dominance of empirical inquiry. Instead, by putting understanding at the top, empirical inquiry is taken to be as a certain form of human understanding of things.

To limit this introductory note to Gadamer as a towering figure in hermeneutics, the following points can be made about the nature of inquiry, in general, and educational inquiry in particular. First of all, in his attempt to delineate human inquiry, Gadamer takes a postfoundationalist position in the absence of incontrovertible foundations.

Secondly, Gadamer holds that human inquiry has an essential dialogical character. Thus, inquiry begins with a question rather than a claim and continues, instead of counterclaims by others, with taking the question as an open question that

itself needs to be understood and decided upon by means of examining tentative answers of interlocutors. Argumentation in hermeneutics is essentially jurisprudential as it involves weighing the grounds given by the both sides of the argumentation. Being constrained within a horizon, any person has particular prejudices that need to be loosened toward a mutual understanding with others and reaching “fusion of horizons.”

Thirdly, even though agreement with others and consensus is important for Gadamer, understanding the subject-matter concerned has a much more vital position. Thus, consensus is necessary but not sufficient for conducting an inquiry. That is why some (e.g., Christopher 1995) has talked about “Gadamer’s Realism.” That is to say, the thing in itself is important as the aim of inquiry even though it is surrounded by thick layers of prejudices that need to be overcome.

Fourthly, achieving truth in an inquiry is not merely a matter of Logos, namely, dialectic, nor merely a matter of Nous or intuition. Gadamer’s position, instead, is somewhere between the two sharing both of them (Healy 2005, p. 42).

Vandenberg (1974), among others, has brought this “in-between” conception to educational inquiry. According to him, people first understand a phenomenon within their lived experience intuitively. Then, they use certain philosophical descriptions to elaborate that experience. Finally, the theoretical framework itself should encounter with people’s lived experience again.

Conclusion

In the first glance, it seems that different meta-theoretical accounts are hard-line rivals whose rivalry can only be finalized in terms of an either-or logic. In one sense, this intuition is true but is surely wrong in another sense. As far as every metatheory holds an exclusive claim for the validity of its own account, an either-or logic is inevitable. However, if exclusivism is abandoned, then holding a compatibilistic perspectivism would be more convincing. By the compatibilistic perspectivism, I mean that every metatheory has a glance to educational knowledge from a certain

perspective so that these perspectives can have a complementary relation to each other and altogether they provide a comprehensive portrait. Take, for instance, pragmatist's insistence on workability of educational theories in relation to Brezinka's or Gadamer's mild realisms. The workability is, no doubt, a very important criterion for evaluating theories but by no means the sole criterion so that it cannot be compatible with Brezinka's or Gadamer's concerns.

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P

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Papatuanuku in a Maori Philosophy of Education

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Introduction

Maori abstract thought must grapple with the everyday, concrete realities of life (Marsden 1985), and this dual work is initiated and continued by the grounded yet mysterious nature of a primordial entity, Papatuanuku (Earth Mother). Papatuanuku has been attributed with a number of sublime characteristics; one of these is its basis for philosophy itself (Mika 2016). This entry analyses that concept and applies it to a specific, Maori notion of education that turns on the wellbeing of the self. Of particular relevance here is Thrupp and Mika's (2012) interpretation of the verb "ako" (teach/learn), which corresponds with the foundational wellbeing that is provided by things in the world; moreover, "ako" is critical in its stance, because as Thrupp and Mika argue, it resists foreclosing against the full possibility of things in the world – a full potential that has already been offered by Papatuanuku. Maori philosophical thinking hence involves a strong *metaphilosophy* as it seeks to reflect on the speculative exercise

that engages with that thinking, including on those limitations that are scribed by Papatuanuku.

The Influence of Papatuanuku on Maori Philosophical Thought and Education

A Point of Reference: The School of Athens

Maori philosophy retains its own distinctive flavor, but it may also make contact with Western thought. Occasionally, key individuals from the latter are represented in art, and what is suggested in that genre and its subsequent interpretation can be equally as fascinating for a Maori discussion as the alleged congruence of the illustration with the individual's theories. We can refer briefly here to two key philosophers – Plato and Aristotle – and their depiction in the well-known fresco *The School of Athens*. What might be most striking to the Maori onlooker is that Plato is pointing at the heavens; Aristotle, in what is generally taken to be a stark contrast, gestures at the earth. A common interpretation of the fresco is that it signifies the essential difference in their philosophies. Aristotle, who played no minor part in the current focus on taxonomies and essences, deals with the realm of the present. Plato, on the other hand, apparently wants an escape from the realm of appearances and urges thinking in terms of abstract ideas. The division between the two – which, it must be noted, may be exaggerated – has set the path for dominant Western propositions about knowledge itself.

Whether the fresco properly aligns with the full extent of Plato's and Aristotle's philosophies is an intriguing subject, but it is the "either/or" binary in the interpretation that could be particularly revealing for the Maori philosopher and may signal something prominent for him or her. Importantly, Maori philosophy would not necessarily take the dualistic representation at face value, due to its own suspicion that binaries are not reflected so simplistically in the natural face of the world. A Maori worldview would note with interest, though, the possibility that there are vastly different ways of interacting with things in the world, and the Maori philosopher may wish to engage

with that sort of depiction, in the form of a dialogue with the representation. Thus, a Maori reaction to Plato and Aristotle, along with their respective philosophies, is not an incidental one, because it is the *fact* of a dichotomous representation that is especially appealing, not so much a debate on whether Plato and Aristotle deserve to be represented in such a way or not. What may be most significant for the Maori thinker in this instance is, again, the *fact* that a less-than-subtle delineation between sky and earth has been made.

The Importance of Papatuanuku in Maori Philosophical Self-Development

Vital to a Maori incursion into thinking here is the manifestation of a problem: in the present case of the fresco, an illustration potentially jars with a Maori metaphysics that would normally prefer to assign objects to an interrelationship rather than a distinction. The speculation that proceeds from that point is consistently influenced by that initial and delicate "shock," because Maori thought attempts to reintegrate feeling with rational thought (Smith 2000). Feeling, somewhat unusually for any worldview that prefers rationalism, must be acknowledged as equally important in Maori philosophy because it has a stated genealogy with apparently rarefied thought, along with other states of being. The upshot for Maori philosophy is that thought and feeling are inextricable; moreover, the thinker must reflect on that interconnection as much as the topic at hand. Its emotional impetus means that the philosopher is likely to continue to acknowledge that instinctive reaction throughout the work. At the very least, the philosopher may theorize to themselves that they were brought to their work by a feeling or an exasperation. This initial prompt is not forgotten in subsequent arguments, with the Maori philosopher often fluctuating between considering an issue on its own rational terms and suddenly referring to that very first, sometimes irrational, impetus.

The expectation that Maori learning in its broadest sense is most fundamentally linked to a vulnerable relationship with emotion is

highlighted by Thrupp and Mika (2012). Through that emotional response, the self learns. Thrupp and Mika note that the current discourse around the term “ako” reduces the term to its more visible facets of “teaching and learning.” In fact, the term carries with it a sense that far exceeds that didactic approach. Alongside its classroom fit, it also dictates that one is susceptible to what an object withholds from view and that one’s role is to speculate on the interconnection between things, rather than to simply provide a self-originating definition for them. The self is encouraged to explore creative approaches to a thing; in general, teaching and learning with “ako” recognizes the highly active links between the speculative self and what appears to be the object of thought.

This responsive mode of thinking illustrates that there is something involved that transcends pure, rational thought. Let us turn here to the fresco’s more substantive suggestion that thinking either takes place by ignoring or embracing the world of appearances in some measure. Maori constantly reference two central metaphysically vital phenomena in their oratory – Papatuanuku (Earth Mother) and Ranginui (Sky Father). Their English glosses, it should be noted, suffice for concise translation but do not do justice to the depth of their sense. Both phenomena were originally joined but were thrust apart, and thus they appear to be separate. However, both are still joined in some ways even if not physically, with their initial symbiosis persisting in each other in much the same way as an original, emotional impetus for thought does for the Maori philosopher. Papatuanuku in particular has received a great deal of coverage in Maori literature, perhaps because her equivalence with “earth” renders her more tangible. She has also been equated with “the infinite” (Marsden 2003, p. 22) and is the mysterious backdrop or nurturing force for land (“whenua,” which simultaneously means “after-birth”). All human activity takes place within the horizon of Ranginui and Papatuanuku, which are responsible for the manifestation of all things. The self is one element among many that are initiated and sustained by Ranginui and Papatuanuku.

Papatuanuku may also be conceived of as “world” in an active sense, and the relationship of objects with the perceiving self and Papatuanuku is highlighted in the following summation by Raerino (2000):

Kai roto i ngā kupu me ngā momo kōrero, waiata, haka me ngā karakia a te Māori ngā oro o te taiao. Ko ngā oro nei hai tūhono i te ao tangata, ki te ao o te wao. Ko ngā momo oro hai tūhono i te ao kikokiko ki te ao wairua, te ira tangata ki te ira atua. (p. 1)

Within words and the diversity of talk, songs, performance and prayers of the Māori, resides the sounds of the world around us. These sounds link man to the world of the environment. These sorts of sounds connect the bodily realm to the spiritual realm, the intrinsic humanness to the intrinsic godliness. (*author’s translation*)

Sounds here are not just audible waves, but in a Maori sense can be thought of as requests or intimations made between the seemingly external world and the self (and vice versa). With this consistent metaphysical relationship, thought is more complex than the fresco would suggest. Philosophical thought lends itself traditionally to grasping the Platonic forms, to a glance upwards. Most tellingly, it is sometimes termed “blue sky thinking.” It is hence a kind of inquiry that feels inherently different to its other, more empirical, approach. But instead of looking up into the heavens, as if the earth is to be avoided, the Maori philosopher’s gaze is more multifaceted and thought is directed and continued by both Ranginui and Papatuanuku. It is at once both concrete and obscure. Thinking is not as rarefied as Plato would have it, nor should it be as utterly “in the visible world” as Aristotle wants it. From a Maori perspective, the pointing upwards that is meant to signify an escape from what could fool the self is only permissible because of the fact of those entities to begin with. The knowing subject that is “above” entities is never fully free of the world, even though he or she appears to be; instead, those entities continue to reside with the Maori philosopher as he or she moves to where Plato dictates in order to philosophize. The Maori philosopher stays firmly within the earth while ascending elsewhere.

Conceptual Notions of “Earth” Within Education

This position makes perfect sense when we do consider that Papatuanuku’s conceptual impetus is locatable in its notion as “ground.” One distinctive discipline of thought that has emerged since the early 1990s, in written form at least, is kaupapa Maori. The term “kaupapa” contains to it an abbreviation of “Papatuanuku” – “papa” – and is hence constituted by Papatuanuku, with Charles Royal (2008) stating that:

Nā, mō te kupu ‘papa’, he kupu nui tēnei i te reo Māori He tikanga nui hoki i roto, ā, e takea katoatia ana i a Papatuanuku. Arā, ahakoa puta ai tēnei kupu ki whea, kei te takea mai i a Papatuanuku, ka tū rānei a Papatuanuku hei taurira mō te whakaputanga o te kupu ‘papa’ nei. (p. 68)

And so, the word ‘papa’ is an important one in the Maori language. It contains to it some vital philosophical aspects; these are fully undergirded with Papatuanuku. That is, regardless of where this word emerges, it has its basis in Papatuanuku, or Papatuanuku stands within the sign of ‘papa’. (*author’s translation*)

Kaupapa Maori is a theoretical body of work, or a research method, that seeks to address colonization and reclaim Maori autonomy. In the vast majority of cases, it is positioned as a Maori ground for social, human-centered activity, but its metaphysical congruence with a ground beyond the human self deserves to be reiterated here. “Papa” may be thought of here as the conceptual soil for a relationship with an idea. The “papa” element of that practice is responsible for thinking, because it is the ground that endures in all cases. It shows itself in Thrupp and Mika’s “ako” to the extent that it draws the Maori learner on to question, inquire, represent, and articulate but never fully leaves the thinking process although thought seems to have soared away from it. This ground also encourages continual thought on the nature of colonization – itself an educational exercise. It highlights the need to reflect on a potentially unpleasant aspect of existence so that the self is formed by a critique: “ako” in its focus on vulnerability is thus congruent with a speculative glance towards what is antithetic as much as pleasant (Thrupp and Mika 2012).

“Ako” proposes that the environment “moves towards us” (Thrupp and Mika, p. 210), with the self responding. Thought, when assessed against the active process that “ako” dictates, is not outside of the influence of those more earthbound things, as they have been initiated by the ongoing and active influence of Papatuanuku. The inescapability of the earth for the Maori thinker is also reflected in yet another term that has certainly suffered in translation. The sort of “groundedness” that is suggested in the term “whakapapa” and its association with “papa” is not commensurate with its English linguistic and conceptual equivalent, “genealogy.” “Genealogy” as a translation is perhaps more reminiscent of a sequential display of different “grounds” rather than an active and persistent “grounding” that “papa” depicts. It is true that whakapapa does denote a relationship between all things in the world, but what is more intriguing about the term is the role of the earth as a conceptual ground in thought. “Whakapapa,” read as an active concept, depicts the “becoming” (“whaka”) of a ground (“papa”) throughout all things in the world (Mika 2011). This ground for a Maori philosopher may be one that involves a given capacity to reflect on other things in the world: it “becomes” in the sense that it provides a fluidly speculative approach to the nature of all things. “Ako” in this case, as a possibility for a learning process, is associated with this ground to the extent that this ground draws one’s attention to one thing *as* it relates to all other things. The self then reflects on both the thing in itself and that relationship. The “becoming” that is alluded to here is a subtle irruption into the self’s perception, such that thinking takes place. Again, we can detect that one is exposed, in the susceptibility inherent to ako, to the outer world, and that thinking is dependent on the lure of Papatuanuku and her originary relationship with all things that exist.

Maori access to thinking in the learning process is therefore incredibly important, because it needs to take place on its own terms and within the influence of that intangible interplay between the earth, the earth’s continuous becoming (“whakapapa”), and its intellectual manifestation through a critique of the base of colonization

(“kaupapa”). Maori are not able to freely reflect on (and within) that primordial ground described above, partly because philosophical research in general appears to be marginalized and also due to the nature of philosophy in schools and universities. It is only marginally visible in schools and, although it occupies a privileged position as a discernor of first assumptions in university study, it does not often attract funding to the extent that its empirical counterpart can. It is also characterized by speculation rather than certain knowledge and is therefore associated with the continual process of inquiry rather than a neatly packaged “outcome.” For Maori, the withdrawal of philosophical thought in the academy and in schools represents the recession of Papatuanuku in the active nature of thought and poses some serious repercussions for one’s self-formation, which can be equated with “ako” and its emotional and spiritual relationship with things in the world. Philosophy in a Maori setting is intimately related to the balance of the self with the external world, and indeed that world is not so external as it constitutes all its individual elements. Maori philosophy therefore acknowledges that speculation about that external world is simultaneously to inquire into its proper representation and, crucially, the connection of that process of theorizing with the community’s health. To that extent, a Maori *papa* of thought is consonant with the balance of the self and the world.

Summary

Maori oratory recognizes and acknowledges the role of the earth in thought and existence generally. Learning is not exempt from its influence, because one is immediately underscored by the earth even as one is moved to represent aspects that originate from it. The term Papatuanuku, as we have seen, shares ontologically in the learning that is proposed through ako. Both indicate that the thinking and learning self is at the mercy of a vast constellation of elements that, in turn, ask that speculative self to represent the world with that complexity in mind.

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Pasifika

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Synonyms

[Pacific](#); [Pacific Islands](#); [Pacific peoples](#); [Pasifiki](#)

Introduction

This section covers a description of the term “Pasifika” people in New Zealand. Furthermore, an explanation of the use of the term Pasifika is covered, as it pertains to people’s identities through the evolving nature of diasporic movements. Examples of diaspora include youth and education are also explored. Finally, the section ends with coverage on the Rethinking Pacific Education Initiative.

Who Are Pasifika People?

This entry is focused on Aotearoa/New Zealand’s perspective of the term “Pasifika.” The umbrella term “Pasifika” has been used by the New Zealand government to describe the ethnic makeup of people migrating from the Pacific Islands to Aotearoa/New Zealand. The origination of the word Pasifika is from the Niue language. In this entry, the term “Pasifika” is used interchangeably with “Pacific,” and Bedford and Didham (2001) state that the term “Pacific” has been commonly and widely utilized at all levels of society including educators, policy makers, community workers, the media, and institutions. In fact, the use of the term has often led to broad generalizations about a group of people who in fact are extremely diverse. Many Pasifika people do not solely identify as saying they are “Pasifika.” Rather, people self-identify with their specific Pasifika ethnic group (e.g., Niuean or Tongan or Tuvaluan). With the different terminologies of Pasifika, (Pacific, Pasefika, Pasifiki, pan-Pacific, to name but a few), there has not been one term that has been consistently used in New Zealand. Pasifika and non-Pasifika people select the term they find most appropriate and relevant to them to use.

Aotearoa/New Zealand is a country that has attracted people from the Pacific Islands over a long period of time. Macpherson et al. (2001) identified that at the end of World War II, there were 2,200 Pasifika people based in Aotearoa/New Zealand. With the subsequent flow of migration, Pasifika people were coming to Aotearoa/New Zealand for various reasons, such as employment and education. In the 1950s, the New Zealand government encouraged a more diverse population to become involved in the workforce. In particular the labor market attracted the flow of Pasifika people, and it was at this point in time that the Pasifika population began to change in size and sociodemographic character (Macpherson et al. 2001).

Similarly, the New Zealand government used the term “Pacific Islanders” in the early 1980s to group and to classify New Zealand migrants belonging to various Pasifika ethnic groups under one name. In the early 1990s up to the present, this

term has evolved into various names such as “Pacific Islands,” “Pacific nations,” “Pacific peoples,” and “Pasifika” or “Pasefika.” The term “Pacific” has been commonly and widely utilized at all levels of society including educators, policy makers, community workers, the media, and institutions (Bedford and Didham 2001).

The “Pasifika Education Research Guidelines” (Anae et al. 2002), developed for the Ministry of Education in Aotearoa/New Zealand, provides one definition of Pasifika peoples. At the time of development, it made reference to the six Pacific nations, namely, Samoa, Tonga, Niue, Cook Islands, Tokelau, and Fiji. In this context, “Pacific people” is exclusive of Māori and in the broadest sense covers peoples from the island nations in the South Pacific and, in its narrowest sense, Pasifika peoples in Aotearoa/New Zealand. The research guidelines go on to clarify the issue of Pasifika people as being a heterogeneous group with different inter and intra-ethnic variations in the cultures. Variations include New Zealand-born/New Zealand-raised, island-born/island-raised Pasifika people being recognized as diverse groups.

At the time of writing, Pasifika peoples are defined as New Zealand residents belonging to the seven Pacific nations, namely, Samoa, Cook Islands, Tonga, Niue, Fiji, Tokelau, and Tuvalu. There are 265,974 people identified in this ethnic grouping, which represents 6.9% of the country’s total population. As a significant population in New Zealand, Pasifika people are a multiethnic group. Diversities exist at specific levels. One of these levels is called cultural diversities which refer to differences in language and culture between all of the Pasifika ethnic groups. Another level is the intra-cultural diversities where differences are associated with youthful groupings. Some groups include diversities that are traditional in nature and differences between village or island heritages. As an example, priority is placed on a particular island (e.g., Pukapuka) over the affiliation to a national birth place (e.g., Cook Islands).

In a geographical definition, Pasifika people are commonly defined by Westerners as people living in Oceania particularly in the sub-regions of Polynesia, Melanesia, and Micronesia. These

island nations in the South Pacific have diverse cultures, different languages, and various ethnicities, which constitute the three most salient features of its people. In 1820, French explorer Dumont d’Urville coined the terms “Polynesian,” “Melanesian,” and “Micronesian” to describe and to distinguish the Pacific and its inhabitants from the rest of the world. Each “nesian” grouping has distinct characteristics. In breaking down the word Melanesian, “Melas” refers to black and “nesos” refers to island, encompassing New Guinea, Bismarck Archipelago, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, New Caledonia, and Fiji. Melanesians make up more than three-fourths of the indigenous Pasifika population. Micronesia consists of Palau, Guam, Northern Mariana Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Marshall Islands, Nauru, and Kiribati. Micronesia is one-twentieth of the Pasifika region population and to the East of Polynesia is French Polynesia (Tahiti Islands) and Rapanui or known in the English name of Easter Island.

Often the question is raised, so who is a Pacific Islander? Hau’ofa (1994) believed that the question does not need to be asked if Oceania is used. This was a term coined by the late Professor Epeli Hau’ofa (1994) who pointed to the sea of islands, being Oceania. The expanded Oceania is extensive across the world from Australia and New Zealand through to the north to the USA and Canada. Oceania is about a world of people connected to one another by the sea.

Pasifika languages are diverse, with several hundred spoken lingua franca across the Pacific. There is some familiarity with either English or French as one or other languages have been used in virtually all the Pacific Islands. In Vanuatu, as well as the lingua franca of Bislama, English and French languages are both used due to British and French colonization.

The people of the Cook Islands, Niue, and Tokelau have a free association relationship with New Zealand which permits the people of these islands to have New Zealand citizenship, while their own country makes their own laws and conducts its own affairs. This is one reason why there are more Cook Island Maoris, Niueans, and Tokelauans living in New Zealand, than in their home island nations.

Pasifika Diaspora

Since the 1950s, Pasifika people have migrated from the Pacific to countries such as New Zealand, Australia, and the USA. Pasifika people live all over the world and are known to be a flowing diasporic population. Generations of Pasifika people are born outside of their Pacific nations, and as a result, many Pasifika youth do not know what it is like to grow up on an island. The onset of diaspora presents certain challenges such as language maintenance. Pasifika youth are more likely than their grandparents to grow up speaking a language that is not their mother tongue. There are many reasons for Pasifika diaspora. It is known through Pasifika communities that the journey of migrations for Pasifika people in New Zealand was about obtaining opportunity in a land of “milk and honey.” This meant that a vision of a better lifestyle and employment for their children was highly important. Many Pasifika parents and families place a high emphasis on education as a way to obtain qualifications and then go onto well-paid careers. There are other motivational factors for Pasifika migration. Remittances are one of the biggest forms of economy in the Pacific region with families and individuals living away from their islands and working in countries as a means to send money back to their families. Educational opportunity abroad increases the likelihood of earning wages or salary that is higher than what can be earned in the Pacific.

Pasifika Youth

Generations of youth who have Pasifika heritage are being born in countries that are not their original ancestral home country. Pasifika youth make up over 50% of the Pasifika population which makes them predominately New Zealand-born Pasifika or Pacific. Because of this reason, it is often described by commentators in education that Pasifika youth are struggling with identity formation and conceptualization. Their worldviews and lifestyles reflect an individualist

approach which is more and more different from their elders. New ethnic identities are being formed especially with the influence of Western cultures and the high use of the English language.

Issues have been associated in describing Pasifika youth identities. There is complexity in positioning the Pacific Samoan self in ethnicity (Rimoni 2012). The experiences of growing up in a country that does not reinforce the value systems of Pasifika cultures pose challenges for cultural identity and what it means to be Pasifika. The notion of “Pasifika edgewalking” has been used by Tupuola (2004) to explain how Pasifika youth “edgewalk” between identities and roles that are Pasifika and Western because they are influenced by both cultures. Local and global cultures influence generations of Pasifika youth which allow them to move between cultures or live between two (or more) worlds. In this notion, Pasifika identities are fluid and constantly changing. Music, fashion, and media come together to influence the way Pasifika youth represent their identities which are somewhat different from their elders. The ASB Polyfest, the largest Secondary School Performing Arts Festival which is run in Auckland, New Zealand each year since 1976, provides an avenue for Pasifika youth to compete as Samoan, Tongan, Niuean, Fijian, Cook Island Maori, Tuvaluan, and Tokelauan performers for their schools. The festival is seen as a competitive but culture-embracing event that allows for Pasifika youth to learn the cultural practices of their Pasifika ethnic groups. The 2-day event is judged by Pasifika elders who are experienced in the culture and language. The schools and youth spend countless hours preparing and practicing for the major competition. Pasifika secondary school performances extend beyond the city of Auckland, which has the highest population of Pasifika youth in New Zealand. Smaller cities in New Zealand are also taking up the Pasifika youth performances as an approach to motivating and affirming identities of Pasifika. “Malaga” (or journey) was the name given to a group of Pasifika students’ cultural show based in Porirua, Wellington (Mackley-Crump 2011). Over 900 students were involved in the show.

Education and Pasifika People

For Pasifika people, education is located in formal (early childhood education, schools, and tertiary institutions), as well as informal contexts such as the family. Informal learning and education has occurred in Pasifika homes and communities for many generations and has been perceived as part of lifelong learning. Lifelong learning has its roots in traditional education with Pasifika elders which enable opportunities for young people and adults to learn specific cultural skills and knowledge. Telling stories is integral to the practices in the Pacific Islands. This is how Pasifika people have taught one another. This is how specific learning takes place, on certain principles and values. Another institution of learning has been the church. The church has provided a place for the mother tongue language with services being spoken in Tongan, Samoan, Cook Island Maori, Tuvaluan, Tokelauan, or Fijian, as examples. In New Zealand, early childhood language centers or nests have been traditionally founded by some of the churches and have been designed to support Pasifika language maintenance and growth. Typically, the mothers of the communities have been the pioneers of such centers and the educators of the young children.

The situation of New Zealand Pasifika education has been evident in the inadequate academic achievement rates. The issues are long standing. For example, 28% of Pacific students left compulsory education with no formal qualifications in 1999. As a result of educational challenges, the New Zealand government developed the Pasifika Education Plan (PEP) in 2001. The plan was developed to provide strategic direction for educators and communities to improve the outcomes for Pacific students in early childhood education, the compulsory (primary and secondary) sector, and tertiary education. Since 2001, the PEP has been revised and relaunched by the Ministry of Education. It was a document reflecting the changing priorities of Pasifika students and families. Further, it was a plan to integrate community input and consultation, by recognizing the roles of the family and community. The plan was about

Pasifika people, educational services, and the government working together.

New Zealand tertiary education includes all involvement in post-school formal education. This encompasses foundational education (such as adult literacy), certificates and diplomas, bachelor degrees, industry training, adult and community education, and postgraduate qualifications. Tertiary education institutes (TEIs) include universities, polytechnics, colleges of education, Wananga (Maori higher education institution), and specialist colleges. In terms of educational performance in higher education, 30.4% represents Pasifika school leavers with a university entrance standard and 25.6% corresponds to the tertiary participation rate of Pasifika students aged 18–24 years old. Of the Pasifika students enrolled in tertiary education, 75.6% enrolled in their second year, but only 39.9% of Pasifika students were able to complete their qualification within 5 years. Of 213,120 Pasifika students, 1500 (0.7%) enrolled in postgraduate-level study. These figures show that the educational progress and academic achievement of Pasifika students has slightly and steadily improved compared to previous years.

The Birth of Rethinking Pacific Education Initiative (RPEI)

The discourse of educational challenges for Pasifika people does not only exist in Aotearoa/ New Zealand but also out to the Pacific region. But the year 2000 marked a significant change in education for the Pacific region. Three key leaders in the Pacific came together literally under an umbrella in the pouring rain. Associate Professor Kabini Sanga, Professor Konai Helu Thaman, and Dr. 'Ana Taufe'ulungaki were waiting for the rain to stop, and, as they huddled under the shelter of the umbrella, they came to a point where they decided that it was time for some dynamic changes in Pasifika education. As a result of the umbrella of discussion, the three leaders brought together other key leaders and educators, Pasifika and Maori, in a colloquium to begin the rethinking

of Pasifika education. From the colloquium, participants began to identify the issues, challenges, needs, and areas of attention for their Pacific countries. Papers were produced and edited into a book, the “Tree of Opportunity” (Pene et al. 2002). The rethinking Pacific education initiative (RPEI) was a significant and positive turning point for Pasifika education in the Pacific region. The word “Pacific” was used as an embracing descriptor of Polynesia, Melanesia, and Micronesia. The official government aid development agency of New Zealand (NZ Aid) became the principal funding organization for the initiative. RPEI initially began mobilizing and engaging with an initiative in Vanuatu. However while RPEI started within a collaborative initiative, it became a philosophy and a movement. The rethinking Pacific education initiative snowballed and outlasted the funding. Leadership development and mentoring is a constant strategy in building up island countries’ educational development. Pasifika people are assuming responsibility for their own communities by focusing on what skills and knowledge they have, rather than focusing on what is not available.

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Pasifiki

► [Pasifika](#)

Passion

► [Emotions](#)

Patterns in Teaching Philosophy

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Synonyms

[Philosophy](#); [Teaching](#)

Introduction: Philosophy and the Philosophers on Stage

Philosophy and education have since their beginnings, in the context of Western traditions rooted in European, Ancient Greek, and Roman culture, showed strong affiliation toward each other. Although philosophy has traditionally been regarded as a fundamentally lonely activity, it is yet only one side of a complex and indeed dynamic picture. The philosopher depicted as the lonely thinker is appropriate in one sense, since thinking — as any cognitive processes in general — always takes place as a critical process

(*intra muros*), i.e., inside the mind. Philosophical thinking has a critical character, in the sense that its main purpose is seeking answers, or as first, seeking appropriate forms of questioning, often fuelled by a deep crisis of various possible sources and features.

The processes in the cognitive sphere coined as philosophy are yet not as individual as it is generally viewed. Not because the processes within the mind would lose their individual character, but – unless they are not confined in a solipsistic world – they must be acknowledged as such in a public discourse. This external characteristic as a condition of philosophy, i.e., the need of philosophical thinking to be identified as philosophy, indicates the other side of the philosopher. Thus we may remember the philosopher as depicted in various social environments, e.g., in the circle of his disciples or being engaged in discussion with peers, etc. The philosopher must be ready to share his ideas, with different possible goals: seeking confirmation, provoking the public, or teaching the young (Arendt 1978). Whatever ambitions he may have, overt or covert motifs behind his public activities in the field of philosophy, these activities are not external to his existence as a philosopher. The Master of philosophy is not simply a wise person bringing forward original thoughts on universally relevant issues, but he must be acknowledged as such by his fellow philosophers and as a rule, by the following generations of his peers – regardless, in historical perspective, of his public reputation.

Apart from its public reputation, philosophy seems to have always been in the need of legitimizing source, i.e., the sphere of philosophers, characterized as a dynamic discursive process which provides the models, strategies, and policies of teaching philosophy with general frameworks at any time. Philosophy, though sometimes regarded as a holy entity, has always been defined by philosophers, who in their due turn would deliver the legitimizing label to their peers according to specific rules, either written or not. Raphael's well-known fresco, *The School of Athens* (*Stanza della Segnatura*, Vatican), could be telling in our perspective, in a twofold sense: first, as grasping the complexity of a symbolical though

virtual gathering of the greatest philosophers and scientists in the Antiquity, in the very center of picture with the two greatest philosophers, being regarded as such by their contemporaries. By this moment, their symbolic presence and mutual acknowledgment provide legitimacy to each other, thus having rendered to be respected as such by later generations. The moment grasped by Rafael is by no means ephemeral to the time of its creation, the first decade of the 1500s. This is not only the representation of gathering of ancient philosophers but the moment of the glorious victory of philosophical reason and rationality against the exclusivist omnipotence of Christian theology and the scholastic education of philosophy of the time. The free spirits of the ancients have been liberated from the tutelage of doctrines embedded in another important tradition, fiercely defended by the authority of the *Mother Ecclesiae*, commonly known as the *Roman Catholic Church*. At the same moment, all the various spirits of modernity, as regards philosophy and the sphere of sciences, were set free to develop into innumerable varieties – to fight against and by rewriting, preserving most of the traditions of the main historical paradigms.

As mentioned above, we may discern the philosopher engaged in his utmost individual activity, mentally active in various fields of the cognitive sphere, on the other hand pursuing philosophical discourse in the context of a specific public sphere – specific in the sense that it would provide him with the legitimate label, acknowledging him as a philosopher. Needless to say, philosophy and philosophers have a unique position, so much differentiating him from the men of any other science: findings of philosophical inquiries are not only questionable, or defiable, but, much worse, often found hardly verifiable. In fact, again unique to philosophers, their findings are often refuted by their own disciples (if not, their disciples are probably not philosophers themselves). It still does not necessarily mean that they are not philosophers. But in more serious cases, it may also happen that philosophers are denounced, which is possible on the same grounds – as so often seen in abusive forms of show trials.

At this moment, we ought to remember the unique character of the relation between the philosopher and his relation to the public, in general. The philosopher's reputation tends to be curiously contrastive, especially in critical periods, when philosophers are put on stage, to the extremes: either highly prestigious or deeply suspicious (Aristophanes 2003). The archetypical conflict refers to a most critical period in the history of Athens, highlighted by the trial of Socrates. Among the major affects it is well-known Plato's decision to leave the public sphere, with all its consequences to the crisis between the political and philosophical spheres – as regards to the interpretation of the public sphere in Plato's philosophy (Arendt 1978).

Three Perspectives

Thus, philosophy in the context of education may perhaps be characterized in three essentially different perspectives to describe the most characteristic paradigms in the context of education, or in a strict sense, teaching philosophy. Far from any intention toward an essentialist typology, these three types are as it follows: (1) the Socratic tradition, (2) the Academic paradigm, and (3) the modern paradigm, with its abundant variety of models, yet usually with more or less overt ideological motivations. The first two great paradigms – resisting to be confined in periods of times – provide models developed under the influence of the Socratic and Platonic ways of interpreting the role of the philosopher in close relation to the meaning of philosophy. In any case, Socrates and Plato provided two sides of the same line of a philosophical school, probably the most influential one of the Greek classics. In Athens, the political, cultural, and economic center of the Mediterranean in the fifth century, Socrates and his disciples paved the ground for a strand of pursuing philosophy on very similar grounds – with two entirely different outcomes. These models made possible the development of two great models in dealing with philosophy. The common ground may perhaps be best grasped by the concept of *paideia* worked out by Werner

Jaeger in his interpretation of Plato's philosophy in the frame of the fundamental concept of educational activity (Jaeger 1963). Here we may recall some key points from the development of the Greek philosophy (Heidegger 1959). Humans, as strange beings as they are in Nature, and against any other naturally occurring existent, are aware of their own mortality. However, they have some other special faculties that are not clearly conceptualized but help them to find themselves closer to the so-called divine sphere. In a long and complex process of evolution, Heraclitus, Pythagoras, Parmenides, just to mention only a few names, had proceeded in developing a conceptual framework that would allow a movement in the cognitive sphere to understand the world of invisibles, i.e., *ideas*, otherwise not revealed to human perception. Cognitive skills in the field of mental faculties enable a strange mobility – that is moving “upwards” – toward a monolithic center of truth that reveals itself to a *divine* capacity, i.e., thinking. This is the point when we first encounter the term philosopher, characteristic to Heraclitus, who had decided to leave the annoying world of the political sphere. As it is known, immortality was accessible to the Greeks by an extraordinary action that is visible to all and worth of memory of all (Kirk, Raven Schofield 1983). It was revolutionary – and very antipolitical – that inside the cognitive sphere, by ascending to the sphere of logos, men may leave the world of mortals and join the world of immortals (the interpretation of “soul” is not a matter of interpretation in here).

The Socratic Pattern

It was the work of the Sophists and Socrates which made possible that philosophical inquiry took the form of critically engaged discourse and as such introduced into the *polis*, metaphorically speaking, to public spaces of the *agora*. However, in contrast to the Sophists' pragmatism, Socrates relied on the pursuit of *paideia* not for any educative purpose, such as adopting certain techniques to outsmart any given counterpart, nor in order to conveying a set of knowledge, eventually practicing the acquired skills. The Socratic model of

paideia (as far as its interpretations are based on an authentic interpretation of solely indirect sources) implies that we are responsible for the world of mortals, i.e., we ought to encourage all our fellow humans, especially our fellow citizens to critically revise the concepts they rely on during their everyday pursuits. Humans share certain commonness in their faculties, e.g., *sensus communis* that would allow everyone to make distinctions and draw conclusions by using commonly accepted rules of logic (Arendt 1982). In this way, teaching does *not directly* enriches the person with the idea of good – as a set of knowledge that must be learnt so as to gain better life and attain a good community, described as just and fair – therefore content in itself. Thus, Socrates was engaged in the everyday life of the polis, and was interested in everyone's lives (he participated in battles fought by the city but also enjoying rather frivolous *symposia*), assuming a universal responsibility in a community that was given to him by birth.

Among later forms of the Socratic tradition, the concept of *cultura animi* can be mentioned (Arendt 1982), although it meant, in the Roman period of time, a combination with various forms of Academism. Similarly, *skepticism* might also be reckoned as heir of the Socratic tradition. In the past century both early phenomenology and Wittgenstein – with the first attempts of the first Vienna Circle (*Wiener Kreis*) – found interest in the critical understanding of the language of philosophy or even the everydayness. Together with their successors, such as pragmatism and critical thinking they are sometimes regarded as being influenced by the Socratic tradition. However, most of these intentions have hardly gained any impact on the *patterns of education* – except their immense popularity as topics of teaching and studying philosophy (Pfister 2010; Liessman & Zenaty 2004).

The Platonic Pattern: Academism

The second model of teaching philosophy, probably the most influential paradigm of education in general, is embedded in the tradition of academic

philosophy. Thus, as mentioned above, the Platonic model of *paideia* bears the hallmarks of the consequences of Plato's experiencing his Master's trial, as Socrates' most famous disciple decided to withdraw from the public sphere and turn his (mental) eyes toward the real objects – far from perishing in the sphere of opinions. This is the moment when the philosopher will take the role of a leader of the young soul – hence the term pedagogy as compounding *paidea* + *gogos* – leading him out of a sphere of shadows and uncertainties. Against the Socratic practice of *paideia*, Plato had introduced two remarkable changes, apparently both having technical character, yet profoundly influencing the understanding the role of philosophy and that of the philosopher (Jaeger 1963).

1. The activities of philosophizing and teaching will be drawn into the safe and *autonomous sphere of Academy* – literally isolating it from the unsafe world of politics. Thus Academy was conceived of as analogous to the model of the cognitive sphere – as the justly leading part of the soul – against the inferior parts of the soul, closer to its eternal counterpart, the body. Further, Academy had been isolated from the body's equally perishable worldly formulation, i.e., the polis.
2. The *specialization of the fields of universal knowledge*, for the time being resulting only in methodologically separated disciplines, to be further divided by the Aristotelian model of philosophy and its particular forms of education. Thus, the once universally present logos will be transformed into techniques of *logics*, also as means to be applied in different forms of *-logies*, to be sure, always having the ambition to provide universal coverage to all known physical, political, or spiritual existents.

The Modern Pattern(s)

Although modern forms of theories and philosophies of education, comprising the role of philosophy in education, here labeled as a third paradigm, have been interested in pedagogy, they are approaching the “original” understanding

of *paideia* in departing from or showing contradictory ways to it. As they are regarded here as ideologically motivated paradigms, teaching philosophy may be seen as modern development, with their roots in a *revolt against scholastic education*. So much different in their characteristics that indeed impossible to coin all of them under one term, the loose term still refers to various models whereby ideology plays – either overt or covert – yet decisive role. Generally speaking, and in an allegedly oversimplifying way, educational models, explicitly in teaching philosophy, have evolved under the tutelage of political ideologies, especially that of liberalism, nationalism, and socialism, or as usually, a specific combination of these dominant ideologies. It is also relevant that ideologies, in the context of understanding the *legitimate role of philosophy and the philosopher*, are closely related to the ways ideologies define some of the basic values of the human existence. To be sure, ideology is not meant that they are learnt, say indoctrinated as ideologies, but certain values are not only treated as topics of discursive (critical) learning, but they provide a *normative framework of education*. The principles upon which different models of teaching philosophy are being built have acquired ideological characteristics all over modernity. In the context of modernity, we may mention *some* of the cardinal values: *human dignity, freedom, justice, individuality, and the stability of the State* (Hobbes 2011; Locke 2001; Rousseau 1979). Although they are manifold in character, they are primarily associated with ideas that are *defining humans* as such, without relying on *any transcendent foundation* and serve as an overall ground for the *stability of a political community*.

Totalitarian regimes, as extreme cases, may represent specific forms in ideological formulations – however, in general outlines, often imitating some of the Western formulae (social justice in appropriate political order, the concept of “end of history,” social Darwinism, etc.). In its extreme forms ideological education is ready to penetrate the autonomy of the sphere Academy, severely corrupting the autonomy of philosophy and that of the education, in general. The other moment in totalitarian forms of

ideological education, paradoxically though, draws closer to the Socratic tradition by its *holistic approach*, bearing a specific political intention: each human being is *responsible for the world*. That is why, surely not in ironical sense, philosophy was also coined as *the worldview* in the educational programs of Communist countries.

Toward *Paideia* in Teaching Philosophy

The Socratic-Platonic tradition still today lurks over the Western tradition in contemporary education, in both forms of the classical paradigms. Platonic Academism is present in the sense of systematic, specialized yet reflective ways of teaching philosophy – present in either basic forms of teaching philosophy: be it *history of philosophy* or *problem-based teaching*. However, providing universal forms of didactics in philosophy, the efficiency depends on a thoroughly processed syllabus and detailed scheme of each lesson. These techniques are often associated with a certain *authoritative* teacher’s attitude; personally varying communicative skills may prove very efficient if selection of texts and topics are appropriate to the target group’s cognitive skills.

The Socratic tradition, in the strict sense, is also present although more often through the teacher’s personal – often *charismatic* – attitudes, with all its advantages and hazards: students motivated in autonomous thinking may feel engaged in further reading, thus resulting excellent results, with potentially long-lasting interest in philosophy. On the other hand, the hazards are also well-known: many students may feel neglected, or disinterested if the teacher is focusing his efforts to a relatively close group of students. These methods are preferably applicable, more efficiently practiced in groups where the course was the students’ own choice, such as in optional seminars, classes, reading clubs, etc.

As a summary, the Socratic model of critical discourse has often been noticed as a most influential form of motivating students to engage themselves in further philosophical readings. However, as a model of teaching philosophy, the Socratic model is acknowledged in a very restricted sense – usually without its basic pursuit of *paideia*, since it is not regarded as compatible

with the fundamental aims of the schooling system. By definition and following the very original experience of Socrates, it is regarded as a way of philosophy that means too high risk to the stability of the social and political order. Still, in critical thinking, for example, certain techniques are adopted, yet hardly assuming the universal responsibility and existential risk, so much characteristic to the philosopher who had never written down a word in his life.

Another, relatively new development seems to apply a certain Socratic way of philosophy, yet questioned by many professionals. The worldwide movement known as *Philosophy with children* has often been regarded as philosophically not legitimate, it still seems to have been spreading and preparing pupils to be open for philosophical thinking: reflecting on the everyday life phenomena, finding conceptual tools and logical forms to a critical understanding of their world. Whatever means applied, philosophy with children may also prove to be a path toward the old tradition of *paideia*.

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Pedagogic

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Peirce and Embedded Philosophy of Education

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Introduction

Peirce's contribution to educational philosophy is embedded within his phenomenological construct. This educational philosophy is general enough to provide for nearly all learning needs and interests, yet specific enough to provide for widespread testing and verification (Hechinger 1960). Peirce's phenomenology provides a sturdy foundation for the development of educational practices that can elicit essential and overarching learning capabilities in young children through adults (Chiasson 2008a, b).

Discussion

Phenomenology is descriptive; it is the study of appearances, which requires facility with proto-reasoning skills, the skills of a good phenomenologist (Peirce 1935, Vol. 5, para. 41). These are skills required for eventual facility with critical thought.

Thus, a good critical thinker in a Peircean sense is first of all a good phenomenologist; that is, someone who can observe without judging, relate in multiple ways, and interpret without deciding.

Facility with these pre- (or proto-) reasoning capabilities can then lead into insightful but untested hypotheses. Hypothesis construction (by means of retroduction) is the very essence of critical thinking, requiring an interplay of Peirce's three sorts of inference types: abduction, deduction, and induction.

Peirce's unique phenomenological construct suggests these proto-reasoning capabilities, which he identifies as necessary for achieving the insights necessary for proto-abductive inferences, must also be necessary for the eventual development of effective critical thinking skills. In Peirce's sense then, a good phenomenologist is someone who possesses the pre-/proto-reasoning skills necessary for engaging thoughtfully and deliberately with not only plans and processes but with possibilities as well.

Phenomena are comprised of things and their qualities. Qualities are the properties of things (including ideas and events), which describe them and/or distinguish one thing from another. Peirce contends that a phenomenologist becomes expert by learning to observe carefully among the qualitative similarities and differences of things without placing judgment upon them (Peirce 1935, Vol. 5, para. 43).

Mastery of critical thinking skills, the psychological equivalent of Peirce's normative sciences, requires that one first master the proto-reasoning skills of a competent phenomenologist. Proto-reasoning skills include the ability to notice, analyze, and then interpret/reinterpret phenomena. From a Peircean point of view, mastery of these phenomenological skills is essential prior to even attempting to develop the semiotic skills of logic and reasoning (Peirce 1932, Vol.1, para. 186). By mastering proto-reasoning skills, even very young children learn to become observers and chroniclers of phenomena, preparing them for the eventual mastery of critical thinking skills.

As with all learning, proto-reasoning skills can only be mastered experientially. For, as Peirce writes "[We] can know nothing except what we directly experience. . . . All the creations of our mind are but patchworks from experience" (Peirce 1935, Vol. 6, para. 492). While the acquisition of facts and examples are a sort of

experience, they cannot substitute for direct and deliberate experience with phenomena.

Proto-reasoning skills enhance direct and deliberate experiences because they enable the suspension of judgment while deliberately engaging with phenomena by:

- 1. Qualifying (noticing/identifying the qualities of things)
- 2. Relating (comparing and contrasting qualities of things)
- 3. Representing (expressing/interpreting things) (Peirce 1935, Vol. 5, para. 436)

Thus, the basis for Peirce’s embedded philosophy of education (which is a sort of *design for thinking*) is the same basis as for his philosophy overall: that is, his particular version of phenomenology, which he also termed the *Doctrine of Categories*. By developing verbal and nonverbal facility with these overarching *Categories*, individuals can gain the ability to engage more effectively with specific learning requirements in both the cognitive and practical worlds.

Qualifying

Qualification is the first platform of Peirce’s embedded philosophy of education. Quality, the category that Peirce named “Firstness,” provides the basis for the development of proto-reasoning skills. Qualities fall into three broad types, which Peirce called “modes of being” (Peirce 1932, Vol. 1, para. 23). Those types are (1) affective (feeling based); (2) sensory (sense-based perceptions); and (3) rational (reason based). Learning the language of qualities is essential for learning the language of relationships (or signs), which in turn are necessary for learning to think critically.

Qualities are the properties, or characteristics, of things. There can be *no thing* (nothing) without qualities to define it. Thus, qualities are whatever a thing has that enables an observer to identify it in some way. If someone says that

Seattle is a large city, then that person is using the rational quality of *size* to sort it into the category of large cities as opposed to medium-sized or small cities.

Qualities allow people to identify a thing as a kind of (or sort of) something. Peirce maintained that properties are true of every real thing, whether anyone ever comes to know that something is real. In this sense, the property (or quality) of motion having to do with the earth orbiting the sun – instead of the other way around as people used to believe – would still be real (or true) had no one ever determined this to be true.

Types of Qualities

Affective Qualities

When children learn to express feelings, they are learning to express qualities of affect. However, qualities of affect are much more than just learning to express play yard feelings such as anger or joy.

Peirce contended that all of scientific discovery depends upon the ability to sense a kind of feeling – a “hunch” and that beliefs arise from a sense of “satisfaction” with whatever truths a person feels he or she has found (Poggiani 2014, pp. 538–39). (Both hunches and satisfactions are affective states.) Peirce also held that motives for doing things fall into higher or lower ethical classes (Peirce 1935, Vol. 5, para. 585) depending upon one’s ability to shape the qualities of the affective mode of being. Below are just a few examples of affective states and a few words that describe them:

Joy	Happy Pleasant Glad	Gratified Delighted Thankful	Anger	Angry Mad Furious	Indignant Wrathful Revengeful
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Education in the qualities and language of affect is a necessary first step in bringing learners into the world of aesthetic and ethical inquiry that proceeds learning to think “rightly” (critically) in a Peircean sense. Perhaps, “first step” is not the right term to use here, since affective education is a long-term process and does not end, even as

introduction into the other sorts of qualities begins.

Affective education involves understanding and experiencing the range between good and bad feelings; between beautiful and ugly surroundings; between good and evil; between boredom and intense focus. This is the foundation of Peirce’s optimistic philosophy. “Love,” he wrote, “recognizing germs of loveliness in the hateful, gradually warms it into life and makes it lovely” (Peirce 1935, Vol. 6. para 289).

Every point along the continuum of each of these states is part of the affective state of the human condition and must reside at the foundation of learning in a Peircean-based educational program.

Sensory Qualities

Peirce contended that aesthetics must inform ethics and ethics must inform reason for right reasoning to occur. The qualities of sensation provide the empirical qualities necessary for informing aesthetic sensibilities. In turn, these are mediated by sentiment (affect) for determining personal value. Qualities of sense may be much easier to for learners to absorb than qualities of affect. For example, red – a quality of vision – is indisputable (to anyone who is not colorblind), while compassion takes a lifetime of experience to experience and understand. Qualities of sense fall into the categories of the normal five senses, plus two others relating to skin sense (or touch) – balance and muscle sense. Below are a few examples of qualities that fall within some of these categories:

Vision	<i>Color</i>	<i>Brightness</i>	Skin sense	<i>Touch</i>	<i>Temperature</i>
	Red	Light		Tickle	Hot
	Blue	Dim		Itch	Cold
	etc.	Dull		Tingle	Cozy

Rational Qualities

Rational qualities have to do with making objective, measurable observations. Something is *larger* than another is. One event occurs *before*

another. Size, time, space (or location), matter and energy, shape, quantity, and change are just some of the rational qualities. Others include generality, opposition, elasticity, complexity, simplicity, etc. The table below lists a few examples.

Size	Little, tiny, miniature, big, large, huge, mammoth,	Long, short, high, tall, slim, wide, narrow	Time	Duration, moment, interval, instant, second, minute,	Hour, day, year, now, past, present, future, then,
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Thinking in terms of qualities provides a valuable philosophical perspective for everyone. Instead of asking: “What is this?” or “What is this for?” learners can begin to wonder, “What does this smell like?” or “Look like” or “How does this make me feel?” “How might it seem to someone (or something) else?”

Relating

The second platform of a Peircean-based philosophy of education is relating things based upon qualities (Peirce 1932, Vol. 1, para. 575). Deliberately relating phenomena based upon their qualities can be done by diagrammatic (or relational) thinking. The tools of diagrammatic thinking require facility with qualification skills, since sorting factors are the qualities, or properties of things. The tools of diagrammatic thinking range from simple sorting practices to much more complex analysis forms. Peirce put great stock into what is now termed “diagrammatic thinking.” Today, many careers require diagrammatic thinking. For example, all computer programmers have mastered diagrammatic thinking, as have engineers, architects, many writers, and individuals in myriad other careers. Engaging young learners in these relational tools provides them with a way to respond deliberately in situations that most adults may incorrectly think are well beyond the scope of young people.

Types of Diagrammatic Thinking

Classification Analysis

A Venn diagram is one form for classification analysis. It is a more complex form of classification than a “simple sort” or a “matching sort” that would ordinarily be used with preschool and early elementary children or a “tree diagram,” which is another ordinary tool of simple classification.

Which of these things is like the others? Which is not? Those questions are verbal forms of classification. However, the nonverbal forms are just as vital to learning. Learners sort a variety of physical things into two or more groups and on down, and then identify their reasons for sorting – such as “Things that I like versus things I don’t like.” “Things that are soft and things that are not soft.” “Things that are familiar; things that are unfamiliar,” etc.

The more familiar learners are with qualitative terms, the more thorough and creative their classification sorts can be, as qualities are the sorting factors for analytic thinking. Preschool children can learn how to make simple sorts by putting away toys, or the silverware, or helping to organize a toolbox. Naturally, not all children will participate willingly or spontaneously in sorting activities, but that does not mean that sorting and classifying skills should be ignored.

Structure Analysis

The second type of diagrammatic thinking involves part/whole thinking. Some people are naturally adept at this kind of analysis and can easily imagine what something will look like when assembled. Others have a deficit in this area. However, everyone can learn how to do structure analysis.

A whole is a structure; a part is a unit of a structure. A person is a whole made up of parts such as arms and legs. The earth is a whole made up of parts such as sea, atmosphere, crust, and core. Everything that exists can be thought of as a part of the whole that we call the universe.

In the case of classification analysis, the relationships are “types of” or “sorts of” something. In structure analysis the relations are spatial.

Things normally considered parts may be thought of in other situations as wholes. A hand, for example, may be called a whole instead of a part if one is concerned with its parts. In structure analysis, the largest including thing with which one is concerned is called a whole. Its included units are called parts. Just as for classification analysis, structure analysis is best introduced to learners as physical experiences: following directions to put a toy together; figuring out how to build a birdhouse; making potholders; learning to sew; making a fort or a go-cart. The more experiences that learners have figuring out how to do things in the physical world, the better their chances at developing skills with structure analysis.

Systems Analysis

The operation of a system reflects a structure moving and/or changing in time and space. Just as structures are wholes that have parts as parts, operations are wholes that have stages and phases as parts. When someone performs a systems analysis, she has a purpose in mind that guides her selection of what she is going to identify as stages of that operation.

The words “stage,” “phase,” and “operation” indicate time-based relationships. Thus, learning to deal with systems is a vital aspect of learning to deal with time – and time is not just a matter of consequence in its ordinary sense of learning to “tell time.” Time, in a philosophical sense, is the arena in which everything occurs. Peirce even used time as a metaphor for his multidimensional doctrine of continuity. Without continuity, there can be no thought, no reality, no relationships, and no thingness of any sort. Additionally, understanding systems and systems-within-systems provides good preparation understanding the consequential thinking of pragmatism and for later introduction into vital world problems in such systems sciences as ecology, economics, political science, sociology, famine-and war prevention, world population studies – and even the personal skill of time management.

The stages and phases chosen when analyzing an operation should be those most appropriate to the purpose. Thus, when they are old enough,

learners should be helped to name ordering factors for stages and phases – just as they choose sorting factors for classifications and identify factors for structure analyses – with direct reference to their purposes.

Interpreting Signs

The purpose of having a basic understanding of different kinds of qualities and different forms of analysis is to arrive at a point where learners can begin to think matters out for themselves in productive ways. By the word “relationships” Peirce meant *signs*, something that represents, points to, or stands in place of something else. In general, this is what Peirce means when he says, “all thought whatsoever is a sign and is mostly of the nature of language.”

Peirce does not mean the term “sign” in just the ordinary sense of that word – as say, a billboard or a stop sign. Also, notice that he says that “thought is *mostly* of the nature of language.” He did not say that *all* thought is language based. Peirce included mathematical thinking as thought – and mathematics as language. In the same sense, he would have included music as a language, as well as any other system or pattern of thought for which there is form and syntax. The particular expression (words, images, diagrams, movement, touch, etc.) by which thinking occurs depends upon the predisposition of the individual doing the thinking. Thus, a pattern of thought is a language, which occurs as signs in any affective, sensory, or rational modality – whether verbal or not.

Peirce identifies three types of signs: representations (icons), indications (indices), and symbols.

Icons (Direct Representations)

Icons are the least ambiguous of signs. They can be either replicas or likenesses. A replica looks like, sounds like, smells like, tastes like, and/or feels like what it is. For example, a video or DVD is a replica of the performance that made the movie, so is a CD a replica of the session that produced the music. A photograph is a replica of the person whose picture was taken, so is a realistic oil portrait of that person. A “scratch and

sniff” sample in a magazine is a replica of the scent of the perfume. A likeness, on the other hand, is a nonliteral representation of something; say a caricature of someone or a cartoon drawing of a mouse.

Indices (Indications)

Indications (which Peirce called “indices” in the plural and “index” in the singular) point to something that is elsewhere in time and/or space. Symptoms, such as rashes, fevers, etc., that physicians observe to diagnose illness are indices, so is a toothpick inserted into the center of a cake that comes out dry indicating that the cake is done (or if coated, not done). Clouds are an indication of rain. A frown on someone’s face is an indication she is upset or angry, or perhaps has a headache, etc. Indices often provide the empirical basis for making inferences that lead to scientific discoveries, medical diagnoses, automobile repairs, search and rescue efforts, and countless other vital and practical activities.

Symbols

Symbols stand in place of the thing or concept that they represent. Moreover, unlike representations (which look like what they are), symbols require agreement among minds for people to know what they mean. Religious forms, such as crosses, six-pointed stars, and crescents are symbolic. Perhaps most significantly, words and numbers are symbols. Words are the most ambiguous of all signs, meaning that they are the most easily misinterpreted and misunderstood. Peirce developed his sign theory to reduce the inherent ambiguity of language – to make language a tool for clear thinking and for effective reasoning.

Once learners master the language of qualities, the tools of analysis, and how to use signs effectively, they will be ready for developing skills for exploring the invisible realms of content, context, and meta-context (including value and purpose) for deciphering meaning.

Conclusion

That Charles Sanders Peirce was a polymath is not open to question. That his semiotic will continue

to influence researchers and developers in many fields (including computer science, linguistics, mathematics, and philosophy) well into the twenty-first century and perhaps beyond is generally accepted.

However, few have yet recognized the value of extracting from Peirce's philosophical construct (in particular from his phenomenology) this viable system for improving learning capabilities in learners of all ages (including those with many sorts of cognitive disabilities) (Hechinger 1960; Upton 1973; Davis and Chiasson 1981; Chiasson and Tristan 2012). This is understandable, for Peirce's writings are difficult to read and understand. However, a Peircean-based learning model is overarching – that is, its roots are preaesthetic, prevalue, and prereason. Its applications are universal.

Fortunately, throughout the twentieth and into this twenty-first century much has already been done to express other applications of Peirce's philosophical construct. Perhaps, his concepts can now be articulated well enough to bring them into the field of educational philosophy and from there into direct classroom practice.

Where Peirce's philosophy was once impenetrable, it is now simple and practical enough for use even at the prereading level (Chiasson 2008a, b). Now, even young children can master age-appropriate expressions of these proto-reasoning skills. These Peircean-based proto-reasoning skills embedded within his phenomenological construct are the true *basic skills*, for they are the skills underlying all meaningful learning.

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Phenomenological Methodology

► Phenomenology in Education

Phenomenological Pedagogy

► Phenomenological Theory of *Bildung* and Education

Phenomenological Research in Education

► Phenomenological Theory of *Bildung* and Education

Phenomenological Theory of *Bildung* and Education

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Synonyms

Bildung; Co-existentials and existentials of pedagogical relation; Description; Foreignness; Learning as experience; Phenomenological pedagogy; Phenomenological research in education; Reduction; Responsivity

Introduction

This article provides a historical overview of the most important approaches in German phenomenological pedagogy to the present. Phenomenological pedagogy both as a theory and empirical research aims at redefining traditional theories of *Bildung* and education in empirical and systematic ways. Within this process of re-definition, the phenomenological methods of description,

reduction, and variation have been adopted critically and developed further. Phenomenological pedagogy thus can present an epistemological and methodological program of its own, one which differs from other approaches within the field of the human sciences, including hermeneutics.

Phenomenological pedagogy has a tradition reaching back more than hundred years. From its very beginnings, it has developed its own approaches to a theory of *Bildung* and education *as experiences*. Traditional theories of *Bildung* (or formation: how we form ourselves and are formed by others) and education, as they have been formulated by Humboldt, Schleiermacher, Herbart, Hegel, and Nietzsche, are redefined by a phenomenological approach in ways that are both empirical and systematic.

Phenomenological Description (Fischer)

In his paper *Deskriptive Pädagogik*, Aloys Fischer (1880–1937) formulates programmatic thoughts on the relation between pedagogy and phenomenology as early as 1914. Fischer is a representative of the *Münchener Schule* (Munich School) surrounding Theodor Lipps. The Munich School critically rejects the egological conception of consciousness proposed by Husserl by claiming a primordial experience of what they referred to as “reality.” Through this assumption, the Munich phenomenologists break away from Husserl’s subject-centered perspective and anticipate thoughts which are later introduced by Merleau-Ponty under the rubric of “world” or “lifeworld.” This is what is meant by “reality” or Real-Ontologie. The methodic tool to capture the experience of reality is the description. Fischer states:

The basic question of all description is what the *Given* in the experience is. Every pedagogy and every theoretical school in pedagogy talks about education . . . every school believes it knows about the matter which is signified as ‘education’ in every detail and is quick to state what and how education *should be*. [. . .] It seems to me that everyone forgets the description of the matter while they try to define and label it. [. . .] Not the meaning of the words, which is the linguistic clarification of the meaning, but the description of matter either: “in question” or

“at hand” is the task which is the foundation of all scientific research; it is the task that makes research possible. (Fischer 1914/1961, p. 144)

Fischer combines the question of methodology with the question of the subject matter of pedagogy as a science, in this case a human science (or *Geisteswissenschaft*). Pedagogy is not a normative science of practice. It is a descriptive science which tries to grasp the subject matter at hand, before it is defined theoretically. Fischer locates the epistemological problem in the fact that educational science, in contrast to sciences with clearly defined objects of research (e.g., Geology), is notoriously insecure about its own subject matter. This is an insight which many pedagogues have expressed, from Herbart to the present. This could be accomplished by employing phenomenological description. Fischer points out that describing a student’s practice in school needs a highly developed psychological and pedagogical awareness: “(It) comes very seldom as a natural gift and can only be attained as the result of sound practicing” (ibid., p. 140).

The method of description is used as a way to reach intersubjective validation of experiences. Fischer goes on to prove the fruitfulness of this method in his works on psychology and school pedagogy. Fischer supposes that description can be “theory-free” (Ibid., p. 142). He maintains that description can lead to pure facts (*Tatsachen*) which are free from presuppositions and prejudices, an argument which seems hardly convincing today. Fischer’s approach has a strong tendency to the moral and the normative, without being able to clarify the conditions of this morality and normativity. Fischer thus affirms a model of traditional, normative pedagogy of role models and culture within the relation of the generations. Still Fischer’s thoughts and research became key issues in phenomenological-pedagogical thinking and reflection.

Anthropological Turn (Bollnow)

After the Second World War and the years of Nazi terror, the phenomenological movement was weakened, and a shift from phenomenological to anthropological concepts occurred. Anthropology in this context means the science (*logos*) of

concepts and notions of mankind (*Anthropos*) and operates in a historical, philosophical, and linguistic perspective. These reflections became important for pedagogy, and pedagogical anthropology was widely spread, even in phenomenology. One of the main representatives is Otto F. Bollnow (1903–1991) who combines Heidegger’s phenomenology with linguistic-philosophical, anthropological, and existential questions (Dilthey and Jaspers) along with a critical reception of existential philosophy and philosophy of life (*Lebensphilosophie*). Bollnow highlights phenomena that are part of what he calls an “education of discontinuity” (Bollnow 1959), for example, crisis, awakening, admonition, guidance, venture, failure, and encounter. He carries out only a few studies which can rightly be called phenomenological–descriptive. They explore the phenomena of practicing (*Übung*), human space, and atmosphere in pedagogy. In contrast to Fischer, the ontological dimension is not considered by Bollnow as a fact of education to be described empirically but as an expression of life itself in the sense of *Lebensphilosophie*. This expression becomes manifest in cultural objectifications (Dilthey) and can be interpreted hermeneutically as a text. Following Bollnow, the understanding of cultural objectifications is reduced to a singular sense. The multiplicity and ambiguity of sense is thus equalized and foreignness is excluded. Looking at Bollnow, we can see how “the pedagogical” is reduced to the pedagogical relation as it was articulated in *Geisteswissenschaftliche Pädagogik*.

In the 1960s and 1970s, German scholars suggested concepts which develop the phenomenological approach further and stand in critical differentiation from Bollnow’s anthropological and hermeneutical pedagogy. Günther Buck, Heinrich Rombach, Werner Loch, Eugen Fink, and Egon Schütz refer to Husserl, Heidegger, and Gadamer and are able to develop genuinely phenomenological approaches for a theory of learning, *Bildung*, and education.

Learning as an Experience (Buck)

Günther Buck’s (1925–1983) study *Learning and experience*, first published in 1967, has become a

classic in German pedagogy (Buck 1989). Buck examines the experience of the process of learning from a historical perspective (Aristoteles, Bacon, Hegel, and Husserl) as well as developing his own theory. It is framed by a hermeneutic of practice (*Handlungshermeneutik*). Buck's theory of understanding and learning as well as his theory of experience in *Bildung* is strongly influenced by Gadamer. From a hermeneutic perspective, understanding and learning are situated within a temporal horizon. Referring to Husserl, Buck integrates the notion of intentionality into his theory. Husserl's analysis of intentionality shows that the structure of experience as a horizon is connected to the circle of anticipation and fulfillment (or disappointment; *Enttäuschung*) of anticipations. On the one hand, the structure of experience as bound by a horizon is based on previous experience (*Wirkungsgeschichte*). On the other hand, this "horizon structure" enables change and the openness to that which is new. The horizon can change. In interpersonal understanding, two horizons come together, and they melt or merge together (*Horizontverschmelzung*) and consequently can change (*Horizontwandel*).

Following Gadamer and Hegel, Buck defines the concept of negation as the "determinate negation" of a specific anticipation in the sense of Hegel – as a dialectical negation that produces something positive. The negation crosses out an intention and brings a moment of discontinuity into the continuity of experience. By going through a "negative" experience – that is, a disappointment of anticipations in a certain situation – we not only experience something, but we also experience ourselves. As one's own horizon is changed in an experience, future anticipations change, as well as past experiences.

Learning from experience can then be seen as learning *as* experience. "Negative" experiences enable us to change previous knowledge and experience, at the same time they open us to new experiences. Given this fact, learning is related to the past as well as to the future. By undergoing "negative" experiences, we are able to become aware of latent attitudes and habits. Learning itself is a reflective moment within the process of experience. By using hermeneutic methods of

understanding, we can explicate the latent structures of the sense of experience in learning.

Buck presents a hermeneutic-phenomenological notion of learning and thus contributes significantly to an understanding of learning as a pedagogical concept. His theory of learning has become an important reference point for contemporary German qualitative research and theories of *Bildung*.

Learning and the Course of Life (Lebenslauf) (Loch)

Werner Loch (1928–2010) developed a biographically based theory of education. Following the ideas of Helmuth Plessner, it is grounded in a non-essentialist anthropology and sees the human being as an open question. Proceeding from this assumption, the phenomenon of education is defined in its structures – both biographically and intergenerationally. It is conceptualized as related to the concept of learning (Loch 2001). In his biographical research, Loch points out various stages of the "curriculum vitae" and differentiates them in relation to learning and educating. Similar to Buck, Loch succeeds in establishing an original, pedagogically significant conception of learning which goes beyond Bollnow's theory. Learning is related to knowing how and competence and is thus determinable in a way that is both nonempirical and noncognitivist. The lived body then becomes important both as a category of reflection and as a phenomenon. Learning is connected to sedimented habits and the habitus in general. Activity and practice function in the "mode of knowing how" rather than of "knowing that." To obtain knowing how, supportive and helping educational practices are important, as well as inhibiting and limiting educational practices. Loch differentiates negative from positive inhibitions in learning. While negative inhibitions in learning work against what is to be learned and can be pedagogically suspended, positive inhibitions are to be supported. Loch does not work out this difference systematically, but he works toward a determination of the negative aspects within educational processes, which Buck calls "negativity" and which have attracted attention in current approaches (see below).

In terms of methodology, Loch can point out important differences between diverse approaches in the human sciences. He succeeds in fleshing out the “poetic” and “creative” function of the phenomenological method and contrasts it to methods of hermeneutics and psychoanalysis.

Structures, Operative Concepts, and Co-existential and Existential Elemental Phenomena (Rombach, Fink, Schütz)

By the end of the 1960s, Heinrich Rombach (1923–2004) and Eugen Fink (1905–1975) provided new phenomenological perspectives on *Bildung* and education as experiences by focusing on structures and elemental phenomena (*Grundphänomene*) and by using a type of reflection they christened “categorical.”

Heinrich Rombach developed a structural phenomenology (Strukturphänomenologie). He advocated a shift from anthropology to structural anthropology and from phenomenological pedagogy to structural pedagogy. According to Rombach, describing mankind as (a) structure and existing within structures means that one must give up the subject-centered and *geisteswissenschaftliche* perspective as well as the sociological one (Rombach 1979). Rombach combines the reflection on elemental phenomena with a reflection on experience as pedagogical experience. This enables him to distinguish between various kinds of experience (as opposed to political, economic, aesthetic, or other experience) and to contrast them with the specific dimension of pedagogical experience.

This differentiation, which is important for educational reflection, was introduced earlier by Rombach’s mentor in Freiburg, Eugen Fink. Fink earned his doctorate under Husserl and Heidegger and remained Husserl’s loyal assistant, even when Husserl was persecuted by the Nazis. Fink sees educational science as a cultural practice to be sustained after the collapse of general guiding principles and narratives in the modern and late modern era and the emergence of nihilism (Nietzsche). Education is both: science and practical life lessons (*Lebenslehre*). Fink poses the question whether educational science could be brought back to lifeworld experience as a lesson

or precept for life and whether it is capable of producing guiding principles and ideas. As we do not have an authoritative, final, and universal interpretation of the meaning of the world and society at our disposal, it is the task of pedagogy in particular to produce these interpretations collectively, but only in a provisional way. In his social phenomenology, Fink differentiates in six fundamental co-existential elemental phenomena: play, power, work, love, death, and education. They are connected to social, co-existential, and embodied practices in the time and space of society and as an expression of care about *Dasein* after the “end of the grand narratives” (Lyotard).

Within education, concern and care, learning, wonder and astonishment, questioning, and counseling become basic practices. Fink’s fundamental thesis sees “man as a fragment,” as someone who does not exist as a complete being or as an object. He can only experience himself in relation to self and world in a fragmentary way. The totality of man and world, or of man and nature as suggested by the *Geisteswissenschaften* as well as the continuity in the generational succession derived from it, have broken apart.

Fink develops a theory of *Bildung* on the basis of this social-anthropological description. *Bildung* can no longer be *Allgemeinbildung* or general *Bildung* in a holistic sense anymore; it has become fragmentary *Bildung*. In this conception of *Bildung*, negativity is not an operation of consciousness but an existential trait of experience. *Bildung* can then be described as coping with this existential plight. In this definition, *Bildung* becomes a practical-existential experiment of sense under preconditions of a provisional, insecure nature, or, in other words, an existential and co-existential practice as production and provisional creation of meaning. It is also a reflective practice, as the operation of phenomenological variation can mark different modes of experiencing in politics, arts, love, time, and labor as differences, and compare these modes. At the same time, the phenomenological reduction enables us to free ourselves from what is taken as facts and opens a perspective on what is possible.

The concept of education is similarly redefined: Fink calls the educational practice

“community of questioning.” This community is determined by power, by society, and by culture and has its reference point in the collective plight of not knowing and not knowing how (Fink 1970). According to Fink, the relation between the generations is marked by foreignness. Under preconditions of foreignness and insecurity, the community of questioning aims at future situations and considers options or possibilities to overcome particular difficulties in their own situation. Education is thus characterized by difference and controversy concerning different interpretations of particular situations. These controversies are those of subjects situated in a sociopolitical space, which means that education becomes a democratic process. Education also becomes a question of productivity, of generating provisional ideas. Fink’s theory of *Bildung* and education differs from his contemporaries who were oriented toward hermeneutics or *Geisteswissenschaften*. The differences can be seen in his considerations of the fragmentary nature of the self. Dealing with and relating to these differences are described as practices of *Bildung*. Apart from the differences in the relation to the self, Fink also considers differences as foreignness between the generations and differences of sociality, democracy, and power. His theory of *Bildung* and education offers connections to Foucault or Derrida and other poststructuralists who were influenced by phenomenology.

Fink’s student Egon Schütz (1932–2015) has developed this approach into an “existential-critical pedagogy” and deepened it in the context of many studies on anthropology, ethics, and aesthetics (for the following see Eugen-Schütz-Archiv).

Schütz adds five existentials as modes of the human “relationship to being” (*Seinsverhältnisse*) to the six co-existentials suggested by Fink: freedom, reason, historicity, language, and the lived body. Schütz radicalizes Fink’s thesis of fragmentarity by referring to Heidegger’s criticism of humanism and subjectivity. The “anthropological circle” as fundamental mode of human self-understanding constitutes the center of Schütz’ theory. Theoretical, practical, scientific, and everyday definitions and conceptions (*Vorstellungen*) of mankind can never lead to complete

self-transparency. Man remains subject to his finiteness and corporality even within the processes of self-formation (*Sich-Bilden*) and self-imagination (*Einbilden*). Taking the anthropological circle into account, Schütz describes *Bildung* as an existentially risky act of limited freedom which takes place under the conditions of finiteness, corporality, and co-existentiality. Schütz sees education as a co-existential experiment, in which man engages in practices of dealing with himself and with the other as incomplete or imperfect beings. He applies the phenomenological methods of reduction and variation: One’s own view as well as different scientific theories and models are critically evaluated in terms of their anthropological presuppositions. These pre-meanings and prejudices are then bracketed in a phenomenological epoché. Following this step, perspectives can be varied, and, stepping back from one’s own approach and others’ theoretical conceptions, enables a variation of different views on the thing itself (*Sache selbst*).

Seen from the perspective of methodology, we can state that Rombach, Fink, Schütz, and Loch make the phenomenological method of reduction and variation fruitful for a theory and practice of *Bildung* and education. They succeed in differentiating phenomenological research in education from pedagogical hermeneutics (*hermeneutische Pädagogik*). Sense, understanding, and interpreting are terms both of hermeneutics and of phenomenology. However, phenomenological description refers to intentional acts, an important way in which it differs from empirical observation and hermeneutic interpretation. Phenomenological description aims at “working out, how a creature like man, who is equipped with a lived body, soul, consciousness and conception of self and thus becomes a self, can express sense-giving intentions at all” (Loch 2001, p. 1198).

Hermeneutics, on the other hand, practices a reconstructive interpretation (*Auslegung*) of something that is given as a text. Phenomenology strives to put sense into what is perceived, thus performing a productive and prospective task:

Putting sense into the human expressions [...] thus becomes the constitutive task of phenomenological

description, which consequently obtains the character of an attribution (*Zuschreibung*). (Ibid.)

According to Fink, this productive and creative dimension is guaranteed by reflectively employing the “operative concepts” of phenomenology (description, reduction, variation).

Thus, phenomenological description not only refers to a description of what is present, visible, and noticeable but also to an analysis of “operative concepts”. Intention and attribution, reduction, and variation are central operative concepts within phenomenology. Only by employing these concepts, one can move from a reconstruction of what is given to a constitution of sense, in the field of education as in any other.

Contemporary Approaches

During the 1980s and 1990s, new and genuinely phenomenological approaches were developed in German educational discourse. Besides Husserl and Heidegger, the new reference points become Merleau-Ponty, Waldenfels, Levinas, Derrida, and Foucault. Phenomena of sociality, corporality, responsivity, alterity, genealogy, and power have been made fruitful for phenomenological reflection on processes of *Bildung* and education. Within this discourse, special attention has been paid to Waldenfels’ philosophy of responsivity. In reference to Merleau-Ponty and to French post-structuralism, Waldenfels widens Husserl’s concept of intentionality through a phenomenology of corporality, foreignness, and “attentionality” (Waldenfels 2007).

By referring to Husserl’s concept of *Lebenswelt*, Wilfried Lippitz follows *geisteswissenschaftliche*, hermeneutic, phenomenological, and socio-theoretical perspectives and critically evaluates them. Following Merleau-Ponty, this endeavor brings Lippitz to a phenomenological definition of learning. To carry out his research, Lippitz redefines the method of description in a hermeneutic-phenomenological perspective under the term of “exemplary description” and, in doing so, refers to Fischer, Langeveld, and Buck. In later works, Lippitz focuses on questions of pedagogical ethics, which he connects to topics of foreignness and alterity. By referring critically

to Levinas, he sketches out a relation to self and to the child and the intergenerational relation (which all carry opportunities for processes of *Bildung*) as ethical relation set in a horizon of alterity and foreignness (Lippitz 2003). Käte Meyer-Drawe also refers to Merleau-Ponty and his phenomenology of intercorporeality, in order to think intersubjectivity within re-learning or learning anew. Besides adapting Merleau-Ponty, she employs theories of Husserl, Buck, and Waldenfels, but also those of Plato and Aristotle and develops an influential theory of learning as experience and learning as a process of re-learning or learning anew. Meyer-Drawe critically examines psychological and neuroscientific concepts in a genealogical analysis. Thus, she is able to describe these approaches in their claims for omnipotence, their reductionism, their discursive power, and their definitional authority. She also succeeds in differentiating them from a pedagogical-phenomenological theory of learning (Meyer-Drawe 2001/1984). Malte Brinkmann makes the phenomenological orientation fruitful for a theory and research of pedagogical experience, by considering epistemological and methodological questions. Based on a phenomenological theory of practicing (*Übung*), he examines temporal and corporal experiences of power within learning and education by using video research (Brinkmann 2012).

Conclusion

The epistemological question of the subject matter and the core of pedagogy as a discipline and profession on the one hand and the methodological question of an adequate research method in connection with the operative terms of phenomenology on the other can already be found in Aloys Fischer’s *Descriptive Pedagogy* (1914). Both questions, the substantive and methodological, have become central to phenomenological educational science. Bollnow answers them in a way that is strongly anthropological and ontological in nature. The conservatism and traditionalism of *Geisteswissenschaftliche Pädagogik* that Bollnow generally affirmed was subsequently overcome by

Buck's theory of learning as experience, Loch's curricular theory of education, and Schütz' existential-critical approach. All three redefine learning, education, and existence differently. At the same time, the methodological difference separating the phenomenological approach from hermeneutic and social-theoretical methods becomes evident. The work of Lippitz, Meyer-Drawe, and Brinkmann define the pedagogical relation, educating, learning, and practicing (*Übung*) as experiences that are defined within the horizons of corporality, responsivity, foreignness, and power and thus differentiated from other approaches within the human sciences and in qualitative research more broadly.

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Phenomenology

- [Heidegger as Teacher](#)
- [Heidegger on Teaching](#)
- [Langeveld, Martinus J. \(1905–1989\)](#)
- [Phenomenology of Digital Media](#)
- [Phenomenology of Inclusion, Belonging, and Language](#)

Phenomenology in Education

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Synonyms

[Education](#); [Everyday existence](#); [Experience](#); [First person](#); [Pedagogic](#); [Phenomenological methodology](#); [Presence](#); [Relation](#); [Responsibility](#); [School](#); [Vulnerability](#)

Introduction

In Scandinavia and Europe, educational institutions are being transformed due to particular political, economical, and educational agreements such as The Bologna Process, to the policies of The Organization for European Economic Co-operation (OECD), and to changes in availability of global knowledge and information mobility through internet and social media. Moreover, families, kindergartens, schools, universities, social welfare programs, and cultures in general are affected deeply by increasing political migration, economic centralization, unemployment, and profound organizational changes in society and work. The structural changes of human and cultural life in Europe contest the common meaning of humanity and democracy and revive critical questions of how to possibly judge and incite alternative thinking and acting in the present situation in education. However, due to the influence of the Bologna Process and the

OECD, education is increasingly a means for political and economic interests. The sole focus on knowledge and (lifelong) learning is making education the strategic center of rotation of society with issues of humanity in the purpose and aims of education coming under severe pressure. This critical situation calls for a radical rethinking of educational means and aims, and actualizes a renewed interest in how to encounter the young generation in the complexity of their lived present, rather than in their potential to increase the outcomes of education. The state of affairs has stirred up major contrasting educational views represented in the Western traditions of education. The cultural history of education in respectively Anglo-American (the English-speaking world) and Continental traditions (Europe and Scandinavia) is key here (Biesta 2011). Although the basis of the present problem is neither of the two systems per se, the very idea that more knowledge represents the main answer to educational questions and prospects has its source in the Anglo-American ideal of capitalism, competition, and the belief in an always more profitable future. While in the English-speaking world education is an object of study dependent of interdisciplinary views and conceptions from “real” disciplines like psychology, sociology, history, economy, and philosophy, the historical European understanding of education as “*pädagogik*,” indicates an independent discipline in its own right with its own conceptions, characteristics, and historical justification (Langeveld 1969; Oelkers 2001; Biesta 2011). Education as an interdisciplinary objective study – the study of the object of knowledge – and education as “*pädagogik*” – a discipline of its own oriented toward the moral relation between the new and the older generation – deploys a distinct difference of how educationalists understand their relation to education and how education relates to other disciplines like philosophy and phenomenology.

Dependent of whether we consider phenomenology to be a philosophy or a methodology, its relation to other disciplines is impacted. Phenomenology as a philosophy in its own right with its own conceptions, definitions, and disciplinary regulations encounters the sphere of other

disciplines based on philosophy’s own language and meanings. Philosophy of education might be an example of how philosophy as a discipline lends its bearing to the object of education by subjugating education to philosophy in a hegemonic relationship. An encounter between phenomenology as a philosophy and education in this context would mean that education accepts the philosophical (phenomenological) characteristics to take control over educational intentions, purposes, and vocabulary. Education would become “phenomenologicalized” and lose its own disciplinary qualities. While phenomenology as a philosophy claims its own independence from other disciplines, phenomenology as a methodology lets itself be applied to other disciplines, allowing the disciplines to be in their own right and asking their own professional questions. Phenomenology as a methodology is not merely a method to be applied, it is implicitly also a way of seeing and living life, or as Mollenhauer (2014, p. 20) indicates “a way of life,” but it positions itself according to the disciplinary character of the other discipline. Phenomenology as a methodology is a kind of human science theory that explores the discipline and questions its foundations, not in order to subjugate it, but in order to sustain its legitimation. Hence, phenomenology as a methodology supports the discipline’s own questions and intentions without taking over its vocabulary and disciplinary characteristics. Phenomenology as methodological approach (and way of life) and education as “*pädagogik*” have coexisted in Europe over decades as a method of existential inquiry into professional practices of children and young peoples’ lifeworlds (for more details see van Manen 2014), reinforced by a range of philosophers like Merleau-Ponty, Heidegger, Levinas, Løgstrup, and Gadamer. Phenomenology as methodology (or human science theory) and a particular way of life focuses on the individual’s lived experience of existential phenomena “the reality slowed down”, as Mollenhauer puts it (2014, p. 19). In this way phenomenology offers “*pädagogik*” ethical resistance by asking questions of reason, basis, and alternatives. By constantly reflecting and transforming “*pädagogik*’s” own questions, paradoxes,

and complexities while sustaining education as “pädagogik” phenomenology puts education as well as itself to the test of revealing the experiential reality of the young to reflection in research and practice.

Phenomenology as Methodology in Education

Nonphilosophers commonly carry out a methodological phenomenology and the professional practice of research indicates that phenomenology is seen from the perspective of the actual professional practice rather than from the perspective of philosophy. This means that phenomenology in this context is not a philosophy of education, but a way of doing educational (pedagogical) research and practice. Phenomenology is a way of contemplating educational questions within the context of educational theory and practice. We might call this “practice” a “phenomenology of practice” which according to van Manen (2014) is a methodological approach relevant to any professional practice. Phenomenology in education is a “phenomenological ‘pedagogic’”. The term ‘pedagogic’ was first used in *Phenomenology & Practice* 2/2014 as the common basic anglicized term indicating the fact that there is no Anglo-American pedagogical tradition, and therefore no word for the practice of this tradition. It is therefore not easy for the Continental pedagogue to tell the English reader what pedagogic is. Theoretical pedagogic, in German “Allgemeine Pädagogik,” cannot be equated to philosophy of education for reasons explicated in the introduction to this article. One main distinction is that education refers to what is happening in schools and educational institutions, while pedagogic refers to everything that is happening to the child from early childhood to adulthood; the broader upbringing and educating the young generation. The special issue of P&P was a tribute to the translation into English of Klaus Mollenhauer’s classic book *Vergessene Zusammenhänge. Über Kultur und Erziehung* (Mollenhauer 1983), 30 years after its publication. It is a virtually giving or giving back “the

phenomenon of pedagogic itself [...] without recourse to pat definitions and easy theoretical conceptualizations” (Levering and Saevi 2014, pp. 5–6), as the word “pedagogic” is the anglicized form of the German term “pädagogik,” the adults’ formal, nonformal, and informal being and acting in relation to the younger generation. The term “pedagogic” indicates a differentiation to the English term “pedagogy” that according to Wivestad (2014, p. 7), “lacks the ‘ic’ and hence the ‘techne’; it lacks the signals of an academic discipline. Wivestad (2014, p. 8) refers to Hügli (1989, p. 4), who claims that pädagogik “is and continues to be... a collective singular [noun] encompassing the whole spectrum of practice and theoretical concerns with upbringing [Erziehung].” Pädagogik as a discipline of its own is here pointed out in English by the term “pedagogic.” There is a range of European countries that share the German educational tradition and thus the term “pädagogik” in singular, indicating the unity and autonomy of the discipline (e.g., Norway – pedagogikk, Sweden – pädagogik, Denmark – pedagogik, The Netherlands – pedagogiek, Spain, Portugal, Italy, Poland – pedagogia, Latvia- pedagogija, Lithuania – pedagogika, Estonia – pedagoogika, France –pédagogie). Within the European and Scandinavian cultures, pedagogic is understood as the educational practice of helping the young generation to grow up in a culture, as well as the theoretical and conceptual reflective and reflexive responsibility for questioning and reformulating this particular culture’s insights, traditions, and habituations. While we might think of education as a formal preparation or qualification to jobs in society, and as children’s socialization to same age mates and to the cultural norms and standards of the status quo, pedagogic also presupposes an element of subjectification *of* and *by* the child or young person (as well as of the adult or teacher). This quality of subjectification, which in German is called “*Bildung*,” indicates a subjective independent counter voice or self-action (Mollenhauer 2014) sometimes from the utterly other; a resistance to the actual, which according to this tradition is the crucial identifier of pedagogic.

Explore Education Anew

Jan Masschelein (2011) in his paper entitled “Experimentum scholae,” provides an interesting exploration of education via the related word “school.” He alludes an allegory to Hannah Arendt’s introduction to her book *Between Past and Future*, where she claims that educational terms like authority, freedom, culture, and the word “education” itself are being emptied of content; the meaning of these words has “evaporated,” leaving behind “empty shells.” The challenge they present to education is “to distil from them [the empty shells] anew their original spirit” (Arendt 1968b, p. 15 in Masschelein 2011, p. 530). Masschelein continues:

Distilling the original spirit is neither to perform a historical reconstruction or genealogy, nor to engage in essentialist analysis in order to define a (suprahistorical) essence. It rather consists of attempts to relate these words to the experiences and materialities connected to the inventions or events that they name and to our actual experiences.

The term “distill” etymologically stems from Latin “distillare” “trickle down in minute drops,” from dis- “apart” + stillare “to drip, drop” (www.etymonline.com), and in chemistry is used to purify and identify a compound. To distil anew the original educational experience then could be to filter out replicas and counterfeits and to admit that experiential insights of education cannot simply be approved by tradition and institutional customs. On the contrary, what is called education has to be explored as fresh and uncontaminated as possible. This is Masschelein’s point of departure in his exploration of education. Also phenomenological method has to be invented anew every time an original research project is initiated (van Manen 2014), and no method (or any style or attitude) can be freed from prejudice and assumptions. Phenomenology in education or a phenomenological pedagogic is concerned with actual experiences of everyday life as they are experientially lived, sensed, and acted (rather than as they should have been or ought to be according to norms and traditions), and in particular the existential experience of situations as experienced by the singular child or young person.

Phenomenological pedagogic resists preset aims and the adult’s psychological effort and ability to define the inner landscape of the child in order to make the correct preplanned learning incitement, as is commonly a teacher’s task today. Rather, the existential orientation of a phenomenological pedagogic evokes a concern for the child’s life as experienced by the child, and in his or her attention to issues of the world. The attentiveness to what is experienced – to what shows itself in the presence of present – demands that the adult or teacher inserts him or herself in time, space, and relationship with the experience and is exposed to what actually happens (rather than to what should have happened according to plans, norms, and assumptions). The adult is concerned with the present – he or she is “present in the present” (Masschelein 2012, p. 356), caring for the present, and in touch *with* and touched *by* what is actually happening.

Let Existence Address

Mollenhauer (2014, p. 26) asserts that at the heart of Continental pedagogic lingers the quest of a moral responsibility for my own being and acting and thus for how I encounter the other as an-other. A moral responsibility for how I am and act (rather than a professional accountability for *who* I am, e.g., teacher, social worker, psychologist) comes from the existential basis of phenomenological pedagogic, indicating that my being and acting has other ways of being and acting as its alternative. What would it mean to education if educational practice spoke to the existence of children and young people, and put reality to the test of human responsibility? What if the adult or teacher realized that all life situations (including the life with young persons) were an exposure to existential choices? The relation between the adult and the child – if it is a pedagogical relation – must be a relation of potentiality, openness, emptiness – a relation that is not preplanned to the extent that it is in the full power of the adult. On the contrary, the responsible relation hesitates in the presence of the other and requestions its purpose and aim. Here, intention and aim are not

theoretical concepts helping the adult or teacher to master educational practice, so to speak, from the outside by applying general rules and regulations to present situations in order to pursue objectives and fixed processes and results. Rather, the concern of the pedagogue is to be present in the present along with the young and being attentive to the existing pedagogical and ethical bases. The moral and pedagogical concern for the child and young person's experience *in* and *of* concrete educational relations and situations is a risky project that might lead to educational failure and defeat. One aspect of risk is the fact that the authority of the adult is different from the authority of the child or young person – although neither of them is unaffected by the power and powerlessness of the other. Authority unlike authoritarianism is a gift from the other and it is relational. Authority like morality, however, is never preset, but could always have been given to me differently or not given to me. The willingness of a phenomenological pedagogic to be addressed by the complexity of existence and care for the other is an ethos that cannot be utilized for a purpose outside the situation (even though the purpose might have good intentions), but has to be put “to the test of its own thinking” (Masschelein 2012, p. 355). To put education to the test of its own thinking might mean to explore its validity for children's lives and for the critical questions of present time, which more often are complex existential dilemmas (e.g., fleeing from war, terror and poverty, young peoples' experience of dismissal, discrimination, devaluation, unemployment, marginalization) than controllable issues of knowledge or learning. Existential educational traditions in Europe put the person (as first person) to the test of ethical existence and coexistence (Masschelein 2012; Mollenhauer 2014; van Manen 2014). They test out a kind of truth telling that concretely and riskily demonstrates (often through cultural works of art like fiction, paintings, and film) what being a teacher or young person might be and, implicit in the demonstration, offers a judgment or ethos of what is good and right. Moral questions are always *questions* that unlike statements or rules are constantly put to the test of

relational coexistence and the complexity of human and existential life.

Why Phenomenology Matters to Education

What does phenomenology mean to education, or said in another way, can phenomenology address questions or incite understandings to education that would not be possible without phenomenology? Education as pedagogic and phenomenology coincide in their shared focus on the concrete, situated, singular, and irreplaceable human experience taking place in the complexity and paradoxes of the moral-relational lifeworld (Sævi 2015, p. 344). Nevertheless, while pedagogic tends to recollect concrete episodes in a more formal scholarly way, like useful didactic material for a particular educational purpose (Mollenhauer 2014, p. 74), phenomenological pedagogic puts lived experience concretely forth as existential examples, depicting present moments in the (em)pathically and bodily sensed experience. Examples of concrete presence in existence can be seen in the films made by the Belgian directors Jean-Pierre and Luc Dardenne, where young people and adults in open, exposed life situations put questions of pedagogic and existence to test (Mai 2010; Masschelein 2012). The films explore existential educational questions where responsible actions take place (or the lack thereof) to let pedagogic happen, or as one of the directors say, to allow the “future [to] take place” (L. Dardenne 2008 in Mai 2010, p. 84). The Dardennes ask once again the old questions of what a teacher, a father, a mother, a child, or the other as other actually is, when existence has little or no support in traditional norms and regulations. They show how humanity and relationality in contemporary life conditions are exposed and vulnerable to human responsibility. They put education to the test of its own thinking and acting and the risk of losing is real. The films help us see that the experience of what *is* in pedagogical situations is different from what ought to be or should have been. The attention to what is experienced implies

nearness and attentiveness to the moral and pedagogical potential of the situation and indicates a basic difference between existential phenomenological pedagogic and a psychological prescriptive foundation of education (Saevi 2014, p. 43). Being experientially present, relating the meaning of the episode to my own experience, my own practice or what might have been my own practice, allows the experience to address me as a pedagogical possibility. The responsibility for that which *is* urges us as adults and teachers to keep educational situations open to experiential understanding – rather than to point to a problem or suggest a solution. If the future should have a chance to take place in present education as Luc Dardenne says (2008), being with children must carry existential human and moral weight as experiential moments for the adult and teacher.

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Phenomenology of Digital Media

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Synonyms

Digital media; Heidegger; Human embodiment; Learning and teaching practices; Phenomenology; Technology

Introduction

Although digital media are fairly recent phenomena, it could be said that the phenomenological movement, from its earliest stages on, has offered a most fruitful starting point for understanding the meaning and the impact of these media for our lives, in general, and for education, in particular. Central to the work of both Husserl and Heidegger is a concern with the growing presence, if not the ubiquity and inevitability, of technology in our daily lives. Their reflections sometimes have a prophetic quality. It is no coincidence that their ideas inform many contemporary thinkers who aim at coming to terms with our present world, which is increasingly a digitized one. The sphere of education is no exception to that: even more educators and children/students relate to one another through screens, instead of meeting one another in real-life presence. And, whereas the initiation into the world used to be one predominantly based on reading and studying (school) books, it is imaginable that digital and social media will become the dominant technologies

which structure the way in which the new generation encounters the world.

First, a particular, “traditional” phenomenological understanding of technology, as present in the work of Heidegger, is discussed, as well as how this view informs contemporary debates on the growing impact of digital technologies on education. As often as not, this impact is deemed unfavorable. Subsequently, this chapter also zooms in on recent work on education and digitization which criticizes this traditional perspective and which tries and comes to an experiential account which is more open to the possibilities that go together with the use of digital media – an account that also gives due to the complex history of technology and stresses bodily dimensions. In view of the format of this text, only a limited number of authors and a limited scope of issues can be discussed. However the authors and examples presented are representative for the way in which phenomenology can contribute to a better understanding of how digital media affect the world of education.

Digital Technologies and the Framing of the World

A basic insight to be drawn from Heidegger’s seminal text *The Question Concerning Technology* (1978) is that we completely misunderstand technology if we only regard it as a set of tools at our disposal. Instead, technology pertains to a way of understanding itself. The world appears to us “enframed” in a way never encountered before we started to rely on technology when leading our lives. More precisely, Heidegger claims that under the conditions of a technological worldview, literally everything is seen as a resource, i.e., something which is out there only to be used and optimized. This analysis stills holds true today (if not with greater urgency than in Heidegger’s own time), as Iain Thomson has shown in an important study on Heidegger and higher education (Thomson 2005). Thomson argues that Heidegger’s analysis, although written long before the introduction of computer technology in our daily lives, actually gives a most accurate description of how digital media operate: the things which appear on our

computer screens are marked out as mere information that can circulate – things that can be quantified and exchanged. And, this applies to almost literally everything: the texts we read and write; the people we encounter and befriend; the world we live in, explore, and enjoy; etc.

As such, we no longer appreciate things for their intrinsic qualities. Rather, we have come to take mere quantity as a sign of quality. This might well explain a rise in instrumental thinking, which has intensely affected the sphere of (higher) education. For instance, subject matters are no longer seen as worthwhile to explore in and out of themselves, but as a potential source of economic benefit, and students solely appear as a possible source of investment (Ibid.). It is important to note that this way of looking isn’t a harmless and easily rectifiable distortion of sight but that it reflects what subject matters, students, and universities *are*: a technological worldview goes together with an *ontological* reduction. As Heidegger claims in regard with the contemporary world: “Only what is calculable in advance counts as being” (quoted in Ibid., p. 149). In that sense, the use of technologies, and particularly of digital technologies, defines what we are, and they delineate the ways in which we relate to reality as such.

On a more *ontic* (i.e., concrete) level, similar analyses have been made in relation to the introduction of digital technologies in the classroom. For instance, Richard Dreyfus (2001) argues that the physical copresence of students, teachers, and the things we study is a necessary condition for education to take place and therefore that the *telepresence* we increasingly encounter on-screen and online is a dangerous evolution. Drawing from Merleau-Ponty, he claims that we can only learn to master a subject *matter* when it is *sensed* as having a reality of its own, i.e., when we (as bodies) are confronted with something external that poses a challenge to us and that doesn’t automatically yield to our will and intention. Therefore, Dreyfus argues, computer and Internet learning is most problematic: the hyper-mediated relation to reality within virtual spaces, as well as the ready-made and algorithmic character of e-learning-programs, prevents this confrontation with a recalcitrant reality. These programs seem to be

developed to immunize pupils/students against this kind of unsettling experience.

To give another illustration, it could be argued that the use of ready-made (PowerPoint) presentations prevents students from experiencing the way in which a teacher actually composes (letter for letter) the words she draws attention to: they just appear with a click of the mouse. This precludes a most valuable educational experience students might have in the traditional classroom context. As Cathy Adams (2016) shows, the use of blackboard and chalk grants students the possibility of witnessing how words come into being. Chalkboarding thus provokes a different and more caring sort of attention when compared to the consumerist-style attention that goes together with seeing appearing slide after slide. Under traditional conditions, it is as if students have a more direct feel of why the words which are produced are important and of how much the teacher cares about these words. This unique way of disclosing the world has up till now no equivalent in the digitally supported classroom (Ibid.).

Beyond a Normative Approach

These analyses underline that technologies, and especially digital ones, are never just means at our disposal, i.e., instruments which we might choose to use (or not) and which are easily interchangeable for other instruments without this having much consequences. They show, on the contrary, that (digital) technologies define to a rather large extent how we experience ourselves, others, and the world. More importantly, they actively give shape to the realm of education – in a more harmful than a fruitful way, so it may seem. As such, phenomenology appears to be a good ally for those who believe that with the advent and proliferation of new technologies, we are destroying something of great value and that the use of digital media obstructs the path of true education. Such a view is not only normative, but also technological determinist, as the consequences which are laid out appear to be unavoidable.

Nonetheless, it is also possible to take a more neutral and productive approach, open to the possibilities which come with digitization. This is evidenced by recent work on digitization and education that starts from a (post)phenomenological perspective. This other approach is closer to the principal aim of phenomenology, viz., try and give a precise, rich, and detailed but also maximally unprejudiced and unbiased account of the way in which reality appears to us. Not unsurprisingly, phenomenology has also been effectively applied in order to come to detailed descriptions of what it means to relate to others and the world under pre-digital and digital conditions. Rather than seeking for a justification against (or for that matter in favor of) new technologies, the first and most important task of such a purely descriptive approach is to draw out what it means to educate and to educate digitally, which (new) possibilities come with (new) technologies, and to draw out differences with what education looks like in more traditional (i.e., classroom) settings.

A substantial effort to give such a descriptive rather than a judgmental account can be found in the work of Gloria Dall’Alba and Robyn Barnacle (2005), Max van Manen and Cathy Adams (2009), and Norm Friesen (2011). Rather than playing out traditional media against digital ones, van Manen and Adams argue that “online computer technologies intensify the phenomenology of writing” (van Manen and Adams 2009, pp. 20–21). Digital, and especially online, technologies open up writing to an unprecedented experience of what it means to be a writer. Drawing from Blanchot, they show that writing online and offline is about entering a not easily graspable space (and as such writing offline and online are markedly different from oral discourse which is always a matter of direct expression and which therefore never implies this kind of journey into the unknown). In order to come to terms with the differences between online and offline text production, van Manen and Adams carefully craft an experiential account of the different ways in which writing comes into being under these two conditions. And so, they convincingly show that in

“cyberwriting” there is a different sense of what it means to make one’s ideas and feelings public, another contact to the insight and truth one seeks through writing, a different feel of one’s own and one’s readers presence, proximity/distance and corporeality, etc.

Likewise, in his study *The Place of the Classroom and the Space of the Screen* (2011), Friesen gives a detailed and rich analysis of “the differences separating screen and classroom as spaces for pedagogy” (p. 15). At stake here is not a plea against or for online learning but the development of “an experientially attuned vocabulary,” in order to offer an accurate picture of the lived experiences of teaching and learning online and offline. Defying much of the mainstream research regarding digitization, which is almost exclusively concerned with how the use of traditional and digital media affects study performance and learning outcomes, Friesen’s goal is to flesh out what it means to be a student, to be a teacher, and to be together (to share experiences and meanings) in both conditions. As such he is describing things which we can all recognize ourselves, but in a more structured way than we usually do. More exactly he analyzes teaching and learning according to the four basic dimensions (or existentials) that structure lived reality: “lived time, lived space, lived body, lived relation[ality]” (p. 25).

The Constitutive Role of Digital Technologies for Humanity

Next to challenging a normative take on the digital in education, recent (post)phenomenological work has also addressed other assumptions which are implicit to the account sketched in the first section, viz., that technology is only a phenomenon of a recent date and that digitization is the paramount exemplification of the recent tendency of relying too much on technology. Over and against this, it could be argued, from a (post)phenomenological point of view, that technology has a much longer history and that our very humanity has actually always been dependent upon the uses of technologies. This follows from

Bernard Stiegler’s (1998) reinterpretation of Husserl’s analysis of the constitution of time consciousness and the role of memory. Whereas Husserl only discriminates between primary retention (actually sensed experience) and secondary retention (past experiences that are not directly accessible, but which co-constitute the meaning of our actual experiences), Stiegler shows that Husserl omits to take into account the most important constitutive dimension of memory: the technological tools we rely on – which he calls tertiary retentions (e.g., carving a date on the wall of a monument or writing a diary entry). The idea here is that it is only thanks to the existence of external memories that human beings have something they can properly call memory in the first place. Technological memory is not an exteriorization of the conscious faculty of memory; it is exactly the other way around.

Therefore, our reliance on digital technologies is not a recent or exceptional phenomenon. Rather, our very constitution as human beings (and the very possibility of conscious phenomena) is dependent upon the use technological prostheses. In that sense digital media are less a “new” phenomenon than often taken for granted. They are merely the latest version of the technologies without which a human life is inconceivable. Moreover, this view entails that the word technology refers to much more than to mechanic, electronic, or digital devices alone. Instead, it concerns *all* tools and supports we rely on to lead a human life. An electric drill is as much a technology as a prehistoric stone axe is, and the same goes for chalkboarding *and* PowerPoint. Also, technology has not merely to do with the *instruments* we use but also with the *use itself* in a practical, material, and bodily sense, i.e., with the gestures and disciplines required to work with particular technologies (Stiegler 1998). It is here that education plays a crucial role, as it is the place where we get acquainted with the basic grammar of the operations necessary to master the culturally dominant technology – be it reading and writing in a traditional or in a digital way (cf. Vlieghe 2015). As Norm Friesen (2011) has argued, even though there exist marked differences (e.g., the inevitability of the play of

concealing and disclosing that goes together with the body that *cannot not* talk in the classroom), there are also important similarities between classroom and educational on-screen activities. Both demand the development of habits, an inflexible bodily discipline, and a “regimentation of time, space and the body” (p. 81). Over and against the prejudice that we leave our bodies behind when sitting in front of a screen, engaging with digital media should be considered as being as much a physical engagement as using traditional media is. And so, in order to understand what it means to teach and learn off- and online, we first and foremost need to concentrate on how we come to embody particular technologies (cf. Dall’Alba and Barnacle 2005).

On this point a fruitful dialogue has been opened between (post)phenomenologists and media theoretical approaches. According to these last approaches (developed in the wake of McLuhan and the Toronto School of Communication and more recently in Germany as media ecology), communicating our feelings and ideas is not only dependent upon technological infrastructure but profoundly influenced by it (i.e., the medium is the message). Media theorists have been especially interested in differences between pre-digital and digital writing and reading technologies. In this regard the recently translated work of Vilem Flusser deserves to be mentioned (e.g., Flusser 2011). Drawing from both phenomenological description of experience and the analysis of features of the material infrastructure we rely on, Flusser argues that there are marked differences between alphabetic and nonalphabetic writing systems, as well as between picture-based, text-based, and computer-based forms of communication: each media technology goes together with a substantially different experiential realm. Flusser goes so far as to claim that our capacity for logical thought and our sense of historical progress are predicated upon the characteristics of (alphabetic) writing. This particular form of writing presupposes a particular repertoire of bodily gestures which support a one-dimensional, *linear* form of thought (alphabetic writing goes in one predefined direction without any possibility of returning), which is opposed to the

two-dimensional form and much less inflexible form of thought which is related to image-based scripts such as ideographic writing systems. Most prophetically, but without making normative commitments *à la* Heidegger, he argues that we are gradually shifting toward a new era, in which our experience of the world is mediated by computer images rather than alphabet-based texts. This will introduce a new, zero-dimensional style of thought (a form of thought which is akin to the computational force of computers) (Ibid.).

The Digital and the Human Body

As noted, a major consequence of the work discussed above is that the often heard claim that digitization implies disembodiment is misguided. A full phenomenological account of digital education requires attention for the body, even if the body is engaged in different ways in digital teaching and learning than it is in the classroom. Taking the human subject as external to the technologies she counts on is not an accurate starting point for understanding the digital (or for that matter for coming to grips with the role of any educational technology, as the example of the gesture of writing illustrates). Rather, as Don Ihde (2002) – one of today’s most renowned phenomenologists of technology, proposes, we should ground phenomenological analysis on human-technology relations (meaning that this relation is as important as the intentional subject-world relation in Husserlian phenomenology). Over and against the technological determinist reading of Heidegger sketched above, Ihde (Ibid.) claims that this positive reading of what (digital) technologies allow for is already (implicitly) present in Heidegger’s prioritizing the practical relation which we entertain with our world when analyzing the proper characteristics of human existence.

Drawing from Ihde and Levinas, Gallit Wellner (2014) argues that we should understand the human-digital technology relationship in terms of the *screen*. Digital media don’t accidentally have screens. Rather, they are defined by having a screen. Moreover, digital media appear as

closely intertwined with our own bodies, in the sense that they address us as a face (or, more exactly, as a quasi-face as Wellner wants it). For instance, “[t]he screen of the cell phone, like a facade of a home, represents an exteriority which hides an interiority. The screen acts like a face that requires a response . . .” (Ibid., p. 311). Therefore, in order to understand our rapports to the digital, we need to take into consideration bodily and emotional qualities that relate to the screen which always appears as something other (alterity) in the strong meaning of that word.

This sense of alterity inherent to screens might be disputed by turning once more to Friesen’s (2011) analysis of experiential differences between classroom and online education. To give only one example, Friesen draws attention to how the experience of silence (e.g., occurring between two students collaborating on a project) is totally opposed on- and offline. Whereas the meaning of silence in the classroom is always constituted by the bodily presence of others and the surroundings one happens to find oneself in, silence experienced online is always linked to the physical distance between those who fall silent. In the first case, the meaning of this silence might be drawn from the other’s body language or her gazing at a salient thing in the surrounding (which might be expressive of heightened attention or boredom). In the second case, however, the other’s silence might mean that the other is no longer communicating (as she is presumably checking up her Facebook account).

This last example illustrates how difficult it is to get away from the normative and technological determinist assumptions discussed above. Although the last analysis gives a rich and detailed account of the phenomenon of silence under both conditions, and although it takes into account the embodiment of both online and offline learners, it also tends to reinforce the idea that the technology in question fully settles what is and what is not possible under digital conditions (techno-determinism), and it tends to frame the digital in a judgmental way, opposing the flat space of the screen to the living place of the classroom – which seems by and large preferable (normative stance). This will probably remain a pitfall and an ever

present challenge to any future phenomenological investigation into the meaning of digital media for education.

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Phenomenology of Ethics and Aesthetics

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Synonyms

Aesthetics; Ethical relation; Ethics; Intersubjectivity; Sense perception; Sensuous, The

Introduction

In education, ethics and aesthetics are more commonly regarded as subject matter to be taught than as essential features of the field. Ethics in education may be conceived as students' moral education, whether defined secularly or religiously, values to be taught to students and embodied by educators. Aesthetics, in turn, is largely understood as part of the arts' curriculum; although, in rarer cases, it may be associated with the pleasing (or perhaps not-so-pleasing) physical building in which teaching takes place.

When we consider how education is experienced, however – the curriculum *as lived*, as opposed to the curriculum *as plan* (Aoki 2005) – we discover that education itself has important ethical and aesthetic dimensions. Whether one is an educator or a student, one's everyday experience of education contains fundamental ethical and aesthetic components that are often overlooked, unseen, or taken for granted in our classrooms and our everyday educator–student interactions. These integral dimensions, however, can be revealed when education is considered from a phenomenological perspective.

This entry begins by reviewing the major phenomenological understandings of ethics and aesthetics. We see how, despite common understandings, neither are principles or ideals we employ. Rather, both ethics and aesthetics are relational experiences, arising through simple yet deeply meaningful encounters we have with our world. This entry then considers how the phenomenology of ethics and aesthetics manifests uniquely within the educational sphere, providing shape and depth of meaning to our encounters.

The Phenomenology of Ethics

Ethics is the study of how one should live: what makes life worth living, what principles or beliefs should guide one's life, how these ideas are established and enacted, and upon what basis they are developed. For phenomenological philosophers, however, to understand ethics is not to examine it as a set of abstract principles or

rules that we follow, but rather as something that arises within and becomes manifest through everyday human life. The phenomenology of ethics, then, is a close study of how we live well with others in our world. Specifically, phenomenologists seek to identify those experiences and their meaning that underpin *eudaimonia* or *the good life*.

From a phenomenological perspective, ethics is understood as being rooted in our interpersonal relations and intersubjectivity. The most basic relation that we enter into is with another person. This original ethical experience – encountering another – serves as the foundation for all other dimensions of ethics, including the development of ethical principles and systems. The first phenomenological philosopher to articulate this position was Emmanuel Levinas. Indeed, one might say that the phenomenology of ethics is first and foremost a Levinasian phenomenology. This is not to claim that other phenomenologists have not offered other phenomenologies of ethics, only that the majority of subsequent ethical investigations are deeply indebted to Levinas' ideas.

Responding to and seeking an alternative to Heidegger's ontology, Levinas demonstrates that there is a profoundly ethical basis to human existence that arises from our first and most simple encounter with another human being: the instant of seeing the other's face. For Levinas, this moment is our most fundamental ethical experience. It is ethics, as well as the origin of subjectivity and intersubjectivity. It is also where all philosophy must begin.

According to Levinas (1968, 1985), when we see the face of the other, we respond to it immediately because it demands and commands us to. We respond to it – and its injunction not to harm the other, but to defend and protect him or her – before we can think or stop ourselves. And in this immediate, spontaneous response, we experience responsibility for the other. It is a response driven by the naked vulnerability of the other's face and the power it holds over us. In looking upon the other's visage, we do not see the face's physical features but the being embodied there. And in that face, we do not see another like ourselves, but an other, someone who is

wholly different to us. The other's face challenges us because of its difference, and, in that difference, it signifies, it "speaks." This signification is, for Levinas, the origin of discourse, communication, and community. Moreover, in placing us in relation to and responsibility for the other, it also calls forth an awareness of ourselves, our subjectivity, our humanity, and our being in relation to others in the world. Importantly, however, our response to and the responsibility we experience for the other are unidirectional. Our response and responsibility are not dependent on a similar response and responsibility being returned to us. Although directly emergent from our experience of interrelation, our response – and by extension, our experience of ethics – is initially singularly ours.

Many phenomenologists have expanded upon Levinas' phenomenology of the face, including Edward Casey, Alphonso Lingis, Ian Thomson, and Max van Manen. From Levinas' ethics, it can be established how certain actions – such as glances, touches, or inaction – have an ethical character. We can also articulate how what we see when we look upon another – the original ethical act – draws forth an awareness of ourselves as ethical beings and of our world as having ethical (or unethical) features. It further opens up an understanding of how our initial perception and what we perceive has the capacity to change who and how we are in the world. Quite simply, Levinas' phenomenology of the face allows for the articulation of the ethics of looking, seeing, being seen, being unseen, and responsibility. It also makes possible explorations of the complexity of ethics within particular environments, such as education or health care. Ethics, Levinas shows us, is intimately intertwined with human relationality. It emerges in our relations with other people, with others in a community, with those like us and those unlike us, and even with animals, things, the natural environment, and our world as a whole.

The Phenomenology of Aesthetics

Like the phenomenology of ethics, the phenomenology of aesthetics has a relatively clear and

specific foundation. Although phenomenological philosophers since Husserl have used art to gain insight into phenomena – such as Merleau-Ponty's study of Cezanne's paintings or Heidegger's exploration of van Gogh's painting of shoes – few have undertaken a rigorous and systematic phenomenology of aesthetics. It seems that the experience that historically was associated with the arts and, in particular, with the beautiful proves a challenge to the phenomenological project. And yet, when attempted, such a phenomenology provides unique insights into the affective domain of life.

To fully understand the phenomenology of aesthetics, we must understand how the term has changed over time. Traditionally, aesthetics was conceived as the experience of the beautiful in the arts. In the modern period, however, the concept expanded to include the experience of anything beautiful (such as people, places, or things). In recent years, aesthetics has undergone yet another, more radical transformation to include negative affective dimensions of existence, coming to reflect more accurately the term's etymological root as being "sense perception."

Early phenomenologies of aesthetics, not unexpectedly, approached it solely as arising through beautiful artworks. These studies initially struggled with the challenge of understanding the experience of art as being more than mere representation. The first to do so was Roman Ingarden (1961, 1973a, b), who posited that the artwork (for him, the literary work) is a being in itself, which is composed of strata that are experienced by its audience. Combined, the strata create the entity of the work, but each layer carries its own value and unique aesthetic qualities. Meaning arises in the encounter between the audience and the strata within the art object. While human consciousness is required for the experience of the strata, Ingarden insists that consciousness itself is not the creative force in the encounter; such force resides in the object. What is "cocreated," however, is the object as a work of art; that is, as an aesthetic object.

Building upon Ingarden's understanding, Mikel Dufrennes (1973) provides the first comprehensive phenomenological analysis of the arts.

According to Dufrennes, to understand the art object, one needs to account for it within a lived world. Like his predecessor, Dufrennes differentiates between the art object, which may be encountered in various ways, and the aesthetic object, which is “the work of art perceived for its own sake” (1973, p. 16). Unlike Ingarden, however, Dufrennes’ phenomenology is not limited to viewer and viewed, reader and text. It also recognizes the history and location of the work, as well as the influence of the artist. Indeed, Dufrennes claims that, in our experience of an aesthetic object, the creator becomes manifest in the work as a “quasi-subject.” At play in any encounter, then, is the creator, the created object, and the audience member or viewer within the lived world.

According to Dufrennes, in the relation between the audience and the art object, the aesthetic object emerges. The viewer/audience “responds to the subjectivity of the work through his own subjectivity” (1973, p. 198). In much the same way that ethics arises in the relation between beings, aesthetics emerges in the deep and sensuous bond that forms between the audience and the artwork (specifically the artwork that contains both its object-specific qualities and that manifests its creator). However, where the ethical relation is understood as fully manifesting instantaneously before we can stop it, the aesthetic relation begins from the first encounter but may build and continue to expand over time. For Dufrennes, aesthetic experience fully manifests as *expression*: affective qualities that form the identity of the aesthetic object over time and that increase and grow with extended reflection. It is expression that gives the object subjecthood as an aesthetic object revealing a fundamental truth.

Although having limited their analysis to art, Dufrenne’s and Ingarden’s phenomenologies form the foundation necessary for conceiving of aesthetics more broadly as the affective, sensuous qualities of phenomena. Indeed, many phenomenological philosophers, both past and present, have demonstrated how the aesthetic dimension of phenomena can reveal truths of our world and serve to supplement more traditional phenomenologies. For instance, Gaston Bachelard’s

various considerations of things like nests, drawers, burning candles, embers, and childhood dreams – studies undertaken using the terms “poetics” and reveries – demonstrate how the aesthetic dimension of these small, simple experiences are deeply bound to the larger meaning of human life. Likewise, Roland Barthes’ phenomenology of photography (1981) shows how the meaning of photography is not found in its objective, identifiable qualities – whether the common *studium* or the more rare *punctum* – but in what truth of its subject a particular image reveals aesthetically to the viewer.

In recent years, phenomenologists have grappled to articulate a new language to account for this expanded understanding of aesthetics. Michel Henry (2008) posits the affectivity of life (i.e., the feeling of being alive, every instant of every day) to be the proper ground of all experience and any philosophical study. He calls this affectivity *pathos*. Adopting a more limited scope, Arnold Berleant (2010) introduces the notion of *negative aesthetics* to complement the traditional positive aesthetics. Like Henry, however, Berleant argues there is an aesthetic dimension to more than just artworks and landscape. It is found in much of life, including urban spaces, social and political action, and even terrorism. In our experiences of various nontraditional aesthetics, Berleant argues there is evidence of a direct connection between aesthetics and ethics: the former often immediately and bodily identifies the latter.

The Phenomenology of Ethics and Aesthetics in Education

Although highly abstract when considered philosophically, the phenomenologies of aesthetics and ethics in education are poignantly revealed in simple, everyday interactions between teachers and students: in the glances and nods, the small words of praise or censure, or things like notes written on assignments. In fact, we can find the richest demonstrations of the ethical and aesthetic components of education in those moments that often go unrecognized by one or both parties or are immediately forgotten.

In education, we generally accept that *how* a teacher does something is as important as what they do; the *how* of education can have profound impact. A single glance can recognize someone in his or her singularity or leave the student feeling overlooked and alone. As Max van Manen's ongoing phenomenological studies of education reveal, small things like the teacher's tone, tact, or even the ability to remember a student's name carry great meaning. Speaking kindly when a student needs it, not calling upon a student at a particular moment, or correctly pronouncing a student's name are all ethical acts. Ethics arises in those momentary interactions; it emerges within the pedagogical relation. The actions may be immediately recognized as ethical or, more likely, go unnoticed, but they each originate from an authentic encounter with the other, the Levinasian response to the face. In encountering his or her student, the teacher has already responded and taken responsibility for that student, even before the teacher chooses to act in a particular way.

Van Manen draws upon the tradition of the Utrecht school and continental pedagogical philosophy, which have long recognized pedagogy as being inherently ethical. These pedagogical moments, however, contain equally important, but less acknowledged, aesthetic components. Students bodily and sensuously experience a teacher's tact or tone or thoughtlessness. These therefore have innate aesthetic components. The aesthetics of the act give shape, form, and feeling to the encounter. We need only think of those moments where someone apparently says a kind word, but it is insincere. We do not believe them for what we feel belies their words. And yet, we only know the insincerity through what is felt. Similarly, a well-placed nod from an adult can carry volumes of meaning to a youth, much more than could be said or explained, and such an act may be remembered by the individual years later. As Berleant and others note, we often immediately identify that which is ethical or unethical in our world by how it makes us feel.

The aesthetic dimension of education can be found in the affective qualities of these single

pedagogical moments, but it is also evident in the larger project, as is ethics. The German pedagogue Klaus Mollenhauer (2014) describes how *presentation*, what "ways of life" adults present to children (i.e., what we portray to children as we live with them), and *representation*, what cultural materials are given to a child (i.e., the formal visual and textual educational materials), are equally important in modern pedagogy. The worlds to which children and youth are exposed help shape them and will have both immediate and latent effects. That which appeals and inheres in children, the "pedagogical call," is likewise both ethical and aesthetic. Manifestations of pedagogical relationality, ethics, and aesthetics are intimately intertwined.

Conclusion

Phenomenology provides us with an opportunity to understand that ethics and aesthetics are not abstract values from a bygone era that have resulted in arbitrary social rules we follow but fundamental components of being human and being human in a world with others. As relational phenomena, they both manifest in the encounter *between* one being and another. The phenomenologies of ethics and aesthetics show us that, in addition to being relational beings, humans are intertwined with our world and one another. Moreover, we see upon close inspection how the two – lived ethics and lived aesthetics – are intimately connected. They shape and inform one another. When considered in the context of education, the phenomenologies of ethics and aesthetics play important roles in revealing the depth of meaning found in everyday educational encounters. Through their light, we may begin to perceive the rich nature of contemporary pedagogy.

Cross-References

- [Epistemology and Educational Administration](#)
- [Heidegger and Wonder](#)

- ▶ Phenomenological Theory of *Bildung* and Education
- ▶ Phenomenology in Education
- ▶ Phenomenology of Higher Education
- ▶ Phenomenology of Movement and Place
- ▶ Phenomenology of the Adult-Child Relation
- ▶ Phenomenology, Education, and the More-Than-Human World
- ▶ Phenomenology, Language, and the Unspoken: The Preverbal Dimension of Children's Experience

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Phenomenology of Higher Education

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Synonyms

Aletheia; College; *Gestell*; Graduate; Heidegger; Higher education; Knowledge; Learning; Levinas; Merleau-Ponty; Ontology; Pedagogy; Postgraduate; Teaching; Technology; Truth; Undergraduate; University

Introduction

In the field of higher education, until quite recently, there has been relatively little explicit attention to insights that can be gained through phenomenology. Even the recent interest can be seen as modest, when compared with the potential for phenomenological perspectives on higher education to inform practice, policy, and research. An increasing interest suggests phenomenology may resonate at a time when higher education is increasingly falling under the influence of a pervasive neoliberal agenda, with its emphasis on accountability and performativity. This instrumental agenda is evident in an overemphasis on reducing complex phenomena related to teaching and learning to readily measureable quantities, as well as in widespread, empty rhetoric about “excellence,” and “world class standards.” An agenda such as this risks promoting superficial compliance – or falling in – with how one is expected to “play the game,” whether as teacher or learner. It creates a distance from who is learning, what is actually being learned, and the mutual responsibilities of students and higher education institutions for enhancing this learning.

Such an agenda contrasts starkly with insights from phenomenology into educating students in higher education, which point to alternative ways forward. In recent years, significant insights have

been gained through phenomenology for educating students during undergraduate and (post)graduate programs offered by higher education institutions, such as universities, colleges, and institutes of technology, or equivalent. In particular, the work of existential phenomenologists – especially Martin Heidegger, but also Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Emmanuel Levinas – has contributed to re-thinking common conceptualizations of what it means to educate in higher education. In so doing, they provide inspiration for addressing challenges facing contemporary higher education, while reminding us that the current reality is not the only one possible.

The focus in what follows is a sketch of some of the insights and influences from phenomenology that are informing current issues related to educating students in higher education. Issues in educating students have featured prominently among those explored with inspiration from phenomenology. Following a brief introduction to some key ideas from Heidegger's work on higher education, several ways in which phenomenology challenges us to re-think higher education and its common practices are outlined below.

Re-thinking Higher Education on Ontological Grounds

Arguably, to date, the potential for insights through phenomenology to inform higher education has been made most apparent by Martin Heidegger, with several others taking inspiration from his work. Among the broad range of topics he tackled, Heidegger lectured and wrote about teaching and learning in higher education, as well as about the role higher education can play in society. An account of phenomenological perspectives on higher education would be incomplete without acknowledging his substantial contributions and continuing influence. Regarding himself primarily as a teacher, Heidegger considered he had devoted his life to higher education. It is perhaps through his idealized vision of reforming the university as a means of nation building that Heidegger fell prey to Germany's National Socialism. Like much of the

German populace, Heidegger later attempted to downplay his links to Nazi ideology and failure to speak out against the Holocaust, although this did not avert a ban that prevented him from teaching in Germany between 1945 and 1949.

In line with Heidegger's broader interest in inquiring into the meaning of being, he sought to re-think education on ontological grounds. In other words, he gave careful thought to what education would entail if it were to enhance our capacity to become and to be more fully human. Indeed, this is a recurring theme in several of his works. More particularly, many of Heidegger's lectures and other texts are pedagogical in both approach and intent. Through his way of inquiring, Heidegger sought to redirect attention to what addresses or concerns us in our living among others and things. He saw potential in education for recovering attentiveness to what matters for us, as human beings in our becoming.

Heidegger's ontological interest places him at odds with much of the extant higher education literature, with its concern with structures in the "mind" that are to correctly represent a world "outside." He considered that truth was not to be found in such representationalism, so this was not a fitting goal for higher education. Instead, he described truth as *aletheia* or phenomenological unhiddenness. Differently expressed, he saw truth as world disclosure, with education offering a means to this form of truth. Truth as world disclosure is conditional upon continual striving for attentiveness and responsiveness to others and things in our dynamic and changing world. This means efforts toward achieving truth would inevitably always be incomplete.

The way in which Heidegger conceptualized learning is itself imbued with this attentiveness and responsiveness. For Heidegger, "to learn means to make everything we do answer to whatever essentials address themselves to us at a given time" (1968, p. 14). This notion of learning cannot be reduced to receiving or acquiring correct knowledge or to engaging in activity with an expectation of procuring something. Instead, it includes both attuning and responding to what is central in what addresses us. If learning is to attune and enable us to respond to what matters

to us in our living, then education has a key part to play in transforming our ways of being in a manner that is directed to others and things in our world. Iain Thomson argues that the transformation or “turning around” advocated by Heidegger occurs “by turning us away from the world in which we are most immediately immersed, then by turning us back to this world in a more reflexive way” (2001, p. 254).

Consistent with this notion of learning that transforms, Heidegger regarded teaching neither as filling students with knowledge as though they were empty vessels nor demonstrating how to uncritically become (like) their teacher. On the contrary, while he considered teaching to be exalted and highly worthy, he emphasized that it was not the teacher or course content that should be in focus, in themselves, but creating space and opportunities that enable students to learn: “Teaching is more difficult than learning because what teaching calls for is this: to let learn” (Heidegger 1968, p. 15).

Heidegger’s conceptualizations of learning and teaching have provoked re-thinking of a prevalent preoccupation in higher education with knowledge acquisition and its application, as well as an associated privileging of the intellect. His conceptualizations prompt us to place emphasis, rather, on integrating knowing, acting, and being through higher education programs (Dall’Alba and Barnacle 2007). These programs have a crucial contribution to make toward enabling students to integrate what they know and can do with how they are learning to be. Redirecting attention from knowledge as an end in itself highlights the potential of higher education to open possibilities for being and becoming how one strives to be among others and things.

Technologizing Higher Education

One of the developments that Heidegger regarded as posing serious questions for our being was the rapid uptake of newer technologies. Similar to other spheres of life, newer digital technologies for communicating and accessing information have become ubiquitous in higher education,

especially in wealthy countries. Educational offerings in online environments involving these technologies are a trend likely to continue. These newer digital technologies – regularly superseded by more novel newcomers – have become a persistent presence in many higher education institutions. These technologies can offer benefits that include increased flexibility in accessing course and support materials, allowing communication among people who are geographically dispersed and improved access to higher education for those with some disabilities. At the same time, the frequent development of newer digital technologies and the presumption they are indicative of innovative, cutting edge programs carries a risk of compulsion to use them in courses. This compulsion is evident, including at institution level, often with limited thought about whether or how these technologies contribute pedagogically to student learning. At times, there is a view that technologies can replace teachers to improve the budget bottom line, typically with little account of the actual costs, either financial or to the persons involved.

This approach to the use of technologies exemplifies a broader concern expressed by Heidegger, which is not limited to employing particular technologies. He argued that technology is not merely a neutral means to an end; not simply a tool we employ for specific purposes. In higher education settings, this can mean we do not simply make use of technologies, but we can be set upon in our use of them. Similarly, but more paradoxically, Heidegger claimed the essence of technology is not anything technological. Instead, he saw technology as a “way of revealing.” In our highly technologized world, the particular way of revealing he identified frames human beings and nature as resources, ready and waiting to be exploited, what he referred to as “standing reserve” (1993/1954, p. 322). He named this calculative, technological rationality *Ge-stell* or enframing (p. 324). When teachers and students are ordered as standing reserve for the purposes of attaining targets on courses employing newer technologies, monitoring throughput in course completions, or ranking institutions across diverse settings, enframing is apparent.

Heidegger's notion of technological framing opens a range of avenues for re-thinking higher education in our technologized world. As Paul Gibbs (2010) points out, the extensive massification of higher education we have witnessed in recent decades in many countries carries with it a risk of embracing and encouraging a technological, calculative way of being toward others and the natural world. This is because a focus on mass education can distract us from education that directs attention to responding to the uniqueness of particular situations. This, in turn, risks promoting an inauthentic, dispersed self who lacks commitment to being and becoming among others. Gibbs argues, like Thomson (2001), that higher education has a key part to play in fostering critical awareness of a technological way of being. This awareness is necessary for taking a resolute stance on our becoming, in a world among others.

The notion of technological framing also provides a starting point as Kevin Flint and Adam Barnard (2010) explore the shaping of the self that occurs in a professional doctorate program. They inquire into ways in which discursive technologies operating within an academic institution can limit opportunities for personal development within the doctorate. They use this inquiry to explore spaces for personal development through research in shaping multiple selves among doctoral researchers.

Re-thinking Teaching and Learning Practices in Higher Education

Phenomenology also provides inspiration and insights for exploring common teaching and learning practices in higher education settings. In the higher education literature, the part that assessment plays in directing student learning has been highlighted. Arguments have been made in favor of assessment of student learning that links to the world beyond educational institutions, as well as incorporating online forms of assessment to improve their contemporary relevance. While these arguments can be seen to have some merit, they typically feature the attributes

and design of assessment tasks. In so doing, they downplay the learning or, more specifically, the transformation in ways of being in the world, which assessment has the potential to encourage (Vu and Dall'Alba 2014). Beyond assessing student achievement, assessment tasks can direct students' efforts in integrating what they know and how they act into forming who they are becoming.

Another common practice in higher education settings is discussions between teachers and students for pedagogical purposes. Teachers can approach these interactions as a means of meeting obligations to students or, in other words, fulfilling contractual requirements. Amanda Fulford (*in press*) points out that this approach reduces teaching to a closed exchange between teachers and students, such as providing and receiving course content. She demonstrates this is an impoverished conceptualization of teaching that does not have student learning as its focus. It also fails to take account of the centrality of relationships among teachers and students to the pedagogical encounter and the learning that can be promoted (Giles et al. 2012).

In a manner reminiscent of Heidegger's critique of commodity exchange in educational settings, Fulford (*in press*) argues that limited exchange of this kind lacks spontaneity and openness to the unexpected, which enable learning. This requires a way of being with students and developing sensibilities that are attuned to reading the relationship and acting in the moment, in ways that encourage learning (Giles et al. 2012). Drawing on Levinas' notion of encountering the Other, such as through another person or ideas, Fulford points to ways in which teaching can open spaces and possibilities for enabling such encounters, in ways that take seriously responsibility for the Other in higher education settings.

Embodying Learning

A further way in which phenomenology informs efforts to re-think teaching and learning practices in higher education is by challenging a preoccupation with developing the intellect, through

highlighting the inescapably embodied way in which we live and make our way in the world. Although not specifically directed to educational settings, Maurice Merleau-Ponty's concept of the "lived body" serves as a source of ideas for exploring alternatives to an emphasis on reason and the intellect. In higher education, where intellectual development often reigns supreme and online environments tend to be associated with innovation, critical analyses of the ways in which our learning and being-in-the-world are necessarily embodied are timely.

Given a preoccupation with the intellect in higher education, the broad array of varied bodies who study and move about in these settings can go largely unnoticed in the research literature. In a study exploring the experiences of mature age students from working class backgrounds in a number of British universities, Serena Bufton (2003) describes how their embodiment intrudes into their efforts to learn and belong in this unfamiliar environment. She points to ways in which nature and culture intersect in the body, as Merleau-Ponty noted and Pierre Bourdieu subsequently elaborated in his notion of "habitus." Bufton outlines how these students experienced a lack of "fit" between the institutional habitus and their own local accents, cultural values, life experiences, and way of speaking and seeing the world. Her study draws attention to a potential blind spot in higher education institutions, where knowledge can be attributed an illusory neutral status.

An additional phenomenological exploration of embodiment builds on Merleau-Ponty's argument that embodied being in the world is a precondition for conceptual understanding. Robyn Barnacle (2009) draws on several phenomenological and feminist scholars in re-thinking mind-body relations in higher education. Taking the example of the role of the gut in emotional responses and mood – recognized in expressions such as gut reaction and gut instinct – she points to inadequacies of the intellect alone for learning. Against the background of her analyses and those of others, Barnacle explores the potential of harnessing sensibility in conjunction with intellect for learning in higher education. She argues

that a key purpose of curricula is to promote a sensibility among students for the way in which particular fields or disciplines engage with the world. This is inevitably an embodied understanding.

Conclusion

This outline has sketched some of the rich and varied ways in which phenomenology is serving to inform questions related to educating students in higher education. As noted in the introduction, interest in phenomenology in the field of higher education, although modest to date, shows signs of expanding. The outline above indicates there is considerable scope for interrogating current issues in higher education through a phenomenological way of inquiring that endeavors to return anew "to the things themselves." This scope extends, of course, well beyond the sketch given here. Phenomenological inquiry allows us to turn back to the world of higher education, with its challenges, possibilities and contradictions, in a more reflexive way. Sharpening such attunement to the lifeworld – our inevitable entwinement with others and things in our living – carries a promise of enabling us to become more fully human. Higher education has a key part to play in directing efforts towards achieving this aspiration.

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Phenomenology of Inclusion, Belonging, and Language

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Synonyms

Language as “house of Being”; Phenomenology; Phenomenology of language; Phenomenon of childhood migration; Play and belonging; Play and language; School and inclusion

Introduction

More than 230 million people, 20% of them young children, live in countries in which they were not born. When children migrate, a sudden change occurs in their lifeworlds that is not of their making; instead, the experience “befalls [them], strikes [them], comes over [them], overwhelms and transforms [them]” (Heidegger 1982, p. 57). This essay explores the phenomena of belonging, language, and inclusion in the lived experiences of young children whose childhood has been interrupted by migration. The

phenomenological inquiry is based on Heidegger’s (1982) notion of language as the “house of Being.” It is guided by the following questions: What is the lived experience of a child whose life is interrupted by migration and whose home is replaced by a space in which to live, where a new language is spoken that does not serve as a guide to the world? What is it like to live in-between languages and cultures? How does a child experience school as a stranger in a world of others? Can the experience of loss of words serve as a means to attain new understandings?

The essay begins by considering the possibilities opened by the phenomenological method – and, in particular, van Manen’s (1994) “fundamental existentials” – to understand children’s lived experiences. It explores how immigrant children experience these existentials in relation to the objects and people at home, to their unfolding sense of self and the meaning of belonging to a place, and to the changes in their lived space brought about by the process of migration. Following Heidegger’s (1982) notion of language as the “house of Being,” it then reflects on the meaning of “being in the Other’s house” as explored through immigrant children’s experiences of school, their loneliness and isolation from their peers, and their inability to make themselves understood through language. Play as a shared experience in childhood is investigated in relation to young children’s ability to engage with the world and others linguistically and non-linguistically. Play as an experience of being with others allows young immigrant children to live between languages as well as to develop their relation to the language of home and the home of language.

The Structure of Human Experiences

Phenomenological research of children’s experiences aims to clarify, describe, and interpret children’s unique ways of attending to the world. As a human science research methodology, phenomenology provides a particularly suitable paradigm for studying the phenomena of belonging,

language, and inclusion in immigrant children's lives because it is concerned with questions of meaning with the goal of understanding the significance of a given human experience.

According to van Manen (1994), the structure of any human experience can be revealed by reflecting on that experience while guided by four existentials by which human beings experience the world: lived space, lived body, lived time, and lived other. In a general sense, *lived space* refers to the physical environment or landscape in which we find ourselves. *Lived body* acknowledges that we are always physically in the world, and our bodies reveal some aspects of ourselves in a particular situation. *Lived time* is subjective time as opposed to objective or clock time. Time is experienced differently depending on the context in which we experience it. The *lived other* is the relationship we have with others in the interpersonal space we share with them.

The exploration of the ways in which these existentials are experienced by immigrant children allows for an understanding of the phenomena of belonging, language, inclusion, and the pedagogical possibilities such an understanding offers (Kirova 2007).

Home, Self, and the House of Being

Home is intimately tied with one's sense of self; it is where our own being finds its genesis and belonging. As Steinbock (1995) asserts, "the homeworld is not just any world, but selectively appropriated with the density of a tradition. It is not the world we experience, but the world *from which* we experience" (Steinbock 1995, p. 222, original emphasis). The walls of the home form a boundary between inner and outer, private and public, space. One rarely thinks of a home in terms of its walls, however. Rather, the objects inside the house create a feeling of at-homeness because the use of the everyday objects in the home is habitual. Children do not question the presence of these objects: they are taken for granted.

The first and most noticeable change in an immigrant child's lifeworld is the change in their

physical surroundings brought by the loss of the familiar world of home (Kirova 2007). For many children, migration means losing the familiar objects inside their home. Yet familiar objects alone do not create a sense of at-homeness; the same objects may be experienced differently in a new space. In order for an object to become part of our home, our bodies need to "know" it in relation to other objects as we inhabit the space at home. Only then does home become a place where our own being finds its genesis and belonging.

A child's sense of at-homeness is also connected to the people who share the space at home. These people, usually the child's parents, siblings, and other members of the family, are those who have shown the child what the objects in the home are and how they are used and cared for. Thus one's identity is shaped at home by the way in which the objects in the home are presented and understood. A child understands that "something *is* only where the appropriate and therefore competent word names a thing as being, and so establishes the given being as a being" (Heidegger 1982, p. 63). Home, then, is where language gives being to the things in the world.

For an immigrant child, everything inside the new home *is* because it has been appropriately and competently named in the child's mother tongue. However, in the world outside the new home, things remain nameless because other people's words are not understood. What is the child's experience of a world where language no longer shows the essential being of things? How is reality conceived in a new language?

Being at School Is Being in the Other's "House"

Immigrant children no longer belong to the world they left behind, nor do they yet belong to the new world. School is where children encounter the world outside of home. And, while going to school is only a fraction of immigrant children's new existence, it plays a central role in their understanding of the world. At school, children are asked to relate to each other and the adults in a

particular rule-governed manner that is fundamentally different from their experiences at home. In contrast to the home, in school a child is asked to become one of a type: a student who is expected to have the same kind of relationship with each teacher based on designated school rules. These rules are abstractions sustained by the school/classroom community and the requirement that students relate to the world in another way, that is, by mastering symbolic forms (e.g., the alphabet, numbers, musical notes) that represent their knowledge and relationship to the self, others, and the world around them. Thus school not only necessitates an ontological change in children, it also imposes a particular (scientific) epistemological construction of their knowledge of and about the world understood through symbols, among which language plays a prominent role.

If the being of anything that exists resides in the word that names it and if language, as a result, is the house of Being, as Heidegger (1982) suggests, then immigrant children's inability to name things in the new world of school is more than an inconvenience. Words achieve their meaning not just from the things they refer to but from associations created in the mind. The lack of these associations and of a common language creates a real barrier between immigrant children and the rest of the people in the school. With no friends and no way of making themselves understood through language, a child feels lonely (Kirova-Petrova 2000). The feelings of loneliness and isolation that immigrant children experience also affect how they experience time while they are at school. Time is experienced as being stretched out (Kirova 2001). As an observer rather than a participant in the life of school, an immigrant child finds school days long and boring. Not being at ease in the new language means, for immigrant children, among many other things, being unable to share humor with their peers. Sharing humor creates a sense of *we-ness* only if a joke is understood. A meeting ground for *we-ness* to happen is rooted in both experience and language and thus is inaccessible to an immigrant child. Laughter becomes a performance for

immigrant children, a way to show others that they too are part of the group. However, this brings little satisfaction. For many children, gaining a feeling of belonging to a peer group is a long and sometimes painful process during which they may become victims of stigmatization and public humiliation that leave them "empty of happiness" (Kirova-Petrova 2000, p. 108).

However, immigrant children's struggles with the new language also open up possibilities to experience the rare occasions when language speaks itself as language. "But when does language speak itself as language?" Heidegger (1982) asks and then answers:

Curiously enough, when we cannot find the right word for something that concerns us, carries us away, oppresses or encourages us. Then we leave unspoken what we have in mind and, without rightly giving it a thought, undergo moments in which language itself has distantly and fleetingly touched us with its essential being. (p. 59)

Heidegger suggests that an experience we have with language draws our attention to our relation to language so that we may then remember this relation. Thus immigrant children can ask, "In what relation do I live to the language I speak?" In speaking their mother tongue, children, like adults, talk about many topics, facts, occurrences, questions, and matters of concern. There is an "essential self-forgetfulness" (Gadamer 1976, p. 64) to language. However, this self-forgetfulness does not apply to those who are learning to speak another language. In trying to choose the right word and to think how to say it, immigrant children only occasionally feel successful. To think in one language and have to translate this thought into another language in speech means that a different mode of thinking is activated. In one's own language, thought is accompanied by the unfolding of speech. The way of thinking is different when that thought is not accompanied by an unfolding of speech. This disconnect can change some new language learners' mode of thinking, with results that may be interpreted by others, and by the immigrant children themselves, as indications that they are stupid (Kirova 2007).

In contrast, native speakers rarely have to concentrate much on what to say. When we are at home in a language, the words seem to choose us. In a self-forgetful mode of thinking and speaking, the interaction is truly conversational or dialogic. In contrast, the mode for using a new language requires reflective thinking rather than a prereflective living with language (Kirova 2007). This way of speaking, of choosing the right words, implies a reflective approach to language: an approach that involves suspension from an immediate stance and results in greater self-consciousness.

As in the experience of turning a house into a home, the experience of learning to use another language brings feelings of not belonging. Unlike learning one's native language, learning a new language is a conscious, purposeful activity. Language becomes homework; it is hard work to learn a new vocabulary. Language is something "out there" that immigrant children need to grasp, a skill yet to be acquired. To come to dwell in the language is to come to a different level of experience. Like dwelling in a new space, dwelling in a new language requires more than memorizing the meaning or the position of the words in a sentence to know how to use them. Learning a new language does not mean learning a corresponding system of signs for what one already knows. This aspect is only part of the story. Rather, language comes into being as language through dialogue and therefore comes to be understood through "a life process in which a community of life is lived out" (Gadamer 1989, p. 446).

How does this life process look to an immigrant child? What "community of life" must children live out in the new world for the new language to come to being through genuine dialogue?

Play Is Being with "Others"

For young immigrant children, it is play that allows them to engage in dialogue with other members of the community in the world around them. The world of children's play is shared (Kirova 2007). It requires and creates a sense of

togetherness, which does not mean only doing things together or behaving playfully. Rather, the true meaning of play comes to life only if the players intentionally let themselves be absorbed into the spirit of play. In the world of play, the sense of togetherness represents itself, not only through the boundaries of shared space but through the boundaries of shared meanings of objects used in play that are created and communicated through language and gesture. Thus possibilities open for genuine dialogue between native and nonnative speakers.

Although play experience is here and now, the players are not limited to the immediate setting: play creates openness where things can be anything. Unlike the adults' world of fixed meanings, for children, things are not yet clearly defined and structured, particularly in the world of play. In the open sense making of play, a pencil suddenly becomes a spoon, a horse, or a soldier. The complete openness of possibilities in play allows changes and newness to emerge in the play world. The power of openness extends an invitation to children to enter life, which allows them in turn to experience the endlessly evolving ways of seeing and feeling the world around them.

Yet even in play, language limits one's opportunity to create meaning in new ways: the openness of play is closed off by naming. In play, often a child is looking for something in particular, and when this something is found, a word calls it into being. To name is to bring forth an object into the context of the mind. Thus to name it is to bring it into being. Naming gives rise to an image, creating concreteness in children's landscapes of images, and giving enormous creative possibilities. Yet once something is named, it *is*, and it *is* the same for everyone involved in the naming. Thus a shared meaning is created. As Heidegger (1982) explains, "the word itself is the relation, by holding everything forth into being, and there upholding it. If the word did not have this bearing, the whole of things, the 'world,' would sink into obscurity" (p. 73).

What play allows is acquisition of the new language to be experienced as dialogic, as a process that is on the border between the self and the

other. Holland et al. (1998) explain that “the self is a position from which meaning is made, a position that is ‘addressed’ by and ‘answers’ others and the world” (p. 173). Thus it is possible in play to reauthor the self in a dialogue, and doing so closes the distance one feels when using the new language. Children’s unique ability to engage in activities in which, as in play, meaning is created rather than imposed shows our human capacity to construct new relatedness to the world and to others.

Conclusion

The investigation of the phenomena of belonging, language, and inclusion in the lived experiences of young immigrant children based on Heidegger’s notion of language as the house of Being allows uncovering the creative and active relation-making processes that immigrant children engage in as they perceive and create new childhoods among scattered and conflicting events and experiences. This investigation shows that for young children these processes are not limited to language. Rather, young children’s ability to engage with the world linguistically and nonlinguistically, as in play, allows them not only to live between languages but also to develop their relation to the language of home and the home of language.

Furthermore, Heidegger’s notion that breaking up what is taken for granted is “the true step back on the way of thinking” (1982, p. 108) allows us to explore how language helps immigrant children experience themselves in the two worlds they live in – home and school – as well as in-between these worlds. Whether the new way of understanding the world is adopted or rejected, there is a chance to reflect on one’s basic way of living. Through encounters where one breaks out of unquestioned frameworks and meets the other in face-to-face situations, there is an opportunity to understand the other better. Such encounters help immigrant children to understand themselves better in terms of where and how they come to be as they are, and what and how they will be when they are at home in the new world.

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Phenomenology of Language

► Phenomenology of Inclusion, Belonging, and Language

Phenomenology of Movement and Place

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Introduction

Movement essentially has its place, its material supports and environmental affordances, and its fit with locales, habitats, and regions. This is

clearly the case in hydrological terms with precipitation patterns, runoffs, and confluences of flows, currents, waves, and tides defining navigable waterways and in geological terms with distinctive landscapes affecting climatic conditions and animal habitations and migrations. Such large-scale correspondences between movement geometries and place typologies are reflected in incremental scales of biological, social, cultural, and historical life. Yet human movement seems curiously and anomalously abstracted from these scales of life by the natural sciences in terms of the putative functioning of a physiological, anatomical, and biomechanical entity. The social sciences may bring to mind the spaces and places that contextualize human movement, giving its functionality many varied forms. But something about the essential life value of movement remains obscured when motility, reduced to bodily functionality, is correlated with sociocultural, historico-political forms of life. The vitality of movement and the liveliness of places no longer seem integrally connected.

Phenomenology provides a reminder that, in the apodictic certainty of lived, living, and to-be-lived experiences, movement and place are co-constitutive, mutually and reciprocally connected, and actively experienced aspects of unitary life phenomena. Intentionality, as the fundamental precept of phenomenological theorizing, is an interaction effect of place-based movements. It is the effective, affective register of being-in-the-world, being flesh of the world, and experiencing simultaneously the immanent and ecstatic moments of moving within, and seemingly at times without, the world. If movements have their places then so, too, can places be recognized as more than sets of activity affordances, more even than networks and meshworks of interactivity. Movement capacity is the kinetic, kinesthetic, aesthetic, and energetic resonance with landscapes, waterscapes, aircapes, and firescapes along with all manner of built and constructed environments. Motility and mobility are, in phenomenological parlance, the noetic (experiencing) and noematic (experienced) correlates of an inherently animated, participatory consciousness.

As least three registers of movement and place appear in the phenomenological tradition. Each of these registers, of *corporeality*, *humanity*, and *virtuality*, provides topical vantage points from which to think through the particular relations of movement and place. Each of these registers also has educational importance for how we might understand curricular constructions, pedagogical relations, and instructional practices in schools. *Corporeality*, contrary to its connotations of corporal punishment, is indicative of a post-Cartesian movement education and, in fact, suggestive of somatic practices and processes of educating physically. *Humanity* is a concentrated focal point for ecological education and a corrective to school curricula and pedagogies of anthropocentric humanism and anthropomorphic speciesism. *Virtuality* indicates an educational response to the challenges of living in an “interactive age” in which life has been taken up in technologically mediated facsimiles and where what is called for may not necessarily be more of the same technological mediations of life. These three ways of casting the phenomenological intentionality of movement and place thus suggest educational applications and inventions of learning to live well and with others in diverse realms and regions of the world.

Corporeality

The place correlates of human agency inform an “I can” that far exceeds the cognitive grasp of movement activation, execution, and termination. The “body-as-lived” is the trope generally invoked in the phenomenological tradition to anchor this expanded sense of agency. Yet focusing on the body, albeit as sensing, feeling, intuiting “flesh,” inevitably localizes movement within self-containment. Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s (1968) best efforts to define this primary intentionality may well fall short of the mobilization of the places that a fully operative intentionality would reveal.

The body as pre-thetic, preconscious motility as advanced by Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and cast by neo-Husserlians in keeping with

lifeworld interests, provides the core phenomenological rendition. Yet movement is associated unproblematically, for the most part, with bodily capacities that are exercised in places that are, to some appreciable extent, interchangeable. Critical and feminist philosophers such as Luce Irigaray, Hélène Cixous, Julia Kristeva, Elizabeth Grosz, and Iris Marion-Young rightly point out the perspectival limitations of these studies of corporeality and the privileging of particular motile bodies. They indicate a more fluid, permeable corporeality that acknowledges the sociopolitical spatializings of otherwise marginalized bodies. In this regard, they extend a line of critique prompted by Marcel Mauss' study of culturally determined comportments, Alfred Schutz's sociological proposal of multiple lifeworlds, Pierre Bourdieu's culturally enframing habitus, and Michel Foucault's genealogies of subject positioning.

The corporeal turn, which is to say, the turn to more variegated modes of embodiment, still with an emphasis on the "primacy of movement," has been pursued vigorously by Maxine Sheets-Johnstone (2011). She draws extensively upon the work of psychoanalyst Daniel Stern in describing the vitality affects and kinetic-kinesthetic-affective dynamics of movement. Yet motility as corporeality, if no longer tied to particular bodies, still seems cast against spatial backgrounds, or else inserted into them, rather than being formative of place awareness if not the very sense of place itself.

Movement has its place, but in being corporealized and somewhat psychologically cast, it is ultimately placeless. By the same token, a troubling humanism remains in phenomenological scholarship that treats place, whether as habitat, environment, or lifeworld, still as the backdrop to movement. Place remains spatial, coordinated topographically with predominantly human interests.

This topology of thought is reflected in educational questions about what is worth knowing about the world and how that knowledge is best taught. Bodies of knowledge are defined in relative movement abstraction to become passed on through judicious placement in school curricula. The arts, crafts, trades, and sports are cast

accordingly as the practical subjects of an otherwise cognitively oriented, liberal curriculum. Yet corporeality serves as a reminder that bodies of knowledge are also moving bodies and that "lived curricula" are the enactments of knowledge-in-action, interaction, and in responsiveness to the changing circumstances of life. Physical education provides a case in point of a school subject based in the latter twentieth century on Cartesian precepts of extended matter molded through bodily exercises and technical skill development and guided by what Gilbert Ryle called "the ghost in the machine." This curriculum superseded movement education as a more expansive and space-attuned sense of bodily capabilities that now, in the twenty-first century, reappears somewhat under the guise of "physical literacy." Somatic education with its sources in the nineteenth century provides inspiration for extending even farther the curricular incorporation of kinetic, kinesthetic, and affective sensibilities. A "somaesthetic" agenda, as Richard Shusterman (2008) defined it, provides a broad curricular framework for connecting the corporeal register of movement and place with the ways of means of educating children and youth physically right across the school curriculum.

But what of the places not represented in the curriculum and inaccessible within its movement strictures? Environmental studies and ecological education afford movement beyond classroom walls; however, the fuller educational significance of these curricular shapes may yet be discerned in the scholarship of eco-phenomenology beyond themes of place-based pedagogy.

Humanimality

The animal body is characterized by its distinctive motility; however, it is the conjunction of movement and place that characterizes the evolution of such variety of animal life forms. Increasing complexity and what we human animals put on ascending scales of intelligent capacity are functions of self-movement within a range of geographical and cultural spaces. Whereas crustaceans have their environmental niches, cetaceans roam the oceans. Whereas marsupials move

distinctively in burrows, trees, grasslands, and bush, human mammals move freely on most landforms and, with technological support, through waterscapes, aircscapes, and even firescapes.

An evolutionary line of movement analysis is thereby opened up in considering increasing biological and morphological complexities as a result of place adaptability. Yet so, too, is a phenomenological direction of inquiry indicated in taking into fuller consideration the animate consciousness of moving in, through, around, on, over, under, between, away from, and toward places of daily immersion in the world.

The revival of nature studies and onto-ethological scholarship from Jacob von Uexküll's (2010) "a foray into the worlds of animals and humans" (Von Uexküll 2010) to the subsequent phenomenological treatments of animality by Martin Heidegger, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and, more recently, Jacques Derrida and Giorgio Agamben bring animate consciousness to considerations of the "intertwining" of humananimality in "the flesh of the world" wherein "the relation of the human and animal is not a hierarchical relation, but lateral, an overcoming that does not abolish kinship" (Merleau-Ponty 2003, p. 268). Our common animality sets movement in place and within networks and webworks, and as coterminous with landscapes, seascapes, firescapes, and aircscapes of ambulation and flight. "Becoming animal" is a trope in the scholarship of Giles Deleuze and Felix Guattari and a practice of the self with others in David Abram's eco-phenomenological writings (Abram 2010).

The educational significance of this "animal turn" is not simply its expansive ecological sensibility. The long-standing human science interest in matters of pedagogical relationality can now register with matters of "vital contact" (Smith 2014) and "transpecific conviviality" (Acampora 2006). What was seen as being out there, whether expansively environmental or narrowly humanimal, can be recognized, heard, and felt as interactional effects and desired, intuited, and divined as connective affects and vitalities of kinship. The nominal reference of pedagogical relationality, namely, the child, allows transposition to many kindred others. Ecological and environmental programs in schools will

continue to be the places where humananimality is explored; however, it remains to be seen how the mainstream school curriculum can incorporate this deepened relational register of movement and place.

Virtuality

All of which can still be tethered readily to considerations of environments and habitats, and various disciplinary renderings of places and their animations. But that tethering puts emphasis on environment, world, space and place as affordances, networks and webworks of motility more so than on motions, emotions, and the generation of the diverse forms and multiple structures of animate existence, which is to say, on the constitutive features of life and of the auto-affectivity to which "life phenomenology" from Martin Heidegger to Michel Henry draws attention.

What might be discerned phenomenologically that is not so wedded to the coupling of anthropocentric functionality and spatially constrained forms? What might be described (even designed, managed, and developed) from the affectivities of dwelling in different locales with various other kinds of animate beings?

Michel Henry's postulate of the "auto-affectivity" of life as the generative force of feelings, forms, and functions and as the essence of life's manifestations is the consistent thread to his writings. While animality and animal life do not figure in Henry's accounts of immanent auto-affectation, there remains a strong sense that such themes cannot be too far removed from a radical phenomenology of transcendence within immanence, without necessarily falling into the difficulties of addressing animality via the "ek-stases" of biological, ethological, and related logics of lifeworld appearances. Indeed, with the "animal turn" in philosophy after Heidegger's "world poor" rendition, and following the inspiration of Uexküllian-inspired onto-ethology, Henry's oeuvre suggests that intentionality is inherently affective. Our relations with one another and with those of a different kind are premised on kinetic-kinesthetic-affective attunements and immersion in a common unfolding of life.

A life ethic, which is to say an ethic of interanimality, may well be best realized in the translation of auto-affectivity to the dynamics of sensing, responding to, and corresponding with other-than-human animals. This translation (along with transposition, mimetic resonances, and even Deleuzian notions of becoming-animal) is, from a Henryian assertion of affectivity over effectivity, a move to a register of virtuality that does not abstract from life, but actually reveals its full force. “Seeing the invisible” is how Michel Henry described it (Henry 2009). Life phenomenology aims surely at an immateriality (in contrast to the current crass materialisms) to which our everyday senses can vaguely correlate. We can bracket out the identity assertions of Husserlian phenomenology (i.e., that which pursues noetic-noematic intentionality), the nostalgia of lifeworld phenomenology (i.e., past tense, “lived” experience), the worldliness of existential phenomenology (i.e., Heideggerian being-in-the-world and Merleau-Pontyan flesh of the world), and even the hyletic materiality of radical phenomenology and still feel life as an auto-affectivity and animating force. Movement and place can thus become the expressive terms of a turn toward life as that which moves deeply, affects profoundly, and carries the words we say to invoke it.

The movement of life philosophy shifts human consciousness to corporeality, the imperatives of human responsivity to humananimality, and grounds humane interactional qualities of sympathy, empathy, compassion, and care in the virtual kinetic-kinesthetic-aesthetic dynamics of life-wide attunement. More practically speaking, there emerges a praxis which contests the “barbarisms” (Henry 2012) of life-denying representations and the contrived relations by which we distinguish ourselves from other-than-human animals as well as those of our own kind. The school curriculum can be reanimated, repopulated, decolonized, and revitalized to become a deeply lived space.

Michel Henry’s corpus of writings provides telling phenomenological account of what is essentially at stake in practices that, on the ek-static surface, appear to be quite removed from the interrogation of the auto-affectivity of life. The gradients between suffering and joy may

well be more representationally known to human beings; however, for neither human beings nor for other-than-human beings can there really be any escape from the pathos of life. We can only act in and through affectivity and, through a series of becomings, realize a pathic, motile connectedness to humans and other animal beings in all kinds of places.

This affective turn, following the corporeal and animal turns, provides insight into optimal learning environments. Such optimization is not necessarily reflected in current enthusiasms for flipped classrooms, twenty-first century communication and social media, and online learning. While face-to-face exchanges seem indicated by the corporeal turn, and body-to-body interactions by the animal turn, virtuality as auto-affectivity remains a learning design challenge to connect the fullest possibilities of life expression with the places we know as schools and which may increasingly be places where “experiential learning” can best flourish.

Yet still the places of engaging meaningfully with others for the sake of vital, life-giving, life-showing, life-affirming interactions may seem like externalized forms that inform movement potentiality rather than as Deleuzian flows, vectors, and valencies of animated, humanimal life. Virtual movements, unlike the representational forms digitized for virtual worlds, should be regarded as the auto-affective, auto-impressive, and self-moving expressions of life that Michel Henry claims for the inner landscape revealed by “material phenomenology.” Such movements are of a pedagogical affectivity yet to be realized more fully but never totally within the shifting configurations of “optimal” learning spaces.

Future Registers

The phenomenological tradition from Edmund Husserl to Michel Henry shows the shifting renditions of movement and place to reveal the expressive and worldly potentialities of life’s immanent auto-affectivity. Corporeality, animality, and virtuality are phenomenological markers of the realization of what Henry referred to as “the inner necessity” or what Henri Bergson called

the *élan vital*, which is to say the inherent forces and efforts of movement that are most palpably discernible in places of creative life expression.

The three motile, phenomenological registers of corporeality, humanimality, and virtuality can be regarded as terms of a dialectic in which attention turns initially and literally to human corporeality. But the human saturation of the phenomena of the world inevitably occasions thinking about an animal nature. The ecological turn to the wider movements of eco-philosophy in turn gains strength in critical relation to technologically virtualized places. Yet renewed questions of virtuality, developed through a radical, material phenomenology, draw attention back to human movement but now with consideration of the profound kinetic, kinaesthetic, somaesthetic dynamics of life affirmation. What continuation of this dialectic might we now discern on the phenomenological horizon?

Phenomenology challenges us with the pressing questions of life, of living with others of a human and other-than-human kind, of the quality of our relations with others, and of speaking, writing, acting, and teaching in authentic, life-affirming ways. Across the academic disciplines and fields of study where the human sciences have taken root, a most pressing task is to reawaken a phenomenological attitude and mobilize the methodological resources of the human sciences in service of the movements, affects, and languages of life. How might phenomenology continue to have us recognize a primacy to movement and bring us in touch with the motions and gestures of the multiple lifeworlds of daily living? Alternatively, what are the appearances of nature, environment, ecology, technology, and virtual worlds that privilege certain animations? What are the affects and effects of an enhanced phenomenological sensitivity? What senses, feelings, emotions, and moods of self-affirmation and responsiveness to others sustain us in our daily lives? To what extent might the descriptive, invocative, provocative language of phenomenology infuse the human sciences and engender a language for speaking directly and movingly of life?

Educational theorizing from matters of teachable content to those of teaching relationships to those of learning environments provide instances

of how the phenomenological dialectic of movement and place has been applied to considerations of curriculum, pedagogy, and instruction. Yet a thorough phenomenology of education goes beyond instances of application and, in turn, may well provide the very material conditions for addressing questions such as those posed above and thus for contributing substantially to the ongoing phenomenological movement.

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Phenomenology of the Adult-Child Relation

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Introduction

A phenomenological focus on the meaning and significance of the adult-child relation starts from the question of how the child experiences the

relation with the adult and how the adult experiences the relation with the child. Phenomenology explores the immediately lived or pre-reflective dimensions of the relational experience rather than the ways we may already conceptualize, theorize, or interpret adult-child relations. It is a form of inquiry that is rooted in continental philosophy. It aims to grasp the meaning structures of human experiences as lived through in everyday situations, relations, and actions. It is methodologically challenging to determine how young children experience the relations they maintain with adults, especially in infants and young children. The descriptions have to be interpretive and intuitive yet also tentative and informed by psychological and philosophical understandings of the intersubjectivities and intentionalities of the child's relations with others.

Historically, the phenomenological perspective was adopted to free itself from earlier denominational interpretations of the adult-child relation. The term "relation" in the phrase adult-child relation encompasses all those affective and emotional states and the sentient and existential human qualities that exist between an adult and a child. Commonly, the meaning of the term "relation" or "relationship" tends to be taken for granted. According to the OED, the terms "relate" and "relation" derive etymologically from *relatus*, meaning to bring back, return, and report, and from *ferre*, meaning to bear and carry. The contemporary dictionary meanings of relation(ship) refer to the connections formed between two or more people or groups based on social interactions and mutual goals, interests, or feelings. Thus, the adult-child relation can be seen as a connection that emerges between parents and children that they continually return to.

Culturally and historically adult-child relations differ empirically and qualitatively in terms of authority, affectivity, closeness, sense of genealogy, and felt responsibility. These relational factors are continually undergoing changes. But the focus here is primarily on the phenomenology of the existentiality of these relations.

The Emergence of the Adult-Child Relation Thematized as Childhood

The emergence of childhood as the development of relational distance between the old and the young arises already in the early work of Johan van den Berg (1956) and in Philip Ariès (1962). Van den Berg documents how by the eighteenth century, the child had become increasingly vulnerable with respect to themes that have to do with adulthood such as sexuality, birth, death, and faith. These "secrets" of adulthood were kept from young people for a gradually expanding period of time, leading to a prolonged childhood and a deferred adulthood. According to van den Berg, the distance between children and adults was created as a result of the increasing complexity of the social order.

In other and less complex times and places, children were perceived simply as miniature adults. They were not yet seen as uniquely and urgently vulnerable due to their young age, innocence, immaturity, or lack of experience. As society and familial relations grew more complex, the young person was infantilized to a state of dependency, and thus a relational distance was created that was named "childhood." To belong to childhood is to belong "not yet" to adulthood.

Some suggest that adults may no longer know (or wish to know) what it means to stand and act in a mature adult relation with children. Consequently, young people exist in a state of abandonment, a relational and moral vacuum that is neither childhood nor adulthood. The childhood of the theorized child seems to be disappearing, but others have pointed at early texts and art, such as the Grandfather and Grandchild portrait by Ghirlandaio (1490), that show that the adult-child relation does indeed possess historical significance that recognizes the way of being of a child. In the painting the (grand)child clearly seems to experience the relational quality of childhood.

Here follow some selected modalities of thematized adult-child relations.

A Relation of Nearness and Distance

The phenomenology of childhood is in part described by the experience of relational distance between children and adults. The sense of distance can already be observed at the moment of the birth of a child and in the reference to the newborn child as newcomer and as stranger. When a “child” is born, he or she still very much enters our life as a stranger. We do not choose a child as we choose a friend for the qualities that he or she already possesses. And even if such choice would become technologically available to some degree, then the newcomer is still someone who is different, relatively unformed, and a carrier of potential. The adult names this difference. To name a child is the adult’s act of dealing with the distance that this difference creates. In the act of naming, the child is recognized and adopted into the family and community. And in the act of naming, the newcomer and childhood itself is named. But the notion of childhood can only exist in the recognition of the connectedness and duality of the adult-child relation. Childhood and adulthood always implicate each other; they are joined terms of a relational discourse.

There is a socially constructed distance between childhood and adulthood that inevitably brings about misunderstandings, alienation, conflict, and rebellion between the generations. Entire industries, disciplines, and educational institutions have been established with the purpose of dealing with the child’s process of *adultus*, literally “growing up.” Some may see this as a phenomenon of questionable value to the child, when adults begin to show special interest in childhood that spells trouble for the child – but it also means that there is trouble with adulthood. It means that adulthood has become so complicated and so full of dangers and contradictions that young people can no longer simply grow up in a natural apprentice relation beside older people as was supposedly possible in earlier ages. As the phenomenon of childhood is historically and culturally relativized, the question arises whether and on what basis children still deserve special rights as children.

A Relation of Prematurity

For developmental psychology, the child is someone who “cannot yet do” certain things, not now but later. Classic developmental child study in the tradition of Rousseau-Piaget tends to perceive the child from the perspective of the end phase of adulthood. But from a phenomenological point of view, the scientific empirical data of developmental psychology are not given by nature; there are no natural facts that developmental psychology can offer to educators as guides for educational or child-rearing practice. The adult must orient to where a particular child is now. From the child’s present world, educator or parent must be prepared to assist and help the child in his or her becoming.

The converse terms childhood and adulthood are relational antonyms. In the experience of the child, the adult experiences his or her adulthood. The adult-child relation trades on the tensions between maturity and immaturity, sophistication, and innocence. It is a relation of growing up for the child when the relation gradually dissolves as the child gains in cognitive, affective, and moral maturity.

The original and most personal relationship between adult and child is the mother-child and parenting relationship. In his classic text, *The Child’s Relations with Others*, Merleau-Ponty (1964) describes how initially the child’s relation with others is still undifferentiated as the child is unaware of itself as a separate being. In other words the genesis of the adult-child relation is for the child initially a non-relation. It is not as if at birth there are two separate entities that establish a relation. Rather there exists for the child immediately an undifferentiated prenatal oneness with the maternal body. There is not yet a communicative relation as long as the child remains unaware of itself in its absolute difference. The first child me is still latent and entirely unaware of itself, while the adult me is a me that knows its own limits.

Around 6 months of age, the child, in exploring things with the hand, will touch the other hand.

And thus, suddenly, the child learns to distinguish between the body (the touching hand) as immediately felt introceptively and the body (the touched hand) as discovered and observed extroceptively.

A Relation of Separateness and Inwardness

The child discovers its separateness when, for example, smiling at the mother or father in the mirror and then being startled when hearing the voice of the mother or father issued not from the specular image but from the physical body of the parent. A little later, the child becomes aware of his or her own observable body, when seeing the specular appearance of its own image in the mirror. Through the specular image, the child notices that he or she is visible for himself and herself as well as for others. By the second and the third year of age, the child becomes more sensitive to the look of the adult with whom the child experiences a certain self-conscious relation. This is also the time that the child senses his or her own independence and the capacity to say “no.”

One can infer two phenomenologies of separateness between childhood and adulthood through the civilizing process of morals and manners. First, children are separated from adults since they lack the consciousness of an economy of inwardness (e.g., the young child is still allowed to show his or her emotions openly). Second, children are kept separate from adults when childlike feelings have to go into hiding or “underground” (e.g., the child may learn to feel shameful about sexual discoveries). Children are “taught” that certain behaviors and feelings are distasteful, shameful, repulsive, and disapproved. All kinds of commands and prohibitions, do’s and don’ts, are more likely to arouse in children certain anxieties and therefore the inclination to render these acts private.

Thus, children learn when and how to feel shame and embarrassment about things that they are to keep suppressed. And this has an important consequence for their relations with others,

especially for their close relations of intimacy. Elias points out how this increased social prescription of many impulses necessarily increases the distance between the personality structure and the behavior of adults and children. What we see is the effect of the function of manners and customs which separates the young person (childhood) from father and mother (adulthood) through the invisible wall created by hidden feelings, driven to an experience of psychological, social, and generational distance through such processes as social rules, praise, and punishment (Elias 1978).

A Relation of Pedagogy: Child-Rearing and Education

Within the educational and child-rearing context, the adult-child relation is the parent-child, teacher-student, or pedagogical relation. The concept of the pedagogical relation was meant to arbitrate over the question whether the experience of pedagogy – parenting, teaching, childcare – is a primordial human experience, thus requiring an independent discipline for study, or whether it is merely an aspect of general processes of socialization whereby young people are initiated into the social order that surrounds them. Wilhelm Dilthey (1833–1911) was the first to propose that a science of education or pedagogy can only find its real starting point by studying the relation between the adult and the child.

Herman Nohl (1967), a student of Dilthey, described the pedagogical relation as an intensely experienced relation, characterized by three aspects: First, the pedagogical relation is a very personal relation animated by a special quality that spontaneously emerges between adult and child and that can be neither managed nor trained nor reduced to any other human interaction. Second, the pedagogical relation is an intentional relation wherein the intent of the adult is always determined in a double direction: by caring for a child as he or she is and by caring for a child for what he or she may become. Third, the

pedagogical relation is an oriented relation; this means that the adult must constantly be able to interpret and understand the present situation and experiences of the child and anticipate the moments when the child in fuller self-responsibility can increasingly participate in the culture.

For the student, the pedagogical relation with the educator is more than a means to an end (to become educated or grown-up); the relation is an event that has significance in and of itself. The relation to a real teacher, someone in whose presence the child or young person experiences his or her evolving identity, is possibly more profound and more consequential than the experience of relations of friendship, love, and so forth. Students may always feel indebted for the rest of their lives to a real and admired teacher, even though the stuff that they learned from this person may have lost its relevance. In part, this may be due to the fact that what is “received” from a great teacher is less a particular body of knowledge or set of skills than the way in which this subject matter was represented or embodied in the person of this teacher, his or her enthusiasm, self-discipline, dedication, commitment, and so forth.

Pedagogy can be generally described as distinguishing what is good or right from what is bad or wrong in our ways of acting and interacting with children. Of course, in our everyday living with children, we do not always know how to distinguish actively and reflectively what is good from what is not good (or less good) for children. In certain situations and predicaments, we may question and doubt ourselves or admit that we may not know what is best for this child or these children. The point is that this doubt and uncertainty belongs to pedagogy and shows us the profoundly ethical nature of pedagogical thinking and acting (van Manen 2015). Without this ethical uncertainty, pedagogy would be reduced to a set of techniques, recipes, or rules. Teaching, parenting, and caring for children are never simple affairs that can be handled by means of rules and recipes. Situational predicaments that can be “solved” by techniques and procedures are not

ethical predicaments. And so, pedagogy is both the tactful ethical practice of our actions and the doubting, questioning, and reflecting on our actions and practices in living with children.

A Relation of Possibility

Children come to us bearing a gift: the gift of experiencing *the possible*. Children are children because they are in the midst of the primal process of becoming. Children, who are not already resigned to the fate of being born into a world of powerlessness and misery that leaves no hope for them, experience life as possibility: anything can happen.

In sharing his or her life with this child, the adult cannot avoid but become an example. This imitational process (*mimesis*) is the meaning of learning. In early English to “learn” meant to teach as well as to learn. A teacher could learn (teach) a child to learn something. As an adult, one embodies possible ways of being for the child. Merleau-Ponty describes how “*mimesis* is the ensnaring of me by the other, the invasion of me by the other; it is that attitude whereby I assume the gestures, the conducts, the favorite words, the ways of doing things of those whom I confront . . . It is a manifestation of a unique system, which unites my body, the other’s body, and the other himself” (1964, p. 145). Conversely, I see the child trying on my gestures, my ways of seeing and doing things, my ways of reacting, and my ways of spending time. And as I see that happening, I am confronted with my own doubts. Is this the way I want my child to act and be? And if not, is it the way I want myself to act and be?

Historically and culturally, the world contains many possibilities of living and being. Children encounter the world through friends, schools, media, neighbors, and digital technologies and through our mediation. But children find their own uniqueness and identity through personal exploration, choice, and commitment. This is what Hannah Arendt (1958) described as the

fact of “natality” that children are constantly born into the world and must be allowed to renew the world. How can the adult safeguard this newness for the growing child? Children cannot just be expected to discover a life. They must also be allowed to act, experiment, and create themselves. Adults have lost this neotenic openness, but in this too, they can learn from the child. Neoteny is the retention by adults of child-like qualities: to remain open to the new and human potentialities. Agamben points out that, in evolutionary terms, adults inherited the physiology of infancy: the hairless skin and fetal features of the eternal child. But because of this neoteny, the adult is granted the possibility of openness and potentiality: to make the impossible possible (1995, pp. 95–98).

A Relation of Violence and Abandonment

A critically significant relation between adults and children is probably most pointedly named a relation of violence and abandonment (Giroux 2003). This is a highly complex and extremely problematic dimension of the experience of childhood of young people who, because of their young age, belong to the biology of childhood but whose social and political circumstances actually rob them of the social, cultural, and pedagogical benefits of a sheltered childhood.

From a critical perspective, childhood can be regarded as an oppressive socially constructed category aimed to regulate and commercially exploit the educational and social lives of children. Keeping children stuck in theories and constraining categories of “childhood” may make it difficult to treat their expressed views and lived experiences with respect and dialogic openness and integrity. The terrible truth is that, globally, every day thousands of children are losing their parents and experience being exploited by adults and abandoned by the societal institutions that ought to protect them.

There exists a relation of violence for millions of children who are orphaned by wars, suffering

from abuse, disease, or starvation, or recruited as child soldiers in distant lands. We know that there are street children of 5 and 6 years of age who are learning to survive in metropolitan areas without any medical care, illiterate, physically and sexually exploited, and exposed to the excesses of violent drug culture. For them, the adult-child relation is an empty existential category without promise or pedagogical significance.

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Phenomenology, Education, and the More-Than-Human World

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Synonyms

Bioregionalism; Curriculum theory; Eco-phenomenology; Place-based pedagogy; Relational pedagogy

Introduction

Education has always been interested in the larger living landscape – the biotic, more-than-human natural community. Schools, museums, parks, zoos, camps, youth organizations, and natural history groups facilitate and mediate relationship with place, both natural and built. In formal schooling, nature study, conservation education, outdoor and adventure education, environmental, global, place-based, and education for sustainability are fields across which lines are blurred in their shared goal to more deeply understand the relationship between humans and the environment on which people depend. At this point in human history, there are strident calls for education to be central to efforts to transform the human relationship with the natural world and in so doing mitigate and reverse dire projections of catastrophic climate change and subsequent mass extinction.

Phenomenology is emerging as an important approach to more deeply understand human relationship, the lived experience of being-in-the-world. The experiential focus of phenomenology and its demand for awareness requires close attention to the felt meaning and embodied nature of our experiencing. This to experience takes place within a network of relations with which people have contact. Understanding the pre-reflective experience of place and environment through careful description provides a language by which assumptions, unexamined values, and taken-for-granted horizons of understanding are made comprehensible. Language born of culture and history frames and structures the world. Language is not often critically reflected upon but provides the ever-present background for meaningful contact with the world. Phenomenology can potentially disrupt that language, providing new light and new language by which to understand human relationship with the larger living landscape.

The Challenge for Phenomenology

The destruction of the Earth and the tearing of the very fabric of life in the name of hyper-

consumption and the global market economy are not susceptible to easy fixes and solutions. Consumerism fueled by pervasive and sophisticated media manipulation pressures parents to work more, longer and farther afield, depriving children of a stable home and relegating them to the care of strangers in often crowded day care. In developed nations, there is a marked rise in eating disorders and obesity as children spend hours inside in the company of television, video, and computer. A lack of connection to people, community, and place is having a profound effect on children. Research has drawn a link between children diagnosed with ADHD and the lack of opportunities of these children to actively engage in outdoor activities in more natural settings and green landscapes. The phrase “nature deficit disorder” was coined to describe the disturbing trend (Louv 2005, p. 70). Large-scale international education efforts have been organized over the past three decades. The documents lay out detailed global plans to make these issues the central concern of education in the future. However, it is arguable education rooted in Judeo-Christian and eighteenth-century Enlightenment constructs of the self-maximizing individual and an infallible free market is an obstacle to a transformative vision that includes an understanding of human ecology and the development of a planetary consciousness.

The international efforts to transform education unabashedly call for the teaching of values. Education has always been a normative undertaking, and values are implicit in every aspect of the pedagogical relationship. Educational theorists are ever mindful of the postmodern critique and the demise of the master narrative and are uncomfortable with reorienting education to any named purpose. Recently proposed transformative visions of education anticipate the deconstructionist critique and present not a master narrative of any one culture but a story of the ultimate “ground” in any theory – the planetary ecosphere – and develop a powerful visionary context for education, embedding the human community within the Earth community.

The growing initiatives to make sustainability, or environmental education, or whatever name is

locally given to an ecocentric reorienting of education lead to the question of *how* to educate for the values of embeddedness, interconnection, participation, relationality, holism, attunement, awareness, and ecology. In many schools, children learn about the world, their immediate environment, and the landscape outside their windows in the science classroom. Science is a cultural pursuit firmly entrenched in the language of objectivism, reductionism, and rationality. It is rooted in the western philosophical tradition and reflects and reinforces society's dominant values. Science has provided and continues to provide through the same abstract and reductionistic methodology the conveniences of technology and the advances in medicine that are to be celebrated as great human achievements adding immeasurably to quality of life. Science allows people to understand conceptually the diversity of life and the importance and complexity of life systems. It has educated the world about the dangers of continuing into a future dependent on carbon. Science is powerful; the culture and profession has legitimacy and the confidence of society. Societies have knowledge, data, and facts, but these do not counter growing global crises emerging on many fronts.

Schools may emphasize energy audits, conservation of resources, using efficient lights, turning off computers, and recycling waste. Because of powerful, pervasive cultural beliefs, these learning activities can further reinforce a resourceist position, one predicated on wise use, efficiency, and the value of the natural world to humans, in other words, ever strengthening an anthropocentric orientation. Schoolyard gardens and green space restoration may be understood as making places more pleasant for human use, consumption, and entertainment. Children learn about the natural world by dissecting owl pellets and diagramming the water cycle. The knowledge gained from these learning activities begs the questions, "In what way do our children *know* the living Earth and what *value* do they give it?" Wendell Berry (2000) says, "We know enough of our history by now to be aware that people *exploit* what they have merely concluded to be of value, but they *defend* what they love" (p. 39). Educators

are asking, "Can the technical, resourceist bias of the sciences with its dispassionate, objectifying language make it incapable of bearing the burden that we place upon it?"

Restoring the Relational

Educators are challenged to find means to go beyond the knowledge of science while at the same time being inclusive of it. This *life* is a particularity, a relationality of embeddedness in place that is unavailable to empiricism and objectivism. There is life, a sentience that engenders care and affection. It calls for a kind of sensitivity, the pathic, the felt, a "living way of knowing" (Jardine 1998, p. 95) that is perhaps not a "knowing" at all. At least not in the sense of *knowing* as we usually consider it. Things cannot survive as abstractions, as categories on chart paper and poster board, but only as unique, individual creatures, entities living in place. Most often what happens in dissecting the owl pellet is that the owl disappears, the mouse that was her meal disappears. In the quest for empirical certainty, in reducing an entity, a species to its constituent parts, it disappears in abstraction. The creature is lost – the individual and the unique are lost. In the coldly determined intelligence of the categories, the trees are lost to "forestry," the skeins of fog, and misty droplets to the "water cycle." In a sense, life is lost. Science cannot show the *life* in the life cycle of the owl. Its life is a wholeness, part of the totality of experience in a place. It is embodied, experiential, and connected to the life process. Some education researchers interested in uncovering a language to describe the primacy of experience as it is related to growing *ecological* awareness and a renewed sense of responsibility to the biotic community look to hermeneutic phenomenology to disclose human existence as a network of relations.

But in what sense do educators use the word "ecological"? In paying close attention to the meaning of the word is to address its significance. "Ecology" can be defined firstly as the science of relationships between organisms and their environments and secondly as the relationships

between organisms and their environments. The definition itself tends toward objective abstraction by placing *the science* as a common term with *the relationships*. When the life of the English word ecology is traced to its roots, it is understood the word is derived from the German *Ökologie* from the Greek *oikos*, house and dwelling. The original life of the word is tied to relationship, clan, and family. The term *dwelling* suggests a noun and synonym for *house*; yet it retains the sense of its verb form, *to dwell*: ecology as dwelling, as what it means to dwell in place. Heidegger describes the troublesome separation in the West between becoming and being as the artificial separation between what it is “to build” and “to dwell.” It has been argued that society is preoccupied with building at the expense of dwelling. Education curriculum privileges the knowledge of building at the expense of the knowledge of dwelling. In his book *Transformative Learning: Educational Vision for the 21st Century* (1999), Canadian scholar Edmund O’Sullivan posits that modernity, with all its wonders and advances, has reached the full fruition of its limitations. O’Sullivan believes a new consciousness is called for – “a planetary consciousness” resulting from an educational framework that must be “visionary and transformative and must clearly go beyond the conventional educational outlooks that we have cultivated for the past several centuries” (1999, p. 3). He argues for what he calls a comprehensive and integrated perspective or what was previously known as a cosmology, one that would engender “an ecologically sustainable vision in the broadest terms; what can be termed a planetary vision” (1999, p. 4). This requires reclaiming the word ecology for education to understand that as we build, we must dwell, and the two cohere.

Language and the Dialogical Nature of Reality

Phenomenology begins with particularity, with phenomena, the reality given in lived experience before reflection. Bypassing theory, concepts, presuppositions, and cultural beliefs, phenomenology brackets these and adopts as a method the

description of the world as it is lived. Phenomenologists describe the pre-reflective; its focus is experiential and outward into the world; as the great French phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty put it, the world is the “natural setting of, and field for, all my thoughts and all my explicit perceptions” (2002, p. 406). David Abram, the American phenomenologist, finds in Merleau-Ponty ecological implications centered on the inextricable relationality of human perception mediated through the body with the larger living world. Abram says the entire phenomenological endeavor has taken place within a region of inquiry circumscribed by a tacit awareness of the Earth as the ground and the horizon of all of our reflections, and the hidden thrust of the phenomenological movement is the reflective rediscovery of our inherence in the Earth. Abram’s work is seminal, and its importance cannot be understated. He provides a language whereby the biosphere as it is experienced and lived from within by an intelligent body becomes accessible and his work allows for an articulation of the interactive and dialogical nature of reality. It is of value to turn to Abram’s words here,

To touch the coarse skin of a tree is thus, at the same time, to experience one’s own tactility, to feel oneself touched *by* the tree. And to see the world is also, at the same time, to experience oneself as visible, to feel oneself *seen*... We can experience things – can touch, hear and taste things – only because, as bodies, we ourselves are entirely a part of the sensible field, and have our own textures, sounds and tastes. We can perceive things only because we ourselves are entirely a part of the sensible world that we perceive! We might as well say that we are organs of this world, flesh of its flesh, and that the world is perceiving itself *through* us. (Abrams 1996, p. 68)

Educators who turn to phenomenology as a philosophical orientation and a research method are in essence seeking to understand and rethink human relations with the larger living field through an experiential approach. Abram is not only paying attention to the experience of nature but to the nature in human experience. Phenomenology opens a space for a deeper understanding of the interactive and dialogical nature of reality and allows for an experiential approach to give

voice to new meanings and possibilities. However, this is often a difficult and challenging task. Curriculum theorist David Jardine writes,

Phenomenology raises the possibility of real hope, i.e. the hope that life as it is actually lived can be faced. It maintains that we as educational ‘theorists’ have living connectedness with the ‘subjects’ of our inquiry. These children in this classroom, this teacher, are not distant objects . . . they are us, our kind, our kin, and understanding them is understanding our kinship with them, understanding, not severing, the ties that bind us to the Earth, to our lives, to the lives of our children. (1998, p. 24)

David Orr’s (1994) bold statement, “all education is environmental education” (p. 12) is provocative and points to the inherent divide between humans and the natural world that is at the heart of the educational enterprise. Students are taught facts devoid of their larger purposes in transmissive, largely passive classrooms that reinforce the divide between the dominant inside space, the human-built world, to the detriment of the larger, living world outside the walls of the school. Andy Fisher (2002) in his important book *Radical Eco-psychology: Psychology in the Service of Life* explores the shifts in patterns of identity and relationships that occur when connections to the web of life essential to human well-being are included. Fisher believes phenomenology offers a bridge to span the distance, the alienation, and estrangements and cultivates a deeper understanding of humans as human *beings*. Inquiring into the strange and unfamiliar is a hermeneutic endeavor. Fisher demonstrates how Gadamerian hermeneutics, particularly, through its central tenet of a “fusion of horizons,” allows for a gaining of self-understanding through an interaction with something other, novel or alien. A person’s horizons are enriched and expanded when prejudices are risked, and assumptions and pre-understandings are examined. Fisher’s work is important as it picks up the work of philosophers like Merleau-Ponty, Eugene Gendlin, and David Michael Levin whose focus on the nature of human nature explicated an embodied intelligence uniquely designed and attuned for relationship with the world. Like Abram, Fisher is a hermeneutic phenomenologist able to demonstrate how nature enters into human experience

influencing the body and mind, as we are wholly dependent, deeply embedded in the web of life.

Deepening a Sense of Place in the Biotic Community

Phenomenology and hermeneutics have been used to inform environmental education that is place-based or bioregional and more recently to investigate sustainability education and the perceptions of children of their experiences in both built and natural environments. Heidegger’s work firmly positioned place at the center of the investigation of the meaning of being. Dasein is firmly rooted and is always in the *world*. Heidegger (1971) writes, “the way in which you are and I am, the manner in which humans *are* on the earth, is . . . dwelling. To be a human being means to be on the earth as a mortal. It means to dwell” (p. 147). Place-based or bioregional education is phenomenological in its central premise to learn to “reinhabit” local places, by becoming aware of the particular ecological relationships that operate within and around the place. The very idea of a *region* in which we “live-in-place” is an elusive concept. The specification of place or bioregion contests a purely topographical definition of place as objective geographic location in a map. A phenomenological approach to learning about place introduces a new geography as experiential, subjective, and storied. It is just this phenomenal, experiential, and lived dimension of the bioregion that offers an opportunity to develop a more complex, subtle picture of the interrelationship between humans and the places they inhabit.

The challenge is to activate and reactivate an attunement and awareness for the bioregions in which people dwell. Phenomenologists Ingrid Stefanovic and Louise Chawla are among those few researchers who inquire into the environmental, place-based experiences of children. Typically undervalued for their naiveté or innocence, the words and experiences of children have been largely overlooked. However, phenomenological research that opens up such lines of inquiry is of particular significance. The hermeneutic phenomenological task of laying bare origins coupled

with the often unstructured, unaffected visions of the child suggested profoundly interesting possibilities to understand more fully what it means to live, to dwell in place. A phenomenological lens means deepening a relationship with the biotic community. For urban children, who often live in homogenized and utilitarian landscapes that are ecologically and aesthetically impoverished, exploring a deeper sense of their connection to the life of the bioregion through phenomenology is a research area in need of further inquiry.

At this point in the human story, the relationship between human beings and the earth, the built environments, urban spaces we design to reflect our embodied embeddedness in place, and the education of the young to live in ways that honor both human nature and the larger living biotic communities on which they depend are areas that phenomenology can meaningfully inform and provide direction.

William Pinar (2004) says curriculum theory is “about discovering and articulating, for oneself and with others, the educational significance of the school subjects for self and society in the ever-changing historical moment” (p. 16). More researchers and curriculum theorists are amending Pinar’s “for self and society” by adding “the Earth.” Societies are beginning to seek a vision for the school subjects that includes consciousness of our Earth-centeredness. Phenomenology can be important in more deeply understanding how profoundly informed is human experience by the cycles and rhythms of the larger living landscape. Phenomenology helps describe human dependence on the more-than-human natural world in new ways and provides a deeper sense of educator David Orr’s words, “All education is environmental education.”

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Phenomenology, Language, and the Unspoken: The Preverbal Dimension of Children's Experience

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Synonyms

Implicit; Lived; Pre-verbal; Unarticulated; Unspoken: latent

Introduction

The world of experience, which is the arena of phenomenological research and theory, is not the epistemological, clear world of rational thinking but the messy, entangled, and qualitative world of significations that are complex and hidden and have a pre-personal, latent, general structure. A -non-epistemological undercurrent runs through human experience, which is difficult to unearth and raise to reflection. The unspoken in phenomenology does not mean that something cannot be said but that it escapes ordinary attention. In the following, we will explore some of the basic phenomenological insights about the implicit

dimensions of perception and meaning and show how in children the unspoken plays out through the body, social life, space, and things and lived time.

Edmund Husserl (1859–1938), the founder of the phenomenological movement, used the example of a cube to illustrate the complexity of a perceptual act: even though we ever see only one side of an object, in our experience, the hidden, concealed sides or *profiles* are present as constituting absences as well. Without them the cube would not be a cube. Even the ground upon which the cube sits is an essential element of its structure. Situated in space, the cube exists in a web of relationships with other things that are close or distant. Things have dimensions or *profiles* that we do not perceive directly but that come into play in establishing their reality or being. Husserl spoke of the “fullness,” or the *plenum* of things, which upon close observation of the perceived world reveals itself. As soon as a thing appears as a figure before the larger background of other related things, places, and events – its *horizon* – we can no longer think of it as a discrete, closed-off entity. Since even its physical outlines are never completely present, a thing is always more than what meets the eye. It reveals some of its aspects and conceals others, and its existence as a physical object is tied into a larger, more or less perceptually present, web of *meaning*. Phenomenologists call this web of relationships that constitute the being of things *the world* and a thing within its worldly horizon a *phenomenon* (Husserl 1952, 1964, 1969).

If a brief phenomenological analysis of something so simple as a cube results in its appearance as a set of complex and infinite relationships, objects can no longer be defined as simple Cartesian *res extensa*, materialistic entities, or even Kantian concepts that can be circumscribed and known. Phenomenology begins with an “idealist” understanding of the world, i.e., a world that is as much idea as it is matter. Husserl’s great contribution was to place this idealism back into *existence*. His rallying call, “to the things themselves,” gave the phenomenological movement the task to investigate not merely the concepts of things, the Cartesian *res cogitans*, but

how objects actually appear to human experience in their situated, spatial, temporal, and relational fullness.

In our ordinary, everyday experience of the world, we encounter our cube, for example, as the library building in our neighborhood. One person says “there is the library,” and the other replies “let’s go and check out a book,” and both assume that they refer to the same building in their shared landscape. Phenomenologists call this *the natural attitude*, which comprises a set of assumptions and habits, which let us function in the world. We take the world for granted as a world of discrete entities, which we can name and manipulate, and even other people and our own bodies are counted among them. The *phenomenological attitude*, on the other hand, attempts to go beyond the natural attitude through careful description and analysis of the way things, like the cube of the library building, appear to our experience. The goal is to reclaim more and more of the fullness of a thing’s being and to understand more of what it *essentially* is: hidden inside the cube is a collection of books on shelves, the repository of past human experience, coded in alphabetic notation, which needs to be disseminated into the minds of the next human generation in order to continue the cultural project which evolved in this location. The task of phenomenology as a research method is to systematically explore the fullness of things that is hidden behind our habitual knowing and understanding. Some of the concealed profiles belong to the perceptual world and others to history and culture. A thing is not a discrete and self-enclosed object but a complex and multi-related *phenomenon*. The unknown, the mysterious, the transcendent, and the unspoken is not somewhere else: it conceals itself in ordinary, everyday life. It is present as the halo of meaning around things. Some of it can come into awareness and language, but much of it remains concealed and unspoken. This play of presence and absence is at the heart of the phenomenological project, and it reveals itself in every simple act of perception.

The work of the French phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908–1961) showed that perception and the body’s engagement with

its environment are more primary than cognition, and epistemological capacities rest on the foundation of perceptual structures. Prior to concepts and language, human beings are embodied, perceptual beings (Merleau-Ponty 2012). A phenomenological analysis of embodiment shows that the perceiving body has its own *nascent intelligence*: we do not have to think how to conform our hand to pick up the smooth round of an apple or how to adjust our gait when walking downhill. The body has a precognitive knowledge and implicit rationality, and *meaningful* interactions with the perceived world can be found already in animal life. Perception – animal or human – has to be thought as a radically non-dualistic continuum between the body and its particular environment: the structures of perception and the structures of the perceived world belong together and form a whole. In his later work, Merleau-Ponty would call this intertwining of body and world *the chiasm*. The challenge, according to Merleau-Ponty, is to show how cognition and language arise out of the perceptual substructure of human existence and how thinking and speaking are shaped by and indebted to it.

Merleau-Ponty's philosophy of perception has been very productive for researchers in cognitive neuroscience, child psychology, and education. His question, "how do cognition and language come about?" led him to an intense interdisciplinary study of animal behavior and child psychology in order to understand the relationship between perception and thinking (Merleau-Ponty 2010). Child development offers a special lens through which to see the relationship between perception and the acquisition of symbolism and abstract cognition. Like animal consciousness, infant consciousness begins as perceptual consciousness, and child consciousness in general is closer to the perceived world than the adult mind. Merleau-Ponty provides us with an epistemological framework for understanding that human consciousness – in early human development and across cultures – can be structured differently than Western adult consciousness, which has been the unquestioned model of what it means to be human in Western philosophy. His challenge to cognitivism and Piagetian epistemology is to look

at the child (and the adult) not only as an *epistemological* being that develops its thinking but as an *ontological* being that has a profound experiential relationship to others, places, things, and time. One way of summarizing this attitude is to say that *ontology precedes epistemology*: we are perceptual, meaning-seeking beings before we have logic and symbolism. Another way of capturing the primacy of perception is to widen our understanding of thinking toward a "wild thinking" or "nascent cognition," where meaning and understanding, though differently structured, are already present in pre-symbolic animal behavior.

If we bring together the phenomenological insight into the fullness and concealedness of things and the search for pre-symbolic, perceptual, situated consciousness, a specific task arises for phenomenological psychology and pedagogy (Simms 2008). If the young child is primarily an experiencing being, what are the structures of child perception and cognition? How do developing human beings act within the horizon of the world that is meaningful to them? Merleau-Ponty and other phenomenologists have developed a hermeneutic strategy for exploring the complex field of human experience by focusing on some of its fundamental and irreducible structures: *embodiment, social relationships, spatial situatedness, things, and temporality*. Phenomenology, and particularly the phenomenology of childhood, explores the world as it is experienced, the *life world*: the *lived* body, the *lived* relationship with the other, the *lived* space and things, and the *lived* time. With respect to children:

- The focus on the experience of the developing *lived body* reveals children's perceptual, motor, and semiotic capacities (semiotic, meaning making).
- The focus on the experience of *lived social relationships* reveals the entanglement of self and other within the growing circle of human relationships and the introduction of culture and language.
- The focus on the experience of *lived space* and *things* reveals the physical environment as it intersects and structures perception, emotion, and cognition.

- The focus on the experience of *lived time* reveals the rhythms of nature, relationships, and culture, which provide the larger framework for human development and history.

Body, others, space, and time are existential *a priori* or *factivities* because their structure is foundational to all human experience. All human beings are embodied, social, temporal, and live in places, even though there is a wide variety in how these essential structures are taken up by individuals or by cultures. The experience of the body cannot be separated from the experiences of others, space, and time because they always appear together, but for the sake of understanding, we can train our lens on one or the other aspect.

The Body: The Preverbal Foundation

The body as lived and experienced is not the anatomical body, which is an abstraction and conceptualization that reflects the perspective of the body as seen from the outside by the other. The anatomical body is a scientific construct that homogenizes and standardizes the body. As a *lived* body, on the other hand, we can experience ourselves as “all ears” or “all thumbs,” or a toothache can concentrate bodily reality in one cheek and make it proportionally large. This principle of differential bodily signification becomes especially apparent in children's drawings: if you tell young children to draw a soccer game, there is a good chance that the players in the drawings will have large feet and no or very undifferentiated hands; if you instruct them to draw children playing catch, the reverse is true, and hands will be large and fingers visible. Children's drawings reveal that in the *experienced* body, size is not a matter of mathematical extensiveness but of signification: big people or body parts are more important than others in the experienced situation.

The lived body finds itself engaged with people places, and things and lives itself as an unreflected presence with them – unless its smooth transcendence and projection into the world as its *action space* is interrupted. A child follows the trajectory of a ball thrown to her, and her hands configure

themselves to catch it. Her repeated practice in catching is not a cognitive, reflective act but the gradual adaptation of bodily structures to environmental events through repetition. Adults shape and define the meanings of children's body parts and body actions intentionally: the girl might be forbidden to practice with the ball at all, or to run, or to venture outdoors because of her parent's personal fears or cultural restrictions. Psychologically, the human body can have a more expansive or more limited perception of what it is able to do, and what kind of world it is competent in. Simone de Beauvoir (2011) saw the social training of girls into a limited body action space and the following loss of the sense of “can do” openness and transcendence as the key issue for women's liberation. Bodies are disciplined and/or rewarded through situated, often subtle cultural practices within family, neighborhood, school, and peer group. But bodies can also be liberated through subtle reclaiming of gestures and action spaces. Merleau-Ponty thought that much of our bodily life is latent and hard to access consciously, but that the body is also the pivot where nature and consciousness meet.

Social Life: The Mystery of Self and Others

The latent dimensions of social life exert a powerful influence on human development from the very beginning. Prior to being independent individuals, human beings are born into social relationships. Infants come from a womb, and without the care of others, they do not flourish. Attachment, love, and desire form the trajectory that pulls the human infant toward the other. The earliest relationship with the other has a personal and a cultural dimension because it sets the patterns for how a particular child relates to the physical and social world, as we saw above.

A phenomenological analysis of the relationship of self and others reveals that the clear boundaries between them, which habitual consciousness presupposes, are not so clear after all. Merleau-Ponty (1948/2004) thought of self and others not as interior, self-enclosed entities but as unique

styles of *conduct* in the world. Most of the time, the self is submerged in its activities and not aware of itself, and the other appears as a co-actor inserted into the fabric of a child's world. But in early childhood, the self acquires the ability to sometimes look at itself *as if through the eyes of the other* and become self-reflexive and aware of its own unique being. Only if the self can look at itself from the perspective of the other can human beings acquire distance from the magical flow of the perceptual world and reflect and think about the world – and themselves. The self is indebted to the other because it receives its first nourishment, its name, its validation as a person, its ability to see possibilities and think, and its language through others. But it also receives the demands and injunctions of others and the distortions and injuries that socialization brings along the path of love. The other has a core that remains impenetrable, but even the self – because of its formation through the other and because it lives through a body – can never be completely self-transparent. Human beings will always have an irreducible gap or lacuna in them that is impenetrable to reflection and knowledge.

Space and Things: Moods, Play, and the Disciplining Power of Spatial Forms

Things, as we saw in our example of the cube, are not mere objects, but to experiencing consciousness, they are *phenomena*, i.e., focal entities within a horizon of meaningful relationships. This is particularly the case for children: early childhood transitional objects, like blankies or teddy bears, are experienced as animated and intentional and have a deep emotional presence. Things have a physiognomy, i.e., their perceivable and imaginary structure invites a child to respond and act. The bouncing ball calls the body to stretch out its arms and run forward, the small space under a drooping bush is irresistible and invites sitting quietly, the drawer wants to be opened and closed, the box needs something in it, and the long, smooth hallway beckons running and sliding. Things are evocative and they inspire

different moods: comfort, excitement, uncanniness, and fear.

As a child, the writer Annie Dillard found an old dime in the alley behind her house, and she spent the next weeks digging up the alley in order to find more hidden treasure. She felt like an adventurer or treasure hunter on a quest. Her father had told her that old cities like Rome, where old coins can be found, were half buried under ground, and she kept digging deeper in order to find more of the treasures hidden in the earth. Children are often intensely sensitive to the hidden, secretive profiles of things, and their imaginative play responds to, brings out, and reveals possibilities that belong to the concealed dimensions of the fullness of the world (Van Manen and Levering 1996).

Things are the markers of place in the expansion of space, and they are related to other things through spatial nearness and distance. The phenomenology of lived space shows that space is structured as a horizon around the body. The body inhabits a particular place, the “here,” which through habitual daily engagement, becomes the center around which the nearness and distance of places is structured. The “here” is familiar, and the “there” is arranged in growing circles of distance and unfamiliarity around it. Lived space, however, is not homogenous in its extensiveness but consists of islands of familiarity that are independent of measured distance. The alley behind a person's house can be the most distant and unfamiliar place because it does not exist on his or her experiential map, while a hotel room in a distant rainy city can quickly become too near and familiar.

Spatial forms, as we saw above, interact with the body and are the other side of bodily gestures: without the ground, there would be no upright gait; without things to reach for, there would be no hands; without the illumination of things through light, there would be no eyes. This intertwining of body and space implies that bodily consciousness can be shaped and manipulated through spatial arrangements. The arrangement of school furniture, for example, disciplines children's bodies into gestures of solitary calmness, containment, and focused attention. Educational

spaces are predetermined by adults and support the socialization of children into the knowledge and values of their culture (Langeveld 1983a,b). They are a good example of the preverbal communication between body and spatial affordances, and teachers and children usually participate in a habitual way without registering the coercive power of space.

The preverbal, spatial field provides the subtle but tangible encounter with a particular culture and its history: places and their things precede our individual lives and carry the material record of a culture's past products, intentions, and values inscribed into their structures.

Lived Time Versus Clock Time

Lived, experienced time has a different flow than clock time. While the clock gives the illusion of time as a homogenous, forward moving stream from past to present to future, the phenomenology of lived time shows time to be experienced as nonlinear, fragmented, and tied to movement in space. Piaget's observations and research showed that time for young children is tied to the sequence of events: his daughter complained that it could not be afternoon since she did not yet take her nap! Past, present, and future do not line up in a neat sequence but are entangled: the past can loom ahead and a future that was imagined can fall behind. The duration of time is not a matter of measure, but of the fullness of events.

The present. Young children assume that the *present* time is not homogenous for all beings but that each lives in its own time, which can shrink or expand depending on particular activities. Children – unreflective about themselves and turned toward the world – strongly sense the flow of ambient becoming, where things move through time alongside the child's own being. To be in the present means to be co-temporal *now* and *with* others in action space. Children easily let go and forget what is no longer part of their direct experience of ambient becoming. In the world of the young, there is no central time master who assures that all are governed by the same abstract time frame.

The future. Children assume that *the future* does not continue infinitely: when a person has reached the fullness of her or his being, time seems to stop. Parents are just old and do not get older for a long time, and if I eat more, I will be older than my older brother. In children's conception of time, growth is not homogenous and time not continuous. On a more visceral level, the young are directed toward the *future* in their desire for coming things. The range of the future, the width of its horizon, and the openness it provides to the child's initiative are strongly determined by parental presence. The strength of the child's reach toward what is coming has its foundation in the trust and hope a healthy adult environment inspires. Freedom for the child means to be granted the opportunity of meeting oneself in a future that is created, in safety, through one's own initiative and imagination. The future is the realm of the possible, and it exists for human beings always as a purely imaginary dimension.

The past. Children participate in their culture's *past* through family narrative and the education process. Family narratives shape children's early memories of their own lives, and it becomes impossible to separate what a person remembers first hand from memories generated by intense, imaginative participation in other people's narratives. Even the untold or repressed family stories are part of the total fabric of a person's history. Narrative participation creates a sense of cultural belonging and allows the child's life to transcend its own generation. In the education process, the child is inserted into the officially sanctioned narrative of a culture's past. Education is the transmission of cultural memory accumulated by past generations.

Conclusion

The preverbal, unspoken dimension of human experience can be accessed through the rigorous process of the phenomenological method, which penetrates the veil of habitual, everyday, unreflected experiences and reveals the power of the interwoven structures of embodiment, social relationships, space, and time.

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Phenomenon of Childhood Migration

- [Phenomenology of Inclusion, Belonging, and Language](#)

Philosophers of Education

- [Philosophy of Education and Science Education](#)

Philosophical Dialogue

- [Philosophy with Children: The Lipman-Sharp Approach to Philosophy for Children](#)

Philosophical Education

- [Philosophy with Children: The Lipman-Sharp Approach to Philosophy for Children](#)

Philosophical Education, An Overview of

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Synonyms

[Critical thinking](#); [Dewey](#); [Education](#); [Philosophy in education](#); [Philosophy of education](#)

Introduction

Education has always been closely related to philosophy. The first serious observation about the purpose and means of education was undertaken by the Pre-Socratic thinkers. Pedagogy, didactics, and other educational disciplines originated from philosophical thinking. In fact, it is impossible to have a serious discussion about education without venturing into the philosophy of education. As Max Black put it nicely, “All serious discussion of educational problems, no matter how specific, soon leads to a consideration of educational *aims*, and becomes a conversation about the good life, the nature of man, the varieties of experience” (Black 1969). It is precisely from this quote that we can interpret philosophy of education as a modern philosophical discipline which aims to determine the purpose and means of education, as well as its influence on life and society. It can range from research of educational theories to the history of philosophy from the beginnings of philosophical thinking to present day. Nowadays, we can discuss Aristotle’s philosophy of education knowing that, formally speaking, the philosophical discipline did not exist in his time. Perhaps we can find the simplest and clearest definition of

philosophy of education in *Encyclopædia Britannica*: “Philosophy of education, philosophical reflection on the nature, aims, and problems of education. The philosophy of education is Janus-faced, looking both inward to the parent discipline of philosophy and outward to educational practice” (Siegel).


Philosophy of education primarily researches and deals with philosophical education, but is not limited to that. Philosophical education is a comprehensive philosophical education which aims to raise a person as a philosophical being. Although it may sound strange, this is necessary. A philosophical human being would be a person who reflects about things and events happening around them. Primarily, a person should be able to think critically about themselves and the world around them. After that, the second level of such an education assumes a higher degree of critical thinking about common philosophical issues. Ideally speaking, this level of philosophical education should be present at philosophy departments at university level (and higher). Today, first-level philosophical education is teaching and learning critical thinking.

Education without philosophical education most often leads to two things – short-term memory and practicing certain skills to cope through life. Such education is one-dimensional and defeats the purpose. If we consider critical thinking at early educational stages, ideally speaking, it would consist of content (knowledge) and reflection on that content. Therefore, there should be content and a method for processing that content. In that way, we ensure that the content is understood, information processed, but also encourage taking a personal critical stand.

Philosophy in education is the existence of philosophy in education either as a separate teaching subject or a group of subjects. A person can acquire certain philosophical notions or methods. Philosophy in education can also be considered in terms of particular theories which exist around a specific type of education.

Philosophy of education as a philosophical discipline is comprehensive and contains, among other things, philosophical education.

Philosophical education also incorporates what is called “philosophy in education.” As a Venn diagram, it looks like this:



As part of philosophical education, learning critical thinking is a philosophical study. One of the specific aims of philosophical education at present is to find ways and methods of teaching critical thinking. In addition, one of the aims of philosophy of education is to reflect about the nature, aims, problems, and usefulness of teaching for critical thinking. This is important in today’s world when people (and children) are bombarded with thousands of relevant and irrelevant pieces of information which expose them to different types of manipulation: political, media, economic, etc. It is precisely critical thinking that can provide the individual with the proper tools to resist this manipulation and choose only relevant information while also developing their own critical thinking.

Critical thinking started in philosophy and that is why critical thinking has to be regarded as philosophy in education and must be strongly connected with philosophical knowledge. Critical thinking in formal and informal education nowadays is rather popular and in demand. There are many different programs for learning critical thinking. Unfortunately, there are programs which neglect their philosophical origin, only

claiming that they teach critical thinking, when, in fact, they do not. Learning for critical of thinking cannot be learning critical thinking if it is not based on philosophy. Among many definitions of critical thinking, the one that really points out the essence of the relation between critical thinking and philosophy is in Lipman's most famous work *Thinking in Education*. While listing the definitions of critical thinking, he states that critical thinking is "a light version of philosophy" (Lipman 2003).

Critical Thinking as a Light Version of Philosophy

There are well-known and well-researched studies and theories on education by eminent philosophers. Now that learning critical thinking has reappeared as an important issue as the purpose of education, we have to think back on what critical thinking is and look for the origins of critical thinking among a variety of thinkers. Recent literature offers many definitions of critical thinking. Some of the crucial aspects of critical thinking are present in Richard Paul and Linda Elder's definition: "Critical thinking is that mode of thinking – about any subject, content, or problem – in which the thinker improves the quality of his or her thinking by skillfully taking charge of the structures inherent in thinking and imposing intellectual standards upon them" (Paul and Elder 2002).

With critical thinking, that is, a light version of philosophy, we improve the quality of our thinking and thought processes. Critical thinking allows us to view things and events in and around our lives from all sides and find solutions to our problems more easily. The only rules that can be true for critical thinking are the rules of formal and informal logic. In all periods of human history, critical thinking was a desirable human trait. Naturally, thinking critically can be dangerous sometimes, if we remember Socrates and how he had to drink poison to carry out his own death sentence.

Critical thinking does not hold any concrete values or principles that could be imposed by

teaching critical thinking. It is a way of thinking that avoids emotional content and arbitrary principles. Critical thinking needs to be impartial and has to rely on common sense and consistent argumentation, according the rules of formal and informal logic, as mentioned before. The need to practice critical thinking in modern-day society has become stronger due to the fact that we are permanently exposed to different means of manipulation. Along with standard manipulation, such as, political and economic, there is media manipulation that has reached every segment of our lives. In part, media manipulation is so obvious that it does not even call for critical thinking. However, critical thinking is an exceptionally adequate tool for uncovering media manipulation on a larger scale. It encourages people to think about the messages received on a daily basis from the media and, by doing so, notices how people are being manipulated by the media.

Even the very use of the term "critical thinking" is sometimes subject to manipulation. The term is sometimes used to attract target audience and justify unfounded criticism that only serves its own purpose. Obviously, that is not critical thinking nor should it be. Critical thinking is not, even though it is sometimes perceived that way, negative thinking only for the purpose of criticizing. That is not critical thinking that is the opposite of it.

Critical Thinking Through the History of Philosophy

Critical thinking is the light version of philosophy, that is why we need to take a look back and see who among the eminent philosophers promoted what we may nowadays refer to as critical thinking. Teaching for critical thinking was developing alongside philosophical thought. Here is a brief overview.

There are traces of critical thinking even among the Pre-Socratic thinkers. The first teachers of critical thinking that we know of were the sophists. As it is often claimed, they taught reasoning skills, that is, oratory. Known

as the masters of persuasion, they often prepared their students to discuss in court and at political gatherings. This becomes more understandable if we consider the fact that the sophists rejected any kind of objective norms, including the truth. Nevertheless, we must not equate sophism with sophistry and its distortions, also known as eristic, as the use of fallacious arguments for the sole purpose of outsmarting someone. Further, there is a famous quote by Protagoras: “DIOG. IX 51 It was he who first said [Protagoras] that there are two opposed arguments on any matter” (Diels 1983). Therefore, a thing or event can be viewed from different angles; if we think critically about an event, then we are looking at it from all possible angles, forming at least two opposing views. Critical thinking should encourage us to question all possible pros and cons of a premise and lead us to a valid conclusion. Perhaps certain sophists pursued the wrong goal, but they were among the first to encourage critical thinking.

Socrates is an essential figure for critical thinking. With a carefully constructed line of questioning, he pointed his interlocutors toward the “truth,” and that truth was something they were not aware of before the conversation with Socrates. In modern terms, we could say that Socrates did not teach his interlocutors what to think but how to think. Socrates’ ways of “extracting” the opinion out of the interlocutor, the way he “made” them think about their own views and judgment, is known as the Socratic method. This is the first known method for learning critical thinking. The goal of the Socratic method was to define the notions under discussion. “He wanted to give birth to true ideas in the clear form of definition, not for a speculative but for a practical end” (Copleston 1993). Although it is not always possible to agree on a definition, the process can guide us toward a clearer, more understandable, and concrete definition. The process itself has actually resulted in fundamental rules of definition. Even Matthew Lipman points out Socrates and the sophists as the philosophers who started to develop critical thinking.

Another important figure for critical thinking in Antiquity is Aristotle. He is considered to be the founder of formal logic, which later developed

and also shaped informal logic. Critical thinking without the rules of formal and informal logic is not possible.

The doubt advocated by ancient skeptics is related to the development of critical thinking theories. The name itself comes from the Greek word σκέψις, which means searching, but also skepsis. If we take the etymological meaning, critical thinking is closely related to skepticism because it requires doubt to look for the truth. Of course, there is a big difference, because sometimes we can arrive at verifiable truths.

In the Middle Ages, Thomas Aquinas developed a system for thoroughly questioning views and beliefs. For each idea under his study, he would demonstrate all the views; he would argue those points of view, either to dispute or support them; and in the end he would express his own sound views on the matter. He executed this so precisely that it is safe to say that every idea in his system was the subject of critical thinking. However, Thomas Aquinas did not question religious dogmas. In spite of that, the systematic approach to certain theories and facts suggests a methodology which is more than acceptable as part of the written methodology of critical thinking.

During the Renaissance, the most interesting author is Erasmus. He pinpointed fables as a great source of practical thinking simply because fables carry a strong message for practicalities of life. Erasmus encourages people to read and think about fables as a good exercise for developing critical thinking. Whether Erasmus used the term critical thinking the same way as we do today, that is difficult to say. More importantly, he claimed that fables were a “guide to practical thinking” and added that they were appropriate for practicing “good vocabulary.” These two things (practice thinking and vocabulary development) are the goals of modern-day critical thinking workshops.

In any case, even though elements of contemporary critical thinking theories can be found among Renaissance thinkers, the actual call for the practice of critical thinking in the modern sense of the term only happened with Francis Bacon.

In 1605, the English philosopher Francis Bacon published *Of the Proficiency and*

Advancement of Learning, Divine and Human. This is the first work that is considered to tackle critical thinking (and not only what we call critical thinking). Bacon states that the mind cannot follow the “right path” if left only to its natural tendencies. He points out that the world has to be observed empirically. Bacon outlines the main topics and ideas which he developed and perfected in his later works. He also suggests clear obstacles or disorders in learning which have to be avoided or addressed to ensure progress. He diagnosed three distempers of learning: “So that in reason as well as in experience there fall out to be these three distempers (as I may term them) of learning: the first, fantastical learning; the second, contentious learning; and the last, delicate learning; vain imaginations, vain altercations, and vain affectations” (Bacon 1906). Here, it is clear that Bacon is discussing erroneous learning/thinking, which he explores further in *Novum Organum Scientiarum* (1620), where he describes four types of idols for four kinds of natural human tendencies that lead to misconception and prejudice. We can get rid of misconception and prejudice with reason. With his three distempers of learning (fantastical, contentious, delicate) and four types of idols (tribe, cave, marketplace, theater), Francis Bacon offered a wide range of misconceptions and prejudice. By discovering the errors in our thinking and becoming aware of the misguided beliefs and views, we have made the first step toward eliminating them.

The goal of developing critical thinking is nothing more than learning how to think correctly. Therefore, Bacon’s observations on “distempers of learning” and “idols” could be labeled as a catalogue of incorrect thinking or typical mistakes in thinking. Other notable works crucial to the theoretical development of critical thinking are *Rules for the Direction of the Mind* (*Regulae ad directionem ingenii*, 1684) by René Descartes, a French philosopher, physicist, and mathematician. Even though he planned to write 36 rules, Descartes only managed 21 rules for direction of the mind. From the point of view of critical thinking theory, some of these rules can be applied to shaping the rules of not only scientific, mathematical, and philosophical research but also critical

thinking. The first 12 rules relate directly to the rules of the scientific method. However, critical thinking cannot be excluded from that. One of the aims of critical thinking is reaching valid conclusions, which can be related to the truth. Some 10 years after *Rules for the Direction of the Mind*, Descartes wrote *Discourse on the Method* (*Discours de la méthode*, 1637). Here again, Descartes explains the four rules of the scientific method, but the rules can also be applied to the “rules” of critical thinking.

Bacon and Descartes were the first ones to grapple with the issues crucial to the theory of critical thinking today. Descartes points out that there has to be a special mental discipline to guide the mind while thinking. Descartes calls for precision and clarity. He also advocates *skepsis* as an important component of thinking. We could say that he follows Socrates’ line of thinking, who would successfully confuse the interlocutor and make them doubt their own views or way of thinking. That is when we start to think more deeply – when there is confusion and doubt. Descartes demands systematic doubt, which becomes integral to critical thinking. Furthermore, he insists that each argument has to be subject to doubt, to be questioned, and to be tested. Bacon and his catalogue of human misconceptions and typical errors in judgment and Descartes with systematic “*skepsis*” and demand for questioning are the modern pioneers of critical thinking.

Immanuel Kant pointed philosophy toward the knowing of the mind in his three critiques and the power of the mind to think systematically and reasonably. In *What Is Enlightenment?*, Kant urges using our own mind: “Enlightenment is man’s emergence from his self-imposed nonage. Nonage is the inability to use one’s own understanding without another’s guidance. This nonage is self-imposed if its cause lies not in lack of understanding but in indecision and lack of courage to use one’s own mind without another’s guidance. Dare to know! (*Sapere aude!*) Have the courage to use your own understanding, is therefore the motto of the enlightenment” (Kant 1970).

In *The idea of a University* from 1852, John Henry Newman indirectly suggests the

advantages of critical thinking. Newman lists all the advantages we can attribute to someone who thinks critically. W. Graham Sumner, an American philosopher, published *Folkways: A Study of Mores, Manners, Customs and Morals* in 1906 with useful contributions to the discussion of critical thinking. He sees critical thinking as a way of raising good citizens. Newman, W.G. Sumner, and several other authors prove that in the mid-nineteenth century there was a need for theoretical research of the study of thinking, that is, for critical thinking in educational systems. Consequently, that was the time when social progress led to discussing “the learning of thinking” within the system of education. Living without thinking about what surrounds us, life without critical thinking, may be simpler, but most aforementioned authors, as well as Bertrand Russell, would agree that thinking philosophically is difficult but also that it is extremely useful for individual progress, to navigate life and find happiness.

John Dewey, the Founder of Modern Critical Thinking Theory

The importance of John Dewey in the modern development of critical thinking is probably best illustrated by the following quote: “In fact, people have been thinking about ‘critical thinking’ and have been researching how to teach it for about a hundred years. In a way, Socrates began this approach to learning over 2,000 years ago, but John Dewey, the American philosopher, psychologist and educator, is widely regarded as the ‘father’ of the modern critical thinking tradition” (Fisher 2001). Therefore, modern-day theory of critical thinking was founded by the American philosopher, pedagogue, and psychologist John Dewey, primarily in *How We Think* (1997). Dewey does not use the term “critical thinking,” he says “reflective thinking.” The idea is the same. Critical thinking is the reflection of our mind about events and things around us. Dewey’s successors gradually neglected the expression “reflective thinking,” and critical thinking became more common. According to Dewey’s definition of reflective thinking, we can gather that it is the

same as critical thinking in the modern sense of the word: “Active, persistent and careful consideration of any belief or supposed form of knowledge in the light of the grounds that support it, and the further conclusions to which it tends, constitutes reflective thought” (Dewey 1997). For most authors, this is evidence that Dewey was actually referring to critical thinking, being the “father,” originator, or founder of contemporary critical thinking theories. The slogan “learning to think” is also closely related to critical thinking in Dewey’s philosophy, where he demands learning, more specifically, practicing critical thinking. It was Dewey who was among the first thinkers to state that learning to think is fundamental to education.

Conclusion

After Dewey, a series of authors continued to develop his reflective thinking system, most famously, Matthew Lipman who elaborated on Dewey’s theory. With the aid of other theories, he developed the theoretical and practical framework of Philosophy for Children. The following articles deal with issues important to the current state of philosophical education. They bring a cross section of elaborate methods and approaches in Philosophy for Children, but also discuss the transition between the first and second step in philosophical education when students go from learning critical thinking to philosophical thinking at high school philosophy classes and thinking about philosophical issues at the International Philosophy Olympiad.

The only way to properly develop critical thinking is to start practicing it and developing thinking skills from early age with philosophical methodology. After that, it can be expanded across philosophic and academic areas. Therefore, think critically!

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Philosophical Grammar

► [Wittgenstein as Educator](#)

Philosophical Idealism and Educational Theory

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Introduction

Among ancient discussions of Greek education, philosophical idealism makes its first appearance in Plato's *Republic*, within his formulation of an ideal state. Here the mathematical sciences and dialectic are presented as affording the student a path to the apprehension of unmediated reality, which, in Platonic theory, is education's supreme goal. Most subsequent discussion or activity among Greeks and Romans which attempts to integrate philosophical idealism either develops or responds to Plato's thinking on this subject. Plato's speculation also succeeded in finding accommodation in more widespread views about ancient educational curricula and in the thinking of some modern educationists.

Synonyms

[Dialectic](#); [Divinization](#); [First principle](#); [Idealism](#); [Mathematics](#); [Reading order](#); [Reality](#); [Theory of forms](#); [Wisdom](#)

Plato

An ancient tradition records that above the entrance to Plato's Academy was displayed the inscription, "Let no one enter who does not know geometry." The earliest surviving evidence for this inscription is in a work by the Emperor Julian (*Against Heraclius the Cynic* 237d), written some 750 years after Plato established his school, and there is good cause to believe that the story is apocryphal. Nevertheless, the tradition reflects important realities about Plato, his philosophical priorities, and his educational goals both in theory (in his writings) and in practice (in the Academy itself). Drawing philosophical inspiration especially from his Pythagorean predecessors, Plato looked to mathematical sciences (arithmetic, plane and solid geometry, astronomy, harmonics) as providing the most compelling evidence for intelligible, immaterial, unchanging reality – the transcendent "Forms," which he considered to be the student's highest object of study.

Plato describes and discusses his theory of Forms in numerous dialogues, but it is in his most famous work, the *Republic*, that he applies their contemplation to the system of education which he formulates for his Utopian society. Here, in Book 7, Socrates explains at length the shape which education takes for the "Guardians" of this ideal society and the purpose of this education (Annas 1981, pp. 272–293). The Guardians have already completed their cultural and physical training when they come to the study of numbers, which they will pursue to the age of 30. This study serves the general purpose of developing the intellect and training people how to think, but much more importantly (in Plato's view) it turns the mind away from our world, the world of becoming (*genesis*), towards truth and reality (*ousia*), the world of Forms (525a–c). Numbers are not Forms, of course, but in our world of becoming their

study is the closest that we can come to Forms themselves (Cornford 1932, pp. 38–39). The order in which the mathematical subjects are studied is important too. Arithmetic prepares the way for geometry, which requires us to think in two and three dimensions. Astronomy comes after geometry; now the student's eyes are raised up from the earth towards the heavens. The celestial bodies, nevertheless, are material and of this world. The heavenly music which they create (originally a Pythagorean belief), however, brings us closer to immaterial reality, and it is direct, unmediated apprehension of reality that should be the goal of education.

Just how can the student achieve this direct contemplation of real, unchanging goodness, justice, courage, and so on? To answer this question Plato invoked his doctrine of *anamnesis*, “recollection,” which presupposes that the soul, in discarnate state, has had direct apprehension and knowledge of the Forms before a person's birth. Its subsequent incarnation and contact with the body cause the person in whom the soul has been embodied to forget this knowledge, but it can be “recollected” when this person is given the right promptings, especially through skilful questioning. A problem with the doctrine of *anamnesis*, however, is that it explains why, not how, people are able to gain access to the Forms. More problematic still is that the doctrine requires proof of the soul's immortality. Plato therefore saw greater potential for explaining how the study of numbers could lead to apprehension of reality in the application of dialectic (*Republic* 532a–535a), which Socrates calls “the capstone of the curriculum” (534e) (Annas 1981, pp. 276–293).

The use of dialectic to accomplish this goal (and its concomitant potential to exemplify recollection) is demonstrated most vividly in Plato's dialogue *Meno* (81e–85d). Here Socrates interrogates a young, unschooled household slave who has no previous knowledge of mathematics. Through a long series of carefully framed questions he leads the slave to the correct solution to the problem of doubling the area of a square. Socrates conducts the interrogation as one who (like the slave) does not know the answer to the

problem he has set, in other words, as an “intellectual midwife” who possesses no body of knowledge himself but is expert in bringing to birth the intellectual offspring conceived by others (cf. *Theaetetus* 150b–151c). The inquiry is therefore viewed as a nonempirical “common search.” Its success is achieved through a solution that is based not on variable opinion (*doxa*), about which people may well disagree, but on secure knowledge (*epistēmē*), which is derived from immutable numerical truths. Dialectic, moreover, elevates the particular geometrical solution which Socrates coaxes from the slave to a general truth whose existence does not rely on the senses.

There are, then, two stages in the process by which, to Plato's thinking, the student may apprehend pure reality: first, the study of the mathematical sciences, and then, the learning and application of dialectic (Cornford 1932, pp. 173–190). We know from surviving evidence that the practice of dialectic – the processes of collection, division, and classification – was an activity central to Plato's Academy.

Aristotle

In his research and teaching, Aristotle pursued the dialectical activity of classification with great energy. As is well known, however, he broke decisively from his teacher Plato by rejecting the theory of Forms. Unlike Plato, he was an empiricist, unwilling to exclude the role of perception and the senses from the acquisition of knowledge. Aristotle observed that experience and memory enable us to collect related instances of things and events, and “from many notions that come from experience, one universal supposition about similar things is produced” (*Metaphysics* 981a5–7). The procedure which leads to this result is called induction; through its application people are able to apprehend universals which, when analyzed, yield first principles. But our discovery of first principles depends on sense perception, so disputes may be expected to arise over the authenticity of a first principle. In these cases, it is the task of dialectic to defend (or disprove) its

authenticity (*Topics* 101a25–b4). According to Aristotle, the knowledge of first principles and first causes is “clearly” *sophia*, i.e., “wisdom” (*Metaphysics* 981b25–982a3).

The fact that Aristotle refused to endow these first principles with their own separate existence is of fundamental importance for understanding his break from Plato and their disagreement over the goal of education. For Plato, apprehension of first principles – of his Forms, in other words – is impossible when the soul is incarnate, since it is then in contact with the body, which is implicated in fallible sense perceptions. For Aristotle, it is only through the sense organs that first principles can be apprehended.

Precisely where Aristotle’s thinking on ideals belongs in his educational activity is far from clear, but the evidence of ancient commentators on his works (writing mainly between the second and the sixth centuries A.D.) may provide some help. Some of these commentators distinguished two kinds of Aristotelian writings, the *exoterikoi* and the *enkyklioi* “discussions” or “arguments” (*logoi*). Just what the adjectives *exoterikoi* and *enkyklioi* refer to in these phrases is open to some basic disagreement. Many have believed that *exoterikoi logoi* are popular works which Aristotle intended for wider consumption, especially philosophical dialogues not unlike Plato’s, whereas *enkyklioi logoi* are works which were not meant for publication but, being of a more technical nature, reflect the teaching which took place in his school. But there are flaws in this argument, and an alternative proposal has been put forward (Bos 1989, pp. 111–152): *exoterikoi logoi* are discussions which deal with the things outside (*ta exo*) the physical realm, while *enkyklioi logoi* deal with physical reality, the things within (*en*) the circle (*kyklos*) of the universe. These latter *logoi*, being nearer to the experience to which people can easily relate, are the subject matter for the preliminary stage of education, which would later acquire the name *enkyklios paideia*, an important designation often translated as “standard education.” The former *logoi* are the concern of advanced students, whose object of

investigation would be *philosophia*, which is concerned with transcendent, theological principles.

Later Platonists and Early Christians

It remains difficult to determine how far Aristotle may have been dependent upon Plato – even if only by reaction against him – in formulating an educational curriculum which was designed to bring the student to the contemplation of immaterial existence. About numerous other ancient thinkers, however, we need not be in any doubt (Hadot 2005, pp. 263–293). For instance, the Alexandrian (Jewish) Platonist Philo (ca. 25 B.C.–ca. A.D. 40), best known for his commentaries on the Pentateuch, often referred to *enkyklios paideia*, especially the mathematical sciences, as an important but preliminary stage in the curriculum, subordinate to the pursuit of *philosophia*; hence his characterization of this early stage as the “handmaid of wisdom” (*Intercourse with the Preliminary Subjects* 73–76). Yet just as *enkyklios paideia* contributes to the pursuit of philosophy, so philosophy then contributes to the possession of wisdom (*sophia*), which is the knowledge of divine and human matters and their causes (79). Clement of Alexandria (ca. 150–ca. 215) adopted Philo’s evaluation of the relative places of *enkyklios paideia*, *philosophia*, and *sophia* (even quoting Philo), but Clement went further by defining wisdom as “knowing God” (*Miscellanies* 1.5.30.1–2). Lactantius (ca. 240–320) characterized wisdom in a similar way but denied that the path to *sophia* ran through *philosophia*, since “knowing God” is something that all people – not only philosophers but “workmen, peasants, women, and all who have human form” – are capable of by nature, and these people should therefore receive instruction (*The Divine Instructions* 3.25–26).

The opinions on education of St. Basil of Caesarea (329/330–379) demonstrate a profound Christian engagement with Plato’s writing on the subject and deserve special attention. Early in his essay *To the young, on how they may benefit from*

pagan literature (2), delivered ostensibly before an audience of youths, Basil makes a basic point emphatically: Christians consider this life and its goods to be nothing, and believe the soul to be infinitely more valuable than the body.

So long as you are unable, because of your age, to understand the depth of the Holy Scriptures' meaning, in the meantime . . . we give a preliminary training to the eye of the soul We must recognize that a contest is set before us, the greatest of all contests, to prepare for which we must do everything and perform every task, as far as we can, and we must associate with [the writings of] poets, prose-writers, orators, and all men from whom we are likely to derive some benefit for the care of the soul. Just as dyers first prepare by certain treatments that which is going to receive the dye, and then apply the colour, whether it be purple or some other shade, in the same way will we, if the glory of the good is destined to abide with us as indelible, then understand the sacred and mystical teachings after we have received preliminary initiation by those external [i.e. pagan] means. And like those who have become accustomed to seeing the [reflected] sun in water, so will we direct our eyes to the light itself.

The dominant theme here is that of "preparation" for apprehension of the ideal: Our study of pagan authors helps us to prepare for the greatest of all struggles. Pagan literature is like the unseen preparatory material that dyers use before they apply the glorious color that is the Holy Scriptures; it provides a preliminary initiation, but the Scriptures are sacred mysteries. The Scriptures are the light itself; pagan literature is reflected light that prepares us to look upon the real thing. These images all trace their origin back to Plato's *Republic* (Döring 2003): the "eye of the soul" which is raised up through dialectic (533c–d), the simile of dyers and their wool (429d–e), and the progress from the vision of reflected images to contemplation of the light itself (515e–516b). Basil's assumption is that intelligible, unchanging reality is contained in the Scriptures, not Plato's world of Forms; the "eye of the soul" gains understanding of the Scriptures through ascent up a pedagogical ladder. Basil's work was widely read and admired throughout the Middle Ages where Greek was understood; from the fifteenth century on it gained enormous popularity in western Europe through the Latin translation of Leonardo Bruni (1370–1444).

St. Augustine (354–430) similarly believed that the products of pagan learning could be presented to students in order to prepare them to acquire knowledge of "the one God himself" (*On Christian Teaching* 144). The liberal arts, especially the mathematical subjects, condition the student for contemplation of higher things (*On Order* 2.12–16). The influence of Plato, crucial in Augustine's conversion to Christianity (*Confessions* Bks. 7–8), is evident everywhere in his writings. Like Basil, he applied Plato's image of "the eye of the soul" to describe the apprehension of intelligible reality (*Various Questions* 46.2).

Divinization

Philo's goal to "know divine matters," and the aspiration of learned Christians to "know God," both reflect a view about philosophy that traces its origins to Plato's *Theaetetus*, where Socrates tells his interlocutor Theodorus that "we must try to escape as quickly as possible from here to there," and that this escape is "assimilation to god, as far as possible" (176a–b). Assimilation to god, or "divinization," is an ideal that was understood and sought in different ways by different ancient people. Early Christians, for instance, could strive for it through life in the desert or in the monastery. For Platonists from the third century A.D. on – i.e., Plotinus and his Neoplatonist successors – divinization was the supreme goal, progress towards which was afforded by the study of texts.

Naturally enough, the texts which they studied above all were the Platonic writings – not *all* of them but rather those that were considered most useful and relevant to their goal. Once agreement was reached on the identity of these fundamental dialogues, two further developments occurred: certain scholars proposed the "correct" organization and reading order of these Platonic writings, and commentaries on each of them were written in order to facilitate their study. The surviving evidence for these reading orders shows a clear desire to draw students progressively to works that deal with the contemplation of transcendental being, in particular the *Timaeus* and the *Parmenides*, which

were (in that order) the final two in most reading lists (Koch 2013; Tarrant 2014). For a similar reason, Platonists also included some of Aristotle's writings in their curriculum, most notably the *Categories* and *Metaphysics*.

The Later Tradition

Throughout the Middle Ages, arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, and harmonics preserved their role as preparation for the study of philosophy and theology. Boethius (ca. 480–ca. 524), who had confidence that these subjects could lead the student to comprehension of what really exists, appears to have been the first to apply the medieval title *quadrivium* to this set of subjects (*Training in Arithmetic* 1).

For 350 years after the reintroduction of Plato's works into western Europe around the beginning of the fifteenth century, "Platonism" implied especially the emphases and preoccupations of the Neoplatonists of late Antiquity. It is unsurprising, therefore, to find that when the great Renaissance humanist Marsilio Ficino came to select and arrange the first ten works of Plato which he would translate into Latin and later incorporate into his 1484 edition (the first printed edition of Plato's complete works in any language), this selection and arrangement aimed to provide for the ascent of the reader's mind to the vision of God, just as the Neoplatonic sequences of late Antiquity had done (the *Parmenides* and the *Philebus* occupy the ninth and tenth places). Ficino makes this intention clear in his preface to the 1464 collection of these ten works which he addressed to Cosimo de' Medici (Toussaint 2013).

It is a common belief that the Neoplatonic interpretation of Plato lost its dominance as a result of the translations and exegeses of the dialogues by Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768–1834). This belief is overstated, but there is no question that these publications (1804–28) did mark a turning point in the study of Plato (Tigerstedt 1974, pp. 5–7). Yet it was central to Schleiermacher's project, too, to determine the order in which the dialogues were composed and should be read (Lamm 2013). The sequence which he decreed

would find no acceptance from any Platonic scholar today, but Schleiermacher's purpose was a pedagogical one, and his solution demonstrates the same concern that much earlier thinkers had shown to raise the student's mind through dialectic to contemplation of the ideal which truly exists. In the *Republic*, which is among the last dialogues that Schleiermacher prescribed, that object of contemplation is "the Good."

At about the same time that Schleiermacher's translations were first appearing, Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762–1814), follower and interpreter of Immanuel Kant, published the *Addresses to the German Nation* which he had delivered in Berlin in 1806 when the city was under occupation by Napoleon. The second and third *Addresses* deal directly with education. Fichte's idealism represented a radical development of Kant's and is unmistakable in both of these *Addresses*, especially in his assertion of human freedom. Obvious too is the influence of Platonic idealism. Only one extract can be provided here, but many others, equally illustrative, could be presented without difficulty (*Address* 3, 29; trans. G.H. Turnbull):

[The student] is a link in the eternal chain of spiritual life in a higher social order. A training which has undertaken to include the whole of his being should undoubtedly lead him to a knowledge of this higher order also. Just as it led him to sketch out for himself by his own activity an image of that moral world-order which never is, but always is to be, so must it lead him to create in thought by the same self-activity an image of that supersensuous world-order in which nothing becomes, and which never has become, but which simply is for ever; all this in such a way that he intimately understands and perceives that it could not be otherwise. Under proper guidance he will complete his attempts at such an image, and find at the end that nothing really exists but life, the spiritual life which lives in thought, and that everything else does not really exist, but only appears to exist.

The effect of philosophical idealism on educational theory is apparent in other, mainly German, thinkers of the past 250 years (especially Kant, Hegel and Schelling). Nowhere, however, is it expressed so forcefully and directly as it is in these works, and never during this time did it exercise such influence as it did on the development of German nationalism through Fichte's *Addresses*.

Cross-References

- Educational Theorists
- Formation of School Subjects
- Hegel on Moral Development, Education, and Ethical Life
- Intellectual Virtues and Educational Practice
- Liberal Arts Education
- Nation, Nationalism, Curriculum, and the Making of Citizens
- Socratic Dialogue: A Comparison Between Ancient and Contemporary Method

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Philosophical Inquiry

- Philosophy with Children: The Lipman-Sharp Approach to Philosophy for Children

Philosophical Inquiry in Education

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Synonyms

Introducing philosophy as a subject matter in formal education; Practice of philosophical dialogue in educational settings, The

Introduction

Philosophy has been highly important throughout the history of Western education. It was clearly present during the period of Classical Greece, led by the sophists, but also by Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle. It regained its importance throughout the Middle Ages, most especially with the rise of the European renaissance – starting around 1000 A.D. – in schools and universities. Philosophy continued and was maintained, at least in some countries, with the implementation of obligatory formal education.

Over recent decades, we have found ourselves in an apparently contradictory situation. On the one hand, there is a notable awareness of the decreasing importance of the humanities, among which many people (mistakenly, in my opinion) include philosophy. The damage done to education by this abandonment of the humanities in general – and philosophy in particular – has often been decried (Nussbaum 2010).

Translation into English: Tom Lardner

On the other hand, we have witnessed a notable increase in the presence of philosophy in formal education. One concrete example is the growth of philosophical practice at the primary school level within the general framework of philosophy for children or with children. Similarly, interest in civic or social values education, which is often linked to philosophical learning, has been on the rise. We should also highlight UNESCO's commitment to the presence of philosophy in formal as well as informal education. In short, there is plenty of evidence available to shine a positive light on the situation, backed up by a number of UNESCO reports.

There is, in other words, a notable effort to extend the presence of philosophy at the primary school level and to consolidate or initiate – depending on the country – its presence in secondary schools. The dominant trend is to present philosophy as a specific activity, akin to a process of inquiry that is regarded as essential in the education of children and young adults. That is why this article is entitled “Philosophical Inquiry in Education.” What follows seeks to clarify the concept of philosophical inquiry, justify the importance of that activity in education, and finally to take a look at those environments where it should be present.

Clarifying the Concept

One feature of philosophy is that those who practice it do not often agree on exactly how to define it, although there tends to be mutual understanding and at least a partial agreement as to what they are doing. When we move on to talking about its presence in education, we encounter another problem apart from the definition itself. There is still a debate between those who, following Kant, emphasize the importance of teaching students to philosophize, and those, more akin to Hegel, who place importance on teaching philosophy – i.e., teaching certain content and knowledge pertaining to philosophy.

While this article focuses here on philosophical inquiry, which puts the emphasis on philosophy as an activity, it is also necessary to make clear from

the start that one cannot engage in philosophical inquiry without addressing certain subjects and concepts belonging specifically to the philosophical discipline. These are the themes that often appear in introductory manuals to philosophy or in higher level philosophical encyclopedias that can be consulted on the internet. These manuals and encyclopedias include, among others, the basic issues of metaphysics, such as unity, reality, truth, the good, beauty, etc., or those related to Kant's four questions concerning what we can know, what we should do, what may we hope for, and what it means to be human. This does not rule out, of course, that any subject or issue from human experience can and should be addressed from a philosophical perspective.

Focusing on those aspects that characterize philosophical inquiry, especially on what philosophers normally do, three features stand out. Firstly, it is the kind of thought that shows a clear capacity to analyze and reason. Secondly, it shows a special preference for discussions about concepts and subjects that are ambiguous, vague, uncertain, borderline, etc. Finally, philosophers create and work with wide-ranging frames of reference, what we could also call global concepts, making connections between theory and practice, or between abstract thought and real-life experiences (Rondhuis 2005). It is possible to add another feature as a corollary, following from those described above: a “philosophical inquiry” aims at seeking out the problems with what we accept as “given,” while working to clarify and bring closer to more generally acceptable “resting points in inquiry” those issues that seem vague and purely subjective. This allows to talk about progress: people are getting better at philosophically addressing and discussing issues and also at differentiating between good and poor reasons and asking always for stronger and better-founded justifications of ideas (Golding 2013).

Those features of philosophical inquiry are found in the ideas of Lipman and many other authors working in the area of philosophy with children and for children, who have contributed important ideas and practices concerning the presence of philosophical inquiry in the classroom. Lipman stresses the importance of fostering

higher-level or multidimensional thinking, a kind of critical, creative, and careful thinking, with all the cognitive and affective dimensions that this implies. This is the sort of thinking that help human beings to advance in the difficult path toward the truth. Or, following the work of Michel Tozzi (1994), it is also possible to summarize the basic features of philosophical inquiry into three general points. In such inquiry, people first problematize, that is, call into question what they normally accept as certain and well known. Then, they conceptualize, which means being rigorous and precise in the use of concepts. And finally, they present their points of view, avoiding the use of fallacies and invalid arguments.

In its efforts to support the presence of philosophy, UNESCO “interprets philosophy in a broad sense as dealing with universal problems of human life and existence and instilling independent thinking for individuals. Philosophy is at the heart of human knowledge, and its scope is as wide as UNESCO’s own fields of competence.” (UNESCO 2005). This perspective on philosophical inquiry is similar to those described above. It is viewpoint that roots itself in classical philosophers and the Socratic method, where irony (problematizing) is combined with maieutic (the thoughtful emergence of knowledge). It is also a model that was highly present in the teaching of philosophy in Medieval European schools and universities, beginning with Abelard and revived in a way by Leonard Nelson’s (1922) powerful proposal. It has spread and taken on great importance since that time.

Given these basic characteristics of philosophical inquiry, we can now choose – according to preference or subject – among a number of inquiry methods that are currently popular in the academic philosophical community. One major trend follows Husserl’s phenomenological method, which has the strong point of focusing on the things themselves, tentatively putting aside what we take for granted. The second trend is that which has come to be called analytic philosophy. This trend focuses on language itself as the central issue, placing value on the analysis of everyday

language and language games for formal education. Then there is the hermeneutic approach, which seeks out intersubjective dialogue in order to reach a personal appropriation of that which is expressed in texts – whether written, visual, or of any other kind. Finally, it is possible to opt for a deconstructive philosophical inquiry, a postmodern approach highlighted by its ability to disassemble texts, identifying their genealogy along with their internal ruptures, which helps to question meanings that are derived in an unreflective manner. At the same time, this approach serves to highlight the limits of any rational project.

Justifying Philosophy’s Presence

Today philosophical inquiry can be found in all levels of education – primary, secondary, and university. UNESCO coordinated a splendid project between 2009 and 2011 which resulted in the publication of six reports on *Teaching of philosophy in...: Latin America and the Caribbean, the Arab region, Asia and the Pacific, English-speaking African countries, French-speaking African countries, Europe, and North America*. These reports were followed by five general conferences organized to discuss these issues. The conferences were held in Tunisia, Santo Domingo, Milan, Manila, and Bamako. Generally, these reports are optimistic about the presence of philosophy, although very different situations make it difficult to generalize. Also it is DOUBTFUL that philosophy is being done in a similar way in all the places WHERE it is taught. Most likely all the experiences have a certain family resemblance, but it is less certain that philosophical inquiry is being practiced everywhere.

In any case, in these times of crisis in the humanities – when society is making far-reaching demands on educators – it is needed to provide arguments to justify why students should devote time in their schedule to philosophical inquiry, which obviously takes time away from other material and subjects. Justifying this by noting the extra-philosophical benefits from

the activity does not mean negating its intrinsic value. Nor does it mean that we are surrendering in a way to a market perspective. Rather, it only means that teachers of philosophy have to give reasons for why students should learn philosophical inquiry. This is simply trying to address a basic demand in a democratic society – students in particular, but also their families and society in general, devote a huge amount of resources to education. Justification and accountability are fundamental.

The intrinsic value of practicing philosophical inquiry can be a leading argument in our justification. Doing philosophy is always a first-person activity, that is, it is something that no one can do for us. It is only oneself who can respond to two basic questions: what kind of person do I want to be and what kind of world do I want to live in. The assertion that Plato put in the mouth of Socrates is still valid: “the unexamined life is not worth living for a human being.” As such, philosophy is essential for attaining a full human life, something that makes it intrinsically valuable. Forgoing philosophy is to avoid taking ownership over one’s own life.

A second argument, based in a sense on an extrinsic value, establishes a direct link between philosophical inquiry and the construction of democratic societies. The appearance of philosophy in classical Greece coincides with the Athenian democracy’s period of splendor. It is difficult to conceive of that particular democracy – the advocate of isonomy, isegoria, and parrhesia – without acknowledging the contribution of its philosophers, especially the sophists. More recently, we can cite the role played by the enlightened *les philosophes* in the eighteenth century, during the fall of the absolute monarchies and the birth of contemporary democracies. In 1916, shortly after the rise of totalitarian political regimes throughout Europe, John Dewey linked democracy with education, regarding democracy not only as a political regime but as a way of life depending on processes of deliberation based on rigorous argument. UNESCO showed the same commitment when, at the dawn of the twenty-

first century, it titled its book about the teaching of philosophy, *Philosophy and the school of Liberty*.

The link between philosophy and democracy is not, however, intrinsic or obvious. Many philosophers say that democracy needs people who are educated with the philosophical skills attained through familiarization with philosophical inquiry. With this in mind, the Spanish philosopher José Antonio Marina has called for the inclusion of philosophical competency in education, invoking the concept of competencies or skills that are guiding contemporary educational reform. It is clear, however, that such philosophical skills can be present without implying the construction of democratic societies. There are well-known examples throughout history. It is enough to remember that Popper considered Plato, Marx, and other philosophers as “enemies of liberty,” or to cite Lukacs’ evaluation of the German idealist philosophers, who advocated an assault on reason, to be reminded of the antidemocratic spirit of some good philosophers. The practice of philosophical inquiry only contributes to democracy if an explicit choice in favor of democracy precedes such inquiry (García Moriyón 2013).

Other arguments serve to justify the practice of philosophical inquiry in the classroom by citing its positive effects on students’ cognitive and affective growth, as well as on their academic performance in general. In other words, it is a justification that appeals to extrinsic benefits – apart from the philosophical reflection itself, yet derived from it. The usefulness of this approach lies in that it does not resort to philosophical argument in validating the positive effect of philosophizing in the classroom. Rather, it cites educational and psychological research and provides indisputable evidence that this effect is positive and significant. It was Matthew Lipman who explicitly introduced this approach when he included the results of research by experts in educational psychology in his first book (Lipman et al. 1980). Since that time there have been many studies demonstrating these positive

outcomes, including a number of meta-analyses (Trickey and Topping 2004) and longitudinal studies. We can confidently state that the benefits of philosophical inquiry for the educational process have been proven beyond any doubt.

It is true that these studies have evaluated the educational effect of philosophical inquiry when it is practiced in a certain way, i.e., when philosophy is done in classrooms that have been transformed into communities of philosophical inquiry – the distinguishing mark of the philosophy for children project and other, similar approaches. In any case, we saw above that the effect of philosophy depends on how teachers understand and practice philosophy in the classroom. Yet it is not always taught and learned in the same way, and experience shows that it is clearly positive when philosophy in the classroom is done in the form of communities of philosophical inquiry.

The Presence of Philosophical Inquiry in Education

Now that the meaning of philosophical inquiry has been clarified and we have provided a brief justification for its presence in education, it is needed to look at how it should be present. It is time to explore how to practice philosophical inquiry in formal education, leaving aside for now its presence in other educational environments – in nonformal as well as informal education. These other environments are surely important and are currently expanding, but it is better to put them aside now for reasons of space.

Recent educational guidelines stress the importance of competencies as basic elements running through all materials and subjects. This emphasis on competencies can be controversial, so to avoid confusion, we will clarify the issue by looking at thoughts on education from some years back, for example, the Delors report from 1996, *La educación encierra un tesoro* (*Learning: the Treasure Within*) and one that came out soon thereafter in 1999 by Morin, *Les sept savoirs nécessaires à l'éducation du futur*. These views serve to clarify the meaning of competencies, avoiding reductionist interpretations of same. This approach gives

great weight to, among other sources, the evaluation done by Gert Biesta (2013), who warned of the risk of excessively focusing on two educational objectives – qualification (especially professional) and socialization – while ignoring subjectification. The reports point out that it is the latter which makes growth and empowerment possible for students.

Accordingly, in looking for competencies or skills related to improving the educational process of subjectification, it would seem necessary to include specific time slots in all subjects when students can reflect on the fundamentals of each discipline. This refers to the need to problematize and clarify the basic concepts of each subject area, in order to achieve full understanding of them. Similarly, the learning of subject matter must be compared and contrasted with that which is learned in other subjects, as well as related to the students' everyday experience – in order to attain a global framework of understanding of their personal lives and of the world they want to live in. Therefore, it is essential that teachers in general include philosophical inquiry in their habitual educational practice. Only in this way, according to Biesta's critique, will we attain integrated learning in a truly educative experience.

Such inquiry, however, requires its own space. In accordance with the solid and coherent proposal put forth by Matthew Lipman and Ann Sharp, children must have some time each week devoted solely to philosophical reflection. This should occur throughout their entire formal obligatory education process, i.e., in every year of that process. Only if that time is allocated can the skills and abilities acquired through philosophical practice grow into true behavioral habits – habits that are necessary in the education of critical, creative, and caring people. Finally, a well-prepared teaching corps is needed to lead this philosophical inquiry, teachers who can transmit and exemplify philosophical content and procedures in their educational activity – with the goal of facilitating children's learning such that the skills become behavioral habits.

It is not easy to demand specific time in the curriculum for philosophical inquiry in an era when that curriculum is already loaded. The

importance of allocating that time, however, is evident. This is already partially being done, at least within the European Union, in three areas. One is civic and social values education, which has become part of the basic curriculum and is being taught, as can be expected, with a clearly philosophical imprint. Another is religious education, which in some countries such as the United Kingdom has a less faith-based and more philosophical focus. Finally, there are standard philosophy classes, which for now are only given in some countries and at the secondary level. Although they remain insufficient, these are three areas in which there is a genuine possibility of progressing in the implementation of philosophical inquiry as a cornerstone of an educational project able to meet the challenges and demands of today's society.

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Philosophical Roots of Gilligan-Kohlberg Controversy, The

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Synonyms

[Ethics of care](#); [Gilligan](#); [Kant](#); [Kohlberg](#); [Philosophy of education](#); [Theories of moral development](#)

The American psychologist Lawrence Kohlberg (1927–1987) is a modern classic in the fields of moral social psychology and theory of a moral development. His cognitivist theory of moral development has become a paradigm in the psychology of education. Students of teaching and education in many countries have been taught that there are six universal developmental modes (stages or schemas) of moral thinking, which are an empirical fact verified by Kohlberg and his followers in hundreds of empirical studies. Thus, the Kohlberg theory must be true because it is empirically verified. Nevertheless, one might ask can there be empirical proof on transcendental (philosophical) theory of morality and its development. Jürgen Habermas was the first to note that Kohlberg's theory of moral stages is a kind of rational reconstruction and that, as such, it cannot be empirically verified or falsified (Habermas 1995). Kohlberg intentionally wanted to do empirical research in the field of moral theory which traditionally has been considered an area of pure metaphysics and philosophical speculation. He believed that his empirical studies can solve the tension between facts and values, as a title of his article implies: From Is to Ought: *How to Commit the Naturalistic Fallacy and Get Away with It in the Study of Moral Development* (Kohlberg 1981). If Kohlberg is right, there is no gap between facts (what there is) and values (what there ought to be), and hence human morality is after all a naturalistic phenomenon and not a transcendental (*noumenal*) entity of the Kantian type. This is strange statement from Kohlberg

who wants to follow Kant's practical philosophy which includes the model of the "two Kingdoms." Kohlberg sees no contradiction in here. Surely empirical research must have some role in ethical theory, but we still believe there is a gap or a Hume's guillotine between "Is" and "Ought." In this matter, we agree with Harvey Siegel who writes that "neither Kohlberg nor anyone else can justify judgments of moral adequacy by appeal to the facts of development" (Siegel 1986, p. 76).

This kind of philosophical critique of Kohlberg's moral theory does not have much weight within the disciplines of psychology and education, in which empirical evidence is considered the hard currency. Of course, the moral development of a human being is an empirical phenomenon, but it also has a transcendental or philosophical dimension. The most famous opponent of Kohlberg is the feminist thinker Carol Gilligan, who presents both philosophical and empirical counterclaims against Kohlberg's cognitivist theory of moral development. Gilligan's main criticism is that Kohlberg constructs what he considers "the highest stage of moral development" from a male viewpoint and thus it is not neutral and impartial at all. Gilligan claims that the Kohlbergian ethic of justice is only one aspect of moral maturity – Kohlberg rejects the side of moral feelings and sentiments (see entry "[Gilligan-Kohlberg Controversy](#)" in EEPAT).

The so-called Gilligan-Kohlberg controversy touches at the heart of philosophical ethics. The basic question concerns the source of our morality: reason (duty) or love (moral sentiments, virtues of friendship). This was also central issue in Francis Hutcheson's, David Hume's, Jean-Jacques Rousseau's, Adam Smith's, Immanuel Kant's, and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel's ethical theories. In order to understand the philosophical root of the Gilligan-Kohlberg debate, it is worthwhile to take overview of the eighteenth century moral theories.

Bernard de Mandeville (1670–1704)

The good point to start is from British egoism and Bernard de Mandeville. In Oliver Stone's film

Wall Street, a character called Gekko illustrates in his speech very nicely Bernard de Mandeville's private-vice-public-benefit moral theory (de Mandeville 2004) which corresponds nicely with Kohlberg's concept of preconventional moral consciousness:

The point is, ladies and gentleman, that greed – for lack of a better word – is good. Greed is right. Greed works. Greed clarifies, cuts through, and captures the essence of the evolutionary spirit. Greed, in all of its forms – greed for life, for money, for love, knowledge – has marked the upward surge of mankind.

Mandeville claims that a private vice like selfishness is most beneficial to public welfare. Mandeville declares that people who act for their own benefit do more good for the society than superficial altruists. So, a successful society must be built on the vice of selfishness. There is no point to chase higher virtues, like Lord Shaftesbury does, because the search is a "wild-Goose-Chase" (Mandeville 2004, p. 331). For Mandeville, morality is as uncertain as fashion and is dependent on teaching and the subtle propaganda of dishonest civic leaders. Selfishness is certain and constant because it lies in the essence of man.

Francis Hutcheson (1694–1746)

Scottish moral sentimentalists Francis Hutcheson (1694–1746), David Hume (1711–1776), and Adam Smith (1723–1790) fought fiercely against Mandeville's moral theory and concept of man. Hutcheson's (2004, pp. 21–22; 69–75) counterclaim against Mandeville is that there are such things as a natural moral sense and natural moral sentiments. Hutcheson adopted the notion of moral sense from Lord Shaftesbury (2004, p. 52), who was a student of John Locke. Hutcheson (2004, p. 121) claims that moral sense motivates our actions and makes us sensitive to moral qualities of action:

... but had we no Sense of moral Qualities in Actions, nor any Conceptions of them, except as advantageous or hurtful, we never could have honour'd or lov'd Agents for publick Love, or had any regard to their Actions, further than they affected ourselves in particular. We might have

form'd the metaphysical Idea of publick Good, but we had never desir'd it, further than it tended to our own private Interest, without a Principle of Benevolence; nor admir'd and lov'd those who were studious of it, without a moral Sense.

Hutcheson agrees with Shaftesbury that God has given us a moral sense and along with it the feeling of nobler pleasure which comes from intending well for others and that by doing so “we undesignedly promote our greatest private good” (Hutcheson 2004, p. 75; Shaftesbury 2004, p. 88).

David Hume (1711–1776)

In the footsteps of Shaftesbury and Hutcheson followed two ethical thinkers that many contemporaries considered the brightest minds on Earth: David Hume and Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Although Hume followed Hutcheson in many ways, he did not believe in such thing as universal love of mankind. He preferred the concept of sympathy which is at work only when people are close to us. For Hume passions and sentiments are primary and reason secondary. In his work *A Treatise of Human Nature*, Hume (2004) proclaims that “Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them” (Hume 2004, p. 283). Of course this slavery is not absolute. Reason can correct passions and moral sentiments. At its best, reason can correct or reorientate moral sentiments, but in no way moral sentiments can be derived from reason (Hume 2004, p. 313):

Since morals, therefore, have an influence on the actions and affections, it follows, that they cannot be deriv'd from reason; and that because reason alone, as we have already prov'd, can never have any such influence. Morals excite passions, and produce or prevent actions. Reason of itself is utterly impotent in this particular. The rules of morality, therefore, are not conclusions of our reason... 'tis in vain to pretend, that morality is discover'd only by a deduction of reason. An active principle can never be founded on an inactive; and if reason be inactive in itself, it must remain so in all its shapes and appearances, whether it exerts itself in natural or moral subjects, whether it considers the powers of external bodies, or the actions of rational beings. It would be tedious to repeat all the arguments, by which I have prov'd, that reason is

perfectly inert, and can never either prevent or produce any action or affection.

Hume agrees with Mandeville that human beings possess primary self-interest, but unlike Mandeville, Hume thinks that there exists also sympathy (Hume 2004, p. 337): “. . . we naturally sympathize with others in the sentiments they entertain of us. Thus self-interest is the original motive to the establishment of justice: but a sympathy with public interest is the source of the moral approbation, which attends that virtue.”

Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778)

Concerning the moral passions, Jean-Jacques Rousseau holds very much the same opinion as his (former) friend Hume, but he is much more pessimistic concerning the benefits of civilization. In his first public work *A Discourse on the Sciences and Arts* (First Discourse), Rousseau (2016a) claims that the advancement of the sciences and arts has caused the corruption of virtue and morality. Due to the civilization process, people have lost their natural emotional sensitivity (*la sensibilité*) to the pain and suffering of the fellow man (see example Kontio 2003). For Rousseau, an uncorrupted and uncivilized natural man is not a Hobbesian egoistic violent person-owner but a kind and caring creature (noble savage) of God. In *Second Discourse*, the concept of the state of nature becomes more complex and less romantic (see Lähde 2008, pp. 67–165). Also the picture of the civilization process gets more sophisticated, but the role of passions remains essential in Rousseau's thinking. Like Hume, Rousseau acknowledges that self-preservation or self-interest is a principle of the human soul, but there exists also another principle, which is pity. Pity is “an innate repugnance to see his fellow suffer” (Rousseau 2016b, p. 19). Also animals have the same feeling, but humans – unlike animals – are free agents even in the state of nature. In *Second Discourse*, Rousseau also clarifies the relation between his two concepts of self-love: amour-de-soi and amour-propre (Rousseau 2016b, p. 41):

We must not confuse egocentrism (*amour-propre*) with love of oneself (*amour-de-soi*), two passions very different by virtue of both their nature and their effects: Love of oneself is a natural sentiment which moves every animal to be vigilant in its own preservation and which, directed in man by reason and modified by pity, produces humanity and virtues. Egocentrism is merely a sentiment that is relative, artificial and born in society, which moves each individual to value himself more than anyone else, which inspires in men all the evils they cause one another, and which is true source of honor. With this well understood, I say that in our primitive state, in the veritable state of nature, egocentrism does not exist.

The sense of being hurt is possible only in a social context in a civilized State in which a struggle for property (distribution) and a struggle for recognition exist. If an action happens in a non-social context, no feelings of hatred or desire for revenge can emerge.

Immanuel Kant (1724–1804)

Hume, Rousseau, and Smith, due to their eloquent rhetoric and enormous knowledge on the history of philosophy, made an impressive contribution to the theory of moral sentiments. The contemporary philosophers did not have a chance in the debate against these two friends. Only a hermit from Königsberg could really compete with Hume and Rousseau in every area of philosophy (epistemology, aesthetics, social philosophy, logic, rhetoric, philosophy of religion, and ethics), and also in fashion. He is, of course, Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) – the greatest representative of rationalistic ethics of all times.

The most fundamental concepts in Immanuel Kant's practical philosophy are the presupposition of freedom of will and the notion of duty. Kant concludes that although natural necessity covers all happenings (at the level of appearances; the phenomenal world) in the world, human beings possess an inherent transcendental freedom. The causality of freedom exists alongside the causality of nature. The human being is simultaneously a member of two kingdoms: the kingdom of necessity (natural causality in the sensible world) and the kingdom of freedom (causality of freedom in

the intelligible world) (Kant 1971, p. 104; Kant 2002, p. 80). The causality of freedom simply means that a human being has the capacity (faculty) to begin a process in the world just by the power of his or her will. This capacity exists despite the lack of empirical proof (proof at the level of appearances).

Kant postulates without a proof or deduction that there exists such a thing as the causality of reason or freedom which is related to the timeless essence of the human being, i.e., the transcendental ego (Kant 2007, pp. A552/B580):

The causality of reason in its intelligible character does not arise or start working at certain time in producing an effect. For then it would itself be subjected to the natural law of appearances, to the extent that this law determines causal series in time, and its causality would then be nature not freedom.

Kant says that a human cannot comprehend without contradiction the paradoxical relationship of the causality of freedom and the causality of nature. Kant calls this the third antinomy of pure reason (Kant 2007, pp. A446–447/B474–475).

As a member of the kingdom of freedom, the human being – or at least the transcendental ego – can exercise his or her freedom of will and choose to follow a duty. Kant thinks that a morally worthy action means following a duty. From the moral point of view, the significance of the motive behind an action surpasses that of its outcome. The motive of a morally worthy action is duty, and duty is derived from the so-called categorical imperative. Dishonest persons occasionally act according to the categorical imperative, while virtuous persons do so all the time. Nevertheless, a dishonest person does not employ their freedom of will and choose to follow the categorical imperative, which is why their actions have no moral worth. Only a person that is rational and free and possesses good will can act morally. Rationally oriented will inserts the moral dimension into an action. Without the moral dimension, an action is irrational and unfree – but the action could still be carried out in accordance with the categorical imperative.

According to Kant, people have two kinds of imperatives: hypothetical and categorical imperatives. A hypothetical imperative is a rule of action

in the pursuit of a particular goal. A hypothetical imperative dictates “if you want X do Y.” Kant claims that reason also produces the absolute maxim of moral action, the categorical imperative. A categorical imperative is unconditional. It simply says “do X.” This law applies to all rational beings, not only human beings. Again there is no proof or deduction involved in this law. It is exclusively a “fact of Reason.”

At least the following three formulations can be found in relation to the categorical imperative in *Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals* (Kant 2002, pp. 50–57):

1. Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law.
2. Act as if the maxim of your action were to become through your will a universal law of nature.
3. Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end.

Kant’s practical philosophy contains many paradoxes and difficulties. The most famous paradox concerns teaching and moral development. It is called the pedagogical paradox (see Kant 2015). This is one way to present the paradox. If we truly follow the categorical imperative in school education, we must treat pupils as free persons and not as a means for bringing up mature adult persons (i.e., childhood is the means and adulthood the end). Then again, the purpose of education is to educate a pupil – by means of the use of power, which is an inappropriate way of treating a person – so that she can become an enlightened mature person in the future. If a pupil is not a free and mature person, how can we treat her like one? If we do not treat her as a free person in education, we will treat her only as a means to an end, although that end is the pupil’s future adult personality. Thus, if we treat her only as a means, how can she ever be more than a mere means? This is a specific situation in which two different duties can be seen to be in conflict – a teacher has both the duty to make use of power in education

and the duty to respect his or her pupils as persons. Kant himself strongly opposed the view that a moral duty could sometimes exist in conflict with another moral rule. Nevertheless, we are not prepared to jump to the conclusion – like MacIntyre does – that Kant’s project of Enlightenment is a total failure. Kant’s practical philosophy is a major resource for modern theories of law, ethics, and education, but it is one-sided. It underestimates the role of moral sentiments and moral virtues subordinating them under the practical reason and cognitive elements of human morality. In his last opus magnum *Metaphysic of Morals*, Kant (1996) writes about a plenty of virtues (doctrine of virtues) and morally relevant feelings, but the core of his argument remains unaltered.

Adam Smith (1723–1790)

Adam Smith is well remembered because of his concept of “invisible hand” which illustrates how the market mechanisms work in civil society (e.g., economy). At the time of Adam Smith a new economic order (capitalism) was rising and this new economic order based on economic exchange between isolated self-centered individuals. Thomas Hobbes’s, John Locke’s, and Bernard de Mandeville’s egoistic moral theories (e.g., British moral egoism) created suitable ideological ground for this new capitalistic mode of production. Nevertheless, Adam Smith surely did not want to support the moral theory of British egoism although his book *The Wealth of Nations* (Smith 1973) suits well into the world view of British moral egoism. In the book *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* (Smith 1976; later TMS) Smith presents a moral theory which is the total opposite of moral egoism.

So there is inherent contradiction or at least a tension in Adam Smith’s social philosophy. This contradiction is known as *Das Adam-Smith-Problem*. On one hand, Adam Smith defends the free market and faceless economic exchange relationships, in which egoistic and rational individuals strive only for their material interests. The sphere of this egoistic economy is called

civil society, and there is no place for compassion and humanity in the civil society. On the other hand, Adam Smith claims that human morality is based on such feeling as sympathy and benevolence. Adam Smith himself of course did not think that there is any contradiction in the situation in which the individual acts egoistically in the economic sphere (civil society) and feels humanity and compassion toward his fellow men in the ethical sphere. Adam Smith considers moral sentiments to be a precondition for a free market society. There rich and healthy people take voluntary care of the drop-outs, invalids, elders, etc., without a State-founded social policy. Thus in no way Adam Smith would support any form of Social Darwinism or nowadays cold hearted global capitalism.

Unlike Hume, Adam Smith did not believe such thing as “moral sense” and considers such notion as bad usage of English tongue (TMS vii 3.3.15). Instead of moral sense Smith speaks about sense of propriety (TMS i.1.3.-4.). Tronto explains Smith’s sense of propriety as following (Tronto 1993, p. 46): “Propriety refers to the sentiment we share, being by nature sociable, that makes us eager to be sure that others perceive us as proper. If we did not develop a sense of propriety, perhaps we would be able to ignore the situations of others. But our desire to be accepted, our sense of propriety, causes us to develop an ability to put ourselves in others’ positions.”

Sense of propriety is related to Smith’s idea of the impartial spectator. Smith claims that moral point of view is the moral sentiment of impartial spectator. If we are engaged in moral conflict our instant moral feelings might be more or less biased. In social interaction we learn to imagine the reaction of the others who have no particular favorable emotion towards any engaged party. We learn to imagine what kind of moral feelings the impartial spectator would feel. We also have to assume that the impartial spectator is well-informed and sympathetic to somewhat normal degree (TMS, iii.2.31–32). When we examine the morality of our own action we should examine like the impartial spectator would examine (TMS iii.1.2.). The voice of the impartial spectator is a voice of conscience. It is a proper way to judge ourselves (TMS iii.1.3).

Besides the sense of propriety Smith presents even more demanding ethical maxim. He wants also to speak about universal benevolence in the spirit of Stoic cosmopolitanism. Notion of universal benevolence goes far beyond the ordinary sense of propriety which could at best include all the citizens of our own country (TMS vi.2.3.1). It also presuppose benevolent God.

Thus we can see three Smithian perspectives of morality:

1. Man’s has natural inclinations towards self-interest with underdeveloped sense of propriety
2. Sense of propriety with different degrees
3. Universal benevolence which presuppose benevolent God

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831)

In the beginning of the nineteenth century, there were two major alternatives in moral theory: the Scottish theory of moral sentiments and the Kantian ethics of duty. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel read carefully the texts of David Hume, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Immanuel Kant, and Adam Smith. He wanted to create a synthetic practical philosophy which would resolve the antithetical contradiction of love and reason in moral theory. From his early work *Das Leben Jesu* (Hegel 1906) to his last opus magnum *The Philosophy of Right* (Hegel 2001), Hegel tries to create a grand synthesis that would “overcome” (*Aufheben*) the tension of love and reason both in society and in human consciousness.

In his early text *System of Ethical Life* (*System der Sittlichkeit*) (Hegel 1979), Hegel introduces a three-level model of society, which consists of the family, the civil society, and the State. A *sittliche* State means a community of reciprocally well-behaving and caring citizens. In *Philosophy of Right*, Hegel (2001) creates a grandiose theory of society based on these three instances. The family is the sphere of love within which man takes care of his beloved. In this sphere, love “rules” and overcomes reason. The civil society

is the sphere of private contracts and egoistic economic exchange. This sphere is ruled by cold reason and Adam Smith's invisible hand. According to Hegel, society cannot manage only with these two instances. Hegel calls for a value community called the *sittliche* (ethical) State which is ruled by rational feeling. This rational feeling surpasses the contradiction between loving one's family and the egoistic reason of civil society. For Hegel, the *sittliche* (sitte means custom or habit) State is a sphere of reciprocal good behavior and caring for each other. In the *sittliche* State, people feel solidarity and compassion toward the "abstract other," toward another citizen of the State. In the level of the state, familial love is extended towards all citizens and is cultivated into rational feeling which ties up the individuals into a reciprocal ethical community.

Gilligan's critique of Kohlberg resembles partly Hegel's critique of Kant's ethical theory. James Gordon Finlayson (2000) describes the difference of Kant's and Hegel's ethics in the following way:

On the one hand, Kant and his followers defend a version of the moral standpoint, that consists in formal and universally valid principles, which have their basis in rationality. On the other, Hegel and his followers claim that formally valid moral principles are themselves historically and socially situated; that they only accrue validity within a set of distinctively "modern" cultural practices and political institutions, which are the product of an historical evolution. . .

In *Phenomenology of Spirit* Hegel (1977) uses Sophocles's play *Antigone* to illustrate the social and historical nature of human morality or *Sittlichkeit* (ethical life; decency). From the Hegelian or communitarian point of view, Kant's categorical imperative is just an empty formula which does not help in concrete moral conflicts. In Sophocles's play, there are two ethical powers in contradiction: the paternal morality of Creon and the maternal morality of Antigone. In Sophocles's play, and also in real life, following purely a heartless cognitive moral reasoning might lead to a disaster or at least to coldness of the heart.

Thus behind the Gilligan-Kohlberg controversy is the over 200-year-old debate concerning the role of reason (duty) and love (moral sentiments) in morality.

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Philosophy of Education and Science Education

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Synonyms

[Educational aims and reforms of science education](#); [Educational theory](#); [Philosophers of education](#); [Philosophy](#); [Philosophy of education](#); [Philosophy of science](#); [Science teacher education and identity](#)

Educational philosophy and theory (EPAT) as subjects of interest remain outside the mainstream of thinking in science education, whether the research field or professional classroom practice. Science education is known to have borrowed ideas from pedagogues and philosophers in the past – e.g., from Rousseau, Pestalozzi, Herbart, and Dewey – however the subfield of academic philosophy of education has been little canvassed and remains on the whole an underdeveloped area. At first glance such a state of affairs may not seem all too surprising since science education is mainly concerned with educating students about particular science subjects or disciplines. But this necessarily implies a tight link between subject content and educational issues and aims. Essential philo-educational questions arise at both levels, confronting researcher and teacher, often in ways that can intersect:

What should be the ultimate aim(s) of science education? Accumulation of knowledge? Should science education enhance both critical thinking and moral education? Or should it be preoccupied with preparing the next generation of specialists? Should the quality of science education be supervised by national standards? What is the nature of science, and thereto, is it authentically represented in textbooks, lab work, and classroom discourse? Does a hidden epistemology and cultural bias/ideology exist behind conventional curriculum and school science? Does a teacher's personal beliefs and conceptions of scientific knowledge and development reflect current views of science history, epistemology, and practice? How does a science teacher's personal philosophy and identity enhance or constrict authentic views of science and/or a learner's capability to understand, appreciate, or critique science? Are learners' cultural views, beliefs, and personal preconceptions more a hindrance or help? Should school science learning theories ape scientific epistemology and practices?

If science education is to mean more than mere instructional techniques with associated texts to encompass broader aims including ideals about what constitutes an educated citizen (i.e., defining "scientific literacy"), or foundational questions about the *nature* of education, of learning, of knowledge, or of science, then educational philosophy and theory must come into view (Nola and Irzik 2005).


An education *in* science has historically been associated with narrow "technical" training in specialized disciplines (e.g., conventional school science), with broader aims of liberal education (e.g., independent thinking, cultural enlightenment), with teaching science for "social relevance" (e.g., science-technology-society-environment: STSE reforms), or lately with "science for engineers" (e.g., the newest US STEM reforms) – the last one an updated version of the older vocational interest (Norris 1997; Pedretti and Nazir 2011). The vocational focus – high school science courses as prerequisites for techno-professional careers – has been a predominant aspect of teaching science since its inception in the 1900s and remains an expectation of parents, students, and society in general. Yet all these diverse curricular directions (or "orientations" or "emphases") imply or assume a particular philosophy of education that is rarely openly articulated or even acknowledged: whether to teach science

(1) for intellectual development (accumulation of knowledge), (2) for individual fulfillment (character), or (3) for socioeconomic or sociopolitical benefit (vocations, citizenship, etc.; cf. Matthews 2015; Roberts 1988). All three, in turn, have strong affinities with earlier, classically defined educational theories and perspectives: the first can be associated with the original knowledge-based educational project of Plato, the second is with Rousseau, and the last is a cross-cultural and timeless expectation of most societies, although in the USA the philosophy was modified by Dewey and progressivism (e.g., as social adaptation or reconstruction; cf. Eisner 1992; Schulz 2014).

When educational goals are examined historically, the foregoing three are ubiquitous; they persistently present themselves albeit in different guises, and they certainly can be identified throughout science educational reform history. No one normally holds exclusively to one or the other, although usually one or the other is emphasized over the other two at a given time (or two may be mixed and dominate over the third) – depending upon the defined educational or socioeconomic "crisis" at hand and under influence of respective social group interests. Such buried philosophies usually surface when diverse stakeholders (teachers, parents, science education researchers, State-controlled ministries, industry, and policy decision-makers) attempt to give voice to notions of "science literacy" and find they too often conflict and can't seem to be "balanced" or reconciled.

The field of science education research has over the last 30 years been staked out by incompatible positions from positivism to post-modernism, from "diehard realism to radical constructivism," the latter encompassing versions of epistemological and sociological relativism (impacted by studies in the post-positivist philosophy, history, and sociology of science). Thereto, teachers' personal and professional identities are in conflict when curriculum orientations clash, especially when they are exposed to discordant academic perspectives on the *nature of science* (NoS). Modern science teacher education has tended overall to bypass philosophy and

Philosophy of Education and Science Education, Fig. 1 PSE Synoptic framework



philosophy of education for courses on instructional techniques, classroom management, cultural studies, and learning theories from psychology and cognitive science – which still dominate the field – but a shift toward EPAT could have positive results for helping clarify the *identity* of both the research field and teacher professionalism (Fensham 2004; Schulz 2014). Minimally it would help teachers develop a philosophical orientated critical mind-set toward educational fads and ideologies that often follow in the wake of a perceived “crisis in science education,” which ensue upon economic and sociopolitical situated national and/or global disorders. At least three so-called crises have been identified: the aftermath of the 1957 “sputnik shock,” later on in the early 1980s with the US *Nation at Risk* report during the neoconservative Reagan era, and another in the late 1990s following various TIMSS and PISA publications, those international standardized science and mathematics education reports. All have in their time and for their own (edu-philosophical) reasons lamented the supposed deplorable state of either national or global science literacy.

Philosophy *for* science education has been of scattered interest among researchers for several decades, especially their limited foray into its subfields, which needs to be acknowledged (e.g.,

language studies, poststructuralism, postmodernism, feminism, hermeneutics, scientific argumentation, Rorty-influenced pragmatism, “critical theory”). The value of the subdiscipline of philosophy *of science* for science education has been generally recognized since the 1960s and has currently developed into the worldwide history and philosophy of science (HPS) reform movement (Matthews 2015). Philosophy *of* education itself has made a major impact on science education in the past only in so far as John Dewey’s ideas and progressivism have continued to influence educational thinking (Fensham 2004). Of lesser influence, though still significant, especially for those arguing today for the value of teaching science for liberal education purposes, have been Scheffler, Peters, and Hirst, themselves influenced by the 1950s/1960s Anglo-analytic philosophy of language and philosophy of science.

Yet the question of the necessity to develop an “in-house” philosophy *of* science education (PSE) has only recently been addressed, although math educators have debated the character of “philosophy of mathematics education” for almost three decades. Such a philosophy would need to take into consideration (if not to integrate) developments in such diverse fields as philosophy proper, philosophy of science, and philosophy of education (see Fig. 1; Schulz 2014):

The framework in-itself assumes neither prior philosophical positions (e.g., metaphysical realism or epistemological relativism) nor pedagogical approaches (e.g., constructivism, multiculturalism, sociopolitical activism, etc.). As a graphic organizer, it does provide science teachers and researchers a holistic framework to undertake analysis of individual topics and perhaps help clarify their own thinking, bias, and positioning with respect to different approaches and ideas. The main point is to show that any particular PSE as it develops for the teacher or researcher should take into consideration, and deliberate upon, the discourses pertinent to the three other major academic fields when they impinge upon key topics in science education. At minimum it should contribute to helping develop a philosophic mind-set.

In sum (as the figure illustrates), any philosophy of science education (PSE) is foremost a *philosophy* (“P”) and as such receives its merit from whatever value is assigned to philosophy as a discipline of critical inquiry – unfortunately, its benefit for the field may not appear at all obvious to science educators. Furthermore, such a philosophy would need to consider issues and developments in the philosophy, history, and sociology of science (“PHS”) and analyze them for their appropriateness for improving learning *of* and *about* science. Finally, such a philosophy would need to consider issues and developments in the philosophy of education and curriculum theory (“PE”) and analyze them for their appropriateness for education in science, as to what that can *mean* and how it could be conceived and best achieved. A fully developed or “mature” PSE can be understood as an appropriate integration of all three fields.

As one specific example, it could contribute to clarifying the dissimilar roles that theoretical, technical, and practical reason play (Aristotle, Habermas) in different reform initiatives which to this day remain confused or ignored. Science teachers are primarily trained in using theoretical reason (discipline-structured knowledge and instruction in traditional classrooms) and not in the other two modes, whereas STSE and especially STEM reforms presume the primary use of

technical reason. Researchers arguing for science-societal-issues (SSI) and sociopolitical or “activism” reform movements expect teachers and students to not only distinguish technical from practical or pragmatic reasoning but expect proficiency, to make effective use of them in classroom discourse, research, and ethical decision-making and action. Barring such clarification and preparation, reform programs will continue to face many predictable hurdles, including being poorly implemented or, at worst, confronting resistance by science teachers.

PSE ultimately aims at improving science education as a research field as well as assisting teachers in broadening their theoretical frameworks and enhancing their practice. Likewise, it aims to raise awareness among researchers to explicitly front their educational philosophies and theories, since the tendency in the past has been to make prescriptive arguments for various reform projects (e.g., the 1950s “science for scientists,” STSE, SSI, STEM, activism) based on obscure or perhaps concealed – or partly hidden – educo-political and philo-theoretical premises. This frequently coordinates with individual authors’ own favored philosophies of science (i.e., realist, empiricist, pragmatist, social constructivist, etc.), whose biases are at best semitransparent.

In Europe, science educators have drawn upon other educational and philosophical traditions, whether Ernst Mach’s educational ideas (little known outside of Germany/Finland) or the more established and occasionally contested *Bildung/Didaktik* tradition, one whose roots in romanticism can be traced back some 200 years. Mach’s educational theory and *Bildung* – also Rousseau, Hirst, and Dewey – represent in fact what can be called *metatheories* of education, those that go considerably beyond learning theory (e.g., constructivism) and seek to answer broader questions of what an educated person should ideally become or what educational institutions should strive in achieving for their citizens. It is well known such theories go back to Antiquity, beginning with the Greek idea of *paideia* (e.g., Plato, Isocrates, Aristotle, Cicero) and are always normative and prescriptive.

Modern metatheories are required to answer the four key educational questions: *what* to teach (curriculum), *how* to teach (instruction), *when* to teach (stages of learner maturity), and especially *why* to teach (specification of outcome or aim). Some educational theorists (e.g., Kieran Egan) have argued that educational development could substantially differ from psychological development, and hence educational metatheory should proceed autonomously from the findings of scientific psychology in prescribing educational progress and aims.

It is in the contested field of educational philosophy and theorizing that science education now finds itself becoming increasingly embroiled, whether drawing with some measure upon classical theories of Plato, Rousseau, and *Bildung* or upon relatively more topical educational (meta) theories of Mach, Peters, Dewey, Egan, Gardner, Noddings, and others. Most importantly, it is within the confines of the framework of the specified educational philosophy that the meaning of “what counts as science education” in general, and thereto, the meaning of “science literacy,” will eventually be spelled out. One can expect that just as educational philosophies are often incompatible, so too will be the resulting expressions of science literacy programs.

This can be illustrated with some contemporary developments. A number of researchers, presently still in the minority, have sought to elaborate an unconventional or “provocative” PSE (self-described) by drawing upon ideas and values from poststructuralist, postcolonialist, and feminist theory, as a philosophy of education, intending to “envision and create a critical and emancipatory science education for the twenty-first century” (Zembylas 2006, p. 585). Approaches to employ insight from Lyotardian postmodernism, nonetheless, have been met with considerable criticism, not least of which are problematic arguments concerning PE and PS (Schulz 2007). Others have argued also on emancipatory grounds and aligned with critical theory and critical pedagogy (and drawing upon Deleuze, Foucault, and others), to develop an overt politicized and “activist” science education

for students, that is, a predominant focus on “science education as/for sociopolitical action.” Such desired normative projects openly espoused by certain researchers represent a *fourth*, non-traditional goal (next to the common three mentioned above) that seek to fundamentally reconstruct and reorientate curriculum and the schooling of science education for social *transformation* (and not social adaptation) purposes, according to Eisner’s (1992) categorization of curriculum ideologies.

This newer sociopolitical variety of PSE has drawn criticism from a liberal education perspective, which points out that it significantly downplays the importance of scientific knowledge and discovery for its own sake and neglects the personal and aesthetic dimensions of science, especially the aspects of beauty, creativity, and wonder (Hadzigeorgiou 2015). It purposively seeks to shift the weight of the primary goal of science education away from the conventional one of preparing the next generation of scientists, engineers, doctors, and other techno-science-based professions for an exclusive stress instead on “science for citizens.” In other words, one aims for achieving critical citizenship for global sustainability, including a critical and ethical distancing from our “knowledge economy” with its techno-scientific base in post-industrial society, and often from Western science itself.

Turning away from the interests of researchers, and focusing instead on the immediate perspective of the classroom science teacher, PSE can be made practical if it allows for integration of the multiple philosophies that a teacher carries, linked with a heuristic teaching model that bridges philosophical abstraction with the teaching situation, allowing choices about the what, the how, and the why of science teaching (Janssen and Berkel 2015).

The latest discourse and stimulating debates concerning EPAT topics as related to the explicit emergence of various philosophies of science education (PSEs) have opened up new intellectual territory for the discipline of science education, encompassing both researchers and teachers, but to different degrees. In general it can be admitted

the research field requires EPAT as a capacity to think deeper and more systematically about the unique cultural, educational, and epistemological dimensions of teaching and learning of science as philosophy, as profession, and as practice. Philosophy as a discipline of critical inquiry, and philosophy of education as a subdiscipline, would ideally enable teachers to develop a reflective, critical PSE to help integrate their teaching philosophies and identities and, hence, examine curricular, cultural, and epistemological issues as they arise: whether associated with classroom discourse, textbook exposition, curriculum change, societal identified crises, reform initiatives, or professional policy deliberations.

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Philosophy of Education: Its Current Trajectory and Challenges

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Philosophy of education is a domain of philosophical inquiry into the nature and aims of education; the diverse normative dimensions of education; the aspects of learning, teaching, and curricula; and the character and structure of educational theory and its own place in that theory. It seeks understanding of educational matters and to provide practical guidance for educational practice and policy. Throughout its history, philosophy of education has been shaped by related philosophical developments and by contemporaneous educational, social, economic, and political circumstances. Over the past half century, it has also come to exhibit features associated with its professionalization as a research specialization.

Historical Overview

What we know of the origins of philosophy of education in the West suggests that it began in Greek Antiquity in the pedagogical claims and counterclaims of the adult educators we now know as philosophers, orators, and sophists (all of whom claimed the title “philosopher” in their time) and in debates about the role of slave pedagogues, the invention of group lessons for children, and the virtues and limitations of Spartan education. In the aftermath of the Peloponnesian Wars, the philosopher-moralists of Athens called for systematic investments in education, and they explored related questions about justice, virtue, happiness, human development, civic friendship, political stability, the relationships between education and law, and the tools of statesmanship.

So it was that in the works of Plato and Aristotle, many of the perennial problems of philosophy of education were framed: What is education?

How does it contribute to human well-being or flourishing? To what extent, and by what means, can the aim of educating children for their own good be reconciled with educating them for the common good? How can education contribute to civic unity? Should education be the same for everyone? Should education be a matter of individual parental choice or publicly controlled? Through what forms of learning and instruction are virtues of character and intellect acquired? How does rationality develop, and what role does instruction play in that development? To what extent and by what means can education “emancipate” human beings or enhance their freedom? What is knowledge and how is it acquired? Can understanding and knowledge be *transmitted* through teaching? How are methods of inquiry and methods of instruction related to one another? What is the role of the arts in education? What role do practical arts and the development of talents play in a “liberal” education? How are education and work related to one another?

Other questions of enduring interest got their footing in the early modern period, in the midst of the scientific revolution and the seemingly endless religious persecution and wars of the Reformation. Philosophers, from René Descartes and Thomas Hobbes to John Locke and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, were occupied with understanding the new science, reconciling it with religious faith and moral knowledge, and rethinking the relationships between church, State, and moral formation: What must be learned through experience to be understood? To what extent is learning through inquiry or discovery feasible? To what extent can education rely on “natural” learning, motivated by curiosity? Should societies forgo the imposition of a State religion and trust the spontaneous activity of human reason to impart the moral prerequisites of good citizenship? In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the industrial revolution, growth of mass schooling, new-found respectability of democracy, and consolidation of the modern system of the arts and aesthetics cast new light on enduring questions of philosophy of education and prompted some new ones: Is mass schooling desirable? Is it compatible with cultural excellence? Should all students receive the same

education? What is the relationship between education and labor? How is education related to socioeconomic status and opportunity?

The history of philosophical inquiry concerning education reveals an occupation with the nature, aims, and means of education, with philosophical aspects of teaching and learning, and with matters of educational authority, responsibility, equity, and entitlement. Through most of this history, philosophical inquiry concerning education rarely announced itself *as* philosophy of education, no one made a living as a philosopher of education, and no societies or journals of philosophy of education had yet been founded. All of this began to change in the middle of the twentieth century. Philosophy of education constituted itself as a profession employed primarily in faculties of education and as a scholarly enterprise straddling education and philosophy. Journals and societies were founded, a handful of institutions established Ph.D. programs in philosophy of education, and the prestige of research stimulated a growing stream of publications, much as it did in other academic domains. As its professional advancement has progressed, philosophy of education has come to exhibit traits associated with the rising costs and diminishing returns on research in a field’s established core. One consequence of this is that the nature and limits of philosophy of education are now harder to identify.

Professionalization, Fragmentation, and Strategies of Renewal

Judging from what is presented and published under the aegis of the philosophy of education societies of Australasia, Great Britain, and North America, philosophy of education is exploding in so many directions away from its historic core that one may wonder whether it is simply disintegrating. It seems intent on leaving no far-flung theoretical stone unturned, on what often appears the merest supposition that so important a theory would naturally have *some* educational implications. To write about Derrida or Dualism, Wittgenstein or Whiteness, or Levinas or Inferentialism may be thought so

obviously rich in practical implications that education need not be mentioned at all. Are these exploding fragments of a field meaningfully tethered to enduring central questions about education? If so, is there a body of ongoing inquiry into those central questions that informs the diverse fragments?

Similar concerns have been expressed about other philosophical subfields in recent decades. Philosophers of law have asked whether their own field, once so plainly defined by a cluster of conceptual and normative questions about the nature and boundaries of law, authority, obligation, responsibility, and liberty, has come to a standstill. Philosophers of science, once similarly focused on the nature of science and logic of scientific laws, explanation, evidence, and theory, have also worried about the fragmentation of their field and the extent to which its far-flung parts are not informed by work on the fundamental questions. All three fields, all of them philosophies of domains of norm-governed human endeavor, have exhibited dramatic out-migration from their centers. As fields of inquiry, law and education have looked beyond themselves for periodic intellectual renewal, and philosophy of law and philosophy of education have followed suit. Yet the patterns of out-migration have been very different. Philosophy of law has advanced and critiqued feminist, neo-Marxist, economic, humanistic, and semiotic analyses of core aspects of law while moving beyond the field's defining core to investigate diverse, specific legal rules, procedures, and principles. The explosion away from the core has been characterized by detailed engagement with puzzling and controversial features of legal systems and developments pertaining to them, relying on intimate knowledge of law and framed in terms accessible to legal scholars and practitioners who are not philosophers. Aspirations to shape practice are not misplaced. The movement away from the core of philosophy of science has followed a similar pattern to the extent it has occupied itself substantially with what is distinctive in different sciences – their distinctive ontological puzzles and modes of inquiry, confirmation, and explanation. The occupation with one or another diverse science has

diminished communication between philosophers of science and collective memory of work in the field's core that could usefully inform their work. With these drawbacks of abandoning the core having been recognized and discussed, there has been a significant renaissance of work on the field's central topics in recent years.

Why should these patterns recur across diverse fields of inquiry? There is a dynamic of diminishing marginal returns on investment that explains it (Tainter 1988, 111 ff.). As a field constitutes itself as a self-governing professional enterprise, it will begin by addressing the most basic and important problems in its domain, a domain defined by its object of study. It will address the nature of the objects in the domain, their properties, and their variety and relationships to one another. If the domain is one of human practice, it will not only seek understanding but will identify norms of success and provide guidance on achieving success. Only by starting in this way is a field likely to attract interest and establish the external and internal legitimacy a profession requires. External legitimacy is predicated on a promise of value to the host sociopolitical system, and internal legitimacy is predicated on intrinsic intellectual rewards and socioeconomic return on energy invested in acquiring professional expertise. The pioneers of fields of inquiry establish the starting points of such legitimacy by demonstrating the success of their methods in producing model solutions to fundamental problems. The course of subsequent work within that research paradigm will follow a predictable path. Improvements in the answers to the most basic questions will be increasingly difficult to obtain, as energy invested in mastering increasingly complex debates and methods yields smaller and smaller refinements. Marginal return on investment in further research on the field's defining questions will decline, and this will yield incentives to (1) work on relatively unexplored but increasingly peripheral problems and (2) search outside the field's established parameters for new sources of intellectual "energy" or new research paradigms.

Both strategies for preserving an acceptable return on investment in research are themselves subject to declining marginal returns, but the

former is more reliably conducive to maintaining the legitimacy of a professionalized field of inquiry. As the examples of medicine, law, and other fields demonstrate, progress on peripheral problems can be conducive to both external legitimacy and internal legitimacy in the form of intellectual gratification and feasible career paths. Prospecting for transformative theoretical paradigms is more adventuresome. In philosophy of education, literary studies, and some related fields, it also often trades on a status hierarchy that honors abstraction. But it is a strategy analogous to prospecting for gold or prospecting for petroleum at a point when energy return on energy invested in petroleum exploration and development is in sharp decline.

Looking Ahead

In order to flourish in the years ahead, philosophy of education must recommit itself to its central problems and find the patience and resourcefulness to do philosophically sound and interesting work *on fundamental and controversial aspects of education*. Only in this way can it replenish itself with talent, bolster its legitimacy, and set itself on a trajectory of accumulating success. In developing its periphery, it would do well to observe the norms of counterpart domains of practical philosophy, such as philosophy of law and biomedical ethics – norms that counsel normative clarity and serious engagement with what can be learned of the institutional and human realities in one's domain of inquiry.

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Philosophy of Science

► [Philosophy of Education and Science Education](#)

Philosophy of Social Science

► [On the Logical Form of Educational Philosophy and Theory: Herbart, Mill, Frankena, and Beyond](#)

Philosophy with Children

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Synonyms

[Community of inquiry](#); [Philosophy for children](#); [Teaching philosophy](#)

Introduction

Philosophy with children (PWC) as well as philosophy for children (P4C) as practices of philosophical thinking of children are essentially connected to the American philosopher Matthew Lipman. Lipman designed the community of inquiry (COI) as a form of philosophizing for

children, created plenty of resources for classroom work, and developed the philosophical foundation of the programme. On a practical level, he founded the Institute for the Advancement of Philosophy for Children at Montclair State University where teachers are educated and where philosophers get acquainted with the P4C programme and the *Thinking* journal as a source of reflection on the practice. P4C eventually spilled over the border of the country: it is present in 50 countries, and Lipman's resources have been translated into more than 20 languages.

Lipman did not coordinate the project on his own; he was helped by his colleagues, especially by Ann M. Sharp. The seminars held in Montclair were attended by philosophers from all around the world who later founded national centers for the P4C. In different countries, the programme was adapted to the social and cultural environment and the local philosophical traditions. For a clearer distinction, Lipman tried to differentiate between his own programme and other principles of philosophical work with children.

Thus, in her approach to P4C that includes children below 5 years of age with the help of picturebooks, Karin Murris, on Lipman's request, started using the term philosophy with children, "which has also been taken up by others as it expresses the democratic and collaborative nature of the practice: philosophy adults do with, not for children." (Haynes and Murris 2011, p. 300). One could use PWC as a general term, referring to every practice, including Lipman's (similar goes for P4C: it can refer to every practice or Lipman's exclusively), or in a narrow sense, for every non-Lipman practice. The former is more commonly used, and it is also used by The International Council of Philosophical Inquiry with Children (ICPIC), which was established in 1985, "to strengthen communications among those in different parts of the world who are engaged in philosophical inquiry with children, in teacher education, in research and for school administrators looking to initiate and develop programs that would encourage children's philosophical thinking" (ICPIC 2015). This is how the term PWC is used in this article.

It should be noted that the P4C programme was developed in the USA, where – as in some other countries – they did not incorporate philosophy in their preuniversity curriculum. Teaching philosophy as a school subject on an upper-secondary education level has a long tradition in European countries. Independently from the P4C programme, there was a debate in Europe on different approaches to the teaching of philosophy and the reasons for it being limited only to upper-secondary level of education; some of these were the French group *Greph* (*groupe de recherches sur l'enseignement philosophique*), the dialogic and pragmatic philosophy didactics by Ekkehard Martens, a German philosopher, and discussions within the AIPPH (*Association Internationale des Professeurs de Philosophie*) on the difference between teaching about philosophy and doing philosophy. Thus, some countries began with independent initiatives to incorporate the teaching of philosophy also into primary education. Simultaneously, there were other principles of philosophical practice (philosophical counseling, the philosophy cafe, the neo-Socratic dialogue ...) emerging independently from the P4C, which, similarly to the latter, are founded on a belief that parallel to the academic philosophy there is the philosophy in everyday life, meaning that besides the theoretical philosophy there also exists philosophy as a way of life. Today, PWC is one of many philosophical practices and as such it is not only influenced by pedagogical and philosophical ideas, but also by other philosophical practices which, reciprocally, it influences as well.

For PWC, a diversity of philosophical practices may be compared to the Wittgenstein concept of family resemblance: there is no common essence, only a string of resemblances, but not a single property connects all the members of a family. However, it seems that philosophers, theorists, and practitioners who work with the PWC are all somehow interconnected. Primarily, they are a part of a common space of the PWC, defined by magazines, conferences, and societies. The other connecting element is grounded in the content: PWC is marked by the connection to Matthew Lipman, who established the link philosophy-child. This connection to Lipman

can be represented by continuation and modification, but it can also have a form of criticism.

Modification: The Structure of the Practice

The 2008 publication of the *Philosophy for Children, Practitioner's Handbook*, presents five traditional steps of the Lipman model, albeit slightly modified: (1) the reading of a philosophical story; (2) asking questions and forming the programme of work; (3) discussion on the questions in the COI; (4) self-evaluation of the practice, philosophical exercises, and activities; and (5) in between each episode, the moderator presents a mind game and a guided discussion on an important concept according to the discussion plan from the handbook. Students may also be involved in a nondialogical philosophical activity (e.g., an interview with parents on an important philosophical question, taking pictures, doing art, etc.) (Gregory 2008, p. 9).

The comparison of standard instructions of the P4C and the PWC instructions (which emerged in the context of the work done in English schools) shows a number of similarities and differences. Sara Stanley suggests the following procedure: (1) presenting the stimulus, (2) thinking time, (3) recorded thinking time, (4) collecting questions, (5) analyzing and deciding upon questions, (6) dialogue, and (7) closure and evaluation (Stanley 2006, p. 31). There are no obvious differences besides the second step (asking questions) being divided into several steps. However, there are two new moments incorporated, the “thinking time” and the “recorded thinking time” – important innovations which introduce the element of silence and the element of writing that the classical P4C approach omitted.

Hymer and Sutcliffe, in their 10-step model, also strive for a more structured research. Their model breaks the dialogue down into three different steps: first words, building, last words. The first step is dedicated to the students' suggestions on how to handle a problem, while the last step helps an individual to have a last say on the topic, to summarize, perhaps ask a new question (Hymer and

Sutcliffe 2012, p. 10). Therefore, last words are used to introduce postdebate commentaries that do not construct the dialogue any more. (The first level of dialogue is similarly parsed by Peter Worley – his philosophical enquiry method [PhiE] consists of five steps: stimulus, first thoughts, task questions, talk time, and enquiry.) Beate Borresen's work follows the same direction, introducing a log sheet into the procedure, which enables the individual to reflect on each step of the COI. Catherine C. McCall, who developed the Community of Philosophical Inquiry (CoPI) while working with Lipman, took another direction. She developed an 18-step approach that focuses on a detailed description of each step of a discussion. Ekkehard Martens developed an integrative model including five methods (phenomenology, hermeneutics, analysis, dialectics, speculation), extracted from the history of philosophy. Oscar Brenifier continues to invent new strategies that force the students to think, thus nurturing their thinking.

Criticism

Oscar Brenifier developed his approach to the philosophical practice with children exclusively of the P4C. He attended the 2003 ICPIP congress in Varna and published a critical article on the “Lipman Method.” His attention was mainly drawn by the demonstration of the P4C he witnessed. The children participating in the demonstration were stringing opinions with no critical thought on the subject. In a discussion they held with Brenifier, they also claimed that philosophy is interesting mainly due to the fact that “there is no ‘true’ and no ‘false’ and that everyone can say what he wants” (Brenifier 2007, p. 226).

The demonstration of the P4C was focused on expressing opinions, not on the analysis and justification of those, keeping the method on a pre-philosophy level. According to Brenifier, this is also evident from the children's statements that the charm of philosophy is in the absence of true answers, which is a point of view defended by those who have not yet encountered philosophy, the goal of which is to show the narrow-mindedness of the common-sense relativism.

Brenifier's critic of Lipman received a number of responses. Pierre Lebuis (Lebuis 2005), a Canadian practitioner of P4C, noted that he agreed with Brenifier's critic of the P4C practice in Varna, but declared that that was not the Lipman practice. The described demonstration of the communal research deviated from P4C. The reason for the deviation, according to Lebuis, is most probably the limited training of the teachers, which should not be attributed to the programme itself, but rather to the problems related to the implementation of the programme.

In this manner, Lebuis exempts Lipman from the critic and indirectly raises awareness of an unusual fact: Brenifier, who criticizes Lipman sharply, is closer to him than many a person within the PWC movement. In his criticism, Brenifier enumerates the activities that the facilitators of the COI should provide: "They must produce questions, formulate hypotheses, interrogate pre-suppositions, give counter-arguments, find the contradictions, analyse ideas, produce concepts, problematize statements, identify the issues, etc.," (Brenifier 2007, p. 237) which corresponds to Lipman's description of the elements of philosophical research in *Thinking and Education*: the articulation of disagreements and the quest for understanding; fostering cognitive skills (e.g., assumption finding, generalization, exemplification) through dialogical practice; learning to employ cognitive tools (e.g., reasons, criteria, concepts, algorithms, rules, principles); and joining together in cooperative reasoning (e.g., building on each other's ideas, offering counter-examples or alternative hypotheses, etc.) (Lipman 1991, p. 242).

Seven years before Brenifier, Susan Gardner opened a debate on the same grounds. In the article "Inquiry is no mere Conversation" she draws attention to the "underrating of the role of facilitator," which leads to the devaluation of an "otherwise brilliant pedagogical method" (Gardner 1996, p. 102), but she takes a step further than Lebuis. Gardner emphasizes the relationship between COI and the truth: the communal research is essentially a research, therefore it seeks truth. This is why in understanding the facilitation of COI, it does not suffice to rely

primarily on the autonomy of the pupils. Gardner does not accept the reason for difficulties to lie only in the strenuous implementation of the programme, but rather focuses on searching for deeper reasons for them. Doing so, she uses Lipman's statement that all research should reach for the truth, at the same time noting that "his writing [is] so rich with insight, particularly with regard to the processes and procedures of inquiry that I fear that his comments with regard to the importance of truth as its regulative ideal are too often overlooked" (Gardner 1996, p. 103).

When analyzing the reasons for a research to slip into conversation, she pinpoints the fact that Lipman in his texts writes about the "natural philosophical propensity" of children, thus giving an impression that a teacher should let the children speak freely, and the dialogue will flow correctly. According to her analysis, Lipman's suggestion of using modeling as a key method in educating teachers "masks the intricacies and in particular the philosophical nuances employed by experts for ensuring a successful community" (Gardner 1996, p. 104).

It should be noted that the title of the article per se, "Inquiry is no mere Conversation," bears proof of her faithfulness to Lipman, who, in *Thinking in Education*, named one of the chapters "The art of conversation," and another one "The structure of dialogue" (Lipman 1991, p. 235). From the content of these two chapters it is clear how Lipman considers various theories, and bases his own view on the discussion of these theories, but does not evaluate them. Thus, he starts his discussion of the dialogue with a view that emphasizes a "disclosure" of a subject in dialogue on one side and the persuasion at the other side, claiming that the dialogue happens somewhere in between, while the COI dialogue is a "dialogue that is disciplined by logic" (Lipman 1991, p. 236). So, in Lipman's writings we find a plurality of ideas that cannot be found in the conclusions he makes. This plurality in written form often anticipates the plurality of understandings and methods of work that later emerged within the PWC.

Brenifier's article received response also from Walter Kohan, who worked in Brazil. He agrees with Brenifier's criticism on many points, but at

the same time exposes the key differences. The specificity of his point of view is best shown through the answer on Brenifier's address of relativism. Kohan points out that Lipman had always outspokenly objected relativism, and therefore, Brenifier's objection to Lipman is unjustified. However, Brenifier and many others within the PWC movement are connected by philosophical underestimation of relativism. Philosophical concepts are controversial, so no one can claim that he is the only one who holds the truth. The concept of truth, as well as other philosophical concepts, can be understood in a number of ways. "This is why what counts most is not for the children to be relativists or absolutists, but for them to be philosophers, essentially the people who openly, creatively and critically deal with different concepts on the grounds of their experience" (Kohan 2005).

Kohan thus does not defend Lipman from Brenifier's accusations, but rather addresses Brenifier and the PWC, claiming that they force feed the children their own perception of truth instead of opening up a space where children could think of the truth on their own. In this manner, Brenifier's criticism led to a dialogue that questioned several of the fundamental concepts of the P4C. Paradoxically, the most radical criticism on Lipman was not expressed by Brenifier as an outside observer, but rather by Kohan, who completed his doctorate with Lipman.

However, the story does not end here. In an issue of the *Journal of Philosophy of Education*, dedicated to philosophy for children, Murris and Haynes include also epistemological and moral relativism into the "recurring themes in the practice of PWC educators." They attach it to the popular belief that "philosophy has no right or wrong answers" (Haynes and Murris 2011, p. 295). They, too, do not comply with the standard instruction in P4C on critical research of every aspect presented in a discussion, as "every participant [is] a potential source of insight and worthy of being listened to responsively. (...) We value the rich openings philosophical teaching creates for everyone involved to play freely with new ideas. The aim of education should not be a mere focusing on the acquisition of knowledge, or a process of socialization into an existing order,

but to speak with one's own voice and to bring something new into the world ..." (Haynes and Murris 2011, p. 296). In order for "other" and "different" to be encountered, mere critical research of every opinion does not suffice, but rather an openness that enables the new to emerge in a discussion. Thus, the fight against relativism becomes more complex. The rigidity of thinking is enriched by new spaces opening up and the open-mindedness toward the otherness. The apparatus of critical thought is not only nonadequate but can act harmfully as well, since it can, when put into central focus in an inappropriate manner, close a space within which the children are searching for their voice.

Conclusion

An overview of different models of practice and a discussion on the objectives of the philosophical practice with children has shown that the demarcation line between the P4C and PWC cannot be drawn between Lipman and different representatives of the PWC, but rather that the differentiation happens within Lipman's work as well as among different representatives of the PWC. The aforementioned discussion has thus led from a mere stating of opinions of the children, past the structured practice in which a facilitator leads and steers the children in quest of truth (simultaneously teaching them about thinking and other skills), to the practice of philosophy based, again, on the thinking of the children. This time, it is not based on expressing opinions, but on "philosophy as an experience of thinking which doesn't admit of any definite order. It aspires to think the unthinkable. (...) It opens the door to difference. In short, it allows an encounter with childhood" (Kohan 2002, p. 11). The first and the last do not represent the two extreme poles within the PWC as they do the extreme poles of every practice aiming to connect philosophy and children.

Lipman's text offers a plurality of principles that cannot be found in his conclusions. This plurality on a textual level anticipates the plurality of interpretations of his work within the PWC.

When Walter Kohan insists on philosophy not being “an ability but an event; not a tool but an experience” (Kohan 2002, p. 10), he is being true to the connection between philosophy and a child, which is at the very heart of Lipman’s work. The development of PWC could be understood as a deviation from Lipman’s ideas, but the pluralization of the programme evident in the new resources, modifications in the structure of work, and the introduction of ideas from different philosophical schools may also be understood as an expression of importance of the Lipman’s programme.

Cross-References

- [Philosophy with Children: The Lipman-Sharp Approach to Philosophy for Children](#)

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Philosophy with Children: The Lipman-Sharp Approach to Philosophy for Children

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Synonyms

[Community of Inquiry](#); [Dialogic Teaching](#); [Educational Philosophy](#); [Ethical Inquiry](#); [Inquiry Dialogue](#); [Philosophical Dialogue](#); [Philosophical Education](#); [Philosophical Inquiry](#); [Philosophy and Childhood](#); [Philosophy for Children](#); [Philosophy with Children](#)

Introduction

Philosophy for Children (P4C) is a designation first associated with Matthew Lipman’s and Ann Margaret Sharp’s particular approach, which now exists within a broader, global educational movement, Philosophy with Children (PwC). Today, many approaches that share similar commitments to the Lipman-Sharp (LS) approach use the P4C label as well. Throughout this entry, LS-P4C will be used to indicate the Lipman-Sharp approach. LS-P4C was the first attempt to develop a comprehensive curriculum designed to engage children and teenagers in philosophical inquiry. Often referred to as the “Lipman approach,” LS-P4C is better understood as the result of an extensive and equal collaboration between Matthew Lipman (1922–2010) and Ann Margaret Sharp (1942–2010), cofounders of the Institute for the Advancement of Philosophy for Children (IAPC) at Montclair State University in Montclair, New Jersey. With affiliate centers in over 40 countries worldwide, the IAPC has served as the home of LS-P4C since its founding in 1974. Globally, versions of P4C and PwC are represented by the numerous constituents of the International Council for Philosophical Inquiry with Children (ICPIC), established in 1985.

The Lipman-Sharp Approach

The genesis of P4C is often marked by the appearance of *Harry Stottlemeier's Discovery* (1982), a philosophical novel written by Matthew Lipman between 1967 and 1969 and first published in 1970. Initial publication of *Harry* came with support from the National Endowment for the Humanities (NEH) for use in a successful pilot in the Montclair, NJ, school district. In the novel, Harry Stottlemeier is a fifth grader who stumbles upon some of the rules of formal logic (Aristotelian) and explores them in different contexts with his friends. Although this is a consistent thread throughout the novel, the characters also grapple with a variety of philosophical concepts and questions drawn from the philosophical canon including: *Invention versus Discovery*; *Thoughts and Reality*; *Children's Rights*; *Can a person have more than one personality?*; *Do animals have culture?*

In its infancy, Lipman envisioned LS-P4C as a series of such novels, although he had a hunch that the program could become more than a curricular one (Lipman 2008). With the founding of the IAPC and with significant contribution from Sharp, LS-P4C further evolved into a pedagogical program aimed at the improvement of thinking with a particular commitment to rigorous and respectful philosophical dialogue. Lipman and Sharp were aided in their endeavors by colleagues from throughout the world at various times and in various ways. It is because of this collaboration that LS-P4C today continues to be unique within the field of PwC and pre-college philosophy in that it represents a comprehensive pedagogical approach with its own empirically verified, systematic curriculum and classroom methodology.

There are four distinguishing features of the LS-P4C approach that mark its unique place in the field:

1. Clear theoretical foundations in philosophy, psychology, and educational theory
2. Clearly defined pedagogical objectives that guide and inform the approach
3. A systematic curriculum involving philosophical novels and teacher manuals

4. An empirically researched and supported model of classroom discussion

Although other programs and approaches across PwC reflect similar features, none reflect all four in a systematic and comprehensive way as LS-P4C does.

Theoretical Foundations

P4C curriculum and methodology are grounded in social-constructivist learning theories. These theories point to social interaction (dialogue) as a mechanism for the internalization of new and more complex ways of thinking and speaking (Mercer and Littleton 2007). An important insight of these theories is that the modeling of these more complex ways of speaking and thinking is not exclusively the role of the teacher. When groups of young people engage in thoughtful and disciplined discussion, any one of them may activate effective ways of thinking and speaking that serve as strategies to be internalized by others. The insights of these theories are reflected in both the practice of classroom dialogue, advocated for in LS-P4C, and in the varied dialogic episodes occurring in the IAPC curriculum novels.

The philosophical foundations of P4C curricular content draw upon Lipman's and Sharp's vast knowledge of the (mostly Western) philosophical canon. The pedagogical components of the approach more specifically draw upon the insights of numerous American philosophers including Justus Buchler (1954) and the pragmatists John Dewey (1916) and Charles Sanders Peirce (1955). Lipman's and Sharp's conception of critical thinking is also strongly influenced by pragmatist epistemology that sees the "truth" replaced by "reflective equilibrium" as something that evolves over time, through an ongoing process of inquiry, communal scrutiny, and verification in action (Gregory 2007). Additionally, the theories of John Dewey (1916) are reflected in P4C's particular philosophy of education as essentially supporting children in awakening to, and grappling with, that which is problematic in whatever subject matter they are engaged (Lipman 2008).

Pedagogical Objectives

Central to the LS-P4C approach is a commitment to helping children strengthen their capacities for inquiry, with the goal of helping them to arrive at their own reasonable, philosophical judgments concerning questions and issues that arise in their own experience. This commitment is established and elucidated in a vast collection of theoretical materials from Lipman, Sharp, and their colleagues in P4C and PwC. Although often generalized as empowering children to “think for themselves,” LS-P4C advocates understand “thinking for oneself” to involve the application and development of critical, creative, and caring thinking.

Critical Thinking. Although largely developed alongside a number of different critical thinking programs and perspectives, LS-P4C is unique in its focus on judgment as the key function of critical thinking. According to LS-P4C, critical thinking involves the application of criteria, sensitivity to context, inferential reasoning, metacognition, and self-correction (Lipman 2003b). Critical thinking for LS-P4C is also concerned with application, where the product of this kind of thinking results in a judgment that can be put into practice or initiate a change. This practical aspect of critical thinking is deeply informed by C. S. Peirce’s (1955) concern with protecting the results of one’s inquiry from turning into meaningless abstractions and unjustified beliefs. Doing so means evaluating the results according to their practical consequences (Gregory 2007). Consistent with Peirce’s concern, the LS-P4C teacher manuals and methodological literature reflect a focus on testing ideas in action.

Creative Thinking. Where critical thinking might be understood as the application of rules and standard criteria of logic and inferential reasoning in a given context, creative thinking, in contrast, involves going outside those rules to generate new possible answers, new criteria, or new ways of framing things. Lipman referred to this as a “freshness,” which he linked with a sense of wonder that is essential to philosophical thinking and inquiry (2003b). Lipman and Sharp characterized creative thinking in part as thinking that is original or precedent setting; imaginative in

envisioning possible worlds; independent in presenting their own thoughts rather than mirroring those of others; experimental in trying on new ways of proceeding; expressive of our experience with our thoughts and perceptions; surprising in what it creates, thereby generating new wonder; and maieutic in its attempt to bring out the best in the world (Lipman 2003b).

Caring Thinking. One of the most unique aspects of LS-P4C’s pedagogical vision and its conception of higher-order thinking is the role of caring thinking. The idea of caring thinking arose from Lipman’s and Sharp’s sensitivity to the role that our passions and emotions play in thinking. To that end, Lipman and Sharp identify caring thinking as thinking, that is, at a minimum: concerned with the problems and challenges that others face; careful to maintain the cognitive excellence of the process and product of one’s thinking; normative in searching for what ought to be rather than simply describing what is; and deliberative in weighing contextual factors prior to making a judgment (Lipman 2003b). Caring thinking is thus thinking that reflects care through a sensitivity to how we are thinking, what is worth thinking about, and what is important to consider as we are thinking. A number of P4C programs around the world, especially ones concerned with developing pro-social behaviors and the reduction of violence, make caring thinking their central focus.

IAPC Curriculum

The LS-P4C/IAPC curriculum is designed to help teachers and students develop a philosophical ear – to recognize philosophical dimensions of their experience and of school subjects – to engage in group dialogue and to practice critical, creative, and caring thinking. The LS-P4C curriculum includes ten novels, each with an accompanying teacher manual (to which several other authors contributed). Eight of these, *Elfie* (2003a), *Kio and Gus* (1982), *Pixie* (1981), *Harry Stottlemeier’s Discovery* (1982), *Nous* (1996a), *Lisa* (1983), *Mark* (1980), and *Suki* (1978), are published directly by the IAPC. Two others, *The Doll Hospital* (1999) and *Geraldo* (2000), were published by the Australian Council for Educational Research (ACER).

IAPC Novels. One of the most unique contributions Lipman made to the field of PwC is the philosophical novel as philosophical text. Together, Lipman and Sharp continued the development and use of the philosophical novel in service of their particular educational aims. Within the LS-P4C, the novel plays a number of important roles, some but not all of which can be filled by good literature in a variety of traditions and disciplines. Lipman and Sharp were not against teachers using materials from outside of the IAPC curriculum, but did see the philosophical novels as best equipped to fully address the pedagogical commitments and theoretical insights of their model. To that end, Lipman and Sharp encouraged others to develop their own philosophical novels. The privilege that the LS-P4C approach grants to the philosophical novel is grounded in its ability to serve as both a stimulus for, and a model of, philosophical sensitivity and multidimensional thinking (DeMarzio 2007).

The LS-P4C novels are meant to serve first and foremost as a stimulus for the questioning and wonderment of the students reading them. Lipman and Sharp were sensitive to exposing young people to philosophical ideas without “hitting them over the head” with them. Where traditional children’s literature may touch upon a variety of philosophically interesting ideas or themes, they all too often reflect a lesson or a “moral to the story” that cannot be ignored by even the most careless reader. The LS-P4C novels attempt to balance *story* with *philosophy* in ways that allow children to uncover the philosophical issues that emerge for them (DeMarzio 2007). Maintaining this balance helps the philosophical ideas and issues embedded in the story to remain connected to the context in which they are explored by the characters. When the philosophical concept emerges in this way, the objectives of problem finding (critical thinking) and contextual attentiveness (caring thinking) are supported. When the children are allowed to draw the ideas from the stimulus, they are also given an opportunity to generate wonder and express their thoughts about the text in ways reflective of creative thinking.

Equally important to serving as a stimulus for philosophical inquiry, the LS-P4C novels serve as models for group discussion and for critical, caring, and creative thinking (DeMarzio 2007). Characters like Harry, Lisa, and Suki discover logical reasoning, engage in self-correction, and consider matters of context. They do so while confronting issues that are ethical, metaphysical, aesthetic, and epistemological in nature. Throughout their shared inquiries, they are considerate of others who have suffered personal losses, have physical disabilities or whose behavior might be considered anti-social. They engage in the kind of behavior conducive to good communal inquiry, including acknowledging, clarifying, and building upon the ideas of others. They also hold each other accountable for their ideas and thoughts in ways that reflect sensitivity and rigor.

In addition to modeling the processes and dispositions of good inquiry, each of the characters in the LS-P4C novels exemplifies a kind of thinking or a type of thinker (DeMarzio 2007). Harry is a critical thinker who approaches things logically. Lisa is a caring thinker who displays a deep sensitivity to context and the experiences of others. Suki is the creative thinker who sees things through the eyes of an artist and helps other to look at things in novel ways. Seldom depicted dealing with a problem on their own, the character’s collaborations represent the various ways that these kinds of thinking can be enlisted in support of each other.

IAPC Manuals. Where the LS-P4C novels model the interplay of different kinds and processes of thinking, the manuals help supplement the skills and conceptual depth that make the interplay possible (Lipman 1996b). Lipman and Sharp populated their curriculum manuals with two distinct tools – Philosophical Discussion Plans and Philosophical Exercises – meant to be activated by the teacher based on her assessment of the group’s skill in philosophizing together. These plans and exercises correspond to each of the “leading philosophical ideas” written into each section of the novel.

Exercises aim to help increase precision in the use of cognitive skills. For example, if during a

discussion the participants are having a hard time establishing criteria, then the teacher might have them work together through an exercise to get more practice in doing so.

Discussion plans help the group to delve deeper into a philosophical concept or issue, often testing the conceptual boundaries that frame them. They can be used to provoke an inquiry themselves or to explore different ways of opening up a concept. For example, if the participants are exploring the concept of human families and the teacher sees that they are struggling to frame the concept as anything beyond blood relationships, the teacher might bring in a discussion plan that looks at love, trust, or familiarity as potential criteria relevant to considerations of family. Discussion plans are typically constructed in ways that pit criteria against each other or that present the criteria as questions of growing complexity. At no point in the manuals do discussion plans or exercises include final answers at which participants should arrive. Instead, they are constructed in ways that maintain the sense of problematicity central to the LS-P4C approach.

Equally important to LS-P4C approach is that the novels and manuals not be moved through systematically, like a typical curriculum workbook. The true spirit of the approach allows for a class to struggle through a chapter in the novel for months, to reflect on, assess, and revise their practice with support from exercises and discussion plans drawn from anywhere in the manual or even constructed by the teacher or the students themselves. The LS-P4C curriculum is meant to stimulate and enhance respectful, collaborative, and rigorous philosophical inquiry into concepts that the group has deemed meaningful and worthwhile. This leads us to what should be understood as the central component of the LS-P4C approach – the community of inquiry.

Community of Inquiry

The LS-P4C model of group dialogue is widely referred to as the community of inquiry (CI/CoI) or community of philosophical inquiry (CoPI), although these terms did not appear in Lipman's

and Sharp's work until 1978. Often attributed to C. S. Peirce, Lipman's and Sharp's notion of the classroom community of inquiry also drew on Dewey's (1916) writing on problem-based inquiry in schools and on Justus Buchler's (1954) writing on classroom dialogue as a form of philosophical inquiry. CI is represented in the LS-P4C/IAPC training materials as a dialogue community, working/thinking together to determine what is most reasonable to believe or do, in response to a contestable question. A reasonable conclusion in CI for Lipman and Sharp is seldom, if ever, understood as a consensus view. Instead, typical products of an effective CI might be: the elimination of indefensible claims; a new or more comprehensive understanding of an issue or concept; a plan for how to act or live; or a more noble vision of society. Framing CI as a goal-oriented task lends itself to ongoing reflection and assessment by the group.

Lipman and Sharp recommended a particular sequence of practice for the LS-P4C approach, not as a rigid method, but as a set of components that teachers were welcome to experiment with, based upon the group's needs and development. The essential parts of the sequence and relevant pedagogical justifications are as follows:

- **Engaging with a Stimulus** – For Lipman and Sharp, this may come in a variety of forms, including, but not limited to, shared experiences, works of art, and important or troubling world events. However, when the group lacks the experience to mine these stimuli for the philosophically problematic, the LS-P4C novels are a helpful resource.
- **Student-Generated Question** – Letting students generate questions in response to their engagement with a stimulus is meant to give them practice in recognizing the philosophical, discovering the problematic, and digging beneath the surface. For Lipman and Sharp, it is also a practical strategy for keeping students engaged. The assumption here is that students will be more intrinsically motivated to inquire into things they identify as meaningful. It is also practice of caring thinking. When the

teacher lets the students control key components of the inquiry process, she is modeling respect and collaboration and setting the stage for an egalitarian participation structure. This egalitarian structure has been identified as an important component in classroom discussion in a number of empirical studies.

- **Inquiry Dialogue** – In the LS-P4C approach, this stage of the sequence is where the majority of the group's time is spent. In a typical LS-P4C classroom, a group might spend 25 min constructing a list of student questions and then spend 10–15 independent inquiry sessions engaging as a CI in response to the questions. Depending on the skill of the group and the results of group and individual assessment, the teacher might also include sessions where the group works on an exercise or discussion plan. It is in the CI that the group practices and hones its skills in critical, creative, and caring thinking.

The LS-P4C facilitator is an invaluable part of the CI. Initially, the facilitator is often a visiting philosopher or the classroom teacher. In the LS-P4C approach, the students should eventually take on the various responsibilities of facilitation as they internalize the facilitator's moves, resulting in a group that facilitates itself. To achieve this ideal, the facilitator serves the important role of modeling and supporting the virtues of good communal inquiry (Gregory 2007). She helps the students to be clear in what they are saying and thinking, and helps them to see how their thoughts and comments relate to the contributions of others. She tracks the inquiry, names argumentation and inquiry moves as they arise, and helps students see important points that emerge. She does this with a sensitivity to letting the students determine the trajectory of the inquiry. Said another way, while the participants determine the direction in which they want the inquiry to go, it is the facilitator's job to help them go there together, critically, creatively, and caringly (Splitter and Sharp 1995).

- **Metacognitive Reflection** – Essential to the LS-P4C approach is the use of post-inquiry

reflection. Because the CI itself is a kind of moral and cognitive engagement, it is ripe for analysis and experimentation. A teacher in the LS-P4C vein will set aside time at the end of each inquiry session to ask the group to assess its work. She might ask them to reflect on the cognitive, moral, political or philosophical criteria that define and shape a good community of inquiry. Typical assessment questions might include: *Are we looking at the issue from different perspectives? Are we making sure that no one is dominating the discussion? Are we challenging each other's thinking? Are we building toward a reasonable conclusion? Are we digging deep into concepts and ideas? Are we getting better at [one of these] than we used to be? How can we improve our practice and/or our thinking next time?* These meta-cognitive practices help clarify and reinforce the norms of good inquiry, and encourage students to treat thinking itself as something to be strategized about and improved upon.

- The final stage in the sequence involves the group translating the inquiry into some mode other than dialogue, like doing an art or action project that in some way implements the new judgments and also continues the inquiry. Testing the results of the inquiry in this way is an important step that maintains the applicability and meaning of philosophical inquiry in our daily lives. It is also an important test within the pragmatist epistemological tradition (Lipman 2001, 2003).

The Future of LS-P4C

The history of LS-P4C is one of experimentation and evolution. The approach has grown from an idea of a dime-store novel for young people to a curriculum and then to what today might best be understood as a pedagogical vision for what education can and should be. The LS-P4C approach continues to grow through the work of the IAPC, whose mission is to advance P4C via educational programming, dissemination, and professional affiliation and through continued empirical and theoretical research. The LS-P4C approach continues to produce empirically verified educational results, and the IAPC is committed to increasing

the effectiveness of the approach through a deeper and more nuanced understanding of the various aspects of the approach outlined here.

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Philosophy with Picturebooks

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Background

Philosophy with picturebooks as an educational philosophy and practice can be understood only in the context of the Philosophy for Children (P4C) program. Since Matthew Lipman et al. (1977) outlined the educational philosophy of this program, there have been differences of opinion about the kinds of texts best suited to teaching philosophy in education. The program is radically different from other approaches in three distinct ways.

First, there is an *entangled relationship between text and philosophy*. In collaboration with colleagues at the Institute for the Advancement of Philosophy for Children (IAPC), based at Montclair State University (USA), Matthew Lipman (1922–2010) developed this comprehensive curriculum consisting of seven dedicated and (deliberately imageless) novels and accompanying manuals to support and guide teachers in the use of the texts for all phases of preuniversity schooling. Lipman argued that “without a curriculum of some kind...the chances that one will be able to do philosophy at all are greatly reduced” (Lipman 1997, p. 1). The curriculum had been specifically designed for teachers who had not studied academic philosophy. In that sense, the P4C curriculum has become the “archetypal” text for P4C, the yardstick against which all others are measured.

Secondly, Lipman's philosophy *of* and *in* education radically opened up a space for a new branch of philosophy: *philosophy of childhood*. His *logically* and not *empirically* sequenced P4C curriculum bypasses any stage theory of children's cognitive development. In education, the influence of psychological theories of child development as the basis for curriculum construction still remains very strong (File et al. 2012). In contrast, the P4C program sequences practice in a range of thinking skills and exploration of recurring philosophical *concepts* rather than competences (Lipman et al. 1977). The exercises and discussion plans in the different manuals are sequenced *logically*, whereas an empirical sequence would involve a correspondence "to already existing stages of cognitive development derived from descriptions of children's behaviour in non-educational contexts" (Lipman 1988, p. 147). P4C's curriculum conceptualization expresses a philosophy of childhood that is (albeit in a limited sense) nondevelopmentalist which therefore demands a pedagogy that is post-developmental. Developmentalism involves an essentialist view of a child and generalizations about what individual children as a matter of fact are capable of, views that are a result of age-related prejudices. The configuration of "child as philosopher" (Haynes 2008, 2014) has helped to expose such discriminatory and limiting views, spearheaded by Gareth Matthews (1994). Like Lipman, Matthews regarded children's capacities to philosophize as a historically neglected area of interest in education and child development.

Thirdly, the P4C program assumes an *entangled relationship between text and pedagogy*: the "teaching methodology" (Lipman et al. 1977, pp. 59–80) for reading the philosophical novels is philosophical inquiry. Lipman compared academic philosophy to memorizing the inscriptions in a graveyard: memorizing a collection of names and dates. A pedagogy is needed that does justice to philosophizing as an *activity* – philosophy as "a way of life" (Lipman 1991) – and academic philosophy is in need of reconceptualization. For Lipman (and Dewey) we cannot "educate *for* enquiry unless we have education *as* enquiry – unless, that is, the qualitative

character we desire to have in the end is loaded into the means" (Lipman 1991, pp. 15, 245, fn 3). After reading Russian psychologist Lev Vygotsky's work in the late 1940s (Lipman 1996, p. xiii), and especially inspired by George Herbert Mead, Lipman (1993, p. 319) developed his curriculum on "an explicit theory of thinking as internalized speech."

American Pragmatist Charles Sanders Peirce (1839–1914) was the first to fuse together the terms "community" and "inquiry" in the domain of scientific inquiry, but it was Lipman who introduced the method as a pedagogy for the teaching of philosophy in schools (Lipman et al. 1977, Ch7). The basic assumption is that learning philosophy is best achieved by engagement in philosophical practices. Further developed in collaboration with Sharp and other colleagues, Lipman (1991, pp. 15–16) describes the community of enquiry as:

A dialogue that tries to conform to logic, it moves forward indirectly like a boat tacking into the wind, but in the process its progress comes to resemble that of thinking itself. Consequently, when this process is internalized or introjected by the participants, they come to think in *moves* that resemble its *procedures*. They come to think as the process thinks.

Laurance Splitter and Ann Margaret Sharp, who have written extensively on the subject, prefer not to give a definition of a community of inquiry, because it is one of those key concepts, they say, "...which takes on new aspects and dimensions as teachers and students apply it and modify it to their purposes. A community of enquiry is at once imminent and transcendent: it provides a framework which pervades the everyday life of its participants and it serves as an ideal to strive for" (Splitter and Sharp 1995, pp. 17–18). They explain that the internalization of the variety of voices in a community of inquiry will lead to a richer, more varied "inner" dialogue and, as a result, a better, more reasonable thinking through "self-correction." They continue that it is because we define ourselves *as persons* through the dialogues and conversations we engage in, that the ethical, social, and ontological aspects of the community of inquiry are central to the very notion of

reason itself (Splitter and Sharp 1995, pp. 32–33). David Kennedy (2006, pp. 159) suggests that in inner dialogue we also address the “child within” – the child the adult once was and still is.

The key educational idea is that the fictional novels *model* children and adults engaging in communities of philosophical inquiry. Lipman explains (1997, p. 1) that student teachers and qualified teachers need “models of *doing philosophy* that are clear, practical and specific. They need to be able to distinguish essentially decidable concepts from essentially contestable concepts, if they are to understand why only the latter are truly philosophical.” The novels function as *models*. They are not a narrative version of the history of philosophy (as, e.g., attempted in Jostein Gaarder’s *Sophie’s World*, 1994), but central philosophical ideas, themes, and questions have been “injected into” the text without the use of technical jargon. The history of Western philosophy is presented as a mode of thinking, with the novels representing the kind of thinking that is typical of the history of philosophy.

The philosophical thinking in the novels is enacted by fictional, thoughtful children who reflect explicitly on their thought processes in the way adult philosophers would do, but that children “normally” do not. Engagement of real children with the “abnormal” conversations in the novels (Kennedy 2011, p. 61) helps them “develop their own philosophy, their own way of thinking about the world” through the community of inquiry pedagogy (Lipman 2008, p. 166). In that sense, the P4C curriculum positions the ideal-philosopher-child (Murriss 2015).

Philosophy with Picturebooks

Lipman’s pioneering work reaches beyond the mere introduction of just another subject in the curriculum, that of philosophy. It profoundly questions how schools regard knowledge and how subjects are taught. For Lipman the statements of which human knowledge is said to be composed are, in fact, answers to questions by now long forgotten (Lipman and Sharp 1984, p. 158). What we now call factual knowledge is

the generally accepted outcome of previous inquiries. The P4C curriculum focuses on questions, not answers, on thinking, not knowledge.

The program has inspired others to create a variety of alternative resources and approaches to support teachers in their philosophical work, either for practical reasons (e.g., shorter, cheaper) or philosophical and pedagogical reasons (for the program’s lack of internal consistency, see Murriss 1997; for its Anglo-American philosophy bias, see Martens 1999, 2008).

The current positivist educational climate has provoked P4C advocates to justify the addition of P4C to the existing curriculum by pointing out its usefulness in terms of raising standards, teaching thinking skills, creativity, citizenship, inclusion, and emotional literacy. These are justifications that are often motivated by accountability or the need to secure funding. Understandably, such an instrumental approach has been criticized (Vansiegelheim 2005; Long 2005). P4C can be the home of a complex mixture of educational ideas and philosophical traditions as practitioners situate the approach rhizomatically in their own cultural, ethnic, religious, and socioeconomic contexts and infuse the practice with their own identity and beliefs.

P4C challenges many perceived wisdoms about classroom size, epistemological expertise, the limits of scientific knowledge, and who should ask the questions in class (see, e.g., Benjamin and Ecchevarria 1992). It questions what it means to be a child and what it means to be treated *as* a citizen. Some authors emphasize the radical democratic nature of the practice. The concept of “democracy” is understood to include moral principles such as freedom and equality and implies that schools make space for children to actively participate as citizens in contexts that are meaningful to them. Depending on one’s practice, P4C can nibble away at the very undemocratic foundations of modern education itself (Kennedy 2006; Kohan 2002; Haynes 2008).

Although Lipman himself was very much inspired by the philosophies of both Plato and American pragmatism (especially John Dewey) and later on also used Vygotskian socio-constructivism to theorize the pedagogy, others

have used a wide range of other philosophies and educational theories to justify P4C, including Kantian philosophy (McCall 2009), semiotics, critical pedagogy (Kohan and Wozniak 2009), postmodernism (Kennedy 2006), and critical posthumanism (Murris 2016).

Disrupting the paradigm of adult philosophy with its emphasis on language, logic, and rationality, David Kennedy, Walter Kohan, and others have influenced the choice of text, the text-pedagogy relationship, and how texts are read in P4C (Haynes and Murris 2012). These dimensions explain the reasons and motivations for the subsequent diversification of practices – differences in the field are related to implicit or explicit views of a child, what philosophy is, and ideas about how philosophy can learn from a child. Since the early 1990s the introduction of these alternatives to the P4C curriculum has generated new debates about the necessary requirement for teachers of P4C (and the trainers of these teachers) to have a background in academic philosophy. The phrase “philosophy with children” was born to distinguish between the “official” Philosophy *for* Children program and other approaches such as “philosophy with picturebooks” (Murris 1992). The phrase philosophy “with” children articulated an important difference and became more widely used much later by what Vansieleghem and Kennedy (2011) refer to as the “second-generation” P4C proponents. They broke with a strategic uniformity to the educational approach and “welcomed difference as a principle of growth” (Vansieleghem and Kennedy 2011, p. 172). The emphasis for many of them, but certainly not all, is no longer on a curriculum that models the normative ideal of analytic reason, but on dialogue that generates communal reflection, philosophical conversations, and democratic practices that include child and young people’s voice – regarded as a potentially transformative power in deciding what counts as philosophy. The diversity of P4C theory and practice is entangled with questions about philosophy, what it is, and which texts one should choose for teaching it.

The picturebook has been a recurrent feature in the diversification. Why is this? What is peculiar

about the picturebook that makes it such a suitable philosophical text?

The P4C curriculum contains the promise of a complete, whole, continuous curriculum that expresses a developmental view of a human being – in terms of development in understanding philosophical concepts. The latter are introduced in an age-related sequential manner, each time with “a little more depth, breadth and sophistication” (Lipman et al. 1977, p. 59). The philosophical child for Lipman (1993), Matthews (1992, 1993, 2006, 2009), and others (Wartenberg 2009; Mohr-Lone 2012) is the child whose verbal utterances resemble the ideas of established academic philosophers, and the picturebooks are selected on the basis of the classical philosophical themes and topics they “contain,” such as freedom versus determinism, lying versus truth telling, or justified anger (Costello 2012).

Other approaches to the use of picturebooks for P4C focus on critical and creative thinking approaches to literacy education (Roche 2015). Avoiding the term “philosophy” can be helpful in not alienating teachers, but the risk attached is that P4C is conceptualized as a mere thinking skills approach without the history of philosophical inquiry to draw on as resource. For Lipman, thinking skills should always be taught in the context of a humanistic discipline, such as philosophy – a discipline that is “representative of the heritage of human thought” (Lipman 1988, p. 40; 1991, pp. 29–30). The task of philosophy is to encourage children to think for themselves *in*, *about*, and *among* the disciplines, which involves an induction into the higher-order thinking and critical reflection upon the methodology of each discipline: its assumptions, criteria, procedures, and modes of reasoning (Lipman 1991, pp. 263–264). A crucial question is how this is done and how the implied reader is positioned in the texts that are chosen for the philosophical work.

Philosophy with picturebooks was introduced by Murris (1992) and further developed in collaboration with Joanna Haynes after they met in 1994 (Murris and Haynes 2002; Haynes and Murris 2012). Philosophy with picturebooks has proven to be popular in practice, not only in early years’ settings or primary/elementary education.

Picturebooks are short, self-contained stories, not too expensive, and sometimes already available in schools, at least those with the financial resources to provide books. In such schools, teachers are familiar with the medium, and the children are used to, and often appreciate, visual texts.

Good quality picturebooks are more than just books with illustrations (hence the spelling of “picturebooks,” instead of “picture books”). Oft-quoted, classic points of reference in children’s literature research argue that picturebooks involve *two* very different interdependent sign systems (the *images* and the *words*) (Nikolajeva and Scott 2006; Sipe 1998). The reader, so the argument goes, is pulled in different directions of meaning-making by the use of these two different sign systems; the linear direction of the text invites readers to continue reading; the pictures compel them to ponder. Importantly, the “gaps” between text and image may be experienced differently as people grow older, which challenges teachers to listen and respond differently from children (Haynes and Murris 2012). In their influential article, Maria Nikolajeva and Carole Scott (2000, p. 238) argue that a picturebook “speaks to both adults and children” and that “the two audiences may approach textual and visual gaps differently and fill them in different ways.” Children’s literature scholar David Lewis (2001, p. 74) describes metaphorically how in contemporary picturebooks “[w]ords are never ‘just words’... [they] are always partial, incomplete, unfinished, waiting the flesh of the pictures. Similarly, the pictures are perpetually pregnant with potential narrative meaning, indeterminate, unfinished, awaiting the closure provided by the words. But the words and the pictures come from outside the picturebook.” The interaction between image and text is neither stable nor predictable. “Boundaries have dissolved,” writes Lewis, “inviting a promiscuous mixing of forms” (Lewis 2001, p.90). Picturebook narratives often feature unusual characters (e.g., humans covered in body hair, aliens), extreme concepts (e.g., immortality, the size of the universe), and obscure thought experiments.

These narratives provoke philosophical conversations – “‘a language of languages,’ a

focus on ‘something greater than the judgments,’ that is, the criteria for those judgments” (Lipman 2008, p. 59). These criteria, in turn, interlock with other criteria that are interlocked with other criteria and so on, and, although no answers yet emerge, the process is “intriguing, exciting, illuminating” (Lipman 2008, p. 59). They generate inquiries that focus on meaning, rather than learning, on understanding, rather than truth – provoking *conceptual questioning*. Reading picturebooks philosophically does not involve a process of finding out what pictures denote or literally represent, but requires sensitivity in bringing together what is said and what is unsaid. These judgments are often complex and unpredictable and involve emotional, imaginative, and reasoned responses – not necessarily with a focus on the philosophical concepts that adults find interesting (Murris 1997).

Lipman’s P4C novels position the “abnormal” child, the thinking child – the adult philosopher’s child modeled in communities of inquiry with peers. In contrast, philosophy with picturebooks often involves children in inquiries about fantastical scenarios in the void between reality and fantasy, rather than about the world as it “is” (for the adult philosopher). The perspective of what it means to be child-philosopher-like is firmly embedded in adult assumptions and desires about how a child should be. In contrast, philosophy with picturebooks does not locate the philosophical “in” texts themselves but in the space *in between* text, child reader, and adult reader (teacher). Gert Biesta (2011, p. 317) writes about “exposure” as the quality of human interaction, which “makes the event of the incoming of uniqueness possible.” It is this kind of philosophy that cannot be mapped out or modeled by the philosophical novels. It could not be; it escapes representation. This position assumes that we have to be more modest in our claims about what narratives can do when doing philosophy in class. A pedagogy of exposure involves consciously giving up regarding education as the formation of childhood as well as regarding children as adult opportunities to carry out adults’ ideals and to use education as an instrument for such ends (Kohan 2011, p. 430).

Although the sociocultural orientation of the way in which the P4C community of inquiry is often theorized was revolutionary at the time, its constructivist ontology seems ironically rather *individualistic* some 45 years after its introduction. What is assumed is that students and teachers learn P4C through a process of “internalization” and therefore presupposes a humanist subjectivity based on binaries such as inner/outer, nature/culture, and matter/discourse and an anthropocentric perspective of what it is to be human/child (and therefore what is involved in teaching philosophy). In philosophy with picturebooks there is a dynamic entanglement between philosophy, the democratic practice of the community of inquiry pedagogy, the notion of the competent child as (implied) philosophical reader, teachers as philosophical readers, and the epistemological ambiguity and aesthetic qualities of the picturebooks. The ontology and epistemology this practice assumes are *relational*.

Moving toward a critical posthumanist orientation, P4C scholars have recently started to pay more attention (this includes the analysis of philosophical enquiries) to the picturebook’s *materiality*: the effects of graphic design, choice of art style, visual grammar, use of colors, and medium (paper, virtual, etc.) (Murris 2016). In fact, there are infinite material-discursive elements that could and should be considered when reading texts philosophically. How these “languages” interact, connect, and influence each other also depends on what readers “bring to” the narrative themselves and the affordances of the material environment. From this perspective the preparation and education of teachers for philosophical practice should be less focused on induction in set curricula and more on the acquisition of a wide range of philosophical content knowledge from various traditions *in combination with* the learning of philosophical pedagogical skills and attitudes. The philosophy teacher does not scaffold existing truths, but problematizes the relationship that both students and teachers have to truths in which they are already installed (Kohan 2011, p.346). The choice of text can hinder or support this experiential process of bringing something new into the world.

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Place

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Synonyms

[Critical place pedagogies](#); [Geography](#); [Place theory](#); [Place-based education](#); [Spatial theory](#)

Introduction

David Harvey (1989 as cited Tuck and McKenzie 2015, p. 1) notes: “How we represent space and time in theory matters, because it affects how we and others interpret and then act with respect to the world”. Edward Casey in his book *The Fate of Place* in 1997 also ruminated that discussions on place have been important, if not always a central theme, for much of the history of Western philosophy. Many contemporary thinkers, inspired most prominently, perhaps, by Martin Heidegger, have made “place” a central concern of theory (particularly ontological meanings) and illustrated that it mattered. Jeff Malpas (2006), for example, argued that throughout his life Heidegger was concerned with understanding “the ‘placed’ character of being,” with “the place of being – as a topology of being” (p. 305). Cresswell (2015) in later writings postulates Heidegger saw place as a

spiritual and philosophical endeavor with the authentic human existence being one rooted in place. Scholars in a range of disciplines have adopted place as a central conceptual and philosophical theme, but in particular geography, humanities and social sciences have been central to understanding how place comes to be activated through and within the relations of humans with others. Areas that have been theorized in literature include place in relation to the body, the local, the regional, and the global. Place as a theme has incorporated a range of foci such as location, architecture, place attachment, place identity, sense of place and in the arts the production, practice, and performance of place. In more contemporary times, theoretical frames have sought to unsettle the romantic sometimes more static physical notions of place with critical, feminist, poststructuralist, and new materialist theorists taking up conceptual ideas around gendered spaces, contested spaces, embodied spaces, the politics of space, cultural topographies, cyberspace, nomadism, spaces of desire, monumental spaces, forgotten spaces, and the materiality and relations of objects and entities (human and nonhuman).

Place and the Geographers

Place as a key theoretical concept emerged principally from the discipline of geography. The early physical geographers understood place primarily as a static spatially bound concept where localized social and material practices were enacted (Tuck and McKenzie 2015). A revival in the later 1970s saw key scholars reinsert “place” outside of its spatial framing to be focused on the social relations that become inscribed within these locales, as they exist necessarily *in* place and *across* places (Cresswell 2015; Massey 1994). Cresswell (2015) argues for “spaces” or locations to become “places” people must imbue meaning to them. Cresswell (2015) (drawing on the work of political geographer John Agnew) recognized a meaningful location as having three aspects: location, locale, and sense of place. Location is the physical setting that can be static (a town) or moving (a ship); locale is the material setting

where social relations are enacted and meanings are produced; and sense of place is the subjective, emotional attachment personal or shared that are evoked by a place. Cresswell (2015) notes the theoretical contribution of Yi-Fu Tuan here who used the term “topophilia” to define the affective bond between people and place and argued people come to know the world through places. “Places” in this insistence are theorized as shared temporal spaces. The work of Edward Relph is also significant here with his philosophical commitment to phenomenology and his introduction of the concept of “placelessness” which came to be a useful term for later theorizations of the human experience of place and mobility in a globalized world (Cresswell 2015). Massey (1994) in her substantial body of work on place also around this time identified that place was not only a set of social relations and networks, but she believed there was a need to pay attention to the complex politics and power of these relations and how they were constantly being played out through shared lives. For Massey, place was open and hybrid and the product of interconnecting flows (Cresswell 2015). A place therefore by its very nature was full of power and symbolism, a complex web of relations of domination and subordination, of solidarity and co-operation. How these relations were negotiated revealed the power and politics of “place” boundaries and the temporal constraints of time. While for Massey (1994), time is often conveyed as having a “coherence and logic to its telling, while space does not” (p. 267). Places have spaces between them, while time provides space its characteristics of fluidity and place its opportunity to pause.

Theorizing Identity and Community Through Place

Physical locales, through the experience of being in space and time, have been theorized as lived spaces, as the site for the cultural production of identity, and offered as the location for place dwellers to connect to the real, material geographies of place and with the imagined, symbolic geographies of space. Theories on community and cultural identity extended these ideas by

discussing how identity (in community) could be produced through and between places and that these places could then become the terrain for elaborating strategies of selfhood. This construction of a community or communal way of being in “place” is a central theme of place theory and place pedagogy. David Gruenewald (see for example Gruenewald and Smith 2008) often discussed in his early work the importance of “real world,” “community based” pedagogies as central to place-based theories, although this work was often limited by the idea of a static “community” existing in a specific “place.” These “orderly” “static” views of community places have not gone uncontested and like many key conceptual ideas in place theory have been disrupted in more contemporary theorizing within the disciplines of geography and other social sciences, spilling over into the education theory literature (Tuck and McKenzie 2015). The focus on the local community specifically came under scrutiny within discourses of globalization, as the relevance of “place” in a global, open, unbounded world with the relative collapsing of space-time due to increased mobility was questioned. Massey (1994) argued that even though humans are living through a time of spatial upheaval, an era of powerful globalization place provides ironically a backcloth for theorizing experiences of colonialization and decolonization, dislocation, otherness, and disorientation. The unsettling of place as “ordered” and “located” allowed for the analyzing of those changes at both at the level of geographical and social relations. For example, deeper analysis of place allowed for the revealing through feminist theorizing the implications of sexism, exposing power relations in colonialization by contrasting indigenous and settlers histories past and present, and for noticing economical relations of capital and corporate accumulation.

Spatial, Phenomenology, Poststructuralism, and Assemblage Theory

Through this unique relationship with time-space compression, place is often theorized as having

both elements of order and chaos. Order, because all spatial locations of phenomena are caused; and therefore they can in principle be explained in “time.” Order also because there are indeed spatial systems, sets of phenomena in which spatial arrangements are also part of the constitution of a system. Yet chaos is also an element inherent to our understandings of the spatial, because although the location of each set of phenomena may be directly caused, the spatial positioning of one in relation to the other may not. That is, place encounters become unintended consequences – paradoxical mixtures that often end up manifesting as unexpected relations between sets of phenomena. Building on assemblage theory, these relations can be mapped as having two roles for place, a material existence and an expressive existence, and two forces supporting place coherence, territorializing forces, and deterritorializing forces (Cresswell 2015). Cresswell (2015) on the changing set of theoretical relationships noted with a phenomenological emphasis on gathering, and the post-structuralist notion of assemblage, places become syncretic wholes made up of parts. Cresswell writing on the history of the idea of place noted traditionally there emerged three main ways place was approached: a descriptive (surface) approach, a social constructionist approach, and a phenomenological approach. In order to represent the complexity, he identified that geographers (such as Doreen Massey) were writing accounts outside of these approaches by incorporating syncretic and descriptive accounts that were informed by phenomenology, post-structuralism, and assemblage theory. This represented what Massey came to call the “throwntogetherness” of place.

Decolonizing Conceptions of Place

Tuck and McKenzie (2015) write, “decolonizing conceptualizations of place confront, undermine, disavow, and unsettle understandings of place” (p. 49). They note that indigenous philosophies and theories (though they do critique the notion of theorizing as too narrow to represent the ways

indigenous people speak of their interactions or relationship to “place”) “represent significant epistemological and ontological departures from those [philosophies of place] that have merged in Western Frames” (p. 51). They explain how “place” and “space” are imbued with a colonizing settler history and that an “ontology of the land” encompasses a material, spiritual, emotional, and intellectual understanding that is more akin to an ontological conceptualization of place that does not prioritize the human or the place but a collective and shared relation to the “land.” The perspectives of Indigenous have been central to recent shifts in re-theorizing space, place, and time outside of Western frameworks. Theoretical work on place in decolonizing spaces brings to the surface issues of replacement and emplacement and the invisibility of Indigenous people’s perspectives in settler epistemologies that repeatedly foreclose discussions on the urgency of decolonization (Tuck and McKenzie 2015).

Place and the New Materialist Turn

The recent new materialist turn has provided also a useful segue here for theorizing even further the entangled and complex materiality of bodies and entities as it sets about supporting the means for re-configuring the dynamism of space, time, and matter through the conceptions of all things “intra-acting with” and “being in” the world (Barad 2007). Barad (2007) for example introduces the apparatuses for studying diffraction as the means for pointing out the specificity of particular entanglements and the entangled effects that “differences” make. Thinking about the nature of differences and space, time, mattering is to consider that prior to their intraaction entanglements do not exist. As humans, writes Barad (2007), we are not outside observers of this entangled world nor are we located in a particular place, but we are part of the world, “part of the world-body space in its dynamic structuration” (p. 185). *Onto-epistem-ology* is the term she proposes for describing the study of knowing in being, coming to terms with how “specific intra-

actions matter” (p. 185) and our humanness of being in and with place in the world.

Place in Education Theory

Until more recent times, it has been argued education theory has for the most part ignored the importance of “place” as a relational concept. In her essay in the 2005 edition of the philosophy of education, Ruitenberg (2005) goes to great lengths drawing on the work of David Orr and others that beyond place as a static physical concept, the place where learning occurs, and place has had no particular impact in contemporary education. She notes in her introduction that education philosopher Michael Peters has also in the past been quoted as saying “modern educational theory has all but ignored questions of space, of geography, of architecture” (2005, p. 212). Emanating from this limited view of place, theorizing place-based pedagogies, has focused primarily on teaching strategies around engaging learners to get to “know a place” to build place-based attachments. Place-based education, according to Stone (2009), was fundamental to schooling that supported environmental education and sustainability. He argued that when places were known deeply and were well loved, they had the best chance of being conserved and cared for in the future. “When people acquire a deep knowledge of a particular place, they begin to care about what happens to the landscape, creatures, and people in it” (Stone 2009, p. 13).

Gruenewald and Smith (2008) have also argued that place-based education rooted in community settings should be reclaimed as central places of public education and that this could alter the role of schools and places of learning with and through connection to places. A significant element of a place-based pedagogy for education therefore has been the opportunity for children to be active learners in the real world and to take their learning outside of the classroom. Ruitenberg (2005) wary of this often narrow emphasis on place pedagogies and outdoor or environmental education has argued this limits

the focus of place-based education on the natural environment, with this “connection to place” is presented mostly with “a hint of nostalgia and romanticism” (p. 212). She contends place means more than the natural environment, places are political spaces often with contested histories and . . . “each (inhabited) place has a spatial configuration through which power and other socio-politico-cultural mechanisms are at play” (p. 215).

Radical or Critical Place Pedagogies

Theorists of place-based education resisting a romantic nostalgia of place, as evident in education discourses around children needing to “re-connect to place” or develop a “sense of place,” have embraced critical theory as enacted through a more radical critical pedagogy of place. New forms of radical place-based pedagogies by critical place-based theorists in education, similarly to cultural and radical geographers in earlier times, have drawn attention to structures of oppression based on race, class, and gender. By interrogating classroom pedagogies and curriculum content, they have questioned how and why certain ways of conceptualizing place are being valued and prioritized in classrooms. A radical or critical pedagogy such as that taken up in contemporary times by education theorists such as Ruitenberg focus on supporting students to consider conflicting interpretations of places, and the multiplicity of meanings they have for others. It supports students to notice the complexity of place relations who is welcome, who is able to live, work, and play in which spaces, and why, and who benefits and who loses from the different modes of emplacement. Armed with a radical pedagogy of place “students are taught to see the multiplicity of and conflicts between interpretations of a place, the traces of meanings carried by the place in the past, the openness to future interpretation and meaning-construction”. Therefore, “(a) radical pedagogy of place does not pretend to offer answers to or ‘correct’ interpretations of hotly contested places”(Ruitenberg 2005, p. 218). Payne and Wattchow’s (2009, p. 18)

slow ecopedagogy of place that comes from the experiential education and experiential learning tradition that has been well represented in “place-based education” provides an example of a “phenomenological deconstruction at the personal, social, cultural, and ecological layers of experience.” They position this work as a response to the intercorporeal and ecocentric turns of contemporary theorizing that sought to address a new ontological ethics of human-nature encounters. This shift to a more radical theorizing of place contested “traditional/dominant epistemic and anthropocentric metaphors of learning, teaching, thinking, and knowing” (Payne and Wattchow 2009, p. 30) and illustrated a turning point where educational theorists begun to move outside and disrupt “under-theorized” definitions of “place” (Tuck and McKenzie 2015). Much of this disruption came from a realization that binaries are not useful in conceiving place. Nespor (2008, p. 481) articulated this well when he wrote: “A division of the world into parallel binaries such as place and nonplace, inhabitant and resident, commons and markets, or local and global, turns complex, changing relations into discrete states, chops gradients into well-bounded regions, and obscures the critical questions of how places are constituted and connected to one another.”

Posthumanist and New Materialist Theorizing

Recent contemporary theorizing of place-based education drawing on key concepts of place, human and nonhuman relations using posthumanist and new materialist theorizing is seeking to disrupt the Cartesian divide between human and other entities. This work challenged the simplistic dichotomies/binaries of animal/human, nature/culture, subject/object, place/nonplace that constructed how place came to be viewed within the impending consequences of the Anthropocene (Malone 2015). Malone (2015) for example in her recent theorizing argues that by considering multispecies relations as

multifarious and diffractive place encounters it supports educational opportunities that question the impact of anthropocentrism and human exceptionalism in the classroom, especially through the disruption of traditional research methodologies and pedagogies in outdoor learning, environmental and sustainability education. Malone (2015) states these new theories provide “the spaces for interrogating further child/body/species/place relations as assemblages, associations and relationships that could be useful when considering the complexity of core concepts in sustainability education like interdependency and multiple ecologies” (p. 54).

Conclusion: Complexity of Place Theorizing

Theorizing about or through concepts of “place” as identified through these varied theoretical turns are by definition ambiguous and contradictory. Seemingly an ordered and simple concept, place is also simultaneously complex and contested. In no context is the nature and purpose of this complexity of negotiations of place more evident than when gazing into classrooms and noticing the subtleties of contrasting definitions being espoused. Education will continue to evolve as an important contested location where epistemological and ontological questions of place/space/time/matter relations exist in the complexity of heterogeneous “space.” Place theorizing has and will continue to be an essential philosophical, conceptual, and methodological activity for furthering deeper understandings of education.

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Place Theory

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- [Fonua](#)

Placing Semiotics Within the Academy

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Synonyms

Epistemology; Humanities; Science; Sebeok; Semiosis; Specialization

Introduction

Today's academy culminates in universities, the central institution of education feeding the intellectual culture of humankind. In historical context, philosophy (science in the "cenoscopic" sense of critical control of objectivity unaided by instruments), along with literature, preceded university life but came to form an integral part of university curriculum. But modern science (in the "ideoscopic" sense, knowledge that could never be attained without instruments) began its distinctive development in the dawning years of the seventeenth century, and its acceptance within the university was anything but smooth. Intellectual advance depends on logic, but old habits have to be overcome, and such displacement is seldom easy within culture. It took more than two centuries for modern science to gain its standing – a standing so firm that students now think of the university in terms of science above all, as evidenced in the acronym STEM (science, technology, engineering, mathematics) for early twenty-first-century attempts at a "core curriculum". Where is semiotics in such a scheme?

Demise of "Common Sense" as an Unresolved Problem

In the context of intellectual culture, no revolution had greater importance than the one that took place in the early seventeenth century,

dramatically marked by the 1633 trial and condemnation of Galileo for teaching the twin heresies that the Earth is not the universe's center and that the sun does not revolve around the Earth. It was a bad day – but not only for religious authorities, students of scripture, and theologians. Among the hardest hit victims of this fiasco was "common sense", which still has not managed to regain a serious semblance of credibility in learned circles. The eighteenth-century attempt by Thomas Reid to identify common sense as the test of the truth of knowledge and the morality of actions fell by the wayside, and the Enlightenment view that scientific knowledge based on systematic observation, experiment, and mathematization could ultimately replace all of prescientific opinions, became the accepted view.

Yet, there remains at the heart of human knowledge an unresolved problem that the rise of modern science serves to underscore rather than resolve: the inescapable conundrum that unless human awareness as preceding all scientific training and refinement has some validity in its own right, then nothing even of science can truly be knowledge. For to begin study of science presupposes the common awareness of human animals out of which the development even of modern science as species-specifically human becomes possible in the first place. Stjernfelt (2007) puts the matter in *semiotic terms*: in order for it to be true that the Way of Signs leads everywhere in nature, it must also be true that "science is continuous with everyday knowledge which is, in turn, continuous with animal cognition and so on indefinitely down the scale of evolution" (p. 8).

Among the early modern philosophers, notably Berkeley and Hume, this problem never came to be recognized as such. Instead, they assumed that mental representation was the beginning of all awareness, an assumption that led to the famous "problem of the external world"; for even though empiricists followed by preference Locke rather than Descartes, they failed to observe or comment upon the fatal assumption (that Locke shared with Descartes) that the direct objects of our apprehension are mental representations formed by our own minds. The "problem of the external world" arose in modernity from just this assumption: that

the mind itself makes whatever is a direct and immediate object of awareness. Locke and Descartes identified this immediate object with ideas. Kant rejected this as too subjective, as “subjectivism”; and in proposing his alternate solution of the senses as giving rise to phenomena distinct from the things provoking sensation, he thought to preserve the universality of scientific knowledge: it is to the phenomena that reason then by its a-priori forms contributes objective necessary structure. Yet Kantian “objectivism” proved no less idealistic than the criticized subjectivism of Descartes and Locke, inasmuch as Kant’s own view was no less divorced from an awareness “scientific” in the sense of giving us an actual knowledge of the “way things are” in their subjective constitution and intersubjective relations obtaining independently of whether we are aware of them or not (Deely 2001).

By way of epistemological warning of “road-block ahead”, it followed that ontology and epistemology in modern parlance mean, in fact, the unknowable because unattainable (what was termed in Latin times *ens reale*) versus the knowable (termed in Latin times *ens rationis*). On this point, between Descartes and Kant there is only this difference: for Descartes *ens rationis* was conceived subjectively, whereas for Kant it was definitively objective, yet wholly determined in its knowability by human subjectivity.

Cryptosemiotics, an Historical Interlude

Semiotics was forced underground in the modern interval, called after Sebeok (1976, 1979) the “cryptosemiotic interlude”, for the very “epistemology” upon which the leading modern philosophers all agreed as the starting point of human knowledge already presupposed that the Way of Signs did not exist in its own right. The Way of Signs is a path that categorically rejects the view that only mental representations of whatever sort are the immediate final terminus of knowledge. It is a path that “leads everywhere in nature, including those domains where humans have never set foot” (Emmeche 1994, p. 126). That idea proves impossible within modern theories of

knowledge united in the common assumption that subjective representation is somehow the heart and essence of human knowing.

The problem with epistemology is not the existence of things in themselves. The problem rather is the theory which makes things “unknowable”. That is a thesis the science of modernity never fully bought into, unlike the philosophers. The doctors studying cancer want to know precisely what this deformation of cells is as it occurs, whether we understand it or not, precisely because only by our coming to know that can we then come to do something about it, namely, cure the cancer.

Semiotic Consciousness, Its Nature and Levels of Development

Semiotics began with the general proposal by Augustine that the difference between nature and culture is irrelevant to the action of signs, for whenever one thing comes to make something other than itself present in our awareness, *signs are at work*. Whether the one thing or the other has its origin inside or outside of our minds and bodies, from nature or from culture, is irrelevant to the action of signs. Material objects which are also themselves signs existing outside of us presuppose cognitive qualities inside of us which are themselves already signs as manifesting something other than themselves, something they themselves are not. The wife is not the idea of wife; yet when the idea of wife fails, the woman sensed cannot be recognized as wife. So there are objects external to our bodies which can be signs only when perceived in conjunction with concepts internal to us and which relate us to those very material objects recognized as this or that – wife, mother, lover, or whatever.

But still we are not at the heart of the matter, given that sensation is a vehicle of semiosis prior to concept formation. For human beings are animals, and all animal awareness begins with sensations, not with *ideas* of sensations, à la Locke, but with sensations as that incipient *experience of objectivity* brought about by the action of some sensible thing upon an animal’s organs of sense.

Light reflects off different bodies differently, and when this differently reflected light strikes some animal's organ of sight, what the animal will "see" depends not only upon the surface reflecting light but also upon the constitution of the animal's eye. The result will be some color. How does this color exist? Neither "in the thing stimulating" as some medievals thought, nor "in the eye of the beholder", as the early moderns postulated. It exists precisely *between* the two as a *relation* connecting one to the other, arising from the action of stimulation here and now.

There is another angle, especially decisive from the semiotic point of view. The animal sensing color simultaneously senses a shape and a position or movement: shape is not color, but is revealed dependently upon color; so the relation of color to shape and position or movement, etc. is already a sign-relation – color is the vehicle on the basis of which shape and position are revealed in sensation. There is no moment of awareness in which this action of signs is not at work, for *all objects are significates, and all concepts are vehicles supporting interpretive sign-relations*: from the very beginning of sensation, prescissively (analytically and not experimentally) distinguished from perceptions and intellections, our awareness depends also upon signs that precede concept formation. This action of signs within sensation is different from the perception of a woman as wife. Whereas *perception* of material objects requires and presupposes concepts formed within the perceiver, *sensation* of basic qualities *logically* precedes formation of concepts and provides the very material which concepts are formed to interpret.

All animals interpret what is sensed according to a certain status: something to be sought, something to be shunned, or something safe to ignore. The *human* animal further creates concepts that make it possible to discover what these objects of perception are (correctly or incorrectly interpreted by the animal, as the case may be), whether awareness dependent or awareness independent, apart from their specific status in relation to the animal. So, intellectual concepts can make objects *knowable* according to what they are in themselves. But the signs of sensation, considered as prior to

objects perceived and/or objects understood, *objectify* something of the animal's surroundings wholly and solely on the basis of the interaction of the animal's body with the surrounding bodies of the immediate physical environment. Accordingly, even though we do not experience sensations wholly separated from our perceptions, sense experience, analytically considered, differs both from sense perception and from understanding, in that the latter two require and presuppose those psychological qualities or states that we call concepts or ideas, while sensations are *prior to concept formations* and presuppose only the action of the physical surroundings upon the external sense organs of the animal body.

There are, as Poincot showed (1632: Bk. 1, ques. 6), no grounds for holding that external sense, prescissively distinguished as such within perception and understanding, attains directly as its proper object only an image produced by the mind itself. The semiosis of sensations gives rise to an awareness (as a nascent objectivity), which simply cannot be classified as epistemological or ontological in any *modern* sense, because the *relations* upon which objectification depends at this level are prior to any such differentiation. Thus, semiotics takes us to the very heart of the problem of knowledge, namely, how it is that signs are able to lead us everywhere in nature.

Facing the Problem of Specialization vis-à-vis the Modern Fragmentation of University Culture

Within the universities, in the seventeenth century when science in the modern sense began to take hold, specialization presented itself as a *sine qua non*, as a necessity for scientific advance in this modern or ideoscopic sense dependent upon the instrumental extensions of the environmental awareness as species specific to human animals (contrasting with the exclusively cenoscopic medieval science). As specializations required for scientific advance in knowledge took hold, general opinions of previous philosophy fragmented. By the late nineteenth century, diversity of specializations threatened the very notion

of any unity of knowledge, and the teachers and administrators within universities began to cast about for some ways of gaining an overview, some ways of restoring, or at least minimally preserving the intellectual development of humankind as a common heritage in which each of us shares and has a stake. The two main avenues of attempt were an introduction of so-called interdisciplinary courses, as well as programs of study based on reading “great books”. Both approaches had their merits and limited success, but neither cut to the heart of the matter.

The Ad Hoc or Improvisational Character of Interdisciplinary Teaching

Interdisciplinary programs are designed to put together two or more specialists in the same classroom, offering students the dialectic of professors making sense first to one another and then, hopefully, also to the students from within specialized perspectives, while also accommodating themselves to the other perspective of specialization represented by their colleague(s) in the given classroom. Thus, twentieth-century interdisciplinary programs proved invariably to be personality-dependent, gerrymandered affairs, more or less valuable depending upon the talents of the professors involved, but “interdisciplinary” in no more than a *de facto* fashion rather than intrinsically interdisciplinary.

A Recrudescence of Scholasticism: The “Great Books” Approach

The “great books” approach fared no better as learning was determined as based on opinions of “authorities”, back to the tradition of the Latin scholastic universities, even if a plurality of sources was replacing the centrality of Aristotle. Since the “great books”, which have shaped the modern world within which the university today exists, come from a variety of specialists, from Chaucer and Shakespeare among the humanists to Newton and Einstein among the scientists, a great-book-based education indeed broadened

students’ minds and opened them to an understanding apparently beyond specialization. Yet, this approach in the end tended to feed into the split between what C. P. Snow characterized as the two cultures: sciences on one side, rooted in specializations aimed to interpret the book of nature, and humanities on the other side, rooted in broad reading interpreting the books written by men. Again “interdisciplinarity” was achieved more *de facto* than *de jure*. Neither the interdisciplinary nor the “great books” approach achieved in principle a unification of the two cultures.

Enter Semiotics

This point of impasse is the entry point for the doctrine of signs, the “one undivided science” which, as Peirce points out (1908: CP 8.342; c.1897: CP 2.227), does “not depend upon new special observations”, yet directly addresses that upon which all special observations and common observations alike depend, namely, the action of signs, semiosis. STEM education – education in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics – contrasts with liberal arts education as yet a further extension of C. P. Snow’s two cultures. But an individual, student or faculty, who comes to understand the standpoint and perspective that semiotics engenders transcends precisely this division.

At Indiana University, when Thomas A. Sebeok became Director of the Research Center for Language Studies in the early 1970s, among his first official actions was to change the name to the Research Center for Language and Semiotic Studies, and everyone expected him to launch an MA and PhD program in semiotics. He did not. Instead, he introduced what he called a “Certificate in Semiotics”, which students could acquire only after, or in conjunction with, graduate study in an established discipline, be it linguistics, anthropology, biology, English, physics, sociology, or whatever. His argument was that semiotics is not so much a discipline in its own right as it is a *field* including all the disciplines, inasmuch as “all thought is in signs”. As a

consequence, Sebeok considered that semiotics as an area of study within the academy ought not to be treated as one more specialization but rather needs to be seen as that which makes specialization in the first place possible, because it establishes the experiential ground from which (first in sensation and then also in conception) the whole of human knowledge springs! Thus, someone on their way to mastering a given subject matter – physics, chemistry, literature, and sociology – would discover on turning to semiotics that their chosen specialization already depends upon (albeit is not reducible to) the action of signs as revealing and distinguishing the very subject matter which is the object studied by the specialization.

Hence, students of semiotics are made to realize that in seeing signs at work within a given academic discipline, they are seeing something that is true of all specialized disciplines, because true of the whole of human knowledge, namely, that underlying all else in awareness and in the background always is *the action of signs*, thanks to which it becomes possible to know objects in the first place, let alone differences between objects which define different disciplines as fragmented areas of specialization.

Conclusion

Semiotics is postmodern in a double sense. It shows the way beyond the epistemology of modern philosophy and, at the same time, enables us to see the *unity* of human understanding beneath and within development of specializations essential to the establishment of modern science. It “investigates what all the other disciplines seem to take for granted” (Taylor 2008, p. 6). Semiotics, as knowledge that results from thematic study of sign action, is not only interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary (cf. Nicolescu 2002) but also *predisciplinary* in providing that common ground of animal awareness out of which humans as semiotic animals come to realize within the biosphere a unique ethical responsibility that includes education in semiotics.

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Play

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Play and Belonging

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Play and Language

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Play: Aesthetics and Ambiguity of Play in Early Childhood Education

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Introduction

Play has been the central component of most curricula for young children throughout the last century. Friedrich Froebel is considered by most to be the father of the modern, Western preschool and he held play to be the child's natural mode of expression. The adults' role in Froebel's kindergarten was to stimulate children's play through the provision of specific forms of environments and toys. This approach is in concert with contemporary Western European and American biological, psychoanalytic, cognitive-developmental, and cross-cultural psychological theories of play, in which one finds assertions that children's play is fundamentally different from adult activities and that adult knowledge, experience, or developmental stage is a teleology for children's play. See, for instance, the work of Groos, A. Freud, Klein, Erikson, Winnicott, and Piaget, although these are just a handful of the theorists who make this claim.

The ideal of modern Western childhood, with its emphasis on the innocence and malleability of children (Aries 1962), has combined with various social conditions to promote two categories of curricula for young children in regards to play: one in which children's play is directed toward adult-determined developmental goals and one in which children's play is protected from adult interference (so called "free play"). These two categories of curricula appear to be equally powerless in response to the current crisis, in which "academic" subject matter learning is becoming the focus of the curriculum, in place of play, in many early childhood classrooms internationally (Brooker and Woodhead 2013). Article 31 of the United

Nation's Committee on the Rights of the Child states that all children have the right to play. Recently, the United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC) reminded State parties of this right and warned that children's time for play is often reduced. They write: "For many children in both rich and poor countries, child labor, domestic work or *educational increasing demands* serve to reduce the time available for the enjoyment of these rights" (UNCRC's General Comment No. 17, 2013, emphasis added). However, these two categories of curricula remain uncontested by any third alternative.

Aesthetics and Ambiguity of Play in Early Childhood Education

Gunilla Lindqvist's (1995) work traces this limitation of curricula for young children back to the dichotomy between imagination and realistic thinking, and her response is her exploration of the "common denominator" of play and aesthetic forms, which she calls the "aesthetics of play" (Lindqvist 1995). Lindqvist is one of the few play scholars who have focused on the relationship between play and art. Lindqvist's study of the aesthetics of play is based in Vygotsky's theories of play, imagination, and creativity (1978, 1987, 2004) and also in Vygotsky's (1971) psychology of art. Vygotsky's (1978) rebuttal to theories of play that position imagination and realistic thinking in opposition to one another was first published in 1933 and was hailed as overcoming the naturalistic and psychoanalytic theories of children's play that preceded it (Elkonin 2005). (One can use the terms imagination and fantasy as synonyms, but the term imagination is preferred, as the term fantasy has connotations of being "not true" which imagination does not have.)

Vygotsky (1987) highlights the importance of understanding imagination as an aspect of the process of creating and experiencing reality that defines our species rather than as something "other" than reality. He elaborates upon his claim that "(i)magination is an integral aspect of realistic thinking" (1987, p. 349), thus:

No accurate cognition of reality is possible without a certain element of imagination, a certain flight from the immediate, concrete, solitary impressions in which this reality is presented in the elementary acts of consciousness. The processes of invention or artistic creativity demand a substantial participation by both realistic thinking and imagination. The two act as a unity. (1987, p. 349)

As Cole and Pelaprat (2011) explain, human conscious experience is a process that requires not just our phylogenetically constrained abilities and our culturally organized experience but also our active reconciliation or “filling in,” our imagining, as we try to make sense of our world.

Vygotsky describes four basic ways that fantasy is associated with reality in the creative process: (1) Anything that one’s imagination creates is always based on elements from reality – from one’s past experiences. (2) Experience is also based in imagination, for instance, through imagining/remembering of one’s own or someone else’s experiences, through stories or through other means. (3) Emotions that arise in reality affect imagination, but imagination also affects emotions. (4) Fantasy becomes reality when imagination is crystallized in a material form which is returned to reality as a new and active force that has the potential to change reality: “(T)o combine elements to produce a structure, to combine the old in new way, . . . is the basis of creativity” (2004, p. 12).

Imagination and creativity are therefore both necessary for thinking, human growth and development, and the process that is the interrelation of the two is a trait of all people, including young children. This second point can be seen especially clearly in play, claims Vygotsky, as he argues that play is imagination embodied in the material world. A child’s play is not a reproduction of what she has experienced nor is it unrelated to these experiences. Instead a child’s play is a creative revision of what she has experienced.

Lindqvist (1995) designed the *creative pedagogy of play* to foster and study the aesthetics of play. Within this pedagogy children’s play is understood to be an early form of the artistic and scientific endeavors of adulthood and, therefore, to produce new and intrinsically valuable insights

that can be of value to adults and children alike. This pedagogy features *playworlds*, which are adult-child joint play activities in which children and teachers jointly create, enter, and exit fantasy worlds. Children contribute their play expertise and adults contribute their experience with art and science. A playworld often takes its starting point in a text, such as a children’s book, poem, or story.

Playworlds are created and studied in a variety of forms and for a variety of reasons, internationally, for instance, in Japan, Finland, the United States, and Serbia, as well as in Lindqvist’s home country, Sweden (i.e., Marjanovic-Shane et al. 2011). However, Lindqvist’s (1995) study of playworlds led her to conclude that there are two aesthetical forms of play. One is connected to music, poetry, and rhythmic movement. This form takes its starting point in the young child’s poetic and rhythmic relationship to objects and language. The second form is connected to literary forms and originates from the basic pattern in folktales. This form can be found in children’s play and stories from the age of three but also in children’s literature. The plot dominates in this esthetical form of play. These two esthetical forms can each constitute a basis for creating a playworld, which in turn supports these two esthetical forms.

These conclusions of Lindqvist’s (1995) concerning the aesthetics of play in curricula for young children can be further developed through theories of aesthetics and early childhood pedagogies that focus on aesthetics. Early childhood pedagogies that focus on play tend to be less useful in developing Lindqvist’s conclusions because they remain firmly based in play theory that does not acknowledge Vygotsky’s challenge to the separation of fantasy and reality and does not value play for its intrinsic qualities. As Brian Sutton-Smith (1997) writes: “. . .extrinsic academic, social, moral, physical, and cognitive play functions, with a progress-oriented thrust, have been the major focus of most child play scientists . . .” (1997, p. 50). It takes an outsider to the field, such as Gadamer (1960), to argue that play ontology is linked to experiencing,

understanding, and *bildung* and that play thus has a value in itself.

Wartofsky (1976) argues that “(h)uman beings become human in coming to know themselves as human” and that the creation and appreciation of art, what he calls “the very activity or praxis of art,” is “humanizing praxis” because it “is a praxis which comes to know itself, i.e., which takes *itself* as its own object” such that “this very activity is a fundamental mode of human self-knowledge” (1976, p. 357). Wartofsky continues thus:

“(A)rt represents its own process of coming into being and insofar, exemplifies and objectifies the distinctively human capacity of creation. It is in the self-recognition of this creative capacity that human beings come to know themselves as human, in the specific sense that they come to know themselves as creators or as artists”. (1976, p. 357)

If one understands art in Wartofsky’s terms, then one can ask if the esthetics of play consist of coming to know oneself as human. Others have used the work of Mikhail Bakhtin to consider play as humanizing, although this work is not based in the study of aesthetics, such as Wartofsky’s study of aesthetics within the field of philosophy, but in interdisciplinary stances, such as Stetsenko’s (2015) “transformative activist stance.” Marjanovic-Shane and White write: “As an act-deed (postupok), play is considered as a way of relating to others as well as a means of co-creating and representing subjectivities” (2014, p. 119). Working from both Bakhtin and Vygotsky’s positions, Stetsenko and Ho argue that in play “children sort out the difficult challenge of becoming unique, self-determined, and free persons within the communal world shared and co-created with others” (2015, p. 221).

The pedagogical approach of the preschools of Reggio Emilia, Italy, known internationally as the *pedagogy of listening*, focuses on aesthetics understood as a process of empathy that relates the self to things and things to each other. Exploration is the central component of the pedagogy of listening, and within this approach play is often regarded as an expression of a traditional Fröbel – inspired preschool didactics that are based on a vision of the child as “nature” (Dahlberg and Lenz Taguchi 1994). However,

insights from the pedagogy of listening into the nature of aesthetics in relation to exploration can help to deepen an understanding of the aesthetics of play.

Within the pedagogy of listening, children are considered to be culture and knowledge creators rather than just reproducers of knowledge. Children are understood to be developing theories and hypotheses about the world that should be considered to be equally possible to those of adults. Key components of this process of exploration are the environment and materials, which are thought of as a “third teacher” who supports children and teachers in formulating problems rather than searching for correct answers.

The pedagogy of listening employs a studio or *atelier*, which is regarded as a place of exploration, invention, and experimentation, and an *atelierista*, an educator with an arts background. *The hundred languages* is a term within the pedagogy of listening that describes the many ways children explore, make and test hypotheses, and express themselves, i.e., through dance, music, gesture, the visual arts, etc. The atelier and atelierista are both resources that exist to support processes of exploration and listening through these 100 languages.

Central to this process of listening is *documentation*, as exploration is not based on pre-defined goals but is instead developed from the children’s interests, questions, and engagement. When documentation is reflected upon, it becomes *pedagogical documentation*. Pedagogical documentation is used to guide a project based on what teachers perceive to be children’s meaning-making processes.

A founding atelierista of the pedagogy of listening, Veia Vecchi, writes the following of the “esthetic dimension” of this pedagogy:

Perhaps first and foremost it is a process of empathy relating the Self to things and things to each other. It is like a slim thread or aspiration to quality that makes us choose one word over another, the same for colour or shade, a certain piece of music, a mathematical formula or the taste of a food. It is an attitude of care and attention for the things we do, a desire for meaning: it is curiosity and wonder; it is the opposite of indifference and carelessness, of conformity, of absence of participation and feeling. (2010, p. 5)

Hutt et al. characterize the difference between play and exploration succinctly. They write: “Implicit in the behaviors we termed ‘exploration’ was the query: What does this *object* do? whilst implicit in the behaviors we termed ‘play’ was the query: What can *I* do with this object?” (1989, p. 11). The pedagogy of listening shows exploration in which art is a tool in the activity of exploration. The creative pedagogy of play shows play in which art (aesthetical form) is the activity. Both of these pedagogies have been developed in great part by teachers of young children, and these teachers continue to be engaged in problematizing the differences and similarities between play and exploration.

If, just as science and art are two key forms of adult creativity, exploration and play are two key forms of early childhood creativity, it may be that art as experience (Dewey 1934) in early childhood, which both of these pedagogies point to, is the necessary area of focus in an ongoing study of the relationship between play and aesthetics. The question of how one might best study the aesthetic experience of play may be most fruitfully addressed not only through theories produced within the academy but also through knowledge generated within early childhood pedagogies themselves, whose curricula stand to be shaped by a better understanding of the aesthetics of play.

Currently, learning is emerging internationally as the primary focus of preschools, at the expense of play (see the United Nation’s Committee on the Rights of the Child’s *General Comment No. 17*, 2013). Arguments in support of play remaining the primary focus of preschools have proliferated and have tended to disregard one of the few things that a survey of the diverse literature on play can claim with any certainty: Play is ambiguous (Sutton-Smith 1997). The resulting proliferation of studies that focus on play in curricula for young children as a knowable entity with knowable outcomes has both moved the field further from the preschool and further into the academy and also stifled some of the most promising and relevant branches of study of play in curricula for young children, such as the study of the esthetics of play.

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Policy Imperative in Early Childhood Education and Care

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Explanatory Notes

Significant variations across national contexts in key terminology for this entry necessitate the inclusion of explanatory notes. The age range for *early childhood* is from birth to 8 years. The term *early childhood education and care* is used to refer to formal education and care services provided for young children in the years before compulsory schooling and in the early years of school. These services may or may not be part of State education systems. This definition encompasses the range of prior to school education and care services available to children including preschool, kindergarten, nursery school, and child care.

Introduction

Policy imperatives frame and shape the implementation of early childhood education and care

systems in particular ways and are bound by social understandings of childhood, children, and the role of the family. Since the spread of formal early childhood education with the nineteenth-century kindergarten movement, there have been significant shifts in how early childhood education and care is understood and provided through policy interventions in many, mainly minority world, countries. It is a domain, often uneasily posited, at the intersection of multiple policy spheres, including education, welfare, and workforce. Since the turn of the second millennium, policy for early childhood education has been subject to considerable scrutiny internationally through the international flow of research and the influence of world policy institutions (e.g., the OECD and World Bank). This scrutiny has been driven by multiple factors including the challenges of disadvantage and inequality, changes in demography, changes in how the institutions of early childhood education are constituted and understood, and considerations of the enactment of children's rights.

Policy and Policy Imperatives

Policy is designed to steer practices toward desired futures. Formal policy documents articulate objectives and frequently seek to mandate or guide how these objectives are to be achieved. Importantly, policy encompasses more than text and is manifest through how texts are translated into practice, as well as choices and silences about preferred courses of action (Press and Mitchell 2013). The term “policy imperative” is used to describe and capture the stated objectives driving policy choices, the framing of the problem to be addressed through policy, and the underlying (and often unarticulated) beliefs and values underpinning policy.

Early childhood education and care systems vary significantly across national contexts in their purpose as well as in how they are organized. These variations have been explained in various ways. In an examination of the marked differences in policy approaches to child care in France and the United States, White (2009) argues that the

ideas underpinning policy choices, specifically the interaction of “norms, frames, and programmatic ideas” are key to explaining how different systems emerge. Thus policy solutions are shaped when policy actors put forward the “right” programmatic ideas using the “right” policy frames that resonate with extant norms to convince policy decision-makers. Rigby et al. (2007) argue that policy design choice, for instance, government investment in public child care or reliance upon the market, shapes not only what the system looks like but also how the policy problem is understood. Most policy scholars agree that policy regimes leave institutional legacies that are highly influential in determining the general direction of future policy.

Policy imperatives provide another way of understanding variations in the nature of early childhood education and care systems and enable an understanding of these variations within, as well as across national contexts. Attention to the policy imperatives at play is particularly useful for understanding early childhood education and care systems because this sector sits at the intersection of multiple policy domains in a way that is distinct from that of education systems for older children and adults.

Following the emergence of formal early childhood education with the nineteenth-century kindergarten movement, policy for early childhood education has been shaped by objectives related to welfare, women’s equality, educational achievement, and the workforce needs of the economy. It has also had to negotiate competing views about the role of the family and the State in relation to responsibilities for the development and well-being of young children. More recently, the ratification of the *United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC)* in 1989 has lent momentum to advocacy for early childhood education and care policy to be based on a commitment to children’s rights. Each broad policy domain shapes early childhood education and care systems in distinct, and at times, competing ways. How (and whether) children’s rights and interests are conceptualized and enacted within each policy framing is contested.

The Family or the State: Where Does Responsibility for Children’s Early Education Rest?

Children’s right to education is enshrined in Article 28 of the *United Nations Convention of the Rights of the Child*. This article states that, in particular, primary education should be “compulsory and available free to all.” Although a number of global policy institutions, such as the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the World Education Forum (WEF), promote universal access to early childhood education (OECD 2001, 2006, 2012, WEF 2015), this exhortation does not enjoy the same degree of unanimity as children’s access to school education. In part this is because the desirability of early childhood education and care for infants and very young children is strongly contested. Such contestation arises from competing discourses of motherhood, conflicting understandings of the conditions considered necessary to children’s healthy development, concerns regarding young children’s vulnerability, and competing views about the nature and extent of State intervention in care and education. In an essay canvassing Western philosophical constructions of childhood in early childhood education, Davis (2010, p. 289) writes that the education of very young children “(m)ore than any other stage in child development...foregrounds the relations of private to public, family to community, maternal sustenance to civic welfare.”

At the end of the nineteenth century, many kindergarten advocates emphasized the responsibility of mothers for children under 2 or 3 years of age by refusing the youngest children access to kindergartens. This position was reinforced later in the twentieth century by Bowlby’s maternal deprivation theory that emphasized exclusive maternal care for the first 3 years of life. Thus, for much of the previous century, the assumed family norm informing early childhood education and care policy was of one parent in the workforce (usually the father) and one parent at home (usually the mother) responsible for children and the domestic sphere. As a result, early childhood education and care in many minority world

nations focused on older children in the years before school and paid scant attention to younger children and infants, except in cases where the family was deemed unable to provide appropriate levels of care. In addition, although some governments' policies strove for universal access to early childhood education for older children, the policies of other governments sought only to provide access as a compensatory measure for children facing risks to their development.

Feminism and Women's Participation in Paid Labor

In the latter third of the twentieth century, feminism has been instrumental in driving significant shifts in early childhood policy, particularly in relation to the expansion of childcare provision. The availability of child care enables mothers with young children to engage in paid labor and to participate in the public sphere. It thus becomes a strategy to support women's equality.

As women's participation in paid labor has become a norm in many nations, economies have become reliant on women's contribution. Hence government policies to support child care are often now framed as key labor force strategies.

Welfare

Early childhood education and care policy objectives concerned with welfare are usually concerned with outcomes related to children. In more recent years, however, such policy has also sought to achieve welfare objectives concerned with parents.

The kindergarten movement evident in many minority world nations at the end of the nineteenth century was associated with philanthropic interventions on behalf of children living in poverty and children who were often poorly nourished and living in cramped and unsanitary conditions. Similarly, in the first few decades of the twentieth century, the nursery movement emerged to provide for the babies and very young children of mothers who worked from necessity, because they were widowed, deserted, or otherwise unable to

rely upon their husbands for support. These were interventions targeted to specific groups of children deemed to have particular needs because of the failure of the family or the State to provide adequately for their healthy development. Nursery care in particular was often described in terms of being an unfortunate necessity.

In more recent decades, a number of highly influential longitudinal studies (e.g., the Effective Provision of Preschool Education study 2004) have affirmed the positive impact of high-quality early childhood education and care for children who face risks to their healthy development and/or who are at risk of school failure. In his review of longitudinal studies, Nobel Prize-winning economist James Heckman (2006) concluded that early childhood education and care was the most cost-effective intervention for children facing disadvantage.

Another version of early childhood education and care as a policy response to welfare emanates from changes to family formation, in particular, increasing numbers of single-parent households (predominantly female headed). Child care enables women to maintain employment, post-childbirth and regardless of family composition, and thus reduces the likelihood of children being raised in poverty. Hence, acting as a buffer against poverty, child care mitigates the risks to children's development that poverty may pose.

Rights and Citizenship

The widespread ratification of the *United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC)* at the turn of the 1990s has generated increasing attention to the rights of young children. Rights considerations not only concern the entitlement rights of children to particular services such as education, they also focus upon how rights might be manifest *within* services.

Article 3 of the *Convention* states that the best interests of the child should be a primary consideration in all actions concerning children. Thus, attention to the daily experiences of children within services (rather than anticipated outcomes from attendance) and how children's citizenship is

played out within early childhood education is also an important objective.

The Impacts of Policy Imperatives

Because early childhood education and care intersects diverse policy domains (e.g., education, women's equality, welfare, and labor), the policy imperative becomes critically important. Each policy imperative comes with a tendency to privilege particular aspects of early childhood education and care. Thus the imperative is highly influential in determining which children and families have access to early childhood education and care services, what the service system looks like, as well as the content and the nature of children's experiences within such settings. Additionally, the multiple and sometimes competing imperatives at play can result in policy incoherence within nation states as well as helping to explain differences across nation states (Fig. 1).


The following section canvasses the tendencies toward particular policy outcomes associated with each policy imperative. This is followed by a short discussion of the policy problem this poses for the development of early childhood education and care systems.

When the primary policy imperative for the provision of early childhood education and care is to enable women's paid employment, it is positioned as an adjunct to workforce participation (either as an emancipatory measure or as an economic measure). In this case, the policy tendency is to prioritize outcomes of childcare accessibility and affordability. That is, policy focuses on supply – ensuring that there are sufficient numbers of child care places to meet demand and containing the cost to families. Child care is often made available for children from a young age.

When the primary policy imperative for the provision of early childhood education and care is related to welfare objectives, the policy tendency is to target the provision of services to particular individuals, groups, or localities. Eligibility for government-supported provision is determined typically through the application of assessment criteria and might include economic or social indices, or health, ability, or welfare assessments.

When the primary policy imperative for the provision of early childhood education and care is related to educational outcomes, provision may be universal or targeted. In universal systems, provision is often (though not always) limited to 1 or 2 years before school entry. As educational discourses strengthen in early childhood education and care, early childhood policy analysts point to the risk of the “schoolification” of curriculum in early childhood education and care. That is, creating early childhood curricula that more closely resemble those of schools and the loss of play-based pedagogies that have traditionally distinguished curriculum for very young children.

When the primary policy imperative for the provision of early childhood education and care is within a discourse of children's rights and citizenship, the policy tendency is to attend to the experiences of children within such programs and to nurture children's values and dispositions for democratic life. So, for instance, the OECD report *Starting Strong II* recommends that early childhood education and care systems “support broad learning, participation and democracy” (p. 218)



Policy Imperative in Early Childhood Education and Care, Fig. 1 Policy domains intersecting early childhood education and care

and safeguard communal, interactive, experiential, and social contexts for children's early learning.

The Policy Problem Policy Imperatives Pose

Policy interest in children's early care and education is exemplified by the OECD's production of four *Starting Strong* reports – international policy reviews of early childhood education and care (2001, 2006, 2012, 2015) in addition to the *Babies and Bosses* (2007) report which canvassed issues of childcare provision as part of reviewing work and family policies. *Starting Strong I* adopted the term “early childhood education and care” to denote the inseparability of children's care and education. The need to adopt such a term in itself is indicative of the policy problem posed by the impact of diverse policy imperatives.

In many nations, policy for children's early education and care has been developed in a piecemeal manner as different policy imperatives give rise to different responses. Significantly, policy rationales for the provision of early childhood education and care may be driven by objectives unrelated to children, such as supporting parents' (read “mothers”) participation in the paid workforce. Even in cases where such rationales are primarily focused on children, there are tensions between whether the resulting service system is primarily a welfare intervention, an educational intervention linked, for instance, to ideas of school readiness or an environment constructed around conceptions of children's democratic practice and citizenship. Many other implications arise from the various policy imperatives at work in relation to early childhood education and care, including who should work in such services, how services are to be provided, from what age children have access, and the nature of early childhood curricula.

Nations' extant norms – including conceptualizations of children and childhood, the positioning of the family and the State, the perceived role of women and mothers in particular, and the emphases placed on governments and markets in the

provision of services – interact with the various policy imperatives at play in early childhood education and care, to shape early childhood education and care in particular ways.

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Policy Scholarship

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Political Aspects of Assessment

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How a society selects, classifies, distributes, transmits and evaluates the educational knowledge it considers to be public, reflects both the distribution of power and the principles of social control (Bernstein 1971, p. 47);

You get what you assess; you don't get what you don't assess; you should build assessment towards what you want...to teach... (Resnick and Resnick 1992, p. 59).

Introduction

The above quotations demonstrate that politics, and political choices, infuse and permeate every aspect of assessment design and use. Everything that a society values cannot be taught in school, choices about curriculum content and teaching methods have to be made. In turn, everything that is taught cannot be assessed; again, choices have to be made, samples have to be constructed (via test items of various kinds). Thus what is assessed represents, and in practice comes to be regarded, as the most important elements of educational experience and curriculum content. This is sometimes known as the “backwash” effect, whereby what is assessed narrows and drives the curriculum in particular directions. However, Bernstein's argument goes beyond this. It is not that assessment inadvertently impacts on the curriculum and students' educational experiences, but rather the selections that are made about what to assess very specifically reflect what the most powerful in society value – and it is those values which influence and pervade the school curriculum. In advanced economies, this is academic knowledge and, to a lesser extent, specific skills and capabilities. This insight can be used to analyze the political implications of assessment (“evaluation” in Bernstein's terms) in relation to social control – who gets to learn what and with what consequences. As the old aphorism has it,

“knowledge is power” and control of access to knowledge is a powerful tool for the control of populations. However, this insight can also be used to drive the curriculum and schooling in particular directions. Thus Resnick and Resnick (1992) take the same broad insight and, in a sense, turn it on its head – if assessment is going to influence the curriculum and educational experiences so profoundly, then let's use it positively, to best effect, and not simply accept the taken-for-granted values of the powerful. Build better assessments, and you will lead education in the direction you want it to develop. Either way, the political implications of assessment are significant – influencing what is taught, how it is taught, by whom, and to whom.

Perhaps because so much development and analysis is undertaken in the relatively closed worlds of psychometric research and test agencies, assessment is often thought of as a largely technical aspect of educational systems. Assessment is designed and used to measure the capabilities and achievements of students and report on these to the students themselves, teachers, parents, employers, university admissions officers, and other users of test and examinations results. Here the argument is that assessment simply reflects what is taught and learned, it does not determine it. That examination results may carry very significant consequences for students is not often regarded as a political issue per se, though the uneven distribution of results across cohorts and social groups (for example, by social class, gender, and race) may raise political concerns about economic efficiency and social mobility. Rather, assessment is seen as a politically neutral way of measuring achievement and distributing social and economic life chances – distributing life chances on academic merit.

More recently, test results have begun to be used to evaluate schools, teachers, and even whole school systems through national and international testing regimes such as National Curriculum Assessment (NCA) in England, No Child Left Behind (NCLB) in the USA, National Assessment Plan Literacy And Numeracy

(NAPLAN) in Australia, the National Certificate of Educational Achievement (NCEA) in New Zealand, and international comparative test organizations such as the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA, run by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, OECD). Even here however, with tests carrying potentially severe consequences for schools and teachers, the tests themselves are largely regarded as technical and neutral mechanisms for identifying the outcomes of education. Test results may feed into political decision-making, but tests and testing are not thought of as political in and of themselves; rather it is argued that they provide information for decision-making (OECD 2013). It can also be argued that test results focus attention on the outcomes of education, on the quality of what is produced, rather than the inputs, with this being especially important in developing countries (Pritchett et al. 2013). But taking a small number of outcomes measures (usually tests in language, maths, and possibly science) as indicative of the quality of an education system as a whole risks the corruption of the indicator as schools and teachers focus on teaching to the test (“you get what you assess”). Thus as test scores go up, educational quality may not necessarily be improved; it may even go down, as teaching to the test narrows the curriculum and the educational experience of students, even very successful students (and perhaps especially the very successful students). There is extensive evidence of this happening in the USA and UK (Torrance 2011). It is a trade-off that may be worth accepting in the short term in developing countries where the baseline quality of educational provision is still low, but not in advanced economies where schools must produce much more than a limited range of test scores. Furthermore, the distribution of life chances to individuals and the distributing or withholding of resources to and from particular schools and teachers are inherently political activities. For example, national testing and international comparisons routinely now involve redirecting public funding to successful schools and withdrawing it from unsuccessful schools through restructuring plans and even closure of so-called failing schools. However, it could

equally well be argued that comparatively unsuccessful schools, working in difficult circumstances, require *more* resource rather than less.

Historically, perhaps for a period of a hundred years or more from the 1860s to the 1960s, assessment was used to categorize, select, and certificate minorities of students: to identify and direct small numbers of the supposedly “feeble minded” to special institutional provision and to select small numbers of students for elite education and subsequently to certificate their academic achievements. Education was a scarce good, access to educational opportunities were limited, and educational assessment was largely concerned with selecting individuals for those limited opportunities: for access to an elite secondary education and access to university. In turn, grades and certificates were awarded to individuals at the end of particular courses of study, as they progressed through the education system. So the focus of assessment was on identifying individual achievement and particularly on selecting and certifying individuals. In so doing, this process functioned to identify and legitimate on grounds of educational merit, the identification of the next cohort of suitably qualified and socialized personnel for economic and social leadership roles in society. Selection and certification was done *by* relatively small elite groups, *of* relatively small elite groups, *for* relatively small elite groups and was underpinned by reference to the idea that innate intellectual ability was distributed along a normal distribution curve within a population (Sutherland 1984). Thus assessment developed as a political *technology of exclusion*, with school leaving examinations in particular, constituting a key mediation point in the articulation of schooling with the economy. The selection, tracking and progression of students through the education system, and the certification of their achievements, or lack of them, have functioned very directly to prepare, filter, and allocate groups of students into vocational and academic tracks and to identify particular individuals for specific roles and employment opportunities.

More recently, the focus and purpose of assessment has changed. The intellectual field and policy context now assumes that all, or at least the

overwhelming majority, of the population can and should be educated to the highest level possible. The focus is now on education for all and the development of a fit-for-purpose assessment system *as a system*, i.e., as part of an integrated approach to national human resource development. The imperative now is to treat education as an economic investment, both on the part of the individual student and on the part of government. How and why these changes have occurred could be the subject of a much longer chapter. Suffice to say that we now live in a world of intense global economic competition and mass movements of capital and labor. Unskilled mass production and employment opportunities have virtually vanished from developed economies, and the emphasis now is on education for the so-called knowledge economy and as a form of investment in human capital. Governments now need to develop assessment mechanisms which harvest and utilize the capabilities of the majority of their populations, rather than dispense with them, and thus assessment is now developing as a *technology of inclusion*. It is expected to accurately identify and report the individual educational achievement of the vast majority of the student population; in turn, such measures are also expected to accurately evaluate the effectiveness of individual schools (and sometimes teachers), while parallel international measures compare, contrast, and evaluate the quality and effectiveness of whole national systems of education.

Furthermore, the field of assessment studies has itself expanded and become much more sophisticated, exploring the relationships between assessment, teaching, and learning. Assessment is now expected to support and underpin the process of learning, not just measure the outcomes of learning. So, again, the expectations for the field are vastly more ambitious than was once the case and the political implications are multiplied as assessment comes to pervade every aspect of the teaching-learning process via formative approaches to assessment and not just through a generalized control of the curriculum. While the development of a more inclusive system may appear to be a more benign use of assessment, it remains a political use and, moreover, such inclusion attributes success and failure, and devolves responsibility for them,

very much down to the efforts of the individual student, teacher, and indeed parent (via their support for their children's learning), rather than locating success and failure at the level of institutional processes and selection procedures, as was the case previously (Torrance 2011, 2015).

So, assessment intersects with every aspect of an educational system and indeed of a social system more generally: at the level of the individual student and teacher and their various experiences (positive or negative) of the assessment process, at the level of the school or similar educational institution and how it is organized and held to account, and at the level of the educational and social system with respect to what knowledge is endorsed and which people are legitimately accredited for future economic and social leadership. Assessment controls the curriculum and, in turn, the work of teachers, and the educational experiences of students more generally; it allocates life chances and opportunities (or the lack of them) to individuals and in turn legitimates the idea of social and economic stratification on grounds of measured achievement and academic merit, and it renders diverse school systems commensurate and comparable with each other via international test programs (Lingard et al. 2013).

It might be argued that we need some mechanism to identify achievement, to mediate social and economic competition for scarce opportunities such as senior technical, administrative, and managerial positions, and indeed to allocate such opportunities to those best equipped to succeed and thereby benefit society as well as the individuals themselves. But much empirical evidence and theoretical analysis suggests that assessment processes and outcomes reproduce social and economic inequalities by reflecting the culture and values of the already successful, rather than identifying capability and achievement irrespective of social background (Bourdieu and Passeron 1977; Cassen and Kingdon 2007). This is also the implication of Bernstein's argument concerning the distribution of power – already powerful social groups control the content and procedures by which “merit” is defined. Not surprisingly it reflects their own accomplishments and behaviors. More recently, it has been suggested that

the development of new technologies and globalized competition is rendering even the traditional success of the “educated middle classes” vulnerable to obsolescence as many middle management and administrative tasks become ensconced in computer programs rather than the roles of employed individuals (Lauder et al. 2012). However, while such developments may threaten traditional definitions of social and economic success, they do not challenge the political role of assessment. Quite the reverse, they will intensify the political role of assessment in further rendering individuals responsible for determining their own futures (Torrance 2015).

Having said this however, it is also important to recognize that assessment is engaged in voluntarily and is not simply imposed on students and teachers in some arbitrary or conspiratorial fashion, though some specific versions of assessment are indeed imposed on school systems by government. Assessment in general is a ubiquitous feature of modern education systems precisely because different educational actors have an interest in developing and working with assessment. Examiners and test developers produce assessments to sell into an educational market (and an increasingly international and globalized market at that, selling tests is a multimillion dollar industry); teachers use assessment for purposes of motivating and controlling students in the classroom; and students submit to assessment because of the potential social and economic benefits that success can bring. Here we see both the political economy and the micropolitics of tests and testing at work – with test agency profits and people’s individual careers and career opportunities being very specifically promoted or inhibited by particular approaches to and uses of assessment.

So, the political aspects of assessment turn on our interpretation of some key questions and revolve around the role they play in controlling the overall trajectory and productivity of education systems. Does assessment merely measure what has been learned, or control what is to be learned, and how it is to be taught? Does assessment merely manage entry to the labor market and select and certificate the best equipped for the job or does it legitimate such selection by reference to academic

merit while masking the role that power and culture play in reproducing social and economic inequality? Do international testing programs such as PISA merely provide useful comparative evidence for national educational decision-making or do they deflect attention from the political nature of the interventions planned and the resource allocation choices that are then made, with assessment effectively substituting for policy and creating the policy problem it purports to address? Moreover, do international testing programs render national systems commensurate, comparable, and hence open to private commercial exploitation as it becomes easier and more profitable to sell the same test and textbook to 15 or 20 countries rather than just into one national system?

How we answer these questions will determine our position on the political aspects of assessment. Our answers will reflect, at least in part, our position within an education system, within the policy/practice nexus, and effectively turn around whether or not we can envisage more valid and equitable approaches to assessment, certification, and selection being developed. There is no shortage of advocates for other approaches to assessment – approaches which would involve a far greater range of educational outcomes being pursued, including the development of practical skills and abilities and the application rather than just the recall of knowledge. These could be pursued by developing more practical assessments of “authentic” tasks undertaken in situ and reported through various forms of “profiles” or “records of achievement” compiled over time by students themselves (Torrance 1995). Reviewing such approaches is beyond the remit of this entry, except to say that developing such approaches would still reflect the political aspects of assessment, but involve different political choices being made and different political and economic goals being pursued.

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Political Economy of Charter Schools

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Synonyms

[Neoliberalism](#); [Profit](#); [Rights](#); [School choice](#)

Introduction

In order to understand charter schools and to avoid many of the confusions inherent in the charter

school debate, it is helpful to view charter schools from the perspective of political economy. Perhaps the main reason there are so many misunderstandings surrounding charter schools is because there is no reliance on political economy to make sense of them. The fact that we live in a culture that is anti-inquiry, anti-discussion, and averse to scientific renderings of phenomena contributes to this state of affairs. The dominant forces in society, such as Wall Street, big business, and their political and media representatives, have a direct interest in promoting mystification and incoherence about many critical issues. This keeps people disoriented and vulnerable to ideas and agendas that are not in their interest. Today, nearly every issue is spun to the point that no one knows what to believe any more. Maximum confusion is widespread. This incoherence and disinformation invariably harms the public interest and blocks the path of progress; it does not serve the majority.

Political economy provides us with rigorous conceptual tools which empower us to place any phenomenon, including charter schools, on a sound objective analytical footing. From the perspective of political economy, questions such as “are there any good charter schools?” or “how can we improve charter schools?” are superfluous. If anything, such questions are a frank admission that there are many lousy charter schools out there but somehow the concept and practice of charter schools is acceptable. Statements such as “charter schools are so diverse that it is undesirable to make generalizations about them” or “charter schools had noble, progressive, grass-roots origins” are also erroneous or misplaced. Such questions and statements miss the mark altogether and expose the absence of a rigorous approach based on political economy.

From the standpoint of political economy, the main question is: what is the relationship between charter schools and the laws governing the production and exchange of the material means of life? That is, to understand the nature of charter schools, when they emerged, why they emerged at a specific time, and who they really serve, we must examine the way production and exchange of the means to reproduce existence takes place in a particular society at a particular time. Without

rooting phenomena in the material production of life, we risk taking an ahistorical and decontextualized approach to phenomena.

To this end, this entry defines political economy and describes the political economy of charter schools. Special attention is paid to the law of the falling rate of profit and neoliberalism as they relate to charter schools. This entry also outlines an alternative to charter schools and existing production and exchange relations. Such an alternative is a human-centered society that provides human rights, including the right to education, with a guarantee; it is the negation of the present state of affairs. Rights belong to humans by virtue of their being and for no other reason whatsoever; they cannot be given or taken away and must be guaranteed from birth to death.

Political Economy

Engels (1877) states that “Political economy, in the widest sense, is the science of the laws governing the production and exchange of the material means of subsistence in human society” (p. 104). Political economy examines how humans produce and exchange what they need to live, including the relations they enter into with each other in the course of this production and exchange. This production and exchange of products is the basis of every society because there can be no life, history, or development without the production of the means of existence. Engels goes on to clarify that while production and exchange “constantly determine and influence each other,” they are different functions because “Production may occur without exchange, but exchange – being necessarily an exchange of products – cannot occur without production” (p. 104). Not all societies have produced products for the purpose of exchange because not all societies have had a well-developed social division of labor and a system of private ownership. Such societies are a very recent phenomenon, historically speaking, and emerge and grow in relation to the development of the forces of production. Furthermore, because production and exchange often vary from country to country and from generation

to generation, “Political economy is therefore essentially a historical science” (p. 104). No mode of production lasts forever. Everything contains its own negation and is in a constant process of *becoming* (Malott and Ford 2015).

Under capitalism, the highest development of commodity production, products are produced mainly for exchange and profit, not for meeting social needs. If something is not profitable, it will not be produced, regardless of whether society needs it or not. A commodity is anything that can be bought and sold. Under advanced commodity production, society coordinates products and exchange through the market, through the so-called invisible hand, what Marx called the law of value, which is why chaos, anarchy, and violence are ever present. Slumps and crises are endemic to such an unplanned economic system because conscious human organization of the economy is continually negated by the old capitalist relations and ideas. Production and consumption cannot be harmonized when the socialized economy is separated into privately owned competing parts. The result is perpetual crisis.

Every commodity has a use value and exchange value, which means that every commodity is simultaneously an object of utility and a bearer of value. The substance of this exchange value, abstract human labor, was discovered by Marx. Undifferentiated human labor, labor stripped of its particular useful form (e.g., weaving, baking, plowing), forms the essential content of value. “[A] commodity,” writes Carchedi (2011), “contains value, crystallised human labour in the abstract” (p. 5). In this view, all labor can be reduced to the expenditure of human brains, muscles, nerves, and limbs. No matter what it is, nothing can be produced without human energy. This capacity, as opposed to the useful forms it takes, imparts to products their value. Unlike use value, which is tangible and readily perceived, value is not something one can touch or readily observe. It can be grasped only through the power of abstraction. More than anything else, value represents the way production and exchange are organized in a particular society; it is fundamentally a *social* relation. Or, as Carchedi (2011) puts it, “Value cannot be observed, only labour can” (p. 8).

Under capitalism, workers do not own the means of production; they lack the wherewithal to provide for their own existence and livelihood, which means that they must sell their ability to work to the capitalist, who *legally* owns the means of production. Capital (dead labor) expands only by exploiting workers (living labor), which is why workers and capitalists have opposing interests. In this setup, workers, who are the source of all value, are alienated from both the production process and the products of their labor; they have no control over the world they themselves create. From a capital-centered perspective, workers are a derogatory cost of production, a burden, and a liability. This view conceals the fact that it is owners of capital who are unproductive, superfluous, and a drain on the economy and society. It is actually the capitalist who is a liability and has no right to be (Malott and Ford 2015).

The magnitude of value is determined by the average work time required to produce something useful. It does not matter what is being produced, whether it is bread, cars, or houses – all are the products of the same common social substance: human labor power. While the use value of a commodity stems from the specific type of work one is engaged in (e.g., baking bread, manufacturing cars, building houses), its value (or exchange value) stems from the average labor time it takes to produce it. Thus, something that takes on average 10 h to produce possesses more value than something that takes on average 7 h to produce. As productivity increases, the value of a commodity falls because it can be produced faster.

Law of the Falling Rate of Profit

Building on the work of his predecessors, Marx showed that under capitalism, competition and the real threat of extinction pressure major owners of capital to constantly improve the forces of production and productivity so as to stay ahead of others and maximize profits. Regardless of their personal values and intentions, any capitalist who becomes complacent about these inescapable pressures quickly finds themselves out of the game. This is why what a capitalist believes or

intends is irrelevant; the logic of capital is decisive. You live and die by the market whether you like it or not (of course, if you are too big to fail, then you are too big to jail, and you will get an enormous financial handout from the government). New technologies, machinery, and techniques must be introduced on a continual basis in order to stay ahead. The alternative is to fall by the wayside.

However, this drive to outcompete others and seize more surplus value invariably causes the rate of profit to decline in the long run. In *The historical transience of capital*, Maito (2014) shows that since the mid-to-late 1800s, despite periods of boom and bust, the rate of profit has steadily declined in 14 major countries (including Germany, the USA, Japan, the United Kingdom, and China). The data reveal a long-term tendency to economic breakdown, showing that capitalism is not capable of infinite development. Uninterrupted extended reproduction is impossible under advanced commodity production and private ownership of the means of production. For more than a century, the torturous business cycle has ruined the lives of millions at home and abroad. Naturally, official political economy claims that anarchy and crisis are natural and inevitable and that there is no alternative to this destructive state of affairs.

Roberts (2009) explains that “when the organic composition of capital rises (i.e., the amount of capital invested in plant, machinery and equipment relative to wages and benefits to the workforce), then the rate of profit for the capitalists will eventually fall” (p. 55). As more is invested in machinery and technology (constant capital), and less on wages and salaries (variable capital), the more the rate of profit declines. Machinery cannot add value to products, it simply *transfers* value. Labor is the only source of profit. Only labor can add value to products. Surplus value has no other source. And since profit equals unpaid labor, the aim of the capitalist is to convert paid labor into unpaid labor. Accordingly, if variable capital (i.e., living labor, the only source of value) is continually diminished while constant capital is continually increased, then the rate of profit (which differs from the *mass* of profit) is bound to decline.

While capitalists use many destructive ways to counter this inevitable decline in the rate of return on investments (e.g., intensifying worker exploitation, layoffs, monopolizing markets, going to war, tearing up contracts, mergers, bankruptcies, militarizing the economy, establishing State-organized pay-the-rich schemes, eliminating social programs, increasing debt, and intensifying antisocial public opinion), they cannot overcome the law itself; it is inescapable and affects the economy as a whole.

Today there are few, if any, profitable investment opportunities for major owners of capital; everything is tapped out; markets are saturated. Especially after the Great Recession of 2008, which has now turned into a long depression, all major investments have declined or stopped. The world's major economies (including India and China) are either anemic or slowing down. Stagnation is widespread. Unimpressive economic forecasts are continually revised downward, while representatives of the financial oligarchy go so far as to openly declare that we may never see the weak economic growth that preceded the Great Recession.

Capitalists are simply not investing. Traditional or typical sources of profit have largely disappeared. Instead, major owners of capital are relying increasingly on what Henry Giroux calls *casino capitalism*, or financial parasitism, to satisfy their unlimited greed. This is where the focus of the economy shifts from value creation to (real and fictitious) value appropriation. For capitalists, determining how to *redistribute* real and fictitious wealth increasingly replaces the actual *creation* of new wealth. The so-called real economy declines, while manipulation of newly created toxic and exotic fictitious financial instruments, along with trillions of dollars in *quantitative easing*, thrives. This retrogressive trend has only intensified in the neoliberal period and shows no signs of letting up.

Neoliberalism

Neo means *new* while *liberalism* refers to the economic doctrine of laissez-faire capitalism, the so-called free market. Neoliberalism refers to the

free market in a new form. Neoliberalism is capitalism under new and different conditions, conditions which differ markedly from previous eras. And because neoliberalism is global, we may use the expression neoliberal globalization to refer to the imperialist character of globalization.

Neoliberalism is the latest iteration of capitalism; the form capitalism has taken in major economies since the late 1970s. It is a concerted attempt by the ruling circles to reverse the falling rate of profit, which takes sharp downturns at specific points in time, in this case starting around 1980. Its main components include privatization, deregulation, repression, and abdication of government responsibility for the well-being of the people. It takes the form of phony austerity programs around the world, with Greece serving as the most vivid recent example of neoliberal pillaging.

Neoliberalism entails the elimination of many social programs and social welfare state arrangements brought into being, mainly through the struggles of millions of workers, during the first and middle parts of the twentieth century. It reverses many of humanity's achievements. It continually imposes cuts in wages, salaries, benefits, pensions, unemployment insurance programs, and more, increasing insecurity and misery for millions. Parks, libraries, sanitation and administrative services, utilities, roads, water, prisons, schools, healthcare – all are being privatized at a faster rate under neoliberalism in order to reverse falling profitability. Inequality, debt, unemployment, underemployment, and poverty have reached new levels under the neoliberal antisocial offensive. None of these assaults on workers, the middle strata, the public interest, and the society could have been achieved without the increased involvement of the State on behalf of major owners of capital. Public authority and public right have essentially disappeared in the neoliberal period.

Charter Schools

Charter schools, now numbering about 6,500, are first and foremost a political-economic project

that emerged squarely in the context of neoliberalism. They did not emerge before the onset of neoliberalism and have nothing to do with education reform. In fact, charter schools appeared less than ten years after the publication of the infamous 1983 *A Nation at Risk Report*, which called for the broad neoliberal restructuring of American education.

For major owners of capital, charter schools, also known as *contract* schools, represent a main way to transfer public funds, assets, and authority to the private sector so as to counter falling profitability. When a student enrolls in a charter school, public per-pupil funds, mostly State and federal, but sometimes local funds too, flow from the public school to the charter school. Annually, this drains billions of dollars from public schools, especially chronically underfunded, segregated, urban public school systems attended mostly by poor and low-income minority students. Venture philanthropists (e.g., Bill Gates), seedy lawyers and real estate developers, hedge fund managers, movie and sports celebrities, and millionaires of other stripes have all jumped on the charter school bandwagon in the context of a failing economy in order to get a piece of the nearly one-trillion-dollar public education budget. Hundreds of millions more in public funds come from the federal Charter Schools Program launched in 1994.

Currently, 44% of all charter school students in the USA are enrolled in a school owned and operated by an education management organization (EMO) (Miron and Gulosino 2013). The real figure is likely higher. EMOs are essentially privatized for-profit organizations. However, it does not matter if we are talking about for-profit or nonprofit charter schools though because both engage in for-profit arrangements and both embrace the free market and competition (winning and losing). Their contractual nature makes this possible. Contract schools stand *outside* long-standing governance arrangements in American public education and make privatization and marketization possible by operationalizing the public-to-private transfer of wealth and authority. Oman (2011) notes that a “Contract is the quintessential legal institution of a market economy” (p. 1). Contracts codify and

legitimize exchange relations under advanced commodity production.

The core error with this approach is that education is not a commodity. Education is not a business. It cannot be bought and sold like beef jerky or chewing tobacco. Schools cannot be opened and closed like a shoe store. Students, parents, and teachers are not consumers or products. Education is a basic human responsibility that a modern society must guarantee so that society moves forward. To subject education to the chaos, anarchy, and violence of the free market is irresponsible and profoundly counterproductive. It ensures constant instability and upheaval – hardly good conditions for teaching and learning. This is why teacher, student, and principal turnover rates are very high in charter schools (Miron and Applegate 2007; Stuit and Smith 2009). It is also why 88% of charter schools are not unionized (National Alliance for Public Charter Schools 2010) and many, if not most, practice selective enrollment patterns that contribute to an already segregated school system (Rotberg 2014) and skewed results on curriculum-narrowing high-stakes standardized tests produced by a handful of for-profit companies. For extensive information on unethical and illegal activities in charter schools across the country, see *Charter School Scandals* at <http://charterschoolscandals.blogspot.com>. For their part, Baker (2012), Green and Mead (2004), Karp (2012), Lubienski and Lubienski (2014), Saltman (2010), and others have shown why charter schools are not public schools.

The Way Forward

There can be no progress so long as the government serves major owners of capital and tramples on people’s rights. The government must restrict monopoly right and take up its responsibility to provide human rights, including the right to education, with a guarantee. Choice in education means removing government responsibility for education and subjecting it to the violence of the free market in the name of providing opportunities to poor and low-income minority students. It is the opposite of what is needed.

As part of a modern nation-building project, the government must fully fund a high-quality public education system open to all. It must also provide the rights to food, shelter, clothing, healthcare, pensions, and work with a guarantee. Rights belong to humans by virtue of their being and for no other reason whatsoever. Rights are not privileges. They cannot be given or taken away and are not based on competition, contracts, ability, wealth, race, sex, language, religion, or national origin. Human needs are not negotiable and cannot be reduced to a matter of policy.

In order for education, healthcare, work, and more to be guaranteed for all, the people must have control over the socialized economy. So long as the socialized economy remains in the hands of the top one percent, uneven development, instability, slumps, crises, chaos, and anarchy will increase. Millions will suffer unnecessarily and things will continue to go from bad to worse. This is why the fight for political empowerment is paramount. The right of the people to govern and decide their own affairs, including economic affairs, is critical. Workers and all progressive forces must deprive owners of capital of their ability to deprive everyone else of their rights.

Workers themselves must decide what is produced and consumed, as well as when and where it is produced and consumed. All the main sectors of the economy must be controlled by the people. Private interests that seek to distort and extort the economy cannot be tolerated. The economy must be oriented to increase the material and cultural well-being of all instead of serving the narrow private interests of a tiny ruling elite. The contradictions between socialized production and private ownership, mental and manual labor, and use value and exchange value must all be overcome so as to develop society and the economy in an all-sided, conscious, and planned manner. Anarchy in production and exchange is inconsistent with modern requirements.

Only under such conditions will education be fully funded, high quality, and open to all. With people in control of their livelihoods and destiny, no longer will there be a need for charter schools and other school-choice schemes that purport to

serve students and society but really enrich a handful of capitalists. The problem is not one of money because there is an overabundance of resources in society. The issue is: *who decides?* The financial oligarchy is unwilling and unable to use the social product to serve the public interest and advance society. It is fully committed to the neoliberal agenda. Only the working class and people can provide a new direction for society, an alternative to the existing society and the outmoded system it is based on.

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Populism

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Introduction

Analyzing educational phenomena means understanding factors which are not merely pedagogical but above all social. This is especially true for the Latin American context, where some social and

power structures strongly influence educational activity as, for example, populism, which before being a political reality is a social phenomenon interwoven in the fabric of the population. Aspects of the populist mentality which affect institutional education programming are reproduced through educational devices. Thus there exists a deep correlation between education and populism: to understand the first, we must not neglect to study the second.

Populism is a political phenomenon which has returned to affect many political and social contexts of the globe in the last few decades after a season in which it had seemed relegated to only a few areas like Latin America. By populism we mean a power relationship based upon a direct rapport between a charismatic leader and the people (Canovan 1981). On the basis of popular consensus, it offers itself as an alternative to a constituted power (establishment) and develops a political discourse based upon a rigid juxtaposition between us and them. Contemporary scientific debate on populism is focused on some crucial aspects such as its definition and its relationship with democracy: the new form of media populism.

The first scientific studies on this theme occurred in the period between the two wars. They were prevalently historical in character and took as their subject of interest the first forms of American populism from the second half of the nineteenth century and the Russian populisms (*narodniki*) occurring slightly later. Successively the conclusion of the fascist experience in Italy contributed to a further scientific research on the subject. For all that it is impossible to sustain that fascism and populism are the same thing, even so on an analytic level they do have a lot in common, such as the mobilization of the masses and the presence of a charismatic leader. The great difference is that fascism availed itself of a strong and strategic ideology, while populisms have always made recourse to tactical and composite ideological forms.

For a good part of the second half of the twentieth century, this term referred to extra European experiences for the most part or at least countries outside of the group of the more advanced western

democracies. Populism particularly seemed to be a prerogative of Latin American governments where the charismatic relationship between the leader and people took on a patriarchal connotation. In this sense the case of Argentinean Peronism had an almost paradigmatic function.

With the end of the 1990s in the period following the collapse of the Soviet Bloc, we see new forms of populism, which have been defined neo-populisms to distinguish them from previous populisms. Not only at the margins of the more advanced societies, but even in more consolidated democracies, we witness the birth of very robust forms of populism. This is the case of the populisms of the European right, such as Haider in Austria and Bossi and Berlusconi in Italy, or also the case of Latin American populisms, personified by leaders such as Chávez, Evo Morales, and Correa, who represented the so-called Latin American “left turn” in the first decade of the new millennium. Today we can count populist entities in many countries in many areas of the world: from Russia to Thailand, to Turkey, to Spain, and to Latin America. In Italy we have a populist political context with several political forces in competition with one another structured on the basis of this characteristic: Berlusconi, the Northern League, the Five Star Movement, and the current premier Renzi.

On the level of populism analysis, we have different orientations of study. Margaret Canovan, for example, provides a first classification of populisms, which still has great value today. Canovan declares repeatedly the need for a systematic study in sociological terms of populism so that “Populism becomes a sociological category rather an historical one” (Canovan 1981, p. 299). Canovan identifies two macro-categories: the first one which she defines agrarian populisms, the American People Party, and Russian populism is part of this category; the second one, which she calls political populism, is formed by the populist dictatorship, populist democracy, reactionary populism, and politicians’ populism.

By agrarian populisms Canovan means both the farmers’ radicalism in the USA and the peasant movements of Eastern Europe, particularly Russian populism. The first is represented by

those protest movements on the part of agricultural producers, who, in the second half of the 1800s, repeatedly launched protest actions with the purpose of claiming economic autonomy when it came to deciding the prices of their products. The objective of this movement was to detach itself from its subordinate position with respect to the federal monopolists who, owning the means of distribution of the products, profited outrageously to the detriment of the producers. From the very first protest actions, these producers showed themselves to be an extended community of resistance, and within a few years, they came to found the People's Party with an effective rhetoric based on the formula of "plain people." Canovan stresses that it was not just a socioeconomic phenomenon based on the claims of agricultural producers, but rather a sociopolitical phenomenon of revolt against the dominant plutocratic elite and national politicians, which for the first time in the history of the USA were able to express a form of "radical democracy" (Canovan 1981, p. 58).

The case of *narodnichestvo*, Russian populism, is profoundly different. If American populism is something that arises from within society and from the deepest needs of economic and political representation of the social base, Russian populism is instead the result of an elaboration made by an intellectual elite. It was a populism of the intelligentsia that was proposed to the rural social classes, whose doctrine was aimed to hypostatize and glorify the rural lifestyle in anti-modern protosocialist terms and on the basis of a sentiment of rediscovery of Slavic roots. American populism arose from the people as a form of self-awareness in the wake of a rebellion; Russian populism took its moves from young intellectuals who, abandoning bourgeois and metropolitan life to stay near the peasants, often rediscovered their orthodox and patriotic roots. In this case, in fact, there was the elaboration of an ideology which contributed more than a little to the development of the struggle against tsarist autocracy, often resulting in acts of terrorism. The end of this movement was decreed by the establishment of the Bolshevik regime.

Political populisms are such because their focus is political rather than agrarian. It is conceivable, however, that there may be cases in which an agrarian populism is also political or that a political populism may contain elements of agrarian populism. In political populism, elements such as the urban dimension, the presence of charismatic leadership, and/or structured political parties are preeminent.

The first kind of political populism which Canovan presents is the "populist dictatorship," and to illustrate she indicates two paradigmatic examples: the Argentinean Juan Domingo Perón (1895–1974) and the American Huey P. Long (1893–1935). In both cases, Canovan underlines the special condition of widespread social uprooting of citizens as the condition that creates possibility of populism: a widespread individual disorientation that acts as a lever to the rhetoric of redemption proposed by the leader and which permits a positive outlet for social resentment. They are phenomena of collaboration between classes, hardly ascribable to a single ideological logic, but highly anti-elitist and characterized by an extraordinary mass mobilization through means of a leader's just as extraordinary charismatic ability. This kind of populism has an effect of weakening democratic institutions and favoring the personalization of the political dimension. Precisely because of this dynamic of mass consensus, these populisms have more things in common with fascism and Nazism.

Populist democracy is the second type of political populism. With this expression are meant all the forms of populism which strive for a considerable increase of political participation and a government of the people. Populist democracy is therefore a radical democracy where the aspects of the representation of the people and the mediation between the governing classes are reduced to the minimum. All the movements that require greater direct democracy in clear opposition with representative democracy and its dysfunctions are part of this subtype. Canovan includes the case of McCarthyism in this area of analysis. Studied by Shils in his famous book *The Torment of Secrecy* (Shils 1956) as a populist social reaction in a political context of democratic elitism, it was the

spread of a popular mentality which simplified the terms of political issues, coming to assume highly uncivil and violent positions. In contrast, Switzerland is a case of concrete, or perhaps it would be better to say institutionalized populist democracy. Government procedures established by the Swiss constitution are, in fact, a rare example of accomplished radical democracy. The people have the possibility to intervene in many crucial questions of political life through referendums and participative forms. The reason for this political regime, which may be considered unique, is the peculiarity of the process of formation of the Swiss State. Unlike other States which were created through a top-down process, Switzerland came into being through a bottom-up evolution of a federal kind among the different cantons. Canovan also presents what may be the extremes of populist democracy, which have often been pointed out by neo-elitist critics: the risk, for example, of a tyranny of the majority in which minorities are not adequately represented; the tendency of public opinion to influence government policy in a non-objective and distorted way, based on the oversimplification and over-dramatization of issues; or the loss of authority and legitimacy of the elected government due to a social logic of exaltation of the popular point of view, but also a loss of authority and prestige of office on the basis of an absolute egalitarianism.

Reactionary populism is characterized by an antiprogressive, nationalist, and often xenophobic and traditionalist ideological content. The return to the people is conceived as a return to roots and a refusal of every element of progress. In this form of populism, the contrast is therefore between a popular base that is identified in its retrograde and reactionary cultural forms against the elites and their progressive and cosmopolitan culture. Therefore this kind of populism is often in sharp disagreement with intellectuals and all forms of avant-garde art. Canovan identifies a typical example in the politician George Wallace, governor of Alabama famous for his positions in favor of the defense of racial segregation of blacks.

Politicians' populism is the last one of the political populisms according to Canovan's classification. More than anything else, it is a political

style expressed through their actions and political practices. The "catch-all people's parties" and all those organizations that are found in the democratic dimension without necessarily desiring a radical structural change, but find strength in direct popular consensus, belong to this subgroup. The concrete political forms where it is possible to find this populist style range from what is called anti-politics to personalist parties to radical coalitions. Canovan gives the example of Jimmy Carter for the USA, who defined himself personally as a populist or the Partido de la Revolución Mexicana PRI. The structural characteristic of politicians' populism is the tactical nature of populism, which consists of using popular appeal as a means of renewing consensus and social legitimacy to realign from time to time political action with the requirements of the context. In this case, the paradoxical nature of the concept of "people" is evident more than ever: if, on the one hand, it is ambiguous, vague, and undefined; on the other hand, at the social level, precisely because of this vagueness, it allows forms of political inclusion, even only momentary and limited, which renew politicians' power.

Canovan's latest studies focused precisely on the people as an abstract political concept, but also as a widespread social representation conditioning the citizens' actions. Populism is set in a wider horizon of problems which goes back to the nature of the western State, so that it is impossible to understand populism as a feature of contemporary democracies unless you reconstruct genealogically the progressive centrality of the people and of popular sovereignty in constitutional forms, in political culture, and in political theory. The people are thus a widespread social concept among the citizenship which not only legitimize political authority but also have the possibility of changing it, according to what Canovan calls sovereign people in reserve.

It is possible to catalogue the principle theories on populism in at least three different approaches as Gidron and Bonikowsky have clarified: populism as a political ideology, populism as a political style, and populism as strategy.

The theories that consider populism an ideology hark back to the concept of "thin-centered"

ideology elaborated by Michael Freeden. According to these authors, populism is in fact a subtle and limited ideology, typical of the new postmodern context and after the end of the great twentieth-century ideologies. The most significant representative of this theoretical orientation is Cas Mudde (Mudde 2007). Mudde explains that populism is a set of ideas on politics and on society which is structured on a macro opposition of *us* against *them*, where *us* is the people while *them* coincides with the elite. Populism is thus always an anti-elitist ideology in a context where the elite coincides with the power establishment. This aspect of juxtaposition between an *us* and a *them* follows an *ingroup-outgroup* logic highlighted by Teun Van Dijk (1998), where every ideology develops a discursive logic of social representations according to which everything that belongs to the sphere of *us* is inclusive, positive, and enhancing, while everything belonging to the sphere of *them* is excluding, negative, and diminishing. Applying this logic to populism presupposes the first sphere being associated with the people, while the second belongs to the elite enemy of the people and to all which opposes the people.

The second approach conceives populism as a form of discourse. The most significant exponents are Laclau and Panizza (Laclau 2005; Panizza 2013). These scholars essentially interpret populism as a means of protesting and engaging in politics on the basis of a communicative style geared toward the claim of a majority of society against the dominating elites. Especially Laclau's writings have permitted a relative revaluation of populist forces. Keeping especially in mind the Latin American cases of progressive matrix populism of the first decade of the present millennium, Laclau has explained how populism may be the political discourse interpreted by the excluded part of society in a subordinate context with respect to the elite. Thanks to the populist discourse, a new democratizing perspective is possible in a context where democracy is merely formal and oligarchic tendencies prevail.

The third type of approach considers populism as a strategy and thus essentially a form of social political mobilization and organization (Weyland

1996; Jansen 2011). Concentrating our attention on the social dynamics which underlie the populist phenomenon, these bring to light aspects such as social mobilization, social polarization, the institutional crisis which precedes the populist ascent, and the role of leadership in regard to all this.

The increase of populisms in the last decades on a global scale has not only been a matter of quantity but also a matter of quality. Today in fact we can find numerous types of new populisms and new labels. We speak in fact of media populism to indicate those forms of populism which are based on forms of social consensus through the media, one example was the case of Berlusconi in Italy and his use of television to impose a political domination, or we speak of web populism to indicate specifically strategies of consensus which use the Internet; we also speak of ethno-populism to define that type of populism based on a strong ethnic connotation of the people in question, as in the case of Evo Morales's movement in Bolivia (De la Torre 2007).

In addition to political populism, other forms of populism exist such as penal populism. This type of populism regards the forms of pressuring and alteration of the justice system by politics. Penal populism is not necessarily tied to a charismatic figure or leader, but it is made up of a series of procedures and situations. Amplifying and distorting the risk of criminality during electoral campaigns, failing to make recourse to statistical data, or making criminal trials glamorous and hyping them up, altering their perception by public opinion, and pressuring the judges are some examples.

Beyond the complexity due to the multiple forms of populism, this phenomenon poses a profound problem with regard to the concept of democracy. Populism may be considered either pathology of the forms of political representation that emerges when the classical mechanisms of mediation in representative governments enter into crisis. However it may also be seen as an intrinsic form of democracy because it is profoundly tied to popular sovereignty, one of the cornerstones of modern democracies. The people's rallying cry in such a strong and absolute

way typical of populist forces may even be perceived as an excess of democracy. Certainly the action of criticism of the establishment fostered by populism is a form of delegitimization of the established order and of the preexisting symbolic social scene; thus populist action constitutes a possibility of social change of the forms of citizenship and of democratic participation in a more direct and vertical direction.

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Postcolonialism, Development, and Education

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Introduction

This entry considers the colonial contexts of development, including development as neocolonialism in the postindependence period, followed by a consideration of the role(s) of education designed for development and the attendant academic or literary postcolonial critiques of postwar development and education. Often neglected in academic postcolonial scholarship, anti-/decolonial postcolonialism emergent from the works of scholar activists and indigenous and land-based sovereignty politics and related conceptions and practices of development and education in the postcolony are also given due consideration.

Colonial Developmental Contexts and Civilizing Missions

The French Enlightenment political philosopher Antoine-Nicolas de Condorcet in his book, *Outlines of a Historical View of the Progress of the Human Mind*, proffered the following questions: Will all nations one day attain that state of civilization which the most enlightened, the freest, and the least burdened by prejudices, such as the French and the Anglo-American, have attained already? Will the vast gulf that separates these people from the slavery of nations under the rule of monarchs, from the barbarism of African tribes, and from the ignorance of savages little by little disappear? According to Condorcet, these immense countries, to arrive at civilization, appeared only to wait till Europeans furnished them with the means, at which point they would instantly become friends and disciples. David Hume, the Scottish philosopher and ostensible founder of modern political science, writing in

1754, suspected that Negros and in general all the other species of men were naturally inferior to the Whites, i.e., there never was, according to Hume, a civilized nation of any other complexion than White nor even any individual eminent either in action or speculation. Civilizational and racial deficits were translated into knowledge and educational inferiority prompting the British anti-slavery activist Thomas Macaulay to pontificate that even a single shelf of European literature was worth all the books of India and Arabia. He subsequently suggested the liquidation of indigenous culture through the linguistic colonization (by English) of the Indian educational system in the early nineteenth century.

The self-proclaimed civilizing responsibility and alleged racial superiority referenced by these Europeans were notably predicated upon various expressions of colonial developmental violence including slavery, genocide, unbridled exploitation of natural resources and labor, and oft irreversible restructuring of local political economies toward capital, a unique distinction of modern European colonial (racialized) capitalist development (Quijano 2000; Rodney 1972). These emasculations are variously documented in colonial critiques forwarded by the likes of Eduardo Galeano (*Open Veins of Latin America*), Walter Rodney (*How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*), Hamza Alavi (*Capitalism and Colonial Production: South Asia*), Syed Hussein Alatas (*Myth of the Lazy Native: Malaya*) and Pramoedya Ananta Toer (*The Buru Quartet: Indonesia*), Dadabhai Naoroji (*Poverty and Un-British Rule in India*), and Frantz Fanon (*Wretched of the Earth: Africa*).

Eduardo Galeano (1973), with reference to the sixteenth-century Spanish silver extraction from the Potosi mines of Bolivia, noted that if one took all the silver mined from this hill, it could build a bridge from Potosi to Spain, while another bridge could also be built from Potosi to Spain with the bones of the Inca slaves who died in these mines (eight million Incas are estimated to have died during Spanish silver extraction). Belgian colonialism is estimated to have resulted in the deaths of ten million Congolese killed in the pursuit of rubber and ivory wherein native refusal to tap rubber for the colonialists often meant losing a

hand or a life. The eighteenth–nineteenth-century exploits of the British East India Company in Bengal, the richest State at the time, included the introduction of English landlordism, the tripling of land taxes, the dispossession of some 20 million small holders including forced conversions to growing opium for export to China (see Opium Wars), the eventual destruction of the local textile industry, and the subsequent famine-related deaths of a third of the population (ten million people), prompting then governor-general William Bentinck to comment that the bones of cotton weavers were bleaching the plains of India and that such misery could hardly be found in the history of commerce.

Frantz Fanon concluded that “Europe is literally the creation of the Third World. . . an opulence that has been fuelled by the sweat and the dead bodies of Negroes, Arabs, Indians and the yellow races” (1963, p. 76), while Mohandas Gandhi, when asked by a journalist what he thought of Western civilization, is rumoured to have replied with cynicism that it would be a very good idea.

Postwar Development and Education

A century and a half later since Condorcet and Hume and shortly after the Second World War, as the colonized worlds achieved statehood and official independence from their colonial occupiers, this racialized civilizing mission of the European powers became the ideological foundation of the postcolonial colonial modern development mission (Duffield and Hewitt 2013; Levy and Young 2011) echoed in the Point Four Program (or Fair Deal aimed at spreading the promise of science, technology, and industrialization) promulgated by President Harry S. Truman of the USA, for the “Third World”: a spatiotemporal-political pejorative, if not fallacy, drawn from nineteenth-century French economic demographer Alfred Sauvy’s use of the term referring to the marginal Third Estate or *Tiers Monde* in France. An emergent neocolonialism (see Kwame Nkrumah) soon defined the continued exploitation of the “officially independent” colonies in the continued interests of Euro-American

capitalist development. Over two-thirds of the world's people from Africa, Asia, Latin American, and the Caribbean were consigned to the dustbin of history as backward, traditional, deficient, and once again in need of Euro-American aid, tutelage, and beneficence (via the Development Project; see Philip McMichael) in all matters of being but primarily in relation to the economic and ostensibly to address poverty through international state-capital-centered Euro-American modernization (Escobar 1995; Rist 2002/2014).

The subsequent installation of Bretton Woods institutions (e.g., IMF and World Bank) controlled by the imperial powers (e.g., voting rights according to capital shares) in the context of the Cold War together provided the institutional architecture for what has been dubbed as the Marshall Plan for the "Third World." Contemporary United Nations expressions of this project include the Millennium Development Goals or MDGs (2000–2015) and the recent Sustainable Development Goals or SDGs. Both sets of goals include focuses around education and literacy, while the World Bank continues to be the dominant funder and global developer of these educational initiatives. Development theorists and theory (Peet and Hartwick 1999) play an integral part in informing these institutions and goals and in addressing the perennial project of Kipling's White Man's Burden, potentially ensuring that neocolonialism continues to transform the capitalist modern West from a geo-temporal entity to a psychological category wherein it seems "the West is now everywhere, within the West and outside, in structures and in minds" (Nandy 1983, p. xi).

For development economists (dominant for the first two postwar decades), whether liberal, classical Marxists or neo-Marxists (see Dependency Theory and World Systems Theory critiques of capitalist modernization and the "development of underdevelopment theory" – influential from the 1960s to the early 1980s in Latin America), decolonization was a matter of adopting industrial development predicated on scientific rationality and the inescapable tide of technological advance along capitalist (or its Keynesian welfare variants) or socialist political-economic revolutionary historical trajectories.

In the *Theory of Economic Progress* written in 1944, C. S. Ayres proclaimed the inevitability of industrial life and values while claiming that the irrational values of prescientific and preindustrial (tribal) cultures were doomed. Sociological theories of modernization, including psychosocial and behavioral theories proposing traditional–modern binaries, imposed disempowering and homogenizing deficit constructions on traditional societies and peoples (Third World), which were colonially productive if not tautological. Sociologists Alex Inkeles and David Smith compared (evaluated) Ahmadullah (rural/traditional man) to Nuril (urban/modern man) in Bangladesh. The American psychologist David McClelland set out to demonstrate need achievement scores (low- and high-achievement countries) and differentials warranting achievement motivation training interventions (education) to stimulate economic development in the "Third World."

These initial theoretical foundations of the macro development project were also instructive for theorizing education and international development (McCowan and Unterhalter 2015). In keeping with the modernizing Zeitgeist, neoliberal capitalist development necessitated an education which trained and enhanced worker's skills for economic growth and productivity while measuring educational worth in terms of returns on educational investment (Human Capital Theory). Neo-Marxist theories encouraged a revolutionary critical education (toward socialism) which addressed economic exploitation and the reproduction of inequality (including de-linking from First World dependency) inevitably linked to capitalist modernizations. Micro-perspectives on (alternative) development based on radical democratic and humanist traditions stimulated various forms of local/community and individual empowerment schemes through participatory learning and action for local development predicated on transforming consciousness and the development of a just society (see ► Freire, Paulo (1921–1997)); and liberal egalitarianism emphasized educational opportunity to equip all individuals for full participation in a democratic society and a humanized capitalist economy addressing basic needs, human rights, human development (all capacities),

gender, the environment and citizenship, and good governance, i.e., an education which assumed and reproduced liberal (reformed) market colonialism and imperialism. This was, by some accounts, a product of both the Communist threat during the Cold War and as part of an exercise in the management of discontent associated with poverty and inequality caused by market-led development, if not the rising tide of expectations stimulated by consumer capitalism.

The *World Education Crisis* signaled by Philip Coombs in the early 1970s put mass modern (capitalist) education (and education equals schooling and associated nonformal interventions) on the development map, eventually prompting the World Conferences on Education for All (e.g., Jomtien, Thailand in 1990) and related MDG and SDG inclusions insisting on the global expansion of modern schooling as a self-evident good, i.e., professing an educational ideology (education cures all) while maintaining a deafening silence around the question of educational neocolonialism(s) and cultural imperialism being reproduced via EFA in the postcolonial era (an alleged historical rupture from the colonial period as per this dominant rhetoric).

Literary (Academic) Postcolonialism, Development, and Education: Discursive and Representational Interventions

Addressing postcolonialism and development, Christine Sylvester suggests that one field begins where the other refuses to look. While both fields are preoccupied with the “colonies” and North–South relations, there are predictably significant (debatable) points of tension and difference (McEwan 2009, p. 2) including:

1. Applicability, where development knowledge (economics) invites translation into practice (mainly macro solutions/interventions), while academic postcolonialism (literature) mainly concerns itself with critiquing colonial discourse and representations;
2. Theoretical objectives, where development is concerned with modernist transformation

based on universal concepts and plans, while academic postcolonialism seeks to question and undo “development” as a Eurocentric invention masquerading as universalist; and

3. Methodologically, where development is selectively ahistorical (e.g., colonial silence), macro, and measurement focused, while academic postcolonialism is preoccupied with the (colonial) historical, micro-experiential (difference/context) and culture, representation, identity, and discourse.

The academic (literary) postcolonial scholarship of Edward Said pertaining to *Orientalism* and *othering*; Homi Bhabha and the unintentional subversive potential of *hybridity* and *mimicry*; Gayatri Spivak and the question of *subalternity*, *representation*, and *articulation*; and Dipesh Chakrabarty’s discursive attempts to unseat Europe as the sovereign theoretical subject, i.e., *Provincializing Europe* to disrupt intellectual dependency and recognize other knowledge(s) (see Raewyn Connell’s *Southern Theory*) have provided the basis for postcolonial critical engagements with the Development (Theory) Project on these and other counts (McEwan 2009), including in relation to dominant conceptions of education for development.

Postcolonial education (in relation to grand narratives pertaining to development and beyond) (McCowan and Unterhalter 2015) deconstructs dominant conceptions of development, related “othering,” and caricaturing through binaries (e.g., traditional–modern) and dominant representations and prescriptions while stimulating critical educational pedagogies (pursuing decolonization of the mind) which, for example, globalize curricula based on comparative-solidarity and selective inclusions of marginalized knowledge(s), if not complete lobotomies as in the case of languages (see *Ngugi wa Thiong’o*); emphasizes critique and a pedagogy of ethics and hope to encourage empathy (not detachment) as opposed to compassion-based approaches in vogue in development education; and questions academic development tourism and field research by academics while suggesting a need for self-reflexivity (unlearning of privilege, acknowledging complicity, learning

to learn from below, etc.) in these cross border/cultural engagements (McEwan 2009). Decolonizing education, research, and knowledge production in the interests of epistemic and cognitive justice and pluralizing the quest for universals and global citizenship are some primary concerns of an academic postcolonial education and development engagement.

According to Chandra Mohanty (see *Feminism Without Borders*), however, while discursive categories are clearly central sites of contestation, they must be grounded in and informed by the material politics of everyday life, especially the daily life struggles for survival of those written out of history. That said, as another body of critical colonial theorizing suggests, academic contestations over discourse/knowledge and education/development (mental decolonization) not only need to be informed by but also need to actively engage in/with the material politics of everyday life and these struggles for survival.

Anti-/Decolonial Postcolonialisms, Development, and Education: Indigenous, Peasant, and Land-Based Sovereignty Politics

While “development studies” rarely listens to the subaltern, the academic and literary postcolonialism of the comfortable classes tends not to be concerned with material politics or with, according to Christine Sylvester, whether the subaltern is eating.

Anticolonial (revolutionary nationalisms and place-based movements), anti-capitalist, indigenous sovereignty (decolonial), and modified socialist politics worked out in and through concrete social struggles offer other colonial critiques, conceptions, and practices of development and education that register historical and continuing material projects generally overlooked by academic and literary postcolonialists and developmentalists alike. These formulations are informed by an engaged-activist intelligentsia of the likes of Frantz Fanon, Walter Rodney, Amílcar Cabral, Ranajit Guha, and Jose Mariátegui, to name a few possibilities while also germinating

from various social struggles in semirural indigenous and small/landless peasant regions and contexts of the postcolony (e.g., Zapatista Army of National Liberation or EZLN movement in Chiapas, Mexico; Landless Workers Movement or MST in Brazil). Colonialism, after all, meaning to cultivate, inhabit, and guard as derived from *colere* in Latin, was and continues to be about land as is also evident in the current land-grab practices of richer States and agribusiness in economically exploitable regions (“Third World”) akin to the empty land hypotheses or the legal basis (doctrine of discovery) for the same during the colonial Age of Discovery.

Sharing a concern for material exploitation with Marxist scholarship and revolutionary politics, Euro-American development and education are variously critiqued, bypassed, resisted, or radically reconstructed in different contexts of the “postcolony” through anticolonial and anti-proletarian material (developmental) struggle over land (dispossession) and labor (servitude). Unlike developmental and educational modernizations predicated on capitalist or Marxist (and in-between) incorporations into the historical pathway of Europe and America, many indigenous scholars anticolonial revolutionary critics proposed conceptions and relations with land as central to political economies and cultures. This enabled a land-based anti- or decolonial politics which jettisoned incorporations into the colonial imperatives of capital (i.e., privatization imperatives of land and agro-industrial colonizations of rural spaces and bodies) and Marxism (i.e., prognostications of inevitability around capitalist dispossession of land and exploitation of labor and revolutionary class struggle thereof from within and against capital and toward modern industrial socialism).

Karl Marx dismissed rurality and peasants as counterrevolutionary in sociopolitical terms, while the idea of revolution was appropriated by the Marxist class-based project. Anticolonial revolutionary activists and intelligentsia affirm the political and revolutionary possibility of the indigenous and the peasantry as anticolonial revolutionaries informed by a land-based sovereignty. According to Zapatista Subcomandante

Insurgente Marcos (2001) of the EZLN in Chiapas, Mexico, the problem is that they want to take our land so that our feet have nothing to stand on. In the Algerian context, Frantz Fanon (1963) notes that for the colonized “land is the most meaningful” as it is “the land which must provide bread and, naturally dignity” but all the colonized “has ever seen on his land is that he can be arrested, beaten, and starved with impunity” (p. 9). He affirms that in “colonial countries only the peasantry is revolutionary. It has nothing to lose and everything to gain” and that “colonialism only loosens its hold when the knife is at its throat” given that it is incapable of reasoning; as a “naked violence” (p. 23). Some Marxist historians and activists in the Indian and South Asian context similarly addressed a peasant and tribal subaltern (sacral) politics in an attempt to write histories from below and register subaltern agency/history and organization in/from a potentially autonomous (from elite nationalist or imperial) political domain (Guha 1982), expressed today as a politics of sovereignty in some rural struggles addressing development dispossession (Harvey 2003) in the “postcolony.”

In theoretical, materialist, and political terms and as a continued critique of economic exploitation, anti-decolonial postcolonial developmentalists have suggested that Marxist imperatives break down in colonial contexts as colonial political-economic structures actually thwarted (halted or disrupted) class formation that accompanies (from a Marxist perspective) the development of market production and therefore the prospects for class-based revolution/politics.

This denial of the historical process of development (colonization stopped indigenous history) of national productive forces, a violent colonial usurpation, called for a revolution that did not change history (Marxism) but restored it by linking a colonial future to the precolonial past, not as nostalgia but as a renewed continuity (Cabral 1979; Marcos 2001; Mariátegui 1996). Speaking in relation to the contexts of Cape Verde and Guinea, Amílcar Cabral calls for a counterforce to restore the history of the colonized, one that takes back the land from the Portuguese colonialists who have taken the land in

order to “halt our history for us to remain tied to the history of Portugal as if we were a wagon on their train” (Cabral 1979, p. 32). The basis for common ground and political-economic unity subsequently had less to do with class (which was not significantly introduced as suggested) than it did with a unity of/around territory; taking back the land for those who have lived in the same place and ensuring that its production is for their own use, i.e., are the economic activities on a given land supporting its inhabitants?

According to this proposition, the relationship between a land and (indigenous) population is seen as the key to historical development as opposed to the history of class struggle and development and education (for development) as modern industrial civilizational progress. In so doing, the likes of Cabral and Marcos, if not Fanon and Guha, variously affirm and restore the historical agency (and history) of peasant and indigenous collectives denied under Marxist historical prognostications singularly tied to the class struggle in relation to capital and the European historical journey (hence the charge of Eurocentrism) and a case in point pertaining to the *Local Histories/Global Designs* proposition (see Walter Dignolo).

Indigenous development socialisms (Mariátegui 1996), for example, are put forward on material and political (and not just normative and utopian) grounds while pointing to the superior productivity of pre-Incan communalism based on *ayllu* (community) and practices like *minga* (collective labor) when compared to the Spanish colonial capital-feudal *criollo* estates and *haciendas* while acknowledging the political significance of myth as motivation and inspiration (what subalternists in Asia refer to as a fundamentally religious subaltern politics) for strong collective bonds to account for Peru and Latin America’s varied indigenous political experience from Europe and the individualistic and isolated French peasant, prompting Marx’s pejorative analogy comparing them to a sack of potatoes (disunited and politically impotent). The strong links between community and land (basis of political struggle) make communal modes of production for local needs politically feasible, if not desirable even on normative, spiritual, and historical grounds as stressed in an indigenous sovereignty

politics of decolonization (Marcos 2001; Meyer and Alvarado 2010; Sankaran 2008).

Education as formal schooling by the neocolonial developmentalist state (and private interests) under these localized conceptions of development and sovereignty based on historical and collective modes and ways of being linked to land as place, territory, and history is a space of colonial contestation against domination. Parallel if not entirely different spaces of education are often put forward in these contexts of struggle. In illustration, Raul Zibechi points to three examples of “education born in the basement of our societies” (borrowing a Zapatista phrase) “by those without” referring to Indians and peasants in (1) a school created by a community/*ayllu* (e.g., Warisata, Bolivia), (2) the “dislocated school” in a movement (e.g., Landless Workers Movement or MST, Brazil), and (3) the Andean and Zapatista schools encouraging the art of learning (e.g., *Kichwas* weaving) (Meyer and Alvarado 2010, pp. 317–328).

With their respective contextual and political variations, a similar anti-/decolonial sovereignty-related land-based developmental politics and education are informing myriad and current food sovereignty struggles (see Food First, GRAIN, War on Want or Journal of Peasant Studies), anti-development dispossession (e.g., by mining and agribusiness land grabs) movements, and indigenous and small/landless peasant politics in numerous locations of the “postcolony” (see The Via Campesina indigenous and small/landless peasant “postcolony” network organization).

These anti-/decolonial postcolonial activisms and associated demands for sovereignty based on the notion of land held in common and *comunalidad* (Meyer and Alvarado 2010) (also see *Ubuntu* and African Socialism) contradict Lockean liberal conceptions of land as private property and modern capitalist developmental claims based on superior productivity for profit and the related deployment of *terra nullius*. Postcolonial engaged-activist theories and material movement practices continue to register a contemporary relevance, however unspectacular under the terms of a modern colonial capitalist Zeitgeist,

if not a continued developmental and educational relevance derived from a material and cultural history pre-dating the Enlightenment and the coloniality of Euro-American power, development, and an education for development.

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Postmodernism and Education: Relevance of Deleuzian and Guattarian Perspective for Education

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Introduction

This entry will elaborate on the philosophy of Gilles Deleuze, both alone and in collaboration with Félix Guattari. In the first section, their philosophy will be regarded as a tool of analysis in relation to Western society. Deleuze's concept of *Control Societies* will be introduced to discuss what the French philosopher Jean-François Lyotard conceives as the postmodern condition.

Additionally the first section will point out what the task of philosophy could consist of from a Deleuzian and Guattarian point of view. In an age of professional training, they argue that doing philosophy requires a *pedagogy of the concept* (Deleuze and Guattari 1994[1991], p. 12). In the second section, their philosophy will not be regarded only as a tool of analysis but as way of living and thinking in relation to the present. Their stance toward philosophy will be illustrated by discussing how nonphilosophical aspects of life – such as cinema, literature, science, and art – are incorporated in their work. In the third and final section, the relevance of philosophy as conceived in the first two parts will be discussed in relation to education.

From Disciplinary Societies Toward Control Societies

In *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge* (1984[1979]), Lyotard shows that in the history of Western societies, there is a movement from a modern relationship with knowledge and truth toward a postmodern relationship. From the Enlightenment period onward and until the Second World War, knowledge predominantly received its legitimization in relation to the truth and subjective ideals recognized by a Western, rational society. Lyotard discusses Humboldt's nineteenth-century idea of *Bildung* to exemplify how a modern relationship with knowledge translates itself into a general edification of the subject (Lyotard 1984, p. 33). However, from the 1950s onward, there is a delegitimation of this relationship with knowledge. In the contemporary, post-industrial society, and postmodern culture, the grand narratives of the *Aufklärung* have lost their credibility in favor of the principle of performativity, which translates itself into an almost exclusive obsession with efficiency and effectivity (Lyotard 1984, p. 37, 47–53). Lyotard's famous report on knowledge thus shows that the business model can be considered as the blueprint for contemporary postmodern society.

In *Postscript on Control Societies* (1995 [1990]), Deleuze takes a similar stance. Deleuze

speaks of a transformation from Michel Foucault's *disciplinary societies* toward *control societies*:

[Disciplinary societies] initiate the organization of vast spaces of enclosure. The individual never ceases passing from one closed environment to another, each having its own laws: first, the family, then the school ('you are no longer in your family'); then the barracks ('you are no longer at school'); then the factory; from time to time the hospital; possibly the prison, the preeminent instance of the enclosed environment.

(Deleuze 1995, p. 177)

Disciplinary institutions like the family, the school, the military, the hospital, and the prison literally confine the individual to a specific place, with specific rules to follow. Lyotard's analysis of modern education which edifies the subject through *Bildung* can be situated within such a disciplinary institution. These institutions, in Foucauldian terms, *enclosed* the subject from the eighteenth century onward and thrived in the first half of the twentieth century.

Like Lyotard, Deleuze recognizes World War II as a fundamental turning point, after which there is an acceleration of new forces which push the old institutions of the disciplinary societies into a crisis. Reform after reform is being announced, "but everybody knows that these institutions are finished, whatever the length of their expiration periods" (Deleuze 1995, p. 178). The model of the corporation or business has replaced the model of the factory in every segment of society, including the field of education. In the disciplinary society, you always restarted from zero; "you went from school to barracks, from barracks to factory" (Deleuze 1995, p. 179). The individual belonged to the masses, which were governed in the different enclosed environments like schools, factories, and prisons. In control societies, however, the business model dominates all these environments, and "you never really finish anything" (Deleuze 1995, p. 179). For Deleuze and Guattari, Kafka's novel *The Trial* is very important because it shows a society constantly shifting between discipline and control. *The Trial* stands in between discipline and control, illustrating both modern and postmodern strategies. The novel is about "apparent acquittal (between two confinements) in disciplinary societies, and *endless*

postponement in (constantly changing) control societies" (Deleuze 1995, p. 179).

Nowadays, Western societies are already deeply transformed into control societies. With the business model at its core, it creates rivalry and competition between individuals. Philosophy, Deleuze and Guattari argue, has not remained unaffected by "the general movement that replaced Critique with sales promotion" (Deleuze and Guattari 1994, p. 10). This is in line with Lyotard's analysis, who argues that in the postmodern society, knowledge has received a specific role it functions as an economic resource. In *What is philosophy?* Deleuze and Guattari describe an age of commercial professional training, where companies claim to be the friend of creativity and *the concept*, the core of philosophy, which has been shamefully picked up by information services and engineering. For now the question will be addressed how Deleuze and Guattari conceive philosophy should respond to this state of affairs. In the third section of this entry, the relevance of this point of view will be discussed in relation to education.

Only a *pedagogy of the concept* can prevent us from this "disaster for thought" (Deleuze and Guattari 1994, p. 12). However, philosophy should not be conceived as the post-Kantian task of creating a universal encyclopedia. In *A thousand plateaus* (1987[1980]) and in relation to their well-known concept of *the rhizome*, they clearly distance themselves from the position of the all-knowing philosopher king. In this sense, Deleuze and Guattari do not argue for a return toward a relationship with knowledge which characterized the modern, disciplinary society. Deleuze and Guattari do not see philosophy fundamentally as a tool of analysis. In fact, doing philosophy implies going beyond the inclination of the analyzed and compartmentalized and dividing structure, to live and think differently. Therefore a pedagogy of the concept should be conceived as an act which releases the subject from identities, in favor of a movement in thought, this way releasing the possibility of thought. However, the pitfall is that today doing philosophy is reduced to superficial, ready-made texts or activities. It is not difficult to use the concepts of Deleuze and Guattari to talk

about brainstorming, the fragmentation of life, the connections that are possible, the networks, etc. Therefore the second section of this entry will elaborate what a pedagogy of the concept nowadays could consist of. What does it mean, from the perspective of Deleuze and Guattari, to create concepts and avoid both analytic, dogmatic intellectualism on the one hand, and commercial, superfluous communication on the other?

The Relevance of Nonphilosophy for Doing Philosophy

In *What is philosophy?* the post-Kantian focus on a *universal encyclopedia of the concept* is contrasted with a *pedagogy of the concept*. Doing philosophy is not about having a just idea but about just having an idea, which consists of researching, time and again, under what conditions, a new concept can be created. This can be exemplified by studying how Deleuze and Guattari interpret the importance of non-philosophy for what doing philosophy is about. Consider how they create a way of thinking in relation to the concept of “the rhizome” in *A thousand plateau* (1987). To think rhizomatically, and more in general, to do philosophy by creating concepts, involves considering how a thought or an event always can be approached through multiple ways. A rhizome is a stem of a plant, from which a new plant can arise at any time. Bulbs, tubers, rats, burrows, potatoes, and couch grass, however, are also examples of the rhizome. Deleuze and Guattari interpret Kafka’s literature as rhizomatic. *The Trial*, for example, grows from bureaucracy and systems of justice. Deleuze and Guattari use this concept as a force to react against a way of thinking deeply rooted in Western reality. To describe this Western way of thinking, they use the image of the tree or the root which “endlessly develops the law of the One that becomes two, then of the two that become four . . .” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, p. 5). Deleuze and Guattari describe accounting and bureaucracy as trees or roots but also psychoanalysis and linguistics such as Chomsky’s grammaticality (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, p. 7).

In contrast to this, “to be rhizomorphous is to produce stems and filaments that seem to be roots, or better yet connect with them by penetrating the trunk, but put them to strange new uses” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, p. 15). The pitfall consists of interpreting the rhizome as a metaphor. As the Dutch philosopher Henk Oosterling argues, for Deleuze and Guattari, the world should not be interpreted *like* a rhizome. The metaphor suggests that a clearly identifiable reality exists, which the rhizome would then represent (Oosterling 2012, p. 188). In contrast, to write and to think *is* rhizomatic and results in a continuous becoming (Oosterling 2012, p. 191). “That about which is being written and how it is said are not juxtaposed as substance and form, but interweave, as content and expression” (Oosterling 2012, p. 197, my translation). Deleuze and Guattari are aiming at the possibility of a different kind of thought, and the nonphilosophy they use, such as literature, mathematics, painting, cinema, or concepts such as the rhizome, is to be interpreted as metonymic for this possibility.

A clear example of the relevance of non-philosophy for doing philosophy is Deleuze’s cinema theory in *Cinema 1* (1986[1983]) and *Cinema 2* (1989[1985]). Deleuze does not use cinematic images to strengthen a particular point of view but rather researches what the implications are when the mind thinks “cinematographically.” For Deleuze, cinema always shows the world; watching cinema is a way of being connected to the world. It shows aspects of the world “in the process of being formed or dissolving through the movement of lines and points taken at any-distant-whatevers of their course” (Deleuze 1986, p. 6). “Cinema” comes from the Greek word “kinetic,” meaning “a motion.” As an art form, it has the potential to offer an experience of the world in which thinking does not think any more through a given method or a “presupposed image of thought which determines our goals and our methods when we try to think” (Deleuze 2004[1968], p. xv). Cinema is a practice of images and signs, created by great directors who think through moving images and create compositions of “images and of signs, that is, a pre-verbal intelligible content” (Deleuze 1986, p. ix). Deleuze conceived cinema as an

automaton. What is important is that in line with Walter Benjamin, he believed that the task at hand is not to tame cinema but precisely to allow it to be an automaton and to render it spiritual. Deleuze conceptualizes his spiritual automaton as always consisting of two contradicting states of mind which nevertheless coincide. Cinematic movement and time influence the spectator who is conscious and unconscious, active but also passive, critical yet at the same time surrendering completely to the experience. Or as the French film director Robert Bresson puts it, cinema allows the spectator not to see what one is already thinking, but to think about what one sees (Bresson 1975).

Heidegger said: 'Man can think in the sense that he possesses the possibility to do so. This possibility alone, however, is no guarantee to us that we are capable of thinking.' It is this capacity, this power, and not the simple logical possibility, that cinema claims to give us in communicating the shock. It is as if cinema were telling us: with me, with the movement-image, you can't escape the shock which arouses the thinker in you. (Deleuze 1989, p. 156)

Accordingly, in Deleuze's work, both alone and in collaboration with Guattari, instead of a set of principles or a clearly delineated methodology, it seems rather that a philosophical attitude or *ethos* is coming to the fore. In fact, doing philosophy seems to imply an *ethos as methodology*. Deleuze and Guattari introduce the question what philosophy is by referring to a "moment of quiet restlessness, at midnight, when there is no longer anything to ask" (Deleuze and Guattari 1994, p. 1). Furthermore, "the friend who appears in philosophy no longer stands for an extrinsic persona, an example or empirical circumstance, but rather for a presence that is intrinsic to thought, a condition of possibility of thought itself, a living category, a transcendental lived reality" (Deleuze and Guattari 1994, p. 3).

The Significance of Deleuze and Guattari for Education

The first and second sections of this entry accentuated two different ways of looking at Deleuze and Guattari's work. In the first section, it was

exemplified that their philosophy can be used as a tool of analysis in relation to (aspects of) Western societies. In what follows, this way of thinking will be discussed in relation to the current state of affairs in education. As we saw in the first section, Deleuze's *Postscript on control societies* clearly refers to a cultural and economic shift where old institutions are crumbling down in favor of new societal forms of organization. As a consequence, knowledge and learning and education are legitimated differently as well. Vis-a-vis the economic productivity of society, knowledge has become a primary resource. In a postmodern society, individuals select the knowledge they need "à la carte" in their specific contexts (Lyotard 1984, p. 49). This way, however, learning is not perceived as merely learning facts or insights as opposed to the modern idea of *Bildung*, in which learning was directly related to shaping a personality. Indeed, it cannot be compared to the modern idea of edification anymore. However, it does have a purpose as we can relate it to the business model Deleuze mentions or the performativity principle of Lyotard. Concretely this entails that when relating to knowledge, the individual is constantly preparing him or herself for the job market. Learning today does not simply imply that time and again, as long as one lives, one merely has the capacity to access information. Rather, it is "the capacity to actualize the relevant data for solving a problem "here and now" and to organize that data into an efficient strategy" (Lyotard 1984, p. 51).

In the light of both Deleuze's and Lyotard's hypotheses, the language of the UNESCO World Report clearly shows what learning is about nowadays:

The 'learning' model has spread far beyond the world of education, into every cranny of economic and social life. It is now increasingly accepted that any organization, profitmaking or not, needs to strengthen its educational, 'learning' side; and here it is important to note that the rise of this pattern coincides with that of innovation generally, in all areas of human activity. (UNESCO World Report 2005, p. 57)

This quote is indicative that the way education is perceived nowadays, indeed, is transforming

from education as a means to edify the subject toward a focus on learning based on a business paradigm the way Deleuze conceived it:

[S]chool is being replaced by *continuing education* and exams by continuous assessment. It's the surest way of turning education into a business. (Deleuze 1995, p. 179)

Factories formed individuals into a body of men for the joint convenience of a management that could monitor each component in this mass, and trade unions that could mobilize mass resistance; but businesses are constantly introducing an inexorable rivalry presented as healthy competition, a wonderful motivation that sets individuals against one another and sets itself up in each of them, dividing each within himself. (Deleuze 1995, p. 179)

In this quote, we read an important reference to the individual, which should be taken into account when thinking about how in education nowadays the emphasis lies on individual, student-centered learning. The individual is not enclosed anymore like in the disciplinary society but rather exposed to perpetual rivalry which “sets itself up in each of them, dividing each within himself.” According to this model of the corporation, “*perpetual training* tends to replace the school, and continuous control to replace the examination” (Deleuze 1995, p. 179). If the factory and its workers are metonymic for the economic life in the disciplinary society, the business corporation and its employers are metonymic for the conditions in which we find ourselves today. Education, instead of shaping a character toward adulthood, would then organize the training of each individual to become an active participant of society and to relate to knowledge predominantly, if not solely, from an economical perspective.

This brings us to the relevance of what doing philosophy consists of as described in the second section of this entry. The significance of Deleuze and Guattari could imply that at least to some extent their method of doing philosophy is used to put education in a different perspective. So apart from using Deleuze and Guattari's work as a tool of analysis to contemplate on the current meaning of knowledge and learning, the significance of their philosophy could also consist of a more fundamental experimentation with the concepts and events related to learning as it is conceived in a

postmodern society. In other words, from a particular philosophical ethos, which is central in the work of Deleuze and Guattari, the control societies' perspective on learning is not accepted and applied anymore, but interrupted or short-circuited, so that the activity of learning becomes a question again. Education then consists of creating a movement in thought and disturbing conventions, rules, dogmatic thought and commercial, and superfluous communication.

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Poststructuralism and Education

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Introduction

Poststructuralism has its origins in European formalism and has strong affinities and continuities with its predecessor paradigm “structuralism” as well as some critical theoretical differences. Both movements have had a strong impact and continuing on educational philosophy and theory especially in relation to questions of the text, criticism, reading, writing and the philosophy of the subject. The twin movements have exercised deep influence in most sub-fields of education. As a movement of thought it has impacted widely in education – not only philosophy but also in policy, feminist thought and postcolonial studies. This chapter charts some of the most significant of poststructuralist developments and their impacts in education. It comments on its emergence and traces its affinities and differences.

Poststructuralism will be resisted in the domain of educational theory and research for some time to come not only for the reason that this domain, at least in the mainstream, is inherently conservative, being largely State or federally funded, and still strongly imbued with the positivist ethos it inherited during its historical development and professionalization as a legitimate field of study but also because poststructuralism – if we can both risk and indulge a singularization – at the broadest level carries with its philosophical reaction to the scientific pretensions of structuralism, a

critique of the very Enlightenment norms that “education research” today prides itself on “truth,” “objectivity,” and “progress.” Poststructuralism as a contemporary philosophical movement offers a range of theories (of the text), critiques (of institutions), new concepts, and forms of analysis (of power) which are relevant and significant for the study of education, but also it offers a range of writings explicitly devoted to education.

Poststructuralism is a difficult term to define. It has often been confused with its kinship term, postmodernism, and, indeed, some critics have argued that the latter term, through patterns of established usage, has come to subsume poststructuralism. We can distinguish between the two terms by recognizing the difference between their theoretical objects of study. Poststructuralism takes as its theoretical object “structuralism,” whereas postmodernism takes as its theoretical object “modernism.” Poststructuralism can be characterized as a mode of thinking, a style of philosophizing, and a kind of writing, yet the term should not be used to convey a sense of homogeneity, singularity, and unity. The very term “poststructuralism” is not uncontested. Mark Poster (1989, p. 6) remarks that the term poststructuralism is American in origin and that “poststructuralist theory” names a uniquely American practice, which is based upon an assimilation of the work of a diverse range of theorists. More generally, we might say that the term is a label used in English-speaking academic communities to describe a distinctively *philosophical* response to the structuralism characterizing the works of Claude Lévi-Strauss (anthropology), Louis Althusser (Marxism), Jacques Lacan (psychoanalysis), and Roland Barthes (literature) (see Gadet 1989). Manfred Frank (1988), a contemporary German philosopher, for his part prefers the term “neo-structuralism” emphasizing a continuity with “structuralism,” as does John Sturrock (1986, p. 137), who focusing upon Jacques Derrida *the* “Post-Structuralist” – indeed, “the weightiest and most acute critic Structuralism has had” – discusses the “post” in “post-Structuralism” in terms of “coming after and of seeking to extend Structuralism in its rightful

direction.” He continues: “Post-Structuralism is a critique of Structuralism conducted from within: that is, it turns certain of Structuralism’s arguments against itself and points to certain fundamental inconsistencies in their method which Structuralists have ignored” (ibid.). Richard Harland (1987), by contrast, coins the term “superstructuralism” as a single umbrella based on an underlying framework of assumptions common to “Structuralists, Poststructuralists, (European) Semioticians, Althusserian Marxists, Lacanians, Foucauldians, et al” (Harland 1993, pp. ix–x). All of these locutions “post-structuralism,” “neo-structuralism,” and “super-structuralism” entertain as central the movement’s historical, institutional, and theoretical *proximity* to “structuralism.” Yet post-structuralism cannot be simply reduced to a set of shared assumptions, a method, a theory, or even a school. It is best referred to as a *movement of thought*—a complex skein of thought—embodying different forms of critical practice. It is decidedly interdisciplinary and has many different but related strands.

As a French and predominately Parisian affair, first-generation poststructuralism is inseparable from the immediate intellectual milieu which prevailed in postwar France, a history dominated by diverse intellectual forces: the legacy of Alexander Kojève’s and Jean Hyppolite’s “existentialist” interpretations of Hegel’s *Phenomenology of Mind*, Heidegger’s phenomenology of Being and Jean-Paul Sartre’s existentialism, Jacques Lacan’s rediscovery and structuralist “reading” of Freud, the omnipresence of Georges Bataille and Maurice Blanchot, Gaston Bachelard’s radical epistemology and Georges Canguilhem’s studies of science, and, perhaps, most importantly, the French reception of Nietzsche. It is also inseparable from the structuralist tradition of linguistics based upon the work of Ferdinand de Saussure and Roman Jakobson and the structuralist interpretations of Claude Lévi-Strauss, Roland Barthes, Louis Althusser, and (early) Michel Foucault. Poststructuralism, considered in terms of contemporary cultural history, can be understood as belonging to the broad movement of European

formalism, with explicit historical links to both formalist and futurist linguistics and poetics and the European avant-garde.

Decisive for the emergence of post-structuralism was, undoubtedly, the rediscovery of Friedrich Nietzsche’s writings and Martin Heidegger’s (1991) interpretation of them by a group of French thinkers, along with the structuralist readings of both Freud and Marx. Where Marx was seen to play out the theme of power in his work, and Freud gave a conceptual priority to the notion of desire, Nietzsche was read as a philosopher who did not prioritize or subordinate the one concept over the other. His philosophy offered a way forward that combined both power and desire (see Schrift 1995; Peters 1998).

The American reception of deconstruction and the influential formulation of “poststructuralism” in the English-speaking world quickly became institutionalized from the point at which Derrida delivered his essay “Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences” to the International Colloquium on Critical Languages and the Sciences of Man at Johns Hopkins University in October 1966. Richard Macksey and Eugenio Donato (1970, p. x) described the conference as “the first time in the United States that structuralist thought had been considered as a cross-disciplinary phenomenon.” Even before the conclusion of the conference, there were clear signs that the ruling transdisciplinary paradigm of structuralism had been superseded, yet only a paragraph in Macksey’s “Concluding Remarks” signaled the importance of Derrida’s “radical reappraisals of our [structuralist] assumptions” (p. 320).

The “decentering” of structure, of the transcendental signified, and of the *sovereign* subject, Derrida suggests — naming his sources of inspiration — can be found in the Nietzschean critique of metaphysics and, especially, of the concepts of being and truth, in the Freudian critique of self-presence, as he says, “the critique of consciousness, of the subject, of self-identity and of self-proximity or self-possession” (Ibid., 280), and, more radically, in the Heideggerian destruction of metaphysics, “of the determination of Being as presence” (ibid.). In the body of the

essay, Derrida considers the theme of “decentering” in relation to Lévi-Strauss’ ethnology and concludes by distinguishing two interpretations of structure. One, Hegelian in origin and exemplified in Lévi-Strauss’ work, he argues, “dreams of deciphering a truth or an origin which escapes play and the order of the sign” and seeks the “inspiration of a new humanism.” The other, “which is no longer turned toward the origin, affirms play and tries to pass beyond man and humanism” (Derrida 1978, p. 292).

Gilles Deleuze’s (1983, orig. 1962) *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, which interpreted Nietzsche’s philosophy as an attack upon the Hegelian dialectic, helped to create the conditions for an accent upon pure difference – a “philosophy of difference” – that emphasized difference not only as a constant in linguistic and symbolic systems but also as a necessary element in the process of creating social and cultural identity (see Schrift 1995; Peters 1996, 1998).

In its first generation, poststructuralism is exemplified in the work and writing of Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault, Julia Kristeva, Jean-François Lyotard, Gilles Deleuze, Luce Irigaray, Jean Baudrillard, and many others. Historically, its early formation and institutional development can be charted in Philippe Sollers’ highly influential journal *Tel Quel*, and there are strong connections with literary figures such as Maurice Blanchot and Roland Barthes. In addition to work which engages directly with specific philosophers, poststructuralist thinkers have developed distinctive forms of analysis (grammatology, deconstruction, archeology, genealogy, semanalysis) and often developed these forms as critiques of specific institutions (family, State, prison, clinic, school, factory, armed forces, university, even philosophy itself) and theorizations of a range of different media (“reading,” “writing,” teaching, television, the visual arts, the plastic arts, film, and forms of electronic communication).

The influence of the first-generation poststructuralists has been immense: inside France it has led to exciting developments at the forefront of feminist research, psychoanalysis, literary theory, anthropology, sociology, and history. It has also led to important cross-fertilizations and

interpenetrations among the disciplines and to intellectual advances in newly configured fields such as film theory, media studies, queer theory, postcolonial studies, and Afro-American and Hellenistic studies. Outside France and especially in the American academy, the influence of poststructuralism has been strongly felt in literary studies (e.g., Jonathan Culler, Shoshana Felman, Vincent Leitch) and is strongly evident in the work of the Harvard literary school (e.g., Paul de Man, Hillis Miller). Within the Western academy, more generally it has influenced the traditional disciplines of sociology (e.g., Zygmunt Bauman, Barry Smart), philosophy (e.g., Cornel West, Paul Patton, Hubert Dreyfus), politics (e.g., Colin Gordon, William Connolly, Barry Hindess), anthropology (e.g., James Clifford, Paul Rabinow), history (e.g., Hayden White, Mark Poster, Dominick LaCapra), geography (e.g., Edward Soja, David Harvey), as well as the newly emergent fields of feminist and gender studies (e.g., Judith Butler, Chris Weedon), postcolonial studies (e.g., Edward Said, Gayatri Spivak, Homi Bhabha), and cultural studies (e.g., Stuart Hall, Simon During).

In part the significance of poststructuralism for educational philosophy and theory lies in the fact that it can be construed as a philosophical reaction against a *scientistic* social science. The theoretical development of French structuralism during the late 1950s and 1960s led to the institutionalization of a transdisciplinary “mega-paradigm” which helped to integrate the humanities and the social sciences but did so in an overly optimistic and *scientistic* conception of the social sciences. Its claim to the status of a “mega-paradigm” was based around the centrality of language and its scientific analysis in human social and cultural life, considered as self-reflexive signifying or semiotic systems or subsystems. It was, in this sense, part of the broader “linguistic turn” taken by Western philosophy. The tradition of structuralist linguistics had its origins in the late nineteenth-century European formalism and under the combined influence of Ferdinand de Saussure (1959) and Roman Jakobson (e.g., 1973) developed into the dominant research program in linguistics. In the hands of Claude Lévi-Strauss, A.J. Greimas, Roland Barthes, Louis

Althusser, Jacques Lacan, Michel Foucault, and many others, it made its way into anthropology, literary criticism, psychoanalysis, Marxism, history, esthetic theory, and studies of popular culture, developing into a powerful overarching framework for the semiotic and linguistic analysis of society, economy, and culture, considered as a series of functionally interrelated sign systems.

Poststructuralism, then, can be interpreted as a specifically *philosophical* response to the alleged scientific status of structuralism – to its status as a mega-paradigm for the social sciences – and as a movement which, under the inspiration of Friedrich Nietzsche, Martin Heidegger, and others, sought to decenter the “structures,” systematicity, and scientific status of structuralism, to critique its underlying metaphysics, and to extend it to a number of different directions while at the same time preserving central elements of structuralism’s critique of the humanist subject.

Its main theoretical tendencies and innovations can be summarized in terms of its *affinities* and *differences* with structuralism:

Affinities

- (i) The critique of Renaissance humanist philosophy and the rational, autonomous, self-transparent subject of humanist thought. A shared suspicion of phenomenology’s and existentialism’s privileging of human consciousness as autonomous, directly accessible, and as the sole basis of historical interpretation, understanding, and action.
- (ii) A general theoretical understanding of language and culture in terms of linguistic and symbolic systems, where the interrelations of constituent elements are regarded as more important than the elements considered in isolation from one another. Both structuralism and poststructuralism take up the Saussurean belief – and innovative methodologies based upon its insights – that linguistic signs act reflexively rather than referentially.
- (iii) A general belief in the Unconscious and in hidden structures or sociohistorical forces that, to a large extent, constrain and govern our behavior. Much of the innovation of structuralism and poststructuralism is directly indebted to Freud’s study of the Unconscious and his clinical investigations which undermined the prevalent philosophical view of the pure rationality and self-transparency of the subject, substituting a greater complexity that called into question traditional distinctions of reason/unreason (madness).
- (iv) A shared intellectual inheritance and tradition based upon Saussure, Jakobson, the Russian formalists, Freud, and Marx, among other thinkers. This shared intellectual history is like a complex skein that has many strands. We might call it European formalism, beginning in prerevolutionary Russia, in Geneva, and in Jena, with simultaneous and overlapping developments in linguistics, poetics, art, science, and literature.

Differences

- (v) The reintroduction of history. Where structuralism sought to efface history through synchronic analyses of structures, poststructuralism brings about a renewed interest in a *critical* history through a reemphasis on diachronic analyses; on the mutation, transformation, and discontinuity of structures; and on serialization, repetition, “archeology,” and, perhaps most importantly, what Foucault, following Nietzsche, calls genealogy. Genealogical narratives are seen to replace ontology, or to express the same thought in a different way, questions of ontology become historized.
- (vi) The challenge to scientism in the human sciences, an anti-foundationalism in epistemology, and a new emphasis upon perspectivism in interpretation. Poststructuralism challenges the rationalism and realism that structuralism continues from positivism, with its promethium faith in scientific method, in progress, and in the capacity of the structuralist approach to discern and identify universal structures of all cultures and the human mind.
- (vii) The rediscovery of Nietzsche and Heidegger’s interpretation of Nietzsche as the “last metaphysician.” Nietzsche’s work

provides a new way to theorize and conceive the discursive operation of power and desire in the constitution and self-overcoming of human subjects. Heidegger in his two-volume *Nietzsche* first published in 1961 focuses upon *The Will to Power* – a work assembled from notes and first published posthumously by his sister – and interprets Nietzsche as the last metaphysician. Derrida, in particular, takes issue with Heidegger’s “reductive” interpretation and translates Heidegger’s “destruction” of the history of Western metaphysics as “deconstruction.”

- (viii) A critical philosophy of technology. Much of the history of poststructuralism can be written as a series of innovative theoretical developments of or about Heidegger’s notion of technology. Heidegger’s philosophy of technology is related to his critique of the history of Western metaphysics and the disclosure of being. The essence of technology is a *poiesis* or “bringing forth” which is grounded in disclosure (*aletheia*). He suggests that the essence of modern technology shows itself in what he calls *enframing* and reveals itself as “standing reserve,” a concept that refers to resources that are stored in the anticipation of consumption. As such modern technology names the final stage in the history of metaphysics (nihilism) and the way in which being is disclosed in this particular epoch: a stockpiling in principle completely knowable and devoted entirely for human use. He suggests that the essence of technology is nothing technological; it is rather a system (*Gestell*), an all-embracing view of technology, described as a mode of human existence that focuses upon the way machinic technology can alter our mode of being, distorting our actions and aspirations. Heidegger is careful not to pose as an optimist or pessimist. He sees his own work as preparation for a new beginning that will enable one to rescue oneself from nihilism and allow the resolute individual to achieve an authenticity.
- (ix) A deepening of democracy and a political critique of Enlightenment values. Poststructuralism criticizes the ways that modern liberal democracies construct political identity on the basis of a series of binary oppositions (e.g., we/them, citizen/noncitizen, responsible/irresponsible, legitimate/illegitimate) which has the effect of excluding or “othering” some groups of people. Western countries grant rights to citizens – rights are dependent upon citizenship – and regard noncitizens, that is, immigrants, those seeking asylum, and refugees, as “aliens.” Some strands of poststructuralist thought are interested in examining how these boundaries are socially constructed and how they are maintained and policed. In particular, the deconstruction of political hierarchies of value comprising binary oppositions and philosophies of difference is seen as highly significant for current debates on multiculturalism and feminism and as issuing from the poststructuralist critique of representation and consensus.
- (x) Foucault’s later work based on the notion of “governmentality” has initiated a substantial body of contemporary work in political philosophy which deals directly with political reason. Foucault coins the term “governmentality” in an analysis of liberalism and neoliberalism, viewing the former as origination in a doctrine concerning the critique of state reason. Foucault uses the term “governmentality” to mean the art of government and to signal the emergence of a distinctive type of rule that became the basis for modern liberal politics. He maintains that the “art of government” emerges in the sixteenth century, motivated by diverse questions: the government of oneself (personal conduct), the government of souls (pastoral doctrine), and the government of children (pedagogy). It is around the same time that “economy” is introduced into political practice as part of the governmentalization of the State. What is distinctive of

Foucault's approach is that he is interested in the question of *how* power is exercised, and, implicitly, he is providing a critique of contemporary tendencies to overvalue problems of the State, reducing it to a unity or singularity based upon a certain functionality. Both Foucault and Derrida, returning to Kant's cosmopolitical writings, have addressed themselves of the prospect for global governance, and Derrida has talked about both deepening democracy and – entertaining developments of new technologies – a “democracy to come.”

- (xi) Philosophies of difference. If there is one element that distinguishes poststructuralism, it is the notion of *difference* which various thinkers use, develop, and apply in different ways. The notion of difference comes from Nietzsche, from Saussure, and from Heidegger. Gilles Deleuze (1983, orig, 1962), in *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, interprets Nietzsche's philosophy according to the principle of difference and advances this interpretation as an attack upon the Hegelian dialectic. Derrida's notion of difference can be traced back to at least two sources: Saussure's insight that linguistic systems are constituted through difference and Heidegger's notion of difference. It took nearly a decade, from the first mention of the notion of difference (in 1959) to its development as *différance*. *Différance*, as Derrida (1981, pp. 8–9) remarks, as both the common root of all the positional concepts marking our language and the condition for all signification, refers not only to the “movement that consists in deferring by means of delay, delegation, reprieve, referral, detour, postponement, reserving” but also and finally to “the unfolding of difference,” of the onto-ontological difference, which Heidegger named as the difference between Being and beings. As such *différance* is seen as plotting the linguistic limits of the subject. Lyotard (1988), by contrast, invents the concept of the *différend* which

he suggests establishes the very condition for the existence of discourse: “that a universal rule of judgment between heterogeneous genre is lacking in general” (p. xi), or again, “there is no genre whose hegemony over others would be just” (p. 158). A *différend*, as Lyotard (1988) defines it, “is a case of conflict, between (at least) two parties, that cannot be equitably resolved for lack of a rule of judgment applicable to both arguments” (p. xi). Poststructuralist notions of difference, pointing to an anti-essentialism, have been subsequently developed in relation to gender and ethnicity: the American feminist philosopher, Iris Marion Young (1991), writes of *Justice and the Politics of Difference*, and the Afro-American philosopher, Cornel West (1992), speaks of “*The New Cultural Politics of Difference*.”

- (xii) Suspicion of metanarratives. Lyotard's definition of the “postmodern condition” characterizes a feature of poststructuralism that we can call the suspicion of transcendental arguments and viewpoints, combined with the rejection of canonical descriptions and final vocabularies. In particular, “suspicion toward metanarratives” refers to the question of legitimation with reference to the *modern* age in which various grand narratives have been advanced as a legitimation of State power. There is no synthesizing or neutral master discourse that can reproduce the speculative unity of knowledge or adjudicate between competing views, claims, or discourses. The “linguistic turn” of twentieth-century philosophy and social sciences does not warrant the assumption of a metalinguistic neutrality or foundational epistemological privilege.
- (xiii) The diagnosis of “power/knowledge” and the exposure of technologies of domination based upon Foucault's analytics of power. For Foucault, power is productive; it is dispersed throughout the social system, and it is intimately related to knowledge. It is productive because it is not only repressive but also creates new knowledge

(which may also liberate). It is dispersed rather than located in any one center, like the State, and it is part of the constellation “power/knowledge” which means that knowledge, in the sense of discursive practices, is generated through the exercise of power in the control of the body. Foucault develops this thesis through his genealogical study of the development of modern institutions like the prison and the school and the corresponding emergence of the social sciences that helped devised new methods of social control.

- (xiv) The politics of the global knowledge/information society/economy. Poststructuralism provides intellectual resources to philosophers of education for unpicking the ruling assumptions currently used to construct the dominant neoliberal paradigm of globalization as a global economy/society allegedly based upon a conception of knowledge and “free trade.” The new production of knowledge and the global knowledge economy, together with classical assumptions of rationality, individuality, and self-interest, are important construction sites for knowledge deconstruction and critique. They are also conceptual sites for alternative conceptions.

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Poststructuralism, Postcolonialism, and Education

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Synonyms

[Colonialism](#); [Empire](#); [Humanism](#); [Modern Education](#); [Postcolonialism](#); [Poststructuralism](#)

Introduction

Postcolonial theory coincides with radical disruptions to colonial systems of thought brought about by civil rights movements in the '60s in France and other Western nations. In the wake of the

Shoah and liberation struggles in ex-colonial nations, French poststructuralists began a systematic critique of Western metaphysics of being and its attendant modernist operation. Poststructuralists use various means and methods to destabilize the assumed primacy of modern structures of language, knowledge, governance, ethics, and patriarchal social relations to unveil the hidden aims and catastrophic ends of Western ontological projects assuming a mythical superiority of European man over other beings (Derrida 1974). For Lévinas (1969), in particular, the ethno-superior subject and totalizing logics underpinning Western ontologies of being greatly inform devastating genocidal and colonial projects leading to the finite extermination of the unique existence of others before, during, and after the Second World War.

Given its emergence in a time of ultimate colonial failure, Robert J. Young argues that poststructuralist theory is already postcolonial. For Young (1990) poststructuralism arises directly from sustained philosophical examination of the modernist imperatives of European ontologies of the human and the nature of human being. According to Young deconstruction is primarily of the “concept, the authority, and assumed primacy of, the category of ‘the West’” (19). The poststructural reveal of colonial ontology in the Western episteme, in turn, generates a postcolonial vocabulary, framework of geopolitical and historical analyses, and set of constructs that challenge, contest, and “rethink the premises, assumptions and protocols of its centrist imperial culture” (Young 2001, p. 414).

Poststructuralism informs the most influential postcolonial theorists of our time, most notably, Edward Said, Homi K. Bhabha, and Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak. In its close association with poststructuralism, postcolonial scholarship is routinely accused of being apolitical. If aligned with the politics of anticolonial and/or decolonizing projects, leading postcolonial theorists are careful to resist a reformulation of oppositional, reductive, ideological, or identarian logics that repeat the narcissistic and self-preserving violence of being underpinning the white mythology of Western metaphysics (Derrida 1974; Bhabha 1994). As

with poststructuralism, postcolonialism is an enactment of thought that excavates, deconstructs, and represents modernist forms of knowledge, history, and social organization, but with explicit reference to a colonial frame and context. Acknowledging their debt to the decolonizing movements, Homi K. Bhabha (1994) suggests that postcolonialism examines blurred, broken, and antagonist social ties produced from violent histories of colonial oppression and their aftermath. For Bhabha, fractured social bonds bind contemporary and global geopolitical relations into a historical knot that is difficult but necessary to untangle. In this regard, postcolonialism bears the reparative impulse of poststructuralism to imagine, create, and enact just modes of thinking and being in the world with others. Postcolonial theorizing seeks to supplement, recuperate, narrate, and renew a wounded humanity from the more violating imperatives, actions, and events cast in the name of the human and humanism.

Key Postcolonial Thinkers in Education

Widely viewed as inaugurating the field, Edward Said's seminal work *Orientalism* is the first full-length study of its kind to examine the representation of the “Eastern Other” in Western metaphysical thought and the humanist tradition. If widely critiqued for creating an “other” monolith of the human, Said's work is remarkable for its detailed, Foucauldian excavation of figures of foreignness as depicted in literary and colonial accounts. In contrast to Said's macro-historicizing project, in the *Location of Culture*, Homi Bhabha invents strategies of critique to investigate the micro-political dimensions of colonial operation. Leaning on an eclectic array of poststructural and anticolonial theories, Bhabha argues that colonial structures find their basis in fantastic self-other relations and formulates a psychosocial lens to bring nuance to philosophical and social investigations of colonial processes. In her groundbreaking article, “Can the Subaltern Speak,” Gayatri Spivak emphasizes the gendered quality of colonial relations, and the complex role of sexually exploited, disappeared, and forgotten women in

colonialism's patronizing schematic. Using deconstruction, Spivak (1988) organizes the unrepresentable qualities of subjectivity of the "other" using the Gramscian conception of subaltern. Subaltern stands in for the unrecognizable and abject (female) body subject to the devastating effects of patriarchal and sexual violence ricocheting off the uneven male colonial contest over family, language, politics, law, culture, education, and resources. Spivak relocates the logics and enactments of patriarchal struggles for social control over territory, rule, and resources in the bodies of women caught in between warring factions of colonial and "native" patriarchal governance.

The poststructural destabilization of canons and institutions of Western knowledge continues to present a series of challenges, aporias, and generative opportunities for postcolonial theorists. Postcolonial scholars conceptually lean on and forge departures from modernist projects of enlightenment, history, and humanism informing modernism's metaphysics of being. The more notable of poststructuralist constructs taken up by postcolonial theories involve the qualification and renewal of ideas of the "other," the human, difference, differend, discourse, subjectivity, narration, representation, and justice in diverse colonial contexts. Through various philosophical and literary methods, postcolonial scholars experiment with, supplement, and/or contest the operation of Western knowledge; culture with "other," hybrid, and indigenous aesthetics; social forms; cultural productions; and critical theories of humanity. Invented constructs such as subaltern, native informant, hybridity, worlding, and the third space, seek to account for a persistently deformed construction of the colonized subject in philosophical thought, colonial records, and contemporary cultural productions of "others" in a globalizing world.

Education and Postcolonial Theory

Immense is the range of postcolonial scholarship and inquiry within and across academic

disciplines. Postcolonial thought is inherently interdisciplinary and transgresses the fields of philosophy, history, geography, anthropology, social science, economics, political science, literature, cultural studies, education, and the helping professions. Still, postcolonial orientations and methods of analysis have yet to significantly infiltrate mainstream forms of compulsory, public education systems across the world that continues to build upon colonial foundations and theories of knowledge, literacy, and learning. As John Willinsky (2000) demonstrates, public schooling in nations worldwide remains stubbornly tethered to educational processes of subject formation in the European mold of the human as upheld by the Commonwealth or ex-colonial State. For example, the impact of colonial English education is felt in global times; to receive an exemplary education is to acquire an education in English. Consequently English is the global language of commerce and trade, academic knowledge, technology, cosmopolitanism, and culture.

Postcolonial scholars look to *education* as enabler, producer, and liberator of human subjectivity from Western aesthetics, logics, operations, discourses, institutions, and the insidious reach of global capitalism. Said's (1978) work contributes an understanding of the role of knowledge production in the making and remaking of societies and worlds. For Said, knowledge, and thus education, is not ethno-culturally neutral or empirically unmotivated. Said's historicizing critique investigates the colonizing operation of the educational enterprise in advancing Western forms of knowledge above and at the expense of others. For Said, true knowledge of the world lies somewhere in an unrelenting archeological excavation of human histories. Bhabha (1994) identifies knowledge archived in colonial encounter as a third space of possibility for a world reeling from colonial pasts. Returning to the colonial archive, Bhabha reconstructs pedagogical strategies of resistance used by colonial subjects, including mimicry, misrecognition, and revolt, against colonial role. He locates human agency in the symbolic capacity of human beings to imagine and produce different social organizations from forms

of resistance to multiple and continually morphing forms of colonial violence and control. Spivak (1993) has theorized education as *pharmakon*, as both a medicine and poison that enable and injure subject formation by particular means, for colonizing and liberating ends. Education, Spivak suggests, remains an important site of postcolonial inquiry and intervention into the ontological meanings and epistemological productions of being and not being human. As with the “post” in structuralism and modernism, Spivak insists that postcolonial studies are not simply what comes before and after colonialism but what is retrievable from within its enabling and enduring anthropomorphic, patriarchal, and ethnocentric violence continuing to form human thought, organization, and existence.

Poststructuralism and the (Post)colonial Roots of Modern Education

Across the world, in ex-colonial, settler colonial, and colonial nation states, public schooling continues to impart, import, and exalt Western ontological and epistemological molds and logics. Poststructuralism does offer educational scholars theoretical tools and methods for interrogating these continuities but without specific reference to a historical or political context. Consequently, poststructural critiques of modernity are often unhinged from enduring material, geopolitical, and educational consequences for indigenous and formerly enslaved and colonized communities. In his book, *Out of Africa*, Pal Ahluwalia argues that poststructuralism carries a foreclosed debt to the particular and localized (post)colonial contexts giving rise to poststructuralism’s incredible movement of thought. Ahluwalia further suggests that poststructuralism arises from an unnamed postcolonial recognition of the violence of modernism’s colonizing logic, one that has yet to be fully mined by scholars working with these frames. For example, obscuring lines between French poststructuralism and its Algerian (post)colonial roots mute the violent historical and political context driving its movement while

sidelining the ontological and epistemological contribution of formerly colonized nations to poststructural thought. Colonial legacies of violence and antagonism can be directly indicted in the contemporary production of postcolonial tensions arising between French citizens, French-Algerian citizens, and Algerian migrants seeking refuge in “multicultural” France. Excavating historical and political context to the legacies of colonialism framing new social and political formations of global life, postcolonial theorists labor to supplement, return, and challenge the primacy of all forms of Western thought (including poststructural) “to disrupt the cultural hegemony of the West, challenging imperialism in its various guises” (including multiculturalism) (Ahluwalia 2010, p. 3). Although linked, the ontological and epistemological “posts” guiding poststructuralism, post-humanism, and post-colonialism are “out of joint,” and, yet, this disjointedness is also a strength, giving rise to generative points of dialogue, debate, and departure for those working across these frameworks.

Educational systems and scholarship also suffer from a foreclosure of education’s colonial roots. A glaring lack of inquiry into colonial foundations of “universal” public schooling advances the study, enactment, and global circulation of Western forms of education (Rizvi 2007). Colonial logics inform categories of difference, normative models of human development, and ideas of national citizenship in public schools across the globe. Through the provision of English and French and the centering of Euro-colonial curricula, public schools in ex-colonial nations continue to be beholden to Western colonial logics, curriculum, and practices of education. Specters of colonial logics justify State-sponsored forms of forced, residential, and segregated schooling structure and inform unequal relations between students and students and teachers while advancing dominant misrepresentations of communities historically marginalized in and by school.

Postcolonial scholars are committed to an examination of the ongoing and persistent role of empire in the contemporary practice of education. These scholars engage with the traumatic

implication of colonial pasts in the present treatment of students from communities affected by injurious school experiences. As with poststructural scholars, postcolonial scholars are concerned with the status of subjectivity and the human in the organization of categories of difference-stratifying school. They contextualize these categories in legacies of slave and/or colonial institutions and demonstrate the influence of colonial pasts for perpetuating material, linguistic, and social inequities in the classroom. Postcolonial scholars also stage reconstructions of race and other defaced social categories as an instrument of colonial technology of subject formation symbolically and materially delivered to children in the earliest experiences in school. They insist on postcolonial frameworks to support teacher training as a responsive education with communities impacted by violent histories of colonization.

Postcolonial scholars in education are uniquely positioned to articulate challenges associated with working inside and against the colonial logic underpinning educational systems in ex-colonial nations and threatening to universalize “new” visions of supposedly “global” and “best” educational practices. They view the constructing and enacting of particular forms of humanness as and in active psychosocial forms of praxis delivered through tacit and insidious colonial educational technologies. They share the poststructural concern with and interrogation of the status of human in education through postcolonial inquiries that persistently question the tight Western, ontological hold and normative value of the human in the formation of children through schooling. Postcolonial approaches to education not only include an excavation of the role and activities of Western “normal school” in colonial projects; they generate and lift up forms of schooling that run counter, alter, or resist those put forth by Western proponents of modern education.

Despite criticism against the largely discursive and intellectualized take-up of postcolonial theory in the Western academy, in many ways the full social and pedagogical potential of postcolonial thought is yet to be realized. Postcolonial theory threatens the colonial foundations of mandatory

public education, an institution of subject formation and social organization that has yet to be shaken. Under global capitalism, ex-colonial nations continue to cling to colonial educational systems to gain economic, political, and material advancement on the world stage. As human rights-based movements of education are tied to Western forms of education, initiatives put forward by the UN such as “Education for All” are also tethered to colonial foundations and Western ontological molds of the human. The global acceptance of Western forms of universal access to public schooling can make education impervious to postcolonial analyses.

Still, postcolonial theory is powerful in rethinking the possibilities of education for new forms of subjectivity, knowledge, and social organization and institution in this century. Indeed, as Fazal Rizvi (2007) suggests, education in a global age necessitates a postcolonial approach as from the minute of the child’s entry into the world she is subject to an immense complex of colonizing forces, discourses, and histories that abstractly condition her being. As globalization rearticulates national boundaries and claims to citizenship, it is critical that educators of the twenty-first century adopt a postcolonial lens. Global movements of people, knowledge, and ideas generate new forms of social connectivity, organization, and belonging informed and driven by a postcolonial past. New manifestations of these histories continue to affect the lived, multilingual, and cultural realities of migrant, immigrant, refugee, and diasporic populations and inform the educational experiences, curricular knowledge, and social organization of students in schools. Without a postcolonial lens, rapidly globalizing forms of Western education risk re-entrenching gross geopolitical and economic inequities and bitter antagonisms between ex-colonial and newly formed and failing nations. Vanessa Andreotti (2011) further argues that, as an actionable form of social praxis, postcolonial theory alerts us to the dangers of foreclosing new and old colonial imperatives underlying any educational enterprise seeking to humanize the child by particular means and/or for certain ends.

Postcolonial approaches to education seek to interrupt normative, “scientific,” and Western frames of educational research and scholarship. Postcolonial constructs pose serious questions to educational and social science researchers utilizing taken-for-granted and/or universalized social categories that form their understanding of unique bodies and complex learning processes of students in the classroom. Postcolonial scholars in education argue that Western theories of development, literacy, and knowledge offer partial, partisan, and thus distorted versions of how each child grows, learns, and participates in social life. When acknowledged that mandatory schooling and modern education are complicit with particular colonial aims of the adult, community, or society, educational scholarship is faced with the demand to rethink some of its most cherished and exalted conceptions of the child, language, care, knowledge, experience, pedagogy, human participation, and education. Postcolonial scholarship in education identifies competing epistemologies, representations of knowledge, and the pedagogical relation as the symbolic and social means by which human beings might relearn a humanity injured but not overdetermined by colonial pasts.

At its most radical, postcolonial theory makes an ethical and pedagogical commitment to creating a freedom seeking and just education for newcomers in an old and globalizing world. Postcolonial histories of oppression and mass violence behoove the adult community to consider and take care with the ontological molds, epistemological virtues, and institutions of human becoming to which the child is necessarily and violently subject. Postcolonial educators challenge the adult community with the demand of supporting the symbolic, experiential, and existential entry of the child in social forms, events, and organizations that acknowledge each child’s whole existence, participation, and potential in particular and shared worlds. Postcolonial scholars in education acknowledge the pedagogical relation as critical to the renewal of violently broken social bonds structuring possible futures of a globally shared human community. Postcolonial education as human praxis might form a

global community that can bear learning from the excesses of empire’s terrible history to think, speak, write, teach, and live with greater intention with all beings sharing an existence, presence, time, and place in a dynamic world.

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Poto

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Central to the theory and practice of Tongan education is the notion of *poto*, the ultimate outcome of learning, from a Tongan perspective. So what is *poto*? This entry describes *poto* and explores its many forms and uses in education and other fields within a Tongan context. The Tongan knowledge system, *tala-e-fonua*, is discussed to explicate further the notion of *poto*.

Poto means wise, discerning, intelligent, and clever (Schneider 1977; Rabone 1845). Churchward (1959) refers to *poto* as “to be clever, skilful; to understand what to do and be able to do it.” In her study of Tongan education, Helu-Thaman (2001) identified three basic educational ideas: *ako*, *'ilo*, and *poto*. She elaborates:

Ako is used to denote learning as well as searching, and in the early part of the nineteenth century it was also used to mean teaching. Later when schools were introduced, the term *faiako* (making learning) was used to refer to a school teacher. *'Ilo* denotes knowing, knowledge and information and implies learning and/or searching. *Poto* refers to one who is wise or learned and is used to describe a state of being or mind, and implies the use of *'ilo* for the benefit of the group and wider society. (Helu-Thaman 2001, p. 53)

As indicated by the definitions above, *poto* has at least two major dimensions. The first one is the spiritual intelligence or the wisdom of the spirit. For example, when a learned person makes a wise decision for the betterment of the community, she or he is referred to as a *tokotaha poto*/wise person. The second element is the cognitive intelligence. For instance, a very knowledgeable person is referred to as *tokotaha poto*/knowledgeable or skilful person. The former is associated more with the *loto*/heart, whereas the latter is more concomitant with the *'atamai*/mind.

To understand *poto* in the Tongan educational context and at its spiritual level, the concept of *loto* is further explored. *Loto* has a range of

meanings that are closely related. *Loto* denotes the heart, soul, will, inner being, core, and depth. *Tokotaha lotopoto* is a term used to describe a person who makes wise decisions, based on the promptings of his heart and spirit, for the betterment of the community. A person who is courageous is called *lotolahi* or *lototo'a*/brave heart, while a coward is called *lotosi'i*/fainthearted or *lotofa'i*/vanquished heart. A loving person is referred to as *loto'ofa*, whereas a heart full of envy is called *lotokovi*. On an abstract level, the concept of *loto* means interior such as *lotofale*/interior of a house. When reduplicated, it means depth as in *moana loloto*/deep ocean. In all these examples, *loto* means the interior, the heart, and the essence.

To gain a fuller comprehension of the cognitive and intellectual element of *poto*, the concept of *'atamai*/mind is further explored. While it usually means the mind, the term *'atamai* literally means to reflect or to project forward. It is made up of two morphemes, *'ata*/reflection and *mai*/to make something come to the fore. *'Ata* means reflection as seen in terms such as *mafoa-'a e-ata* (the breaking of dawn), *'ata*/reflection in a mirror, and *tauata* and *ataata* – the emergence of ideas in one's mind or thinking. *Mai* means to bring forth.

A metaphor that is used to describe the *'atamai*/cognitive intelligence is *mata*. *Mata* has a number of meanings that include eyes, face, representative, surface, point, green, and unripe (Schneider 1977; Rabone 1845). The term *matapoto* is often used to describe a person who is intelligent and quick to observe potentials and convert them to advantages and opportunities.

At the social level, *mata* not only means the eyes or face of human beings, but it also stands as a symbol for the character of the individual. A person who loves and cares, for instance, is referred to as *tokotaha mata'ofa*/loving face, while an uncaring person is regarded as *mata'ita'e'ofa*/unloving face. A person who cares for the well-being of her extended family and community is known as *matakāinga*/extended-family caring face. In the field of strategic leadership, a visionary and forward-thinking leader is known as *matalōloa*/long-distance vision.

Exploring connections between *mata/mind* and *loto/heart* can reveal the systemic coherence between them and their product of *poto* as cognitive intelligence and *poto* as spiritual intelligence. At the abstract level, *mata* means outside, exterior, or surface, whereas *loto* is interior/depth. In human and education terms, *mata* symbolizes the mind, while *loto* stands for the heart. Additionally, from a spiritual dimension, *mata* symbolizes the material, whereas *loto* refers to the spiritual. Furthermore, from a Tongan educational perspective, the ongoing interaction between *mata/mind* and *loto/heart* is central to the learning and development of a person. Whereas *mata* refers to cognition and knowing, *loto* is the spiritual center and driving force of *poto/wisdom* and has a central role in a person's decision-making, such as translating knowledge into practical and positive outcomes.

To motivate a Tongan person to learn or act, the *loto/heart* or spirit is the key. This is best illustrated by the old Tongan maxim of “*Tonga mo'unga ki he loto*”/the mountain of Tonga is the heart. When the Tongan's heart is motivated and moved, it will demonstrate qualities such as *lototo'a/courage* and *lotolahi/determination*, and that person is self-driven to achieve goals at high standards.

Lotopoto literally means wise heart. It refers not only to being intelligent and knowledgeable, but, more importantly, to using intelligence and knowledge under all conditions for the right purpose. Also, it points to a depth of wisdom that has intellectual and spiritual dimensions. Further, it indicates that a person who is *lotopoto* is one that acts wisely for the collective well-being rather for his personal gain and individual advancement only.

Through the social construction of *matapoto* and *lotopoto*, it can be suggested that the use of *'ilo/knowledge* for the benefit of society – a hallmark of being *poto* – is largely an outcome of educating the *loto/heart* rather than the mind only. In other words, central to the notion of Tongan education is a clear and dynamic coherence between teaching the mind and educating the heart. While *matapoto* focuses on acquiring knowledge and skills, *lotopoto* is more about

embedding Tongan core values and principles such as *fe'ofa'aki/love one another*, *fetokoni'aki/reciprocity*, *faitotonu/integrity*, and *fakapotopoto/wise, prudent, and judicious*. Therefore, Tongan education is about educating both the mind and heart, and its purpose is to attain *poto* in both spheres. Additionally, *lotopoto* is of greater significance to Tongan education because knowledge is not only sought, but is also put to good use, thus completing the educational process and its purpose. This Tongan philosophy of education – the gaining of knowledge and translating it into action for the betterment of society and for the collective good – is aptly captured in the hymn number 510 of the Free Wesleyan Church of Tonga. The hymn was composed in the early days of Christianity in Tonga, a period when Tongan education and thinking were dominant:

Loto mo e 'atamai/Heart and mind
ko Ho pule'anga ia/Thine kingdom
Fokotu'u taloni ai/Establish therein Thy throne
Tala ai ho fatongia/Therewith Thine dominion
defined

Poto as wisdom can be seen in other Tongan contexts. For example, *fuopotopoto/the poto shape* is the Tongan term for the circle. This use of *poto* means that the shape of the circle represents balance, whole, and complete. In other words, *fuopotopoto* is the shape of wisdom because it represents being inclusive, equal, and fair to all parties. In traditional Tongan horticulture, the mature and best quality *'ufi (yam)* for seedlings is called *'ufi poto* or wise yam. As a third example, made up of a reduplication of *poto*, the term *fakapotopoto* not only means wise and intelligent but also refers to being frugal, prudent, and judicious. In *fakapotopoto*, it can be observed that the intelligence of the mind and the wisdom of the heart are combined. A clever person with little experience who embarks on a project and makes mistakes along the way is referred to as *ko e potopoto-'a-niu-mui* (clever but inexperienced person). When analyzed in greater details, *fakapotopoto* has four major dimensions: *taki fakapotopoto* (strategic or wise and prudent leadership), *pule fakapotopoto* (effective/wise and prudent management), *ngāue fakapotopoto* (right/wise and prudent application of knowledge,

skills, and experience), and *anga fakapotopoto* (wise application of ethical or spiritual principles).

As one of many applications in the Tongan knowledge system of *tala-e-fonua* (wisdom and knowledge of the land or indigenous knowledge system), the *fakapotopoto* leadership model is not only valuable for understanding the past but, more importantly, can be useful in navigating the present and future (Durie 2004; Tu'itahi 2009). A brief examination of *fonua* can provide more understanding of *poto* and its many meanings and uses such as *matapoto*, *lotopoto*, and *fakapotopoto*.

Simply put, *fonua* means people and the land. More deeply, it is a socio-ecological philosophy that espouses and reflects the natural reality of humanity being one and in unity with the rest of the ecology. This interconnected and interdependent relationship is evident in the material and spiritual dimensions of Tongan life. For instance, in the human life cycle, four significant abodes of the human being are all referred to as *fonua*. The baby is nurtured in the *fonua*/womb of the mother. Meanwhile, the mother is nourished by the physical *fonua*/environment. Similarly, the baby is embraced and sustained by the physical *fonua* once it is born into it. The ceremony of burying the umbilical cord of the baby into the land symbolically, physically, and spiritually ties the human being with the *fonua*. When a human being passes on from this natural *fonua*, her physical remains are returned to her *fonualoto*/land within the land, or grave, while her *laumālie*/spirit continues its journey to the *fonua ta'engata*/eternal *fonua* or life hereafter (Māhina 1992; Tu'itahi 2009).

In essence, Tongans, other Pacific peoples, and other indigenous peoples for that matter have evolved their history of existence and their knowledge systems largely from the symbiotic relationship with Mother Nature (Māhina 1992; Tu'itahi 2009). Further, they have evolved a value system that underpins their harmonious and sustainable relationship with the ecology and with each other as fellow human beings. Through stories, song and dance, and other such cultural activities, Tongans preserve their history which is woven with the ecology. Exploring *fonua/whenua* from a

health perspective, Durie (2004) notes this symbiotic relationship. He writes:

All indigenous peoples have a tradition of unity with the environment and the tradition is reflected in song, custom, subsistence, approaches to healing, birthing, and the rituals associated with death. The relationship between people and the environment therefore forms an important foundation for the organisation of indigenous knowledge, the categorisation of life experiences, and the shaping of attitudes and patterns of thinking. Because human identity is regarded as an extension of the environment, there is an element of inseparability between people and the natural world. The individual is a part of all creation and the idea that the world or creation exists for the purpose of human domination and exploitation is absent from indigenous world-views. (Durie 2004, p. 4)

As Durie observes above, much of indigenous knowledge is derived from the relationship of indigenous peoples and their environment. The concepts of *poto*, *matapoto*, *lotopoto*, *fakapotopoto*, and Tongan *ako*/education and learning, as briefly discussed in this entry, are examples of that process. Māhina (1992) points out that *tala-e-fonua*/oral history, once regarded as mere prehistorical myths and legends, is, in fact, history. But because it is coded in Tongan cultural devices such as *heliaki*/symbolism, understanding *tala-e-fonua* can be challenging. Tu'itahi (2009) maintains that in addition to being Tongan history, *tala-e-fonua* is also the Tongan knowledge system. *Tala-e-fonua* refers not only to the distinct but related domains of knowledge in the system, but it also refers to the methodological frameworks and processes through which Tongans over the ages have employed to search and try to understand their natural and social realities.

While there is no scope in this entry to explore them thoroughly, it should be noted that there are at least two other Tongan terms that are related to *loto* in terms of describing the faculties and functions of the heart and the behavior of a person. These two terms are *ongo*/emotion, intuition, and feelings and *anga*/behavior, character, attitude, and attributes. *Ongo ki he loto* is an expression used to describe how one feels something deeply in one's heart. *Ongo tonu* means that a person's intuition is correct or right.

Language is a human invention, a social construct that is influenced and shaped by the capacity of the human spirit, mind, and body, as well as the social and natural environment. In light of this perspective, it is insightful and instructive to explore the phonemic and morphemic characteristics of these three terms – *poto*, *loto*, and *ongo*.

Firstly, they are of similar phonetical sound, especially the “o” sound. This suggests that the “o” sound in Tongan phonetics is often used to form words and meanings that describe the inner realities – physical and metaphysical – of the human being. It can be added that the same linguistic process/practice appears to be applied in other areas of Tongan milieu, such as the terms *toto*, blood; *loloto* or deep; *moto*, the inner essence of a flower that manifests in a bud that is ready to bloom; and *longo* and *longonoa* which mean silence, implying that the physical, mental, and spiritual faculty of the human being is looking inward rather than outward. Other set of examples of how the “o” sound is instrumental for forming words that depict the mental, spiritual, and emotional state are *nonga*/peaceful state of being, *noa*/state of tranquility, *fakanonoa*/state of inner solitude and sojourn, and *faka’o’onoa*/state of solitary meditative reflection as in the case of an accomplished *punake*/composer-choreographer-musician seeking inspiration. In all these terms, it can be observed that the phonemic and morphemic elements of the “o” sound and letter are present.

Similarly, the words for the mind and other such mental faculties are constructed phonetically and morphemically with the “a” vowel and sound, as seen in the following words: *tau ata*/dawn, ‘*ata*/reflection, ‘*atamai*/mind, *mata*/face, and *anga*/behavior.

In attempting to describe *poto*, this entry explored and established that *poto* is a central concept in Tongan educational philosophy, drawing the conclusion that *poto* refers to a well-trained ‘*atamai*/mind with practical skills and a wise, educated *loto*/heart. *Poto* is not only about knowing and doing with the mind and body, but is also about discerning with the heart the right thing to do and do it the right way for the right reasons, such as utilizing knowledge for the common good. *Poto* is about practical knowledge and

ethical application of knowledge with wisdom. *Poto* is not only cognitive intelligence, but, more importantly, emotional and spiritual intelligence. Additionally, this entry suggests that translating *poto* into action for the betterment of society is of greater significance than being knowledgeable without practical application.

Putting into the broader perspective, *poto* as a Tongan educational construct was derived from and will continue to develop within the context of *tala-e-fonua*, the Indigenous Tongan knowledge system, that is based on the symbiotic and dynamic relationship between human beings and their environment. *Tala-e-fonua* is underpinned by the principle that humanity and its environment are one and inseparable. In other words, humanity is part of the whole ecology as illustrated by the meaning of the Tongan socio-ecological concept: *fonua*/land and people are one.

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Praxis

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Synonyms

[Critical Distance](#); [Critical Reflection](#); [Praxis](#)

Introduction

Praxis is the central concept which Paulo Freire adopts to capture the dialectical relationship between consciousness and the world, reflected in the pedagogical approach for which he became famous. The concept of *praxis* dates back to the time of the ancient Greeks and as far back as Aristotle. It connects with Socrates' dictum, captured by Plato in the *Apologia*, that the unexamined life is a life not worth living. This entails reflection on the process of living – an intellectual function. This is connected with Gramsci's later notion that all human beings are intellectuals but not all carry out the function of intellectuals. The reference here is to the thinking and reflecting processes that accompany most activities and that one should help nurture with political change in mind.

Praxis continued to be adopted in subsequent writings in social theory. It entails action-reflection-transformative action. It gained revolutionary prominence in Marxist thought and action. Gramsci rendered *Praxis* the central concept of his philosophy – “The Philosophy of Praxis” – in keeping with the Marxist tradition and Marx himself: “revolutionizing practice” (Marx and Engels 1978, p. 144) entailing reflection on action to change the world. This is captured in Marx's 11th and final Thesis on Feuerbach where he states: “The philosophers have only *interpreted* the world, in various ways, the point, however, is to *change* it.” (Marx and Engels 1978, p. 145).

Marx's early notion of praxis centered on the world of practical activity and everyday life. Later in *Capital*, it took on a decidedly

production-oriented turn, in that the area of labor activity is given the greatest prominence as the focus of critical reflection for revolutionary action. Paulo Freire, to whom this section is dedicated, drew on Marx in his conception of *praxis*, the central concept in his pedagogical politics: the “pedagogy of praxis.” In *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, Freire writes:

But human activity consists of action and reflection: it is praxis, it is transformation of the world. (Freire 1970, 1993, p. 125)

Reflection, Theory, and Transformation

There is a transformative edge to Freire’s interpretation of praxis which involves theory which is regarded as a codification of reflection on and rumination with regard to experience and therefore the world of action (Freire 1970, 1993). This renders problematic common phrases such as “from theory to praxis” – theory is embedded in praxis. Praxis is geared to transforming the world, that is to say, one intervenes in history to contribute towards its development. Put differently, education based on “praxis” is one that allows people to act on their material surroundings and reflect upon them with a view to transforming them.

The process (action-reflection-transformative action) involved is *dialectical* and not sequential as the late Paula Allman (1999), one of the key exponents of Marxian concepts in Freire and Gramsci, emphasized time and time again.

For Freire, action on its own, isolated from reflection, is tantamount to mindless activism. Reflection, divorced from action, constitutes empty theorizing.

Praxis lies at the heart of different situations in Freire’s writings. One recurring aspect of his use of the concept is that of standing aside, either voluntarily or through forced circumstances, to take a critical look at things which are familiar. Frank Youngman (1986) aptly puts it thus: “... education must help people in the process of objectifying the world, critically understanding it, and acting to change it.” (p. 171). This serves as a definition of the term *praxis*.

Contradiction of Opposites

While gaining this critical distance, with a social justice intention, the people involved would be contributing to “negating the negation.” (Allman 1999) They would be negating the process of thwarting the subaltern, the oppressed, and disenfranchised in their process of becoming, becoming more, in this case becoming “more fully human,” a notion that exposed Freire to criticism, from a postmodernist and related perspectives, of essentializing the human condition. In denying the necessary conditions for this humanization to occur, one would be dehumanizing oneself while, at the same time, dehumanizing others. By the same token, in gaining further “humanization,” the oppressed humanize the oppressor. All this is related to solving the contradiction of opposites between oppressors and oppressed. This is genuine revolutionary activity, one which is intended to resolve the contradiction rather than maintain it by simply replacing the personnel involved, the oppressed replacing the oppressor by acting on the internalized image of the latter, activating the “oppressor consciousness” –wanting to be like the oppressor. Praxis can play an important role in solving this contradiction.

Pedagogy of Praxis

Paulo Freire’s pedagogical approach, developed in the North-East of Brazil, and especially in Angicos, can take us some way in this regard. It is an education based on praxis. It is in fact the “Pedagogy of Praxis,” something which somehow echoes, though not deliberately, Gramsci’s “Pedagogy of Praxis.” It is a pedagogy which has “critical distancing” at its core. What is often problematically referred to, in Latin America, as the “Metodo Paulo Freire” is said to capture this sense of critical distancing. What is important, however, for one’s appreciation of Freire’s approach, is the philosophy at the heart of it, rather than the “method” itself. As with all pedagogical approaches, the one advocated and exemplified by

Freire is bound by context. In fact, Freire time and time again argued that one should not refer to his approach as a “method.” What happened in say Angicos cannot be transferred elsewhere cargo style. Putting it differently, and echoing Freire’s words, the experiment cannot be transplanted but must be reinvented. This having been said, a recapitulation of the Freire approach at Angicos brings to light the basic features of an education based on praxis. Quite instructive here is Dennis Goulet’s succinct account of this approach, in his preface to the English version of Freire’s very early writings.

Generative Words and Themes

There was a preliminary phase since any community education project entails one’s getting to know the community involved, the people’s speech patterns, aspirations, preoccupations, and what captures their imagination, among other things. Every community has its own characteristics. Educators were to spend time in the community, probably as part of a team involving target learners themselves who became coresearchers and coeducators in the project, just as the educators became colearners. The collective work involved searching for “generative words” with a focus on their “syllabic richness” and intimate connection to the people’s quotidian experience (Goulet 1973, p. 11). The next stage involved codifying the material gathered into different forms of cultural products, including dramatic representations, photos, drawings, etc. This was meant to enable people, who form part of this culture, to gain critical distance from things that are familiar to them, “extraordinarily re-experiencing the ordinary” as Ira Shor puts it in his *Critical Teaching in Everyday Life*. The ensuing discussion, prompted by “hinge themes,” introduced by the official educator, involved a process of decodification. The group members were helped to recognize the situation as the one in which they live. They were helped to hopefully begin to view it in a different, more critical light, unveiling, in the process, the underlying contradictions of this reality. They were then involved in developing alternative futures, a new codification

through which they intervene in the history-making process affecting their own community and possibly larger ones (Goulet 1973, p. 11).

There are some important points to consider regarding the use of *Praxis* by Freire especially through this pedagogical approach. The borrowing from Marx is there for all to see. It is the people’s material surroundings, and the social relations to which these give rise, that lie at the heart of the raising of their critical consciousness. In *The German Ideology*, Marx and Engels posited:

Consciousness is, therefore, from the very beginning a social product, and remains so as long as men [*sic.*] exist at all. (Marx and Engels 1978, p. 158)

Praxis constitutes the means of understanding the social relationships involved and identifying the possibilities of such awareness for the struggle to generate a climate for radical social change. The point of departure, for Freire, is human beings “in the ‘here and now’.” (Freire 1970, 1993, p. 85).

Conscientização

Secondly, this pedagogical approach involves *conscientização* (Roberts 2000), a concept that is closely linked to that of *praxis*. *Conscientização* has its prominent place in Latin American social thought, including radical religious thinking. Freire acknowledges that it had been employed by Brazilian radicals in the 1960s and identifies Dom Helder Camara, then Bishop of Recife, as the person who helped popularize it. Freire later stopped adopting the term because of its loose usage, devoid of any sense of praxis (Freire 1993, p. 110). He later began to reuse it describing it as the process “of the coming of consciousness” (Freire 1993, p. 110).

Third, there is a connection between praxis, *conscientização*, and literacy. However, the kind of literacy involved is one that transcends that of simply functional literacy. The latter kind of literacy, though sufficiently political in the sense that it allowed subaltern groups, in Brazil at the time, the right to vote, did not allow for praxis. Functional literacy of that type would involve a mechanical

process of learning – devoid of the political act of reflection. It was divorced from the context for radical social change. The kind of politicizing literacy Freire introduced, a literacy-entailing praxis, was called “critical literacy.” The quest for critical literacy, that is, to read and write the word and the world, applies to both the conventionally illiterate and conventionally literate alike. One can read the word but not necessarily read the world while doing so. Others have argued, going beyond Freire, that critical literacy also involves reading and *writing* the world and its construction through various media in a process of critical literacy. The terms critical literacy, *conscientização*, and praxis therefore become inextricably intertwined. Critical literacy, involving praxis, is the process whereby one reads the word and the world with a view, in the revolutionary praxis sense, to transforming it. Parallels with the work of Italian critical educator, don Lorenzo Milani, have been made in this context.

Authentic Dialogue and the Collective Dimension of Learning

Fourth, the process throughout is based on authentic dialogue. The educator, while not being on an equal footing because of his/her authority as educator and in the subject matter being investigated, an authority that, however, does not degenerate into authoritarianism, would be disposed to *relearn* what she or he knows through interaction with the learners. The latter, while learning, also teach, through the insights, often based on their own cultural background experience, they bring to bear on the object of coinvestigation. Freire wrote, in this regard, of “teacher-student” and “students-teachers” (Freire 1970, 1993, p. 80).

Liberatory education is fundamentally a situation where the teacher and the students *both* have to be learners, *both* have to be cognitive subjects, in spite of their being different. This for me is the first test of liberating education, for teachers and students both to be critical agents in the act of knowing. (Freire, in Shor and Freire 1987, p. 33)

Fifth, what emerges from this process is an affirmation of the collective dimension of learning.

There is the recognition here that revolutionary transformation of the world implies a collective, and not a single, effort. Revolutionary praxis is *collective* in nature. Freire argued that one engages in the task of social-justice-oriented transformation in concert with others (Freire 1970, 1993, pp. 85–86). Taking a purely individualistic approach to becoming “human” is mistaken in that it can entail denying others possibilities for reaching the same state. It would entail the dehumanizing process of “having more” (pp. 85–86), all part and parcel of “having” rather than “being.”

Different Contexts for Praxis

The process of *praxis* in his early and most celebrated works, namely, *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* and *Cultural Action for Freedom*, centered around political and communal life in general. In later work, however, when confronted by impoverished communities such as those of Guinea Bissau, then just liberated from Portuguese colonialism, his formulations around *praxis* took on a slant that echoes *Capital* Vol. 1. It also echoes Karl Marx’s advocacy of a “polytechnic education” in the “Geneva Resolution of 1866.” The site of reflection for Freire, in this specific African context, was the world of economic production. Freire argued extensively and prescriptively (at odds with his general philosophy), in Letter 11, that there should be no dichotomy between productive labor and education (Freire 1978).

He even went so far as to argue that educational institutions should not be “distinguished, essentially, from the factory or from the productive activity in the agricultural field” (p. 105), thus echoing Mao, Nyerere (the school-*shamba* as a site for “self-reliance” education), and others who wrote from a “Third World” perspective in this context. This position, which provoked severe criticism, posits a version of praxis characterized by reflection on the world of production. It somehow echoes Ernesto “Che” Guevara’s belief that “praxis (critical, creative, human life-activity) can radically transform men and women into different kinds of being through labor” (von Vacano 2013, p. 484).

Exile as Praxis

Finally, reference was made earlier to Freire's different uses of *Praxis* for an understanding of different situations. Reflecting on his experience of exile in "talking books" with people who were banished externally (Antonio Faundez) or "exiled" internally (imprisoned in Brazil – Frei Betto), Freire even used *praxis* to define these moments. These situations allowed Freire and the two coauthors in question the chance to gain critical distance from the context they knew. They were cut off from action in countries (Chile under Allende, Brazil before the 1964 coup) where a potential social transformation was halted by repressive military takeovers. Freire makes statements to this effect in the 1989 book with Faundez, translated into English as *Learning to Question*, and also in the hitherto nontranslated into English exchange with Ricardo Kotscho and Frei Betto (Carlos Alberto Libanio Cristo). This exchange appears under the book title *Essa Escola Chamada Vida* (The School called Life).

The period of exile constituted a profoundly pedagogical experience for Freire. The same applied to Betto who engaged in drama and other projects within the Brazilian cells; he was twice imprisoned (Betto was a student leader during the military dictatorship period). Conversations with other exiles or prisoners of conscience, or otherwise, served as a form of praxis since they had the potential to generate the knowledge, emotional responses, and reinvigoration necessary to seek to transform Brazilian society once the stressful situation was to come to an end. This was to occur with the *abertura* (opening) in the early 1980s and the promise of democracy, a very fragile democracy at first (Freire was at first skeptical of returning from exile and was persuaded to do so by such friends as Cardinal Paulo Evaristo Arns).

Relearning Changed Context of Origin

For Freire, however, praxis of this type entailed further dialogue and learning on return to the country from which he was banished. He had to

"relearn Brazil" since the context in which he was born and bred had changed considerably throughout the 16-year period of exile. Otherwise, the implication would be that, as a hero welcomed home, he ran the risk of being another agent of "cultural invasion," generating imported ideas which cannot be transplanted in the new, albeit home, context. Engaging in praxis involved constant reflection and relearning on the world of action. In Freire's case, this must have culminated in his having sufficiently relearned Brazil to the extent that he acquired the confidence to assume the post of Education Secretary in the Municipal PT government of São Paulo, when invited to do so by Mayor Erundina. There he reintroduced "praxis" in a manner that allowed the concept to lie at the heart of the "popular public schools" he helped develop, targeted at such children as the "*menino/a* popular" (popular child). He encouraged the "school community" to develop curricula on the basis of "thematic complexes" that arose from investigations of the surrounding environment.

Conclusion

It would be fair to state, by way of conclusion, that Freire's earlier and broader conceptualization of *praxis* is the most enduring interpretation of this term in critical education circles. Ira Shor, Antonia Darder, Henry Giroux, Peter Roberts, Paula Allman, and Peter McLaren frequently use it. The concept also lies at the heart of the radical liberation theology movement in Latin America that inspired and is inspired by Freire. Leonardo and Clodovis Boff described faith as a "liberating praxis," the term Freire himself uses in *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*.

There are those who distinguish between "praxis" or, in some cases, "intellectual praxis" and "revolutionary praxis." The former is said to constitute a case where people might change but the structure of oppression is left intact. This has been a standard critique of Freire. Conscientisation does not necessarily lead to transformation. It might simply lead to adopting an attitude based on critical awareness but this

does not bring about change. Revolutionary praxis entails building on one's continuous critical engagement and awareness to act on the world, possibly even through militant action and violence (as with guerilla warfare in Latin America and elsewhere) to bring about change. One does not preclude the other. Praxis, involving conscientisation, can help create the climate for revolutionary change. In Gramsci's words, every revolution is preceded by an "intense labor of criticism." Otherwise, the material change involved would be simply a top-down development rather than an ongoing revolutionary democratic one; hence the "prefigurative" educational work. Freire's pedagogy of praxis serves this prefigurative work well. As Gramsci postulated, revolutions of different kind, sudden or of very long duration, the latter involving the gradual renegotiation and transformation of relations of hegemony, require a long process of educational and cultural work. The "pedagogy/philosophy of praxis," in the Freirean and Gramscian sense, can potentially play a decisive role in this process.

Cross-References

- [Dewey on Educational Research and the Science of Education](#)
- [Freire's Philosophy and Pedagogy: Humanization and Education](#)

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Pre-disposed Understanding

- [Hermeneutics and Educational Experience](#)

Predisposition

- [Gadamer and the Philosophy of Education](#)

Presence

- [Phenomenology in Education](#)

Pre-verbal

- [Phenomenology, Language, and the Unspoken: The Preverbal Dimension of Children's Experience](#)

Primary School Curriculum to Foster Thinking About Mathematics

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Introduction

Since the Fall of 1993, at the Centre Interdisciplinaire de Recherche sur l'Apprentissage et le Développement en Éducation (CIRADE) of

the Université du Québec at Montréal (UQAM), two mathematicians (Louise Lafortune and Richard Pallascio) and two philosophers (Marie-France Daniel and Pierre Sykes) have collaborated to design and develop a research project involving philosophy, mathematics, and sciences. Previous observations in the classroom had led the researchers to realize that, within the school curriculum, children like some subject matters and dislike others. Most of them usually succeed in arts, physical education, and language arts but many have difficulties in succeeding in mathematics. Why? On the one hand, as Matthew Lipman advocate and colleagues, the school curricula are not sufficiently “meaningful” for children (1980). On the other hand, some studies in the field of mathematics suggest that there are myths and prejudices about mathematics in primary schools and that the school system is partly responsible for this. Indeed, the school system does not invite children to express emotions in class about mathematics nor does it favor creativity. It does not allow dialogue among peers about mathematical concepts and problems nor the construction of mathematical knowledge by the students themselves (Lafortune 1992).

For quite some time, myths and prejudices about teaching and learning mathematics have taken root. Some of these myths and prejudices are as follows: students have to toil and suffer to learn mathematics; every mathematical problem has only one correct answer; there exists one right way to solve a mathematical problem; inherent objectives of teaching and learning mathematics are found in speed and accuracy with computational skills; speed and accuracy are more readily achieved with competition than cooperation; there is no place for discussion in mathematics; logical and rational thinking are the main skills to foster in mathematics – not creativity and intuition; mathematics is very difficult and can be better understood by a few talented students; men and boys are more inclined to succeed in mathematics than women and girls, for males are rational and females are more intuitive and sensitive (Davidson 1980; Lafortune 1990).

Throughout history there have also been myths and prejudices about philosophy. Let us remember that in Plato’s *Republic*, philosophy was a discipline reserved for a male elite, the rest of the community not being wise enough to deal appropriately with this double edge weapon (Book V). In the following 2000 years, philosophical thinking and philosophical discussions have often not been an expression of liberation which reveals the self, but a means of domination by language which shows to those who do not correspond to certain models, that they have good reasons to feel guilt, shame, and fear. In this way, philosophy like mathematics has been a means of domination of certain individuals over others, often of men over women and children. Even today, at the end of the twentieth century, philosophy is mostly restricted to higher education (college and university).

Some of the myths and prejudices which concern philosophy are: philosophy deals only with abstract concepts; philosophy uses particular idioms; philosophy is far from daily concerns; philosophy is dialectic and involves only logical and rational thinking; philosophy excludes intuition and feelings; philosophy always includes debates with effective rhetoric; philosophy is for those who possess mature thinking; and philosophy is not for children (Daniel 1996).

In the face of all these myths and prejudices about mathematics and philosophy, the question arises as to whether there is anything university researchers and curricula designers can do about how students perceive and experience mathematics. We believe there is: based on a different way of thinking about mathematics, as well as a new way of doing philosophy, we seek to invite primary school students to participate in philosophico-mathematical communities of inquiry that will help them tame mathematics, understand better, like them better, and have more pleasure in doing mathematics. In the following pages, we will present the philosophical foundations and epistemological principles inherent to the philosophico-mathematical curriculum we are designing and using in class. We will also

include some excerpts of the material so far written. Finally, we will present some qualitative results of experimentations held in three different primary schools.

The Philosophical Foundations and the Epistemological Principles Inherent to the Philosophico-Mathematical Curriculum

We know that all educative activities, including mathematics, are processes which involve the aptitude to learn as well as the aptitude to teach. Children construct their ideas and attitudes towards mathematics and other subject matters by the means of ideas and attitudes that have been taught to them. This leads us to question various aspects of teaching and learning and to distinguish their roles in the process of apprenticeship.

To Teach Versus to Learn: A Conceptual Distinction

In the constructivist and pragmatist points of view, to learn has to be differentiated from to teach. According to Latin etymology, to teach comes from “*insignere*” (to signal, to let others know) and to learn comes from “*apprehendere*” (to take with). The first term implies that the teachers are the subjects of the educative act, while the second implies that the students themselves are the subjects of the educative act.

To teach carries an ambiguous status: it is situated at the frontier of education and instruction (education being understood as an act from inside and instruction as having an outside cause). In the classroom, teaching is too often related to transmitting, which presupposes that students’ role consist in receiving, memorizing, and understanding rather than creating, inferring, and evaluating (see Gilford in Paré 1977).

To learn might also be ambiguous. In daily language, to learn might be used in its transitive form, and it then involves a subjective act (to gain knowledge of something or acquire skill in some art and to become transformed by it). When used

in its intransitive form, it involves an objective act (to become informed of, or about something by someone). Nevertheless, the Latin etymology of the verb “to learn” (*apprehendere*) reveals its essence, that is, to take with, to assimilate, to become able, to transform the self. Thus, to learn implies a voluntary and conscious act by a person to take the risk to get involved in the development of his or her capabilities (to do, to feel, to think, and to be) in order to improve his or her comprehension of data, of self, of others, and of life.

If to teach and to learn refer to two different aspects of education, we nevertheless believe that these two concepts are not conflicting because, in the classroom context, these concepts are complementary in nature. In the apprenticeship of mathematics for instance, we believe that there must be a part of teaching as well as a part of learning. Yet, we believe that learning has a predominant role to play.

The First Basic Principle of Learning: Learning Is a Process Based on the Reconstruction of Knowledge by the Self

What are the fundamental principles of significant learning? Pragmatists such as John Dewey would answer that a person learns through doubt and uncertainty. As Dewey points out, uncertainty brings about a process of discovery and learning (1916/1983, 1967). Ernest Bayles (1980), recapturing the Deweyan vision of learning, talks about the process of formulation of insights by the self as well as logical organization by the self. Constructivists for their part state that the learning process starts with the self-appropriation of knowledge and with the construction of problems and their possible solutions by the students themselves (Bednarz and Garnier 1989; St-Onge 1992). Following the pragmatist and constructivist perspectives and inspired by the pedagogy of Lipman et al. (1980), we have come to believe, concerning the learning of mathematics, that the teachers’ role should focus on getting children involved in an active process of reconstruction of knowledge rather than giving a problem to students and ask them for the right answer. Indeed, to educate in mathematics should not merely

involve enticing children to give final answers to problems. To educate in mathematics should privilege guidance of children involved in the process of mathematical inquiry (transformation, readjustment, reconstruction, and improvement) (Daniel 1996).

Some traditional pedagogists could ask: “What is there to inquire about by students in mathematics?” We answer that in this model, each step of the problem-solving process could lead to an inquiry or to a construction: construction of the problems inherent to the mathematics problem; construction of the meaning of concepts inherent to a given problem; construction of the possible solutions to a problem; construction of the possibility of transferring the solutions to a problem to other problems and to various life experiences; and construction of one’s strength and character.

The regular application of this pedagogy should have a positive impact on children’s motivation in doing mathematics and also on children’s self-development, because construction by the self can foster, in time, self-development (Davidson 1980; Sharp 1992). Indeed, to learn mathematics does not only mean to acquire knowledge and skills in mathematics but to learn how to improve one’s ways of thinking, feeling, acting, and being (Vincent, quoted by Brossard and Marsolais 1992). This is confirmed by more and more researchers that show that learning mathematics is strongly related to attitudes and emotions (among others: Lafortune 1992). Other researchers are trying to find ways to help teachers foster students’ metacognition (Lafortune and St-Pierre 1994).

Many mathematics teachers and program designers contend, when it comes to teaching mathematics to students, that the teacher must privilege the cognitive aspects of learning rather than the affective or social dimensions (Baruk 1994). We believe that such pedagogical and epistemological points of view lead to the persistence of many myths and prejudices about mathematics in primary school classrooms. Some of these myths and prejudices may be related to comments made by primary school children on mathematics: mathematics is useless in daily life; mathematics

has no relationships with the rest of the curriculum; to succeed in mathematics, one has to find “tricks” and to think fast; mathematics is boring and hard; to succeed in mathematics, one has to be brilliant; the students who succeed well in mathematics are boring; students are not allowed to make mistakes in mathematics; it is a waste of time to try to understand mathematics; girls have to study more than boys to succeed in mathematics; and mathematics teachers know everything (Lafortune 1993).

In the face of such comments on mathematics, we believe it is about time to act towards changing attitudes towards mathematics and suggest the application of new pedagogical models in teaching mathematics. The model we have come to privilege is a constructive model (or some may say an inquiry model).

The Second Basic Principle of Learning: The Intrinsic Motivation to Get Involved

The second principle of significant learning in mathematics is called intrinsic motivation and is referred to in every book by John Dewey on education. For Dewey (1967), there exist two kinds of interests in an activity. The first kind is an interest that is generated by a person towards an activity (intrinsic) and is conducive to having the person succeed in the activity. The second kind of interest stems from an interest proposed by another person towards an activity (extrinsic) and is less conducive to success in the activity. With regard to the intrinsic interest and motivation to learn mathematics, Dewey states (1967) that as soon as studies in mathematics are dissociated from personal interest and their social utility, that is, when mathematics are presented as a mass of technical relationships and formulas, they become abstract and vain for students. It is only when children become intrinsically interested and conscious of mathematics as a means of solving daily problems (as opposed to ends in themselves) that they enjoy playing with numbers, symbols, and formulas. Dewey recognizes the pedagogical and epistemological necessity to take into account the experience of students along with the role played by the self. He recognizes the affective aspect of learning.

Jean Piaget (1962) also lets us recognize the importance of personal interest in learning, by supporting the point of view that students who are interested in learning and are positively encouraged in the classroom, will have more enthusiasm to study and will learn more easily. He states that, for more than half of students, weakness in mathematics is due to affective blocks. Piaget contends that affectivity intervenes in the structures of intelligence, as a source of knowledge and of original cognitive acts (see also Daniel 1992c).

For Mumme and Shepherd (1990), effective communication about mathematics enhances students' comprehension and empowers them as learners. In this sense, and considering the importance of "reflexive dialogue" in class, we believe that each and every student should have the opportunity, within the mathematics class, to share with the rest of the group, elements of his or her constructions regarding various problems. Indeed, there is no need for students to make efforts to answer the teacher's questions if there exists only one good answer and if everyone in the classroom has previously been asked to memorize it (Dewey 1916/1983). Children will be motivated to make efforts to solve mathematical problems, only if they know that their answers can make a difference and be useful to their peers (Bayles 1980; Daniel 1992c). (One can also read: Lefebvre-Pinard 1989; Gilly 1989; Bauersfeld 1980; Blaye 1989a,b).

In order to respect the second principle of learning and foster students' interest in quality dialogue, the novels we are writing are philosophico-mathematical. The stories revolve around open-ended mathematical concepts and problems (such as truth, proof, success, the infinity, figure versus shape) which call for discussion among children. We assume that if children realize that they have the right to propose different answers to such concepts and problems, they will quickly learn to enjoy doing mathematics. They will dissolve affective blocks towards mathematics and replace them by self-confidence and real interest and eventually produce better results in mathematics.

Also, it is fundamental that children come to realize that talent and success in mathematics do not proceed from innate dispositions but rather from making good judgments. And children cannot succeed in making good mathematical judgments unless they continually practice making judgments (Lipman 1991; St-Onge 1992).

It follows then, that children should have the opportunity to communicate and to work with each other in order to understand mathematical problems; that they should have the opportunity to identify the possible solutions to a problem and attempt to submit these solutions to concrete tests. It is through such dynamics that students will become responsible for their learning, that they will realize that they can learn according to their motivation to make efforts at participating to the elaboration of their own instruments of mathematical thinking (Daniel 1992b; Daniel and Lebuis 1993).

The Role of Philosophy in the Development of Mathematical Learning

Usually, students view mathematics as a demanding discipline, where only one right answer is correct (McKnight et al. 1987). Discussions in mathematics class often lack the diversity of thought and originality we strive to develop (English 1993). If learning as involvement of the whole self means anything in learning mathematics, we should privilege the development of reasoning, conceptualization, translating, and researching in the mathematics class.

This brings us to the role of philosophy within the process of learning mathematics. First, let us specify what kind of philosophy is involved here. It is not the philosophy studied in traditional academic settings but rather a practice of philosophy, a "doing" of philosophy which refers to Socrates' maïeutic (Lipman 1988). Doing philosophy to learn about mathematics involves the creation of a philosophico-mathematical community of inquiry where children practice at thinking about mathematics in an autonomous, critical, and creative fashion.

This community of inquiry is a locus where children can search for the meaning of philosophico-mathematical concepts; a locus where they can share their results with their peers in order to construct thinking about mathematics and contribute to their learning of different ways to deal with mathematics.

Conceptualizing

Most children in primary schools use and understand a limited form of language and address concepts in a limited fashion. For instance, if they often talk about truth, they rarely question mathematical truth; if they often ask for proof, they seldom ask for mathematical demonstration; if they often compare the number of stars to the infinite, they rarely talk about infinite numbers; if they often use the word number, they have difficulties understanding the distinction between number and numeral; if they know what a cube is, they do not know the difference between the shape of a cube and its sketch, and so on. This is to say that mathematical language is formed of particular words whose meanings do not always correspond to those in daily language. We agree with Stella Baruk ([Xerox copy](#)) that we should not eliminate these words from students' books but, rather, help children understand the different meanings of these words, according to the different contexts they are used in. In this regard, Baruk wrote a dictionary of mathematics ([1992](#)) to guide students in their search for meanings. We believe that a good way to stimulate this search is to form a philosophico-mathematical community of inquiry in class where students are invited to clarify, together, the meaning of the mathematical words and concepts they are using very often without understanding them well. The community of inquiry enables students to practice at conceptualizing and at relating concepts to their different meanings, while at the same time, to practice at developing language skills through communication with peers.

Training in concept-formation skills is meaningful for primary school students whenever it uses, as a starting point, the concepts usually used and understood by children in their daily language ([Austin 1962](#)). Our philosophico-

mathematical curriculum adopts this starting point by proposing to children stories that depict daily situations. These stories address concepts such as truth, proof, infinite, too much, not enough, part of, and set the stage for children to talk about concepts in a community of inquiry. We believe that if children start to work with concepts that are meaningful to them, they will be interested and motivated to go further in their intellectual exploration and become authentic explorers in philosophico-mathematical language. As Lipman asserts ([1991](#)), if students work with concepts, they observe similarities and differences between two or more concepts, clarify ambiguities inherent to these concepts, establish and formulate relationships between them, explore their implications, and imagine new contexts they might be applied to. In other words, in working with philosophico-mathematical concepts, children learn to think for themselves in the language of mathematics.

To think for oneself in the languages of the different subject matters involves critical and creative thinking, for autonomous thinking implies that a person is able to reflect impartially and objectively about others' discourse – as well as her's or his' (critical). It also implies that a person is able to enrich this same discourse with fresh knowledge, new relationships, and pertinent concepts (creative).

The fostering of critical mathematical thinking could have children realize they are not thinking by themselves when they are merely repeating a series of exercises. It could also have children become less prone to naive scientific creeds and less gullible in the face of pseudoscientific authority claiming discourses of absolute truth. They could be less inclined to forget that most scientific discourses reflect hypotheses which have to be criticized, revised, and modified (one can look at: [Bednarz et al. 1992](#)). The fostering of creative mathematical thinking may help children create new useful concepts to better understand a theory; to discover a formerly unnoticed relation between two elements; to construct useful ordering; to organize the parts of a whole in a different fashion; and so on. According to David Tall ([1991](#)), some of the fundamental ingredients of

mathematical creativity are relational understanding, intuition, imagination, and inspiration. In short, because the fostering of concept-formation skills concerns philosophico-mathematical concepts, it represents more than a mere development of intellectual abilities. It is a global and fundamental education, which encourages students to think critically and creatively about mathematics and which gives them the possibility to articulate the expression of their opinions and contentions concerning personal as well as social or moral problems.

Reasoning

Reasoning and conceptualizing are strongly inter-related. Reasoning is the capacity of organizing different ideas into coherent systems often by means of human language. To do mathematics does not merely mean to get acquainted with the procedures of calculation (Baruk 1994). To do mathematics is a way to imagine the world, to deal with reality, and to reason about problems which are meaningful. When children, within a philosophical community of inquiry about mathematics, sit down and search together for the meanings of a mathematical problem, they develop their reasoning skills because, in order to succeed in their discursive activity, they have to extend the knowledge they already have (in regard with mathematics or with personal experience) through reasoning (Daniel 1994). When students search for meaning, they have to go through different proficiencies in such areas as classification, definition, question-formulation, giving examples and counter-examples, constructing and criticizing analogies, comparing, contrasting, and so on (Lipman 1991) – all proficiencies which are related to the development of reasoning.

Translating or Generalizing

To do philosophy about mathematics also involves and fosters translation skills. This is a high value skill, for to translate means to deal with human language. And as the reality of language is characterized by diversity and plurality, to translate means to deal with ambiguity. As with ambiguity, so with relationships. Actually, the most

basic element of translation skills is found in relationships – in mathematics as well as in other disciplines. As Luis Radford (1992) states, a mathematics problem is never set down in vacuo: it always means a relationship to something. In this sense, to translate implies to establish meaningful relationships between one problem and another, between one solution and another, between one context and another, and between one language and another.

Moreover, we are convinced that mathematical knowledge remains useless for students, unless they are able to transfer it to daily experience in order to improve its quality. Indeed, just as translating skills are fostered through philosophico-mathematical discussion, children will be able to construct their knowledge in other disciplines, to construct their vision of the world, and to construct their own self. In this context, mathematics becomes a way of thinking and a means of communication.

As Michel St-Onge notices (1992), if the teachers first explain to children the solution to problems and then give them exercises related to the solution, children will never exercise translation skills and, consequently, when a real problem occurs, they will not know how to resolve it. Philosophico-mathematical discussions in the classroom exercise translation skills, for it gives students the opportunity to observe, test, construct, and revise mathematical relationships. In this sense, translation is not only an intellectual act but a global behavior: it recognizes the existence of a plurality of modes of reaching truth as well as the necessity to submit any truth to examination.

Inquiring

The last set of cognitive skills do not merely involve the articulation of questions but, also and mainly, the inquiring attitude which implies activities such as: observing, doubting, questioning, seeking reasons, and searching for meaning (Daniel 1992a).

Very young children like to explore and always ask “Why?” But when they grow up they tend to look for clear-cut answers. They tend to put limitations to their inquiry by accepting (receiving) ready-made answers. And schools participate to this process by stressing the importance of clear-

cut answers in addition to the accumulation and memorization of information. As Pallascio contends (1992), average teachers of mathematics will rarely put themselves in a situation of inquiry. If they do, they tend to avoid sharing the difficulties they encounter in inquiry with their students. They tend to hide the process of inquiry and only show the final term (see also Daniel 1992b). Parallel to, it is rare that teachers propose to their students, real mathematical problems whose solutions are really unknown, a problem which is meaningful to students and which allows them to inquire, to invent, and to reconstruct (see also St-Onge 1992). Of course, stored knowledge is indispensable to question the results of research, to continue the exploration, and to inquiry in general (Tall 1991). Yet, to be fully educated in mathematics means to remain thirsty for new ideas and new questioning through the inquiry process.

In the philosophico-mathematical curriculum we are developing, students have to identify causes and effects, parts and wholes, means and ends, and means and consequences just as they have to suggest hypothesis, to formulate problems, to find solutions, and so on. All these mental acts maintain and foster the inquiry attitude.

Summary

In working with a philosophico-mathematical curriculum, primary school students should train in the four varieties of cognitive skills (reasoning skills, concept-formation skills, translation skills, and inquiry skills). They should learn to communicate within a community of inquiry, develop affective and social skills, and eliminate, to one degree or another, some of the myths and prejudices related to mathematics.

The Philosophico-Mathematical Curriculum

The curriculum we are designing includes a philosophico-mathematical novel and a teacher's manual, in keeping with the tradition of *Philosophy for Children*. The novel depicts children's daily life experiences in relation to philosophico-

mathematical concepts and problems. The manual is essentially composed of discussion plans about mathematical concepts and myths, philosophico-mathematical exercises, and mathematical activities. This material will be used in mathematics classes from fourth to sixth grade. The main objective of the curriculum is to foster philosophical discussions among children with regard to mathematical concepts, problems, myths, and prejudices.

Main Ideas

Some of the philosophico-mathematical ideas included in the material are:

- Can a room be a cube or does it only look like a cube?
- Do teachers know everything about geometry?
- Mathematics are useless, boring, difficult, and call for too much work.
- What is a problem?
- The fear of failing.
- Usefulness and uselessness.
- Too much and not enough.
- Abstract versus concrete.
- Is beauty in arts equivalent to beauty in mathematics?
- The necessity of proof and demonstration.
- Can animals think mathematically?
- Is geometry part of mathematics?
- Those who are good in mathematics rarely understand those who have difficulties in it.
- Where does success come from?
- The role of the community of inquiry in the finding of a solution to a problem of mathematics.
- Relationships.
- To guess and to reason.
- To believe.
- To understand mathematical operations and to memorize them.
- The role of intuition in mathematics.
- How can mathematics be useful in the resolution of daily problems?
- Infinite and indefinite.
- Does zero equal nothing?
- Rules, respect of the rules, exceptions to the rules.

- Does truth exist? Does mathematical truth exist?
- Do mathematics exist as an absolute, in the universe, or do they have to be created by human beings to exist?
- Far from; near of.
- Are mathematics a universal language?
- Number and numeral.
- To be a genius in mathematics.

Following the methodology of Philosophy for Children, students read one chapter of the novel by taking turns reading one sentence each. Then they are invited to ask meaningful questions brought about by reading the novel. Discussions on these questions take place within a philosophico-mathematical community of inquiry.

Extracts from the Novel

Matilde enters her bedroom and slams the door behind her. She takes off her shoes, puts her packsack in a corner and throws herself onto her bed. Ah! How GOOD she feels!

Matilde enjoys her bedroom. It is a very small green room, with a square floor.

- Hum! it almost looks like a cube! Isabelle taught us something about the cube this morning, in the geometry class. What was she saying, exactly?

Isabelle's words come gradually to Matilde's mind. While she looks vaguely around her, Matilde wonders:

- Can a room really be a cube or can it only look like a cube? Isabelle told us that it was not possible to see, on earth, a PERFECT cube. This surprises me!

Matilde tries to think about this problem, but she is tired. She gets bogged down in her
(continued)

ideas; she becomes impatient and, finally, says to herself:

- Tomorrow, I will ask Isabelle to clarify this for me. After all, SHE is the teacher! She probably knows everything about geometry.

Matilde's thoughts fly away, released from their mathematical problem. She starts to daydream about her new boyfriend, Mathieu:

- Ah! Mathieu, what a guy!

Everything is now calm and pleasant in Mathilde's room when, suddenly, she sees a big red sphere passing in front of her. Her heart still beating, she recognizes her brother entering her bedroom and who has just thrown his basketball against the wall. What a pest!

- I have a problem, Matilde.
- Really? Well, me too David, and it's YOU!
- No, please, listen to me. I really have a problem. I believe I've failed, once more, a mathematics exam this afternoon.
- Why do you say that, David?
- Because this is what I think, that's all!
- You said: "I BELIEVE I've failed, once more, a mathematics exam." What makes you believe you've failed? Is it your fear to fail or a prediction of failure? Maybe it is something else altogether.
- I don't really know. It is merely an impression.
- But, David, do you at least have good reasons to believe what you say? It is not because you have failed some tests last year, that you will fail them all this year.
- I know, but I hate mathematics!

(continued)

- David, you always repeat to yourself: “I am not good in mathematics; students who are not good in mathematics fail their tests, so I will fail my tests.” With this negative attitude, it is not surprising that you have failures.
- Mathematics are useless. The only thing they really do is provoke stress. And mathematics are so boring; they are difficult and call for too much work at home. I prefer to play ball or to draw. I am excellent in drawing!

After a moment of silence, David adds:

- And that is what I am going to do. I will draw my “Frustrations” in my room. This will be useful.
- Hi! Mathieu. Are you here for David?
- Yeah. Isn’t he ready yet?
- No. He has to clean his room before leaving. Did you have a good time at your party last weekend?
- It was not bad, answers Mathieu. You should have come with your brother! he adds, blushing.
- What do you think? I heard you when you said you were embarrassed to invite me because I’m a “brain” in mathematics.
- It’s not true! You’re all making this up.
- I heard you perfectly well Mathieu! And if I heard you, it’s true.
- Tell me, what is truth anyway? I think it’s just a word that doesn’t mean anything. Truth doesn’t exist.
- How can you say such a thing Mathieu? There are many things that are true and on which we rely every day.
- Like what? Give me an example.
- Well like “The earth is round.” Or “the earth revolves around the sun.”
- But Matilde, don’t you know that a few hundred years ago, everyone believed that the earth was flat?

(continued)

- So?
- So what tells you we won’t believe the earth is oval, a few hundred years from now?
- What’s your point Mathieu?
- What I’m trying to tell you is that what you say is true, that is, “The earth is round” may not be true. In the Middle Ages, the people saying “The earth is flat” were not saying something true.
- Matilde, you’re saying the same thing as I am ! You’re saying that something can be true for certain people and false for others. Like me, you’re saying that truth doesn’t exist.
- I’ll give you another example. Let me think. Here we are: $2 + 2 = 4$. This is always true and everyone agrees about it.
- I’m not so sure Matilde that 2 and 2 have always been equal to 4 or will always be equal to 4.
- You’re kidding!
- No I’m not. Close your eyes and imagine for a moment, that we’re in year 2897.
- O.K. Go on.
- Picture it: strange beings are dressed differently and even look quite different when compared to us.
- What else?
- Keep thinking about these strange beings and try to get into their thoughts, now. Aren’t they different from ours?
- Yes, probably.
- Continue your voyage in their brain, Matilde. Wouldn’t you say their way of calculating is also different from ours?
- Maybe, I don’t know.
- Well, I’m sure it is, Matilde. These beings are so different from us that they must have the need to invent a new way of calculating for them to evolve. I think that it’s quite probable that in year 2897, $2 + 2$ will equal 1 0 0 or something.

(continued)

- I think mathematics are truths that can't change.
- Why? What makes you say that?
- I can't explain it to you, but I know it. I think mathematics exist regardless of what we may think of them.
- I don't get it, Matilde.
- Well, I think that mathematics are truths that already exist in the universe and that humans just need to discover them.
- I think quite the opposite: mathematicians have invented mathematics and since they are human beings, they can make mistakes or change their minds. So for me, there is no mathematical truth.

At this point, David, who was listening in, asks:

- Tell me Mathieu, how and why would humans invent something like mathematics?
- To progress! replies Mathieu.
- Nah, says David. I think that mathematics exist in the universe the same way the stars out there exist. It's the astronomer's or the mathematician's job to discover them.

At this point, Matilde's and David's mother comes in the kitchen intrigued by the conversation she was overhearing from the living-room.

Looking at Matilde and David she says:

- Let's say that mathematics already exist in the universe. Would that mean that mathematicians have never created or invented a mathematics formula? To me that would be impossible.

Before Matilde and David could react, she turned to Mathieu:

- Let's say that mathematics exist in the minds of humans, would that mean that a
- (continued)*

baby would, at birth, possess the ability to calculate? Wouldn't it be strange?

Mathieu was surprised by his friends' mother's question and since he's shy, he chooses to run off:

- I'm sorry Mam, but we have to go. It's already late. Right David?

Back in her room, Matilde whispers:

- I still wonder if truth exists.

Some Reactions from an Experimentation in Three Classrooms

Since February 1994, a qualitative experimentation of the philosophico-mathematical material is carried out in classrooms of three different primary schools. After each class, teachers have to fill out an evaluation form (concerning the novel, the manual, and the discussion). Moreover, each discussion is recorded on audio tape. To this date, we cannot provide an analysis of the discussions. Nevertheless, based on the evaluation forms filled by teachers, we can share the following comments:

- The students are glad to see that David does not like mathematics.
- The students find the novel more interesting and easier to read than what they trained on in Philosophy for Children.
- Children are very helpful in suggesting ways to make discussions more interesting.
- There is a high participation of children to discussions, although relating discussion contents to mathematics is not always fun for some of them. Sometimes they do not want to hear about mathematics.
- Exercises and activities proposed by the manual are useful.
- Sometimes, it is difficult to establish a direct link between the topic of the discussion

proposed by the students and the choice of exercise or activity proposed in the manual. Sometimes, the teachers mention, we are left to adapt or invent, on the spot, an exercise or an activity clearly related to the discussion. It is difficult to succeed at this.

- We should get into more practical activities related to mathematics to help us talk about them.

Conclusion

We believe that to design and apply a curriculum which would foster the philosophical dialogue about mathematics is a significant way to start to tame and to like to learn mathematics. Indeed, we believe that if children do not like mathematics it is because they hardly see their relationship to the daily world or to their own personal problems. A philosophical curriculum has the power to help children establish this relationship, for it is:

1. A tool adapted to children, which talks to them in their own language and about their own difficulties and interests in regard with mathematics
2. A tool that can foster thinking about mathematics, because philosophy contains universal concepts which can be dealt with by children as well as by adults

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Private and Public in European Higher Education

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Synonyms

[Control](#); [Funding](#); [Goods](#); [Ownership](#)

Introduction

The dichotomy public/private has become increasingly crucial in higher education. More precisely, there is a growing pressure to make higher education more private and less public. In many countries, this is also currently the dominant trend.

This aim to increase the level of privatization must be understood in light of the traditional perception of higher education as a public good. The original idea of the university as in terms of universality, i.e., as a community of teachers or students, bears similarities with the notion of higher education as a public good, something held in common to which all contribute and from which all profit. In the Middle Ages, universities formed a trans local community, a network of seats of learning, sanctioned by the Catholic Church. Higher education thus enjoyed a certain degree of independence from local authorities. With the rise of nation states, religious authorities lost most of their power over higher education. From the seventeenth century, and especially from the nineteenth century and onwards, universities became important pillars in the process of nation building and were crucial, not only for forming a national State bureaucracy but also for supplying national literary canons and national histories. Higher education as a private good is of a more recent date, having arisen in conjunction with the expansion of capitalism as an economic system and invoking such concepts as markets, supply and demand, commodities, and profits. The fervor for higher education as a private good has

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accelerated greatly during the last three to four decades and is related to the rise of the global knowledge economy. In this new economy, higher education and research are perceived as crucial assets and a necessary infrastructure for national economies and businesses to be competitive on a global market.

There are a number of processes that aim at supporting and increasing the private dimensions of higher education. At a policy level, the general introduction of neoliberal policy from the late 1970s and early 1980s has had large impact on higher education. This includes a movement toward the privatization of higher education, increasing the number of private institutions and strengthening their position, and augmenting the private funding of higher education, mainly by introducing or raising tuition fees. The latter has become more urgent since the costs for higher education has increased rapidly with the second phase of the massification of higher education (Verger and Charle 2012).

The privatization wave is also closely related to the internationalization of higher education. The influx of international students has increased steadily, and foreign students today account for a substantial section of the enrollments in a number of the most prominent host countries, including the USA, the UK, Australia, Germany, and France. An important vehicle here is the inclusion of higher education in the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) by the World Trade Organization (WTO), which includes cross-border supply (provision of a service at a distance, distance learning, e-learning, etc.), consumption abroad (studies in other countries), commercial presence (branch campuses set up in other countries), and the presence of natural persons (staff teaching abroad) (Robertson et al. 2002). In some countries, such as Denmark and Sweden, international students from outside the EES area are charged full cover tuitions fees, while European and domestic students pay no fees at all. In the UK, the limit of 3000 £ for tuitions fees does not apply to non-European students, making it more profitable to recruit these full fee paying international students rather than other categories of students. A similar development has occurred in

research, where decreased public direct funding and increased private and external funding have created a higher education system that can be described as academic capitalism (Slaughter and Leslie 1997).

Yet another aspect of privatization is the introduction of new public management (NPM) in higher education. In very general terms, this means that management and steering models from the private sector have been implemented in the (traditionally) public sector, including higher education. This implies a focus on accountability, efficiency, transparency, decentralization, and deregulation. It is clear that the market model is presupposed.

Three Dimensions of the Private/Public Divide

The public/private divide of higher education is, of course, manifold and complex (see also Marginson 2007). At least three basic dimensions can be identified. A first dimension relates to the *funding* of higher education. Should it be funded by public or private means? The funding can also be mixed and could differ between student categories, such as national or international students. The *control* of higher education forms a second dimension. Control includes different levels, from the supranational to the national, the regional down to the local, including the individual higher education institutions. The State often functions as the controlling stakeholder but can subsidize a system of higher education including privately controlled seats of learning. A third and more diffuse dimension relates to the *organization* of higher education, which can be more or less inspired by private corporate models and market-driven principles. The three dimensions can go hand in hand. A higher education system with a substantial share of private funding might also have a large private institutional sector and a high degree of market-oriented offerings. Naturally, even other combinations are possible. In the following, European countries will be analyzed according to the three different dimensions.


A Differentiated Public/Private National Landscape in Europe

Starting with the *financial* dimension, European countries differ greatly regarding the extent to which higher education is financed by public means or by private resources. According to figures from OECD for 2012 (see Diagram 1 below), it is clear that, in a European context, public funding dominates, and it is the most crucial source of financing in all countries. There are, however, important differences. Three countries reached over 40% private funding (Portugal, Hungary, and the United Kingdom), and an additional three countries (Russian Federation, Latvia, and Italy) exceed 30%. These can be contrasted to those with 10% and below – implying almost complete public funding – including the five Nordic countries, as well as Austria, Belgium, and Luxembourg. Thus, there seems to be a geographical pattern in the privatization of funding. Eastern, Mediterranean countries, and the UK are more dependent upon private funding, while Central, Western, and Northern European countries tend to be more publicly funded.

From a global perspective, the level of private funding of higher education in Europe stands out as low. Both non-European Anglo-Saxon

countries, such as the USA (62%), Australia (55%), and New Zealand (48%), and Asian countries, such as Japan (66%) and Korea (71%), have higher levels of private funding than the most extreme cases in Europe. It should also be noticed that the UK constitutes an exception in the European context. The OECD data for the UK in 2012 is lower than for the years 2007–2011, when the country had levels of approximately 70%, which is of the same magnitude as the non-European countries mentioned above.

A further differentiation of private funding can be made. Within the category of private sources, household expenditure dominates. There is, however, no clear connection to the level of private funding. Among the countries with a high degree of overall private funding, some, such as Italy, Portugal, and Latvia, have a large proportion of household funding, while the UK and the Netherlands have lower levels of household funding. At the other end of the spectrum, where the total private funding constitutes a low share, the relative weight of the household funding also differs greatly. Within the Nordic countries, household funding stands for almost all the private funding in Iceland and in Norway but is nonexistent in Finland and very low in Sweden.



Private and Public in European Higher Education, Diagram 1 Higher education in European countries 2012. Total private expenditure, household expenditure and rate of students enrolled in private institutions (Source: OECD 2015)

The second dimension, the *control* of higher education, based on student enrollment rates in private institutions, adds to the complexity (see Diagram 1 above). The UK and Latvia, two countries with the highest level of private funding, have 100% and 92% of the students studying at private institutions, whereas the four other countries with the highest level of private funding, Portugal, Hungary, the Russian Federation, and Italy, have only between 9% and 18% of their students in private institutions. Belgium, with 58% of the students in private institutions, has a low level of private funding (10%). There is also a set of countries with a very low level of private funding and relatively high rates of students in private institutions (Iceland, Finland, and Norway).

The evidence thus suggests that there are at least six typical combinations of private funding/private enrollment: high/high (the UK), high/low (Italy), medium-high/high (Estonia), medium-high/low (Ireland), low/high (Finland), and low/low (Denmark). The conclusion to be drawn is that funding and control are two separate dimensions of the public/private relationship in higher education in Europe. In non-European countries, there tends to be a stronger link between a high level of private funding, large share of household expenditure, and a large private sector in these countries in comparison to the European countries. Once again, the European countries stand out as less privatized and with greater variation.

Internal National Differentiations

In addition, there is often a differentiation of public and private enrollment within each national context. In most countries, shorter programs with a focus on practical, technical, or occupational skills for direct entry into the labor market (so-called type B higher education in the OECD statistics) have a larger share of students enrolled in private institutions than largely theoretical programs designed to provide sufficient qualifications for entry into advanced research programs and professions with high skill requirements (type A higher education). For 2012, the national

average for first category was 37% compared to 25% for the latter (OECD 2015).

Also, the typical pattern is that educational institutions primarily oriented towards the private sector, such as business schools or technical colleges, are more often private. In France, for instance, the vast majority of the business schools are private, as compared with 30% of the engineering schools. In Sweden, a country with a low level of privatization in higher education, only three institutions are private: one business school, one technical university, and one regional university college with an international business school.

When analyzing the more precise positions of the institutions within a global field of higher education, European countries differ from the USA, where private institutions dominate the upper echelons. While 22 among the 39 US universities ranked top-hundred by the *Times Higher Education World University Rankings* 2015–2016 are private, the vast majority of European universities in this exclusive group are public. The figures for the Shanghai ranking (*Academic Ranking of World Universities* 2015) are similar: 22 out of 51 US universities among the 100 highest ranked are private, as compared to handful out of 34 European universities. The private dominance in the American context becomes even more obvious when only the top-20 universities are considered: 11 out of 16 are private in the Shanghai ranking, and 12 out of 14 are private in the Times Higher Education ranking.

There is one area of European higher education where private institutions are competitive with public ones: business schools. While the American business schools are often part of larger universities, the European business schools are often institutions in their own right and frequently privately controlled. This is true for the leading French business schools, INSEAD, École des hautes études commerciales de Paris (HEC), and École Supérieure des Sciences Économiques et Commerciales (ESSEC), the leading European school, according to *Financial Times* ranking, the London School of Economics, the highest ranked Italian business school, Bocconi, and the most prestigious Swedish institution, the Stockholm School of Economics.


Increasing Privatization and Expansion

The increase in privatization of higher education should be understood in different contexts. First, it is related to the expansion of higher education, which generally came in two phases. The first occurred after the Second World War and the booming economies of the 1950s and 1960s, when higher education in many countries, in the terminology of Martin Trow (1974), was transformed from elite systems to systems of mass higher education. In the second phase, which stretches from the 1990s and onward, many Western countries entered a system of universal access. Especially this second phase of expansion has been associated with increasing demands for more private financing of higher education. In the OECD's *Education at a Glance*, for instance, it is stated that "More people are participating in a wider range of educational programs offered by increasing numbers of providers than ever before. As a result, the question of who should support an individual's efforts to acquire more education – governments or the individuals

themselves – is becoming increasingly important" (2015, p. 238).

The last 15 years (1998–2012, see Diagram 2 below) also indicate a general growth of private funding in higher education in European countries. Some countries have increased very radically. Portugal has raised its share of private funding from 8% to 46%; Hungary from 23 to 46; the Netherlands from 13 to 29, and the UK from 37 to 70 (in 2011, falling back to 43 in 2012). Many countries have seen moderate expansion: Germany from 8% to 14%; France from 15 to 20; Poland from 17 to 22; and Finland from 3 to 4. Only four countries have negative figures: Spain, Ireland, Belgium, and Norway.

But the link between expansion and privatization is not direct. While the expansion poses questions concerning how to fund higher education, different solutions can be considered. It is possible, for instance, to increase enrollment without raising the funding at the same rate, creating an erosion of resources. Expansion can also occur by the exportation of students. Due to underinvestment in Mediterranean countries such as Greece,



Private and Public in European Higher Education, Diagram 2 Higher education in some European countries. Total private expenditure, 1998–2012 (Source: OECD: *Education at a Glance*, 2000–2015)

Italy, and Spain, many young people from have enrolled in higher education abroad.

Shifting Organizational Patterns

In order to fully comprehend the privatization of higher education, the third dimension relating to the *organization* of higher learning, which can be more or less inspired by private corporate models and market-driven principles, has to be taken into account. Here, profound changes in systems of higher education have occurred which cannot be captured by the statistics referred to above. Many of these changes are orchestrated by supranational organizations (Laval and Weber 2002).

One obvious and far-reaching such transformation is the implementation of the Bologna process in European higher education. The crucial aims of the process are to enhance mobility and employability. This implies the creation of an international market of higher education where it is possible to transfer from one national system to another facilitated by two pillars of the process, the standardization of the educational system in three cycles and the standardization of the credit system. The stress on employability shifts the focus of the higher education system from the cultivation of academic knowledge to the production of manpower for the labor markets.

Yet another crucial change is the introduction of new modes of management in higher education, often referred to as new public management. Guided by principles such as accountability, transparency, efficiency, and decentralization, the goal has been to transform public rule-based bureaucracies to private company-like administrations. A precondition is the market model. Administrative units compete on a market and are compared with each other according to key elements. The model for public administration is transparency, so that clients and customers (students, patients, etc.) can make informed choices. Since funding is often tied to these choices, the system works in the direction of steering funding towards the most efficient and goal-fulfilling units. The issue of how to measure quality, and how and to what

extent it is tied to efficiency, has been a matter of some controversy (Rider and Waluszewski 2015).

Another issue related to the influence of private business models is the deterioration of collegial decision-making and increased concentration of power to management in chain of command structures. This also implies increasing power of external stakeholders in boards of higher education institutions. While these processes are often portrayed as enhancing the autonomy of higher education institutions, by decentralizing central decisions on funding distribution, employment structures, working conditions, etc., from the national level to the local level, a substantial reregulation is occurring. It is far from obvious that this leads to increased autonomy of the professionals, the teachers and the researchers, who seems better protected by national regulation than local feudalism.

Conclusion

Since the 1980s, a general shifting of power relations between public and private dimensions of higher education in Europe has occurred, where the latter has gained momentum at the cost of the former. There has been an increase in funding stemming from private sources, including households, enrollment in private institutions has increased, and organizational models originating from companies and private business have become more widespread in higher education.

If the development is seen in light of Burton Clark's famous tri-polar structure of the coordination of higher education (1983), it is not only the case that many countries have glided from the State-dominated pole towards the market pole, but also that there has been a movement from the professional pole towards the market one, implying that privatization implies loss of professional power.

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Punishment

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The Justifications of Punishment

Analytic philosophy tends to separate the two main philosophical questions concerning punishment – those of meaning and justification. They tend to be separated and treated almost

independently of one another. In this section we will follow this assumption. There are several traditional but opposed justifications of punishment, but, it will be argued*, none fit easily with the punishment of children (Marshall 1984). Here we will look at these traditional justifications, irrespective of whether or not they apply to children.

The *retributive* theory can be traced at least to the Old Testament adage of “an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth.” As the term “retributive” suggests, this involves a demand that punishment involves a paying back by the offender for his *offense*, and this notion of retribution is part of the justification of punishment. If the payment demanded by the Old Testament adage appears harsh and vindictive, the *payment* demanded by modern retributivists may not need to be as strong as that demanded by that adage. But, as the theory’s detractors often adduce, it is a “paying” back and is not concerned about the future behavior of the offender. In modern times, however, the recipient of any retribution has shifted from the victim to the State, though recent discussions on crime and punishment have centered on the plight of the victims of crime and how they personally are to be recompensed. Retribution then is *backward* looking, to the offense, and not forward looking and does little for the victim.

It is almost as if there is a moral accounts book, in which good and evil are entered on each side of the book in credit and debit pages. To keep the moral accounts balanced, the amount of evil brought into the world by a crime can only be alleviated by some credit of good, i.e., retribution or paying back by the offender. The moral accounts book must be kept balanced.

In less stern terms, we can see the retributive theory as holding that offenders need punishment and that justice is served on this account. Some retributivists however hold a stronger position that punishment is intrinsically good, i.e., that it is a good in itself and therefore in need of no further justification.

The *deterrent* theory (sometimes referred to as a utilitarian theory) is the major alternative to retribution as a justification for punishment. Its strengths are to be found in the differences

which it has from retributive theories. While admitting that punishment is essentially an evil, the deterrent theory claims that it is justified because its purpose is to deter the offender, and others, from committing the same or similar offenses in the future. Thus it is *forward* looking and in opposition to the retributive theory which is backward looking. In its forward-looking aspect, it is concerned with the behavior of the offender and with changing that behavior in the future. This is deterrence's strength in my view. At first sight then, this forward-looking aspect may have some attraction for a search for the justification of punishing children.

There are a number of problems associated with the deterrent theory (see, e.g., Acton 1963). First a deterrent theory of justification may also justify the punishment of innocent people so that others might be deterred. Here the objection might be that it is only the guilty who can be punished and that the innocent should not be punished. If this is part of the definition of punishment*, then it would appear that the infliction of pain should be described in some other way, as murder say, or as some other form of unlawful killing. Hence the "punishment" of the innocent cannot be justified as punishment because it is not punishment at all.

But perhaps it is the threat of punishment which deters and not merely punishment per se. First, there is a presupposition that people want to, or are likely to, or are disposed to do *X*. But for many people, the thought, desire, and any plan to do *X* just do not arise. *X* is not the sort of thing in which they engage. Second, in the notion of deterrence, there is an implied threat – if you do *X*, then *Y* will follow. Furthermore the deterrent theory is concerned not just with past offenders but with all people; for the punishment of one offender is meant to be a deterrent to others in that there is a threat for all others which accompanies the actual punishment of a particular offender. But why do we wish or need to threaten people in this manner, at all, especially for those to whom the thought of *X*-ing does not occur? Why do we treat the offender (who may be truly contrite and determined to change his/her ways) and the innocent others in this manner?

Sometimes punishment is said to be justified because it *reforms* people, but usually this putative justification of punishment receives short shrift in the philosophical literature; reform is reform and punishment is punishment. In other words the concepts of punishment and reform are claimed to be logically distinct. Reform implies a serious straying from the path and the need to be redirected, or to redirect oneself considerably. But at first sight this justification of punishment has its attractions.

But if it is meant to be a general justification for punishment, the way in which the legal institution of punishment works, especially in prisons, is hardly conducive to reform. Furthermore reform, as a justification, does not seem to work very well. In order to justify punishment because it reforms, there would need to be greater success with punishment as a reform than seems to be the case in actual fact.

Usually then reform receives short shrift as a justification for punishment. It would be nice if punishment did reform but it doesn't. At best reform is a contingent bonus. Philosophically, reform is reform and is not identical with punishment.

Finally, A. C. Ewing (1929) talks about an educative function of punishment. He argues that punishment helps "din the words in," i.e., that if the rational explanations of why something involves a crime or an intolerable state of affairs are accompanied by some form of punishment, then this may assist in the explanations being understood or accepted. But as Ewing's examples seem to involve the young and their moral education, this account will be discussed elsewhere (consult other section on punishment).

The Legal Model of Punishment

In this section I discuss the legal model of punishment, sometimes known as the Flew-Benn-Hart model after three of its proponents. However there are conceptual problems in the Flew-Benn-Hart model which make its application to children problematic (Marshall 1972, 1975), and the traditional justifications of punishment do not seem to

apply to children either (Marshall 1984). Why there are problems over the meaning of “punishment” and its justification in the case of children will be discussed in another section.

In Anglo-American philosophy of education, the analytic approach dominated for nearly two decades from the early 1960s. The account of punishment offered by philosopher of education R. S. Peters in *Ethics and Education* (1966) is analytic, follows the Flew-Benn-Hart model, and has been accepted, essentially, by a substantial number of analytic philosophers of education. It results however in a number of philosophical paradoxes for talk of the punishment of children. These are caused by taking from general philosophy analytic models of the meaning and justification of punishment in legal and adult cases and applying them to young people. Peters’ work is used to illustrate this general analytic position on punishment, because it is readily available, and has set an important general framework for discussion and debate on the meaning of “punishment” and its legitimization in philosophy of education.

Those philosophers who have been interested in punishment have tended to concentrate upon two major questions, concerned with *meaning* and *justification*. The following questions have almost come to dominate philosophical literature: “what is the meaning of ‘punishment’?” and “how is punishment to be justified?” The selection of papers edited by H. B. Acton in his important collection, *The Philosophy of Punishment* (1963), illustrates this point well. Our concern here is with the first question.

The Anglo-American philosophical literature generally concerns itself with a particular model of punishment. This (legal) model is presented, e.g., by H. L. A. Hart in *Punishment and Responsibility* (1968), as an answer to these questions of meaning and justification. As Hart’s work draws upon earlier work of Antony Flew and Stanley Benn, the model is sometimes referred to as the Flew-Benn-Hart model of punishment. And as it was essentially to be adopted by R. S. Peters in his enormously influential writings on philosophy of education (1966), it might also be referred to here as the Flew-Benn-Hart-Peters model of punishment.

Hart (1968) says that he is merely drawing upon “recent admirable work scattered through . . . philosophical journals.” That Hart specifically added the qualifier “English” to his list of journals need not be of too much concern. If this does represent a certain insularity or philosophical myopia, Hart was probably correct at that time that there was little need to go beyond this literature in English-speaking philosophy (see, in particular, the edited collection by Acton). However, it should be added that he is also writing from within an established legal tradition and with more than merely an analytic methodology as he relates his approach to that of Locke’s discussion of property.

Drawing upon Flew (1954) and Benn (1958), he says that he will define the standard case of the concept of punishment as containing five *necessary* elements or conditions for the correct application of the concept “punishment.” Hart argued that (1968, p. 4 f.):

1. It must involve pain or other consequences normally considered unpleasant.
2. It must be for an offense against legal rules.
3. It must be of an actual or supposed offender for his offense.
4. It must be intentionally administered by human beings other than the offender.
5. It must be imposed and administered by an authority constituted by a legal system against which the offense is committed.

Hart then drew a distinction between standard cases and *substandard* or *secondary* cases. For the accolade of standard to be applied, all five conditions listed above had to be met. Substandard cases were illustrated by the following *cases*, or possibilities: pain or consequences for breaching other than legal rules – here he gives as specific examples, the family and the school; by other than authoritative officials; and unpleasantness or pain imposed deliberately by authorities but upon non-offenders. Hence the paradox for educators over the meaning of “punishment” for how can we talk meaningfully, in more than a substandard sense of the term “punishment” and more than metaphorically, about the punishment of children?

If we accept Hart's position, then the use of "punishment" in relation to young people in home or school is a substandard case of the use of the concept.

This standard account is to be found, essentially, in R. S. Peters' *Ethics and Education* (1966). Peters also adopts Hart's fourfold division of meaningful questions about punishment. These are said to be (Hart 1968, p. 4) questions of *definition*, *justification*, and *distribution*, with the latter divided into questions of *who* should be punished, i.e., *entitlement*, and the *form* and *severity*. Peters, however, sees the first two questions only as being philosophical questions, with the remaining two being the province of jurists and administrators. In effect then, in Peter's account, we have a philosophical division of labor, with the efforts of philosophers directed at the first two questions about punishment – definition and justification – and the relegation of the last two questions to the status of administrative, juridical, or, in Peters' case, educational questions. If Peters' particular account of punishment did not meet with universal approval (see, e.g., Wilson 1971; John Wilson 1977), nevertheless, the model sets the form of the debates that ensued in philosophy of education.

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Queer Theory

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Queer theory originated during the 1980s AIDS crisis and functioned first as a socially and politically mobilizing phrase to fight intensifying homophobia as well as government and medical inaction regarding the disease (Jagose 1996,

pp. 93–94). For Leo Bersani (1995, p. 72), “queer” incorporated “the inextricability of the sexual and the political.” The very concept of “queer,” then, has embedded within it, as Ann Cvetkovich (2003, p. 174) notes, “histories of suffering and resistance,” including the “crucial presence of lesbian activists, so many of whom came to ACT UP with previous political experience and contributed organizing skills.” The theorizing of “queer” has for some threatened to erase that founding lesbian presence, replacing women with a generic abstraction (“queer”), despite the fact “many” of the most prominent queer theorists were “undoubtedly feminist”: queer theory itself was “an interdisciplinary formation . . . developed out of – and continues to be understandable in terms of – feminist knowledges” (Jagose 1996, p. 119).

The publication of Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick’s (1985) *Between Men* may have initiated queer theory as an intellectual discipline, but by the early 1990s, this specialized academic field had become, Annamarie Jagose (1996, p. 109) concludes, a “movement,” even as it was being criticized as white, middle-class, and capitalistic, too attentive to whatever was *au courant* (Jagose 1996, pp. 114–115), even “elitist” and “inaccessible” (Jagose 1996, p. 110). That critique has been repeated, most recently and perhaps most emphatically, by James Penney (2014, p. 1), who has endorsed “a critical return to Marxism and psychoanalysis (Freud and Lacan),” by means of which he advocates “abandon[ing] the exhausted

project of sexuality's politicization." The theorist often credited with inaugurating the phrase "queer theory" – Teresa de Lauretis – famously abandoned it on the grounds that it had been co-opted (Jagose 1996, p. 127). "[N]ormalizing the queer," Judith Butler (1994, p. 21) acknowledged, would be "a sad finish."

Despite demands for its dismantling, contemporary queer theory suggests to Jen Gilbert (2014, p. xxii) "that the study of queerness, at least, pulls people into networks of belonging." So queer theory continues, even intensifies, both in terms of the temperature of its internal debates but its reach as well, now including (as well as informed by) *race* and *education* while referencing *psychoanalysis* as both thematic and methodology. Race, education, and psychoanalysis in queer theory – and its future – are the topics discussed in this entry.

Race

For some, the concept of "queer" had "race" incorporated within it from the outset, if negatively. In "the [homophobic] popular imagination," Richard Dyer (1997, p. 216) recalls, "uncontrolled African heterosexual appetite" combined with "white sexual decadence" to produce the "disease, death, and danger." Homophobia, then, and perhaps not only in the United States, has been informed not only by racism but by misogyny too, since (straight) men loathe detecting in men they demand to see in women (Hocquenghem 1978). Constructed as analogous to an ethnic minority – that is, as a distinct and identifiable population, rather than as a radical potentiality for all – "queer" demands recognition and equal rights within the existing social system (Jagose 1996, p. 61; Warner 1993, p. xxvi). Ironically, given the analogy to a race-based politics, the ethnic model's subject was often "white" (Jagose 1996, p. 62). Despite bell hooks (1994, p. 128) crediting of "feminist and/or queer theory" as enabling "a broader context for discussions of black body politics," Phillip Brian Harper (2005, p. 110) condemned "queer studies [as] unacceptably Euro-American in orientation."

To alter that orientation, E. Patrick Johnson (2005, p. 125) replaced "queer" with "quare" from the African American vernacular in a project of "recapitulation and recuperation" (2005, p. 127). Marlon B. Ross (2005, p. 176) embedded "racial ideology as integral to the invention of homosexual identity," a move inverted by Stokes (2001, p. 188), who insisted that "whiteness" is "itself queer." Black queer studies represented, Walcott (2005, p. 98) explained, "both the edge and the cutting edge of a reinvigorated black studies project" (see also Mercer 1994). Allied with black queer studies was Michael Awkward's (1995, p. 48) theorization of a "black male feminism," "heterosexual" in this theorist's self-positioning (Awkward 1995, p. 56). Is, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (2003, p. 34) asked, "heteronormativity contained within the 'queer'?" These binaries blur in psychoanalytic treatments of gender and sexuality.

Psychoanalysis

On "Planet Queer" (Watney 1996, p. 24) – now relocated online (Bryson 2004) – sexuality is separated from gender, itself, Judith Butler (2004, p. 54) emphasized, "internally unstable . . . transgendered lives are evidence of the breakdown of any lines of causal determinism between sexuality and gender." Not only theorizations of that relationship have been informed by psychoanalysis, so have the relationships among gender studies (Silverman 1992), race (Lane 1998), and education (Britzman 1998; Taubman 2011). Psychoanalysis also informs the most recent rejection of queer theory (Penney 2014).

Queer theory has also rejected psychoanalysis. David Halperin (2009, p. 8) asserts that "sexual subjectivity 'requires' neither psychology or psychoanalysis," as it is "shaped by originary social experiences of rejection and shame, and bristling with impulses to transgression." Halperin (2009, p. 78) asserts that "abjection . . . describes a dynamic social process constitutive of the subjectivity of gay men and other inferiorized groups." Focused on Genet, Halperin (2009, p. 84), underscores its potential: "Humiliation turns into

defiance.” Such “reversals” are, he acknowledges, “miraculous,” especially so, one would add, given that, in Halperin’s view, they occur without “agency,” at least as this term is typically defined (2009, p. 85). Indeed, with its “transformative power” (2009, p. 88), “abjection is not the problem . . . but the solution” (2009, p. 87). “For groups constituted by historical injury,” Love (2007, p. 1) acknowledges, “the challenge is to engage with the past without being destroyed by it.”

Halperin – whose scholarship (see Halperin 1990) is canonical – is almost alone in his repudiation of psychoanalysis in queer theory. Queer theory’s “temporal turn” (Dinshaw 2012, p. 34) is informed by psychoanalytic preoccupations with injury, trauma, and reparation. “Queer history has been an education in absence,” Love (2007, p. 52) reminds, as “the queer past is even more remote, more deeply marked by power’s claw,” claiming that the queer “community [is] not as constituted by a shared set of identity traits, but rather as emerging from a shared experience of social violence” (2007, p. 51). In queer theory, the “quest for history” becomes, Cvetkovich (2003, p. 268) suggests, a “psychic need rather than a science.” Is education also a “psychic need rather than a science”?

Education

Queer theory informs the study and practice of education (see Britzman 1998). The relationship between education and queer theory is, however, an ambivalent one, Gilbert (2014, p. xix) explains, as “sexuality is . . . the source of curiosity . . . so central to learning . . . [but it] also threatens the aims of education,” namely “mastery” and “knowledge” (2014, p. xxiii), themselves defenses, she offers, against “the helplessness that learning introduces.” Such psychoanalytic insight follows others, including Madeleine R. Grumet’s (1988) analysis of women’s complicity in curriculum for patriarchy.

“There can be no education without the charge of sexuality,” Gilbert (2014, p. x) appreciates, as “love, curiosity, and aggression fuel our

engagements with knowledge.” She (2014, p. x) adds: “And yet education – its practices, procedures, rules, structures, and relations – can be undone by the wildness of sexuality.” Gilbert asserts that “sex education is larger than information, affirmation, or prohibition,” as it inevitably addresses “the most intimate aspects of life – love, loss, vulnerability, power, friendship, aggression” (2014, p. 28). Sex education, she emphasizes, “is necessarily entangled in the youth’s efforts to construct a self, find love outside the family, and enjoy a newly adult body” (2014, p. 28). Gilbert concludes with a “manifesto” for a queer sex education (see 2014, pp. 96–100).

Education is embedded in racial sexual politics and psychic life, a psychoanalytic insight that remains obscure, Kobena Mercer (1994, p. 122) appreciates, given humanity’s “stubborn resistance to the recognition of unconscious fantasy as a structuring principle of our social, emotional, and political life.” Given the “existential complexity” of the “lived” experience of “real existing racialized subjects,” Cameron McCarthy (2014, p. 42) and his colleagues conclude, “our research imaginations on race are in sore need of rebooting.” So, perhaps, are our research imaginations on education and queer theory.

Is Its Future Past?

Queer theory represents both a rupture and a “continuity” of “previous gay liberationist and lesbian feminist models” (Jagose 1996, p. 5), liberationist models that began, by one account, among World War II veterans (Bérubé 1990). Queer theory’s history is, however, located centuries earlier (Halperin 1990). Matt Brim (2014, p. 52) cautions that “neither . . . ‘gay’ and ‘queer’ . . . is always accurate [:] the supposed trajectory from the first to the second employs a potentially dangerous teleology of progress and liberation.” Gilbert (2014, p. xvi) acknowledges that “LGBTQ is a fragile construction . . . freighted by a false sense of political unity.” That fragility may provide a point of continuity, as queer theory has claimed to be an antisocial

theory (Bersani 1995), a claim also clear in Edelman's (2004, p. 3) assertion of "resistance" to "the social."

It had been Bersani (1995, p. 32) who cautioned that social recognition and political inclusion could be annihilating; he worried that "gays have been de-gayng themselves in the very process of making themselves visible." Moreover, "once we agreed to be seen," Bersani (1995, p. 12) continued, "we also agree to being policed," a sequence confirmed by contemporary and not only queer concerns over surveillance, security, and privacy in the age of the Internet. In an age of terrorism, others – perhaps most prominently Puar (2007) – assert that queer has been incorporated within nationalist, imperialist, xenophobic, and capitalist complicities, the last allegation made before (see, for instance, Case 2000, p. 31).

Is There a Future for Queer Theory? While Racialization Continues

Including the incorporation of non-North American and mix-raced theorizations of sexual orientation, spatiality, and temporality (see, for instance, Ahmed 2006, pp. 24, 66), the first phase of identity politics may be coming to a close, and not only due to the expansion of the extant "heterosexual" order that gay marriage, the legalized adoption of children, and social inclusion accomplishes. Determined to "wrest sexuality discourse from its various minoritarianisms," Penney aligns the queer with what he terms "a genuinely universal emancipatory struggle beyond the reach of capitalism's complicity with the continuing proliferation and deconstruction of sexual and gender identities" (2014, pp. 1–2; see also Cohen 2005). Pronouncing "queer studies and queer theory are intellectual dead discourses" (2014, p. 3) – "*All the valuable points queer theory has made about human sexuality were previously made by Freud and developed in (aspects of) the psychoanalytic tradition*" (2014, p. 5) – Penney asserts "the strong, if not absolute, determination of sexual identities by economically structured social relations" (2014, p. 4). Can socialism replace sexuality?

That is an old question, and not only theoretically. Almost 50 years ago, Pier Paolo Pasolini proclaimed that homosexual liberation would achieve its own annihilation as, at the same time, he condemned the student rebellions of 1968 as bourgeois violence against the sons of the poor (e.g., the police), asserting – despite his expulsion from the Italian Communist Party – the primacy of the economic, however mediated this domain is, he insisted (after Gramsci) by culture, desire, and religion. Like contemporary queer theorists Heather Love and Carolyn Dinshaw, Pasolini pined for the past; for him too "feeling backward" (Love 2007, p. 4) represented a political protest against the enforced futurism of compulsory capitalism. As Angelo Restivo (2002, pp. 149–150) points out, Pasolini shared with Marcuse a deep distress over how capitalism substituted "lifestyle" for the historicity of "lived experience," thereby making morally mandatory – Pasolini insisted – that "homosexuality remain an alterity." Restivo (2002, p. 150) concludes: "Pasolini remains central to any theorization of 'queerness'."

Does remaining an alterity mean refusing marriage, declining to raise children, disrespecting heterosexist identities? Does it mean the intellectual evacuation of a desolate present wherein queer theory can be imagined *sans* "anti-normativity"? Can the past be reactivated as a psychoanalytic practice in the educational service of working through the present to a future we cannot foresee? Is the future of queer theory in its past?

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Quest for Heroes

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Synonyms

Cult figures; Faith in numbers; Major thinkers;
Role model; Seminal authors

Introduction

The educational science is replete with references, in diverse contexts, to the “great names” and “great figures” of the discipline, and the works

of these luminaries are often dubbed “classics.” These individuals and their writings are an important part of the educational curriculum. They are assigned special significance for having achieved a certain measure of universal validity; their concepts are highly regarded as particularly instructive and inspiring. This entry examines the function of these “classics.” It argues that the quest for heroes is not merely characteristic of a particular historical epoch and not just focused on “great figures” and their ideas but part of the educational discourse.

The Classical Authors: An Overview

Regardless of the specific topic being addressed, authors in education journals like to cite the “great names” in their field, even when this reference lacks specific applicability. In this way, such references often appear to be a form of *name-dropping* to legitimize one’s position or argument. Accordingly, such references to the luminaries of the discipline should not necessarily be understood as an attempt to arrive at objective truth based on the contributions to understanding made by past luminaries, but rather as a mere pedestal on which the author showcases his or her own theoretical or normative preconceptions. The persons accepted into the pantheon of “major thinkers” vary across time and space and are especially contingent on linguistic contexts. Academics in American or British education, for example, considers different authors to be seminal than their French or German counterparts. Furthermore, the established pantheon of classical authors may remain relatively constant within a particular language over time. It is not typical for a classic to be supplanted by another from one day to the next, and, in fact, the loss of seminal status is a relatively rare phenomenon. By contrast, it is much easier to be inducted into the pantheon of classics when new themes, new perspectives, or new questions come along with the need for new heroes. The present *Encyclopedia* clearly has a “classics section,” populated by the names of Gilles Deleuze, John Dewey, Paulo Freire, Martin Heidegger, Friedrich Nietzsche, and Ludwig

Wittgenstein, who have been honored in their own exclusive section. However, the selection leans heavily on the British tradition of analytic philosophy, revealing that the construction of the classics – contrary to the intentions of those who seek to grant them special status – does not truly represent something timeless, but always relates to preferences and interests.

Thus, while one can identify marked differences between traditions based on linguistic contexts, there are some common names that enjoy validity beyond linguistic boundaries. For example, the Genevan philosopher Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778) is included among the classics everywhere and his writings serve as a springboard for diverse educational themes. In the German-speaking world, he is termed the “inventor” of childhood, while in the English-speaking context, his educational writings are read more in the context of citizenship or civic education. Meanwhile, the French language discourse emphasizes his concept of the original state of nature. The situation is similar in the case of Johann Heinrich Pestalozzi (1746–1827), who was also Swiss and is often cited in connection with schooling, teaching, and the education of the poor. Depending on the country in questions, we find that Pestalozzi is remembered in dramatically different ways. In America, Pestalozzi’s name is linked to the notion of the object lesson, an aspect also discussed in German language discourse, but always eclipsed by Pestalozzi’s role as a seminal author in social education. French discourse, in turn, sees his work as a teacher and organizer of schools as an attempt to put Rousseau’s ideas into practice.

There is also a collective canon of pre-eighteenth-century classics that does not vary substantially among the various language domains. Examples of classic figures from this period include the Church Father Augustine (354–430), the Czech educator Jan Amos Comenius (1592–1670), and the English philosopher John Locke (1632–1704). However, during the nineteenth century, the various pathways of the classics begin to separate, and starting from this period, increasing emphasis was placed on heroes native to a given country or language. The

German-speaking world claims as its classic figure the educational policy-maker and “inventor” of the theory of *Bildung* Wilhelm von Humboldt (1767–1835), the theologian and founder of hermeneutics Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768–1834), the founder of the scientific theory of education Johann Friedrich Herbart (1776–1841), the early childhood educator Friedrich Fröbel (1782–1852), and the early fighter for the professionalization of the teaching profession Friedrich Adolph Wilhelm Diesterweg (1790–1866). Among these figures, Herbart and Fröbel gained entry into the English language canon by way of Herbartianism and the Fröbel movement. The English-speaking “great men” of education include the sociologist Herbert Spencer (1820–1903) and the liberal economist John Stuart Mill (1806–1873), but in the German world, they remain mostly marginal figures. The French sociologist Émile Durkheim (1858–1917) is scarcely considered worthy of mention in the German-speaking world, quite the opposite of his seminal position in the French context but in keeping with his position in English language discourse. The early twentieth century also brought forth figures who are canonized as classic figures in a multilingual context, such as John Dewey (1859–1952), Rudolf Steiner (1861–1925), and Maria Montessori (1870–1952), but among them, Dewey represents a relatively newly recognized phenomenon in the German-speaking world. Until the end of the twentieth century, Dewey was about as well known or unknown in the German world as Herbert Spencer or John Stuart Mill, and the pragmatism associated with his name was considered – at least in the first half of the twentieth century – as anathema.

Thus, beyond any particular national or linguistic context, there has clearly been general interest in the construction of classics, but there is no universal principle for the attribution of this function to particular individuals, since this choice is largely dependent on each specific historical context (Horlacher 2014). This entry takes an epistemological perspective on the classics of education, examining the significance and function of those heroic figures whose appearance was

closely linked to the teacher education in the nineteenth century. The primary aim of constructing major thinkers was to provide prospective educators with models. This understanding of the role of the classics and the notion of the history of education associated with it may have changed in recent decades, but at heart, the quest for heroes has not been fundamentally called into question.

Schooling and Teacher Education as Part of the Nation-Building Process and as a Site for the Emergence of Classic Figures

In the eighteenth century, a widespread belief developed in the power of education to resolve current and future social problems (Smeyers and Depaepe 2008). As a result, teachers were no longer viewed as “mere” schoolmasters – that is, just another set of skilled individuals who transmitted particular knowledge or skills – but, instead, were now elevated into moral role models with a broad educational mission. This new functional attribution gave teachers a prominent role in questions of moral orientation, which was previously the exclusive domain of the preacher or the church. This new understanding of the profession meant that the education of future teachers could no longer be limited to introducing them to methodology and didactics through handbooks and procedural manuals; instead, teacher education would have to draw upon broader wellsprings of knowledge. To this end, new teacher training institutions had to be established.

A curriculum for educating teachers developed, linked to various forms of privately organized, nongovernment-certified training programs, and the topical area “history of education” was an important part of this curriculum (Goodson 1988, p. 41). Thus, the history of education including the notion of the classics not only became a matter of interest within education, but because of the public function of teachers, it also became part of the process of nation building. Government-organized and government-financed public schools were seen as the appropriate

instrument for effectively transforming inhabitants into citizens (Tröhler et al. 2011). Such a transformation of the citizen was essential for the success of the “nation-state,” a key organizing concept in Europe in the wake of the Napoleonic wars. It was (and still is) impossible to imagine schools without teachers, and for this reason, the training of teachers meant to embody the desired goal of educating citizens became the object of greater attention.

The belief in role models, which became a major element in the process of professionalizing the educator, was closely linked in the German-speaking world with the concept of *Bildung*, which had developed and became instrumentalized in the field of education around 1800. It was a term that incorporated religious, aesthetic, literary, and ethical concepts (Horlacher 2016). *Bildung* connoted concepts and theories in the teacher education that transcended methodology and didactics, addressing elements of the “personality” and role model function of teachers as well as their national pedagogic, societal, and moral role as educators of the citizenry. *Bildung* thus became part of a type of teacher training that looked beyond the inculcation of traditional educational methods and content. The changed nature of teacher education is demonstrated vividly by the various “histories of education” that arose.

These “histories of education” typically included a description of the national education system, but in large part consisted of biographical descriptions of exemplary educators who were to serve future teachers as role models and moral paradigms. In this respect, the histories drew formally on the medieval tradition of the lives of the saints. The “founder” of this genre was the German geologist Karl Georg von Raumer (1783–1865), who published his *History of Education* in four volumes between 1843 and 1854 based on lectures he had delivered at the universities of Halle and Erlangen. In the foreword to the first volume, he justified the need for such a publication from his personal experiences as a teacher. For Raumer, what mattered most in writing such a “history” was the “ideal of *Bildung*” as well as knowledge about the ways a particular society educated its children imparted its own

educational ideal during a particular epoch. It was also important to introduce the “great educator personalities,” and Raumer made particular use of the biographies of practicing teachers to show how ideas could be implemented in practice. Raumer did not hesitate to take a clear stance on educational practices and candidly railed against the kind of “objective presentation” of the lives and works of these figures that might be pursued by a historian. As Raumer states in the preface to the first volume of his *History*, an objective history would not serve the true goals of his historiography because such objectivity would fail to provide any moral orientation.

Despite its rejection of objectivity, this type of historical writing placed Raumer in the mainstream of the dominant tradition of nineteenth-century European historicism (Beiser 2011). The central focus was on the “great ideas” of the “great men,” who were seen as the crucial actors responsible for “influencing” the course of history (by which they essentially meant political history). It should come as little surprise, then, that the study of history was also regarded as ideal preparation for government service; for here as well, learning from history and learning from role models formed an ideal foundation for training competent civil servants.

This concept was appealing to Raumer – and, along with him, for a number of other authors of “histories of education” or “classics of education,” as they were later called – because by engaging with their histories and learning about the “great educators,” future teachers could confirm and strengthen their moral beliefs. From an international perspective, during the same period, the German States, and especially Prussia, had assumed a pioneering role in developing a professionalized system of teacher training and were respected as such by other nations (Geitz et al. 1995). Not surprisingly, the German model of the “history of education” was also adopted in various other national settings, albeit with adaptations to include those figures from each nation (Rohstock, and Tröhler 2014).

Over the course of the twentieth century, academic historians began to question the personality-centered notion of historiography

and tended to examine the course of history using a structural or social- and cultural-historical approach, as in the Annales School. In the context of discourse history and the linguistic turn, they virtually expelled the subject from historiography, but nevertheless, the figure of the role model remained a dominant mode of thought in the world of education (McCulloch 2011). This is illustrated by educators such as Maria Montessori, John Dewey, Jane Addams, and Paulo Freire, whose works and lives achieved virtually heroic status. These educators had founded their own “schools,” and drawn “pilgrimages” to their workplaces, and their works continue to be cited, although it often remains unclear whether they are merely cited and mined for citations or are actually being read, contextualized, and historicized. Thus, the twentieth century created its own pantheon of new heroic figures of education, and they were not toppled by the theoretical discourse of historiography. Particularly among professional groups engaged in teaching, these figures continued to play an important role just as they had before.

The End of Heroes?

The growing strength of the discipline of psychology during the twentieth century and the associated increase in the influence of empirical educational research dominated by psychology challenged the traditional role of the “history of education” as part of teacher training. The idea of providing normative guidance through role models found itself competing with new scientific discoveries about learning and behavior from controlled experiments in the laboratory or classroom, which were accompanied by the promise to make schools and instruction “better.” The educational profession’s involvement with moral role models receded into the background under this pressure. However, even though the “history of education” became ever more marginalized in the teacher training curriculum, beliefs related to this subject remained alive in educational theory and practice. The theoretical frames of reference in empirical education research are typically based on concepts drawn from

psychology, and these concepts, in turn, often incorporate notions of educational reform without explicitly formulating this connection or its historical contingency. These unquestioned, positively connoted ideals include “child-centered” education, “individualization,” and “self-activation,” along with “happiness” and “participation”; their proponents see no need to contextualize them, since they are postulated as emerging from an ahistorical, psychologically determined nature of the child (Glover, and Ronning 1987).

Against this backdrop, we should also mention the turn to numbers and statistics and, thus, to a putative objectivity, which can be characterized as a search for new heroes to meet the needs of the twenty-first century. Although the generators of numbers and statistics may often regard them as provisional or tentative, offering only limited explanatory power, this has not prevented the public, policy-makers, or even scientists from interpreting them as facts and to a certain extent as the “truth” (Porter 1995). This trend has permeated educational policy debates on how best to run school systems, accompanied by a growing emphasis on evaluation and performance measurements along with faith in the persuasive power of international comparative studies. The findings of these studies were presented in the form of rankings, thereby suggesting that quality or output not only can be quantified but also used internationally to place countries in a certain rank order and that this rank order actually reflected an empirical reality. Concern about whether your country has risen or fell in the rankings of the newest PISA study or whether the position of your university has improved in international rankings now preoccupies a large sector of the public. The magnitude of the public response to the publication of various rankings reveals that despite all political and scientific cautions to the contrary, people have faith in the numbers and statistics associated with them.

Even if the belief in numbers and statistics has not been quite as widespread in the world of teacher training or in certain sectors of the educational sciences as it is in educational policy-making, numbers and statistics have largely taken the place of the educational heroes from the “history of education,” at least in the

curriculum, and have become a kind of “fetish” of the twenty-first century. To some extent, they are also used to promote the normative claims of educational theory and practice, as educators seek clearer guidance and instruction for solving societal problems. Psychological theories come with a certain promise to make teaching and learning “better” or more “effective” and thereby lead to greater happiness.

However, these theories are of limited use to provide normative guidance for individual action in practice. Even in the twenty-first century, meeting this need is left to the roster of luminaries in the “history of education,” and as a result, this canon of figures has become ever wider and more short-lived, if more colorful than it was back in the nineteenth century. In keeping with their reception in the nineteenth century, these heroes are not read as historic figures in their own contexts, but rather as the embodiments of particular educational articles of faith. These articles of faith are regarded as given and not to be questioned by historical research. The question whether educational theory and educational practice can continue to grow and develop despite this restriction or if, instead, the quest for heroes will merely end up presenting the same articles of faith in new packaging can only be answered historically and comparatively. However, the persistence of the educational classics does seem to indicate the limitations of any attempt to squelch the quest for heroes. Heroes are simply too tempting as normative objects of identification within a complex moral and moralizing practice.

Cross-References

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- [Dewey on Teaching and Teacher Education](#)
- [Educational Theorists](#)
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- [Herbart, Johann Friedrich \(1776–1841\)](#)
- [Nation, Nationalism, Curriculum, and the Making of Citizens](#)
- [Overview of Metatheory of Educational Knowledge](#)

- [Quest of Educational Slogans, The](#)
- [Teacher Education at the Intersection of Educational Sciences](#)
- [Wittgenstein as Educator](#)

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Quest of Educational Slogans, The

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Synonyms

Catchword; Emotive expression; Motto; Persuasive language; Saying; Statement

Introduction

The notion of education is “inclusive and imprecise” (Tröhler 2011, p. 1). This circumstance owes less to fuzzy thinking or lack of curiosity than to the phenomenon referred to itself. Learning as well as education involve *invisible* processes. Yet that which cannot be sensed immediately must be structured metaphorically if it is to be understood clearly (Lakoff and Johnson 1980). That said, metaphors still lack a good reputation in the sciences. Even so, they serve as paraphrased usage, as figures of speech in which pictures dominate and terms seldom find use or are lacking entirely. While metaphors have been ascribed an important function since Greek and Roman Antiquity, mainly in poetry and politics or rhetoric, modern theories no longer see metaphors serving a mere ornamental or persuasive function. They are viewed instead as basic elements in order to *recognize* or *understand* phenomena. From this standpoint, science free of metaphors is rather an illusion, and metaphorical theories function as theories of recognition and understanding (Blumenberg 1998).

Slogans – Discourse Battle Cries

Israel Scheffler believed that distinctions within the language of education (see the work of the same name published in 1960) occur clearly between (i) definitions, (ii) educational slogans, and (iii) educational metaphors. From a contemporary standpoint inspired by lingual criticism, it can surely be disputed whether these distinctions can be stringently maintained. Slogans are hardly imaginable without use of metaphors. Such turns of phrase have often spun off slogans and possess an implicitly normative character. Meanwhile, hardly anyone within the realm of education (but conscious at the same time of the historic, social, and political meaning of language and speech) can believe in the idea of definitions that are free of metaphors and slogans.

Naturally the word “slogan” is also a metaphor (see below) as is “education.” Slogans are usually typified by short and punchy sayings or colorful

phrases that persuade or convince people – especially in politics and advertising. So why cannot the notion of education be defined clearly in this way with a well-chosen batch of precise words? One reason, as already mentioned, lies in its all-embracing nature: The notion “includes moral or character education as well as school, continuing, or vocational education and focuses on the subject of education, the child, the pupil, the student, the future citizen, on the stakeholders, parents, the family, or the school” (Tröhler 2011, p. 1). Learning and education are so central to human societies (and especially to modern ones) that they not only touch upon almost all aspects of life but also all citizens who in one function or another have more or less clear (usually normative) notions about learning and education.

This is in no sense an exclusive situation. *All* terms central to society are open to dispute (e.g., identity, morality, justice, civil society, love, responsibility)! The meaning, omnipresence, and normativity of these so-called constructions lead to struggles over power and dominance in discussion: Who can or should define what one ought to understand specifically by education, school, school reform, or lifelong learning? And what consequences result from it? Those who dominate discussion also partially determine how the world should be viewed and which actions and viewpoints are appropriate and legitimate within a historic and sociocultural context. It is usually ignored that one is situated in the realm of the *invisible* and the *imaginary* figures. “Discourses,” according to Ian Parker, “allow us to see things that are not ‘really’ there, (. . .) once an object has been elaborated in a discourse, it is difficult *not* to refer to it as if it were real” (Parker 1992, p. 5).

In this situation, educational slogans gain the greatest social importance. The word “slogan” is traced back to the battle cry of the Scottish clans – thus to rallying calls (of Scottish-Gaelic *sluagh-ghairm*, whereby *sluagh* refers to “army” or “folk” and *ghairm* to “cry”). The expression was replaced by *slogorne* in the sixteenth century, and since the eighteenth century, it has been used in a figurative sense but also metaphorically.

Practical Relevance and Lack of Semantic Precision

There are literally hundreds of educational slogans; a few well-known ones and some less known are mentioned:

“Education is a better safeguard of liberty than a standing army,” “Education is bitter, but the fruit is sweet,” “Education is learning what you didn’t even know you didn’t know,” “Knowledge is power,” “Education is power,” “Education’s purpose is to replace an empty mind with an open one,” “If you think education is expensive, try ignorance,” “Let us reform our schools, and we shall find little need of reform in our prisons,” “No child left behind,” “Without books our kids would be crooks,” “Education is an arsenal, not a horizon,” “Education is what’s left over when all one’s school learning has been forgotten,” “Experience is what you get when you didn’t get what you wanted,” “Lead people, manage things,” “Pedagogy from the child’s point of view,” “Help me to do it myself,” “Just say no,” “Head, heart, hand,” “Learning by doing,” “The child’s right to its own death,” “The child’s right to today,” “Where *Id* was, there *Ego* shall be,” “Pick up the children wherever they are,” “Relationship instead of education,” “From materials to skills,” “From teaching to learning.”

Many of these slogans generate agreement, yet this consensus is often merely broad and shallow. Slogans have “no standard form, and they make no claim either to facilitate discourse or to explain the meanings of terms” (Scheffler 1960, p. 36). The problem with educational slogans, Scheffler already opined at the time, was literal usage (Scheffler 1960, pp. 36–37). Many slogans transform themselves into pedagogical mottos this way. Nonetheless, criticism of slogans’ literal sense naturally does not mean that the slogan or the content implied by it must be rejected, since “one commits no logical error in accepting these criticisms and at the same time applauding the emphasis of the slogan” (p. 41).

The practical relevance of educational slogans lies in attributing an “essentially contested concept.” Essentially contested concepts are “evaluative” because they imply value-judgements. As Garver (1978) emphasized, discussion of an important issue creates various ways to handle the variety of meanings of the key terms in an argument, particularly (i) dogmatic, (ii) skeptical,

and (iii) eclectic ones. These means of dealing are all problematical, since they tend to ontologize the content of a discourse and to omit linguistically and socially critical aspects when analyzing the discussion.

It is only dogmatic to allow but *one* viewpoint or interpretation. It is skeptical (in an exaggerated sense) to dismiss a claim of validity for *all* viewpoints, while it is eclectic and may seem somewhat naïve to view *each* interpretation as containing a *similar degree* of truth of *similar value*. Such positions are all scientifically untenable in the final analysis.

Slogans and Loaded Language

However you want to look at it, educational slogans remain as meaningful as they are problematic: “(…) there is no reason to believe that slogans will be eradicated” (Hare 1986, p. 72). The problematic part is the (conscious) manipulation: “If a slogan exaggerates for effect, there is a danger that other ideas may be ignored or unduly neglected” (p. 72). Nevertheless, one has to admit that even in education there “are certain important goals in education which cannot be adequately captured in terms of specific behaviors” (Hare 1986, p. 82). This insight does not release the educational scholar from using appropriate language. “We should continue to make our objectives as precise as we can, since there is no virtue in being vague” (p. 83). There are many linguistic modes in which educational slogans become problematic and make discourse more cloudy than clarifying: exaggeration, oversimplification, black-and-white thinking, moralization, and emotional argument are important features to steer discourses from the issue at hand. All these modes, as well as others, may be classified as *loaded* with *emotive* language, for they intend to produce specific emotional responses in the audience or reader (Macagno and Walton 2014).

Single words can be “loaded” when they have an evaluative meaning in addition to their descriptive meaning. Often cited are examples such as “beast” (= loaded) instead of “animal” or “weed” (= loaded) instead of plant (=unloaded) to

provide insight. It is admittedly more difficult to recognize that (depending on the context) use of the term “intrinsic motivation” can be classified as loaded language. On one hand, loaded language is not necessarily always manipulative, for it may function solely as expressive language. On the other hand, educational language is full of persuasive terms, off-the-cuff consensus-building “good” words and equally off-the-cuff “bad” words that prompt loathing. These help to transform the vocabularies, the interpretation patterns, and the pedagogical practice itself. Regardless of how we rate such transformations, it can be postulated that developing a repertoire of pedagogical vocabularies belongs to pedagogical education. Sensitivity to moral imagery that reflects a look at their “blind spots” and conveys a focused interest in strategically important figure-background maneuvers within pedagogy’s politically correct and politically incorrect arena for discussion.

Pedagogical language seems somewhat pseudoreligious. It must be understood to a limited degree as an expression of a secularized religion (and theology) (see Osterwalder et al. 2003). How otherwise could one understand the pedagogically meaningful commitment to remain constantly active in combating wickedness, injustice, and misery? Only on this religious basis (without which modern morality is hardly imaginable) can one come to the specific contents, purposes, or goals of completely independent evaluation. This applies either through the voice of God now secularized in the categorical imperative or through another overriding moral principle. Accordingly, “be active” should be good in principle, but “be passive” would almost always be bad; “be committed” or “be involved” would be good in principle, but “be uncommitted” would be bad; “be openly transformative” would always be good, but “remain conservative” rather poor; “change” good, but “stagnation” poor.

An Example: The Admired Term “Active Learning”

The contemporary pedagogical discussion is full of activism rhetoric: *Active learning is good. Open*

learning is also good; the same applies to communal learning, holistic learning, self-regulated learning, and sustainable learning. The combination of these learning forms approximates a magic formula of pedagogical persuasion practice. The example of *active learning* alone tells us what we need to know. Pedagogues as well as education scholars explain this by saying that we should be *actively involved in learning ourselves* (voluntarily if possible and/or out of personal involvement as well as understanding and responsibility).

Helmut Heid (2002, p. 103) sneers with reason over such talk and cites relevant authors (educational psychologists whose names should not be of interest here) according to which: “Children (...) are productive with the greatest probability when they are active in their own learning process,” or they know that “the learning person stands at the center of the learning process,” or according to which learning “without one’s own involvement is not imaginable,” or who also know that “successful learning assumes the active involvement of the learner.”

Heid compares such statements with the following: “Successful drinking presumes that the drinker is involved in his drinking.” (ibid.) So what do we know when we know that we reject learning processes “unanimously” (?) “as an individual” (?), “involuntarily” (?), “uninvolved” (?), and “senselessly”? The presumption suggests that it is not a whole lot. Perhaps a politically correct pedagogy has hardly anything to say in the realm of *educational content* without persuasion adjectives such as “active,” “open,” “communal,” “integral,” “innovative,” “constructive,” “constructivistic,” etc. It obtains its power of suggestion from neglecting the counterparts of contrasted terminology (active-passive, open-closed, communal-individual, integral-fragmented). The contrasts (simply suggested and thus defamatory but not examined) were also quickly revealed to show how lacking this seemingly pedagogical presentation is in substance. Nonetheless, it is effective political rhetoric and that *is* substantial. It is good to be active, committed, and involved – in any case always in the moral and pedagogic realm. Yet the questions *in which direction* the morally demanded

activism, interventionism, and transformation leads us (or should lead us), which goals they actually pursue, and which side effects they could trigger interest amazingly little and are obviously also secondary.

The Good Words and the Bad Words

One used to be on safe ground in democratic and scientific discussions by adopting the viewpoint that socially important concepts are controversial. Think of the term “democracy” itself – or of “rights,” “justice,” “love,” “society,” “the good life,” “moral duty,” as well as “education” and “training.” There is reason for the assumption that:

- It could be important that this dispute continues in democratic settings.
- It sometimes has to do with living with civility with dissent (i.e., nonviolently) and not necessarily forcing a consensual “yes.”
- “Controversial” does not mean “spongy” or “subjective”; in a nutshell, it means we can argue in a coherent manner.

Unfortunately, though, the implied argument represents a quickly formulated *de facto* justification for spongy subjectivism and hence fruitful ground for persuasion and defamation as well.

Thus many pedagogical discourses live from the Manichean division between “good” and “bad” words (as well as corresponding images and marginal connotations). Among the “bad words” are surely “authority,” “obedience,” “power,” “discipline,” “punishment,” “*ex cathedra* teaching” – in part perhaps “virtue” as well and sometimes also “performance,” “exercise,” and (for many pedagogues) even “education,” “good” education is no “typical” education, “good” teachers are not “typical” teachers (cf. Schirlbauer 1996, p. 71). The defamatory words must be adapted by more or less refined terminology avoidance strategies, that is, unless they perform useful services to describe their opponents’ pedagogical thinking or actions. Yet their own positions can be summed up this way: If a teaching concept cannot be renounced, it will be

presented in a vocabulary that hushes up the asymmetry and role complementarity of the teacher relationship. Teachers in many situations become “facilitators of learning,” “accompanists for learning procedures,” and “designers of learning arrangements.” Pupils become “customers,” while parent–child relationships are seen primarily as “partnerships” and “friendships.” And naturally “subordinates” are called “collaborators.” Such labeling of defamed “old” people involved suggesting symmetry between them goes along with promises and hopes that usually cannot be fulfilled or must be disappointed. The pedagogical phenomena lying behind this lose their basic structure by only permitting the “good” words now. These phenomena are rather presented more subtly in their imperative form.

Thus the effort to overcome the so-called pedagogical antinomy between compulsion and freedom – the contradiction of all modern autonomy pedagogy – regularly leads into pedagogical kitsch or pedagogical ideology. At least it leads to use of a “monistic” metaphor (which can be considered the common characteristic of kitsch and ideology). Kant’s famous question on pedagogical antinomy (“How do I cultivate freedom by compelling it?”) cannot be answered free of trouble or contradiction in either the specific education situation or the general theoretical setting – at least not without setting delicate weights. “Overcoming” the contradiction will become possible by:

- One-sided use of metaphors (e.g., using the growth metaphor)
- Emotionalizing the vocabulary (use of persuasive terms) linked with
- Hypertropical distinctions between “good” and “bad” pedagogical actors

Slogans and Persuasion Terms

Persuasive definitions are definitions that are not apt to determine, isolate, or clarify (which would be their task) but rather strive to “convince” by use of emotionally loaded words. In this way they can produce clarity in a more or less direct and polemical manner. This means it involves efforts to

manipulate and direct the outlooks and feelings of those addressed in a certain way. Persuasive definitions really come into play in educational slogans through use of “good” and “bad” words. The clearer the emotional load of the words (in either a positive or negative sense), the more the pedagogical heart will be moved or repulsed. It will also make it more difficult to recognize the strategic use of language. Instead it probably means to stand in especially close accord with the moral reality and the truth. The fact that slogans and persuasive definitions often appear inconspicuously belongs to their variability, strength, and the issue involved. “True slogans, (...), those that have the greatest effect and constitute the greatest danger, are not necessarily the most striking, by any means; true slogans are those that succeed best by concealing their real nature” (Reboul 1979, p. 296). For example, if alternative and private schools are defined by this approach, the slogans stress that they (apparently in contrast to others, notably public schools) “respect the pupils’ personalities at center stage.” If the least possible “extrinsic” motive is promoted but “intrinsic” motives are intensified and satisfied or if schools are understood as “embryonic societies,” children are merely described as “different,” etc., it involves pedagogical slogans in the best case. On one hand, these often receive a high rate of agreement. On the other hand, though, it means nothing at all by definition other than that they possess persuasive power by pseudodefinition.

Transformations of Vocabularies

Important transformations of vocabularies have marked pedagogical thinking during recent decades and hence changed the outlook on pedagogical reality. Educational slogans have played a central role in these processes. Changing vocabularies means changing interpretation patterns, and this in turns means weighing things differently. That is also an invitation to act and react differently, among other things. Some pedagogically important transformations of vocabulary appear to be:

- Transforming the language of virtue into the language of skills (e.g., from wanting to knowing)
- Transforming the language of morality into the language of psychology (e.g., from punishment to therapy)
- Transforming the language of politics into the language of economics (e.g., from citizen to customer)
- Transforming the language of action (the subjects) into the language of behavior (of the behaving creature with needs)

Pedagogical training includes sensitivity to linguistics and language nuances of pedagogical science and interpretation. On one hand, it involves developing a repertoire of pedagogical vocabulary that can denominate practice in the field more diversely rather than giving them clear and narrow meanings. On the other hand, it concerns development of a sensorium that differentiates between pedagogical and lay usage, the “blind spots” and focus areas in both sectors, their strategic figure-background maneuvering between political correctness and incorrectness. This (normative) view is equivalent to the statement about pedagogical training: On one hand, understanding of differing moral principles and their varying slogans. On the other hand, it develops motivation for an appropriate language to describe pedagogical phenomena.

Cross-References

- [Educational Policy](#)
- [Educational Theory](#)

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Questions on the Global Indigenous

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Introduction

The term “indigenous,” an instantly global one, has undoubtedly been incredibly helpful in mobilizing political change. But some more subtle, and nevertheless important, colonizing aspects about the term can be discerned, including its natural tendency to normalize diverse groups. This critique of the term rests in the possibility that global discourses can threaten to be homogenizing if their users are not careful. They may be used tactically and in that sense are merely useful shorthand for a much more complex set of circumstances that simply cannot be accounted for individually; however, the term “indigenous” is also extended to other phenomena, such as “knowledge” and then by implication “science,” and so its reach moves beyond just its own sphere.

What may be at stake here are tensions between individual indigenous people and their innate differences between each other on the one hand and the grander pronouncements that arise in literature about indigenous belief systems and politics on the other. The task of becoming familiar with the hegemony of such globalizing discourses and understanding their potential benefits is a transformatively educational one, insofar as there are both global and local literatures and lived realities to engage with.

Homogenizing Discourses and Indigenous Peoples

Distinct indigenous peoples often have a particular aversion to those labels that group their particular groups together. In New Zealand, for instance, the group that is commonly known as “Maori” today had no name for themselves prior to colonization. This fact led notable Maori academic John Rangihau (1992) to identify that:

These feelings . . . for me are my Tuhoetanga rather than my Maoritanga. My being Maori is absolutely dependent on my history as a Tuhoie person as against being a Maori person. It seems to me there is no such thing as Maoritanga because Maoritanga is an all-inclusive term which embraces all Maori How can I share with the history of Ngati Porou, of Te Arawa, of Waikato I have a faint suspicion that Maoritanga is a term coined by the Pakeha to bring the tribes together. (p. 190)

It is important to note that, despite its convenience, a rigid definition would be problematic given the diversity of the populations who consider themselves indigenous. An equally significant factor is the notion that labeling and defining indigeneity is a predominantly Western idea in its essence. According to both Battiste and HENDERSON (2000) and CORNTASSEL (2003), to define indigeneity is a project that does not entirely coincide with indigenous thought. Rangihau's point is more than just political (although this aspect is important); he is moreover concerned with the consequences of homogenizing languages and terms for the inherent differences of tribal selves. This idea harks back to various traditional beliefs around safeguarding against normalizing and

maintaining difference (Mika and Stewart 2015). A global concept of “indigenous” is hence ontologically problematic as it seeks, from an indigenous metaphysical perspective, to disregard the vibrancy of the links that each individual has to his or her own unique land.

But there are certainly political implications at play here, and they stem in the first instance from issues of defining what indigenous means. Cornassel (2003) writes of the global debate that exists around defining who is indigenous and discusses challenges that range from the notion of peoples’ unlimited self-identification as indigenous to strict standards and requirements to prove one’s indigeneity. However according to Taiaiake and Cornassel (2005):

Indigenous peoples are just that: Indigenous to the lands they inhabit, in contrast to and in contention with [European and other empire-centered] colonial societies. . . . The struggle to survive as distinct peoples on foundations constituted in their unique heritages, attachments to their homelands, and natural ways of life is what is shared by all Indigenous peoples, as well as the fact that their existence is in large part lived as determined acts of survival against colonising states’ efforts to eradicate them culturally, politically and physically. (p. 597)

Subsequently, organizations such as the United Nations and many other indigenous organizations have outlined characteristics rather than a fixed definition to help describe indigenous groups of people. According to organizations such as the Secretariat of the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues (2004), for instance, a few of the key indicators of indigenous groups of people include self-identification, strong connections to their geographical locations, distinct language, culture, practices, and beliefs.

Another key point that makes defining indigenous people problematic is the degree of non-indigenous contact, through integration, colonization, or assimilation that may have been visited on indigenous people. While the huge detriment that indigenous peoples continue to suffer may not necessarily muddy the clarity they have of themselves as “indigenous,” it can nevertheless undermine key facets of their existence. To be able to understand why such a deterioration is occurring in historically robust communities, one

must explore the contribution of colonization to this weakening of the indigenous well-being. The majority of global indigenous communities have experienced some form of integration, assimilation, colonization, or genocide. It is well known that the impact of systematic dispossession of many indigenous peoples from their lands, identities, languages, and cultures has been devastating. Lawson-Te Aho (2013) discusses the intergenerational trauma from this process of dispossession that exists and continues to affect many indigenous groups. In Aotearoa/New Zealand, high youth suicide statistics are linked to the historical trauma from the colonization of the indigenous peoples of the land. She suggests that, to positively influence the historical trauma and the rising suicide statistics in Aotearoa/New Zealand (and potentially other indigenous communities), there must be a redress, a reframing, and a reconstruction of past intergenerational trauma.

Indigenous Knowledge: A Normalizing Phenomenon?

Due to the fraught notion of “indigenous,” it is perhaps no surprise that any derivative of it, such as *indigenous knowledge*, would pose similar difficulties. Again, the issue is not straightforward because it is politically convenient, in the face of colonization, to be able to group vastly different knowledge systems (which may nevertheless share a very like-minded metaphysics); yet, it is also critically important that users of the acronym “IK” retain awareness that those differences do exist. In the New Zealand context, because of a loss of knowledge or at least its gradual withdrawal, Maori have attempted to reclaim their own knowledge alongside politicizing the process. In other words, the reclamation of knowledge is not simply a process of learning what has thus far been hidden; it just as importantly engages with what is presumed not to be Maori knowledge. In more global terms, this can be accounted for by the fact that indigenous knowledge, in the same way as indigenous people themselves, has been hugely undermined. This loss of

indigenous knowledge is a contributing factor that has led to confusion of indigenous identity and dilution of the indigenous cultures.

The impact of colonization to indigenous identity and well-being around the world has only highlighted the interruption and corruption of indigenous knowledge. Indigenous ways of being and knowing are intricately connected to indigenous identity, spiritual knowledge, and education for the well-being of indigenous peoples. Consequently, because of this close relationship of indigenous knowledge to identity, it is important to also clarify the meaning of indigenous knowledge. In relation to this conundrum, Battiste and Henderson (2000) assert that there is no standardized definition of indigenous knowledge because it is intimately connected to its group and hence cannot be moved away from in order to be strictly labeled. Much like the issues of defining indigenous people, it would seem that similar challenges arise with defining indigenous knowledge. Semali and Kincheloe (1999), however, attempt a definition and explain it as being, among other things, localized. A comprehensive explanation was recorded in 1994 by Special Rapporteur Erica-Irene A. Daes in her study titled "Protection of the Heritage of the Indigenous Peoples"; she defines indigenous knowledge as "a complete knowledge system with its own concepts of epistemology, philosophy, and scientific and logic validity" (as cited in Lawson and Bertucci 1996, p. 770). She further determines that the various ceremonies, protocols, initiations, trainings, and practices contained within the specific geological location are vital to interpreting and teaching that very knowledge system. Transmitting and maintaining such knowledge systems, it appears, are a responsibility of the indigenous individuals and communities; further, individuals must refer to the transmission practices that are peculiar to their own language in order to ensure that the integrity of that language's specific and profound meanings is retained.

A currently audible debate is the one that engages with whether indigenous knowledges should be known as "science." It is controversial because it deals immediately with a treasured

discourse of the West. Some recriminations against the term "science" itself can be made as it is so tightly bound up with Western thought; on that basis, it could be considered inappropriate to equate with indigenous knowledge, which tends to keep the world in one piece rather than break it down into its individual components. In that argument, treating indigenous knowledge to the values of science is harmful to the former; additionally, the converse may be true too, to the extent that the pure meaning of science is detracted from when equated with another episteme. This latter point tends to be less relevant to indigenous peoples than the former, because of the indigenous focus on the importance of their own knowledges; however, the two are related inasmuch as they both indicate a deterioration of knowledge, and the phenomenon of knowledge itself is valorized by indigenous peoples. When looked at from that perspective, the deletion of science – however subtle – through the imprint of indigenous knowledge may be more of an issue for indigenous peoples than at first thought.

Indigenous scholarship is, it may be anticipated, divided on this topic, with a somewhat greater measure evidently voting in favor of the equivalence of indigenous knowledge and science. To be sure, there is some credibility to be gained for indigenous knowledge by describing it as science. Many indigenous scholars have thus recommended the broadening of science to include indigenous knowledge, to legitimize and validate this knowledge within dominant science discourses. In this viewpoint, indigenous knowledge can correspond with another term and its concept without sustaining any harm. The arguments here are as much pragmatic as they are theoretical, with scholars maintaining that indigenous communities can accrue a great deal of benefit through calling their knowledge "science." These communities can have access to research funds and medical trials, and they can open their debates up so that their premises are equivalent to those of scientists. In the New Zealand context, Maori have been somewhat undecided; in the Waitangi Tribunal claim that dealt with ownership of cultural and intellectual property, for instance, research was commissioned that cast a wide net

over the issue and that highlighted various views on the topic, resulting in diverse thinking on the area.

In the context of our discussion, though, a problem emerges that a further homogeneity occurs when the two are equated with each other. Not only would local groups of people have been brought under a governing umbrella of “indigenous” but their unique knowledge systems are now understood under the vast but constricting discourse of “science.” There is the risk of a continuing loss of knowledge with the label of “science”; even more insidiously, however, the term “knowledge” may potentially have already achieved this outcome because not all indigenous peoples had a term for conceptualizing the world in terms of the epistemic certainty that the word “knowledge” asks for. If “knowledge” is meant as a more expansive discourse than certainty, then it may not be an issue but rarely is it thought of as a different phenomenon than one of clarity and precision and in that vein it is homogenizing. Moreover, one term for the multifaceted ways that indigenous peoples have of interacting with the world could be an undesirable one, with its tendency to group intuition, experience, spiritual responses to the world, and collective understandings of entities, under the one, potentially restrictive, term.

Decolonization and the Process of Transformation: Understanding the Local, Treating with the Global

Various scholars aim to regain and protect vestiges of traditional knowledge and thinking, others are more intent on analyzing Western coloniality, but they are both essentially counter-colonial approaches. Retaining the local while choosing to engage with the global is one of the most pressing issues facing indigenous peoples, and in all cases – whether assuming a traditionalist voice or a counter-colonial one (or, indeed, both) – indigenous writers on indigeneity are acutely aware of the hegemonic forces at work that militate against the preservation of traditional

and counter-colonial thinking. Writing on decolonization occurs frequently and is broad in nature. Quite fortuitously, the critique that is to govern whether one should utilize the discourse of indigeneity will itself come from both global and local sources. There now exists a good deal of indigenous literature that directly warns against the consequences of being normalized or globalized, but there is equally much that encourages the indigenous self to look beyond tribal territories.

Indigenous authors, in their quest to regain authentic or appropriate indigenous existence, are quick to describe the hegemonic discourses that are firmly entrenched within institutions and other colonial aspects such as media, education, and government. Some authors, such as Deloria (2001), discuss the potential for a global indigenous metaphysics while leaving room for individual differences between the groups. His remarks here comprise a political concern, as they attempt to activate philosophy so that it is relevant in an everyday sense. But local indigenous groups, as Deloria seems to suggest, can be ontologically as well as politically transformed through uses of terms, and “indigenous” is certainly no exception. It is also a transformative act to familiarize oneself with the various theories that deal with the area. Some of these theories, it must be noted, may come from nonindigenous theorists. Deloria’s remarks also urge the indigenous reader to keep at the forefront his or her teachings from their elders (and, we might add here, the younger generations). For him, metaphysics is an institutionally relevant study that lies at the basis of indigenous peoples’ knowledge and oppression generally, but any unmonitored temptation to adopt it at the expense of each group’s discrete knowledge is tempered. There is a learning process at work here that emphasizes the development of skills among each indigenous citizen to assess, among other things, the consequences of accepting the notion of “indigenous” and its various offshoots. The decision to adopt the term, its qualification with “knowledge” and so on, would most likely be a collective one, falling to each indigenous group rather than foisted on it by the individual indigenous person.

Conclusion

The term “indigenous” and its derivatives, such as “indigenous knowledge,” are primarily meant to refer to the politics of diverse groups’ unique lives. It is an extremely controversial label, and so it should come as no surprise that it is tracked with a certain transformative process. This formative nature consists in a schooling up on the literature and the demands and needs of each indigenous group; it also refers to a constraint in rushing to deem a cause to be universal. Indigenous groups risk much by adopting it either in its own right or as a qualifier for other phenomena such as knowledge, but there is also a great deal to be gained – particularly in a political sense – in its use.

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Rancière and Education

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Jacques Rancière (b. 1940) has been prominent among Anglo cultural theorists since the late

1990s. Bringing disparate strands of critique together – aesthetics, politics, literature, and importantly, education – Rancière has since the early 2000s also become influential among educational theorists. Rancière studied philosophy under his mentor, the structuralist/Marxist Louis Althusser, at the École Normal Supérieure in Paris. After publishing *Lire le Capital* with Althusser, however, Rancière turned to denounce Althusser with the publication of *Althusser’s Lesson* (Althusser 1996; Rancière 1974). This latter work reflects on the milieu of student uprisings in 1968 Paris and rejects the pretense of a theorist who guides the masses. In 1999, he joined the philosophy department at the Centre Universitaire de Vincennes, subsequently the University of Paris. He retired from there in 2000, professor emeritus.

Rancière’s work spans the topics of literature, politics, aesthetics, and, significantly, education. It can be said that among the major continental theorists of the post-structuralist, post-Marxist era, Rancière is the first to open up the literary/political/aesthetic trinity with an extensive educational component. Thus, one need not translate his theory *into* education; rather, one can grapple in the mother tongue with the work of a superb theorist who also theorizes education. Rancière’s major works include the following. *The Philosopher and His Poor*, wherein he argues that Western philosophy has, since Plato, defined itself as at odds with laborers (2003). *The Nights of Labour* documents workers’ manifestations in the context

of coming to voice, rather than in the context of following some sort of theoretical orthodoxy (1991b). *The Politics of Aesthetics* describes the aesthetic dimension to reconfiguring human sensibility in order to bring about political acts (2004) and, importantly, Rancière's book on education, *The Ignorant Schoolmaster*, which chronicles the pedagogical adventure, and the educational theory, of Joseph Jacotot (1991a).

In *The Ignorant Schoolmaster*, published in 1987 and translated into English in 1991, Rancière uses the historical figure of the nineteenth-century schoolmaster, Joseph Jacotot, to theorize education and its relation to truth, emancipation, and equality. In this work, the story is told of Jacotot, an exiled French schoolteacher who discovered in 1818 an unconventional teaching platform that spread across Europe. Many considered Jacotot's deviation from instructional norms, as his radically egalitarian pedagogy, dangerous to the social fabric. Jacotot, knowing no Flemish, found himself teaching students whose language he didn't know. Finding success with this "ignorant" method, Jacotot went on to formulate a philosophy of "universal education," the foundation of which was both a linguistic radicality and an epistemological break. "Universal education" was founded on (1) the arbitrariness of language and (2) the separation of will from intelligence.

Jacotot's was a philosophy of "intellectual emancipation" finding great currency among a wide set of educators. As Jacotot professed, one need not teach that which one knows, and one should refrain from knowing what one teaches. Indeed, one must *not* teach what one knows. When one teaches what one knows, there is a "particular inequality that normal pedagogical logic operates" (Bingham and Biesta, p. 4). However, when one teaches that which is unknown to the teacher, "the teacher is first of all a person who speaks to another, who tells stories and returns the authority of knowledge to the poetic condition of all spoken interaction" (Bingham and Biesta, 6). Such a pedagogy would enable even illiterate parents to teach their children how to read and write. It should be noted that *The Ignorant Schoolmaster* is written with a vacillating voice that blurs

the boundaries between Rancière's thought, on the one hand, and the subject matter of Jacotot's teachings and philosophy, on the other. Educational scholars as well as general cultural theorists tend to treat the work as a statement of Rancière's theoretical perspective in spite of this vacillating voice.

Before outlining some of Rancière's major educational contributions, attention to key Rancièrian concepts – ones that inform his overall oeuvre – is warranted. Rancière is an extremely consistent thinker, with the exception, perhaps, of his turnaround with regard to Althusser's thought. Thus, each of Rancière's key concepts serves to elucidate various elements even in works where these concepts are not specifically mentioned. "Police" is Rancière's name for the management of human modes of life, society, and human passions. Rancièrian policing has nothing to do with human beings who are employed by the State, but rather the ordering of what gets to count as discourse and purposeful action. Rancière's "police," writes Eric Méchoulan, "as power practices and social life styles, builds inequalities, but such a construction has to appear natural" (4). The "distribution of the sensible" is a phrase of Rancière's that further clarifies the police order. This distribution "refers to the implicit law governing the sensible order that parcels out places and forms of participation in a common world. . . [it] produces a system of self-evident fact of perception based on the set horizons and modalities of what is visible and audible as well as what can be said, thought, made, or done" (Rancière 2004, p. 85). Whereas the distribution of the sensible offers up modalities of perception, the police order represents an organization of bodies based upon this distribution.

As Rancière writes,

This is what a distribution of the sensible means: a relation between occupations and equipment, between being in a specific space and time, performing specific activities, and being endowed with capacities of seeing, saying, and doing that "fit" those activities. (Rockhill and Whatts, p. 275).

"Dissensus" is Rancière's term for the creation of a fissure within the distribution of the sensible and within the police order. A critical artistic

work, for example, can lead to dissensus when it produces a new perception of the world and creates a commitment to its transformation. “Dissensus,” writes Rancière, “is the demonstration (*manifestation*) of a gap in the sensible itself. . . [It] makes visible that which had no reason to be seen; it places one world in another. . .” (2010, p. 38). Dissensus consists of three parts: the production of sensory inconsistencies, the development of an awareness of these inconsistencies, and then a mobilization of individuals based on these inconsistencies. Central to both Rancière’s educational theory and his political understanding of the police and dissensus is his notion of “subjectification.” “Subjectification” “. . . is the process by which a political subject extracts itself from the dominant categories of identification and classification. By treating a wrong and attempting to implement equality, political subjectification creates a common locus of dispute over those who have no part in the established order” (Rancière 2004, p. 92). Subjectification is the coming into subjectivity of one who has participated in dissensus.

Rancière’s “presumption of equality” and the “arbitrariness of language” are themes of Rancière’s work that have special resonances with education. With regard to the presumption of equality, it is not that all people *are* equal. That is, Rancière does not offer some philosophical, psychological, or political justification for the sameness of all people. Nor does the presumption of equality mean that all people need to be allotted resources in a similar fashion. Thus, the presumption of equality is not an ontological or political claim. It is rather a subjunctive claim, one that sets up a presupposition by which subjects might formulate language and actions by which they participate in politics and prove, through verification, that equality is a fact. The presumption of equality provides a means for a verification of equality. And as Rancière notes,

A verification of equality is an operation which grabs hold of the knot that ties equality to inequality. It handles the knot so as to tip the balance, to enforce the presupposition of equality tied up with the presupposition of inequality and increase its power. (Rockhill and Watts, p. 280).

In constructing an intervention on language, Rancière follows what has become an inevitable path in French theory after the “linguistic turn” (Rorty). Namely, it now seems incumbent on French theorists to offer a unique commentary on, or a usage of, language theory. While Rancière has refused the notion that his work has a theoretical anchor in language theory, he has stated that his thinking grew when, after studying Joseph Jacotot, “I became more sensitive to the fact that words are never definitions of things or states of things but are like weapons exchanged in combat, in dialogue” (Boustinduy). Thus, language is arbitrary. There are no words that are more privileged than others to tell a given story. The philosopher’s words are not any more important than the joiner’s. The sociologist’s words are no more important than the poet’s. The teacher’s words are not any more important than the student’s.

All of the above concepts are discernible, if not explicitly mentioned, in Rancière’s major educational work, *The Ignorant Schoolmaster*. However, this educational work also brings various of its own themes to the fore. Each of these themes constitutes a major educational contribution by a theorist whose work has a uniquely educational dimension.

Rancière Among Educational Theorists

Jacques Rancière, with the publication of *The Ignorant Schoolmaster*, positioned himself as an unprecedented educational theorist. He established an iconoclastic approach to education through his recuperation of Joseph Jacotot. Rancière’s work can be seen in contrast to three prevalent educational perspectives that dominated the twentieth century into the beginning of the twenty-first century. Education has commonly been described in one of three ways. These ways roughly correspond to the traditional, progressive, and critical models of education. As a traditional project, education is conceived as a platform for disseminating a common set of learnings. These learnings will, in turn, enable citizens to share a common language for use in the public sphere. Such learnings may or may not derive from the

experiences of the students since traditional education is not concerned with the private lives that students have had in the past, but with the common knowledge that needs to be fostered so that they can speak with others in the public sphere.

Progressive education shares the same liberalist tendencies of traditional theory, but progressives are more concerned about the bridge to be constructed between private experience and public life. So while the progressive orientation shares the desire to create a common body of knowledge that will enable citizens to communicate in the public sphere, progressives insist that a common body of knowledge can only be understood from the particular experience of each particular person. Thus, one must link private experience to public discourse. Critical education, in turn, considers traditional and progressive models to be lacking. For criticalists, education itself is identified as a tool that has been used by various oppressive interests to foster inequality. Education must be changed so that it no longer serves hegemony. Education must be refashioned so that it no longer impedes democracy, emancipation, and enlightenment.

In contrast to these three views, Rancière offers a divergent alternative. First, Rancière's recuperation of Jacotot is at odds with the traditional figure of a knowledgeable teacher whose role it is to disseminate his or her knowledge. Instead, Rancière's teacher is "ignorant," willingly unknowledgeable about subject matter. Further – and here is where numerous readers of Rancière go astray – Rancière's account has little to do with progressive pedagogy. As Rancière puts it, "The distinction between 'stultification' and 'emancipation' is not a distinction between methods of instruction. It is not a distinction between traditional or authoritarian methods, on one hand, and new or active methods on the other: stultification can and does happen in all kinds of active and modern ways" (Bingham and Biesta, p. 6). And finally, Rancière's contribution is not to be confused with the work of unveiling carried out by critical pedagogy. Rancière is explicitly critical of Pierre Bourdieu's theory of reproduction, "a discourse deriving its authority from the presumed naivete or ignorance of its objects of

study" (Rancière 1991a, xi). Insofar as criticalist education is largely indebted to such notions of reproduction, and to programs by which educators might combat reproduction, Rancière's pedagogical logic is different still from critical pedagogy.

In contrast, Rancière offers an assault on the very notion of educational epistemology. While other paradigms have worked within such an epistemology, Rancière claims that any schooled epistemology is a matter of inequality. He wants to break with "the particular inequality that normal pedagogical logic orchestrates. . ." where instruction normally serves to "split the intellect in two, to consign to the everyday life of students the procedures by which their minds have heretofore learned everything they know" (Bingham and Biesta, p. 4). Rancière insists that knowledge of the teacher must not correspond with knowledge of the student. Instead, the will of the teacher must be matched to the will of the student without their knowledges being commensurated. It is the commensuration of knowledges that leads to knowledge comparisons and student stultification. Only through a de-tethering of knowledge-knowledge comparison can intellectual emancipation obtain.

Having briefly outlined Rancière's key contributions and the distinction between his work and the work of other educational theories, two distinct themes of Rancière's educational work will be detailed: educational emancipation and educational truth. At least since Immanuel Kant's essays 'What is Enlightenment?' and 'On Education,' emancipation has been construed as an Enlightenment goal of education. Schools have been construed as places fostering "man's release from his self-incurred tutelage" and a release from "man's inability to make use of his understanding without the direction of another" (Kant 1992, p. 90). The Enlightenment project of the school has been an effort to bring students to a place of autonomy and rational thinking. However, Rancière's work demonstrates that this Enlightenment project of emancipation is problematic. Emancipation, so construed, is "something that is *done to* somebody" (Bingham and Biesta, p. 30). So while emancipation "is oriented towards equality, independence and freedom, it actually installs

dependency at the very heart of the ‘act’ of emancipation” (Bingham and Biesta, p. 31).

In contrast, Rancière proposes a form of emancipation that is done actively. Rancière notes that “nobody escapes from the social minority save by their own efforts” (2007, p. 48). This form is proposed both in politics and in education. In politics, Rancière documents the emancipation of French workers *by* French workers, “who, in the nineteenth century, created newspapers or associations, wrote poems, or joined utopian groups were claiming the status of fully speaking and thinking beings” (Rancière 2003, p. 219). This sort of political emancipation does not happen with the help of others; it happens at the hands of French workers themselves. Likewise in education, the students of Jacotot do not achieve intellectual emancipation with the help of someone else. Rather, they read, speak, and write French through repetition and verification *on their own*. Intellectual emancipation in education is thus a practice wherein explication no longer takes place. It is a practice where students take up a position as speakers, speakers who have as much right to make sense of the world as any other person, any other explicator who might pretend that students are somehow not equal to the task.

Another significant contribution is Rancière’s educational conception of truth. Once again, Rancière departs from traditional, progressive, and critical models. Each of these dominant models partakes in an Enlightenment orientation toward truth. Each considers truth to be a desirable, attainable goal, one that can be arrived by perfecting the insight of humans through the enlightening process of education. For these dominant models, education is a vehicle by which one arrives at truth. Rancière demonstrates that this Enlightenment model of truth is shored up by the notion that truth needs to be explained in schools. Thus, the Enlightenment model of truth – embraced by dominant educational theory – actually reinforces the notion that education should be explanatory.

Rancière uses language theory and anti-explanatory pedagogy in tandem to posit an educational alternative to Enlightenment truth. That is to say, Rancière demonstrates how truth takes on a

new role when Jacotot’s universal teaching and Jacotot’s thesis on arbitrary language are combined. With regard to language, truth, and Jacotot’s pedagogy, Rancière writes:

Truth is not told. It is whole, and language fragments it; it is necessary, and languages are arbitrary. It was this thesis on the arbitrariness of languages – even more than the proclamation of universal teaching – that made Jacotot’s teaching scandalous. (1991a, p. 60)

Rancière uses Jacotot’s example to demonstrate the fact that truth does not depend on the particular language of a particular expert. No one has a monopoly on explicating truth because truth is not amenable to explication. Whereas explanatory pedagogy assumes that language can be a vehicle toward truth, Rancière reminds us that such a perspective depends on a rather simple, language-as-clear-window paradigm.

Significantly, Rancière demonstrates that the school has become a symbol for the Enlightenment orientation toward truth. The school, as an institution, is posited as a place where people speak with words that are more knowledgeable than the words spoken outside of school. Those knowledgeable words, in turn, are supposed to bring students to truth. This model informs schools, and it also informs society at large. Rancière argues that we now have a “society pedagogicized,” where society itself takes cues from the school as to the availability of truth. Truth is, in general, assumed to be attainable through language because in an era of compulsory schooling, each person learns – in school, early on – that truth can be explained through language in a classroom. Thus, when Rancière and Jacotot insist on the arbitrariness of language, he insists that the school is not a primary place for attaining truth because the language of the teacher is no more privileged than the language of any other person.

Jacques Rancière remains a prolific philosopher. His writings will continue to inform educational philosophy because the themes he raises in the areas of philosophy, social theory, aesthetics, politics, literature, and education remain consistent. His new writings will no doubt to inform his older ones, and his educational import will continue to grow as a result.

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Rancière on Radical Equality and Adult Education

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Universal teaching is above all the universal verification of the similarity of what all the emancipated can do, all those who have decided to think of themselves as people just like everyone else. (Rancière 1991, p. 41)

Synonyms

Democratic education; Dialogical education; Pedagogy of the oppressed

Introduction: Free and Chained

The philosophical strands of adult education are many but in the following I divide them in two. In this division there is “a philosophy of the order” which has usually been “a tamed philosophy.” The tamed philosophers have felt content in the lap of power in examining usually politically neutral and innocuous questions including such themes as active citizenship, which has shown the possibilities of the philosophy of the order: “be active but only within given limits and with given forms.” The philosophy of the order serves the police (police order); it is a philosophy without philosophy. On the other hand, there is “a living philosophy of adult education”: it has been susceptible to the “nonphilosophical” social effects representing an organic – “sparking” or “flaming” – philosophy.

In the following I read Rancière’s work through two traditions of thought: those of living philosophy and critical pedagogy, both of which are anchored to social action and revolutionary practice and to such political thinking as anarchism, syndicalism, communalism, and Marxism. Learning is defined in these critical traditions of education above all as a political, critically reflective action (cf. Brookfield 1995), a change in meaning perspectives (Mezirow 1995), or a revolutionary praxis (Freire 2005). In terms of learning, revolution can be defined using Ian Parker’s (2007, p. 148) words as “an opportunity for discovering new ways of living, of bringing to the fore aspects of human creativity and hope that are usually suppressed.” Along these lines, the social criticism and promotion of the political change are central features of radical education besides critical research and reflecting teaching (see also Lawson 1996, p. 142).

Living philosophy of adult education is not restricted only to big leaders or to trendsetters and to their effects, which have been conveyed, but refers to the ordinary people’s existence as bodily and experiential beings reflecting their active being in the world: this may be forgotten in an apparently learned but often unlearned academic name-dropping of the philosophy of the order. The living philosophy of adult education

is based on an ontological fact, which states that “there is only one human species and only one nature related to the flesh and skeleton, and to the bones and skin as long as at least a modest breath moves the beings. The truth about the human being is her own living body” (Onfray 2004, p. 34). On the other hand, the living philosophy of education (or a philosophy of the first person) respects peoples’ experiences, their own voice, and points of view. This means that all their experiences, including thinking and feeling, willing and loving, and believing and hoping, are taken seriously as starting points for the rigor critical analysis of the current condition. But as Billington (2003, pp. 318–319) reminds us, it is often forgotten especially in the Western philosophy of education. (In the middle of the 1990s, K. H. Lawson (1996, p. 144) estimated that philosophies of adult education have usually had only a marginal position in the research area. However, the situation has improved during the early years of the new millennia at least (see Elias and Merriam 2005, p. 5). These remarks must apply to the academic philosophy of the adult education only because the living philosophy of the adult education has had tremendous effects in the adult world for ages. As Finnish Professor of Adult Education Kari E. Nurmi (2002) once stated, the history of adult education consists of both occidental and oriental thinkers and founders of various traditions from Aristotle to Plato and from Socrates to Democritus, Gautama Siddhartha, and Kung Fu-Tse. These founding figures have provided inspiration to later-day thinkers such as Nikolai F. S. Grundtvig, Kurt Lewin, Jane Addams, Frederick Taylor, and Antonio Gramsci; these and many others have justified, though from different ideological standpoints, the practices of adult learning needed in the overall development of the society. In addition to the ones that have been mentioned, other names could be presented from Martin Buber and Malcolm Knowles to Paulo Freire as the central players of the field of adult education theory. Furthermore, many others also could be named: Desmond Tutu, Malcolm X, Jesus, Martin Luther King, Che Guevara, Mother Teresa, etc. (see also Willis 2007).)

The traditions of the living philosophy and critical pedagogy offer a ground to study French

philosopher Jacques Rancière’s idea of a radical equality. In his book entitled *The Ignorant Schoolmaster* (1991) (originally published in French as *Le Maître Ignorant* in 1987), he presents his critique of critical educational theory leading to emancipatory learning, and aiming at radically equal society, Rancière has radicalized the educational thinking of the Enlightenment with a claim that equality is a foundation both for the democratic politics and democratic education and not their objective or ideal end result. He also has examined such educational culture which is based on self-learning (or self-education) without external authorities. According to this rationale, *one can teach what one does not know*. This obscure thought Rancière has adopted from the private thinker Joseph Jacotot who lived in France and the Netherlands in the years 1770–1830 developing what was then called as “universal” or “panecastic” teaching method. This idea of teaching what one does not know serves as a cornerstone of Rancière’s suggestion of radical equality.

The philosophical foundations of “universal,” or more appropriately, an emancipatory method, are in close resemblance to the ideas criticizing both liberal democracies and State-based schooling systems as watered forms of equality. Rancière instead emphasizes the ordinary people’s possibilities to function as social subjects and maintains the significance of self-learning to reach humanity through radical equality. In this respect, his thinking is useful in reflecting the functions of the individual in the history of civilization, the roles of expertise in society, the meaning of politics and democracy, and the preconditions for the economic, political, and social change. In addition Rancière’s thinking is of special interest to those concerned in the relation between forms of education in terms of transformative and revolutionary change in an equal society.

Who’s Jacques Rancière?

Jacques Rancière (born in 1940) was a star pupil of philosopher Louis Althusser during the first

half of the 1960s in Ecole Normal Supérieure in rue d'Ulm, Paris. But in the end of the decade, he made a sharp intellectual distinction with his teacher accusing Althusserians of their structuralism, which, as Rancière claims, tends to serve the power elite only (Hewlett 2007, p. 84). According to Rancière's critique, Althusser underestimated the significance of the individual in the political and social change, collapsed to the elitism in trying to make a difference between scientific and other conceptualizations of Marxism and in claiming that the educational process is based on absolute inequality of knowledge and ignorance (ibid., p. 93).

Although it is hard to pigeonhole Rancière's intellectual work, it is fair to say that it is connected to the rich and turbulent traditions of French Marxism, existentialism, phenomenology, and hermeneutics (Dillon 2005, p. 430; Hewlett 2007). In his academic career, Rancière served in the University VIII of Paris in 1969–2000, his last 10 years as Professor of Aesthetics and Politics of actions. He got his own political education as part of the long 1960s and as a consequence of the events in Paris in May 1968. The communists' groups departed and Rancière ended up in the party fraction (*Gauche Prolétarienne*) whose members emphasized revolutionary action instead of theory in the times of political uprising. Among the members were Jean-Paul Sartre and Michel Foucault who tried to get rid of the Leninist-type vanguardism and to abolish the division between intellectuals and workers and intellectual and manual labor. Their ultimate objective was students', intellectuals', and workers' alliance and a united battlefield against conservatism and reformist politics (Reid 1989, pp. xvi–xvii).

There is at least three distinct periods in Rancière's work. After the influence of Althusser, he first concentrated on historical studies and then devoted himself to social and political philosophy. The political philosophy has later been connected to the philosophic analysis of aesthetics and the media. These research subjects are motivated by the interest in the questions of social and political control and their relation to the concept of emancipation. Rancière believes it is not a philosopher's task to give voice to the silent and

oppressed but to add her own voice into other voices: more than to interpret and write a theory, a philosopher's duty is to hear and listen. And this way a philosopher helps voices to echo and adds power of the silenced (ibid., p. 137; Hewlett 2007).

As Jean-Philippe Deranty (ibid., p. 136) puts it, "Rancière was out of place in the 70s, when Althusser's brand of Marxism was the official dogma of French intelligentsia. He was out of place in the 80s, when the utopian moment was weeded out of political philosophy. He is out of place today with his neo-Hegelian aesthetics and his reading of literature focused on proletarian emancipation." Initially, Rancière had been impressed from Marx but later distanced himself from Marx's core ideas; he is an existentialist but has given up the concept of the self-assertion, a postmodern theoretician who judges the language philosophy of Jean-Jacques Lyotard, a student of the social order who reacts critically to Michel Foucault's definition of power, a sociologist and historian interested in the misery of the world but critical toward Pierre Bourdieu's interpretations of the theme, a theorist of the confession rejecting the concept of understanding, and an expert on Gilles Deleuze whose political thinking is however geared around the notion of the subject (Deranty 2003, p. 136).

First and foremost, Rancière is a theorist of political philosophy and equality to whom the central question seems to be "the absent presence of the equality." To him no social order neither guarantees nor creates equality; it cannot be required either. According to Rancière, equality is an origin for political and other action, not the other way around, since equality is always practiced and verified in social practices (Dillon 2005, pp. 430–431). This way it is possible to understand Rancière's interest in educational processes and teaching methods as democratic exercise of power. The school is an establishing "transmission force" of the individuals and the political system in the modern societies. Its definitiveness is concealed in its ability to appear in the disguise of democracy (Rancière 1995, p. 52). The school presents itself as the level honoring form of democracy, although it serves capitalism as a

diploma mill and an examination automat. It has been celebrated as the ultimate apparatus of equality with its meritocratic possibilities, but for Rancière this does not meet the demands of the radical equality. (On meritocracy and its history of ideologies (see Goldthorpe 1997); problems and critique of such concepts as potential capability and talent often used in the meritocratic language (see Sennett 2007, pp. 99–122).)

Critique of the System Logic of Education and Radical Equality

The equality of social and educational possibilities has often been considered as the general objectives in the theory of the critical theory and critical pedagogy (see McLaren and Kincheloe 2007). These objectives have been striven for with different welfare political means such as progressive taxation, universal health care, social security, publicly funded schools, and so on. “One of the real achievements of modern society is to remove the opposition between *mass* and *mental*. Educational institutions have improved standards of numeracy and literacy on a scale which the Victorians could not have imagined,” writes sociologist Richard Sennett (2007, p. 85). Even though the social mobility has risen steadily, the sociologists of education have however noticed that the objective of the social and educational equality has been achieved only partly even in the wealthy West.

A vast array of analysis of the educational inequality has been presented; probably the best known among them is sociologist Pierre Bourdieu’s theory of reproduction. It states that the production and reproduction of social relations takes place in the area of formal and informal education; especially, it is the core function of the schooling system. According to the theory of reproduction, the education maintains the existing social order and individual differences. Even with new political correction movements, it has not been possible to remove different learning obstacles and to weed educational or other so-called disadvantages. One should keep in mind that these anomalies – unequal opportunities, dropping out

phenomenon, and disadvantages of various sorts – are qualities of capitalism and its schooling system; in other words, they are social issues, not individual problems (as C. W. Mills once taught us). Furthermore, the social and educational problems caused by the global supply of labor (“race to the bottom” as capitalism looks for labor wherever labor is cheapest), by automation, and by the management of aging have arisen in modern societies; together they have caused what have been labeled as “the fear of uselessness” (Sennett 2007, pp. 86–103). Massive school and social bureaucracy and respective “governmentality” have been founded to take care of the social ill, guaranteeing political consensus and taming dissidence.

However, in Rancière’s view of radical inequality, these analyses presented by the benevolent educational sociologists and their suggestions for corrective actions in educational policy are wrong and inadequate in reaching radical equality. In the pursuit of radical equality, one must grasp the roots of the problem (“and the root of the human being is a human being itself,” as Marx maintained) without trusting too much to the fact that the system would carry out equality for all. In this instance, this “grasping the roots” means among other things theoretical work around the notions of equality and empirical work in the participating institutions of socialization. Radical equality is based on the announcement of everyone’s similarity and everyone’s ability to voluntary thinking. As Rancière (1991, p. 41) puts it: “Universal teaching is above all the universal verification of the similarity of what all the emancipated can do, all those who have decided to think of themselves as people just like everyone else.”

From the beginning of the 1970s, Rancière has criticized Bourdieu’s reproduction thesis and its application in educational policy making. In his opinion, Bourdieu has built an idea of the intellectual aristocracy, of “sociology kings,” who always know the people’s matters and their life situations better than themselves. In its determinism, Bourdieu’s sociology of education thus presents “the philosophy of the police order” serving the dominating power whose representatives do not even hear the ordinary people’s voice but

consider it as meaningless nonsense (Hewlett 2007, pp. 90, 91–97), but on the other hand, one can claim that Rancière has used Bourdieu as a stroll man in developing his own points of view. (For this reason, Rancière does not warm from liberal ideas or formal political theories emphasizing status quo because they are too context free and stress too much a dialogue without social status and differences in the level of education (see Hewlett 2007, pp. 96–97). The issues of equality, fairness, and freedom cannot be reduced to an equal ideal communication because ideal communication does not exist.)

According to the criticism, Bourdieu assumes that people are more or less ignorant; people from the working class will be excluded from the educational system just because they do not realize or are not aware of the real reasons for the exclusion. This ignorance, in turn, is a structural consequence of the apparently democratic capitalist system, which closes them out in the first place. In Bourdieu's thinking, the system stays erect because people do not realize its proper functions and because it reproduces its own existence by staying unrecognized again and again within its own processes (Ross 1991, pp. xi–xii). However, Rancière does not want to sign or accept this circle logic of reasoning but stresses that the matters are as they are, and remain unchanged, partly because of these so-called social facts. In other words, Rancière wants educational sociologist to be more than neutral observers and gatherers of social facts; they should not only explain but also change the world of education.

In other words, they should try to be more critical and abandon their God's eye view and technically detailed analysis legitimating their own expertise and leaving the real sufferings of the world untouched and intact. Furthermore, they should reject their will to power, or as Rancière (1995, p. 52) remarks, their lasting hunger to "win every round." Probably, this critical position against the fellow philosophers and sociologists dealing with educational issues is among the reasons why Rancière once got interested in Joseph Jacotot's "intellectual adventure" and his suggestion that humanity could be better off without State-governed schooling system. In Rancière's

thinking, the deschooled world without teachers, who always know better than their pupils, that is, the world in which teachers and pupils alike can learn together and every participant's contribution is important and valued, is something to reach for.

Rancière has also made his case against the reformist, social democratic left, and its views on educational equality and equal opportunities. The reformist left has used Bourdieu's notions in watering the possibilities of the radical equality and creating new educational reform after reform, building all sorts of helping systems for the marginalized and unfortunate and special education for the disabled. In the words of Rancière, the reformist system of apparent equal opportunities has only strengthened the "police order" of the society. At the same time, it has created conservative public pedagogy that retains social hierarchies between people and experts (such as a hierarchy between a sociologist-king, a teacher-servant, and a pupil-slave). Furthermore, educational reformers have established an educational system from above in which teachers are reduced to as mere technicians. This system has also been used to arrange population into unquestioned and conventional classes both in the society (social classes) and in the classrooms (by age). Rancière's fellow countryman and brother in radical philosophy Michel Onfray writes in a pointed way:

Even if the whole schooling system had been disguised to rags of educational sciences or any other enlightened teaching practices, its only task would still be what is called 'adapting to the society' so that it would not be named otherwise: bending, subjecting, spraining of the backbone, obeying or even skill of lying and sanctimoniousness. (Onfray 2004, p. 76)

Irrespective of the goodwill or strong mind of the individual teachers, the modern system of education has served State politics almost without exception. And even though the politics has had many aims and goals in the escorting of the history, it has usually "aimed at changing of the individual into the subject" (ibid., p. 38):

The monarchists have appealed to the king as the figure of divine right and the superterranean representative of the heavenly unity principle; the communists have inclined to calmed, harmonious, classless, warless, and consensual society; on a

resolutely monotheistic society body in short; the fascists have thought of the homogenized nation, of the militarized and healthy native country; the capitalists have been possessed by the law of the market, the mechanical control of the liberty of its money currents and its advantages. And among the positivists, scientists and certain sociologists there are eager helpers next to the orthodox and next to the dogmatists. (Ibid., p. 79)

Higher and Lower Intelligence

In the meritocratic society, a potential capability and the so-called talent has replaced the social advantages and possibilities given by the inherited place in the society. In the meritocracy, those who know (or those who have the opportunity to set the standards of knowing) considered as experts have needed those who don't know and the ignorant in reproducing and legitimating their own privileged expert positions. These structural processes of legitimation belong to what Rancière describes as the pedagogical myth. The pedagogical myth divides the world into two by supposing a socially constructed division of power, as well as a lower and higher intelligence. As Rancière (1991, p. 7) points out:

[The pedagogical myth] says that there is an inferior intelligence and a superior one. The former registers perceptions by change, retains them, interprets and repeats them empirically, within the closed circle of habit and need. This is the intelligence of the young child and the common man. The superior intelligence knows things by reason, proceeds by method, from the simple to the complex, from the part to the whole. It is this intelligence that allows the master to transmit his knowledge by adapting it to the intellectual capacities of the student and allows him to verify that the students has satisfactorily understood what he learned.

Rancière's main objective is not to criticize sociological theories of education such as Bourdieu's but to develop a political theory that could be used in reevaluating the concept of equality and build a theory of radical equality. In this effort he takes as his source insights presented by the philosophers of the Enlightenment who maintained that human beings are born equal irrespective of their estate, family, or other social backgrounds and instead stressed the

revolutionary power of education and self-education. As Immanuel Kant put it in his famous treatise on Enlightenment: lack of Enlightenment is not due to their lack of intellect, to think for themselves, but lack of courage (Kant 1784). His often-cited definition of Enlightenment is as follows:

Enlightenment is man's emergence from self imposed immaturity (Unmündigkeit) for which he himself was responsible. Immaturity and dependence are the inability to use one's own intellect without the direction of another. One is responsible for this immaturity and dependence, if its cause is not a lack of intelligence, but a lack of determination and courage to think without the direction of another. Sapere aude! Dare to know! is therefore the slogan of the Enlightenment. (Kant 1784)

However, Rancière formulates these theses of the Enlightenment anew with the help of Joseph Jacotot by dissociating emancipatory education off all kinds of system logic aiming at students' subjection and obedience.

The duty of Joseph Jacotot's disciples is thus simple: They must announce to everyone, in all places and all circumstances, the news, the practice. One can teach what one doesn't know. A poor and ignorant father can thus begin educating his children: something must be learned and all the rest related to it, on this principle: everyone is of equal intelligence. (Rancière 1991, p. 101)

The State cannot produce or allow this kind of progressive pedagogy because education in the employ of the system only expands the distance which it promised to destroy in the name of equality (Rancière 2004, p. 223). The following quotation captures the core default included in Rancière's concept of the radical equality:

Equality is a presupposition, an initial axiom – or it is nothing. And this egalitarian axiom subverts in the last instance the egalitarian order itself. It is in vain that the superior gives orders to his inferior if the inferior does not understand at least two things: first, the content of the order, and second, that he must obey. But for the inferior to understand this, he must already be the equal of the superior. (Ibid., p. 223; see also Dillon 2005, p. 433)

Rancière's concept of radical equality is practical in nature; it is the praxis – a mix of theory and practice – which verifies radical equality. Radical equality means the opening of all the imaginable

possibilities and opportunities to everyone. This requires the politics of critique and the politics of hope. They address the question of social reality as given and provide pile of new ideas. In this sense, the politics of radical equality share the same objectives as the arts: to organize the accepted pictures of the social reality anew and to struggle against the denial of recognition experienced by the controlled (Deranty 2003, p. 137). The politics promoting radical equality includes the announcement of messianic hope that overcomes politics by retaining “irreversible” and “excess” as fundamental principles of life-sustaining practices (Dillon 2005, pp. 433–444). Or, as the famous May 1968 graffiti put it: “Be realistic, demand the impossible!” (There are, of course, many forms and meanings of equality. But in the critical tradition of educational research, one should keep in mind that concepts do not fall from heaven but are always theoretically and ideologically laden, and so is the concept of equality. For sure it is a human invention; we, as human beings, have invented it in our natural languages and given it different meanings and definitions. Besides that “equality” can be seen from other angles: biologically, we are equal in terms of various nutritional, sexual, and other needs as well as qualities related to *Homo sapiens* species. Regardless of the results in developmental and differential psychology serving the needs of capitalism (see Parker 2007, pp. 49–53), we also share many psychological qualities. The same applies to the social realm, which, by definition, is a social construction; social reality is only partly given and partly based on own decision making in everyday practices and in political arenas.)

Emancipatory Method

And in these thoughts of the radical equality is a source for Joseph Jacotot’s emancipatory teaching method which Rancière studies in *The Ignorant Schoolmaster*. Emancipatory method is the method of teaching and learning, which “looks for the totality of human intelligence in each intellectual manifestation” (Rancière 1991, p. 39). It is assumed in the emancipatory teaching that

(1) everyone has similar intelligence, (2) everyone is able to teach herself, and (3) everything is in everything (“All the power of the language is in the totality of a book”) (ibid., p. 26).

Jacotot has probably adopted the idea of equal intelligence from the philosophers of Enlightenment even though already Descartes (2008) reminded of the matter at the beginning of his *Discours de la méthode* (1637) as follows:

Good sense is, of all things among men, the most equally distributed; for every one thinks himself so abundantly provided with it, that those even who are the most difficult to satisfy in everything else, do not usually desire a larger measure of this quality than they already possess . . . For myself, I have never fancied my mind to be in any respect more perfect than those of the generality; on the contrary, I have often wished that I were equal to some others in promptitude of thought, or in clearness and distinctness of imagination, or in fullness and readiness of memory. And besides these, I know of no other qualities that contribute to the perfection of the mind; for as to the reason or sense, inasmuch as it is that alone which constitutes us men, and distinguishes us from the brutes, I am disposed to believe that it is to be found complete in each individual; and on this point to adopt the common opinion of philosophers, who say that the difference of greater and less holds only among the accidents, and not among the forms or natures of individuals of the same species.

Jacotot was born in Dijon in 1770, and at the age of 19, in the year of the conquest of Bastille, he was nominated as Professor of Latin in his hometown. Later he was recruited to the army participating in the war against Belgium as a captain; after the counterrevolution, he fled to the Netherlands, returned to France in 1830, and died 10 years later. In the Netherlands, Jacotot was hired as the teacher of the French language in the University of Leuven. Teaching was difficult from the start for few of Jacotot’s students who spoke French; most of them knew only their native language, Dutch or Flemish. Despite the difficulty, students were interested in learning with Jacotot, so a way had to be found, the smallest common denominator that would help moving on. At that time in Brussels, a 24-volume didactic-utopian story entitled *Télémaque* by the author Fénelon was published as a bilingual version in French and Flemish. Jacotot

took these editions into use and through the interpreter asked students to start to translate the text. The task was to translate the text from French with the help of the Flemish language text and to know a French text eventually so well that it would be possible to read it aloud from beginning to end.

Thus, the students started the foreign language and learned gradually without the teacher, crossing their teacher's expectations. Why did the students take this task that at the outset seemed so difficult? Was it the mere fact that at the time in France pupils were expected to take their teacher's lessons more or less as doctrines? Was it perhaps against this background that Jacotot's students were allowed to study themselves and that they were trusted to study without their teacher's unquestioned authority? This would imply that Jacotot's teaching (without teaching) was a significant learning experience for the students.

At least to Jacotot himself the students' achievement was an epoch-making learning experience (a turning point experience). He experienced an intellectual awakening after having realized that the teacher did not have to know better than his pupils. The thought challenged a Platonic idea of the pedagogic relationship where there is an intellectual and moral distance between a teacher and the pupil even in a dialogical situation. From the point of view of emancipatory teaching and learning, this kind of a distance is as useless as is the evaluation of that distance (or the level of the understanding defined as a "talent," a "skill," or an "ability") between the teacher and his/her pupils. The will to learn is the most important thing. The will to learn precedes the intelligence: the intellect enters into the service of the will of learning; intelligence is in the service of the will to learn. This thought deviates radically from the modern pedagogic thinking where it is usually leaned on the ideology of equal opportunities and teacher's intellectual and administrative authority. Rancière states after Jacotot that "what an emancipated person can do is to be an emancipator: to give, not the key to knowledge but the consciousness what an intelligence can do when it considers itself equal to any other and considers any other equal to itself" (Rancière 1991, p. 39).

In every teacher, there is a small Socrates (a master explicator) leading the pupils in the right, given, or determined direction. This way students might learn many things (and to repeat their teacher's knowledge like parrots), but this pedagogy does not emancipate (Rancière 1991, p. 29). An ideology of the equal opportunities emphasized in the modern era doesn't tell anything about the intellect; it neither admits nor forbids it nor the will to learn. Emancipatory method instead is a method of the will. It states that it is possible to learn independently, without the seer, if one wants to learn. In turn the will to learn is promoted by a desire to know; a desire exceeds the situation and the demands set by the given social conditions.

Modern nation states have believed in schooling and they still do. Rancière is however susceptible to the grand narratives of education and modernization from which the school and education as we know it are paradigmatic examples. In Rancière's measures, the modern belief in the system training is not only deceiving but also an illusion in that it doesn't fulfill its promise as a bedrock of democracy. Modern schooling is directed from above and fastened on the goals appointed by the ideological State apparatus. There is no actual freedom inside the system, not to mention the promotion of radical equality. The grand narratives like education cover to their shades pedagogic and other such insights which are formed as part of ordinary people's activities and which can be of major significance when people strive toward the radical equality.

Therefore, Rancière has studied nineteenth-century working-class history in bringing up those small narratives, which have not been suitable for the elites' triumphal march of the history of the progress. The example of this is his book *Nights of Labor* which reports the ordinary people's writing hobbies in France in the first part of the 1800s (Rancière 1989). In this work Rancière's objective has been to bring out the ordinary people's voices and interpretations under the established history. "It is a statement both of the right of the ordinary person to be listened to and a celebration of the profound usefulness of learning from what the ordinary person

has to say, unmediated as far as possible by the intervention of the more powerful” (Hewlett 2007, p. 86). Emancipatory educators participate for their part for this “excavation work” of the historical and present forms of oppression especially in the spheres of informal learning in which their teaching can be radically frightening both to students and teachers (as well as the power elite) because it can emancipate them both (Dillon 2005, p. 444).

Some Applications of the Emancipatory Method

For Ranci re significant studying and learning take place as self-learning and collaborative learning organically in the natural environments, without outside authorities. The very same issues Ranci re has raised in the context of political philosophy have been widely discussed among the philosophers and theorists of radical adult education. Progressive educators (Counts, Dewey) have dealt with the question of democratic schooling and education whereas theorists in community education have developed the ideas of local educational practices and forms of working-class education (see Willis 2007). In these an attempt has been made to build a theory for a democratic society based on democratic educational activity. Alike insights have also been developed in a child-centered pedagogy (see Gadotti 1996, pp. 135–138). But above all, the liberating agenda of the living philosophy is connected to the spontaneous learning activities which restores adults’ self-autonomy in their voluntary study activity in the formal learning institutions, in social movements, in culture work and in art, in trade-union training, and in peer-to-peer learning as well as in ordinary peoples’ self-education. (One example of the free learning: Ranci re’s philosopher colleague Michel Onfray left his job as a teacher of philosophy in 2002, and Caen established a free folk university (L’Universit  Populaire de Caen; see <http://upc.michelonfray.fr/>) in the town near its home area on all the willing ones. The establishment of the free university was on the other hand a reaction to the universities against the philosophy of the order which had nested on the other hand political act):

Onfray founded the university as a reaction to the arrival of Jean-Marie Le Pen, the leader of the far-right National Front party, into the second round of the 2002 presidential elections against Jacques Chirac. The idea, he said, was to fight against that happening again by “promoting and publicizing intelligence,” and to try to “analyze and understand how the world functions in order to put forward alternative solutions to the contemporary negativity.” Open to anyone, with free tuition and requiring no registration, prior education, tests or other course work, the concept, like his books, is also spreading beyond his home. There are now five other Popular Universities in France and one in Belgium, all of which acknowledge Caen as their model. (Spurgeon 2006)

The son of a manual agricultural laborer and a cleaning woman, Onfray was a professor of philosophy for two decades, until he resigned from the national education system in 2002 to establish a tuition-free Universit  Populaire (People’s University) at Caen, at which Onfray and a handful of dedicated colleagues teach philosophy and other weighty subjects to working-class and ghetto youth who are not supposed to be interested in such intellectual refinements. Onfray has never forgotten his underclass origins, and his dedication to helping the young of the left-out classes is admirable and inspiring. The Universit  Populaire, which is open to all who cannot access the state university system, and on principle does not accept any money from the State – Onfray uses the profits from his books to help finance it – has had enormous success. (Ireland 2006)

In these traditions of the living philosophy, learning has linked organically to adults’ needs to theorize their educational realities and facilitated them to reflect their living conditions (see Elias and Merriam 2005, p. 6). At best in these learning processes, people create collaboratively the sense of solidarity and the consciousness of democracy. Thus, the democratization of educational situations does not stay halfway; actually, as Stephen Brookfield (1995, p. 136) has noted, democratic education only partially is as impossible as to be pregnant only partially. And as he further states:

Once you commit to working democratically, you have to take the leap of faith that says that people will make informed choices. And you must trust that if they don’t make the choices that you think in the short term are the best ones for them (like attending every class), in the long run, the experience of being in control will make them more responsible the next time they are able to exercise power. (Ibid., p. 137).

There are several educational theories and practices, which resemble Rancière's ideas. Among the most known, popular and obvious ones are Ivan Illich's (1971) idea of a deschooled and convivial society, Paulo Freire's (2005) critical educational theory of the oppressed, and Erich Fromm's (1990) ideas of the sane society. Or let us think of the Zapatista pedagogy in Chiapas Mexico. It is not another top-down educational model led by the State, but exemplifies dialogical and democratic principles of emancipatory education, especially those emphasizing localization of education and government by calling for "a move beyond solidarity to a consideration of the possibilities for linking multiple, heterogeneous struggles as well as for transformations between and within sectors and locales" (Bahl and Callahan 1998, p. 24). In the case of Zapatistas and their leader Subcomandante Marcos, the question has been how to change the world without taking power (Holloway 2005).

In the realm of the Internet, or the Wikiworld (Suoranta and Vadén 2008), collaborative, peer-to-peer practices are flourishing as social media. These communities of practices utilize people's "general intellect," common knowledge, and voluntary participation. Criteria of the emancipatory teaching and learning method will become fully operational after an open-access principle, and free software applications are combined with free and open studies and education in places like the Wikiversity in the Internet or free universities and other free learning associations. For in these evolving worlds of free studies, an interest is not in the "potential capability" or talent but in everyone's access to participate and learn equally, to take according to one's needs, and to give according to one's abilities. This way the promises of equal education are also redeemed as universal human rights. At best collaborative practices in the Internet present new forms of internationalism, common will, and the power of the people. If we want, we can! Rancière sheds light on his own idea as follows:

From my point of view, the Internet is similar to what writing was at a certain moment. It meant the circulation of words and knowledge which could be appropriated by anyone. It is not a question of

giving knowledge to everybody, it is a question of having words circulate in a free and desirable way, and I think that this is what's happening with the Internet. That is probably why some reactionary people are so angry with the Internet, saying it's horrible that people log on to the web and they can find everything they want, that it is against research and intelligence. I would say no, it is the way intelligence, equal intelligence, works. You wander randomly in a library the same way you surf randomly on the Internet. This is, from my point of view, what equality of intelligence means. (Lie and Rancière 2006)

Finally

Jacques Rancière's idea seems to be that education and learning are means to participate in politics or, more precisely, they are forms of political socialization; the way education is arranged has significant political and social consequences. Methods and forms of education can be used either for supporting of the system or for changing of it. In the modern nation States, overall political goals in social and economic policy set also the aims of education. Emancipatory education is not suitable for a training system of the modern State, but points to the possibility of a totally different social order and maybe also to necessity of the altogether different world.

What is especially interesting in Rancière's thinking is its dialectical and partly antagonistic tone, how he stresses the necessity of resistance toward an existing order. This position is based on his conviction that the essence of politics is not consensus but dissensus, not agreement through ideal speech acts as in Habermas but disagreement. And this holds true in the basic level of language use, for as Rancière thinks the use of language defines one's position in different social hierarchies. To him, "Words are not simply words with inherent, context-free meaning, but are received very differently according to who is uttering them and where they are uttered" (Hewlett 2007, p. 97). But on the other hand, it gives a change to disagree and contest the predominant meanings and power positions. As Hewlett (2007, p. 99) reminds us, for Rancière "human beings are political, then, precisely

because they are literary, because the meanings of words are contested and struggled over in disputes between the powerful and the powerless, those who have to date determined the meaning of words and those who have not.”

Rancière is an important figure pertaining to the living and radical philosophy of education since he has tackled some of the elementary questions of education in his works, among them the following questions: In the relation of an individual and community and role of the individual in the human history, is the individual an object or a subject, a target or an agent? What are the significance of philosophy and educational sciences in terms of expert training and the legitimization of the given social order? What is the meaning of radical politics from the point of view of political control, equality, democratic processes, and social transformation? How can adults use their democratic rights in changing the world into better? Is there a place for equal educational processes in that change? What is the genesis or origin of the political and social change? Does education have any role in it?

Rancière himself sets an individual before a community or a system and criticizes “the philosophy of the order,” and social sciences, from supporting the expert power turned into a lapdog of economic and political elite. To him politics is ruptures, cracks, and disagreements in the world of business as usual and political trade-offs. True politics consist of the dissidence and revolutionary participation; it is the voice of the multitude, of the ordinary people. The equality promoted and supported by the reformist left is nothing more than eviscerated and lost equality compared to the radical equality in which the equality is an origin for the politics, not the goal or an end result of equal politics. The radicalism of the equality is a solution to the problems of the meritocratic system in the sense that it reminds of the possibility of such the world in which it is possible to learn according to one’s needs and to educate, to teach, and to give according to one’s abilities.

Where some theorists of critical education have answered negatively – or at least are doubtful – a question whether critical educational practices can be tools for changing the world (see

Holst 2002, pp. 78–79), Rancière answers the question affirmatively. And furthermore, the question has been wrong posed from his point of view since education, society, and politics are always inseparable; they are intertwined or woven into each other as far as human beings are literate. The question is only how they and their complex, ideological, and hegemonic relations are defined. For Rancière the emancipatory practice of education is the birthplace of radically equal society. It fulfills the following principles: *you can what you will and teach what you don’t know – learn what you want to learn!* In sum I am inclined to claim that not only is Rancière’s notion of radical equality a partial challenge to the Enlightenment’s principles of progress and emancipation, as Hewlett (2007, p. 94) thinks but more than that: it poses an extreme radicalization of the fundamentals of the Enlightenment. And therefore, Rancière’s notions on radical equality and education should belong to the key readings of all students of critical education.

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Rankings and Mediatization of University

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Synonyms

Media Logic; Mediatization; Publicity; University Rankings

Introduction

While *rankings* and various kinds of assessments of universities or professional schools within certain fields have been around for quite some time, it was not until the beginning of the twenty-first century and the publishing of the Shanghai Jiao Tong *Academic Ranking of World Universities* (in 2003) and the *Times Higher Education World University Ranking* (in 2004) that rankings became global in the sense that they aimed to compare university performance around the world. These major initiatives were soon followed by many others, both private and public, with varying ambitions and scope. Within a short span of time, there was an increase in rankings at all levels: global, regional (such as the European Union), and national. By offering purportedly objective comparisons between the qualities of different higher education institutions worldwide,

rankings have had a major impact on the reshaping of the higher education landscape. They have also been integral to the transformations of what is now commonly perceived to be a global university sector or market (Drori et al. 2012). Consequently, university rankings are often viewed and theorized as symptoms or results of meta-processes such as globalization and commercialization. Global rankings seem inevitable in a globalized world, where knowledge is perceived as a vital commodity for individuals as well as nations in the global competition for jobs, innovation, and economic growth.

The surge in the use and impact of rankings fits well as an example of globalization and global governance models for higher education, but there is also research suggesting that they are prime examples of how *mediatization* shapes the institutional context of science, scholarship, and higher education. Accordingly, the emergence and proliferation of rankings can be seen, at least in part, as a result of the development of certain kinds of media products but also as typical products of a “media logic,” that is, the institutional and technological *modus operandi* of the media, including the ways in which media create and distribute material and symbolic resources. Even though there is no one authoritative definition of the concept, mediatization usually refers to a process where the media influence and intervene on the activity of other institutions, such as universities.

Mediatization

The term *mediatization* describes a process of social change in which media exert greater and greater influence and become ever more deeply integrated into different spheres of society (Asp 1986; Strömbäck 2008). In recent years, many scholars both within media studies and political sciences have found the concept of mediatization useful in thinking about, describing and analyzing how the mass media act as agents of change for other institutions (Schillemans 2012). Like other multifaceted and complex meta-processes such as

globalization, however, mediatization is not easily delimited or defined. It designates not so much a coherent theory as a theoretical perspective or frame of reference (Strömbäck and Esser 2014). There is, nonetheless, a broad consensus that mediatization can be defined, in the most general terms, as the rise and intensification of the influence of the media on the functioning of different sectors of society (Lundby 2009). What the concept of mediatization tries to capture is the multi-dimensional and intricate long-term correlation between media change and cultural change (Hepp et al. 2010). In other words, the concept of mediatization is used to describe a process of transformation, wherein the original logics of a field, institution, or organization give way to the specific logics of the media. Thus, through the process of mediatization, academic institutions and organizations become increasingly dependent on the media and, as a consequence, are increasingly guided by media logic. One example of this is that scientists, research groups, universities, and other academic institutions have to prioritize and allocate more resources to their media activities. In a “media society” or a “mediatized society,” the growing importance of the media in shaping public opinion, awareness, and perception has a considerable impact on the way institutions of research and higher education are understood, evaluated, and managed. Mediatization theory, however, studies not only how information about research and higher education is transmitted through media but also how media are integrated in the fundamental work of academic institutions. By way of its specific “logic,” the media create a dramaturgy building on simplification, polarization, intensification, personalization, visualization, and stereotypization (Asp 1986) – a dramaturgy that fits ill with the traditional academic precepts and values (cf. Rider et al., 2013). By publicizing central issues related to higher education in certain specific ways, such as the framing and presentation of policy debates, for example, the media not only inform but even shape the public understanding of the activities, practices, and results of research and higher education. Politicians and management, as well as the institutions and organizations involved, must then

adapt to the public image thus created, through changes in policies, regulations, and funding (Pallas and Wedlin 2013). Thus, through the process of mediatization, the media attain autonomy with respect to the institutions they mediate. “Mediatization,” then, designates this adaption of different social fields or systems, such as those of higher education and research, to these autonomous institutionalized rules for how media mediates. These rules, that is, institutionalized formats and forms of staging, are what the concept of “media logic” is all about (Altheide and Snow 1979).

Mediatization scholarship examines how, and the extent to which media communication is integrated in policy processes, organizational structures are modified and designed to accommodate this communication, and the execution of core tasks are imbued with media logic, as well as conceivable or likely outcomes of such accommodation and adaptation (cf. Fredriksson et al. 2015; Schillemans 2012). According to some scholars, the increasing power and autonomy of the media implies an increasing dependency in the institutions mediated, such as universities. The heightened autonomy of the first is won at the loss of autonomy of the second.

The concept of mediatization is most often used to analyze the relationship between politics and media. As we have seen, however, the concept is equally useful for understanding the relationship between higher education and media. Mediatization provides a framework for understanding why universities submit to the rankings, for instance, and why the latter have become so useful for policymakers and decision-makers on different levels in the global higher education sector.

Rankings as Example of the Mediatization of Universities

A common feature of university rankings, be they national, regional or global, is that they aim to grade higher education institutions according to various indicators or metrics. There has been much debate about the merits of ranking

methodology and whether they measure what they purport to measure. Research has suggested a number of problems with university rankings. One problem is that reputation, included as an indicator at least to some extent in most rankings, is of questionable validity. Further, rankings change their criteria and methodologies, making it difficult to make comparisons over time. A third issue has to do with the negative impacts of rankings: they assume a zero-sum game, since there can only be a certain number of top universities in a league table. That assumption in itself at the very outset characterizes the overwhelming majority of the world’s institutions of higher education as “non-excellent.”

Rankings have also been criticized for privileging established centers of research and higher learning in the industrialized West, by virtue of their heritage, wealth, and strong traditions of academic freedom and meritocracy (Altbach 2012). Another example of such privileging bias is the universal pressure to publish in English and on issues deemed worthy of publication in Western journals (Kang 2009). In order to become “world class,” according to the rankings, non-English-speaking countries must encourage publishing in predominately Anglophone journals. There has been considerable discussion of the deleterious consequences of this development; aside from domain loss within other languages, there is a risk that problems and issues of local or regional concern will not be addressed by scholarship at all (Lin 2009). Finally, the rankings have been criticized for the relative lack of importance attached to teaching. By focusing almost exclusively on research outputs in leading journals, rankings tend to favor institutions heavy on disciplines that attract the most funding and produce the most publications and citations (i.e., the STEM subjects, medicine, and pharmacology), since these determine the position reached in the rankings (Altbach 2012).

The scholarly debates over the value and meaning of the rankings have not stopped them from acquiring public and political popularity as a way to measure and compare the performance of entire universities across diverse social, political, economic, and cultural contexts. One explanation

for the popularity of rankings that has been suggested is the impact of the extensive media coverage of them. The results of the comparisons and the assessments of higher education institutions are almost always newsworthy, while many of the rankings themselves are products created or sponsored by media outlets. In their publicizing of the rankings, the media constitute their meaning. They have taken the assessment of quality outside of the jurisdiction of the universities themselves and placed it “within a wider comparative and international framework overseen by governments and supranational organizations” (Hazelkorn 2015). By making supposedly “objective” comparisons between different universities, and by the effective dissemination of the results in and through media, rankings have become a “quasi-funding instrument,” fusing national and international priorities and transforming a benchmarking tool into a strategic instrument (Hazelkorn 2009) for university managements as well as governments eager to increase national competitiveness in the global race for knowledge capital. As higher education becomes increasingly central to strategies for enhancing competitive advantage in what is called “the global knowledge economy,” it also becomes more adapted to its role as an instrument of economic development. Higher education and research are thus redirected toward wealth creation and economic competitiveness at the expense of other tasks. It is in this process and under these conditions that “knowledge becomes commodity” (Slaughter and Leslie 1997). Mediatization scholars would say that in a mediatized world, the media plays an essential part in the production, marketing, and distribution of this commodity on all levels.

Consequences of Mediatization for Public Education

Whether or not rankings really measure what they purport to measure is an important issue for the methodologies and quality of different rankings. Mediatization studies, however, are more concerned with the effects rankings might have

on the inner workings of higher education institutions. One way to do this is to think about what rankings might mean for the relationships between institutions of research and higher education and their societal environments.

The modern media society is characterized by an abundance of information and a scarcity of attention (Asp 1986). Hence, institutions and organizations, both public and private, are involved in a constant struggle to get people’s attention. Since rankings are, by way of the media dramaturgy, newsworthy, they direct attention to higher education and research as important sectors in society. But rankings do more than that: they also translate the internal moral and professional norms, values, and qualities in accordance with the media logic. The media formulate the internal qualities of research and higher education in ways that make them suited for public communication (Pallas and Wedlin 2013). In this way, the media not only publicize higher education and research but also make them “public” in more profound ways. From the internal perspective of research and higher education, this translation of the internal qualities according to media logic can have unintended and undesirable consequences. Since the media need to emphasize and elaborate specific aspects of organizations or events in order to make them comprehensible and relevant for a broader audience, the mediation of research tends toward oversimplification. This, in turn, in the public mind, is liable to sever the relation between universities, on the one hand, and traditional and established academic norms and values, on the other. In mediating popularized and simplified images of the very complex and diversified activities and operations at higher education institutions, the media produce images of what good research and higher education are or should be that render invisible what, from the point of view of university teaching, science and scholarship, are fundamental. The popularized and simplified images can only convey a very limited conception of what research and higher education is, what it does, and the possible ways it could contribute to the surrounding society since it is impossible to mediate the complexity and diversity that actually

exist at the tens of thousands of departments, research units, colleges, and universities throughout the world. Rankings, the prime example of this popularization and simplification, inevitably promote a conception of research and education that directs attention to certain disciplines and activities while largely ignoring others. The phenomenon of mediatization, here exemplified by rankings, makes universities dependent on the media for their recognition and legitimacy in the public sphere. In order to attract students and attract funding, for example, the universities must accommodate the expectations placed on them as a consequence of the public, which is mediated, version of what a university fundamentally is.

In contrast with the complex reality that they take themselves to be explaining, rankings are very simple and straightforward: they seem to provide an objective comparison and evaluation with respect to a limited number of discrete variables or indicators, across a broad range of diverse cultural, social, economic, and political contexts. The simplicity is itself a consequence of media logic, the aim of which is to produce a coherent and easily grasped image. Thus, “excellence” in teaching or research is whatever the rankings, that is, the framework for the mediation of universities, say it is. From the perspective of mediatization theory, the rankings can be said to produce “excellence” through their effects on regional and national policy, university management, and even the choices of the individual. The image produced in the rankings, disseminated through media and consumed by the public, become the basis for decision-making at all levels. The subsequent reorganizing of higher education institutions constitutes a shift from a traditional academic organization with collegial autonomy and control over curricula and research toward an organization in which every section is assessed in relation to the university’s ability to climb, that is, to appear more “excellent,” in the rankings. This devotion of attention and resources to branding weakens traditional academic structures, values, and concepts, which are usurped by the principles and practices of corporate management.

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Rationality

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Real Recognize Real: Local Hip-Hop Cultures and Global Imbalances in the African Diaspora

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Hip-hop is revered as a global countercultural movement that disrupts dominant configurations of power and gives voice to traditionally marginalized peoples. Its origins illustrate how marginalized Black and Latina/o youth in the United States use technology and culture in contradictory fashions to illustrate the lived experiences of race and the structures of racism in the postindustrial city. This movement galvanized both minoritarian and arts communities in New York City. It is a poignant reminder of the impetus behind cultural studies: to illustrate how culture is inextricably linked to economic, political, and ideological power that impacts one's material conditions, life chances, lived experiences, and interactions with the State. Hip-hop's four core expressions of rapping, DJ'ing (disk jockeying), breakdancing, and graffiti have become rich sites of critical pedagogy where racialized groups are also producers of meaning, knowledge, and critique in contrast to dominant modes of power. While a movement that originated in the South Bronx in 1970s New York City, it quickly spread across the United States (US), and now around the globe.

Studies of youth and hip-hop culture are proliferating and producing cunning research. Furthermore, hip-hop culture has become a transnational community engaged by marginalized groups in order to critique their local conditions, global capitalism, and their stigmatized cultural representations in public discourses and mass media. While hip-hop is indeed becoming a more globalized phenomenon, it is not without its own power dynamics. This entry examines how hip-hop culture in the city of Salvador da Bahia illustrates the perils of globalizing cultural studies, namely that hip-hop too often traverses the dominant global flows and obscures the ways in which

non-Anglophone marginalized groups in the Global South engage hip-hop as well as globalization. Simply put, hip-hop culture must be contextualized in local historical dimensions to trouble the homogenization of transnational communities but also to work through and dialogue about internal differences.

Cultural Studies

Stuart Hall (1980) convincingly argues that cultural studies is not simply the study of cultural texts but how those texts are embedded into ideologies of representation, power, resistance, (counter)hegemony, and formations that are indicative of particular historical moments. Culture, in other words, is not detached from our lived experiences and material conditions. As a result, cultural studies, as an interdisciplinary field, extends the study of culture in two ways: the first, “to an ‘anthropological’ definition of culture – as cultural *practices*; second, the move to a more historical definition of cultural practices: questioning the anthropological meaning and interrogating its universality” (p. 27). Hall’s definition nuances how culture is practiced and performed in a group’s everyday lives and social rituals. This undoubtedly is specific to how a group makes meaning of culture and is shared among its members. This requires interaction by actors within a group and how they construct the social world in order to navigate it. This approach is buttressed by taking a historical approach that refuses a static notion of culture that is flat and timeless. Rather, it is a process that is contested, struggled, and continually being remade. Culture then is mediated by those who constitute a specific social formation, impacted by their historical moment, and how they are positioned with particular sets of social relations. Thus, culture is cultivated by particular arrangements of social, political, and ideological power.

Global Hip-Hop Culture and the African Diaspora

Hall’s definition is critical to nuancing the imbalances within the global hip-hop community.

Hip-hop culture is not simply the production and consumption of its four key elements: rapping, DJ’ing, breakdancing, and graffiti. Moving hip-hop culture within anthropological understandings of culture necessitates situating it within how hip-hop is lived, practiced, ritualized, communitarian, and meaningful. It also situates the historical changes within a given society as well as global relations. It is no coincidence that hip-hop in the US arose in the aftermath of the US Civil Rights movement of the 1960s. Despite these historical changes, the United States remodeled its ideology and social structures in order to sustain existing structures of economic and political power. This resulted in the deindustrialization of urban cities; shifting manufacturing jobs abroad; urban projects that displaced Black and Latina/o communities; and the increase in the service, telecommunications, and finance sectors. Put simply, the postindustrial city was the site where these political, economic, and ideological shifts occurred in the United States.

Hip-hop culture arose from those changes in the United States. US African Americans, Anglophone Afro-Caribbeans, and Caribbean Latina/os were put into similar socioeconomic positions despite vast differences in culture, history, and ethnoracial identities. These Afro-diasporic intimacies were also forged out of similar experiences that were the result of cuts in social services, increased policing, and urban displacement (Chang 2005). In these spaces of marginalization and silences, a bricolage of expressive cultures mediated through technology produced hip-hop culture to speak back against their lived experiences, material conditions, and cultural representations that were naturalized in ideology and social structure. Hip-hop culture illustrates the ways in which culture is continually remade and invented in a particular time and place that is embedded in a bricolage of social relations.

Advances in technology and telecommunications facilitate the extension of hip-hop culture around the globe. Today, youth around the world participate in hip-hop culture and have become part of a transnational community. This provides a lexicon of resistance, imagery of power from the margins, and a multicultural and multiethnic

identity that transcends and critiques the nation-state as well as forms of oppression in the modern world. At the same time, the emphasis on a global hip-hop culture has created a false universality that all oppressions or forms of marginalization are identical. This is not to elide the very real conditions and violence that people experience. Indeed, forms of oppression can often cut at right angles to each other, as Paul Gilroy (2000) has noted, that operate through interlocking systems of oppression. Rather, it is to make clear that oppressions operate through interlocking systems that are malleable but also rooted in specific socio-historical totalities. Globalization is not simply able to erase those convoluted residues of the past. They take on different arrangements, and a society is articulated in a variety of possibilities that create structures of dominance. Eliding the global dimensions of hip-hop culture only rearranges the organization of power and repositions particular groups in a marginal position, with the divide between the Anglophone and non-Anglophone worlds being but one example. It is thus imperative to nuance these tensions between the local and the global within the larger hip-hop community.

In addition, the conflation of hip-hop culture as a space of marginalization too often elides the role of race, specifically blackness. Anthropologist Marc Perry (2008) intervenes into the erasure of race and the African Diaspora in the globalization of hip-hop culture. He argues, “hip hop can be seen globally as an increasingly important conduit for just those kinds of transnational black identifications and emergent subjectivities that have historically constituted the African diaspora as a lived social formation” (p. 639). Even as hip-hop becomes a transnational, multicultural, and multi-ethnic community, it is still foundational in the contemporary moment for African-descended peoples across the globe to forge diasporic identities, cultures, and communities. Highlighting issues of race and Blackness within hip-hop cultures is important because it not only illustrates the uneven terrain that those terms traverse, exposing the imbalances that globalization

embeds in the African Diaspora. Local understandings of hip-hop culture may in fact contest the dominant discourse within global hip-hop itself. This is an issue of not only translation but also context. Literary scholar Brent Hayes Edwards and his notion of *décalage* to expose an unevenness in the African Diaspora that “resists translation into English; to signal that resistance and, moreover, to endorse the way that this terms marks a resistance to crossing over” (2003, p. 13). Edwards’ intervention here is useful to understanding how local hip-hop cultures expose imbalances and tensions within the global hip-hop community.

Local Understandings of Global Hip-Hop Culture

These tensions can be exemplified in a hip-hop workshop observed during the author’s ethnographic research on the Bahian hip-hop movement in 2014. What became apparent was that global hip-hop, as a culture and object of study, can easily elide local tensions and complexities in the Global South. Part of this can be attributed to language and geographical difference. However, this can also be attributed to glorifying commonalities while eschewing varied positionalities within transnational communities. These differences are part of regional tensions in a given nation as well as reproducing familiar tropes about the African Diaspora and global Black culture.

During this hip-hop workshop, a US African American female professor whose expertise is global hip-hop and the African Diaspora was brought to Salvador da Bahia. In addition to delivering a lecture at the local university, she was to give a workshop in one of the shantytowns on the periphery of the city. This particular shantytown is notable for multiple reasons. The first is this neighborhood had a cultural center that could hold events such as the workshop. Another significance is that few foreigners come to this cultural center and engage with locals. In fact, most tourists rarely leave the historic center of

Pelourinho or the beach neighborhoods of Barra and Rio Vermelho. To host a US African American female professor who specializes in global hip-hop and the African Diaspora is certainly rare and a special occasion for this community as well as the professor. Finally, two locally prominent Black male rappers live in this neighborhood. Thus, the neighborhood is associated with the local hip-hop culture.

One of the Black male rappers invited me to this event in order to observe how Bahian hip-hop is engaged and understood outside of Brazil. Observing an encounter of an US expert on global hip-hop culture and the African Diaspora in a city known as “Black Rome” exemplifies the tensions between the local and the global in hip-hop culture and the African Diaspora. This is by no means to deride the professor. She should be applauded for engaging with this community. As Brazil is not her geographical expertise, her presentation conjured represented tensions that frequently arise in hip-hop culture and the African Diaspora, both in study and as a community. Specifically, it made visible how global cultures are unbalanced due to the means of power over knowledge production and capitalism. This does not elide interlocking forms of oppression, such as race, class, gender, and sexuality, but rather illustrates how these are also impacted global relations that are discursively understood as the Global South, the Third World, or developing nations. While global cultures and transnational communities oft share striking similarities across context, one must not elide how local meanings of culture, community, and identity are historically constituted and locally specific.

Diasporic Temporalities

A particular tension of the African Diaspora with the modern world is the notion of temporality, the notion that Blacks are behind in progress and development. This does not preclude varying notions of time within the African Diaspora as well where some cultures are viewed as modern and others as premodern. Hip-hop culture is viewed as the modern incarnation of Afro-

diasporic cultures and situated in the most cosmopolitan and globalized cities. Put another way, hip-hop is modern Blackness and privileges global Anglophone cities. Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, Brazil’s most cosmopolitan cities, are the locales associated with hip-hop culture but also modern Blackness (Sansone 2003). Thus, modern Blackness in Brazil is only recognized in the urban landscapes that are highly visible in globalization.

This elides the historical and global reverberations in Salvador da Bahia, an important colonial outpost and port city for the Atlantic slave trade. Salvador was the political and economic center of Brazil’s sugar plantations that were concentrated in the Northeast. After abolition, the South and Southeast were deliberately developed and industrialized to compete in the global economy (Skidmore 1993). Salvador and its majority Black population were deemed unfit in aiding these modernizing efforts. Important is the idea that Salvador’s Africanity inhibited its Black population from being equipped to participate in a free market and thus backwards. Within Brazil, Africanity is divided between a modernizing South and Southeast juxtaposed to a backwards and premodern Northeast.

Diasporic Recognition

These tensions were exposed in the workshop the author observed. In her informative workshop, the professor cogently illustrated the origins by which US hip-hop arose and how they sprouted across the United States and the globe. She linked these to African philosophies of culture, rhythm, and music. She noted that these roots have common cultural origins in Salvador. Her argument was that hip-hop is the cultural conduit for a transnational Afro-diasporic community. While she illustrated the input of African cultures into hip-hop, its output lost Salvador and produced São Paulo. Her examples of Brazilian hip-hop, namely Os Racionais MCs, were from the city of São Paulo. Hip-hop in São Paulo has done much to illustrate the literal and figurative racial violence against Blacks in Brazil. Yet, this reproduces the notion

that cities such as Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo are the only globally embedded cities in Brazil.

Salvador is silenced in these conversations about Black modernity. Its landscape and Afro-Bahian cultures are frequently drawn upon to learn about the past and African cultural roots. However, it is erased from contemporary Afro-diasporic cultures. This speaks to the “racialized feminization of Salvador” make (K.-K. Perry 2013, p. 42; see also Pinho 2008) where the city is the recipient of desire by outside forces that demarcate Blacks’ and especially Black women’s agency and voices. Yet, Salvador is also reproduced as effeminate by other localities in the diaspora. Hip-hop is certainly an example where Salvador is a reservoir of cultural influence for other Afro-diasporic groups, but little attention is given to Black Bahians’ concerns, desires, or novel forms of Black culture.

The community members at the workshop challenged these assumptions and informed the professor that there is a substantial hip-hop scene in Salvador and at the fore of the intersection of hip-hop culture and the African Diaspora. Bahian hip-hop was already drawing on their Afro-Bahian roots and doing innovative cultural work through their hip-hop cultural production. In other words, they did not need hip-hop to come to them via the United States or even São Paulo. They were already going to hip-hop. One youth presented local group Opanijé as an example. The trio of rappers formed Opanijé in 2005 and draw extensively on Candomblé, an Afro-Brazilian religion, in their sound, themes, and imagery in their music and videos. Notable political rappers, such as Mos Def, Talib Kweli, and Jurassic 5, also influence their work (Maca 2008). Opanijé also performed at a concert with Chuck D of Public Enemy. Opanijé not only demonstrates the presence of weaving the African Diaspora and hip-hop culture but also how they are engaging both beyond the borders of Brazil.

This encounter is more significant than recognizing Bahian hip-hop. It also speaks to the invisibility of Afro-diasporic cultural forms beyond Salvador’s historic center and various desires for premodern African culture associated with Afro-

Bahian culture. At stake is the gendering of Salvador as a passive space of molding, controlling, and desiring not only by the Brazilian nation but also by other Afro-diasporic groups. It elides those who are there and how they live and create knowledge in the modern world. The community members at the hip-hop workshop pressed back against the notion that hip-hop elsewhere must be brought to them in order to bring them into the contemporary moment as if they were provincial and stuck in a premodern past. Rather, they illustrate that they too are enmeshed in a global world, modernity, and hip-hop. They illustrate not only how globalization is being localized but also how local actors are engaging the global in ways not frequently recognized or that might disrupt global discourses of their locality.

Conclusion

This entry illustrates the tensions of transnational communities, global cultures, and the African Diaspora. In an age of ever increasing mediated and imaginary connections, globalization has not erased local differences or narratives. These local specificities are rooted in global *and* national forces. The latter has very real ideological and material consequences of how Blackness and Black bodies in particular locales are understood. As necessary as it is to understand how globalization is creating different arrangements of social relations, it is also necessary to contextualize the specificity of local actors and how they are using globalization in ways that are not highly visible. Engaging how the local reaches the global and the global engages the local provides a fruitful space for negotiating internal differences in transnational communities.

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Reconsidering Aesthetics and Everyday Life

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Why should the lamp or the house be an art object, but not our life? (Foucault 1991, p. 350)

Introduction

When considering the career of the treatment of the topic of aesthetics (defined, hereafter, as the operationalization and application of form, taste, self-stylization, and the creative imagination to the demands of contemporary life) in the educational field, one is struck by a striking bifurcation. Mainstream and liberal curriculum standard-bearers such as Eliot Eisner (1997, 2005) writing on the topic have gone down the path of more or less insulating aesthetics within self-enclosing disciplinary frames of reference emphasizing self-referentiality, connoisseurship, and the maverick-like qualities of artistic producers. This orientation might be called, after Pierre Bourdieu, the “charismatic approach” (1993, p. 76) in which the artist and the aesthetic object are judged by art-qua-art criteria shorn from the social environment. Aesthetic conversations within this paradigm brush off art objects from contaminating imbrication in the political world. The work of aesthetics in this sense is to transcend the turmoil of everyday life ennobling artistic producers and their creations and the elected audience of affinity who know how to properly consume artistic objects. Further custodial work is conducted to keep at bay those wayward producers, curators, etc., who engage in works of bad taste (as in a Mapplethorpe) or who exercise too strenuous social critique.

On the other side of this divide, neo-Marxists and cultural studies theorists of education have never really overcome the inherited terms that had been set for aesthetics within classical or

orthodox Marxism. On these terms proponents have tended to place aesthetics outside the realm of systematic consideration of the workings of society subordinating these practices to the economic and integrating the discussion of aesthetics within the superstructures. Here, then, aesthetics were understood to either slavishly contribute to the reproduction of economic relations (as scholars such as *Schooling in a Capitalist America*'s authors Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis had mapped out in their general formulation of the workings of education and culture in the social order) or had become part of the workings of spitball popular culture of resistance and rejection of the mental programs of schooling as cultural reproduction theorists such as Paul Willis (1981) had maintained.

Taking a different path in this entry, I wish to build upon critical, post-Marxist scholarship on education and society that has prompted a return, in recent years, to the scenario of aesthetics within contemporary society. Here, I am referring to the work of a multidisciplinary group of scholars writing from within a plurality of fields – education, anthropology, sociology, cultural geography, and history. I call attention to scholars such as Arjun Appadurai (2013) writing on the work of the imagination, Stuart Hall and Sarat Maharaj (2001) writing on the liberating eruption of aesthetics out of the institutional confines of the museum spilling over in carnal communion with everyday life, Saskia Sassen (2014) who foregrounds the work of aesthetic practices in the building of the new global city, and the work of Michel Foucault who has sought to decenter establishment aesthetics and its high priests calling attention to the banality of the work of art and the care of the self.

While neo-Marxist scholars of education writing on urban life have tended to place aesthetics on the boundaries of critical practices, treating aesthetics as a surplus set of practices that can only be made fully relevant when added on to a more concentrated attention to economy and politics, these post-Marxist theorists maintain that aesthetic practices now underwrite the fiber of everyday modern life. As Arjun Appadurai usefully points out in the *Modernity at Large* and *The*

Future as Cultural Fact, aesthetic practices are no longer to be simply understood as the practices exclusive to the artist – a maverick or charismatic citizen creating selective images about the past, present, and the future of human existence. But aesthetic practices are linked to the work of the imagination of ordinary people and connected even more earnestly to the work of capitalism and its organization and reorganization on a global scale. What Appadurai, Sassen, and others are pointing toward can be identified as a central energy in modern life associated with the production, reception, and circulation of representations and images and the diffusion of knowledge and information – the core of what Manuel Castells calls the new information paradigm where information is the key product and new driver of the capitalist order and where its organization and deployment contribute to reshaping contemporary social relations. It is within this paradigm that the manipulation of form, images, and style (not the ever mountainous climb of data but the transaction of aesthetics of existence) quite literally articulates the most aggressive possible marketing of signs, the radically active ascesis of self-caring, of how we look, of who we would want to look like, the house we would like to live in, and the places around the world we would like to visit. All of these practices are really seductions of style and persuasion that are now deeply commodified – whether in the domain of reality television, packaged tours, the sandboxes of console-supported video games, or the online virtual play worlds of the World of Warcraft.

In what follows, I want to extend these understandings in a very specific way by discussing the historical entanglement of aesthetic practices in the diffusion of modernization and developmentalism to the Third World. Second, I want to point as well to the deepening role of aesthetics in the organization of capitalism in the new millennium. Third, I close the essay with a brief discussion of the crisis of language that the aestheticization of everyday life has precipitated in neo-Marxist efforts to grasp the central dynamics of contemporary societies. The latter development has led to a depreciation of the value and insightfulness of neo-Marxist analysis in our time.

Let me now turn to a discussion of the historical context of the integration of aesthetics into commerce and the transfer of modernization principles through aesthetics to the Third World.

Aesthetics and Economic Production in Historical Relief

The long shadow of the integration of aesthetics and capitalist economics can be tracked back into the circumstances of the late-nineteenth-century industrialization, the generation of new markets for the ever-expanding range of capitalist goods and services, and the production of consumer durables. These “luxuries” of personal style were in their everyday utility, if not necessity, expanding middle-class consumption patterns to the working class. Within this set of developments, deepening patterns of aestheticization in advertising, the imbuelement of commercial products with sensuousity, flair, and feeling, and so forth generated a leveling effect in the processes of class representation and helped to transform agrarian and immigrant actors into the new acquisitive urban subjects. As Dean MacCannell would argue, the commodity world of capitalism derived value not simply from invested labor but from the symbolic register in which human actors attached stratified meaning to things, their shape and form, and their near magical power to signify beauty, self-worth, and importance. This symbolic energy in aesthetic forms would contribute to the generation of flow and fluidity within the representational furniture of the class order and contribute tremendous value-added dynamism binding ecumenical groups of social subjects to the unfolding capitalist order. The working class could now try on the uniforms of the upper classes, explore their ways of life through the glow and illumination of what TS Eliot in his poem *Portrait of A Lady* called “bric-a-brac,” and through consumer credit and loans acquire the imitation furniture, jewelry, and items of leisure that mirrored aristocratic existence. Aesthetic practices integrated into economic form were now performing the pedagogy of molding the new subjectivities of the modern age – less in collision with capital in the classical sense identified by Friedrich Engels in *The Condition of the*

Working Class in England but more in besotted communion with the spectacular array of consumer products capitalism had strewn in their wake. To be a true citizen in the modern society was to be a dedicated consumer.

Modernization’s Aesthetic Arrival to the Third World

This model of progress, proletarianized and internationalized by the middle of the twentieth century, would be taken full scale to the Global South, embodied in Coco Cola and Pepsi ads, the family size Coca Cola drink, the cultural translation performed by the films, musicals, popular songs, etc., that entered the Third World through cinema houses, radio, television and newspapers, comic books, and cartoons, and the lure of the new sleek-looking surfaces of consumer durables and household electronic appliances. Here, debt-driven consumption summarized the aspirations of the masses for something more than material want. These practices of borrowing today and paying tomorrow underlined a fueled working-class interest in comparative affluence – a desire to expand and materialize freedom by codifying taste and style and by integrating the aesthetic and leisure practices into their rigorously subordinated lives defined by industrial parks. These aestheticized aspects of material culture were themselves indices of a new aspirational momentum generated in the so-called preindustrial economies that were navigating the modernization paradigm propounded by Anglo-American policy intellectuals. The newly aestheticized material culture paralleled new imperialist policies of industrialization by invitation and the transfer of production processes of multinational capital to the Third World.

The modernization paradigm traveled instantaneously incubated in the spreading tentacles of electronic mediation embracing the most remote parts of the earth. Musicals such as *The King and I* and *The Sound of Music* and soap operas such as *Portia Faces Life* offered aesthetic solutions to the problems of necessity and want in the Third World. These popular cultural productions propagated ideas such as the inviolability of contract and the value equivalence involved in the process of exchange of labor power for wages. They

extended a shimmering imaginary plane of existence linking the metropolis to the periphery latent with needs and saturated with unfulfilled desires. These aesthetic works suggested that the Third World life, linked to tradition and agrarian organization and imagination, was flawed, oppressive, backward (a neo-Marxist claim as well!). This type of enlightenment narrative was propagated, for example, in highly popularized musicals such as the *The King and I*. Circulated through radio, television, and film, *The King and I* made popular the modernization dilemma of the old traditions of Siam (Thailand) versus the suppressed wish fulfillment of Siam's people, particularly their capacity for individual action and choice. *The King and I* ultimately set the capriciousness of the absolutist state against the visions of constitutional democracy. The way out of cultural miasma and backwardness to enlightenment was provided in the person of an English schoolteacher, Anna, who would carry out the work of cultural incorporation and translation. The cultural and philosophical forms of modernization – the right to private property, the capacity of the workers to sell their labor power, and the deification of Western democratic traditions – are all underscored in this musical in which a half-naked king, with Anna's help, must reconstitute his relations to his subjects and retool himself as a comprador agent of capitalism's expansion in Southeast Asia.

The aestheticization of the economic – capitalism with a human face – sold the Third World on the modernization theories of Western policy intellectuals such as Daniel Lerner, Harold Lasswell, and William W. Rostow. The “passing of traditional society,” as Lerner called it, involved that fearful asymmetry of contractual agreement to exploitation and excavation of the resources of the native and her land, along with state-enforced guarantee of the privileged status of the right to private property that multinationals and mercantile local elites so intensely craved. The development gap between the Third World and the First could be jumped by the expansion of the consumerist culture of possessive individualism and the wholesale adoption of the infrastructure of industrialized production by “overseas” territories. Just as new streets were being paved

for industrialization by invitation in the 1960s in Puerto Rico and Barbados – the sweet middle-class life of the *Brady Bunch* and later *The Partridge Family* presented itself through television as the embodiment of the one and only true heaven, as the buoyant end game in the struggle for happiness. Why couldn't a woman be more like a man (*My Fair Lady*)? Why couldn't we the Third World Siams be more like the enlightened West?

It was, in part, this developmentalist dream of plenitude and progress that delivered the “Pakis” and the “Jamaicans” to the land of the “Lads” in pursuit of the Holy Grail of the better life and the material rewards of capitalism – as Paul Willis had documented in the *Learning to Labor* (1981). As cultural theorists writing about education had barely noticed, the postindustrial phase in capitalism brought a new multicultural environment onto the terrain of metropolitan urban centers. By the 1980s a new aesthetics of everyday meaning of style marked the sartorial and leisure choices of urban youth in metropolitan centers. Whether it was the post-beatnik, yuppie culture in New York or punk and skin-headed flamboyance in London, a cultural turn to hybrid genres and world culture marked the identities of white working class indelibly. What was missing in the cultural studies account of these new cultural formations was the backstory of imperialism and colonialism. What cultural studies theorists of the Center for Contemporary Cultural Studies confronted in Birmingham in the ocular opposition of the immigrant other to the Lads in the *Learning to Labor* is this abridgment of a continuous line or movement of disembeddedness and transformation in an imaginative and spatial geography that extended the aspirations of the Jamaicans, the West Indians, the Pakis, the Indians, and the Bangladeshis from the periphery to beachheads in Brixton and Manchester. The full significance of what this movement would mean in the changing terms of globalization was indeed far more fully recognized in the popular films such as *The Full Monty* (1997), *Billy Elliot* (2000), and *This Is England* (2007). To understand these dynamics more clearly, we must now turn to a consideration of the role of aesthetics in everyday life.

Everyday Life

The role of aesthetics in everyday life has deepened in the last few decades with the rising importance of computerization and media-driven technologies. The work of aesthetics is not simply now embodied in the selling of messages and images but in the very construction of products and constituencies of affiliation in the new millennium. It is pivotally located in the convergence platforms that integrate the old media technologies of television, radio and newspapers, and comic strips into the new technologies of handheld machines (Jenkins 2008). All these affordances have enhanced that whole area of stylization of the self and the self-management of everyday life that Foucault discusses in his *History of Sexuality* volumes, and Baumann alerts us too in books such as *Liquid Modernity*. But the processes of aestheticization also reach deeper into the marketing and circulation of goods and services, the proliferation of labels, and the redirection of difference and diversity toward the new vending machines of choice. As the author of *No Logo*, Naomi Klein, insisted some years ago, it is the aesthetics of entrepreneurial identities and labels, logos, and brands that have displaced the manufacture of products as the heart and soul of what makes post-Fordist capitalism tick. Everywhere smart capital is running away from the materialization of dense product inventories, costly overheads, and static models of factory organization and opting instead for the cultivation of new bonds of consumer affiliation and labeling, relying on the faithful consumer to spawn markets by parading the labels of branded distinction in their natural habitats. It is precisely here in this new restructuring arrangement, too, that the critical separation of work from leisure – a division in the social and economic orders that Marxist scholarship held onto from Marx and Engels formulations through to Harry Braverman, Bowles and Gintis, and cultural studies theorists such as Willis – has collapsed as labor has become deftly integrated into leisure. There is a constant diffusion of value in leisure generated in the 24/7 interactive engagement of the twenty-first-century consumers in the full penumbra of digitally based inducements in video games, online fantasy

communities, online shopping, culture fashioning, and even I-reporting.

Leisure is work and work has shifted radically into all leisure spaces. The consumer's body and its extension by handheld machines, such as the mobile phone, have become the new interactive canvases of commodity fetishism. It is in this framework of cultural oversupply that the modern consumer tries on new identities and engages in practices of self-correction and self-modulation. Transnational corporations such as Starbucks and Nike now brand new ecumenical communities with their labels like so many tattoos on the social/global body. And so, ethnic, class, and gendered communities are now coalescing around practices of consumption and patterns of taste rather than around production relations or ancestry, or geography, or biology. The language of the new aesthetically branded world now registers the new ecumenical orders of feeling, affect, and taste. These ecumenical orders overlap with the traditional collectivities of class or race or gender, but in the most frenetic and unpredictable of ways. This buoyant aestheticism has generated a new cannibalism as the modern actor seeks refuge in ever more savage intensities and hybridities (MacCannell 2013).

The Aftermath of the New Aesthetics and the Impact on Radical Scholarship in Education

This shifting terrain of the aesthetics of existence articulated to identity, and affiliation has overtaken neo-Marxist scholarship in education by events. We live in an era in which old metaphors associated with Marxism – concepts such as “class,” “economy,” “state,” “production,” “reproduction,” “resistance,” “the labor/capital contradiction,” “reality” and “fiction,” “ideology” versus “truth,” and “materiality” and “immateriality” are being worn down by the transformations of the past decades in which the saturation of economic and political practices in aesthetic mediations has proceeded full pace (Bauman and Raud 2015). The framework of analysis that linked education to capitalist employers, to factories, to the nation-state, and so forth is no longer serviceable as the coordination of economic and

symbolic production is now rearticulated along multiple sites in a global process of marketing, branding, and outsourcing of the production of goods and services.

We have reached a stage in this millennium where the old “conflict” versus “consensus” metaphors do not seem to apply. Instead of models based on conflict and resistance, increasingly social groups are being defined by overwhelming patterns of transnational hybridities, new forms of association and affiliation that seem to flash on the surface of life rather than to plunge deeper down into some neo-Marxist substructure. Paul Willis’s nationally and geographically bounded Lads are now being replaced by Hisham Aidi’s banlieusard diasporic youth formulating their powerful musical critiques of the French State and their protests against living conditions of immigrants by melding electronically relayed African-American hip-hop with Sufism and new North African poetry (Aidi 2014).

All these developments are turning the old materialism versus idealism debate on its head. It is the frenetic application of forms of existence, forms of life, the dynamic circulation of and strategic deployment of style, and the application of social aesthetics that now govern political rationalities and corporate mobilization in our times. The new representational technologies are the new centers of public instruction providing the forum for the work of the imagination of the great masses of the people to order their pasts and present and plot their futures. They are creating instant traditions and nostalgias of the present in which our pasts are disembedded and separated out as abstract value into new semiotic systems and techniques of persuasions, new forms of ecumenical clothing that quote Che, Mao, Fidel, and Marx, and “revolution” in the banality of commodified life – the publicity of one brand of dishwashing liquid as having “revolutionary” effects is just one good example of the work of aesthetics in the brazen rearticulation of terms and traditions in the brave new world in which we live. Who now owns the terms that define the authentic traditions of radicalism that inform our works? Who now has final purchase on the terms

“resistance,” “revolution,” “democracy,” “participation,” and “empowerment?” The massive work of aesthetic and textual production is blooming in a crucible of opposites – socially extended projects producing the cultural citizen in the new international division of labor, in which the State may not be a first or the final referent.

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Religion and Modern Educational Aspirations

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Introduction

Religion is – across national context – commonly said to have had a historically central role in educating and raising future generations in pre-modern times. In popular as well as in academic discourse, it has often been assumed that the non-West was and still is particularly marked and even controlled by religion up until today, and thus it is dubbed “premodern.” The West, including Western education, has in contrast been identified with modernity and thus secular rationality. Modernity in Europe and North America has been perceived as based on separation of religion from public matters, including separation of religion from modern schooling. Such views are related to the concept of secularization that up until the 1990s dominated Western educational and historical research, as well as religion studies, including voices critical toward secularization as a political project.

Since secularization as a research paradigm was increasingly found inadequate from especially the 1990s, historiographic educational research has challenged the narratives on modern

schooling and pointed to how religion has played a role in modern European and North American educational effort: How religion, especially in the form of Protestantism, has been used and transformed in the modern civilizing mission of schooling, in nation-building through schooling, and in the languages of education, and as such, circulated globally. The concepts of modern schooling that developed in Europe and North America from especially the mid-nineteenth century onward have been part of transforming and reinforcing religion globally from colonialism to present day politics of globalization.

The Question of Religion in Educational Discourse

Though it is common sense in the educational field that religion before modernity has played a central role in education, opinions differ when turning to a perspective of the present. In, for instance, Europe, among teachers, scholars, and teacher educators, as well as among politicians and other debating voices in the media, roughly two main positions can be detected. One position points to the fact that religion in the meaning of Christianity had such an important cultural impact that its role should be maintained since it provides the education systems with history, cultural background, and morality for the future citizens. The other position views religion as belonging to the past and views it as progress to leave religion in the past: The role of teaching future citizens morality and conduct today should, from this position, be sustained by what is seen as secular bodies of school knowledge such as philosophy of life, civics, etc.

Both approaches, though ideologically differently positioned, share a prescriptive aim, namely, to point out what role religion should play and thus which conclusions should be drawn in the education systems. The positions also rest on another common presupposition, namely, that religion has historically been fraught with morality and as such delivered the basis for the legislation and constitutions of States (“the law”), hence the foundation of present society. Religion is in

other words viewed as a form of morality in the meaning of guidelines for individuals as well as the moral basis for modern ideas of the political.

Seen from a historiographic point of view, such assumptions are somehow correct and yet not very precise. Though it is correct that in, for instance, Medieval Europe the church played a crucial role, it was just as much as a political, economic, and sometimes military force, and religion can thus not be confined to being a provider of morality. While the reformation in especially Northern and Central Europe led to new relations and divisions between State and church institutions, for instance, to several confessions and thus church institutions within the same State, it did not necessarily mean a division between church and State administration. In the Lutheran States in Scandinavia, parish priests on the contrary served as local administrative representatives of the State, and it was not least in this capacity that church and schools remained and became increasingly connected, namely, during the forming of the State education systems in the nineteenth century.

Viewing the role of religion – and religion in education – as confined to morality and a supplier of culture and cultural heritage is closely connected to modernity and to a political process of secularization in the meaning of division of church institutions from State institutions such as schools. This process began much earlier in republican States such as the USA than in, for instance, the European monarchies.

In light of this (ideological), positions as the abovementioned do, however, point to and exemplify central elements regarding how religion as a phenomenon has been perceived and made useful in the European and North American States throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, meaning during the emergence of modern schooling and the founding of education as academic discipline and science. This period was also the formative period for modern State formation, where State crafting, especially from the early twentieth century, increasingly became based on functionalizing and optimizing the State body and its citizens by means of scientific results and methods. As part of this process, what today is

defined as religion became scientifically conceptualized and described.

The educational field has played a pivotal role for projects of science-based State crafting and as a central venue for the political project of secularization. Religion did not disappear from education. Rather it was transformed and spread out, for instance as a central part of what historian and educational theorist Daniel Tröhler calls *languages of education* (2011) and as part of the salvation project of modern schooling (e.g., Baader 2005; Popkewitz 2011). Furthermore, religion in education can be seen as a force in what Emilio Gentile (in relation to Italian fascism) has named *the sacralization of politics* (1996) and as related to what, e.g., Robert Bellah, inspired by, e.g., Rousseau's work on "The Social Contract," has conceptualized as civil religion (1967). Finally, education in the form of religion and religion in the form of education have been important parts of European colonial projects, a process which has been crucial on the one hand to how religion took the shape of a civilizing education mission, which also reflected back on the metropolitan terrain of empire and on the other hand for the whole basis of talking about religion as a phenomenon.

Christianity as Religion and Education

As an academic concept religion was originally a European creation, a provincial entity that got circulated globally not least through colonialism, for instance, through missions and migrations. Historian of European intellectual history Tomoko Masuzawa has pointed to how the concept of the so-called world religions should be understood as situated in the European project of claiming universalism and as closely connected to hierarchies of othering (2005). While the upcoming discipline of anthropology played a decisive role as knowledge producer during the British Empire, the German universities, for instance, became an important site for developing what today is known as Comparative Religion.

The emergence of comparative studies of religion was part of a general rise in exploring and

conquering "the Orient" through knowledge production in, for instance, the philological disciplines, which boomed during the nineteenth century. At the Northern European universities, a new range of academic disciplines centered on "culture" developed, an effort that included attempts to make academic knowledge about culture useful to society. In, for instance, Germany, liberal theologian scholars were among the late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century pioneers of studying religion as culture. A part of this scholarly effort was to make the new science-based knowledge on religion useful for the modern State. These so-called cultural Protestant theologians argued that academic knowledge about religion as culture could provide State and society with culture and thus bridge between a growing divide between Christianity and culture by means of academic knowledge. Many also involved in the Social Christian movement which sought to provide solutions to the so-called social question as an alternative to the rising labor movement: How to resolve the growing poverty in especially the urban setting – for instance, through education – without fundamentally changing the social divisions of society.

The new cultural disciplines were in other words utilized from the outset, and seeking to utilize new academic results in the education system and to involve in the educational sciences was part of this endeavor for many cultural protestant scholars of culture. A German example is the reform pedagogue and Jena-plan architect Peter Petersen, trained theologian under, e.g., the Danish-German-Swedish liberal theologian and pioneer of comparative religion Edvard Lehmann, who also involved in the question of education. In Sweden, comparative religion in the form of "history of religion" became integrated in the school curriculum for religious instruction in 1919 as one of the first examples of this in the world. Such reform did not implicate that all religions were seen as equally valuable for developing moral and culture as part of creating good citizens for the State; rather, Christianity was viewed as being the highest of cultural value, but also, for instance, "non-Christian" figures such as Zarathustra could be of value in State education (Buchardt 2015).

Another central site for globally distributing the concept of religion into social practice was missionary education (and the upcoming discipline of missionary studies which collected knowledge about religion as well as on for instance educational efforts in “the missionary fields”). The missions were confronted with what in the period was increasingly understood as differences in culture among populations under colonial rule, and missionary education thus in different ways became a central site of the “civilizing missions” that were able to handle difference.

Historian Pama Sengupta has in studies of Bengal during the British rule shown how colonial pedagogy cannot be understood as a Western secularization of the non-West: The “involvement of missionaries in the expansion of modern education ultimately reinforced, rather than weakened, the place of religion and religious identity in the development of Indian Modernity” (Sengupta 2011, p. 1). This contributed to setting the conditions under which Muslim and Hindu educational reformers operated and which ultimately “made education one of the primary ways in which Bengalis, whether Christian, Hindu, or Muslim, came to identify and ultimately divide themselves” (Ibid, p. 5).

Also “at home” – in the metropolitan terrain of the Empire – missionary practice impacted education and led to new practices concerning religion in schools. Historians of education Rob Freathy, Stephen Parker, and Jonathan Doney have shown how the late twentieth-century reform of religious education in domestic UK schools where a so-called world religion approach was adopted can be traced back to, for instance, the Edinburgh *World Missionary Conference* in 1910 and the ecumenical movement which developed from such international cooperation (see, e.g., Freathy et al. 2015).

Protestantism, Educational Reform, and the Global Languages of Education

The world religion approach to the teaching of religion in schools can be understood as part of the development of concepts for schooling, which could grasp the social and “cultural diversity”

among the populations to be schooled. The world religion concept utilized in schooling can simultaneously – in line with Masuzawa’s points – be viewed as tool for dividing and creating hierarchies of population through hierarchies of knowledge.

The same can be said concerning the cultural Protestant academic involvement in the aspirations of modernizing schooling and modernizing the State through schooling in Northern Europe, e.g., in Sweden and Germany in the early twentieth century, as well as with their Protestant equivalents across the Atlantic: Protestant reformers that involved in the so-called Social Gospel Movement in the USA. Historian of education and educational theorist Thomas S. Popkewitz has shown how Puritan narratives of salvation reappeared in American progressive education, intertwined with national exceptionalist ideas about the chosen people. In addition, this entangled with ideas on the moral disorder in the conditions as well as in the people of urban settings, a legacy from the Social Gospel Movement to which many of the educational reformers related during the early twentieth century (Popkewitz 2011, e.g., pp. 220ff, Tröhler 2011).

The Social Question inscribed ordering and classifying principles about modes of living that differentiated and divided the qualities encased as civic virtues of “the chosen people” from those different and casting out in other, unlivable spaces. [...] The very inclusive principles that ordered the sciences of education and pedagogical practices entailed inequality through the divisions that characterized and distinguished the qualities of individuality. (Popkewitz 2011, pp. 235–236)

Though there were crucial exchanges across the Atlantic, differences regarding confession and State formation, which also impacted the field of education, are important to note. While tracing the religious elements in the language system behind contemporary globally circulating educational discourse, Tröhler has pointed to distinctions between republicanism and the monarchies and between the languages of different Protestantisms. Calvinism and Puritanism were influential in republics such as Switzerland and the USA and Lutheranism in, for instance, imperial Germany (e.g., Tröhler 2011). An orientation

toward *Bildung* and thus “Geist” and “the culture sphere” in German pedagogy and toward “the social sphere” and the demands of the republic in American educational science, can thus not be understood independently of the different Protestant languages which fed into educational thought and modern educational aspirations.

This is also mirrored in the differences between the roads taken by German and Nordic Cultural Protestantism and the American Social Gospel Movement, despite similarities. Both movements were confession-wise quite open and comprehensive, but the Lutheran imprint was strong in the North European movements, whereas the Social Gospel Movement developed in an environment marked by reformed Calvinism, the latter with a strong tradition for communal and republican engagement (cp. Tröhler 2011).

The new liberal Protestantism in Northern Europe did also have its social wing, for instance, the German *Evangelisch-sozialer Kongress*, a social and political movement, active from the 1890s and into the 1920s, with the aim of dealing with social problems from a Protestant ethical point of view, featuring key figures such as the pastor and politician Friedrich Naumann who also engaged in educational questions. However, it was not least by transforming religion into culture and putting it to work for the State in formal education that liberal Protestantism and educational reforming intertwined in Germany and in the German-influenced Nordic States (Buchardt 2015).

Protestant languages also formed part of the German reform pedagogy, but as it has been explored by historian and educational theorist Maike Sophie Baader, the Christian elements mixed with inspiration from, for instance, Theosophy, modern Western occultism, and esotericism in what Baader calls *figures of thought* (Denkfiguren) such as “the child as holy” and “the teacher as pastor” (e.g., Baader 2005).

Religion and Education as Scholarly Object

Rather than seeing modern schooling and modern educational aspiration as secular, it might make

more sense to understand educational modernity in its European and North American shape as, in the words of historian of education Fritz Osterwalder, pedagogization of the public sphere which went hand in hand with a sacralization of pedagogy (Osterwalder 2006). The extent to which religion in modern pedagogized form has been part of a sacralization of State and politics and of making the civil religious has not yet been fully explored, but that religion has played a vital role in this process is beyond reasonable doubt.

It is, however, important to note that insofar as it makes sense to talk about sacralization of State and schooling, it is to be understood as the flipside of the coin in a process of increasing secularization in the meaning of institutional division of State and church, a process which in the Protestant-dominated States in Europe took place from the late eighteenth century onward. The status of religious instruction as a subject matter in schools was during this process a highly debated topic in, for instance, many European States, and still is today.

The question of religion in education historically can, however, not be confined to the question of religious education. Just as the intellectual history of religion in schooling is broader than religion as a subject matter, so is the institutional history, as, for instance, historian Daniel Lindmark has pointed out (Lindmark 2015). Naturally, the question of religion in schooling can also not be confined to Europe and North America. Nonetheless the global languages of education circulated through, e.g., supranational bodies can be said to draw extensively on what historian and educational theorist Bernadette Baker has conceptualized as Western world forming (Baker 2009). The same can be said of the very concept of religion, and thus – once again – about its pedagogically utilized modern forms.

Cross-References

- ▶ [Deleuze, Religion, and Education](#)
- ▶ [Dewey](#)
- ▶ [Educationalization of Social Problems and the Educationalization of the Modern World](#)

- [Formation of School Subjects](#)
- [Global English, Postcolonialism, and Education](#)
- [Longing for Innocence and Purity: Nature and Child-Centered Education](#)
- [Nation, Nationalism, Curriculum, and the Making of Citizens](#)
- [Rousseau on *Bildung* and Morality](#)

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Resurgence of Freirean Pedagogy in the New Media Age

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Introduction

In this contribution Paulo Freire's pedagogy is replaced, into a contemporary context. The contribution starts with a short description of the background that led Freire to see the need to develop a pedagogy. A retelling of Freire's meeting with poor farmers in Brazil in the 1950's will be outlined in brief terms. These farmers were oppressed primarily because they were illiterate; hence Freire saw the need to develop a pedagogy that was able to solve this problem. Secondly, this entry highlights the trend that current Western curricula and schools largely focus on developing students' reading skills. The problem Freire faced in the 1950's in Brazil is no longer an issue. However, other problems have occurred, i.e., problems which may be comparable to the illiteracy among Brazilian farmers in the 1950's. For example, images have become an important part of the everyday life. People express themselves through images, are socialized through images, etc. Images affect modern people, and they help to understand the world. But can the young generation read images adequately? The claim in this contribution is that the absence of images in many Western curricula increases the risk that children and young people become visual illiterates. This

leads to the third point of the entry, namely, that there is a certain need to return to Freire's pedagogy, as a kind of repetition.

Repetition will function as a kind of method in this entry. But what is a repetition? The Danish writer Søren Aabye Kierkegaard distinguished between two kinds of repetition. Firstly, there is a mechanical kind of repetition, where the copy is identical to the original. Kierkegaard talks about "the same sameness" (Kierkegaard 1983, p. 170). A direct transcription of a text can be an example of this kind of repetition. Secondly, Kierkegaard's authorship contains a repetition that can be described as "the unlike sameness" (ibid., p. 175). An example here might be a book which is translated into another language. Even though the two books are very alike, they are also different and unlike each other. This latter kind of repetition will be used for the following analysis, i.e., a kind of repetition that cannot avoid to add something new, even though it shows deep respect for that which is repeated.

Thus, the structure and design of the contribution look like this: It starts with a brief description of Freire's experiences and how they led him to develop a new kind of pedagogy. This history is then repeated, by replacing it into a contemporary context, i.e., a problem in today's media age that is both similar to and different from the problems that was highlighted by Freire. In the third section, there will be a brief description of some basic features in Freire's pedagogical perspectives, before these perspectives are repeated in the fourth and final section. As such, the basic features of Freire's pedagogy are preserved, while some new features are added to that pedagogy, making it possible to deal with one of the problems that the new media age is facing. Through the repetition of this specific history and pedagogy, there may be a need for the resurgence of Freirean pedagogy in the new media age.

History Repeated: From Linguistic Illiteracy to Visual Illiteracy

Brazil in the 1940s and 1950s: Illiteracy

From 1946 to 1954 Freire was Director of the Department of Education and Culture of the

Social Service in the Brazilian State of Pernambuco (Torres 2014). In this service, he began to develop methods to teach adult peasants to read and write. The reason for doing this was that these farmers were, according to Freire, oppressed as they could not read nor write. According to Freire, this illiteracy was not only the root of oppression but also the root of the strict authoritarian mentality and absence of democratic principles in Brazil. The authority was on the side of the landowners and governors, who could easily oppress the peasants because they could neither read nor write.

At this time, Brazil was considered to be a closed society, in which illiterates, but also others, were silenced (Freire 2005). The illiterates did not have the right to vote and they did not have a chance to express their views on matters affecting their own lives. Consequently, they were deprived of feelings of responsibility and solidarity towards their own country. At the same time they were oppressed, neglected, and silenced; almost forced to be like the ones who were in charge. As for Freire, this was typical features of a dehumanizing society.

However, from the 1960s, things started to happen in Brazil, i.e., the closed society was beginning to look like an open society (Torres 2014). This occurred primarily in the period when the leftist politician João Belchior Marques Goulart (1918–1976) was president, for the period 1961–1964. Although much remained in order to say that Brazil was an open society, Freire found several hallmarks of an open society where participation in decision-making and opportunities for critical attitudes were present. Not the least, there was room for radicalism, and from Freire's perspective, the radicals were the subjects of history, as opposed to the oppressed who were regarded as objects of history, as their lives were governed by others (McLaren 1999). Where the authoritarians construct their own "truth," which is then forced upon others, the radicals seek to solve problems together with others and not for others.

Freire wished to do something about this and he saw possible solutions through pedagogy. He therefore developed educational programs to teach peasants to read and, as a result of he being appointed director of the Department of Cultural Extension of Recife University in 1961,

these programs were spread throughout Brazil (Roberts 2000). Although these programs were developed in order to learn to read, the underlying goal was to create an open society, free from oppression. Thus, Freire had to side with the weak and oppressed, so as to create space for critical awareness, which in turn would lead to a more humanized society (Freire 2013).

The New Media Age: Visual Illiteracy

There is of course a great deal of differences between Brazil in Freire's time and the new media age. Where the former society was characterized by closedness and totalitarianism, the latter is characterized by openness and democracy. Even though one can ask if there are any similarities between the two societies and eras whatsoever, such a claim might be supported.

To begin with, images influence the lives of children and young people to a great extent; they look at images, take photos, share photos, and give comments to images much of the day. With smartphones they shoot an enormous number of images, which are shared on social media, almost in the same instant as they are taken. Many young people share thousands of images over a year. The figures are almost scarily high, and there is almost no limit when it comes to sharing photos. This openness is virtually the opposite of what Freire witnessed in Brazil in the 1950's, as this society was characterized by closedness, rather than openness.

Still, there are some similarities between the two societies. That has to do with a typical behavior of many young people of today, i.e., they seem to think less and less about how their images look. Moreover, many young people are not aware of the power that is exercised through digital media and that such an exercise of power may have a profound influence on their lives (Maar and Burda 2004). Take Facebook as an example. People on Facebook often have many "friends," often several hundred. With so many "friends," one will easily lose track of who all these people are. Besides, others outside the "circle of friends" may easily get access to what is published on Facebook. The point being that users of Facebook are vulnerable. Moreover, the age limit in social media is set for 13 years, but it is not illegal for

children under 13 to be on Facebook or Instagram. These young users are particularly vulnerable. For example, imagine that a 13-year-old girl posts a picture of herself on Facebook. It is a so-called selfie. Her face is clearly visible in the picture and she makes a kiss mouth. Her intentions are innocent, but the 13-year-old girl has probably not thought about the recipients, or, rather, she has just thought that her selfie will be received by friends and acquaintances. What she probably has not thought of is that such an image may easily lead associations to something more than an innocent kiss. An imprudence may lead to an inadvertent invitation.

Another example is retouched photos depicting people as "perfect," for example, a picture of a slim and pretty girl, without any defects. Documentary photos in the media may serve as yet another example, where important events are clipped off. In both examples, the image is lying, and those who do not see through this lie can easily be fooled into thinking that reality equals that which is described in the picture. In other words, this receiver is deceived and therefore oppressed by the image.

To learn to understand images to a greater extent is clearly an advantage, in order to being able to use them in a good way. Not least, curricula need to focus on training in visual understanding. Today's children and young people need to acquire basic skills in the language they use every day, all the time. The challenge is that aesthetic skills have low status in today's society. Several Western curricula overlook not only images but also dance, theater, music, handicrafts, etc. As long as the curricula primarily focus on numbers and text, they help to oppress the language of image which young people use on a daily basis. Instead, the society entrusts the education and understanding of such a big part of being a social being to the children themselves. It may turn out well, but in many cases it does not. Thus, there is good reason to ask whether the curricula increase the risk of visual illiteracy among many young people.

What, then, does visual illiteracy signify? In short, a visual illiterate is one who cannot read images (Boehm 2007). Certainly, almost all people understand, at least to a certain extent, images,

just as most people can perceive the spoken language and understand that a dog is an animal or a rose is a flower. But although most people can talk and listen and understand, the Western schools usually emphasize that children must go to school to learn to read, write, and interpret texts, while developing knowledge about the history of literature. This is not the case when it comes to images, at least not to a large extent. Rather, skills in reading, writing, and arithmetic is considered to be of importance. The problem is that schools largely relate to an abstract world and little to the everyday lives of the pupils. For example, many curricula put emphasis on different ways to master poetry and equations, but this is not part of the daily lives of most pupils. As previously stated, the communication of most children and young people involve images, yet they do not learn to either create or interpret images at school. Neither do the pupils receive sufficient knowledge of the history of image at school. Accordingly, children and young people do not learn to read images the way they can read texts. That is basically the reason why children and young people of the new media age run the risk of being visual illiterates, a phenomenon that to some extent is comparable to the illiteracy that characterized the Brazilian farmers in Freire's time. The point is that the consequence of being illiterate, whether it is visual or linguistic, is oppression.

The Pedagogy of Freire Repeated

A good step in the right direction, when it comes to solving the problem of visual illiteracy, is to emphasize images in the curriculum. However, that is not enough. There is also need for a good pedagogy, and it is here that Freire's pedagogy of the oppressed is relevant. Henceforth, this contribution shall therefore begin by making a brief account of his main pedagogical perspectives, before relocating his pedagogy in the new media age where image plays a huge role.

Freire's Pedagogy

One of the reasons why Freire saw the need to develop a new kind of pedagogy was that the

traditional pedagogy posed many problems (Roberts 2000). The biggest problem was that pedagogy maintained the unequal balance of power in the Brazilian society. Through pedagogy, some decided and controlled, while some were governed and oppressed. For example, the relationship between teacher and pupil were asymmetrical (Freire 2005). While the teacher emerged as an authority, the pupils appeared as passive and manipulable objects. In other words, the traditional pedagogy consisted mostly in mechanical instruction, where control rather than freedom was prominent. As the pupils are controlled and converted into objects, while being manipulated in the direction that the teachers have pointed out, this pedagogy reminds us of the landowners who oppressed peasants for the sake of being wealthy. We are left with a dehumanizing pedagogy, where pupils adapt that which already exists (Freire 2014). Instead of being critical, the pupils are socialized into certain patterns and ways of living, without regard to their own world. Such kind of pedagogy does not lead to change for a better and more humane society.

Yet Freire saw opportunities for freedom through pedagogy. In working for a more humane society, pedagogy should, amongst others, create space for a dialogue between the pupils and their own world (Freire 2005). The teaching ought to start with problems that affect the pupils directly. The objective of this pedagogy is to open for critical awareness, including criticism of dogmas and accepted truths. At the same time, the pupils must be allowed to be involved in decisions about their own lives. As such, it will be possible for those who have been oppressed to enter the political life, which may be a way to change the world (Freire 2014). Instead of relying on an authoritarian relationship between teacher and pupil, Freire imagined that this relationship should be governed by a dialectical and dialogical relationship. To break out of an authoritarian relationship is possible when both parties are helping to solve a common problem.

Not least, pedagogy should allow for both reflection and action (Freire 2005). Through reflection the pupils can reflect on their situation in the world, and through action they can

intervene in the world, and possibly change it and making it more humane. For Freire, it is also important that the relationship between reflection and action, which constitute praxis, is dialectical (*ibid.*). A pedagogy without action will for him be considered as weak and powerless. At best it will maintain the status quo. Nor will it be of great help if actions take place without reflection, according to Freire (2005). In such cases actions happen on impulse, without any goal or intention. Thus, one may easily end in activism that is based on strong ideology and irrationalism. So, when the actions are not based on reflections, they may be characterized by power and authority rather than freedom. For Freire, this is a form of illegitimate praxis. Legitimate praxis, on the other hand, involves a dialectical relationship between reflection and action. In such cases, change without oppression may happen.

Freire's pedagogy of the oppressed aims at awareness, where the pupils initially realize that they are oppressed. The pedagogy is thus creating a movement that goes from a naive and unreflecting consciousness to a critical and creative consciousness (Freire 2013). For Freire this is legitimate praxis, in which the participants appear as subjects. However, this will not occur by itself. Above all, teachers should take responsibility for this to happen, which means that they must make room for active participants who will fight against oppression, as opposed to socially adapted individuals.

Overall, Freire developed a problem-oriented pedagogy, where the pupils were considered as subjects of their own world. Besides, and this is important, Freire did not perceive his own pedagogy to be final. For him, pedagogy had to be created over and over again, by way of a dialectical relationship between teacher and pupil (Freire 2005). Thus, Freire's pedagogy is always moving and changing.

Freire's Pedagogy in the New Media Age: Image Is Praxis

This openness makes it possible to place Freire's pedagogy in the frame of today's new media age. In this way Freire's pedagogy is repeated. While sticking closely to his pedagogy, trying to

preserve the same, something new and different do emerge, through the repetition.

As a first step of such a repetition, one should notice that Freire was preoccupied with the word. For him, the word meant praxis (Freire 2005). That is to say that the word must be supported by reflection, which in turn leads to action. While words without action will lead to nothing other than pure verbalism, i.e., a form of illegitimate thinking, words without reflection restrict the actions, leading up to pure activism, which is considered by Freire to be a form of illegitimate action. The consequence of both of these limitations is that the word loses its power. When the word corresponds to praxis, where reflection and action are key elements, it can change and transform the world.

One way of repeating Freire's pedagogy is to suggest that image means praxis. A slightly repetition of Freire thus states that image without action will leave us with nothing other than the language of image, while image without reflection will limit the actions, as, for example, the image runs the risk of losing its power in making the actions more humane.

But how can pedagogy make use of reflection when it comes to image? In many ways. One way may consist in the teacher having a dialogue with the pupils about images. As stated above, Freire suggested that the problems should be related to the pupils own experiences, and a good pedagogical method can therefore be to start the dialogue and reflection with images that have a special meaning for the pupils. Actually, there is empirical evidence that such a pedagogical approach can awaken something existential in pupils, something which has not been fully promote to consciousness (Saeverot 2015, p. 105). Thus, pupils can, by way of image and teacher as interlocutor, reach something that is important in their lives. The indirect way through the image initiates a reflection of the pupil, while the dialogue puts words on something that has been "there," but without being totally clear. Since the pupils have a central role in the whole thing, the free will may feel less directed from the outside. This corresponds well to Freire's idea that pedagogy must not be authoritarian in any manner.

But how is it possible to connect actions to image, first and foremost humane actions? One answer to this question is that certain images can have an awakening effect. Through image the recipients can imagine, and almost feel, the pain of others, whereupon the conscience becomes involved. A good example of this is found in another research project (Saeverot, in progress), where one of the pupils chose to reflect upon the now famous documentary picture of the three-year-old Syrian boy who shortly before his death said: "I will tell God everything." The boy is painfully aware that he will soon die, and listening to the trace of his words may be the closest one can come to feel his pain. The pain must be felt, as reason already knows that the boy is suffering. The reason also knows that innocent people die in Syria daily. Therefore, it will probably not be as powerful just informing the pupils about this, without image. It may be compared to informing someone of something which he or she already knows. What Freire's pedagogy aims at is to eradicate indifference. And image has the power to do just that, as it goes directly to the recipients' feelings and reaches out to the conscience (Boehm 2007), which may pull the recipients out of paralysis and at the same time awaken the state of passion. Thus, image is praxis, which in turn can realize Freire's dream of an increasingly more humane society.

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Revitalizing Islamic Ecological Ethics Through Education

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South Africa

Introduction

For a growing number of environmental thinkers, the social and ecological malaise afflicting people and the planet remains among the defining challenges of the twenty-first century and presents a spiritual and moral, rather than a technological, conundrum (Tucker and Grim 2001; Gottlieb 2003). Religious traditions, for many the world over, still offers "the primary form of cultural conversation outside the modern story of economic growth and technological fixes" (Oelschlager 1996, p. 47) and represent a way of imagining (and living) an ecological future.

Religious traditions present a range of world-views, metaphors, rituals, knowledge conceptions, educational approaches, and a lived spirituality – of relevance to the environment. By way of its demand for radical transformation, religion could also "become a powerful alternative to modernizing and a powerful help for ecologizing, provided that a connection can be established (or rather re-established) between religion and *Creation*" (Latour 2009, p. 464). Engagement with the environmental narratives of religion – or its ecotheology, produces both ethical and educational visions which respond to the ecological question.

The theocentric ecoethics of Islam presents an environmental imaginary based on the sovereignty of the Creator, the responsible trusteeship of humankind and the intrinsic value of creation. Drawing upon these ecoethics, Muslims across the world are actively voicing their concern for the environment and harnessing the educational landscape of Islam as one of the primary conduits for environmental action.

Ecological Ethics in Islam

Muslim scholars and practitioners, while approaching the environmental question from different angles, refer to the relationship between humans and the environment as an ethical one (Nasr 1996; Ouis 2003; Özdemir 2008; Llwellyn 2003). The Islamic view on nature is neither ecocentric nor anthropocentric, but is essentially theocentric (God-centered) and is drawn from “dissected parts of Islamic theology, law and ethics, in outline form” (Izzi Dien 2000, p. 81).

Concern for the environment is deeply rooted in all fields of Islamic teaching and culture (Foltz 2005). Theological concepts, such as *tawhīd* (unity), *khilāfah* (trusteeship), and *‘adl* (justice), have been drawn upon to illustrate the Islamic ecotheology. Islamic ecoethics generally involves the extension of these broad principles regarding the nature, meaning, and value of the world and its creatures to the human-environment relationship (Izzi Dien 2000; Khalid 2002; Ouis 2003). The ecoethical principles discussed below foreground the fundamental aspects of the environmental narrative of Islam.

Tawhīd is often put forward as the key principle underlying the ecoethic of Islam (Khalid 2002). According to Manzoor (1984), this principle is the sine qua non of the Islamic faith and asserts that God is the absolute source of all values and also the Owner and Originator of the universe. All discussions of ethical conduct in Islam proceed from this concept since an understanding of the principle of unity impresses upon the hearts of Muslims “what moral conduct or normal behaviour should consist of” (Irving 1979, p. 2) and affirms the interconnectedness of the natural

order, the creation of One God. Indeed, it is *the* principle which gives the religion of Islam its distinctive morphology and makes the ecoethic of Islam wholeheartedly theocentric. This principle, which centers upon the Oneness of the Creator, spells out clearly that the Owner, Creator, and Sustainer of the entire universe is Allah. This principle has profound implications for the relationship between humans and nature since it “liberates the human mind from the false sense of autonomy or dominion over the Earth’s natural resources” (Goolam 2003, p. 266).

Humans have been appointed as trustees on Earth, holding it in usufruct, answerable for the just and responsible discharge of this trusteeship in accordance with Divine Laws. Trusteeship or *khilāfah* is further shaped by the belief that humans, in their servanthood, are accountable for everything in their care. True *khilāfah* is thus not about dominion, mastery, or control over any part of creation, but is centered on responsible trusteeship, cherishing and carrying out the capabilities entrusted to human beings with humility and obedience to the laws of the Creator as expressed in His Books and in creation. This principle, as discussed by Muslim environmental scholars, portrays men and women as trustees or stewards, who are provided with bounties that should be enjoyed within limits (al-Hamid 1997; Izzi Dien 2000; Özdemir 2003). *Khilāfah* is located within the framework of Divine Sovereignty, encapsulated in *tawhīd* and requires humanity to care gratefully for the environment that belongs to Allah and serves His Will (Timm 1990).

Creation (*khalq*), a term used to refer to the natural world here, is a reflection of divinely arranged structure and order. The value of the natural world in Islam can be condensed into three primary functions: Firstly, all of creation has intrinsic value and is regarded as signs or *āyāt* of Allah, worshipping and glorifying Him, even though humankind cannot perceive this. Secondly, nature has an ecological value as an integral part of the whole ecosystem, created in measure and balance (*mīzān*) by Allah. And finally, nature has an instrumental value to humans who hold it in usufruct. The Qur’an states

that the natural world has been “subjected” (*taskhīr*) or “constrained” by Allah for human use, but this does not entail domination, exploitation, or control of nature, but rather use of the Earth’s natural resources within the ethical mandates of Islam. Lubis (1998) considers these three functions in a hierarchical fashion with the intrinsic value of nature, as *āyāt* of Allah, as the *raison d’être* for its protection and conservation. The view that nature possesses value solely for human use has also been challenged by both traditional and contemporary scholars, and the primary reason for conservation of the natural world is often put forward as the sanctity of creation (Bagader et al. 1994; Izzi Dien 2000; Özdemir 2003).

Fasād features prominently in the ecoIslamic discourse. Translated as destruction, corruption, or mischief, *fasād* is said to apply to the realm of the environment as it does to any other part of life. It is the result of transgressing the limits as ordained by God – including those limits in the natural world so cogently captured in recent scientific thinking on planetary boundaries (Rockström et al. 2009). *Fasād* results from humanity’s “unwary interference with the natural laws and environmental systems” and “[e]nvironmental pollution, which is tantamount to the disruption of natural balance, is the main form of corruption on the earth” (Ghoneim 2000). This interpretation, of *fasād* as environmental pollution and destruction, is prevalent among many Qur’anic commentators. The environmental crisis is thus framed primarily as a failure of human trusteeship, where nature becomes the index of how well a particular society has performed (Ouis 2003; Setia 2007).

Corruption prevails in the land and the sea because of all the evil that the hands of humanity have earned—so that He may cause them to taste something of that which they have done—so that they may return in penitence to God. (The Byzantines 30, p. 41)

Humankind is called, in the above verse, to desist from polluting and destroying the earth. They are encouraged, in the same chapter, to turn back from evil toward their “innate” goodness, or *fiṭrah*, the primordial nature of

humankind. *Fiṭrah*, the concept of original goodness and belief in One God, incorporates not only “passive receptivity to good and right action, but an active inclination and natural innate predisposition to know Allah, to submit to Him and to do right” (Mohamed 1996, p. 21).

So set thou thy face steadily and truly to the Faith: (establish) God’s handiwork according to the pattern [*fiṭrah*] on which He has made mankind: no change (let there be) in the work (wrought) by God: that is the standard religion: but most among mankind understand not. (The Byzantines 30, p. 30)

When living in her original state of *fiṭrah*, a human being becomes the perfect *khalīfah*, believing in and submitting to her Creator and His Laws (Mohamed 1996). What implications does *fiṭrah* have for environmental concern? *Fiṭrah* is considered to be the natural state of humankind which is one of being in harmony with nature. Muslim ecotheologians argue that what is required is a “return” to this natural way of living – embodied in the teachings of Islam. The notion of *fiṭrah* is therefore in sync with the call by environmentalists to live with an understanding of the interconnectedness of everything in nature (Ouis 2003) – in accordance with their deepest human nature which is beautiful, harmonious, and right (Khalid 2002; Chishti 2003).

Boasting an extensive and growing educational establishment, both traditional and modern institutions, are playing a vital role in the educational life of Muslims the world over, including education about and for the environment. Environmental education, which assists in the actualization of the ethical mandate of *khalīfah*, is now regarded as a central component of Islamic education since it equips Muslims with the knowledge required to fulfill a religious obligation, environmental care (Al-Naki 2004; Haddad 2006; Abu-Hola 2009).

Ecoethics and Pedagogy in Islam

Among the definitive purposes of the educational process in Islam is to facilitate the trusteeship of humankind, who are charged with living in accordance with Divine Laws and securing the

common good, justice, and welfare of creation, *maṣāliḥ al-khalq*. Knowledge, which will assist humankind in exercising this vicegerency, reflecting the highest ethical values, is therefore required. These ethical horizons incorporate both the human and nonhuman worlds.

The acquisition of knowledge, regarded as an obligation and an act of worship which garners reward, must also manifest itself in action (*ʿamāl ṣālihāt*). Wan Daud (1989, p. 74) defines *ʿamāl ṣālihāt* as “all those actions that emerge out of and in conformity to, the Islamic worldview” and include “ritual obligations and other religious duties as well as efforts of personal or social significance,” including environmental care and action. This action-oriented epistemology and life-affirming spirituality of Islam necessitates the importance of being *in* history, concerned with securing the well-being of all creation (Kazmi 2000; Ramadan 2009).

Muslim educationists face the task of developing reflective and critical engagement with all knowledge (*taʿlīm*); nurturing mindful individuals who undertake responsible action (*tarbiyyah*); and inculcating the spirit of social activism (*taʿdīb*) which epitomizes the action-oriented flavor of Islamic pedagogy. Several writers have identified these three terms as central to the educational process in Islam (Cook 1999; Hussain 2004; Waghid 2010). In the discussion below, these terms are conceptualized in relation to environmental education.

Taʿlīm is derived from the Arabic word *ʿilm* and encompasses several meanings including knowledge, learning, and intellection. As described in the Qurʾan, *ʿilm* delineates a broad spectrum of knowledge, revealed and non-revealed. The Qurʾan also uses a variety of terms to denote the various methods of knowing such as “listening (in the sense of understanding), observing, contemplating, reasoning, considering, reflecting” (Guessoum 2009, p. 64). Islamic thinker, Al-Farābī (d. 950), suggests that *taʿlīm* incorporates student-centered learning and is an interactive process that involves both the teacher and the student, in which the teacher facilitates the student’s journey toward knowing, comprehension, and conceptualization (Günther 2006).

Taʿlīm is thus conceptualized as “deliberative and reflective engagement” and entails socializing the learner into an inherited body of knowledge, revealed and non-revealed (Waghid 2010). However, it also requires, of necessity, the cultivation of critical thinking, independence, and courage as demonstrated in the prophetic pedagogy. The implications of *taʿlīm* in constructing the ecological narrative of Islam thus requires that Muslims reflect and deliberate upon the inherited body of knowledge, the ecoethical principles in the Qurʾan and Sunnah, the legal instruments and institutions oriented toward environmental care, and critically engage with ecological knowledge in constructing an ecoethic which responds to social and ecological injustices.

The second concept, *tarbiyyah*, is derived from the Arabic root *rabā* which means to make or let grow, to raise or rear up, or to educate and teach a child. The derivative term *tarbiyyah* is said to refer to pedagogy, instruction, and education. *Tarbiyyah*, in the educational sense, is frequently used in reference to “nurturing and caring for children” and teaching them not *about* Islam, but what it means to *be* Muslim – the beliefs, values, principles, rights, and responsibilities and attitudes which a Muslim should uphold (Tauhidi 2001). The importance of *tarbiyyah*, seen as the social and moral development of the Muslim personality, is echoed by Hussain (2007, p. 300) who regards the “quintessential goal of moral education the awakening and proper situating of the inner being within a person.” Waghid (2008) also assigns to *tarbiyyah* the meaning of responsible action. As it relates to the ecological knowledge of Islam, *tarbiyyah* thus extends the process of engaging with the ecoethic of Islam (*taʿlīm*) toward actualization of this ecoethic in practice.

The concept of *taʿdīb*, as elaborated by Al-Attas (1979), denotes the final and critical aspect of Islamic education – social activism, the vital link between knowledge (*ʿilm*) and good actions (*ʿamāl ṣālihāt*). This concept entrenches the transformative objectives of Islamic education. *Taʿdīb* is drawn from the concept of *ʿādab*, meaning “a custom or norm of conduct passed through generations” (Douglass and Shaikh 2004, p. 14). It also refers to the recognition and

acknowledgement of the right and proper place of all things and beings – manifest in the condition of justice (Al-Attas 1979). *Ta'dīb*, according to Al-Attas, entails not only having the knowledge of the right and proper place of all beings in the universe, its *fiṭrah* and *mīzān*, but to strive to be in harmony with the entire cosmos – to not only live in a state of justice but to be active and willing participants in achieving this state. Waghid (2010, p. 246) argues that *ta'dīb*, as social activism or good action, has “emancipatory interests in mind, which can be made possible through a just striving which takes into account [and assures] the rights of others,” human and nonhuman.

These concepts constitute the basic tenets of introducing the ecoethics of Islam in the educational process: reflective engagement with all ecological knowledge (*ta'lim*), the Words and Works of the Creator; cultivating the qualities required to undertake responsible environmental action (*tarbiyyah*); and effecting meaningful and positive change (*ta'dīb*) for the environment in one's self and in society.

The growing ecoIslamic movement is slowly moving toward reflecting the liberating ecotheology of Islam which affirms that environmental care is a religious obligation, an act of spiritual obedience, and requires action to right environmental aberrations. It is beginning to evince the holistic epistemology which requires critical engagement with *all* existing knowledge, revealed and non-revealed, to understand and formulate a response to the ecological question of our time. And while it displays greater success in highlighting the need for responsible environmental action (*tarbiyyah*), it needs to improve both the knowledge acquisition (*ta'lim*) and social activism (*ta'dīb*) components of the environmental learning process (Mohamed 2012) in Islam.

Conclusion

As the world faces mounting environmental challenges, developing a response which directs humankind toward just and responsible action is imperative. Islam plays a pivotal role in shaping the worldview of more than one billion people in

the world today. Its environmental narrative presents not only an understanding of the natural world – an ethic which promotes just, respectful, and responsible interaction between humans and nature – but an educational philosophy which could propel Muslims to harness the transformative force of their faith to right the environmental aberrations in society.

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Rhizoanalysis as Educational Research

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Synonyms

Actual-Virtual; Affect; Assemblage; Becoming; Rhizomatic Research

Introduction

In 1976, a tiny book, entitled *The Rhizome*, written by G. Deleuze & F. Guattari was published in French. It was later integrated as the opening plateau in the book *Mille Plateaux* published in 1980. From a concept of the rhizome emerges a concept of rhizoanalysis, a nonmethod in conducting educational research. Rhizoanalysis proposes to be different relying on its ontological force, transcendental empiricism, created by Deleuze and Guattari. Its originality lies in a decentered subject (human and nonhuman). It appeals to creativity, innovation, and becoming.

In the last century, structuralism was a significant philosophical and linguistic movement embedded in transcendent empiricism. It is a binary system (e.g., good or bad; literate or illiterate) associated with linear representation. Representation limits experience to the world as it is known to individuals, not as a world that could be. Linear representation assumes a world built on foundational knowledge that is taken up (re-presented) and created through symbols. Representation is something that can be directly experienced. Representation also considers that there is an object present but that it also has another meaning. For example, a daffodil in February represents awareness of cancer month.

Closely associated with representation is interpretation. Interpretation involves getting at the meaning of what something or someone represents. A metaphor can be considered an example of interpretation. However, Deleuze's renunciation of metaphor flows from some of the most fundamental commitments upheld throughout his philosophy: his rejection of the representational image of thought, his pragmatism, and his long-standing interest in the mobility of philosophical concepts (Patton 2010, p. 21).

... concepts involve two other dimensions, percepts and affects. ... Percepts aren't perceptions, they're packets of sensations and relations that live on independently of whoever experiences them. Affects aren't feelings, they're becomings that spill over beyond whoever lives through them (thereby becoming someone else)... (Deleuze 1995, p. 137).

Ontology

Deleuze and Guattari rejected transcendent empiricism in favor of transcendental empiricism. A binary system is unable to account for instability in systems. Deleuze in challenging the concept of binary systems such as those promoted by structuralism, for example, transformed ways of working with unstable systems. Regardless, there will always be a slippage, a line of flight (*ligne de fuite*). In this way, Deleuze and Guattari argued for an open system that appealed to instability, creativity, and mutation; hence, the importance of becoming.

They maintain their stance on anti-representation and anti-interpretation in that something (knowledge, perception) cannot be directly experienced. Deleuze and Guattari (1987) refer to interpretation as an illness, interpretosis. There is no appeal to interpretation.

... Actually, there is no longer any need to interpret, but that is because the best interpretation, the weightiest and most radical one, is an eminently significant silence ... (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, p. 114).

In addition to antirepresentation and anti-interpretation, other features of transcendental empiricism are immanence and difference, and subject decentering. They would be part of an assemblage, a key concept for Deleuze and Guattari.

Immanence and Difference

In keeping with transcendental empiricism, experience is not an event ascribed to the autonomous thinking subject. Deleuze and Guattari favored experience conceived in terms of the virtual thought of an experience, that of immanence (virtual-actual interaction). Here is an example. Two colleagues are walking along a corridor at school. The smell of coffee disrupts the conversation. What might happen next? The clock on the wall says it is 4 o'clock. Whatever has been going on has been disrupted. The rupture brings on a virtual thought of what might happen. It is asignifying. Potentially it actualizes by picking up a coffee and an impromptu meeting with the school principal at the coffee shop, returning to

class to correct class assignments, and perhaps going home. Where the smell of coffee might lead is unpredictable and not predetermined, perhaps to another rupture. A virtual-actual interaction (immanenc) repeats; however, the repetition is never the same. Becoming and difference: what it is/was could be no longer. In becoming, it is different.

Assemblage and Decentered Subject

The subject is decentered in that the subject becomes part of an assemblage (*agencement*). What is an assemblage? How does it function? What does it produce? Experience, presented earlier, is not grounded in the individual. The subject is decentered and connected to other elements in an assemblage. The elements in an assemblage are constituted nonlinearly and nonhierarchically. The example of coffee describes an assemblage consisting of connectivity between elements of content (clock, coffee machine, daylight, bodies walking) and expression (collective assemblages of enunciation). Deleuze and Guattari maintain that language is social and not individual and utterances reflect a dominant social order (Masny 2014b). However, the deterritorializing process opens up possibilities for extending experience in an assemblage. Collective assemblages of enunciation are considered a way in which speaking is expressed socially (e.g., order words, a clock expressing time, obligations) that disrupt/deterritorialize and in the process reconfigure the assemblage differently based on a relationality of the elements through affect. In this particular example, immanence emerges in situ. In other words, the virtual-actual interaction is made possible in relation to the disruption (coffee smell) that activated and disrupted (deterritorialize) the elements of content and expression and reconfigured the assemblage.

Rhizome

While the problem of closed systems might have contributed to creating an ontological concept of transcendental empiricism, Deleuze and Guattari were confronted with the problem of arborescence (the syntactic tree structures proposed by

Chomsky) which might have been a catalyst in creating the concept of the rhizome and promoting the rhizome as a horizontal system of thought.

Characteristics of the rhizome include: connectivity (“any point to any other point”), heterogeneity (“regimes of signs and nonsign states”), multiplicity (“neither the one nor the multiple. . .”), asignifying rupture, mapping, and decalomania. Each will be briefly explored for they set the stage for a rhizoanalytic inquiry that problematizes a received (conventional) view of qualitative methods and methodologies.

A rhizome connects from one point to another. The connections are heterogeneous. An example is the wasp and the orchid, a connection of animal and plant. A rhizome is made of plateaus.

A rhizome is made of plateaus. A plateau refers to “any multiplicity connected to other multiplicities . . . to form or extend a rhizome” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, p. 22). A rhizome has neither beginning nor end. Its shoots spring from the middle and grow horizontally in no predetermined way. A rhizome is composed of “dimensions or rather directions in motion” (idem p. 8). There are no points or positions in a rhizome, such as those found in a structure, tree, or [vertical] root. There are only lines: molar lines, molecular lines, and lines of flight. These lines “are merely localizable linkages between points and positions” (ibid.). For example, molar lines are rigid/fixed. When a molar line ruptures, it emits a line of flight/becoming. It is an asignifying rupture on a plane of consistency and virtual.

A rhizome maps its lines, a map produced and constructed, “detachable, connectable, reversible, modifiable”. It has multiple entryways and exits. Mapping involves “experimentation in contact with the real (idem p. 12)” while tracing involves reproduction of itself. However, according to Deleuze and Guattari, it is important to “plug tracing back into the map”:

The orchid deterritorializes by forming an image, a tracing of a wasp; but the wasp reterritorializes on that image. The wasp is nevertheless deterritorialized, becoming a piece in the orchid’s reproductive apparatus. But it reterritorializes the orchid by transporting its pollen. Wasp and orchid, as heterogeneous elements, form a rhizome. (idem p. 10)

The importance lies in a deterritorialization and reterritorialization to happen and reconfigure the assemblage (*agencement*). A rhizome with all its lines constitutes an assemblage. It consists of content and expression that de- and reterritorialize. The assemblage brings together various elements not pre-established but rather on a relation to each other through affect. While a received view may consider an assemblage, it does not focus on the relationality of affect of the elements in the assemblage and how relationships of affect create different becomings.

Rhizoanalysis

Relevance

In rhizoanalysis, ontology becomes a significant force guiding a research inquiry. Rhizoanalysis is a nonmethod. What is presented in this section becomes one way to do rhizoanalysis in keeping with Deleuzian ontology. Accordingly, rhizoanalysis constitutes a radical departure from what might be considered the received view of doing research, that is, postpositivist and humanist research paradigms (subject centering, representation, interpretation, etc.) that have been critiqued (Masny 2013; Mazzei and Jackson 2012; St. Pierre 2014).

Deleuze studied life through problematization. How does a problem come about and what has a problem produced in becoming? Problems stem from experiences in life. A problem invites experimentation. Furthermore, problematizing creates concepts. Concept creation is important as it provides new directions for thinking. In this entry, a problem arises from experiences of conducting empirical research in education. The problem is one of incommensurability. The autonomous thinking subject grounds experience, in other words, attempts to fix (pin down) and predict what research observations and interviews as data mean through representation and interpretation. In contrast, Deleuzian ontology engages in a decentered subject, antirepresentation and anti-interpretation, immanence and difference. Such a perspective of reality combined with the rhizome, itself an assemblage, de- and reterritorializes

empirical research and creates a new concept, rhizoanalysis.

What Is Rhizoanalysis?

There is no one-way to do rhizoanalysis (Dufresne 2002; Fox and Alldred 2015; Olsson 2009; Perry 2013; Waterhouse 2011; Sellars 2013). Regardless, its analytic orientation to research is based on Deleuzian ontology and the rhizome (multiplicity, connectivity, heterogeneity, rupture, and mapping). Moreover, in its movement of horizontal lines/shoots, a rhizome is nonhierarchical. In other words, every element (connection) is equally important. One element enters into a relation with another element. The relationality is one of affect, becoming in the process of mapping connections of lines: molar (rigid), molecular (supple), and lines of light.

Research Assemblage

There is immanence, a virtual actual interaction during which an aspect of the research assemblage disrupts (e.g. interacting bodies) deterritorializes/virtualizes becoming asignifying and actualizes as rhizoanalysis. When there is an unpredictable event (such as incommensurability), ruptures in conventional research happen and emit lines of flight. The direction of actualization cannot be predicted. Rhizoanalysis through a research assemblage creates new connections through becoming. What emerges is a different way of doing research until an imminent event engages once more in a virtual-action interaction. What was a particular form of doing research could be no longer. It is different. It is difference that allows for creation and invention to happen continuously (Dufresne 2006).

As stated earlier, rhizoanalysis is an assemblage and connected to a research assemblage. What emerges is a particular view of rhizoanalysis. In what follows are examples taken from a research project involving rhizoanalysis (Masny 2013, 2015). The research project focuses on acquiring multiple writing systems simultaneously in multilingual children. How does the process of acquisition happen and what does it produce in becoming? Accordingly, the research assemblage consists of content (the school, the classroom, computer, lighting, etc.)

and expression (collective assemblages of enunciation, order words). These nonhierarchical elements and their relationality to each other through affect contribute to de- and reterritorialize the research assemblage. The elements in the assemblage are not predetermined. In this entry, Cristelle, a 7-year-old girl in the research study effects and is effected through a relationality of affects of the elements of which Cristelle is one in the assemblage thereby becoming.

In this project there were filmed observations in class that became a springboard for interviews subsequently transcribed. The transcriptions do not undergo coding and are antirepresentational. In other words, the transcripts are not representations or a copy of the interview. Particular parts of the interview conceptualized as vignettes become the focus for analysis. The mind is not responsible for selecting vignettes even though the experience of connectivity takes place in the mind. Rather it is within a research assemblage, including observations that rhizomatic ruptures happen and with the power of affect flowing through a relationality of elements in the assemblage, vignettes emerge. Vignettes emerge based on the power of affect to flow through the assemblage and be affected by the assemblage. Vignettes deterritorialize and take off in unpredictable rhizomatic ways and reterritorialize creating new territories (e.g., video-vignettes, analytical vignettes, Masny 2015). Regarding analysis, the issue of data has been ongoing. Some researchers (St. Pierre 2014) critique what data do when connected to the received view of empirical research. In this entry, data have undergone deterritorialization and reterritorialized as palpation. Data in the received view are directly experienced. In rhizoanalysis, data have actualized as palpation that which cannot be directly experienced. Palpation (May 2005) will be explored further.

What follows is a research project that takes into account transcendental empiricism and the rhizome. Both govern rhizoanalysis and also promote the use of:

1. The infinitive invoking the prepersonal with the absence of subject and object; the infinitive speaks to events yet-to-come.

2. Indirect discourse decentering the subject.
3. A collective assemblages of enunciation (there is no first person pronoun) which speaks to the social nature of language, one in which reality is organized according to a dominant social order.
4. Problematization eliciting questions. Questions become responses to problems, “a useful way to suspend or resist this tendency to actualize-fix the virtual-problem as solutions-interpretations-recommendations” (Waterhouse, personal communication). Questions might elicit further problematization. As well, questions become a way to respond to data that cannot be directly experienced.

In an interview, Cristelle and the researcher were going over a riddle activity in class the previous day. She stated she did not enjoy the activity. She liked recess. She can play. She also liked drawing. When asked what activities she liked in class she answered that there was “none.” What happens then when asked to do activities in class she does not like? She replied that she “must do it.” The researcher inquired if she liked writing. She replied “no, it’s boring”, “everything is boring”.

With these vignettes, how do blocs of sensation flow through connecting relations that include Cristelle in the assemblage? The assemblage consists of content (Cristelle, the researcher, the video, the activities, the teacher, classmates, curriculum, the physical layout of the classroom, etc.), expression (collective assemblages of enunciation, order-words such as drawing after writing, curriculum), deterritorialization (becoming), and reterritorialization (new/different concept). The coming together of connecting relations in an assemblage is unpredictable, not pre-given, and formed at a particular moment in time and space. [A rhizomatic assemblage of connectivity, heterogeneity, multiplicity, decentering subject]

Cristelle stated that she must do the activities even though she does not like them. Is it the power of domination (*pouvoir*) through order words? Institutionalized power (*pouvoir*) in a rhizome consists of a molar (rigid) path that nevertheless ruptures and emits a line of flight. Is it a power of

becoming (puissance), an immanence (virtual – actual interaction), a potential for transforming and becoming? Herein lies perhaps the untimely of power and becoming. Do order-words constitute rigid institutionalized spaces (molar lines)? It appears that collective assemblages of enunciation and order-words such as planned curriculum that position recess and drawing relate to a power of domination (*pouvoir*). However, there is also the relation of elements in an assemblage that through the power of becoming (*puissance*), recess, and drawing become different (undergo transformation). What might happen? Questions emerge from a problem. In addition, questions might elicit further problematization. As well, questions become a way to respond to palpated data, data that cannot be directly experienced.

In the received view of qualitative research the problem stated at the beginning of a research project is followed by research questions. Questions are formulated with the aim of finding solutions. Taken-for-granted assumptions of research tools merit problematizing. In rhizoanalysis, conventional coding, problem, and research questions deterritorialize only to reterritorialize as problematization and questions formulated as responses in order to disengage from interpretation (interpretosis) and encourage concept creation. There is no appeal to interpretation, simply raw tellings. In other words, to interpret/explain is to judge.

From a rhizomatic perspective, representational data emit lines of flight, a becoming–problem that deterritorializes data, becoming other in response to what it is not, difference and palpating data. To palpate data and construct questions from data open to the problem of how data function and what data produce.

With rhizoanalysis, we are in the realm of the empirical, but not of the representational kind. Empirical representation of data relies on direct observable experience supplemented by rich and thick descriptions and member checks, and inviting interpretation through empathy (Masny 2014a). Representation and interpretation go hand in hand in conventional qualitative research. Through rhizoanalysis, representation and interpretation deterritorialize and reterritorialize as

antirepresentation and anti-interpretation. There is no direct experience of data. In other words, the research assemblage is not limited to what a researcher generates by way of interpretation based on the data before her/him. Immanence and difference extend experience of rhizoanalysis beyond what is to what might be.

Intermezzo

In education, there are many approaches to research. Rhizoanalysis is one that relates to an ontology proposed by Deleuze and Guattari (subject decentering, antirepresentation, anti-interpretation, immanence, etc.). Rhizoanalysis has its specificity, an opportunity to experiment with the unknown, the unpredictable, and the nongiven. Rhizoanalysis is able to respond to the instability that presents itself in the world.

This position stands in contrast to problems “given ready-made” that disappear in the responses or solutions (Deleuze 1997, p. 158). This is not Deleuze’s position. He has set about to problematize a situation emerging out of life’s experiences to create questions that open up discussions that might lead to further questions and discussions “in which there are many possible solutions each of which captures something, not everything, put before us by the problem” (May 2005, p. 83). As May (2005) suggests, Deleuze has put forward an ontology of problems. Perhaps it is an invitation to jettison ontology of problems as a driving force in rhizoanalysis for it can provide an interesting alternative to conventional subject-centered educational research.

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Rhizomatic Research

- [Rhizoanalysis as Educational Research](#)

Rights

- [Political Economy of Charter Schools](#)

Risk Taking

- [Cavell and Postmodern Education](#)

Rodríguez, Simón

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Introduction

Simón Rodríguez's writings are within the richest and most powerful in the Latin American nineteenth century. Over his entire written works, Rodríguez maintains an absolutely novel concept regarding popular education. Through this idea, the author denies the very identity principle of each educational institution of the time. The Latin American school in the mid-eighteenth century and early-nineteenth century consists of a diverse group of schooling institutions. Each one accepts within a determined kind of population according to certain identity criteria established by a caste system. In this context, different schools are created throughout the colony for the castes that comprise the Spanish Empire. Schools for rich white boys, for poor white boys, schools for girls according to their stratum and social place, schools for boys part of the natives' nobility, for the children of common natives that could not show nobility by birth, schools for mestizos, and schools for orphans (Gonzálbo Aizpurú 2005; Querejazu 2012). Admissions, as well as the contents taught in each one of them, were determined and oriented according to the identity of the school population for which they were conceived. Thus, we could say that the school environment is structured on the basis of a complex class

interaction system built over the principle of identity. Each one of these schools requires this principle as a condition for admission and accepting of a student. Thus, educational institutions ensure the preservation and replication of a determined social and political order typified by a division in hierarchies of the people that comprise it. This system did not experience significant variations during the early years of the republic and most of the nineteenth century. The idea of popular education coined by Rodríguez breaks with this schooling order as it entails the unfolding of a radical equalitarian principle, powerful and unknown until that moment. Rodríguez's *Popular Education* not only denies the identity principle held by the rest of the institutions, but it also affirms a completely different principle from which to open new paths to consider education for the people of America. Based on this concept, the author develops an educational project unprecedented in the continent. Rodríguez upholds an educational project that is equalitarian, welcoming, and irreverent. *Popular Education* regarding Rodríguez's work affirms equality as a starting point for each and every one of his students. According to this point of view, no student is worth more than the other. His schools have no distinctions regarding caste, creed, lineage, or sex. They are all equal. It is on this statement that the welcoming feature of popular education is based on. According to Rodríguez, every boy and girl in the city enters school without any identity requirements. Unlike traditional schools, which have strict admission criteria based on the students' identity, Rodríguez unconditionally opens his school to all children in the city. Finally, the irreverent feature of popular education lies precisely in the fact that, within it, respect is not based on fear, distinctions, or superiority of any kind. Given the equalitarian and welcoming features of popular education, no kind of subduing is allowed within.

Popular Education, the Philosophical Name of a Novelty

The Bolivian city of Chuquisaca was an area ruled and structured in hierarchies. The system of

division and classification of human beings based on an alleged racial composition was in full force in the early-nineteenth century. Its schools were a reflection of the city and the system. Rodríguez broke that order by creating and spreading an equalitarian principle implied in the inclusion, in the same classroom, of all children as equals.

"Education for all, because they are all citizens" (Rodríguez 1999, p. 284) is the representation of this statement which meant the dissolution of an unequal environment and the opening of another environment in Chuquisaca and Latin America. In *American Societies in 1828* he wrote on this matter. There, he states "... even if work is done to remove from peoples the idea they have on their fate, nothing can be accomplished unless they feel the effects of moving" (Rodríguez 1999, p. 271). From his point of view, equality and inequality of the people rest, ultimately, in the choices each person makes to that respect and their consequences. Thus, his "Education for all, because they all are citizens." Such statement assumes, unlike educational projects of the time, that citizenship, understood as a political concept that expresses equality among men and women, can be found in the very beginning of the schooling process. It is not a school that creates citizens, but one that affirms their opportunity. All children of the city, boys and girls, are citizens, are equal, and are therefore admitted to the new school.

Equality in Rodríguez's school is axiomatic in nature for it takes root and follows the logic derivative of its consequences. In other words, it is a constant claim from which a coherent practice emerges. It is a statemental dimension and not a program. For Rodríguez, equality is not something to be attained in the near future, but a part of the order of what is. It constitutes an appearance in an environment where inequality prevails and he upholds the abolition of that very environment along with the chance to create a new one.

Rodríguez's school, in its equalitarian claim, not only allows any and all to enter but provides time for studies to those who, until then, had to use it to work. Time off from social and work duties is offered in a radical and unconditional manner

there. Unlike other schools which offer free time to those who already have it by birth, money or gender, Rodríguez's school provides it for all based on the aforementioned principle of equality.

Such a gesture is unprecedented in Latin American education. So novel was the action taken in Chuquisaca that the common educational knowledge of the time was insufficient to name what took place. Authorities and local oligarchy employed terms such as "place of doom," "brothel," "whorehouse," "stunned Frenchman," "madman," "nun kidnapper," and "child corruptor" to talk about the school and the teacher. They never used educational concepts or any other knowledge related to the school.

Rodríguez was aware of the novelty that took place in Chuquisaca. What happened in his school was different from any other known school. New concepts were required to name what took place there. In this sense, he wrote "all foundations are pious... – some for foundlings, others for orphans, others for noble girls, others for sons of the military, others for the disabled... in all of them charity is mentioned: they were not made for the common good but for the salvation of the founder or the flaunting of the Ruler" (Rodríguez 1999, p. 358).

For him, common knowledge from institutional schools was not appropriate to show what happened in Chuquisaca, precisely because his project was something completely new for the political and social situation in which it was applied. In his own words "the establishment set in Bolivia is social, its combination is new, in a word it is the Republic" (ibidem). It was necessary to create a concept that, up to that point, escaped any educational terminology. His call to philosophy may be read in this sense. In *American Societies* he wrote "public teaching in the nineteenth century asks for a lot of philosophy: common interest claims for a reform and... America is called, by the circumstances, to undertake it" (1999, p. 234).

The school, his school, needs philosophy. For Rodríguez there is a close relation between theory, concepts, facts, and life in general. In the case in point, philosophy thinks, argues, criticizes, and conceptualizes what took place in his school. It

is the ground for his decision to break apart from the traditional educational order and creating a new one. Ultimately, it is that through which Rodríguez justified a way of acting and living (Kohan 2014). According to his interpretation of American reality in his school in Chuquisaca, a problem existed for which there were no proper concepts to notice it. The presence of boys and girls from the different castes as equals created a political anomaly within education. That is to say, something new and unnamed was introduced from a decision. This incursion opened a new setting that was unthinkable with the concepts and teaching methods of the time. New concepts were required as well as the commitment to uphold them before the battering of tradition and conservatism.

Popular education in Rodríguez's work fulfills that double role. On the one hand, it is the philosophical name through which Rodríguez conceptualizes this dimension of equality materialized in the presence of all the boys and girls of the city in his school. It is a theoretical construction from which he shows a decision that guided the rest of his life and constitutes the strongest invention of his ideas. It was a new concept that showed a new school in America. A public, equal, irreverent, and welcoming school. One that "combines knowledge and life, one that teaches people how to live, which means teaching them how to be active, animated, self-sufficient people" (Kohan 2014).

Militant Life: The Popular Teacher

On the other hand, *Popular Education* is an expression of a militant life. That idea is shown through his whole life as the foundation of any emancipation process of the people, for the people, and by the people in a radical and intransigent manner. Beyond relevant conveniences, Mr. Simón upheld *Popular Education* in each and every action and place. He always argued, debated, wrote, and proposed *Popular Education*. In his last writing *An extract from Republican Education* (Rodríguez 1999) published between April and May in 1849 in *Neo Grandino*, it is

possible to clearly see this committed gesture that supports a way of life dedicated to equal education for all. In the beginning of this text published six years prior to his death, he writes: "I have been talking and writing both publicly and privately about the republican system for twenty-four years, and the fruit of all my good actions has been the title of MADMAN" (225). Failure, mockery, ostracism, and coldness had been his companions since the failed experience of Chuquisaca. Few were those who listened to him, even less those who read him. The only appeal the old philosopher showed, walking erratically through the American continent, was the title of "teacher of the liberator." Everything showed the most definite failure of his ideas. Rodríguez himself seemed to confirm it in his writing. However, it is not so. The text continues, the paragraph ends in a fiery, challenging, potent, and why not, militant statement. Rodríguez, exhausted and full of failures upon him raises his pen once more and writes: "Children and madmen speak the truth" (*ibidem*). Far from quitting, changing, or betraying his ideas, he raised the odds and claimed them as truths.

This project of *Popular Education*, which Rodríguez puts into practice and defends during his whole life, is a revolutionary invention in the Latin American nineteenth century. Within it there is a new meaning to the position of those teaching, learning, and of what is taught. In relation to those learning, as we have said, the basis is equality as a true fact of reality. This simple fact is carved in a devastating manner within a tradition that wants to remain and blows it away. As for content, Rodríguez's work does not provide a body of specific ideas and doctrines to be taught or learnt beyond setting relations between work, political life, and knowledge. The only possible exceptions are some remarks in *Friendly advices to the School of Latacunga* (Rodríguez 1999:) and a comment to the note in page number 10 of *Defense of Bolívar* (Rodríguez 1999). Finally, the standpoint of the person who teaches is reimagined from two models of teaching: the horn teacher (Rodríguez 1999, p. 233) and the teacher that makes knowledge available to all (Rodríguez 1999, p. 63).

The horn teacher is the teacher that comes from tradition, concerned with dropping knowledge foreign to the art of living. They are people interested in their own knowledge, with no sensitivity for others' feeling, thinking, knowing, and living. For this he writes: "as proof that hoarding knowledge alien to the art of living nothing has been made to shape social behavior – observe how many spoiled wise men inhabit the land of sciences" (Rodríguez 1999, p. 104). They are individualistic wise men that can do little for thinking, creating, and developing a school that teaches how to live as the popular school intends.

As an answer to horn teachers, Rodríguez places the *teacher of all*, the *popular teacher*. For Rodríguez, the popular teacher that inhabits the new school is the one concerned with making knowledge available to all. Unlike the horn teacher, locked within himself, the popular teacher is one that volunteers unconditionally to his students and their needs with the aim to "INSPIRE some, ROUSE others, the DESIRE of KNOWLEDGE" (Rodríguez 1999, p. 17). He does not provide a particular knowledge but is concerned with teaching how to learn. He creates in his students a different relationship with knowledge and its output, places them as beings capable of understanding, questioning, and creating knowledge relative to the life each person wants to have. To summarize, as Kohan says, the popular teacher: "is he who creates in others the desire to understand and transform his own and others' life" (Kohan 2014).

These notions of *education*, *school*, and *popular teacher* are materialized in the city of Chuquisaca with Bolívar's support. The project only lasts a few months. The oligarchy in the city spread a series of ill intended rumors regarding Rodríguez and his work. These defamatory statements come with a series of disagreements with the government of the Republic which caused Rodríguez's resignation to his position and the closing of the school. A few months after leaving his position, Rodríguez left the Republic of Bolivia and set on a journey that would take him through Chile, Ecuador, and Peru.

As he did in Europe, everywhere he went he worked as a teacher. Always in the company of

two trunks where he kept his writings, he traversed different countries communicating his idea of a school for all. He practically lived in misery. He never accepted charity; he only asked for work. Ever faithful to his ideas and friends, he tirelessly repeated the need for a popular education project.

Eventually, he managed to publish his writings with little success. Most of them were partially published and distributed in installments. In the city of Arequipa, he published an early version of what would later be *American Societies in 1828*. In 1830, he publishes *The liberator of America's noon and his brothers in arms defended by a friend of the social cause* and *Comments on the land of Vincocaya in relation to the endeavor of deviating the natural course of its waters and drive them through the Zumbai River to Arequipa*. In the city of Concepción, Chile, he published *Social lights and virtues* for the first time in 1834. He published *Social lights and virtues* in the city of Valparaíso, Chile, in 1840. That year, in the same city, he published a series of eleven articles in the newspaper *The Mercury* entitled “Parties” along with an “Extract to the Defense of Bolívar.” In the city of Lima, Peru, in 1842 he published the second edition of *American Societies in 1828. How will the coming centuries be and how they can be*. In 1843, he published six issues of a work entitled “Critics to the Measures of the Government.” In Bogotá, the newspaper *The Neo-Granadino* published in issues 38, 39, and 40 during April and May 1849 “A short extract of my work on Republican Education.” This is his last publication while he was alive.

Exhausted, practically forgotten by all and very ill he arrived to the town of Amotape. The town priest, regarding him as a heretic, did not grant him entrance. He was forced to stay in a ruined house in the outskirts of town. He was accompanied by Camilo Gómez. The next morning the priest was asked to come to the bed of the teacher who is at death's door. He finally died in the Peruvian town of Amotape on February 28, 1854. Some biographers tell that in his death-bed, instead of confessing and requesting the last rites from the town priest, Rodríguez decided to perform a materialistic dissertation in which he

recalls the Oath Bolívar had made before the teacher not to rest until the continent was emancipated from Spanish power. According to those who support this version, the last Rodriguean gesture is proof of his faithfulness to the promise of liberation to which he dedicated his life. It is true that there are no solid data that may confirm this version. However, his writings, along with all biographic documents kept are more than sufficient evidence of the strength, courage, coherence, and creativity of a man who, with his way of life, transformed education in his time.

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Role Model

► [Quest for Heroes](#)

Rorty, Richard (1931–2007)

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Richard Rorty's (1931–2007) autobiographical article “Trotsky and the Wild Orchids” (1992, henceforth TWO) described his philosophical education and intellectual journey up to the writing of his last and controversial “philosophical” book *Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity* (1989,

henceforth CIS). (Rorty's last book is really *Achieving Our Country*, published in 1998, but he described it specifically as a "political" rather than a philosophical book: "The book does not deal with philosophy at all. It's just a political polemic" (2006, p. 88). His volumes of collected essays and papers, and his interviews and participation at symposia are not here included among his books.) The article described his early life and upbringing in his bourgeois family home in New York where his parents were Trotskyite political activists and where the discussion of revolutionary left-wing literature and politics were the order of the day. There, he says, he learned "that the point of being human was to spend one's life fighting social injustice" (1992, p. 142). The article also referred to his youthful predilection for taking solitary walks in the mountains of north-west New Jersey and becoming inexplicably but profoundly enamored of the study of "socially useless" wild orchids (1992, p. 143). In later years, as a philosophy professor at the University of Western Virginia, before he wrote TWO or CIS, he summarized his political and philosophical outlook at the time as "bourgeois," "liberal," and "postmodernist." Earlier, in *Postmodernist Bourgeois Liberalism*, he had identified himself as one of "us postmodernist bourgeois liberals," using the term "postmodernist," he said, in the same sense as Jean-Francois Lyotard's (1979/1999) to signal a "'distrust of metanarratives,' narratives which describe or predict the activities of such entities as the noumenal self or the Absolute Spirit or the Proletariat" (1983, p. 585).

Subsequently retracting on being "postmodernist" because Lyotard's book "did not succeed in giving the term a useful sense, nor have later attempts," to do so, he said that he "would prefer to talk about Foucault, Derrida, and the rest individually rather than try to lump them together as representatives of something called postmodernist philosophy" (2006, p. 95). In TWO he summarized the work of these philosophers as "philosophically right though politically silly" (TWO 1992, p. 152). The judgment that they were "philosophically right" signaled his broad but consistent identification with the post-Nietzschean/post-Heideggerian philosophical platform the

philosophers shared and which is often signified by "postmodernism." The "politically silly," on the other hand, signaled his radical disapproval with their politics which he regarded as still saturated with a "repellent Parisian world-weariness and hopelessness, as well as with leftover Marxist cynicism about gradual, non-revolutionary reform" (1990a, p. 44). *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* (1980, henceforth PMN), the book that first brought him his real fame, marked his critical break with the analytic tradition within which he had been educated and had worked as a philosopher. There he identified his philosophical outlook with that of Dewey, Wittgenstein, and Heidegger who he described as the great "revolutionary" philosophers of the twentieth century and whose merit it was to break free "from the Kantian conception of philosophy as foundational" which had held their earlier writings captive and to embrace instead a philosophy which was "therapeutic rather than constructive, edifying rather than systematic, designed to make the reader question his own motives for philosophizing rather than provide him with a new philosophical programme" (1980, pp. 5–6).

PMN was written to carry out the same therapeutic work on analytic philosophy with the view of contributing to the three philosophers' basic agenda of undermining what he called Cartesian/post-Kantian "epistemological foundationalism." This he defined as the claim made on philosophy's behalf to be the guardian of culture, underwriter of the knowledge claims of science, and "the notion of the philosopher as guardian of rationality" (1980, p. 317). A claim made good by its special expertise in epistemology. The book proposes abandoning these hegemonic claims, abandoning epistemology as a project of commensuration to bring all knowledge claims under a common set of rules, and filling the "cultural vacancy" thereby created with "hermeneutics" conceived "largely [as] a struggle against this assumption." Not as epistemology's "successor subject" but to signal the end of the need for such a subject (1980, p. 316). Hermeneutics would be content to replace epistemology's ambition for truth with that for temporary agreements. Its purpose would be *edifying* rather than systematic, its intellectual culture

conversational rather than truth-tracking. Its politics would be akin to those of a Deweyan democratic community where the conversation needs no grounding in an “antecedently existing common ground” to achieve its consensus (1980, p. 318) but is conducted “within an agreed-upon set of conventions about what counts as a relevant contribution, what counts as answering a question, what counts as having a good argument for that answer or a good criticism of it” (1980, p. 365). A hermeneutic conversational intellectual and political culture would have no need for “systematic” thinkers or “systematic philosophy” conceived as a *Fach* or discipline and engaged in a “project of universal commensuration” (1980, p. 371). It would need no overarching, hegemonic, metanarrative to bring all the smaller local narratives together under one truth discourse. The only sense whereby its conversation would be systematic is that it would accord with the community’s conventions worked out democratically through the same conversation. “Being hermeneutic with the opposition” for such a democratic community would be about showing “how the other side looks from our own point of view . . . how the odd or paradoxical or offensives things they say hang together with the rest of what they want to say, and how what they say looks when put in our own alternative idiom” (1980, pp. 364–365).

The aim of “edification,” of “edifying philosophers,” Rorty says, is “to help their readers, or society as a whole, to break free from outworn vocabularies and attitudes” (1980, p. 12). It thus corresponds with “Gadamer’s romantic notion of man as self-creative” (1980, p. 358), substituting “the notion of *Bildung* (education, self-formation) for that of ‘knowledge’ as the goal of thinking” (1980, p. 359). Rorty chooses the term for “this project of finding new, better, more interesting, more fruitful, ways of speaking” rather than “education” because education, he says, “sounds too flat,” too unexciting (1980, p. 360). Because “self-formation” is more suggestive of what he has in mind than “education” which is more associated with the transmission and acquisition of knowledge, whether the “self” in question is an individual intellectual self or the collective democratic

self of a community. The promotion of edification opposes the educational “to the epistemological or the technological, point of view,” with the specific understanding of the educational conceived as edifying (1980, p. 359). In *Consequences of Pragmatism* (1982a, henceforth CP), Rorty describes the presence of all-purpose intellectuals in the community and educated public, who would replace the philosophers as the protagonists of this hermeneutic, “post-philosophical,” intellectual culture, who were specialists not in truth but “in seeing how things hung together,” who had “no special ‘problems’ to solve, nor any ‘method’ to apply, abided by no particular disciplinary standards, had no collective self-image as a ‘profession’,” and who were “ready to offer a view of pretty much anything, in the hope of making it hang together with everything else” (1982a, p. xxxix). Earlier in PMN he had also described what he called the “inverse of hermeneutics” as “the attempt to reinterpret our familiar surroundings in the unfamiliar terms of our new inventions . . . to take us out of our old selves by the power of strangeness, to aid us in becoming new beings” (1980, p. 360). In other words, differently from the edifying language of a hermeneutic culture, its language is poetic, and his reference to it in the book anticipates a much stronger characterization of individual self-formation later in CIS in the figure of “the strong poet,” which will be returned to later.

In 1982, the same year that he published CP, Rorty published an article specifically on university education named “Hermeneutics, General Studies, and Teaching.” There he defines hermeneutics more simply as “anti-Platonism,” and Gadamer is still his “principle example of a ‘hermeneutic’ philosopher” (1982b, p. 2). Dewey, whose influence was written large in CP, is linked with Gadamer in the sense that, Rorty says, for both “human experience is ‘essentially linguistic’” (Gadamer, *Philosophical Hermeneutics*, p. 19) (1982b, p. 3) and in the sense that both identified the same “educational problem,” for the university, namely, “finding a way to guide students between the Scylla of Platonism and the Charybdis of vulgar relativism,” between the “reliance on a God-surrogate and on one’s

individual preferences,” and their answer is also similar; to put one’s reliance “on the common sense of the community to which one belongs” (1982b, p. 6). The essay then takes up the question: “what educational apparatus could be relied on to provide such a sense?” (1982b, p. 6). It criticizes the way humanistic and scientific education are distinguished and opposed to each other and wants to conceive university education as one into “great books” that put us in touch with great minds (as against, with respect to science, into a “scientific method” that can put us in touch with the nature of things). Students should be taught to read the books “as vehicles of *Bildung*, of the self-formation of the race, rather than as means for escaping the human condition by grasping eternal Truths.” In a manner such as to arrive “at a sense of human community, and of this community as foundationless, supported neither by science nor by history” (1982b, p. 9) and nor evidently by philosophy either. The scientific culture to promote this reading would be Kuhnian, the historical Nietzschean. The object of reading the books would be to “give students a chance for intellectual-hero worship by letting them see intellectual greatness as greatness at overcoming problems” (1982b, p. 10).

The historicist thrust of this educational program would be how the threat of vulgar relativism is defeated. Rorty refers to it as “liberal” and expresses his fear in the essay that it could be lost to a purely “vocational” one as “the fear that the student will never have heroes, will never fall in love with anything . . . will never ‘use his mind’, have his higher faculties awoken, utilize the better part of his soul,” hence “he” will be incapable of identifying with “his” humanity or of engaging in critical reflection on his society’s beliefs (1982b, p. 10). Nor does such a liberal account of an educational program signify some descent into irrationality or intellectual anarchy or lead us “to give up the notion of a ‘core curriculum,’ of ‘a body of knowledge common to educated men.’” On the contrary such a core is needed to prevent the “love affair” from being narrow and obsessional, “to make sure no student has only *one* hero, and that there is enough overlap between the students’ *sets* of heroes to permit the

students to share their romantic sensibilities, to have interesting conversations with one another” (1982b, p. 11 emphasis in original). “To pick a core curriculum,” Rorty continues his account, “is, therefore, to pick a community,” and the teachers suited to teach it would be those “whose sense of participation in the community – and thus whose sense of the point of their own lives – is somehow bound up with reading the books, or performing the activities, which they have picked for the ‘core’” (1982b, p. 12). Their teaching, he adds, should be seductive rather than instructional: an invitation to join a community of problem solvers “united by the romantic sense that solving these problems is the point of living” (1982b, p. 13).

Shortly after the appearance of CIS, in the early 1990s, there were a number of philosophers who speculated differently on the educational significance of his philosophical work (see Nicholson 1989; Arcilla 1990; Neiman 1991; Hostetler 1992; Wain 1995). But his response to them was far from encouraging. He replied by warning against what he described as “the danger of over-philosophication” in education, stating that he was “dubious about the relevance of philosophy to education, for the same reason that I am dubious about the relevance of philosophy to politics” (1990a, p. 41). (Arcilla (1995) himself subsequently wrote a book about Rorty and education, *For the Love of Perfection: Richard Rorty and Liberal Education*, Routledge (NY, London).) The statement which casts doubt on the very legitimacy of the philosophy of education is consistent with his attacks on philosophy as an academic, professional discipline in PMN and CP where, as we saw above, he supported the emergence of a new post-philosophical hermeneutic intellectual culture. Earlier than this short article on “over-philosophication,” in an invited address to the American Association of Colleges published in 1990 also titled “Education Without Dogma 1999,” he had dismissed what he termed the long-standing intellectual debate between left and right over whether education is properly about truth or freedom (the sort of debate, he said, Dewey had described as pointless) as a waste of time rendering the issue more complicated and

intractable than it needed to be. Thankfully, he claimed, the stakeholders had moved on and resolved the issue pragmatically by accommodating the purposes of truth and freedom within different processes of education and in different institutions, the first in “lower education” (i.e., primary and secondary schooling) which “is mostly a matter of socialization, of trying to inculcate a sense of citizenship,” the second in “higher education” (i.e., the nonvocational university), which is “mostly a matter of individuation, of trying to awaken the individual’s imagination in the hope that she will become able to re-create herself.” He wasn’t sure, he had concluded in this article written and published in the same year, “that philosophy can do much for any of these enterprises,” which was exactly the same point he made in his other 1990 article (1990b, p. 41).

This abjuration of “philosophy” does not mean that there is nothing about education in CIS, quite the contrary. But there is no reference in it at all to Gadamer or a hermeneutic culture nor to edification or the politics of conversation. The language at work in the book is of contingency and irony instead, and its politics are those of a liberal utopia. The education of the individual is now not about an edified “self-formation” but about the self-creation of the strong poet, who is “the maker” rather than “the finder,” whose poetry is that of radical self-redescription, and who is now “humanity’s hero – rather than the scientist,” as she was in the modern world (1989, p. 26). The strong poet is someone who is not content “to accept someone else’s description of oneself, to execute a previously prepared program, to write, at most, elegant variations on previously written poems” (1989, p. 28). Though a long self-declared Deweyan pragmatist, this figure of the strong self-created poet is clearly not Deweyan; it is primarily of Nietzschean inspiration and elaborated by reference to such as Freud, Proust, and Harold Bloom (who invented the term). All are strongly present in the book. CIS is the terminus of the intellectual journey described in TWO when he had abandoned his original project to find some “intellectual or aesthetic framework” that would let him “hold reality and justice in a single vision” (1992, p. 143) as “self-deceptive” all along, and

“... decided to write a book about what intellectual life might be like if one could manage to give up” (1992, p. 147), on this sort of philosophical project “to hold self-creation and justice, private perfection and human solidarity, in a single vision” (1989, p. xiv). The strong poet cast as “liberal ironist” is the intellectual hero of the “liberal utopia” the book articulates; the liberal is one who believes that “cruelty is the worst thing we do,” while the “ironist” is “the sort of person who faces up to the contingency of his or her own most central beliefs and desires” and has “abandoned the idea that those central beliefs and desires refer back to something beyond the reach of time and chance” (1989, p. xv). One is educated as an ironist and strong poet by reading the works of authors like Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Baudelaire, Proust, Heidegger, and Nabokov, all “useful as exemplars, as illustrations of what private perfection – a self-created, autonomous human life – can be like” and as a liberal, by reading the works of authors like Marx, Mill, Dewey, Habermas, and Rawls, all “fellow citizens rather than exemplars” (p. xiv). The sentiment of “solidarity,” the third term in the title of the book, indispensable to social justice, corresponds with the liberal aversion to cruelty, with the hope “that suffering will be diminished, that the humiliation of human beings by other human beings may stop” (p. xv). Its education is about learning to identify imaginatively with the suffering of others in one’s community and in humanity at large, coming to see them as “one of us,” and is obtained by reading appropriate narratives, “e.g. novels or ethnographies” (1989, p. 192).

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Rousseau on *Bildung* and Morality

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Introduction

When the idea of *Bildung* is attached to Rousseau's educational thinking, it is, of course, an anachronism. The idea of *Bildung* emerged in relation to the emergence of classical German idealism and is profoundly intertwined with its fundamental philosophical motives. When speaking about German idealism, we do not refer to a monolithic idea but to the thematically rich and complex philosophical discourse that often includes contradictory views on the fundamental philosophical concepts. If there is a common denominator that characterizes all the

philosophies of German idealism, it is that they are all theories of freedom and this fundamental motivation is definitely Rousseauian in spirit. It was Rousseau who “discovered” the peculiar concept of autonomy that inherits from (and advanced) Kant to become a shared aspect of German idealism. It is this concept of autonomy on which the modern tradition of *Bildung* is based. It should be possible, then, to reconstruct the idea of *Bildung* from Rousseau's writings and, consequently, to point out the profound influence on Rousseau's pedagogical thought on the emergence of the tradition of modern educational thought. The task of this entry is to do this – briefly and selectively – mainly in the light of Rousseau's principal writings, *The Discourse on Sciences and Arts* (*Discours sur les sciences et les arts*, 1750) and *The Discourse on Inequality* (*Discours sur l'origine de l'inégalité*, 1755) and *Émile* (*Émile ou De l'éducation*, 1762). According to Rousseau, these writings are “inseparable and together form the same whole” (Rousseau 1995, p. 575). In addition, Rousseau defines their fundamental and unifying motivation to defend, with their full force, the principle of *natural goodness*. The *Bildung*-theoretical significance of the principle of natural goodness becomes, also, evident when it is related to the concept of autonomy.

On *Bildung* and Morality

Jean-Jacques Rousseau's (1712–1778) profound influence on the emergence of the tradition of modern educational thought, its fundamental argumentation models and motives, is based on Rousseau's “discovery” of the concept of freedom as self-legislative autonomy. Rousseau developed this peculiar concept of freedom in opposition to Hobbes' definition of “freedom as the absence of external impediments” or “freedom as the silence of the laws” and, inherently, the limited definition of human rationality as instrumental to the nature (passions). Instead, according to Rousseau, human rationality has, because of its spontaneity, the capacity to determine from itself the universal and necessary theoretical and moral principles.

This definition is crucially modern: Reason as self-legislative autonomy does not have a cosmological grounding in divinity or in external nature but is inherent in reason itself and has, thus, the productive power to create from itself the ends for human life (see Henrich 2003, pp. 46–61; Velkley 1995). Although Rousseau does not use the notion of *autonomy*, it is clear that freedom in its truest sense, i.e., moral freedom (*liberté moral*), corresponds with and anticipates accurately the Kantian concept of autonomy:

It is he who knows how to conquer his affections; for then he follows his reason and his conscience; he does his duty; he keeps himself in order, and nothing can make him deviate from it. Up to now you were only apparently free. You had only the precarious freedom of a slave to whom nothing has been commanded. Learn to become your own master. Command your heart, Emile, and you will be virtuous. (Rousseau 1979, V, pp. 444–445.)

This passage (see also Rousseau 1997b I, pp. 8, 54) from the end of *Émile* summarizes how the idea of *Bildung* can be connected to, or reconstructed from, Rousseau's educational philosophy. As the passage makes clear, freedom as autonomy is distinct from the "apparent" and "precarious" freedom that the pupil has enjoyed "up to now." So, freedom as autonomy characterizes the *end* rather than the *beginning* (cf. Lockean concept of autonomy) of the process of *Bildung* and is, for Rousseau, the highest affirmation of human nature. Obviously, or at least according to Rousseau, we cannot attain (the idea of) freedom unless we are assumed to be not free from the beginning. Thus, the first anthropological category that demarcates man from animal is defined by Rousseau as a "property of being a free agent" (Rousseau 1986a, p. 148) (i.e., freedom of the will), and it is, specifically, consciousness or sentiment of this freedom (of power of willing and choosing) that constitutes the inalienable core of humanity. Instead of defining freedom, as just a necessary condition for the possibility for the obedience to the "dictations" of nature (passions), for Rousseau freedom, when referring to self-imposed laws, constitutes the very essence of the human being (see Henrich 2003, pp. 46–61). Submitting one's freedom – whether the dictations of

nature, of divinity, or of opinion of others – is therefore giving up the very essence of humanity and the moral dignity constitutive to it (see, e.g., Rousseau 1997b I, pp. 4, 45; I, 2, 42). The "property of being a free agent" makes it possible to conceive of man as a self-determining source of his actions; from this follows that the process of *Bildung* can be understood as a transformative process where man, in the medium of self-activity, cultivates the original sentiment of freedom into freedom as autonomy. The metaphor of perfection adequately describes Rousseau's idea of *Bildung*, as follows. In order to explain how the transformative process of *Bildung* is possible, Rousseau introduces, as the other anthropological category which differentiates man from animal, the faculty of perfecting oneself (*perfectibilité*) (Rousseau 1986a, p. 149). *Perfectibility* (cf. *Bildsamkeit*) refers to the plasticity of human nature, not only defined superficially as the human's potential to learn and develop all his natural faculties in the medium of self-action and in *relation* to the things and men (or in relation to the physical and moral worlds) but more fundamentally, referring to the idea that is *not* natural for man to stay in his original condition but instead, to strive beyond his condition and devise for himself "a new form of existence that is his own" (Cassirer 1989, p. 105). The concept of *perfectibility* has, therefore, not only an adaptive meaning but a crucially normative and critical one: There is, indeed, an idea of transcending what is "now" to the new form of existence. In this sense, the "world of *Bildung*" presumes, as its necessary *other* the prevailing order of things that is not accepted as a final and definite. In the case of Rousseau, this is the "world of *alienation*."

When this "new existence" is defined in terms of freedom as autonomy, it follows that *Bildung* is, for Rousseau, always moral *Bildung*. In the passage above, the concepts of *duty*, *virtue*, and *order* refers to the moral nature of the idea of *Bildung*. More precisely, the concept of autonomy includes the idea that true freedom is more than just negative in nature but is, so to speak, "more freedom" to guarantee also the freedom of others. Thus, this "new existence" presumes a moral character that is enabled to judge her aims and the ends of life

not only from the point of view of the private good and well-being but from a generalized point of view, in relation to the well-being of others and, ultimately, in relation to the overarching human good. That is, the concept of autonomy includes the idea of a reciprocal recognition of *persons*, i.e., it explicitly excludes treating others as a means to an ends, which would be an instrumental-strategic rationality (see Dent 1992, pp. 120–121). To put it briefly, when anchoring his theory of the *Bildung* to the concept of autonomy, the necessary consequence is that the idea of going beyond oneself to the “new existence” means accepting moral responsibilities toward others, society, and humanity in general. With this in mind, it is now also possible to explain what Rousseau means by saying that man is naturally good. After anchoring his theory of *Bildung* to the concept of freedom as a self-legislative autonomy, it is evident that by “the principle of natural goodness” Rousseau does not mean the moral goodness of natural instincts (*pitié*) or passions, but rather, to rephrase Cassirer’s (1989, pp. 104–105) formulation, the fundamental orientation and destiny of the human free will. Man is, consequently, “by nature good” if he/she lifts himself/herself spontaneously and without external help to the idea of freedom and surrenders voluntarily to the ethical law that safeguards not only his own person but that of others too.

Moreover, the idea of autonomy as a self-legislative rationality presumes, naturally, that there is an active *self* who is able to define for himself the commitments that he is willing to follow. When these commitments are characterized as *laws*, it means that they are general and, thus, products of reason (*raison*). The concepts of *self* and of *reason* and the link between these can be clarified as follows. Human rational faculties refer, in general, to the active faculties of the human mind or consciousness, the basic activity of which is comparison. Reason (*raison*) must be demarcated from the more limited form of human rationality, namely, understanding (*entendement*). Understanding refers, of course, to the synthetic activity of the *self*, i.e., the force of mind that brings together and compares the sensations, i.e., impressions made by the objects (so to say “not-

self”). Understanding is, thus, the basic activity of the *self* that, still, cannot function if nothing is given to it through sensibility (passivity). In fact, according to Rousseau, the *self* can be known and distinguished from the objects (or “not-self”) only because of its activity (see Rousseau 1979, IV, pp. 270–271). This is the form of rationality Rousseau attaches to primordial human nature and, to a certain extent, also to the animals (Rousseau 1986a, p. 148). A crucial feature of understanding is that because it is dependent on sensation, it represents the minimum combination, restricted to the immediate future or immediate past, or the “what is happening now” (see Henrich 2003, p. 49). One of Rousseau’s famous examples from the *Discourse on Inequality* illustrates the limits of understanding: “Such is still nowadays the extent of the Carib’s foresight: he sells his Cotton bed in the morning and comes weeping to buy it back in the evening, having failed to foresee that he would need it for the coming night” (Rousseau 1986a, p. 151).

What Rousseau calls reason (*raison*) is the distinctive human rational faculty that strives toward totality in cognition, a productive capacity to formulate general, intellectual ideas (i.e., the ideas that exceed the boundaries of the sensation, e.g., the idea of unconditioned duty). It is only with the help of discursive reason that the idea of the world as a totality of things can be formulated. Moreover, Rousseau defines reason as “two dimensional” (i.e., not as alternatives). This means that reason can have “two objects” that differ qualitatively and must be seen simultaneously (see Rousseau 2001, p. 40). This distinction is made in *Émile*, with the concepts of sensual and intellectual reason (see Rousseau 1979, II, p. 125) or alternatively childish-sensual and intellectual-human reason. Whereas the objects of sensual reason are sensible and material, measurable objects of intellectual reason (like moral beauty) are not, but discovered only by estimation. Thus, as it is easy to see, the distinction between these rationalities corresponds to the distinction between the definitions of prudential or instrumental-strategic reason and moral reason. As the Carib example above illustrates, understanding alone does not offer sufficient rational

resources for human life, and for this reason Rousseau, as the paragraph above expresses, attaches freedom to *reason*, not to understanding. Obviously, it is moral reason that has the capacity to give the ultimate ends for human life and, thus, has also a critical function when evaluating the utility of the ends arising from prudential reason.

It is of utmost importance to notice that in this passage Rousseau – as ever – attaches to the basic moral concepts *duty* and *virtue* (as a fulfillment of a duty) the idea of commanding, i.e., duty as imperative in nature: “Command your heart, Émile, and you will be virtuous,” and this means following the dictations of reason. This is one of the many examples Rousseau gives in order to exemplify that although freedom belongs to the intellectual realm, it can have effects on sensible world, i.e., the self can “conquer his affections” by imposing on itself the ethical law. Moreover, it makes no sense to speak about “conquering” if there is nothing to be conquered. So, virtue and vice are defined in relation to each other, and virtue is then, of course, always about overcoming the vice. From this it follows that Rousseau’s philosophy cannot be characterized as advocating primitivism (see Lovejoy 1923) because escaping vice is, at the same time, escaping the possibility of virtue and thus the possibility for the highest affirmation of human nature. This notion is furthered when the next important concept of the paragraph above is taken into consideration. The concept is “moral order.” Again, it must be noticed that it does not make sense to speak about “the order” if it is not defined in relation to something that is understood as its opposite.

There is some moral order whenever there is sentiment and intelligence. The difference is that the good man orders himself in relation to the whole, and the wicked one orders whole in relation to himself. The latter makes himself the center of all things; the former measures his radius and keeps to the circumference. (Rousseau 1979, IV, p. 455)

Rousseau introduces here two different, contradictory concepts of moral orders. The difference between these is defined according to the general moral perspective of their subject. The difference between a good and wicked man is that the latter promotes solely his private good

but the latter has adopted a more generalized moral point of view and, as consequently, strives to contribute not merely his private good, but the general good or well-being of humanity. This distinction has a crucial importance in Rousseau’s thinking in general because the core problem of modern subjectivity – what Rousseau designates *bourgeois* – and consequently the core of the evil, is egocentricity. Thus, the moral psychology characterizing bourgeois subjectivity stresses the self-interest connected with the definition of reason as instrumental to the limitless ends of passions. As Rousseau’s principal writings attempt to prove, this bourgeois characteristic or “ethos of the modernity” that defines man’s place as dominant within the whole has a great tendency in the end to destroy ideas of common good, fatherland, and citizen, for example. It follows, then, that for Rousseau virtue is overcoming an egocentric perspective of life. For this reason Rousseau defines virtue, in its most general sense, as a *love of order* that can be known, as it is clear, *only* in relation to the factual moral order. In other words, virtue as the highest affirmation of human nature is possible only within society. This is the reason why, for Rousseau, society is not a resignation of human freedom (Hobbes) but its fulfillment, and this is the credit that ensues from the societal bond (Rousseau 1997b I, pp. 8, 54). So in the end these clashing moral orders refer to the inner conflict of modern subjectivity, and this, of course, also underlines Rousseau’s modernity. It is clear that the idea of moral order does not refer, for Rousseau, to any concrete historical or societal conditions (e.g., primitive idea of *Golden Age*) but, rather, when anchored to the freedom (i.e., of course, indeterminate from historical and societal conditions), representing an abstract idea that is, in a way, realized and constituted in every virtuous action, i.e., in every time when a subject overcomes the egocentric order. This is how the concept of autonomy attempts to answer to the core problem of modernity: It does not define man’s place as dominant within the whole, but instead, “relativizes” it in a sense that “s/he orders himself in relation to the whole and not vice versa.”

The function of the concept of general moral order is, clearly, to offer a solution to the

teleological problem of modernity, i.e., to demonstrate that reason is “at home” in the universe in spite of all the contradictory evidence and apparent human suffering. What is equally clear is that this solution differs from other early modern solutions to this very same question based on anthropological empiricism (the tradition of modern natural law, modern individualism, or liberalism), which – still after rejecting the premodern teleology – is based on the idea that (1) reason can discern a natural order if the primordial nature is recovered by philosophical inquiry and (2) the observance of the consequent revealed natural order can overcome the human sufferings (see Velkley 1995, pp. 186–187). Rousseau rejected categorically all the variations of modern individualism (e.g., Grotius, Hobbes, Locke, moral sense theory) for a very simply reason: According to Rousseau the “cure for the disease” must be discovered from the disease itself, and the fallacy of modern individualism is that the individual searches for the cure for moral sufferings from the wrong source, i.e., from the *nature*, and as a consequence any resulting solution is ineffective. By defining freedom as at the core of core of humanity, Rousseau shifts the Archimedean point of philosophy from nature to freedom and establishes from this point of view the justification of reason by introducing an idea of the general moral order where observance can overcome human suffering. In other words, the idea of general moral order is not a projection of nature, nor does it have a model in nature, but is instead a projection of freedom whose critical function is to offer a normative orientation for human life in modernity, exactly what the main philosophical doctrines of British and French Enlightenment did not, according to Rousseau, manage to do.

There is still one crucially important *Bildung*-theoretical concept mentioned in the passage at the beginning of this entry that needs to be considered: namely, the *conscience*, which Rousseau also calls the *love of order*. Rousseau’s idea is that although reason can help us discern the idea of moral order, it does not alone have (the step Kant took) the motivational force to make us act morally. Thus, the status of the concept of conscience in Rousseau’s theory of *Bildung* is clearly

to function as a motivational principle for moral action. Indeed, one may be tempted to ask “why must I follow, or what makes me follow, the dictations of my reason and being faithful to my true nature by committing myself to the moral maxims that are at odds with the factual order of things?” Or “what makes me to search for the truth which is indifferent to my material well-being and perhaps not rewarded in ‘this world’ at all, if ‘this world’ is, so to say ‘untrue’?”

There is another interest, which is entirely unrelated to social advantages, which is relative only to ourselves, to the good of our soul, to our absolute well-being, which therefore I call spiritual or moral interest [– –] an interest which, in spite of having no sensible, material objects, is no less true, no less great, no less solid, and, in a word, the only interest which tends toward our genuine happiness, since it is intimately related to our nature. This, Sir, is the interest which virtue pursues and ought to pursue, and which in no way deprives the actions it inspires of merit, purity and moral goodness. (Rousseau 1997a, p. 262)

The words, “another interest” (or another principle of *love of self* (see, Rousseau 2001, p. 28)) refers to the fact that conscience offers a motivational basis for human action that is not the same than an interest of passions, i.e., the demands of self-preservation (in physical and moral sense of the word, i.e., *amour de soi* and *amour propre*). Whereas passions are, according to Rousseau, the principal instruments of freedom, serving the well-being of the sensitive being (in physical (*amour de soi*) and moral (*amour propre*) sense), conscience serves the well-being of the intellectual being (see Rousseau 2001, p. 28). What is passion for the body, conscience is for the soul. Conscience as a love of order is precisely the innate, i.e., transcendental (also named as a voice of God), principle of justice that requires a certain kind of an order – where happiness and moral merits are distributed according to the principle of justice – that the factual order of things constantly violates and cannot be accepted as a definite order of things (see Rousseau 1979, I, p. 66). Moreover, although conscience is, according to Rousseau, independent of reason, it cannot be developed without reason: “To know the good is not to love it; man does not have innate

knowledge of it, but as soon as his reason makes him know it, his conscience leads him to love it. It is this sentiment which is innate” (Rousseau 1979, IV, p. 290). Thus, the development of conscience is related to the moral comparisons (i.e., the activity of moral self) and the development of moral reason. In this way the concept of conscience offers, in Rousseau’s theory of *Bildung*, the critical *Bildung*-interest. Thus, the process of *Bildung* and the development of the moral perspective of life require, then, the cultivation of the rational faculties of mind together with the development of consciousness. Thus, the idea of moral order given to us by *reason* and *conscience* – a moral order that directs us to love it – develops together with the development of the moral perspective of life, affording a simultaneous and unitary whole (see Henrich 1992, pp. 13–14).

What, then, is the relation between moral needs (*amour propre*) and conscience? Rousseau uses the concept of *amour propre* in a double sense. In its natural and constructive form, it represents the necessary and healthy human need to enter into the moral world and to be acknowledged as a morally worthy being (person). In short, *amour propre* refers to the very basic human need: the need for recognition from others. Also, in its natural form this recognition is reciprocal. This becomes apparent in the fourth book of *Émile*, where Rousseau describes the birth of the first moral sentiments in relation to the “birth” of moral reason. Namely, the moral comparisons (moral reason) awaken the first moral sentiments: “This choosing, which is held to be the opposite of reason, comes to us from it [...] Far from arising from nature, love is the rule and the bridle of nature’s inclinations. It is due to love that except for the beloved object, one sex ceases to be anything for the other” (Rousseau 1979, IV, p. 214). So, it is reason that introduces to the sensible being the first forms of moral attachments by distinguishing the object of love from other objects. This identification presumes moral comparisons where certain objects are compared favorably to other objects. So, if this is how *amour propre* is born, its morally constructive role becomes evident when its reciprocal nature is taken into account: “To be loved, one has to

make oneself more lovable than another. To be preferred, one has to make oneself more lovable than another, more lovable than every other, at least in the eyes of the beloved object” (ibid.). So, *amour propre* is, in this form, an important avenue to virtue because it directs us to seek recognition from others and, thus, because of the reciprocal nature of the love, it grants to the other the same recognition that it demands (see Dent 1992, pp. 33–36).

On the other hand, Rousseau refers to *amour propre* in a very different and, with respect to the preceding discussion, directly opposite, destructive sense. This is closely related to the moral psychology of bourgeois subjectivity and to the theme of alienation. More precisely, if the former definition of *amour propre* can be designated natural, it can, however, attain the *inflamed* form that manifests the desire for domination, prestige, and will to power at the expense of others (as Rousseau defines vanity – that is one of most typical sentiments related to the inflamed *amour propre* – as an attitude that demands everything without giving anything instead), and in order to satisfy the demands of inflamed *amour propre*, the subject must adopt – to use the Habermasian terminology – instrumental-strategic modes of action. Clearly, this description closely resembles Hobbes’ definition of natural man and, as its consequence, a bourgeois society at war against all. However, Rousseau’s idea is that this form of *amour propre* is unnatural in the sense that it is against the principle of natural goodness and, thus, against the true well-being of humanity. Indeed, as we see from the description of the history of civilization in *The Second Discourse*, it is clearly Rousseau’s idea that *inflamed amour propre* steers humanity to its tragic end. Why this form of *amour propre* does not achieve dominance in *Émile* has to do with the pedagogical conditions found in the account.

On the other hand, conscience, as the passage above illustrates, demands a kind of moral action that does not seek primarily satisfaction from the opinion of others. It requires *unconditional* fulfillment of moral duties, and that is the reason why Rousseau writes that the satisfaction of this interest is “entirely unrelated to social advantages” and

is “relative to our absolute well-being.” Thus, the relation between the demands of conscience and *amour propre* is that the justification of the demands of *amour propre* should be considered in light of the conscience and not vice versa. As Dent (1988, p. 236) writes: “It is conscience that can check us in yielding to the importunate press of sensual desire and pleasure, to resist the urges of inflamed passion, and it can direct us to choosing to do what is right and just instead.” In this sense, it is exactly the principle of conscience that, in the end, constitutes us as a truly social being (see Henrich 1992, pp. 11–12).

In light of the concepts defined above, it is possible to give a brief interpretation of the relation of Rousseau’s principal writings. *Discourses* (second in much mature form) concentrate mainly, first, as an introduction to the genealogy of the pathologies of the modern bourgeois society and its subject and, second, to anticipate the course of the history of humanity as a perfection of bourgeois corruption to its tragic end. These writings introduce the first influential modern theory of alienation according to which the problem of modern bourgeois subjectivity is that the subject’s self-definition or the *sentiment de l’existence* is based solely on the opinion of others and, thus, not on the consciousness of one’s freedom. Thus, instead of thinking autonomously, the life of modern bourgeois subjectivity is a constant anticipation of the thoughts and opinions of others (i.e., living outside oneself and, thus, “losing the self”). It is easy to see how the theme of alienation is in contrast to the principle of natural goodness. Alienation refers, precisely, to the form of existence that is *not one’s own* and from the subject’s consciousness of this, according to Rousseau, originates all moral sufferings. The theme of alienation is related to the theme of egocentricity so that, in the end, the satisfaction of the limitless ends of passions, especially those that are related to the moral needs (*amour propre*), can be satisfied only by the affirmation of other people’s opinion. *Émile* may be defined, then, as an anthropological complementary to the *Discourses*. Because these contradictory moral orders are defined as direct opposites, it follows that the genealogy of the pathologies should be

understood as directly in opposition to the idea of *Bildung*. If man had in the primordial state of nature a sentiment of his original freedom (sentiment of the power of willing and choosing), then the history of civilization is not a cultivation of this but, instead, its suffocation. Thus, Rousseau’s critique of civilization is a description of the bourgeois moral order with egocentricity as its core. *Émile*, of course, introduces an alternative history of sorts to *Discourses*. From this follows, also, that the basic concepts of Rousseau’s anthropology are introduced mainly in a dramatically different light in *Discourses* and *Émile*. In *The Second Discourses*’ history of civilization, for example, *pitié*, i.e., “natural repugnance at seeing any sentient Being, and especially any being like ourselves, perish or suffer” (Rousseau 1986a, p. 132), turns into the weakness and the primordial *amour de soi*, i.e., the intense interest in well-being and self-preservation (ibid), reaching violent or inflamed modifications (inflamed *amour propre*, e.g., vanity). Reason is introduced in its one-dimensional prudential or instrumental sense and, thus, impotent to introduce morally sustainable ends for humanity. Conscience (i.e., the love of order) is not even mentioned. In *Émile* all these concepts are, instead, introduced in a constructive sense, as necessary resources when building a moral perspective of life, and in this sense it does not describe the genealogy of alienation but can be considered as a *Bildungsroman*.

Conclusion

Although the idea of *Bildung* – or the principle of natural goodness – includes the idea of an individual elevating himself/herself spontaneously and without external help to the idea of freedom, Rousseau asserts that the individual cannot do this without external and intentional pedagogical help. The fundamental pedagogical problem *Émile* attempts to solve is how to transform the natural, *amoral* being into a morally competent being who is able to define his place in the society (see Benner and English 2004). Clearly, for Rousseau, education is the bridge between these two anthropological images of man. Thus, the cardinal idea

of *Émile's* natural education is – as can be assumed on the basis of Rousseau's concept of *Bildung* – to prove to the pupil that he is, although always partly socially determined, also free to resist its corruptive power and choose virtue rather than vice, i.e., to submit his will rather to the commands of his conscience and reason rather than surrender uncritically to the power of passions. *Émile* can therefore be considered as a “study” of how education can promote the actualization of freedom or, in other words, help determine those pedagogical *necessities* needed to support the cultivation of freedom.

It is perhaps easy to see why education – when committing to this task – is designated *natural*. It is not natural in the sense that, e.g., the moral development of the pupil takes place or is targeted outside bourgeois society or “just happens” without an educator's intentional pedagogical efforts (*Erziehung*) or, for that matter, that the learning processes are supposed to “happen easily” without sometimes even “painful” efforts from the pupil himself. It is natural because it is related to the genuine well-being of the pupil and the actualization of his/her proper character. In fact, *Émile's* natural education is highly artificial, and this makes it possible to construct “the curriculum” of natural education in a way that it is not determined by prevailing bourgeois ideology. Thus, the concept of natural education is crucially a critical concept. Namely, if *Discourses* and *Émile* are seen as defining an alternative point of references for the future of humanity, then it is also clear that there are alternative concepts of education promoting the different courses of history. In this sense *Émile* introduces a fictional pedagogical reform that is a direct critique of the contemporary (mainly French) materialistically orientated bourgeois education. Because of this, natural education is an almost absolute negation of contemporary bourgeois education, i.e., the rationale of natural education is not even attempted to adopt from the prevailing pedagogical praxis. As Rousseau constantly emphasizes, bourgeois education is nothing but an instrument of the bourgeois moral corruption, i.e., does not cultivate freedom but its opposite (see, e.g., Rousseau 1986b, pp. 20–21; Rousseau 1986a, p. 210;

Rousseau 1979, I, pp. 43–46; Rousseau 1979, II, pp. 84–85; Rousseau 2001, p. 35).

The idea of *Bildung*, when anchored on the concept of freedom-as-autonomy, has a revolutionary significance from the point of view of educational theory (in a sense of *Erziehung*). Indeed, it can be claimed that Rousseau's educational thinking represents the first influential modern attempt to define the concept of education on the basis of the principle of autonomous subjectivity. Thus, Rousseau's educational philosophy can be understood as a critique that is targeted, first, against premodern attempts to define the concept of education on cosmological grounds and, second, against the previous modern attempts to define the concept of education on the basis of the anthropological empiricism typical to the tradition of modern individualism or liberalism. The “discovery” of autonomy, as should be apparent, alters radically the fundamental argumentation models and motivations of modern educational thought because when humanity is defined in terms of freedom, the fundamental questions of educational theory as well as the interest of educational science are, consequently, attached to the concept of freedom. Thus, the questions are: how can education promote the actualization of freedom and, thus, the actualization of humanity? How can educational science offer us “reflective tools” in this endeavor? This is, of course, the educational philosophical application of Rousseau's critical idea that all the philosophy has to be oriented toward a concept of freedom for this is the only way to restore the rights of humanity. It is well known that Kant adopts this Rousseauian idea as the “keystone” not only of his critical philosophy but also of his pedagogical writings (i.e., the idea of pedagogical paradox) (see Henrich 1992, 2003; Velkley 1995).

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S

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School Development and School Reforms

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Synonyms

[Education for citizenship](#); [Educationalization](#); [Equality](#); [Goals of schooling](#); [History of education](#); [Meritocracy](#); [School reform](#); [Social efficiency](#); [Social mobility](#)

Introduction

If there are two truths nearly universally recognized in the history of American schooling, they are that Americans have an unwavering faith in schooling to transform the individual and society for the better and that American schools are deficient and in need of reform. These two beliefs – limitless potential and inadequate realization – have combined historically to make school reform something of a national pastime. This entry explores the political, cultural, and organizational dynamics that animate the constant drive for school reform and that have produced the sense – not wholly unwarranted – of constant failure and the need for still more reform. The first section explores the political and organizational features of schools that have given rise historically to one major source of calls for school reform: the transformation of social problems into school problems. The second section examines the specific and competing goals of schooling itself, and how attempts to resolve the tensions between these goals has also given rise to constant calls for school reform. Though this entry explores these two sources of school reform separately, as will become clear, reform efforts are rarely strictly in one category or the other as calls for school reform are a function of perceptions of the broad array of social institutions in which schools feature prominently.

School Development and Societal Roots of School Reform

Though many American towns particularly in the Northeast had developed an array of institutions to educate their young – charity schools, church schools, private academies – by the late eighteenth century, scholars generally date the beginning of the common school movement to the 1830s and the rise of a tireless cohort of school system builders including, notably, Horace Mann and Henry Barnard. While access to schooling and literacy levels among Americans was already quite high by world standards, the common school reformers distinguished themselves by arguing for more systematic instruction, increased professionalization of teachers, more consistent attendance, and, crucially, a single system of tax-supported public schools. The promise held out by common school advocates that schools could produce morally upright, republican citizens was well attuned to the anxieties of the age. Faced with the socially disruptive effects of urbanization, the factory system, an increasingly interconnected market economy, and large-scale immigration – primarily Irish Catholic – Americans in the North were increasingly convinced that universal schooling was the key to social cohesion and preservation of the republic in an increasingly turbulent age. Thus, the curriculum of the common school tended to emphasize the middle-class Protestant themes of discipline, hard work, and self-improvement rather than strictly scholastic achievement. As many scholars have noted, the overtly moral themes of individual responsibility in the early common school curriculum meshed well with a society increasingly characterized by the inequality of market capitalism and the dissolution of the family unit in the face of shifting patterns of work and migration (Kaestle 1983; Reese 2011).

Though the arguments made by common school reformers proved alluring to a wide swath of Americans, the distinct legal and organizational character of American school schooling meant that the uptake of these ideas was uneven and the provision of schools available varied considerably by region and urbanicity – the South generally had fewer schools for poor whites and none

for African Americans; rural communities tended to have more limited educational offerings than urban centers.

The organization of the American school system is best characterized, especially when compared to other countries, as radically decentralized. The US constitution makes no mention of education or a school system, and while federal policy has encouraged the establishment of schools and universities through the granting of federal land to States (e.g., the Northwest Ordinance (1787); Morrill Act (1862)), the responsibility for the creation, organization, and perpetual funding of schools has always been left to individual States. States themselves, in turn, have transferred this responsibility to individual cities and towns – either permitting or requiring towns of a certain size to make provision for the creation of publicly funded schools.

The upshot of this organization – often described as “loosely coupled” – meant that historically there has been very limited federal or State government infrastructure to support the creation and oversight of individual schools. Unlike national ministries in other countries, responsibilities of the US Bureau of Education (founded in 1867) extended only to the compilation of statistics and the dissemination reports about school activities rather than direct influence on them. Likewise, the median number of officials in State departments of education in 1900 was two. Though States exerted increasingly strong influence on school policy starting around the turn of the twentieth century in the form of compulsory attendance laws, district consolidation, minimum school standards, and contingent State aid, these efforts were frequently aimed at prodding local officials to direct their school reform energies in particular ways and usually remained dependent on local acquiescence (Steffes 2012). Even in the second half of the twentieth century when school quality increasingly rose to the level of national concern, federal education legislation was still dependent on State and, more often, local officials for implementation. The distributed responsibility for schools has helped sustain the cherished American ideal of “local control” of schools and is a good example of the tendency of the American State to develop in

ways less visible – though not necessarily less strong – than European States.

The combination of the relatively limited, distributed State educational infrastructure; association of schools as community, rather than State or federal, institutions; and enduring cultural faith in the power of education to solve social problems through the betterment of individuals helps explain the seeming permanent state of school reform.

First, it has made schools a primary location for State intervention in social problems. The transmutation of social and economic problems into educational ones can be traced in a nearly unbroken line from early nineteenth-century concerns about social stability through late nineteenth-century concerns about assimilation, alcohol consumption, and public health to twentieth-century concerns about national defense, drug use, sexual health, economic competitiveness, racism, and inequality. In each case, schools were identified by combinations of social reformers, politicians, and the public at large as the appropriate site for addressing the problem of the day in part because of their ubiquity – nearly all communities have them and nearly every child attends one – and in part for the comparatively light touch that these efforts seem to impose. That is not to say that these efforts have not generated a fair bit of controversy – they have – but it is easier to aspire to change the flexible attitudes and behaviors of youth than the ossified ways of their parents. Since American society is rarely at a loss for social problems in need of solving, the task of school reform becomes a permanent tool of social policy.

Second, while the belief in the power of schooling has made schools a reflexive answer to many social problems, the multiple layers of organizational control – federal, State, local, school, classroom – and the limited capacities within each layer means that the translation of school reform policies into classroom practice is difficult and prone to the introduction of local adaptations at each level. One result of this organizational challenge is that cycles of “policy talk” – and even actual policy – can be largely disconnected from actual change in schools

especially given that timelines for policy action and policy implementation are often entirely distinct (Tyack and Cuban 1995). As was the case during the Cold War, lawmakers could be viewed as effectively combating the Soviet threat by supporting new and more rigorous math and science curricula even when the social payoff was in the distant future and ultimately unrealized when the curricular reforms were supplanted by still more and different reforms.

More often, successfully implemented school reforms have been those that have focused on structural reforms or the addition of distinct organizational features that are easier to achieve and more readily discernible than changes in classroom practice. Examples of these kinds of structural and organizational changes include the age grading of schools, the creation of issue-specific courses (e.g., sex ed, health, home economics), the establishment of kindergartens and junior high schools, and the introduction of curricular standards. Though all of these reforms are widely recognized as comprising the core of modern schooling, as organizational features of school, their capacity to address the social concerns that gave rise to their creation is limited: the introduction of more articulated and rigorous curricular standards adopted by nearly every American State in the 1970s to combat threats to American economic competitiveness had little effect on either classroom practice or macroeconomic trends.

Third, while change through schooling is a very indirect intervention into social problems – if for no other reason than the considerable lag between intervention and desired outcome – the reflex to use schools in this way can be self-perpetuating. Directing State building efforts toward schools for one public health problem, vaccination, for example, makes schools a more “obvious” site for intervention in the next public health problem. Likewise, in the second half of the twentieth century, the effort to rectify the harms of centuries of racial subjugation, segregation, and discrimination via the integration of schools or the effort to fight poverty through the extension of school programs and an increase in school funding directed the expansion of the American State in the

direction of schooling – a decision that not only reframed these problems as educational in nature but also that directed attention from other possible solutions to these issues. At a broader level, as many scholars have noted, the educationalization of social problems has a tendency to emphasize the individual dimension of problems in ways that can obscure its larger structural dimensions as well as bring the school system in line for criticism (and more reform) for failing to solve problems largely beyond its institutional capacities and purview. Thus, the failure of minority populations to achieve similar labor, economic, or social outcomes came to be defined as a failure of the educational system in particular and a failure of social welfare policy more generally (e.g., Kantor and Brenzel 1992).

Conflicting Goals and Organizational Sources of School Reform

The previous section focused on the ways in which school reform was the result of larger social issues becoming repackaged as educational problems. This section examines another source of school reform efforts: inherent tensions within the multiple goals of schooling. As political institutions in a liberal democracy, schools have always had multiple constituencies – taxpayers, employers, and parents – and, in turn, multiple formulations of their intended goals of which some are largely collective public goods (e.g., creation of good citizens and productive workers) and others are largely private goods (e.g., individual attainment and upward mobility). Though historically there have been many components and formulations of these goals, they can generally be grouped under three headings: democratic equality, social efficiency, and social mobility (Labaree 2012).

Stated briefly, democratic equality is the idea that schools should be primarily concerned with the creation and equal treatment of capable citizens with the capacity for productive participation in a democracy; social efficiency is the idea that schools should be primarily concerned with the training of productive workers who can fulfill the

demands of the labor force; and social mobility is the idea that the schools should be primarily concerned with providing opportunities for individual upward social or economic mobility. Though at different times education policy has been driven by a different combination of these goals, the need to balance these three contradictory goals has been a core organizational challenge of public schools from the beginning. One way to understand the constant churn of school reform efforts, then, is the persistent effort to alleviate organizational tensions when one or more of these goals are perceived to be out of balance with the others.

The complicated interplay of these goals can be seen from the earliest days of public schooling in America. As noted above, one early impetus for widespread tax-supported schooling was white, Protestant middle-class anxieties about declining moral values and social cohesion. Whether by opportunity, suasion, or coercion, the resulting increase in school attendance among all classes of white children, it also had several consequences that became the impetus for subsequent calls for reform. While increased attendance may have quelled concerns over the creation of competent citizens, the increased educational attainment among all classes of whites reduced the value of education as a source of social distinction for the children of middle-class and wealthy families. Conversely, as education became associated with citizenship in antebellum America, African Americans found themselves increasingly excluded from educational opportunity (Moss 2010).

Families seeking to regain the value of school attainment as a means of upward mobility and social distinction pressed in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century for the upward expansion of tax-supported schooling in the form of public high schools. Though enrollment in high school was initially determined by entrance examination – a mechanism that supported claims of equal opportunity, academic merit, and social distinction – demand for equal access to this new source of upward mobility led, in the early decades of the twentieth century, to the massive expansion of high schools and high school attendance.

Here again the expansion of educational opportunity in the name of equal opportunity led to the further reform of the school system via the creation of distinct educational tracks. These tracks allowed those in the higher, academic tracks to distinguish themselves from the larger mass of high school attendees. The use of stratification within levels of schooling has been used repeatedly to hold open the possibilities of social mobility in the face of expanded educational access including after the Civil War with the provision largely vocational education opportunities for African Americans and, in the second half of the twentieth century, as a way of integrating schools while segregating access to academic content (Anderson 1988; Oakes 1985).

The interaction between the social efficiency and democratic equality and upward mobility goals can likewise be traced to recurring calls for school reform. The early success of the common school movement drove not only the expansion of school access but also calls to curb wasteful school spending and to bring more organizational coherence to burgeoning school systems. These calls for greater efficiency through rationality and, often the introduction of techniques from business, are a recurring theme in the history of school reform. In the nineteenth century, they helped introduce age grading into the formerly one-room school house and encouraged superintendents in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century to fashion themselves in the mold of managerial experts overseeing the fundamentally technical process of schooling and helping to build the “one best system” and created a push for the introduction of non-college-oriented, vocational curricular tracks to aid the training of blue collar workers (e.g., Tyack 1974).

In the twentieth century as federal school policy during the Cold War increasingly placed an emphasis on the development of human capital, social efficiency-based arguments were combined with the general expansion of high school enrollment to create a push for consolidating school districts and the creation of the comprehensive high school in order to maximize organizational efficiency and, aligning with upward mobility goals for social distinction, the creation of more

rigorous academic tracks for the cultivation of the country's most gifted and talented students. In the last decades of the twentieth century, calls for greater academic rigor and accountability in the use of public funds combined with critiques of American economic competitiveness to produce the modern standards-based accountability movement. The accountability movement, given voice in the famous *Nation at Risk* report and crystallized in the *No Child Left Behind Act*, embodied not only the prioritization of human capital development that is the hallmark of social efficiency concerns but also enduring equity concerns that low academic standards disproportionately affected poor and minority students and middle-class concerns that upward mobility increasingly involved distinction at the global rather than national level (Vinovskis 2009). The general failure of the standards movement to achieve its goals of greater American academic competitiveness or greater equality of educational outcomes reflects both the chronically limited capacity of the federal government to intervene in classroom instructional quality and the orthogonal interests embedded in the American school system – while the standards movements have induced improvements at the low end of the academic spectrum, it has induced still greater improvements from those at the higher end of the economic and academic distribution seeking to maintain or advance their social position.

Conclusion

The American school system has been, and continues to be, in a state of nearly constant reform. This condition can give rise to the perception that the school system is in a state of crisis or irreparability. Such a view, however, fails to account for the ways in which the persistent calls for school reform are a function of society's general faith in the capacity of education to cure social ills, the contradictory goals society seeks to produce through its school system, and the system's own success in meeting some of these goals. The result is a system that is in part a victim of its own success and that appears dysfunctional as a result – success at addressing certain social

ills is rewarded by the passing off of still more and greater social problems; and success in expanding opportunity along one dimension is met with calls for greater capacity or efficiency in another. Thus, the perpetual state of school reform should be viewed not as a sign of weakness or disrepair but, on the contrary, of the enduring vitality and perpetual growth of the school system.

Cross-References

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Schopenhauer and Nietzsche on Moral Growth

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Arthur Schopenhauer

According to Immanuel Kant, the outcome of moral growth should be a person that is rational and free and possesses a good will. The Kantian Enlightened mature person is a master of his or her feelings also in the case that these emotions are in accordance with the categorical imperative. Arthur Schopenhauer holds a very different view on what is a truly morally mature person. For Schopenhauer, a mature person is not the one that follows duty (categorical imperative), but the truly mature is a holy ascetic who has developed his virtues of compassion (*Mitleid*) to perfection. Schopenhauer claims that morality is a matter of intuition (*Anschauung*), not practical reason and duty. Nevertheless, Schopenhauer was impressed by Kant's architecture of thinking. Schopenhauer's ethics, in the same manner as his metaphysics, grows from his critique of Kant, which does not diminish his debt to Kant (On the relationship between Kant's and Schopenhauer's metaphysics, see Räsänen 2005; Viljanen 2009). Schopenhauer considers Kant's model of the two kingdoms as "Kant's greatest and most brilliant merit in the service of ethics" (Schopenhauer 2010, p. 184) (The phrase "member of two kingdoms" is not Kant's own expression but rather an established interpretation of his practical philosophy. Kant only wrote about being a member of the sensible and the intelligible world. Schopenhauer didn't use the phrase "two kingdoms" either. He used the expression "coexistence of freedom with necessity" (Schopenhauer 2010, p. 185).).

Kant claims that the causality of freedom exists alongside the causality of nature. The human being is simultaneously a member of two kingdoms: the

kingdom of necessity (natural causality in the sensible world) and the kingdom of freedom (causality of freedom in the intelligible world) (Kant 1971, p. 104; Kant 2002, p. 80; see also Hudson 2002). The causality of freedom simply means that a human being has the capacity (faculty) to begin a process in the world just by the power of his or her will. This capacity exists despite the lack of empirical proof. Kant postulates without a deduction that there exists such a thing as the causality of freedom which is related to the timeless essence of the human being, i.e., the transcendental ego (Kant 2007, p. A552/B580):

The causality of reason in its intelligible character does not arise or start working at certain time in producing an effect. For then it would itself be subjected to the natural law of appearances, to the extent that this law determines causal series in time, and its causality would then be nature not freedom.

Schopenhauer agrees with Kant that humans have an *intelligible character* and an *empirical character*. Schopenhauer follows Kant's so-called transcendental aesthetic and claims that the *intelligible character* is not limited by time and space. Time and space are just forms of sensuous intuition (*Anschauung*). Things appear to have a spatial and temporal dimension but these dimensions are not the properties of a *thing-in-itself*. Schopenhauer takes from Kant also the division between *appearance* (the world of representation) and *thing-in-itself*. Unlike Kant, Schopenhauer associates *appearance* with the human's *empirical character* and *thing-in-itself* with the *intelligible character*. And to distance himself even more from Kant, Schopenhauer does not believe in "the freedom of will" in a Kantian sense (Schopenhauer believes in another kind of human freedom. See Schopenhauer 1969, pp. 286–293. Schopenhauer is very skeptical towards Kant's notion of the freedom of will, because it arises the question of "Can you will what you will?" and after that "Can you also will what you will to will?" *ad infinitum*. Furthermore, Schopenhauer was not satisfied with Kant's definition that causality of freedom is the ability to initiate a series of alterations by oneself without preceding causes. For Schopenhauer, that is just *liberum arbitrium indifferentiae*, e.g., free

choice of indifference. See Schopenhauer 2010, pp. 7–43. Schopenhauer's critique of Kant shows that Schopenhauer was truly a master of rhetoric and eristic. He even wrote a small book called *The Art of Always Being Right*. See Schopenhauer 2004.), but he still considers persons to be responsible for their actions because of their *intelligible character* and voice of conscience (Schopenhauer 2010, p. 186):

Freedom belongs not to the empirical, but only to the intelligible character. A given person's 'doing' is necessarily determined externally through motives and internally through his character; hence, everything that he does occurs necessarily. But in his 'essence', there lies freedom.

Schopenhauer writes that it is commonly thought that the will of the human being is free and independent. Schopenhauer states that every individual action is determined by the effect of motive on the character. Effect and cause are one form of the universal law of principle of sufficient reason (*principii rationis*), and human action, like every phenomenon (appearance), follows this law. The *thing-in-itself*, or a *noumenal thing*, is free from the law of principle of sufficient reason (of acting). "But because in self-consciousness the will is known directly and in itself, there also lies in this consciousness the consciousness of freedom" (Schopenhauer 1969, p. 113). A priori (before experience), everyone considers himself to be quite free, but a posteriori (through experience), everyone finds that he is not free. Schopenhauer cites Helvetius: *La Liberté est un mystère* – Freedom is a mystery (Schopenhauer 2010, p. 33).

In his work, Schopenhauer combined eighteenth-century Enlightenment, early nineteenth-century Romanticism, and Ancient Indian philosophy. His philosophy contains strong pessimism, but still there can be found some positive Stoic and Buddhist notions of morality. Schopenhauer claims that the source of morality is our natural feeling of compassion (*Mitleid*) which comes to contradiction with the basic strive of "will-to-live" (*Wille zum Leben*) (see Salomaa 1944, pp. 305–308). According to Schopenhauer, all animals, including humans, are manifestations of the will-to-live. The will-to-live is for Schopenhauer the ultimate thing-in-itself (see

Schopenhauer 1969, pp. 112–120). Everything else is *phenomenal* – Platonic shapes on the wall. The will to live is *noumenal* (Platonic *eidos*). The *noumenal* world is the “world as will” (*Die Welt als Wille*) and the *phenomenal* world is the “world as representation” (*Die Welt als Vorstellung*). In a Spinozian manner, the (metaphysical) will is the world, but humans cannot have knowledge about the will. Human knowledge concerns spatial and temporal phenomena (appearances) wherefrom humans form representations – Platonic shadows of the shadows. In the *phenomenal world*, will manifests itself as the will-to-live. To deny will is same as denying the world and will-to-live, which is for Schopenhauer the ultimate moral end. Will is the source of all suffering, and a person who is free from willing is at the highest state of morality aimed at peaceful nothingness (see Schopenhauer 1966, pp. 603–633).

For Schopenhauer, the will-to-live is not an empirical will. Will is metaphysical (*noumenal*), and humans cannot have any empirical knowledge of this will. Nevertheless, we do know or feel it intuitively. Intuitively we understand that there exists some irrational essence that blindly forces us to live and makes us want to exist. We have this intuition because we have a body, and the body is a manifestation of will or the objectivity of will (Schopenhauer 1969, p. 100). Through our bodies, will makes us prefer existing over nonexisting. It makes us will rather than deny willing. Will is irrational, senseless, original, and groundless (Schopenhauer 1969, p. 290). Intuitively we follow the irrational ethics of the will-to-live. Intuitively we grasp the greedy hunger for life, but we cannot find any deeper meaning for life. We are thrown into existence without knowing what the point of living is. The will-to-live contains no deeper meaning. The will-to-live just produces the eternal circulation of life wherein a single individual’s life or death is unimportant. According to Julian Young’s interpretation, will is not only bad but also clearly mad (Young 2005, p. 82).

The will-to-live does not produce any lasting satisfaction or happiness. Quite contrary, blind and irrational will produces needs, anxiety, deprivation, distress, and suffering. Any achieved

satisfaction is limited and provisional. The grass is always greener on the other side of the fence. The will-to-live makes our existence almost a living hell. Happiness is more like an illusion, and the simple existence of evil makes us question the value of existence as a whole. Referring to Lord Byron, Schopenhauer declares (Schopenhauer 1966, p. 576): “For that thousands had lived in happiness and joy would never do away with the anguish and death-agony of one individual; and just as little does my present well-being undo my previous sufferings.” Mankind cannot expect any progress to happen related to the decreasing of suffering. Wars, crimes, and other forms of evil will always reappear *eadem sed aliter* – in the same but still a different way. Schopenhauer comes to the ultimate pessimistic conclusion (Schopenhauer 1966, p. 171): “. . . we very soon look upon the world as something whose non-existence is not only conceivable, but even preferable to its existence.”

The existence of the world we cannot – and should not – undo, and suicide is not an option. The best that we can do, according to Schopenhauer, is to liberate ourselves from suffering by denial of the will-to-live. That is the road to salvation. Will has the power to freely abolish itself. Schopenhauer refers to this as the euthanasia of the will (see Schopenhauer 1966, pp. 634–639). Here we have a certain kind of Schopenhauerian theory of moral development. It is a road from suffering to holiness and self-denial. Schopenhauer claims that mankind has two ways to liberate itself from suffering and needing: art and morality. With art we can achieve only momentary liberation in a form of aesthetic consciousness, which is quickly followed by a return to *mundane* suffering (Schopenhauer’s aesthetics consciousness in mind Adorno & Horkheimer made their famous interpretations on Odysseus and Sirens (Adorno & Horkheimer 1997, p. 34): “What Odysseus hears is without consequence for him; he is able only to nod his head as a sign to be set free from his bonds; but it is too late; his men. . . leave him at the mast in order to save him and themselves. . . The prisoner is present at a concert, an inactive eavesdropper like the later concertgoers, and his spirited call for liberation

fades like applause.” Adorno & Horkheimer transformed *will-to-live* into “treadmill of self-preservation of bourgeois subjectivity”). Only morality, which leads to a total denial of the will, can guarantee ultimate liberation, but only a few of us can achieve it.

Schopenhauer presumes that besides egoistic feelings like envy, humans have feelings of compassion (Schopenhauer 2004, p. 3):


Fundamental disposition towards others, assuming the character either of Envy or of Sympathy, is the point at which the moral virtues and vices of mankind first diverge. These two diametrically opposite qualities exist in every man; for they spring from the inevitable comparison which he draws between his own lot and that of others. According as the result of this comparison affects his individual character does the one or the other of these qualities become the source and principle of all his actions. Envy builds the wall between Thee and Me thicker and stronger; Sympathy makes it slight and transparent; nay, sometimes it pulls down the wall altogether; and then the distinction between self and not-self vanishes.

The basic principle of Schopenhauer’s morality of compassion is following (Schopenhauer 2010, p. 170):

‘Neminem laede, immo omnes, quantum potes iuva – Harm no one; rather, help everyone as much you can.’ This is and remains the true, pure content of all morals. . . From the other side, egoism screams with a loud voice: ‘Help no one; rather harm everyone if it brings you advantage;’ indeed, malice gives the variant: ‘but harm everyone as much as you can.’

The road from egoism to the total denial of the will-to-live is interpreted here as the Schopenhauerian theory of moral development. It has several stages or forms of character: The first is the stage (level zero, see Table 1.) of natural egoism which is a phenomenal expression of the *noumenal* will-to-live. From natural egoism, one can degenerate into the stage of malice (level –1). In this stage, a person gets satisfaction by hurting some person or animal. We could count aesthetic consciousness as stage 0.5, at which normal and egoistic consciousness ceases and the “I” becomes “decentered.” Actually, aesthetic consciousness is not a stage per se but a mode of consciousness of a normal person (whereas malign people and

Schopenhauer and Nietzsche on Moral Growth, Table 1 Reconstructed Schopenhauerian theory of moral growth

	–1	Malice	A person’s will another’s woe.
	0	Egoism	A person’s will one’s own weal.
	½		Disappearance of the usual egocentricity in a form of a aesthetic consciousness .
	1	Ordinary level compassion	Mixture of egoism and compassion.
	2	Saint-level compassion	Strong feeling of compassion, life of an ascetic.
	2½	Final level of saintness	Total withdrawal of all willing.

saints are considered abnormal). Like Kant, Schopenhauer thinks that beauty promises us happiness and pleases us without interest (*ohne Intresse; le désintéressement*). Aesthetic consciousness is a kind of Sabbath from the hard labor of always willing to act upon one’s own interest. If one is able to experience beauty without interests, one is not totally bad. Schopenhauer quotes his family friend Goethe (Schopenhauer 1969, p. 221): “Whoever beholds human beauty cannot be infected with evil; he feels in harmony with himself and the world.”

The second stage (level 1) is perfecting of one’s virtues of love and sympathy (partial denial of the will-to-live) and leaving the stage of natural egoism. This is the best thing that most of us can do. We can never entirely deny our egoism but we can limit it. We can listen to the voice of our conscience and enhance our natural feeling of compassion. The third stage (level 2) is that of a holy man and means a total denial of the will. It is attained only through asceticism and complete self-surrender. The person turns away from all the pleasures of life. This is the way of perfect virtue. It cannot be taught, and systems of ethics cannot produce a holy man. A saint or holy man understands the metaphysical unity of all things and feels everybody’s suffering as his own. A saint tries to ease others’ suffering, but in the

final stage (level 2.5) a saint gives up all willing, including wanting to help others, and withdraws from all earthly activities. We present the following Schopenhauerian moral stages.

If we force Schopenhauer's moral theory into developmental theory, we get an ethical scale on which one can go forwards or backwards. In *Parerga and Paralipomena*, Schopenhauer claims that the will-to-live causes embitterment, which might lead to a situation wherein one tries to lighten one's own suffering by agonizing others. This road eventually evolves into real malice and evilness, and the person gains satisfaction of others' suffering (see Schopenhauer 2000, p. 215). In this case, we can speak of moral degeneration. Schopenhauer wants people to avoid the road to embitterment and selfishness. He offers the road to salvation, which is the narrow path of asceticism and the holy man. In a way, this is Schopenhauer's notion of the *Übermensch*. The path of the holy man is only for the few and elected.

We cannot say that Schopenhauer has a theory of moral growth, because he insists that individual character is innate and unalterable. Though nobody is born with an innate malign character, one cannot become a saint if that is not one's innate purpose. Nevertheless, you can hope that there is a little saint inside you and act accordingly. That actually is Schopenhauer's practical advice. One must try to feel compassion like a saint feels and stop estimating persons by their worth of dignity (Schopenhauer 2000, p. 202):

I would, therefore, like to lay down the following rule in contrast to the above-mentioned moral principle of Kant. In the case of every man with whom we come in contact, we should not undertake an objective estimation of his worth and dignity; and so we should not take into consideration the wickedness of his notions; for the first could easily excite our hatred and the last our contempt. On the contrary, we should bear in mind only his sufferings, his need, anxiety, and pain. We shall then always feel in sympathy with him, akin to him, and, instead of hatred or contempt, we shall experience compassion; for this alone is the *ἀγάπη* [agape] to which the Gospel summons us. The standpoint of sympathy or compassion is the only one suitable for curbing hatred or contempt, certainly not that of seeking pretended 'dignity'.

Friedrich Nietzsche: Immoralist

Nietzsche's moral theory can be described as master-morality. His idea of moral is essentially aristocratic, and it does not include an idea of equality or kinship between all human beings. Master-morality is the morals of the few, who are essentially better than others. Master-morality is to be understood as a negation to the so-called slave-morality, which is closer to our common understanding of morality. The common notion of morality includes certain moral principles and virtues like equality and universality, goodness and happiness, compassion (pity), and caring for other people. For Nietzsche, it was *pity* which needed to be overcome, because it represents weakness. Hence his view on morality and moral growth is very different from Schopenhauer's, even though Schopenhauer was one of the most important philosophers for Nietzsche. Nietzsche sees Schopenhauer as a great teacher and a worthy opponent to his ideas. Schopenhauer saw compassion and pity as the ground for morality. For Nietzsche, those feelings are the lowest and the most destructive things, and they are features of the slave-morality of the masses. Nietzsche would have never said this, but from Nietzsche's point of view Schopenhauer is "a slave-lover or herd-lover."

According to Nietzsche, masses are like herding animals who only seek immediate satisfaction and release from senseless suffering. Their moral belongs to the lower slave-morality, and it is quite senseless to offer them a higher education. Only a selected group of people are worthy of being educated, and even fewer are capable of educating. There must be a different moral and a different education for the noble and for the masses. Nietzsche declares that the education of the masses cannot be the goal. Rather, it must be the education of individual, selected human beings – in other words, geniuses.

The only value of the masses is that they are needed when noblemen are educated in the spirit of master-morality. The masses are a kind of material storage from which noblemen can rise. The masses are not worthy of education. Education is a kind of mentor–student relation.

Education has nothing to do with either the majority of children or the majority of adults. The goal is to educate those few decorous students who understand the importance of committing themselves to the power of the genius-teacher and following him. Nietzsche describes this concept through the analogy of two kinds of travelers: mass travelers and the rarer lone travelers on the way to education. If you chose to follow the path of the smaller group, the road will be more difficult to follow; it will be steeper and more winding. The first path is quite easy to follow, which is perhaps why most of us choose it. And as you travel along this path, you are sure to encounter many likeminded souls traveling both in front of and behind you. The other path will offer less companionship and, as mentioned above, will be more difficult to follow, steeper, and often dangerous. Three types of people belong to this smaller group. First and foremost, is the teacher-philosopher, i.e., genius. Secondly, are the students who are likely to become geniuses, the first-rate talents. And thirdly, are the group of students who are needed in the process of the birth of genius. They are assistants who are second- and third-rate talents. Nietzsche considered himself to be a philosopher in this elitist group. Moreover, in the text *Schopenhauer as Educator*, it is Nietzsche who is the hero, not Schopenhauer, because he understands Schopenhauer's brilliance and genius, which elevates him to Schopenhauer's level and even beyond it (Kakkori 2008; Nietzsche 2004, p. 96, 1983, pp. 175–176) (The text *Schopenhauer as educator* is actually about Nietzsche as educator. See example Fitzsimons 1999.).

The true teacher is a philosopher, and for Nietzsche it was Schopenhauer. True teachers are great philosophers who teach the truth about things. These great philosophers do not give lectures every day, because they know that they cannot always speak about truth and true things. They also know that there are days when they cannot think of anything. A true teacher can also select his students, so he does not have to speak to the masses. According to this idea, lecturing on the history of philosophy is not speaking of truth. Nietzsche refers to those university philosophers

who must teach every day and cannot choose their students as “learned” – as opposed to philosophers (Nietzsche 1983, p. 186.).

Masters and Masses – Bad and Evil


Nietzsche presents his idea of morality and its division into master-morality and slave-morality in his book *Beyond Good and Evil* (2009). The division of people into the masses and the few and privileged is typical for Nietzsche in his entire production. Nietzsche considers master-morality as higher system of morality which makes a distinction between good and bad, or between “life-affirming” and “life-denying.” Wealth, strength, health, and power, the sorts of traits found in the Homeric hero, count as good, while bad is associated with the poor, weak, sick, and pathetic, the sorts of traits conventionally associated with slaves in ancient times. Examples of those who belong to the masters and whom Nietzsche admired are Alcibiades, Caesar, Descartes, Napoleon, and Leonardo da Vinci.

To the slave-morality belongs the difference between good and evil. The embodiment of slave-morality is the pregnant woman. Nietzsche associates slave-morality with the Jewish and Christian traditions and to the democratic movement. (Nietzsche 2009, fragment 202; see Hargiss 2011) Value emerges from the contrast between good and *evil*: good being associated with otherworldliness, charity, piety, meekness, and submission; evil seen as worldly, cruel, selfish, wealthy, and aggressive (Nietzsche 2009, fragment 260):

The noble type of man separates from himself the beings in whom the opposite of this exalted, proud disposition displays itself he despises them. Let it at once be noted that in this first kind of morality the antithesis ‘good’ and ‘bad’ means practically the same as ‘noble’ and ‘despicable’, – the antithesis ‘good’ and ‘evil’ is of a different origin.

Good means a different thing to noblemen and to the masses. The noblemen belong to a world wherein there is no division between good and evil – like the title of Nietzsche's opus *Beyond Good and Evil* (*Jenseits von Gut und Böse*) indicates. This other world does not mean the Kingdom of Heaven, but rather the world where the Nietzschean hero, the *Übermensch*, rules by

Schopenhauer and Nietzsche on Moral Growth, Table 2 Development of the moral of mankind according to Nietzsche (2009, fragment 32).

	Period	Time	Value of action
	PREMORAL period of mankind	The longest period of human history	Value is dependent on the CONSEQUENCES of action.
	MORAL period of mankind	Last ten thousand years	Value is dependent on the INTENTION of the action.
	ULTRAMORAL period of mankind	Nowadays, among immoralists (Nietzsche, Übermensch), or some day in the near future.	Value of action is outside of moral. Value of an action lies in that which is NOT INTENTIONAL.

revaluating all values. There is no more anything evil, only good or bad according to whether it is good or bad for the few noblemen. This moral is not for all people. Therefore, there must be different kinds of moral to different kinds of people (Nietzsche 2009, fragment 228): “The requirement of one morality for all is really a detriment to higher men, in short, that there is a distinction of rank between man and man, and consequently between morality and morality.”

The well-being of the Nietzschean hero is the only value. What happens to most of the people, to the masses, has no importance or value. It would be easy to interpret Nietzsche’s moral to be individual and subjective. But that is not correct – Nietzsche’s moral is not founded on individual decision, but rather on hierarchy of ranging order (Salomaa 1988, p. 51).

Valuable is what benefits noblemen. Nietzsche always looks into the world through the eyes of the noblemen. For example, in one of his texts he describes how young men are having a dialog with an older wise man up on a hill while watching at the same time a larger group of people wandering down in the valley. Zarathustra wanders alone looking at the world from the perspective of outsider. He never takes into account how things are for the masses, or what is good for the masses. There is no Kantian maxim nor virtues, only an order of the hierarchy of people. Both Kohlberg (1969) and Gilligan (1993) would consider this the lowest stage of moral development, but for Nietzsche it is an outcome of a nobleman’s moral development. Master-morality has no developmental relation to slave-morality. Master-morality and slave-morality are two separate forms of moral.

Nietzsche finds three historical periods in the moral development of mankind: premoral period, moral period, and ultramoral period. In the premoral period, the value or nonvalue of an action was inferred from its consequences; the action in itself was not taken into consideration anymore than its origin. In the moral period, the last ten thousand years, the value of action was inferred from its origin, and this origin is the intention of the action. In other words, the value of an action lay in the value of its intention. The ultramoral period is the period of the chosen few who are immoralists, like Nietzsche. The task for the immoralists is to surmount morality itself. The immoralists are members of master-morality. They are strong and powerful, and they do not fear, and as such they are beyond morality, because fear is the mother of slave-morality and herd-morality. Morality in Europe in the modern times is herd animal morality. The *Übermensch* is not a herd animal. He is a lion, an eagle, or a snake (Table 2).

For Nietzsche, there is only one imperative: “Know thyself!” This imperative is not of the same kind as Kant’s categorical imperative. Nietzsche’s imperative is not a moral one, even though it belongs to the development of the moral of mankind. In the premoral period, this imperative was totally unknown. In the moral period, it was the first attempt at gaining self-knowledge. The ultramoral period is the time of Nietzsche’s imperative. The imperative is not a moral one because it does not take into account other people, only oneself. Nietzsche sees no problem here because the whole point is to overcome the moral period and its focus to the intention of action, which keeps in mind the well-being of others.

The target of Nietzsche's ethical criticism is all forms of the slave-morality including Kantian deontological moral, utilitarianism, Schopenhauerian pity-morality, British sentimentalists, etc. All philosophers since Plato have made an error, because they wanted to give a foundation to morality. Nietzsche saw that the error is that morality itself has been regarded as something given. This means that the problem of morality itself and its existence has been omitted. Against pity, Nietzsche claims that he who feels pity is brought down to the level of the pitiful people. Pity makes person ill and weak. It is something which does not enhance life. In Nietzsche's *Zarathustra* (Nietzsche 1999), God dies in pity. When compassion or pity is considered as the basic principle of society, the will is denied. Schopenhauer makes the same point, but for him it constitutes the ultimate end of moral development.

Nietzsche and the Will

Nietzschean master-morality represents the will to power as revaluating all the values. The need for revaluating is the essence of Nietzschean nihilism. All old values have lost their meanings, even God is dead, and there is no transcendental horizon left. The will to power is all, and it is even better to will for nothingness than to deny the will to power. The opposite of the will to power is asceticism, which according to Nietzsche means the denial of life. Nietzsche's *Übermensch* is capable of the will to power and revaluating all the values. It seems also that the *Übermensch* has no pity or other weak sentiments; he is beyond all compassion and feminine feelings because they constrict the will to power (*Mitleid* is translated as *pity* when Nietzsche is using it. Schopenhauer uses *Mitleid* in a different sense, and Schopenhauer's *Mitleid* is translated here as *compassion*. *Mitleid* is always something very negative and destructive for Nietzsche. See Cartwright 1988, pp. 558–567.).

Moral growth means overcoming yourself by becoming what you are. This is what Nietzsche means by his slogan "Know thyself!". For Schopenhauer, moral growth means becoming something that is against the essence of the world,

which is the will-to-live. The Schopenhauerian ascetic holy man is an unnatural denier of life who has totally finished willing. Schopenhauer sees that the holy man possesses a mystical power to overcome the will. According to Nietzsche, there is no escape from willing, because "man would much rather will *nothingness* than *not* will. . ." (Nietzsche 1998, p. 118).

Nietzsche asks: "What does nihilism mean? That the highest values devalue themselves?" Devaluating the highest values, like beauty, goodness, and truth, means corruption and depravity. Even Nietzsche believes that time of nihilism has come, but he does not actually portray the decadence. He is interested in nihilism because it makes possible revaluating all the values, and this revaluating all the values is grounded on the will to power. Nietzsche says that the will to power is the innermost essence of being (Nietzsche 1968, p. 369 § 693). Willing in general always means willing to be stronger, willing to grow – and willing the means to this (Nietzsche 1968, p. 356, 675). Nietzsche's positive attitude toward willing is almost opposite to Schopenhauer's concept of the will. Nietzsche knows this and argues that what Schopenhauer calls will is a mere empty word (Nietzsche 1968, pp. 369, 692).

The will to power was not a problem for Nietzsche like it was for Schopenhauer. Nietzsche regards even ridiculous the way how Schopenhauer tries to overcome endless willing in the aesthetic experiencing of beautiful art. Schopenhauer follows Kant's idea of beauty. For Kant, beauty is at the same time universal and without interest. This beautiful has the power to ease endless willing. Nietzsche wonders how, for example, "under the enchantment of beauty one can look at *even* robeless female statues 'without interest'" (Nietzsche 1998, p. 72). For Schopenhauer, sexual looking at a female statue destroys the aesthetic experience whose purpose is to free the consciousness from willing, especially sexual willing which always leads to misery.

Will is the essence of power. Will actually wants willing itself, and this way it overcomes itself. Will wants to get stronger, and this means it wants more power. Will is not only wanting but

also demanding. It demands all power – power to reevaluate all the values. Accordingly to Nietzsche, there are no transcendental powers to give us our laws, neither a Kantian maxim to tell us what we should do, nor laws from God. This is the reason why Nietzsche makes the existence of all moral questionable and considers himself to be an ultra-moral being who is beyond all morality. His denial of moral and all transcendental made had a strong influence on twentieth-century philosophy, for example Martin Heidegger, Jean-Paul Sartre, and Michel Foucault. Our moral thinking has not recovered from Nietzsche's announcement of the death of God.

Conclusion

We can conclude that for Nietzsche, moral growth means overcoming oneself by becoming what one is. At the same time this means overcoming morality and becoming ultramoral or immoralist. This is not possible for the masses. The masses follow a slave-morality like Christianity or Schopenhauerian pity morality. The overcoming of morality is only possible for the master race. So there is no developmental link between slave-morality and master-morality. We can also conclude that for Schopenhauer, moral growth means coming to something that is against essence of the world. The essence of the world is the will-to-live. The Schopenhauerian ascetic holy man is an unnatural denier of the world and will. Schopenhauerian ascetic holy is total opposite of Nietzschean *übermensch*. *Übermensch* does not recognize golden rule or other imperative than "Know thyself!" The Schopenhauerian "Übermensch" is a kind of Jesus who lives beyond the golden rule because his purpose is to sacrifice his own needs for the sake of others (the mass). Nietzsche was intentionally anti-Christian. His teacher, Schopenhauer, tried to understand the idea of agape better than Christian.

Carol Gilligan's theory of moral development has many common features with Schopenhauer's moral theory. Schopenhauer and Gilligan share the same critique of Kantian moral cognitivism. Their most striking difference is that

Schopenhauer was not sensitive for gender issues. Schopenhauer is, like Nietzsche, a practical and theoretical chauvinist. Our construction of the Schopenhauerian model of moral development has some resemblance with Gilligan's theory of moral development. In both models, the starting point is some kind of egoistic or egocentric point of view. After that, the Schopenhauerian model is a kind of reversal of Gilligan's theory. For Gilligan, caring both for oneself and for others is a legitimate ethical standpoint and actually the highest possible ethical stance (Gilligan 1993, p. 74). For Schopenhauer, there is no true synthesis of caring for oneself and caring for others. The highest ethical stance is the way of absolute virtue which means the total sacrifice of one's own well-being for the sake of the other.

There is one way in which the Schopenhauerian model can contribute to Gilliganian notion of growth. Gilligan does not consider or empirically study the possibility of moral degeneration or moral unlearning. In certain circumstances, a person can deviate – or just decide to do so – from everyday egoism to plain malice or evilness. In some extreme situations, social structures even support this kind of moral degeneration (war crimes, Milgram experiment, deviant socialization, etc.). It is of utmost importance for any theory of moral development to consider the case of moral degeneration and its remedies *ex pre & ex post facto* (before and after the act).

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Science, Naturalism, and Education

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The relationship between science and naturalism has been a topic of an ongoing debate in both the philosophy of science and science education. That science and naturalism are somehow related is usually taken for granted. What is at issue, however, is the exact nature of this relationship as well as the particular variety of naturalism involved. More precisely, is naturalism a contingent outcome of science or a necessary presupposition for doing science, and is it an ontological or a

methodological position? Although these questions belong in the philosophy of science, science education is concerned with them too, because it needs to know what to teach about the *nature of science*, and because it is faced with the challenge of supernaturalists who attempt to introduce creationism or intelligent design into the curriculum.

Naturalism

The evolution/creation controversy reveals the kind of naturalism involved here: naturalism as the opposite of supernaturalism. This naturalism is a set of assumptions about the furniture of the world and about the way the world works – and thereby about which entities and processes are admissible referents of scientific theories and explanations. Thus it is an *ontological* (or metaphysical) view. Roughly speaking, naturalism is the view that all that exists is our lawful spatiotemporal world. Its negation is supernaturalism: the view that our lawful spatiotemporal world is not all that exists because there is a nonspatiotemporal world transcending the natural one, whose inhabitants are intentional beings that are not subject to natural laws. Naturalism assumes that everything in the world works according to its own laws as opposed to laws imposed from above or no laws at all; that nothing comes out of nothing and nothing turns into nothing; and, consequently, that also our perceptions and conceptions, that is, the very processes of gaining knowledge, are not manipulated by external, in particular supernatural, agents but are themselves purely natural and lawful processes.

Note that a lawless world could be natural, too. But a lawless or chaotic world (in the traditional sense of “chaos”) would not be able to sustain the existence of complex beings with complex brains for a longer time, although they could randomly pop into (and out of) existence once in a while. For this reason, the concept of ontological naturalism usually includes the assumption of a lawful natural world, in which even randomness is not lawless as there are probabilistic and stochastic laws. Likewise, a supernatural world is not taken to be chaotic either.

The previous characterization is somewhat unsatisfactory because it seems to involve some circularity: natural is what is not supernatural, and supernatural is what is not natural. This problem can be avoided only by a full-fledged ontological theory describing the features of natural entities and elucidating the concepts of thing, property, law, event, process, and cause. Such theories, which must also address the status of mind and of abstract objects, do exist, but they are too complex to be summarized here (Bunge 1977; Mahner 2012).

Supernaturalism

In ordinary language, “supernatural” applies not just to religious entities, powers, or processes (gods, angels, demons, miracles) but also to profane ones (poltergeists, clairvoyance, psychokinesis). The latter might better be called “paranatural” because, possibly, they could just be yet unknown natural entities or abilities. For more than 150 years, parapsychology has unsuccessfully attempted to prove their existence so that the paranatural is most likely illusory (and parapsychology remains a pseudoscience). Yet if parapsychology were successful, the paranatural would probably be incorporated into normal science, thus becoming natural. Therefore, “paranatural” is mostly an epistemological attribute.

By contrast, the supernatural is something that supposedly exists and works beyond natural, spatiotemporal entities, laws, and processes. In fact, the supernatural is usually defined but negatively, that is, by negating certain natural properties. For example, “transcendence” is the negation of “immanence,” that is, *not* being located in our spatiotemporal world. Or, a first cause is nothing but an *uncaused* cause. Other properties of the supernatural are just natural properties raised to an absolute degree (omnipotence, omniscience). In this construal, the supernatural is only quantitatively different from the natural and as its attributes are still conceived of on the basis of familiar natural properties, it remains somehow intelligible. Perhaps it is this familiarity that blurs the line to the paranatural and that helps people to believe in the existence of such entities. As this conception is more or less anthropomorphic, many

theologians consider it primitive and unacceptable. So they take the supernatural to be *categorically* different from the natural. God, then, is the *Wholly Other*, not someone or something to be understood even by the faintest analogy with anything known natural; his properties are genuinely transcendent and essentially mysterious, ineffable, incomprehensible. These two types of the supernatural may be called *overnatural* and *transnatural*, respectively (Spiegelberg 1951).

Obviously, if something is by definition transcendent and ineffable, it is unintelligible. Nobody, neither theologians nor scientists, should be able to know and say anything about it. So the transnatural is by definition beyond the reach of science. However, it is also useless for the ordinary believer – and ultimately also for theology – because every discipline needs a subject matter to investigate. To obtain a modicum of intelligibility, conceptions of the supernatural usually combine overnatural and transnatural features. This allows the believer to oscillate between these two conceptions, depending on his argumentative needs. Only by referring to the overnatural can he claim that the supernatural meddles with the natural world at least occasionally and that science is able to study the supernatural. After all, if some overnatural entity interacted with the natural world, it would have to work by partly naturalizing itself, that is, by being able to produce natural causes and, in turn, be affected by them (Pennock 2000). If the overnatural worked through sheer magic, it would work through principally incomprehensible processes.

Scientific Methods and Evidence

A popular view among scientists maintains that science need not bother with philosophy, let alone ontology, at all: scientists should just apply and follow the scientific method. If science is ultimately about finding the truth, all that counts is evidence. Whether it confirms the natural or points to the supernatural, we should follow the evidence wherever it leads. This empiricist view assumes that both scientific methods (such as observation, measurement, and experiment) and

the evidence they produce do not depend on any ontological assumptions, such as naturalism.

Yet why would some scientists and philosophers maintain that science is based on naturalism? This becomes clear by analyzing a simple measurement, occurring in ordinary life or in science: measuring temperature with a thermometer. First, does this measurement occur in the real world or in our imagination only? Assuming that both the thermometer and the surrounding medium are real things, that is, being aware that the measurement in question is not merely a thought experiment, is an instance of ontological realism. Second, do scientists expect that the mercury in the thermometer moves capriciously or lawfully? Of course, scientists expect that there is a lawful relationship between some property of the surrounding medium (its kinetic energy or temperature) and some property of the mercury, namely, its density or expansion. As the mercury can expand only within the narrow glass tube, there is a lawful relationship between the height of the mercury column and the outside temperature. And this lawful relation always obtains under the same conditions and at all times so that the measurement can be repeated as often as needed. This is the lawfulness principle. Third, scientists also expect that they can cause the thermometer reading to go up or down, for example, by heating or cooling the surrounding medium. This requires some ontic causality principle (as opposed to an epistemological one).

Fourth, a tacit assumption is that the thermometer cannot be causally influenced in a *direct* way solely by our thoughts or wishes, that is, without the interposition of motoric actions of our bodies. Indeed, if the world were permeated by causally efficacious mental forces, scientists would have no reason to trust the reading of any measuring instrument or the results of any experiment. This is the no-psi principle. Fifth, what holds for natural entities applies *a fortiori* to supernatural entities. Scientists (tacitly) expect, then, that no supernatural entity manipulates either their scientific tests or their mental (neuronal) processes or both. This is the no-supernature principle. The reason for these last two assumptions is quite simple: the data obtained through observation, measurement, or experiment could not function

as evidence if they were the telepathic product of wishful thinking or of supernatural manipulation.

Naturalism as an Ontological Presupposition of Science

The ontological expectations listed in the preceding are held mostly tacitly, and even if scientists are not aware of them, they are built in in the very design of any scientific technique: it would make no sense to conduct measurements or experiments in the first place if these ontological expectations were different. Of course, it is logically possible that the world does not conform to these ontological expectations, either entirely or partially. In the first case scientific methods should fail, in the second case they should work only wherever or whenever the world does possess the required ontic properties. However, if the very functioning of scientific methods depends on whether the world has certain ontic properties, the above “expectations” actually constitute ontological *presuppositions*: they are necessary ontological conditions for doing science. Again, this does not entail that the world actually exhibits such conditions, but that scientific methods can work only wherever they obtain (Mahner 2012, 2014).

Now scientists have no reason to assume that the world is ontically patchy, but the starting point is that it is uniform: that naturalism applies everywhere. Thus they hold the ontological *null hypothesis* that there is no supernature. A null hypothesis usually negates that something is the case, in particular that something exists or that two variables are related. Examples: “Junk food is not the cause of obesity,” or “The Loch Ness monster does not exist.” The reason for this approach is simple: science cannot assert that something is the case without empirical evidence. So in order to prove some positive alternative hypothesis, its corresponding null hypothesis must be refuted empirically. However, there is an important difference between scientific and ontological null hypotheses: the latter are usually regarded as unfalsifiable by *direct* empirical evidence. But some ontological hypotheses may be disconfirmed *indirectly*. For example, science

could fail as a cognitive enterprise, either in its entirety or in some particular area, so that naturalism as an ontological view applying to the whole world might have to be reconsidered.

Can Science Study the Supernatural?

Empiricists, who believe that scientific evidence can be had without ontological presuppositions, offer long lists of conceivable supernatural interventions that could be studied by science (Fales 2013; Fishman and Boudry 2013). Their argument: if science can confirm the existence of the supernatural, it does not presuppose naturalism. For example, if angels descended from the sky and raised the dead or if studies on the effects of intercessory prayer yielded significant positive results, we would have empirical evidence for the supernatural and hence a valid test. At first sight, this sounds convincing, but a closer look at the hidden assumptions of these two examples, abbreviated *A* and *B*, reveals some problems.

Both *A* and *B* still presuppose that our perceptions and conceptions of these occurrences are natural processes, that is, that they are *not* the result of supernatural manipulation. Otherwise they would not provide evidence for a real event, but could not be distinguished from hallucination. *A* requires that supernatural entities are able to naturalize themselves at least to such a degree that they are perceptible and able to interact with natural matter. *B* presupposes that both the praying as a neurophysiological process and the healing as a biological process are partly natural. Only the intermediate step would involve supernatural causation, and it would also have to be partly natural, as the praying would have to affect a supernatural entity, who in turn must stimulate the healing process. Obviously, what must be involved here are merely overnatural entities. By contrast, transnatural events would not be detectable. Think of transsubstantiation: whatever scientific analyses we undertake, we see nothing but bread and wine. Another example is *continuous creation*: there is no way we could prove scientifically that God recreates the world moment by moment out of nothing to sustain our existence.

Now what could science find out about over-natural entities? Not much. Science would be able to *empirically* study only the *natural* aspects of *A* and *B*, that is, the natural effects of overnatural interventions. It would not be able to study over-natural entities *directly*, unless we could catch, for instance, an angel and hold it for questioning or even dissection. But if that were possible, we would be faced just with some unusual natural entity, not an overnatural one. So science may confirm that some spooky events occurred, but the possible explanations would be entirely theoretical. As in many other areas, science would have to infer the unobservable from the observable by postulating so-called *theoretical entities* that are able to explain the observable. However, as is well known, an inference from the observable to the unobservable is never conclusive, because different unobservables may explain the same observable.

For example, if there were reproducible evidence that intercessory prayer works, there would be various alternative natural hypotheses compatible with the evidence, such as a superior alien civilization playing a prank on us. In the philosophy of science, this is known as the problem of underdetermination. Whereas in science underdetermination is an overrated problem because it can often be overcome in practice, it remains a problem for supernatural hypotheses. After all, in science it is ontologically innocuous that for some evidence *e* there are alternative hypotheses consistent with *e*, because all these alternatives refer to natural entities or processes. In the case of a hypothesis referring to an over-natural entity, however, there are also alternative natural hypotheses compatible with *e*, even if they are as outlandish as the alien prank hypothesis. So would *e* ever be good enough to make scientists opt for something that is even more outlandish for involving a supernatural entity?

Supernatural Entities and Scientific Explanation

At first sight, invoking a supernatural cause to account for some fact does seem to have explanatory power. For example, intelligent design

creationists claim that the theory of evolution cannot explain how certain complex organs have originated. So they invoke a supernatural entity, an intelligent designer (who allegedly need not be, but is in fact God) who helped to create these organs. This answer appears to have explanatory power because, by analogy with human handicraft, we all understand what creating artifacts is about. Yet in fact it explains nothing because it explains too much. The problem is that an answer like “God made it the way it is” can be applied to all facts. Whatever exists and whatever happens can be explained by reference to the will and actions of some supernatural entity. But an explanation that explains everything explains nothing. Also, explaining the unknown by something magical and occult is an instance of the *obscurum per obscurius* fallacy. It may be argued that referring to supernatural entities is an appeal to ignorance, the respective explanations being therefore pseudoexplanatory. Indeed, as science would know nothing about the possible powers and intentions of such entities, explanations of some fact *x* would reduce to the form: some supernatural entity chose to do *x* for unknown reasons. Is this superior to “we do not know what caused *x*”?

Furthermore, there are two proliferation problems with overnatural explanations. First, if we admit one supernatural entity into the explanatory realm of science, we are on a slippery slope to admitting as many as we fancy. If we admit God as an explainer, we may as well admit demons, angels, fairies, and so on. Moreover, in most cases all these overnatural entities would do the same explanatory work, so it would be hard, if not impossible, to choose between competing supernatural explanations. The God hypothesis is not per se more plausible than others, it only appears to be, because in our culture we are more familiar with it. Yet this does not increase its scientific merit. Second, even if science could study the overnatural and incorporate it into its explanations, how would scientists know that those are final? Alternatively, what would they do if they also encountered explanatory gaps in the supernatural world? The analogous procedure would be to resort to super-supernatural entities to fill these gaps in the first-order supernatural world – and so

on. This illustrates the problems of the god-of-the-gaps approach.

The Relation Between Ontology and Methodology

In a realist philosophy, being is prior to knowing. That is, the furniture and structure of the world must make cognition possible in the first place, and they must allow for the successful application of scientific methods. Hence, for a methodology to make any sense and to work successfully, there must be an ontology that helps to explain the functioning of this methodology. The ontology explaining the methodology of science is naturalism.

Empiricist philosophers who maintain that science can study the supernatural appear to believe that scientific methodology would remain intact if supernatural entities were admitted as explainers in scientific theories. But if there were solid evidence for the existence of supernatural entities, it would be hard to not also admit a nonnaturalist epistemology and methodology in which special forms of cognition, such as revelation, religious experience, or whatever nonnatural ways of communication with the supernatural may obtain, are accepted as legitimate sources of knowledge and means of justification. Indeed, some theologians make a case for a theistic science (e.g., Plantinga 2001). This illustrates that methodology is not free of ontology, and that the standards of evidence of science are bound to naturalism.

If its methodology (including its standards of evidence) is essential to science, science can work only in a naturalist world. If there is a supernature interacting with our world, then science can study at most the natural part of this world, including perhaps the quasi-natural features of overnatural entities, assuming of course that, in so doing, our cognitive processes are not manipulated by the overnatural. The alternative is to give up the naturalist definition of science and transform it into a supernaturalist, if not theistic, science. The question is, however, whether this “new science” would be a progress or rather a counter-revolution.

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Scientific Communication and the Open Society: The Emerging Paradigm of “Open Knowledge Production”

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Introduction

The history of scientific communication, even in the postwar period, is a mammoth undertaking where technological developments and the new paradigm of open knowledge production seem to outstrip our capacity to give an adequate account of them. There is so much experimentation by way of new electronic journals launched and new projects being established that it is near impossible to document even the range in its diversity let alone

theorize its main characteristics and implications for modes of scientific communication. One source, perhaps the most comprehensive, provides a bibliography on scholarly electronic publishing that runs to 1,400 items in English under such categories as: economic issues; electronic books and texts; electronic serials; general works; legal issues; library issues; new publishing models; publisher issues; repositories, e-prints, and AOI (Bailey 1996–2006; see also 2001).

The history of electronic scientific communication itself is now nearly 20 years old if we date the process from the appearance of the first electronic journals. The electronic revolution of those first utopian years in the early 1990s with predictions of the collapse of the traditional print-based system, the demise of academic publishers, and the replacement by electronic journals has not yet come to pass. As Valauskas (1997) argues “electronic scholarly journals differentiate themselves from printed scholarly journals by accelerated peer review, combined with mercurial production schemes . . . The sheer interactive nature of digital journals . . . and the ability to access the complete archives of a given title on a server make that sort of publishing a significant departure from the long established traditions of print.” He concludes, “Electronic scholarly journals are indeed different from traditional print scholarly journals, but not as radically different as some would argue. They are different in terms of process, but not in terms of the ancient traditions of peer review and verification.” At the same time, while slower than originally thought there are certainly revolutionary changes taking place that I will refer generically to as “open knowledge production,” a term that might be said to embrace open source, open access, open “science” (referring to systematic knowledge), open courseware, and open education.

History of Electronic Forms of Scientific Communication

To begin let us remind ourselves that the history of scientific communication demonstrates that the typical form of the scientific article presented in print-based journals in essay form is a result of

development over two centuries beginning in seventeenth century with the emergence of learned societies and cooperation among scientists. *Journal des Sçavans*, the first journal, was published in Paris in 1665 (Fjällbrant 1997) as a twelve page quarto pamphlet, appearing only a few months before the *Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society*, the oldest journal in continuous production (see the journal’s website where it is recorded “The Royal Society was founded in 1660 to promote the new or experimental philosophy of that time, embodying the principles envisaged by Sir Francis Bacon. Henry Oldenburg was appointed as the first (joint) secretary to the Society and he was also the first editor of the Society’s journal *Philosophical Transactions*.” The first issue appeared in 1665 and included Oldenburg’s correspondence with some of Europe’s scientists as well an account by Robert Boyle of a Very Odd Monstrous Calf. Subsequent early issues include “articles” by Robert Hooke, Issac Newton, and Benjamin Franklin. The entire archive is available online). The development of the journal and scientific norms of cooperation, forms of academic writing, and the norm of peer review was part and parcel of the institutionalization of science first with the development of the model of the Royal Society that was emulated elsewhere in Europe and the USA, and then later institutionalization received a strong impetus from the emergence of the modern research university beginning with the establishment of the University of Berlin in 1810 in the reforms of Humboldt. This institutionalization of science necessarily also was a part of the juridical-legal system of writing that grew up around the notion of a professional scientist and academic, the notion of the academic author, the idea of public science or research, the ownership of ideas, and academic recognition for the author who claimed originality for a discovery, set of results, or piece of scholarship (Kaufer and Carley 1993).

Over 180 years later, the form, style, and economics of scientific communication were to undergo another set of changes to its socio-technical ecology and infrastructure. The prehistory of the emergence of electronic forms of scientific communication can be traced back at least to Ted Nelson’s notion of “hypertext,” which he

coined in 1963 and went on to develop as a hyper-text system. It is also a prehistory that reveals the development of networking and network publishing in the Advanced Research Projects Agency Network (ARPANET) launched by the US Department of Defense in 1969 and in the Education Resources Information Center (ERIC) launched by the US Department of Education's Office of Educational Research and Improvement and the National Library of Education (ARPANET was discontinued in 1990 while ERIC advertises itself as "the world's largest digital library of educational literature" with free access to more than 1.2 million bibliographic records of journal articles <http://www.eric.ed.gov/>). In this context, it is important to recognize that the concept of "information" emerged from the combination of the development of modern military intelligence (breaking codes, deciphering messages, encoding information, resolving conflict of sources, etc.) and the development of new communication technologies, often also strongly related to the military context and the cooperation between the military and business sector, for instance, the US Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) developed in response to Sputnik, the contribution of RAND to packet switching through its research on the control of missiles and the ARPANET constructed in 1969 linking the University of California at Los Angeles, SRI at Stanford, University of California at Santa Barbara, and University of Utah.

Here some account of the impact of computers on writing is required including the shift from: literacy to orality and the way that computers re-introduce oral characteristics into writing; linearity to connectivity; fixity to fluidity; and passivity to interactivity (Ferris 2002). Jay David Bolter's (1991) *Writing Space: The computer, hypertext and the history of writing* is the seminal text that explores the computer's place in the history of symbolic (textual) media. The consequences of the networking of science and culture have yet to be worked through fully yet certainly as Bolter points out the new definition of literacy is synonymous with computer literacy and while it is the case that the computer signifies the end of traditional print literacy it does not signify the end

of literacy. The Web has now spawned a whole set of new media genres and forms and the Internet has been accepted into education enthusiastically and in a way that previous technologies like television were not. We have not begun to identify systematically the way these new media forms and the development of visual literacy have and will impact upon scientific communication but already there have been some telling signs (see Woolgar 2000; Nentwich 2003).

The Economic Context and the Serials Crisis

A media industry overview conducted by Morgan and Stanley in 2002 revealed a US\$7 billion market for global STM publishing broadly divided into scientific publishing (with libraries as major markets) and medical publishing (with hospitals and practitioners as major markets) with Reed as the market leader. The report indicated that scientific publishing is the fastest-growing media sub-sector of the past 15 years and that since "1986 the average price of a journal has risen by 215% while the number of journals purchased has fallen by only 5.1%" (Morgan and Stanley 2002, p. 2).

Global Scientific Publishing Market Players, 2001

	2001 Revenues	2001 Market
	(US\$m)	Share (%)
Reed Elsevier (Elsevier Science)	1,055.3	23.3
American Chemical Society	357.3	7.9
Thomson	259.0	5.7
John Wiley & Sons	243.6	5.4
Inst. of Electrical & Elect. Engineers	200.3	4.4
Wolters Kluwer	169.3	3.7
McGraw-Hill	146.2	3.2
Taylor & Francis	144.6	3.2
Springer-Verlag	44.0	1.0
Others	1,916.9	42.3
Total Scientific Market	4,536.4	100.0

Source: Simba, Morgan, and Stanley (2002: 2)

The report concludes that the nature of the industry is unlikely to change although it will experience a cyclical slowdown due to budget cuts; large publishers will enjoy economies of scale through “bundling” and margins will expand for those publishers with successful online platforms.

In “The Oligopoly of Academic Publishers in the Digital Era” Vincent Larivière and his colleagues provide an account of the consolidation of the scientific publishing industry and its high profit rates. Analyzing some 45 million documents indexed in the Web of Science over the period 1973–2013 they show that “in both natural and medical sciences (NMS) and social sciences and humanities (SSH), Reed-Elsevier, Wiley-Blackwell, Springer, and Taylor & Francis increased their share of the published output, especially since the advent of the digital era (mid-1990s). Combined, the top five most prolific publishers account for more than 50% of all papers published in 2013”.

They comment further as part of their conclusion: Since the creation of scientific journals 350 years ago, large commercial publishing houses have increased their control of the science system. The proportion of the scientific output published in journals under their ownership has risen steadily over the past 40 years, and even more so since the advent of the digital era. The value added, however, has not followed a similar trend. While one could argue that their role of typesetting, printing, and diffusion were central in the print world..., the ease with which these function can be fulfilled—or are no longer necessary—in the electronic world makes one wonder: what do we need publishers for? <http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0127502>

Their ingenuous question seems unable to take account of the fact that knowledge capitalism is not based on need but rather on opportunity, risk, profit and competition with a natural tendency toward monopoly, especially in a global digital world where extra users and new journals can be added to publishing platforms at virtually no extra cost.

The European Commission’s (2006, p. 5) report *Study on the Economic and Technical*

Evolution of Scientific Publication Markets in Europe corroborates and updates the Morgan & Stanley report confirming

The core STM (science, technology and medicine) publishing market is estimated between USD 7 billion and USD 11 billion, while in 2001 OECD countries allocated USD 638 billion to R&D. In the last 30 years, the prices of scientific journals have been steadily increasing. Between 1975 and 1995, they increased 200–300% beyond inflation.

The report goes on to record that as of 1995, publishers started to adopt digital delivery modes and to provide online access to their journals, but while the new technologies and the Internet have dramatically improved the accessibility of scientific publications for researchers, the actual access to the literature still relies on their library’s ability to pay subscriptions.

The report outlines the broad market trends from 1995 which is taken as the approximate start of the “electronic revolution” including the following main features that have remained constant since about 1975:

1. The increasing reliance on journals as the main channel for dissemination of scientific knowledge, with a growth that parallels the growth of research produced
2. The dominance of the “reader-pay” or “library pay,” as opposed to the “author-pay” model of journal dissemination
3. The existence of many publishers in the market, with two big groups of publishers: For-profits (FP) and Not-for-profits (NFP), the latter group including learned societies and university presses
4. The very fast growth of some big FP publishers, through new journal introduction, through the running of journals from learned societies, and through mergers (EC, 2006: 7)

In 1987, *New Horizons in Adult Education*, perhaps the earliest electronic journal, was established by the Syracuse University Kellogg Project (The journal is now titled *New Horizons in Adult Education & Human Resource Development* and run from the College of Education at Florida International University <http://education>.

fiu.edu/newhorizons/) and in 1989 *Psychology* (Psychology). In 1990 three online journals were launched: Electronic Journal of Communication, Postmodern Culture, and Bryn Mawr Classical Review) was established by Stevan Harnad the same year that the Newsletter on Serials Pricing was launched and there was serious talk of a crisis in scholarly communication which has grown ever more insistent. The origins of the crisis are the increasing volume and high cost for print journals and books together with loss of control in the marketplace and through copyright (see, for instance, the statements of the Universities of Connecticut and Iowa State respectively, <http://www.lib.uconn.edu/about/publications/scholarlycommunication.html>, <http://www.lib.iastate.edu/libinfo/reptempl/origins.html>).

The United Kingdom House of Commons Science and Technology Select Committee (2004) determined that in face of the high and increasing prices of journals imposed by academic publishers that the Government should develop a strategy to improve the provision of academic publications. The issue at stake is put succinctly quoting statistics from The Chartered Institute of Library and Information Professionals:

Whilst the volume of research output and the price of scientific journals has been steadily increasing - one respected source cites average journal price increases of 58% between 1998 and 2003 - library budgets have seen funding decreases. (Introduction).

The concern is that the results and profits of government investment in public good science are being increasingly diverted to the publishers' shareholders ("Between 1986 and 2004, journal expenditures of North American research libraries increased by a staggering 273%, with the average journal unit cost increasing by 188%. During this same period, the US Consumer Price Index rose by 73%, meaning that journal costs have outstripped inflation by a factor of almost 4" see the website Scholarly Communication at UIUC <http://www.library.uiuc.edu/scholcomm/journalcosts.htm>). The Select Committee on reviewing technological developments that have fundamentally changed the way that

scientific articles are published making it feasible to be published free online and acknowledging that several new models have emerged around the movement known as "Open Access" recommends

that all UK higher education institutions establish institutional repositories on which their published output can be stored and from which it can be read, free of charge, online. It also recommends that Research Councils and other Government funders mandate their funded researchers to deposit a copy of all of their articles in this way. The Government will need to appoint a central body to oversee the implementation of the repositories; to help with networking; and to ensure compliance with the technical standards needed to provide maximum functionality. Set-up and running costs are relatively low, making institutional repositories a cost-effective way of improving access to scientific publications. (Summary).

The Committee also suggests that the UK Government become a proponent for change internationally leading by example (The full report Scientific Publications: Free for all? is available as a pdf file). The report was seen in some quarters as an important step forward in the global movement for open access to scientific and medical literature. The Government's response was lukewarm: it was not convinced of the "serials crisis" arguing that consortia can make a big difference and, in general, it supported the concept of "healthy" competition in the publishing industry (A full account of the process and the UK Government's response is given by Steven Harnad at <http://www.ecs.soton.ac.uk/~harnad/Hypermail/Amsci/4131.html>. Harnad comments that the Committee originally had a vague remit to reform publishing but went on to discuss problems associated with journal publishing, affordability, pricing, and accessibility, recommending author self-archiving).

The Open Access Movement

The EC report also provides a useful summary of the Open Access Movement beginning with SPARC's (Scholarly Publishing and Academic Resources Coalition) launch in 1998 (<http://www.arl.org/sparc>). SPARC on its website

advertises itself as “an international alliance of academic and research libraries working to correct imbalances in the scholarly publishing system” and provides the following self-description.

SPARC (the Scholarly Publishing and Academic Resources Coalition), launched in 1998 as an initiative of the Association of Research Libraries, is an alliance of 222 academic and research libraries working to correct imbalances in the scholarly publishing system. These imbalances have driven the cost of scholarly journals (especially in science, technology, and medicine) to insupportably high levels, and have critically diminished the community’s ability to access, share, and use information. At the core of SPARC’s mission is the belief that these imbalances inhibit the advancement of scholarship and are at odds with fundamental needs of scholars and the academic enterprise.

(from its 2007 Program Plan)

The movement, its complexity, and its momentum can best be represented by a timeline of developments. Clearly no one paper or indeed book can give a complete picture of its developments and with every passing day the overall picture becomes more complex.

Open Access Timeline

I have focused on major reports including all the EC report’s significant events in the initial period 1990–2006. The most detailed timeline is that by Peter Suber of which this is but a small selection. (Suber’s timeline ends in 2009, <http://legacy.earlham.edu/~peters/fos/timeline.htm>; see also <http://symplectic.co.uk/open-access-timeline/>; <http://oad.simmons.edu/oadwiki/Timeline>). Marie Lebert’s chronology at <https://marielebert.wordpress.com/2015/06/20/openaccesschronology/> provides a simplified view that provides some of the major developments after 2006 including: SPARC: Open-access Journal Publishing Resource Index, Enabling Open Scholarship (EOS), Academia.eduOAPEN (Open Access Publishing in European Networks), CiteSeerX, The Open Access Directory (OAD), DASH (Digital Access to Scholarship at Harvard), Open Access Tracking Project (OATP), COAR (Confederation of Open Access Repositories), DataCite, Open Access Journal Bibliography, Bibliography on Citation Impact, IS4OA (Infrastructure Services for Open Access), Open Access,

The Research Impact Measurement – Timeline, to name some of the major developments.

Pre-1990 (I have focused on major reports including all the EC report’s significant events. The most detailed timeline is that by Peter Suber of which this is but a small selection. See his website.)	ERIC (1966), Project Gutenberg (1971), <i>New Horizons in Adult Education</i> (1987), <i>Psychology</i> (1989)
1990	<i>Electronic Journal of Communication, Postmodern Culture, Bryn Mawr Classical Review</i>
1991	<i>Surfaces, Behavior and Brain Sciences, Ejournal</i>
1992	First Symposium on Scholarly Publishing on the Electronic Networks
1993	<i>Aboriginal Studies Electronic Data Archive, Education Policy Analysis Archive</i>
1994	Digital Libraries Initiative, <i>Electronic Journal of Sociology</i>
1995	<i>Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy</i>
1996	Electronic Publishing Trust for Development
1997	<i>Research Papers in Economics</i>
1998	SPARC, The International Consortium for the Advancement of Academic Publication
1999	Declaration on Science and the Use of Scientific Knowledge (UNESCO)
2000	PubMed Central (PMC), BioMed Central, Public Library of Science
2001	Public Library of Science petition
2002	Budapest Open Access Initiative, Creative Commons
2003	Bethesda Statement on Open Access Publishing, Berlin Declaration on Open Access to Knowledge in the Sciences and Humanities, US Public Access to Science Act
2004	UK House of Commons Science & Technology Report, Wellcome Trust Reports, OECD’s Declaration On Access To Research Data From Public Funding

(continued)

2005	Policy on Enhancing Public Access to Archived Publications Resulting from NIH-Funded Research, The Open Knowledge Foundation
2006	UK Research Council's Statement on Open Access, EC Commission Report, launch of Open J-Gate ("an electronic gateway to global journal literature in open access domain" (Informatics India Ltd), as of March 22, 2007, it indexed 3,913 open access journals)

What these reports and declarations have in common is a statement of commitment to the principles of open access and open knowledge production. By "open access," the Budapest Open Access Initiative (BOAI) means: free availability on the public internet, permitting any users to read, download, copy, distribute, print, search, or link to the full texts of these articles; crawl them for indexing; pass them as data to software; or use them for any other lawful purpose, without financial, legal, or technical barriers other than those inseparable from gaining access to the Internet itself. The only constraint on reproduction and distribution, and the only role for copyright in this domain, should be to give authors control over the integrity of their work and the right to be properly acknowledged and cited (Budapest Open Access Initiative).

As the BOAI public statement puts it, "[p]rimarily, this category encompasses...peer-reviewed journal articles, but it also includes any unreviewed preprints that [scholars] might wish to put online for comment or to alert colleagues to important research findings."

Typically, these statements and declarations also make reference to the serials crisis, the economics of academic publishing, and an emerging global intellectual property (IP) regime that expands and looks after the interests of IP owners without the same or sufficient regard for the rights of users, especially in the Third World. More activist associations provide histories of the open access movement and develop alliances across a variety of organizations involved with scientific communication including libraries and their associations, research institutions, universities and

university consortia, learned societies, open access journals, small university presses, government and State agencies, and publishers. There is general concern about the extent of new IP regulations, increased duration of copyright, and the extension of IP to new areas of activity including databases and software. There is also strong concern for questions involving the governance of the Internet, the protection of its intellectual commons, and the way that private interests are being allowed to muscle in and enclose some areas of the public domain (see Intellectual Property Reform and Open Knowledge, <http://www.soros.org/initiatives/information/focus/access/grants/reform>) (Höök 1999; Jacobs 2006; Willinski 2006).

Most of these statements also place their faith in the promise of open access and the architecture of the Internet to distribute and disseminate public knowledge. Thus, the Statement of the Libraries & Publishers Working Group (Bethesda Statement on Open Access Publishing, June 20, 2003 <http://www.earlham.edu/~peters>) runs

We believe that open access will be an essential component of scientific publishing in the future and that works reporting the results of current scientific research should be as openly accessible and freely useable as possible.

The Statement then itemizes a set of proposal for libraries and journal publishers aimed at encouraging the open access model. The Statement of Scientists and Scientific Societies Working Group from the same source reads:

Scientific research is an interdependent process whereby each experiment is informed by the results of others. The scientists who perform research and the professional societies that represent them have a great interest in ensuring that research results are disseminated as immediately, broadly and effectively as possible. Electronic publication of research results offers the opportunity and the obligation to share research results, ideas and discoveries freely with the scientific community and the public.

In the Preface to the Berlin Declaration (Berlin Declaration on Open Access to Knowledge in the Sciences and Humanities, October 22, 2003 <http://www.zim.mpg.de/openaccess-berlin>), there is a recognition of the way the Internet has

changed scientific practice focusing on how the Internet has emerged as a “functional medium for distributing knowledge” that will also significantly “modify the nature of scientific publishing as well as the existing system of quality assurance”:

The Internet has fundamentally changed the practical and economic realities of distributing scientific knowledge and cultural heritage. For the first time ever, the Internet now offers the chance to constitute a global and interactive representation of human knowledge, including cultural heritage, and the guarantee of worldwide access.

The Association of College & Research Libraries (ACRL) “Principles and Strategies for the Reform of Scholarly Communication,” issued August 28, 2003, defines scholarly communication as

the system through which research and other scholarly writings are created, evaluated for quality, disseminated to the scholarly community, and preserved for future use. The system includes both formal means of communication, such as publication in peer-reviewed journals, and informal channels, such as electronic listservs.

The Principles then examine the system in crisis mentioning specifically increasing prices, commercialization, and economic pressures facing university presses and the humanities, creeping licensing agreement and the expansion of copyright, long-term preservation and access to electronic information, and the way that powerful commercial interests have been successful at the national level in limiting the public domain and reducing principles of fair use. It goes on to stipulate a set of principles and strategies.

Both the OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Declaration on Access to Research Data From Public Funding, January 30, 2004 <http://www.oecd.org>) and the UN World Summit on the Information Society (UN World Summit on the Information Society Declaration of Principles and Plan of Action, December 12, 2003) emphasize the importance of shared knowledge and the significance of the international exchange of data, information and knowledge for the advancement of scientific research and innovation, and for meeting the development goals of the Millennium

Declaration. In addition, open access is recognized as having the potential to maximize the value derived from public investments in science, help with training researchers, increase the scale and scope of research, and enhance the participation of developing countries in the global science system. The World Summit goes further by politically linking open access and open knowledge production to principles of democracy and to fundamental human rights of freedom of expression and opinion under the United Nations. Furthermore, it emphasizes the role of governments in the promotion of ICTs for development, the importance of the information and communication infrastructure as an essential foundation for an inclusive information society. There are a broader set of arguments that predate open access, open knowledge production systems, and open education that argue for the necessity of open information to democracy more broadly (see Peters 2007).

The Open Society

Whatever the historical origins, the term “open” has now become associated with “open knowledge production,” although Benkler (2006) and others also use other terms such as “commons-based production.” In any event, the term open has resonance with systems theory, cybernetics, and with open systems. In systems theory, an open system is defined as a system where matter or energy can flow into and/or out of the system which is thus in continuous interaction with its environment. In computer science, open systems are computer systems that provide some combination of interoperability, portability, and open software standards. The term openness as developed from systems theory especially as adopted and modified in economics, sociology, and politics can mean “open” markets, “open” science, and “open” institutions. In this sense, openness is opposed to secrecy and associated also with both participation and self-governance. Often the case is made for the openness of markets and political systems in Eastern Europe following the demise of the closed system of Soviet authoritarianism although there is no conclusive data on the

empirical relation between liberalization in the political and economic senses (i.e., “free trade,” “open capital markets” or globalization, and democracy). As Eichengreen and Leblang (2007: 4) argue

The idea that globalization promotes the diffusion of democratic ideas goes back at least to Kant (1795). Schumpeter (1950), Lipset (1959), and Hayek (1960) all argued that free trade and capital flows, by enhancing the efficiency of resource allocation, raise incomes and lead to the economic development that fosters demands for democracy. Within modern political science, the connections between economic and political liberalization is one of the foundational topics of international political economy.

This kind of understanding, for instance, underlies The Open Society Institute (OSI), a foundation created in 1993 by George Soros (Soros became acquainted with Karl Popper’s ideas on the open society when he was at the London School of Economics and writing a number of books defending the open society including *Open Society: Reforming Global Capitalism* (2000); *The Crisis of Global Capitalism: Open Society Endangered* (1998); *Underwriting Democracy* (1991); and *Opening the Soviet System* (1990)) to support his foundations in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union established to help countries make the transition from communism. The OSI

aims to shape public policy to promote democratic governance, human rights, and economic, legal, and social reform. On a local level, OSI implements a range of initiatives to support the rule of law, education, public health, and independent media. At the same time, OSI works to build alliances across borders and continents on issues such as combating corruption and rights abuses.

(The Open Society Institute)

The concept of the “open society” was given its first formulation by Henri Bergson (1977 orig. 1932) in *The Two Sources of Morality and Religion* as an outgrowth of his *Creative Evolution* (orig. 1911). He described two sources of morality, one open whose religion is dynamic, the other closed whose religion is static. Only the former is both creative and oriented toward progress; it is genuinely universal and aims at peace.

Some years later, Karl Popper (1945) wrote *The Open Society and its Enemies* while a political exile in New Zealand during 1937–1943. It was an influential two-volume work that criticized historicism (Plato, Hegel, and Marx) and provided a defense of the principles of liberal democracy. His aim in this work was not unrelated to his doctrine of fallibilism, especially in relation to the social sciences and its powers of prediction, and the promotion and defense of the critical ethos in science. The relationship of Popper and his ideas to Hayek is still a largely unwritten story; Hayek was responsible for championing Popper’s appointment at the LSE and cited him first in his early “Economics and Knowledge” 1936 paper which established the field of the economics of knowledge and heralded the “knowledge economy.” There is some evidence that Hayek’s attack on central planning strongly influenced Popper’s attack on historicism and closed societies (Caldwell 2003).

There are some general arguments for making the association between the open society and the knowledge economy. Joseph Stiglitz, the renegade ex-Chief Economist of the World Bank who resigned over ideological issues draws an interesting connection between knowledge and development with the strong implication that universities as traditional knowledge institutions have become the leading future service industries and need to be more fully integrated into the prevailing mode of production. He asserts, “We now see economic development as less like the construction business and more like education in the broad and comprehensive sense that covers, knowledge, institutions, and culture” (Stiglitz 1999a, p. 2). Stiglitz argues that the “movement to the knowledge economy necessitates a rethinking of economic fundamentals” because, he maintains, knowledge is different from other goods in that it shares many of the properties of a “global” public good. This means, among other things, a key role for governments in protecting intellectual property rights, although appropriate definitions of such rights are not clear or straightforward. It signals also dangers of monopolization, which Stiglitz suggests, given the economies of scale to be achieved, may be even greater for knowledge

economies than for industrial economies. In more technical terms, knowledge is nonrivalrous, that is, knowledge once discovered and made public operates expansively to defy the normal “law” of scarcity that governs most commodity markets. Knowledge in its immaterial or conceptual forms – ideas, information, concepts, functions, and abstract objects of thought – is purely non-rivalrous, that is, there is essentially zero marginal costs to adding more users. Yet, once materially embodied or encoded, such as in learning or in applications or processes, knowledge becomes costly in time and resources. The pure non-rivalrousness of knowledge can be differentiated from the low cost of its dissemination, resulting from improvements in electronic media and technology, although there may be congestion effects and waiting time (to reserve a book or download from the Internet). Stiglitz argues that these knowledge principles carry over to knowledge institutions and countries as a whole. If basic intellectual property rights are routinely violated, the supply of knowledge will be diminished. Where trust relationships have been flagrantly violated learning opportunities will vanish. Experimentation is another type of openness, which cannot take place in closed societies or institutions hostile to change. Finally, he argues that changes in economic institutions have counterparts in the political sphere, demanding institutions of the open society such as a free press, transparent government, pluralism, checks and balances, toleration, freedom of thought, and open public debate. This political openness is essential for the success of the transformation toward a knowledge economy (see Peters 2007).

Open Knowledge Production

Open or Free?

The terms “open knowledge” and “open knowledge production” are now well accepted in the literature to refer to a range of related models of “peer production” and “peer governance” that provide an emerging alternative to traditional proprietary models of knowledge production. The concept of “open” and “openness” deserves

special attention because it has come to christen a range of related activities concerned with the advantages of decentralized distributed networks that characterize what Benkler (2006) calls “commons-based peer production” and increasingly defines the political economy of the digital networked environment. The concept of “openness,” for example, has been applied to:

- Open source
- Open access
- Open content
- Open courseware
- Open communication
- Open archives
- Open urls
- Open learning
- Open education

Typically, as we saw with the BOAI definition, the concept “open” is sometimes associated with “free” although Richard Stallman prefers the term “free” in relation to both “free software” and Free Software Foundation. Stallman provides the following definition of “free”

Free software is a matter of the users’ freedom to run, copy, distribute, study, change and improve the software. More precisely, it refers to four kinds of freedom, for the users of the software:

- The freedom to run the program, for any purpose (freedom 0).
- The freedom to study how the program works, and adapt it to your needs (freedom 1). Access to the source code is a precondition for this.
- The freedom to redistribute copies so you can help your neighbor (freedom 2).
- The freedom to improve the program, and release your improvements to the public, so that the whole community benefits (freedom 3). Access to the source code is a precondition for this.

(Richard Stallman)

Stallman distinguishes “free” from “open.” While criteria for the latter was derived from his definition of free, it is something less than free and attempts to avoid the ethical question. He explains:

In 1998, a part of the free software community splintered off and began campaigning in the name of “open source.” The term was originally proposed to avoid a possible misunderstanding of the term

“free software,” but it soon became associated with philosophical views quite different from those of the free software movement... Nearly all open source software is free software; the two terms describe almost the same category of software. But they stand for views based on fundamentally different values. Open source is a development methodology; free software is a social movement.

(Richard Stallman)

Social Dimension of Open Knowledge Production

This may have been the case at the end of the 1990s, but today the notion of openness as it applies to the new convergences of open source, open access, and open knowledge production has clearly taken on the hue of a political and social movement. Open access and open knowledge production, sometimes also referred to A2K and P2P (peer-to-peer), now customarily refers to knowledge creation and sharing as well a range of other topics such as framing human rights and development, political economy of trade treaties and intellectual property, peer production and education, digital right management, and open archives (OA), OA publishing and libraries, among others.

In a study of how social production transforms markets and freedom, Benkler (2006, p. 1) begins his authoritative work with the following words:

Information, knowledge, and culture are central to human freedom and human development. How they are produced and exchanged in our society critically affects the way we see the state of the world as it is and might be; who decides these questions; and how we, as societies and polities, come to understand what can and ought to be done. For more than 150 years, modern complex democracies have depended in large measure on an industrial information economy for these basic functions. In the past decade and a half, we have begun to see a radical change in the organization of information production. Enabled by technological change, we are beginning to see a series of economic, social, and cultural adaptations that make possible a radical transformation of how we make the information environment we occupy as autonomous individuals, citizens, and members of cultural and social groups... The change brought about by the networked information environment is deep. It is structural. It goes to the very foundations of how liberal markets and liberal democracies have coevolved for almost two centuries.

Benkler is not alone in making what seem like extravagant claims. His work rests on and is in turn reinforced by a range of scholars mostly working in the related areas of informatics, international law, and political economy, including James Boyle, Hal Abelson, and Lawrence Lessig (see Peters 2007). They concur that the role of nonmarket and non-proprietary production promotes the emergence of a new information environment and networked economy that both depends upon and encourages great individual freedom, democratic participation, collaboration, and interactivity. This

“promises to enable social production and exchange to play a much larger role, alongside property - and market based production, than they ever have in modern democracies” (Benkler 2006: 3). Peer production of information, knowledge, and culture enabled by the emergence of free and open-source software permits the expansion of the social model production beyond software platform into every domain of information and cultural production.

Open knowledge production is based upon an incremental, decentralized (and asynchronous), and collaborative development process that transcends the traditional proprietary market model. Commons-based peer production is based on free cooperation, not on the selling of one's labor in exchange of a wage, nor motivated primarily by profit or for the exchange value of the resulting product; it is managed through new modes of peer governance rather than traditional organizational hierarchies and it is an innovative application of copyright which creates an information commons and transcends the limitations attached to both the private (for-profit) and public (State-based) property forms (I based this formulation on Michel Bauwens' P2P Foundation work at the P2P Foundation < P2P Foundation).

Related Approaches

As Michael Bauwens' P2P Foundation acknowledges there are and have been many thinkers and scholars who have expressed similar ideas in terms of the “High-tech Gift Economy” (Richard Barbrook), “the Public Domain” (James Boyle), “Copyright, Commodification and Culture” (Julia Cohen), “Peer Governance and Democracy” (Erik Douglas), “Connective Knowledge” (Stephen

Downes), and “An Economic Theory of Infrastructure and Commons Management” (Brett Frischmann 2005). There is a clear link of this set of ideas to those that employ ecological or environmental models to talk about the commons such as “Freedom In The Commons” (Yochai Benkler), “the Second Enclosure Movement” (James Boyle), “Circulation of the Commons” and “immaterial labor” (Nick Dyer-Witheford) and “the Tragedy of the Commons” (Garreth Harding). Others have sought to provide, in addition, an evolutionary thesis concerning societal evolution and/or changed states of consciousness, including “the movement from tribes to networks” (David Ronfeldt), “the Participatory Worldview” (David Skrbina), and “the Enactive Theory of Consciousness” (Evan Thompson). Finally, some scholars have sought to link open knowledge or commons-based production to a political system and especially to Marxism including “Socialist Individualism”(Magnus Marsdal), “The DotCommunist Manifesto” (Eben Moglen), “the tradition of civil socialism” (Bruno Theret) and “sharing culture” (Raoul Victor). This list is quite useful but also potentially difficult to decipher and interpret; three sets of ideas outlining the economics of open knowledge production systems, reinterpreting this phenomenon in terms of ecological or environmental models, shifts in evolutionary consciousness, and its exemplification of political models. The first set of links to ecological or environmental models is now well established across the literature whether it be in political economy, law, sociology, psychology, or some combination of all four (see Peters 2007); the second set of links to evolutionary models also in some way can be considered an extension of the first set and is a powerful paradigm in psychology (computational models of cognition), philosophy (connectionist epistemology), and anthropology (There are a number of dominant precedents for this work including that of the so-called Cybernetics Group sponsored by the Macy Foundation series of conferences beginning in 1946 (Feedback Mechanisms and Circular Causal Systems in Biological and Social Systems) and including Gregory Bateson, Julian Bigelow, Frank Fremont-Smith, Kurt Lewin, Warren McCulloch,

Margaret Mead, John von Neumann, Northrop, Arturo Rosenblueth, Claude Shannon, and Norbert Wiener, among others (see Heims 1993; Dupuy 2000). Bateson’s (1972) *Steps to an Ecology of Mind* is one of the classics to emerge but see also more recently Piero Scaruffi’s (2006) *The Nature of Consciousness* that attempts a synthesis of Philosophy, Psychology, Computer Science, Mathematics, Biology, Neurology, and Physics, at <http://www.thymos.com/nature/preface.html> or Ken Wilber on “integral psychology”); the third set seems particularly problematic with scholars from both marxist and liberal traditions of political economy claiming open knowledge production systems for their own, even though the principles they articulate are overlapping.

The Foundation for P2P Alternatives| provides the following brief sketch that outlines the relationships between these different set of ideas:

- That technology reflects a change of consciousness toward participation and in turn strengthens it
- That the networked format, expressed in the specific manner of peer-to-peer relations, is a new form of political organizing and subjectivity, and an alternative for the political/economic order, which, though it does not offer solutions per se, points the way to a variety of dialogical and self-organizing formats to device different processes for arriving at such solutions; it ushers in an era of “nonrepresentational democracy,” where an increasing number of people are able to manage their social and productive life through the use of a variety of networks and peer circles
- That it creates a new public domain, an information commons, which should be protected and extended, especially in the domain of common knowledge creation, and that this domain, where the cost of reproducing knowledge is near zero, requires fundamental changes in the intellectual property regime, as reflected by new forms such as the free software movement
- That the principles developed by the free software movement, in particular the General Public License, provides for models that could be used in other areas of social and productive life

- That it reconnects with the older traditions and attempts for a more cooperative social order, but this time obviates the need for authoritarianism and centralization; it has the potential of showing that the new egalitarian digital culture is connected to the older traditions of cooperation of the workers and peasants and to the search for an engaged and meaningful life as expressed in one's work, which becomes an expression of individual and collective creativity, rather than as a salaried means of survival
- That it offers youth a vision of renewal and hope to create a world that is more in tune with their values; that it creates a new language and discourse in tune with the new historical phase of "cognitive capitalism"; P2P is a language which every "digital youngster" can understand
- That it combines subjectivity (new values), intersubjectivity (new relations), objectivity (an enabling technology), and interobjectivity (new forms of organization) that mutually strengthen each other in a positive feedback loop, and it is clearly on the offensive and growing but lacking "political self-consciousness"

There is no doubt that there exist relationships between these different sets of ideas, and the emerging information environment is based upon a new form of open knowledge production that has strong implications for a kind of informational democracy (Peters 2007); whether the same set of relationships between these ideas can be extended to shifts of consciousness understood in ecological or evolutionary terms, or whether they imply a certain kind of political system or even spirituality is best treated as a set of working hypotheses at this stage. The actual complexity of establishing theoretical relationships between these different sets (rather than assuming them) is staggeringly difficult.

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Sebeok

► Placing Semiotics Within the Academy

Second Language Acquisition: An Edusemiotic Approach

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Synonyms

Experience; Language learning; Signification;
Sign user; Systems approach

Introduction

This entry introduces the methods of second language acquisition (SLA) from the perspective of edusemiotics (Semetsky and Stables 2014; Stables and Semetsky 2015). This approach moves away from educational psychology that traditionally informed research in SLA to a new direction in, specifically, philosophy of education informed by such important precursors to edusemiotics as

Charles S. Peirce, Gilles Deleuze, and Félix Guattari, as well as Gregory Bateson. Edusemiotics of SLA conceptualizes the process of teaching a second language not merely as a method of transferring words, grammatical structures, and phonology of a target language to a new learner as assumed in many language classrooms but as a way of conveying new kinds of experiences embedded in meaning-making systems of signs.

Mainstream SLA Theory and Philosophy

Since its inception, SLA theory and research have been strongly influenced by psychological theories of learning, such as behavioral, cognitive, and sociocultural theories. The grammar translation and audio-lingual methods of language acquisition followed the principles of behaviorism that addressed learning mainly as a habit formation realized through instrumental conditioning by implementing constant repetition of language forms. The cognitivist theory of learning coincided with Chomskyan revolution in linguistics and the birth of computers that compared learning to simple information processing and stressed the ways language learners internalized language forms, initially through conscious reflection and then through pattern-building practices. Since the 1980s, SLA has adopted the Vygotskian sociocultural theory (SCT) by focusing on learners' subjective experiences (e.g., accommodation to individual differences and learning strategies), by viewing learning as a social act (e.g., incorporating group activities in the classroom), and by utilizing language contents that are real, engaging, and socially relevant (e.g., introducing authentic materials). As it is shown further in this entry, these pedagogical advances were handicapped by top-down philosophical pressures of modern theoretical linguistics that kept derailing the SLA toward mostly cognitive models of education.

The Chomskyan Linguistics and SLA

Noam Chomsky found an elegant way of explaining common structures among many

languages termed universal grammar. Yet Chomsky crunched language to its core and dismissed an everyday use of language. Additionally he proposed that since all languages share similar principles, we could not have acquired these common features throughout our lives but were born with a language acquisition device or LAD. Such device is an assumed module in the brain equipped with principles of language structures that allow children to acquire language without much effort. Chomskyan linguistics considered language in the abstract rather than in concrete usage and practice, ignoring the most fundamental aspect of any communication, inclusive of pedagogy, that edusemiotics posits as the construction of shared meanings. The human language became devoid of its pragmatic force; instead the emphasis was placed on the surface level and mechanical structure of language. Following Chomsky who saw the I-language (internal language) different from the E-language (external language), the SLA classroom sought to teach a standard form of a target language that was not influenced by the presumed irregularities of language frequently found in everyday form of talk. Hence, mainstream SLA followed a pedagogical approach in which words had exact definitions, grammatical structures conveyed particular functions, and pronunciations were modeled after ideal native-like fluencies. At the conceptual level, any deviation from the alleged standard form of language was either ignored or reduced to “interferences.”

The *social turn* (Block 2003), as it is called, challenged Chomskyan legacy, but mainly at the pedagogical, rather than theoretical, level. It was claimed that language learning cannot be separated from its social and physical contexts. The social turn includes socio-cognitive, sociocultural, language socialization, complex adaptive system theory, as well as ecological and semiotic approaches. Building on Lev Vygotsky’s vision of language as a social sign and a tool, the social turn affirmed that learners do not merely learn a new method of communication but are acculturated into a new meaning-making system allowing them to perform meaningful social acts. The most important aspect of the social turn was to establish that language learners are not

incompetent communicators; rather, they attempt to construct an intersubjective space between their first and the target language. Complemented by complex adaptive system theory of SLA (Larsen-Freeman 2011), the social turn claimed that through local interactions between agents, including language learners and native speakers of the target language, a relatively stable pattern of language use emerges. Congruent with the naturalistic approach of fractal growths in the physical world, language learners expand on and access resources in the second language analogous to the growth of a branching tree. In general terms, the social turn emphasized the communicative aspect of language learning. However, it fell short of an understanding that the communication itself emerges from the interaction and interpretation; hence, it followed the same methodology of teaching a standard and ideal form of a target language.

SLA in the Context of Edusemiotics

Edusemiotics (Stables and Semetsky 2015) posits learning as not only a matter of cognitive understanding but of exploration and growth analogous to, and embedded into, the living process of semiosis as the evolution and transformation of signs. From the perspective of a language learner, acquisition is not simply reduced to the memorization of words and grammatical structures with fixed properties and functions. For instance, while mainstream SLA education evaluates the progress of a language learner with the finite acquisition of new vocabularies, grammatical structures, and other forms of a new language, edusemiotics considers all aspects of language as signs subject to interpretation and meaning-making entangled in the ever-growing symbolic network. Importantly, a sign is not just a tool reduced to a conventional relation to its referent but is intermingled in a web of concepts and ideas that relates to and brings out multiple references and signs. When a language learner is offered the opportunity to know that a word or grammatical structure signifies something, she does not reduce it to a simple one-to-one correspondence as a new word pointing to a

single referent. A native Spanish speaker, for example, does not merely learn that the word “*mesa*” in her native language corresponds to the English word “*table*” as a certain object in the manner of direct representation. She is always already participating in a broader semiotic system where other words and concepts, *not as objects but as signs*, are related to the word “*table*.” In the experience of the learner, a newly acquired sign has already expanded, leaked, and interfaced with other related signs, such as other words (chair, furniture, tablecloth), contexts (dining room, office room, living room), shapes (things with horizontal surface, usually hold above the ground with some legs), and functions (things usually used for working, eating, or holding decorative articles). In contrast, a child learning English as a native language must still work out such a web of symbolic interrelationship.

From the perspective of Peirce, a sign does not have a direct representation but is always involved in a triadic relationship. That is, contrary to the semiotic model of Ferdinand de Saussure, who perceived of signification in a dyadic relationship, only between a sign and an object (or a concept), Peirce was convinced that it is an interpretant (and accordingly, interpretive, semiotic process) that is a necessary part of any signification. In this triadic model, signification results when an agent (any living thing) interprets that a sign means something beyond itself. As such, in Peircean semiotics, signs are not static; they constantly grow and change. From an edusemiotics perspective, signs expand in a mode analogous to the growth of a rhizome (Deleuze 1994; Deleuze and Guattari 1988). A rhizome is a metaphoric model of growth when contents of natural world and its cultural products expand in multidirectional routes and planes, irreducible to a single point of reference or root but analogous to the spreads of grass. A rhizomatic growth is in contrast to linear and additive – what Deleuze called arborescent – progression. In most language classrooms, it is usually assumed that learners advance in a linear way, by knowing more words, grammatical structures, or other features of the new language.

When language particles are assumed to have fixed definitions and functions, the learner appears

to have to simply reproduce the knowledge of the teacher: “do as I do.” In this model it is the teacher who takes one thing (passive student) to another (language as a fixed object). But language seen as a web of interwoven signs and concepts growing in a rhizomatic network of relations forces both the teacher and her student to enter the symbolic field. In this model the teacher asks the learner: “do with me.” The learner then would not be connecting signs in a unidirectional way: a sign user herself functions as a sign in a triadic, recursive, and ever-growing semiotic system of interpretants. Indeed Peirce reminds us that symbols are similar to living things, in a very strict sense. He emphasizes that we can learn as much from the words as the words from us. Peirce provides a poignant example: “how much more the word electricity means now than it did in the days of Franklin; how much more the term planet means now than it did in the time [of] Hipparchus. These words have acquired information; just as a man’s thought does by further perception” (Burks 1958, p. 353). Such recursivity between a sign and its users is intensified in the classrooms permeated with meaningful interpretations rather than forceful corrections of the perceived “deficiencies” from the ideal form of language.

Incidentally, knowing more and more variables (age, motivation, language identity, aptitude, acculturation, anxiety, self-esteem, etc.) involved in SLA has not helped advance the field (cf. Larsen-Freeman 2011; van Lier 2004). Variable-based theories of SLA follow a positivistic philosophy of direct causality assuming that the world is basically a mechanism whose behavior, although at times appearing to be complex, follows a linear path and can be explained away by the reduction to its variables. Gregory Bateson, however, offered a systems approach to the complexity of nature. He emphasized that any delinication made in studying parts of a living system, whether physical or cultural, is an arbitrary choice and convention, and rather than components, parts, or variables, it is mutual interfaces that produce change, development, and the evolution of the system as a whole. This perspective forces us to pay attention to the *relations* within a system rather than its isolated members. It also opens our

eyes to see that the very variable we analyze is always dynamically *becoming* rather than just *being* a variable. Describing how a blind man perceives of the world by tapping his cane on the surface of a sidewalk, Bateson asked: “consider a blind man with a stick. Where does the blind man’s self begin? At the tip of the stick? At the handle of the stick? Or at some point halfway up the stick?” (1972, p. 318). The blind man’s “self,” in interactions with the world, is a complex system including the man, the cane, and the sidewalk which is not an arbitrary pathway but has a specific pattern that follows a still-larger system of a particular city codes and rules. The world for the blind man presents itself as a system, a complete unit that included the man sign in itself and, as Peirce would say, is perfused with signs.

Similarly, from an edusemiotic perspective, language acquisition is not reduced to a learner influenced by additive or subtractive variables. The learner is not a sole recipient of changes being acted upon by the phenomenon branded “language acquisition.” The learner, the target language, the content of the subject matter used in teaching, the physical aspect of the classroom, the teacher, other learners, the native language of the learner, and so forth are all semiotic systems with their own particular histories, affordances, and degrees of freedom that are brought in together, each one of these systems signifying a different thing to different participating entities. A language-learning event occurs at the borders of these systems, in the membranes of these constantly changing signs. When these systems meet, they collide and assemble *something* (language acquisition) experienced by *someone* (language learner) to *stand for something other than itself* (the target language).

None of the systems involved in language acquisition are reduced to static objects, pre-existing concepts, or entities as typically assumed in many SLA theories. A semiotic system is composed of *assemblages* (Deleuze and Guattari 1988) that are not reduced to contradictory or competing opposites as per Cartesian philosophy. The term assemblage, in this case, is used to denote that a social or ontological event, such as acquisition of a new language, is not an

aggregation of smaller events or objects with fix functions or properties. An assemblage is constituted in the interaction between multiple systems, each with varying functions and properties. When these systems communicate and interact, they create a unique organization. From such perspective, systems are engaged in constant *becomings* through their borders and along the *lines of flight* that run away as much as they leak and flow in-between. Such collisions and interfaces do not create a simple cohesion but transformations and mutations. Larsen-Freeman (2011) noted that language learners frequently “coadapt” their communicative resources to match with those of their interlocutors. Thus, language learners are viewed as systems and not individuals, and the act of communication is a dynamic organization. In acquiring a new language, a learner is never the same, nor is her experience of the language she is learning. When they meet, they mutually leak along and through their surfaces. They change and become transformed into other signs thereby contributing to mutual coevolution within and beyond a given semiotic system. Language acquisition is always a creative process. The language teacher cannot bring the new language to the language learner. It is ultimately the language learner who must make sense of the words: to figure out what they *point to* and what actions can be *performed by/with* them.

Conclusion

Knowing another language plays an important role in the way we experience and increase the overlap of the phenomenal world we share with others. As Stables (2012, p. 50) notes with regard to people with whom we seem to share a similar phenomenal world, it is epistemologically impossible to know everything about them or nothing at all. The acquisition of a second language increases the range of semiotic interpretants and expands the boundaries of the world in question. Learning a new language cannot be limited to classroom practice filled with grammar drill, out-of-context sentences, and filling in the blanks. The role of language “is not limited to first, second or foreign language classes, it

pervades all of education, in all subjects... All education is language education, since language is a defining quality of what it means to be human” (van Lier 2004, p. 2). Edusemiotics sees language not as an abstraction of mind dominated by static words and grammatical structures but as a participatory experience and activity. The learner is not a dot moving across a stationary space toward a finite goal while loaded with separate parts of language. She is a dynamic field or, according to Bateson and Deleuze, a *plateau* – attracted to another one, coping, fusing, and collapsing thereby changing and expanding this very field. The language learners are not arriving at the gate of the language of other speakers from the starting point as in the bottom-up approach, from letters to words and to sentences, or as they are divided up in courses from basic, then intermediate, and finally advanced level, each time linearly increasing vocabulary, grammar, and discourse. From an edusemiotic perspective, learners are not raw materials that enter a factory and are put on an assembly line where a teacher adds something and passes them on further.

Far from being on an assembly line, a language learner is experiencing a new field of becoming, and language is a dynamic system of signs the learner is engaged with and is using in practical experience. All language is a form of action. A language learner is experiencing what new words and grammatical structures “do” and how she can creatively use them to perform actions and make her experience meaningful. Deleuze compares the experiences of a new learner to a novice athlete or a surfer entering a wave for the first time. As the new surfer has to learn what to do with the surfboard in the context of waves, so the language learner needs to know what to do with the new language in the ever-evolving contexts and amidst new experiences. And the very nature of the various experiences permeating these two semiotic fields, whether of a surfer with a board entering a wave or a new language learner entering the field of another language, of getting wet, and of joining and mutating between these phenomenological realities, explains the initial attraction, the desire to learn a new language, and the process of signs becoming other signs.

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Semiosis as Relational Becoming

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Synonyms

[Child](#); [Education](#); [Edusemiotics](#); [Evolution](#); [Humanism](#); [Policy](#); [Posthumanism](#); [Process](#); [Semiosis](#)

Introduction

Semiosis is widely understood as the process by which humans make meaning, drawing on more

than linguistic resources alone. For Charles S. Peirce, however, semiosis is no less than evolution itself, driving forward all universal processes, from the play of cosmic forces to the progress of human thought. Something is always in relation to something, or some things, else (that it is not) such that a third or interpretant (to use Peirce's terms) is produced, which itself stands in relation to, on Peirce's account, both sign *per se* and its object. The specific concern of edusemiotics is with how human beings develop in the context of the broader universe of signification: in effect, the universe as permeated with signs, both human and nonhuman, both linguistic and extralinguistic. Edusemiotics defies the logic of either-or in favor of both-and. Accordingly, it goes beyond classical humanist assumptions about the discreteness of the human condition grounded in Cartesian and Newtonian beliefs about the separateness of two substances, rational mind and mechanical matter, without lapsing into either pure cognitivist idealism or crude behaviorist empiricism. It acknowledges fully both the embodiment of the human condition and its relationship with the nonhuman. The fully semiotic account of education is necessarily posthumanist.

Be(com)ing Human: Toward a Posthumanist, Relational Framework for Educational Policy and Practice

The sign, as an irreducible minimal unit of semiosis, makes sense only in its context, as the word in its sentence, the sentence in the text, and the stem cell in the part of the body in which it is to serve. In short, things are defined by what they are not, by those other things to which they exist in relation. This insight is merely an extension of the basic tenets of Saussurean structural linguistics. The broader (Peircean) perspective posits semiosis as a dynamic process, the transformation of signs *per se*. The sign is not a fixed entity but is ever changing: sometimes slowly, like the rock, and sometimes quickly, like the gust of wind. We must understand things, therefore, with reference to what they are not and as always *becoming*. These premises lead to theories of the human,

the child, and education (Stables 2008/2011, 2012). Such theories are both fully semiotic, in taking the sign as the basic unit of analysis and semiosis as a process that embraces evolution and adaptation as well as specifically cultural meaning, and posthumanist, in the sense of denying the absolute distinctness of human essence and mind. This posthumanist perspective on education stresses the interdependence of human and non-human life: both are embedded in semiosis as a relational process of signs becoming other.

Both religious and secular humanisms encounter problems on two fronts: in defining where human identity begins and ends and in explaining the supposed uniqueness of the human mind manifested in its powers of reason and language. If it were self-evident where human life begins and ends, there would be no strong debates on abortion, children's rights, or end of life. The violence and complexity of these debates reveal fault lines in humanist assumptions. Can the fertilized egg really be regarded as human or the not yet independently breathing baby as nonhuman? Is the brain-dead accident victim on life support as fully human as the doctor who treats him? These ethical questions emerge from taking a dualistic prospective on human nature as opposite to non-human and the all-or-nothing human condition. But the human is never fully human; it is always concerned with *becoming human* (even if not always consciously) in terms of an orientation toward flourishing. The human is trying to perfect being human, simultaneously falling short in this but defining her humanity through her failure and vulnerability.

This perspective differs from the classical humanist position in terms of treatment of the other. If we are a priori fully human, then others (even other humans) inevitably fall short of our expectations through their differences. Humanism, which overtly commits to peaceful coexistence, contains within itself the seeds of mutual destruction. If we begin with our sense of ourselves as struggling to meet our human aspirations, we are more inclined to sympathize with others of our species and may be more sympathetic to those sentient beings guided by different regulative ideals. To be human on this account is

therefore to be on a quest for greater human flourishing in the context of other forms of life and nonlife that are not dismissed as mere resources to enable us to meet selfish ends. If we destroy the not us which defines us, then we also damage ourselves. Given that a fully semiotic position regards evolution and adaptation as matters of semiosis, the move from a humanist to a posthumanist age is in the interests of human flourishing. After several centuries in which the human interest has considered itself best served by dismissing the natural environment as mechanical resource, humanity now acknowledges its relational debt to the nonhuman and its duty to value biodiversity. Interestingly, animal studies have increasingly come to recognize similarities with, rather than differences from, the human. Recent work on primate communication that shows how monkeys follow basic linguistic laws forms one striking example of this (Semple et al. 2010).

Regarding specifically educational theory, the edusemiotic, process-oriented, and relational account offers a number of radical insights. The first is the problematization of the child. If adults are not finite beings, the power of the common conception that children are adults-in-the-making is compromised. Increasingly, social theory posits the "kidult" as flexible and uncertain, in opposition to the assumption of adulthood as a settled state, akin to Aristotle's fulfillment of a citizenship role. Less and less do we expect a person to do the same job or have the same interests and inclinations from the end of childhood to a fixed age of retirement and inevitable decline. The current uncertainty and widespread anxiety about childhood is at root a problem grounded in the unsettling of adulthood. If adulthood is not clearly definable, then childhood too cannot be defined. Furthermore, if a child's legal and educational rights are defined with respect to the rights of adults on the grounds that the latter are fully human, then agreement on those rights is proving increasingly problematic. On the other hand, insofar as adults are the engagers with signs, so are children. The fact that children's relatively limited life experiences render them less able to act safely and reliably as apparently autonomous agents

should not be confused as a simple fact of biological and psychological development, for no adults are fully autonomous or reliable either. This perspective has implications for teaching, learning, and educational policy. Semiosis cannot be stopped or ultimately controlled by any agent or group of agents, and the narrow focus on educational outcomes and precise evaluation of institutions and organizations necessarily leads to damaging reductionism.

The edusemiotic premise that knowledge is always contextual does not imply that it has no transferability. Still, what the adult speaks in the context of one set of relationships, the child hears in the context of another so that what something means varies between interpreters and changes over time. What is being taught is never quite what students learn. At the same time, we rely on the next generation to solve the problems we have left them. Succeeding generations are always required to feed a growing population or deal with a degraded environment. It is counterproductive, therefore, to continue with an educational regime that is grounded in the mechanistic language of precisely defined learning objectives. Whatever we teach, it remains unclear whether students will have learned this content, and we require new insights from new generations. In the long run, the outcomes of teaching cannot be fully predicted, and educators and students, as embedded in semiotic relations, both exercise their respective judgments and reflect and modify their cultural positions. If governments intend to go on funding education, they must do so on a basis of some trust, or they will impoverish what they are funding by stages as they increase ever greater control over it. Ultimately, such attempts at control will fail, just as totalitarian government will ultimately fail, but much repression of human aspiration can take place in the process.

Educational policy is so far a long way from acknowledging the insights offered by this fully semiotic, posthumanist account that posits both teachers and learners as engaged in relations and interpreting signs situated in the greater, cultural and natural, environment. The application of edusemiotic theory in practice demands transformation of the structure of the school system and

has important implications for the degree to which learning outcomes can be predicted. Considering that semiosis operates at both conscious and unconscious levels, if we take a broad view of interpretation as a response across those levels, then edusemiotics posits a view of the student as an interpreter rather than a plain receiver of education. Respectively, teachers are interpreters of their students' signs, both verbal or explicit and nonverbal or subtle. Schools are not mere preparations for adult life, which is too a matter of continuous interpretation. Rather, schools are places where people develop interests and skills that they may continue to develop in later life, within the process of semiosis. A much quoted educational "opportunity" is only an opportunity if interpreted as such, even if not immediately.

Edusemiotics defies an all-or-nothing approach to schooling. Instead, schools should offer increasing scope for student interpretation rather than taking the view that the formative years should be mainly devoted to acquiring knowledge and skills to be deployed later, during the adult years. There is, in reality, no such sudden switch, and children are not motivated to learn that which has no value for them in relation to their ongoing life process. In relation to this, one of the hardest things for educators and policy makers to acknowledge is that (perceived) compulsion is one of the strongest detrimental factors in education. As soon as students are old enough to make their minds up about anything, they are able to plan and decide how they will respond to any particular educational intervention, and they will respond most probably when motivated by resonance with their own aspirations toward a more satisfying human condition. Some contested areas that elicit contemporary debates in educational theory while simultaneously expanding the scope of edusemiotics are listed below.

The Specialness of the Human

The account outlined in this entry is one that regards differences between the human and the nonhuman, between immaterial mind and material nature, as always of degree rather than kind. This relationship is construed somewhat differently by various commentators. Some take an

anthroposemiotic view, arguing that full semiosis only occurs at the level of the rational human (and perhaps divine) mind. Whether such accounts make the case for, or merely assume, the specialness of human-meaning making is a matter of debate. Deely (2009) construes as *metasemiosis* the action of signs coming to terms with beings as beings, both mind dependent and mind independent, with relationality transcending the customary subject-object and mind-matter divides that are the legacy of Cartesian dualism. Some edusemioticians, such as Pikkariainen, have regarded full semiosis as the province of the human, but do not explain this simply by virtue of humans having a biologically distinct capacity for reason.

It is clear from the range of such accounts that the distinctness case for humanity, from the edusemiotic perspective, can be variously construed. There are many points of possible compromise, not least in recognizing that as humans, we inevitably take the human species as being better at the things we humans usually do than other species are. In debates within educational theory, while often little hangs on where one sits in relation to this debate, the implications of this position can be wide ranging (Stables 2012). Whatever one's position on this, a purely mechanistic account of physical nature is clearly in conflict with the unlimited semiosis described by Peircean relational categories.

Some debates in this area thus map closely onto broader philosophical questions around rationality and realism. These, in turn, relate to debates around the nature of the semiotic object.

The Rational Belief Systems Problem

If semiosis pervades, even constitutes, the universe, is the whole universe and everything in it rational? There are live debates within edusemiotics about the limits and scopes of both rationality and realism. Notable examples include Inna Semetsky's research on the symbolism of tarot that culminated in her exploration of this medium from the edusemiotic perspective (Semetsky 2013), which takes this phenomenon out of the supernatural realm by postulating the radical rationality of edusemiotics per se. A second is a range of views about the importance of

the semiotic/Peircean object in learning that can refer to a material entity, a physical process, a purely psychological entity, or a merely another sign, as well as – while grammatically singular – to a collective or range of the above. A third is a wide range of views among semioticians about the validity of forms of religious and nonscientific thinking. Connected to this is a debate about semiotic realism, again turning somewhat on the conceptions of the object, with semioticians positioned on a continuum from strong Peircean realism to strongly relativistic poststructuralism. These debates continue to prove productive in the context of edusemiotics. For example, one can sympathize with Olteanu's realist thesis that learning begins with the recognition of similarity and proceeds, across Peirce's categories, from icon to argument (Olteanu 2015). Edusemiotics posits that teachers often work on the basis of their own and their students' preconceptions and habits of thought (that may be irrational or unconscious); this poses a problem to those who espouse simple transmission models of educational practice that assume a priori Cartesian rationality and disregard individuals' commitments to pluralistic models of reality, including the reality of signs.

Indeterminate Outcomes

Because education is such a politicized field and so dependent on State funding, the fully semiotic commitment to unpredictable outcomes presents an option that many policy makers are simply unwilling to consider. Policy makers seem determined to continue breaking "Stables' Law" (Stables 2012): that universal conclusions cannot be validly inferred from contingent premises. What is put into the system in one context cannot be guaranteed to produce identical outcomes to the same intervention in another context. If context A has a perceived weakness and intervention X produced apparent improvement in context B, it may be erroneously assumed that the same improvement will occur if the intervention is applied to A ($AX = BX$). Unfortunately, this is never the case ($AX \neq BX$). Interventions can never account for *all* the variables at play in either A or B. On the account of performance, policy makers would be giving into weakness to admit

this. According to Lyotard (1986), public services in many parts of the world operate in a narrowly performative manner, in which success is determined by the measurable achievement of predetermined outcomes: in everyday terms, a sausage machine model that conceives of teachers as the inputters and students as the outputs. Educators generally recognize such limitations, regardless of their commitment to edusemiotics that elicits the necessity to embed semiotic insights into educational policy making, even if the transformative process may take a long time. As long as politicians and/or educational policy makers seek quickly achieved, measurable outcomes as the proof of their effectiveness in office or institution, they are likely to resist accounts that stress the ubiquity of interpretation pertaining to edusemiotics and hence continue to be committed to narrow conceptions of education and its aims. Edusemiotics shares the democratic politics as a matter of open-ended debate, in relations with others and in mutual exploration; it is time, a full century after Dewey's *Democracy and Education*, to acknowledge fully that education should be conducted in this spirit.

Conclusion

A growing body of work is broadly in line with the fully semiotic, posthumanist approach, outlined here, whereby humans are considered to be in dynamic relations with a greater posthuman environment. Among examples acknowledging their semiotic roots are Pesce's work on teacher development and Pigrum's on creative teaching and learning processes (Pesce 2014; Pigrum 2014). Stables' work with Gough on learning as interpretation and adaptation speaks more strongly to the posthumanist strand in the thinking (Gough and Stables 2012). There are further developing areas, including a recent collaboration with Adam Ockelford, whose work on musical interaction with children with disabilities is already internationally renowned but which can be further strengthened through more explicit use of resources from edusemiotics (Ockelford 2010)

and the bringing together of researchers in biological anthropology with semioticians to develop the understandings of human-nonhuman communications as a research area within educational semiotics.

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- [Edusemiotics To Date, An Introduction of](#)

- Educational Semiotics, Greimas, and Theory of Action
- Ethics and Significance: Insights from Welby for Meaningful Education

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Service-Learning

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Synonyms

Community-based learning; Community-based learning and research; Community-engaged learning; Community service-learning

Introduction

Service-learning (SL) is widely defined as a form of experiential education that integrates

meaningful community service into the curriculum. SL contains two main elements: engagement within the community (service) and reflection on that engagement (learning). According to Bringle and Hatcher, these elements should be balanced by expecting students to “participate in an organized service activity that meets identified community needs” and “reflect on the service activity in such a way as to gain further understanding of course content, a broader appreciation of the discipline, and an enhanced sense of civic responsibility” (1995, p. 112). SL is well established in K-16 schools (primary, secondary, and higher education) in North America, Western Australia, and New Zealand.

Definitions of service-learning can be divided in two main groups. The first group of definitions describes SL as a form of education, and the second group of definitions defines SL as an educational philosophy. Definitions of SL as a form of education share three key elements that differentiate SL from other forms of experiential education. These elements are structured extensive reflection, application of learning in real-life settings, and relevant service. Student reflection encourages integration of theory and practice. Application of learning in real-life contexts should complement objectives of students’ future careers. Therefore, service needs to be relevant, meaningful, and tightly integrated into the curriculum. Participants in SL should demonstrate a balance of abstract and concrete knowledge, the development of social intelligence, and civic responsibility.

Service-learning as a philosophy is characterized by “human growth and purpose, a social vision, an approach to community, and a way of knowing” (Kendall 1990, p. 23 as cited in Jacoby 2014, p. 5). Based on the assumption that engagement in community service may cause changes in social reality, SL belongs to the tradition of radical/critical pedagogy. SL is related to the Freirean concept of educational *praxis*, since it links concrete experiences to abstract theoretical concepts and broadens the perception of power and change. Using the concept of *history*, SL encompasses the broad context of addressed social issues, various responses to those issues, and efforts to address

them. SL is based on *dialogue*, which is prerequisite for the formation of partnerships between teachers, students, and communities.

SL is usually placed under the same umbrella with student volunteerism. However, volunteerism is focused on the service being provided and its benefits for the community, while SL puts equivalent focus on students and the community. The active civic participation in SL distinguishes it from various forms of active learning (e.g., field studies, internships, or problem-based learning). According to Eyler and Giles, “the thing that separates service-learning from other field-based and experiential forms of learning is the service, the giving to others, and students seem aware of this particular value” (1999, p. 37). Unlike various forms of field-based education, which are usually more beneficial to providers (students) than to the community, SL defines both students and community members as direct and equal beneficiaries of service.

Four Stages of Service-Learning

SL projects typically consist of four interlocked stages: investigation and preparation, action, reflection, and demonstration (Kaye 2004). During investigation and preparation, students identify a community need or issue that needs to be addressed and analyze key resources they can offer (skills, interests, and talents). Investigation is performed through different approaches: interviews, surveys, books, the Internet, and personal observations, and it requires teamwork. At the end of this stage, students document the nature and extent of the identified community need. Investigation and preparation consists of acquisition of relevant knowledge and skills and their alignment to curricular goals. Here, teachers define relevant learning outcomes and cross-reference them with student interests, identified community needs, and related academic content. Students are often placed in smaller groups. Roles, responsibilities, and prerequisite skills of each group member are clarified, and project timelines are developed. In collaboration with the community, students identify and analyze different viewpoints toward the

same problem. In this way, they learn about the “historical, sociological, cultural, economic, and political contexts that underlie the needs or issues” (Jacoby 2014, p. 3). In the tradition of critical education, SL pedagogy might sometimes be linked to a progressive political agenda. Experiential learning is paired with critical analysis and reflection, leading students to place their service inside a social context through academic readings.

During action, students implement the planned project, engage in meaningful and personally relevant service, and apply the newly acquired knowledge and skills. Action may take a form of direct or indirect service, research, or advocacy and should represent a collaborative and safe environment to learn, grow, and make mistakes. Reflection takes place before, during, and after the service and links all stages of SL. Reflection should foster empathy for others. It integrates experience and aims to situate emotional, cognitive, and social features of experience into a larger context. Multiple challenging reflection activities (such as reflection journals, group in-class or online discussions, directed writings, portfolios, role-play, etc.) are vehicles for assessment of individual student performance and SL projects at large. Through critical reflection, students perceive influence of their service on the community and themselves. Using another concept attributed to Freire, students simultaneously learn how to read the word and the world (Freire 1972).

In demonstration, students summarize their SL experience. They document the entire project to be able to draw on all stages of their service-learning experience and use project results for improvement. Practical activities during demonstration include public presentations, blogs, portfolios, videos, and other ways of communicating developed competencies and achieved outcomes within the community.

Benefits and Criticism of Service-Learning

SL has five major stakeholders: students, teachers, universities/schools, community partners, and local community members (individuals, groups,

or organizations). Understanding among stakeholders is established through SL partnerships. Students, working as a team, are engaged in real-life SL projects that complement their theoretical learning and stimulate deep thinking about themselves and their relationships to the society. Educational aspects of SL are evaluated based on the connection between learning and service, and practical aspects of SL are evaluated in relation to the community. In lieu with the tradition of critical pedagogy, students engaged in SL are treated as equal stakeholders with a strong voice in preparation, implementation, and evaluation of projects. Service-learning research brings consistent evidence of students' improvement in problem solving, communication skills, teamwork, intercultural competency, leadership, and career decision-making (Carrington and Selva 2010; Harris et al. 2010; Kenworthy-U'ren 2008; Milne et al. 2008, Prentice and Robinson 2010, as cited in Smith and Shaw 2012, p. 1). Students also report richer and longer-lasting relationships between them and teachers (Pribbenow 2005, as cited in Workman and Berry 2010).

In their review of relevant literature, Workman and Berry (2011) indicate that teachers actively learn from and about their students. SL enables them to position their schools and universities as service-branded and to establish various networks. Teachers report the following benefits of SL: taking on new roles, enhanced teaching through active mentorship, building richer connections with students, fostering stronger student engagement, and increased relevance of teaching and learning. Community partners begin to perceive teachers as pragmatic, engaged experts, and teachers become more aware of their own impact on the local community. Community partners (such as NGOs or local authorities) and their clients from the local community provide learning opportunities for students, benefiting in return from the valuable human capital. "Satisfied community partners sometimes offer students paid internships and final professional career placements upon graduation," while "universities sharing the SL mission become leaders for cross-institutional teaching and research opportunities"

(Workman and Berry 2011, p. 137). SL projects enhance reputation of educational institutions, since community partners provide information to other community organizations about their experiences. They also provide universities and schools with the framework for the development of long-term community partnerships and strategic planning.

SL is commonly critiqued based on its longitudinal impacts on all stakeholders, particularly students and the community. In SL, student performance and learning is based on reflection, which is very hard to assess (Clayton et al. 2013). Furthermore, most SL is course based, so limited time frames and numbers of engaged participants may twist its focus toward students and their learning achievements. In such cases, teaching and learning might be conducted at the cost of the community or even preserve unjust social structures (Roschelle et al. 2000 as cited in Mitchell 2008). SL is also critiqued on theoretical grounds. Critics point at the lack of an articulated conceptual framework, where SL is at the same time interpreted as a pedagogical strategy that enhances student learning, a field of education, a philosophical approach, a vehicle for raising student empathy, self-awareness and social intelligence, and a radical social movement. They seek for

a more comprehensive approach to the assessment of service learning institutionalization that can provide researchers and practitioners with the kinds of data and evidence needed to more fully understand the most effective strategies, structures, and policies for facilitating the institutionalization of service learning. (Clayton et al. 2013)

Some critics are also concerned that SL might reinforce stereotypes and aggravate power asymmetries between cultural and social groups (Stewart and Webster 2010).

In response to practical critiques, SL community has identified a plurality of perspectives and value-based frameworks that unify service-learning. A range of quality standards and core principles for service-learning have been offered, most notably the four Rs: respect, reciprocity, relevance, and reflection (Butin 2003 as cited in

Smith and Shaw 2012, p. 2). Mutual respect among all stakeholders is prerequisite for supporting diversity, promotion of tolerance, and acceptance of others. Respect needs to be demonstrated to views, circumstances, and ways of life of service recipients. Reciprocity indicates a value exchange process which benefits all stakeholders. Students enhance their learning; teachers engage with the community; and educational institutions improve quality of their work, while the community benefits from direct outcomes of SL projects. Relevance is achieved through integration of service and curriculum. Finally, intentional reflection about the service-learning experience enables students to examine their beliefs and make their learning meaningful.

In response to theoretical critiques, scholars have put forward a complex pedagogical and philosophical concept of SL based on multiple theoretical models (Jacoby 2014, p. 6). This concept draws from Dewey's philosophy of experience, its links to reflective thinking, and the importance of interaction between students and the community. SL is also based on David Kolb's learning cycle and the psychological importance of reflection. Emphasizing social responsibility, change, and social justice, recent literature situates SL with the tradition of critical pedagogy. This has emerged into a progressive pedagogical orientation called critical service-learning, which requires "students to not only participate in communities, but to transform them as engaged and active citizens" (Mitchell 2008).

Service-Learning and Digital Technologies

Until recently, SL was widely assumed incompatible with educational technologies: SL puts emphasis on community engagement and hands-on practice, while technology implies individual work with computers. However, technological development has slowly but surely brought SL closer to digital technologies. Service-e-learning (SeL) (also called *technology-based service-learning*, *e-service-learning*, and *digital service-*

learning) is "an integrative pedagogy that engages learners through technology in civic inquiry, service, reflection, and action" (Dailey-Hebert et al. 2008, p. 1 as cited in Waldner et al. 2012). SeL links educational technology to a meaningful community service, utilizing technological devices to enhance civic engagement and filling the technological gaps within the community.

In the network society, environmental and social issues, online communities, and online service span across country borders. Working in teams, students in SeL use technologies such as teleconferencing, blogs, virtual classrooms, online videos, discussion boards, digital storytelling, etc. As a consequence, they are able to address needs and issues beyond their local contexts, develop cultural understanding, and engage in service-learning projects that expand from local to global. Dealing with complex issues of abroad communities, students develop understanding of needs and issues in their own communities, develop cultural sensitivity, overcome stereotypes and prejudices, and obtain a more nuanced understanding of cultural differences.

Waldner et al. (2012) list four types of SeL courses: Type I (instruction is fully online and service is on site), Type II (instruction is fully on site and service is fully online), Type III (instruction and service may be both on site and online), and Type IV (instruction and service are fully online). The identified types of courses bring various benefits (e.g., independence of time and space) and various limitations (e.g., technological challenges, communication barriers, and teacher workload). However, SL can be aligned with various other approaches beyond e-learning. Competing approaches to the relationships between SL and digital technologies, most notably those based on connectivism (such as networked learning), might transcend some limitations of SeL and bring fresh benefits. Based on community engagement, contemporary SL might also benefit from research on digital cultures and their complex relationships with education. As an evolving educational practice, contemporary SL needs to be continually thought of in relation to digital technologies.

Conclusion

SL aims to support the development of basic twenty-first century skills: critical and creative thinking, reflection, communication, collaboration, information literacy, and social skills. SL is closely linked to other field-based and experiential forms of learning, but its success is conditioned by active civic participation. The way in which SL is implemented varies greatly between educational institutions. Some institutions emphasize social responsibility, change, and social justice and advocate critical pedagogy. Others are more oriented toward the international communities and cross-cultural education: Furthermore, there is also a growing trend of serving online communities through online civic action. Yet, what unifies different forms of SL is a value-based framework with the core standards such as respect, reciprocity, relevance, and reflection. Research documents worldwide integration of SL into curriculum and its positive impacts on student ability to develop relevant and situated knowledge. In a rapidly changing educational landscape, educational institutions continuously seek to discover best SL practices, address changing student populations, and achieve institutional sustainability.

There are several trends that might impact the future of SL. Civic mission and integration of community engagement into curricula have become priorities of many educational institutions, and they continue to expand strategic investments in community partnerships. Educational institutions are faced with pressing requirements to evaluate the outcomes of SL in quantitative and quantitative ways and to focus on creation of interdependent community partnerships. With the globalization of education, SL has also become progressively internationalized. In order to support students with diverse backgrounds and abilities, in a variety of settings, educational institutions are faced with the challenge of integrating digital technologies and SL. Global sustainability, along with the huge potential of educational technology, is the continuous challenge that SL will need to address in the times to come.

Cross-References

- [Citizenship, Inclusion, and Education](#)
- [Critical Education and Digital Cultures](#)
- [Dewey on the Concept of Education as Growth](#)
- [Dewey on Thinking in Education](#)
- [Networked Learning](#)
- [Philosophy of Education: Its Current Trajectory and Challenges](#)

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Sketching the Multiple Relevance of Postmodernism to Educational Theory

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Introduction

Philosophically, the last decades of the twentieth century have been marked by debates concerning postmodernism. At times denoting an artistic

trend; at other times signifying a whole era and its self-understanding; or designating a new line of thought (Hutcheon 1989), the postmodern has attracted much theoretical attention and exerted a strong influence on contemporary worldviews and academic disciplines. Educational philosophy has been especially receptive of postmodern thought. The present entry maps this influence through a brief reference to major postmodern ideas and thinkers and to the transfer of postmodern insights to educational-theoretical discourses.

It has not been easy to define the term “post-modern” (and the related -ism) or to determine the advent of the corresponding era. The notion has proven too elastic to cover overspecified, exclusive, and narrow semantic contents. Likewise, the passage from modernity to postmodernity cannot be treated as an accomplished reality, let alone as a rigidly demarcated event with a clear chronology leading up to its stabilization. But the very effort strictly to define postmodernism and to demarcate postmodernity would be a rather “un-postmodern” thing to do because part of what counts as postmodern is the resistance to pinning down meanings and to simplifying complex phenomena. Therefore, this entry will employ only minimal approximations of the term and will let the rich and diverse semantics of postmodernism be figured out through the exposition of postmodern ideas and of their basic educational bearing.

Postmodern Ideas

For the purposes of this overview, postmodernism is minimally taken to denote a set of philosophical orientations that share incredulity towards master, grand, or meta-narratives (Lyotard 1984). The term “meta-narratives” signifies modern, ambitious, theoretical systems that aspire to answer comprehensive and totalizing questions about the self and the world. Meta-narrative answers to such questions draw their hegemony and social currency from the legitimizing power of rationality and/or science. Postmodern thought examines the modern construction of the self and the world through its rich variety of implications

(ontological, ethical, aesthetic, epistemic, and political) and discloses modern distributions of power.

This can be illustrated with reference to epistemic and political implications. Epistemic implications of meta-narratives that attract postmodern attacks comprise: the tailoring of reality to the purposes and confines of purportedly all-encompassing, overarching theories; the assumption of a uniform reality on which humanity supposedly has full representational control; and the subject–object relation of the self and the world that (re)produces binary oppositions (e.g., “the mind vs. the body”) and misses more complex and ambiguous intersections. Against the modern, metaphysical connection of the human and the world as a relation of a “subject (*hypokeimenon*) versus an object (*antikeimenon*),” postmodernism posits the text (*keimenon*) and our textual relationality as the binding force of thought and existence. Textual operations construct the world for us and construct us as effects of language and enculturation. Political implications of meta-narratives that postmodernism combats comprise: the assumption of a privileged relation of the West to reason, knowledge, and truth; the emphasis on western technological and scientific achievements of “universal” value that rationalizes Eurocentric expansionism and discrimination against (cultural) otherness; the glorification of identity as a rigid determinant of who we are; and the anthropocentric (re)presentation of nature as an object to be observed, studied, possessed, and exploited by the “modernizer” and “developer” to the “benefit” of humanity. Against the modern politics of anthropocentrism, Eurocentrism, and self-centeredness, many postmodern thinkers have defended: a view of nature as a coplayer in the game of life rather than as an object on which we act; a respect for otherness and cultural diversity; a fluidity of identity along with a multiplicity of identities and corresponding citizenships; and an acknowledgment of the otherness within us (within our own geographical spaces and within our own selves).

With Friedrich Nietzsche, Mikhail Bakhtin, Georges Bataille, and Roland Barthes as some of its diverse precursors who prefigured part of what later became the general trend of (especially

French) continental thought, postmodernism shifts philosophical attention toward neglected themes. Some such are the will to power, the erotic, the “carnavalesque,” desire and drives, sacrifice, mythology, metaphor, affect, excess, and polysemy. Postmodernism engages with these themes in ways that single out how and why such socially and theoretically repressed topics return to haunt thought and action, certainties and hopes, and priorities, institutions, and systems. In so doing, postmodern scholarship ultimately exposes the repressive effects of means-ends rationality and the didacticism, sterility, and facile cognitivism of modern pedagogies and educational systems. It also condemns the obsession with order that turns teaching and learning into appropriation and transmission of digestible, deliverable, and marketable “products.” Indicatively, modern metaphysics, politics, and didactics stand accused of favoring thought over language, reality over relationality, unity over plurality, community and commonality over difference and diversity, foundationalism over contingency, rigorism over playfulness, consensus over dissent, dialogue over agonistics, transcendence over immanence, authenticity or purity over hybridity, measurability over the new and the unknown, securitization over risk, and regulative disciplinarity over resistance.

The set of philosophies that are typically termed “postmodern” involves multiple (and often ambivalent) reactions to modernist reflection, values, and self-conceptions. Despite deconstructive reservations concerning the -ism of the postmodern trend (Derrida 1994), philosophers who have typically been described thus (even those whose reaction to such a label has been reticent or even negative – e.g., Foucault, Lacan, Lyotard, Derrida (Blake et al. 1998, p. 5) have profoundly shaped academic discourses of the turn of the millennium. They have made academics more suspicious of claims to scientific innocence and of uncritical praise on knowledge, more cautious about the dangers and paradoxes of identity, and more vigilant regarding hierarchies that research consolidates. Thinkers as diverse as Richard Rorty and Gilles Deleuze increase awareness of the room that scholars should be prepared

to make for noncanonical thought and encourage openness to what Rorty names “abnormal” discourse. Post-Freudian and Lacanian psychoanalysts detect a controlling, scopophilic drive operating underneath the supposedly disinterested scientific curiosity, the cultivation of which education has so unreservedly declared its major aim. Julia Kristeva has given a feminist twist to the Lacanian preoccupation with the symbolic as law-bound, articulated order through her theorization of the semiotic as a counteracting, material level of language of great educational implications for our analyses of the mother–child relationship. The postmodern feminist use of the concept of *chora* as a nonpatriarchal, undifferentiated space resisting articulation and being potentially subversive of political hierarchies has, from Kristeva down to Luce Irigaray, contributed to philosophical-educational innovative discussions of childhood, care, and the teacher–pupil relationship. Foucault’s and Judith Butler’s philosophies had set the premises for what later formed a solid literature of attacks on heteronormative naturalizations of gender. Such attacks have made educationists more sensitive to the demands of social movements and marginalized or excluded groups but also more self-reflective regarding the paradoxical effects of education on identity formation.

Transferred to educational theory, the postmodern influence means that we can no longer maintain an “innocent” eye as concerns unquestioned pedagogical emphases on the desire for knowledge and on the dialogical classroom grounded in Rationality or in the Scientific Method or in Community. Educational philosophers who endorse the postmodern framework describe modernist educational practice as operating “within an overarching norm of consonance, notions of sameness and agreement that permeate schools and classroom life” (Stone 1994: 49). Against it, they promote the kind of postmodern educational theory and practice that favors dissonance rather than consonance. Even educators such as Barbara Thayer-Bacon and Charles Bacon (1998, p. 2) who wish to preserve and employ a notion of community, epistemic relationality, and dialogue for the sake of a caring,

democratic classroom feel obliged first to take into account the challenges that a postmodern context presents to such notions. They ask: "is it possible for a form (or forms) of community to emerge that does justice to particularity and universality?" They explain that this question is topical because "we live in a time when our situation, a postmodern situation as Habermas describes it, is one in which 'both revolutionary self-confidence and theoretical self-certainty are gone.'" Hence, to them, it is appropriate to ask further: in a postmodern theoretical context, "is there hope for achieving communities based on undistorted communication, dialogue, communal judgment, rational persuasion, nonviolence, and an ethic of care?" (ibid). Their affirmative response to this question comes only after their critical consideration of the postmodern objections and their cautious avoidance of the pitfalls of modern educational complicities.

Postmodern thought has provided educational theory with conceptual tools that help it respond to the new givens of a postmodern condition and of a globalized world typically accompanied in the nineties with (neo)liberal educational agendas and systemic pressures. The incredulity toward meta-narratives and its significance for reconsidering educational operations of reality construction and of the legitimizing role of reason and theory has helped educators notice (neo)liberal educational expectations that smack of bad utopianism. Managerial, one-sided and ideological pleas for more data and measurable "outcomes" that promised a more ordered and productive world became the target of much postmodern educational thought. Neat categorizations of philosophical persuasions as either analytic or continental that used to block exchanges across the relevant divide also within philosophy of education became complicated when educational theory saw them through the prism of Stanley Cavell's philosophy. Paul De Man and Derrida deconstructed the metaphysics of plenitude and presence that segregated *logos* from art (a segregation that downplayed the epistemological value of metaphor). The broader deconstruction of logocentrism contributed to strengthening

the critique of those "back to basics" curricular provisions that tended to marginalize aesthetic education or physical education.

Humanism, individualism, and liberalism educated generations of white, male, affluent, superior Westerners who oppressed other human beings on grounds of their supposed "inferiority" or "barbarity" and exploited nature in the name of progress and development. The postmodernist response to such an education is the exploration of the prospect of what is termed "antihumanist" education, an education that should not be mistaken as, ostensibly, operating against humanity but should be understood as beyond and against the specific humanism that had, from the Renaissance onwards, placed the human self (in fact, the "educated man of action," the "rational egoist," the administrator and scientist fabricating technologies of the self, etc.) centre stage and tasked a supposed universalism with serving "man." Thus, postmodern educators are less confident than their modernist colleagues regarding the tenets and visions of "Enlightened" education and progressive pedagogy. Enlightenment principles and the concomitant education are said to mask implicit and unacknowledged violence the very moment that they purport to free the self from its shackles. But, for many postmodern thinkers, there is no human nature which was once, or still is, in chains. Therefore, at best, emancipation is empty and, at worst, a pretext of hegemonic discourses complicit in discrimination or even terror. Generally, postmodern educators have reconsidered and problematized truth, justice, equality, liberation, autonomy, and other such ideas, also known as "the Shibboleths of modernity" that infiltrated educational discourses of humanism, individualism, and liberalism. The meanings of such notions and their educational significance have been "mapped," "negotiated," "challenged," "deconstructed," "queered," and "interrogated" – and all these verbs are placed here in quotation marks that indicate the fact that all are part of a typically postmodern vocabulary of "acting" and "performing" instead of providing consensual truths, assertions, reconstructions, foundations, systems, and proofs.

After postmodernism, educational theory has become more sensitive to technologies of the self, performativities, and biopolitical operations (from Foucault down to Giorgio Agamben) and does not rush to recommend educational aims or measures without prior genealogies and cartographies of how concepts and values have historically developed into key terms of pedagogy. Jacques Rancière's exploration of the "no-count" (that which remains invisible and inaudible in major distributions of the sensible) in established social ontology and Agamben's notion of the "state of exception" have offered educators critical insights into facile "no-child-left-behind" educational policies. The complication of modern notions of identity, allegiance, and citizenship has had important implications for political education especially concerning inclusion and exclusion. In awareness of state mechanisms of power that interpellate various subjectivities (Louis Althusser) and produce the I (eye) of the student and teacher, much educational philosophy today is largely reluctant to support the cultivation of specific subjectivities or collective identifications and allegiances (e.g., the autonomous subject, patriotism, feminism, cosmopolitanism). Challenges to particularist identities, even to those which appear progressive such as gender, have shown that, when belonging becomes naturalized, it betrays and undermines any positive promise (e.g., the promise to promote equity) (Bryson and DeCastell, 1993). But even the educational fostering of more inclusive identities or virtues such as cosmopolitanism becomes challenged, especially when such -isms are based on universalist pretenses or reflect glossed over elitism. Poststructuralism, postfeminism, postanalytic philosophy, post-Freudian psychoanalysis, and other "postisms" have been broad frameworks for revisiting older commitments and for investing them with new intellectual and pedagogical energies.

The critique of the Cartesian subject, of mentalism and solipsism as epistemic warrants, and of the related rationalist individualism prepared the ground for a rapprochement of educational theory with nonrationalist alternatives to modernism and

non-Western philosophies (e.g., Buddhism). Many current educational philosophers feel free from older ideological constraints to pursue and investigate pedagogical convergences of East and West concerning the (knowing) subject and the ethics of teaching. Harkening to postmodern ethics, ethical (rather than moral) education moved away from both deontology and utilitarianism to explore alternative paths that go beyond the "human rights" discourse or the "gains and losses" talk. Though tackled also within a liberal philosophical educational framework, topics such as shame, guilt, forgiveness, friendship, and hospitality have educationally been approached anew through reference to major postmodern ethical philosophers. Postmodern educational research on ethics has been more investigative of the possibility of transcending the moral(ist) education of duties and obligations toward a face-to-face ethics of asymmetrical responsibility of the I to the Other (Levinas). Attentive to the textual fabric of what we perceive as ontological order (Derrida) and to the simulated, "hyperreal" character of educational, cultural material (Baudrillard), educational theory dismisses apolitical complacency, positivist claims to value neutrality, and facile recourse to facticity and "reality" as justificatory framings. Postmodern education is vigilant regarding the political role that narratives play in the shaping of the learner and alert to the "committed" rather than disinterested position of academia and research (Lyotard), retrieving context-sensitivity and situatedness against abstraction and generality.

Following postmodern thought, many educators have become suspicious of educational promises of obtaining representational knowledge and effecting the emancipation of their students or of society; in their eyes, there are no handy solutions to educational issues or prescriptions for a better educational practice, no gigantic leaps to school improvement through bold educational reforms, no radical utopianism but, rather, piecemeal betterment through trial and error (Rorty). The loss of revolutionary confidence, the challenge to knowledge and the questioning of theoretical certainties create space for the educational accommodation of playfulness, pastiche, and experimentation.

Questioning pinned-down meanings and illusions of authenticity enables political educational attention to semantic precariousness and diasporic diversity, framing schools as multicultural contact zones. Deleuzian terms such as “deterritorialization” and “rhizomes” shed a different light on educational routes and roots, inspire a writing of multiple entrances, and allow more complexity beyond linear argumentation.

Conclusion

Postmodernism questions ‘all forms of foundationalism and the absolutist and ahistorical categories and values, sustained and propagated through the symbolic unifying power of the grand narratives, by which “man,” “reason,” “history,” and “culture” were first projected in universalist European terms’ (Peters 2005, p. 442). Its relevance is manifest in many educational-theoretical texts of the last decades. The influence of postmodern thought on educational theory is evident in the sources (journals, collections of essays, monographs) of the field, the directions that the corresponding research has taken and the scholarly activities (conferences, fora, website postings) of the corresponding international academic community.

However, this has not been done without contestations and significant objections. Additional issues are the ambivalent positionalities of some philosophers (e.g., it is difficult to situate Levinas within the “postmodern” designation) whose work resists camps and trends, and the predicament that the effort to have rich and multiple philosophical underpinnings of education often leads to placing together difficult theoretical bedfellows.

Even within broadly conceived postmodern idioms, the supposed deconstructibility of truth, knowledge, and justice; their wholesale indictment; and the loss of faith in the Shibboleths of modernity are not always associated with enabling educational ramifications. There have also been challenges to educational tendencies toward newly consolidated postmodern vogue. Modish work tends to be blind to developments in educational theory outside the confines of

postmodernist thought and ends up fortifying the walls of postmodernism in the un-postmodern manner of creating new hierarchies and binary oppositions and of blocking exchange and osmosis. Postmodern educational theory requires more engagement with the Frankfurt School (Habermas, Apel, Honneth), (post)analytic and liberal philosophy, and with critics of postmodern thought such as Alain Badiou and Quentin Meillassoux who cannot easily be dismissed as supposedly “modern” or “Enlightened.”

Nevertheless, despite shortcomings such as sterile polemics, fad, and stronghold attitudes, the encounter of education and postmodernism involves the hybridization and pollination that postmodernism celebrates even if somewhat one-sidedly.

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Skills

- [Islamic Perspective of Vocational Education](#)

Social and Restorative Justice: A Moral Imperative for Educational Leaders

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Synonyms

Community engagement; Cultural relevance;
Holistic development; Inclusion; Layered leader-
ship; Marginalization; Social issues

Introduction

In 1994, Herman Bianchi suggested that education scholars were so connected to the retributive model of criminal justice for school students they were unable to accept the effectiveness of other models in other times and places. Five years later, Jon Braithwaite (1999) argued that through the history of the world, restorative justice had been the dominant model of criminal justice, and as such, a move toward a restorative justice model was a return to our roots and not the latest attempt to solve our ailing justice system. Other research (Llewellyn and Howse 1999) argued that restorative justice is not a new idea, but a prominent concept of justice visible throughout most of human history and often used interchangeably as “restorative processes” including restorative discipline, restorative practices, and restorative values.

Brief History of Administration of Justice

Prior to our modern system of State-centered public justice, the administration of justice was not simply about applying rules. Instead, it was a mediating and negotiating process known as community justice. Community justice grew out of the need for communities to resolve disputes,

reconcile harm, and maintain relationships. The use of retributive justice, or forced resolution, was seen as a last resort. As governments grew, they began the process of replacing community justice with courts. Courts established rule of law and applied the rules, established guilt, and set penalties. Victims, offenders, and the community lost control of disputes; instead, punishment served the interest of the State while doing nothing to address the harm caused by the wrongdoing (Llewellyn and Howse 1999).

The retributive approach to justice is the philosophy that has underlined our Western systems of criminal justice that relies on third-party sanctions and punishment to address societal wrongs (Schweigert 1999). This model measures wrongdoing through a system of rules associated with particular consequences, establishes the wrongs committed, and assigns guilt. The traditional retributive model has the offender as the focus and does not consider the needs of the victim or the community. In addition, it does not take into consideration the view of offender as a victim or the stigma that comes with labeling a person as a criminal (Calhoun and Pelech 2010). Today, the United States juvenile justice system is burdened by the cost of high rates of incarceration and the maintenance of the world’s largest jails and prison system. In addition, there is the stigmatization and marginalization of those in juvenile courts which limits their opportunities once back into their communities. As a response to these issues, and a growing emphasis on human rights, restorative justice and practices have begun “to move away from a retributive justice approach in order to focus on ‘putting things right’ between all those involved or affected by wrong-doing and achieves this by shifting the focus from individuals to whole communities” (Wearmouth et al. 2007, p. 196). It has since found its way to the corridors of schools and communities. Restorative practices in the form of highly structured processes of victim-offender conferencing are being, or have already been, developed in a number of areas around the world including North America, Europe, Australia, and New Zealand (see Schweigert 1999).

The Rise of Restorative Justice: An Education Context

Two peoples have made very specific and profound contributions to practices in the field of restorative justice – the First Nations people of Canada and the United States and the Maori of New Zealand. By the second half of the 1990s, “the expression “restorative justice” had become popular and attracted many segments of society, including schoolteachers, principals, politicians, juvenile justice agencies, police, judges, victim support groups, aboriginal elders, and parents” (Johnstone and Van Ness 2007, p. 77). Although the origins of restorative justice are widely contested and varying definitions continue to unfold, many education scholars agree that the inherent failings of school discipline and the implementation of zero-tolerance policies have created an impetus for alternative models to be devised.

Recent developments in education throughout the world have highlighted how important it has become for educational leaders (e.g., school administrators and teachers) to focus on an inclusive approach to leading, teaching, and learning (Wearmouth et al. 2007). These educational leaders and other educators are now required to deal with greater understanding of human rights issues including cultural, physical, and intellectual diversity in schools. A factor that is often missing from much of the debate around inclusion is an understanding that within any institution, educators and students’ relationships are defined by that institution’s social practices. Research has clearly asserted that difficulties in learning and behavior in schools are highly contextual in nature (Wearmouth et al. 2007) – that young people’s thinking and behavior are shaped by the social contexts in which they live and learn (Bruner 1996). Essentially, there is an understanding that family and culture are highly influential in shaping the thinking and behavior of young people in schools.

The principal aim of restorative processes in schools is to repair the harm that has been caused by the incident through the active involvement of all stakeholders – victims, offenders, and their

supporters or community representatives (where they want this) – in discussing what happened and deciding on the appropriate outcomes (Sumner et al. 2010). Given the range of due process concerns that arise from such interaction, most restorative justice practices that are used within the school and community settings require the offender – oftentimes the “at-promise” student – first to admit responsibility for the offense and for both the victim and the offender to consent to their involvement in the process. It is thought that through such a process, stakeholders will subsequently have a deeper understanding of the circumstances and consequences of the offense; that all participants will have agreed and contributed to the drafting of a behavioral or task-oriented contract to which the offender has to adhere; and that all participants will experience a sense of procedural justice.

Beyond the significant shift required of the schools and community effectively to curb violence and achieve justice within a restorative response is the impact this has for altering the leadership role at the school level and throughout the community. Social and restorative justice leaders engage with the communities. In the best interest of students (Stefkovich and Begley 2007), they feel a moral imperative to work with those they serve including students, teachers, families, partners, and other entities in the communities to understand the problem and then to seek positive solutions to those problems as a whole community.

Restorative justice models are increasingly advocated by educators who regularly work with student suspensions and expulsions and considered as the preferred alternative to retributive justice (Johnstone and Van Ness 2007). It is a process in which parties involved in a specific offense work collectively to find resolution. A wider more comprehensive definition is provided by Gilbert and Settles (2007) who state crime is viewed “as a harm to individuals, their neighborhoods, the surrounding community and even the offender. Crimes produce injuries that must be repaired by those who caused the injury” (p. 6) and that “crimes are more than violations of law, and justice is more than punishment of the guilty.” They further posit that restorative

justice “strives to promote healing through structured communication processes among victims, offenders, community representatives and government officials. . . to accomplish these goals in a manner that promotes peace and order for the community, vindication for the victim, and recompense for the offender” (p. 7).

Although models of restorative justice differ, there are several common components to how parties work toward restoration. The process of restorative justice must be voluntary and must include telling the truth. The only way to repair the wrong is to know and understand what has happened. At the heart of the restorative justice process is an encounter which involves sharing the truth in the presence of the offender, victim, and community. Sharing the truth allows the community to see the truth, allows the offender to see the harm inflicted, and allows the victim to see the offender as a person. For the encounter to be successful, it must include a facilitator who serves as the symbolic representation of the community and who allows the participants to decide what is important and what the right resolution is. Through a series of encounters, healing can begin and agreements can be reached. Through listening and understanding, participants can commit to restoring their relationship to one of dignity, concern, and respect (Llewellyn and Howse 1999). Finally, the restorative process empowers the offender, and the victim, to take an active role in the justice process. In order for a program to be completely restorative, it must include several components:

- Involves all parties with a stake in the resolution of the conflict, the victim, perpetrator, and the community.
- Recognizes and seeks to address the harms to one another, remembering that harm is not restricted to the victim but can be expressed by the offender and the community.
- Is voluntary. Participation cannot be the result of coercion, fear, threats, or manipulation brought to bear on either the victim or the offender.
- Is premised on and include truth telling in the form of an admission of responsibility for what

happened on the part of the perpetrator. This is a precondition for a restorative process.

- Involves encounter, a face-to-face sharing of stories and experiences between victim-offender and community.
- Protects the rights of victims and offenders.
- Involves a facilitator who can ensure the need of a broader social perspective.
- Aims for reintegration of the victim and offender into the community.
- Develops a plan for the future or agreement for resolution out of negotiation.
- Does not involve punishment.
- Is evaluated by its results, whether it restores or not (Llewellyn and Howse 1999, p. 73).

Social Justice and Restorative Justice

The term social justice is evoked daily in literature and the news media; however, it can be difficult to define. According to Murrell (2006), “social justice involves a disposition toward recognizing and eradicating all forms of oppression and differential treatment extant in the practices and policies of institutions, as well as a fealty to participatory democracy as a means of this action” (p. 81). Narrowing the definition of social justice from the world stage, to the classroom, does not make the task any easier. How social justice relates to and influences educational areas such as program development, curricula, practicum opportunities, educational philosophies, and social vision is a large conversation. What can be said is that education plays a part in promoting justice and the development of democratic citizenship. One might argue that this educational commitment to social justice is diminished through our current political environment of emphasizing curriculum tied to basic literacy and numeracy and not much else.

In addition to a modern emphasis on academic success in the face of globalization, countries throughout the world continue to adopt the social justice principle of universal education for all children including “at-promise” students. This increasing inclusiveness has led to challenges of diversity, individuality, and discipline. Schools

must now weigh the needs of the many with the needs of the few. An individual student's right to an education and to be college-ready must be weighed against the majority of students' rights to a safe and affirming educational environment. To combat these challenges, schools in Europe, Australia, New Zealand, and North America are implementing restorative practices in the form of victim-offender conferences as a process for conflict resolution and student discipline. Teachers and staff are trained as mediators and lead restorative circles to bring together the offender, victim, and community members in an effort to turn injury into personal healing and community development (Wearmouth et al. 2007).

Within the United States, a restorative approach to discipline could be perceived as a realistic alternative to zero-tolerance retributive policies, which mandate suspension and expulsion, and disproportionately target minority students. Specifically, minority youth are disproportionately represented in the number of school suspensions, expulsions, and referrals to the juvenile justice system. Restorative justice is increasingly being implemented as an alternative to retributive school discipline policies and a social justice response to the school to prison pipeline. There is minimal research on school-based restorative justice and even less on its implementation and efficacy in schools serving youth of color. However, one example of how restorative justice policies reduce violence, suspensions, and referrals to the juvenile justice system can be found in the Oakland Unified School District. In a 2007 case study conducted by the Thelton E. Henderson Center for Social Justice at the University of California, Berkeley, Cole Middle School in West Oakland's restorative justice program (created as an alternative to zero-tolerance disciplinary policies) was found to resolve conflict and build school community.

All teachers and staff at Cole Middle School were trained in the practice of disciplinary circles and community-building activities (Sumner et al. 2010). This new restorative discipline program then became the primary way of resolving disciplinary issues at Cole. Students were also offered an elective restorative justice class, and a

full-time disciplinary case manager was provided. Students participated in restorative circles which also included teachers and staff. The circles were led by a circle keeper to ensure everyone had an opportunity to speak. The morning advisory period was utilized as time to hold restorative circles and address disciplinary infractions. The study concluded that the restorative justice program strengthened school relationships, promoted and fostered social justice, helped students and adults deal with violence in their community, reduced suspensions by 87%, expulsions to zero, and saw increased student responsibility and autonomy (Sumner et al. 2010).

Restorative justice programs implemented in schools provide students with the opportunity to confront the harm they have caused, and in the process, students learn empathy and accountability. From a philosophical lens, restorative justice practices appear to be well suited for school campuses because they have the ability to support student learning by providing an alternative to retributive discipline and creating a supportive atmosphere. The restorative justice models employed by recovery programs promote social justice and restorative practices through an attempt to reintegrate offenders back into the school community. This initiative goes against the current education policies at the federal, State, and local level, which tend to lean toward retributive justice.

Conclusion

This encyclopedia entry focused on current realities for marginalized populations in urban schools. The author presented a broader theoretical, inclusive framework rooted in social justice and restorative practices that offer the best practices for a greater number of students who are "at-promise" of minimal academic success. "At-promise," as opposed to "at-risk," is used when describing underperforming student populations as it eliminates the deficit connotation associated with these learners. The extant literature suggests that examination of restorative justice practices specific to "at-promise" students and

those from “other” populations within a social justice framework is very limited (Bacon 2010). It is evident, however, from the few studies conducted that by adopting this approach, researchers and practitioners can connect and extend long-established lines of conceptual and empirical inquiry aimed at improving student learning outcomes and school practices and thereby gain insights that may otherwise be overlooked or assumed.

A further argument posits that this broader conceptualization of social and restorative justice adds to extant discourses about students who not only experience various types of daily oppression at schools (e.g., bullying, rule-breakers, homelessness, mental health issues, etc.) but also regularly live on the fringes of society. The time has come to share alternative models of justice, practices, and discipline strategies that school leaders, teachers, community members, policymakers, scholars, and practitioners alike might find beneficial when searching for more effective means to create safe teaching and learning environments for all students. It is hoped that lessons learned from effective restorative processes in schools will improve the preparation and practice of school leaders, thus improve educational outcomes for all students, and help prevent the gross injustice done to children who make poor decisions and end up on the bus from schools to juvenile hall or to prison.

It is morally imperative to provide safe and supportive learning environments for all students and to generate, refine, and test theories of restorative practices in education.

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Social Change

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Social Emotional Learning

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Social Emotional Learning and Latino Students

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Synonyms

Compassion; Empathy; Holistic education; Integrative education; Mindfulness; Relationship building; Social emotional learning; Wellbeing

Introduction

As an educational movement, social-emotional learning (SEL) is gaining momentum nationally and internationally. Considered by some to be “the missing piece” in education, SEL is a process of building emotional resiliency and relational competency as necessary skills in school, work, and life. Social-emotional learning is a process that builds self-awareness and social awareness while also providing practical skills for managing oneself effectively and interacting with others in constructive and responsible ways. In other words, social-emotional learning is “the process through which we learn to recognize and manage emotions, care about others, make good decisions, behave ethically and responsibly, develop positive relationships, and avoid negative behaviors” (Zins et al. 2004, p. 4). These skills are positively linked with range of personal, interpersonal, and academic outcomes while also being associated with a reduction in conduct problems, aggressive behavior, and emotional distress among K–12 students. SEL programming has been found to be effective for ethnic and racially diverse students within urban, suburban, and rural settings with benefits including: (1) an increase in social-emotional skills, (2) improved attitudes about self and others, (3) greater connection with school, (4) positive classroom behavior, and (5) an improvement in academic achievement (Durlak et al. 2011). There is strong evidence to suggest

that social and emotional skills are the foundation for personal, relational, and academic flourishing.

Within the United States, interest in social-emotional learning is growing, especially with recent developments in affective neuroscience linking SEL with resiliency and enhanced brain functions essential for learning. Globally, interest has also spread widely. In fact, in 2003 UNESCO (The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization) “initiated a worldwide plan to promote SEL by preparing a report delineating ten basic principles for integrating SEL based on the latest empirical research in the area. . . the report was sent to ministries of education in 140 countries” (Schonert-Reichl and Hymel 2007, p. 22). As a leading organization, the Collaborative for Academic, Social, and Emotional Learning (CASEL) has identified five core SEL competencies: (1) self-awareness, (2) self-management, (3) relationship building, (4) social awareness, and (5) responsible decision making. While individual competencies are inherently valuable, it is especially helpful to consider how these skills are interconnected and embedded within a larger educational paradigm. What is the bigger picture of social-emotional learning, and why is it relevant for the education of Latino students in particular?

Social-emotional learning can be deeply understood within a broader perspective known as holistic education—a philosophical framework interested in human flourishing. From a holistic standpoint, social-emotional learning is more than a set of skills that can be taught in isolation.

Rather, the core SEL competencies are best thought of as being embedded within a larger, integrative, and ecological perspective guided by a vision of hope and possibility for humanity.

Holistic Education: Defining the Paradigm

Holistic education is a comprehensive and integrative approach to teaching and learning. It departs from schooling traditions that over-emphasize cognitive development, individualism, and competition. Instead, principles of

interconnectivity, community, and human potential serve as guiding values. As an ecological perspective, holistic education is interested in cultivating the whole person within the context of community and the natural world. Community from this perspective is understood as an interconnected network of wholes. The individual exists within the context of family, neighborhood, and school; these communal contexts are embedded within the larger context of society, which is itself embedded within the global community; and the world as a whole is embedded within the greater context of the universe. As a philosophical paradigm, holistic education seeks to integrate all aspects of the human being in the process of teaching and learning. This includes cultivating the social, emotional, intellectual, aesthetic, and physical development of individuals. From this perspective, both students and teachers are seen as complex human beings in development and in need of supportive and enriching environments in which to thrive. A holistic approach to teaching and learning is at odds with policies that pressure educators to mainly focus their efforts on raising test scores.

With contemporary education's focus on standardized testing and the cultivation of mostly logical, rational, and analytical mental abilities, other human faculties like emotional intelligence, social bonding, and the development of empathy and compassion are often neglected. The result is an unnatural fragmentation within self and between self and world, which can have profoundly negative consequences. When it comes to schooling experiences, some argue that much of traditional education promotes alienation, fragmentation, and suffering; the opposite is connection, integration, and well-being, which is what the holistic perspective advocates—and it is what social and emotional learning makes possible.

The overvaluation of standardized testing rests on the assumption that academic achievement and cognitive skills (as measured by test scores) lead to a productive competitive workforce that ensures a vibrant economy. This is an assumption that is challenged by leading economists who call for greater integration of social and emotional skills in schools:

To meet the economic, political, social, and personal demand for competency, much more is required of students and adults than just cognitive proficiencies as measured by test scores. *Individuals must develop interpersonal skills that enable them to relate to others in many different societal situations. They must also develop the intrapersonal skills that include good judgment and strategies for meeting their own needs in effective ways.* (Levin 2012, p. 270, emphasis added)

Leading economists, psychologists, neuroscientists, and educators agree: it is no longer enough to *only* educate the brain; we must *also* educate the heart and develop relational competencies while becoming healthy and productive members of society.

Children are growing up in rapidly changing and challenging times. With its focus on learnable skills and constructive ways of being, social-emotional learning equips young people with key competencies to navigate the complex realities of life, inside and outside the classroom. The development of social-emotional skills benefits all children and has unique implications for Latino students in particular.

Latino Students: A Growing Population

Latinos constitute the largest and fastest growing ethnic group in the nation. In States like California and Texas, Latino students make up nearly half of the public school population. The enrollment of English Language Learners (ELLs) in US public schools has increased by over 50% in the last decade. According to census data, approximately 80% of English Language Learners are Spanish speakers, and about one in four ELLs lives below the poverty line (Migration Policy Institute 2015). The question of how to support Latino students, and in particular those who are English Language Learners, is a pressing one for educators.

As the Latino student population grows, socioeconomic and educational disparities continue. On measures of academic achievement, Latino students, on average, perform far below their peers; high school dropout rates are high, and college entrance rates are low. Latino children are less likely to have access to early childhood

education, which has been found to positively impact long-term school and life outcomes. For children living in poverty, challenges faced outside of school have significant implications for what happens in school (Noguera 2003). Issues like hunger, access to health care, complex living arrangements, economic hardship, and mental-emotional stress impact a student's ability to focus and engage in the academic demands of school. For Latino immigrant youth, these challenges are compounded through the acculturation process, which may include the experience of marginalization, social alienation, low self-esteem, low levels of school bonding, and language barriers (Castro-Olivo 2014). Integrating social and emotional learning in schools can help mitigate some of the challenges Latino students face.

Social-Emotional Learning and Latino Students

Research on social-emotional learning and Latino students is limited. However, there is evidence to suggest that while young Latino students enter school lagging behind in literacy skills, their social-emotional competencies are “on par or even excel that of their non-Latino peers” (Murphey et al. 2014, p. 4). This foundation, coupled with strong family ties and bilingualistic resources, is an asset that schools can build on. When working with Latino students – especially those living in high-poverty neighborhoods and those classified as English Language Learners – it is essential to consider the emotional experience underlying cognitive tasks as well as the role of relationship building and positive classroom culture in facilitating language and literacy development.

The cognitive demands that English Language Learners experience are substantial. For example, students whose native language is not English are working to understand conceptual information and subject-specific content knowledge while simultaneously learning the very language through which that knowledge and information is shared. Not only are the cognitive demands

great, the emotional dynamics involved are equally challenging. Learning a second language or developing biliteracy is a socially and cognitively challenging process that is laden with a range of emotions, including a sense of confusion, doubt, fear, worry, anxiety, frustration, and embarrassment – all of which can impede learning. At the core of social-emotional learning is the cultivation of awareness, emotional intelligence, social bonding, and self-regulation – all of which have been found to facilitate productive engagement in school and life. Educators working to improve the quality of education for Latino students would benefit from understanding the role that emotion plays in the process of teaching and learning. Self-awareness and self-regulation are core SEL skills that help mediate the profound connection between emotion and cognition.

Self-Awareness and Self-Regulation: The Emotion-Cognition Connection

The interplay between emotions and cognition either enhance or inhibit learning.

Understanding the role that emotions play in cognitive functioning is highly relevant for educators as they facilitate learning among their students and simultaneously consider the implication of their own emotional landscape in the classroom:

Recent advancements in neuroscience are highlighting connections between emotion, social functioning and decision making that have the potential to revolutionize our understanding of the role of affect in education. In particular, the neurobiological evidence suggest that the aspects of cognition that we recruit most heavily in schools, namely learning, attention, memory, decision-making, and social functioning, are both profoundly affected by and subsumed within the processes of emotion. (Immordino-Yang and Demasio 2007, p. 3)

In other words, emotions and cognition are deeply interrelated. Understanding the connection between emotions and cognition is relevant for advancing the ways in which student learning and teacher development are supported. Of key consideration is the relationship between stress and critical aspects of cognition.

Under non-stressful conditions, the brain's executive control center functions in optimal ways; under stressful conditions, it is impaired. This creates a situation where emotionally laden impulses ("fight, flight, or freeze" reactions) override higher-order thinking and decision-making abilities, resulting in behavior being more reactionary and impulsive rather than thoughtful and deliberate. The stress response is a survival mechanism essential amidst real danger. However, in the course of a regular day, having a heightened state of stress, worry, anxiety, or fear gets in the way of optimal cognitive functioning and impacts the health and well-being of an individual.

Understanding the emotion-cognition connection is especially relevant for educators working with Latino populations given that this group is identified as being high risk for mental health issues like anxiety and depression. When experiencing challenging and depleting emotions, students are less able to fully engage in the cognitive demands of school. This is where social and emotional learning can help.

As a core competency in the SEL framework, cultivating self-awareness includes developing the ability to identify emotions as they arise and label feelings, which can help reduce the stress response in the moment. Connected to self-awareness is self-regulation or the ability to manage feelings as they arise; it also includes the ability to manage behavior, control impulses, and redirect attention as needed. For Latino students who live in high-poverty neighborhoods and immigrant youth who experience a range of stressors associated with learning a new language, adapting to new sociocultural norms and moving through the migration and acculturation process, having the opportunity to develop and strengthen SEL skills can support their personal and academic development (Castro-Olivo 2014).

Given the neurobiological connection between emotion and cognition, it becomes essential to help children learn how to regulate their emotions and manage their stress – developing these skills is an issue of well-being and academic achievement. At the heart of social-emotional learning is the ability to: (1) identify emotions as they arise and (2) regulate emotions and behaviors for

optimal cognitive and social functioning – these are learnable skills found to enhance personal, interpersonal, and academic outcomes.

The cognitive, social, and emotional dynamics experienced by students in school are mediated by the quality of the learning environment and the nature of relationships with teachers and peers. Social-emotional learning can help build positive relationships while cultivating nurturing environments conducive to learning – these elements are particularly relevant for literacy and language development among Latino students.

Social Awareness and Relationship Building: The Social: Cognitive Connection

Human beings are a social and emotional species. As such, our emotional state is influenced by our moment-to-moment experiences within the multiple social contexts in which we find ourselves. Positive relationships among peers and between teachers and students help create enriching learning environments that optimize learning. When considering the needs of Latino English Language Learners in particular, educators must acknowledge the role that social interaction plays in language and literacy development.

Given that human development occurs within multiple social contexts (i.e., family, peers, school, media, community, etc.), learning is continuously taking place between and within individuals. From a sociocultural perspective, learning takes place on the social plane (interpersonally) and is internalized in the mental plane (intrapersonally). Cultivating learning environments and developing positive student-teacher relationships support English Language Learners in feeling safe as they navigate the complexity of school while learning a second language. In addition to creating a sense of safety and belonging, relationships in school become critical scaffolds that facilitate language and literacy development.

From the sociocultural perspective, human development is a socially mediated process, which means that relationships and social interaction are key to learning. One important issue for

teachers working with Latino students, especially those who are considered to be English Language Learners, is finding ways of meeting their linguistic needs while supporting their academic development in the process. When it comes to supporting English Language Learners, research suggests that second language acquisition is best achieved by building on the primary language. This necessarily requires a deep valuing of a child's home language and sociocultural resources which can radically help bridge the cultural and linguistic disconnect that often happens between home and school. Building bridges necessarily requires cultivating and sustaining trusting and caring relationships between teachers, students, and families, which is a process greatly supported by social-emotional learning for students and for teachers.

Given the range of personal, interpersonal, and academic benefits of SEL, research in K–12 continues to grow. However, the preparation of teachers to facilitate social-emotional learning is surprisingly limited: “Teachers rarely receive and are not required to take courses on social and emotional development in childhood as part of their teacher training. . . . To our knowledge, there are no pre-service or in-service training programs that focus on improving teachers’ knowledge and skills regarding students’ social and emotional development. . . .” (Jennings and Greenberg 2009, p. 512, emphasis added). Knowing that social-emotional skills are foundational for a variety of school and life outcomes, it is increasingly necessary to prepare and support teachers in cultivating social-emotional competencies themselves. By integrating SEL into teacher preparation and ongoing professional development – and by modeling social-emotional competencies in the classroom – teachers can be better equipped to facilitate these skills among their students while experiencing the benefits of developing SEL competencies themselves.

There is a depth and vastness to social-emotional learning that is worth noting. Within each of the five core competencies are a range of learnable skills as outlined by the Collaborative for Academic, Social, and Emotional Learning (CASEL). For example, the domain of self-

awareness includes the ability to recognize and manage emotions; discern the interrelation between feelings, thoughts, and behavior; and accurately assess personal strengths and weaknesses. Social awareness includes the ability to consider the perspectives of others, read social and emotional cues, and cultivate empathy and compassion. The domain of self-management includes the ability to regulate emotions, manage stress, control impulses, and set goals. Relationship building includes the ability to relate well with others, resolve conflicts in constructive ways, collaborate, and develop clear communication skills (Zins et al. 2004, p. 195). Finally, responsible decision making, which underlies all of the above, calls for recognition that every individual matters, that every word and action have an impact, and that impact is either constructive or destructive. Considering the well-being of self and others while making moment-to-moment choices requires self-awareness, self-regulation, social awareness, and relational competency – all of which form an integrative intelligence.

Social-emotional learning is essential in educating the whole person; it highlights the power of the individual while acknowledging the fragile yet solid interconnected web of life. As interrelated skills, social-emotional competencies support individuals in taking personal responsibility for themselves while recognizing their ethical responsibility to the greater whole. As an educational movement, SEL encourages individuals to move in the world carefully, thoughtfully, and constructively while making an effort to consciously reduce any intentional or unintentional harm that may be caused along the way. The value and promise of social-emotional learning lie in its focus on practical tools, learnable skills, and core competencies that enhance traditional school outcomes while facilitating personal and interpersonal well-being in the process.

In considering the education of Latino students, social-emotional learning is highly relevant. For English Language Learners, SEL skills can help facilitate the process of language and literacy development while also supporting the mental-emotional well-being of children from

high-poverty neighborhoods – all of which have implications for school, work, and life. These critical skills are best thought of as being interrelated and embedded within a larger ecological perspective. As a theoretical framework, the holistic educational paradigm outlines a hopeful vision for humanity, while the practical application of social-emotional skills brings to life that vision and fosters a more just, compassionate, and humane society – starting within the walls of a teacher's classroom and rippling out from there.

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Social Groups

- [Disability, Diversity, and Higher Education](#)

Social Imaginaries and Children's Rights

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Synonyms

[Children's Rights](#); [Education](#); [Participation](#)

Introduction

The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (“CRC” or “the Convention”) is the global community's agreed vision for its children. It establishes a set of values and norms, agreed by the world's governments over a quarter of a century ago to inform laws and guide State action and social attitudes. It is a key expression of global states' conception of childhood and one that has been influential, to varying degrees, in shaping wider social imaginaries in the member states of the United Nations.

The Convention was adopted by the United Nations (“UN”) General Assembly in 1989 after 10 years of negotiation between the world's governments (42 of whom participated in the drafting Working Group). Within its text, education features prominently not just in two dedicated provisions (Articles 28 and 29) but also through references to education for particular groups of children (such as children with disabilities and those in detention) and to specific topics to be included in education (health and drug education). Given that its standards have been endorsed in law by 196 member states of the UN (in fact, all members bar the USA), the Convention is a high profile and comprehensive statement of the world's aspirations for its children and their education.

A Contested Yet Powerful Global Vision for Children

The Convention is the first legally binding human rights treaty that provides bespoke rights for children. However, it is not the first articulation of them internationally. Its forerunners, the Geneva Declaration (1924) and Universal Declaration on the Rights of the Child (1959), were conceived and endorsed as part of the global response to the suffering of many children in the wake of the two world wars. The 1924 Declaration, promoted by Eglantyne Jebb, the founder of Save the Children, reflects a construction of childhood that is particular to the social and political context of the time, with its overriding concern for children's welfare and protection. Its text, well intentioned but profoundly paternalistic, states: "The child that is hungry must be fed, the child that is sick must be nursed, the child that is backward must be helped, the delinquent child must be reclaimed, and the orphan and the waif must be sheltered and succoured." The 1959 Declaration modernized the terminology on childhood and extended the agreed aspirations for children to include matters such as the child's right to an identity, but it did not go so far as to afford children the autonomy rights that characterize human rights instruments for other protected groups. Nor at that stage was the UN prepared to move beyond a non-binding declaration and embed its promises into a legally recognized human rights treaty.

While the CRC is the most widely and rapidly ratified international human rights treaty, its path to adoption as a legally binding human rights instrument by the UN General Assembly in 1989 was neither easy nor fast. Much of that delay can be attributed to the discussion, theoretical and practical, about the existence or extent of children's rights to autonomy and in particular to participate in the decision-making that impacts on their lives. It was not until the late 1970s, prompted by the work of the child "liberationists" (in particular John Holt and Richard Farson) and aligning with the feminist movement for equality, that the demand for children to be acknowledged as independent rights holders began to gain ground. This relatively tardy path to recognition

in international human rights law (a Convention for women was agreed two decades previously) was in large part due to an ongoing debate about what rights entail as well as who can have or exercise them. This discussion is fraught often but perhaps no more so than in relation to children (see Tobin 2013). The resistance is often linked to perceived inadequacies in children's capacity to make rational decisions in their own lives and therefore in their ability to "claim" or exercise their rights (Archard 2014), a position that has been evolving both in law (e.g., the landmark Gillick decision in the UK) and in the scholarship that emerged from a new sociology of childhood scholars (such as Jens Qvortrup and Allison James). Legal theorists have debated and discussed the nature of rights for decades, choosing children and their perceived lack of capacity as a "test case" for rights more generally (MacCormick 1976).

The drafting of the CRC provided an opportunity for the world's governments to discuss, describe, and ultimately determine its position in this contested debate, not only providing a collective vision of a world in which children thrive and develop but also defining children's own role and entitlement to influence those processes. Its predecessors had gone some way in paving the road for children to be recognized as rights holders. However, the vision that they offered was one of protection and welfare rather than autonomy and capacity for self-determination. During drafting, discussion of the latter continued to be contentious, often because of the perception that affording these rights to children would impinge on the authority of parents, a particular concern in the USA and the main reason it has not yet ratified the CRC. For the treaty to be adopted by the UN, the draft had to be accepted unanimously so the product, while having global endorsement, is the inevitable result of significant political negotiation.

Compromises were reached so that the diverse states of the UN were able to find a consensus on the conditions of childhood that they could live with and embrace collectively. The end product covers all of the key socioeconomic rights (education, health, and an adequate standard of

living) as well as civil and political rights (to identity, expression, association, and conscience). It places an obligation on states to protect children from abuse, neglect, and economic and sexual exploitation and includes protections for particularly vulnerable groups of children including children with disabilities, children in detention, and child soldiers. Even so, it has been described as “a beginning but only a beginning” given a series of gaps in coverage, including its neglect of citizenship rights as well as the needs of gay and lesbian young people and adequate provision for children with disabilities (Freeman 2000).

Although the Convention is open to a dynamic and evolving interpretation, it is a vision that has been articulated for (some would argue imposed upon) one group (children) by another (adults). While this is arguably the case for all human rights treaties (they are negotiated and agreed by political elites and powerful advocacy groups), one of the most cogent challenges to the notion of the CRC as a global social imaginary is the fact that children had almost no input into defining these values and norms, leading Freeman to observe that there is “not a little irony in having a Convention which emphasises participatory rights (in Article 12) whilst foreclosing the participation of children in the formulation of the rights encoded” (2000, p. 282). Children may agree with much of what adults have chosen for them but still have their own views on the content, style, and interpretation of it. Had they been involved in contributing to the global, legal statement of the imagined ideal states of childhood it is likely that it would have been expressed differently, with matters such as the right to play or to vote in elections being given greater priority or included respectively (Lundy et al. 2015).

Others argue that what has been included represents a Western vision of childhood and one that has been imposed on other countries, particularly the global south. This is a criticism of human rights standards more generally and those who defend the universality of the values expressed draw on the engagement of many diverse countries in drafting and the fact of ratification, albeit that many countries ratify subject to sweeping

reservations (e.g., that they will comply only so far as that is compatible with Sharia law). In contrast, it has been suggested that most States have accepted the universalism of the standards but blame poor progress in implementation on the disconnect between the attitudes of the government and the values of the people. Harris-Short (2003, pp. 176–177) argues that, if international human rights are to be effective, the individual and his or her culture, beliefs, and values must become constitutive of international human rights law and international society as a whole: “the whole system must undergo a fundamental transition from a society of states to a society of humankind.” This approach has links to a further body of thinking on “living rights” for children, that is, the rights that are shaped and crafted by children themselves (Hanson and Nieuwenhuys 2012).

The ongoing plight of many of the world's children also belies the notion that the CRC has in fact been globally endorsed. Child deaths, exploitation, hunger, and illiteracy exist in all societies and are prevalent in many in spite of the global aspirations. King, drawing on autopoietic theory, suggests that those who endorse the Convention have been carried away on “a magic carpet” of excessive optimism” (1994, p. 385). Blame is attributed to the fact that it is not “real law,” given its nontraditional and arguably weak enforcement mechanisms. In response, it can be argued that it is important that this type of global imaginary exists even if it is incomplete, not fully embraced, and/or limited in terms of its implementation and enforcement. It is, in many respects, an imaginary in the making. Even recalcitrant States, those who have ratified the CRC without being persuaded by its values, can over time be prompted by the international peer pressure and ultimately acculturated to it is norms (Lundy 2012). Social attitudes too can follow suit with public attitudes (e.g., to corporal punishment or child labor) shifting in line with the implementation in law of these global norms. Freeman (2000) argues that its existence in law is important since law is an important symbol of legitimacy – an accomplished fact – which is difficult to resist. Moreover, a focus on what remains to be done, considerable though those challenges are, can obscure its many achievements, not least its

incorporation into domestic law and policy in many countries (Lundy et al. 2013).

Global Norms for Education: Balancing Pragmatism with Idealism

Education rights have been a consistent feature of international human rights law. Although education is not a right that is exclusive to children, it is one enjoyed mainly by them and one that is recognized as crucial to their development and ability to enjoy their other rights. The CRC, in articulating bespoke rights for those under the age of 18, thus provided a fresh platform on which to build on the agreed global aspirations for education with a specific focus on *children*. In doing so, it emerged that one article was insufficient to capture all aspects of this particular articulation of global governments' imaginary for children with the result that the drafters chose to expound it in two lengthy provisions: Article 28 focuses primarily on issues of access to education, while Article 29 addresses the aims of education.

Article 28, in addition to reiterating rights of access to primary, secondary, vocational, and higher education, includes new provisions requiring discipline to be administered with dignity and for States to take measures to promote regular school attendance. Although there is a requirement to implement the rights progressively (that is, striving for continuous improvement), Article 28 in particular contains several qualifications and limitations that reflect the actual rather than the ideal situation in many of the signatory States. Only primary education has to be free. States are obliged to "encourage" secondary and vocational education and to "take appropriate measures" which include the introduction of free education and offering financial assistance in case of need. In this instance, the imaginary is far from the collective notion of the ideal and indeed the actual experience of many children.

Article 29, in contrast, includes a very broad and ambitious account of the goals of education, addressing many current national and transnational dilemmas. Article 29 defines the aims of education to include quality education as well as

tolerance, equality, and respect for human rights. Notably, it expands the aims of education in Article 13 of the International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights to include two entirely new themes: one on respect for identity and culture (29 (1)(c)) and the other on respect for the natural environment (29(1)(e)). For example, it requires education to be directed to "the national values of the country in which the child is living, the country from which he or she may originate, and civilizations different from his or her own" as well as the "preparation of the child for responsible life in a free society, in the spirit of understanding, peace, tolerance, equality of sexes, and friendship among all peoples, ethnic, national and religious groups, and persons of indigenous origin."

The Convention also recognizes that the aims of education are not just delivered through what the child is taught in the curriculum but how the child is treated in the classroom and beyond. Addressing children's rights "in" education is considered to be crucial if the aims of education are to be learnt through experience. The Committee has emphasized that students do not lose their rights when they pass through the school gate: children should enjoy their civil rights to freedom of conscience, privacy, and expression as well as protection from abuse and neglect and cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment. Moreover, all of this must be provided without discrimination and must give his or her views due weight; and his or her best interests must be a primary consideration in all decisions affecting him or her. As such, the Committee has stated that Article 29 has "a qualitative dimension which reflects the rights and inherent dignity of the child; it also insists upon the need for education to be child-centred, child-friendly and empowering, and it highlights the need for educational processes to be based upon the very principles it enunciates" (UN Committee on the Rights of the Child 2001, para. 2).

Several of its provisions underscore the vision of child-centered education. Of most relevance in this context is Article 12, one of the most widely cited but misunderstood provisions of the CRC (Lundy 2007). Crucially, it recognizes that children are not just able to express their views but that they are *entitled* to do so in all matters

affecting them. Not only does Article 12 establish the entitlement of students to be heard but, when read along with other key provisions of the CRC, it defines how this should be operationalized. In particular, it places emphasis on the obligation of duty-bearers (including educationalists) to ensure that children's engagement is in itself rights-respecting. Unlike adults who also have a right to freedom of expression, children are also entitled to have their views taken seriously. At the heart of the human rights agenda is the desire to ensure that the State (and its agents) do not exercise power in a way that undermines a person's right to be treated with dignity and equality. Ensuring that those who do not hold power may nonetheless exert influence on their own lives is one important dimension of this.

In spite of the global vision articulated in the CRC and some evidence that its standards are influencing law, policy, and practice in education (Lundy 2012), there is no country in which all children receive acceptable education in safety and security, with equal access to good-quality teaching and learning and in an atmosphere which respects their identity, culture, and values. Moreover, there are some groups of children (e.g., those in detention, children with disabilities, and many indigenous children) who experience fundamental and persistent disadvantage and some contexts (such as conflict, forced migration, and extreme poverty) which pose significant challenges for implementation. However, the fact that global consensus was achieved on education rights in the CRC at all is notable given the scale of the challenge and the diversity of the nations and cultures that embraced it. While States are afforded considerable discretion as to how they respond to implementing education rights in practice, the existence of a worldwide accord on the need for and content of children's rights and education is important in and of itself, irrespective of patchy, unsatisfactory, or reluctant implementation. Much progress has been made in education through rights-based advocacy and monitoring and it appears that there continues to be a high degree of continuing support for education rights not just among NGOs but also the world's governments.

Conclusion

The UNCRC is an important global conception of what constitutes a desirable society for children. The views and experiences of the societies in which it has been implemented (to varying degrees) do not always align with its articulation of a desirable childhood but they have undoubtedly been impacted by it. Moreover a question arises as to whether the vision agreed 25 years ago and articulated in the Convention on the Rights of the Child, remains appropriate and/or will endure. It has been suggested that the CRC has failed to keep pace with recent developments in children's lives such as the use of new technologies and increased use of drugs and alcohol. However, if the social imaginary changes, as it already has and will undoubtedly continue to do, experience suggests that the CRC may be flexible enough to adapt and cope. It is a living instrument, one that is currently embracing practices (such as the use of social media and cyber-bullying) that were barely envisaged a quarter of a century ago. Moreover, part of its enduring strength rests in its connections with and capacity to bolster other movements and imaginaries, for example, the case for inclusionary practices in schools or the student voice movement. These may have developed independently but they draw frequently on the perceived additional legal and moral imperative as well as the global reach of the CRC to define their terms and practices. The Convention will, for the foreseeable future, continue to be a concrete, if incomplete and contested, expression of the world's aspiration for its children, shaping law and policy as well as influencing social attitudes.

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Social Imaginaries and Democratic Teaching and Learning

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Introduction

Over recent decades, the world has undergone a major shift in education policy from State-led to market-led reforms spearheaded by a neoliberal ideological and political ascendancy. This has been manifested through structural adjustment programs (SAPs) in both developed and developing country contexts (Carnoy 1995). This entry discusses how neoliberal policy reforms have

further undermined the possibility of democratic teaching and learning in developing country contexts. The entry begins with a discussion on the characteristics and conditions necessary for what is imagined in modern society as democratic teaching and learning. It then discusses how democratic teaching and learning has been, and continues to be, constrained by dominant education marketization policy discourses. It is argued that democratic teaching and learning does not just begin and flourish in the classroom. Rather, it should be viewed as the result of continuous historically, culturally, and socially constructed and reconstructed phenomena at the societal, institutional, and local classroom levels. Democratic teaching and learning practices socially construct teachers' and students' identities by giving them opportunities to participate actively in knowledge construction. However, under neoliberalism, SAPs have affected public service provision in particular ways in developing country contexts by emphasizing the necessity of marketization, privatization, and capped State expenditure on education in order to achieve universal participation in primary and secondary schooling.

Social imaginaries may be understood as the various ways in which a society conceptualizes its ideal collective reality and the social means through which people work with others to attempt to realize this ideal. These ways include the nature of interactions between themselves and their colleagues and the social expectations they attempt to achieve in the context of moral and practical imaginaries that motivate these expectations. Conceptions of the imaginary emphasize "the social," "expectations," and the "normative." Taylor (2004) identifies three basic forms of social imaginaries in contemporary modern society: "the market economy, the public sphere, and the self-governing people" (p. 2).

Understanding Democratic Curriculum Through Critical and Poststructuralist Theories

An understanding of democratic teaching and learning practices in the real world, and

particularly in developing country contexts, requires an understanding of critical and post-structuralist discourse theories because they offer a systematic approach to analyzing education policy and social realities. These realities vary considerably between the Global North and the Global South and between OECD bloc countries and developing country contexts, including those which have been subject to SAPs required by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund in what Carnoy (1995, p. 653) describes as the “new structural reality.” While critical theory informs the analysis by identifying social ideologies reproduced through discourse, poststructuralist theory provides concepts of how power/knowledge, subject positioning, and subjectivity are important in understanding democratic teaching and learning. According to poststructuralists, democratic teaching and learning may be seen as culturally, socially, and historically constructed through discourse. Discourses are representations of social structures and practices that carry with them power relations and ideologies. They represent what people think, say, and do. Poststructuralists differentiate between dominant and nondominant discourses (Foucault 1972). Dominant discourses are those produced and sustained to benefit the interests of powerful people in society. Dominant discourses carry ideologies and power of dominant groups. Ideologies and discourse are related in that social ideologies work through language that mediates social action. Ideologies are partially constitutive of social reality. Therefore, the imaginary of democratic teaching and learning in the classroom may be constrained or facilitated by power relations between students and teachers that are reproduced through dominant discourses and ideologies over the various subjects.

According to poststructuralists, dominant curriculum policy discourses have two major constructive and constitutive effects. Foremost, they constrain how teachers and students participate in curriculum because these discourses furnish possible subject positions. Subject positions continuously occupied by particular social subjects over a considerable period may construct subjectivity (Davies & Harre, 1999). Second, discourses

construct objects in various forms through the deployment and use of particular vocabularies. Understanding discourses is important in understanding the theory and practice of democratic teaching and learning.

Consistent with scholars who have criticized the limitations of *purely* functionalist and structuralist approaches to understanding the material practices of social institutions (e.g., Bourdieu 1977), this entry applies critical and poststructural theories of discourse. Such theories are illuminating insofar as teaching and learning practices are thereby represented in and through language discourse, which is open to multiple interpretations. The application of critical theory in this entry is also informed by the view that democratic teaching and learning practices, to a greater or lesser extent, may be influenced by both individual and group teacher and student ideologies, values, and strategies at local community, family, institutional, and classroom levels. Critical theory thus helps to uncover the ways in which these ideologies, values, and strategies materially influence the presence or absence of democratic teaching and learning practices. Curricula in schools and classrooms also need to meet the imagined and practical expectations of teachers and students who come from different social backgrounds, with different needs and abilities. Democratic teaching and learning offers significant possibilities and opportunities for achieving this in developing country contexts although, as this entry illustrates, this is not always the case.

Basic Principles and Features of Democratic Teaching and Learning

Teaching and learning may be said to be democratic if it follows certain morally informed principles. Democratic education emphasizes the common interests of the many, rather than the particular interests of the few (Dewey 1916). Further, for Dewey, democratic education should enhance all children’s ability to develop and apply “deliberative, practical reason in moral situations” (Jenlink 2009, p. 4). Dewey suggested that teachers could not promote this by teaching what

he called “ready-made knowledge” that served to constrain moral reasoning. Instead, it could best be achieved by introducing “a mode of associated living.” Foremost, democratic education occurs when teachers and students together have equal say or freedom in curriculum, pedagogy, and evaluation. For example, in the curriculum, they are free to select content: what and how much content and how and when to teach it. Moreover, they have power to participate in content planning and decision-making. The creation of democratic schools, classrooms, and curriculum requires teachers and students to learn, choose, practice, and evaluate democratic ways that will empower them and improve the knowledge construction process. For example, in a democratic classroom discourse, teachers and students have the freedom to participate in theorizing, experimentation (Kelly 2009), and research based on their immediate school and classroom contexts, because curriculum on this view is context specific (Smith & Lova 2003). In democratic education, there is less interference or imposed institutional barriers to constrain to the freedom of teachers and students to perform such practices according to their local school contexts. The fundamental role of democracy in education may be summarized in two conceptual constructs: social and political liberation and empowerment of those who experience the curriculum (Kelly 2009). These two values are argued to enhance mental independence, respect for others, and respect for the ideas and contributions of both teachers and students in the curriculum and knowledge construction process.

Similarly, all teachers and students have equal opportunity to participate in the planning, decision-making, and implementation of the selected content, experiences, resources, pedagogy, and evaluation practices. Practicing democratic curriculum is possible if tracking, norm-referenced testing, and other mechanisms that constrain students’ access to educational programs (based on their gender, race, age, or socioeconomic class, location) are eliminated. However, teachers and students’ decision to practice curriculum in democratic way may either be facilitated or constrained by their existing capability and capacity, that is, their knowledge,

attitudes, and beliefs about curricula aims and objectives’ roles and rights, and responsibilities in the curriculum process.

Moreover, in a democratic curriculum, students cooperate and collaborate in the learning process rather than competing. They work collaboratively through a learning community. Competition is considered to reduce teachers’ and students’ ability to work together as a community of learners and to concentrate on thought-provoking and creative curriculum practices. Finally, democratic curriculum content, process, and praxis (thoughtful practice) are argued to be more likely to produce democratic citizens who will think, behave, and act in a democratic way. Democratic content is thereby produced in a democratic way. It is an outcome of dialogue and participation of all stakeholders in the society or community. Stakeholders’ voices and needs are represented in the curriculum making, implementation, and evaluation. The democratic curriculum takes into account the knowledge, cultures, and experiences of students from different historical, sociocultural, and political backgrounds. As will be demonstrated, this view of education is markedly different from that imposed in recent decades through neoliberalism, SAPs, and the marketization of curriculum production in developing country contexts.

Conditions That May Facilitate Democratic Teaching and Learning

Proponents of democratic teaching and learning in developed countries (e.g., Beane 2005; Apple and Beane 2007; Fielding and Moss 2011; Riley 2004) accept that it is more likely to occur when the following conditions are fulfilled. Foremost, there are smaller class sizes that enable each student to have an equal say on the ways schools and curricula are run. Similarly, it occurs where teachers develop a pedagogic identity of being listeners to pupils’ talk rather than talking at them. This is seen to facilitate teachers’ understanding of the day-to-day challenges students face within and outside schools. Teachers and students who respect each other’s contributions

create more demanding lessons that promote motivation for creativity, critical thinking, and ideas in a safe environment. Moreover, democratic curriculum flourishes where teachers provide opportunities for students who have missed learning for any reason to facilitate their participation and construction of knowledge. In addition, it may be said to take place in situations where teachers and students develop opportunities for both formal and informal learning, both inside and outside schools and classrooms. Finally, democratic education may be said to occur where stakeholders work together with schools, teachers, and students to improve physical learning environment, curricular resources, and social interaction (Riley 2004).

Discursive Construction of Nondemocratic Teaching and Learning

Over the past several decades, neoliberal theories of the ideal society and economy have led to the proliferation of education policies of marketization, privatization, deregulation, and decentralization. Education policy and provision in many countries have been transformed from State-led to market-led. In many developing countries, such movements took the form of SAPs. However, despite the imagined emphasis on decentralization, in practice education policymaking and implementation continued to be centrally controlled. In such a centralized education system, policy decisions and implementation are tightly controlled from upper hierarchy. In this model, the possibility of democratic teaching and learning may be seen to be constrained by power relations reconstructed through dominant policy discourses that aim to serve the interests of the powerful, rather than those of teachers and students. Thus, the State, publishing companies, school management, and elite communities construct less democratic school curriculum, pedagogy, and evaluation discourses for reproduction at the lower hierarchy of the education system and institutions. In developing countries, these discourses commonly include prescriptions for syllabus

coverage, centrally set examination, textbook approval, financial, school inspection, and curriculum policy changes.

One of the conditions of modernity is the dominance of the market in the many aspects of society from production, distribution, and consumption of goods and services (Taylor 2004). In theory, markets are assumed to provide greater freedom of choice of education programs and resources like textbooks, reference books, teachers' guides, teaching aids, and lesson plans. However, in practice, in a centralized education systems, schools, teachers, and students' freedom to select resources may be constrained by multiple dominant competing and contradictory policy discourses constructed by the market, the State, community, school owners, and school administrators. For example, while the market may be structured to produce textbooks, the government produces subject syllabi that outline curricular content selected by State policymakers, and centrally set examinations. The contradictory objectives of textbook producers and distributors, the government, teachers, and students constrain the possibility of democratic curriculum because while some teachers and students may want to select particular textbooks that facilitate deeper understanding, the market may not produce such textbooks. In addition, those produced may be too expensive for some students or they may contain contents that do not meet the needs and expectations of teachers and students. Similarly, freedom may be constrained by school inspectors and State policymakers who direct the type and nature of textbooks available for selection through the discourse of finance and textbook approval. The availability and amount of money collected and spent on textbooks is directed by the State, whose interpretation may in turn be subject to variation at school level. This has implications on the quantity, nature, and textbooks categories teachers and students purchase, which in turn, materially shapes pedagogic and evaluation practices.

It may be argued that marketization policy reform texts and discourses reconstruct the discourse of competition that constrains teachers and students from working in collaboration and cooperation in a community of practice. Competition

reduces teachers and students' ability to work together as a community of learners that enable shared thinking and collaboration that provokes creativity. The imposition of SAPs in developing countries requires both rapid achievement of universal primary and secondary education and rapid increases in the proportions of students who successfully complete secondary school qualifications. Curriculum construction consequently emphasizes official syllabus coverage and passing national and local examinations, rather than constructivist teaching for understanding.

A lack of adequate school resourcing at system level and greatly increased class sizes at the local level, especially in rural areas, further constrain teachers' pedagogical freedom. Together, State syllabus coverage requirements, examination imperatives, and market positioning by official and unofficial textbook publishers combine to influence the curriculum toward their interests. Teacher and student ideologies and beliefs are guided to select the most affordable and readily accessible resources that appear to offer easy syllabus coverage and the opportunity to pass nationally set examinations. Teachers and students lack the freedom to select content that may encourage learning for understanding. Furthermore, these material conditions of work influence teachers to select and practice nondemocratic teacher-dominated pedagogies in order to cover syllabi and prepare students for examinations. The two discourses of syllabus coverage and examinations, thus, become the publishers' advertising discursive tool to influence schools, teachers, and students' textbook and pedagogy selection decisions and practices.

SAPs in a developing country context may also reinforce the existing central control of educational decision-making. Schools have less autonomy on how much, when, and on what resources to spend allocated from the central level. Instead, the central authorities provide revenue collection and spending rules and procedures. Related to finance are the centrally set national examinations where teachers and students have little control on the form, content, and timing of those examinations. These examinations intersect with other policy texts and discourses to influence what,

how, and when teachers teach. As a result, schools have fewer resources which affect how they teach and evaluate their work.

Democratic teaching and learning may also be constrained by teacher ideologies and attitudes about students, subject matter, and the nature of learning because teachers select and practice pedagogies that position students as passive participants and limit their creativity and critical thinking. For example, teachers who believe that some curricular contents are more difficult than others may omit them, even though they are part of the official syllabi, believing that they cannot teach such topics. Similarly, teachers who are constructed and constituted by examination ideologies and believe that participatory pedagogies are impracticable will construct syllabus coverage discursive practice that call for lectures and notes taking pedagogies.

In addition, students' democratic participation in curriculum in the case of most developing countries is constrained by very large class sizes that deny their equal share in the classroom discussion due to limited time and other resources. Teachers have less time to listen to each student's contribution. Further, large classes means having inadequate funding to purchase textbooks for each student to access the necessary power/knowledge that would enhance their participation in classroom activities and future social identity formation. However, the small minority of students from affluent families will access power/knowledge and, therefore, dominate curriculum discourse and reproduce their already dominant power/knowledge. Such domination and reproduction demotivate the majority of students' creativity and reflection on their work and constrain their self-esteem and self-actualization.

Conclusion

This entry has examined how contemporary education marketization policy and practices adopted over the past two decades in many countries constrain democratic teaching and learning, a condition that is argued to be necessary for a democratic society. The democratic curriculum remains an

idealized form of pedagogical practice in developing country contexts that have experienced SAPs because its realization is constrained by dominant discourses socially and historically constructed by the market and the State and reproduced at the institutional and classroom levels. Thus, a major challenge is that democracy in theory is far from democracy in practice. Marketization policies required by SAP interventions continue to serve to reproduce the existing social arrangements of inequality, discrimination, and marginalization. Democratic curriculum practices in schools and classrooms would require policymakers, school administrators, teachers, and students to practice democratic values in their individual, institutional, and societal relations. That is, democracy must begin with the thinking and actions of individuals in schools, the State, and family level practices. Such an imaginary is difficult if not impossible to achieve in developing country contexts under the current constraints of structural adjustment programs.

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Social Imaginaries and Deschooling

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Synonyms

[Denouncing the monopoly held by schools](#)

Introduction

From a perspective gained over the 50 years since they were first formulated in the 1960s and 1970s, deschooling theories may be studied as a direct rejection of underlying paradoxes in the modern social imaginary. The initiators of this pedagogic school of thought focused their attention on the discourse generated by modern education centers and the impact it had on broad sectors of the general public. The central thesis that united the different advocates who developed their ideas under the deschooling umbrella was that both education and the teaching-learning processes were threatened in a world where States structured their education systems on the monopoly held by schools.

Theoreticians of deschooling saw education as a way to ensure social order by means of the mutual benefit of its participants. This led them

to denounce the monopoly that traditional education institutions held on education and learning. In their most well-known texts, they decried schools as places that generated social problems rather than being places where they were solved. This criticism of schools and universities – institutions that were the torchbearers of modern society's highest aspirations – caused unprecedented commotion in academia in the 1960s and 1970s. The impact was similarly notable on many of the social movements that at the time considered educational institutions as places for solving the main challenges faced by society.

It is worthwhile to note how the ideas developed in the 1960s and 1970s by writers such as Ivan Illich (1926–2002), John Holt (1923–1985), Paul Goodman (1911–1972), and Everett Reimer (1910–1998) continue on in theories of education in the twenty-first century. The works by this generation of authors act as theoretical underpinnings for new pedagogical approaches in the twenty-first century that show the possibilities of creating organized spaces for teaching and learning beyond the school. Such approaches are now reconsidering deschooling theories in the context of the online society in the wake of the Internet revolution, the modern liquidity, the crisis of capitalism in 2008, the ecological crisis, and the disrepute of representative liberal democracies. It is therefore of great interest to analyze not only the main lines of criticism that Illich, Holt, Goodman, and Reimer expounded in their works but also the genesis of the discourse structured by this generation of authors as well as the way they made use of linguistic conventions that were laid out 50 years ago.

Cuernavaca (Mexico): A Landmark for Deschooling

Even a cursory look at theories of deschooling must take into account the undertakings in Cuernavaca, Mexico, specifically at the Centro Intercultural de Documentación (CIDOC) between 1963 and 1976 (Cayley 1992, pp. 202–204). Founded by Ivan Illich, this center acted as a meeting place for important

intellectuals interested in opening up lines of economic, cultural, political, and social criticism that were both necessary and possible in the second half of the twentieth century.

Illich's leadership was key to the way in which CIDOC evolved as a space for thought. Founded in the shadow of the training programs for missionaries of the Catholic Church, by 1970 the center had become an international gathering point where avant-garde intellectuals and politicians came to study, do research, and converse. Critical study of modern-day institutions was the starting point in the analyses and reflections emanating from Cuernavaca. Broad sectors of the antiestablishment social movements in Latin America took part in its activities. The center reached out to intellectuals from the newly emerging counter-hegemony and counterculture sectors that were turning the region into one of the most outstanding political testing grounds in the world. There, they came up with genuine alternatives to institutional development and progress. CIDOC was home to exploration of and debate about radical options to such an extent that a reversal in the predominant societal trends of the time was deemed to be unavoidable and imminent.

In the summer of 1967, Reimer and Illich began their systematic and radical analysis of the school system. One year later, in 1968, Reimer started an 8-week seminar that he taught at CIDOC called *Alternatives in Education*. From July 15 to September 1, 1968, both men established a set of periodic meetings. Holt participated in Reimer's *Alternatives in Education* seminar at Cuernavaca as well. Along with Holt, many other educational philosophers in American critical pedagogy, such as Martin Carnoy, Joel Spring, Edgar Friedenberg, John Ohlinger, Jonathan Kozol, George Dennison, and Jerome Bruner, took part in the seminar and publications that were organized in Cuernavaca. Together, these critics formed a generation of pedagogues that held the work of Paul Goodman as their intellectual model. Goodman himself also became a frequent collaborator in activities at CIDOC.

The lines of discussion raised at the *Alternatives in Education* seminar often led to the publication of different texts that clearly reflected the

critical approach being taken in Cuernavaca. In 1968 in CIDOC Cuaderno 45, two of Reimer's texts were published in Spanish: *La educación descarriada I* and *La educación descarriada II* ("Education Gone Astray I" and "Education Gone Astray II"). In September 1970, the CIDOC Notebooks collection published the book *The Dawn of Epimethean Man and Other Essays* by Ivan Illich. In 1971 and 1972, CIDOC published four more issues featuring texts that had been discussed in the seminar as well as ones written from lectures after 1968. The title of this collection was *Alternatives in Education*, which was released in four issues (numbers 74, 75, 76, and 77) in the CIDOC Notebooks collection. This same collection also published four of Holt's papers: "A Letter Advocating School Resistance," "Summerhill and Beyond," "A Commentary About the Magnitude of the American Educational Establishment, 1960–1970," and "Reformulations: A Letter Written after Two Weeks in Cuernavaca."

Criticism of Schools and Alternatives to Schooling

It is important to situate the starting point of criticism against prevailing educational institutions as proposed by the theoreticians of deschooling. For participants in the *Alternatives in Education* seminar in Cuernavaca, for example, egalitarian schooling of the population *en masse* was economically unfeasible. All over the world, it was evident that the funds spent on schooling were never quite enough to meet the expectations of parents, teachers, and students. In the 1970s the USA was regarded as proof that no country was wealthy enough to afford a school system capable of satisfying the demands that the system itself created. Thus, it was argued that radical change was needed in the discourse on education to acknowledge that the whole endeavor of schooling was economically absurd.

In addition to the economic strand in the theoretical approaches of authors such as Illich, Reimer, Holt, and Goodman, there were psychological and social elements as well. These authors found schooling to be socially paralyzing and

intellectually disempowering. They believed that one of the main problems created by the ever-growing schooling of society was the inability school-educated people displayed in being able to imagine a world without school. This could be seen in how completely unable those who attempted school reforms (politicians, educators, academics) were to value any learning process achieved outside the traditional confines of school. With their values institutionalized by planned and technically constructed processes, members of modern-day society were socialized to believe that the "good life" consisted in having institutions for the purpose of defining whatever values they and their society believed were necessary. Indeed, the ethos of institutional insatiability was the defining feature of modern-day societies.

Furthermore, deschooling theorists held that education possessed a subversive potential that was mitigated by schooling. They argued that any society that hoped to make each individual's human experience and consciousness-raising the center of its development should find in "education" a way to overcome the "training" that took place in the classroom. A desirable goal was a society where everyone had equal opportunity to become educated. However, for them the problem was that schools had already taken over most of the funding available for education. Illich pointed out that the first article in a Declaration of Human Rights appropriate for a humanistic society should be based on the State not decreeing any law establishing compulsory education, on the grounds that no ritual could possibly be obligatory for all.

The conception of learning underlying the deschooling approach starts from rather romantic notions. These theorists considered the widespread belief that most knowledge resulted from teaching to be a fallacy that encompassed school systems. In contrast, deschooling theorists argued that people acquired most of their knowledge outside the classroom. Learning came about casually and was the human undertaking that least needed any third-party involvement at all. They noted that even the most intellectual learning was not the result of programmed instruction.

As an alternative to schooling, a number of different ways were conceived of for regaining

control of the means of education. In that regard, Illich's book *Deschooling Society* (1971) and Reimer's *School is Dead* (1971) developed road maps to speed up the deschooling process. In his book *Freedom and Beyond* (1972), Holt, too, posited theoretical bases for a possible alternative to the spread of school systems. What united these authors was that each developed an alternative that upset the traditional pedagogy then being deployed in school systems. According to conventional schooling logic, resources in education were administered on the basis of the curricular goals of the teachers. What proponents of deschooling advocated was to do the opposite, that is, to develop approaches to learning that let the students gain access to any educational resource that could help them define and achieve their own goals.

The Context of Deschooling: Between Progressive Education and the Counterculture

One of the hallmark models for deschooling is progressive education. However, unlike the pedagogical proposals of representative authors from the progressive movement, advocates of deschooling discarded from the start any possibility of merely reforming the existing institutions. Consequently, by analyzing the linguistic conventions used by deschooling and that in turn emanate from the contemporary social imaginary, we find a clear continuity with progressive pedagogy in matters of active learning and the internationalization of pedagogic renewal. The schism with the framework of formal educational institutions, however, goes back to similar arguments from political protest movements against the economic, political, and cultural system of the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s in the West.

In their main works, theorists of deschooling emphasized experiential learning or "learning by doing," critical thinking, development of social skills, democracy, looking to the future for ideas about how to structure present-day education, and using the interest of the child as a mainstay in the teaching-learning process. All those aspects bear witness to the continuity with progressive

education developed in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. More precisely, it can be said that the main influence was the ideas of John Dewey and, in particular, his conceptualization of the subject who learns from a pragmatic perspective. The main difference deschooling theorists make with progressive education has to do with the possibility of transforming educational institutions. Thus, whereas Dewey saw the feasibility of school reform and the constitution of schools as a form of community life, authors such as Illich, Reimer, and Holt insisted on school institutions' intrinsic inability to be reformed. To them, the only possible option was the immediate elimination of school systems altogether.

This idea of a radical split and elimination of the institutions that acted as barriers to progress and development must be studied as a plausible response in the context of late twentieth-century thought. This was a time when a sense of decline took hold in Western society in the aftermath of the Second World War. This feeling of crisis bears close relation with political, cultural, and economic questions of the age. In politics, it was a time of deteriorating relations between the Cold War powers. International politics then became further reduced to two opposing fronts, and nearly every country in the world found itself on one side of the battlefield or the other. It was a time in which there was little room for nuances in an official field of tremendously polarized ideologies.

From the economic point of view, industrial production underwent a slowdown in growth. Symptomatic of this trend is the fact that in the late 1960s, the prestigious Club of Rome questioned the bases of the development model of international markets that had witnessed soaring production and yields. In fact, the Club of Rome was foreshadowing the energy crisis that would grip the world in the early 1970s (Meadows et al., 1972). The Yom Kippur War in October 1973 was a clear example of how dependent the world economy had become on fossil fuels such as oil and gas.

On a cultural level, in the very heart of the West, different movements were afoot that would shape the counterculture movement. The underpinnings of this trend lay in their criticism of the patrons who

had governed the artistic world and its officialdom for most of the twentieth century. Cultural liberation, breaking away from the official framework, and seeking out new ways of experiencing art, the body, technology, and nature are all an expression of a feeling of distance with respect to the structures and institutions of the past and with the predominant notion of authority at the time.

This is therefore the philosophical setting that made it possible to theorize a radical line of criticism of educational institutions. The writings of authors such as Illich, Reimer, Goodman, and Holt must be read as a response to this context of political, economic, and cultural relations. Here is where their radicalism finds its fundamentals and breaks away from the institutions of the past.

Deschooling Theories in the Twentieth Century

Research conducted in recent years has shown that, even though the basis of criticism against educational institutions was the common denominator shared by the different authors of deschooling, there were in fact a number of important nuances in how they focused their criticism and what objectives they hoped to achieve. Many of those nuances surfaced in works published by these same authors in the 1980s and 1990s. Thus, Illich's criticism of how modern notions of education perverted learning – a line of argument he especially developed in the texts he published after *Deschooling Society* (1971) – is not the same as the need Reimer found in his only book, *School is Dead*, (1971) for freeing education from the monopoly of schools and other educational institutions. Similarly, questioning of the role of the school as pedagogical structures was not the same as the advocacy of unschooling or homeschooling as featured in John Holt's works from the 1980s, and nor was it the same as the countercultural criticism presented by Paul Goodman in the books he wrote to analyze the question of education and its institutions from a libertarian perspective.

Bearing in mind the above in terms of the divergences in thought among this generation of

writers, we still find at least one aspect they had in common: they all discerned the need to explore the disregard for modern-day Western institutional school systems in the late twentieth century. From this perspective, schools, studied as institutions in charge of supplying education, were a key piece in the web of institutions that formed a macrostructure claiming to guarantee the provision of services that covered the needs of individuals in society. Thus, in their convergent criticism of schools, Illich, Reimer, Holt, and Goodman were among those who believed it was possible to combat against the psychological paralysis, social disempowering, cultural uprooting, and economic inequality with which the modern world was threatening large segments of the population. In the end, what advocates of deschooling called into question was the educational discourse that had located schooling as the main institution responsible for educating the population at large for their own good ever since the end of WWII.

Conclusion

It may be broadly concluded that by the 1960s and 1970s, the big, absolute truths, like the big, absolute institutions (and the latter above all because they legitimize the former), had begun to become questionable. As a result, the idea of public institutions as a means of mass emancipation began to decline. There was, therefore, an opportunity to articulate a theory of suspicion on the three fundamental aspects of modern educational discourse: its structure as a meta-story, its link to social progress, and the fostering of individual emancipation. In consequence, schools, and the education provided in them, could now be challenged with a certain amount of support from significant fractions of society.

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Social Imaginaries and Econometrics for Education Policy

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Synonyms

Causality; Control variables; Linearity; Optimality; Proxy variables; Statistical significance

Introduction

A notable feature in the evolution of economics in the past 50 years has been the emergence of “mainstream” economics. This is a term adopted largely by its critics in the economics community to highlight the dominance of a pared-down approach reliant on abstract theory, primarily neo-classical economics. Economists have also come to focus principally on quantitative research methods, with one in particular, econometrics being overwhelmingly dominant. Not surprisingly, then, economists have encouraged the use of econometrics in the analysis of the teaching of economics, or, as they refer to it, the study of economic education. The American Economic Association has produced an “Online Handbook for the Use of Contemporary Econometrics in Economic Education Research,” developed by Becker, who is also coeditor of a book on the subject. The dominance of the technique is made clear in the preface to the book. There MacDowell and Highsmith suggest that its coverage of model building, simultaneous equations, and qualitative response analysis offers inexperienced researchers “a comprehensive coverage of the basic statistical

estimation and testing procedures *required* for the evaluation of learning” (Becker and Walstad 1987, p. xii, emphasis added). It is implicitly assumed that the techniques are appropriate.

It is not only in economics education but also in education and education policy more broadly that these techniques have taken hold. Hanushek in particular has published extensively in this area and econometrics is increasingly being used for policy-focused analysis in education.

In his discussion of social imaginaries, Taylor (2004, p. 33) writes:

Ideas always come in history wrapped up in certain practices, even if these are only discursive practices. But the motivations that drive toward the adoption and spread of these packages may be very varied.

The practice of econometrics involves the acceptance of generally unstated ideas about the nature of variables and the relationships between them. The interpretation of results involves assumptions about the nature of causality and policy decisions. So what drove the development of these practices and the adoption of these approaches?

In econometrics, there has been simultaneous development of computer-based packages and electronic databases. Over time, this meant that the techniques have become accessible to an increasing number of analysts, the required skill level has fallen, and conventions have developed. Initially tentative assumptions have evolved into firm foundations required for the application of the techniques. These are now so familiar that they are unquestioned by all but a small minority. In other words, “. . .the theory is schematized in the dense sphere of common practice” (Taylor 2004, p. 30).

Mainstream neoclassical microeconomic theory is built on a foundation that takes universal perfect competition as an ideal. Its suitability is not questioned in standard textbooks and research papers, although it is based on an unrealistic view of the world and a specific optimality criterion (Pareto optimality). Deviations from the ideal are considered to be “market failures” for which various remedies have been devised.

A parallel could be drawn for econometrics. Criteria for determining the relationship between

selected variables, trying to find a “best fit,” were originally tentatively selected but have subsequently assumed great significance. There is now a concept of optimal estimation which can be achieved under “ideal” circumstances and corrections that can be made where the required assumptions are not met. Consider a variable, Y , the value of which depends in large part on the values of a set of variables, X_1 , X_2 , and so on. Y could be a test result, and the X s could be the student’s mark the previous year, hours spent studying, the teacher this year, etc. Ordinary least squares multiple regression might be used to estimate such a relationship. In econometric theory, it has been shown that, under the required conditions, this approach meets certain desirable criteria. Specifically, it provides the “best linear unbiased estimates” (BLUE) of the parameters of a model. This has conventionally been viewed as giving the best estimates that can be achieved. If the required conditions are not met, problems arise. Without going into technical details, some common problems are those of autocorrelation, heteroskedasticity, and multicollinearity. These are well covered in standard econometrics textbooks, and methods have been devised to address them. Resulting training has focused on application of these techniques. By comparison, limited attention has been given to broader issues of choice of technique (what should a “best” estimator do?) and associated reservations and qualifications (are the variables related to each other in a linear way?). Consequently there still remains the question whether the “ideal” is really so desirable or relevant.

The purpose of this particular section is to identify the social imaginaries which may be associated with this approach. In other words, the aim is to identify some of the limitations that are commonly overlooked in the standard approaches. This is done by looking at the basic assumptions of the assumed ideal situation.

Econometrics involves the estimation of a relationship between variables. A general functional form is specified, with the parameters indicating the relationship between variables. The estimation process then provides information on possible values for the parameters and additional statistical diagnostic information. The starting point is

therefore the choice of variables and specification of the functional form.

Ideally there is some theoretical basis for these decisions. Statistical criteria relate to the numbers alone, the values in the data set. They are independent of the meaning assigned to the numbers, whatever they are (student grades, class size, teachers’ years of teaching, etc.).

Theory involves simplification. Subsequent empirical analysis, even if based on theory, involves further simplification. The result is at best a tenuous relationship with reality. The following sections consider first the criteria for BLUE estimators, then the relationship between such estimators and theoretically specified relationships between variables, followed by some common refinements and interpretations of results.

BLUE Estimators

Consider an equation:

$$Y = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X_1 + \beta_2 X_2 + \dots + \beta_n X_n + \varepsilon$$

where Y is the dependent variable, $X_1 \dots X_n$ are the explanatory variables, and ε is an error term (which exists because the relationship is not fully specified).

- (i) Linearity – linear models assume a fixed value for each β_i . This is actually very restrictive. Consider Y as an individual’s income in a particular year and X_i as years of education. First, if these variables are used, each extra year of education is assumed to have the same incremental effect, β_i , on income irrespective of whether it is the third or the twelfth year of education. Second, the effect is assumed to be invariant to differences in the values of any other explanatory variables, such as the school attended, or parents’ socioeconomic status – an additional year of education would still increase income by an amount β_i . Third, if the aim is to determine the effect of a year’s education on income, the effect is considered to be fully identified in the income of the period represented by the data.

This would not suit careers with very different earnings profiles over time, such as doctors for whom income can be expected to rise with age and manual workers whose incomes may peak much earlier. Fourth, the effect of an additional year of education is assumed to be the same for every person in the study. More generally, all the observations are assumed to be of the same structure, and so the effects are also identical. These requirements are far more restrictive than most theories would specify. Nevertheless, poor explanatory power for an equation is put down to either measurement error or omitted variables. Inappropriate or imprecise specification of the relationships should be an equally serious concern.

- (ii) Unbiasedness – an unbiased estimator is one for which the expected value of the estimate is equal to the true value. This means that the estimator is unbiased in the estimated form of variables. Sometimes a linear relationship is estimated when the underlying relationship of interest is nonlinear. Note that, by using log transformations, multiplication can be undertaken by adding, and raising by a power through multiplication. Consider $Z = AX^aY^b$. Converting to log form, this becomes $(\log Z) = (\log A) + a(\log X) + b(\log Y)$. The latter form is linear. Adding an error term, it can be estimated using linear regression. If the required assumptions hold, the estimates will be unbiased and so the resulting estimates of $\log Z$ will be unbiased. However, that does not mean that the results will still be unbiased when transformed back into the desired form, Z . Consider Z having the values 10 and 100 and hence a mean of 55. $\log Z$ to base 10 is 1 and 2, respectively, with a mean of 1.5 which has an antilog of 31.6.
- (iii) Best – an estimator of the parameters β_0 to β_n is BLUE if, of all the possible linear unbiased estimators, it is best according to some quality measures. The measure used is that it has the lowest sum of squared errors, the sum of the squared differences between actual and estimated values of the dependent variable in the observations used. This is a conventional measure, but there are other possibilities, such

as for quantile regression which uses absolute errors. “Best” means best out of the subset of possible estimators. There may be nonlinear or biased estimators with lower sum of squared errors such that the resulting estimates are more accurate. (It may be better to have many shots hit a target closely grouped but slightly to the right of the bull’s eye, rather than being widely scattered but with the bull’s eye at the center of the loose grouping.)

Estimators and Theoretical Relationships

Econometrics involves the estimation of values for the parameters of a specified relationship along with related diagnostics. The data used are all assumed to be based on the same underlying structure with the same parameter values. This applies whether the data are from several observations at the same time (cross-section), or over time (time series), or a mix of the two (panel). The assumption is nontrivial, with flawed analyses being recognized in education long ago:

It is not uncommon to find, for instance, research on dropout that fails to distinguish dropout resulting from academic failure from that which is the outcome of voluntary withdrawal. Nor is it uncommon to find permanent dropouts placed together with persons whose leaving may be temporary in nature or may lead to transfer to other institutions of higher education. (Tinto 1975, pp. 89–90)

There are also limitations in the functional forms that are being estimated. Stock variables describe a point in time and flow variables measure quantities aggregated over discrete units of time, such as semesters or years. Reality occurs in continuous time, in which the values of stock variables can change and the timing of flow variables is important, although it is not possible to identify from the data where within a time period events took place.

There is also commonly a very restrictive functional relationship between independent and dependent variables (or, in simultaneous equation models, exogenous and endogenous variables). Consider the pattern of change over time of an independent variable providing an “input wave”

and the impact of this on the dependent variable observed as an “output wave.” In a linear model, the two waves would have either identical patterns if the coefficient, β , is positive or inverse patterns if β is negative. A new teacher is assumed to result in an immediate increase or drop in student performance, for example. The timing and nature of impact of one variable on another can be far more complex than this, but that cannot be easily identified. Similarly if a change in an independent variable occurs at the end of a time period, the impact on the dependent variable will be felt not in the current, but in the next or later periods. Hence aggregation into time periods results in imprecise specification even if the real timing of impact is exact and identical in all cases.

The relevance of a variable in an equation is commonly assessed by statistical criteria. However, statistical significance depends in part on the number of observations (which is quite distinct from the underlying importance of the variable), and statistical significance is not the same as policy significance. A statistically significant result, even if it coincides with underlying causal factors, may be such that attainable changes are very small or very costly, or alternatively a useful policy instrument may have a large but variable (and hence statistically insignificant) effect.

Moreover, there is a fundamental problem with statistical tests of significance. Known as the “fallacy of the transposed conditional,” significance tests estimate the probability of an outcome if the null hypothesis is true. It is argued that an unlikely result indicates that the null hypothesis may be false. However, there is no information about the likelihood of an outcome when the null hypothesis is false. “The likelihood of an outcome given (conditional on) the null hypothesis” is not the same as “the likelihood of the null hypothesis given (conditional on) an outcome.” The latter is the situation in a hypothesis test, hence the reference to a “transposed conditional.”

An additional problem arises in that correlation neither implies causality nor does it cover all possible causal relationships. Correlation is a measure only of linear association between data

series. There are numerous other possible causal patterns that could be observed, such as a threshold effect (drowning and depth of water), or a viable range (survival in relation to temperature), not to mention INUS conditions. These latter refer to situations where an event can occur when a set of conditions arises, and there may be several such sets that produce the same effect. University study could be considered an INUS condition for higher income. It is *Insufficient* on its own (the person would then have to work). It is a *Necessary* part of a set of conditions (getting higher income by becoming a doctor). The set of conditions is *Unnecessary* (high income can come from being a top sports person or musician), but it is *Sufficient* (the education followed by employment as a doctor will give higher income). Similarly, consider “causes” of car accidents, workplace deaths, or obtaining a company directorship.

Interpretation of results is further complicated in that some data series are used as proxies for something else; hence, household income or a parent’s education might be used as a measure of socioeconomic status. Should results then be interpreted in terms of the intended variable or the proxy variable? Even if not planned, the result for one variable may actually be picking up the effect of something else with which it is highly correlated.

Econometric results aim to identify average relationships over a sample, but individual situations may be very different. As Egon Guba wrote in the Foreword to a book on action research in education:

generalized, one-size-fits-all solutions do not work. . . Without intimate knowledge of local context, one cannot hope to devise solutions to local problems. *All* problems are de facto local; inquiry must be decentralized to the local context. (Stringer 2007, p. ix)

Interpretations of Results

Regression results are generally biased if relevant variables are omitted. One commonly accepted approach is the inclusion of “control variables,”

which are claimed to control for the effects of the designated variable. Hence, for example, addition of a household income variable could be used to claim that results apply “after having controlled for household income.” Unfortunately these variables are added without regard to the functional relationship. In the extreme cases, this is achieved in blanket fashion simply through the addition of a “vector of control variables,” an increasingly common practice. The functional form is important, but linearity assumes “additive separability,” whereby each variable can be considered in isolation. This is problematic because “Observational data...are rife with dependency structures...No one variable can meaningfully be ‘held constant’ while others are allowed to vary” (Babones 2014, pp. 123–124).

Hanushek writes: “Most research articles, after finding a set of things that is correlated with student performance, immediately go to a section on policy conclusions” (Hanushek 1997, p. 303). He is concerned about causality and replication, or the wider applicability of findings from a study. Models alone do not address all the aspects to be considered when making policy decisions. Moreover, “A good model is merely one type of evidence among others, not the end of the argument. Much less the ultimate authority.” (Majone 1989, p. 51)

There are many complicating factors, including differing responses to passive versus active use of policy variables, learning and changed behavior (so the structure may change), the need to consider alternative policy options and their costs and benefits, and subgroups responding differently to an approach. In discussion on teacher value-added estimates as a basis for performance pay, Hanushek and Rivkin (2010, pp. 269–270) raise: “concerns about accuracy, fairness, and potential adverse effects of incentives based on a limited set of outcomes...[and] concerns about incentives to cheat, adopt teaching methods that teach narrowly to tests, and ignore non-tested subjects.”

Conclusion

The focus on econometrics as a social imaginary provides a valuable insight into the problems that

might result. The concerns are further highlighted in parallel literature on the concept of framing, the role of theories as providing analogies and the additional issues to be considered to relate these to the real world (Birks 2015). Additional support can be found in cultural political economy, which asks why particular imaginaries may arise and emphasizes that “both history and institutions matter” (Jessop and Oosterlynck 2008, p. 1156).

Fifty years ago, basic econometric research focused on building up techniques with the expectation that there would be parallel improvements in data bases. It was hoped that this would result in valuable research at some stage in the future. In reality, econometrics packages and online databases made the techniques far more accessible, but the techniques and data quality were not able to live up to expectations. However, the practices became entrenched and people chose to focus on this “high status” activity using packages and large available online databases, ignoring the reservations that should be raised. This was at the cost of more pragmatic analysis of real world situations. There is a place for econometrics in an analyst’s toolkit, but it must be used with care, is only suited to certain types of data, and should be used in conjunction with other research techniques. The term “mainstream economics” is increasingly used to refer to what is perceived by many as a current narrowly focused approach to economics. In contrast, pluralist approaches are less prominent but offer alternative, more diverse techniques and theories. Education researchers may find that this alternative literature can provide useful insights.

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Social Imaginaries and Education as Transformation

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Introduction

Education as a transformational process has been discussed across traditions of philosophy of education. If we initially consider the basic meaning of transformation as a process of change, we can say that education, in the social imaginary of western society, is commonly understood as a process by which human beings undergo change through the acquisition of new knowledge and skills. Philosophy of education, however, has developed a more specialized concept of education as transformation that will be discussed here.

As early as 1916, in his major work *Democracy and Education*, John Dewey refers to the “ordinary” conception of education as the transmission of information from the older generation to the younger (Dewey 1916/2008, p. 12). Today, 100 years after Dewey’s remarks, such a notion of education as *transmission* remains a prominent part of the social imaginary. This popular

understanding of education continues to be reinforced through a particular image of the teacher, a figure frequently represented in popular culture as the person at the front of a classroom authoritatively passing on information to children sitting in rows of desks, passively listening. At the same time, this image of “teacher-centered” education, influenced by traditional ideas of education as the passing on of intellectual and cultural heritage, has been countered by a different notion of education influenced by progressive education movements. Commonly referred to as “child-centered” education, progressive ideas of education are reflected in common notions that learning should be enjoyable and that children should be happy when learning. On this view, the child’s interests guide the educational process and in turn determine the organization of classroom activities. In popular culture, images suggestive of child-centered education also emerge: children playing together, sitting in circles rather than at desks, or engaged in a hands-on school activity or project, often without the teacher in frame. Although teacher-centered and child-centered images point to contradictory theoretical positions, they nevertheless coexist in the social imaginary today. Both views of education can be seen to be competing for dominance in educational policy and practice, for example, in parts of the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, and Europe.

These popular images and the related ideas surrounding the nature of education stand in contrast to the critical philosophical notion of education as transformation, which has been developed in the traditions of philosophy of education. In these contexts, thinkers have sought to distinguish *education* from *socialization* and *schooling*. Socialization involves habituating the younger generation into the rules, customs, and norms of a given society. “Schooling,” in this specific context, describes a mere transfer of facts from older generation to younger. For many philosophers of education, this sense of schooling departs from the ideal role of the school in modern society as one of engaging the younger generation in transformative educational processes.

This entry discusses the philosophical notion of education as transformation by first considering

Plato's *Allegory of the Cave*. It then describes related notions of education from three different traditions of philosophy of education – the concept of *Bildung* in the German tradition of educational theory, John Dewey's American pragmatist conception of education, and British analytic philosopher R. S. Peters' ideas of education and transformation – and also identifies some contemporary viewpoints from current philosophy of education. Finally, the entry indicates how current trends in twenty-first-century educational policy relate to the idea of education as a transformative process.

Plato's Cave Allegory as an Image of Transformation

Early in the western philosophical tradition, Plato's *Allegory of the Cave* (1997) tells us something important about education as transformation. Socrates asks Glaucon to imagine prisoners inside a cave staring at shadows on a cave wall and believing them to be real. When one slave is pulled out of the cave and freed, at first he is painfully blinded in the brightness of the light and then he is able to gradually see brighter and brighter objects until he can look at the sun. In the process, he starts to question and compare this new world outside the cave with the old one inside the cave. His gradual change in perspective on knowledge and truth, and on himself and his relations to the world, is so dramatically altered that he can hardly imagine how he could have ever held the beliefs he held while in the cave. Plato's cave offers a foundation for thinking about education as transformation because it illuminates the idea that, in educational learning processes, what was once familiar and taken for granted becomes strange and what was once strange becomes familiar. This theme of transformation arises in various forms in classical and contemporary traditions of philosophy of education, as discussed below.

Bildung as a Transformational Process

The German idea of *Bildung* (commonly translated as education or formation) has its roots in the

Greek Sophist and Socratic traditions and the questions they posed about the legitimacy of our basic forms of perception and understanding of the world (Ruhloff 1993). German philosopher Wilhelm von Humboldt's short writing entitled *Theorie der Bildung des Menschen* (translated as *Theory of Bildung*) (1969 and 2001) provides a foundation for thinking about how education involves a human being's active and passive interaction with the world. From these interactions, human beings are able to come to new ideas, gain new perspectives, and learn. Humboldt draws out the idea that human beings learn from difference and otherness; we need difference in order to flourish, such that we rely on a world that is "not us" [*NichtMensch*] (Humboldt 1969, p. 235). Thus, *Bildung* is dependent upon the manifold, "most general, most free, and most animated interplay between self and world"; this interplay is one in which both self and world change (Humboldt 1969, p. 235).

Bildung as a transformative process is mediated by moments in which we question our taken-for-granted ways of seeing and being in the world, moments that Humboldt refers to as "self-alienation," and these are followed by a return to oneself with a different perspective and understanding of the world and one's relation to it (Humboldt 1969, p. 237). Self-alienation relates to what G.W. F. Hegel calls the experience of consciousness, when one is aware of oneself in the world. Processes mediated by self-alienation are part of what make it possible for human beings to arrive at a transformed outlook on the world, such that their feelings, wishes, capabilities, and questions change and reshape the ways they inhabit the world.

Nineteenth-century German philosopher of education J. F. Herbart (1806/1902) extends the notion of *Bildung* and the idea of human beings as capable of transformation. Herbart considers the fact that the world as other can either help or hinder human transformational processes. For Herbart, educators have the responsibility of making the world into a space that facilitates human transformation. Herbart differentiates between two kinds of transformations, one cognitive and the other moral. The cognitive transformation involves the extension and expansion of an individual's "circle

of thought” [*Gedankenkreis*] to include differentiated ways of knowing and modes of participating in the world. The moral transformation involves the individual becoming capable of self-critique of his own motives of action and established norms (Herbart 1806/1902). In particular, Herbart emphasizes that transformation in the moral realm involves us in a necessary “inner struggle” incited by the difficulty of moving away from egoistic ways of interacting with others and learning respect and recognition of others (see Benner and English 2004; English 2013).

Herbart (1835/1913) develops the notion of *Bildsamkeit* (translated as educability) as the foundational principle of education. Both terms, *Bildung* and *Bildsamkeit*, have the same root word *bild*, and the word *bildsam* relates to the Latin word *formabilis* or *docile*, meaning formable or teachable, respectively. The concept of *Bildsamkeit* captures the idea that human beings are capable of forming the world around them and being formed by it, and for Herbart, it therefore describes an aspect of the human condition that educators must presuppose before they can consider educating another human being. The term *Bildsamkeit* underscores the idea that human beings are learning beings, capable of transformation.

Education as Reconstruction: John Dewey’s Notion of Transformation and Education

John Dewey, a philosopher of education in the tradition of American Pragmatism, draws upon a central idea in pragmatism that can be found in similar forms in C. S. Peirce, William James, and George Herbert Mead, namely, the idea that experiences of resistance lead human beings to fall into doubt or become confused and that this can promote thinking about and questioning of taken-for-granted habits and ideas. This idea of how thinking and questioning are initiated informs Dewey’s notion of education as a transformative process. Dewey’s concept of education ties educational processes to our experience of the world, in particular to our experiences of new, as yet unfamiliar objects and ideas that, because they are new, are

unexpected and point out a limit to our existing knowledge and ability (see, e.g., Dewey 1916/2008). Such experiences interrupt our common, habitual ways of thinking, judging, and acting (English 2013). Our encounters with new objects and ideas can incite what Dewey calls “reflective experiences,” experiences in which we reflect upon the strange and unfamiliar encounters we have had in the world and rethink how we understand our relationship to the world.

In contrast to the “ordinary” definition of education as transmission, Dewey puts forward a “technical” definition of education as reconstruction. Education as a process of reconstruction involves the “reconstruction or reorganization” of a human being’s experience, such that our experience gains new “meaning” and increases our “ability to direct the course of subsequent experience” (1916/2008, p. 82). Education, on this view, has to do with the enrichment of our experiences through our encounters with difference and newness.

Dewey’s understanding of education has commonalities with the German tradition of *Bildung*. In particular, Dewey highlights the idea that in educational processes, our interaction with the world incites self-reflection and struggle and, through this interaction, both self and world change. However, Dewey places more emphasis than his predecessors on the idea that human beings are capable of holding themselves in “suspense” before taking action or fixating on a solution to a problem. When we are in suspense, we are held between old, “tried and true” ideas, that now appear flawed, and the new ideas that have not yet been established, a space which can be thought of as an “in-between” realm of learning (English 2013, pp. 65–78). This realm between old and new knowledge and ability, in which we have not yet found the ways out of our difficulties, is a space of reflection upon self and world, in which we are engaged in inquiry and experiment with new ways of thinking and new possibilities for action.

In engaging in such reflective experiences, which Dewey also refers to as “reflective inquiry,” our experiences become more meaningful because we have increased our understanding of the connections between self and world, that is, between what we “do” and what we “undergo” in consequence

(see, e.g., Dewey 1916/2008, p. 146 ff.). This process does not simply involve adapting to our environment as it is nor simply forcing the environment to adapt to our will; rather it involves an interaction between self and world. When such interactions are transformative, they enhance our ability to reimagine the future and create new aims.

Transformation and Education in the Thinking of R.S. Peters

For R. S. Peters, a philosopher of education in the analytic tradition, education as a transformational process is not equivalent to mere self-actualization, nor does it amount to one's conforming to the existing order of things. Peters' discussion of education addresses the issue of the learner's confrontation with the otherness of the world and its connection to the learner's transformation (English 2009). Without reference to Herbart, Peters takes a similar approach to the issue. Early in *Ethics and Education*, he notes the possibility of the individual's narrow, limited and undifferentiated development and emphasizes throughout his work that the learning individual needs to be initiated into the differentiated forms of knowledge, awareness, and practices that make up the tradition of human thought and activity (Peters 1966, pp. 47–48). In his discussion of education as "initiation," Peters utilizes a metaphor of getting learners "on the inside" that helps clarify his understanding of education as transformation. Educators not only have to "initiate" learning processes of learners, but they also must initiate learners in the sense of getting them "on the inside" of human modes of thought and understanding (see Peters 1966, e.g., p. 31). This process involves more than merely learning by rote or acquiring inert knowledge, activities which would not be considered education: "education implies a man's outlook is transformed by what he knows" (Peters 1967, p. 7). For Peters, what is referred to as education is only education in this deeper sense when it results in an individual's transformed perspective, which affects how he or she sees the world.

Although he spends less time considering what is entailed in the process by which an individual's

perspective is transformed, Peters does discuss the interaction between the child and the world in a way that helps clarify how he is conceiving of this process. The world that the child enters is a shared world, common to both teacher and learner, that Peters describes as an "impersonal world" made up of human traditions of thought and knowledge and "the criteria by reference to which that content is criticized" (1966, p. 52). Peters views the child as starting life on the "outside" on this world, without knowledge, language, or an understanding of human relationships. Both the natural order, the world of objects, and the moral order, the world of human relationships, appear fixed to the child (Peters 1966, p. 52). As the child develops and gradually gains an understanding of things and human relationships, the child gets on the "inside" of the shared world.

The transformation that is part of the child's development occurs in both the "natural order" and the "moral order." Transformation in the natural order involves the child coming to distinguish between real and imaginary and understand causal connections that are beyond his control (Peters 1973, p. 118). In the context of the moral order, the child's transformed perspective arises from learning to take the "point of view of the other" into consideration (Peters 1973, p. 118).

For Peters, the teacher plays a critical role in the learner's transformational processes. The teacher understands the shared world and knows how to question the validity of thought and knowledge. A central task for the teacher in supporting educational processes is to question learners so that they find their errors, which in turn helps them to take on "the questioner in [their] own mind[s]" (Peters 1967, p. 20).

Contemporary Notions of Education and Transformation

Contemporary philosophers of education continue to develop ideas of education as transformation and have drawn largely upon the traditions of hermeneutics and phenomenology to illustrate key aspects of transformational processes. For example, in contemporary German philosophical

discourse, the notion of *Umlernen* is used to capture the idea of learning as a “painful turnaround” that involves the transformative restructuring of foregoing and possible experience (Meyer-Drawe 1984; Buck 1969). Other scholars have discussed negative and discontinuous experiences as constitutive of both teaching and learning as transformative educational processes (e.g., Koch 1995; Benner 2003; English 2013). Others within the Anglo-American discourse discuss how certain kinds of interactions that challenge one’s self-understanding are transformative in that they offer new insight into oneself and the world (e.g., Kerdeman 2003).

Conclusion

In the twenty-first century, diverging trends in educational policy indicate that teacher-centered and child-centered understandings of education are still significant features of the social imaginary which continue to compete for representation in contemporary educational policy. Narrowly teacher-centered views of education, which reduce the idea of teaching to a mechanical transmission of facts to be regurgitated by students on tests, point to an understanding of education as a linear process, rather than a transformational one. Such views of education and teaching are increasingly reinforced by the global educational policy movement toward international comparative testing. Arguably, the value placed on test-based accountability in education has influenced a new global social imaginary in which education is generally thought to be easily measurable by standardized tests. There also has been a reaction against this trend, in which the stresses of the testing regime on young people are thought to be counterproductive to their well-being. These reactions tend to be associated with alternative child-centered policy trends, such as those that place emphasis on active learning (in contrast to rote learning).

On the other hand, some recent policies reflect ideas more strongly associated with philosophical notions of transformation. For example, the Scottish Curriculum for Excellence’s guidance documents for teachers of “Religious and Moral

Education” encourage teachers to initiate “moral challenge” as part of students’ learning processes. Additionally, the National Council for Teachers of Mathematics in the United States has introduced the notion of “productive struggle” as essential to mathematics learning at all ages and provides guidance for teachers as to what “productive struggle” looks like in practice. In the European Union, higher education policy is promoting the development of students’ ability to self-correct, think critically, and communicate across difference. It is yet to be seen the extent to which these ideas will take hold in the social imaginary.

What remains essential to the idea of transformation is that it involves a change that can be painful and entails moments of self-critical reflection in which we question the old ways of thinking and being before the change toward the new becomes fully possible. This notion of education as transformation is still significant in philosophy of education today, and it is seen to provide us with criteria for evaluating whether or not an individual’s interaction with objects (e.g., a child’s interaction with science lab resources in a classroom), or with other human beings (e.g., a child’s interaction with the teacher), is truly *educational*, in the critical philosophical sense.

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Social Imaginaries and Inclusion

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Synonyms

Exclusion; Inclusion; Inclusive learning environment; Inclusive schools; Neoliberalism

Introduction

The main goal of this entry is to introduce inclusion as a sociological concept consistent with which exclusion is an internal part of inclusion. When exclusion is the basis of inclusion, the establishment of communities will always involve both inclusion and exclusion processes. Similarly, the development of inclusive schools and inclusive learning environments will involve both inclusion and exclusion processes.

With this starting point, international educational research knowledge about inclusive schools and inclusive learning environments in general will be related to the fundamental dilemma that inclusion on the one hand may be seen to be about human rights, solidarity, and democracy, and on the other hand, it is about ensuring the cohesion of neoliberal society by means of every person's obligation to realize one's potential through learning, development, and education regardless of one's needs and skills.

Research in Inclusive Schools and Inclusive Environments

The social imaginary of developing inclusive schools has called for new pedagogical and educational strategies that support inclusion of all students, irrespective of their needs. As a consequence, much educational research knowledge has been produced concerning the characteristics of inclusive learning environments and about how to develop inclusive schools (e.g., Booth et al. 2000). Educational inclusion research has mainly been based on ideology and human rights with reference to the Salamanca Statement. The Salamanca Statement was signed by 92 countries in 1994. It asserts that schools with inclusive practices are most effective in relation to guarding against discrimination and ensuring the rights of individuals with disabilities to achieve equal opportunities for participation in society. Moreover, the 2006 United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Article 24, has the purpose to ensure the right of everyone to education, development, and learning no matter

what the particular situation and needs of the individual. Article 24 considers how schools and educational institutions ought to offer inclusive learning environments. According to the article, it should not be possible to be rejected or excluded from an ordinary school because of one's disability. Ideally, there should be no risk factors that might prevent participation. Exclusion, therefore, is primarily about how risk factors are handled and how they are given meaning and significance of society.

The predominant understanding of inclusion in both the Salamanca Statement and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities takes as its starting point the idea of society "failing" individuals, excluding them from participation in society. The conception of society failing individuals means that reasons for exclusion are related to the constitution of society and its institutions, which, on this understanding of inclusion, ought to ensure that all individuals may participate, acknowledging the differences of those individuals.

The predominant, normative conception of inclusion contains the premise that communities are heterogeneous and able to handle a high degree of diversity. From this point of view, inclusion is about solidarity, democracy, and civil rights. Everyone should have the possibility to be included, regardless of their contribution to society or their competencies or special needs. To ensure the individual's right to participate, society must make itself accessible to the individuals, regardless of conditions and needs. Inclusion is, in this perspective, a practical expression of the ideal of creating a pluralistic community culture, which recognizes heterogeneity and insists on everyone learning to live with diversity. This is viewed as strengthening society. At the same time, this conception of inclusion involves an understanding of exclusion as an expression of a dysfunctional society and as discrimination.

Much educational inclusion research has also been based on ideologies of human rights, solidarity, and democracy in order to investigate how to support inclusive educational processes and how to achieve inclusive learning environments through identifying dilemmas, barriers, and

opportunities in relation to inclusion. Research has developed knowledge of how different disciplines, professions, practices, and forms of knowledge can be developed, integrated, and linked in various ways in order to develop new capacities and new intervention forms within ordinary learning environments.

Even though a lot of educational research knowledge has been produced in recent decades about the characteristics of inclusive learning environments and about how to develop inclusive schools, it has also been found that it remains a great challenge to achieve inclusion in practice (e.g., Hansen 2012; Thomas and Loxley 2007; Thomas et al. 2005).

Exclusion as an Integral Part of Inclusion

The gap between educational theory and practice has of course many reasons. Here, the consequence of the dominant understanding of inclusion in educational inclusion research, namely, not taking into account the sociological fact that all communities constitute themselves through both inclusion and exclusion processes, will be emphasized (Laclau 1996; Jenkins 2000). A unilateral focus on inclusion ignores the sociological fact that all communities need to place limits on what can be included and what must be excluded in order to secure their own existence (Hansen 2012). The point is that inclusion cannot be achieved by eliminating exclusion processes if exclusion is an integral part of inclusion. The relationship between individual and society is both about society failing individuals and about individuals failing society (Bjerre 2015). From a sociological perspective, the constitution of communities always presupposes the establishment of common rules, moral, values, and norms – a collective social identity. This explains why individuals need to adapt to society by learning and following rules and morals and by internalizing common understandings, in order to be included. In the construction of a social identity, internal differences within society are ignored, and thereby the differential character of identity is undermined. Consequently, commonality is not

an expression of uniform character but an expression of establishing differences between “us” and “them.” Society will consequently reflect the differences among individuals to a certain degree, and at the same time, the individual will reflect a collective social identity. In inclusive communities, the balance between the unique individual identity and the collective social identity will differ from the balance in integrative communities, because inclusive communities will reflect the differences of the individuals to a higher degree compared with an integrative community. But, in inclusive societies, there will also be limits on how much diversity a society can accommodate before it breaks apart, thus destroying its social structure (Hansen 2012).

Both inclusion and exclusion processes are thus part of the constitution of all kinds of communities, and a boundary is always set between inclusion and exclusion. This boundary is dependent on context and possibility but never necessity. Neither determining structures nor free and volitional individuals decide the placement of this boundary.

The phenomenon of educational inclusion research that investigates how to develop inclusive learning environments without taking into account that exclusion is an integral part of inclusion may be explained in several ways, for example, by defining inclusion as a vision or as a process that can never be fully realized or never ends or by accepting that inclusion has a limit in practice and that it is therefore not beneficial to all children’s learning and developing to participate in the same classroom which enables a distinction to be made between “responsible inclusion” and “full inclusion” (Evans and Lunt 2005). In general, there seems to be acceptance of a pragmatic solution to the relationship between a conceptual understanding of inclusion as limitless in principle and an *a priori* assumption that inclusion in practice always has a limit – regardless of the different explanations. However, these different perspectives or explanations primarily compensate for the lack of a theoretical determination of the limit to inclusion in the conceptual determination of inclusion. The limit to inclusion is then

explained by theories and concepts outside the concept or theory of inclusion itself.

Conceptualizing Inclusion and Exclusion

In order to develop a theoretical determination of the concept of inclusion and exclusion, discourse theory can be helpful (Laclau 1996, Hansen 2012).

According to Laclau (1996), all concepts are constructed by virtue of the otherness of the concept and that every concept presupposes its otherness. This otherness of the concept makes the concept possible as a concept, but at the same time, it makes it impossible as a concept in itself. If inclusion is to be considered as a concept in itself, it has to exclude that which constitutes its otherness: exclusion. From this point of view, inclusive communities should be developed by excluding exclusion. By excluding exclusion, inclusion is grounded in various normative principles that state *a priori* what should be included and what should not be included; in inclusive communities, exclusion should not be included, and thereby a distinction is made between the morally acceptable and the morally unacceptable. Exclusion is not morally acceptable in inclusive communities. But communities are not inclusive if they only include what is morally approved to include. Compared to the construction of concepts, grounding inclusion in a norm different from itself dissolves inclusion as a meaningful category (Laclau 1996). Therefore inclusion means to include what is morally approved (Hansen 2012).

On the other hand, it is not possible to consider inclusion as limitless because an unlimited inclusive community cannot exclude exclusion processes by which the inclusive community unintentionally may lead to an exclusive community. In understanding inclusion as a concept, inclusion presupposes exclusion and exclusion presupposes inclusion. The point is that inclusion and exclusion are two connected and interdependent processes. Exclusion makes inclusion possible, and simultaneously it makes limitless inclusion impossible. And the other way

around, inclusion makes exclusion possible, and simultaneously it makes limitless exclusion impossible. In other words, inclusive communities need to include a certain degree of exclusion to ensure their own existence as inclusive (Hansen 2012).

So, on the one hand, all communities are characterized by some degree of differentiation. On the other hand, there need to be limits to how much differentiation a community can sustain if it is not to pose a threat to the cohesion of the community. Inclusion and exclusion are therefore both necessary processes in the constitution of all communities, and exclusive processes will always be a fundamental part of the existence of an inclusive community.

How Inclusive Schools Exclude

Looking at educational inclusion research from this point of view, the question in relation to inclusion is how to handle both inclusion and exclusion processes in the task of ensuring the learning and development of all pupils in ordinary schools. Even though teachers may really want to develop inclusive learning environments, they cannot avoid excluding some ways of acting or specific kinds of behavior from the established classroom because of the limit to inclusion. The main challenge to inclusive schools is thus how to handle the dilemma both to construct an inclusive environment, containing a higher degree of diversity in order to ensure all students' participation, and at the same time manage the necessity of exclusiveness and exclusive values even though exclusion processes are not politically acceptable and therefore could not be legitimized as "exclusion."

To analyze both inclusion and exclusion processes thus takes as its starting point the investigation of how a specific school or learning community constructs its own limit to diversity and to what degree the community handles diversity without perceiving diversity as a threat to the cohesion of that community. This means uncovering the processes that make specific, meaningful constructions and subject positioning possible and at the same

time exclude other constructions and subject positioning as impossible within a specific school or learning community. In this way, a space is created to identify patterns which exclude the differences that would make it possible to create a more inclusive learning environment.

Inclusion and Neoliberalism

To uncover the processes that exclude specific meaning constructions and subject positioning and thereby to identify patterns which exclude specific differences has become increasingly important since it has become a dominant political goal to ensure the participation in society of all persons and to develop inclusive schools. As early as 1992, the then EU president, Jacques Delors, formulated the idea that the biggest threat to European welfare States was no longer poverty and inequality but social exclusion, and, by extension, nonparticipation in society. From this point of view, fairness is no longer concerned with creating economic and social equality but with providing every person an equal possibility to participate actively in societal life in order to ensure the cohesion of society. From this perspective, inclusion and participation are not only about solidarity, democracy, and human rights. They are also about how to ensure the cohesion of society through the duty to participate of all individuals.

Inclusion and the right and duty of every person to participate might therefore also be linked to dominant neoliberal conceptions of humanity: the idea that everyone has the resources and potential to make themselves relevant to society through self-development and developing their potential. By ensuring their own inclusion, individuals ensure the cohesion of society. From a neoliberal perspective, every person is presumed to have the potential as well as the possibility of participating in society. Accordingly, the category of "unable" no longer exists in neoliberal political rhetoric, as every person is expected to be able to become an active participant in societal life (Pedersen 2011). On the other hand, society must ensure that the individual actually has the possibility of taking

responsibility for his or her own inclusion, and some might need help toward inclusion, realizing their potential through motivation and support. Viewed from a neoliberal perspective, problems related to inclusion processes are thus not structurally conditioned, while personal, social, or familial barriers to participation and inclusion are no longer approved. Problems are rather determined by destiny, and the individual is master over his or her own destiny (Andersen 2005).

Understanding inclusion as a means to advance the neoliberal project has a major impact on individuals. From a neoliberal perspective, the relationship between individual and society is only a matter of will, commitment, and responsibility; the individual's will to participate, commitment to society, and responsibility for him or herself to become included in society. Politics is therefore about contributing to the individual's creation of a self which can shape itself and its own destiny, thereby ensuring the realization of every person's right and duty to participation. Should they not – against expectations – succeed, individuals themselves must take responsibility for their own destiny as being excluded (Andersen 2005).

Political discourses, as well as those based on rights and control strategies, thus contribute collectively in creating a powerful hegemonic force directed toward ensuring the rights, duties, and possibility of every person to be able to participate in society and in communities. This hegemony encourages individuals to live the heralded life, expecting everyone to have the desire to both comply with the political objectives and to find meaning and purpose in them. To optimize one's learning and thereby prepare oneself for further education and active participation in society is the only life strategy which can be ascribed meaning within the prevailing political discourse. The dominating inclusion discourse thereby unintentionally contributes to exclusion processes by excluding the variations of conception that would make it possible for specific individuals or groups to live a life in society which is different from the heralded life which is to realize one's potential for learning, development, and education.

Similarly, inclusive schools have not only the task of making themselves accessible to the

individual through the handling of increased diversity. Inclusive schools are also responsible for supporting the individual student's possibility of realizing his or her potential for learning and education. Further, to be included in the inclusive learning, environment demands a specific social identity as a student who can and will realize his or her potential for learning and development, irrespective of any personal, societal, or familial situation. In this way, the inclusive school places demands on all students to position themselves as subjects who can and will – or become able – to live a normalized life through learning and further education. So, even though inclusive schools are characterized by a higher degree of diversity, there will still be limits to diversity through an obligatory collectivity; to find one's potential for learning and development.

In this perspective, the main goal of the inclusive school is to ensure that everyone optimizes their educational opportunities and readies themselves for further education. On the one hand, this task can be seen as a way to realize solidarity, human rights, and democracy, because a lack of education in the future will be one of the most crucial socioeconomic risk factors in relation to marginalization and exclusion (Pedersen 2011). On the other hand, pure recognition fails to appreciate the question of social injustice, dysfunctional family relations, and individuals who do not thrive either psychologically, physically, or socially. In this context, an absence of recognition and legitimation of personal, social, and familial barriers to learning and further education could inadvertently lead to the exclusion of certain individuals' chances of participation and inclusion. This is simply because some individuals cannot – and may never be able – to meet the demands of finding and realizing their potential.

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Social Imaginaries and Possibilism in State Schooling

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Synonyms

Pragmatism; Rationality; Rationalization; Realism

Introduction

This entry considers first, the purpose of State schooling as modern social imaginary; second, selected examples of contemporary possibilism in schooling policy and practice; third, some of the theoretical and empirical flaws in possibilism; and finally, a productive distinction between possibilism as rationality and possibilism as rationalization.

The term “modern social imaginary” was coined by the Canadian hermeneutic philosopher Charles Taylor (2004) to convey the ways in which societies imagine, idealize, and attempt to realize themselves in both moral and practical terms. The social imaginary comprises three spheres through which these occur; namely, the economy, the public sphere, and self-governance. All three may be said to be relevant to a theoretical analysis of “State” or “public” schooling systems. From an administrative perspective, these systems comprise: (i) their constituent policy ensembles, narratives, and trajectories over time; (ii) policy settings at particular historical junctures (including both the quantum of funding appropriations and particular weightings or priorities within this); and, (iii) the specific policy texts (curriculum, pedagogy, evaluation) that are negotiated daily by teachers, students, and families.

From a hermeneutic perspective, schooling policies also inscribe a community or a society’s assessment of what is morally worthwhile and what is worth striving to realize through publicly funded and delivered schooling provision that is always imperfect. In this sense, a State schooling system is about the practical articulation and realization of a society’s moral aspirations for its young people. However, no society is homogeneous. Lobby groups (for-profit, not-for-profit), cultural and geographical communities, adherents of particular schooling theories, and diverse participant groups all engage in the public sphere in order to advance their own ideologies of the most important purposes of State schooling and how best to enact these.

Ideologies and theories of “possibilism” are central to this educational project not least because the day-to-day administration of schooling proceeds pragmatically on the premise that there will never be sufficient public funding to meet all the demands made on it by society as a whole, by the intellectual elites, politicians, powerful business interests, and secular or faith communities within it.

State Schooling

The practical administration of State schooling addresses questions of effectiveness and

efficiency. Effectiveness concerns questions such as: What are the realistically possible outcomes of a comprehensive, compulsory schooling system that must satisfy the needs and goals of a socially, economically, spiritually, and cognitively diverse student population? Efficiency concerns questions such as: How can a publicly acceptable array of possible student outcomes be achieved at optimum cost to the State? Possibilism may be similarly understood as a matter of State school administration but at ideological, theoretical, *and* practical levels. In terms of its contribution to the modern social imaginary, it is about the ways in which the polity, civil society, and families conceive of and proselytise purported causal relationships between State schooling provision and improved individual student outcomes, enhanced intergenerational family prospects, and greater aggregate prosperity and harmony in society as a whole.

In the sense that they have always examined, judged, and progressively sorted young people for society's preferred occupational destination types (manual, technical, professional, entrepreneurial), State schooling systems embody society's official aspirations for, and practical pathways to, adult economic self-sufficiency and wellbeing. This operates on the jurisdiction as a whole (e.g., Gross Domestic Product), the family unit (e.g., school choices), and the individual (e.g., subject choices). State schooling systems similarly have been mandated a major role in the normative development and socialization of children, including their preparation for meaningful participation in and contribution to those aspects of society that are held in common (e.g., social capital). Equally, through their modes of central steerage and local self-governance, in their relative levels of public, private, and philanthropic funding sources, and in the degrees to which they variously serve social reproduction, redistribution, and equity purposes, State schooling may be understood as an archetypal modern social imaginary.

Political and cultural struggles to advance society's idealized view of schooling rely on acceptance or rejection of the proposition that schooling is a "wicked problem" (Rittel and

Webber 1973). Rittel and Webber refute the notion that public policy can be conceived of or enacted scientifically. On their criteria, State schooling would be a wicked problem because it cannot be definitively described due to the myriad of cognitive, affective, physical, spiritual, economic, and social challenges or problems it is intended to resolve on behalf of the rest of society. Moreover, there is no universal agreement on the nature of the public or social good that State schooling is intended to promote, or on the meaning of equity against which to evaluate its success. In this context, they argue that definitions of "optimal" or "acceptable" solutions must always be qualified while the criteria against which the success or failure of State schooling is judged, cannot be considered definitive or objective, but only ever subjective or intersubjective and partial.

In direct contrast to the view that State schooling's inherent complexities are irreconcilable with policy science solutions, the school effectiveness and school improvement (SESI) movements (Morley and Rassool 1999) have greatly influenced the conception and operationalization of State schooling policy in developed economies since the latter part of the twentieth century. SESI theory and practice are premised on the position that it is possible for academics and officials to define a schooling problem, help practitioners and their communities to implement precise pedagogical strategies intended to overcome the problem, and evaluate the extent to which this has occurred – definitively and objectively. Moreover, it has been forcefully asserted in scholarly, professional, and popular cultural texts that it is possible to do this irrespective of the family, social, and economic circumstances in which teachers and students interact. This deliberate excision of the impact of local context and circumstances from definitions of the schooling "problem" represents what is arguably the dominant version of possibilism today. In the context of teachers and schools being required to meet officially mandated minimum outcomes from compulsory schooling for *all* their students, Nash (2003) has described this as "state-sponsored possibilism."

Possibilism in Practice

In this part of the discussion, three representative texts are briefly described to illustrate the practices of contemporary State-sponsored possibilism. In the following part of the discussion, selected ideological and theoretical underpinnings of possibilism are examined.

In 2005, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (2005) released an analysis of how its developed economy member states reportedly conceptualize and respond to the challenges of improving schooling outcomes for the significant minority of children who do not experience minimum expected levels of success. Known vernacularly as the “Teachers Matter” report, the report’s summary drew a distinction between matters that were judged to be readily open to influence by policy makers and those that were not. In terms of the latter, it was recognized that the greatest influences or sources of variation on student achievement overall were those that students brought with them to school: prior abilities, attitudes, and family and community background (OECD 2005, p. 2). Foremost among the former was reportedly “the broad consensus [...] that ‘teacher quality’ is the single most important school variable influencing student achievement” (p. 2). In the context of the modern social imaginary, this may be regarded as an attempt by influential policy elites to refocus society’s imagination and idealization of what “matters” in State schooling sharply on what goes on inside school, as opposed to outside, and on matters of teaching practices and dispositions rather than broader social policy and its material effects. In this sense, it is a conscious effort to include teachers and teaching within professional and popular conceptions of the realm of the “possible,” and to exclude prior ability, attitude, and family and community background on the basis that these are matters over which it is “not possible” for schooling to exert direct influence.

By any definition, this utterance represents a radical attempt to alter the social imaginary of State schooling. It is one that has since been seized upon by politicians, officials, academics, and

schooling policy entrepreneurs and advocates from both the public and private sectors across the OECD bloc. A few years later, for example, John Hattie, a professor of education at the University of Auckland, published *Visible Learning: A synthesis of over 800 meta-analyses of studies relating to achievement* (Hattie 2009), which was immediately labeled by one professional magazine reviewer as “reveal[ing] the holy grail” of teaching and learning, and thereafter marketed as such. The book continued the increasingly normalized possibilist theme of differentiating between matters that were open to influence by teachers and those that were not. It claimed to identify and rank order those dimensions of teaching and learning that according to “research” exerted the greatest measurable “effect size” on students’ cognition. The heavily qualified scholarship that underpinned the book’s opening sections was later widely ignored in the public sphere while the “scientific evidence” was repurposed to argue that teachers should be expected to increase all student’s achievement outcomes by at least the “hinge point” of the average achievement effect size, or 1 year’s growth, each year and then continue to do so every year.

In 2011, Sir Michael Barber, a former professor of education at the Institute of Education, London, and senior public policy “standards and targets” adviser in the UK Blair governments, published a possibilist manual with colleagues at McKinsey and Company called *Deliverology 101: A field guide for educational leaders*. Deliverology is defined in the manual as “a systematic process for driving progress and delivering results in government and the public sector” (Barber et al. 2011, p. vii), and the authors offer the reader proven strategies to “create an irreversible delivery culture” (p. 171). From roles as Head of Global Practice at McKinsey, and Managing Partner of Delivery Associates, Barber has since been appointed Chief Education Adviser at Pearson, the world’s largest private educational organization. A major focus of Barber’s work at both McKinsey and Pearson has been to exercise global “thought leadership” in the use of achievement data analytics. The agenda has been to

encourage governments to adopt standardized measures of student achievement, to collate and authoritatively interpret comparative student achievement outcome data at system level from various primary sources on their behalf, and to then offer governments publicly and privately delivered State schooling “solutions” in partnership with a wide range of venture capital, social investment, and philanthropic schooling policy actors.

Looking across State schooling in both the OECD bloc and the Global South in 2016, then, one may discern a consistent discourse of possibilism in official policy, commercial and philanthropic schooling services delivery, and ongoing scholarly activity in the SESI tradition. Most significantly, perhaps, in terms of its adoption as part of the State schooling modern social imaginary within broader civil society, possibilism appears at present to be accepted as a largely unremarked feature of popular cultural texts: All children can and should succeed at school irrespective of prior ability, attitude, and family and community contexts.

Possibilism in Theory

Three approaches to possibilism are discussed. In order to broadly differentiate them, they are here called psychologically optimist, sociologically realist, and methodologically pluralist.

In 1976, the *Journal of Teacher Education* published a special issue to commemorate the American bicentennial and look forward to its “third century.” The guest editorial was written by S.K. Bailey (1976), vice-president of the American Council on Education and an academic expert in American schooling legislation and its administration. The title of his editorial was: “The case for ‘possibilism.’” Quoting a contemporary possibilist colleague, Bailey asserted that “the future is up for grabs. It will be, in part, what we *will* it to be” (p. 290, emphasis in original). Bailey then elaborated “four steps to possibilism”: first, “tell it as it is”; second, “dream how it might be different”; third, “affirm people’s capacity for decency and growth”; and fourth, “plot the

instrumental means” (p. 290). While the brief editorial in no way attempts to theorize or justify possibilism, it does neatly capture its essential bureaucratic or public policy imperative, namely to socialize the belief that it is possible to will a beneficial State schooling future, irrespective of present circumstances. This is in some senses precisely the same ideology espoused by the OECD, high-profile policy actors, and academics working in the SESI tradition.

In contrast, the sociologist of education Roy Nash has argued that possibilist ideologies selectively ignore or fail to appreciate a large body of quantitative and qualitative empirical evidence that explains precisely why some children fail to succeed at school. According to Nash, this predictable and consistent failure to succeed is not amenable to simple will on the part of policy makers, administrators, or teachers. Educational inequality and difference occur sociologically because of what Nash conceives of as “the cognitive *habitus*.” According to Nash’s research, “durable cognitive schemes, acquired by children in classed environments, are a principle cause of observed class variation in educational performance” (p. 171). This cognitive *habitus* is necessary to success in “the kind of abstract problem-solving exercised in mathematics and other language-based, symbolic information processing” (p. 172), in other words during schoolwork. However, it develops differentially in families. Given Nash’s arguments that essential features of the cognitive *habitus* are formed in early childhood and that prior attainment is demonstrably the strongest predictor of subsequent scholastic achievement, he rejects the possibilist ideology that achievement gains can simply be willed by bureaucrats and delivered by teachers irrespective of the state of the child’s cognitive *habitus*. Nash holds to a realist view in the world in which social properties, such as the family resources framework that generates the child’s cognitive *habitus*, have material, durable effects.

The methodological possibilism of Albert O Hirschman (Lepenies 2008) also sits in opposition to the bureaucratic possibilism of the kind denounced by Nash. However, it offers something

of a problem-solving alternative that could be of practical assistance to those charged with developing public policy responses to intractable schooling challenges, like the polity expectation that all children should succeed. According to Lepenies, “Hirschman advocates an escape from the ‘straightjacket constructs’ of policies grounded in generalizations, universal laws and fixed sequences by searching instead for the uniqueness or unique features of a given situation” (p. 448). This form of what might be called methodological possibilism is thus concerned with identifying what is possible given the unique features and local circumstances of, in this instance, a particular State schooling challenge. In this sense, like Nash’s realist family resource framework, Hirschman’s possibilism seeks to understand the complexities of how the social world actually works in practice, not how ideally it should work in theory, and to then encourage local interventions on that basis. Similarly, like Nash’s realist rejection of State-sponsored psychological possibilism, Hirschman’s methodological possibilism rejects externally imposed, mandated solutions in favor of flexible approaches that are locally responsive. Methodological possibilism assumes that a solution of some sort may commonly be found provided that the complexities of local circumstances, and their material effects, are sufficiently appreciated as a result of examining the same real phenomenon through multiple perspectives. In contrast, psychologically optimistic possibilism appears to claim that a solution may be found provided only there is sufficient common will and commitment.

Conclusion: Possibilism as Rationality and Rationalization

These opposing views of possibilism may usefully be understood in the context of State schooling by applying Flyvbjerg’s (1998) distinction between rationality and rationalization. The former is a description of the world as it is depicted according to official discourses articulated and circulated by those in positions of power. The latter is a description of the world as it is actually

experienced by most people in society. According to the rationality of State-sponsored possibilism, centrally mandated schooling policies and officially preferred teaching and learning practices are claimed to offer the promise of a State schooling system in which all children can succeed irrespective of prior ability, attitude towards schooling, and the day-to-day material realities and effects of the child’s family and community circumstances. This is a possibilism constructed on a highly partial view of childhood and on an idealized view of the pedagogical relations between teachers, students, and families. In contrast, what we might describe as the rationalization of a realist or methodological possibilism would begin by developing a rich, nuanced appreciation of the durable cognitive dispositions that the child brings to school; of the ways in which these both enable and constrain the child from engaging in meaningful learning; and of what supports, opportunities, and resources the child may need to become more confident and agentic in school, in the family, and in the community. State-sponsored possibilism in schooling represents a concerted effort by those in power to decouple achievement from family and community circumstances. Such a psychological possibilism seeks to reorient the popular narratives that maintain the modern social imaginary of State schooling to ones in which all children can succeed provided only that teachers will it and children aspire to it. A realist or methodological possibilism of State schooling would instead begin with the material realities of inequitable early childhood experience as they are lived, and seek to identify all the necessary interventions (family, community, and polity) that might be required to mitigate them over time.

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Social Imaginaries and Schooling

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Synonyms

Achievement; Charles Taylor; Modern social imaginary; Schooling

Introduction

This entry considers the status of schooling through the notion of the modern social imaginary. The relationship between schooling and the modern social imaginary is first introduced generally and then explored in more detail through the two primary concepts that define the modern social imaginary, specifically secular time and bifocal consciousness. The role of achievement is taken as emblematic of schooling as a modern social imaginary institution. This entry concludes

with some brief critical considerations of schooling as a modern social imaginary.

Charles Taylor brings together the three domains of economics, the public sphere, and a self-governing (sovereign) people to mark what he terms a modern social imaginary. Each of these domains, alone and collectively, represent what Taylor identifies as a significant shift in the assumptions that people, specifically Western people, make in their everyday, ordinary lives. These assumptions are the baseline from which the activities of modern individuals proceed. When one thinks about going to school, attending classes, raising their hand to speak, expecting a teacher present, etc., they are actively (but likely not reflectively) participating in the modern social imaginary. In other words, the modern social imaginary is the way one's ordinary life makes sense and is made sense of. Being able to imagine the scenario described above, to picture the arrangement of desks, the interactions between the students and teachers in the classroom, and the kinds of work being done, is a part of the modern social imaginary to the degree that one is able to fill in the details for this sparsely described scenario in a way that makes sense not only to the one doing the imagining, but makes sense of that person as well. When a person can put themselves in this scenario, they are participating in the ordinary life of schooling – not because they necessarily do this in their ordinary life at present but because they can imagine what this scenario involves and most likely have had experiences in schools that inform their imagining of school. Many of the details that accompany these activities can be imagined as though they were a part of their everyday activities, which is precisely what indicates one's engagement with Taylor's notion of modern social imaginaries.

In his defining work for modern social imaginaries, Taylor (2004) posits two interrelated notions that make the Western social imaginary particularly modern. The first notion is secular time. Taylor offers a broad definition of secularity by emphasizing that secular time rules out an external guarantor standing outside of time and acting as a reference point for a society's normative order. While secularity for Taylor captures the

sense of “without religion” that more colloquial uses of secularity connote, he emphasizes a notion of secularity that deals more generally with the distinction between immanence and transcendence. At this more general level, society within secular time is not based on a model whereby some higher authority like God has preordained social categories and processes that hierarchically sort genus and species according to some transcendent ordering principle such as the Great Chain of Being. Instead, society is entirely immanent to time: the actions and objects in and of time operate in a horizontal world wherein the legitimating authority is found in and as a part of society rather than being transcendent to it. Recalling Habermas’ work on the structural shift from religious to rational authority in Enlightenment Europe (1989), Taylor highlights the uptake of reason and rational discourse as a significant consequence of society’s transition to secular time. For this theory, authority is a matter of debate that reason legitimates the actions in and order of society. Accordingly, actors can change society via rational debate, and reason is the grounds from which actors act. Through secular time, then, individuals in the modern social imaginary assume a new type of rational and immanent order wherein society is a sphere upon which action is based, and actors are capable of changing society.

This split between actors (or agents) and the society in which one acts offers the second fundamental notion for modern social imaginaries – the bifocal consciousness of society. Taylor reasons that in order for secular time to be immanent, individuals’ consciousness of society must maintain two foci, agency and objectification. Agency can be understood here as the limitations and affordances one has to act in society, particularly as those actions can direct social change. Objectification is the process by which something is made into an object (objectified) to be acted upon. At the most general level, objectification turns society into an object. In order for the modern social imaginary to operate, individuals must be able to instigate change in society without appeal to a transcendent authority; they must be able to imagine society as an object to be acted

within, i.e., to objectify society, and to imagine that their actions can cause change. Conversely, in a transcendent model, actors are limited in what they can change by the plan of a higher authority. This transcendent position supports ideas like the great Chain of Being where anything outside of this chain is apart from God’s domain. Thus, if one were to act outside of this transcendent normative order, they would not be changing society but likely damning themselves or in need of salvation through some intermediary. However, with the immanence of secular time, agents are sovereign actors among equally sovereign actors who act through social institutions and agencies. While these social institutions are objectified as operating independently of particular agents, and regularly do so, they are also open to being challenged and changed by agents and regularly are. Thus, the modern social imaginary maps the terrain in which agents act, i.e., objectify society, as well as flattens that society so agents are able to change it through their actions without the need for intermediaries like kings or priests. Taylor offers the economy as a prime example of this bifocal consciousness. The economy, on Taylor’s view, is objectified as a system of transactions between agents that economic agents assume to exist (objectify) as a precondition of the actions for which they are the agents. Economic transactions take place independently of individual agents and agencies, yet they are also the mode of action for economic agents. An individual can buy, sell, and produce an array of products, but these acts operate within a system of supply and demand that does not rely on any specific individual performing them. Yet, in order for an individual to enter into economic transactions, they objectify the economy as a system in which these transactions both make sense to the individual and make sense of the individual (as an economic agent).

With the fundamental roles of secular time and a bifocal consciousness of society outlined, the implications of the modern social imaginary for schooling begin to take shape. To understand the role of schooling in the modern social imaginary, it will be helpful to take a brief detour into the transformation of schooling projected by the

Enlightenment. Schooling is one of the primary social institutions that has come to define and be defined by Western modernity and Enlightenment thinking. While it would be a mistake to think of schooling as a uniform, monolithic construct across the space-time of Western society, Kant's "What is Enlightenment?" (1784/1996) offers a general starting point to distinguish modern schooling within the context of the modern social imaginary from previous varieties of schooling. For Kant, Enlightenment represents individuals' freedom to make public use of their reason. This culminates in his demand that followers of the Enlightenment "Dare to know!" by which he urges individuals to throw off dogmatism of all sorts and to reason for themselves about any and all public matters. Kant offers examples of officers, tax collectors, and clergy as those potential dogmatists (what Taylor would consider intermediaries) who can curtail the freedom required for the public use of one's reason through their obedience to a higher order, be it the State or Church. Kant's move away from dogmatism and toward the public use of one's reason, including the freedom such use requires, offers the mark of distinction for modern schooling whereby schools can be viewed as social institutions dedicated to the maturation of children being spoken for into adults who speak for themselves rather than speaking for some higher authority.

When schooling is viewed through the Kantian approach to Enlightenment, Taylor's modern social imaginary merges ordinary life with philosophical justification. The reason for modern schooling in its Western iterations is premised on the development of sovereign individuals capable of acting in the public sphere as rational agents. Philosophically one might say the shift for schooling from Medieval to Modern is a shift from final to efficient cause, or from schooling toward an end like salvation to schooling toward developing one's ability to reason, what Kant describes as speaking for one's self. Taylor's work on the modern social imaginary lays a foundation for schooling as an institutional practice through which children continually encounter society in secular time and through a bifocal consciousness

in which students learn through their own actions as well as through being acted upon.

Following Taylor's argument, one should expect to find Western schooling in its modern iteration to operate in accordance with the premises of the modern social imaginary, namely, secular time and bifocal consciousness. To understand schooling as a process and set of institutions embedded in the modern social imaginary, schooling should largely promote reason as the primary legitimating authority in the development of children into rational actors able to direct social change while objectifying the society in which they act. Due to the diverse approaches contained within Western schooling, exceptions will be present (religious schooling for example), but the important question for modern social imaginaries is whether schooling promotes these premises in the main. Thus, what is needed is a common reference point that describes Western schooling in relatively established yet current ways. One such reference point can be found in the notion of achievement.

A feature of Western schooling that bears out Taylor's modern social imaginary is what Parsons (1959) refers to as the single axis of achievement found in schools. This axis can take any number of forms; though in contemporary Western schooling, it has been drawn largely in terms of standards for literacy and numeracy and evaluated through student performance on standards-based tests. Parsons highlights the importance of the axis of achievement in legitimating the kinds of differentiation that schools enable and enact. Through national standards-based testing and international comparative testing, rankings, and league tables between schools, regions, and nations are produced and used as reasons for reforming education policy and practice at macro (international and national), meso (regional and district), and micro (school and classroom) levels. Because different levels of achievement manifest a range of consequences specifically in terms of failure and success, the formation of the axis of achievement must be seen as fair in its processes and outcomes. The differentiation between student performance along the axis of achievement requires the

assurances of objective measurement as well as equality of opportunity. The measures must differentiate based on work and ability and not on factors beyond a student's control. Moreover, evaluation must be controlled so students who are being tested in common have been taught in a common curriculum. These two features of the axis of achievement mirror Taylor's notions of secular time and bifocal consciousness.

Parsons' single axis of achievement is a notional construct located in secular time as it is shared among the various publics and stakeholders involved in schooling. It offers a systematic way to evaluate student performance and differentiate between student ability in an agreed upon manner. Yet, this agreement does not look beyond society for its reasoning. With contemporary Western schooling in view, the single axis of achievement is entirely immanent to society, i.e., within secular time, whereby schooling is a social institution orientated toward developing students' abilities in literacy and numeracy. Rather than appealing to a transcendent notion of salvation, for example, the rationality of the subject matter, e.g., the logics of literacy and numeracy, provides the legitimating authority for achievement. An answer is correct or incorrect based on reasons immanent to the subject matter, and achievement differentiates students based on reasoning they are generally capable of performing. While exceptions can be identified to rational authority whenever a student is told they need to learn a subject because it will be on the test or because the teacher or State said so, at a general level schooling establishes the axis of achievement within secular time and in this aspect represents an institution within the modern social imaginary as Taylor defines it. What remains is a consideration of whether and how schooling in the modern social imaginary operates according to a bifocal consciousness of objectification and agency.

Accepting achievement as a common feature of Western schooling in general and an important process for schooling as part of the modern social imaginary requires, in addition to secular time, that one locates the features of bifocal consciousness, namely, the mutual relation of objectification

and agency, as a precondition of action that operates independently of agents while also maintaining the freedom for agents to act. The axis of achievement identified by Taylor relies upon the families and staffs of schools sharing the value of achievement as an objective means of differentiation. This shared value entails objectifying assumptions about teaching, learning, knowledge, and ignorance, in the sense that achievement is able to point to these dimensions of schooling as existing independently of individuals. The independent existence of achievement is especially acute in its ability to be quantified in ways that indicate whether a learner is performing their role successfully. Receiving a low score on an achievement test shows that a student did not learn something, did not pass from ignorance to knowledge in an acceptable way. While any number of mitigating factors can be used to direct and redirect arguments of why a learner did not achieve an appropriate score, the objectification of achievement stands as the ground from which such arguments issue. Yet, achievement also guarantees the freedom of agents in schooling due to the agents' ability to improve their scores over time through learning and gaining knowledge. As such, achievement is a form of objectification embodied by schooling that provides an environment in which agents of schooling (teachers, students, policy makers, parents, etc.) can act to change achievement. This achievement objectification mirrors Taylor's consideration of the economy as a field that must be objectified in order for one to act within it: in fact, agents have no environment in which they can act without such objectification. Western schooling based on achievement is a paragon of the modern social imaginary to the extent that it is located within secular time and premised upon the ability of its agents to improve not only the achievement of individuals but also achievement itself.

Understanding schooling as emblematic of Taylor's modern social imaginary offers a set of regulatory criteria. For instance, a proponent of schooling in this model may approach school reform based on the support of programs and practices that reinforce achievement understood

through secular time and bifocal consciousness. However, there are also limitations to this way of conceiving schooling, one of which Taylor acknowledges. Given his reliance on the historical events of the French and American revolutions as definitively breaking from previous social imaginaries, his concept of the modern social imaginary is exclusively Western in its development and focus. This commits the modern social imaginary to a narrow geography and history that schooling as a social institution far exceeds. While elements of the modern social imaginary may be located in non-Western paradigms of schooling, the geographical and historical development of schooling in non-Western areas do not have constitutive ties to the French and American revolutions and Enlightenment thinking that are fundamental to Taylor's notion of modernity. As such, the status of schooling as a part of the modern social imaginary excludes a significant portion of the world from what Taylor defines as modern.

Taylor points out that the modern marks a new normative order, but the normative status of modernity does not make up part of his consideration on modern social imaginaries. That is to say, modernity as Taylor uses the term comprises historically situated forms of reasoning, secularity, objectification, and activity to the exclusion of non-Western contexts. Taylor acknowledges that his work does not extricate modernity from Western history and philosophy and suggests widening the notion of modernity to include non-Western contexts. This approach views modernity as capable of being disentangled from Western philosophy and history and generalized to non-Western contexts while maintaining modernity's defining features of secular time and bifocal consciousness. Modernity acts as a normative category into which Western and non-Western alike can fit.

Conclusion

Critiques of modernity as a normative category have focused on the problems of assuming continuity within what is labeled as modern (Foucault 1984), as well as problems with the denigration of what (and who) falls outside of modernity

(Bhabha 1994) and the processes by which the non-modern are made to be modern (Said 1994). Tellingly, these critiques issue from what can be called a postmodern concern with grand narratives (Lyotard 1984), and they offer an important set of questions when considering schooling as a part of the modern social imaginary. When focusing on modernity as a normative category rather than as a concept that nonnormatively marks the arrival of a new normative order as Taylor does, the criticisms of the normative status of modernity can be addressed to schooling and achievement. For instance, when achievement is used as a device to identify students as at risk, priority learners, failing, exceptional, below standard, etc. and those students who are disproportionately identified as minority and non-White, questions arise concerning what is being valued as achievement and how normative assumptions of identity underpin otherwise objectified and agentic achievement in the secular time of schooling. Schooling may provide a powerful example of the modern social imaginary at work; however, questions remain around the normative status of modernity and its implications for schooling.

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Social Imaginaries and the New Education Fellowship

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Synonyms

New Education Fellowship (NEF); Progressive Education Association (PEA)

Introduction

The New Education Fellowship (NEF, the “Fellowship”) was the largest, most influential, and enduring of the organizations that emerged from the new education movement. The NEF was established in Europe in 1921 primarily to promote new education ideals following the founding of the Progressive Education Association (PEA) in the USA in 1919. These two progressive organizations were part of a broader wave of “crusades” that comprised the initial global development of “the new education” in the late nineteenth century and early decades of the twentieth century. Both the NEF and the PEA built on the efforts of the new or pioneering schools, the progressive ideas of eminent educational thinkers, and the development of a range of new education teaching methods that enabled pioneering teachers to put new education ideals into practice.

The NEF had a broad agenda that not only included the promotion of new education but also emphasized international tolerance and citizenship, the spiritual development of mankind, and the creation of a global democratic fellowship of educators and affiliated organizations. The organization’s roots were not just strictly in the new education but also drew upon theosophical thought and the Theosophical Society, the conferences and followers of Maria Montessori and the Montessori Method, the so-called first wave of the feminist movement, and the enormous influence

of a small group of progressive educators, in particular, Beatrice Ensor.

This entry presents an outline of the origins, founding, organizational structure, and underlying principles of the NEF. The last section considers the central role of the NEF in the international promotion of the new education and how aspects of progressivism came to maintain an enduring place in the educational landscape.

The Origins of the New Education Fellowship (1915–1920)

The immediate antecedents of the NEF organization were forged in the historical, political, spiritual, and educational milieu encompassing the First World War. As the NEF stalwarts, Boyd and Rawson (1965) explained, this conflict forced people around the world to scrutinize every aspect of their way of life leading to greater solidarity and the formation of a range of global organizations. However, while social and economic restoration was a high priority in international politics, *educational* reformation was not. This role was assigned to voluntary international educational bodies, such as the NEF.

There were significant issues to leaving this task to voluntary organizations. On the one hand, new organizations could be formed relatively quickly to respond to changing needs (as the NEF was), and educators with vision, spirit, and commitment could achieve significant gains where perhaps a larger officially sanctioned international organization might not. On the other hand, such voluntary groups frequently struggled with a lack of ongoing financial security and changing personnel, as well as often debilitating debates around philosophy and strategic approaches. Both the NEF and the PEA as voluntary organizations were to struggle with these issues throughout their existence.

Despite this, the NEF managed to flourish and succeed in its early years by harnessing the passion (and personal finances) of progressive and theosophical educators. The NEF was fortunate to gain high-level national and international political

support derived from its inclusive and diverse membership policies, its democratically based, semiautonomous organizational structures, and the broad international appeal of its principles. The NEF was also extremely adept at spreading its philosophy through its international journals, conferences, and networks.

Founding of the New Education Fellowship (1921)

By the early 1920s, the international education community had begun to focus on reconstruction, and unsurprisingly progressive educators worldwide were discussing and writing about the need for educational reconstruction after the war. The theosophical community endorsed this desire for postwar reconstruction. Theosophists had become increasingly disillusioned with Western materialism and modernism. The utilization of modern science and technology to maximize carnage in the war effort had pushed them to critique materialism and look for spiritual solutions to mankind's problems. The theosophists were not just focusing on educational reconstruction after the war but on a much grander spiritual ideal – the creation of a New Era and the coming of a New Age.

It was amidst this general mood for reconstruction that Beatrice Ensor's Theosophical Fraternity in Education group held their conference in Letchworth in August 1920. The Fraternity by then had over 500 members in England and sections around the world. This conference had two aims: fostering a global network of educational innovators and education for peace. Resonating with theosophists' earlier views on educational reconstruction, the Fraternity argued for a major reconstruction of both educational and spiritual provision. This could only be achieved by replacing competition with cooperation, external discipline with self-discipline, indoctrination with critical thinking, and materialism with spiritual growth. During the Fraternity's 1920 conference, it was agreed to convene a larger conference of new educators in France to be held in the summer of 1921, and it was here that the NEF was to be formally constituted.

What became known as the first world NEF Conference was held in Calais in August 1921 and was deemed to be a great success. There were over one hundred delegates from at least fifteen countries, including Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, England, France, Holland, Ireland, India, Italy, Russia, Scotland, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and Yugoslavia. This Conference thus represented the first major opportunity, postwar for educators to meet.

In what was to be the case in successive NEF conferences, there was a considerable variety in the program of lectures. The sessions were broadly based around the theme of *The Creative Self-Expression of the Child*, and presenters considered core aspects of the new education from a multidisciplinary perspective, including the nature of the child, self-government, creative education, analytical psychology, and the schools of tomorrow. There was also an exhibition of children's art and craft work including paintings, jewelry, lacework, bookbinding, and needlework from English and Scottish theosophical and progressive schools. This mix of varied presentations and exhibitions of children's work was to become the model for future regional and international conferences of the NEF.

The Calais Conference was international in nature and intent, bringing together a diverse group of people with varying (and contradictory) views on the nature of education and educational reconstruction. Distinguished international guests included Dr Decroly (founder of a new education movement in Belgium), Dr Ferrière (director of the Bureau International des Ecoles Nouvelles in Switzerland), MR Nussbaum (director of the first Ecole-Foyer), Professor A Beltette (secretary of the International Federation of Secondary Schools), MJ Loiseau (leader of the new Scout movement in France), and James Young (a pupil of Dr Jung).

A major concern expressed, however, was whether there would be enough "community of spirit and purpose" to enable the creation of a workable world organization. The formation of such an organization fell to a small committee (the Committee of Five) that met during the Conference. The Committee argued that the time had

come for a union of new educators who could see the signs of the emergence of a New Era and that such a Fellowship should be flexible, non-bureaucratic, and truly democratic. The following scheme was proposed and accepted: (a) there should be three journals (English, French, and German); (b) journal subscriptions included membership of the NEF; (c) there should be no rules or constitution; and (d) member countries would be independent. The NEF as an organization was thus formally constituted in 1921.

Without doubt, Beatrice Ensor was the main force behind the founding of the NEF and she had a multilingual background, a powerful personality, strong theosophical and progressive beliefs, and a persuasive ability. Ensor had been a progressive schoolteacher, inspector of schools (HMI) for the Board of Education, and from 1915 the organizing secretary of the Theosophical Educational Trust, and in 1920, she established the *New Era* journal.

Organizational Structure and Principles of the New Education Fellowship

The NEF from its beginnings was intended to be an international movement that sought to bring together those who believed that the problems confronting society were fundamentally issues of human relationships that necessitated a new approach to education. The structure developed for the organization was designed to carry out three functions:

1. *The promotion of new education ideals.* The NEF became a “permanent working laboratory” where new developments in educational theory and practice could be shared. Notably the Fellowship’s network of conferences, national sections and groups, and journals in a number of languages provided a global vehicle for this role.
2. *The development of human solidarity.* This spirit of human solidarity was facilitated by the Fellowship and manifested through close personal networks between educators nationally and internationally and underpinned the Fellowship’s aims for collective action.

3. *The facilitation of internationalization.* Members of the Fellowship came to learn about, understand, and respect the social and cultural differences between the regions and nations of the world where previously misunderstandings could lead to division and conflict in human relationships.

There was a small central body organized by a committee structure that comprised an international body of elected representatives and an executive body for more day-to-day affairs. An inclusive “sections and groups” structure allowed countries to join the NEF as a national umbrella “section” under which any number of more local “groups” could be formed. The three initial journals that were the official organs of the organization later expanded to over twenty Fellowship journals in fifteen languages. The NEF also facilitated the organization of official congresses, both regional and world conferences, and was involved in other activities such as acting as a clearing-house for progressive material, publishing conference proceedings and progressive material, and establishing research commissions. As such, the Fellowship’s organizational structure was a simple, parsimonious one suited to the needs of a voluntary organization that was, in essence, a global network of new educators.

In addition, Ensor argued that the NEF should be nonsectarian, nonpolitical, not committed to any specific educational approaches or methods, and sufficiently flexible for every institution and country to develop independently in order to fully meet their own local needs, while still being true to a broad set of shared principles. The set of common principles developed by the Committee of Five was very broad and reflected the core tenets of the new education. They also closely resonated with theosophical thought, particularly the spiritual references and the placing of “the supremacy of the spirit” as the first principle. The seven principles focused on children’s spiritual development, the development of individuality and innate interests, developmental appropriateness, cooperation, coeducation, and citizenship. This first set of principles was distributed widely and published in each version of the

organization's journals up until their revision at the Nice Conference in 1932.

The 1932 revision of the principles reflected a general trend in the new education literature from fostering complete individual freedom to the inclusion of more social responsibility. In addition, the emphasis on international fellowship was heightened, while the spiritual references were toned down considerably. Again, this new set of nine principles was widely distributed.

The New Education Fellowship and the Crusades of "The New Education"

The rise of "the new education" in the late nineteenth and first decades of the twentieth century was part of a broader movement of social, political, economic, and industrial reforms. Political and social theorists and others were challenging the existing conditions and traditions of the time, and progressive educators were an important part of this movement. "The New Education," as it was termed at the time, was a reaction against traditional or "old" educational thinking, approaches, and practices, and at the forefront of this movement were many of the leading educational thinkers of the age.

In particular, the NEF increasingly saw itself as the organization that lay at the center of this movement and that could play a leading role in facilitating the development and consolidation of the new education globally. Beatrice Ensor conceptualized the growth of new education as a series of "crusades." The first crusade was the establishment of new or pioneer schools globally, beginning around the turn of the twentieth century. The most significant of these schools (and their founding date) were: *England* – Abbotsholme (1889); Bedales (1893); West Down (1897); Little Commonwealth (1913); *Germany* – the Leitz Schools (1898); Free School Community (1906); Odenwald (1910); *France* – L'École des Roches (1898); *Belgium* – the Hermitage (1907); *Italy* – Montessori's Orthophrenic School (1900) and Casa dei Bambini (Children's House School

(1907); *Switzerland* – Glarisegg (1902); Hof Oberkirch (1906/7); *America* – Cook County Normal School (1883); George Junior Republic (1895); the Deweys' Laboratory School (1896); Meriam's Laboratory School (1904); *India* – Sanctuary School, Santiniketan (1901); Christian Boys' School, Kharar (1923); and, *New Zealand* – the Vasanta Garden School (1919). Each country developed particular pioneering schools and progressive approaches that reflected its own social and educational contexts. Later, the schools were promoted by the NEF and their staff became members of the Fellowship.

The second crusade revolved around the ideas of a group of pioneering educational thinkers who inspired the new educators and which became, as Ensor put it in 1930, "a mighty current changing the whole trend of education." These thinkers included CH Becker, Boyd Bode, Pierre Bovet, William Boyd, Martin Buber, PC Chang, Fred Clarke, George Counts, Ovide Decroly, John Dewey, Sigmund Freud, Edmond Holmes, Julian Huxley, Susan Isaacs, Carl Jung, IL Kandel, WH Kilpatrick, Homer Lane, Paul Langevin, Arthur Lismer, Norman MacMunn, Karl Mannheim, Maria Montessori, Cyril Norwood, AS Neill, Percy Nunn, JA Lauwerys, Helen Parkhurst, Jean Piaget, Wyatt Rawson, Harold Rugg, Michael Sadler, E Salter Davies, Hu Shih, Rabindranath Tagore, RH Tawney, and Laurin Zilliacus. They wrote articles for the NEF journals and were speakers at NEF regional and world conferences and articulated in their writing and actions a body of progressive educational ideas that quickly spread around the globe in the first decades of the twentieth century. Of note, the majority of these ideas were heavily based on the writing, methods, and educational practices of a number of earlier social, political, and educational reformists such as, Rousseau, Pestalozzi, and Froebel.

The third crusade involved the adoption of new education methods and approaches by pioneering teachers in State schools around the world. These teachers followed the experiments being undertaken in the new experimental schools and were inspired by the new educational thinkers. They

were able to draw upon a burgeoning literature on new school practices and the large body of new education ideas being expounded by progressive educators in the early decades of the twentieth century. In the United States, there was the Dalton Laboratory Plan (Helen Parkhurst), the Project Method (inspired by Dewey and formalized by William Kilpatrick), and the Winnetka Technique (developed by Carleton Washburne for the Winnetka schools in Chicago). In France, there was the School Co-operative (B Profit), the Free Group or Cousinet Method (Roger Cousinet), and the Printing Press in the School Method (Celestin Freinet). Those working with children with physical and mental disabilities included the Montessori Method (Maria Montessori) and the Decroly Method (Ovide Decroly). The “artist-educators” included Franz Cizek’s Viennese studio where children were given free rein to their artistic expression, Émile Jaques-Dalcroze who developed the Eurythmics Method of music education, and Caldwell Cook who developed the Play Way Method. These methods and approaches were frequently discussed in NEF journals and newsletters and at their conferences.

The fourth crusade related to organizations that supported and facilitated the spread of new education globally, particularly from the end of the nineteenth century and into the first half of the twentieth century. The most relevant philanthropic organizations were the various trusts set up by Andrew Carnegie. Many universities made a significant contribution to the new education, including the School of Education at the University of Chicago and Teachers College, Columbia University, the University of Manchester, and the Institute of Education, London University. Progressive educational research institutes also promoted new education ideas, including the Scottish Council for Research in Education, the South African National Bureau for Educational and Social Research, the Australian Council for Educational Research, and the New Zealand Council for Educational Research. Professional organizations that supported the new education aims and the NEF included the Theosophical Society, the Quaker movement, the Institute of Pacific Relations, the Austro-American Institute of Education,

the League of Nation’s International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation, the Geneva-based JJ Rousseau Institute’s International Bureau of Education, and the short-lived Bureau International des Ecoles Nouvelles. Organizations established solely to meet the needs of the new education movement were the New Education Fellowship (NEF) and the Progressive Education Association (PEA). The PEA and NEF developed closer ties in the late 1920s, and the PEA later became an official section of the NEF, changing its name in 1944 to the American Education Fellowship. The PEA was disbanded in 1955 (Graham, 1967).

All of these organizations became magnets for new educators and progressive education approaches. The NEF played an important role in promoting their progressive activities while helping to breaking down their geographical isolation, from newspaper and journal articles to overseas visitors and travel grants. Educators globally in the early decades of the twentieth century were very much in touch with the key new education developments that were occurring elsewhere, and much credit must go to the NEF for this.

Conclusion

The New Education Fellowship was a remarkable new education initiative that started from small beginnings and grew to become the largest progressive education organization in the world. From its early origins in the Theosophical Fraternity in Education, the NEF quickly attracted a membership of many of the most eminent educators in the world. While it was formed decades after the first “crusades” of the new education, it filled a global educational vacuum in international efforts for social, political, and economic reconstruction after First World War. The Fellowship’s rapid expansion seemingly occurred without much overt planning, and its spirited ideals and principles for creating better people for a better world struck a chord with educators, policymakers, administrators, official international bodies (such as UNESCO), and others interested in education around the world.

The Fellowship's democratic grassroots organizational structure also contributed to its popularity and growth, but conversely was to be a source of its inherent weakness. The fundamental issues for the NEF were its financial foundations (that were primarily based on membership numbers alone) and its voluntary status. Despite a rapid growth in membership, and much enthusiasm from its adherents, the NEF was not able to undertake many of the projects that it wished to, and this limited its potential growth. When external funding was available, the organization prospered; when it was not, the organization fell into decline, particularly in the 1940s. The Second World War also disrupted the NEF's activities globally, and, it could be argued, the conflict broke the "spirit" of the organization, founded as it was to stop such a cataclysm from recurring. Also, the NEF suffered a drop in membership as progressive ideas and methods became more accepted in public schools worldwide.

Into the 1950s and beyond, progressive ideas and methods were being increasingly challenged by other pedagogical approaches and philosophical ideas and its popularity waned. At the same time, fundamental aspects of child-centered education were being seen as much less radical and were being appropriated into the language of policymakers and adapted into the normal practices of educators globally. As a result, the zeal for progressive crusading had passed. The PEA disbanded in 1955 and in 1966, and the NEF changed its name to the World Education Fellowship (WEF) and still exists as a global organization with relatively similar goals, albeit with a considerably reduced funding base and membership.

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Further Reading

The various journals of the NEF/WEF - e.g., *The New Era*.

Social Imaginaries: An Overview

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Synonyms

[Educational history](#); [Educational myths](#); [Hermeneutic philosophy](#); [Policy scholarship](#)

Introduction

Historical analysis of the life cycle of educational ideas and ideals is integral to an understanding of educational policy and practice in a particular society at any given time. How do ideas and ideals about the nature, aims, and effective organization of formal educational activities come into being, flourish, and wither? To what extent do they become embodied in the everyday language, practices, and relations of education policy discourse in various parts of an "education system"? Why do some appear to gain widespread popular support and acceptance within a society and others do not?

The term "modern social imaginary" was coined by the Canadian hermeneutic philosopher Charles Taylor (2004). Taylor analyzes the way in which western societies have both imagined and attempted to realize themselves according to popular conceptions of their moral purpose and moral order. He does this according to three modes of imagination and realization: the economy, the public sphere, and self-governance. His philosophical interest concerns the continuities and discontinuities in the ordinary social processes through which ideas and ideals transform and renormalize the everyday practices of societies over centuries. In this respect, his analysis has far more in common with, say, Foucault's (2002) archeology of discursive knowledge-power formations and their embodiment in disciplinary practices and individual subjectivities than it does with, say, Lacan's psychoanalytic study of

the imaginary self. The social imaginary serves as a heuristic to examine the material relationships between educational ideas or ideals and educational policies and practices as they operate within an educational system and its host culture. Using this heuristic, we may also raise useful questions about the reasons why public education is so contested, why some educational ideas appear to enjoy universal appeal and similar effects irrespective of local context, while others are seemingly realized in quite different and even contradictory ways across diverse cultural settings.

This entry begins by briefly elaborating Taylor's philosophical concept of the modern social imaginary. It then presents a selection of analyses of the ascendancy of major educational ideas and ideals in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. It concludes with an assessment of the insights on educational ideas, policy, and practice that are afforded by adopting a philosophical orientation of education as social imaginary.

Modern Social Imaginaries

Taylor uses the term "modern social imaginary" (Taylor 2004) to describe the way in which people imagine and work to maintain the society in which they live. The imaginary is essentially a commonly shared moral conception of the ideal society. Taylor's social imaginary has elements of both moral structure (what is right) and moral agency (what is worth striving for). A social imaginary, for Taylor, is about how people "imagine their social existence, how they fit together with others, how things go on between them and their fellows, the expectations that are normally met, and the deeper normative notions and images that underlie all these expectations" (p. 23). Taylor uses the term imaginary in preference to theory because he is concerned with how "ordinary people" imagine the social "and this is often not expressed in theoretical terms, but is carried in images, stories and legends" (p. 23). Imaginaries are shared by large fractions of society, whereas theory may remain the preserve of minorities or elites. Additionally, "the social imaginary is that

common understanding that makes possible common practices and a widely shared sense of legitimacy" (p. 23). Public education, particularly schooling, is not based on a single canonical body of objective knowledge. Instead it is a culturally based selection of ideas and ideals that have to become accepted as meaningful and right for families, communities, and a society as a whole. These features of social imaginaries are highly relevant to an appreciation of how common understandings of education shape the genesis, enactment, and continual contestation of specific educational policies and practices within a system.

For Taylor, modern social imaginaries manifest three distinct forms of "social self-understanding" (p. 69). These are the economy, the public sphere, and democratic self-governance. In the transition from classical to modern social imaginaries, Taylor identifies a shift in conception of the moral order from one in which society was divinely prescribed and hierarchically organized, and where one's duty was to one's designated place in that moral order, to one in which humans exchange goods and services within what we conceive of as an economy. Consequently, what is right and what is worth striving for is increasingly an economic order, with all that entails about normative valuing of behavior, relations, and achievements in social institutions such as education. Within an economically framed moral order, the ability of individuals to engage in productive work and to create and maintain a private space for their family unit, together with the personal autonomy these require, is of primary importance. Taylor's notion of the primacy of economic self-understanding helps to explain how education policies that are premised on personal responsibility, family advancement, and freedom of choice and association may acquire significant appeal within contemporary society because they are essentially seen as morally good and worth striving for.

For Taylor, the public sphere is a fluid and mobile social commons where people meet (physical and virtually) "to discuss matters of common interest; and thus to be able to form a common mind about these" (p. 83). The public

sphere is part of and essential to an appreciation of the importance of civil society. In the public sphere, individuals choose to associate in order to pursue their mutual interests. The public sphere is “extrapolitical” and “metatopical” (pp. 92–93). The public sphere actively mediates the political and polity spheres. Accordingly, in terms of public education, it may be seen to be vital for education ideals, ideas, and the resultant policies to speak to and be responsive to concerns articulated through the public sphere if they are to gain enduring popular consent and support.

Taylor’s third form of self-understanding concerns the transition from the undivided monarchical rule of the classical age to the constitutional political State of the modern age. The transition has been characterized by struggles, often revolutionary, as peoples become dissatisfied with what they perceive as the unjust exercise of power over their lives and seek to have this replaced by a more acceptable balance between executive power, collective obligations, and individual freedoms. A simple summary of the process during such periods would be that elite theoretical attempts to identify moral and practical problems grow to become a mass popular resentment at the perceived injustice of the current settlement. This precipitates attempts to initiate practical governance change. At first, such attempts may continue to draw on social imaginaries that successfully made sense of the past. That they cannot explain new and changed practices leads eventually to the emergence of new theories and conceptions of the ideal moral order. These permit a more radical departure from old assumptions and a move towards new governance settlements.

Public education represents a microcosm of these societal transitions in the form of efforts to achieve lasting education settlements that meet the needs and aspirations of greater and greater fractions of a society. However, the ideologies and ideas that underpin these have carried quite diverse understandings of the economy and the public sphere and how these should inform system level education funding and provision. Thus, at the time of writing, education policies in many Western and non-Western societies still exhibit ongoing unresolved struggles for ascendancy

between, for example, neoliberal, social-democratic, and authoritarian conceptions of the purposes and necessary forms of organization and administration of education (early childhood, school, tertiary, and community).

Overall then, the social imaginary is focused on common or popular understandings of what is right and worth striving for in society rather than on the abstract theories of academic, political, or bureaucratic elites. Taylor’s three forms of self-understanding enable us to examine the complex and contested ways in which educational ideas and ideals are positioned with regard to: (i) both the macroeconomic (re)distribution of public educational resources at national level and the micro-economic strategies families follow to improve their personal circumstances, (ii) the positioning and choices of groups within society to associate and communicate around particular educational policies in the public sphere (physical and virtual), and (iii) the extent to which educational policies and practices are perceived to advance a society’s moral ideals and norms in respect of acceptable social and economic settlements.

Educational Imaginaries

Until the second half of the eighteenth century, education in England was largely the church’s educational enterprise based on “the idea that education is a unity, the key to which lies in religion” (Burgess 1958, p. 4). Universities and grammar schools were the preserve of social elites, while basic charity schools were established for the deserving poor. During the eighteenth century, the church’s corporate monopoly on schooling and a classical curriculum was gradually fragmented by the emergence of what Burgess calls the private classical school, established by individuals to provide a liberal education (p. 7). As grammar schools became more exclusive, charitable founders and private benefactors greatly increased the number of “non-classical charity schools” (p. 8) to provide moral education though religious instruction and the teaching of literacy and numeracy: “these were to be the answer to both pauperism and irreligion”

(p. 9). The number of day charity schools grew, through donations and subscriptions, and their administration became incorporated in the form of local and, later, national societies, many of which exhibited active cooperation between church, dissenters, and secular groups. The second half of the eighteenth century saw the introduction of State maintenance grants and a short-lived system of payment by results. The 1870 Education Act created school boards to advance the ideal of universal entitlement to elementary education and, subsequently, the establishment of a unified national system of local education authorities to provide greater assurance to central government that this was actually occurring. While this example is peculiar to England and Wales, it has broad historic parallels with education systems elsewhere. Together they illustrate the emergence over several hundred years of what is arguably the first systemic educational imaginary, mass compulsory schooling.

Similar discursive trajectories may be seen in the emergence, proliferation, and decline of educational ideas and their contiguous policies and practices in all western countries, together with many examples of contestation or rejection of dominant schooling forms through “alternative” education. Cremin’s (1961) classic study of the ordinary school, for example, shows how the American progressive education movement emerged after the Civil War and was “part of a vast humanitarian effort to apply the promise of American life—the ideal of government by, of, and for the people—to the puzzling new urban-industrial civilization” (p. viii). While it declined and disappeared in the decades after the Second World War, Cremin argues that its success as an idea lay in broadening the scope of schooling beyond basic skills to include issues of health, work, and the quality of life; introducing pedagogies that were based on the new psychological and social science research; a recognition that the education offered must meet the needs of a diverse child population; and the democratization of cultural values (pp. viii–ix). While progressive education attracted a significant following across political, polity, and civil society groups, including teachers, its dominance was by no means

uncontested. Kliebard (2004) thus documents, across much the same historical period as Cremin, the constant struggle for ascendancy and popular support among four curriculum ideologies, each of which held relatively greater sway at particular times across the different interest groups that make up the schooling discourse community. Herbert’s four ideologies were: humanist, progressive, traditionalist, and social reconstructionist. Each may be said to reflect diverse understandings of how society and the economy interact and, consequently, therefore, what the school curriculum should comprise in order to best prepare young people for meaningful social and economic participation.

That curricula and attendant schooling forms in a given period reflect the ideas and ideals of dominant groups in society aptly demonstrates that “how one conceives of education . . . is a function of how one conceives of the culture and its aims, professed or otherwise” (Bruner 1996, p. x). Moreover, notes Bruner, “learning and thinking are always *situated* in a cultural setting and always dependent on the utilization of cultural resources” (p. 4). In this sense, the educational imaginary materially shapes and is shaped by topical economic, social, and cultural discourses. Thus Callahan (1962), for example, is able to show how at the beginning of the twentieth century in America, the administration of public schools came to be dominated by what he called the “cult of efficiency” expressed in the form of business ideas, assumptions, processes, and practices applied to educational activities. In seeking to explain the dominance of industrial or commercial over educational ideas, he observed that educators enjoyed relatively low status in American society at the time, compared with business which was regarded as a defining cultural, social, and economic ideal. Furthermore, “what was unexpected was the extent, not only of the power of the business-industrial groups, but of the strength of the business ideology in the American culture . . . I had expected more professional autonomy and I was completely unprepared for the extent and degree of capitulation by administrators to whatever demands were made upon them” (pp. vii–viii).

Formal education may therefore be seen in some ways as an idiosyncratic modern social imaginary in terms of how Taylor's three forms of self-awareness play out. While mass compulsory schooling has consistently lain at the heart of system level official education policy because of its facility to sort entire student cohorts for diverse employment and higher education outcomes, discourses around the value of adult and community education (and, for that matter, early childhood education) have proven more ephemeral. This is so despite periodic recognition that adult and community education (e.g., Blyth 1983) has an important role to play in enabling those who may not have succeeded in formal education to acquire the knowledge, skills, and dispositions to engage more confidently and autonomously in the economy and the public sphere.

For many students, there may also be a significant difference between the official curriculum and how it is experienced. In this regard, for example, Branson (1991) analyzes the relationships between gender, education, and work and argues that "we are all born into an economically and culturally biased environment, biased in class, gender and ethnic terms" (p. 95). Education both produces and reproduces existing power structures within a society and therefore needs to be seen as potentially regressive, not progressive. According to Taylor's conception of the imaginary, gradual realization of the regressive elements of an education system will create the conditions in which elites, alliances of interest groups, and then society as a whole seek to change what becomes perceived as an unjust educational settlement.

Relatedly, Ball (2012) uses the term "neoliberal imaginary" to describe how, today, influential individuals, non-governmental organizations, venture philanthropists, and business interests develop largely private, virtual networks of interest outside the public sphere to promote the adoption of privatization and commercialization ideologies in the policies and practices of public education provision. Finally, returning to Taylor's notion of the imaginary as "images, stories and legends" (2004, p. 23), an iconic former Director

of Education in New Zealand, C E Beeby (1986) articulated the notion of an "educational myth" which is required to sustain any successful educational settlement. In Beeby's case, the defining myth of the decades following the Great Depression in 1930s New Zealand was the State's commitment to provide free, universal access to education according to need and merit and thereby to create equality of opportunity. Looking back a quarter of a century after his retirement, Beeby argued that a successful myth needs to be in accord with a strong public aspiration, expressed in language flexible enough to accommodate different interpretations of it, and unattainable for at least a generation. In time, as the weaknesses of the old myth become clear, the old myth is absorbed into a new educational myth of the next generation (pp. xv–xvi). This description is consistent with Taylor's account of how accepted norms of self-governance change through growing public awareness of the injustices of the current social and economic settlements.

Conclusion

The conception of the social imaginary enables analysis of the dominant moral purpose and moral order of a society in terms of private (or familial) and public (or systemic) economic agency. It also encourages a focus on the strategies of association and communication that are employed by interest groups within the public sphere and between the public, political, and polity spheres. Finally, it requires an analysis of the ways in which societies over time change their shared understandings of socially just economic and social settlements and the events through which old settlements are abandoned in favor of others that appear to have greater moral purpose and utility.

The introduction of modern mass compulsory education has typically been advocated on the basis that it provides significant economic, social, and community benefits, both public and private. The concept of the social imaginary permits contiguous analysis of each of these, and of their complex interactions in the context of general

and particular educational ideas and ideas, in and between societies, at particular historical junctures and over much longer periods of time. In this sense, it makes sense to talk of modern educational imaginaries. A hermeneutic philosophical orientation such as Taylor's encourages a focus on the meanings, values, and moral worth that ordinary people in society attach to educational ideals and ideals, how political and polity groups both shape and are shaped by these, how lasting educational settlements are achieved, and why they fail.

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Sociological Approaches to Educational Administration

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Introduction

The generation and classification of data about society and social groups was pivotal in the establishment of public administration. Analysis of such data predates the establishment of any academic departments and was arguably central to early Western philosophy. It is the analysis of the social world that is the focus of sociology. As a branch of social thought and analysis, sociology at its broadest is concerned with the study of human behavior and its origins, development, organization, and institutions. Significantly, sociology is not confined to any one particular set of theoretical resources or approach to data generation (e.g., qualitative or quantitative). It is a broad multi-paradigmatic discipline concerned with social behavior.

While it is difficult to pinpoint the moment of origin for sociology as an academic discipline, three scholars considered to be the founding

architects of contemporary sociology are Émile Durkheim, Karl Marx, and Max Weber. Durkheim held a strong belief in a *science* of the social world – comparable to the natural sciences – and it is this stream of sociology that was influential during the early phases of the North American-driven *Theory Movement* in educational administration in the mid-twentieth century. Marxist analysis of the social world, and the centrality of power, remains prominent – even if not always identified – in the critical stream of scholarship. Weber, who incidentally was writing at around the same time as Frederick Winslow Taylor – arguably the father of contemporary management sciences – wrote a highly influential, but significantly misunderstood, account of the role of the economy, administration, and society and included a discussion of charismatic leadership.

Sociology however is not a homogenous discipline. There are many differing orientations, or traditions, including, but not exclusively, structural-functionalist, political-conflict, constructivist, and critical humanist perspectives. Slater (1995) provides an overview of the ways in which these differing perspectives manifest in the educational administration literatures. The structural-functionalist perspective conceives of administration as a set of measurable behaviors or skills. With links to trait theory, this mode of inquiry frequently leads to lists of desirable actions or attributes. There is an underlying rational logic and research findings are designed to improve the efficiency and/or effectiveness of organizations. With the contemporary policy agenda of professional standards or licensing requirements, this perspective is a major contributor to the literatures of the field. Political-conflict approaches are concerned with power relations (similar to Marxism) and in particular dominance-subordination. Bureaucratic approaches are linked to this perspective and researchers frequently argue that educational administration is a technology of control. Feminist accounts of educational administration seek to trouble, or problematize, the forms of domination and legitimation of power structures in existing education systems. The constructivists

are less focused on the actual behaviors and more with the meaning ascribed to action. This shifts the attention from universal measurable behaviors to the particular meaning and intent of behaviors in context. Unlike other approaches (e.g., structural-functionalist), from a constructivist perspective, it is impossible to distinguish between cause and effect and nothing is value-free. The critical humanist is concerned with an explicit moral point of view and giving meaning to collective effort. With the expanding critique of neoliberalism and managerialism in educational administration, the critical humanist is focused less on getting people to do something and instead about getting them to do what is right. The distinctions between these perspectives are not always clear as such partitioning serves the classifiers' purposes more so than scholars. In addition, it is symbolical of the way in which sociology is focused on an always in motion social activity.

Apart from having many different traditions, sociology also operates at two – although deeply connected – levels. The most commonly recognized is sociology of a field of practice, for example, sociology of education or educational administration. In this case, sociology provides a set of theoretical resources for thinking through and describing events in the social world. The “education” or “educational administration” is used to demarcate the object of analysis. It is often possible to recognize this form of scholarship through the appropriation of great thinkers (e.g., Bourdieu, Weber) to theorize educational administration. The difficulty here is that the received terms remain intact and the two domains of inquiry “sociology” and “educational administration” remain separate. A second approach is a sociology of knowledge production. In this sense, much like the sociology of science, focus is on the epistemological and ontological preliminaries of research. The leading proponent of this approach in educational administration (although frequently using the more contemporary title of educational leadership) is Gunter. For example, her latest book, *An Intellectual History of School Leadership Practice and Research* Gunter (2016), classifies research around traditions, purposes, domains, contexts, and networks to provide

those working in educational administration and leadership with an analytical framework for understanding knowledge production.

Sociology and Educational Administration

The importance, or significance, of sociological approaches for educational administration is a well-rehearsed argument. As Bates (1980) argued, “the processes through which learning is organized in society are of central importance in both the production of knowledge, the maintenance of culture, and the reproduction of social structure” (p. 1). However, a coming together of sociology and educational administration is not easily achieved. Educational administration sits at the intersection of well-developed traditions of sociology of education and the sociology of organizations (often referred to as organizational studies), among others. This poses a problem as sociology, including the sociology of education, has continued on with little explicit reference to educational administration (see Tipton 1977).

In the pursuit of validity within the academy, educational administration sought to establish boundaries around itself as an academic discipline. In doing so, any disciplinary knowledge from beyond the constructed boundaries of educational administration was excluded. Primacy was given to understanding individuals within organizations and their interactions with the structural arrangements of institutions and systems. What sociology offered educational administration was an opening up beyond the individualistic and structural accounts of organizations. As Clark (1965) argued:

sociology should be able to make a major contribution to the study of administration within formal structures. It is also notably a discipline whose sensitivity to emergent phenomena and informal patterns should aid greatly in extending the study of educational administration to the many influences on policy and practice that are located outside of formal structures. (p. 69)

The study of educational administration had been rooted in psychology and a psychological

framework due to an interest in individuals and individual-level phenomena. The Hawthorne Studies and subsequent Human Relations Movement brought relationships between and within organizations to the fore. Introducing a more interactive approach to understanding organizations and those within them was generative of new questions for educational administration. If administration is a social activity, then it is only logical to have theories of educational administration embedded within broader theories of the social world. Enduring questions of the sociological project such as structure/agency, individualism/collectivism, and universal/particular became productive spaces for educational administration. The imperialism of disciplinary boundaries was less important than the development of theoretical and methodological resources for engaging with the increasingly complex nature of educational organizations and their administration.

Key Moves

In North America, but primarily the USA, the W.K. Kellogg-supported Cooperative Program in Educational Administration (CPEA) centers were important mechanisms for encouraging sociologists, psychologists, and others to conduct scholarship on educational administration during the mid-1900s. As a result, psychology and sociology were influential during the importation of *science* in the lead-up to the *Theory Movement*. The sociological influences in the *Theory Movement* were built upon an appropriation of Talcott Parson's systems theory through Jacob Getzels' (1952) *A Psycho-Sociological Framework for the Study of Education Administration*. From a sociological perspective, this approach reflects a very particular form of scholarship, one built upon logical empiricism as *the* way to do science. In mainstream discourses, this approach was – and continues to be – popular. The use of survey techniques and the construction/classification of social groups for analysis provided the basis of substantive applied research.

Australia and New Zealand are another well-recognized home for sociological-based

scholarship in educational administration. While the USA has drawn from sociological approaches at large, the Australian and New Zealand contribution has been very much based in critical social theory. Primarily grounded in the work of scholars at Deakin University during the 1980s–1990s, in particular, Richard Bates' critical theory of educational administration, Jill Blackmore's contribution to feminist theorizing, and John Smyth's critique of the self-managing school, Australia has long been recognized as a site of sociological-inspired scholarship.

The social sciences have long been thought of as a useful theoretical resource across the Commonwealth. This is arguably captured in Baron and Taylor's (1969) classic text *Educational Administration and the Social Sciences*. This history is particularly important. In the USA, the brand of sociology that informed the *Theory Movement* and whose traces remain in major outlets (e.g., *Educational Administration Quarterly*) is very much concerned with objectivity in measurement and the exhibitionism of data (production and analysis). Of greatest import were the scientific method and the construction of rigorous and robust research.

In contrast, the UK, Australia, and New Zealand adopted a more open form of sociology. The interpretive was accepted at a greater scale and as a legitimate form of knowledge production. This goes part of the way to explaining why when Greenfield launched his attack on the apparent objectivity of the *Theory Movement* he received far greater support from Commonwealth-based scholars than he did from US-based ones. In the USA, early professors of educational administration and then the *Theory Movement* sought to establish an apolitical account that could acquire legitimacy within the broader academy. Objectivity, measurement, and causality (e.g., cause and effect) were imperative. In contrast, across the Commonwealth, there was a stronger recognition or conceptualization of education as a political activity. In England, for example, schooling had a long history of class warfare and scholarship could not easily overlook this sociocultural context. At scale, and contingent on temporality, the effects of colonialism/imperialism still linger

across the Commonwealth, and sociopolitical accounts of educational administration are far more evident in both practice and scholarship. The closest equivalent in the USA is the attention to matters of race, particularly through the University Council for Educational Administration (UCEA) and general educational research associations such as the American Educational Research Association (AERA). However, this takes less of an explicit sociological approach and instead draws more broadly on a range of social sciences.

With the broad definition of sociology, the histories of different traditions and how they play out in different academic communities is easily overlooked. It highlights the need to understand how actions are located in contexts. In this sense, sociology works as both content and method. Sociological analysis calls for understanding the interplay between actions and contexts. An important distinction here centers on how this interplay is conceived.

There are two major schools of thought on the nature of relations in sociological analysis: substantialist and relational. The substantialist, sometimes referred to as entity-based in the broader leadership and management literatures, constructs research objects as discrete – even if interrelated – entities. This is core to systems thinking and the partitioning of organizations, context (or the environment), and the multitude of subsystems. Each entity becomes a variable in the research framework and then can be the focus of interventions (e.g., experimental or policy). Quantitative analysis of educational administration requires a substantialist lens. The mechanistic partitioning and measurement of external knowable entities is linked to structuralist-functionalist accounts. Relations in this approach are reduced to relationships between entities and can be measured for strength and directionality. Such approaches are often critiqued for being essentialist or deterministic as labels (e.g., gender, age, socioeconomic status) are effective static measures overlaid on context and assigned based on a preexisting criteria. In contrast, relational approaches are more fluid. Separate entities are not possible and understanding of particular events or actors can only be in

relation to other actors and events. Variables in a substantial account are instead rethought as positions within a social space rather than essentialized. Questions shift from attempts to construct a list of desirable behaviors for effectiveness (with a particular version of cause and effect) to elaborated descriptions of unfolding social activity. The move is subtle, but the final product is considerably different. What this highlights is that sociological resources facilitate many different forms of scholarship and contribution.

Contemporary Developments

Gunter (2010) identified an emerging trend of using sociological approaches in educational administration and leadership research. While it is difficult to capture the scope of this scholarship, there are some recognizable areas that are leading contemporary developments in educational administration.

Unlike the sociology of education (and post-structuralist accounts of education), educational administration calls upon compensatory more than reproduction-based accounts of the role of the schooling. Primarily built on the work of Bourdieu and Passeron (1970[1990]), reproduction argues that education systems serve to sustain the existing social order. This position is common in parallel discussions in critical social theory. Not surprisingly, educational administration has an underlying generative principle that key actors in organizations and organizations at large can make a positive contribution to society. To that end, educational administration is conceived as a compensatory role, where, if enacted effectively, education can overcome any form of disadvantage that students may experience. The minimal engagement across approaches (reproduction and compensatory) is a limitation to contemporary dialogue and debate in educational administration and with other forms of education scholarship.

With an increasing use of sociological approaches in educational administration, there is also substantial evidence of appropriation of great thinkers. There are many great thinkers from sociology and more broadly social theory

being imported into educational administration literatures. The likes of Bourdieu, Foucault, Arendt, Derrida, Lyotard, among others have texts dedicated to them and the application of their theories to educational administration. At least two difficulties exist with this trend: (i) the separation of sociology and educational administration remains as ideas and vocabularies are imported and overlaid leaving the received terms intact, and (ii) the theoretical resources are rarely mobilized at scale and instead cherry-picked to serve the researchers purpose. In the case of the former, the challenge is to move beyond the novelty and to provide insights not possible with existing theorizations. With the latter, the epistemic histories of concepts and their relations to a larger theory of practice are lost when applied in isolation.

Closely related to the above is the slippery use of sociological language in education administration. The current example is “capital.” As a concept, capital has a rich history in many disciplines but particularly sociology and economics. A rapidly expanding set of literatures in educational administration are using capital – and various adjectives to demarcate it. Social capital and cultural capital as theoretical resources have long histories in sociology, primarily through the work of Bourdieu. This has gone underdeveloped in educational administration. With a degree of presentism in contemporary work, epistemic equivalence is granted to these resources in ways which are theoretically indefensible.

Consistent with a relational turn in contemporary sociology and increased attention in broader leadership and management literatures, educational administration is paying more attention to relational approaches (Eacott 2015). This has taken many forms and could be a fad, but with the sustained attention in both sociology and leadership literatures, it is potentially a fruitful direction for scholarship in educational administration.

A final trend is the expansion of work on knowledge production in educational administration. With the exception of the *Theory Movement* and a few interventions (e.g., Greenfield’s

subjectivism, Bates’ critical theory of educational administration, Evers and Lakomski’s natural coherentism), relatively little attention has been paid to understanding how knowledge is produced, disseminated, and sustained. The potential for providing insights into the relations between knowledge production and practice has arguably never been greater than during a period of increasing professional standards, certification, and licensing.

Conclusion

Sociology offers educational administration the means to theorize how it is perceived, understood, and enacted within the contexts of particular sociocultural, political, and economic conditions. It is a broad multi-paradigmatic discipline. To mobilize sociological resources in the scholarship of educational administration requires substantial reading in order to locate one’s work within broader discussions. This entry has provided a brief overview of the history of sociology and educational administration. Importantly it drew attention to some of the ways in which geography played in the adoption of sociology and the implications for scholarship. In addition, it identified some contemporary developments in the mobilization of sociology in educational administration that offer both challenges and new insights into how the field works. Importantly, it has been stressed that what sociology can provide are a set of theoretical resources for understanding the ways in which educational institutions go about their work, and because of the dynamic and contradictory nature of the social world, this is an ongoing and inexhaustible intellectual project.

Cross-References

- ▶ [Educational Administration and the Inequality of School Achievement](#)
- ▶ [Global English, Postcolonialism, and Education](#)
- ▶ [Human Capital Theory in Education](#)

- [Neoliberal Globalization and Educational Administration: Western and Developing Nation Perspectives](#)
- [Neoliberalism](#)

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Sociology of Disability

- [Disability Studies in Education \(DSE\) and the Epistemology of Special Education](#)

Sociology of Education

- [Foucault and Educational Theory](#)

Socratic Dialogue

- [Frankl and the Philosophy of Moral Growth](#)
- [Socratic Dialogue in Education](#)

Socratic Dialogue in Education

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Synonyms

[Arguments; Education; Socratic dialogue; Teaching for thinking](#)

Introduction

Socrates and his pupil Plato believed that education through dialogue is good. Although there are no written traces and we only know about Socrates through the work of other authors, Socrates and the dialectic method attributed to him have left a permanent mark both in the history of philosophy, as well as in the dialectic method as an educational method which teaches students how to think. Guthrie mentions Socrates as a tipping point in philosophy. Socrates insisted on philosophy aimed toward his fellow citizens and the moral and intellectual issues they were coming across, disregarding issues of natural philosophy that most of the pre-Socratic philosophers were focused on. Guthrie quotes Cicero's *Tusculan Disputations*:

Ancient philosophy up to Socrates, who was taught by Archelaus the pupil of Anaxagoras, dealt with number and movement, and these early thinkers inquired zealously into the magnitude, intervals, and courses of the stars, and all celestial matters. But Socrates first called philosophy down from the sky, set it in the cities and even introduced it into homes, and compelled it to consider life and morals, good and evil. (Guthrie 1971)

Socratic Method

This is precisely one of Socrates' main qualities: he tried to encourage his fellow citizens and interlocutors to think about the things truly relevant for people. The method he employed is known as the Socratic method. Therefore, Socrates was an advocate of enlightenment and constantly urged his fellow citizens to think. We should also point out that aiming philosophy toward citizens was a process started by the sophists. They offered their intellectual and philosophical services to anyone who could afford them, while Socrates strived to enlighten his pupils and citizens. Socrates used questions to guide the interlocutor toward "the truth," something the interlocutor was unaware prior to the conversation with Socrates. In modern terms, it could be said that Socrates did not teach his interlocutors what they should think but how to think. There is the comparison between Socrates and a midwife; Socrates is helping with "the birth" of an opinion. He used to help the interlocutor to form and state their opinion and bring it into the world. In *Theaetetus*, Plato as Socrates draws a comparison to the midwife:

SOCRATES: Well, my art of midwifery is in most respects like theirs; but differs, in that I attend men and not women; and look after their souls when they are in labour, and not after their bodies: and the triumph of my art is in thoroughly examining whether the thought which the mind of the young man brings forth is a false idol or a noble and true birth. And like the midwives, I am barren, and the reproach which is often made against me, that I ask questions of others and have not the wit to answer them myself, is very just – the reason is, that the god compels me to be a midwife, but does not allow me to bring forth. And therefore I am not myself at all wise, nor have I anything to show which is the invention or birth of my own soul, but those who converse with me profit. Some of them appear dull enough at first, but afterwards, as out acquaintance ripens, if the god is gracious to them, they all make astonishing progress; and this in the opinion of others as well as in their own (Plato 2014).

Perhaps it can be said that Socrates was able to make people "birth" their opinions, strictly paying attention to the argumentation and "closeness to the truth." Socrates' midwifery art refers to, naturally, his use of ironic-maieutic method which can be observed on any example of Plato's dialogue:

with carefully constructed questions, Socrates puts the interlocutor in a position to, first, question their principles (irony) and then, with another series of careful questioning, to bring forth new, logically based principles (maieutic).

The Socratic method is (rightfully) attributed to Socrates and the way in which he pulled the opinion out of the interlocutor and how he made them question their own principles and judgment. Copleston describes the method:

What was Socrates' practical method? It took the form of "dialectic" or conversation. He would get into conversation with someone and try to elicit from him his ideas on some subject. For instance, he might profess his ignorance of what courage really is, and ask the other man if he had any light on the subject. Or Socrates would lead the conversation in that direction, and when the other man had used the word "courage," Socrates would ask him what courage is, professing his own ignorance and desire to learn. His companion had used the word, therefore he must know what it meant. When some definition or description had been given him, Socrates would profess his great satisfaction, but would intimate that there were one or two little difficulties which he would like to see cleared up. Accordingly he asked questions, letting the other man do most of the talking, but keeping the course of the conversation under his control, and so would expose the inadequacy of the proposed definition of courage. The other would fall back on a fresh or modified definition, and so the process would go on, with or without final success. (Copleston 1993)

Copleston points out the main characteristics of the Socratic method. Apart from "birthing" the opinion of the interlocutor, he also taught or, better yet, practiced how to think and ensured the procedure followed logical rules. Socrates did not allow the interlocutor to state their principle without the proper argument, that is, every definition, sentence, and statement had to be corroborated. Moreover, whatever was said was examined from all possible "sides." This process of questioning what had been said allowed rejecting any ideas cofuted by either Socrates or the interlocutor. In this way, only the ideas resistant to the fiercest questioning could be maintained. As observed by Haynes, any mental "debris" would be removed:

The Socratic method was called *elenchus*. The idea was to open space for learning through liberation

and prevent garbage to clutter the mind, and address pure, fresh thinking. This includes both the intellect and emotion in challenging previously established beliefs and assumptions. (Haynes 2003)

No matter how idealized Socrates may be in Plato's dialogues, it is clear that for most of the interlocutors, the conversations with Socrates, at least in some part, are not pleasant. Socrates uses any means necessary, he does not hold back and does not play games, and any invalid line of argument rejects the thesis in question. For most of the interlocutors, it is not easy to keep calm, while their beliefs and attitudes crumble like a house of cards. To most individuals, it is not easy to experience the total denial of their established principles or opinions (whether this is done by Socrates or someone else). Hayes is obviously right when he says that both the intellect and emotions play a part in the *elenchus* (this refers to Socrates as well). Socrates confronts the interlocutor with their opinion, with themselves, revealing their misconceptions and mistakes, and that is not an easy task for anyone. Socrates may be helping them to birth the truth about the subject in question, but the collateral damage consists of the people themselves, because the truth that is brought to light is the truth about the people themselves. Discovering your own flaws has to cause negative emotions. Without facing our own "negativity," there is no "pure and fresh thinking."

Socrates' dialectic method has two parts: irony and maieutic. Irony is the initial part of the method where Socrates asks the interlocutor to define the basic notions relating to the subject, because he (Socrates) "does not know them." In his work *Socrates. Towards the discovery of Human Wisdom*, in chapter on Irony, dialectic versus maieutic (Reale 2003), Reale discusses the Socratic method. He also talks about Jan Patočka, who says:

Essentially, irony is part of the Socratic educational method, that is, the care for the soul. (Reale 2003)

Is the Socratic method an educational one? Given everything that has been mentioned so far, yes, even more so than many other methods considered to be educational. The Socratic irony is not simple. It is not easy to use irony in the

Socratic sense; every answer offered has to be met with its essence, while seemingly naively pretending not to know what the subject is, and then offering a counter answer or question either to allude or provoke doubt.

Socrates, in fact, logically questions the opinions and principles of the interlocutor, while irony brings into question the attitude of the interlocutor, so that the confused individual has to elaborate on their opinion or principle, in accordance with logical consistency of what they are about to say.

Socrates believed that only through a live conversation can we get closer to the truth, find out something new, and eventually learn. All of that is not possible without thorough thinking on the subject, and rules of thinking are used to deny the logical inconsistencies and to reach, if possible, a satisfactory logical conclusion. Socrates used his methods to establish greater knowledge, based on sound principles and definitions of things that he discussed:

His "irony," then, his profession of ignorance, was sincere; he did not know, but he wanted to find out, and he wanted to induce others to reflect for themselves and to give real thought to the supremely important work of caring for their souls. (Copleston 1993)

Maieutic is a more complex process than irony. Through careful questioning, Socrates examines the attitudes stated by the interlocutor but also guides them to a logically consistent conclusion. However, the conclusion may not always be reached, as evident from Plato's dialogues. Lack of a real conclusion is not or, at least, should not be a problem, because thinking about and raising awareness of the issue is the path toward solving it. Nevertheless, there are authors who doubt that maieutic was actually created by Socrates. According to Reale:

But everyone did not consider maieutic as Socrates' expression, rather, they thought it was Plato's poetic invention. For instance, Burnyeat and Vlastos believed that the method [sc. maieutic] is Plato's invention, alien to Socrates from Plato's early dialogues. (Reale 2003)

Regardless of whether or not maieutic is an original Socratic method, together with irony, it

is a part of the Socratic dialogue, as it is called today, with its contemporary interpretation being used more and more in formal and nonformal education.

Contemporary Version of the Socratic Dialogue in Education

Colloquially, Socrates “made” the interlocutor to think about their judgments, principles, and statements, but more precisely, he encouraged thinking. The definition of Socrates as the grandfather of critical thinking, that is, of “learning how to think,” can be found among most critical thinking theoreticians. Some contemporary philosophical tendencies, such as “philosophy with children,” use dialogue based on irony and maieutic. This is called the “Socratic dialogue,” “Socratic method,” or “elenctic method.” It is a form of discussion based on questions and answers used to encourage critical thinking and “shed light on the path to the truth.” It is a dialectic method that includes opposing views, defending those views logically and problem-solving.

What is the goal of the Socratic method in education? The standard answer would be that the method encourages children and teenagers (and all those who participate in this type of educational programs) to develop critical thinking. The participants’ benefit from the development of critical thinking is probably best described by Shaw: “The process of Socratic dialogue assists students to organise their thoughts and sequence their learning. It guides learning by emphasising what is important and relevant” (Shaw 2008). Furthermore, Socratic dialogue develops what we refer to nowadays as critical thinking and what John Dewey referred to as reflective thinking. It was John Dewey who reestablished the need to learn how to think in modern society. “No one doubts, theoretically, the importance of fostering in school good habits of thinking” (Dewey 1926, p. 226). However, according to Dewey, although in theory the problem of thinking in educational process observed in practice is different. However, even the theoretical does not

recognize the importance of this problem: “But apart from the fact that the acknowledgment is not so great in practice as in theory, there is not adequate theoretical recognition that all which the school can or need do for pupils, so far as their minds are concerned (i.e., leaving out certain specialized muscular abilities), is to develop their ability to think” (Dewey 1926). So, one of the main goals of the school is to develop the ability to think. Dewey continues: “Thinking which is not connected with increase of efficiency in action, and with learning more about ourselves and the world in which we live, has something the matter with it just as thought” (Dewey 1926). Bringing back “the learning how to think,” that is, getting used to critical thinking, can be achieved by using the Socratic method in educational systems.

As a rule, contemporary tendencies and programs which aim to teach children how to think and develop their critical thinking include an updated version of the Socratic dialogue, that is, a dialogue which features the Socratic question and answer method. The method’s tagline could be “question everything” but based on sound arguments. The method can be adapted according to age, and the most important question of the method is “Why?”. However, modern-day Socratic method in education is primarily based on thoughtful series of questions. These questions open up new question and new explanations. R. W. Paul divided the questions of the Socratic method into six basic types:

1. Questions for clarification: Why do you say that? How does this relate to our discussion?
2. Questions that probe assumptions: What could we assume instead? How can you verify or disapprove that assumption?
3. Questions that probe reasons and evidence: What would be an example? What is....analogous to? What do you think causes to happen...? Why?
4. Questions about viewpoints and perspectives: What would be an alternative? What is another way to look at it? Would you explain why it is necessary or beneficial, and who benefits?

- Why it is the best? What are the strengths and weaknesses of...? How are...and... similar? What is a counterargument for...?
5. Questions that probe implications and consequences: What generalizations can you make? What are the consequences of that assumption? What are you implying? How does... affect...? How does...tie in with what we learned before?
 6. Questions about the question: What was the point of this question? Why do you think I asked this question? What does...mean? How does...apply to everyday life? (Paul et al. 2002)

Paul is good at establishing the types of questions in a contemporary Socratic dialogue. During workshops and while working with clients, apart from these types of question, the most frequently asked question, and also the most efficient one, is *why*, which demands a logical response.

Encouraging Intellectual Engagement

Socrates walked around the streets and town squares in Athens and encouraged people to think, to develop their own opinion, to dare to think, and to dare question the socially acceptable norms. Eventually, he was sentenced to death. Nowadays, we may not be sentenced to death if we think for ourselves and encourage others to do the same. Nevertheless, lethargy and mental laziness mean that most people lack the will power to bravely face everything that is put in front of them. To live thoughtfully and to live according to Kant's *Sapere aude!* is difficult, but it is the only life worth living. Laziness and self-neglect is not life, merely survival. This is why changes have to be made in the educational curricula. They should encourage moral awareness among students, which also comes hand in hand with responsibility and, ultimately, freedom. These programs may be manipulated; therefore, they have to be planned carefully. Such programs offer no ready-made answers. On the contrary, they provide content for thinking and methods to do so. Each student is welcome to come to their

own conclusion or what Hare calls the critical level of moral thinking. A curriculum which tries to achieve that – encourage students to think critically and reach their own conclusions – is present in educational systems around the world. However, formal education is hard to change; so many programs that are dedicated to learning how to think and development of critical thinking via the Socratic method are often part of nonformal education. The French philosopher Oscar Brenifier developed such a method called the Socratic method of Oscar Brenifier, in the UNESCO book *Philosophy – a School of Freedom* (Goucha 2007).

Example: The Socratic Method of Oscar Brenifier

Brenifier's method is based on Socratic dialogue in the literal sense. Discussion with children has no formal or technical rules (sitting arrangement, talking order), but the method relies on logic, naturally. The teacher/moderator guides the discussion and points out the logical errors in children's abstraction. Oftentimes, the discussion revolves around clarifying a notion or a problem. At first, the method may seem too abrasive for working with children, because the moderator points out children's misconceptions, which is not easy for children (or anyone else). Nevertheless, the method is good for raising awareness about contradictory statements; associating child's personality with general rules; becoming aware of your own character, personality, and thoughts in a given setting; identifying an issue and ways of dealing with it; facing and accepting the truth; rejecting the strict good versus bad dichotomy; etc.

Why did Socrates' interlocutors feel uncomfortable? Because Socrates disputed their misconceptions and pointed out the flaws in their reasoning. This is how people feel any time someone shatters their prejudice and misguided opinions. This is an issue of the ego, that is, egoism and vanity. This is what seems to be Brenifier's focus. If we can disregard our ego in a philosophical dialogue, if we can confront a logical line of thought, then we are in a far better position to find the answers we seek.

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Socratic Dialogue: A Comparison Between Ancient and Contemporary Method

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These last years have witnessed the emergence and blossoming of practices inspired by philosophy on the didactic and pedagogical scene. In this context, Socrates' philosophy represents one main point of reference. Socratic dialogue is now a model for a maieutic conception of teaching as well as for the constitution of dialogical communities and for an interrogative inquiry into reality. However, at times this recovery of the Socratic model is not exempt from misunderstandings and anachronisms. The aim of this entry is to underline the main differences between the ancient and contemporary method.

Socratic Dialogue in the Ancient World

Socratic dialogue as a literary genre emerges in Athens during the fourth century BC, immediately after Socrates' death in 399 BC, in order to bear testimony and leave a durable trace of Socrates' life and method. (Some researchers argue that the Socratic dialogue as a literary genre was already present during Socrates' lifetime, assuming a didactic function, cf. Rossetti (2011a).) These instances are at the basis of the development of the *logoi sokratikoi* genre, of which Plato is a proponent among many. The Socratic method, as a dialogic practice experienced by various interlocutors, has obviously an earlier origin, which can be traced back to the discursive or rhetoric practices characterizing democratic Athens. Public speeches, orations, and discussions in court mark the emergence of an art of the word that is nurtured by democracy. Within this context, Socrates embodies an educational methodology and an idea of philosophical research markedly distinct from methodologies which were fashionable at the time, especially those of the sophists. Also the sophists practiced dialogue with their disciples, but the purpose and characteristics of their method were different from the Socratic approach.

The first Platonic dialogues (the dialogues written by Plato immediately after the death of Socrates; those credited as authentic by most scholars are *Apology of Socrates*, *Menexenus*, *Protagoras*, *Laches*, *The Republic* Book I, *Charmides*, *Euthyphro*, *Lysis*, *Hippias Major*, *Ion*, *Hippias Minor*, *Crito*, *Euthydemus*, *Cratylus*, *Gorgias*, *Meno*) represent a vivid testimony of the Socratic method: it is thus possible to extract from them crucial information to delineate the general characteristics of this approach (for an analysis of the Socratic method in Plato's first dialogues, cf. L. Candiottio (2012a)).

The Maieutical Character of the Socratic Dialogue

The first and fundamental feature of the method is that it is a maieutic method. Maieutics (literally, midwifery) can be defined as an art which, by operating through dialogue (the basic mode of dialogue is that of questions and answers), enables

the soul to give birth to the truth it seeks. The truth is already present in the soul of the seeker: the Socratic questioning is the modality through which Socrates helps his interlocutor to discover the truth he already possesses. The dialogue enables, within a joint research, to get closer to the truth; it allows the interlocutor to find out the truth in first person, avoiding thus dogmatic expositions on the teacher's part. A knowledge which is not experienced in first person by the interlocutor cannot be acknowledged as true, as it is necessarily perceived by him/her as something external: accordingly, it does not possess the strength to compel the subject towards a conduct consistent with its specifications.

Maieutic knowledge unfolds thus as a form of practice implying the transformation of the subject involved in its elaboration. Through continuous questioning and answering, maieutics enables the questioning soul to generate what she/he already knows and possibly, at a further stage, presents discursively the knowledge it gave birth to. For the soul to be ready, it is necessary to have a preliminary-cleansing work addressing errors, false beliefs, stereotypes, and prejudices; for achieving this purpose, Socrates uses the elenchus (refutation). The elenchus articulates two moments: firstly, the thesis of the interlocutor is analyzed; secondly, objections are proposed. Examination and objections are strictly interconnected – given their mutual dependency, the elenchus can be defined as a refuting process which tends to generate a positive thesis. The moment of analysis enables the individuation of contradictions intrinsic in the thesis, a process automatically resulting in its negation. The logical movement bringing to the negation of falsity is always accompanied, in the Socratic method, by a psychological movement through which the interlocutor subjectivizes the contradictory character of his/her argument. If this moment of awareness (moment of negativity) is lacking, the elenchus is *ineffective* (see Candiotta 2015), and it cannot support the second phase of Socratic maieutics, namely, the production of a positive thesis (the passage of the Plato's sophist describing the noble sophistic is enlightening in this sense, cf. Plat., *Soph.* 230 b4–d4).

The Practical Relevance of the Dialogue Topic

The second key feature of the Socratic method is its ethical, political, and educational relevance. The topics debated by Socrates and his interlocutors in the first Platonic dialogues establish always a strict connection between working on one's self and improving the life of the polis. Socrates urges the subject to take care of his soul in order to be good, beautiful, and just (for a contemporary reading of this theme, cf. M. Foucault (2001)). The pedagogic valence of the Socratic method builds upon this basis: philosophical research is a pedagogical modality which Socrates shapes in order to enable his interlocutors to improve. From this perspective, it is possible to affirm, with Pierre Hadot (1995, 2002), that philosophical research, in its dialogic form, is Socrates' and Plato's main spiritual exercise. Furthermore, the debated themes are always interesting for the interlocutor: the examples adopted by Socrates are interesting for him/her as they always relate to his/her daily life. It is no coincidence then if in the *Laches*, where the interlocutors are two strategists, the argument is courage, or if in the *Charmides*, where the interlocutors are two figures that will play an important historical role in Athenian politics (*Critias* and *Charmides*), the primary emphasis is on temperance. Socrates and Plato, in fact, considered temperance as a necessary skill for a good politician. However, these considerations imply neither that Socratic dialogues are always successful nor a constant openness on the part of Socrates' interlocutors – quite the contrary. For instance, in *Gorgias* it is possible to notice both ferocious defenses by the interlocutor and violent refutations by Socrates. In my opinion, this signals Socrates' and Plato's interest in criticizing the political situation of the time through a refutation of its representatives. By refuting Callicles, Socrates demonstrates his inadequacy to the audience; Socrates is aware that Callicles is not willing to be "purified" and thus directs his elenctic action towards the public attending the debate (see Candiotta 2014).

The Collaboration of Interlocutors and Their Partaking in “a Philosophical Form of Life”

The third main feature concerns the type of relation which develops between Socrates and his interlocutors. (Elsewhere, I called this particular process “retroactive extended elenchus.” To approach this theme more in detail, cf. Candiotta (2012b, 2015).) On the one hand, Socrates emphasizes that the interlocutors must collaborate towards a common goal (unveiling truth), rather than asserting their preeminence through a kind of dialogical fight (this aspect marks a crucial difference from sophistry). Philosophical research enacted through dialogue is thus a joint research, unfolding in a collective context towards collective goals. This communitarian aspect is not accidental, but a central prerequisite and instrument of orientation without which the research could not be successful, not even at a gnoseological level. Of course, it is possible to think alone; however in this case, it is always necessary to test dialogically the correctness of what has been thought. In general terms, apart from this case, Socrates emphasizes how the truth can be discovered maieutically only through dialogue, thus through a shared dimension of research – even if the moment in which the truth is grasped is individual and cannot be completely presented at a linguistic level. These various facets of the Socratic method are clearly delineated in Plato’s *Seventh Letter* (Plato, *Seventh Letter*, 340b–345c), where the author underlines that philosophical research through dialogue is fruitful only if the subjects involved in the dialogue partake in a common form of life, a philosophical form of life, and the achievement of knowledge is a sudden event taking place in the soul of the person involved in the dialogical activity. A fundamental nexus is thus established between community and self-knowledge – intending with self-knowledge an intellectual achievement which is not an end in itself but, again, oriented towards the communitarian aspect of the common good.

For Plato, philosophy operates within a social network where the example and teaching of a single person cannot suffice. The whole community must practice philosophy. Not only political action supported by philosophy, but philosophical

knowledge itself requires a communitarian dimension. Also the aspect concerning *theoria* has to do with what is common rather than individual. Plato argues in fact that philosophical knowledge emerges in the individual soul, thanks to the dialogue among people who share a given form of life and which are constantly in contact with each other.

There neither is nor ever will be a treatise of mine on the subject [philosophy]. For it does not admit of exposition like other branches of knowledge; but after much converse about the matter itself and a life lived together, suddenly a light, as it were, is kindled in one soul by a flame that leaps to it from another, and thereafter sustains itself. (Plato, *Seventh Letter*, 341c4–d2)

The truth is grasped by each person by dialoguing with oneself and others. Truth is never possessed and achieved by a single individual: it cannot be grasped independently from dialogical interaction except in rare cases, and even such cases require a proof of their veridicity which can only be obtained within a discursive setting.

However, differently from Dionysius, they were aware that those [insights acquired through dialogue] were not their own thoughts, but a “possession shared amongst friends” of the Academy, emerged through that admirable exchange of spiritual energies implying giving and receiving; in the mediation of acting and experimenting, which establishes the academia as the highest form and eternal model of any community of culture, education and life, the quintessence of any community of men bound by a reciprocal understanding. (Stenzel 1966, p. 302 (my translation))

Only an adequate preparation or propaedeutic can lit the flame of philosophical knowledge. This propaedeutic is obtained on the one hand through a form of communitarian life, where interests and philosophical discussions are shared and, on the other hand, through a quotidian individual study and through the radical choice to live a specific form of life – namely, a philosophical one. It is crucial to emphasize how, from this perspective, the highest forms of philosophical knowledge depend, on the one hand, on markedly material circumstances – to live in a specific place, with certain people, and during a given span of time – and on the other hand, on aspects which refer to a personal choice. Philosophical

knowledge cannot be enclosed in a dogmatic definition as it emerges in a particular “shape,” con-substantial with a relational-dialogic context. On the other hand, the relation ensuing between Socrates qua proponent of maieutics and his interlocutors is asymmetrical. Socrates, although reiterating his lack of knowledge, guides his interlocutor towards prefixed avenues of inquiry, singles out viable paths through fictitious questions (Longo 2000), causes paradoxes and aporias to expose errors, and orientates the research towards themes that bring into question the whole being of his interlocutor. Socrates is thus a guide that knows where to lead his interlocutor, even if he does not know exactly which type of knowledge such interlocutor will be able to attain. The asymmetry between Socrates maieutician and his interlocutors is different from the traditional asymmetry that exists in the relationship between teacher and disciple, where the teacher transmits a specific range of knowledge to the disciple. The asymmetry between Socrates and his interlocutors is underlined by Socrates’ solid methodological knowledge and in his role as a guide throughout the research journey. In this sense, Socrates’ approach differs both from the dogmatic knowledge typically transmitted by the traditional teacher and from the sophists’ conception of dialogue as deployment of dialectical weaponry functional to subdue the interlocutors.

The Use of Rhetorical Strategies in the Dialogue

In recent years, however, it has been pointed out (Kohan 2009; Rossetti 2011b) how Socrates does not really listen to his interlocutors. Not unlike the sophists, Socrates makes use of a number of strategies to control the dialogue. Such strategies are the fourth fundamental characteristic of the Socratic dialogue. Livio Rossetti furthers this thread of analysis by emphasizing how the emotional style adopted by Socrates was intended to corner his interlocutor. It is interesting, however, to understand why Socrates deemed useful to push the interlocutor in difficult positions. Arguably, the strategy which effected emotions was functional for what Socrates aimed to elicit in the interlocutor (and in the public): not a

substantive doctrine but the awareness of contradictions. The emotional preparation, creating a particular atmosphere, was functional to the interiorization of a specific dilemma or latent problem. This process could bring the subject to live a liberating emotion able of disclosing unexpected perspectives. Rossetti points out that the effectiveness of the Socratic dialogue does not rest on the strength of the proposed arguments (they are often incomplete or erroneous), but in rhetorical techniques which display, among other things, a sapient use of emotions. Moreover, Socrates used to ridicule interlocutors and often enacted violent patterns of refutation. When he was more lenient, he applied, at most, a paternalistic style.

Rossetti’s reading enables us to grasp the rhetorical strategies used by Socrates. These are specific dialogical modalities which aim to produce a given effect in the interlocutor. Some of them may appear similar to the ones employed by the sophists; however, in my perspective, their different purpose marks a cleavage between the two: for Socrates the ultimate aim of dialogical interaction is the improvement of the interlocutor (or the public), through the recognition of one’s errors and, possibly, the achievement of truth, while for the sophists the main goal is the agonistic defeat of the interlocutor as a way to obtain fame, honor, and glory. In fact, the Socratic asking invites constantly the interlocutor to question him-/herself within a perspective of “self-knowledge” and care of the self.

The Self-Improvement of the Interlocutors as the Purpose of the Dialogue

The model of philosophy proposed by Socrates is thus consistent with the definition of philosophy as an art of life (Horn 1998), as daily practice enabling to live a dignified life, virtuous, and therefore happy. Through a philosophic interpretation of the Delphic maxim “know thyself,” Plato, through Socrates, establishes philosophy, and in particular philosophical dialogue, as the most profound form of education available to individuals and society.

This last aspect introduces a fifth characteristic, concerning the purpose of Socratic dialogue, and more specifically its gnoseological-ethical-

political purpose, aiming to improve both the individual and the polis that she/he inhabits. It is necessary to emphasize here that the figure of Socrates qua model of philosopher is crucial for the development of the ancient Socratic dialogue in its Platonic acceptance.

Socrates embodies the philosopher who does not know but is aware of his lack of knowledge. For this reason Socrates addresses those who think to possess knowledge; by declaring his ignorance, he forces them to question their knowledge and to recognize its lack of foundations. The beginning of any true research is in fact the awareness of one's own ignorance and the liberation from his/her own mistakes of judgment. Socrates defines his research method as follows, speaking in first person:

Of what sort am I? One of those who would be glad to be refuted if I say anything untrue, and glad to refute anyone else who might speak untruly; but just as glad, mind you, to be refuted as to refute, since I regard the former as the greater benefit, in proportion as it is a greater benefit for oneself to be delivered from the greatest evil than to deliver someone else. For I consider that a man cannot suffer any evil so great as a false opinion on the subjects of our actual argument. (Plato, *Gorgias*, 458a)

Socratic dialogue leads to aporia; however, aporia is not to be intended as a negative outcome – it rather exemplifies a first great dialogical conquest: the awareness of error, of not knowing. One main outcome of Socratic dialogue is thus an urgent need to continue researching, starting in the first place from a process of self-examination. By investigating the opinions of his interlocutors, Socrates enables them to call into questioning themselves and their own mode of life.

Nicias: You strike me as not being aware that, whoever comes into close contact with Socrates and has any talk with him face to face, is bound to be drawn round and round by him in the course of the argument—though it may have started at first on a quite different theme—and cannot stop until he is led into giving an account of himself, of the manner in which [188a] he now spends his days, and of the kind of life he has lived hitherto. (Plato, *Laches*, 187e–188a)

Socrates possesses a knowledge different from those paradigms which were conventional at the

time; it is not a theory which can be taught but rather a sapience immediately conducive to practice: the necessity to research and embody an ethical form of common life. Socrates does not aim to limit the discussion to concepts such as “good,” “fair,” “pious,” etc., but wishes that these concepts, once made available to the interlocutor by means of rational demonstration, become for him/her a form of life. Crucially, Socratic knowledge qua work on the self is an appeal to “being.” Socrates knows the value of moral action as such action is implied by his own choice, on his personal commitment, and on a personal urgency to improve, and this is possible only starting from the awareness of one's own errors.

Accordingly, Socratic knowledge is “knowing how to live.” The “art of living” is a mode of life oriented towards the good and animated by a constant strife to improve and to avoid errors; this attitude prevents the occurrence of evil to the person who has embraced this mode of existence.

...no evil can come to a good man either in life or after death. ... (Plato, *Apology*, 41d)

The Contemporary Method

Philosophical inquiry carried out as a dialogue or discussion is a philosophical practice that never disappeared and that in the last 40 years, thanks to a growing interest towards philosophical practices by nonphilosophers or specialists and beyond strictly epistemological concerns, produced (has been object of) a thriving experimentation in various fields and contexts – hence the emergence of various initiatives to practice philosophical dialogue collectively: philosophy for children, philosophy for community, café philo, etc.

Socratic dialogue can be included in this group of practices; during the twentieth century, it has been redesigned in several formulations and re-proposed by various schools with different purposes, not only philosophical. The method has been applied, especially in the Anglo-Saxon world, in psychotherapy (especially cognitivist paradigms), in legal settings, in context of conflict mediation, in health-care settings, in companies to

facilitate the achievement of common objectives, in schools, etc. Here I will provide a general outline of contemporary Socratic dialogue focusing in particular on its elaboration in the German context. Arguably, such elaboration is the variant that remains closer to the spirit of ancient Socratic dialogue, although differing from it in some respects.

The philosophical thread in question originated in Germany in the second decade of the twentieth century, thanks to the work of Leonard Nelson and his disciples Gustav Heckmann and Minna Specht. Methodologically, the starting point of Socratic dialogue is a question that interests the research group and that is supported by a number of concrete examples. Usually, a participant proposes a personal experience prompting a philosophical question, which is thereby proposed to the group as starting point for research. Questions are generally related to moral and ethical fields but can also refer to a gnoseological or ontological dimension.

The basic question is formulated according to the Socratic *ti esti*, “what is x?” But it can also assume different shapes. It is crucial, in order for a productive common research to take place, that the participants find the question interesting and somehow close to their personal experience (in this respect it is possible to detect a similarity between Socratic dialogue and the first rule of biographic-supportive communication (Madera and Tarca 2007), which refers to autobiography and to a type of first-person philosophy). The initial formulation of the question will therefore affect the whole course of the common inquiry.

Once the question is asked, participants examine examples drawn from concrete life experiences: the discussion focuses, firstly, on the situation proposed by the participant who formulated the question and, secondly, on other examples illustrated by other subjects participating in the dialogue. Starting from examples, philosophical research can produce a knowledge which is embodied, rather than abstract or distant from the experiences of the research participants. This process enables – as Socrates knew – an immediate involvement of interlocutors and the possibility of realizing the acquired knowledge in concrete

forms of life. From a gnoseological perspective, this process tends to privilege induction over deduction and to emphasize how knowledge – also in its theoretical, general, and even universal acception – can be discovered starting from sensible experience.

The discussion follows the exposition and analysis of examples. During this moment, the correctness of argumentative logic is emphasized and contradictions and fallacies are underlined, while the group strives to individuate shared axioms. Incidentally, it is necessary to point out here how main presuppositions of the method are both a kind of rationalism, a specific confidence in human beings’ rational capacity of achieving a form of coherent knowledge (a form of knowledge, itself rational), and a specific conception, typical of the modern age, of understanding truth in its logical-mathematical formulation. Contemporary philosophy highlighted the crisis of such model in different occasions. While the validity of such position is open to debate, it is arguably necessary to be aware that adopting the Socratic method implies assuming a certain epistemological paradigm, characterized by its own strength and limitations. Also in the ancient method, there was a tendency towards rationalism; however, for Socrates, the main emphasis is on the moral purpose of dialogical inquiry; Socrates was ready to set aside formal correctness if this could facilitate a moral improvement in the interlocutor (Dorion 2004). Anglo-Saxon commentators interested in Socratic dialogue, operating from an analytical perspective, often underscore logical inconsistencies in Socrates’ arguments. In my perspective, however, these inconsistencies signal how, for Socrates, logical correctness was a valid instrument, but not the ultimate goal of the dialogue. Accordingly, in specific occasions, it could be considered of secondary importance. Moreover, the “errors” were used with strategic purpose, assuming thus a rhetorical role.

In terms of the subjective disposition of the participant, Socratic dialogue requires an attitude of sincerity towards oneself and others, as well as trust in one’s own capacity of inquiry and in that of other participants. Socrates himself emphasized this aspect, pointing out how the attitude of the

interlocutor towards the inquiry and his guide was crucial to determine whether or not he could attain philosophical knowledge (Plato's *Gorgias* is exemplificative in this sense). In the dialogues written by Plato, we often find interlocutors who cannot achieve a productive attitude as they are perched on their positions, unwilling to admit their mistakes. They do not trust Socrates, believing that he aims to obtain a heuristic-agonistic victory rather than to help them. Plato describes these characters – mostly sophists, rhetoricians, orators, and politicians – in order to criticize Athenian society, demonstrating their low moral qualities and the way in which they pursue a life of fame, honor, and glory.

Moreover, Plato staged hostile interlocutors for emphasizing Socrates' figure. Socrates was the teacher whose main activity was to liberate his interlocutors from error through strategies which were at times violent and that affected their emotions and who subsequently guided them in the search for truth. Accordingly, in the ancient Socratic dialogue finding, hostile interlocutors were almost the norm.

The contemporary Socratic dialogue is, however, a freely chosen philosophical practice characterized by a form of symmetry among all the participants. Therefore, the abovementioned dynamics do not take place, except in the form of accidents due to participants' inability to maintain the required behavior. A positive disposition of the participants is thus a necessary prerequisite to implement the philosophical practice in question.

There is no figure like Socrates in the present Socratic dialogue. Within research groups, there is a moderator which acts more as a facilitator, rather than as a teacher or guide. His/her task is neither to orient discussion nor to intervene in relation to contents, but to verify that during each step of the research, participants proceed with order towards shared forms of knowledge – forms which are obtained through a progressive agreement concerning the various points under discussion. We could say that each participant has the task of playing Socrates' role both for him-/herself and for others.

It is thus possible to notice that the underlying assumptions of ancient and contemporary

Socratic dialogues are noticeably different. In the first one, the truth to be known is already ontologically posited, and the subjects participating in the dialogue follow a common path, punctuated by questions and answers, which leads them, thanks to an expert guide (Socrates), to approach truth maieutically. In the second case, the truth is not predetermined but constructed within the dialogical-linguistic context through an agreement between research participants. In the first case, Socrates does not necessarily listen to his interlocutors; in the second availability to listen, empathy and sharing are essential conditions. The journey undertaken by the subjects participating in contemporary Socratic dialogues is constructive, rather than revelatory. Ancient Socratic dialogue strove to achieve truth, while contemporary Socratic dialogue is in search of shared truths.

This fundamental difference – based on the role of the facilitator, the relation between facilitator and interlocutors, and the type of knowledge underpinning the entire process – depends on profound differences between the epochs and cultures in which these dialogic practices were implemented and between the overall conceptual frameworks of orientation animating their proponents.

Within the fourth-century Athens, Plato aimed to distance himself from the risks characterizing the emerging democracy – a political form which, in conjunction with the sophists' teachings, resulted for him in relativism and instability in the ontological, gnoseological, moral, and political fields. Against this risk, Plato constructed Socratic dialogues having as main point of reference a stable and universal ontology, which could support stable ethical and political instances. The 1920s in Germany, conversely, are characterized by the emergence of National Socialism, and Socratic dialogue was intended by Nelson as a practice of freedom, resistance, and democratic struggle against dictatorial and totalitarian tendencies.

The cultural and political backgrounds are thus extremely different and in some ways opposite. This is, in my opinion, the main reason behind the methodological difference separating ancient and contemporary forms of Socratic dialogue. In both cases, however, the dialogical practice was experienced as an activity which enabled a space of

opposition vis-à-vis the dominant ideology of the times, thus the emergence of critical and autonomous thinking in the people participating in the dialogue.

The Socratic dialogue of German mold, not unlike the ancient Socratic dialogue handed down by Plato, is characterized by a marked political and pedagogical valence, an aspect that in other contemporary formulations of Socratic dialogue is not equally central.

Accordingly, in spite of the abovementioned substantial differences between the ancient method and the contemporary German approach, the latter can be considered as the worthiest heir of the spirit and attitude animating the former. Arguably, present forms adopting the Socratic method instrumentally, without a political and pedagogical background and using the method as a self-referential communicative strategy rather than as a pathway to improvement where the logical dimension is subordinated to the moral dimension involving the participants, risk in some cases to be closer to the method of the sophists than to that of Socrates.

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Students Who Want Banking Education and Related Challenges to Problem-Posing Education

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Introduction

In *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* and other works, Paulo Freire conceives education as a political act that takes place in contexts marked by unequal power relations. His elaborations of these views and their pedagogical implications have influenced generations of educators who have sought to liberate or empower their students to reconstruct and enhance society through teaching and learning processes. In particular, Freire's concept of "banking" versus "problem-posing" education illustrates how ideology frames practices in schooling (Freire 1970/2000). According to this view, the banking educator spoon-feeds so-called objective, abstract knowledge to students, and the students are responsible only for memorizing and reiterating the educational "truth" back to instructors. On the other hand, the problem-posing educator works hand in hand with students more as equals, to collaboratively identify problems in society that matter to both parties and generate solutions to improve spiritual and material life for all members of society. Although Freire cautioned against the possibly uncritical export of his views to global contexts that might contrast significantly with the Brazilian settings, he himself primarily

worked within (Freire 2005), this framing of education as a relationship of power between students and teachers can be seen to undergird contemporary pedagogical trends around the world, echoed in such discourses as experiential learning and student-centered and outcome-based education.

Given the popular interest in progressive education in philosophy of education worldwide, much recent research has explored how different aspects of Freire's work can help enhance education in diverse cultural, political, and geographical contexts (see, for instance, Peters and Besley 2015). Outside of Freire's Brazil, settings marked by colonialism and/or mass oppression and inequality of indigenous populations are particularly explored in such work, given that decolonization of society through empowerment of students and communities is one of Freire's major themes. Yet in considering Freire's work in such diverse environments, interesting counter-examples and complexities have been identified in implementing Freirean problem-posing education. In particular, recognizing students as equals and valuing their views and interests are essential to a Freirean approach to pedagogy. Yet some innovators have observed challenges in realizing these ideas in global classrooms, which are related to students' expressed or apparent interests in passive transmission-style education, aimed at neutral facts and objective knowledge. This can lead a Freirean educator to ask what pedagogy "for the oppressed" entails in practice, where students claim to want a kind of banking education! In other contexts, the power relationship between teachers and students is more complex than that portrayed initially in the dichotomy of banking versus problem-posing education.

This entry focuses on challenges contemporary educators and philosophers of education have observed in implementing a kind of empowering student-centered, anti-banking education aligned with Freire's thought. It also considers the role of hope in Freire's work. The aim of this entry is not to suggest a singular resolution to conceptual and practical difficulties educators face today but to draw attention to complexities of Freirean themes and explore how a progressive Freirean educator might round out their critical understanding of

Freire's views and their educational implications in relation to some major predicaments in contemporary pedagogy and education.

The Paradox of Students Wanting Banking Education

Pedagogy of the Oppressed (Freire 1970/2000) elaborates how the inequality and oppression of students in authoring schooling experiences leads to their systematic disadvantage over time. Freire describes banking education on political, relational, and epistemological levels (1970/2000). First, banking education is *politically* aligned with the interests of the elite or privileged in society in Freire's view. While students and the mass of disadvantaged members of society have little say regarding curricular content, pedagogy, or learning goals or outcomes, banking education reflects the will of powerful members of society, who wish to keep the status quo of inequity and oppression in place. In terms of *relations*, unequal power positions are embodied through the teaching-centered classroom environment. The teacher and his or her thoughts and views are at the center or the "front" of classroom focus, and thus that of student aspirations and labor, as Freire observes. Students face the teacher as individuals, and the teacher has a one-to-one relationship with each student, wherein the teacher assesses each student according to top-down standards. Students stand in relation to one another only as competitors in a material context in banking education. Knowledge, it follows, is used nearly as a tool against students, against their collective flourishing. Schooling does not normally empower them as a community, as Freire sees it, but serves to maintain the unequal political-economic status quo, although it is expressed as neutral and objective.

Student-centered, problem-posing education, or "pedagogy of the oppressed," is the opposite: students should have an equal say in education's goals and features, *their* experiences and values are the focus of practice, and *their* views, in acts of constructing meaningful collective understanding, are conceived as valuable knowledge.

Though *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* has a clear Marxist sociopolitical orientation, focused on class conflict, that is not palatable across all contemporary contexts today, its student-centered educational perspective has resonated quite broadly with many theorists and teachers across diverse societies in recent decades. Its influence can be seen in student-centered statements on pedagogy, echoed in national- and international-level policy documents, that regard classrooms where students are active in social construction of knowledge and where their interests and background experiences are considered as more productive to enhance learning (Jackson 2015). Such statements reflect the recent popularity of the view that empowering learners entails listening to and considering them fully as humans, in contrast to traditional teacher-centered approaches that trace the banking-education classroom power relation.

However, many educators also observe today how pedagogical concerns can get split from curricular and measurement issues in contemporary education, maintaining schooling environments that are not entirely student-centered from a Freirean view, though they are described as student centered in reform discourse. They observe that content knowledge is, across a great variety of educational settings worldwide, rarely developed by students or teachers in local, as Freirean endorsed. Instead, across diverse setting standards are organized increasingly at an international level, to enhance educational accountability and transferability and mobility across systems (Rizvi and Lingard 2010; Berman et al. 2007). Furthermore, in so-called student-centered contexts, teachers can be seen as accountable and therefore as the key focus for scrutiny and intervention (such as through professional development processes), rather than students. Unlike the basic banking education framework which casts teachers as powerful and students as powerless, teachers also report feeling like pawns in this case! They are held to account, like their students, to higher-ups from this alternative standpoint. As their success or performance hinges in part on the work of students, some suggest that the assumed power relationship of teacher and student in the banking-education formula is inverted

in contemporary student-centered education (Jackson 2015).

Furthermore, Freire's own view of the teacher-student relationship in everyday educational spaces is less binary than the basic framing of the two in banking education initially suggests. In *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, Freire notes that so-called oppressors are also victims of dehumanization, as the oppressed are, within oppressive systems. For the empowerment of both, the liberation of the oppressed is essential. Yet this liberation does not depend on liberation by oppressors but by their self-emancipation, as Freire contends. This liberation, authored by the oppressed (in a new harmony with former oppressors), has an empowering and humanizing impact on both. In later works (2005), Freire also observes that complicated and inverse power dynamics can be found in classrooms between middle-class teachers and elite students, reflecting a nuanced view of learning relations in education, rather than a simple binary approach.

Major challenges for practicing problem-posing education follow from the recognition that teachers are not all powerful in designing education and enhancing educational opportunities. In contexts where banking education has been commonly used, educators may struggle with balancing power relations. On the one hand, Freire's theory suggests that one must strive to change him or herself through envisioning a new kind of classroom climate, as a teacher may not have experienced liberatory education as a student. A related situation is faced by Freirean professors and teacher educators, who may struggle to persuade teacher education students to see a student-centered practice as feasible (see Budge 2015; Neumann 2015). People tend to view as essential to education features from their own school experience. If a teacher experienced a teacher centered or banking model of education as a student, he or she may feel uncomfortable with implementing a different style in his or her own class. He or she may fear a new approach does not count as proper education, as has been seen among teachers facing various educational reforms generally. On the other hand, a framework where students are active in constructing

knowledge and generating social problems and solutions also depends more on students' willingness and ability to express their views. Thus, educational reformers in diverse contexts note that changing pedagogy in the course of an individual's overall formal education can be met with (perhaps unwitting) resistance from the student. If students do not count their views as knowledge or valuable due to their past educational experiences, this may fuel resistance.

There are also situations where teachers have less power than students in the first place in the educational system, contrary to the view that banking education is the *de facto* state in schooling. Teachers may feel at the mercy of students as the latter's achievement in standardized tests increasingly is used to measure their own work performance. Alternatively, there are cases where students may resist teacher authority and knowledge, having greater political or material power in society. The discourse of student-centered versus teacher-centered education (banking vs. problem-posing education) supposes that teachers are powerful within a society, but this does not hold true across societies worldwide nor within all segments of a society. In elite schools and in societies where many educators are relatively disadvantaged, teachers can face students refusing their knowledge, views, and/or pedagogies. As student-centered or problem-posing education is dependent upon active student participation, such students can reject problem-posing education in favor of banking education.

The United Arab Emirates has a context of empowered students who want banking education. In this society, local students are elites compared to migrant laborer teachers in schools (Jackson 2015). It is difficult to apply a Freirean framing here. When teachers are migrant laborers coming from outside the society, it is not straightforward that their particular pedagogies are aligned to appropriate visions of indigenous empowerment. Where cultural differences across host and sending countries are clear, local students may see it as in their interest to reject the influence of foreign or global interventions, in seeming alignment with a decolonization orientation as elaborated by Freire. In such a case, it would

seem that banking education could be demanded by students who want to resist undue outside cultural influence on their lives, while a problem-posing education is a globalist incursion on students who may not clearly experience harmful oppression or inequity (Jackson 2015).

This situation also brings to mind how problem-posing education ultimately requires more of students, intellectually and emotionally. Problem posing can make individuals vulnerable to despair, as real-life problems are complicated and hard to resolve. Such realizations can lead one to feel bleak regarding the impossibility of resolving problems once and for all (Roberts 2016). Problem posing in the classroom can also bring out conflicts across students, who may not all face or experience problems in similar ways. This creates more complex classroom dynamics than those in the contrasting, presumed neutral, teacher-centered classroom, for both students and teachers.

From a Freirean perspective, such labor may be worthwhile, to change society for the empowerment of all. Yet as Freire notes, students may be socialized before entering the problem-posing classroom toward banking-education attitudes about schooling and society. In this case, a teacher meets with their "false understanding of the world" (Freire 1970/2000). This also presents a problem for a progressive educator: if empowerment requires the equality of the teacher and students, relying on a dialogue where both parties' experiences, values, and interests are considered, is it reasonable or coherent for a Freirean educator to judge students' views as false or naïve? Acts of authoritarian judgment of, and the desire to correct, false understanding risk retracing the traditional, banking view, wherein the teacher knows best. How an educator can encourage students, without exerting undue will, thus remains a challenge for many Freirean educators and philosophers of education in conceiving of and practicing problem-posing education.

Freire writes of these and other challenges without offering anything like a recipe to resolve them (1997). In light of such concerns, he does encourage educators to remain *hopeful* in the quest for education as a liberatory act of societal reconstruction. In Freire's writings, hope can be

seen as an essential element in the quest for humanization that he regarded as part of what it means to be a human, unfinished and not determined (Roberts 2016). Freire saw problem posing and human desire to resolve problems through increasing understanding as natural parts of what it means to be human. The processes of dialogue, accompanied by the ongoing practice of dialogic virtues of compassion and empathy, humility, open-mindedness, and honesty, always have as its purpose problem posing and problem exploration in Freire's view. Starting a dialogue that aims to enhance mutual understanding is therefore more critical to humanization and mutual empowerment of educators and students from a Freirean perspective than alleviating false consciousness authoritatively.

Some, including Freire himself, have suggested that faith is implied in such processes. There is no guide or linear progression. Freire would assert that such a notion is contrary to problem posing within authentic contexts that is essential to pedagogy for liberation. Rather, there is a process of increasing mutual understanding around issues of social significance that leads to some exploration of what can be done in the future, as well as identification of further problems and challenges. When faced with the difficulties of implementing problem-posing education in tough circumstances, teachers pursuing dialogue for better understanding of the context at hand, including their students as individuals and their lives, may find that they need to rely on hope and faith. Such hope and faith are seen from a Freirean view as more human or natural alternatives to cynical reversion to banking education, for example, or giving in to student desires. Such "advice" (to have hope. . .) might not be seen as practical to the most proactive educational reformer or innovator, who wishes to turn things upside down in the classroom at a rapid pace. Yet Freire did not see reversing the status quo or token reaction as solutions to the challenges of education in society, in his work. As humanization and empowerment are relational, having hope and encouraging hope in others can be seen from a Freirean lens as more

modest first steps toward an appropriately reconstructive form of education

Freire's philosophy of education has inspired educators around the world, and his model of banking versus problem-posing education has had a particular impact, as the former model resonates with many people's own educational experiences, while the latter symbolizes a conceivable educational utopia. Yet despite its attractiveness in the abstract, the model of pedagogy for the oppressed and problem-posing education can be quite difficult to implement in classrooms. It is not just a matter of educators handing over power in contemporary education but of both educators and students gaining greater power over their lives and labor. As a utopian vision, it can be challenging to implement a kind of education one has not experienced or to participate in it as a student with contrasting past experiences. Finally, students and educators may retain attraction to banking education for a host of pragmatic reasons: it is easier, more comfortable, less risky, and less emotionally and intellectually taxing. This raises a question of how educators can implement problem-posing education when students may express desire for banking education, which seems to paradoxically demand that teachers use banking education to respect students within a problem-posing orientation! Though Freire offers no recipes, the importance of hope in educational endeavors remains vital in such impasses, according to a Freirean view. As we are not finished beings but possess hope as essential to our quest for humanization, exploring possibilities relationally remains important despite such major challenges.

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Subcultures

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Sustainability and Education

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Synonyms

[Education for sustainable development](#); [Sustainability competencies](#); [Sustainability didactics](#)

Introduction

In this entry, we consider how the transition to a healthy society existing on an ecologically viable Earth requires committed, critical, and competent citizens whose education enables them to aspire to values that are not purely based on the material side of their existence but also on care for fellow human beings and, indeed, other species, here and elsewhere, now and in the future. From this perspective, sustainability is primarily viewed as a driver of educational innovation, and education as a driver of sustainability. More specifically, sustainability is held to be an emerging property of an ongoing learning process, rather than an agreed upon outcome that can be comfortably and authoritatively prescribed, transferred, or taught. Examples of the possibilities and limitations of education and learning in addressing the key sustainability issues of our time are also introduced, highlighting the significance of *Bildung*, wicked problems, and whole-of-institution approaches.

Sustainability: What Does Education Have to Do with It?

Despite over 40 years of effort to promote and develop environmental education (EE), and over 20 years of the equivalent for education for sustainable development (ESD), educational philosophy, theory, policy, or practice has not been sufficiently reoriented to serve the well-being of people and planet. Unsurprisingly, forces to ensure that education services economic needs prevail, e.g., by positioning young people as flexible workers who switch jobs in line with changing economic demands (Nussbaum 2010). As a result, education has, in many instances, been governed by the global economic climate, rather than become a field of activity that also addresses the ecological climate, that is, fosters the means to become more human and more sustainable.

This is despite the growing recognition in society that sustainability concerns need to come into focus in education, even if it is not so clear how to do this. In part, this is a result of what we might call the nature of sustainability and associated challenges. On the one hand, sustainability is urgent, yet on the other, it is inevitably unknown and unknowable. Furthermore, it remains a contested concept both normatively and scientifically (although there is increased consensus within the scientific community about the rapidly declining state of the planet). This is compounded in the case of sustainable *development*, as some groups in society consider the suggestion that we must always develop to be highly problematic and inherently unsustainable. Equally, the relationship between education and development is a continuous subject of debate (McCowan and Unterhalter 2015). So key questions to be asked include: Should education always lead to development? And are all forms of development appropriate for all, including all species?

Within the field of educational philosophy and theory, leading scholars such as Martha Nussbaum, Michael Apple, and Gert Biesta, who paid little attention to global sustainability challenges early on in their careers, are beginning to address such questions. They are now strong advocates for strengthening the role of education

in co-creating more equitable, democratic, responsible, and meaningful ways of living (see Apple 2010; Biesta 2014, and Nussbaum 2010). In this essay, we consider key parameters for these and other responses.

Sustainable Development and Sustainability: Hopelessly Ill-Defined or Attractively Vague?

While there is very little reasonable doubt about the seriousness of the global socio-ecological challenges threatening our planet, there is a lot of *unreasonable* doubt around such topics as climate change, intentionally created by interest groups seeking to maintain current unhealthy systems. Citizens and, indeed, many educators and policy-makers, among them, can find themselves confused and caught in the middle, often defaulting to the everyday routines and systems they are accustomed to in their personal and professional lives.

Nonetheless, the existence of diverse definitions and interpretations of various sustainability-related notions in different contexts may be inevitable and furthermore desirable. From the perspective of education, the view that sustainable development is something that requires continuous learning in order to find out what works best within a given context and given with what we know today is an interesting one: sustainable development as a journey, rather than a destination (Scott and Gough 2004). However, the ill-definedness, contestation, and confusion connected with such terms can easily become an excuse to not engage with sustainability in education. This might be a risky response as emerging sustainability challenges are too important to be ignored by educators, most recently and forcefully expressed in the UN's Sustainable Development Goals. For those who do want to engage, there are a number of educational challenges to grapple with.

First, the growing urgency may require quick instrumental responses to change people's lifestyles and behaviors. In the extreme, these could lead to an eco-totalitarian society where education

is one of several “tools” to be used instrumentally. This instrumental response might be considered problematic when education is seen as *Bildung* (Biesta 2014). *Bildung* usually refers to semiautonomous learning processes that enable people to become human through their own exploration, discovery, and interaction with and in the world, mindful of its possibilities and constraints (physically, socially, morally, ecologically, economically, culturally). In EE, and more recently in ESD, such a perspective is referred to as an emancipatory perspective, where the nature of the sustainability crisis calls for a rethinking of values, reconnecting people with places, and leading meaningful, ethical, morally defensible, and globally responsible lives. Here education is about enabling people to deal with, among other things, complexity, uncertainty, ambiguity, and loss of identity and sense of place, in a meaningful, ethical, and caring way (on the latter, see Noddings 2005). From an emancipatory point of view, education is not an instrument to be used to prescribe certain behaviors or inculcate certain values, but rather a means for meaningful engagement, making deliberate choices, and for relating and connecting with the world on both human and more-than-human grounds.

At the same time, there are more socio-critical perspectives that call for critique, disruption, and transformation, and developing people’s capacities to contribute to all three. Education, it is argued, needs to enable and empower people to question and even disrupt unsustainable patterns (abuse of power, exploitation, marginalization) and systems (capitalism with built-in inequities and a focus on growth and expansion), while simultaneously exploring new ones that are based on healthier relations between people and between people and planet.

Perhaps from an “educative” point of view, it may be more generative to consider sustainability as an emergent and continuously redefined and recalibrated property. This reconceptualization needs to occur within and is a function of the physical boundaries (e.g., the Earth’s “biocapacity”) and social boundaries (e.g., limits of democracy and participation). In fact, Biesta (2014) argues that we cannot always focus on

personal growth and development as if this is an infinite possibility: we must also learn to live with constraints and within boundaries and learn to live meaningful, fulfilling, and responsible lives within inevitable limitations. In a sense, the seminal “Limits to Growth” warning from the Club of Rome in the early 1970s not only applies to economic development but also to human development, and perhaps, any form of development. This position does not match well with prevailing innovation, development, and growth discourse.

The Difficulty of Reorienting Education

That educational systems have hardly engaged with sustainability is hardly surprising when considering the everyday reality of schooling (Wals and Dillon 2015). Three widely reported global trends are particularly unhelpful:

1. Teachers are held accountable for the performance of their students in international comparisons such as the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA), which focus on literacy, numeracy, and science, making it difficult for them to engage in something as ill-defined as “sustainability.”
2. People, including pupils and students, spend many waking hours gazing at an electronic screen looking for instant gratification and quick responses, even during school hours. This makes it hard to develop a sense of place and to connect more deeply with the complex issues of sustainability affecting our world.
3. Although, not officially and often subliminally, educational institutions are increasingly seen as the manufacturing sites for the “human capital” needed to serve the economy. They are also treated as places where the seeds of consumerism can be planted from an early age, as seen in the growing influence of commercial interests shaping education systems.

Nonetheless, there are parts of the world where there is space for teaching and learning in a more sustainability-oriented education system. Several factors, often in combination, seem to be critical

for such an education to occur, including (Wals and Dillon 2015):

- Space for a localized curriculum;
- A school ethos conducive to connectivity and place-based learning
- A culture of reflexivity as opposed to a culture of accountability
- A local community concerned about sustainability
- The vision, leadership, and capacities of key educators

It may come as a surprise to find there are countries where the entire school system has adapted to the challenges of teaching for sustainability while also doing well on international comparisons. Finland is one such example where schools are permitted to develop their own localized curricula working on existentially relevant issues without losing sight of the so-called basics. It helps, of course, that in Finland, teachers have a high status in society, are well paid, and are encouraged to research their own practice. A key question then is whether the nature of sustainability, both conceptually and empirically, calls for a particular pedagogical and didactical orientation, and a particular way of schooling.

Sustainability Pedagogy

Sustainability pedagogy is hardly referred to in current discourses on education and learning. But in linking with the earlier referred to as a *Bildung* orientation as an appropriate orientation to emancipatory education, it is useful to reflect on what sustainability pedagogy might entail. Pedagogy in general refers to the creation of spaces (emotional, social, and physical) that are conducive for learners to develop, become, and be in the world. Sustainability pedagogy adds to this a normative orientation that presupposes a certain way of developing, becoming, and being in the world in light of certain expectations (e.g., about living together, what is fair, just and democratic) and inevitable constraints (e.g., the fragility of eco-systems and limits to the carrying capacity

of the Earth). There are some clues available about what such pedagogy might entail, based on critical pedagogy and place-based pedagogy, but also on earlier work done in the field of environmental education. These suggest that such pedagogy would need to be:

- Relational (allowing for caring for and connecting with people, places, other species, etc.), critical (allowing for critique and questioning),
- “Actional” (allowing for agency and creating change), ethical (opening up spaces for ethical considerations and moral dilemmas),
- Political (confrontational, transgressive and disruptive of routines, systems and structures when deemed appropriate).

Sustainability Didactics

Sustainability, as an inevitably ill-defined and ill-structured concept, poses didactical challenges too. Sustainability represents what some refer to as *wicked problems*. These defy definition, have no single solution that works always and everywhere, are marinated in ambiguity, and are submerged in conflicts of interest among multiple stakeholders. Sustainability, in a sense, cannot be taught. At best, teachers can create environments that are conducive to the exploration of sustainability issues around climate change, poverty, food security, biodiversity, and so on. As such, teaching *about* as well as *for* sustainability also becomes an educational design challenge.

Given this, there is a need to develop a new didactical orientation that enables learners to grapple with wicked problems. It requires teaching and learning and the design of learning environments or spaces that enable learners to:

- See the world more holistically through, for instance, systems thinking
- See the local manifestations of global phenomena but also the global manifestations of their own choices and actions
- Consider different perspectives (e.g., past-present-future but also to consider short- and

- long-term effects, through the eyes of others, other species and the more-than-human world)
- Deal with complexity and uncertainty, not with the aim of reducing them but rather with the aim of making it generative for reflection and continuous learning
- Navigate socio-scientific disputes, anticipate probable futures, and imagine and articulate more desirable ones
- Move beyond awareness and the threat of paralysis by actively involving them in change and transformation
- Reflect on and discuss values, ethics, and moral dilemmas

Sustainability didactics can be developed within distinct traditional subject areas (e.g., within Mathematics) or can become a cross-cutting approach that integrates or transcends specific approaches that align with the traditional academic disciplines.

Schooling for Sustainability: Boundary Crossing and Whole School Approaches

One way to work on sustainability competencies and outcomes in a meaningful and integrated way is to take existential or “real” sustainability issues as a starting point for teaching and learning, advancing more reflective ways of thinking while also engaging learners in change and transformation. A so-called whole-of-institution approach to sustainability is a good example of simultaneously creating more responsive and responsible teaching and learning, improving health and environment in and around the school, strengthening school-community relationships, and creating space for participation and transformation. Such an approach implies a different way of designing spaces for learning, in that it allows for boundary crossing between different disciplines, perspectives, interests, and values. Research on the impact of whole-of-institution approaches in the UK suggests that such an approach has the potential to improve the school ethos, the quality of both health, and students’ learning and reduces the school’s ecological

footprint (Barratt Hacking et al. 2010). However, a recent Australian study points out a range of problematic aspects, such as when impact is foregrounded over educational priorities and concerns, and factors that bring about influence on sustainability and educational outcomes are not understood transparently and ethically (Rickinson et al. 2016).

Nevertheless, sustainability education can be seen as a mechanism for capacity-building and the creation of so-called vital coalitions or partnerships to enable citizens, young and old, to determine together what it takes to move from their current ways of living. These typically rely on consumption, continuous growth, and technology, at the expense of more sustainable ways of living that not only meet economic needs but also and foremost, address the needs of people and planet (Noddings 2005). Multiple actors are brought together in the context of addressing a common sustainability challenge, using a blend of learning processes (for instance, discovery learning, joint fact finding, problem-based learning, social learning, interdisciplinary learning, place-based learning) in order to bring about real, meaningful, and responsible change, with people and planet in mind (Biesta 2014).

Concluding Remarks

At its heart, sustainability has something to do with an ability to sustain. But *what* to sustain? *what for?* and *how?* are critical questions that are not easily answered, particularly as the world changes rapidly. Knowledge quickly becomes obsolete and values and interests shift, as do the powers that drive them – through, as well as despite, education. The indeterminacy of sustainability, coupled with the normative position of having a moral responsibility of taking care of people and planet in a way that enables quality and dignified lives for all – including nonhuman species – now and in the future, calls for new and renewed forms of learning, learning spaces, and learning environments. When sustainability is considered an emerging property of an ongoing learning process, a key focus needs to be on the

spaces (physical, social, cultural, and psychological) and the conditions (levers, barriers, support mechanisms) that allow for such learning to take place in the first instance. These learning spaces and conditions should allow for the critique and even subversion and disruption of existing frameworks, frames, institutions, rules of the game, procedures, and patterns that have been established over time, particularly in recognizing that these may have been useful in the times they were conceived but may turn out to be inherently unsustainable.

Thus by stressing disruptive capacity-building and transgressive learning (see also Lotz-Sisitka et al. 2015), the focus of education can shift away from learning to cope with the negative and disempowering effects of the current hegemonic ways of “producing,” “consuming,” and “living,” towards addressing root causes of unsustainability as part of the wider quest for morally defensible, ethical, and meaningful lives. As such, sustainability can become a driver of educational innovation in education, while simultaneously education and learning can become drivers of sustainability.

Cross-References

- [Environmental Activism](#)
- [Environmental Learning](#)

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Taking Our Time: Slow Learning, Cautious Teaching

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In his later works, Wittgenstein offers some remarks that seem to point to the importance of slowness in various kinds of learning. A principal object of his interest is the making of progress in philosophy. In *Culture and Value* (1980, 80e), we read that philosophers should greet each other by saying “Take your time!” and that “In philosophy the winner of the race is the one who can run most slowly. Or: the one who gets to the winning post last” (34e). Wittgenstein notes that his own writing – his own “sentences,” as he puts it, which here must mean his philosophical writing – is “all to be read *slowly*” (57e, emphasis in original). His other remarks on the importance of slowness include, in the collection of fragments published as *Zettel*, the warning that “In philosophy we may not *terminate* a disease of thought. It must run its natural course, and *slow* cure is all important” (§ 382). The emphases are in the original: they seem themselves to enjoin a slow reading.

In this short chapter, I ask a number of questions. Why should philosophy necessarily be slow? We should not assume that the answer here is obvious, for example because the philosopher goes about constructing her arguments with

an unusual degree of care. Might what Wittgenstein writes here about progress in philosophy be true also of other forms of thoughtful apprehension and ratiocination? Yet I do not mean to attribute to Wittgenstein a theory of learning, still less a theory of all learning. That would go against the efforts he made in his later work to insist that he only made “investigations” (see the first sentence of his Preface to the *Philosophical Investigations* 1972, p. vii) and that he offered only “miscellaneous remarks” (*Vermischte Bemerkungen*). The edition of a translation of these under the title of *Culture and Value* is unfortunate in suggesting something more coherent, when the emphasis on “miscellaneous remarks” warns us neither to expect to find a systematic theory here nor, by implication, to construct one on the basis of them. It is nevertheless interesting to ask – to investigate – whether what Wittgenstein writes largely about the learning of philosophy may have some wider bearing. I shall do this by considering possible connections between “slowness” and some of Wittgenstein’s other central ideas, particularly the idea that art, rather than science, might be a model for understanding, and his well-known conception of philosophy as a kind of therapy. Why and in what ways might all this seem to require or involve a kind of slowness?

The reflections that I offer on these questions are lent topicality by the tendency of educational systems throughout the developed world today to emphasize the very opposite of slowness. “New and improved” education must instead constantly

be, as Fendler notes (2008), “faster, more powerful and longer lasting.” For instance, why should a university student not complete a bachelor’s degree in 2 years rather than 3? Such accelerated programs are usually designated “fast-track,” to trade on the associations of elite athletes or first-class train travel; at the same time advertisements tend to foreground the advantages of paying only 2 years’ worth of fees and entering the job market sooner (Staffordshire University n.d.). In education in schools, but now increasingly in higher education too, PISA (Programme for International Student Assessment) with the cooperation of the OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) is widely held to be responsible for the manic demands for quick solutions and immediate results. Its 3-year assessment cycle is blamed for causing “a shift of attention to short-term fixes designed to help a country quickly climb the rankings, despite research showing that enduring changes in education practice take decades, not a few years, to come to fruition” (Andrews et al. 2014). This leads to ignoring the “important role of non-educational factors, among which a nation’s socio-economic inequality is paramount. In many countries, including the US, inequality has dramatically increased over the past 15 years, explaining the widening educational gap between rich and poor which education reforms, no matter how sophisticated, are unlikely to redress” (ibid.). The first step toward a better understanding of nation states’ relative educational performance is clear: “slow down the testing juggernaut” (ibid.). The emphasis on “short-term fixes,” by contrast, leads to the desperate search for the philosopher’s stone of “accelerated learning,” versions of which generally rely on a few dubious or discredited shibboleths such as talk of “brain learning,” Howard Gardner’s theory of multiple intelligences, and the idea that we each possess a “personal learning style” (see Accelerated Learning Systems Limited 2001 for an example that includes all of these).

What does Wittgenstein mean by *slow* learning, then, and on what grounds does he value it? His remarks on this in *Culture and Value* occur in the context of reflections on art and especially poetry and music. At 34e, where we also find his remark

about the winner coming last to the winning post, he quotes Longfellow’s poem *The Builders*:

In the elder days of art
Builders wrought with greatest care
Each minute and unseen part,
For the gods are everywhere.

This stanza was so important to Wittgenstein that he considered adopting it as a motto for the *Philosophical Investigations* (Brenner 1999, p. 11). In fact the last line is not Longfellow’s: he wrote “For the gods see everywhere.” The alteration may be intentional (Baker and Hacker 2005, p. 32). Wittgenstein’s version of it strongly recalls a remark attributed to the early Greek philosopher, Heraclitus, usually quoted as “there are gods everywhere.” The next stanza seems to confirm that Wittgenstein had this in mind, whether he changed the wording in the previous stanza deliberately or unconsciously:

Let us do our work as well,
Both the unseen and the seen;
Make the house, where Gods may dwell,
Beautiful, entire, and clean.

It is worth recalling the context which supposedly occasioned Heraclitus’s famous remark. Some visitors had come to see the celebrated philosopher and were disconcerted to find him warming himself at his stove, as if such an everyday activity was incompatible with his status and reputation. The story is told by Aristotle (*De Partibus Animalium* I 5.645a15-23): Heraclitus “urged his visitors to come in without fear, for there were gods there too.” We might express this by saying he reminded them that the element of the sublime that they expected to find was indeed present in the room, in the most mundane particulars (Gregoric 2001). There is thus a nice irony in that Heraclitus denies them the kind of profound philosophical observation that they seek (of the sort that they could proudly relate to their friends back home) and in doing so offers them one worth their visit, if they have the wit to see it.

We are to take our time then, and run the race slowly, by being prepared to engage, to wrestle, with the details of the ideas that puzzle us – the “minute and unseen parts,” as it were – thinking

them through for ourselves rather than expecting to find, even to have served up to us, ready-made answers of a recognizably philosophical kind, or literary or historical kind depending on the context. We might compare Wittgenstein's insistence that philosophers have to "go the bloody *hard* way" (Rhees 1969, emphasis in original). The point is not that philosophy inevitably involves drudgery. It is more that going the hard way is essential in order to proceed against the tendency to seek comfort or stimulus (*ibid.*).

Although Wittgenstein instances only philosophy when he recommends the virtues of slowness, it is not difficult to think of everyday examples from formal education. We might imagine a class of sixth formers learning to read a poem: in this case one by James Fenton, whose title is *Nothing* (2013). It is necessary to include the poem here in full:

I take a jewel from a junk-shop tray
And wish I had a love to buy it for.
Nothing I choose will make you turn my way
Nothing I give will make you love me more.

I know that I've embarrassed you too long
And I'm ashamed to linger at your door.
Whatever I embark on will be wrong
Nothing I do will make you love me more.

I cannot work. I cannot read or write.
How can I frame a letter to implore.
Eloquence is a lie. The truth is trite.
Nothing I say will make you love me more.

So I replace the jewel in the tray
And laughingly pretend I'm far too poor.
Nothing I give, nothing I do or say,
Nothing I am will make you love me more.

It is no disrespect to the beginning student of poetry to say that she is likely to identify the speaker of the poem with the poet and to assume that the poet has been rejected by someone he or she is in love with. One Internet version encourages this, declaring that it is "a poem about unrequited love in honour of Valentine's day. James Fenton speaks of that simple, sad truth which most of us have to accept at some point in our lives – the fact that we just aren't wanted." The confident connection to Valentine's Day and to the alleged

"simple, sad truth" attempts to fix the meaning of the poem in place by nailing it to reality: as if the meaning of the poem could be fixed and grasped easily and, of course, quickly.

A slower and more attentive reader may notice a problem here. The speaker of the poem addresses someone he or she calls "you," and the second stanza indicates a relationship that has a past ("I've embarrassed you too long"), an unhappy present ("I'm ashamed to linger at your door"), and a future, even if it is an empty or frustrating one ("Whatever I embark on will be wrong"). These sound, we might think, like real pasts, presents, and futures. They encourage the identification of the speaker with the poet and the assumption that the poem is autobiographical. However, the literary figure of the lover shut out at the door of the beloved is one of the oldest in poetry, so common in the poetry of classical Rome and Greece that it has its own technical term: the *paraclausithyron* (Smith 2014).

Once the reader is alerted to the distinctively literary quality of the poem and is thus released from the expectation of finding a simple meaning located in autobiographical fact, she might notice and enjoy the paradox of a line of poetry that declares "I cannot work. I cannot read or write." She might even explore the possibility of a reading in which nothing will make the speaker more loved because he is already as loved as he can be: in which case he is not so much desperate at being wholly unloved but in search of the impossible guarantee of perfect love. In that case, so far from pitying himself for being unloved, he is gently laughing at himself (final stanza) for his search for that guarantee: and then the last two lines register his realization that he is loved as much as can be reasonably be hoped for.

One reader treats such explorations with impatience, wanting to nail down "the meaning" and move on. Another reader relishes the play of interpretation. Something similar is often the case in the study of history: one student expects to be able to conclude, fairly quickly and with a degree of finality, that Germany held or did not hold imperialistic ambitions in 1914 and these were (or were not) among the causes of the First World War. The more sophisticated historian

understands and even relishes the way that interpretations change, so that it is hardly possible to state with finality just what the causes of the First World War were.

A comparable contrast can be found in different approaches to the experience of art. On the one hand, there is the long contemplation and repeated revisiting of an artwork that yields dawning recognition of its complexities. On the other hand, to take a particular example, in 2014 Amsterdam's Rijksmuseum hosted an exhibition called "Art is Therapy." It was intended to show "what art can mean to visitors. And not so much from an (art-) historical point of view, but focusing rather on the therapeutic effect that art can have and the big questions in life that art can answer" (Rijksmuseum Amsterdam 2014). The usual labels, which often give little more than the name of the artist and the date of the painting, were variously replaced or upstaged by enormous yellow Post-it notes. For example, a painting of a tumultuous naval battle "is frank about pride in achievement," according to its accompanying Post-it, and stands as a reproof to our tamer and less spirited world where we often lack "the sheer courage and force of character" to see things through. The message is that "Goodness should be strong" (ibid.). Here everything there is to say about the painting is readily known in advance, without the need for any real engagement with it, without the effort and slow struggle of interpretation. The visitor only needs to glance at the Post-it and move on. It is not hard to see that the nature of teaching in the arts is at issue here (Smith 2015).

There is a familiar philosophical distinction between *Erklären* (explanation) and *Verstehen* (understanding) that registers much of the contrast sketched above. *Erklären* has its principal home in the natural sciences, as when we seek to explain the phenomenon of the rainbow. *Verstehen* points to the interpretative element in understanding a poem, painting, or indeed a person. While there should be no implication that explanation in the natural sciences is typically a quick matter, still less a rushed one, nevertheless an explanation that is arrived at speedily (an explanation of an outbreak of typhus, say) is clearly desirable; and once the correct explanation has been arrived at, there is

usually no need for further research, at least as far as the simple explanation of the particular phenomenon is concerned. Things are different with *Verstehen* or understanding. One's understanding of a poem or sculpture is always provisional or, in the title of this chapter, cautious: the reader may want to revise her interpretation of a particular poem or artifact at some point in the future, and another critic may offer an interpretation that she will concede is an improvement on her own.

One way to think of the difference between the earlier and the later Wittgenstein – roughly, between the author of the *Tractatus* and the author of the *Philosophical Investigations* – is that the earlier Wittgenstein is strongly inclined to take scientific and mathematical knowledge and its acquisition as the model for all knowledge and its acquisition. This is perhaps one reason why Wittgenstein remarks that mathematicians make bad philosophers (1967 § 382). The later Wittgenstein is far more hospitable to the idea that there are many kinds of knowledge and many ways of learning or – what comes down to much the same thing – that metaphors from a wide range of human experience may prove illuminating here. The regular references to art and music in *Culture and Value* seem to play this role, in part. They draw attention to the emotional and volitional aspects of cognition. Thus, shortly before his remark that philosophers should greet each other by saying "Take your time" (80e), Wittgenstein writes:

I may find scientific questions interesting, but they never really grip me. Only *conceptual* and *aesthetic* questions do that. At bottom I am indifferent to the solution of scientific problems; but not the other sort. (79e, emphasis in original)

Some brief remarks about Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy as a kind of therapy (*PI* §133 and elsewhere) will serve as a conclusion. First, a particular "disease of thought" in our time that stands in need of therapy is our expectation that there will always be quick answers and easy routes to comfort or satisfaction. Secondly, the therapist – one working in the traditions of psychoanalysis and psychotherapy – works slowly. The patient is not to be offered solutions, but helped to learn how to go about finding solutions.

Wittgenstein regards this as an essential feature of therapy, writing that “In philosophy we may not *terminate* a disease of thought. It must run its natural course, and *slow* cure is all important” (*Zettel* 382, original emphasis). It should be unnecessary to add that quick answers are indeed desirable in many areas of life and that perspicuity and quickness of apprehension are in most cases significant intellectual virtues. The cautious teacher simply bears in mind Wittgenstein’s reminder that there are by contrast areas – most prominently what he calls “conceptual and aesthetic” ones – where “bloody hard” and slow is the only way to go.

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Talanoa

► [Talanoa: A Tongan Research Methodology and Method](#)

Talanoa: A Tongan Research Methodology and Method

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Synonyms

Talanoa

Introduction

This paper examines *talanoa* as a notion that guides cultural approaches, pathways, and activities and which Pacific peoples undertake to create meanings about themselves within the world in which they live and their relationships to that world and to each other. It will also endeavor to unravel layers of *talanoa* to fathom the wisdom and the spirit within it and to discuss how it may be used as culturally appropriate methods and methodology for researching Pacific issues.

Talanoa, Context, and Some Background

The ideas about *talanoa* in this paper are written from a Tongan perspective, located in Aotearoa (New Zealand), which is predominantly western in its institutional values and general disposition. Māori as *tangata whenua* (people of the land) have challenged these positions over time for

more control over their own political, economic, and cultural development. In social development, Māori values and concepts were included in health and education policies, methodologies, and pedagogical approaches to make research and education more reflective of Māori realities and worldviews. The growing acceptance of Māori holistic notions (e.g., *aroha*/compassion, love), *awhi* (care, cultural support) as business, pedagogical, or research notions (Smith 2012; Vaioleti 2011), have fired my imagination to propose *talanoa* methods and methodology for Pacific research and others.

The word “tala” means to command, tell, relate, and inform while “noa” can mean common, of no value, or without exertion. *Talanoa* is a conversation, a talk, and an exchange of ideas, be it formal or informal (Churchward 1959). It is a verb but as a noun, and it can be a story. As a process, it is used in multiple ways to obtain information, building relationships and for creating and transferring knowledge. Tongans, Samoans, Fijians, and other Pacific communities in the Pacific, Aotearoa, Australia, and the USA use *talanoa* as discussed in this paper or variations of it.

While working in Fiji and Samoa in the early 2000, the way that leaders received information from the community, which they use to make decisions about civil, church, and national matters, was through *talanoa* (Vaioleti 2006). In the early 2000s, *talanoa* was written as a culturally appropriate means through which Pacific peoples can authentically share their issues in research and provide philosophies to guide it. This approach is the Talanoa Research Methodology (TRM). According to Farrelly and Nabobo-Baba (2012 in Vaioleti 2013), TRM is the most accepted Pacific methodology across the Pacific.

Talanoa: hala kuo papa (Well-Used/ Proven and Ancestral Pathway)

Talanoa itself as a word is functional and relational; it is an instruction of what to do and how that is to be done. It is an epistemological and ontological process that is used to explain

philosophies, to secure identity, to provide rationale for important decisions, to seek solutions, to heal, to entertain, and to cause *māfana* (positive warm feeling, energy) in peoples’ heart. It can be a storehouse, framework, and even a network in which knowledge, secrets, and other information are held. *Talanoa* as well as chants, songs, poems, phrases, and even iconic words are often ways of remembering genealogies, landmarks or oceanic pathways, tribal boundaries, signs of looming natural or man-made disasters, and even important prayers.

Because these types of knowledge were or are often about the difference between life or death, their preservation in the *mo’oni* (truest) form was paramount – hence, the accuracy of the *uho* (content), *fu* (sequence), and even sounds which later turned into written letters and words of *talanoa* are likely to have stayed *mo’oni* over generations of ancestors. The accuracy and robustness of the *talanoa* as a way of passing on and constructing knowledge are spiritually significant and have a proud and robust genealogy, and therefore I suggest a fitting base for a Pacific methodology.

My son Andreas, founder and owner of several companies, intrigued me with a particular gift. He was a spelling champion at primary and high schools. I recall him once sharing that he was fascinated by words, their construction, and their origin, and he spent much time breaking them up to form other words and even searching for possible foreign origins.

After much *talanoa mo hoku loto* (deep self-reflections), I realized that Andreas had a *faiva* (a magic, trick, formula, performance). His *faiva* was to treat words as stories. He would break up words into combinations of letters which he saw codes for different parts of the plot for a story. The codes were held together by the flow of the story. During his turn in the competitions, the judges will hear the combinations of the letters but for Andreas, it was the totality of his *talanoa* (story) he was reliving as the word spelling was unfolding.

I will use Andreas’ *faiva*, a *hala kuo papa*, to make Tongan iconic words *mahu’inga mālie* (contextually meaningful), but instead of using

the letters as plots for a story to guide the spelling, I will break up the iconic *talanoa* to sense if there are sounds or even some *laumālie* (essence or spirit) that may animate from it. I must however consider two foundational matters to guide this.

Tongan language is functional and relational, and as mentioned already, it is organized around specific epistemology and arranged ontologically. For this reason, it is neither grammatical nor simple in its meaning from a western or mainstream perspective. The second point to this is that the Tongan (and other Pacific) languages have tonal and rhythmic patterns: song-like, chant-like, poetic expressions and rhythmic in their *fu* (form); therefore, its delivery is also a *faiva* that can stir up *māfana* in one's own or another indignant person's heart.

If one is to analyze the word *talanoa* using the above perspectives, three tonal and ontological notions intersect rhythmically as in *ta-la-noa*. *Ta* is often known as *tā* meaning beat, as of a chant, pulse, or the beat of the heart. *Noa* on the other hand can be space and space is also known in Tongan, Samoan, and other Pacific languages as *vā*. *Ta*, *la* and *noa* are notional, functional, spiritual, relational and some of the cornerstones of Tongan onotogy.

An Epistemological and Ontological Unpacking of *Talanoa*

Ferris-Leary (2013, pp. 134–135) proposed that:

In accordance with Māhina's Ta-Va Theory of Reality and the Hypothesis of Laumālie, I propose . . . that Moana (Pacific) "words" are . . . constructed from intersections of other Moana "words" or abbreviations of "words" rather than having a specific linguistic root, and each "word" or "abbreviated word", implies through its *laumālie*, multiple and deeper layers of epistemological and ontological content. In other words, a single Moana "word" may be an "additive" construction using intersections of other "words" or . . . other "words" in order to include their *laumālie*.

When *tā* and *vā* are repeated, one will have pulse, pause, pulse, pause again, and again in a cyclic rhythmic dance (performance) a symbol of *mo'ui* (life, essence, sense of being alive) and


membership of a bigger collective. *Tā* energizes and *vā* provides the space to give meaning (*mālie*) to the *tā*. In Tongan performing arts, *tā* and *vā* occur in ways that create much *melie* (aesthetically sweet, pleasing emotion). In the ancient times, drumbeats were a form of long distant communications, and the *tā* (beats) and *vā* (spaces between beats) were arranged to communicate all cognitive and emotional and spiritual contents. *Tā* and *vā* of drumming were even used to energize people to fever excitements in preparation for battle. There seems to be direct connections between *tā* and *vā* of performing arts (*faiva* including *talanoa*) and the *loto e tangata* Tonga (psychology or essence of that Tongan person). Tongan thinkers such as Māhina and Ka'ili use *tā* and *vā* as theories of reality to explain and predict ontological phenomena of Pacific peoples, particularly Tongans.

The middle of *ta-la-noa* is *la*. *La* can be a short for *La'ā*, the word for the Sun, a god of the old Polynesian religions. *La'ā* directly or indirectly provided life's necessities, and much was tributed to it for those reasons. Polynesians as great navigators of the past prayed to the *La'ā* for favors in their oceanic travels. It is not a coincidence that the sail that took their great *vaka* (ships) to many new places is still called *la*. The genealogy of *la* may lead also to (*La*)*ngi* (sky), reference to the great spirit or the place of the god/s. Also, *la* is the start of *La(umalie)*, the Tongan for the great spirit, god. In the past, it was customary not to use a name of a god for fear of violating their *tapu*. When it was necessary to refer to them, it was the start of the name only that was mentioned.

If we accept *la* as symbolism for *La(umalie)*, then *tā* and *vā* have a third intersecting notion often associated with *māfana* (warm sense of anticipation, light-heartedness, positive warm sensation) which if intensified can lead to achieving *mālie* (elevated sense of spirituality; sense of ecstasy). *Manu'atu* (2002) shares how the processes of three Tongan concepts lead to achieving *mālie* from Tongan *katoanga faiva* (cultural performance of Tonga). She suggests that *mālie* is a process that produces meaningful connections between *ta'anga* (the context in Tongan language and culture), *hiva* (singing), and *haka* (the bodily

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Fig. 1 Graphical intersection that represents connections between *ta*, *la*, and *noa*



movements); the psyche and the spirit of both the performers and audience become *māfana* (light-heartedness, positive warm sensation), all of which energize and uplift people to a different level of spiritual enlightenment and oneness.

If *tā* and *vā* in *faiva* or even in the skilful to and fro in the performance of *talanoa* is repeated, then meaningful *mālie* can be achieved. If *mālie* is sustained over a period or intensified, it can lead to much elation even ecstasy and a sense of enhancement and positive well-being. This stage is often referred to by Tongans as *kuo tau-homau-langi* (we have touched or been touched by *langi*/heaven), or we are now one with the great spirit/god. This is the state of spirituality that Halapua (in Vaoleti 2013) suggested that if reached in *talanoa*, information that emmerge is straight from the heart, uncluttered hence can be trusted findings.

The figure below is a graphical intersection that represents a notional connection and relationship between *tā*, *laumalie*, and *noa* (*vā*). A metaphoric representation of the relationship in a research situation can be that *tā* is the researcher who may lead the *talanoa*. The participant is *noa*, the

giver of knowledge. *La* can be the goodwill, ethics, protocols, and the spirit that positively energize and guide the research relationship. (*La*)*umālie* may even be the aim and hope of the research, which will include a result that will benefit Pacific interests. The *laumālie* of *talanoa* will allow the participant to lead and be the *tā* at different stages in the to and fro of the *talanoa* fusion. *La* can even be the metaphor for the sail that harnesses the information fused between *tā* and *noa* (*vā*) (Fig. 1).

In terms of the value of this approach, Pacific societies have traditionally used the process of *talanoa* to both develop knowledge cooperation and understanding. *Talanoa* is a process that is an important part of social identity and a Pacific way of viewing and negotiating the world.

Talanoa as a Methodology

Methodology deals with the philosophy, the assumptions, and values that underlie and guide the methods used for TRM. TRM takes on a critical stance for emancipation purposes. For

talanoa, its “ology” is about centralizing Pacific ways and values in how the research methods are applied. For research, this should ensure that the integrity of Pacific participants and Pacific knowledge are maintained or enhanced and the result of research will be relevant and beneficial to Pacific issues.

In TRM both researcher/s and participants are active in the process and are involved in defining and redefining meanings in order to arrive at agreed knowledge. If philosophy is about the ways people undertake to understand or create the fundamentals about themselves, their world, and their relationships to that world and each other, then it is about those people constructing knowledge in their own ways, not as prescribed by other peoples’ ideals.

Langafonua (elevating or advancing the *fonua*) is Tongan for working together for the benefit of society or country. It is about co-building and can be represented by constructionism inherent in *talanoa*. *Langafonua* is the building or enhancing what *fonua* represents such as language and cultural notions such as *talanoa*. *Langafonua* by *talanoa* is achieved in spread and understanding of culture and ways of being by those involved. *Talanoa* told are lives re-lived and stories re-told are lives shared with an ever growing concentric circle of possible hosts for such knowledge. Every time they are shared, they have the chance to be examined, challenged, enriched, reshaped, recomposed, and re-owned through good *vā* (relationship, relational space). The circle of learning and reconstruction of fundamentals starts again so *talanoa* assures currency and relevancy of *fonua*.

Talanoa shares similarities with a narrative approach to research, especially with reference to the process used to share information, and sharing information is sharing of self. TRM shares a phenomenological approach to research with grounded theory, naturalist inquiry, and some ethnographical research approaches. In *talanoa*, however, culture is central and in such *talanoa* can become a specific environment too. In this sense while it is nonlinear and responsive like the above mainstream methodologies, *talanoa* is a phenomenological process that is appropriate to

Tongan or Pacific environment, and philosophy therefore is different as it is ontologically embedded.

In previous papers I have argued that for a while Pacific peoples have been exposed to research that have not been beneficial for them and suggested that non-Pacific/indigenous methodologies and methods used to guide research for Pacific issues were ill-equipped to fully comprehend Pacific phenomena. The quality of *talanoa*, and thus TRM, is dependent on how accurately a researcher can recognize participant actions and nonactions, what is said and unsaid in combination with how they are or are not said (*fiuo*), and then affirming and interpreting those through the cultural ways of the participant (*uho*). These involve *tā* and *vā* (the researcher and participant/s). What is obvious is the third element represented by *la* and in this case *laumālie* (spirit or spirituality) as represented by *mālie*. Achieving *mālie* is necessary for a sense of empowerment by both researcher and participants, a state that will encourage more critical deep thinking and freer contributions to the research.

Despite shared characteristics with other methodologies, *talanoa* centers Pacific cultures and paradigms, with emancipation of their processes as a by-product. Using *talanoa* and its cultural protocols is a philosophical approach that provides strategies that empower Pacific peoples to have control over their knowledge creation and operationalizes a certain amount of self-determination. Its philosophical base is collective and it acknowledges Pacific aspirations for knowledge creation and knowledge searching. *Talanoa* advocates for control over authentic and trustworthy knowledge-making processes while developing its own theoretical and methodological base for relationship to Māori in Aotearoa and others and each other.

Talanoa as a Method

Methods are about the way *talanoa* is used as a tool, technique, or process to secure or co-construct knowledge. For that reason, *talanoa* involves learning to live, tell, relive, and retell

stories of relational knowing as narrative inquirers, that is, stories in which ideas are not owned but shared, reshaped, recomposed, and renowned through relationship and conversation at the different levels of *talanoa*.

When a life (in *talanoa*) is shared, a certain essence of the *vā* (space) environment and *tā* (time) which it is shared becomes a part of that life marking it (*talanoa*) different from the last time it is shared. For thousands of years, *talanoa* lived and were told orally and relived. In the late 1800s the missionaries taught Tongans to re-live their lives (hence *talanoa*) in written texts. Today, *talanoa* as lives are relived in emails, phone conversations, surveys, and even observations. New forms of lives are retold or relived electronically therefore *talanoa* as a tool, and a method has to reshape itself to stay timely, precise and phenomenal.

The following methods are approaches that can be applied at different stages of the *talanoa*. The methods can be utilized singularly, simultaneously, or discursively. One method of the *talanoa* may be dominant, and others can be employed interchangeably to set a good atmosphere, pass or obtain information holistically, and prod or triangulate while observing cultural protocols. Based on Tongan protocols and language, methods of the *talanoa* that are likely to be used are:

Talatalanoa

Talatala can mean consultative; therefore, *talatalanoa* can mean consultative talk with a view to uncover something. *Talatalanoa* allows the speakers and participants to go to and fro many times, and every time those involved go back, they pick up and unpack matters missed/not realized (Linita Manu'atu, *talanoa*, Aug. 2016). It is almost always done calmly and with a positive spirit. Since a composition by the late King Tupou IV called *Toe Talatalanoa* (let us talk again), *talatalanoa* had taken a softer, deeper, and spiritual meaning. The late King implied that *talatalanoa* is the method in which God communicates with his unreserved compassion. One of the lines is *fakaikiiki hangē ki ha tamaiki* which actually means the messages are simplified as if for children and that love is given out of compassion and freely.

Talatalanoa then from the above discussions uses simple language, and it requires minimal formality because of the good understanding or relationship between those involved; however, as it is for the Tongan language, it is ontologically shaped. It may just be a way to maintain connection, or to lay the foundation for a more objectified *talanoa* such as *faka'eke'eke* and *talanoa'i* at a later stage.

Talanoa faikava

Faikava is the process in which kava is prepared for drinking at a gathering. A *faikava* can consist of two or more people in a circle, and the main ingredient shared are kava and *talanoa*. In *faikava* the most senior person of the group monitors and directs the activities of the occasion including the *talanoa* to maintain a good *vā* and the group on any task at hand.

The use of *faikava* is a metaphor for a group of shared characteristics; therefore, its use in *talanoa* is likened to a focus group. In *faikava*, it is common for one person to speak at a time, and while they speak, everyone actively engages and reflects until it is the next person's time to contribute. One topic is interrogated at one time until what needs to be covered has been completed.

Talanoa usu

'Ana Mo'ungatonga (*talanoa*, Dec, 2010) suggested that *talanoa usu* is "...*me'a fa'u pe...*" (just a construction), a makeup story. She further suggested that "...*'oku 'aonga ia ke fa'u ha founa ke fakatefito kiai hano fakamata'i ha 'uhinga 'oku faingata'a hono fakamatala'i...*" (it is used as a metaphor for scaffolding those involved in the *talanoa* to more important or key information that may be difficult to explain). Experts in *talanoa usu* can capture appreciative participants as these experts are skilled in humor and in contextual constructions to suit topics but still respectful to participants' age, gender, and rank. It is ideal for building trust and for relaxing participants.

Talanoa faha'ikehe (tevolo)

Faha'ikehe means those from the other side (including ancestors). The Christian missionaries

rename *faha'ikehe tevolo* (devil) to discourage the Tongan people from activities that involved *faha'ikehe*. However, today these *talanoa* engage the emotion, spirit, body, and the mind in ways that most other *talanoa* cannot. This is an ontological dimension of *talanoa* and has to do with supernatural matters. This is fundamental to understanding Tongan thoughts, relationships, spirituality, and knowledge as it strikes at the heart of their epistemology. As epistemology includes how knowledge is legitimated, some Tongans (and other Pacific peoples) still consider dreams, visitations, and visions to be a source of legitimated knowledge.

Talanoa faka'eke'eke

'Eke implies act of asking direct questions. *Faka* means the way of and *'eke'eke* implies verbal searching, interviewing, or even relentless questioning. *Talanoa faka'eke'eke* can start with a question, and depending on the answer, more probing questions may follow. The questions connect or build on the answers given by participants in order to identify or uncover certain point/s.

Because this *talanoa* has a more objective aim, it is efficient and likely to be dominated by the researcher. This approach is more likely to miss social contexts and other dimensions necessary for a full picture. However, one can employ *pōtalanoa* to gain more data on issues missed by this approach. *Faka'eke'eke* is the term given to formal police investigative procedures in Tonga.

Pōtalanoa

Pō implies night or evening which points to this *talanoa*'s origin. In a Tongan village life before the time of television, after the evening meal, friends, relatives, and neighbors would visit each others' house to *talanoa*, discuss family matters, as well as the more secular such as sharing plans and hopes for the days ahead. It may be what we identify as conversation and can be held anytime, both day and night. Manu'atu (2002, p. 194) describes *pōtalanoa* as:

...Cultural and political practice of Tongan people where space in time is created to connect to the contexts of their experiences through discussions and talking with others. Through *pōtalanoa*, the

people come to know questions, find out, ...about their world and their relationships to it. In my view a key to the practice of *pōtalanoa* is the capacity of people to connect with each other within a context of whether it is kinship, a work experience, common knowledge, faith or whatever.

It is fitting that Manu'atu (above) saw *pōtalanoa* as the way people come to know questions and become aware of their world and their relationships to it which form the elements of the very philosophical argument of this chapter for *talanoa*.

Talanoa'i

Talanoa'i is a verb; purposeful, has a particular aim which may be an outcome. *Talanoa'i* allows participants to go back and forth many times, and every time those involved go back, they pick up and unpack matters that may have been missed. It implies high-level analysis and synthesis. Those involved in *talanoa'i* have similar backgrounds or status, complementary expertise in the topic of a *talanoa*. *Talanoa'i* then is a more rigorous process guided by its purpose/s and possibly a leader. It may even take the form of a robust debate but with the normal respect for age, gender, and others' cultural conventions.

In *talanoa'i* the researcher is not a distant observer but is active in the *talanoa* process and in defining and redefining meanings in order to achieve the aim of what is being *talanoa'i*. *Talanoa'i* is suited for stripping layers of history and hurt that may have lead to tension, bad relationships, and even conflict. *Talanoa'i* encourages contributions from participants just as participants may demand the same of the researcher. Different people may take leadership at different stages of the encounter in the active pursuit of the best knowledge, solution, or a final consensus.

Tālānga

Tālānga is dialogical and involves both the acts of speaking and listening. *Tālānga* can be used to challenge. The two approaches of *tālānga* are *kau'i-talanoa* and *tau-ngutu*. *Kau'i-talanoa* can mean joining a conversation which one is not expected to (Vaka'uta 2008, as cited in Vaiotei 2013). This may be a result of exclusion based on

rank, gender, age, or class. *Kau'i-talanoa* is used to disrupt and challenge the authenticity or fact of a *talanoa*. It is used by outsiders or less powerful individual or groups to invite themselves into a *talanoa*. At another level, *tau-ngutu* (fighting or warring mouth) is talking or arguing back, a more forceful way of stating opposing views (ibid). *Tālānga* can be used to challenge a process or findings during and even after the *talanoa* process.

Further Discussion on *Talanoa* and Application

When the methods of *talanoa* are used skillfully, positive relationships and richer findings can result. They can be used to triangulate; to assess authenticity as well as cause and effect through power differentiation (e.g. between researchers (tā) and or between participants (vā)) and adjust reflexively whenever needed. These can be done using *talatalanoa* or *tālānga* while *talanoa faikava* is introduced regularly to maintain the *mālie* (enjoyment) of *talanoa*. The person who is leading the *talanoa* can use one or as many methods simultaneously as appropriate to assist participants in reconstructing or recapture the full richness of experiences being studied.

When TRM is used to study a phenomenon, *talanoa* attempts to understand it through the eyes of the participants. For that reason, the multiple approaches of *talanoa* would be a culturally, spiritually, intellectually flexible method for explicating the meaning, structure, and essence of such phenomenon as it appears to the participants. *Talatalanoa* may be a good start for a *talanoa* to focus participants into the task and then the researcher or the participant/s can use *talanoa faka'eke'eke* to clarify points or even establish credibility or either party. *Talanoa usu* can be used concurrently to scaffold any party to the topic or relax them while layering on meaning in the reconstruction of the phenomenon being studied.

Cultural interplays during *talanoa* include emotions, silence, reflective thoughts, and eye and body movements which are all integrated and inseparable parts of *talanoa* as collectively they are articulation

of participants' communication. It is in the flexible and multilevel manifestations of *talanoa* that allow skillful researchers and participants to construct, relive, retell, and re-share their experiences in their richest and most authentic forms.

Protocol/Ethics in *Talanoa*

Vaiioleti (2006, pp. 29–32) discussed *faka'apa'apa* (respect), *anga lelei* (appropriate disposition), *mateuteu* (prepared well), *poto he anga* (culturally apt), and *'ofa fe'unga* (exercise appropriate compassion), based in *'anga faka-Tonga* (Tongan processes and ways) and how to apply them contextually to guide *talanoa*. These will protect the integrity of participants and researchers and ensure that data collected, findings, or construction are as authentic as possible. *Talanoa* should be pragmatic, and when it loses *mālie* (aesthetics, authenticity, spirit) or no more new information is forthcoming, then it should cease. The protocols proposed to guide *talanoa* emphasizes that while truth is good, respect for human dignity is better.

Fakakaukau (Bringing Together): Thoughts on Analysis

Talanoa research approach can generate a large quantity of information, notes, tape recordings, jottings, and emails all of which have to be analyzed, and information do not naturally fall into neat categories. However, in a small-scale *talanoa* research using physical documents, the analysis of the information is likely to be manageable. This can be done by reading through material generated and get a feel for what is collected, identifying key themes and issues in each text. They should be then entered under different headings but categories related to the research questions to be juxtaposed and compared to identify relationships between different themes and other factors.

However, for larger projects with a significant numbers of participants, it is now customary for the data to be uploaded to an electronic database to be coded and processed using programs such as

Nvivo in order to analyze, characterize, classify, and visualize the information gathered. The skill in interpreting the data and creating the knowledge from the TRM findings still rests with the researcher/s. The advice given here though is that reasons for making decisions on influential elements of the analysis such as coding or chunking, main categorizes, and how those are related or contributed to answering the research questions should be recorded and transparent as this will contribute to the robustness and acceptance of the final findings of the TRM.

Talanoa shares a philosophical base with Kaupapa Māori and other localized critical research methodologies; therefore, it is effective in visualizing deep issues and making voices heard. This is not always comfortable for funders or dominant institutions. On the other hand, many organizations value the new and cultural insights that can be the start for developing authentic and lasting solutions, which an indigenous research approach can bring in terms of cutting through issues that limit the opportunities for those that have not benefitted fully from what our civilization has achieved.

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Teacher Education

► [Teacher Education at the Intersection of Educational Sciences](#)

Teacher Education at the Intersection of Educational Sciences

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Synonyms

[American progressive movement](#); [Capitalism and modernity](#); [Educationalization](#); [History of teacher education](#); [Neoliberalism](#); [New education movement](#); [“New language of learning”](#); [Teacher education](#); [Teachers' associations](#)

Introduction

In the Western world, modern teacher education developed at the juncture of long-term processes: the educationalization of world problems since the eighteenth century; the emergence of pedagogical theories that eventually led to a body of knowledge in the nineteenth century – the educational sciences; and the creation of the modern educational state in tune with a liberal economy and a new mode of governance. Teacher education went through changes influenced by developments in Western thought but also by external contextual external forces such as the settings and demands created by industrialization, technological changes, and the more recent push to an incremental alignment of teacher education programs in a globalizing, neoliberal environment.

Teacher Education in the “Longue Durée”

The educationalization of the world (Depaepe and Smeyers 2008; Tröhler 2013) – the understanding

of social problems as educational ones – took full shape in the nineteenth century. The encompassing conditions of possibility for this process have been the ideology of progress, which implied a new positioning in the historical continuing influenced by philosophers of the Enlightenment, increasing interdependency between State and capital, and a new understanding of governance and of the relationship between State and the political subject. Notions of republicanism circulated widely in Europe in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries alongside the secularizing processes associated with the Enlightenment that took place in Europe and North America. The mission of the new school would configure the role of the teacher; civic virtue, and the formation of the political subject for the nation-state, would become a relevant educational component. Of importance here is the catalytic role of Johann Heinrich Pestalozzi (1746–1827) in the educationalization process (Tröhler 2013). Although his concern was not the professional teacher but the loving mother as teacher, Pestalozzi became a point of reference in teacher formation by the mid-nineteenth century. In Pestalozzi's method of observation – or art of education, as he called it – the role of the teacher is to remove the confusion of first sense impressions, to make objects distinct, and to classify those related or similar to each other (moving confusion to units). It would be John Frederick Herbart (1776–1841) and Frederick A. W. Froebel (1782–1852) who would begin developing systems of educational thought – Herbart's based on associationism and Froebel's on activism.

The Protestant reformation, a central element in the ideological and political configuration of modernity, had a very early impact on the creation of school systems, an example being the Duchy of Württemberg in 1559 followed by other States. The Prussian State is of interest here because during the revival after the Napoleonic wars, Prussia created the first State department of public instruction, and its director sent 17 teachers to study for 3 years with Pestalozzi; the teachers became directors of normal schools to train teachers in Pestalozzi's methods and ideas. The Prussian model, and with it the Pestalozzian

principles, reached the USA (Horace Mann's design of the Massachusetts systems), Canada (Egerton Ryerson, architect of public elementary education in Upper Canada), other European countries, and Latin-American countries like Argentina. There was an element in the Prussian model and in the normal schools that fit well with emerging ideologies: instead of coercive rules associated with a monarchical system, there was a transformation of the notion of sustaining power that the governed would participate in some way in their own governance (McGarry 2012). After mid-eighteenth century liberalism, other ideologies as well circulated transnationally and at their point of reception were mediated by local conditions and inserted in the narratives there. For example, the language of schooling and teacher training in the USA was assimilated into the early nineteenth-century American Protestant-republican ideology.

Teacher preparation and State certification were part of the development of common schools and mass public instruction, the modern school being a central element of the modern nation-state in northern and Western Europe. Over a century, there was a shift from education as a function of church and family to education as a function of the State. The teachers had the responsibility to educate the nation's children, to build their subjectivities, and to help generate a governable polity. It was also a time of empire building, and secular teachers as well as teaching religious missionaries had a civilizing mission within the context of a new form of colonial empire. Colonialism moved ways of being in the world to those perceived as lagging behind. Catholics carved their place in the educational enterprises and negotiated to partake in the educational systems while keeping their identity. Members of congregations pursued certification and later attended normal schools and higher education institutions.

Normal schools – which ranged from high schools with specialized courses to a few months or 1–2 years of classes after high school – provided formalized teacher training according to the “science of pedagogy.” The separation of elementary and secondary teaching preparation led easily to the feminization of teaching, particularly at the elementary level. By 1888,

63% of US teachers were women, and in urban areas it reached 90% of teachers (Fraser 2007). At the end of the century, the teachers were by and large middle-class Protestant women of European origin; there were also some African-American teachers from the free black communities of the North, there were some poor women with scholarships, and, of course, there were large numbers of women religious teachers (Fraser 2007).

Canada was not different. The feminization of teaching was encompassed by the ideal of domesticity for women, which translated into the profile of the woman teacher as holder of ethical superiority and, above all, community builder. It is not surprising that history and history of education figured prominently in the normalite instruction in Canada and in other Western countries. Herbart and the Herbartians – like American Charles McMurry, who wrote textbooks used in normal schools, or English Herbartian Catherine Dodd – valued history as a source of character development and used stories and biography to illustrate desirable moral qualities. Froebel was no less influential with regard to the advocacy of kindergarten and the promotion of manual training; in Ontario, Canada, provincial inspector James Hughes' *Froebel's Educational Laws for all Teachers* (1897) circulated widely among teachers.

In the late nineteenth century, prestigious universities created chairs in pedagogy not only in the USA (at the universities of Iowa, Ohio, Michigan, Columbia, Berkeley, Chicago, Stanford, and Harvard) but also in Europe (in the UK, the first chairs in education were established in 1876 at Edinburgh and St. Andrews in Scotland). These would evolve into departments and later schools or colleges of education. Whereas the normal schools prepared a large number of elementary teachers (mostly women), university education professors focused on the preparation of high school teachers and school administrators (mostly men) and on educational research. Early in the twentieth century, normal schools in the USA evolved into teachers colleges with diversified offerings, becoming liberal arts colleges with various missions, and then from the 1950s, most of them won the title of “university”; the path was from normal school to teachers college to State

college to State university (Labaree 2008). The process in Canada was somewhat different: teachers colleges replaced normal schools in the mid 1940s and 1950s, and in the 1960s teacher education, including elementary teaching, was moved to the university.

In Spain, the Chair of Pedagogy was created at the Universidad Central in Madrid in 1904, and the University of Barcelona began the Seminar of Pedagogy in 1930; these steps and the creation of the *Escuela Superior de Magisterio* (Magisterium Upper School) in 1909, devoted to the preparation of professors for the normal schools, led to the creation of departments of pedagogy in the Faculties of Philosophy at the Universities of Madrid and Barcelona; the new departments would prepare teachers and administrators for the higher echelons of the system, including secondary schools, as well as researchers (Bruno-Jofré and Jover 2008). This explains the bipolar constitution of the system and its different teacher education cultures still dominant today.

Toward the end of the nineteenth century, educational theories and theories of childhood began to form a body of knowledge referred to as educational sciences. They intersected with political developments, evolutionism, Herbert Spencer's social Darwinism, experimental psychology, and emerging social ideologies. A complex material infrastructure emerged, composed of departments, societies, laboratories, institutions, groups, congresses, and journals with circulation among teachers and administrators such as *The School Journal* (published in Chicago and New York).

Within the New Education Movement figured prominently Ovide Decroly (1871–1932), Belgian neurologist specializing in medical pedagogy and pedotechnics; Edouard Claparède (1873–1940), Swiss neurologist and child psychologist; Georg Kerschensteiner (1854–1932), German educational theorist; Adolphe Ferrière (1879–1960), Swiss educator, founder of the New Education Fellowship in 1921; and Maria Montessori (1870–1952), Italian physician and educator, among others. The movement carried a reformist agenda albeit of a variegated quality.

The American progressive movement had a set of tendencies that Labaree (2005) categorized into

two groupings. Pedagogical progressives focused on teaching and learning in the classroom and included John Dewey, Francis Parker, G. Stanley Hall, William Kilpatrick, and others. Administrative progressives were utilitarians who focused on social efficiency, governance, and curriculum, a group which included Edward L. Thorndike, a behaviorist psychologist. Both major tendencies were grounded in developmentalist theories despite being embraced from different positions: the administrative progressives were leading to professional management of schools, vocational training, and differentiated outcomes; the pedagogical progressives were focusing on the purposes and interest of the students driving the curriculum.

The question here is how these varied reformist tendencies were translated into teacher preparation. Disperse monographic studies show that elementary teachers graduating from normal schools, teachers colleges, and early programs at universities were exposed to John Dewey's theories as well as William Kilpatrick's active methods, Ovide Decroly, and others, and there were many examples of reformist ideas in classes all over the world, including the emergence of specialized schools like the Montessori or the Waldorf schools (created by Rudolph Steiner), which required special teacher preparation. However, teacher education – intellectually not very strong, particularly with regard to the preparation of elementary teachers – aimed at preparing teachers and administrators who could function efficiently in a system that sorted students by academic ability and future job prospects, while the notion of nation building persisted with modifications and intersections of internationalism after the First World War until the post-1945 era. It is interesting to note, however, that case studies have shown that the official discourse on citizenship and nation building was not necessarily taught and learned in schools, which had their own contours; the teachers brought to the class their own existential conditions and contexts.

At the end of the nineteenth century, educational congresses were organized in line with the establishment of international scientific congresses; however, they were linked to educational

exhibitions and world fairs that included education as part of propaganda of the industrial powers. At the same time, starting with the Bureau International des Écoles Nouvelles, founded by Adolphe Ferrière in 1899, reformists embarked on a transnational networking process emphasizing moral and political assumptions of the teaching profession (Fuchs 2004). The concept of scientific education and the ideas expounded by the new education advocates and progressive educators were, as Fuchs (2004) has argued, European-based concepts that were grounded in the differentiation between a “civilized Europe” and a “barbaric” rest of the world.

Teachers' associations promoting material interests were organized nationally and internationally; a case in point was the World Federation of Education Associations. Teachers' leaders and particularly secondary teachers were exposed to these developments in various parts of the world. It is viable to say that there was, in the first half of the century, an internationalized discursive network with various layers and types of network structures and situations. Of note, based on recent studies, was the relationship among teacher educators such as in the case of Australian, British, and North American teacher educators.

The post-1945 period signaled great changes in education at various levels in response to changes in capitalism, its relationship with modernity, and the incoming demands of neoliberalism. Teacher education went through a transitional process in most places in the long 1960s (1958–1974). There was, as Rohstock and Tröhler (2014) wrote, a process of scientification of teacher education within the context of the cognitive revolution – within the tenets of cognitive psychology, the teacher was expected to provide students with knowledge structures and scaffolding in the learning process. Teacher education was influenced by notions of education as human capital and a future-oriented point of reference. The Cold War provided the overall ideological framework. Faculties of education, rather new in many countries, tended to deliver eclectic programs not alien to the complex historical context. There was a coexistence of residual elements shaping teacher education with emerging ideas on education

sustained by the power of science and upcoming new technologies. The civil rights movement, the decolonization processes, the search for differentiation, and intercultural/multicultural issues started to reach the programs, particularly in the 1980s as public education became more inclusive. At the time, teacher education began to emphasize the preparation of a teacher for the future and continued stressing teachers' cognition, while the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development called attention to the need to reform teacher preparation (referred to as teacher training). Educational reform had an international dimension. Toward the 1990s, faculties of education changed their programs, having in mind an ideal teacher who would serve as a teacher-researcher. The ideal teacher would be able to reflect upon their own thinking and actions. This approach led to the creation of teacher education models from a practice-and-theory perspective. On the way to renewing paradigms, teacher education programs tended to align teacher practice with a globalizing, neoliberal societal environment in a world that assumed the validity of international standardized tests to define and measure teaching success.

Today, history and philosophy of education are not afforded much of a place in most programs, and, thus, there are few or no questions regarding intellectual habits of mind, educational aims guiding the constructions of goals, or discussions of what is good education. The “new language of learning” in education and, in particular, effective learning focuses on process and misses questions of content, relationship, and purpose (Biesta 2014). From the perspective of educational policy, the Bologna Process in Europe, which aimed at the harmonization of higher education and fostering mobility of students and workers, created conditions for change, even as resistance generated interesting situations of heteromorphism. Teacher education has been part of this process, although differences among European countries abound.

The technological revolution changed the tenets of teacher education, bringing the reality of ubiquitous learning to the class and a new positioning of the students breaking boundaries of space and time. Teachers' organizations had to

contend with the opening of education to the private sector, the legacies of conservative discourses dominant in the 1980s and 1990s, as well as with the “need” to produce skilled and knowledgeable students for the global economy who are assessed through high-stake tests.

Teacher education is now its own field. Since 1984, division K – Teaching and Teacher Education – has played a role within the American Educational Research Association (AERA); in 1993, the Self-Study of Teacher Education Practices was recognized as a special interest group; journals devoted to the study that teachers make of their own practice embody the paradigmatic changes. Nonetheless, teacher education has an inherent dynamism at the crossroads of its insertion in universities – which are themselves going through fluid changes and are being shaped by new managerial practices, transnational agendas, private and public stakeholders, and the fragmentariness of life. Teacher education reveals again and again the unique agency of teachers, reformers, philosophers, and historians of education and their commitment to generate conditions for a pedagogy of wonder and imagination in a school responsive to the various dimensions of being human.

Cross-References

- [Dewey on Educational Aims](#)
- [Educationalization of Social Problems and the Educationalization of the Modern World](#)
- [Human Capital Theory in Education](#)
- [School Development and School Reforms](#)

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Teacher Evaluation and Islamic Education, A Critical Perspective

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Teacher Evaluation and Islamic Education

Teacher evaluation is intended to improve student outcomes through the instrumentality of better teacher performance in the form of both enhanced teaching quality and improved teaching practices. Yet it should be pointed out from the onset that what separates other forms of evaluation from

teacher evaluation is just a very thin line. While generally evaluation is concerned with the act of associating values with scores achieved through measurement, teacher evaluation is associated specifically with teacher performance. The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) *Review on Evaluation and Assessment Frameworks for Improving School Outcomes* (2009, pp. 3–4) identifies six main interrelated aspects that constitute teacher evaluation and therefore distinguish it from the general concept of evaluation. One, there is the *unit to be assessed* which covers the "who" question of evaluation and concerns the individual teacher whose performance is to be analyzed as part of an evaluation and assessment framework alongside other components like the system, the school, and the student. Two, there are the *capabilities to assess and to use feedback* which answer the "by whom" question of teacher evaluation. The focus of this question is the preparation to evaluate and offer feedback. Three, there also are *aspects assessed* and this is all about the "what" question of teacher evaluation. The concern here are the main activities of teaching that should be covered in the exercise. These include planning and preparation, the classroom setting, and the teaching process itself. Four, *evaluation "technology"* which is all about the "how" question and addresses issues bordering on procedure, device, or approach to evaluation. Fifth, *purposes of evaluation* which address the "for what" question, namely, objectives of evaluation and mechanisms formulated and targeted at the realization of the objectives. The sixth and last are *agents involved* and focus on the "for whom" question which deals with the stakeholders such as parents, teachers, school administrators, teacher unions, and policy makers in the development and implementation of teacher evaluation processes.

The question to raise at this juncture is, if the evaluation of students is so central to the job of the teacher for the purpose of achieving academic excellence which is targeted by teacher performance, would it be out of place to rationalize that the teacher who him or herself is arguably the chief promoter of excellence through his or her pedagogical performance cannot but be subjected

to such an enrichment experience that seeks to enhance the quality of their performance. The Holy Qur'an enjoins that he who promotes righteousness or spiritual excellence demonstrates it first, "Do you order people righteousness and forget yourselves, while you recite The Book: Then, will you use reason?" (The Holy Qur'an: 2: 44). What excellence can students achieve if their teachers are deficient and substandard in the subject involved?

In a particular notion of Islamic education which may be explained as the process of imparting knowledge, skills, and values for the purpose of producing a good (wo)man through the development of all his/her domains namely the cognitive, the affective, the psychomotor, in consonance with Islamic principles, practitioners have often called attention to the inconsistency of learning experiences with educational objectives, especially with respect to spiritual and moral development. A tenable explanation of Islamic education has been offered by the First World Conference on Muslim Education. One of the features of such education is to aim at the balanced growth of the total personality of a human being through the training of his/her spirit, intellect, rational self, and feelings. Another feature is the infusion of faith into the totality of man's personality. Yet another feature is a sense of emotional attachment to Islam that must be stimulated in (wo)man to enable him/her access to the Qur'an and Sunnah and general dictates of Islam in a manner capable of facilitating his/her attainment of the status of vicegerent of Allah (Al-Attas 1979, pp. 158–159).

However, it should be pointed out that the above characterization of Islamic education seems faithful to the conception of education as a form of *tarbiyah* which connotes good breeding. Al-Al-Attas further explores the idea of Islamic education to be more of *ta'dib*. A man of *adab* is defined as a good and honorable man nurtured by the Qur'an which may be likened to Allah's invitation to a spiritual banquet. He elucidates that the acquiring of real knowledge of the Qur'an is the partaking of the fine food in it in a manner akin to the enjoyment of fine food in a fine banquet whose quality is invariably enhanced by worthy

company and that partaking of the food be in keeping with the rules of refined conduct. It is derivable from Al-Attas' argument that the concept of *ta'dib* by far surpasses and transcends the idea of *ta'lim* whose implication is restricted to instruction or knowledge dissemination as well as the concept of *tarbiyah* which, as noted earlier, applies to good breeding and is therefore limited in its philological implication. The significance of illustrating with these three concepts lies in the comprehensive and somewhat all-encompassing nature of the idea of *ta'dib*, in connection with education as it presupposes that teacher evaluation must not elude any aspect of man, given the fact that a comprehensive and all-embracing education requires no less than an all-encompassing teacher evaluation.

Al-Attas' view as enumerated above finds support in Rosnani (1996, p. 31) who identifies "the way we teach and the way we evaluate educational objectives as the root of the problem of education in the Muslim world." She observes that the educational objectives among Muslims are not screened by their own educational philosophy but "rather by the Western, secular, and liberal philosophy of education" (Rosnani 1996, p. 31). She emphasizes the need for Muslim teachers to dispel the notion that teacher evaluation is no more than their evaluation of their students which is synonymous with giving the paper and pencil test and make the procedure closely consistent with the educational objectives of the curriculum in order not to make the evaluation procedure become the focus of students' attention and even of the teachers' attention.

To underscore the place of a teacher evaluation method that is capable of serving Islamic purposes, this entry examines the basic concept of evaluation in the Islamic tradition as espoused by the Qur'an, with a view to making a case for teacher evaluation. It therefore becomes imperative to turn first to the Holy Qur'an which is replete with injunctions on *thawaab* (i.e., reward) and *'iqaab* (i.e., punishment) which are both contingent upon *hisaab* (i.e., judgment) which itself is a product of accountability and evaluation.

In a tradition of the Holy Prophet whose chain of narration is traced by Nu'man bn Sa'd through

Ali, he gives a clear picture of heavenly reward and punishment, saying:

When the Almighty Allah says in the Qur'an:

The Day We shall gather the pious and righteous persons into the Most Gracious (Allah), like a delegation (presented before a king for honour) (Qur'an, 19: 85)

The honor talked about will be in various dimensions. They will not be allowed to walk on legs but rather carried on horseback, the horses too will be of a worthy stock the like which would not have been seen by humankind. At the gate of *al-jannah*, they will be received by Allah's angels as Allah has said: And the angels will meet them, (with the greeting):

This is your Day which you were promised (Qur'an, 21: 103).

And as regards the sinners, the Almighty Allah says:

"And We shall drive the disbelievers to Hell, in a thirsty state (like a thirsty herd driven down to water) (Q. 19:87), and in another injunction, explains their light saying: "Those who will be gathered to Hell (prone) on their faces, such will be in an evil state, and most astray from the Straight Path" (Qur'an, 25: 34).

That the outcome of man's accountability is determined by his actions and efforts is clearly articulated in another injunction of the Qur'an, as follows:

So whoever does good equal to the weight of an atom (or a small ant) shall see it. And whoever does evil equal to the weight of an atom (or a small ant) shall see it (Qur'an, 100: 7-8).

The above Qur'anic injunction emphasizes the outcome of labor and may be applied to student's achievement as a result of the teacher's effort. That explains why the teacher's excellence in his/her practice matters much.

The aspects of learning covered and evaluated in Islamic education explain why it proves strong where the Western model of teacher evaluation proves deficient. In other words, the concerns for and issues involved in teacher evaluation for Islamic education proves unnecessary. Dhaou (2005) has offered a credible analysis of evaluation-related verses in the Qur'an, in

connection with the teacher. Yet it is noteworthy that the message contained in the various verses of the Qur'an cited in above should be studied with specific details for systematic application as part of the principles of any systematic Islamic education program.

Muslim thinkers have, along the path of the foregoing, contributed significantly to the discourse on teacher evaluation. Al-Talbi (2000), for instance, argues that Al-Farabi is of the view that the aim of the teacher's examination of his students is to find out a learner's level in the field being studied. He opines that in such a situation, it is not only the student but also his teacher that is under examination. According to him, the questions asked by the teacher could have either an educational or an experimental character. The latter concerns questions asked a student who is expected to know something so as to demonstrate that knowledge while the former has to do with a person's testing of himself to ascertain if he has made a quantitative or methodological mistake.

Unless there is a good mechanism for teacher evaluation with a view to addressing his professional deficiencies, his own evaluation of students may not be regarded as trustworthy. Relying on Al-Farabi's *Ihsan-ul-Ulum*, Al-Talbi enumerates instruments that are available to help us check the compass, the ruler, the scales, the abacus, astronomical summary tables which are few in number yet applicable to many things. He asserts that the teacher's evaluation should not be restricted to only the test of knowledge and that the intelligence also can be tested. He identifies the ability to discriminate, the capacity for deductive and critical reasoning, understanding the relationship between isolated pieces of information, and grasping the links between them, as belonging to the family of intelligence, and emphasizes that one of the most important ways of recognizing intelligence is through mathematical ability (Al-Talbi 2000, p. 45).

As regards Ibn Sina, who is reputed for his original thinking and distinctive educational view and as "the leader of a philosophical school which influenced education both in the Islamic east and the Christian west," as presented by Al-Naqib (2000, p. 7), there is need to expose the teacher to various evaluation techniques. The

varied nature of his techniques will be an asset to him in determining the place of motivation in his own evaluative experience with his students. Ultimately, such skills shall culminate in his realize the central nature reward and disapproval as the case may be. To Al-Ghazali (1898, 1986), however, evaluation of prospective teachers should not be restricted to his knowledge but also extended to his character and practical application of the subject of his learning. This in fact is a good justification for the practical programs component of any credible Islamic education program. All those views show why Muslims should not continue to train their teachers along the Western educational lines whose rationale is not necessarily grounded in divine principles.

Accordingly, a teacher's potential for stimulation of critical debates, creative discussions, intellectual discourses, and public speaking, for assessment among students, are among salient concerns to underscore in teacher evaluation especially where he is required to develop in his students' soft skills such as critical, creative, and ethical skills as well as communication skill, social or interpersonal skills, and self esteem. However, much is desired of the teacher educator in this regard who is expected to use his creativity, resourcefulness, and versatility in generating or applying appropriate evaluation procedures in order to facilitate teacher evaluation for effective performance in different classroom situations.

Documentary certificates as a means of expressing the outcome of teacher evaluation were not known to the Muslims during the early days of Islam. It was for the student or student teacher himself/herself to decide whether (s)he was truly competent enough to hold a new circle in which he would sit as a master. Yet many students were often hesitant to do so in view of the technical nature of the discussions and arguments which were expected to take place between a teacher and his students and which required the teacher to prove himself as worthy of his teaching position. For instance, Shalaby (1954) observes that Abu Hanifa once felt capable and therefore left Hammad's circle and sat as a teacher but when he was asked some questions which he was not able to answer he dissolved his circle and rejoined

that of his teacher. Shalaby also observes that, contrary to Abu Hanifa's experience, Wasil Ibn 'Atta' (181 A.H.) "departed from the circle of al-Basri (110 A.H.)/728 AD) when the subject of the commission of crime was discussed, then he successfully forms a new circle where he proved a remarkable thinker" (p.147). It was owing to the significant place of the Traditions of the Prophet that the *Muhaddithun* (scholars of Hadith) began the tradition of issuing certificates to their students as a way of declaring them ripe for teaching. The objective of such certification was for the teacher to enable such students as having been so certified to recite Traditions taken through him (Shalaby 1954). The practice later passed to other subjects whereby "the master would grant a recognized certificate to those students who satisfactorily passed the prescribed course of study under him...and...such a certificate was usually written upon the fly-leaf of the book studied" (Shalaby 1954, p. 148). It was such a practice that later metamorphosed into *ijazah*, with the passage of time.

The *ijazah* method is the teacher's authorization of his students to disseminate his knowledge to others. It is a product of teacher evaluation because it seeks to determine the suitability of the candidate for teaching. Six different types of such exercise were identified and described as *al-Munawalah* (Shalaby 1954, p. 51). One of the six notable types is the variant of *al-Munawalah* in which case a Shaykh gave his books or some of them to his students or any scholar (Shalaby 1954). In such a situation, the teacher would (instruct the students to) assure his own students that the authorization bears the handwriting of his Shaykh. Another approach to *al-Munawalah* was for the Shaykh to grant a student use of all the books in his library. Again, another approach is to authorize others to quote him in reference to all the books read by him or experiences recorded by him. This seems unacceptable to many scholars. The third form of *al-Munawalah* was for the Shaykh to send in writing some Hadiths or portions of some Hadith books with an authorization to the bearer. The fourth form was the authorization of an individual on the narration of authentic Hadiths in certain books. The lack of identification of the individual's specific Hadiths or areas of

competence earned this form of authorization some opposition. The fifth form was self authorization of which an endorsement was secured by the Shaykh. The sixth form is an authorization issued by a Shaykh to another.

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Teachers

- [Gender, Sexuality, and Marxism](#)

Teachers' Associations

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Teaching and Critically Reflective Practice in Freire

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Synonyms

[Contemplative wondering about work](#); [Critically: analytically](#); [Diagnostically reflective practice = teacher inquiry](#); [Thoughtful reflection on classroom work](#)

Introduction

Few of the many books written by Freire drew particular, and extended, attention to the teacher in the way *Pedagogy of Freedom* (1998) was able to do. While this entry draws on many other important works by Freire, it specifically probes elements of this book to place before readers some of the salient qualities and attributes Freire believed teachers, educators, and thinkers of education ought to aspire to.

There are four themes of relevance here. The first is Freire's commitment to the idea of teaching as a political activity, particularly in the context of the contemporary neoliberal grind, which was widely evident across multiple nations by the time of his death in 1997. The second is that teaching could be, indeed should be, regarded as an ethical activity, and this entry explores that claim. It is an important claim to uphold in a climate that increasingly regards teachers to be mere functionaries of the State and its pursuit of "achievement objectives" for the twenty-first century labor market.

Freire is well known for his, sometimes controversial, position on the development of a critical consciousness. Relating ideas about the development of a critical consciousness to teachers and teaching leads to a double consideration: first, teachers have a role in initiating their students into the process of developing criticality, and second, teachers have a responsibility to both themselves and their profession to develop as critically reflective practitioners. Both roles will be dealt with in the second half of this entry.

Before advancing any further, however, it will be helpful to review some of the central ideas contained in Freire's concept of teaching as a profession. He regarded teaching to be a vocation that was "mysterious" and the reason for the devotion of teachers (p. 126). Freire believed that the individual teacher has "consciously taken [the] option to intervene in the world" (p. 122), and for him this was no mystery. Freire's words highlight the ethical nature of intrinsically valuable work of teaching professionals who focus on matters of great significance to people and their lives. In this context, it may be understood why Freire stated unequivocally that teachers must struggle "to bring dignity to the practice of teaching" (p. 64). These commitments demanded of teachers may, however, be discomforting to some.

Teaching Is a Political Activity

Not all teachers (especially beginning ones) may immediately comprehend the direct influence of policy on their professional lives. Becoming aware of the role of policy, and coming to realize that teachers have the potential to challenge the effects of those policies, does, however, reveal teaching to be a political activity. One of the most important ways in which policy has influenced teaching was the (infamous) "No Child Left Behind" (NCLB) policy of the United States administration of George W. Bush. It was an example of policy reflecting a reaction to public (and political) perceptions of a systemic failure in education to deliver a return on taxpayer investment (namely students

successfully navigating the school system and being deemed "employable").

Paulo Freire argued that modernizing reformist policies in education (such as NCLB) spawned a "neoliberal technoscientific education," creating a false dichotomy between the need for a broader liberating education and the narrow economic intentions of vocationalism (1996, p. 131). Freire's *Pedagogy of Freedom* (1998) revealed his concern with the impact of the "scourge of neoliberalism" (p. 22) on teachers' thought and practice. The fatalistic ideology of neoliberalism encourages teachers to see the world as a given, discouraging theorizing of its underlying causes and tensions, giving preference instead to data manipulation as an explanatory tool. The neoliberal agenda thus places enormous emphasis on the accumulation of grades through continuous assessment. The promise of a hopeful education that develops a love of society and consequently egalitarian tendencies is no more than a vain hope under these policy agendas. Instead, what these policies do teach is acceptance of growing socioeconomic disparities that consign most students to a narrow vocational life (Freire 2005).

In the face of this, teachers of courage and love have the "right and duty to opt" (Freire 1998, p. 53) and "consciously [take the] option to intervene in the world" (p. 122). Thus, Freire contended that there is no neutral pedagogy (Shor and Freire 1987), and so when they take up a position, teachers commit to making a difference to the lives of their students. One sense in which this proposition can be understood is for educators to recognize that their role is more influential than merely teaching content – their role includes the moral formation of learners (Freire 1998), which cannot be separated from teaching content.

As teaching occurs in a sociopolitical and economic policy context, it is further appropriate for teachers to display their respect for the sociocultural location of their students. Teachers have a direct influence on the cultural formation of students. This role may be particularly important to teachers helping their students to survive in a world they find alienating and one that often denies the cultural background of students or

subsumes this background in the mainstream culture. Confronting these political realities presupposes that teachers exercise ethical care and love for their students.

Teaching Is an Ethical Activity

Teaching is people-centered and draws heavily on, and significantly influences, human motivations, desires, beliefs, and goals. The relationships that develop in an educative context are therefore complex, and so Freire wanted teachers to note, “it is not possible to imagine the human condition disconnected from the ethical condition” (1998, p. 39). Therefore, teaching, Freire would argue, is an ethical activity.

Freire believed it not possible to be a teacher who educates, while at the same time avoiding the development of an attitude of love and care towards students (1998). So much so, he believed it the duty of teachers to be knowledgeable of the background of their students. This entails coming to understand first-hand of the daily living conditions of students and the context of their socioeconomic lives:

It's impossible to talk of respect for students...without taking into consideration the conditions in which they are living and the importance of all the knowledge derived from life experience, which they bring with them to school. I can in no way underestimate such knowledge. (1998, p. 62)

In classrooms that emphasize relationships, mutual trust between teachers and students will grow from the coherence of the actions and words of teachers. “Children are extremely sensitive to teachers who do exactly the opposite of what they say” (Freire 2005, p. 98). Therefore, Freire accentuated teachers’ actions over their words (actions speak louder than words), but ethical teachers must strive to ensure their words and deeds cohere. When, however, unethical choices are made, such as violating trust, then the relationships that exist in a school community are violated.

The ethical teacher is disposed to listening. This implies a focus on what is being said rather

than a focus on speaking or, as Freire ([1970] 1996) has it, delivering “communiqués.” A focus on listening over speaking does not silence the teacher’s voice, but allows the student’s voice that is struggling to make meaning and sense of knowledge. To create the climate in which this student voice can be heard requires a spirit of humility on the part of the teacher (Freire 1998), although this does not imply the submission of the teacher. By being an active listener, however, the teacher models appropriate behavior for students to follow in their relations with teachers.

Freire challenged the deepening instrumentality of teaching, suggesting that “to transform the experience of educating into a matter of simple technique is to impoverish what is fundamentally human in this experience: namely, its capacity to form the human person” (1998, p. 39). Thus, teaching is not a technical matter, Freire suggesting that to “educate is essentially to form” (p. 39). Teachers therefore engage in a task that is both richly ethical, yet radically uncertain. This state of uncertainty was captured by one of Freire’s well-known notions that humans are never complete; thus he was committed to an ontology of teaching that recognized teachers to be in a state of ever becoming (1998).

A final point of relevance to the idea of teaching as an ethical profession is what Freire had to say about power imbalances, possibly a reality of all classrooms, even democratic ones. Freire wanted teachers to respect the curiosity of students by not crushing their spirit. The ethical teacher respects “the dignity, autonomy, and identity of the student” (1998, p. 62), bringing “dignity to the practice of teaching” (p. 64). Needless to say, this is a challenging call, given the obvious power imbalances between (younger, less experienced, and less knowledgeable) students and teachers who are older, more experienced, and (possibly) more knowledgeable.

Commitment to Developing Critical Thinking in Students

In his famed *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* (1970/1996), Freire rejected “banking education” in

favor of “problem-posing education,” a rejection he reiterated in *Pedagogy of Freedom* (1998). He was thus condemning a transmission style of teaching in favor of a dialogical education that would develop critical epistemological curiosity (1970/1996, 1998) or, in other words, a critical disposition (1976). In Freire’s notion of problem-posing pedagogy, the life experience and prior knowledge of students become a text, or authentic context, in the development of knowledge and critical understanding. Problem-posing teachers demand academic rigor, yet also realize that students are always “recreating and remaking” knowledge (1998, p. 31). Thus, problem-posing teachers will seek ways to bridge the body of existing knowledge with that which students have and bring with them to ensure their students cross over from ingenuous curiosity to critical curiosity and consciousness.

Students should not have to engage in this development of critical understanding alone, or unaided. Rather, they require an “educator with a democratic vision or posture [who] cannot avoid...insisting on the critical capacity, curiosity, and autonomy of the learner” (p. 33). Therefore, it is important, argued Freire, for teachers to be reminded of their responsibility to promote and develop critical thinking: “The teacher needs to model an active, skeptical learner in the classroom who invites students to be curious and critical...and creative” (Shor and Freire 1987, p. 8).

Developing the critical thinking of students does not take place in a vacuum, and if students are to think critically, they must think *about* something. Specifically, this will be the knowledge of the curriculum and the knowledge of the students. It is important therefore that teachers must see themselves, and be seen, as authorities in their field of expertise (Freire 1998; Freire and Macedo 1987; Macedo 2000). This position is, however, counterbalanced by Freire’s insistence that democratic educators are not elitists or authoritarians (1985). Authoritative teachers ensure that minimum knowledge content is made available so that each student is equipped, not only for a gainful and meaningful life but a critically reflective one too. On the assumption that there is no value-free

pedagogy (Shor and Freire 1987), teachers seeking to develop the critical thinking of their students will problematize concrete human relations as a precursor to the development of critical consciousness (Freire 1970).

Teachers are challenged by a policy climate of accountability, and a demand for ever-increased student attainment, and may thus choose to ignore Freire’s behest to support students in developing their ability to become critically aware of their world. Or they can engage with the democratic import implicit in the promise of problem-posing education. Critically reflective teachers can achieve this goal for their students by demanding academic rigor and having the expectation that *all* their students can benefit by this rigor. Thus “a culture of excellence and justice” (Duncan-Andrade and Morrell 2008, p. 172) pervades the classroom, replacing low expectations and discrimination.

There are, however, dangers here. The notion of “critical thinking” is one that has become popularized by many national and State curriculum documents. As an example, see the New Zealand Curriculum (Ministry of Education [MOE], 2007), which is significantly influenced by the “key competencies” research of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (see Benade 2012; OECD 2003). This curriculum makes only one reference to “critical thinking” (MOE 2007, p. 23) but uses the terms “critical” and “critically” eighteen times and “thinking” 20 times, this is in a document with only 43 pages of curriculum-relevant text. This policy outlines five key competencies for schools to focus on, one of which is “thinking”. So far, this seems laudable, but the detail yields a somewhat different message where “thinking” is defined as “using creative, critical, and metacognitive processes to make sense of information, experiences and ideas” (p. 12). Positively, this thinking should encourage students to “challenge the basis of assumptions and perceptions,” but may end up being little more than “developing understanding...constructing knowledge...[and]...reflect[ing] on their own learning” (p. 12).

Therefore, caution is advocated, as Freire’s notion of “critical consciousness” is not

equivalent to the suggestions advocated by this curriculum document in relation to “thinking” or “thinking critically.” It can be seen how Freire’s concept can be domesticated though, and it has been pointed out before (Roberts 2000) that Freire’s notion of critical consciousness is linked to his praxis of humanization – the ideal that all people will attain their ontological ideal of becoming more fully human *through liberation*. The on-going search for humanization is an on-going search for critical consciousness of the changing material world, to reflect on that world, and to transform it accordingly (2000). That is somewhat different to thinking about thinking.

Teachers’ Reflective Practice

Not only are teachers “unfinished” (Freire 1998), as are all humans, but by virtue of their exercise of an option to intervene in an imperfect world, they commit themselves to bring about transformative change. Therefore, the daily practice of teaching suggests that the identity of a teaching professional is actively forged and developed and is constantly evolving. In *Pedagogy of Freedom* (1998), Freire clearly intended that teachers be open to change and new ideas, through critical reflection. This reflective activity will support teachers to be consistent in their work, so that there is no incoherence of word and deed (1998). As already noted this coherence builds trust in the classroom. Coherent teachers are characterized by their “right thinking” (p. 40), which is developed not in one-off bursts but rather through regular and consistent practice. Such an approach “demands a seriousness in the search for secure and solid bases for his/her positions” (p. 40).

Freire noted on several occasions in *Pedagogy of Freedom* (1998) that action precedes theory, that a critically reflective teacher is open to change and novelty, and, of course, that both the words and deeds and theory and practice of a teacher must be coherent. Critical reflection on practice is thus central to Freire’s theory. When teachers think critically about their present practice, their future practice will benefit, and they develop their

theoretical understanding of their own purpose as educators. In Freire’s own words: “My theoretical explanation of [educational] practice ought to be also a concrete and practical demonstration of what I am saying” (p. 49). This interaction between practice and theory was termed “praxis” by Freire. An explicit Freirean strategy of praxis involves: problem identification, problem analysis, creation of a plan of action to address the problem, implementation of the plan, and analysis and evaluation of the action (Duncan-Andrade and Morrell 2008). This process supports teachers in their own research and knowledge development, and its action-orientation is in keeping with Freire’s view that reflective activity has the potential to transform the world (1976).

Praxis may thus also be understood as a process of critical self-reflection. Underlying this pedagogical approach is the teacher’s commitment to students “recreating and remaking” knowledge (Freire 1998, p. 31). A further underlying feature of praxis is wrestling with the differences of ability among students, who are not all ready to learn at the same time. Through a process of reflection, self-reflective teachers theorize their practice then try out their emerging theories as they gear classroom programs in such a way that students can bridge the gap from ingenuous to critical curiosity.

As self-critical learners, and problem-posing educators, teachers research their students as if they were themselves “texts.” Teachers seek to understand their students much as a reader seeks to understand a text. It is especially important that a teacher seek to understand the meanings their students construct. In doing so, teachers must demonstrate their respect for the dignity of their students and their acceptance of the idea that the moral formation of students cannot be separated from the teaching of content (1998).

Therefore, it may be seen that praxis, as a way of understanding critical reflection on practice, is morally informed and committed to transformative action. A focus on the relationship between theory and practice by teachers as part of their daily routine helps to challenge the technical and instrumental rationality pervading education in

the twenty-first century. Praxis is a resolution of the tensions that exist between theory and practice, enabling teachers to develop new approaches to knowledge and understanding, based on their interpretation of their students and what they know, existing knowledge, and the unique contexts of their classrooms.

Conclusion

In *Pedagogy of Freedom* (1998), Freire explicitly addressed himself to what it means to be a teacher. In so doing, he implicitly and explicitly provided a sense of what it means to be a *professional* in the context of the early twenty-first century that is dominated by an agenda driven by economic concerns. These concerns have been referred to here as neoliberalism, which Freire labeled a “scourge” (p. 28). The neoliberal agenda for education is reformist modernization, often played out in education as a demand for greater student achievement against a backdrop of data accumulation and accountability requirements. Too often, teachers meekly acquiesce – but Freire called for courage and set out a number of priorities for teachers.

Teaching is not a neutral activity and demands that teachers take up a position – on this point, Freire was clear. Ideally, the position he wanted teachers to take up is that of a critical, democratic, and progressive educator. In particular, he wanted teachers to be culturally responsive to their students and to contribute to their cultural formation. This position presupposes an orientation of love and care towards students, and this exhortation draws attention to teaching as an ethical activity. Teachers would have to be mindful of the inevitable power imbalances in their classrooms and work to overcome this challenge. In so doing, teachers commit themselves to keeping to the fore the dignity of their students as human beings. Teachers have other commitments beside. They must show the way so that their students develop as critical thinkers who know and understand their world, so that, like their teachers they may choose to intervene and transform their world. Finally, teachers cannot be helpful in supporting their

students to become critical thinkers and doers unless they too are models of critical reflection and action. Freire, a man grounded in the day-to-day of his students’ lives, recognized the significance of practice, yet believed theory to be significant in shaping practice. There are tensions and contradictions in the relationship between theory and practice, and Freire’s emphasis on praxis attempted to alert teachers to the dialectical ebb and flow between practice and theory, and theory and practice.

Freire’s simple humility and respect for the dignity of others, and his driving passion for the attainment of a just world in the face of a global orientation that emphasizes greed, self-aggrandizement, and individual attainment over social cohesion, serve as an object lesson to all educators and a model for all teachers to emulate.

Cross-References

- [Conscientization, Conscience, and Education](#)
- [Critical Pedagogy, Historical Origins Of](#)
- [Dewey and Critical Pedagogy](#)
- [Dewey on Ethics and Moral Education](#)
- [Dewey on Teaching and Teacher Education](#)
- [Dewey on Thinking in Education](#)
- [Dialogue and Critical Pedagogy](#)
- [North American Critical Pedagogy](#)

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order for the latter to receive education that meets their needs as Singapore citizens and as Muslims.

Much is known about the full-time Islamic religious schools, the madrasah (e.g., Abdul Rahman 2006). Perhaps less well known is the equally important part-time Islamic education offered in the weekends by the mosques and other establishments. Both the madrasah and its part-time counterparts suffer from negative perceptions chief of which relate to the quality of such education and the impact that this education has on social cohesion in multicultural Singapore. In recent times, Islamic education has undergone a steady transformation. New programs have been introduced that are more responsive to the issues facing Muslims in a multicultural society and a globalized world. This reflects the Singapore Muslim community's confidence to try out new models of Islamic education.

This entry describes some aspects of the part-time Islamic education program offered in the mosques in Singapore. The program is designed to cultivate spirituality and morality at the same time enabling its students to feel at ease with their identity as Muslims and as citizens.

Teaching for Thinking

► Socratic Dialogue in Education

Teaching Islam to Children in Multicultural Singapore

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Introduction

For many Singapore Muslims, secular education provided by the national schools is a legitimate and useful system that promises access to socioeconomic mobility. But it is a deficient system that must be completed with a supplementary Islamic education that offers the religious and cultural knowledge that is important to Muslims. Families enroll their children in both types of schooling in

Islamic Education

The history of Islamic education has been well documented (e.g., Kadi 2006; Leiser 1986). Much has been said about its contributions to the development of Muslim and non-Muslim societies – the production of sacred and pragmatic knowledge including the *hadith* (the verified words and actions of Prophet Muhammad), mathematics, medicine, and the humanities among others. The scientific greatness of this religion-based civilization, however, has since declined due to internal and external strife – the political rivalries among Muslim leaders and the Western colonial expansion being notable among them.

At the heart of Islamic tradition is the study and transmission of religious knowledge and practice. All knowledge, whether revealed or acquired, is revered, but knowledge linked to faith occupies a privileged place in the Muslim religious imaginary (Moosa 2015). The Qur'an is held by

Muslims to be the exact and immutable words of God and thus is the perfect example of revealed knowledge, i.e., knowledge as revealed by God. Acquired knowledge is derived from reason, or science, through the study of the physical universe and human societies. Memorization is a purposeful choice in the study of the Qur'an and a methodology that is used extensively in Islamic educational institutions.

Muslim children are taught about their religion from a young age (Boyle 2006; Hefner and Zaman 2007). Education of Muslim children can take place in the home, mosque, study circles, and after-school programs where the heritage of Islamic knowledge and practice is passed to future generations. Education for Muslims may also take the more formal structure of the *madrasah*, a full-time school, where the curriculum may include both religious and secular education, and the range of purposes can be as pragmatic as training students to become religious experts, to training students to become skilled tradespersons and employees of public and private secular institutions (Park and Niyozov 2008).

Where Islamic religious instruction is supplementary to public secular schooling, which can take place at the home of a Qur'anic teacher for a duration of time daily or in the weekends, the minimum a child would be tasked to learn is to recite the Qur'an if not also memorize some *surah* (chapter). This is a testament to the centrality of the Qur'an in Islamic education. The teacher might add to his teaching some aspects of *fard 'ain* (obligatory acts performed by each individual Muslim such as ablution, *solat* (five daily prayers), and fasting). Once the teacher is satisfied that the child has recited the Qur'an in its entirety with the proper *tajweed* (rules governing pronunciation during recitation of the Qur'an), the occasion will be celebrated by the child's family.

Learning and Memorization

Memorization of the Qur'an is synonymous with learning the Qur'an and is very important to the Muslim communities. It instills in the children the practice of living life as a good and observant Muslim. This type of learning has the lasting effect of embodying the revealed knowledge of

the Qur'an in the beings of the students (Boyle 2006). Embodiment, however, is exclusive to the Qur'an; other forms of knowledge such as those arising from reason are not fixed and therefore do not need to be embodied or engraved in memory. In her study of Islamic schools in Morocco, Yemen, and Nigeria, Boyle (2006) suggests that while the students might not be able to explain what they had memorized, they do "know" some of the Qur'an in the primary sense of being able to recite parts of it (Boyle 2006). Following the Muslim jurist, theologian and Sufi Al-Ghazali and the historiographer Ibn Khaldun, Boyle (2006) explains that memorization of the Qur'an is not the opposite of understanding it:

Memorisation is generally considered the first step in understanding (not a substitute for it), as its general purpose was to ensure that sacred knowledge was passed on in proper form so that it could be understood later. (p. 488)

Indeed, the meaning of what is memorized may gradually unfold as children advance in maturity or as they go on to higher education studying the various disciplines of Islamic Studies such as the exegesis of the Qur'an and the rule-based practice of the discipline of law (*fiqh* or *shari'ah* – a moral discourse on ethical guidelines), which make reference to the Qur'an. The memorization of the Qur'an is therefore meant to be the first step in a lifelong enterprise of seeking understanding and thus knowledge.

Putting memorization at the forefront of learning the Qur'an, however, may not be the best method in all contexts. The Qur'an was revealed to Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) in his own language and that of his community of followers. The majority of the Muslim communities cited in Boyle (2006) (Morocco, Yemen, and Nigeria) also speak Arabic. For all of them, memorizing of texts in their own language surely comes with at least a vague understanding of what the texts mean. It is another matter when one memorizes a text in a language one does not speak and understand as in the case of Singapore Muslims who are generally non-Arabic speakers. A tweak in the way memorization is utilized would be required, a point that will be clarified in the next section.

Rethinking Islamic Education in Singapore

Singapore is an island city-state of over six million people where Muslims (the majority of whom are indigenous Malays) constitute 15% of the population, with Taoists, Buddhists, Christians, Hindus, Sikhs, and believers of other faiths making up the rest of the population. It is secularly governed; however, the constitution upholds the right of groups to adhere to their religious faiths for as long as they do not compete with each other and their beliefs do not contest the ideological and administrative practices of the government which safeguards racial tolerance in the law, pushes race out of the front line of politics, and relegates racial cultural practices “to the realm of private and voluntaristic, individual, or collective practices” (Chua 1995, p. 106).

The majority of Muslims in Singapore grow up enrolled in the secular national schools and attend weekend religious classes for their Islamic education as described earlier. Since the early 1980s, when villages gave way to modern high-rise flats in multiracial neighborhoods, children receive religious instructions in the mosques where the curriculum incorporates the memorization of *du'a* and the basic rules (e.g., concerning ablution and *solat*) in addition to the recitation and memorization of the Qur'an. Today, the majority of Muslim children receive their supplementary Islamic education at the mosque (commonly known as mosque madrasah) or through private religious establishments.

For some time, Singapore shares with other Muslim countries in the region an Islamic education which is perceived to suffer from shortcomings. These include the inappropriate use of memorization other than for the learning of the Qur'an, rote learning, and the attention to rituals and aspects of mysticism. Such emphases appear to depart from ideas on education in contemporary society which place importance on the acquisition of knowledge and understanding, the cultivation of a spirit of inquiry, the development of responsible attitudes, and the preparation of young people for later life and wider society (Abdul Rahman 2006).

The rapid globalization and Islamic revivalism in the last three decades provided the impetus for the Islamic Religious Council of Singapore – a

statutory body that looks after the religious, social, educational, economic, and cultural interests of Singapore's Muslim community – to rethink the approach to Islamic education. In the mosques, a new curriculum has been introduced for different age groups. It exists alongside the more traditional mosque madrasah curriculum which it is gradually replacing. The new curriculum prepares Muslim children to better understand, appreciate, and practice Islam in light of the present and future challenges. It strives to develop students intellectually, spiritually, and emotionally into a responsible social being. The change in curriculum and pedagogy extends to the medium of instruction, from Malay to English, to cater to Malay children who prefer English and to accommodate non-Malay-speaking Muslim students. This is a departure from the traditional practice of using Malay as a medium of instruction.

The new curriculum moves beyond the subject of “faith and practices,” which is essentially *fard 'ain*, and “Qur'anic literacy,” which involves reciting, understanding, and memorizing selected chapters of the Qur'an. Using values-based, interactive methods and age-appropriate activities to aid active learning and participation, teachers inculcate values (*akhlaq*) through the stories of the prophets. Students, in turn, by engaging in interactive activities and field trips, build “life skills and character” as well as learn about “social and civilizational Islam.” There is a clear attempt to help children understand, in an age-appropriate manner, the connection between the knowledge learned and the environment in which they live: about friendship, neighbors, giving to charity, helping the needy, and appreciating the environment. These are preludes to being an active contributor and participant of the larger society. The relevance of Islamic values and practices in the students' daily lives and their identity as Muslim citizens living in a multicultural society are thus important components of the curriculum.

A distinctive feature of the curriculum is in the way it puts a premium on understanding of what is being taught from the start rather than later (cf. Boyle 2006). However, just as children's cognitive skills and behavioral dispositions develop in stages, so too should content be selected and

delivered in such a way that understanding is appropriate to the age. For instance, the essence of a *surah* (chapter) could be distilled early in the program appropriate to the age but revisited in the later years. Similarly, *fard 'ain* is taught and provided practice in a way that is age appropriate. Understanding is therefore incremental, progressing over the 20 years that the students receive religious instructions from the program.

Another important feature is its thematic content. On any particular day, the various subjects – Qur'anic reading, the values taught, a historical event discussed – would revolve around the same theme. In the case of Qur'anic literacy, instead of reciting the Qur'an cumulatively from page 1, children recite and memorize chapters that are relevant to the theme. Tying a *surah* to a theme offers a better chance for it to be fully embodied (Hardaker & Sabki, 2015) considering that the children do not understand Arabic but rely on the translation and teachers' explanation of the text. In this way, memorization, which is facilitated through appropriate hands-on activities, remains a crucial part in learning but not foregrounded.

This mosque-based program is not meant to develop religious experts or Islamic scholars who would require a more intensive training and assessment which the full-time madrasah is in a better position to provide. The mosque curriculum is designed with a specific purpose, "to develop *soleh/solehah* (pious/righteous) children who are nurtured with *taqwa* (God-consciousness) and good *akhlak* (character), knowledgeable in Islam, become practicing Muslims, and show care and concern towards others" (Majlis Ugama Islam Singapura 2015). Importantly, they have a holistic understanding of the religion, and the knowledge they gain enables them to establish a relationship with the Creator as well as develop good relations with fellow citizens – Muslims and non-Muslims – and the environment around them.

Final Remarks

Supplementary Islamic education serves a purpose specific to the needs of non-Arabic-speaking Muslim children who attend secular national schools in

multicultural Singapore. It departs from the almost exclusive use of memorization and rote learning as a pedagogical tool in earlier and some versions of Islamic education. The depth and intensity of knowledge and skills taught and how they are taught must not be compared with those of the full-time madrasah which has its own peculiar aims. The new approach to Islamic education in the mosques gives emphasis to the development of spirituality and morality and good citizenry. Importantly, it offers a learning experience that has the power to be transformative – where learning goes beyond the surface and touches the soul of the student leading the individual to act upon what has been learned. This experiment with Islamic education in Singapore is worth watching!

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Teaching Philosophy

► Philosophy with Children

Technofeminist Lens on Schooling in the Digital Age

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Introduction

The site of the school is, increasingly, a site of the digital. Teachers and students increasingly interact with each other and learn about and comment on the world around them using digital tools. The culture of schools, and the culture of student life, is presented, shaped, disputed, and contoured by students, faculty, staff, and parents interacting, around the school, online. In order to engage with this online culture-making, this encyclopedia entry draws on many of the conceptual terms and theoretical interventions of technofeminist scholars, such as Elizabeth Grosz, Anne Balsamo, Donna Haraway, Toril Moi, Iris Marion Young, and others, to excavate the ways a technofeminist lens allows us to draw forth the shaping of the site of the school in the digital age. The school engages in technological identity-making, identity-making along gendered lines, and a technofeminist lens allows us to explore those intersections.

Technofeminism explores cultures and practices around digitalia, and in this way technofeminism adds to ongoing discussions around digital culture, that are happening in cultural studies. This paper brings the lens of technofeminism to bear on the school and highlights the intersections of digital technology and gender at the site of the school. While often overlooked as a site of culture-making within cultural studies literature, schools are places where youth (and parents, and community members) spend 7–10 h every week day engaging in culture-making, identity-making, and culture-learning. The school is a site of intensive culturing, and this entry uses technofeminism as a way to explore the gendered and digital intersections of that cultural interaction.

In order to examine the ways that technofeminism is brought to bear on the site of the

school, first technofeminism as a field of study is defined. Technofeminism is then divided into four subfields or lines of inquiries: progressive inquiries; radical inquiries; embodiment, materiality, and ecological inquiries; and cross-disciplinary inquiries. These subfields are explored as a way to make meaning of digital technology, gender, and other positionalities, within the school.

Technofeminism and Education

Technofeminism is a line of research and praxis that unites gender studies, science and technology studies, and the study of digital and material spaces. There is a focus on critical intersectionality but also more on the ways that materialities, digital processes and programs, corporeal bodies, performative identities, and regimes of truth work together – and sometimes push against each other, in ways that make up our experiences with our technological and digital present. Technofeminism works to bring these intersections to light but also to highlight questions and practices in ways that push toward greater equality and critical inquiry in our society.

Technofeminism, as a lens for inquiry into education, examines the ways that intersections between technology and gender shape what we think of as the purposes of schooling, the ways we think schooling is done, and what counts as a proper teacher, learner, and technological subject. Technofeminism in education examines questions such as: How do gender and technology shape the ways we understand what counts as learning and teaching?; How does technology shape how we think about and perform identity?; How does access to technology shape outcomes in the school, and how do access points align with gender?; How does technology shape school curriculum, pedagogy, and evaluation, and how does this production interact with gendered expectations?; How does technology shape what counts as knowledge, and then how does this interact with gender to shape who counts as a “knower”?

These questions can have progressive, ecological, and even radical effects and lines of inquiry. The next sections parse out some of the ways that

technofeminism can be used to shed light on the school as highly embedded in cultures of the digital and technological – with gendered shaping.

Progressive Inquiries

The progressive line of inquiry in technofeminism and education takes up issues of access and empowerment in a way where gender is considered stable. Rather than thinking about how technology challenges what we think of as a woman or a man, progressive lines of inquiry regard these categories as stable. Gender shapes who has access to various technologies, how those technologies are used, and how technology is made or created. Schools are spaces of gendered practice, and gendering, as well as spaces of technology. Progressive lines of inquiry often explore specific subject positions in the school, such as librarians, school teachers, students, and mothers, and their diversity of experience with and access to technology in the school. This research takes up questions such as: How does technology shape teaching and librarian work as women's work? How is technology built for female teachers (or not), and how is it that gender shapes how technology is practiced in the schools? How does access to technology shape the ways that girls and boys think of themselves and their future lives?

Technofeminism, as a progressive line of inquiry, examines all forms of unequal access, technological engagement, and facilitation toward technological savvy. An example of this kind of scholarship which focuses on access to technology is the work being done on the STEM pipeline and the ways that women often “leak out” of pathways toward STEM education and STEM careers. A 2011 report by the US Department of Commerce reports that, while women make up about half of the workforce, they hold less than 25% of STEM jobs. This percentage drops even further if we remove STEM-oriented jobs in healthcare or education. President Obama released a report in 2013 which showed that women currently earn 41% of PhDs in STEM fields but make up only 28% of tenure-track faculty in those fields. However, this is not just a US problem. Likewise, the European Commission, in

2012, released a report showing that women made up 45% of the workforce, gained 53% of tertiary degrees, and yet only made up 32% of the STEM workforce. The International Federation of University Women released a 2015 report noting that, in Asia, only 18.9% of the STEM workforce are women. This same report revealed that 12% of the global STEM workforce are women. Women are not equally represented in STEM fields, and schools can be both part of the problem, or part of the solution, as we seek to critique and reverse the cultural norms and institutional policies that lead to the “leaky” STEM pipeline.

Beyond thinking about the STEM gender-gap, there are myriad ways that our interactions with technology in the site of the school are gendered. The labor of teaching in the digital age involves the creation of class websites, the creation of parent e-mail lists, data input into online programs that allow parents to have constant access to student grades, and the use of smart boards and other specialized digital technologies. And yet, the position of teacher is inherently a feminized subject position. Thus, teachers are shaped by an identity-paradox. Discourses that interpolate teachers as feminized link into discourses that interpolate the feminized position as antithetical to competent use of digital technologies. Teachers are asked to master the use of digital technologies and yet are always/already seen as incompetent users of digital technology. This same gendering shapes interactions between students, where boys and girls who are both asked to use digital technologies to create school work are judged as “naturally talented,” or not, in ways that draw on both actual access to digital technologies, as well as discourses that shape how labor and practice become intelligible to the viewer in gendered ways. School parents (often school moms) are asked to complete tasks for the school that involve digital labor, and this labor is often both erased and made suspect because it involves *moms* doing the kind of work that would normally be done by digital “professionals.”

These lines of thought foreground the ways that women are disempowered, made suspect, made second-class citizens, not given equal opportunities, and interpolated into a discourse

of technology that renders women and girls automatically out of bounds. This type of research is vital because it takes up diversity and equity issues, but it also validates current gender norms and often reinforces heteronormative and gender normed ideas of women, men, and uses of technology. Another line of inquiry in technofeminism foregrounds the ways that technology can be used to challenge gender and hetero norms. This is a more radical line of technofeminism.

Radical Inquiries

In its radical form, technofeminism works to deconstruct and push against the concept of gender as stable, and explores ways that technology can work as counter-hegemonic discourse and practice that proliferates a multiplicity of gender identities. This line of inquiry takes up questions such as: How does technology validate and interpolate gender normativity? How does technology challenge gender normativity? How are these practices used in the classroom? How does the use of technology in the classroom, in ways that focus on identity, create and challenge perceptions of gender and sexuality in the classroom? For this line of inquiry, pushing against the stability and binary of gender is key, and exploring what it might mean to more fully think about and practice trans or hybrid forms of gender becomes critical.

There are many examples of this line of inquiry – inquiry that focuses on the ways that digital technology can work to both cement and challenge gender binaries. For example, the edited collection *Adolescent Literacies and the Gendered Self* (2013) contains multiple articles on ways that teachers and students use new media and digital tools to grapple with the ways that gender is performed, policed, and challenged. There are also numerous digital tools that aid in questioning and pushing against patriarchy and gender normativity. *Jailbreak the Patriarchy* is one digital tool – a web browser extension for Google Chrome – that switches gendered pronouns on everything that is read using your web browser as a way of exploring gender normativity and gendered expectations. There are games, sometimes

used in classroom environments, which invite people to explore what it might mean to play with gender binaries in their creation of avatars and in-game interactions. Critical teachers and students can then use these games to create discussions around gendered and hetero norms.

While these games and digital tools, and these lines of inquiry, often invoke a feeling of play, virtuality, and experimentation, technofeminism is also grounded in embodiment, materiality, and ecological relationships.

Embodiment, Materiality, and Ecological Inquiries

While technofeminism explicitly takes up the intersection of gender and technology, it is always embedded in the idea that this intersection involves real bodies, virtual spaces, material spaces, and ecological and relational processes. The most fecund space of research is found in the reciprocal shaping of the virtual/digital and the corporeal/material. There is also a commitment to parsing out the ways in which geographies, things, and the world of the not-human both shape and are shaped by human bodies, ideologies, and cultures. Technofeminism assumes that technology must always interact with culture, ideology, and also with corporeality and real objects. There is a physical corporeality, as well as virtual, dimension to the reciprocal process of embodiment by/through technology. This commitment to culture, materiality, and embodiment in research informs studies on soma-cognition and soma-pedagogy with digital tools, ecological and relational research on classroom practices and investments in glocality, as well as research and curriculum development in eco education.

For example, Carol Taylor (2013), Greenhalgh-Spencer (2014), and Christina Hughes and Celia Lurry (2013) have all done extensive research on the ways that relationships between bodies, objects, and the larger ecology shape how we make sense of the world, how we come to know what we know, and how we operate in a classroom. There is also extensive scholarship being done on using digital devices that create

hybrid moments – where you are interacting with the digital device and also with a real world environment – that are designed to give students experiences that help them to think about environmental disasters, biomes, ecological interventions, manufacturing and global trade, and the ways that geography, commerce, race, class, nationality, and gender factor into labor, knowledge, and policies for our environment.

There are many researchers and teachers who are making connections between the uses of digital technology and ecological disasters. There are now curricula designed to help students think about e-waste and making green contributions to their communities. Many are using digital technology to work toward ecological understanding and cleanup. Schools are foregrounding these issues through a focus on ecology and eco education, and also doing this by highlighting a relationality to the earth, ecology, and materiality. Technofeminism works with these research projects and curricula to focus on the gendered implications. The use of digital technologies in the school invariably links into the world of digital production: where women (often in the Global South) work to produce and dispose of digital artifacts, while (most often) men both design and take credit for these digital artifacts. This process creates a system where men are designing the tools used by everyone, and women are making and then cleaning up after the tools that are used by everyone. Technofeminist research and curricula work to highlight these issues and push against injustice. Schools organize to create awareness campaigns around e-waste and provide safe avenues for disposal of dead devices.

This investment in making connections, between individuals, societies, material objects, ideologies, cultures, and technologies, is further aided and extended by a willingness to engage with other disciplines. One line of inquiry in technofeminist research explicitly takes up the ways that other fields can add critical illuminations onto the intersection of technology and gender. Critical cross-disciplinarity, as a line of flight within technofeminism, brings other fields to bear on the relationships and intersections of gender and technology.

Cross-Disciplinary Inquiries

Technofeminism, as an intersection of technology and gender, recognizes that objects, positionalities, cultures, language, and bodies interact in ways that form meaning and shape actions. As a field of research, it is well-positioned to foreground the value of bringing other fields of research and other ways of knowing to bear on phenomena. Critical cross-disciplinarity, as a sub-field of technofeminism, formalizes that process. Inquiries that are interdisciplinary ask questions such as: How do gender and technology intersect with race, religion, socioeconomic class, nationality, language, ethnicity, dis/ability, geography and age?; How do multiple positionalities interact in order to shape epistemology and praxis around technology?

For example, there is extensive research that looks at the ways that race and gender intersect with disability in the use of assistive technology and digital technology in the classroom more broadly. Shoshana Magnet (2011) offers an insightful critique of the ways that technology is used as a diagnostic tool to track students, to measure output, to categorize with a cognitive disability, etc.; and how these technologies often intersect with race, class, and gender in ways that sometimes make the use of digital tools for diagnosis problematic. There is also a strain of research that explores the ways that disability is symbolized or embodied, in raced, classed, and gendered ways, in RPGs or online worlds such as *Second Life*.

Furthermore, there is a growing body of scholarship that examines the power of positionalities outside of the standard race, class, and gender categories. For example, Fogle and King (2015) write about the ways that technologies are used to teach and assess English, language learners, and multilingual students; and they explore the ways that gender and sexuality inform the ways that students respond to these tools. These authors explore the ways that language – as a part of but also different from race and ethnicity – intersects with gender and technologies. Another scholar, Teresa Correa (2015), explores beyond the race, class, and gender categories to look at the

positionality of youth. She “investigates whether bottom-up technology transmission is associated with a possible reduction of socioeconomic-, age-, and gender-based digital gaps” (p. 1163). In her work, Correa argues that the status of adolescence, adulthood, parenthood, and childhood all influence feelings of efficacy with technology as well as the desire to experiment with and learn more about technology. Adolescent students gain experience with the digital in school, and then become the “experts” on digital interaction in their homes. An interdisciplinary or critical cross-disciplinary approach allows us to explore the ways that multiple identity markers work to construct the self as a technological subject within the context of schooling.

Conclusion

Technofeminism, in progressive, radical, ecological, or cross-disciplinary lines of inquiry, guides toward the consideration of technology as more than a set of tools, machines, or practices. Technology, and the making of the technological subject, involves reciprocal relationships where technology shapes what becomes intelligible and do-able but is also shaped by the desires, questions, practices, and cultures of people and institutions. This reciprocal relationship has implications for how we do research in technology more broadly and also has specific implications for what happens in schools. Schools foster the making of culture, the making of identity, and the becoming of both gendered and technological subjects. Technofeminism leads us to consider the intensive structuring of the subject that happens in schools, and explore how relationships with people and things are built. Technofeminism, further, leads to new forms of pedagogical engagement, where teachers and students use technology as a lens for critique and also as a way to oppose inequity and create multiplicity in thought and identity. Technology can validate the status quo and can also be reimaged by subjects using and remaking technology in new ways. This stance should guide future research and practices in schools.

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Technoliteracies

- Digital Literacies

Technoliteracy

- Digital Literacies

Technology

- [Phenomenology of Digital Media](#)
- [Phenomenology of Higher Education](#)

Temporalities of Academic Work

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Synonyms

[Acceleration](#); [Higher education](#); [Research conduct](#); [Speed – positive aspects](#); [Time pressure](#)

Introduction

Since the beginning of the twenty-first century, academic work in institutions of higher education has been subject to manifold and unprecedented technological and political-economic pressures. For academics, it is nowadays far from sufficient to be committed and competent in a discipline, intellectually engaged with a distinctive research niche, and a competent teacher. To be professionally successful, academics now need to adopt output-oriented and anticipatory behavior. They need to negotiate – and in a sense internalize – ubiquitous digitally mediated metrics assessing their work. They are what their h-index of publication productivity and citation impact is. Academics also must navigate regimes of accountability, market-driven and managerial mindsets, and excessive (both externally imposed and internally steered) competition for resources (i.e., grant income) and prestige.

This entry surveys insights from the current debate on the changing temporalities of academic work and traces major argumentative threads and critiques that have emerged in this body of scholarship. Specifically, it identifies two major

discourses. The *prevailing discourse* stresses acceleration and time pressure in academic work in relation to the tectonic shifts in and of academia under digital capitalism (e.g., the role of information and communication technologies, increasing workloads, metrification of academic work, and personal and professional implications of these trends). The *marginal discourse* deals primarily, and perhaps unconventionally, with positive and often underestimated aspects of acceleration in academic work. Examples include fast communication, immediate access to publication databases, fast publication practices, and psychophenomenological attributes of research conduct.

Acceleration Experience

Until recently, in the social sciences, acceleration has predominantly been gestured at or used as a contextual reference. Nowadays, however, acceleration has become a prominent theme in current discussions on temporal dimensions of modernity (Rosa 2013; Tomlinson 2007). These discussions investigate, among other themes, the interconnectedness between acceleration and modernization, (digital) technologies, secularism, capitalism, modern warfare, and bureaucracy. The debates also include sources and expressions of acceleration, patterns of acceleration, motors, contours, and unintended ramifications. They trace, for example, what rush, hurry, time pressure, and speed-up mean for democratic order and mental well-being of modern individuals.

Technically speaking, acceleration is defined as change in velocity with respect to time. Physical movement is therefore a crucial attribute. Yet, the social sciences and the humanities treat acceleration differently: as a distinctive modern *experience*. Rosa says that experience of acceleration can be defined as the “increase of episodes of action and/or experience per unit of time as a result of a scarcity of time resources” (2013, p. 121). Thus conceived, acceleration experience does not (necessarily) express physical movement but rather captures a widespread state of mind, shared social ambience, and prevailing sentiment. In this sense, acceleration experience is also

stationary: as modern individuals, in fact, we “can experience time pressure, haste, hurry and rush – all of these essentially cultural-phenomenological rather than physical descriptions – without even stirring from our office desk” (Tomlinson 2007, p. 3).

Albeit largely stationary, acceleration experience manifests itself in very tangible ways (chronic time pressure, burnout, depression, frustrations). Acknowledging its intellectual grounding in critical social theory, the evolving “acceleration debate” is often overly preoccupied with such negative implications of acceleration. Acceleration is, often correctly, treated here as something inherently harmful – for social development, psychological conditions, professional conduct, sustaining social relations and formation of identity (see Rosa 2013). This interpretation, nonetheless, underestimates the possibility that acceleration can be energizing, useful, convenient, and satisfactory. Alongside its oppressive and detrimental effects, acceleration, although in a thin sense, might also manifest itself as a positive experience. This forms two major discourses in relation to acceleration experience. The prevailing discourse highlights negative aspects of acceleration, while the less-discussed marginal discourse emphasizes its energizing and liberating features.

Empirically and ethnographically, researchers have begun to explore how acceleration experience manifests in working life and in relation to digital technologies (Wajcman 2015). Since the end of the first decade of the new millennium, examinations of acceleration and temporality have also become an emerging field in critical studies of higher education. Academia is an apt field to explore acceleration. It is not only a “laboratory” of the economic (ir)rationality of neoliberalism; it has also morphed from society’s intellectual epicenter into a branch of the economy. Academia has smoothly adopted principles such as audit culture, managerialism, accountability, and efficiency. Such adoption has arrived at the detriment of cultivating disinterested research and *Bildung* – intellectual formation and development through education. In this connection, scholars scrutinize the shifting character of the academic profession and the transformation of

rhythms of academia (see Pels 2003; Gibbs et al. 2015), often contextualized by acceleration in and of academic life, and its consequences.

Prevailing Discourse: Oppressive Acceleration, or *Busyness*

In contemporary academia, there is a pervasive sense that things are constantly and incessantly speeding up. Academics report chronic time pressure, a “rat-race” lifestyle, fear of missing out (“FOMO”), tyranny of e-mail, frustration, stress, burnout, sleeplessness, exhaustion, mental problems, and inability to follow developments and debates in their respective disciplines and fields (see, e.g., Besley and Peters 2005; Ylijoki 2013; Müller 2014).

A common, rational reaction to such pressures is compression and speed-up of job-related activities such as reading, writing, communicating, conducting research, analyzing results, and so on. Academics, as widely reported, have lost their status of “leisure class” and the associated temporality. This pattern negatively impacts, perhaps even nullifies, the *unhasty* pace (Pels 2003) that had underpinned the academic profession. For instance, academics from humanities and social sciences report that due to excessive workloads and “text and information obesity,” they can barely find the time to read, not to mention write books (Rosa 2013, p. 136).

The involuntary and oppressive acceleration often reaches into extra-academic activities such as family life and regeneration activities (sports, hobbies), where it disturbs social ties and friendships. What seems to be disappearing is not “time as such” but “quality time” (see Wajcman 2015), which constitutes crucial functional and normative preconditions for knowledge reproduction and well-being of individual academics, and is defined in opposition to the currently dominant experience of “distorted or interrupted time” and “permanent distraction.” The spectrum of negative temporal experiences can be called “oppressive acceleration,” and its main feature is disruption of unique rhythms underpinning the academic vocation. This spectrum can be

contextualized with the ongoing and deepening neoliberalization of academia, transformation of academic jobs, progressive reduction of scholarship to metrics, massification of academia, and exponentially growing numbers of publications expected to be written and waiting to be read.

The neoliberal practices – with managerialism, the imperative of boundless productivity and the notion of “excellence” at their center – constitute a “fast academic time,” which is increasingly incompatible with the relatively unhasty rhythm or “slow time” of academic work. Steadily increasing job demands, rising number of administrative duties, and bureaucratic form-filling account for additional and substantial “time-thieves” in academic research. Academics certainly cannot conduct research fast; they can barely write “fast.” Reading, as another closely related near-universal academic activity, can occasionally be conducted speedily. Yet, this heavily depends on various parameters, including the character of the text (for instance, student seminars might read faster than latest research) or familiarity with the topic. Also, many experiments in natural sciences as well as research activities in the humanities and the social sciences (i.e., archival work, data collection) are temporally demanding and cannot be conducted speedily.

What it means to be an academic nowadays changes dramatically. Based on how academics understand own profession (and its transformations), and how this understanding is continuously (re)formed and (re)created, academic subjectivity generates “winners” and “losers.” Winners are capable of being “in synch” with the accelerating tempo of academic life due to their situatedness and position within the existing hierarchies (e.g., established male professors of natural sciences are arguably less susceptible to temporal pressures than female junior academics in the humanities and the social sciences). The most vulnerable group in this sense are postdocs and early career scholars who often report anxieties and “life at the bottleneck” resulting from, as Müller (2014) aptly asserts, the directionless race to the bottom.

Academic work, and research in particular, might under some circumstances be defined as unhasty or busyless activities. This means that

they are slow – not in a regressive sense but perhaps slower than professional pursuits in private domains, politics, media, and business (Pels 2003). Hence, the “slow ideology” and its appeal as a counterpoise to oppressive acceleration (e.g., Slow Science, Slow Academy, Slow University, Slow Professor) begin to appear as an important strand in critical debates on contemporary academia. Alongside neoliberalization and managerialism, the main target of slow ideology is academia’s fast time – i.e., the experience of rush, busyness, stress, and the like – “in which many are immersed,” but is unevenly distributed within academia (Barnett 2011, p. 74). Adding to this view, the academic time as such – and acceleration experience at its center – is ideally multifaceted: the overarching and desirable unhasty pace (especially in comparison with other social domains) is intertwined with “fast moments.”

Marginal Discourse: Conductive Acceleration, or *Eureka*

Without undermining the seriousness of oppressive acceleration for academic work, knowledge production, and human well-being, academic acceleration also results in certain positive effects. Conductive acceleration is defined as intended, controlled intensification or dynamization of a specific activity. Conductive acceleration may be related with a technological medium that enables faster movements or processes, or it can work through more subtle psychological dynamic associated with the act of research such as intuition, rule of thumb, or tacit knowledge. Conductive acceleration can be further divided in two categories: practical acceleration and psychophenomenological acceleration. These aspects of acceleration experienced in academic life are discussed, often in connection or contrast with the dominant discourse on acceleration (see Barnett 2011, pp. 72–5).

It is also commonplace among academics to highlight the conveniences of fast and remote access to entire journals and other scientific databases through university library interfaces. In terms of the pace of publication and distinctive

temporalities of different publication formats in the natural sciences, Ludwik Fleck (1979, pp. 111–125) introduces the fast-moving “journal science” and slow-moving “vademecum science,” and analyzes the interplay between them. The journal science accounts for tentative, cutting-edge, *vanguard*, fragmented, *fast* shaping of scientific knowledge, and vademecum science accounts for slow, codified, established scientific knowledge in the form of textbooks, handbooks, “stable” canons, and paradigms. Academics practicing “journal science” require fast-moving publishing industry, and tools monitoring speed of review and speed of publication offer valued orientation in publication landscapes.

Acceleration is not always reactive and involuntary – it is also attributable to fundamental tenets of scientific progress. Many academics appreciate open access short reports and blog contributions, with vast online readerships, which greatly outnumber readerships of academic journals. This opens up the question of whether the use of digital technologies which enables fast (scientific) communication can be also perceived – and experienced – in positive terms. In the case of learning, for instance, the overall perception of the “digital turn” in higher education is largely positive. Hence, next to digital technologies’ indisputably intrusive nature (permanent connectivity, email overload), there surely exist some practical and enhancing aspects (fast dissemination of research, prompt communication).

In psychophenomenological terms, acceleration experience in academic work can also be seen as energizing – it can and does contain the pleasure of discovery, accomplishment, application, and solution. This perspective stresses the role of (often unexpected or unintended) accident in scientific work, which potentially delivers innovative perspectives. The role of the mind in the “psychology” of academic work is also important here, particularly as teamwork, brainstorming, and other collective generative activities that potentially “ignite” a train of thought. Under the influential model of Daniel Kahneman (2011), thinking as such comprises of different speeds – fast *and* slow.

Experimenting, thinking through, and writing are slow, contemplative, and time-consuming

attributes of research. If academics (are forced to) speed up these activities, they may compromise accuracy, correctness, and validity. Yet there are other attributes of research which can be seen as “fast” in a positive sense, and which complement the productive “slow” attributes. This category of conductive acceleration reflects *moments* in academic work which are sensual and cognitive in nature. Conductive acceleration functions similarly to oppressive acceleration, as these moments account for a state of mind or mental (re)configurations of individual’s mindset, rather than a physical enjoyment produced by activities such as riding a motorbike or roller-coaster.

The triggers of conductive accelerative moments in academic work are “Aha moments,” the pleasure of discovery, and they can be captured with the familiar term *Eureka* (insight, epiphany). Conductive acceleration moments often result from accomplishment of research tasks, successful publications, and complete projects. Such propellants of acceleration are *conditioned* by the existence of the principle of temporal autonomy that academics would ideally enjoy, and academic institutions would ideally protect and nourish. Yet the opposite seems to be the case: together with leisure and comparatively unhasty rhythms of academic work, fast and energizing moments are equally compromised in the neoliberal regime.

Acceleration cannot be restricted to a rational reaction to short time supply. It can be intentional, voluntary, energizing, convenient, conductive; it may open new possibilities and connections (e.g., distributing research results on social media); it might accompany moments of discovery and propel intellectual endeavors. Acceleration which academics have fully under control, when they are able to “change gears,” externally imposed or resulting from the temporal demands associated with externally sanctioned duties, can bring accomplishment and satisfaction.

Conclusion

Individual time experience in the academia is far from singular or definitive. It can be thought of

using the prevailing discourse of oppression and the marginal discourse of positive effects. In spite of its strong domination, the discourse of oppression needs to be complemented with important energizing and convenient attributes of acceleration in academic life. In the emerging debate on the academic temporal experience, such nuanced view is often underestimated, as the prevailing discourse tends to criticize oppressive acceleration exclusively (albeit correctly and productively).

Reaching the ideal of slowness resolves only a part of the problem, as leisure and an unhasty pace coexist in symbiosis with conductive acceleration. The established dichotomy of “good slowness” versus “bad acceleration” is incomplete. If slowness can also be unwelcomed and undesired, then acceleration can also be practical and energizing. In spite of their analytic separation, the two acceleration experiences overlap and intermingle in the academic lifeworld; they are fluid and mutually constitutive. The productive tension between the two temporalities of academic work containing slow *and* fast attributes is in need of preservation.

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Testing

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Theorizing Curriculum Implementation and Evaluation in Early Childhood Education

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Theorizing Curriculum Implementation and Evaluation in Early Childhood Education

Theories of curriculum implementation and evaluation in early childhood education during recent decades have been governed, broadly, by two

contrasting sets of assumptions. The first set of assumptions attempts to understand curriculum in early childhood education holistically, viewing children, educators, and families as learning together. The second takes a much more instrumental view, positioning teachers' practices as causal mechanisms for child and family outcomes. This encyclopedia entry will summarize each of these positions, concluding with a brief discussion of the possibilities for a rapprochement between the two positions.

One of the defining characteristics of the field of early childhood education is its ongoing struggle to define "the curriculum" (Gibbons 2011). In part this is due to the field's history of viewing early education holistically, extending beyond traditional subject-oriented domains such as science, mathematics, and the arts. The epistemological bases of this holistic definition position knowledge not as a purely conscious, intra-mental phenomenon, but as including embodied, esthetic, and affective dimensions of human knowing and being. This epistemological stance draws on a post-Cartesian understanding of learning and development (Simms 2008), viewing knowledge as developing in and through a unity of mind and body. Unlike the development of school curricula, with their origins in content-oriented syllabic models of content and allied teaching methods, early childhood curricula have developed through a long sociohistorical trajectory that has overlapped the domains of subject-oriented content, relationship-oriented teaching methods, home environments, classroom practices and materials, family culture and aspirations, children's interests and agency, educators' preferences and intentions, and the social and economic demands of the wider community.

This post-Cartesian and socioculturally-oriented definition of curriculum also means that the distinction between "teaching" and "learning" does not hold: if curriculum is understood holistically, then the pedagogies children experience are necessarily subsumed into children's experience of the curriculum, thereby forming a key aspect of curriculum implementation itself (Edwards and Nuttall 2005). This drawing together of curriculum implementation with curriculum per se has

been taken up to some extent in school settings through the concept of "enacted curriculum," which attempts to combine the demands of subject-oriented curriculum (the "intended curriculum") with what actually happens in the classroom, including teaching practices. The definition of curriculum in early childhood education remains even broader, since it aims to capture every aspect of the environment to which children are exposed. Aotearoa New Zealand's early childhood curriculum framework, *Te Whāriki* (Ministry of Education 1996), reflects this all-encompassing epistemological and experiential basis for early childhood curriculum when it states:

The curriculum is provided by the people, places, and things in the child's environment: the adults, the other children, the physical environment, and the resources. The curriculum integrates care and education and includes both specifically planned experiences and activities and interactions that arise spontaneously. (p. 11)

A holistic definition of curriculum raises particular challenges for curriculum evaluation, since the number of variables at play in curriculum implementation is enormous and many of these variables, such as the nature of spontaneous interactions, are highly subjective and context-specific. This definitional problem is complicated even further when identifying the epistemological and ideological discourses within early childhood curriculum documents. These include post-modernistic, humanistic-constructivistic, futures-oriented, and individualistic, which reflect implicit and shifting understandings about the ontological status of children and childhood (Turunen and Määttä 2012). Socioculturally-oriented definitions of curriculum implementation in early childhood education have also become widespread during this period and are consistent with a holistic view of curriculum implementation, since socioculturalism understands teaching and learning as interpenetrating and co-evolving (both for children and their teachers). Such discourses have given risen to attempts, in Finland, New Zealand, and elsewhere, to evaluate early childhood curricula by employing concepts such as ethical and political practice and through

localized strategies of teacher reflection and center self-review.

Although such broadly discursive strategies and localized practices have been shown to have impact at the local level, they have had only limited impact at the broader policy level, due to parallel developments in economics and education policy that rely on a much more instrumental view of the relationship between teaching and learning. This second understanding of the nature and purposes of early childhood curriculum has become influential since the 1960s and draws principally on human capital theory, which has come to dominate early childhood education policy globally during recent decades (Lightfoot-Rueda and Peach 2015). When applied to early childhood education, human capital theory argues that inequality in early years experiences leads to subsequent inequality in academic ability, health, and adult success, and that investment in quality early childhood education can remediate adverse parental and environment effects on achievement. Such arguments, although contested on ideological, epistemological, and methodological grounds, have been highly persuasive amongst governments in minority-world countries seeking to both contain government expenditure and maximize the effects of targeted expenditure. This persuasiveness has resulted in major policy investment in early childhood education, with an accompanying intensification of policy strategies to monitor quality in early childhood services (OECD 2015).

Many of these strategies rely on quantification of curriculum implementation activities as “inputs” and measurement of children’s subsequent scholastic achievement as “outputs,” in order to be assimilated into the complex mathematical formulae used to express human capital theory. Economist and Nobel laureate James Heckman has calculated, for example, that investment in high-quality early childhood education for disadvantaged children produces up to a 10% return on investment for government across a child’s lifetime, through reducing subsequent demands on health, justice, and social services budgets. This positivistic epistemology has been used by governments and lobby groups to subsequently make claims about “what works” in early

childhood education, particularly for historically marginalized groups of people. Although early childhood academics have contested the axiological bases for such claims (Dahlberg and Moss 2005), regimes of monitoring and accountability are now widespread and highly quantified. This has resulted in tensions for early childhood teachers whose axiological commitments do not align with the pedagogical implications of human capital theory, which have been identified as leading to an emphasis on the “academic” aspects of early childhood curriculum at the expense of a more embodied and holistic view.

Tensions over the definition of curriculum in early childhood education surface again as children move between prior-to-school educational institutions and school settings. Disturbances at this point in children’s lives are, at least in part, grounded in the contrasting ethical stances taken by educators with respect to what constitutes worthwhile knowledge (Carr 2013). These disturbances are most commonly evidenced through the assessment tools employed by educators, since these tools not only attempt to explain children’s learning and development but serve to reinscribe the epistemological and axiological commitments of particular professional contexts. Assessment tools provide a direct window into what is valued and understood as “the curriculum,” however defined.

Attempts to reach a compromise between these ideological, epistemological, and methodological attempts to make sense of early childhood curriculum have been only modestly successful, at best. Early attempts at theorizing curriculum implementation and evaluation in early childhood education tried to resolve this tension by quantifying curriculum evaluation whilst also capturing the complex nature of early childhood curriculum. These attempts adopted the concepts of “structural quality” and “process quality” as evaluative categories. Structural quality denoted observable features of the environment (e.g., materials, ratios of staff to children) and aspects of resourcing identified as influencing children’s curricular experiences (e.g., level of teacher qualifications, amount of ongoing professional development for teachers). The concept of process quality attempted to capture more ephemeral aspects of children’s experience,

including the number and nature of interactions between teachers and children.

Instruments such as the Early Childhood Environment Rating Scale (ECERS) and its revised version, ECERS-R (Harms and Cryer 1998), have been developed to support the attempt to evaluate both structural and process variables in early childhood education environments. The ECERS-R includes items, collectively referred to as “proximal” or “process” variables, to represent human interactions. In the case of the ECERS-R these rely heavily on spoken language, including “greeting/departing,” “encouraging children to communicate,” “discipline,” “staff-child interactions,” and “staff interaction and cooperation.” The embodied aspect of children’s experience is evident in the category of “Personal care routines,” which includes items such as “toileting/diapering,” “nap/rest,” and “meals/snacks,” separate from categories such as “Activities,” “Language-reasoning,” and “Interaction.” However critics of the ECERS-R have argued that it can provide only, at best, a global indication of quality as a broad construct in curriculum evaluation (Perlman et al. 2004). Furthermore, contemporary curriculum evaluation moves relying on instruments such as the ECERS-R also implicitly assume a unidirectional causal relationship between teachers’ practice and child outcomes, rather than attempting to resolve the relationship between them.

Although some research has attempted to identify the relationship between the two constructs of “structural” and “process” quality, the challenge remains to develop evaluation strategies in early childhood education that can make sense of the multiplicity of variables within a holistic definition of curriculum and the dynamic, multi-directional interplay of teaching and learning.

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Theory

- [Leadership Research and Practice: Competing Conceptions of Theory](#)

Theory Building and Education for Understanding

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The term “understanding” has many senses, most of them valid in their appropriate contexts. There is a sense in which our loyal dog understands

us. There is a spiritual sense, in which understanding is arrived at through inward reflection – something we may assume does not play a role in our dog’s understanding. There is a sense in which understanding means about the same as wisdom, a sense in which it is a form of deep practical knowledge, and of course a subjective sense signaled by expressions such as “Now I get it.” But then there is also the “illusion of understanding” (Jacoby et al. 1994). Non-illusory understanding must be able to pass certain tests, and the most convincing test is the ability to produce explanations that stand up under criticism and empirical testing. Producing such explanations is in essence theory building. This article examines the implications of viewing the collaborative pursuit of understanding by students as a theoretical enterprise.

From Brainstorming to Theory Building

Ask a roomful of elementary school children why something is the case – why leaves turn color in the fall, for instance, or how an airplane stays aloft – and they will produce a variety of explanations, some fanciful but some fairly reasonable and even ingenious. Their thinking will for the most part qualify as theoretical: They attribute the phenomenon to natural causes; faced with contrary evidence, they will abandon or alter their explanations. What is missing is theory development. The children are usually satisfied with their explanatory ideas and indicate no spontaneous interest in testing them or developing them further. What they are doing is a kind of brainstorming, and teachers may be thoroughly delighted with it, see no need to press on, and balk at getting young children to recognize that some of their ideas are wrong. Children, thus, are invited to spin theories but they are held back from theory building. *Theory building starts when an explanatory idea is modified or further developed to produce a better explanation.*

What constitutes a theory has been the subject of much discussion across a wide range of disciplines. At the school level, however, educators can afford to take a relaxed approach to the question of definition. There is little harm in calling every

explanatory statement uttered by a student a theory and placing the emphasis instead on theory change and improvement. This is in line with the programmatic view of science originating with Imre Lakatos (1970). According to Lakatos, a theory should not be judged on the basis of its status at a point in time but on its course of development, which may be progressive or degenerative, depending on whether negative evidence is dealt with in ways that strengthen or weaken the theory. Weak ways include adding exceptions and weasel words such as “usually” and “tends to.” What constitutes strengthening an explanation, however, is more complicated. The accumulation of supportive evidence may increase confidence in a theory, but it does not improve the theory itself. On the basis of concepts of “reasoning to the best explanation” and “explanatory coherence” (Thagard 2000), an explanation can be judged to be getting stronger if:

1. It explains more facts.
2. It excludes more false statements.
3. It connects to more other explanations.
4. It explains things in more detail.
5. Parts of the explanation interlock so that it becomes increasingly difficult to modify parts without altering the whole.
6. It is able more clearly to identify what it fails to explain.
7. It generates better predictions.
8. It explains *how* identified causal factors work, rather than only identifying and quantifying their effects.

A strong theoretical program may encounter many “anomalies,” as Lakatos called them – discoveries, observations, or failed predictions – that are problematic for the developing theory, but it gains strength by theory revisions in accord with the eight criteria just listed. The history of evolutionary biology, from Darwin onward, is a remarkable story of progress on every one of these points, with evolutionary theory becoming stronger and stronger as a result.

Young students’ explanatory theories are likely to consist of single-cause explanations: Hunting is the cause of species endangerment, summer weather is caused by the earth getting closer to

the sun, and so forth. Adding more causal factors is an improvement, but usually only with respect to the first and seventh criteria. Yet adding causal factors and accumulating evidence is often all that inquiry learning and guided discovery consist of. Such theory-free approaches are often inaccurately labeled “positivism,” which does injustice to a philosophical program that was a great deal more sophisticated. A more accurate label is “naïve” or “dust bowl empiricism.” Although the eight criteria may be difficult to meet, they are not particularly hard to understand. Consequently they can serve as goals for teachers and students and standards according to which students can evaluate their own explanatory efforts.

Progress in explanatory theory building means more than constructing a better answer to the initial question. It also usually means improving the question being addressed – “deepening” the inquiry. In Hakkarainen’s cyclical model of inquiry, “question deepening” is an essential part of the process, not an occasional outcome (Muukkonen et al. 2009). Theories, as Karl Popper maintained, are provisional solutions to problems, and a theory cannot be understood, let alone improved, without adequate understanding of the problem the theory is supposed to solve.

Question deepening is well recognized in mature science, but it is especially important with school students, because their initial questions are liable to be superficial or overly general, and explanatory progress does not really get moving until the problem is better formulated. Deepening or refining the question does not necessarily require a major conceptual shift, either. The following dialogue was reported by a grade 5/6 teacher:

Student: I need to understand: how does the heart work?

Teacher: What is it you don’t understand about that?

Student: Why does the blood have to circulate?

Why the blood needs to circulate is a much deeper question, one that “gets to the heart” of understanding the circulatory system: It needs to be answered before the whole system of arteries and veins and the existence of a subsystem devoted to the lungs make much sense. Yet the deepening took only a matter of seconds.

However, getting to a fruitful question may often require repeated cycles of theorizing and reformulating problems. Within the span of the school years, there may be no end to it. Although question deepening is often a responsibility left for the teacher, a current development in the learning sciences is to provide students with tools that help them carry out a deepening of inquiry by themselves (Scardamalia and Bereiter 2014).

Truth and Authority

In the preceding discussion of theory improvement, nothing was said about truth or getting closer to the truth. Philosophers of science mostly agree that there is no way of ascertaining that a theory is getting closer to the truth, and so such judgment can only be made retrospectively. In formal education, however, there is a stand-in for truth according to which student progress in understanding can be judged: expert consensus or the representation of it in authoritative texts. It is possible to judge student progress in terms of getting closer to the authoritative consensus, and this is how student understanding has traditionally been assessed (Nickerson 1985). Claims that the authoritative consensus is correct are commonly based on the weight of evidence. This becomes apparent when a vocal minority questions the authoritative consensus, as is currently the case with climate change and evolution. The scientific consensus in both cases is based on powerful theoretical models, but the arguments in support of the consensus appeal mainly to the massive evidence in favor of it rather than to the explanatory power of the models. Thus, for purposes of academic success and effective citizenship, it is important that students understand the strengths and weaknesses of expert consensus and weight of evidence, while still guiding their own efforts to achieve understanding by principles of explanatory coherence. One objection to the current emphasis on argumentation in school science and social studies is that it tends to overvalue weight of evidence and to neglect explanatory power. Weight of evidence is not ignored in applied sciences. If the science is lacking to explain why

treatment A works better than treatment B or to explain why in some cases treatment B works better, but the vast majority of results favor treatment A, then A becomes the treatment of choice. Similarly, if economic history shows that applying one economic theory usually leads to better results than applying another, then it is reasonable to base a choice on the weight of historical evidence even though the scientific merits of the two theories may still be in dispute. Scientific literacy and, more generally, knowledge literacy require recognizing the value of principled (e.g., theoretical) knowledge and also recognizing bases for rational and even creative action when principled knowledge is lacking (cf. Bereiter 2014).

Because for students the bulk of their disciplinary knowledge comes from authoritative sources rather than from original inquiry, it is important for them to develop an intelligent stance with regard to authoritative sources. Studies of student epistemologies have shown that, while naïve acceptance characterizes many students, blanket skepticism is also readily taken up by many adolescents. Serious and sustained engagement in explanatory theory building should lead to a more constructive stance. Theory builders are of necessity *bricoleurs*; they build things out of whatever is available, and what's available is often imperfect or intended for a different purpose. So they build on existing authoritative knowledge, while recognizing that that knowledge may be faulty or somewhat irrelevant. They learn to appreciate the work that previous generations of theorizers have put into developing what are now put forth as laws or facts. They may begin to appreciate that, while everyone has the right to criticize, not every criticism deserves to be taken seriously. Perhaps all this paragraph is saying is that explanatory theory building by students should take place within a larger framework of liberal education.

Theory Building Outside Science and Mathematics

Although students are most likely to encounter theories in science, explanation ranges much more widely over human experience. There is

explaining a particular poem, painting, or art movement; there is explaining a historical event or a current event that makes the news; there is explaining a social condition or problem; and of course there is the continual need to explain the words and actions of people near to us. Ideally such explanations have explanatory coherence and openness to evidence similar to what scientific theories have and so can be judged according to the same criteria. They differ from scientific theories, however, in two noteworthy ways. One difference is that nonscientific explanations are usually one-off. They are not part of a more extensive theoretical program. The other difference is that, while scientific theories are generally intended to apply universally to a class of phenomena, these other kinds of explanations are “theories of the case.” The term comes from jurisprudence where, for instance, the prosecution in a criminal trial needs to present a theory that explains the evidence, and the theory needs to have compelling explanatory power; otherwise, the defense wins. Medical diagnoses are also theories of individual cases, which need to have enough explanatory power to justify what may be life-or-death decisions. Theories of the case play a large role in the daily lives of thinking people. Any puzzling event will set people to theorizing, and hopefully discussion will progress toward greater explanatory power, which in turn will serve as the basis for more intelligent action.

In the learning and cognitive sciences, building theories of the case exemplifies a process known as “case-based reasoning”. This is reasoning from knowledge of particular cases rather than from general principles. It often makes use of analogy to arrive at conclusions based on similar cases. The goal of case-based causal reasoning may be simply to satisfy curiosity, but it may also serve practical purposes, such as lowering a fuel bill that has taken an unexplained rise or repairing a friendship when a friend has unaccountably taken offense at something we said or did. In everyday life, developing explanations case by case is probably for most people most of the time the most important kind of theorizing they do. It therefore deserves serious educational attention, which starts with recognizing that it is real

theorizing and can be judged against standards rather than being treated as wholly subjective.

Collaborative Theory Building or Collaborative Learning?

What has been called theory building here may often be called simply collaborative learning. This is most apparent when a group of students in a university lecture course meet to prepare for an examination. If all they do is rehearse information they wish to remember for the exam, that is cooperative learning pure and simple. But suppose they recognize that rote memorization is not enough, they collaborate in trying to work out the meaning of statements in their lecture notes or course materials whose meaning is unclear to them. They are trying to build a coherent explanation of the statements in question, and this warrants being labeled theory building. It is building a theory of a particular case – a particular set of statements – but the explanation or theory is likely to have application beyond that case, to explain something about the real world. But it is not developing original theory. It is, for practical purposes, sticking closely to someone else's – the lecturer's – ideas. So is it not more appropriate to call this collaborative learning rather than theory building?

From the point of view of process, what the students are doing is clearly theory building. It just happens that what they are theorizing about may itself be a theory. From the point of view of motive or intent, however, what the students are doing is clearly collaborative learning. They are not trying to solve a theoretical problem but are cramming for an exam. From the point of view of content, the answer is less clear. If successful, the result of their labors will have the properties of a theory; it will have explanatory coherence or explanatory power. And it will in a sense be original: not original in the sense of contributing something new to the science of political economics, for instance, but original in the sense that it contributes something new to the explication of certain ideas in political economics. From a pedagogical point view, it is probably desirable

to attend to both the collaborative learning aspect and the theory-building aspect. The collaborative learning results can be improved by improving the theory building, supporting the development of more powerful explanations, and bringing more world knowledge into the theory-building tent. From a pedagogical viewpoint, however, it is also important that the new insight produced by theory building be shared by all the participants. This imposes a further constraint on the theory-building process, a constraint of comprehensibility, which – although it may render the process more difficult – is relevant to its purpose.

Not only in preparing for examinations but also in any course work focused on ideas, much of the explanation-building students will do is explaining given explanations. Especially in science education, however, constructivist approaches encourage students' more direct efforts to explain natural phenomena. This is doing authentic, creative science. Questions that arise are whether students can actually do it, as compared to playacting the roles of real scientists, and whether it is a good use of classroom time, as compared to straightforward instruction (Kirschner 1992). Rather than disputing whether students' efforts constitute genuine scientific knowledge creation, a more relevant educational issue is how students' own explanatory efforts relate to existing explanations. Theories in the sciences and other progressive fields seldom arise simply from thinking about observed phenomena. They more build on or sometimes react against existing theory. From both a learning standpoint and a theory-building standpoint, the relation to authoritative knowledge, as discussed previously, is a major concern. From a learning standpoint, this relation receives much attention from educational philosophers and theorists, with concepts such as relativism, criticism, and opinion versus evidence figuring prominently. But when authoritative knowledge is regarded as something for students to build on in their own explanatory efforts, the game changes from one of accepting or rejecting knowledge claims to one of idea improvement – using authoritative texts as one kind of resource.

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Theory of Forms

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Third World Girl as an Educative Spectacle

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The language of the spectacle consists of signs of the dominant system of production — signs which are at the same time the ultimate end-products of that system (Debord 1967).

Introduction

Children and youth have long been bodies in/upon which adult hopes and anxieties about political-economic futures rest. This social category mobilizes moral panics, articulation of social problems, and respective solutions (Lesko 2001; Katz 2008) – these hopes and anxieties manifest in image form. Accordingly, childhood has become a spectacle, “a site of accumulation and commodification – in whose name much is done” (Katz 2008, p. 5). Following Cindy Katz, in her analysis of Western media, Sarah Projansky (2014) contends that “spectacularization is a discursive and economic strategy” of the twenty-first century that is acutely applicable to girls. By this, she means that girls have turned into visual objects on display, as spectacular and/or scandalous, which results in the surveillance and discipline of everyday girls. The bodies of girls in and from the global South circulate as a cultural form, positioned as a vector of development with the greatest potential, yet facing the most risk. The Third World Girl is an extension and reconfiguration of the infamous Third World Woman figure framed by Mohanty (1986) to underscore Western liberal feminists’ consolidation and representation of “victimized women”

from the global South. In what follows, this entry illustrates how the Third World Girl has been constructed and how she has become an educative spectacle, which acts as a form of public pedagogy (Giroux 2004).

The Spectacle as an Educative Phenomenon

Spectacle is the accumulation of capital to the point where it becomes image, according to French Situationist scholar Guy Debord (1967). Spectacle is a term that “unifies and explains a great diversity of apparent phenomena” (p. 10). While Debord’s theorizing of spectacle is fairly abstract, broadly describing societal conditions, scholars such as Kellner (2005), Katz (2008), and Projansky (2014) have made the term concrete and specific. Kellner (2005) posits that spectacle is one of the organizing principles of modern economy, State, society, and everyday life. It refers to an understanding of society organized around the consumption of images and commodities, and furthermore, it signifies how consumer capitalism is normalized in institutions and social spaces and how social relations and individual subjectivities are therein governed. Therefore, what is significant about the notion of spectacle is that it is not a mere collection of images, but rather it is about, “social relation[s] among people mediated by images” (Debord 1967, p. 4, emphasis added). The term is useful to analyze the political economy of images associated with international development, and the teachings embedded within the assemblages of such images. Specifically, the campaign images function as commodity fetishism; the geopolitical relations signified by images and their production, and its influence on the politics of everyday life and social relations reveal the importance of such a framework in examining international development campaigns and rhetoric. The spectacle, then, manifests cultural dimensions of global, political, and economic logics. This is evident in representations of Third World Girls from the global South in transnational campaigns where girls become commodity fetish objects projected

to create economic growth and further consumer capitalism. Global insecurities about political and economic futures are channeled into images of Third World Girls who are represented simultaneously as victimized and possessing untapped and unlimited potential, and are hence positioned as prime subjects for investment.

Spectacles generally, and the spectacle of the Third World Girl specifically, can be understood as a form of public pedagogy. Public pedagogy, an educational term heavily utilized by cultural studies scholars since the 1990s, refers to educational activity and learning that occurs outside of formal schools: in institutional spaces such as museums and libraries; in informal educational sites such as popular culture and media campaigns; and through sites of activism, including grassroots social movements (Sandlin et al. 2010). Cultural studies scholars in particular have engaged this term to inquire into the ways in which spaces of public and popular culture have educative dimensions that reproduce, sustain, and challenge normalized and/or oppressive configurations of reality. For instance, Henry Giroux’s extensive work examining the educative dimensions of popular culture sites and products such as Disney argues that the realm of cultural has a pedagogical function that works to “construct identities, mobilize desires, and shape moral values” (Sandlin et al. 2010, p. 349). As illustrated by Kellner (2005) and Projansky (2014), spectacles are contested terrains that simultaneously represent and manufacture societal values, and therefore spectacles are educative productions. How has the Third World Girl as a commodified object of desire been produced? And what is taught and learned about geopolitical relationships and global fantasies through the spectacularization of the Third World Girl?

The Third World Girl: An Extension of the Third World Woman

In 1986, Chandra Mohanty argued that Western feminists essentialized the lives and struggles of women in the global South, representing them as a composite, singular Third World Woman. Third

World Women have been portrayed as objects and “victims of male violence, victims of the colonial process, victims of the Arab familial system, victims of economic development processes” (p. 57) with the capacity to be developed and liberated by white feminists. Colonial institutions and its neo-imperial counterparts have consistently used the perceived status and cultural practices related to women and girls as a signification of “traditional” and “backward” ways of the Third World. Third World Women are positioned as needing to be liberated from their oppressive cultures and men (Mani 1987; Spivak 1988) even though conditions of exploitation, oppression, and dispossession have been intensified through colonization, development, and more recently neoliberalization. The roots of the aforementioned geopolitical relationship between the Western liberator and victimized Third World Women is intimately tied to constructions of race embedded in Enlightenment thought that governed slavery and colonialism wherein colonial societies were constructed as stagnant. In the postcolonial era, binary oppositions of race were mapped onto development/underdevelopment; theories of modernization were structured around such differences. Third World Women, associated with the “backward,” unproductive end of the spectrum, were targeted by development initiatives focused on their reproductive roles, most notably through population control policies and microcredit initiatives (Wilson 2011).

Over the last three decades, as liberal feminism dovetailed with international development’s use of human capital logic, Third World Women have become further situated and centered as key instruments for economic growth and national progress. Along the commonsensical lines of modernization, the logic of development supposes that modernizing women and girls can lead to the progress of the State. Since then, images of the Third World Women in international development campaigns have shifted from representing tragic oppressive conditions of women as victims to positive agentic images that capture the potential of the entrepreneurial woman (Wilson 2011).

Recently, the gaze has shifted from the Third World Woman to the Third World Girl, as has the

responsibility to shoulder national development. Whereas women are portrayed as complete, fiercely bounded by tradition, and therefore requiring much undoing, as a child, the Third World Girl is seen as incomplete and in a stage of becoming. Therefore, the girl child has become a more strategic target for the project of international development as she better captures and mobilizes hope among her consumers. A regime of truth about the promise of Third World Girl has emerged through development entities like the United Nations partnered with transnational corporations like the Nike Foundation and in conversation with neoliberal postfeminist ideals of girlhood.

Still and moving visual representations of Third World Girls in transnational media campaigns such as Nike Foundation’s *Girl Effect*, international nongovernmental organization (iNGO) CARE’s *I am powerful* campaign, and the recently produced film *Girl Rising* showcase the Third World Girl as spectacle. In these campaigns, the Girl is shown pregnant with potential. In the *Girl Effect* viral video, for instance, we see the Third World Girl initially at risk without formal education. We are shown the trajectory of a young girl who faces the evils of Third World poverty that result in child marriage, early pregnancy, prostitution, and the spread of HIV/AIDS. The campaign video underscores that her life is out of her control, and investment in the girl child is imperative. The provision of formal schooling is the proposed solution to uplift her from this impoverished condition and *also* to secure the social and economic development of her nation. A classic still image from iNGO CARE’s *I am powerful* campaign depicts a young woman looking forward with fierce eyes, her multicolored scarf covering her head, and alone acacia tree situated behind her. Slogans rotating underneath clips within an associated campaign video include: I am invisible, but invincible; I am a natural resource with untapped potential; I can contribute if I am given a chance; I can change my community. In these transnational campaigns, the spectator is invited to hold together the simultaneous risk and promise of the Third World Girl. The audience is invited to consume her as a commodity guaranteeing profit and

security. However, we are informed that she cannot become powerful on her own. While “she has power to change her world” she needs you, who has the “power to help her do it.”

Tracing Global Investments in Girls' Education

The international development media spectacle manifests undergirding neoimperial economic and geopolitical relationships. The following section traces the trajectory of international development processes that has normalized the notion that if you educate a girl, you educate a nation as commonsensical truth. The United Nations, World Bank, and transnational corporations were instrumental in constructing the adolescent Third World Girl and positioning her as the most significant site for development. The logic of human capital undergirding the convergence around girls' education can be traced to economic liberalization during the Reagan-Thatcher era of the eighties. During the 1980s, Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher developed domestic and international economic policies that broke down trade barriers in order to reduce government expenditure in public sectors and expand privatization by centralizing the market. The correlation between investment in girls' education and economic growth was proliferated by 1980s World Bank research that illustrated how improved access and enrollment of girls in formal schooling led to: increased GDP per capita, decreased infant mortality rates, and increased life expectancies (King and Hill 1995). At that time, the president of the World Bank, Sir James Wolfensohn, noted, “‘girls’ education is the single best investment that can be made in the developing world today” (UNICEF 1995, p. 3). This led to the proliferation of a discursive logic, which assumed that investment in girls would reduce poverty by increasing national economic growth. At the 1990 Jomtien Conference, the United Nations (UN), bilateral development organizations, nation states, and nongovernmental organizations together designed the Education for All (EFA) goals.

These goals saw increased global investment in girls' education. In 1995, Section L of the Beijing Platform for Action was the first global document to single out “the girl child” as a distinct demographic target for development (Croll 2006). At the Fourth UN conference for women, the girl child was given her own category, and strategies for her protection were outlined. In the year 2000, at the World Education Conference in Dakar, the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) affirmed the necessary investment in girls' education, and a governing body situated under UNICEF, the United Nations Girls Education Initiative (UNGEI) was launched with the intention of monitoring and expanding this effort. Thus, within 20 years, the development apparatus (Escobar 1995; Ferguson 1990) constructed the girl child of developing nations as an object and set up institutional bodies specifically geared toward her “well-being” and “protection.”

Five years later, in 2005, the Nike foundation took hold of the World Bank's earlier research, partnered with the UN foundation, and echoed Wolfensohn's words in a slightly different way. The Nike foundation presented the *adolescent* girl in particular, as an “untapped resource” with extreme economic potential and thus the “catalyst for ending global poverty” (Nike Foundation 2005). Within the next few years, development entities and corporate bodies paid immense attention to this new category. Adolescent girls were centered in development discourse, policy, and programs. In 2007, United Nations bodies developed an interagency task force to support nations in developing policies and programs to reach girls between the ages of 14–19 (UNESCO 2011) and the World Bank launched the Adolescent Girls Initiative (AGI) in 2008 while the Nike Foundation partnered with Department of International Development (DFID) established Girl Hub, an online database. At the end of that same year, the International Day of the Girl Child was inaugurated and endorsed by governments and organizations across the globe. Within three decades, the monolithic Third World adolescent girl was constructed, and governing institutional bodies

were created in order to ensure she could be protected, provided for, and invested in.

Therefore, the notion that the adolescent Third World Girl is the missing link to national development is situated within a larger narrative of development history. Over the past three decades, girls and women's empowerment have become centralized in development programs. Moreover, liberal development's focus on investing in human capital and liberal feminism's emphasis on gender equality in education and the labor market in the West led development agencies to position girls as an instrumental means for alleviating poverty in the global South (Moeller 2014).

Exporting Western Girlhood

While the campaign for girls' education and rights was cemented in UN agencies, discourses that endorsed ideals of girl power and "can-do" femininity (Harris 2004) situated young women as ideal late modern subjects gained momentum in the Western world. Young women in the global North emerged as subjects worthy of investment; they were represented as educationally and economically successful, responsible, and self-inventing in social and cultural spaces. Two predominant reasons account for this emergence of women in the "production of the late modern social order and its values" (p. 6). First, liberalization led to global economic restructuring, which relied on the labor of young women, and the advancements of liberal feminism increased opportunities for middle-class women. In addition, neoliberal ideas of responsibility, choice, and innovation converged with liberal feminist ideals of women's liberation and opportunity.

Several scholars demonstrate how the intersections of neoliberalism and postfeminism advance mutually reinforcing discourses of individualism and free choice and the argument that women as opposed to men are more suitable to be entrepreneurial leaders and agents of social change (Gill 2007; McRobbie 2009; Gill and Schraff 2011). In considering postfeminism as an object of analysis, Rosalind Gill (2008) describes the features of a postfeminist sensibility – "the notion that

femininity is a bodily property; the shift from objectification to subjectification; an emphasis upon self surveillance, monitoring and self-discipline; a focus on individualism, choice and empowerment; the dominance of a makeover paradigm; and a resurgence of ideas about natural sexual difference" (p. 3).

These features are characteristic of the empowered Western postfeminist subject who is positioned as normative. The narrative of the successful girl positions female subjects as assertive, self-inventing, ambitious, and confident; it assumes that girls can and often do "have it all" (Harris 2004; Gonick 2006). Young women are represented as having potential to be educationally successful, economically productive, and able to take control of their bodies and sexual capacities. Harris (2004) discusses how empowered young women are perceived to be successful citizen-subjects and leaders because they are seen as able to take responsibility for themselves, their families, and community with minimal dependence on the State; they are constituted as the new consumers and leaders for the global good. The ideal neoliberal feminine subject is consequently complicit with neoliberalism and postfeminism.

Alongside girl power are depictions of girls as vulnerable and "at risk" (Harris 2004; Projansky 2014). Their bodies are marked by teen pregnancy and hypersexuality, and they are also perceived as risk for nation building and progress. Gonick (2006) argues that girl power and at-risk narratives were produced during the same time and circulate simultaneously. She claims these narratives are interwoven and require one another as they "participate in the production of the neoliberal girl subject with the former representing the idealized form of the self-determining individual and the latter personifying an anxiety about those who are unsuccessful in producing themselves in this way" (p. 2). Even though the girl in the global North is an unstable category (Projansky 2014), empowered neoliberal Western girlhood is exported through girl empowerment campaigns and educational interventions.

The assumptions undergirding the global convergence around girls' education hinge upon the

juxtaposition of the postfeminist subject from the global North with the girl in/from the global South oppressed by her culture according to Rosalind Gill and Ofra Koffman (2013).

The *ideal* Third World Girl subject is represented as taking up standards of Western empowered femininity, which can be accessed through modern progress-oriented institutions such as schools and the market. According to the problematic discursive construction of Girl Effect, Third World Girls require formal schooling and empowerment interventions in order for their inert potential to be activated. Once the girl is empowered through education and literacy, she will marry later, delay and regulate her childbearing. And if her capacity is built, she will become an entrepreneurial agent of change and eventually “call the shots” (Nike Foundation 2009). Thus, as scholars have illustrated, the Third World Girl is represented as an entrepreneurial subject in waiting (Koffman and Gill 2013) and development programs seek to activate this subjectivity (Hayhurst 2014). The particular combination of agency, individualism, regulated sexuality, and empowerment are trademarks of espoused Western girlhood. As such, empowered liberal feminism, which is grounded in postfeminist fictions and neoliberalism, is exported from the global North to the global South. While this discourse suggests that investment in girls’ education can position young women to call the shots and lead a nation’s economic development, Connell (2002) has demonstrated that processes of globalization and a neoliberal economic order have in fact accentuated gender disparities and made gender democratization even more difficult.

Conclusions

The neoliberalization of girlhood involves the construction of economically productive, sexually regulated, self-dependent individuals through participation in formal education and has become requisite in contemporary times. As such, in both the global South and the global North, the girl has become an object of investment and the empowered girl has become an object of desire

(Lesko et al. 2015). In recent years, international NGOs paired with campaigns directed by transnational corporations have galvanized a spectacle about the problem of victimized, uneducated girls, and the urgent need to tap into their potential. The imagining of this ideal girl, paired with humanitarian longings to save and elevate her has mobilized immense traction among diverse actors. This compelling cultural production rests within the era of globalization – a context that engenders physical and ideological mobility, and thereby produces global imaginings and longings for Western ideals of girl power feminism. These idealized femininities are propagated as they rapidly move through corporate and international nongovernmental organization media platforms such as the Nike Foundation’s Girl Effect campaign and through Malala Yousafzai’s celebratory status recently advanced with the Nobel Peace Prize. The spectacle, undergirded by human rights discourses, has unleashed a moral crusade authorizing intervention in places far and near and requires investigation.

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Three Views of Philosophy and Multiculturalism: Searle, Rorty, and Taylor

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Philosophers have been slow to join the public debate on multiculturalism in spite of the important philosophical issues at stake. Notable exceptions are John Searle and Charles Taylor, who address the philosophical implications of the controversy over the curriculum in several recent essays (John R. Searle, “Rationality and Realism: What Is at Stake?” *Daedalus*, volume 122, no. 4 (Fall 1992), pp. 55–84, p. 69; John Searle, “The Storm Over the University,” in *Debating P.C.* Paul Berman, ed. (New York: Dell, 1992), pp. 85–123; Charles Taylor, “The Politics of Recognition,” in *Multiculturalism*. Amy Gutmann, ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), pp. 25–73). Taylor defends multicultural education as a moral imperative of one branch of the liberal tradition, while Searle argues that a victory for multiculturalism would mean the destruction of the Western intellectual heritage. This entry will examine some of the arguments on both sides of the issue and propose an interpretation of multiculturalism as particularly significant for teaching philosophy.

John Searle views the current debate over the curriculum as far more dangerous than past controversies in higher education, because the very philosophical principles which make knowledge and education possible are under attack. The concepts of truth, reality, objectivity, and rationality which have been taken for granted in higher education (as well as in our civilization in general) have been challenged by what he calls the “subculture of postmodernism,” a loosely defined group of left-wing academics which includes multiculturalists, feminists, deconstructionists, and followers of Nietzsche, T.S. Kuhn, and Richard Rorty. I shall not attempt to discuss all of these movements but intend to focus only upon the issue of multicultural education, which

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I understand to mean teaching students about other cultural traditions in addition to their own.

Searle summarizes the main principles of what he calls “metaphysical realism” or the “Western rationalistic tradition” as follows:

Knowledge is typically of a mind-independent reality. It is expressed in a public language, it contains true propositions – these propositions are true because they accurately represent that reality – and knowledge is arrived at by applying, and is subject to, constraints of rationality and logic. The merits and demerits of theories are largely a matter of meeting or failing to meet the criteria implicit in this conception. (Searle 1993, p. 69)

All of the above principles, Searle argues, have been challenged for political reasons by those who are attempting to use the university in order to advance leftist causes. The culture of postmodernism debunks the scholarly ideal of the disinterested inquirer in quest of objective and universally valid knowledge and interprets claims to objectivity as disguised forms of power seeking.

According to Searle, the educational implications of the postmodern subculture have been devastating. The abandonment of traditional standards of truth and objectivity has left room for an educational agenda which aims, for example, to reinforce students’ pride in a particular racial or ethnic group, to treat all cultures as intellectually equal and therefore equally deserving of being represented in the curriculum, and to use affirmative action rather than academic excellence as the main criterion for faculty hiring. The denial of the presuppositions of the Western rationalistic tradition is not analogous to the denial of ordinary empirical or scientific theses, Searle maintains, because these principles function as the conditions of intelligibility of our linguistic, cultural, and scientific institutions. To reject them is to undermine the practices of teaching and research which are the *raison d’être* of the university and to threaten the foundations of Western civilization. Searle writes:

An immediate difficulty with denials of metaphysical realism is that they remove the rational constraints that are supposed to shape discourse, when that discourse aims at something beyond itself. To paraphrase Dostoevsky, without metaphysical realism, anything is permissible. (“The Storm Over the University,” p. 112)

One question that could be raised about this line of argument is, “Does the denial of metaphysical realism actually pose a threat to higher education and civilization?” Richard Rorty does not think so, and he gives a different view of the relationship between the philosophical principles of the Western rationalistic tradition and the practices of the university. According to Rorty, objective truth understood as correspondence between our knowledge and an independent reality is a notion without meaningful content. He would prefer to describe objectivity as the search for “the widest possible intersubjective agreement” (Rorty 1994, p. 52). Challenging traditional views of knowledge and truth poses no threat to educational or any other institutions, he argues, because philosophical principles do not support our practices but merely provide optional ways of describing them to ourselves. Their function is rhetorical rather than presuppositional. If academics stopped thinking about their work in terms of the correspondence theory of truth and adopted a pragmatic view, this would not result in their being less careful and honest in their research or teaching. Rorty thinks that people tend to be more loyal to traditional practices than to the philosophical theories which allegedly justify them. He would like to see us free ourselves from the belief that the ethics of the academy depends on meta-theoretical commitments to truth and reality, just as earlier generations gradually freed themselves from the belief that morality depended upon acting in accordance with God’s will. To him both beliefs are simply “rhetorical flourishes designed to make practitioners feel that they are being true to something big and strong” (Ibid., p. 61).

If Rorty is right (and I think he is) that it makes no difference to educational practice whether or not we accept the principles of the Western rationalistic tradition, then Searle cannot appeal to these principles to support the traditional canon, nor can the multiculturalists rest their defense on denying them. Searle says that the rejection of metaphysical realism “goes hand in hand with” a belief in multiculturalism, although he sees the relationship between the two as more complex than the “obvious” relation of metaphysical realism to the ideals of the university. He writes:

In my experience at least, the present multiculturalist reformers of higher education did not come to a revised conception of education from a refutation of the Western Rationalistic Tradition; rather they sought a refutation of the Western Rationalistic Tradition that would justify a revised conception of education that they already found appealing. (Rorty "Rationality and Realism. . .," p. 71)

But from Rorty's point of view, the new conception of education cannot be justified on the basis of the rejection of the Western rationalistic tradition, because there is no presuppositional relation between philosophical principles and educational practices.

Although he denies the traditional conception of truth and rationality, Rorty appears to have no views on multiculturalism or any interest in curricular reform. In the context of a discussion of general education, he writes, "it does not greatly matter what the core curriculum is as long as there is one – as long as each community defines itself by adopting one" (Rorty 1982, p. 112). Consistent with his general position on the relation between theory and practice, he argues that philosophy has no particular relevance to education, at least in the short run; in the long run, he would no doubt argue it would be better if students learned to describe themselves as "seekers of solidarity with other inquirers" rather than as "seekers of absolute truth." Rorty's analysis is helpful as a corrective to theories like Searle's which overestimate the influence of philosophy on ordinary practices, but since he admits that his version of pragmatism has no bearing on education, he cannot give us any help in resolving the dispute about multiculturalism.

Another question that could be asked about Searle's analysis of the crisis in education is, "Does multiculturalism in fact presuppose the denial of the Western rationalistic tradition?" Certainly, not all advocates of multiculturalism adopt the presuppositions of the "culture of postmodernism." Charles Taylor, for example, argues explicitly against the kind of "anything goes" subjectivism that Searle criticizes ("The Politics of Recognition," pp. 69–72). Taylor treats multiculturalism as a historical and political issue rather than an epistemological one. He distinguishes two traditions in liberal democratic theory – on the one

hand, the politics of equal dignity, based on the idea that all humans are equally deserving of respect and equal rights, and on the other hand, the politics of difference, based on the need for recognition of the unique identity of individuals and groups. These two perspectives appear to be incompatible, because the former requires treating people in a difference-blind manner, while the latter demands differential treatment, but Taylor maintains that both are built on the notion of equal respect.

Human identity is created "dialogically," in relation to others, he argues. Because it is partly shaped by recognition, the withholding of recognition (or misrecognition) can be damaging to a person's dignity. Multiculturalism, according to Taylor, is a logical extension of the politics of equal respect and the politics of recognition. In the context of education, the demand it makes is for equal respect and therefore equal recognition, for each culture within the curriculum. Taylor regards this claim as valid if it is taken as a starting hypothesis to bring to the study of other cultures, a presumption that "all human cultures that have animated whole societies over some considerable stretch of time have something important to say to all human beings" (Ibid., p. 66). In order to understand a very different culture and appreciate the value of its contributions, there must be what Gadamer calls a "fusion of horizons," in which we learn new vocabularies of comparison, and our standards are transformed by the study of the other.

However, the claim for recognition in the curriculum is often misinterpreted as a definitive conclusion that all cultures are of equal worth. Taylor rejects this interpretation as a "subjectivist, half-baked neo-Nietzschean" theory, according to which all judgments of value are really impositions of power. To designate a culture as worthy based upon this kind, subjectivism is an act of condescension rather than respect, which misses the whole point of the politics of recognition. Alternatively, designating a different culture as objectively valuable before the "fusion of horizons" has taken place makes the ethnocentric assumption that the necessary standards of judgment are already available (Ibid., p. 70). Taylor

thinks that a proper understanding of the politics of recognition demands of us:

... an admission that we are very far away from that ultimate horizon from which the relative worth of different cultures might be evident. This would mean breaking with an illusion that still holds many "multiculturalists" – as well as their most bitter opponents – in its grip. (*Ibid.*, p. 73)

He succeeds in showing that we need not lapse into a self-defeating relativism or subjectivism if we are open to comparative cultural study and committed to developing a more inclusive curriculum.

I have argued that there is no necessary connection between multiculturalism and the rejection of the Western rationalistic tradition. It is possible to believe the assumptions of the "sub-culture of postmodernism" without being a multiculturalist (like Rorty) or to be a multiculturalist without believing these assumptions (like Taylor). In other words, contrary to Searle, the denial of metaphysical realism is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for multiculturalism. The central issue involved in the debate about the curriculum does not seem to be a contest between rational and irrational epistemologies or left and right wing politics. In the unlikely event that all of the disputes between realists and idealists or conservatives and liberals were resolved tomorrow, college teachers would not suddenly see the light about which courses to offer in their programs and which readings to include in their syllabi.

Epistemological and political controversies have tended to obscure the most important issue at stake in the debate over multiculturalism – its educational value, especially in teaching philosophy. The challenge of different points of view has been a stimulus to think at least since the origins of Western philosophy in ancient Greece. In the sixth century B.C. on the Turkish coast of the Aegean Sea, trade in ideas flourished as well as trade in goods. Thales of Miletus challenged traditional anthropomorphic views of nature, predicted an eclipse of the sun, and is said to be not only the first philosopher but also the father of the natural sciences. Xenophanes of Colophon criticized anthropomorphic views of the gods in sayings such as: "Ethiopians have gods with snub

noses and black hair, Thracians have gods with grey eyes and red hair." He could be called the first multiculturalist as well as the father of the social sciences and humanities. Would it be an exaggeration to say that without cross-cultural interaction, borrowing, and debate there would be no liberal arts and sciences and no university today?

Pursuing this interesting historical question is far beyond my scope, and so I would like to focus on the relevance of multiculturalism for teaching philosophy in the present. The paragon of the teacher of philosophy, of course, is Plato's Socrates, and the best teachers emulate him in two respects – as midwives and as gadflies. In his role as midwife, Socrates assists in giving birth to the opinions of others, which, after critical scrutiny, invariably turn out to be mere "wind eggs." In his role as gadfly, Socrates pricks people out of their dogmatic slumber and stimulates them to think.

Undergraduate students today, not unlike the characters in Plato's dialogues, are often self-absorbed, arrogantly opinionated, and intellectually lazy. The followers of Socrates recognize that one of the main functions of philosophical education is what I call "the unfixation of belief," with apologies to C.S. Peirce. In Peirce's well-known essay, "The Fixation of Belief," he defends the method of scientific inquiry as opposed to the alternative ways of forming beliefs – tenacity, authority, and a priori thought. For philosophy teachers the challenge is not so much to improve students' methods of arriving at their opinions as to get them to loosen their intellectual grip on the opinions they have fixed upon so that they can see other points of view as legitimate.

Some courses work better than others according to the criterion of the "unfixation of belief." I have found that a multicultural approach to teaching philosophy is a very effective way to wake students up to different points of view and give them a sense of intellectual humility. To give some examples, a course in American philosophy that covers Jefferson, Emerson, Thoreau, Peirce, James, and Dewey is good. One that also includes Margaret Fuller, the Seneca Falls Declaration, Frederick Douglass, Martin Luther King, and Native American perspectives is much better.

Similarly, a course in metaphysics which includes non-Western systems of thought, a course in political philosophy which includes third world perspectives, and a course in epistemology or ethics which includes feminist theories are more likely to succeed in the “unfixation of belief” than those courses which are taught according to the narrow range of issues included in most currently available textbooks.

From a pedagogical point of view, the strongest argument against multicultural philosophy courses is that they are very difficult to teach well, given the present state of graduate training and available resources in philosophy. Most philosophers, even those young enough to have been introduced to the “subculture of postmodernism” as undergraduates, did not themselves receive a multicultural graduate education. Without faculty development opportunities – e.g., sabbatical leaves, faculty seminars, guest speakers, special conferences, and summer workshops – many philosophy teachers do not have the expertise or the confidence to teach new material in their discipline. Even with such programs, which are expensive enough so that not all colleges and universities can afford them, the lack of appropriate textbooks in most areas of philosophy makes it difficult to develop multicultural philosophy courses without depending upon the regular use of “spontaneous” xeroxing. Perhaps one reason multiculturalism has not caught on in philosophy, as it has in other humanities’ disciplines and the social sciences, is that most graduate training in philosophy is so narrow that few philosophers are prepared to teach multicultural courses or to write multicultural books.

Searle, Rorty, and Taylor have made important contributions to the debate on multiculturalism by addressing the large, abstract issues of its epistemological and political presuppositions. Concrete pedagogical issues, however, such as the educational benefits of multiculturalism and the obstacles to its implementation, have for the most part been neglected (For an exception see Lawrence Foster and Patricia Herzog, eds. *Philosophical Perspectives on Pluralism and Multiculturalism* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1994). I have tried to show that from a teacher’s

point of view, multiculturalism is not a newfangled, “postmodern” movement which is destructive of rationality, nor it is a subversive plot hatched by tenured radicals from the 1960s. To paraphrase William James on pragmatism, it is just a new word for an old way of thinking and teaching. A multicultural curriculum works very well in fulfilling the traditional goals of education in philosophy. It can assist the teacher as Socratic “midwife” and “gadfly” in delivering students of their narrow and uncritical opinions and awakening them to a world of intellectual diversity.

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Time

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Transliteracies

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Introduction

Transliteracies involve people's mobile, emergent sense-making practices *across* various phenomena in a world characterized by rapid circulation of objects, ideas, and people over widening networks. Literacy researchers interested in tracing

these developing ontologies across new or expanding communicational landscapes need tools and frameworks to theorize and study the instability and contingency of literacy practices "on the move." To this end, the transliteracies framework attends to the ways people dynamically configure, synthesize, and adapt across the material/immaterial world while taking into consideration the role of objects in those mobile, emergent engagements. Following from the New London Group's (1996) call for broadening views of literacy, the transliteracies framework emphasizes the situated, contingent, and ideological nature of meaning-making and foregrounds issues of equity by examining the ways people and resources are simultaneously connected, distributed, restricted, and regulated.

This entry begins by tracing the development of the concept of transliteracies in educational research and elaborating the transliteracies framework in more detail. The subsequent section describes the three theoretical principles upon which this framework builds – mobility, activity, and materiality – and traces their genealogies in literacy studies. The final section outlines how researchers might study transliteracies through an inquiry process of flattening and unflattening that draws on various analytical "tools for inquiry." The conclusion suggests implications for educational practice and research, particularly in light of the ways new tools for meaning-making and new practices of global connection are rapidly emerging and evolving.

Defining Transliteracies

An interdisciplinary working group of scholars and educators building on the work of Alan Liu and the Transliteracies Project first used the term "transliteracy" in 2007 to describe an individual's ability to read and write across various tools, media, and platforms (Thomas et al. 2007). This definition was expanded by researchers who theorized *transliteracies* as mobile meaning-making practices involved in creating and maintaining social relations within and across complex networks (Stornaiuolo et al. [in press](#)). In emphasizing

the mobile and emergent nature of meaning-making, this latter definition was central to the development of the transliterations framework, a flexible heuristic for attending to learning and meaning-making “on the move.” The transliterations framework builds on foundational literacy scholarship characterizing literacies as mobile, multiple, multimodal, ideological, and situated in everyday practice and responds to one challenge of this scholarship, what scholars have called the “paradox” of mobility – the understanding that mobility must always be understood in relation to immobility. This paradox of mobility highlights the contingent, socially situated nature of literacy practice, which the transliterations framework traces across two intertwined dimensions: (1) a focus on the indeterminate nature of creating connections and boundaries across spaces, practices, and time (*trans*); and (2) attention to the dynamic, mobile nature of meaning-making using an array of available resources (*literacies*).

The first dimension important to a transliterations framework draws on the prefix *trans-* (often defined as across, beyond, or through) to highlight the inherent mobilities or traversals in literacy practice. A *trans* focus – explored in interdisciplinary scholarship through concepts like translanguaging, transmodalities, transmedia, *trans** identities, and transnationalism – highlights the fluidity and indeterminacy of practice, leaving unspecified who or what moves and in what direction or fashion. For example, when someone simultaneously “checks in” to a restaurant via an app on the phone, jokes with companions about the oversized menu at the dinner table, and ignores the unwanted remarks of one friend while exchanging meaningful glances with another, the transliterations framework offers analytic methods for tracing the ways these various “actors” (people and things) intertwine across virtual and physical space in activity and the role of literacies in such interactions. As people and things move in unpredictable, fluid, and asymmetrical patterns, a transliterations framework attends to the activity of making connections, constructing boundaries, and building relationships without assuming the nature of those connections or relationships in advance. Such analytic focus on the

ways people and things interact draws attention to the mobility paradox, to the ways people and resources “on the move” are also constrained, restricted, marginalized, or rendered immobile. In other words, a *trans* focus makes salient questions not only about what moves across space or time but also about who or what cannot move or whose movement is highly regulated or contested (e.g., refugees traveling to distant shores, multiple languages in English-dominant classrooms, and Black youth subject to schools’ disciplinary systems).

The second dimension, drawing on the root word *literacies*, emphasizes the mobile dimensions of meaning-making. Building on insights from New Literacy Studies (Street 2003), the transliterations framework highlights the ideological and socially situated nature of all literacy practices and recognizes the multiple ways literacies are practiced in response to emerging technologies and increasing cultural and social diversities (New London Group 1996). Such an expansive understanding positions researchers to examine not only the multimodal, designed nature of meaning-making, but also the emotional, affective, aesthetic, and embodied dimensions of making sense across the material/immaterial world. In the example above, a primary focus on how the individual is reading the menu or using the app would miss affective, emotional, collaborative dimensions of practice (e.g., the menu becomes salient only insofar as it helps create social bonds between some members of the group, further isolating and alienating others; the app’s meaningfulness may be less salient to the present company – colocated in the restaurant – but highly salient to the owner seeking to attract new business or the old friend who decided to drop in after seeing the “check in”). A focus on the emergent, mobile, and affective aspects of literacy practices extends understandings of literacy beyond traditional text-centric, school-oriented definitions that are primarily concerned with individual ability. The transliterations framework foregrounds the equity dimensions of transliterate practice, calling attention to the institutional, historical, cultural, and systemic ways people and things have been rendered mobile and immobile.

Three Key Tenets

Literacies, from the perspective of a transliteracies framework, are, and have always been, fundamentally mobile social practices (Leander et al. 2010). This means literacies are creative social practices that are lived, enacted, and understood within connected, ideological, and contingent systems through which people and things move. While literacies have always involved such mobilities, the last 30 years have seen a considerable increase in the speed and scale of global flows of media, cultures, people, information, and materials. In addition, the rapid development and global adoption of mobile technologies (e.g., mobile phones, tablets, activity trackers) have significantly changed people's everyday interactions and practices across time and space. These contemporary techno-social developments have changed the ways people interpret (e.g., geographic information overlaid on physical city streets through the use of a GPS device or smartphone) and produce (e.g., recording and remixing media to be shared with social networks) with/in the world while on the move. A transliteracies framework draws upon substantial work in literacy studies to account theoretically and methodologically for *mobility*, as people's practices move across multiple modalities, spaces, and time (see, for example, related concepts such as transmodality, semiotic repertoires, and timescales). A focus on transliteracies attunes researchers not only to contemporary movements of people and things as they relate to meaning-making, but also to the ways people's mobile practices are policed, monitored, surveilled, and controlled – including the histories of these practices, the ways these practices unfold differently for different people and groups, and the ways systemic dimensions of oppression become instantiated in mobile practices.

A central commitment of a transliteracies framework involves situating individuals' literacy practices in broader cultural, social, and historical contexts, with context understood to be socially constructed through *activity*. As literacy scholars who draw on cultural historical activity theory and actor-network theory (e.g., Prior 2008) demonstrate, such an activity orientation to meaning-

making highlights the collaborative and collective dimensions of practice, as artifacts, goals, communities, and rules emerge in dynamic relationships that are both patterned and emergent. By focusing on people's transliterate practices, researchers can attend not only to the ways people's individual and collective goals and intentions drive activity, but also to the ways emotions and feelings arise and emerge in unfolding action. Further, such an approach invites the historical tracing of such emergence over time and in response to mediating factors, especially via artifacts that carry traces of the past. While traditional literacy-oriented artifacts like texts, pens, and computers are often the focus of literacies researchers, an activity orientation in the transliteracies framework highlights a range of other kinds of mediational artifacts as possible interactants in activity (a favorite piece of clothing or the warmth and smell of a newborn baby). By rooting people's practices within unfolding activity and in relation to broader social, cultural, and historical systems, a transliteracies framework calls attention to the ways inequities become reinforced, perpetuated, and inscribed over time.

From a transliteracies perspective, the stuff of life – objects, media, artifacts, things – exert influence as people make meaning in the social world. Extending from work in artifactual literacies (Pahl and Rowsell 2010) and new materialisms in literacy practice, a transliteracies framework draws attention to the emergent material-semiotic assemblages that form, act, and circulate across complex systems of relations, becoming irreducibly intertwined with social semiotic systems and the body in experience. It is in this intertwining that meaning bubbles up among the resources, materials, texts, and things dynamically involved in lived experience. By emphasizing *materiality* as a central tenet, a transliteracies framework complicates the common placement of language and sign as the ontological center of literacies practices and invites expansive epistemological stances toward literacies research, inclusive of affective, corporeal, and performative learning ontologies. Attending to the histories and trajectories of the interinvolvement of people and things reveals how material resources become

distributed, at times and for some people, in inequitable ways, with some people's perspectives and voices valued and others silenced.

Transliterations Research as Inquiry Process

Researchers studying digital practices have emphasized the particular challenges of tracing meaning-making across globally dispersed, multilingual, and multimodal networks (e.g., Reddit, Instagram, Vine) and transitory and wearable technologies (e.g., Snapchat, Fitbit, Apple watch). The transliterations framework offers a flexible heuristic for studying contemporary meaning-making through its inquiry approach (Cochran-Smith and Lytle 2009) to tracing the meaning-making paths of people and objects as they interact in dynamic and fluid relationships. An inquiry approach in transliterations research involves following connections and relationships as they unfold without assuming the nature of those relationships in advance. Such a stance invites unruliness, indeterminacy, and uncertainty into the research process and leaves room for fresh insights into how meaning is made across space and time.

In transliterations research, inquiry is a reflexive process of “flattening” and “unflattening” the analytic landscape. “Flattening” the social world is an analytical move that involves both holding one's own assumptions and beliefs up to scrutiny and making space for alternative understandings about the world to surface. This move includes the challenging work of reflexively questioning one's assumptions, foregrounding the perspectives of others, and taking one's own positionality into account. While researchers bring their experiences and expectations about the social world to bear in research, a “flat ontology” (Latour 2005) requires that they refrain from immediately imposing such assertions on the phenomena at hand and instead initially hold all actors, people, or objects, as ontologically equal. By holding at bay determinations about the ways actors are connected, and their relative importance in activity, researchers make space for other perspectives

and ways of knowing to emerge. The “unflattening” process involves researchers flexibly and responsively taking up perspectives and positions in analytical response to the emergent phenomena, working to make visible the differing vantage points developing in experience (including their own). In this process, the researcher discovers new ways of seeing and understanding the transliterations topography. Such an unflattening process allows different experiences and voices to be heard, particularly those whose perspectives are rarely taken into account.

Four analytical tools have proven useful in the ongoing process of flattening and unflattening in transliterations research. These “tools for inquiry” help researchers remain sensitive in tracing emergent relationships and connections among people and things in interaction. Each tool acts as a framing device, a lens to guide inquiry, with each lens making visible some aspects of data while holding others out of frame. These tools, then, are starting points in transliterations research, and each is aimed at cultivating a reflexive, responsive inquiry stance. Certainly a number of analytical tools can be useful for flattening and unflattening, but these four in concert with each other offer a grounded means of tracing unfolding relationships while attending to issues of power and privilege, especially the systemic dimensions that play out in practice to disenfranchise, dehumanize, and marginalize.

The first inquiry tool, *emergence*, attends to the indeterminate unfolding of sociogenesis in experience and compels the analyst to “move with” the embodied, symbolic, and material intertwining threads in human action. The analyst considers how meanings shift, transform, and travel over time and across spaces in relation to differentially available resources and existing patterns of relations, tracing how possibilities emerge/open/close and re-emerge/re-open/re-close in practice. The second tool, *resonance*, attunes focus to the ways meanings ripple and sediment in different ways, patterning across spaces, practices, texts, and times. The researcher considers what “takes hold” for individuals, groups, and objects in interactions, and how resonating phenomena are

differently situated, amplified, and quieted. *Uptake*, the third inquiry tool, supports the analyst in making visible understandings as people and things respond to one another and become interpenetrated. The analyst attends to how meanings shift in relation to other texts, people, and contexts, both historically and proleptically, and how people signal their understandings and allocate their attention in activity. Finally, *scale*, the fourth inquiry tool, considers the ways spatial and temporal relationships are produced in and through people's practices, often highlighting hierarchies and asymmetries that emerge across different timescales (Lemke 2000). In attending to issues of scale, the researcher considers how scaling practices position people and things in relation across networks, time, and space and how these scalar relations are inscribed and articulated in texts, objects, and literacy practice.

The iterative processes of flattening and unflattening analytic landscapes require researchers to take into account multiple perspectives without privileging one dimension of practice. For example, literacies researchers often begin with an interest in how people use texts, but such a predetermined starting place risks overdetermining the role of texts and according them more importance than participants themselves do. By adopting an inquiry stance and tracing meaning-making as it unfolds, transliterations researchers are better positioned to attend to various dimensions (e.g., the role of the body or emotion) that emerge over time and in response to the material and social world. This flattening/unflattening process can help researchers challenge and expand dominant understandings of literacy even as it requires them to position themselves, and their histories and commitments, in relation to other participants in activity.

Conclusion

To account for the ways literacies are constantly shifting in relation to developing social practices and technologies, literacy scholars have called for capacious and flexible theoretical and

methodological approaches that put emergence and movement at the conceptual center. Such approaches would not predetermine what constitutes literacies nor take an a priori perspective on the nature of relationships among people and things. The transliterations framework offers such a flexible, inquiry-based approach in its charge to researchers to engage in the reflexive process of flattening and unflattening the ontological landscape through responsive analytic moves that attend to *emergence* across varied *scales* of activity – both time and space; *resonance* among artifacts and ideas; and *uptake* among people and objects (Stornaiuolo et al. [in press](#)). By situating an individual's practices in relation to the interconnected and systemic dimensions of activity, the transliterations framework challenges static, skills-oriented orientations toward literacy that can be applied to disenfranchise and limit opportunities for learners. Such an expansive approach is important today as accountability measures in education work to limit literate expression to what can be standardized and measured even as unprecedented means of communication and expression expand across digital and global networks. A transliterations framework helps educators, researchers, and theorists navigate this paradox of mobility, working to make visible how multiple practices emerge and develop beyond those currently supported and valued by established educational institutions and staid systems of learning.

Cross-References

- [Digital Literacies](#)
- [Multiliteracies](#)
- [Multimodal Literacies](#)
- [new literacies, New Literacies](#)

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Truth and the Pragmatic Theory of Learning

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Introduction

Pragmatism does not simply offer another competing theory of truth. The meanings of truth are many, as Peirce, James, and Dewey have observed. Debates over the nature of truth appeal to different intuitions about truth. They can be lexically enumerated, yet dictionaries also indicate a common root for the term. In the *Oxford English Dictionary* we read:

Truth. 1. The character of being, or disposition to be, true to a person, principle, cause, etc.; faithfulness, fidelity, loyalty, constancy, steadfast allegiance. (See also troth). 2. One's faith or loyalty as pledged in a promise or agreement; a solemn engagement or promise, a covenant: = troth.

Root meanings of truth are based on *fidelity* and *commitment*. Truth is about values. When someone is not able to stay true or be true, we call them "wrong." When someone says something untrue, we call them "wrong." When we need an explanation why a person has the truth or is in the wrong, then we appeal to one or another view of truth – how one can come into the truth. Pragmatism duly regards truth as a valuational and normative matter, and it acknowledges the plurality of views on truth.

A Synoptic View of Theories of Truth

A description of how a person can come into possession of truth is a theory of truth in

miniature, even if, at first, that description at most expresses an intuition. Developing an intuitive view of truth into a full account reasonably covering all knowers is serious philosophical work. Pursuing the additional question of whether one of those theories about knowing truth is most satisfactory is traditionally labeled as *epistemology*.

In epistemology, establishing one theory of truth while denying that rival theories are sensible is extremely difficult. Intuitions behind all those theories can be compelling and indispensable as any. Justifying one theory as more “truthful” to the nature of truth risks circularity, since appealing to that theory’s own intuitive basis begs the question, and any higher epistemic criterion must cohere with that theory of truth itself, again begging the question. Pragmatism is neither a singular theory of truth seeking greater validity than the rest nor a metaepistemic criterion passing judgment on all theories of truth. It offers an expansive theory of learning that accounts for the valuable ways that humans can faithfully appreciate reality.

As a first approximation, the following table lists nine views of truth, distinguished by their preferences about the provenance and temporality of truth.

Justifying truth by	Senses alone	Senses and reason	Reason alone
Nature of truth is			
Retrospective	<i>Empiricism:</i> truth is what has occurred in experience	<i>Realism:</i> truth is what reasonable belief corresponds with	<i>Rationalism:</i> truth is what necessary principles require
Circumspective	<i>Journalism:</i> truth is whatever is happening in experience	<i>Relativism:</i> truth is what is instructed by each culture	<i>Coherentism:</i> truth is whatever axiomatic systems affirm
Prospective	<i>Positivism:</i> truth is what will be arriving in experience	<i>Experimentalism:</i> truth is what will be learned by experiment	<i>Deductivism:</i> truth is what will be logically inferred

Each major pragmatist offered a formulation of experimentalism in order to rival views of truth loyal only to the senses or to reason. For William James, the “true” is “only the expedient in the way of our thinking.” (James 2011, 226) Dewey said, “The best definition of truth from the logical standpoint which is known to me is that by Peirce: ‘The opinion which is fated to be ultimately

agreed to by all who investigate is what we mean by the truth, and the object represented in this opinion is the real’” (Dewey 1938, 343n). These pragmatists never naively supposed that their preferred view of truth was true to every way that “truth” is ordinarily used in common language. It is no real criticism of pragmatism to point out that asking the truth from a person testifying on the witness stand during a trial cannot be covered by experimentalism (since trials expect retrospective truth from witnesses).

Pragmatism is not reducible to experimentalism, or to its cousins in philosophy of science, instrumentalism, and operationalism. Pragmatism is not primarily a theory of truth. Instead, pragmatism is better understood as a general theory of human learning and knowledge which combines the best features of realism, relativism, and experimentalism. Pragmatism sides with realism’s expectation that intelligence does reach the objectively real and takes relativism’s point that knowledge at any particular historical moment will be partial and perspectival rather than monolithic. As for the other six views of truth, pragmatism regards them as descriptions of stages or phases of intelligent inquiry to be treated as self-sufficient for limited purposes.

Pragmatism connects truth with learning, using a simple link through the concept of knowledge. If everything that can be *known* must be first *learned*, and if knowledge aims at *truth*, then the method of learning should aim at the truth. But this simple formula invites three approaches to learning. (1) Do we have a better grasp of the nature of truth? Then we should coordinate our learning methodology with this “truth” so that we can understand how knowledge is possible. (2) Alternatively, do we have a better grasp of how we actually do learn? Then our notion of truth should be constructed accordingly, so that what is knowable by learning is the truth. (3) Finally, we might suppose that we already have sufficient grasp of both “truth” and “learning,” leaving us with the question of whether knowledge is possible. If they are in harmony, (3a) knowledge is possible, but if not, then (3b) we must be skeptics about the possibility of knowledge.

Philosophers who have chosen path (1) are usually classified as rationalists. They start from a vision of truth and infer how the mind possesses the powers of knowing this truth. Philosophers who instead opt for path (2) are usually called “empiricists.” They proceed from a theory of human learning to determine what is knowable and only then proceed to define the nature of truth in terms of what is knowable. Option (3a) is distinguishable from rationalism, but in actual practice, since the result is the same in both cases, both (1) and (3a) philosophers take the rationalist course. However, option (3b) cannot be assimilated into (2), since (3b) does not agree that truth should be defined in terms of what is knowable. Philosophers who prefer (3b) are best termed “skeptics” since they use an independently ascertained notion of truth to explain why we cannot possess knowledge of the truth.

Pragmatism seeks to avoid both rationalism and skepticism by making novel developments to the tradition of empiricism – its “naturalizing” and “historicizing” contributions.

Learning and Knowledge in a Naturalistic Context

The first contribution lies in pragmatism’s efforts to naturalize our understanding of human learning and knowledge. Pragmatists disdain any rationalistic determination of truth or knowledge performed independently of an understanding of actual human learning. Pragmatism is quite often lumped together with skepticism by rationalists, since rationalists are disdainful of pragmatism’s willful disregard for what must be, in their view, the “real” nature of truth. Rationalists typically claim that on the pragmatic theory of knowledge, we would be barred from knowledge of truth and limited to learning only what is pragmatically relevant. Rationalism, in the form of absolute idealism, ruled the philosophical scene when the primary pragmatists began their struggle to revive empiricism. But long after the demise of absolute idealism, rationalism remain alive today in many guises. For example, it is quite common for a

present-day epistemologist to grudgingly admit that pragmatism has made contributions to the understanding of human learning. Yet that same epistemologist makes sure to disclaim any pragmatic influence on his own theory of knowledge. A popular way to keep pragmatism at bay is to assert that pragmatism offers only a “non-epistemic” theory of knowledge, and thus cannot be relevant for the epistemologist who is solely concerned with an “epistemic” theory of knowledge. “Epistemic” in this context means that such a theory of knowledge is concerned with the relationship between knowledge and truth. A “nonepistemic” theory, for this epistemologist, ignores truth and instead probes other mundane causes for belief besides the pure quest to know the truth.

But this attempted demarcation simply begs the whole issue, since the epistemologist is evidently relying on some definition of truth that stands independently from a theory of actual human learning and knowledge acquisition. The fundamental disagreement is exposed when the pragmatist retorts that she is indeed concerned with the relationship between knowledge and truth and refuses to admit any conception of truth having origins independent from the theory of human knowledge. If the epistemologist responds that there is in fact a concept of truth on which “the truth” exists independently of any and all human learning, that strongly rationalist metaphysical position only earns scorn from pragmatists. Pragmatism would not attempt to make sense of a notion of a truth or a reality completely transcendent of all possible human knowing. Of course there are realities yet to be known, and we could not adequately understand human learning without a notion of that realm. But by “truth” a pragmatist simply refers to what is and will be known, because any other notion of truth lacks useful meaning. That is why pragmatists reject the “justified true belief” theory of knowledge – fully justified belief simply is what we can possibly mean by true belief. Allowing “truth” to float freely as a superfluous criterion for knowledge invites in the rationalistic notion of truth divorced from actual human powers of conception and learning. Rationalists categorize philosophies as

“realist” if they admit the existence of a completely transcendent truth/reality independent of human knowledge. If pragmatism cannot be metaphysically realistic, can it be realistic in any sense?

Metaphysical, or transcendental, realists have traditionally answered negatively, because they assume that a denial of realism entails an acceptance of idealism. Idealism, by claiming that all reality must be characterized by mental qualities or activities, does indeed hold that there cannot be any reality forever beyond knowing minds (human and/or divine). But idealism can be, and very often is, just as rationalistic as metaphysical realism. Pragmatists have developed many of the most powerful objections to forms of idealism. However, by assuming that idealism is the only alternative to realism, metaphysical realists are driven to classify pragmatism as an idealism of either the personal relativism or social relativism kind. Metaphysical realists are particularly tempted to find in pragmatism only idealism because of pragmatism’s explicit adoption of empiricism. In modern philosophy since Descartes, empiricism has indeed been closely linked to idealisms and especially to personal, or subjective, idealism. Instead of allying with idealism, pragmatists have undertaken the task of “naturalizing” experience, learning, knowledge, and truth.

Although scientific reductionism has claimed the label of naturalism for itself, pragmatism resists. The role of the learner cannot be irrelevant to the reality known. First, scientific inquiry is nothing but the effort of human learning to better understand the ongoing relationships among observable matters. Thus, proper objects of scientific knowledge include those observable matters – the matters to be explained cannot be less real or unreal by comparison to the related matters explaining them. Second, scientific inquiry discovers those dependable relations among natural matters only through our deliberate conduct of experimental inquiry, and confirmed results enhance our potential control over the environing world. The experiential processes of controlled inquiry cannot be relegated to any subjective or unreal status – they are as naturally real

as any unobservable entities postulated by subatomic physics. Philosophical intuitions or reasonings that judge experience to be irredeemably detached from the world have no standing with pragmatism, either. The genuine growth of human knowledge requires that this growth exists within a wider context of experienceable nature whose existence is independent of, but not transcendent of, human learning.

Learning and Knowledge in a Historical Context

Pragmatism’s second special contribution to empiricism lies in its historical standpoint on the nature of learning. Empiricism, like rationalism, traditionally assumed that the central faculties responsible for learning have not altered their functioning for as long as humans have been on the planet. Pragmatism rejected that ahistorical psychology, finding that human intelligence was itself an evolving and growing power. Furthermore, scientific methods of experimental inquiry are recent inventions, showing how the best methods for human learning can develop over time.

Most of humanity still relies on their relatively fixed set of habitual beliefs, modifiable mostly by less-than-scientific methods. Three lower modes of belief have always been available, and until recent centuries, these have been the only methods available. The first mode is the period of infancy and young childhood, during which imitation and emulation build up habits of practice. The second mode is to place unquestioning confidence in the common beliefs of one’s society, which seem enduringly intuitive and familiar. Peirce called this second stage the “method of tenacity.” The third mode is to resort to the respected rules of one’s society whenever troublesome situations arise and to stand by those rules even if they prove useless. Peirce called this third stage the “method of authority.” The fourth stage is the “method of science,” which is characterized by a higher-level logic of inference that can propose alternative rules appropriate to situations,

and thus provide for a wider variety of alternative habits available for testing.

Pragmatism prefers tried and tested rules for controlling belief, and therefore it endorses fallibilism: Any item of knowledge might be modified or overturned by future experimental inquiry. This position is not a retreat into anything-goes relativism or a resignation to skepticism. It is fallacious to think that just because any item of acquired knowledge may be amendable by future inquiry, most or all of knowledge must be wildly inaccurate or that humanity is fated to forever know very little about the world. Skepticism towards knowledge is unwarranted because discovering the inadequacy of some knowledge occurs only through the discovery of other, better knowledge.

Pragmatism characterizes skepticism as a consequence of demanding too much from any individual learner. Knowledge, however, is never primarily the possession of anyone in the singular. The smallest unit possessing knowledge is the community of inquirers; a person has knowledge only in virtue of being a participating member. Learning is entirely social in nature, and methods of inquiry are likewise communal. Because the amount of knowledge is presently so vast, we now credit memorization as a form of knowledge, but this derivative “knowing” is not the primary mode of learning. The acquisition of new knowledge is confirmed through the inquiries of communities, never those of a single individual. Only a community can confirm that experiments are conducted properly, and results are repeatable and reported accurately.

Communities skilled in conducting scientific inquiries (inquiries avoiding poor observations and fallacious reasoning, and utilizing advanced abductive procedures permitting future self-correction) are together responsible for accumulating knowledge in a coherent manner. Scientific disciplines can correct each other, for no science can falsify another science’s knowledge, yet a science can reveal another science’s knowledge to be limited, partial, and perspectival. As there is no supreme independent method for adjudicating among sciences or ranking sciences, the sciences themselves are responsible for determining how

they possess perspectival knowledge of their subject matters and how best to coordinate their respective ontologies.

Pragmatism and the Primacy of Science

No scientific discipline ever needs to compromise on knowledge with a less-than-scientific community, or with cultural convictions generally. Cultures are replete with valuable practices that work well enough without hardly anyone understanding why they work, so memorable narratives do the work of conveying credibility to succeeding generations rather than scientific explanations. Pragmatism understands the philosophical anthropology behind traditions and narratives about cultural practices, but it cannot lift cultural narratives aiding convenience or prosperity to a cognitive status higher than science.

Pragmatism is not about legitimizing a utilitarian criterion for truth, pragmatism denies that learning is controlled by popularity, and pragmatism rejects the idealistic view that one’s society dictates what one can know. The scientific knowledge of the few always overrides the habitual beliefs of millions, no matter how tenaciously held. Science is not just another cultural practice or cultural authority alongside all the rest. Science established its own standards of conduct in order to form inquiry communities devoted to testing and disproving beliefs, not to form a culture propagated by conforming consensus. A “scientific culture” is any culture relying primarily on science for material and civic advancement, not a separate kind of culture to rival others.

Social sciences studying how cultures like to describe the world, and discovering why a group maintains a belief in something, are not inquiring into whether that thing is real. For example, understanding that an indigenous group blames malevolent spirits for illnesses is not equivalent to learning about those spirits or confirming their reality. Whatever passes for learning within a culture does not automatically make the resulting beliefs instances of genuine learning or knowledge. A social science paradigm presuming that

the acceptance of cultural narratives is necessary for comprehending a culture simply abandons science. Cultural studies preferring relativism about knowledge fall to an intellectual level below science. Educational theory can be pragmatist in spirit by prioritizing experimental inquiry without adopting social relativism about truth or knowledge.

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Universities and the Politics of Autonomy

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Introduction

Political debates concerning the university are numerous and usually rancorous. They also unfortunately tend to be played out along fairly predictable binaries – autonomy or control, freedom or responsibility, and neoliberalism or professionalism. Much of the academic literature tends toward one side of this debate, painting a rather dystopian image of the present and future of university life as plagued by some combination of marketization, privatization, commodification, and even reification. In this version of the events, the space for autonomy, whether academic or institutional, appears to be narrowing in the face of a disappearing State apparatus and the rise of a hype-consumerist culture.

Not surprisingly, then, many academics have responded negatively to current changes in university administration. In particular, they have set their sights on the growth of accountability systems in universities, a trend that is noticeable internationally and identified by some as a “corrosive” development in the university sector (Schwier 2012). Accountability mechanisms

such as audit and inspection are viewed in some quarters as Trojan horses for senior management, which “together act to codify behaviors” of academics (Hammersley-Fletcher and Qualter 2009, p. 363).

These concerns should not be a surprise, given that questions have been asked about the consequences of increased accountability in higher education since the 1980s (e.g., Elton 1988). There may be some truth in the claims concerning accountability and its function as a control mechanism, but nevertheless it would be worthwhile exploring a less polarized and one-sided account of university management and administration. What needs to be engaged with currently is a more nuanced account of institutional autonomy in the context of ever-greater demands for accountability. How do universities and the academy balance competing demands for autonomy *and* control? This is a more pressing issue to deal with and can help move us away from a pervasive politics of nostalgia when it comes to academic life. To explore this question, the entry draws on theoretical concepts from critical theory, which are used to help delineate the limits of both autonomy and control. This entry explores the implication of these limits for issues such as academic freedom, academic identity, and institutional democracy.

Universities and the Politics of Nostalgia

When passing judgment on the current travails of higher education internationally, appealing to previous historical formations can only provide so much comfort. As with many aspects of modern professional life, retreating to idealized versions of the past as a bulwark against current challenges raises as many questions as it answers (Murphy 2011). The fact that institutional cultures, structures, and identities have shifted dramatically over time ensures that there is no idea of the university “free of historical contingency” (Rochford 2006, p. 147). The twentieth-century development of a mass higher education system driven by demographic and economic pressures led to a proliferation and diversification of institutions, many of which bear little resemblance to “traditional”

forms. The consequent heightening of institutional competition has meant that historical notions of identity and purpose have had to accommodate more prosaic concerns with marketing and recruitment.

Likewise, the transformation in the student demographic does not help the traditionalist case. This overhaul of the demand side brings with it a range of pressures and additional complexities that make historical comparisons even more problematic. Chief among these pressures is that students are now much more concerned about receiving “value for money,” a situation exacerbated by the global trend for decreased government support for higher education while placing increased financial burden on students.

Appeals to history as a defense against government interference are similarly inclined to failure. Past form suggests that the current heated debate is just the most recent manifestation of a perpetual tension between higher education and government (Murphy 2009, 2011). The audit backlash could also be viewed as a visible example of the “forgotten history” linking educational and commercial conceptions (McWilliam 2004, p. 160), a history that renders auditing as an “alien invader” highly dubious. This history acts as a useful reminder that traditional concepts of professionalism, identity, and purpose are as manufactured and artificial as any current attempt to re-brand the sector.

These issues suggest that contrasting modern and “traditional” forms of university, brutal and disquieting as this may be, offers a reality check for those looking to use the past as a weapon against current higher education policy. The strategy is fraught with both factual and analytical challenges, something that applies equally to proponents and detractors of market-driven accountability. It is also useful to remember that valorizing the ideal over the real, and vice versa, is a popular political pastime, with no one ideology holding a monopoly over historical truth. The past is as contested as it is oversimplified, with the political left no stranger to romantic notions of yesteryear.

At the same time, these qualifications of historical arguments are not enough to dispel troubling thoughts regarding the shift in public policy.

Some of these troubling thoughts are associated with the heightened bureaucracy around quality assurance – performance indicators, audit, inspection, and evaluation. Consumerism is also becoming increasingly embedded in a more established cultural ethos, *student-centeredness*, and a “soft” institutional framework that has found its significance magnified alongside the expansion of market-based forms of governance. Increasingly orthodox, student-centered approaches to teaching and learning can be said to have provided a sympathetic cultural environment for consumerism to flourish, a classic case of conservatism “piggybacking” more liberal/progressive intentions.

In the context of consumerism, the historical movement away from more traditional teacher- or discipline-centered approaches has proved a difficult transition. The alignment of received “best practice,” consumer rights, and institutional sanctions has heightened professional anxiety regarding the relationship between academic and student. This anxiety is manifested in what some categorize as the therapeutic turn in education (Ecclestone and Hayes 2008). At its worst, this turn encourages a tendency to confuse student support with intrapsychic affirmation, a confusion that reduces intellectual engagement to the level of rehabilitation (Barrow 2009, p. 186).

This is a particular concern in the context of assessment feedback, where the now standard avoidance of terms like “weak” and “poor” prioritizes conceptions of self-esteem at the expense of honest and appropriate communication (Barrow 2009, p. 186). Some have argued that the perceived vulnerability of students and the subsequent emphasis on individual needs makes it a challenge to confront their belief systems, an unintended consequence of progressivism that can have potentially damaging effects on the teaching-learning relationship in HE.

So those concerned with the function of the university in a modern liberal democracy, and the place of academic autonomy within it, can find much to be worried about. The dangers of increasing political and economic encroachment are real – the question is, how worried should one be about the loss of freedom in the academy?

Ideology and Critique

Although academic autonomy has been reshaped with the advent of marketization, the more troubling aspects of this association are tempered to some degree by the presence of a strong democratic impulse combined with the inevitable force of historical change. There is another sense in which universities and academics should be *really* troubled by the past, which relates to the powerful force that swept marketization across higher education in the 1980s. This force was nothing other than a “fundamental change in the ideology of higher education” (Peters 1992, p. 126), a change, for example, pursued with zeal by the Conservative Party in the UK, who shamelessly used industrial and technological changes as a justification to “bring the university into line.”

It is difficult to perceive this transformation in the character of universities other than as a direct attack on the institution. Far from being inevitable, the transformation was a form of counter-revolution against one of the last bastions of liberalism and source of enlightenment, a political offensive that sought to recast the university as irrelevant, outdated, and anti-vocation. Integral to this undertaking was the development in the 1980s of a “hostile, negative view of the educational past” that “held the ‘educational establishment’ responsible for the problems that needed solving” (McCulloch 1997, p. 74). This political strategy set the stage for an evangelical pursuit of efficiency, performance, and marketization, and Peters was correct to note in 1992 that this form of historical branding “will set the parameters within which higher education is to be conceived for a considerable time to come” (Peters 1992, p. 126). The benign tension between the State and university was swept aside by the real politics of ideological score settling, leaving in its wake a tangible antagonism.

The consequences of this political debacle indicate that, while the present should not be a slave to the past, neither should history become the “enemy, something dangerous and alien, to be controlled or expunged” (McCulloch 1997, p. 74). Historical lessons are there to be learned, in this case the fact that the process of “making markets,”

as Newman and Clarke call it (2009, p. 89), is itself “inherently political.” This lesson appears relatively straightforward; the manner in which it has been learned, however, has proven hazardous for academics. Different historical methodologies have been used to explore the current hybrid of markets and accountability, mostly with diminishing returns. Some have used Michel Foucault’s moral archaeology to capture the oppressive nature of modern public sector governance, identifying in current policy a shift toward a panopticon-like state, one in which audit technologies result in institutional self-censorship, new forms of rationality and morality, and regimes of power.

This concentration on the micro-politics of subjectivity comes to some extent at the expense of a more nuanced debate over accountability and professionalism. Postmodern-inspired talk of oppression and resistance is not the most appropriate way of characterizing a predominantly State-funded sector, one that must be democratically answerable to its tax-paying electorate (Murphy 2009). Conversely, the emphasis on fluctuating and amorphous notions of “identity” and “self” as forms of resistance or otherwise loses some of its strength in the face of budget cuts and threats of redundancy. As Jenkins (2000, p. 22) suggests, Foucault’s panoptic vision is not necessarily the best way to appreciate the “potential for utilitarian social control that lies at the heart of modern rationalization.”

Framing the discussion in terms of power and subjection avoids offering concrete solutions to the problems faced by the academy. The inadequacy of this approach begs the question of what can provide a normative grounding for critique. Strong residues of another source of historical critique can be detected in various commentaries on higher education – Marxism. Although currently out of favor as a source of intellectual dissent, it is not difficult to perceive a residue of historical materialism in much critique of public policy, with universities becoming “marketized,” “commercialized,” and even “commodified.” These terms are sometimes used interchangeably, but alongside “proletarianization” offer a rudimentary source of dissent for many.

As with the use of Foucault, the use of Marxist-inspired ideas to generate a theory of loss in academic institutions tends to be unconvincing. Its inadequacy as an explanatory theory in this context is partly due to the fact that the critique of commodification has been cast adrift from that which gave it meaning in the first place. It is also due to a lack of fit between critiques of capitalism and current debates over the purpose of universities. Whatever universities may be, they are not definably capitalist in nature, one of the reasons why notions of consumption applied to higher education tend to run aground. It is also why characterizing the loss of academic autonomy as “proletarianization” makes little sense in the context of institutions that are not built to extract surplus economic value from their “workers.”

The inability of theories such as Marxism and postmodernism to provide an effective and coherent account of academic loss is one of the more troubling aspects of historical comparison. Laments for a bygone era are no substitute for theories that can adequately gauge what has in fact been lost in the shift toward a mass HE system. Cast adrift without normative foundations, what can the academy offer in the face of marketization? How can it defend itself from further intrusion while retaining whatever autonomy it has left?

One place to start would be for the academy to take control over its own professional identity and play to its strengths as a form of public good and public service. Such a route would make sense given academic unease in the face of creeping privatization and help reclaim the agendas around accountability and democracy at the heart of public service. This could help reverse the ceding of control over these agendas to institutionalized versions in the shape of “impact” and “knowledge exchange” and act as a bulwark against further erosion of autonomy.

Whether or not the academy is in a position to “publicize” itself in such a fashion is open to debate and must inevitably confront real challenges in the shape of professional insularity, disciplinarity, and the increasing proliferation of academic identities (Murphy 2011). There is also the lingering suspicion that reclaiming a public service ethos plays into the hands of modern

institutional agendas around impact and relevance. However, if academics continue to avoid delivering their own response to these issues, it must surely be the case that institutions will only too gladly provide the response for them.

Conclusion

In detailing some of the different approaches to academic autonomy, this entry has evidenced the complex nature of debates around professional control and institutional/national politics. These debates, shaped by intellectual concerns over power and ideology, have often led the academy down blind alleys and into the world of simplistic binary divides. These competing historical narratives around academic autonomy have also helped to increase the sense of uncertainty, eating away at foundations based on traditional authority. It is therefore not surprising that the urge to authenticate is consequently strong, but this does not excuse the fact that this urge to cement and codify professional parameters has come at the expense of more reflective inquiry into sources of control. For a profession devoted to meaning making, it is surprising that it has been less successful at making sense of its own world. To suggest that fluctuating levels of control are unwelcome divergences from some kind of natural harmony misunderstands the fragile nature of autonomy, professional or otherwise, in the first place.

As suggested in this entry, the academy could do worse than reconsider its function as a public service, a function that allows it a legitimate source of identity while at the same time wrestling control back from institutional and governmental agendas. This take on issues of control also suggests that identity and autonomy are intertwined in the academic profession, a suggestion that invites comparison with other professions such as teachers, doctors, and social workers. While issues of control inevitably play out differently in these professional contexts, it might prove beneficial to explore how the politics of autonomy has manifested itself elsewhere, as such comparisons would help the academy turn the gaze away from itself and instead face outward, toward the public sphere.

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University

- [Phenomenology of Higher Education](#)

University Rankings

- [Rankings and Mediatization of University](#)

Unmaking the Work of Pedagogy Through Deleuze and Guattari

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Synonyms

[Critique of capitalism](#); [Educational change/reform and norms](#); [Pedagogy](#); [Schizophrenia](#); [Subjectivity](#); [Time](#)

Introduction

The application of Deleuze and Guattari's philosophical work to pedagogy would seemingly position them on the side of the bottom-up, child centered, antiauthoritarian, nonconformist progressivism of the 1960s and 1970s. While this characterization is superficially correct and can raise the ire of conservative critics of educational provision, this entry will show that the application of Deleuze and Guattari to pedagogy is an involved, convoluted, and strenuous activity. This is because (1) the philosophical position of Deleuze and Guattari's work is not as straightforward as *only* working through a (de)centered or "a"-centered self that challenges the creation of subjectivity by capitalism or is simply anti-capitalist. Indeed, many of Deleuze's philosophical works and Guattari's speculative/political pieces focus on the construction of subjectivity (e.g., in Kafka's literature) and understanding how and why Deleuze and Guattari's move beyond subjective construction by capitalism in social life is key to comprehending how to use their work in education for pedagogy; (2) Deleuze and Guattari sought evidence for their claims about the creation of subjectivity and how to comprehend capitalism in this light. The creation of subjectivity by capitalism is mirrored in/through education according to Deleuze and Guattari (1988), which is a compelling argument for understanding the unmaking of pedagogy of

this entry. This entry will explore the application of Deleuze and Guattari to pedagogy, which is far from an "anything goes" attitude to educational provision, but looks to include all factors in the complete analysis of educative power; for example, (3) Deleuze and Guattari were particularly concerned about how their philosophy would be received and taken up, especially with respect to its use by interested power elites. Therefore, there is a necessary coding and movement in thought, alongside and between the reception and use of their work, which can be frustrating for critics, that determines the immanence of their philosophy and specifically provides a schema for how to use their ideas in education as pedagogy. This entry will show how Deleuze and Guattari pedagogy unravels what has gone before in education, does not produce "ready-made" solutions to today's educational problems as part of "the same," but signifies an "unmaking" of normative defined notions of pedagogy.

Schizophrenia, Capitalism, and Pedagogy

Gilles Deleuze is perhaps best known for his dual writing projects with the French theorist and activist, Félix Guattari, which resulted in two extraordinary books that focused on the multifarious relationships between schizophrenia and capitalism (Deleuze and Guattari 1984, 1988). These works are almost impossible to summarize and deserve multiple readings before one comes close to understanding their range and importance. However, there is a connection between the theme of this writing, i.e., Deleuze and Guattari's notion of pedagogy through unmaking, and the unexpected and exciting aspects of Deleuze and Guattari's writings on capitalism and schizophrenia. Firstly, a coherent line of argumentation appears if the "image of thought" discussion as that was raised by Deleuze (1994) in *Difference and Repetition* with respect to philosophical dogma and that had been foreshadowed in *Nietzsche and Philosophy* and *Proust and Signs* is reimaged and reapplied to the subsequent *Capitalism and Schizophrenia* texts. The basic

argument taken from Deleuze's early texts with respect to pedagogy happens in relation to the "image of thought," in that the "unmaking" of pedagogy is enacted if one questions the "image of thought" as it has appeared in philosophical texts, because one comes closer to thought *qua* learning in the world, as a new mode of undogmatic pedagogy can appear, as Deleuze defines it, as a form of "transcendental empiricism" (Deleuze 1994).

Pedagogy can henceforth be realigned and performed as a mode of intense critical/affective thinking and subsequently as genuine learning, because one is able to effectively critique the "difference as difference" of philosophical texts to understand their places in the world, and the assumptions and repetitions in thought as have been set up by the philosophers become clear as dogma. Hence, Deleuze sets up pedagogy as "unmaking," in terms of specifically not being convinced by previously agreed upon norms and in the questioning of consensus, especially as it has appeared between philosophers or theologians. Pedagogy is according to Deleuze (1994) not something that is "done to one" or "is done by one to others," but is something that one participates in, it is a mode of co-construction, teaching and learning become fused, one is opened up to the future, and one is better able to question knowledge construction as such. In consequence, one is able to make wider and more profound "mindscapes" through thought, i.e., via the unconscious and with nature (Deleuze 1994), and this action strengthens the interrelated, reciprocating connection between teaching and learning as transcendental empiricism. The wider relationships that Deleuze and Guattari (1984, 1988) are interested in *Anti-Oedipus* and in *A Thousand Plateaus* concern capitalism and schizophrenia, which are taken as two poles in the contemporary, fluctuating situation that is dominated by capitalism. The point of analysis here is not that there is a general "becoming more schizophrenic" due to capitalism or that schizophrenia is directly caused by capitalism. The analysis that is given by Deleuze and Guattari (1984, 1988) tends toward understanding the processes invoked by capitalism that can have

long-term psychoanalytic effects which can be bracketed and organized through the rubric of schizophrenia.

Deleuze (1994) changed the name of his philosophical approach in *Difference and Repetition*, which he termed as "transcendental empiricism," to "transcendental materialism" in *Anti-Oedipus* (Deleuze and Guattari 1984). However, the transcendental aspect of the approach advocated by Deleuze in both texts is not *transcendent*, i.e., leading to a type of exploration of the conditions for experience or of "I" and as one finds in Kant. Rather, the transcendental in *Difference and Repetition* refers to the difference and repetition of empirical events; thought is embodied as partial objects and as the unmaking of pedagogy. In *Anti-Oedipus*, the transcendental refers to the material flow of things and their synthesis, as they pass through the (de)centered subject, or the subject undone by capitalism, in a parallel manner to Whitehead's (1929) panpsychism, which lends mind to objects and objects to mind, in the world and through process.

In the case of *Anti-Oedipus* and *A Thousand Plateaus*, a dizzying array of conceptual and intellectual units, methods, and ideas are invented and made apparent that link schizophrenia with capitalism such as (re-) and (de-)territorialization; coding, decoding, and over-coding; rhizomatics; desire and the desiring machines; assemblage; the body without organs or BwO; the war machine; abstract machines; the plane of immanence; and schizoanalysis. In and through this entry, these concepts from the *Capitalism and Schizophrenia* books will be related to the "unmaking" of pedagogy, in order to discern the forces which direct the ways in which teaching and learning happen in the contemporary capitalist, social, and psychological situation and to "unmake" this psychosocio-capitalist knot in terms of thinking through the image of thought produced by capitalist (and schizophrenic) education.

Deleuze and Guattari's aim in their *Capitalism and Schizophrenia* books is to understand the underlying psychic, cognitive, and affective processes that pass through the subject and that determine and play with being as becoming, as one lives through the dictates of capitalist social life.

For example, Deleuze and Guattari (1984, p. 190) take the omniscient fact of contemporary debt and how the reality of debt has expanded and broadened beyond the confines of straightforward, flesh-to-debt relationships that one finds, for example, in premodern societies, that literally mark the body of the debtors. Today, the reality of debt is pan global and often submerged, as the lines of credit have been expanded exponentially from small communities of interdependents and the overlords of their land and territory. The identifiable overlord figure has been replaced by a formidable mixture of debt powers, e.g., between banking systems, their clients, and mortgage credit finance packages, as were exposed during the 2008 global financial crisis, and between State systems and their taxation, bond, and monetary systems, by and in interest rates; in student loans, through corporate finance systems; and in consumer debt arrangements. The unmaking of pedagogy in this context requires understanding the image of thought that these interrelated debt arrangements afford.

The image of thought of debt relationships and pedagogy, what educators teach and learn, and how the items of the curriculum are delivered are all now incredibly involved and multilayered, as the notion of debt itself has gone from a recognizable bodily practice of power, exemplified by marking and scarring, to omnipresent and multiple forms of financial control and submission. In many countries, debt now accompanies college- or university-level study and reaches down into the education system as a whole through private education. Unless one is literally able to pay the study fees up-front (i.e., one comes from a privileged, previously capitalized position), one is caught in the web of debt over time, as soon as one goes to university or starts to study and learn (hence the notion of “edu-debt,” Cole 2013). Of course, this new reality of unrestrained and global finance capitalism has consequences for what one teaches and learns and how one learns, as debt incessantly mounts up and repayments incur interest. Under these conditions, one inevitably plays it safe and chooses a subject to study that should lead to a high-earning career and which will facilitate the repayment of the debt as

quickly as possible. Moreover, these conditions of debt have effects on the body and mind, as well as practical lifestyle and career choices.

Deleuze and Guattari’s (1984, 1988) process-orientated and interlinked arguments about capitalism and schizophrenia importantly include the incursion of machines into the frame about what it is like to live, think, and learn under capitalism. Machines are not a metaphor for the way one now thinks and learns or for capitalist pedagogy, but machines termed as “the machinic” by Deleuze and Guattari are a literal means to grasp the effects on desire that being in debt for the whole of one’s life has, as can be expressed through the conjunction “desiring machines.” Importantly, the insertion of the machine is not a categorical or projective stance taken by Deleuze and Guattari (1984, 1988) to replace the human self with something less comforting, but opens up, for example, a passage or process, to understand how debt now disturbs the way one teaches, learns, and thinks. As one goes ever further into debt – which is ironically often framed by metaphors of freedom and self-reliance – the necessity to make up the time of repayment becomes an imperative. A type of restlessness and agitation overwhelms the agent as the reality of the financial interest rates and the time frame of debt looms, and this psychic disturbance may be interpreted through forms of mental disease such as depression, neurosis, psychosis, or schizophrenia. The agent ultimately incorporates debt into themselves as a dead part of his or her being. One could say that debt is a machinic form of non-becoming that doesn’t change other than as a number or percentage and is an anathema to the chaos of the natural world or the creativity of the unconscious imagination – furthermore, debt importantly affects the desire of the agent. The desires of the agent become embroiled by debt as “machinic desire” and as a form of the death drive or as constant repetitions of financial repayments that (re)figure life as a tunnel with financial salvation at the end of that tunnel and as the only possible light coming from inheritance or from receiving some great windfall from an unexpected source and these extraordinary riches paying off the debt.

Clearly, under these conditions, one cannot teach and learn in the way that Deleuze (1994) states in *Difference and Repetition*, i.e., in contact with nature and through the creativity of the unconscious. Contrary to learning through the unconscious and in nature and contrary to the transcendental empiricism of *Difference and Repetition*, the pedagogy of capitalism is funneled through debt repayment and in having the means to make these installments, which produces a compelling argument for the unmaking of such pedagogy. However, Deleuze and Guattari (1984, 1988) do not give a simple, moralistic interpretation of the capitalized situation (and its unmaking) and do not attribute all evil or wrongdoing to the beneficiaries and elites of capitalism. Rather, they offer a sophisticated analysis of how the capitalist situation has been arrived at and how one can diagnose and explore the symptoms of what capitalism can do. Deleuze and Guattari (1984, 1988) show that the question of the precise effects of capitalism on the contemporary psyche is a complicated and convoluted one that it is based in nonlinear history and in developments in the ways in which socialization happens and collectives have been produced, and, furthermore, these processes have developed significantly since the time of their two major publications. It is clear that present-day children significantly learn through online environments and social media such as Facebook, as well as at school or in formal “face-to-face” situations (Cole and Pullen 2010), and this changes the unmaking of capitalist pedagogy.

Online environments are often fully connected to commercial interests, and this pressure to accept commercial dictates as norms has intensified considerably since the time of Deleuze and Guattari’s opus maxima during the 1970s. One can read Deleuze and Guattari’s work on capitalism and schizophrenia as a sophisticated extension of Guy Debord’s (1994) analysis of *The Society of the Spectacle* in that “(i)n societies where modern conditions of production prevail, all of life presents itself as an immense accumulation of spectacles. Everything that was directly lived has moved away into a representation” (Debord 1994, p. 3). In Deleuze and Guattari

(1984), the representation of life and pedagogy is enacted by the three syntheses of capitalism (connective-disjunctive-conjunctive), and these cannot be directly opposed, but only followed as flows, and diverted through intense thought and a new mode of pedagogy if one takes Deleuze and Guattari at their word that unmakes the pedagogy of the past and questions the image of thought of the capitalist present.

Conclusion

The strongest question with respect to the philosophy that one may derive from Deleuze and Guattari and that pertains to pedagogy is what is the point of articulating the Deleuze and Guattari perspective on pedagogy as unmaking? In an attempt to answer this question, the ways in which Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy may be taken up by educational practitioners and researchers will be listed below:

1. The eight postulates as listed in the “Deleuze and Learning” entry (same author) and in Deleuze (1994) can be used for what could be termed as “critical thinking practice.” This practice involves examining texts and the representation of thought, e.g., in cinema, in order to understand the image of thought, and the assumptions and dogmas inherent in those thoughts and therefore leads to a new mode of pedagogy tied to these learnings (as unmaking). This form of educational practice has important work to do in questioning the image of thought of contemporary capitalism.
2. The application of “Deleuze and Guattari pedagogy” to literacy pedagogy opens up the field away from border control work around illiteracy and (re)introduces other multiple literacies that could be overlooked in the everyday life of the formal classroom (Masny and Cole 2009) and that further strengthens critical thinking practice.
3. The nature of schools as sedentary markers in society, and therefore schooling as such, and the conditioning processes in schooling, e.g.,

- institutionalization, are put under pressure due to the application of Deleuze and Guattari pedagogy as a practice (i.e., questioning fixed ideas about schooling).
4. The value of the end processes of pedagogy such as final examinations is seriously questioned according to this approach to pedagogy through unmaking. Deleuze and Guattari would applaud formative types of assessment, as well as quality feedback and the playing with the authority of having the “right” answer or even reframing the question. Of paramount importance to Deleuze and Guattari pedagogy is the process of thinking about “the image of thought” as has been described above.
 5. Deleuze and Guattari pedagogy puts emphasis on experimentation, role-playing, and the questioning of power games. At the heart of this practice are an affinity with environmental concerns, the nonhuman world, and the subversion of commercial culture as a banal imposition on what one learns. For example, many “technological innovations” in educational practice could be seen as attempts by educational software designers to sell new products.
 6. The unconscious is not an inaccessible other, but at the center of Deleuze and Guattari pedagogy. This means that exercises designed to stimulate the unconscious are important markers with respect to what one does as an educator. For example, one should be able to act spontaneously and in the moment, following unexpected cracks in the set curriculum as they appear.
 7. Deleuze and Guattari pedagogy indicates a move away from right-wing, market-based influences in education, often described under the rubric of “neoliberalism.” This point of the unmaking in/by pedagogy is not to head for a utopic, anarchic, communist, or agrarian state, but to create a space wherein other forms of socialization may become apparent in the future through education.
 8. Educational policy and curriculum design may be made more responsive to context and change if the principles of Deleuze and Guattari pedagogy were applied as a mode of thinking practice and unmaking.

9. Lastly, but importantly, Deleuzian pedagogy rests on the affect that he took from his reading of Spinoza and the ways in which the affect circulates in life and as a basis for all relations. Hence, affect needs to be recognized as a major component in all educational contexts (see Cole 2011a, b).

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Unspoken: Latent

- [Phenomenology, Language, and the Unspoken: The Preverbal Dimension of Children's Experience](#)

Upbringing

► [Langeveld, Martinus J. \(1905–1989\)](#)

Urban Environmental Education

► [Environment and Education](#)

Use of Levinas in Educational Philosophy, The

► [Levinas in the Philosophy of Education](#)

Use of Quipus in Peru and the Process of Alphabetization and Schooling, The

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Synonyms

[Incas](#); [Indigenous](#); [Peru](#); [Quipus](#); [Schooling](#)

Introduction

In 1605, Felipe Guaman Poma de Ayala writes to King Philip III *El primer nueva coronica y buen gobierno* [First New Chronicle and Good Government] detailing the use of *quipus* in the administration of the Inca Empire and commenting on the people who did that job and the way they achieved this position. The Spanish administration ways are illustrated, together with their issues and defects, in face of which the author suggests to put back in place the Inca administrators, thus showing equivalence between writing and the use of *quipus*. The high social classes of the indigenous society were the first ones to have access to writing, so great

part of the responsibility implied in using this new tool rested upon them. Nevertheless, ordinary people, children, and even women – considers the author – should also have access to this knowledge.

The Author

In order to expose the unfairness suffered by the Incas, and using writing as a means to exert power, Guaman Poma declares himself to be a spokesman before the King. He poses the need to appropriate this technology in what he foresees as the transition from the use of *quipus* to the schooling process, which taught writing with the Latin alphabet. In the image below, he introduces his portrait (Fig. 1).

In his ample work of 1,189 pages, Felipe Guaman Poma de Ayala (ca. 1556–1644), a Peruvian ethnographer of his time, introduces the 12 Incas [Kings] and their Coyas [Queens], their royal functionaries, the rites, and ceremonies performed at the time, together with some considerations about the ages of the world. He addresses his text to King Philip III, to whom he describes in long pages the defective administration of the kingdom, considering that an Andean administrator “is better than a Spanish lieutenant” and “is likely to proceed without doing so much harm and mischief” (Adorno and Murra, 2006, p. 807). The harm in question is presented in the chapters about “The Conquer of This Kingdom” and “Good Government and Justice.” In the final sections, he depicts the Andean world, including a world map and details of different cities and villages. The work is particularly featured by 398 illustrations that accompany the text, “for it not to become tiring at the moment of reading” (p. 10). The current study presents some of those images, as well as the legends that accompany them in ancient Spanish, with their corresponding modern English versions. These images are analyzed as more than simple complements, as far as they contribute important information to the interpretation of the text.

The writer actually sent the text to King Philip III, but after a mysterious arrival to the Spanish

Use of Quipus in Peru and the Process of Alphabetization and Schooling, The,

Fig. 1 CAMINA EL AUTOR.

Con su hijo don Francisco de Ayala. (p. 1095/1009)

(The first number corresponds to the pagination of the original manuscript, while the second one corresponds to the printed edition's pagination). The author walks with his son, don Francisco de Ayala

(Special thanks to The Royal Library, Copenhagen, for allowing the use of the images of the *Guaman Poma de Ayala* manuscript, GKS 2232 4°. Retrieved from <http://www.kb.dk/permalink/2006/poma/info/en/frontpage.htm>. Drawing 385)



court, it had a hazardous fate. In effect, the manuscript got lost for centuries, until appearing recorded in the Royal Library of Copenhagen in the eighteenth century. But it was only until 1908 that the German librarian Richard Pietschmann published it as a new discovery. In 1936, Paul Rivet presented a facsimiled edition, which was the only available one until the publication of the critical edition by Rolena Adorno and John Murra in 1980. The current study resorted to the 6th Spanish edition by Adorno and Murra (2006) and to the images of “The Guaman Poma Website,” in charge of the Royal Library of Copenhagen.

The Peruvian author reflects on the uses of *quipus*, their administrators, and the transition from this way of administrative knowledge to its written equivalent, with which – he considers – it

should not be disjunctive. Just as well, he points out that the lower social strata should also have access to writing, which he acknowledged as an efficient way of expressing themselves.

The Use of Quipus

The *quipu* or *khipu* were an Inca tool for recording the movement of people and goods. A *quipu* consists of a series of colored, spun, plied, and knotted threads or strings made of cotton or camelid fiber and suspended from a main cord. The type of knot indicated a number, and the knot's placement signified units according to a base ten positional system. This device was used to monitor tax obligations; keep record of counted goods such as gold or corn; collect census, calendrical military,

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Fig. 2 DEPÓCITO DEL INGA, COLLCA. (p. 335/309). Storehouses of the Inka

(Special thanks to The Royal Library, Copenhagen, for allowing the use of the images of the *Guaman Poma de Ayala* manuscript, GKS 2232 4°. Retrieved from <http://www.kb.dk/permalink/2006/poma/info/en/frontpage.htm>. Drawing 132)



or other data; and, according to Brotherston (1992), even to record narratives.

From the very first pages of his work, Guaman Poma mentions the use of *quipus*: “cin escriptura nenguna, no más de por los quipos y memorias y relaciones de los indios antiguos” [without any writing, and only by using *quipus*, ancient indigenous people used to keep records and memories] (p. 8). *Quipus* were the system by which the Inca kingdom was administered, as it can be observed in the following images: In Fig. 2, the Inca gives instructions to a *suyoyoc*; Fig. 3 shows *Condor Chaua*, one of the *chasquicoc*, as he presents the accounting system.

The *chasquicoc* (treasurers) and the *susuyoc* or *suyoyoc* (administrators) were among the most important functionaries in charge of the Inca kingdom. They were the sons of the great lords and as such they learned the duties of

“counting and commanding,” so that they became skillful at administrating the lands at the death of their fathers. They had to prove to be capable and diligent in order to take responsibility for the communities and their crops, thus honoring the gods, so that there was abundance of all type of food, fruit, clothes, cattle, and mines. Their duty was not restricted to administering the lands, because they also had to mete out justice by solving the quarrels of the people in their communities (p. 321). Justice, which was certainly scarce under the ruling of the newly established Spanish government, actually depended on the duty of the *susuyoc*. Guaman Poma complains to King Philip III and suggests that, if the former administrators were experienced in managing the kingdom, they were the most indicated ones to serve God and his Majesty the King.

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Fig. 3 CONTADOR MAYOR Y TESORERO.

TAVANTINSVUIOQUIPOC
CURACA CONDOR CHAVA.
(p. 360/332). Kuraka
Condor Chava, Chief
accountant and treasurer,
Tawantin Suyu khipu
kuraka, authority in charge
of the khipus of
the kingdom

(Special thanks to The
Royal Library,
Copenhagen, for allowing
the use of the images of the
Guaman Poma de Ayala
manuscript, GKS 2232 4°. Retrieved from <http://www.kb.dk/permalink/2006/poma/info/en/frontpage.htm>. Drawing 143)



As shown in Fig. 4, the native administrator holds a book and a *quipu* in his hands, in order to keep record of contracts, sales, and purchases. The author even proposes that those who perform in this position should have the authority to penalize the damage caused by *regidores* (aldermen) and *alcaldes* (magistrates), and that the major *caciques* (principal native lords) should also take the responsibility to protect the poor among the natives (Fig. 5).

According to the author, this administrator should be a former royal official, examined as follows:

The major *caciques* . . . must be raised as Christians and know the Spanish language, and even Latin, if possible. They must be skillful at writing and counting and at drafting queries and grievances in the defense of themselves and of the natives under their authority, who are actually their vassals, poor natives of Christ.

They should ideally be spirited, resolute men, not fearing the Devil, the *corregidor* (royal administrator), the *encomendero* (the Spanish functionary in charge of the *encomienda*, which was the legal system employed to regulate native labor) the priest or the Spanish; instead only fearing God and your Majesty. (p. 770/718)

This official not only had to know his duties but also be brave and confront his opponents, “not fearing the Devil or the royal administrator,” because the Spanish rulers used to violate the indigenous rights since the times of the discovery.

Writing and Power

The power of writing came from the moment of the discovery. Inherited by the sailors since ancient times, in the first place writing affected the religious scope through the sacred Scriptures,

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Fig. 4 REGIDORES. TENGA

LIBRO QVIPO CUENTA.

Surcococ, administrador
despensero. (p. 800/746).
The native administrator of
resources, or *Surcococ*, with
the **book** and **kipu**
(knotted strings) he uses
for accounting

(Special thanks to The
Royal Library,
Copenhagen, for allowing
the use of the images of the
Guaman Poma de Ayala
manuscript, GKS 2232 4°. Retrieved from <http://www.kb.dk/permalink/2006/poma/info/en/frontpage.htm>. Drawing 301)



which was the supreme and unquestionable text. In the second place, it affected legal aspects as a means to demonstrate true testimonies or the legality of any deed: agreements, summons, bulls, decrees, and others.

The members of the Amerindian cultures soon recognized the efficacy of this way of exerting power. Writing operated as an almost magical instrument, not allowing any reply or discussion, in what Lienhard (1990, pp. 22–23) designated as the *fetishism of writing*. Nevertheless, writing was neutral in itself; that is, it could be used with diverse purposes, which could go in favor or against the natives, the latter being the most frequent use.

The notion that writing could be used against the natives was soon recognized. Guaman Poma presents several examples such as the one shown

in Fig. 6, wherein a Spanish royal administrator dictates a letter to his assistant.

Writing in favor of the natives was actually scarce, but not totally inexistent. Guaman Poma also provides some examples such as when a woman receives a letter to seek justice from the authorities (Fig. 7).

The case of the woman who seeks justice provides an outstanding example of how writing was also used to favor the natives, as far as it indicates the likely authorities to whom it was possible to appeal in order to solve a grievance, as indicated by the small letter text that accompanies the image:

[she begs that] The mentioned magistrate gives her a justice letter, so that the vicar listens to her and metes out justice, also notifying the Bishop, for him to punish this and other [unfair priests], thus setting an example in this kingdom.

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Fig. 5 PRINCIPALES A DE SER DESAMINADO. El buen principal de letra y lengua de español que sepa hazer una petición, interrogatorio y pleito... (p. 770/718). An upstanding native lord drafts a grievance on behalf of an Andean commoner. The principals must be examined for Spanish writing, making petitions and interrogatories, and presenting disputes

(Special thanks to The Royal Library, Copenhagen, for allowing the use of the images of the *Guaman Poma de Ayala* manuscript, GKS 2232 4°. Retrieved from <http://www.kb.dk/permalink/2006/poma/info/en/frontpage.htm>. Drawing 292)



...And seeks justice from the mentioned magistrate, major cacique, administrator, protector, general lieutenant of the royal administrator, from the latter [himself], or from anyone [who metes out] justice. The town council or any other corresponding justice body are commanded to session and respond and sign the grievance, all of which the notary must testify about. This must later on be dispatched to the vicar general, who shall be in the middle of the mentioned province.

The request must be endorsed by the notary, for the procedure to follow its legal course. In this case, the fetishism of writing decreases notoriously: administrative and legal effectiveness does not rely on writing itself, but on the person who has the authority to communicate through writing. Quispe Agnoli (2006) analyzes the situation of writing and its consequences in the New

World, with particular emphasis on the work of Guaman Poma. She explains how the perception of the indigenous legitimate authority had been undermined, which she illustrates with the case of the *Nahua*, which is analogous to that of the Incas:

... In evaluating the pre-Hispanic culture, a transition can be observed, from the highly civilized *Nahua* to the ignorant native. ... the missionaries resorted to psychological punishment and emphasized the cultural inferiority of the pre-Hispanic culture, thus undermining and destroying the indigenous subjectivity. (Quispe Agnoli 2006, p. 170)

In the examples above, writing is only allowed to the dominant class. Guaman Poma proposes to extend this permission to the natives, for them to appropriate this form of power. The author questions the inferiority to which they have been subjected,



Use of Quipus in Peru and the Process of Alphabetization and Schooling, The, Fig. 6 CORREGIMIENTO. CORREGIDOR DE PROVINCIAS. Después de auerse hordenado los dichos corregidores. . . a resultado muy grandes daños en estos reynos del Pirú. Y al cabo salen del corregimiento con haziendas de más de cinquenta mil pesos a la costa y daños de los pobres yndios. (p. 488/455). The royal administrator (*corregidor*) and his secretary. After the appointing of the mentioned *corregidores* . . . Serious damage has

resulted in these reigns of Peru. And when they are done, they leave the *corregimiento* with fortunes of up to 50,000 pesos at the expense of, and damaging, the poor natives

(Special thanks to The Royal Library, Copenhagen, for allowing the use of the images of the *Guaman Poma de Ayala manuscript*, GKS 2232 4°. Retrieved from <http://www.kb.dk/permalink/2006/poma/info/en/frontpage.htm>. Drawing 198)

because they have a fairer and more efficient administrative system, as is the case of the *susuyoc*.

Schooling

As indicated by the author in the first part of his work, even before the coming of the Spanish, the

age of 5 was considered to be the appropriate time to start schooling: “The mentioned kids . . . are ready to attend school and be taught the doctrine” (p. 209/185). Under the Spanish ruling, these kids started school at the command of the priests, whose cruelty, however, was notorious (Fig. 8).

In face of the abuses suffered by boys and girls, the author proposes that the priests appoint a

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Fig. 7 PADRES. CAVILDO DE LA QUEJA. Que perdió la pobre yndia contra el padre y pide justicia . . . El dicho alcalde le dé carta de justicia . . . (p. 654/618). An Indian woman, falsely accused of concubinage by the parish priest, presents her petition for justice to the native magistrate

(Special thanks to The Royal Library, Copenhagen, for allowing the use of the images of the *Guaman Poma de Ayala* manuscript, GKS 2232 4°. Retrieved from <http://www.kb.dk/permalink/2006/poma/info/en/frontpage.htm>. Drawing 260)



“sensible Christian” as native instructor, for him to teach doctrine (i.e., to provide education) (p. 587/556), as it is observed wherein the hat type allows identifying an indigenous teacher. Spanish teachers were the priests, in figure 8 appears with a miter; Spanish authorities used flounced collars and hats as in figure 6; indigenous teachers and authorities used round hats with a flower like figures 9 and 10.

When the author mentions “all boys and girls,” he really means it: the children from high and low social strata, whose parents, he suggests, should pay the teacher according to their corresponding economic possibilities:

...alcalde o cacique, le pague al dicho maystro un patacón cada muchacho y un almud de maýs, otro de papas. Y ci es pobre, quatro reales y un almud de

maýs. Y ci es güerfano, que no le pague nada, cino que los domingos y fiestas le trayga una has de leña y le ayude en su sementera quando se ofreciere en el año, asi mismo las muchachas. (p. 672/635).


magistrate or major *cacique* pays the mentioned teacher one *patacón* [golden coin] per kid, and one *almud* [weight measure] of corn and another one of potatoes; and if [the child] is poor, 4 *reales* [a lower denomination coin] and one *almud* of corn; and if [the child] is an orphan, let them not pay anything to the teacher, instead bringing [him] a bundle of firewood and helping him in his garden on Sundays and holidays whenever necessary along the year, and in the same way the girls could do it.

It is worth while noting what the children are writing in the image: “may you all know how much/many.” Quispe explains that this is a usual sentence in legal documents. Therefore,

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Fig. 8 PADRES CASTIGA CRVELMENTE. Los dichos padres a los niños. De cinco años a entrar a la doctrina, de ciete años a salir a las comunidades y obligaciones. . . (p. 585/554). At the age of 5, native boys are brought to the parish, where they receive religious instruction and suffer cruel punishments

(Special thanks to The Royal Library, Copenhagen, for allowing the use of the images of the *Guaman Poma de Ayala* manuscript, GKS 2232 4°. Retrieved from <http://www.kb.dk/permalink/2006/poma/info/en/frontpage.htm>. Drawing 234)



“Schooling is not only aimed at acquiring a new literacy, but at training notaries as well, that is, natives that are capable of assuming this social role, which shall allow them to claim their rights and survive in the new colonial order” (Quispe Agnoli 2006, pp. 195–196).

For Guaman Poma, the hope of a deep change is in the hands of the new generations. They are the spokespeople of a consciousness that shall return. He considers that the indigenous society must rebuild their authority to claim their rights and propose solutions. Despite their acceptance of the figure of the “poor Indian,” his yearning is that they stop perceiving themselves as immersed in cultural misery and in the dependency of other

authorities. Their ability to assume the discursive forms of the other shall give them the possibility to be heard.

Conclusions

The transition from the use of *quipus* to writing illustrates the active reception of a technology imposed by the dominant society. The de-fetishization of writing, which takes place when the spokesperson is prioritized over the communication channel, leads the author to proposing the appropriation of this channel to transmit the voice of the indigenous culture. He



Use of Quipus in Peru and the Process of Alphabetization and Schooling, The, Fig. 9 MAISTROS. LOS MAISTROS DE CO. Y de escuela desde rreyno tributario. Que los dichos maystrosan de enseña a los muchachos, niños, niñas, mosos y las doncellas. . . Se les tome lición y le enseñe a leer y scriuir. . . Que en este rreyno en los pueblos chicos o grandes ayga escuela y sepan leer, escriuir, cantar canto de órgano los dichos niños y niñas todos. Porque aci conviene para el seruicio de Dios y de su Magestad. Nota: En la imagen el niño escribe: “sepan cuanto” (p. 670/634). The cruel choir and school masters should teach their students to read and write, so that they become good Christians. That the mentioned teachers must

instruct the youngsters, namely, boys, girls, and lads and maidens . . . Let them be examined and taught reading and writing. . . Let there be schools in both the small and big towns of this kingdom, and all the mentioned boys and girls know how to read, write, and sing organ music. So it must be done to serve God and your Majesty. Note: In the image, the boy writes: “sepan cuanto” [may everybody know how much/many]

(Special thanks to The Royal Library, Copenhagen, for allowing the use of the images of the *Guaman Poma de Ayala manuscript*, GKS 2232 4°. Retrieved from <http://www.kb.dk/permalink/2006/poma/info/en/frontpage.htm>. Drawing 266)

suggests that the best users of the writing system are probably those former functionaries of the Inca kingdom who know the use of *quipus*. Yet, he promotes a generalized use of writing, also including women in these first steps

toward alphabetization and schooling in colonial Peru.

The author does not hesitate to present himself as a legitimate spokesman of a valid speech, enunciated from the dominant forms. Guaman Poma



Use of Quipus in Peru and the Process of Alphabetization and Schooling, The, Fig. 10 ESCRIVANO DE CABILDO NOMBRADO DE SU Magestad. Quilcaycamayoc. ...Se declara que no se meta español ni mestizo ni cholo ni negro ni mulato ni zambahigo, cino entre ellos [indios] por la ley de derecho lexítimo agtual, primizu, corporal que Dios plantó entre los indios en este rreyno. (p. 814/759). A native scribe of the municipal court, or *quilcaycamayoc*, drafts a will. ... It is declared not to include any mestizos, Black men, mulattos, half-breeds

(neither American-Europeans nor American-Africans) or Spanish, for there to be only Indians among them, according to the law of legitimate right currently in force about God's first creatures in this kingdom

(Special thanks to The Royal Library, Copenhagen, for allowing the use of the images of the *Guaman Poma de Ayala manuscript*, GKS 2232 4°. Retrieved from <http://www.kb.dk/permalink/2006/poma/info/en/frontpage.htm>. Drawing 307)

addresses his work to the authority, thus revoking the colonial forms and presenting a more efficient perspective of administration.

To conclude, Fig. 10 synthesizes these stances.

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Utilitarianism

- [Ethics and Education](#)

Utrecht School

- [Langeveld, Martinus J. \(1905–1989\)](#)

Va, Tauhi Va

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Introduction

The term “vā” exists in a number of Polynesian languages including Tongan and Samoan. In the New Zealand Māori language it is referred to as wā. In the Tongan language, vā is defined by Churchward (1959) as the distance between or distance apart. Ka‘ili (2005) elaborates on this definition by referring to vā as space between social relations, socio-spatial relations, or space that relates. Thaman (2003) simply refers to vā or vaa as interpersonal relationships. Another term that is sometimes used interchangeably with vā in the Tongan language is vaha‘a.

In Tongan, “tauhi” means to look after, tend to, or to take care of (Churchward 1959). The term “tauhi” can also refer to the person who looks after or takes care of another person, items, or place. Tauhi vā literally means to look after or protect the vā or space between two or more people or among groups who are related to one another in some way (Thaman 2003). Ka‘ili (2005) describes tauhi vā as “the art of creating and maintaining beautiful social relations (vā) through the mutual performance of social duties (fatongia).” These definitions point to the importance of vā in the Tongan

context, a social space that is created, nurtured, protected, and maintained.

This entry provides an overview of vā and tauhi vā from a Tongan perspective. Firstly, it focuses on tauhi vā as a core cultural value. It then discusses examples of the types of vā that exist in different contexts such as kāinga (extended family), schools, workplaces, and the church and relates how tauhi vā is practiced in those contexts. The entry then examines attempts to apply vā and tauhi vā as a theory to guide work in different spheres of life.

Tauhi Vā as a Core Value

Tauhi vā is considered as one of the four core values underpinning Tongan language and culture. The other three values are faka‘apa‘apa (respect), mamahi‘ime‘a (sense of responsibility and commitment to the cause), and lototō (humility). These four values are commonly referred to as the faa‘i kaveikoula (golden or fundamental values) which bind and hold together the Tongan culture. The widespread use of the faa‘i kaveikoula is attributed to the late Queen Salote Tupou III, a Tongan monarch who was committed to the protection and promotion of Tongan traditions, language, and culture. The inclusion of tauhi vā as a core value indicates the importance of relationships in the Tongan context. Nurturing and maintaining relationships is a fundamental practice in the Tongan traditional way of life.

Together with faka'apa'apa, mamahime'a, and lototō, tauhi vā position people first and foremost so that they understand what, where, why, and how they relate with others in social settings and in the wider society, as well as how they nurture, protect, and maintain their vā. Inherent in the faa'i kaveikoula is the value of 'ofa (love or compassion), which ultimately determines why Tongans are motivated and moved to act and/or behave in a certain way.

Tauhi Vā in Practice

Thaman (2003) suggests that vā implies certain behavioral expectations from and between persons who are involved in the relationships. Nurturing and maintaining the vā takes effort and it involves commitment, responsibilities, and obligations. Tauhi vā is a reciprocal activity whereby the persons involved will give each other time, food, and other material things as a sign of their respect of the vā. In response, the other party in the relationship reciprocates by giving something in return. Through mutual performance of their responsibilities and obligations their vā is nurtured, strengthened, and maintained.

While interpersonal relationships between one person and another can be the focus of the tauhi vā, membership in groups and institutions within the society also creates vā and requires one to engage in tauhi vā. This type of vā may include:

Tauhi vā mo e kāinga (Nurturing relationship with the extended family)

Tauhi vā mo e fonua (Nurturing relationship with the village/island)

Tauhi vā mo e ako'anga (Nurturing relationship with one's school)

Tauhi vā mo e siasi (Nurturing relationship with one's church)

Tauhi vā mo e 'Otua (Nurturing relationship with God)

States of the Vā

The vā may exist in various states. For instance,

'Oku lelei hona vā (lit. There is goodness or harmony or beauty in their relationship) meaning, they get on well.

'Oku kovi hona vā (There is harm in their relationship). This is also referred to as vā tamaki (strained or sour relations).

'Oku māfana hona vā (lit. There is warmth in their relationship) meaning, they are friendly with each other.

'Oku momoko hona vā (lit. Their relationship is cold) meaning, they cannot stand each other.

'Oku ofi hona vā (lit. There is closeness in their relationship) meaning, they are very close.

'Oku mama'o hona vā (There is a distance in their relationship) meaning, they are not very close to each other.

'Oku motu hona vā (There is a break-up in their relationship), meaning, they have decided to cut off all communications and interactions, and they do not get on.

The ultimate aim of tauhi vā is to coexist peacefully, that is, vā lelei (good or harmonious relationship). When people are practicing and experiencing vā lelei they are happy, healthy, willing to participate in whatever obligations, and productive. Where there is vā kovi or vā tamaki then there is an uneasiness in the flow of interactions and an unhappiness in the relationships. Such vā kovi may eventually lead to the motu or motuhi (break-up) of the vā. However, it is believed that strained vā can be recreated, repaired, and reconnected when the persons involved decide that the vā is far too important to be left unattended to.

Tauhi vā in the Kāinga

In the context of the family and kāinga (extended family), there are important vā that are nurtured and maintained. These vā may include the following:

Ko e vā 'o e tamai mo e fa'e (The relationship between father and mother)

Ko e vā 'o e fānau mo e matu'a (The relationship between children and their parents)

Ko e vā 'o e tuonga'ane mo e tuofefine (The relationship between brother and sister)

Ko e vā 'o e tokoua mo e tokoua (The relationship between sisters or between brothers)

Ko e vā 'o e makapuna mo e kui (The relationship between grandchildren and grandparents)

Ko e vā 'o e fānau mo e mehekitanga (The relationship between children and their father's sister)

Ko e vā 'o e fānau mo e fa'ētangata (The relationship between children and their mother's brother).

As Thaman (2003) suggests, the nature and scope of the vā in Tongan society is dependent on the context in which the relationships exist and are played out. At the kāinga level, vā has to do with how a person is genealogically positioned in relation to other members, past and present. This in turn is generally determined by sex and age, whereby females are ranked higher than males and older siblings higher than the younger ones.

The vā of the tuonga'ane (brother) and toufine (sister) is especially maintained and protected in the Tongan family. There are certain types of respectful behavior and language that are expected between brothers and sisters and people in any gatherings where brothers and sisters are present. The same appropriate behavior enacted by a sister towards her brothers would also be extended to her male cousins. Likewise, brothers would exhibit the same respectful behaviors and language towards their sisters as well as their female cousins.

The following paragraph is an example of how positioning is exercised in the Tongan culture.

The mehekitanga (father's sister) assumes the highest rank and most 'eiki (privileged) position in the extended family. The mehekitanga is considered one's fahu (the person who is 'eiki to you and is accorded the highest level of respect in one's family). Given the higher rank to one's mehekitanga (father's sister) she and her children have authority to make decisions and are influential in the conduct of certain rituals associated with significant life events such as births, marriages, and deaths. If there are more than one mehekitanga, then age will determine their rank in any given context, with the oldest mehekitanga occupying the most 'eiki (privileged) position and is the

fahu. On the other hand, one's fa'etangata (mother's brother) occupies the lowest ranked position in one's extended family, and one may have authority over the fa'etangata and his children. Each position within the kāinga comes with responsibilities and obligations. The fahu relationship is only practiced when the people involved acknowledge and respect it. Although the fa'etangata is considered the lowest ranked person in the extended family, a sister's love for her brother may lead her to decide for her children not to exploit the fahu relationship. However, out of faka'apa'apa (respect), lototō (humility), and mamahi'im'ea (loyalty) to his sister, the brother may encourage his children to undertake their obligations to their fahu.

The tauhi vā in the kāinga requires 'ilo (knowledge) of genealogies and the roles and responsibilities of particular persons within the kāinga. Young members of the kāinga would learn from the older members how members are related to one another and specific ways of nurturing and maintaining the vā within the extended family. The 'ilo (knowledge) and poto'i ngāue (skills) associated with tauhi vā are learned informally by young people through observation of older members of the kāinga. It is desirable that a person is anga poto (has the knowledge and how to apply the knowledge in their performance) and uses it to tauhi vā.

Tauhi vā is practiced by members of the extended family within the village and country and across the globe, wherever members of the extended family may reside. When Tongans send remittances to relatives in Tonga and other countries such as New Zealand, Australia, United States, and other nations in the Pacific, they are participating in what Ka'ili (2005) describes as transnational tauhi vā. As communal people, sometimes a person is asked to do things in support of other family members in order to tauhi vā. For instance, it is common for members of the family in the diaspora to call and ask that one pays a visit to a colleague, friend, or church member who may be visiting the country. One would prepare food and/or mats and other cultural artifacts to take in support of a family member in the diaspora who needs you to enact the tauhi vā on their behalf.

Tauhi vā in Educational Institutions

The tauhi vā in the extended family may also be practiced in the workplace including the school context. This is clearly evident in the event of a funeral where colleagues will contribute money, kakala (fragrant flowers), and food and cultural items such as mats and ngatu (tapa cloth) and pay their respect to a colleague who has lost a loved one such as a spouse, child, or a parent.

In the school context certain vā exist. Three of the most significant vā are those between the students and their teachers, between current students and former students, and between teachers and parents and community.

The 'ilo (knowledge) and poto (skills) that students have gained through ako (learning) during their time at schools is considered a treasure which is reciprocated through tauhi vā. The strength of this vā is maintained through the parents and ex-students becoming important sources of funding for the school. Almost all secondary schools in Tonga have an active ex-students association which fundraises and undertakes projects to support the teaching and learning resources of the school. Ex-students are engaged in such activities because of their appreciation for what the school had done for them. Ko e ako'anga e na'e lalanga ai 'eku mo'ui (This is the school which wove together the foundation for my knowledge, skills, and life).

Tupou College, a boys' college owned by the Free Wesleyan church, which was established in 1866, and which was the first high school to be established in the Pacific, recently celebrated its 150 years anniversary in Tonga. Children and grandchildren of former students, who had already passed away, present money in memory of their fathers, grandfathers, and in some cases great grandfathers. More than eight million dollars was raised by ex-students and their families in Tonga and in the diaspora to contribute to the renovation of school and staff buildings, equipment and teaching resources, and building of new facilities. Ex-students from various years and classes identified a project (e.g., renovation of the school church, dining hall, staff houses, school gate, landscaping, and garaging for the farming vehicles) and worked to raise funds and complete

the projects in time for the celebration. These are all forms of tauhi vā, by reciprocating and giving back to a school which they consider to have laid the foundation for the knowledge and skills of their family members. In some cases, the act of tauhi vā is done more than 150 years after the event, by the great-grandchildren and grandchildren of those who were involved. The historical event illustrates that tauhi vā can be performed over many generations. The tauhi vā by people in the past may benefit those in the present and the tauhi vā by people in the present will benefit those in the future. The scope and breadth of the benefits gained from tauhi vā in collective living is phenomenal.

Tauhi vā in the Churches

The churches also play a significant role in the lives of Tongans. It is generally believed that a Tongan is born to perform certain fatongia (duties) and to be 'aonga (useful) to the extended family, church, and nation. Thus, the church is a very important institution in the lives of Tongans. Certain vā are created within the church. The term kāinga lotu (kāinga meaning kin and lotu meaning religion) refers to the members of a congregation. Thus, the kin-like connections among members of the kāinga lotu creates vā among them which must be nurtured and maintained.

Christianity has become the main religion of the Tongan people; therefore, the majority of Tongans have come to accept a very significant vā, which is, their vā with Almighty God. Most Tongans contribute and tauhi vā to their church organizations as a way of demonstrating their love and respect for God. Their tauhi vā to the faifekau (minister/pastor) and people in need reflects their attempts to tauhi vā to their God. Their faith in God drives the protection of those vā.

Taufe'ulungaki (2004) ably sums up the centrality given to vā and tauhi vā when she says that the essence of any community is the relationships of its members. It is through these relationships that members come to share experiences and memories, acknowledge shared roots, address shared moral concerns, and share responsibilities and obligations.

Theory of Tauhi Vā and Its Applications

A few Tongan academics and researchers have attempted to apply vā and tauhi vā as a theory to guide work in various fields such as a theorizing about reality (Mahina 2002), intercultural understanding and peace building (Thaman 2003), social work practice (Mila-Schaaf 2006) and leadership model in the public service context in Aotearoa New Zealand (Paea 2015), and conceptualizing tauhi vā as a performing art (Ka'ili 2008) based on research with the transnational Tongans in Maui, Hawaii.

Mahina (2002, cited by Ka'ili 2005) has conceptualized vā (space) and tā (time) to proposed the tā-vā theory of reality. Mahina identifies four dimensions of vā: physical, social, intellectual, and symbolic. Although vā is connected to all four dimensions, within tauhi vā it is primarily concerned with the social dimension. Ka'ili (2008) builds on Mahina's tā-vā theory of reality to conceptualize tauhi vā as a performing art that transforms tā (time) and vā (space) to create mālie (beauty), which in turn evokes feeling of māfana (warmth), hakailangitau (elation), and langilangi (honor) among the performers of tauhi vā.

Thaman (2003, 2008) promotes the use of tauhi vā as the basis for intercultural understanding and building peace in society. For Thaman (2008), learning to live together requires understanding of the different cultures within a society. Hence, a strategy for intercultural understanding may be found in the notion of vā, which acknowledges the significance of interpersonal and intergroup relationships and responsibilities.

Mila-Schaaf (2006) proposes a vā-centered approach to social work practice in Aotearoa New Zealand. For Mila-Schaaf (2006) a focus on vā may lead to a closer examination of our interactions with others, our intentions, and the conscious actions that impact on the nature of our relationships with others. Using the concept of vā to examine the relationships of people in a crisis might be an effective tool to better understand what people are going through. For instance, examining the hurts associated with the vā that has been broken, sharing anxieties about obligations for tauhi vā, or making plans and steps to

restore or repair the vā between people can become a powerful tool for dealing with people in crisis.

Paea (2015) presents a Tongan model of leadership grounded on tauhi vā māfana (nurturing warm relationships), based on research with Tongans in the public service context in New Zealand. The Tauhi Vā Māfana leadership model conceptualizes leadership as the cultural practice of nurturing warm relationships, which is based on the dynamic interplay between fāмили (familial relationships), māfana (warm lover/inner passion), fua fatongia (fulfilling obligations), and faka'apa'apa within a cultural context.

Concluding Comments

Vā is central to the very existence of Tongan people. Tauhi vā is not only a core value underpinning Tonga language and culture, its practices in various contexts defines and determines how and why a person behaves in a particular way. Nurturing and maintaining an individual's vā to ensure a state of vā lelei requires commitment, resources, time, and effort.

In the practice of tauhi vā, other cultural values are at play, namely, faka'apa'apa (respect), mamahi'ime'a (sense of responsibility and commitment to the cause), and lototō (humility), with the binding value of 'ofa (compassion). The scope, breadth, and depth of living the benefits of tauhi vā have been made permanent in Tongan people's histories and cultural practices over many generations.

The reconceptualization of the cultural values and practices associated with vā and tauhi vā have led a number of Tongan academics to formulate models and theory to guide work in various spheres of life; including performing arts, peace building, social work practice, and leadership in public service. Future academics and researchers can build of these models, thereby increasing the 'aonga (usefulness) of vā and tauhi vā as appropriate cultural frameworks to guide provision of valued and meaningful services within our communities.

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Validity

► Fairness in Educational Assessment

Validity Theory in Measurement

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Introduction

While validity is widely regarded as the most important concept in test development and evaluation, its definition and scope have been matters of considerable debate. Since the “classic” definition of validity popularized in the 1920s – that validity is the degree to which a test measures what it is purported to measure – a range of alternative conceptions have been proposed. Successive

editions of two widely cited texts developed in the US contexts have brought some sense of evolving “consensus” to the dialogue: chapters on “validity” or “validation” in four editions of the *Educational Measurement* handbook between 1951 and 2006 (by Cureton, Cronbach, Messick, and Kane), as well as editions of the *Standards for Educational and Psychological Testing* (hereafter, *Standards*), jointly sponsored by the American Educational Research Association (AERA), the American Psychological Association (APA), and the National Council on Measurement in Education (NCME), first published separately by APA and AERA/NCME under somewhat different names in 1954 and 1955, with the most recent edition in 2014. These foundational texts have routinely sparked critical dialogue, suggesting that matters of how best to conceptualize validity and validation are not settled.

The historical development of the concept of validity – with its multiple definitions – is well covered in a number of texts, perhaps most comprehensively to date in the collaborative work of Newton and Shaw (2014; see also Kane, 2006; and Moss et al., 2006). While acknowledging the importance of this history, this entry will focus instead on scholarly debates about validity between 1999 and 2016. The entry draws first on the most recent editions of the *Standards* (American Educational Research Association, American Psychological Association, & National Council on Measurement in Education, 1999; American Educational Research Association, American Psychological Association, & National Council on Measurement in Education, 2014) and the chapter on “Validation” in *Educational Measurement* (Kane, 2006), then proceeds to illustrate a range of alternative positions in recent scholarship. Articles reflecting this range can be found in three special issues of journals focused on validity: *Educational Researcher* (ER, 2007), *Journal of Educational Measurement* (JEM, 2013), and *Assessment in Education: Principles, Policy, and Practice* (AIE, 2016). We focus on the work of Borsboom and colleagues, Cizek, Haertel, Kane, Moss, Newton and Shaw, and Shepard, each of whom has participated repeatedly in the dialogue, to illustrate the breadth of

perspectives. (Note: For position statements published in one of the special issues noted above, in-text citations will name the relevant issue (e.g., *JEM*), with a full citation for that issue to be found in the “References.”)

Current “Consensus” Positions on Validity

The 1999 *Standards* described validity as referring to “the degree to which evidence and theory support the interpretations of test scores entailed by proposed uses of tests” (p. 9) and characterized validation as “a scientifically sound validity argument to support the intended interpretation of test scores and their relevance to the proposed use” (p. 9). The text outlined five sources of evidence appropriate to validity arguments: (1) “test content,” (2) “response processes,” (3) “internal structure,” (4) “relations to other variables,” and (5) “consequences of testing” (pp. 11–16). This reflected a break with earlier editions of the *Standards*, which had relied on traditional categories of content, criterion, and construct in characterizing types of validity evidence; it also reflected an endorsement of a “unified” notion of validity reflected in Messick’s “Validity” chapter in the 1989 edition of *Educational Measurement*. Although the role of consequences with respect to validity has long been controversial, the 1999 *Standards* provided for the relevance of consequences to validity arguments when (a) they illuminate ways in which the test might underrepresent or contain components that are irrelevant to the intended interpretation of test scores, (b) the test is developed and administered with an intended use in mind, and (c) the test is intended to have an indirect impact that goes beyond direct uses of the test scores themselves.

In Kane’s “Validation” chapter in the 2006 edition of *Educational Measurement*, he discussed “validation as the process of evaluating the plausibility of proposed interpretations and uses, and . . . validity as the extent to which the evidence supports or refutes the proposed interpretations and uses” (p. 17). Building on earlier statements by Cronbach and Messick, Kane

highlighted the logic and structure of validation as that of a practical argument; he outlined two arguments that undergird the process of validation: (1) an *interpretive argument* that “specifies the proposed interpretations and uses of test results by laying out the network of inferences and assumptions leading from the observed performances to the conclusions and decisions based on the performances” (p. 23), and (2) a *validity argument* evaluating the plausibility and appropriateness of the interpretive argument. Importantly, plausibility and appropriateness are not acontextual – the amount of evidence needed to support a proposed test use is, to some degree, proportionate with the stakes of possible assessment outcomes. Validation is a process weighed against consequences. To guide readers in the process of validation, Kane described categories of inference that regularly appear in interpretive arguments: *score inferences* from the performance record to the score, *generalization inferences* from the scores on to the domain of other test-like tasks, *extrapolation inferences* from the scores to the target domain about which one wants to draw conclusions, and *decision inferences* which link test scores to decisions and actions, as well as to intended and unintended consequences. The 2014 edition of the *Standards* largely maintained the characterization of validity in the earlier 1999 *Standards*, with minor modifications that enhance clarity. While not inconsistent with Kane’s characterization in the chapter on “Validation” it does not fully adopt his key terminology.

Current Controversies Concerning Validity

The conceptualization of validity in the most recent *Standards* and “Validation” chapter in *Educational Measurement* has sparked a vibrant critical dialogue. Some scholars have sought to elaborate and extend the discussion of validity as it relates to test use and consequences to include the indirect impacts of test use and the actual uses of test scores. Some scholars have sought to narrow the scope to interpretations as distinct from uses or, further, to the test itself. And at least one

pair of scholars has argued that the concept should be abandoned altogether.

Kane's recent work (e.g., *JEM*, 2013) has elaborated his discussion of validity with respect to test use. He has revised his label of "interpretive argument (IA)" to "interpretive/use argument (IUA)," explaining his original "expression may give too much weight to interpretations and not enough to uses" (*JEM*, 2013, p. 2). For Kane, "the IUA includes all of the claims based on the test scores (i.e., the network of inferences and in the proposed interpretation and use)" (p. 2). Kane's view of intended test use articulated scores to decisions by means of "a *decision rule* which stipulates that certain actions be taken given certain test scores. The decision inference takes an interpreted score as its datum and yields a decision as the claim" (p. 46). Here as well, consequences must be taken into consideration, and participate in the evaluation of decision rules: "A decision rule that achieves its goals at an acceptable cost and with acceptable consequences is considered a success" (p. 47). Considering the fact that "[t]est users presumably know how they are using the tests," Kane argued these users "tend to be in the best position to evaluate the consequences of their own decision rules and have a responsibility to do so" (p. 57).

Haertel (2013) extended the discussion of test use and consequences by focusing on the distinction between *direct* or *indirect* "mechanisms of action" (p. 2). *Direct mechanisms of action* "encompass uses and interpretations that rely directly on the information scores provide about measured constructs," and include "instructional guidance," "student planning and selection," "informing comparisons among educational approaches," and "educational management" (p. 2). *Indirect mechanisms of action* are those "leading to intended or unintended consequences, that do not depend directly on test scores" (p. 3), and include "directing student effort," "focusing the system," and "shaping perceptions" (p. 2). Testing, in other words, affects schooling by a host of mechanisms in excess of those Haertel identifies as "direct." Acknowledging this fact has, for Haertel, important implications: "In order to maximize the benefits and minimize any

negative effects of educational testing applications, test validation must attend to indirect as well as direct effects of testing" (p. 17).

Carrying this direction of argument further, Moss (*AIE*, 2016) contended that validity inquiry is not only relevant to *intended* test score uses and interpretations but also to *actual* test score uses and interpretations. Her approach to validity complemented rather than contradicted Kane's work and the 2014 *Standards*, working toward "a more complex theory of validity that can *shift* focus, as needed: from the intended interpretations and uses of test scores that guide test developers to the actual or situated interpretations, decisions and actions that serve local users' purposes" (p. 237). She drew on empirical studies of test and other data use to argue that, "[i]ntended interpretations from standardised tests are always locally mediated and provide, at best, partial answers to local questions" (p. 247) like how and where to allocate resources, select curriculum, focus professional development, or even frame problems. Moss (*JEM*, 2013) argued that "validity theory supporting such data uses might be most productively conceptualized around the particular questions or problems that evidence is needed to address, rather than around an intended interpretation/use from a particular testing program and the circumscribed evidence it provides" (p. 96). But, given the myriad questions or problems that local educators face, it would not be possible to consider explicitly the validity of each local use of test scores. Consequently, she argued validation efforts might most productively be refocused "to the broader learning or organizational environment and the extent to which it is sufficiently well resourced to support an evidence-based professional practice that enhances student learning" (p. 96).

While the scholars whose work is described above have sought to elaborate and extend the concept of validity reflected in the most recent editions of both the "Validity Chapter" and the *Standards*, others have raised concerns about the expansiveness of these conceptions of validity and validation. Cizek (*AIE*, 2016), for instance, has argued that concerns about interpretation and use are "incompatible" (p. 212) and should be

treated as fundamentally separate, distinguishing “validation of an intended score inference and justification of a specific test use” (p. 214). While he endorsed four of the five sources of evidence from the most recent *Standards* for validation of score inferences, he reserved use of the terms “validity” and “validation” for evidence related to score inferences, relegating questions of consequences (alongside other considerations, like fairness) to the separate category “Justification of Intended [or Specific] Test Use” (p. 219).

Recently, too, challenges to the concept of validity advanced by theorists like Kane and Messick have come from Borsboom and his coauthors, and from the Newton and Shaw. In a series of coauthored texts, Borsboom has contested the very philosophical nature of validity. One 2004 article in particular, coauthored by Borsboom, Mellenbergh, and Heerden (hereafter, “Borsboom et al.”), seems to have inspired considerable debate. Borsboom et al. have proposed that the proper focus of validity is not interpretation but instead tests themselves: “a test is valid for measuring an attribute if, and only if (a) the attribute exists and (b) variations in the attribute causally produce variations in the outcomes of the measurement procedure” (p. 1061). This refocusing and simplification of validity shifts the scope of relevant inquiry from questions of epistemology (focused on test score interpretation) to questions of ontology (whether, in actuality, a test really “measures what it is purported to measure”). In this vein, Borsboom et al. “suggest not only that epistemological issues are irrelevant to validity but that their importance may well be overrated in validation research as well” (p. 1067). Epistemology-oriented validation would, in this view, be largely obviated by theory-driven test construction – for Borsboom et al., validity is “something that one puts into an instrument” (p. 1067).

Where Borsboom et al. (2004) called into question the philosophical foundations of validity, Newton and Shaw have advanced the possibility of retiring the term “validity” itself. Grounded in constructivism and animated by a historical review of validity theory literature, their work avoids proclamations about whether “validity” is

an essentially epistemological or ontological concept – expansive or narrow in scope – in favor of a view of “validity” as historically plural and irreducibly social: “Ultimately, this is not a technical matter concerning the *proper* use of the term ‘validity’. It is simply a matter of how we, the educational and psychological measurement supra-community, decide to use it. It is a matter of convention” (2014, p. 178). Validity, in other words, has no focus or scope but that which is ascribed to it. And because “validity” – as a term – has eluded a fixed and monolithic conventional definition, the best course of action for the supra-community Newton and Shaw (*AIE*, 2016) describe might be to abandon “validity” as a term altogether. The reason for this, Newton and Shaw have suggested, is that use of the term “validity” might manufacture conflict and confusion where few substantive controversies exist, at least in terms of how test evaluation is commonly imagined and practiced: “*disagreement has focused primarily upon how best to apply the label* [‘validity’], *not upon how best to apprehend the underlying concepts*. If we were to retire the word ‘validity’ our substantive concepts would undoubtedly survive intact” (p. 190).

Shepard (*AIE*, 2016) has defended the concept of validity from the kinds of challenges leveled by Borsboom et al. and Newton and Shaw (among others), arguing for a focus that encompasses not just questions of score meaning and interpretation but also questions of use – while not going so far as to agree that actual interpretations and uses incorporating test scores with other data sources should be included in the concept, as Moss had argued. Shepard has suggested that the concept of validity advanced by Borsboom et al. makes sense only when an attribute is solely, deterministically responsible for measured outcomes. Herein, for Shepard, lies an important problem: “In the social sciences, except for tautologies, causes aren’t deterministic” (*AIE*, p. 270). Instead, even if we were to assume the existence of real attributes, observed outcomes in the social sciences are necessarily multiply-determined or complexly indeterminate, such that any individual attribute like “intelligence” is impossible to fully disentangle from confounding causal factors (e.g.,

practice or test item familiarity). However attractive it might be, a highly narrow realist definition of validity cannot address the complexity endemic to most measurement in the social sciences.

Moreover, there is potentially an even greater problem with a simplified validity concept that eschews questions of bias, interpretation, and use. For Shepard (*AIE*, 2016),

The vocabulary of social science is embedded in institutional and legal contexts and laden with associated connotations. . . . It would be an inappropriate bait-and-switch tactic to deploy a narrower definition in these contexts in which validity is the more complex and decision-directed idea developed in the broader institutional-legal context. (p. 271)

Shepard has also contended that “[t]he fact that the 1999 and 2014 [*Standards*] definitions are so similar . . . speaks to shared understandings over time by a large majority of testing experts” – a level of consensus that renders *Standards* documents “the professionally defensible definition [of “validity”] to be shared with non-experts” (p. 272).

Newton and Shaw might correctly identify that definitions of validity have varied over time and that there is not yet a definition of validity assented to by all practitioners and theorists. This observation does not, Shepard (*AIE*, 2016) has argued, pose a fatal challenge to the consensus definition of validity. Shepard has described this consensus definition as providing simultaneously an “agreed-upon working definition of a complex idea,” a “research agenda,” and “a clear and well-organised framework for orderly debate” (*AIE*, p. 272). It might be said, then, that the affordances of a meaningful validity theory are not merely technical, but are also discursive, providing theorists and practitioners a vocabulary for constructing and contesting social scientific knowledge and policy. As Shepard has put it,

Disagreements about the definition of validity . . . are not necessarily a problem in a scientific field, so long as we are clear about the nature of the disagreement and track how differences in our conceptions lead in turn to differences in methods and findings. (p. 278)

Shepard has also cautioned against a pseudoscientific identification of technical purity with science itself. Science is always already ethical and social: “To act as if value choices and ethical decisions are outside of science is to ignore the value-laden nature of the scientific process involved in every aspect of test development and validity evaluation” (p. 276). For this reason, it might be assumed that a *scientific* definition of validity would necessarily incorporate and allow for questions of social consensus, contestation, and for putatively “social” questions of use – questions inextricable from meaningful test design and equally relevant to meaningful test evaluation.

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Values

- [Confucian Values and Vietnamese School Leadership](#)
 - [Ethics and Significance: Insights from Welby for Meaningful Education](#)
 - [Frankena's Model for Analyzing Philosophies of Education](#)
 - [Ontology and Semiotics: Educating in Values](#)
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Values Education

- [Ethics and Values Education](#)
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Values in Science and in Science Classrooms

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Introduction

Understanding the role of values in science is central in History and Philosophy of Science-informed curricular proposals and in science education research. At the same time, the nature and significance of values in scientific knowledge and practices has increasingly become an object of debate in contemporary philosophy of science: Is science value-free? Is value-free science an ideal that should be aimed at? The presence of cognitive (or epistemic) values is usually agreed on, though there is controversy over their nature and relative importance. Non-cognitive (non-epistemic) values provide for a much more contentious ground. Stances on the role of values have a bearing on central issues in the philosophy of science, such as rationality, objectivity, and

putative demarcation of science and non-science. Values are also related to current debates on technology, risk assessment or Big Science (authority or trust, for instance), and to the interaction of science and the wider social, economical or political context.

From a pedagogical point of view, values issues are an integral part of other areas of the curriculum: different philosophical fields (ethics, epistemology, political philosophy), citizen education, the social sciences, the arts. Therefore, bringing values issues into the science classroom has a double relevance: both towards the science classroom itself and, in a wider sense, towards the goals of education at large.

Here an overview of some current philosophical stances on the subject will be presented. Then, some rationales for including teaching about values in science education will be discussed. And finally both science education and philosophy education will be drawn from in order to indicate some questions that should be taken into consideration in introducing a particular type of values (ethics related issues) in the secondary education classroom.

The role of values in science has usually been a key element in the list of issues that should be addressed in the science classroom from an History and Philosophy of Science point of view. At the same time, the role of values in scientific knowledge and inquiry has been and is a debated question in contemporary philosophy of science. Is science value-free? Is value-free science an ideal that should be aimed at? Traditionally, several philosophers have held that science is and should be neutral. This idea is still popular among many scientists. Among philosophers, on the other side, it has become a controversial point. The actual presence of values in scientific inquiry is seemingly a matter of fact, since preferences and choices are apparent when scientists select which problems are worth resolving, when they decide which subjects to investigate, when a strategy is chosen or adopted, when the consequences or applications of research are contemplated and evaluated. However, a distinction is usually traced

between epistemic (cognitive or internal) values and nonepistemic (noncognitive, external) ones such as moral, political, economic, social, religious, aesthetical, and gender-related values.

There is an almost undisputed acceptance of the presence and role of cognitive values (empirical adequacy, explanatory power, internal consistency, simplicity, etc.) in scientific inquiry. All other things being equal, a theory that realizes an epistemic value to a greater degree is usually deemed to be preferable to another that does not instantiate it or that instantiates it to a lesser degree. There is however some controversy over their nature and hierarchy.

Nonepistemic values provide for a much more contentious ground. Stances on their existence and (un)desirability have a bearing on current debates on technology, risk assessment, or scientists' responsibility and accountability. They also impinge on central issues in the philosophy of science, such as rationality, universality, and objectivity. Objectivity has typically been considered as an identifying trait of scientific knowledge. The presence of noncognitive values is thought to undermine that trait, especially in the context of justification. Consequently, the value-free ideal aims at banishing noncognitive values from sound scientific research. Yet, they may be admitted in the context of discovery. Scientists may choose the problems they are interested in out of moral or political concerns for human flourishing or they may be interested in resolving a question out of aesthetical reasons, for instance augmenting the symmetry, balance, or elegance of a theory. Research programs depend on funding by institutions such as the State, the military, or the industry, which encourage or discourage specific lines of research.

In addition, scientific inquiry is not an individual enterprise but a social practice. Scientific communities embody or aim to embody certain norms and values in their practices, a specific *ethos*, sometimes described by the so-called Mertonian values: communalism, universalism, disinterestedness, and organized skepticism. Modesty or humility in the sense of recognizing indebtedness to the work of predecessors and colleagues and acknowledging the limitations of

self and of scientific knowledge in general are also praised. On the other hand, responsibility and concern over the application of scientific knowledge has preoccupied scientists and philosophers, especially since World War II: Is the research permissible if one can foresee that results of that research will aid on wrongful ends, on the damaging or exploitation of human beings, animals, or the environment? Ethical and political concerns appear with regard to methodology. Should scientists be free to pursue whatever issue they choose in whatever way they consider reliable? Is experimentation on human subjects acceptable? Is every potential subject equally vulnerable? Is invasive experimentation on animals acceptable? On what grounds? Should scientists be concerned and responsible for the environment? What would be the limits and restrictions in each of these cases?

Therefore, noncognitive values seem inevitable and even desirable in the contexts of discovery and application. But for most scientists and for many philosophers, they are supposed to be left out of any decision-making process scientists engage in when *accepting* a theory, that is, when considering it has been sufficiently tested that it does not immediately require further investigation (Lacey 1999). However, even against this ideal of value-free science, philosophers have posed different arguments: arguments from denying the distinction between fact and value, arguments from underdetermination of theory, and arguments from the social processes of science (Dupré et al. 2007).

A long standing philosophical tradition has emphasized that the distinction between judgments of fact ("is") and judgments of value ("ought") can be categorically established: no judgment of value can be logically derived from a judgment of fact. Moreover, judgments of fact are objective, while judgments of value are subjective. As such, they are neither factual nor analytical, and lack truth-value. Hence, judgments of value should not have any place in accepting a theory. This value/fact distinction has been challenged both from empirical examples and from theoretical stances, for instance by pragmatist philosophers and especially by Putnam (Gómez

2014). The second group of arguments draw from the Quine-Duhem thesis and from Kuhn's work. Since no observational prediction can be derived from a theory without auxiliary assumptions, then falsifying that prediction means that either the theory or the auxiliary assumption(s) are false. In this sense, there is no conclusive refutation, and theory is underdetermined by data. Theory choice is therefore relative to other values and assumptions that are adhered to by the scientist or the scientific community. Finally, the way in which scientists interact among themselves and with society at large and the way in which personal or social interests, values, and commitments shape these interactions has also been taken into consideration in arguing against the value-free ideal.

For instance, Hugh Lacey considers that scientific inquiry can be led within different worldviews and value outlooks, as long as it is objective and inclusive (Lacey 1999). Objectivity implies empirically grounded and confirmed knowledge. Science is inclusive as long as it can, in principle, satisfy multiple and different interests related to diverse worldviews. Lacey distinguishes three notions that form the core of scientific inquiry: neutrality, impartiality, and autonomy. Science is neutral insofar as it does not favor a particular value outlook and can be significant for every viable one. It is impartial as far as the criteria for theory acceptance do not embrace any noncognitive values. Science is autonomous as long as choice of problems, evaluation of theories, content of scientific education, and requirements for admittance into the scientific community are the prerogative of the community itself, with no external interference from the State, the Church, the Party, etc. Impartiality is the central notion with regard to epistemology: theories should be accepted if and only if, subjected to rigorous standards of evaluation, they display cognitive values to the highest degree, in agreement with relevant empirical data and other accepted theories.

Nevertheless, different worldviews imply different strategies. Modern science has been conducted mostly under a materialistic worldview that privileges quantitative categories and exclude links with values and with the wider environment

of human practices and experience. However, there are other possible ways of conducting science in accord with the requirement of impartiality. In addition, neutrality is better served by a plurality of strategies, connected to different worldviews and their related value outlooks. There is an important constraint: if a worldview requires abandoning impartiality (such as religious worldviews may do), then they are incompatible with well-conducted science.

Another perspective that does not deny empiricism but argues for a positive role of non-cognitive (or contextual) values is that of Helen Longino, who proposes a "modest" empiricism (Longino 1990). Evidence is relevant to confirm or disconfirm a theory only with regard to background assumptions. These express either "constitutive values" or cognitive virtues, on the one hand, and "contextual values" that convey social or practical interests on the other hand. Contextual values "guide interpretations and suggest models within which the data can be ordered and organized" (Longino 1990, p. 219). However, when contextual assumptions change, which data is considered significant also changes. There is a close interaction between background assumptions, general theoretical perspectives, and experience, but Longino does not embrace relativism. Contextual values do not exclude objectivity. Scientific inquiry is not an individualistic endeavor but the pursuit of a community. Therefore, subjective preferences can be minimized as long as they are subject to public questioning: The more heterogeneous the community, the more dissimilar the assumptions will be, and the more severe the criticism to which they will be exposed.

Values Teaching in the Science Classroom

Teaching about the role of values in science inquiry may seem debatable or even irrelevant to those who think science teaching should aim at the transmission of facts and the scientific method, or to those who think of science as value-free. Even cognitive values may not be easily recognized or acknowledged by science teachers. If

they do, deciding how much time and effort to invest in these issues may still be a hard choice. The amount of time required for addressing controversial issues with an acceptable degree of depth may be perceived as excessive, detracting from “real” scientific content, and yet not crucial to Nature of Science. The Teachers may feel overwhelmed by the need to address incomplete or insufficient information, uncertainty and risk. The same can be said about the variety and complexity of ethical and political philosophical standpoints, psychological perspectives, and sociological theories (Reiss 2010). An alleged lack of expertise, resources, and strategies regarding the teaching of open-ended issues adds to a feeling of discomfort. Finally, some topics may seem “too” controversial when they challenge religious faith or deeply held moral or political stances. So why bring value issues into the science classroom?

Arguments for integrating an understanding about the nature of science along with relevant science content have been about for a long time, and they have achieved a significant degree of agreement among science educators and curriculum designers (Matthews 2015). The initial training of the next generation of scientists is not the only goal for science teaching. Equally (or more) important are other general aims. One of them is helping in the growth of aesthetic sensibility and creativity, opening possibilities to appreciate and delight in different forms and expressions of beauty and art. Another, and no less important, goal is to educate every student for active, autonomous, and critical engagement as citizens, including concrete, responsible involvement in decision-making and action regarding ethically and politically laden scientific and technological issues.

Such issues have a relevant space in collective civic and political debates, and the media frequently reflect them. Topics may range from global dimensions (e.g., nuclear plant safety, global warming, stem-cell research, and nanotechnology) to regional or national dimensions (DNA evidence in determining the filiation of dictatorship victims’ offspring or identifying

human remains, local impact of GMO crops, wind turbines in the flyway of bird migration) to personal decisions (Shall I vaccinate my children against H1N1 influenza or MMR? Should I consume GMO vegetables? To what extent will the use of my cell phone affect my health or my social life?).

Deliberation and action around these foregoing issues presuppose accurate scientific information, well-considered ethical and political standpoints, and sound reasoning. In a sense, every teacher and every school is, in fact, a moral and political educator whether spontaneously or deliberately, explicitly or tacitly. Science teachers may help students acquire and develop conceptual and procedural knowledge required to select well-substantiated evidence over inaccurate opinion. Conversely, new interest on scientific content may derive from an involvement in science-related debates and dilemmas. Students can develop a more authentic representation of scientific inquiry and of the scope and limits of scientific knowledge. Crude images of science and scientists as pure, selfless, beneficial, and undisputable or as mere providers of ideology or power wielders that exclude the interests of great portions of humanity can be replaced by more nuanced, better-examined conceptions.

Different goals can be achieved by teaching ethics in the science classroom. Reiss states four of them: heightening students’ ethical sensitivity, increasing students’ ethical knowledge, improving students’ ethical judgment, and helping make students into better people (Reiss 2010). Should science teachers aim at explaining students about values in science inquiry, or should they aim at students *becoming* honest, sceptical, truthful, whether in science classes or more generally in school and outside it? Should teachers instill a particular moral and political outlook? Should they aim instead at students’ developing skills and attitudes required for making autonomous and critical evaluations and choices regarding values, moral codes, or ethical dilemmas? Taking a stance on these issues will inform choice of strategies and activities. On one side, classes can consist in the presentation, analysis, and

comprehension of different ethical or political perspectives. Asking students to make informed decisions about controversial issues would suppose a deeper involvement. Inviting them to develop the necessary skills and attitudes related to making autonomous choices among a plurality of moral systems and ethical theories would require another kind of teaching and learning activities. Aiming at long-lasting impact on actual principles and behaviors would require understanding of theories and training in sound reasoning, but at the same time would exceed those requirements.

Different aims call for different strategies and activities. Moral inculcation attempts to socialize, imparting a certain notion of the good life, and a specific value outlook. Emphasis is on what students are supposed to believe and do (according to some particular tradition), through explicit lessons or implicitly through habit formation and emulation of role models. However, education in modern multicultural democracies does not seem to be compatible with these methodologies. Values clarification approaches take a step in the direction of values being discussed rather than imposed. They seek to help students articulate their own preferences and inclinations, instead of simply assenting to received or prevailing traditions. However, no criterion would be considered in order to differentiate or judge between claims. To avoid naïve dogmatic or equally naïve relativistic stances, or mere common sense exchanges, a working understanding of some ethical frameworks developed throughout the history of philosophy would be a fundamental help (Haynes 1999).

Cognitive-development approaches aim at students making autonomous and critical judgments regarding a plurality of ethical or political views. Sound moral reasoning becomes a central concern, and philosophers such as Habermas or Rawls are drawn from for a philosophical background. Piaget's or Kohlberg's work can also provide psychological and developmental support. Teaching strategies may involve whole class or small-group work in the analysis of moral dilemmas, and critical debate and reflection on

values, norms, rules, rights, and duties from diverse ethical or political outlooks. The risk to avoid in this case would be presenting the class with a variety of ethical stances and no criteria to choose among them, which may lead to an unsophisticated, relativistic picture, wherein anything may be acceptable so long as one can find the right ethical theory to support that particular position.

Finally, moral emotions and sentiments can also be included, drawing from care ethics and care ethics education (whether virtue-caring or relational-caring), emphasizing moral sensitivity, particularly the ability and disposition to attentive listening, solidarity, and commitment. Aristotelian ethics can also be a fruitful stance from which to design teaching and learning about virtues, and especially prudence, the practical wisdom that helps choosing and deciding among different moral alternatives. Group dynamics, such as role-playing, may help in fostering empathy and understanding of others' values, interests, and needs. Works of art, especially in literature and cinema, can offer helpful resources. The work of Levinas can also be usefully explored, to suggest a different emphasis on responsibility and ethics as first philosophy founded in the face-to-face encounter with the Other.

Not all these educational frameworks, ethics theories, and theories on moral reasoning would be supposed to be the object of a science curriculum. Science teachers would not have the time or the required expertise. In-depth discussion of ethical theories or training in moral reasoning would turn the science classroom into a philosophy course. At-length consideration of these issues would probably find a more congenial environment in history, civics, or philosophy classrooms. However, socioscientific, ethical, and political questions arise in science classrooms, whether spontaneously or as part of the curriculum. Natural science teachers and their social sciences or humanities colleagues should have enough familiarity with one another's frameworks to be able to lead value-laden discussions and sound moral and political reasoning about science-related issues in their classrooms (Couló 2014). Moreover, this mutual acquaintance can facilitate cross-

curricular collaboration between subjects or departments in joint school projects on points of interest, such as ecological problems, public health topics, human rights questions, or social justice issues.

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Verification

- [Moderation and Assessment](#)

Verification of Educational Theory

- [Overview of Metatheory of Educational Knowledge](#)

Verificationism

- [On “the Temptation to Attack Common Sense”](#)

Videogaming and Literacies

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Synonyms

[Digital gaming](#); [Situated learning](#)

Introduction

Historically, videogames have been effective teaching and learning tools. In the 1950s, early forms of simulation videogames as military training tools included “the ‘dynamic air war game’...used to train officers in the solution of strategy problems” (Problems of War, 1951). Videogame simulations also were useful training mechanisms for businesses and business schools, and these games were integrated into the academic and industry realms between the late 1950s and early 1960s. Entities, such as the *American Management Association* and the *Harvard Business Review*, published papers that focused on the role of simulation games in honing decision-making skills and applying learned information to face-to-face scenarios. Predating current high-definition versions of videogames and layered discussions of multimodalities and multiliteracies, these examples suggest that videogames have been honored for some of their teaching and learning capacities for over 65 years (for more, see Abrams 2015a).

The interactivity supported by videogames makes the particular medium different from others. Patricia Greenfield (1984), one of the first scholars to write about videogames and learning, noted that videogames are different from television because of the confluence of dynamic visuals and participatory roles. In other words, interaction sets videogames apart from other forms of media.

Further, digital games have been heralded as effective learning tools because they include immediate feedback and support iterative

learning. Videogames also include multimodal affordances that enable players to read, write, and communicate meaning in embodied and dynamic ways (Bailey et al. 2017; Steinkuehler et al. 2005). Experimentation, or learning through trial and error, enables the videogamer to benefit from making mistakes, and, depending on the game, there are different opportunities to respawn or restart and try again. Additionally, digital games enable players to achieve what they may otherwise be unable to do beyond the virtual space. For some, this may be completing a half-pipe in virtual snowboarding; for others, it may be flying across the sky and floating in the air in *Minecraft*. Gamers may have to suspend their disbelief to play a videogame, but there is creativity in doing so. Not only do many videogames feature forms of customization, from avatar design to world construction, but also players have a degree of autonomy within the game space, making decisions that make sense to them (and that typically lead to in-game success). Such meaning making hinges on player recognition and understanding of various multimodal sign systems, and this encyclopedia entry will address how such literacies are inherent in the gaming experience. Though focusing on game creation and the literacies related to coding extends beyond the scope of this entry, it is necessary to acknowledge how coding and the manipulation of software tools to create videogames involve discrete and evolving understandings and practices, and there are literacies necessary for critically participating in and negotiating the terrain of game design.

Definitions

In this entry, the term, literacies (in its plural form), may include print text, but it also encompasses expansive forms of meaning making with a variety of modes and within a variety of settings. Please see other contributions to this encyclopedia for more information about this definition. The socio-culturally imbued meaning of the word, literacies, inherently calls attention to interactions with multimodal texts, issues of identity, and the fluid nature

of literacy practices and spaces. Further, the examination of literacies includes on-screen and off-screen participatory meaning making, which are part of the collective learning experience and, thus, cannot be divorced from one another.

The term, videogame, will refer to any digital game played on a commercial console, including, but not limited to, the Microsoft Xbox, the Sony PlayStation, and the Nintendo Wii. Additionally, games played on a computer, tablet, phone, or other mobile devices are included in this definition. Currently, videogames can be streamed or downloaded and accessed via a website, an app, or a disc. The range in content and genre – from digital puzzles to world-building games to massively multiplayer online role-playing games – provides a vast array of choices for players, and all genres are part of this all-encompassing definition of videogaming.

Videogames and Identity

The discussion of identity is central to that of gaming literacies, especially given the socioculturally situated nature of meaning making (for more on literacies and identities, please see Donna Alvermann's entry in this encyclopedia). In other words, learners' interactions with multimodal texts are all part of their literacy experiences. Gee (2003/2007) explained that a videogamer has a real offscreen identity, a virtual representation on the screen (e.g., the virtual identity), and a projective identity that exists when the player feels responsible for the on-screen character. When players use the first-person perspective to refer to the character on the screen through exclamations, such as "Look at how high I just jumped!" they are showing evidence of a projective identity. Narratives within the game also help to create a personal connection to the game character (Squire 2012). Game-based identities also exist beyond the screen through the associative identity, which represents the extension of the online character and action into the offline world (Abrams 2011). When players enact specific movements (jumping when their character is jumping) or gestures (swinging a microphone to

enact the role of a rock star) or when they verbalize noises and linguistic characteristics (growling like a *Minecraft* zombie), their offline identity is shaped – even temporarily – by their game play.

These examples reveal how gaming literacies are intricate, interconnected, and fluid, and they help to underscore the important online-offline connection, supporting calls against separating the online from the offline; such arguments suggest that the boundaries are porous or even ruptured, as meaning making transcends both realms simultaneously (Burnett 2011; Burnett & Merchant 2014). Further, it is important to note the growing need for alternate ways to address learning without creating or perpetuating boundaries. Such a paradigm shift could occur if there is a focus on practices and an understanding that experiences online inform the experiences offline (and vice versa).

Despite the growing concern about the use of boundary-forming language to discuss meaning making that spans digital and non-digital spaces, in this entry the online and offline are addressed as such in order to account for previous scholarship and for materials encountered and engagement within specific spaces. Further, given that research continues to examine the affordances and constraints of technology and emerging spaces, there continues to be a need to acknowledge often-evolving site-specific parameters. Nonetheless, in what follows, the terms, online and offline, may be used to distinguish where learners encounter information, but the focus on literacy practices helps to underscore how learning transcends these spaces.

Key Concepts for Understanding Gaming Literacies

In 2007, Katie Salen published the article *Gaming Literacies: A Game Design Study in Action*, in which she specifically drew a connection between one's gaming attitude and play in relation to digital game designs and rules. Salen, who has been known for her work on game design, focused both on how games work and on how learning occurred in relation to the game-as-rule-based-system.

According to Salen, gaming literacies included how players worked within and through the game. Further, she noted that player creativity, which could be linked to playfulness, also signaled the ways that players could make the game their own by modifying, disregarding, and/or reinventing rules. Gaming literacies, therefore, were evident in these creative realms.

Salen's article on gaming literacies provides a framework to address the components of gaming and the literacies that are part of such meaning making across modalities and spaces. Namely, Salen called attention to four overall components, suggesting that gaming literacies included (1) understanding how a game works; (2) using related online and offline resources, such as game forums, walk-throughs, and gamer mentorship; (3) understanding how to socially navigate within the game space; and (4) engaging in player collaboration and knowledge distribution. Here again, the dynamic nature of videogaming is underscored, and the four components can be used to address how gaming literacies are intricately part of digital game play. These four categories are interrelated though they are addressed separately.

Understanding How the Game Works

In general, understanding how a digital or non-digital game works includes the mechanics of – or methods for – game play. For instance, all games hinge on governing rules. Even a non-digital game, such as tic-tac-toe, has rules. Traditionally, it is a two-player game. It requires each player to know that there is a symbol (in this case “x” and “o”) that, respectively, represents him/her. The game is based on turn taking, and the objective of the game is to get three in a row horizontally, vertically, or diagonally. No player may change, erase, or dismiss the other player's moves. Knowledge of the rules not only enables players to engage in game play but also provides them the ability to extend or defy the rules to create their own game play. For more information about game design and the role of rules, please see Salen and Zimmerman's *Rules of Play*.

Designing and/or following (and possibly purposefully breaking) the rules relies on the knowledge of, what Gee (2003/2007) called, the semiotic domain or “any set of practices that recruits one or more modalities (e.g., oral or written language, images, equations, symbols, sounds, gestures, graphs, artifacts, etc.) to communicate distinctive types of meanings” (2007, p. 19). In the example of tic-tac-toe above, the semiotic domain may include written symbols (the lines of the tic-tac-toe board, the “x” and the “o,” and the final line to signify a win) and gestures or spoken language noting turn taking, excitement, or frustration. Previous games on the page may serve as artifacts of successes, failures, or stalemates. Likewise, with a digital game, like *Candy Crush*, the semiotic domain includes many of those previously mentioned, as well as numbers, shapes, sounds, moving images, and finger movements. The discussion of gaming literacies, therefore, involves understanding how multimodal systems are part of the meaning-making process.

Additionally, by addressing videogaming as a semiotic domain, Gee created an opportunity to focus on gaming in relation to literacies and learning. More specifically, Gee (2003/2007) outlined 36 learning principles that are part of, what he distinguished as, good videogames. The majority of the principles involve self-reflection and meta-cognitive awareness of progress as they attend to:

- Information and sign systems the learner encounters in the game (e.g., Explicit Information On-Demand and Just-in-Time Principle, Text Principle, Design Principle)
- Identities and learning (e.g., Committed Learning Principle, Self-Knowledge Principle, Identity Principle)
- Customized/gamer-driven and adaptive/scaffolded features of games (e.g., Active, Critical Learning Principle, Transfer Principle, Insider Principle, Incremental Principle, Discovery Principle)
- Sociocultural influences on learning (e.g., Cultural Models About the World Principle, Cultural Models About Learning Principle)

Though not inclusive of all the principles, the above list underscores the interrelationship between game content and player action and can call attention to the resources that inform game play.

Examining Practices and Resources

Gaming is not simply about the program on the screen. Rather, there are online and offline resources that provide players information about the game, as well as suggestions for new moves or strategies. These spaces include, but are not limited to, forums, wikis, and walk-throughs that support gamer-to-gamer interaction and mentorship, which also influence game play and overall meaning making.

On the screen, players encounter and interpret a host of multimodal symbols – from alphabetic text to symbolic representations that are part of the text – and they navigate this information gleaned within and beyond the game to make decisions. Further, gamer practices can be connected to other online sources, such as the aforementioned sites, as well as blogs, discussion boards, fan fiction, and in-game texting (Steinkuehler 2007). In other words, there are semiotic domains related to gaming that exist beyond the game, itself, and the diverse meaning-making activities ultimately cohere in nuanced ways to inform learning and game play. Thus, game playing naturally involves a constellation of literacies (Steinkuehler 2007) that gamers negotiate as they engage socially and game successfully.

In addition to the constellation of literacies that players encounter on the screen, players also manage a constellation of information (Martin et al. 2013) as they draw upon online and offline game-based resources. Players may view diverse texts across multiple screens – from desktop to laptop to phone – and the constellation of information accounts for the various visual, audio, and physical stimuli within and beyond the game realm that influence game play. With a melange of texts and information, players layer their literacies (Abrams 2015b) as they make meaning in nuanced ways across various contexts.

The development of game knowledge also hinges on gamer exchanges that address strategy

and problem solving and involve fan-based extensions of game play. Fandom-related activities include, but are not limited to, fan fiction, fan art, and Machinima; respectively, these story-based creations elaborate on game knowledge and emerge through print text, image, and video. As such, these paratexts (Apperley and Walsh 2012) showcase players' re-creations, extensions, or modifications of a game's story line or characterizations. Fan-based work often is supported by other fans, who will tag, comment, or build upon the artifact.

Socially Navigating Within the Game Space

Though some may play digital games independently or against a computerized opponent, most videogaming situations are highly social. Gaming literacies, therefore, also include a player's ability to interact with others in the game space. Multi-player games that feature guilds (as seen in *World of Warcraft*) or teams (as seen in *Call of Duty*) require the coordination of players' actions. Be it through in-game texts or online voice chat, player socialization typically revolves around the ability to understand and participate in valued practices, such as strategizing, debriefing, or even talking about non-game social content. Such behavior harkens back to Gee's (1996/2012) theory of big D Discourses or being-doing-valuing combinations. Discourses involve speaking, reading, writing, gesturing, and other ways of being that not only are part of one's identity but also enable one to engage in the literacies of a specific space. In order for one to socially navigate and belong to a game environment (Abrams and Lammers [in press](#)), one must understand and inhabit the Discourses of that realm and, thus, communicate effectively within the game space.

Engagement in Player Collaboration and Knowledge Distribution

It cannot be assumed that all games are alike and that players can easily apply knowledge of one game to another. Because the semiotic domain

may be game specific, there are nuances that situate learning and collaboration with regards to one's knowledge of characters, symbols, icons, language or descriptors, and even the controller (Abrams and Lammers [in press](#)). Pressing the "x" button on the controller may move the on-screen character differently across games. Though gamers can learn through trial-and-error experimentation, gamers also learn through the distribution of knowledge; often players will verbalize suggestions and moves (e.g., "jump now") that will enable the other player to win. At times, players will serve as mentors to others, explaining the rules of the game and playing practice rounds to help a neophyte become familiar with a game. Additionally, collaboration occurs when players share strategies, offer feedback, and alert each other to when an opponent draws near. This type of interaction is seminal to players' development of their gaming literacies.

Games as Pedagogical Tools

Contemporary pedagogy has included digital gaming in an effort to enhance educational practice. Though some videogaming research has addressed violence and addiction, studies also have heralded games as motivational tools that encourage problem solving, that support the development of cognitive and spatial skills, and that promote agentive, relevant learning experiences. Elements of gaming even have been seen as parallel to those of the reading process, as both require predicting, checking, and revising (Beavis 1998). Videogaming also has been found to provide a meaningful context for academic material, enabling students to understand content area information within the game setting. In this way, gaming literacies can support the development of content area literacies, as research has revealed students learning historical, mathematical, lexical, and scientific information through videogame play. Finally, games have become platforms for student-driven instruction that emphasizes creativity, critical thinking, and (re)invention in the classroom. Though traditional practices of a factory model education may continue to exist within

many classrooms, there is a movement to veer away from teacher-dominated drill-and-skill instruction and shift toward student-generated content that applies academic concepts in imaginative, individualized, and innovative ways.

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Vietnam

► [Confucian Values and Vietnamese School Leadership](#)

Viewing Early Years' Curriculum Through Poststructuralist Lenses

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Introduction

Framing early years' curriculum documents and their implementation within poststructuralist theoretical perspectives reconceptualizes curriculum enactments. Early years' curricula command increasing attention from societies, education professionals, and government policy makers and regulators in many countries including those in Europe and North America and in Australia and Aotearoa New Zealand. This interest is often framed in terms of economic benefits, where children's early education is linked with better futures for themselves and their societies. Neoliberal ideologies lead policy makers to consider early education spending in terms of value for money. This entry discusses diverse understandings of curriculum and associated theoretical frameworks and

how curriculum frameworks and enactments interplay in early childhood settings. Poststructural perspectives are engaged, including Foucault's theories of discourse and circulating power relations and Deleuze's and Guattari's theories of rhizomatic assemblages of movement and becoming, mapping flows of desire and affect.

Many early years' curriculum documents are underpinned by developmental psychology and/or sociocultural theories of early learning. They are often influenced by policy makers' neoliberal concerns with measurable outcomes, standards, and accountability. Developmental, sociocultural, and neoliberal perspectives depend on centering of knowing human subjects acting with intention on others. In contrast, poststructural perspectives decenter the human individual; they resist binaries, hierarchies, and categories of being and becoming that serve to "other" and marginalize some while privileging others. They question taken-for-granted structures and processes and reconceptualize concepts like belonging, relationships, and connections. Power, desire, and affect flow among relationships or assemblages, rather than being owned and exerted by human individuals. Poststructural perspectives challenge hierarchies of thinking that position teachers as knowing and responsible for the learning of not-yet-knowing children or that position children's well-being as of prime concern and teachers' well-being as secondary. Children, teachers, and families and their curricular enactments are reframed within dynamic interconnections where power, desire, and affect flow.

Poststructuralism

Poststructuralist theories emerged into consideration by educational thinkers and researchers relatively recently, and their incorporation into curriculum frameworks, enactments, and research has been correspondingly recent. Important theorists of poststructural thought, including Foucault, Deleuze and Guattari, Lyotard, and Derrida, published and taught in the 1970s and 1980s.

Peters and Burbules (2004) describe poststructuralism as a philosophical response to structuralism. French structuralism of the late 1950s and 1960s challenges the humanist concept of a central human actor and thinker and instead proposes metanarratives, structures, and processes that provide overarching explanations in fields such as language, psychology, and education. Poststructuralist theories support structuralist challenges to humanism and share beliefs in social and historical influences shaping thoughts and actions. They question universal "truth" claims of overarching metanarratives and their associated hierarchies and categories, and instead they focus on dynamic and multiple knowledges. Peters and Burbules (2004) suggest that poststructuralism "is best referred to as a *movement of thought* - a *complex* skein of thought embodying different forms of critical practice" (p. 18). Poststructural critical approaches include deconstruction that seeks to disturb the taken-for-granted in texts (following Derrida), genealogy that investigates dynamic practices of power relations within discourses (following Foucault), and cartographic approaches that map flows of affect and desire (following Deleuze and Guattari).

Theoretical Perspectives in Early Years' Curricula

Curriculum frameworks outline aspirational visions, beliefs, and values that express particular theoretical perspectives on early learning and pedagogy. Diverse theoretical frameworks shape answers to curricular questions of what to teach and how to teach it and, conversely, what children need to learn and how they learn. Developmentally Appropriate Practices (DAP), a popular approach to early years' curriculum in the United States, is underpinned by developmental psychology. The Nordic curriculum tradition of Scandinavia is based in social pedagogy and highlights learning in interactions among adults and children. The Reggio Emilia approach originating in North Italy draws on multiple theoretical

perspectives including critical and poststructural theories and is based on images of powerful and competent children determining and constructing their own learning. *Te Whāriki*, the curriculum framework of Aotearoa New Zealand, and *Aistear*, from Ireland, are informed by sociocultural and developmental perspectives. The Australian curriculum framework *Being, Belonging and Becoming: The Early Years Learning Framework for Australia* draws largely on sociocultural perspectives (while acknowledging multiple theoretical perspectives including poststructural), describing curriculum and learning as co-constructed within respectful and caring relationships among adults and children.

Curricula are often underpinned by multiple theoretical perspectives, influenced by contexts at their initial development and subsequent implementation. Incorporation of poststructural perspectives into some early years' curricula has happened gradually and recently, as early years' theorists, researchers, and practitioners have become aware of these ways of thinking and possibilities they offer. Curriculum frameworks describe the "what," "how," and "why" of early childhood teaching and learning in terms of particular values, beliefs, and theories of teaching and learning. Curriculum enactments involve early years' services with diverse philosophies; educators, family members, and children with their own philosophical, cultural, and theoretical perspectives; and communities and environments. Over time, interpretations of curriculum frameworks can change through their implementation and enactments, alongside research, dialogue, and thinking. Drawing on poststructural theories of Deleuze and Guattari, White and Mika (2013) describe *Te Whāriki* as assembled with literature, philosophies (with attention to Māori philosophies), and teaching and learning practices. They argue for continual theorization of *Te Whāriki* as a living document in dialogue:

Te Whāriki invokes multiple dialogues: between text and infant, between text and teacher, between text and theories, and between text and cultures. These dialogues collectively call for a lived

response to curriculum that exceeds the text, or practice, alone. In this sense, curriculum is represented through the young child in dialogue with others. (White and Mika 2013, p. 105)

The curriculum approach of Reggio Emilia in northern Italy had its origins in the contexts and concerns of postwar Italy. Founder Loris Malaguzzi recounts how his involvement in small parent-run schools led to the curriculum approach now known as Reggio Emilia implemented in early years' services from the early 1960s (Gandini 2012). He explains an underpinning vision of openness to diverse perspectives, including those of Piaget, sociocultural, critical, and poststructural thinking: "We had to preserve our decision to learn from children, from events, and from families, to our full extent of our professional limits, and to maintain a readiness to change points of view, so as never to have too many certainties" (p. 31).

The early childhood curriculum of Aotearoa New Zealand *Te Whāriki*, formulated in the early 1990s, is underpinned by sociocultural perspectives within a bicultural context (consisting of indigenous Māori and Pākehā/New Zealand European cultures), alongside developmental influences. Collaboration among authors Carr and May and Māori co-writers Tamati and Tilly Reedy and community consultation processes opened up diverse theoretical perspectives. *Te Whāriki* describes principles and strands encapsulating values and goals while recognizing diverse enactments in early years' settings that reflect their philosophical and cultural contexts.

The more recent (2009) Australian curriculum framework *Being, Belonging and Becoming: The Early Years Learning Framework for Australia* describes educators drawing on a range of theoretical perspectives to enact curriculum including developmental, sociocultural, socio-behaviorist, critical, and poststructural theories. A resource for educators suggests diverse possibilities for engaging with the curriculum framework to enact curriculum: "It is not a book that will offer you the answer for 'how to do' the EYLF [Early Years Learning Framework], but rather it

illuminates the different processes of how people are engaging with the EYLF and why" (Giugni 2010, p. 7).

Reconceptualizing Early Years' Curriculum

The reconceptualist movement in education attends to power relations that produce marginalization and privilege, inclusion, and exclusion. Reconceptualist methodologies include "post-structural, feminist, critical, newmaterial, post-human and postcolonial approaches" (www.erm.hio.no/) and provide rich resources for exploring early years' curricula. In Canada, curriculum document writers have used reconceptualist perspectives "as counter narratives to dominant ECE discourses such as developmentalism, economic investment, and the universal child" (Iannacci and Whitty 2009, p. 10), which exert powerful influence on curriculum enactments in North America. In the early years' curriculum framework of British Columbia, and in guidance for curriculum implementation, educators are encouraged to critically reflect on "where our ideas about how the world works have come from, who has generated them and whom they benefit" and to "understand the world from the perspective of groups who are consistently marginalized and silenced in it" (Ministry of Education British Columbia, n.d., p. 11).

Poststructural perspectives provide useful tools for reconceptualizing early years' curriculum enactments because, in decentering the human individual, the focus moves from individual teachers and children to the ways they (and other aspects of the early childhood setting) affect each other. Humans are understood not as self-contained identities who know and act autonomously, but as subjectivities shaped within relationships, interconnectedness, and flows of affect, desire, and power. Ethical engagement in curriculum within poststructural perspectives involves attending to micropolitical flows of affect, desire, and power, how these act to privilege or marginalize, and possibilities for becoming otherwise.

Curriculum Enactments Through Poststructuralist Lenses

Viewing curriculum enactments through post-structuralist lenses opens up possibilities for "complexifying practice . . . an incomplete, ongoing, messy process filled with struggles, tensions, challenges, frustrations, unknowns, discomfort, and divergence in positions" (Pacini-Ketchabaw et al. 2015, p. xiii), rather than simplifying understandings and agreeing on "best practice." These approaches do unsettling work, as they challenge complacency by asking teachers to trouble their taken-for-granted assumptions and to provoke questioning of "normal" practice. This entry considers two such theoretical approaches: Foucault's theories of discourse and discursive practices within relations of power and Deleuze's and Guattari's theories of rhizomatic assemblages of movement and becoming, mapping flows of desire and affect.

Foucault

Foucault rejected being labeled structuralist or poststructuralist; however, his theories of power entwined with the knowledge regarded as truth provide valuable tools for poststructural critique: "'Truth' is linked in a circular relation with systems of power which produce and sustain it, and to effects of power which it induces and which extend it" (Foucault 1980a, p. 133). According to Foucault's theories of discourse, ways of being and becoming are shaped within discursive values, beliefs, and assumptions that determine what is regarded as knowledge and truth. Discursive practices of discipline and governmentality and desire for pleasure and power shape subjectivities within networks of power relations: "continuous and uninterrupted processes which subject our bodies, govern our gestures, dictate our behaviours" (Foucault 1980b, p. 97).

Dominant discourses constrain possible ways to be, based on values and beliefs that are taken for granted. In colonized societies such as Canada, Australia, and Aotearoa New Zealand, discourses of colonization continue to privilege colonist perspectives and marginalize or invisibilize indigenous ways of being. Ashton (2015) draws on

Foucault's theories to reflect on critique by an indigenous scholar of a draft New Brunswick (Canada) early years' curriculum framework. She considers how discourses of colonialism continue to be enacted within curriculum statements of diversity and inclusiveness, observing that "Curricula do not occupy spaces outside of politics but are constructed within dominant regimes of governmentality" (p. 85). In the same edited publication, Tesar (2015) draws on Foucault's theories to critique *Te Whāriki* as witnessing and resisting neoliberal and neocolonial discourses in Aotearoa New Zealand. He describes *Te Whāriki* as an assemblage of discourses, including "a bicultural discourse, an educational discourse, a discourse of care, a neo-liberal/neo-colonial discourse, a sociocultural and a developmental discourse" (p. 110). Tesar notes tensions in *Te Whāriki* as an official instrument of neoliberal and neocolonial government policies while resisting neoliberalism and neocolonialism by asserting and advocating indigenous Māori knowledges and worldviews. Foucault's theories of discourse and circulating power provide tools to reconceptualize early years' curriculum and enactments through questioning and complexifying.

Deleuze and Guattari

Deleuze and Guattari focus on movement and change, rather than static ways of being: "lines of articulation or segmentarity, strata and territories; but also lines of flight, movements of deterritorialisation and destratification" (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, p. 4). Complex and multiple ways of becoming are produced within flows of affect and desire. The Reggio Emilia curriculum approach is characterized by Davies (2014) as the capacity and willingness to be open to affecting and being affected by the other, through "emergent" listening to multiple modes of communication ("languages") and openness to difference. She links this way of enacting curriculum to theories of Deleuze and Guattari as she describes "listening as usual" to a subject with a recognizable identity entangled with emergent listening to a 'subject' (under erasure) that is dynamic and relational.

Concepts such as rhizomes, machines, and assemblages emphasize interconnectedness of matter, signs, and language. Rhizomatic thinking provides a poststructuralist challenge to the hierarchies and categories of structuralist meta-narratives, which Deleuze and Guattari characterize as "tree logic": "its object is an unconscious that is itself representative, crystallised into codified complexes, laid out along a genetic axis and distributed within a syntagmatic structure" (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, p. 13). Sellers (2010) likens the "woven mat" central metaphor of *Te Whāriki* to a rhizome: "philosophically re-reading the (structuralist) woven mat of the conventionally structured whariki as (poststructuralist) 'matting', an interconnected rhizo network of stems" (p. 562).

A growing body of writing based in post-structural perspectives focuses on the Australian curriculum framework. For example, Sumsion and Grieshaber (2012) use concepts of assemblages, rhizomes, and lines to explore diverse visions of better childhoods, as they envisage the framework "as a political and pedagogical intervention aimed at creating better childhoods and better futures for children, for communities and for society" (p. 232). They explore the framework as a rhizomatic assemblage where they map flows of desires concerning children's relations with others. They note rigid lines set up by binaries including adult/child and protection/participation, supple lines of possible change such as concerns about power relations among adults and children and whether it is appropriate for children to be active citizens, and lines of flight to new unforeseen ways of being glimpsed in invitations in the framework for children and adults to explore social justice issues together. By paying attention to possibilities for lines of flight that escape constraints on ways of becoming different, new ways of enacting curriculum are affirmed.

Conclusion

Poststructural perspectives on early years' curricula provide valuable opportunities to reconceptualize curriculum and curricular

enactments. These perspectives are acknowledged in some curriculum frameworks and documents that guide implementation and in research and critiques. In many countries, early years' education and care are a matter for government involvement, often informed by neoliberal concerns for economic well-being, accountability, and progress. Poststructural perspectives attend to relationalities and interconnectedness and enable critical reflection illuminating flows of power, desire, and affect in early years' policies, curriculum frameworks, and enactments. Engagement at macro- and micropolitical levels by early years' educators and researchers opens possibilities for challenging hierarchies that marginalize and exclude and for exploring possible lines of escape from some constraints on ways of becoming shaped by early years' curricula.

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Virtue Epistemology and Education

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Introduction

Virtue epistemology (VE) is an emerging field of study in the theory of knowledge (epistemology) – one emerging yet hearkening back to the very beginnings of Western theorizing about knowledge, particularly in the works of Aristotle (384–322 BC). In simple terms, VE is an approach to the theory of knowledge that emphasizes the role of persons in formation and justification of beliefs. This is (perhaps surprisingly) decidedly contrary to the “traditional” focus of twentieth-century epistemology – the

exacting analysis of belief, knowledge, and other epistemically relevant concepts. Virtue epistemologists contend this approach leaves out a key ingredient: the individual knower herself. Thus virtue epistemologists generally forego belief-based approaches and direct their analyses to the (variously understood) characteristics of persons. This has prompted some to refer to VE as “person-based” epistemology.

To understand VE’s significance – and ultimately its implications for educational philosophy – it is beneficial to consider the intellectual tumult under which it was first articulated. As such, this entry offers a concise *overview* of epistemology from the mid-twentieth century to the present day – focusing particularly on the debates that fostered the emergence of virtue epistemology. I begin with an explication of the concept of knowledge itself: What sort of thing is it? This is followed by a discussion of Edmond Gettier’s important and provocative observations about the “standard” definition of knowledge and the debates about justification that arose in its wake. Such debates, in fact, provided impetus for the development of virtue epistemology – the final section of this entry. Here I outline two strains of VE that have emerged in the past 30 years. I then make a further distinction between narrow and wide forms of epistemology, followed by a discussion of several commonly cited intellectual virtues. Finally, I conclude with a brief rationale for educational theorizing in virtue epistemology and some areas open to further inquiry.

What Is Epistemology?

Epistemology derives from the Greek word, *episteme*, which translates as knowledge. Thus epistemology is the systematic study of knowledge. Among the central questions that concern epistemologists are: What are the necessary ingredients for knowledge? Does knowledge have a certain structure? What are the various sources of justified belief? Questions of this sort pick out an important feature of traditional epistemology; it is centrally concerned with analyzing various features of justified belief. It does not consider how the character and cognitive traits of persons

might influence our understanding of knowledge and its function in our lives. Rather it restricts its analysis to beliefs; it is belief-based. (I will show a little later that some modern movements in epistemology have redirected this analysis away from beliefs and instead focus on persons as reliable and/or responsible knowers.) Herein, I will refer to this kind of epistemology – belief-based – as traditional epistemology. This term should not be construed as pejorative; it simply serves as a marker for epistemology that focuses primarily on belief analysis.

What Is Knowledge?

Late twentieth-century epistemology can also be understood as reckoning with a particular definition of knowledge – knowledge defined as justified true belief. The justified true belief definition takes the following form (where *P* is a proposition and *S* is a human subject):

<i>S</i> knows that <i>P</i>**	if and only if	<i>P</i> is true <i>S</i> believes that <i>P</i> is true <i>S</i> is justified in believing that <i>P</i> is true
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Consider an example. Suppose Sarah sees a bird outside her window. She immediately forms the belief that there is a bird outside her window. Her belief is true because there really is a bird outside her widow. Thus Sarah holds a true belief, but she also must meet the *justification* condition. In other words, Sarah should have good reasons for believing she sees a bird outside her window. In this case, she does – she sees the bird. Because she meets all three conditions, Sarah can reasonably claim to know that there is a bird outside her window. But suppose she believes there is a bird outside her window, and there is a bird outside her window, but she cannot see the bird clearly or only caught a movement out of the corner of her eye. She holds a true belief, but we might worry that her reasons for believing are not strong enough. In this case, she fails to meet the justification condition and we might hesitate to count her true belief as a case of knowledge. Justified true belief is a useful definition that explains most ordinary cases of knowledge. As I will show a little later, however, advocates of virtue epistemology do not

believe justified true belief fully explains knowledge. First, however, I sketch out a history of knowledge in the latter half of the twentieth century.

Foundations for Virtue Epistemology

In 1963, Edmond Gettier, an American epistemologist, penned a landmark paper, “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?” Here he demonstrated that the traditional definition of knowledge – justified true belief – could be problematized through a series of cleverly constructed counterexamples. Gettier argued that a person could hold a true belief, and be justified in doing so, yet not be credited with knowledge. Consider the following examples:

1. *Fake Barn County*. Suppose Mark and Dashiell take a sightseeing trip through Kay County, Oklahoma. Unbeknownst to them, however, the denizens of Kay County have razed all but one barn in the county. They have erected barn facades in their place. From the road these fake barns are indistinguishable from real barns. In fact, on several occasions, the two have mistakenly taken these counterfeit barns for the real thing. At one point, however, as they are driving down a dusty county road, Dashiell points excitedly at a barn and exclaims, “That’s a beautiful barn!” In fact, on this occasion he is correct; he has unwittingly pointed to the only real barn in the entire county. He seems to meet all the requirements for justified true belief. It is true that he sees a *real* barn; he has good reason to believe that it is a barn; and he certainly believes he sees a barn (Adapted from A. Goldman 1976).
2. *The Blue Suit*. Suppose Sarah has seen James wearing a blue suit on numerous occasions and heard him talk about how much he likes it. She agrees that it is a very fine suit and was delighted when he agreed to tell her where he purchased it. Thus, she justifiably believes that he owns a blue suit. Suppose again that she says to herself, “James owns a blue suit, or

Kimberly is in Rome.” She does not actually know where Kimberly is, but correctly reasons that the first half of the proposition entails the truth of the whole. James, however, does not own a blue suit (perhaps he recently sold it or it was stolen) but Kimberly by chance actually is in Rome. Sarah holds a justified true belief.

In each example, these persons meet all the conditions for knowledge. First, their beliefs are justified: Dashiell clearly *sees* the barn, and Sarah exercises excellent reasoning. Second, their beliefs are actually true. And, third, they each hold these beliefs with little or no misgiving. We would hesitate, however, to call their beliefs knowledge because they seem to have been the recipients of a large measure of good luck.

Unsurprisingly, Gettier’s paper prompted a flurry of responses. Solutions were offered and refuted; counterarguments were constructed and new examples composed. Despite this activity (and perhaps because of it) the problem only grew more entrenched. Michael Huemer (2002) claims, “Gettier’s refutation started a cottage industry of knowledge-analyzers” (p. 436). With time, however, it became increasingly clear that he had deeply altered the course of epistemology. According to Roberts and Wood (2007): “Epistemologists appeared to think that salvation from Gettier lay in fastidiousness and technical finery, so that epistemology became increasingly ingrown, epicyclical, and irrelevant to broader philosophical and human concerns” (p. 5). An alternative to traditional, belief-based, epistemology has been proposed – one that places persons at the center of philosophical analysis. In the following section, I explore a particular issue that emerges in the literature on Gettier – the issue of epistemic luck. I illustrate how VE is (in part) a response to this issue.

The preceding counterexamples demonstrate that the conditions of justified true belief can be met, but we might feel reluctant to attribute knowledge to either person. It would seem more a matter of epistemic *luck* than true justification. Consider an analogy offered by Ernest Sosa (2007). Suppose a highly skilled archer takes

aim at a target and shoots. The arrow flies straight and true and is going to strike the bull's-eye. Then, suddenly, a rogue gust of wind pulls the arrow from its course. It is no longer going to hit the bull's-eye. Then, by chance, the same wind reverses its course and puts the arrow back in its original trajectory. Once more, it is going to hit the bull's-eye (p. 22). We may question whether the archer is responsible for his accuracy of his shot; he seems to be merely the recipient of good fortune.

Sosa's example illustrates why some philosophers have defined knowledge as something approximating "nonaccidentally" true belief (Pritchard 2004, p. 193). There are numerous ways of understanding such beliefs. John Greco, for example, holds nonaccidental beliefs to be those for which a person can take *credit*. He writes, "To say that someone knows is to say that his believing the truth can be credited to him. It is to say that the person got things right due to his own abilities, efforts and actions, rather than due to dumb luck, or blind chance, or something else" (p. 111). This is so because having *creditable* reasons for a belief – justification – is thought to improve its worth or standing. If we reconsider the Gettier cases, it appears that Sarah and Dashiell *do not* deserve credit for the accuracy of their beliefs. They were merely lucky or, put differently, they did not obtain true beliefs by virtue of their own intellectual activity. Luck interposed. But suppose Dashiell and his father were driving through an ordinary country landscape – one filled with real barns. In this case, Dashiell's declaration would seem a real case of knowledge – a case believing for which he can take credit. The notion of credit, however, moves us closer to the impulse behind virtue epistemology. First, it illustrates why virtue epistemologists are centrally concerned with persons; to gain credit for a belief, a person should form that belief in the right way, e.g., virtuously. And, second, it demonstrates why VE is concerned with persons. This is because it focuses its analysis on the traits of knowers themselves – on how they form their beliefs and how particular traits contribute to the warrant or justification of beliefs.

Some Prominent Forms of Virtue Epistemology

We are now positioned to engage with VE directly. Here I provide a brief timeline of the conceptual development of VE. In particular, I analyze the work of key scholars in the field. In the process, I roughly divide VE into two major strains: virtue reliabilism and virtue responsibilism. This discussion provides a conceptual map of the VE terrain. Having explicated these positions, I then describe another distinction: narrow and wide forms of epistemology. Here I suggest that wide accounts have expanded the scope of epistemology, and that this opens the door for an applied virtue epistemology – one particularly apt for education.

Virtue Reliabilism

Ernest Sosa inaugurated virtue epistemology in 1981 with his article, "The Raft and the Pyramid: Coherence versus Foundations in the Theory of Knowledge." The aim of this paper was to present a theory of knowledge that could circumvent standard problems in contemporary epistemology. He uses the analogy of a "raft" to refer to coherence theory. Coherentists argue that a justified belief is one that coheres within a larger body of beliefs. Donald Davidson (2000) writes, "What distinguishes a coherence theory is simply the claim that nothing can count as a reason for holding a belief except another belief" (p. 156). The "pyramid" refers to epistemic foundationalism. This is the view that some beliefs are foundational and require no further support or justification. According to Sosa (1980), each system – coherentism and foundationalism – is flawed (pp. 3–26).

Coherentism stresses the logical connections between our beliefs, but fails to account for beliefs at the periphery of our belief network. Foundationalism seems to ultimately fail to provide a solid footing. Rather, Sosa (1991) urges epistemologists to shift their analysis to persons – to those qualities and characteristics of human beings that reliably lead them to true belief. Thus, Sosa's view has been described as

virtue-reliabilism. However, it should be noted that Sosa's virtues are not virtues "in the narrow Aristotelian sense" (Sosa 1991, p. 271). Such virtues would include moral dispositions like intellectual honesty and open-mindedness. Instead, he argues that certain intellectual capacities (e.g., excellent memory and rationality) and perceptual faculties (e.g., eyesight and hearing) are virtue-laden insofar as they position us to attain our epistemic goals. He writes,

But there is a broader sense of "virtue," still Greek, in which anything with a function – natural or artificial – does have virtues. The eye does, after all, have its virtues, and so does a knife. And if we include grasping the truth about one's environment among the proper ends of a human being, then the faculty of sight would seem in a broad sense a virtue in human beings; and if grasping the truth is an intellectual matter then that virtue is also in a straightforward sense an intellectual virtue. (p. 271)

For Sosa, then, faculties like eyesight possess a kind of power or ability, one that is central to belief formation. Importantly, however, the eye's property of being virtuous is contingent upon its power to help persons reliably arrive at truth. When internally flawed – for example, severe glaucoma or blindness – its truth-conducive properties are inhibited. So too is its property of being virtuousness. Furthermore, Sosa defines a justified belief as one that is grounded in the intellectual virtues. This provides a sort of foundation desired by the foundationalist – one rooted in the reliability of the intellectual virtues. It also leaves room for the Coherentist, insofar as justified beliefs are the product of making the right sort of connection – that is, reliable and thus virtuous connections (Sosa 1980). Thus, Sosa inaugurated a VE on the promise that it could succeed where other theories could not.

Others have followed Sosa's lead. John Greco (2002), for example, defines the intellectual virtues in roughly the same way, as "innate faculties or acquired habits that enable a person to arrive at truth and void error in some relevant field" (p. 287). Like Sosa he cites capacities like reliable memory, perception, and good reasoning ability. Greco (2003) also offers an interesting account of justification. He maintains that a person knows a given proposition when he or she believes it out of

an intellectual virtue. This involves three facets. First, a person must be motivated toward the truth and in possession of the right sort of disposition (s) to know. These dispositions are the products of intellectual virtue; they show up when one exercises an intellectual virtue. Second, a person's belief must be the product of intellectual virtue (s) – that is, the epistemic good obtained is the result of exercising an intellectual virtue. And, third, a person's true belief should be creditable to her (p. 311). Both Greco and Sosa advance virtue-based epistemologies that hinge on the possession of reliable cognitive characteristics and both hold that VE has much to offer in the way of addressing standard problems in epistemology.

Virtue Responsibilism

Virtue-responsibilism also draws upon the intellectual virtues but defines them differently. Rather than describe them as characteristics of cognition (like reliabilists), they understand the virtues to be traits of character – things like open-mindedness, intellectual honesty, and conscientiousness. As such, they draw attention to the moral nature of knowing and knowledge. This is not a new idea in the history of epistemology. Indeed, virtue epistemology's, intellectual genealogy is rooted in Aristotle's distinction between moral and intellectual virtue. In this section, I describe the work of two philosophers in this tradition – Lorraine Code and Linda Zagzebski.

In *Epistemic Responsibility*, Lorraine Code (1987) argues for an epistemology based in the recognition that knowledge is a social affair. She believes the chief epistemic virtue is responsibility – recognition that we are responsible for our beliefs and their function in wider society. She writes, "It is only those who, in their knowing, strive to do justice to the *object*-to the *world* they want to know as well as possible – who can aspire to intellectual virtue" (p. 59). Code's account has a strong social justice thread running throughout. As such, her responsibilism begins with the assumption that we all inhabit a knowable world, one in which real problems exist. Knowledge that is gained through intellectual virtue more accurately reflects the true state of affairs in this world. This requires what she calls

“normative realism.” Thus, “Intellectually virtuous persons value knowing and understanding how things really are” (p. 59). And, finally, unlike Sosa and Greco, Code holds little hope for standard methodologies in epistemology. These, she thinks, are too narrow and have too little to do with the experience of being human (p. 254). In other words, a central goal of her book is to provide an account of knowledge that accounts for human characteristics and qualities, and the social dimensions in which knowledge exists.

Like Lorraine Code, Linda Zagzebski believes persons’ cognitive character is central to epistemology. Her approach, however, draws much more explicitly from Aristotle. Her most enduring work (1996), *Virtues of the Mind*, is the most widely cited work of VE in the Aristotelian tradition. A central thesis of this book is that traditional epistemology has taken a wrong turn in its disputes over justification, and argues that epistemology can benefit from a virtue theory in the same way that ethics has. First, she claims that the structures of epistemology and ethics are strongly analogous. In ethics, the historically dominant views have been consequentialism and deontological ethics. She calls these “act-based” theories – a term that operates analogously to belief-based theory in epistemology (Zagzebski 1996, pp. 2–19). Of the former, consequentialism, her comments are particularly relevant.

Consequentialists argue that what makes an action right can be evaluated by its consequences – whether more good or bad results. Zagzebski (1996) links this theory to reliabilism, claiming that they are structurally identical.

In reliabilist theories the epistemic goal is to bring about true beliefs and to avoid bringing about false beliefs, just as on consequentialist theories the moral goal is to bring about good states of affairs and to avoid bringing about bad states of affairs. (Zagzebski 1996, pp. 7–8)

Importantly, Zagzebski (1996) claims that objections to consequentialism can also be leveled against reliabilism. For example, she asks us to imagine two persons, Dennis and Christopher, who share essentially the same set of true propositions. Dennis, however, obtained all his beliefs from Christopher – a perfectly *reliable* authority.

According to Zagzebski, reliabilism stipulates that Dennis is equally justified insofar as testimony is generally considered a normatively acceptable source of knowledge. Here, then, we encounter Zagzebski’s objection. She insists we intuitively ascribe superiority to Christopher. This may be because Christopher’s “mode” of acquiring true beliefs is superior, or it may be that Christopher obtains added “understanding” and “clarity” (pp. 27–28). Reliabilism, argues Zagzebski, cannot explain the simple intuition that we (our motives, intentions, and cognitive character) are somehow integral to the formation of true beliefs. In short, what is lost in both theories (consequentialism and reliabilism) is any consideration of the motives or intentions of the agent. This clearly puts her at odds with the likes of Ernest Sosa, whose intellectual virtues she thinks are hardly virtues at all, or are virtues “only by courtesy” (Zagzebski 2000, p. 172).

The scope of Zagzebski’s project – to bring ethics and epistemology under the same banner of virtue theory – is grand indeed. In her *Précis of Virtues of the Mind* (2000), she writes, “my purpose [...] was to outline a pure virtue theory that is rich enough to include an account of intellectual virtues within the same theory as moral virtues, and to show how such a theory can generate a way to handle both epistemic evaluation and moral evaluation” (p. 172). A central contention is that the boundaries erected between moral and intellectual virtue are a mistake, although each may have different ends in mind (e.g., moral virtues might strive for moral soundness whereas intellectual virtues promote excellent knowing). In particular, Zagzebski understands the intellectual virtues as possessing two main components – a *motivation* component that impels a person to acquire epistemic goods and a *success* component wherein a person gets true belief from having believed virtuously.

Some Commonly Cited Intellectual Virtues

We have seen that reliabilists conceive of virtues as cognitive faculties or abilities that dispose

persons to acquire true beliefs. Responsibilists, on the other hand, take a much more traditional approach. They cite character traits like intellectual honesty, courage, open-mindedness, love of knowledge, and conscientiousness. Such traits describe excellent knowers. Consider the first two intellectual virtues mentioned. The virtue of honesty is a disposition to tell the truth – both as honest self-appraisal and to others. For example, it is a trait that is particularly valued in academic contexts. Most course syllabi at universities contain a passage on plagiarism and academic integrity. Violation of these policies is considered a grave academic offense and is generally punished quite severely. Intellectual honesty also indicates a willingness to be fully disclosed to oneself. In *Being and Nothingness*, Jean-Paul, S. (1956). describes an *akratic* (weak willed) gambler who sincerely commits to quitting his ruinous habit. A day comes, however, when the opportunity to gamble presents. His earlier commitment has faded and he gives into temptation. This is a common scenario. It is easy to imagine, though, that if he had been fully honest with himself from the beginning, he would have acknowledged that his commitment was only halfhearted. This illustrates the intellectual virtue of honesty and it leads us to the second virtue – intellectual courage. Self-evaluation of the sort neglected by the gambler is not easy. It takes courage to face our weaknesses and oftentimes even more courage to do something about them. Intellectual courage describes a disposition to face our fears, to take intellectual risks, to revise deeply held beliefs, and the like.

Narrow and Wide Virtue Epistemology

Those in the VE tradition face a decision with regard to how they choose to relate to the standard problems of traditional epistemology. Some, Ernest Sosa, John Greco, and Linda Zagzebski, for example, have attempted to apply the concepts of VE to these issues with debatable success. Such theorists aim to build systems that can deal with standard problems in epistemology – e.g., the aforementioned debates about justification. For example, both Sosa and Zagzebski have

given a response to the Gettier problem, and both have offered analyses of knowledge that (although different in direction) attend to the historical dilemmas that have characterized post-Gettier epistemology. Furthermore, these theories can be viewed as viable (if contested) entries into the larger project of epistemology. In other words, they recognize and validate the traditional problems. I refer to these forms of VE as *narrow* accounts.

Others, however, have not been so sanguine about these attempts. Jonathan Kvanvig (2010) argues that VE's future looks much brighter outside the domain of traditional epistemology and its controversies. He cites the work of Lorraine Code (1987), James Montmarquet (1993), and newer works by figures like Robert C. Roberts and Jay Wood as prime examples of philosophers who have extended the traditional margins of epistemology. This widening, of course, creates "an expansion of the issues and problems that become the targets of philosophical reflection of a particularly epistemological sort" (p. 200). Those in this camp draw from a much wider array of sources and believe that a wider range of epistemic goods is relevant to epistemology, e.g., understanding, wisdom, and acquaintance. They also refrain from creating narrowly focused epistemologies and stress the importance of flexibility. This widening, I believe, provides educational theorists with new and exciting tools for intellectual discovery. In fact, there are numerous reasons for introducing VE into the theoretical discourse in education. Three are provided in the next section.

Virtue Epistemology and Education: A Rationale for Exploration

In the first place, VE has attracted considerable attention in the discipline of philosophy, some going as far as to suggest that it can overcome certain intractable debates in epistemology (See also Zagzebski 1996; Sosa 1980). Undoubtedly, similar and perhaps analogous debates persist in educational theory, e.g., disputes over the epistemological grounding of educational

research. Virtue theoretic perspectives might recast and clarify these debates. And yet, it appears that little has been written on VE in education. This is somewhat surprising given our (educational theorists') tendency to draw from sources outside education. Perhaps education's inclination to favor "continental" philosophical sources explains this oversight, or perhaps epistemology has previously been too abstracted from educational concerns. Regardless, virtue epistemology – especially the wide form just outlined – is directly applicable to education in a way that traditional epistemological approaches are not.

A second reason for introducing VE concerns the epistemological nature and aims of education. Education (broadly understood) is a deeply "epistemic" concept. Harvey Siegel (2008) explains,

Education is not only rich in epistemological content and relevance; specific epistemological issues – for example, those concerning ultimate epistemic aims and values, and the evidential status of testimony – are helpfully viewed in the context of education, such that thinking about education promises substantial benefit for the pursuit of standard epistemological questions. This is especially true in the current epistemological climate, in which both virtue epistemology and social epistemology are high on the epistemological agenda. (p. 456)

Siegel's *epistemic* aims of education might include the acquisition of a prescribed body of knowledge, the development of relevant skills, or a host of other epistemic goods like understanding (wisdom) and acquaintance through experience. Thus, if virtue epistemologists are right, it follows that intellectually virtuous students are best positioned to obtain these goals. To illustrate, if Sarah is open-minded, conscientious, and intellectually honest, she possess character traits and habits of mind that dispose her to doxastic excellence. She will consider other viewpoints, carefully evaluate her work, and monitor her beliefs for inconsistencies. Conversely, if Johnny is close-minded, intellectually careless, and intellectually dishonest, it stands to reason that he will perform poorly with respect to knowledge acquisition and the ultimate aims of education. Both students will, in effect, approach school *through* their respective intellectual virtues and vices.

Given education's implicit connection to epistemological concepts and the applicability of VE to education, it seems appropriate to consider virtue epistemology and its implications for education.

A third and final reason to pursue a project in VE involves its recognition that belief formation is an important human endeavor. As noted earlier, VE is aptly referred to as *person-based* epistemology. This is because it centers its philosophical analysis on the character traits and qualities of human beings – those traits that dispose persons to successfully acquire knowledge and other epistemic goods. This is significant precisely because education is both an important social institution *and* a central player in the formation of students' epistemic practices. Virtue epistemology can (and does on some accounts) operate as a form of regulative epistemology – that is, an epistemological framework providing noetic guidance. Far from being a new or innovative notion, regulative epistemology has a long history in philosophy. (For a quintessential example regulative epistemology, see John Locke 2007.) For a number of reasons, however, such approaches fell out of fashion in the twentieth century (Kvanvig 2007). Nevertheless, *some* recent work in epistemology signals a return or reclamation of socially conscious epistemology.

Virtue Epistemology and Education: Some Areas for Future Research

In conclusion, I want to highlight some potential areas for future research in education and virtue epistemology, especially with respect to several commonly adopted epistemological frameworks. If VE is to take root in educational theory and philosophy, it will undoubtedly have to contend with these points of view. First, consider the highly influential theory of constructivism. Undoubtedly, constructivists and virtue epistemologists will begin from very different metaphysical starting points. Indeed, constructivism, in its overtly philosophical form, would oppose the notion that any sort of objectivity is possible with respect to knowledge. This is not a position many (if any) virtue epistemologists would adopt. Practically speaking, however, each camp places the locus of responsibility squarely on the

shoulders of the individual. To what extent do these theories overlap and diverge? Is belief *formation* tantamount to belief construction? How might they inform one another? Indeed, I believe constructivist literature in education might be a tremendous (if unexpected) resource for the application of virtue epistemology. Such a study would naturally reveal some interesting differences – especially with respect to more radical forms of constructivism – but also, perhaps, some important similarities. Likewise, attention also might be drawn to critical theories – especially their emphasis on justice – as intellectually virtuous modes of thinking. In other words, does a critical intellectual stance and commitment to justice entail certain epistemic virtues? (Bevan 2009).

Roberts and Wood (2007) note that VE shares some thematic similarities with postmodern and existential thought. For example, they discuss the works of Friedrich Nietzsche, Jacques Derrida, and Richard Rorty in great detail, highlighting some interesting (and surprising) points of contact. In an earlier piece, for example, W. Jay Wood (1999) writes, “I propose that postmodern philosophy has not altogether outgrown the need for epistemology, and that an epistemology which takes seriously the notion of intellectual virtues in one alternative very much worth considering” (p. 13). Wood’s main contention is that postmodern intellectual ethics are in a deep sense dependent on the certain habits of minds. These he likens to the possession of certain intellectual virtues, like open-mindedness, love of knowledge, intellectual honesty, and wisdom. He goes on to argue that postmodernism and VE also share important thematic similarities (e.g., a recognition that axiomatic approaches to theorizing warrant scrutiny – indeed, that they might even be misguided). As with constructivism, one must exercise caution with respect to the metaphysical assumptions supporting these two frameworks. Nevertheless, it seems plausible that an interesting dialog might be established between postmodern educational scholars and virtue epistemologists.

Lorraine Code (1987) is another epistemologist whose work draws upon sources not typically associated with traditional Anglo

epistemology – drawing extensively from feminist and continental philosophy. Her willingness to draw upon nontraditional, even conventionally antagonistic, sources illustrates how the concept of intellectual virtue has currency in theoretical orientations well outside the traditional scope of analytic epistemology. This is (to the author) an exciting feature of VE, one that warrants further investigation. Indeed, it suggests that VE and educational theory will find important points of methodological contact.

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Visual Literacy

► Critical Pedagogy and Art

Visual Methodologies and Latino Cultural Studies: Implications for the Sociology of Education

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Introduction

In many academic contexts, from anthropology to sociology, from urbanology to semiotics, many attempts have been made to understand social dynamics with regard to what people observe around them. Advertising, mass media, social networks, photographic archives, family photograph albums, Polaroid, smartphones, and graffiti act on human relations and contribute in defining the sociocultural panorama which surrounds persons (Simmel 1908).

This section proposes the elements that compose visual methodology, defining the area of

application in relationship to Latino cultural identities and illustrating research techniques with which the researcher can approach this sector. The ways in which social investigation is enriched by the use of visual methods are presented, which consist of every collection and analysis technique that uses images. The term visual methodology can be traced back to the scientific field of visual sociology, which in literature can be variously understood as a discipline, a research technique, or a research system (Harper 1988; Pauwels 2010).

The image in social research has traditionally been used to study contexts other than “Occidental” and has contributed, on the one hand, in building and reinforcing stereotypes, as what happened, for example, in the use of images by colonists and explorers; on the other hand, it has contributed in revealing prejudices, as what happened with the studies by Erving Goffman (1976) or by Ariel Dorfman and Armand Mattelart with *Para leer al Pato Donald* (1972), authors who will be discussed further on.

Georg Simmel (1908) is the one who had identified the relationship between visual stimulation and social living. For Simmel, the sense of sight contributes in getting to know those who are different from the one observing, even if only merely from the aesthetic point of view.

Visual Techniques

Visual methodology mainly refers to a qualitative research approach and includes every technique that uses images as information or data. Two areas of visual sociology can be identified: sociology *with* images and sociology *on* images (Harper 1988). In the first case, researchers and/or the people studied produce and analyze images. In the second, researchers and/or the persons studied analyze already existing images. In other words, the areas of social research to be considered are mainly two: (a) the researcher produces images or causes images to be produced as an empirical basis; (b) the researcher analyzes images originally produced not for research objectives. The four techniques of sociology *with* images are

video-photographic research, interviews with photo-elicitation, native image making, and re-photography.

Sociology on images includes the study of photographic archives, home mode communication, and every analysis regarding images as sources that were not originally produced for scientific purposes.

In this perspective, Goffman's *Gender Advertisements* (1976) is a famous example of analysis on images such as those used in advertising. Goffman shows how magazine advertising reveals a model of gender norms, a model that regulates the ways in which men and women are portrayed. Visual appearance is an element that contributes to prejudice and stereotyping toward social groups such as ethnic cultural minorities.

Sut Jhally's work also looks to the discrimination issue, following a critical perspective, both in the ways in which films, video clips, and publicity are made and in the attitudes and reactions of the public. Sut Jhally and Justin Lewis (1992) show, with a study on the audience through 53 focus groups, how *The Cosby Show* proposes racist stereotypes and misleading representations on the daily life of Afro-Americans in the United States.

Photo-Elicitation

The interview with photo-video stimulus is a semi-structured variation of the interview based on pictures and not on a line of questions. Stimulus consists of proposal of photographs or videos to the person being interviewed, who, upon interpreting them, reveals his own life experience and his personal *Weltanschauung*. The heuristic power of the image lies in polysemy, in the weakness of its own code.

Leticia González et al. (2006) study the transmission of racist ideology in baseball, using photo-elicitation as a technique. Pictures of baseball players are shown to a sample of 811 people. The ethnic group, especially black, white, and Latin, influences the opinion people have on the factors that lead a player to success. Similarly, David Lopez (2000) uses photo-elicitation to show the dynamics between Latinos who had

immigrated several years earlier to the Midwest of the United States (*old-timers*) and Latinos who had recently arrived in the same places (*newcomers*). Thanks to the tool of photography, the misgivings the old-timers feel toward the newcomers are revealed.

Visual Discourse Analysis and Visual Content Analysis

Discourse analysis focuses on language and on its power to structure knowledge. One kind of discourse analysis refers to linguistic structuralism, to application of structuralism to the analysis of power. In this perspective, Megan Strom (2015) critically examines, in the United States, the discursive construction of social hierarchy in the local Spanish-language print media, to consider if this construction challenges or not the mainstream one. She considers two patterns of hierarchic representation: in the first one, the Anglo-Americans are hierarchically superior to the Latinos; in the second, however, the Latinos are equal or dominant in comparison to the Anglo-Americans.

The relevance of the visual dimension is also noted in the techniques of content analysis. Quantitative content analysis traditionally consists of techniques of data gathering and analysis in order to systematically analyze *cultural artifacts*.

An example of visual content analysis is Catherine Lutz and Jane Collins' research (1993), which examines how the non-“Occidental” are portrayed in the United States with reference to issues of power and ethnicity, particularly through media images such as those found in the *National Geographic*. Lutz and Collins randomly choose a picture for each of the 594 articles that between 1950 and 1986 deal with non-“Western” subjects. Non-“Occidental” are portrayed as less advanced technologically, closer to nature, less well dressed, more spiritual, and more at ease with their bodies.

Another famous example of content analysis is the work *Para leer al Pato Donald* (a work better known as *How to Read Donald Duck. Imperialist Ideology in the Disney Comic*) by Dorfman and Mattelart (1972), a work which analyzes the latent

content of the American comic strip. The two authors argue that more or less explicit apologetic references of American ideology can be identified, involving aspects relating to emotional life, importance of money, and power over non-Americans, which in particular is at the basis of expansionism in South America.

Analysis of Photographic Album and Archives

The use of image sources and of family photo albums to study social phenomena has a long tradition in sociology. For Pierre Bourdieu et al. (1965), membership in a social class is expressed in different photographic practices. He considers peasant society (*paysans*), urban working classes (*classes populaires*), office workers (*employés*), middle management (*cadres moyens*), senior executives, and upper management (*cadres supérieurs*).

Photographic practices, albums, and photograph collections are meant to affirm the unity of the family group, favoring the integration of the individual into the family, whose cohesion is thus strengthened. Photographic practice therefore reveals the mores that produce it (Bourdieu et al. 1965).

The collections of family photos are “themed” and generally show happy families (Halle 1993). Richard Chalfen explicitly cites constructivism in the analysis of *home mode communication*, understood as participating observation applied to how people create photographs and videos in a family setting and how people arrange photograph albums. The empirical material of *home mode communication* consists of family photo albums and photo keepsake boxes. In this perspective, family albums represent and help build family unity, patriotism, personal success, or rather acceptance of social norms. Photographic images of failed expectations or deviancy from norms do not exist. In this way, a visual dimension of daily life and a sort of *mise en scène* are constructed (Chalfen 1987). We must understand how people try to communicate personal information, narrating stories through their own images, and how they make statements about themselves

meaningful. Photographs are not copies of reality but affirmations of it, as Bourdieu’s research on family albums shows: photographs reinforce people’s integration in the family network. In particular, regarding the analysis of image collections, different kinds of albums have been identified, featured by different themes. The family album is the most widespread. Photo albums, especially family photo albums, are geared toward stable visual patterns (Blanco 2010). Blanco’s originality (2010) is to consider the photo album as a particular *medium*, which is characterized by its own *phatic function*, taking up the term from Malinowski. What distinguishes photography as a medium is the function carried out on the phatic level.

Anna Cristina Pertierra (2012) analyzes, for example, a series of photo portraits taken during the fifteenth birthday celebration of young Cuban girls (*quinceañera*). This occasion marks the passage from girlhood to womanhood in Mexico, Central America, and among Latinos in the United States and is a rite of passage characterized by traditional elements like a tiara, a fancy dress, makeup, floral decorations at home, a classic photo portrait, and contemporary practices like the use of *smartphones* to take pictures.

The use of photography is associated with festive events, which lie outside of the daily routine and must be photographed because they solemnize and reify the image which the group intends to give of itself. The use of photography fulfills its own function completely when it appears in ritualized forms: “First, there are rituals which are to be reported; secondly, there are ways of reporting which are themselves rituals; and thirdly, the medium may itself be a ritual of collective memory” (Chaney 1983, p. 117). The photographic image carries out an activity which preexists its appearance, namely, the solemnization and immortalization of an intense moment of collective life. If one admits that celebrations have the function of vivifying and recreating the group, one understands well that photography finds itself associated, since it provides the means of solemnizing those culminating moments of social life in which the group solemnly reaffirms its own unity (Bourdieu et al. 1965).

Video-Photographic Field Research

Video-photographic field research has characteristics similar to participating observation and uses tools like cameras, video cameras, or other technological devices. Visual field research is used especially for marginal environments that are hardly knowable for non-experts. In sociology, photography establishes itself as a supplement to simple observation. This technique derives from anthropology and is used, for example, by Gregory Bateson and Margaret Mead to document material culture, dances, and rituals of tribal populations (Mead and Bateson 1942).

Bateson and Mead's work is considered the first use of methodologically rigorous visual data. Even before the works of the two aforementioned anthropologists, explorers and colonists from the seventeenth century used drawings to describe anthropological contexts in Africa and Latin America.

Marcia Esparza (2006), for example, uses visual research to document the condition of women in the Mexican prison of Santa Maria Ixcotel. The photographic images are used with other heuristic tools such as statistical data. This allows a greater understanding of the complexity of the studied phenomenon.

Photographic field research has produced original results regarding the comparison between material cultures of different countries. *Material World: A Global Family Portrait* (Menzel et al. 1995) is a research in which families from different latitudes are portrayed in front of their dwellings exposing everything that it contains.

Ethnographies

The aforementioned technique of video-photographic research on the field recalls simple observation, which is an unobtrusive measure par excellence. In the mid-twentieth century, John Collier Jr. uses photography to ethnographically describe Western material culture. John Collier Jr. works for the Farm

Security Administration in New Mexico, studying the conditions, clothing, and material culture of the workers. This tradition of research has produced original results that concern the comparison between the material cultures of different countries. The work *Hungry Planet: What the World Eats* consists of portraits of people from 34 different countries, from Latin America to China, photographed together with the food that they consume in their meals in a typical day (Menzel and D'Aluisio 2007).

Besides material culture, photography and video allow us to observe and study human interactions. Besides their value as a support to field notes, pictures may contribute in the understanding of nonverbal language. A classic example of nonverbal language analysis is the work by David Efron, which betrays an objectivist and racist tone, *Gesture, race and culture: a tentative study of the spatio-temporal and "linguistic" aspects of the gestural behavior of eastern Jews and southern Italians in New York City, living under similar as well as different environmental conditions* (Efron 1941). Applicability of visual techniques emerges from Randall Collins' work *Interaction Ritual Chains* (2004), where Collins presents the situational analysis model to analyze the genesis of cultural processes, a model which he calls *interaction ritual*, also called *focus* or *emotional-entertainment mechanism*. We must consider an international situation and how intense *mutual focus* and *emotional entertainment* are among the participants in the situation. When *mutual focus* and *emotional entertainment* are intense, a *self-reinforcing feedback process* generates moments of shared emotional experience (*emotional energy*). These moments are culturally significant motivational magnets, i.e., they are experiences thanks to which culture is created and reinforced. In other words, the rituals of face-to-face interaction create *first-order* symbols, something which constitutes the starting point for other symbolic circuits, such as those of the media. Once they are infused with situational emotional energy, symbols may circulate through conversation *networks* and be internalized as ways of thinking by people.



Visual Methodologies and Latino Cultural Studies: Implications for the Sociology of Education, Fig. 1 Re-photography: the Navajo Tom Torlino “before

and after” having attended the *Carlisle School*. Richard Henry Pratt Papers, Yale University, ca 1882 (Source: Web)

Re-photography

Re-photography, also called the *before* and *after* technique, is a long-standing heuristic tool. The same person, the same place, or the same situation is portrayed in two different times.

The interest in the visual dimension of social living emerges also from cultural anthropology where photography and then video are used to document material culture and rites in their tribal environment. The photographs of distant peoples and *others* seem to be concentrated on conditions so desperate as to be insurmountable. In the late nineteenth century, photography is used as a tool to propagandize the effectiveness of Anglo-Saxon education on Native Americans. For example, at the *Carlisle Indian Industrial School* in Pennsylvania, Captain Richard Pratt, superintendent of the institute, orders the taking of *before* and *after* photos, calling this

activity explicitly *propaganda*. In this case as well, the pictures have been touched up, for example, to lighten the color of the skin of the Native Americans (Margolis and Rowe 2004). The Navajo Tom Torlino is photographed before and after the “cure” of the Carlisle School (Fig. 1).

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Vocationalism

► Islamic Perspective of Vocational Education

Vulnerability

► Phenomenology in Education

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Whakapapa (Genealogy)

- [Whakapapa: A Māori Way of Knowing and Being in the World](#)

Whakapapa: A Māori Way of Knowing and Being in the World

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Synonyms

[Whakapapa \(genealogy\)](#)

Introduction

Whakapapa is central to Māori perceptions of knowing and is at the very core of what it means to be Māori. The literal translation of whakapapa is to place in layers. It involves multiple layers and interpretations that form the basis of Māori values and beliefs. Whakapapa is a way of thinking and knowing which is fundamental to almost every facet of a Māori worldview. The importance of whakapapa within Māori culture cannot be overestimated. It acts as a basic form of knowing an epistemological template. This entry explores the centrality of whakapapa to Māori of knowing, learning, and ways of being in the world.

Māori Ways of Knowing and Being in the World

Māori ways of knowing and being are fundamentally different to those of non-Māori, influenced and shaped by historical and contemporary interpretive systems. It is these interpretive systems or worlds that Māori learners inhabit, enact, and reflect in their learning. Being Māori can be viewed through a number of interpretive systems. These interpretive systems are not distinct or separate from each other, but rather are interrelated components of a dynamic weaving that encompasses Māori identities both historical and contemporary. Historical ways of knowing and being in the world stress the centrality of relationships with the land (whenua), with people – past and present including the extended family/subtribe/tribe (whānau/hapū/iwi) – and with the spiritual dimension and universe (wairuatanga). The importance of whakapapa to these relationships cannot be overstated. The impact of colonization, assimilation, land loss, language loss, urbanization, and twenty-first-century global and national conditions has worked in different ways and combinations to shape and transform historical Māori ways of knowing and understandings of what it means to be Māori. Contemporary ways of knowing and being Māori therefore are the result of individuals and groups weaving specific combinations of realities, understandings, and experiences. However the critical point is that if one wishes to identify with one's Māori heritage and has whakapapa, that person is Māori.

Key differences also exist between the Māori and non-Māori perceptions of knowledge and rights to knowledge. Māori, knowledge is perceived as a taonga (precious gift), passed down from ancestors, therefore to be taken seriously, treated with respect and preserved intact. Knowledge does not belong to individuals, neither is the property of the hapū (subtribe) and iwi (tribe). Individuals are the repositories of the group's knowledge and have the responsibility to use it for the benefit of the group and not for personal gain. Whakapapa is not only a means of passing down knowledge from generation to generation

but is also important in structuring Māori perceptions of knowledge, knowing, and knowers.

Whakapapa

Whakapapa has many meanings but is generally viewed as genealogy and history.

“Papa” is described as something that is broad and flat such as a board or slab and “whaka” can be translated as “to enable” or “make happen.” Whakapapa relates to the idea of placing in layers or laying one on another. It operates at various levels but is most commonly concerned with genealogical narratives, stories that are recounted layer upon layer and ancestor upon ancestor up to the present day, a genealogical layering of one generation of ancestors upon the previous. Whakapapa is a continuous lifeline from those who existed before to those living today. It encompasses everything that is passed from one generation to the next, from one ancestor to the next and, from the deceased to the living. Whakapapa connects Māori to ancestors; history; the environment, Ranginui (sky father) and Papatūānuku (earth mother); birthrights; whenua (land); tūrangawaewae (place to stand); whānau (extended family), hapū (subtribe), and iwi (tribe); and moana (sea), awa (river), maunga (mountain), and waka (ancestral canoe).

Whakapapa also denotes the genealogical descent of Māori from the divine creation of the universe to the living world. It outlines the genealogical descent of all living things from the gods to the present day and provides a basis for the organization of knowledge in relation to the creation of the universe and the development of all things. Māori are descendents of the heavens and through whakapapa can trace lineage back to the very beginning of time and the birthing of the universe. This birthing is normally told using a whakapapa format which outlines the process of creation from the beginning of time to the primal parents Ranginui (sky father) and Papatūānuku (earth mother) and their children including Tāne, from whom Māori descend. The following is an example of the creation whakapapa:

I te tīmatanga, ko te kore—In the beginning there was a void.

Ko te pō—Within the void was the night.

Nā te pō—From within the night, seeds were cultivated.

Ka puta kō te Kukune—It was here that movement began—the stretching.

Ko te Pupuke—There the shoots enlarged and swelled.

Ko te Hihiri—Then there was pure energy.

Ko te Mahara—Then there was the subconscious.

Ko te Manako—Then the desire to know.

Ka puta i te whei ao—Movement from darkness to light, from conception to birth.

Ki te ao mārama e—From the learning comes knowing.

Tihei Mauri ora—I sneeze and there is life.

(Ministry of Education 2009, p. 48)

Ranginui (sky father) and Papatūānuku (earth mother), the primal parents, were next in line followed by their children. There are variations in the accounts of the numbers of children born to Ranginui and Papatūānuku. There were approximately 70 children; however there were six main atua (guardians or gods) who received authority over certain domains of life. They include Tūmataurangi (atua of war), Tangaroa (atua of the oceans), Tawhirimatea (atua of the weather), Rongomātāne and Haumia tiketike (atua of food), and Tāne (atua of the forests). Māori trace their lineage to Tāne and therefore back to the creation of the universe.

Whakapapa and Ways of Being

Whakapapa identifies who one is and where one is from and thus identifies the place one belongs to. Whakapapa connects Māori to the land providing a sense of unity and harmony with the environment. It has been viewed as verification of the continued existence of Māori not only as a people but also as tangata whenua (people of the land) in Aotearoa. It affirms kin ties to iwi, hapū, and whānau and to tūrangawaewae (tribal lands). It reifies connections to past generations and those generations to come and asserts that Māori will continue to exist as long as the land continues to exist.

Whakapapa informs relationships and provides the foundation for inherent connectedness and interdependence to all things. From a traditional Māori perspective, it is your whakapapa that makes you who you are. Reciting your whakapapa is a way of shaping your identity. Through telling and retelling whakapapa, the connections to ancestors, to the land, and to the deities become apparent. Whakapapa is fundamental to being Māori. It is the connection to people and the land, past, present, and future, and to the spiritual world and the universe. It is key to Māori ways of structuring and knowing the world and ones place in it:

Whakapapa identifies who I am, where I am from and in doing so identifies a place that I can proudly call my tūrangawaewae (place to stand). It is this whakapapa knowledge that gives an individual or collective a sense of purpose that... grounds us to Papatūānuku (earth mother)... my whakapapa and iwi (tribal) affiliations are my biological and kinship credentials that form my Māori identity. (Graham 2009, pp. 1–2)

Whakapapa provides a continuum of life from the spiritual world to the physical world and from the creation of the universe to people, past, present, and future. Not only does whakapapa permit Māori to trace descent through past generations, it also allows movement and growth into the future. Identity, past, present, and future, comes from whakapapa links – to the past through ancestors, to the present through whānau, and to the future through children and grandchildren. Spiritual beliefs are a central feature of a person's overall well-being and identity. The spirits of the dead are accepted as real as the living. Life is a movement, passing and moving from generation to generation and person to person. Key to this concept is the understanding that time has no boundaries, being both past and present. From a Māori perspective, the opposite is the case and the past is ahead not behind. It is therefore in the past that one finds one's models, inspiration, and guides. As only the past and present are knowable, they are viewed as “mua,” or at the front of consciousness. The future which cannot

be seen is therefore behind or “muri.” We are from this viewpoint traveling backward in time, and the present unfolds in front, linking to the past.

This conceptualization of history, time, of the continuous cosmic movement does not leave the past behind; rather one carries one’s past into the future. The past therefore is central to and shapes both present and future identity. The strength of carrying one’s past into the future is that ancestors are ever present, and one’s place in the kin group is acknowledged and affirmed. Whakapapa is therefore not only about personal identity but also connects to whānau, immediate family grouping, as well as hapū and iwi, who share a common genealogy. Through these connections whakapapa establishes personal, collective, and whānau identities, positioning, and connectedness.

The creation stories with its layering of metaphor and symbolism provide the backdrop to the interrelatedness and indeterminacy of the natural, spiritual, social worlds. From a Māori perspective, people are not superior to other entities in the wider world but related through whakapapa to all aspects of the environment, themselves imbued with spiritual elements. Māori are part of the environment, connected to everything in it; therefore it requires respect. In this sense man belonged to the earth, and although man could use the resources of the earth, man did not own them:

In Māori cosmology, the gods (ngā Atua) are the origin of species. For example, the offspring of Tāne, Tū, Tāwhiri, Tangaroa, Rōngo, Haumia (and some 70-odd others) eventually populated the universe with every diverse species known. Under this system, humans are related to both animate and inanimate objects, including animals, fish, plants and the physical environment (land, rocks, water, air and stars). Thus there is no separation between the physical and spiritual worlds; in the holistic Māori worldview they are continuous. (Cheung 2008, p. 3)

Whakapapa and Ways of Knowing

The whakapapa of the universe is understood in terms of a movement, from nothingness or potential to the world of light. An example of this is the way the creation whakapapa is utilized to

represent the process of conception and birthing, not only of the world “*te ōrokohanga*,” but the birthing of the child “*te whānau tangata*” and the birthing of learning of the child “*te āhuetanga o te tamaiti*” (Ministry of Education 2009, p. 50). These birthing concepts emphasize evolving consciousness and learning rather than a physical evolving of matter. The child can be viewed as moving through realms of learning to a space of realization and understanding which expresses Māori ways of knowing, being, and doing.

Whakapapa is acknowledged as a way of thinking, a way of storing knowledge, and a way of debating knowledge. This holistic, outward-looking perspective of knowing is intimately connected and continually developing. These can be viewed as a double spiral on three levels. The first level is the level of the human person, where we move from nothingness through different stages and experiences into the night, then the world of light, to a state of oneness with others. The second level is the level of the cosmos. This movement and unfolding from the “nothingness, to the night, to the world of light” on this level symbolizes the unfolding of the cosmos and the universe. The third and final level, that of Io (the supreme god), is the core, the source of all energy (Shirres 1997).

This unfolding and continuously evolving world has also been linked to the growth of a plant “*te pu, te more, weu, aka, rea, waonui, kune and whe* meaning primary root, tap root, fibrous roots, trunk, tendrils, massed branches, buds and fronds” (Marsden 1992, p. 134) and the conception, gestation, and birth of a child. The child is viewed as moving from “*te kore, ki te po, ki te ao mārama*,” from nothingness or potential, to the world of light, from conception to birth:

The miracle of childbirth was equal in importance to the creation of the world to our tohunga mystics. The power of the child being born in our tradition cannot be stressed enough. The child is Tāne, a very real representation of Tāne, the god who brought light into the world. The child follows the entire path of Tāne during the Night ages, from its conception, its occupation in the heated darkness or womb, to the struggle for daylight during childbirth. Therefore the whole Māori scheme of creation actually coheres to the process of a child being born. (Robinson 2005, pp. 307–308)

This understanding of the universe and the evolution from “nothingness, into the night, into the world of light” connects strongly to the unfolding of consciousness and thought as well as an unfolding of matter. The development of the physical world therefore paralleled understandings of the development and emergence of patterns of human thought. This concept of creation and the gradual development of full awareness and understanding are expressed in the following whakapapa, as translated by Taylor (1855):

Na te kune te pupuke	<i>From the conception the increase</i>
Na te pupuke te hihiri	<i>From the increase the thought</i>
Na te hihiri te mahara	<i>From the thought the remembrance</i>
Na te mahara te hinengaro	<i>From the remembrance the consciousness</i>
Na te hinengaro te manako	<i>From the consciousness the desire</i>

(cited Shirres 1997, pp. 24–25)

The creation whakapapa provides a three-dimensional perspective of the world Māori. The first dimension or realm is te korekore, the realm of potential being and energy; the second, te po, the realm of becoming; and finally te ao mārama, the realm of being. An important point in this unfolding world is that it related to continuity, where the world is continuously being created and recreated. This relates strongly to children’s learning, and therefore assessment, in that like the universe, children’s ideas and understandings are continuously being created and recreated, defined, and redefined. Like the universe there is no end point to children’s learning, thinking, and understanding; rather it is an ongoing lifelong process. Another point is that the universe is dynamic. It is a stream of processes and events that are lineal rather than cyclical. This lineal movement is a two-way process, with the spirits of the departed descending to Hawaiki and those in a state of becoming ascending to the world of light. This idea also strongly links to the dynamic nature of knowledge acquisition and learning and the two-way traffic of ideas, thinking, and understandings. Some ideas ascend from potential

being into the world of becoming where they challenges and stretches thinking and into the world of being, of enlightenment and clarification. Other knowledge and understandings descend from the world of being, from a place of knowing and certainty, to a world of becoming, or uncertainty. It is here that once firmly held views and opinions may be challenged and interrupted and, if unable to stand up to the critique of becoming, are relegated to the world of potential being, or nothingness. In this way learning is not just an accumulation of ideas and understandings but a dynamic process of continuous germination, cultivation and pruning.

Whakapapa and Learning

The realms of “te korekore, te po, te ao mārama” provide a frame from which to view Māori learning, one that is deeply embedded within a Māori worldview and which expresses Māori ways of knowing, being, and doing.

- *Te Korekore: Potential Being*
Te korekore is the realm of potential being, between nonbeing and being. This realm is where all things gestate, where there is endless potential for learning and growth. This is a time of potential and possibilities, a time of openness to new ideas and growth. It is the seedbed of learning and development.
- *Te Po: Becoming*
Te po is the period of becoming, of stretching, of challenge, and of growth. There are many sub-realms within te po, “te Po te kitea, te Po tangotango, Po whawha, Po namunamu,” meaning “the night of unseeing, the night of hesitant exploration, night of bold groping, night inclined towards the day” (Marsden 1992, p.135). These nights provide an insight into the realm of te po, which is marked with uncertainty, hesitancy, apprehension, and negotiation. It does however also have a sense of stretching and swelling and unfolding potential and consciousness. This is the growth period of the seed of learning and development. Learning can occur simultaneously on different

levels; on different topics or subjects; on different planes including physical, emotional, and spiritual; and in different intensities. Like the contractions of birthing a child, the birthing of ideas and understandings is challenging, very rarely without pain, and comes in waves, surging and ebbing.

- *Te Ao Mārama: Being*

Te ao mārama is the realm of being, the realm of realization, enlightenment, and clarification. It is not, however, viewed as the end point, but rather as part of a continuously unfolding stream. The universe is likened to a stream of processes and events never static. Furthermore Māori did not develop the idea of a goal of history, so not only was there no end point, there was no final objective or goal. Each element is an integral part of the whole. So to know something is to locate it within space and time. Knowledge of whakapapa is critical to this.

Teaching, learning, and the learner are located within the context of Ranginui, the sky father, and Papatūānuku, the earth mother, their children, and their descendents. Whakapapa situates the learner within this world. Learners can place themselves in the world and so are able to relate to any aspects of life or nonlife including mountains, the rain, the sea, and all creatures and things in the world.

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Where the Learning Sciences Need Philosophers

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The learning sciences comprise a relatively new disciplinary community (commonly dated from 1991) that has largely taken over that part of educational psychology concerned with learning and thinking (Sawyer 2006). Although the learning sciences draw on a number of disciplines, their most direct line of descent is from cognitive science. Cognitive science, however, has had philosophers in its midst from the beginning – several of its leading figures are also leading philosophers – but this has not been true of the learning sciences. Such philosophical work as goes on in this field, and there is actually quite a lot, is done by amateurs. This article is aimed at identifying useful roles philosophers could play in the advancement of scientifically grounded efforts to improve educational practice. It makes no effort to present a coherent framework for philosophical contributions to the learning sciences. Instead, it touches on an assortment of possibilities, mainly in the hope of arousing philosophers of education to take the kind of active role that philosophers already take in cognitive science and in the many disciplines and professions that have a branch called “philosophy of. . .”

One way philosophers could be of value to people engaged in learning research and innovation is by helping clarify ubiquitous but fuzzy concepts. Take *literacies*, for example. In popular educational usage, the plural form of the term embraces things like “economic literacy” and “geographical literacy.” Does “literacy” mean anything special here or is it just a pretentious synonym for “knowledge”? And then there is *skill*, as in “higher-order thinking skills” and “twenty-first-century skills.” Is this term also used mainly for rhetorical effect or is it to be understood as claiming that “critical thinking,”

“problem solving,” “creative thinking,” and the like are actual teachable skills that can be widely applied, much like arithmetic skills? There are empirical issues here about learnability, teachability, and transfer, but there are also issues of what people mean, or think they mean, or fail to think about what they mean when they use these and many other trendy terms that fill the literature of teaching and learning.

Beyond conceptual problems, however, are more substantive problems that need collaborative, interdisciplinary work.

Different Conceptions of Knowledge and Their Different Uses

The traditional epistemological conception of knowledge as “true and justified belief” is far too restrictive for use in the behavioral sciences. Because learning scientists generally take knowledge development seriously, the field is awash in different conceptions of knowledge coming from neuroscience, semiotics, sociology, organizational theory (where knowledge creation is an important theme), and philosophy of science, where conceptions of knowledge become entangled with conceptions of the nature of science and scientific practice.

Perhaps a unified framework can be produced that ties all the various conceptions of knowledge together, or perhaps what learning scientists need is a way to move between conceptions as the situation requires without getting into tangles about what knowledge *really* is or is not. In any case, philosophers could help fend off the anti-knowledge forces that impinge on education from several directions. Most prominent among these at present are technology enthusiasts who parade the notion of “just-in-time” knowledge and whose line of argument is that schools should not be filling students’ heads with knowledge (which they believe becomes obsolete very rapidly) and should instead teach information search skills (as if the mechanics of Internet search do not also become rapidly obsolete). Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, evidence accumulated that the main determinant of reading comprehension is

what the reader already knows (Anderson and Pearson 1984). Those findings have not suddenly become irrelevant. Added to them is increasing recognition of the importance of knowledge in creative thinking. Yet it is understandable that knowledge should be downgraded, if knowledge is understood to be the contents of a mental filing cabinet. That is a notion traceable back to the hugely influential *Taxonomy of Educational Objectives* (Bloom 1956). The *Taxonomy* treated knowledge as inert stuff that is acted upon by mental skills. Even to this day, movements such as the “twenty-first-century skills” movement treat knowledge and mental skills as disjoint categories, ignoring knowledge domains such as systems theory and probability and statistics, which demonstrably instrumental value in effective thinking. Yet anyone who has done web searches seeking answers to questions of any complexity must surely have found that success in this very “twenty-first century” activity depends crucially on the domain knowledge one can bring to the search.

Knowledge Creation

It seems that until recent decades, scientists and other scholars referred to their creative achievements as discoveries rather than products or creations. Recall Newton’s likening his accomplishments to finding pretty stones on a beach and to his seeing farther than others by standing on the shoulders of giants. Perhaps the shift to a knowledge creation conception began with what A. N. Whitehead identified as the professionalization of invention in the nineteenth century. Steam engines and electric light bulbs are obviously invented, not discovered, and so why should a theory not also be recognized as an invention?

The idea of corporate knowledge creation took hold readily when Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) published *The Knowledge-Creating Company*. Some universities also began advertising themselves as creators of knowledge in the same sense – that is, as producers of new technology, new theories, new strategies in health care, and so forth. They were referring, however, to their research programs, not their educational functions.

In education, the idea of knowledge creation has had a much harder time gaining a foothold. Since the 1980s, however, “Knowledge Building” has gained increasing recognition in the learning sciences as an approach that makes students’ collective responsibility for knowledge creation and idea improvement central to the educational process (Scardamalia and Bereiter 2014).

In process terms, Knowledge Building means bringing design thinking – a generalization of the kind of thinking designers do (Brown 2009) – into work with disciplinary subject matter. This is in contrast to a kind of thinking that has, with considerable backing from philosophy, gained high status in contemporary science education: argumentative thinking, concerned with the justification of knowledge claims (Andriessen et al. 2003). In the actual process of creating new public knowledge, activity in both design thinking and argument to justify claims will typically occur and in close conjunction, but this does not obviate the distinction. The distinction has practical relevance in education, because to the extent it is valid, it implies that there is a serious imbalance in pedagogy. Since ancient times, design thinking has played almost no role in formal education. The advent of constructivist pedagogy has not changed this, in as much as constructive activities such as “guided discovery” mainly engage students in testing the truth value of propositions (e.g., testing which variables do and do not affect an observed phenomenon). The obvious way to introduce design thinking within the framework of formal education is to engage students in theory building. It is easy to invoke criteria according to which young students’ efforts along these lines are not “real” theories. More challenging is to identify in what respect children’s explanatory efforts are theoretical and to suggest what would constitute a next step up toward mature theory building. This is a matter on which philosophers could make a significant contribution to curriculum development.

What Constitutes Depth of Learning?

No one argues in favor of superficiality over depth in learning, but depth falls into that

category of qualities people feel confident they can recognize yet find it impossible to define. That schooling often falls short in promoting depth of learning is also widely recognized, but critics tend to focus their attacks on a caricature of direct instruction that has virtually no advocates. Good direct instruction goes well beyond rote memorization and reproduction to the point where students can explain, offer evidence, and even apply the acquired knowledge in limited contexts. What research on students’ concepts suggests, however, is that learners can do all this – pass tests of comprehension and application – without the new knowledge having much effect on their mental lives on the way they apprehend the world about them. Students may know that the earth is round like a globe, but in all their experiencing and thinking concerning the earth, it remains flat; knowledge that the earth is round plays no role in their conceptions of up and down, tides, the changing of the seasons, and all the many understandings that depend on thinking of the earth as a sphere. For educated adults, everyday practical thinking may also treat the earth as a flat surface over which the sun passes, but, in the background, knowledge of the earth’s shape and relation to the sun will inform their thinking – in varying degrees depending on their depth of knowledge. Although the fact that the earth is round may rise to consciousness only when needed, cosmology may be said to be continually present in what Wittgenstein called the “scaffolding of our thoughts.” We represent the earth mentally *as* a globe, even when we are not actively thinking of it as such.

Comparisons of understanding with misunderstanding are abundant, but studies of differences between shallow and deep understanding are rare. To the extent that depth is measured at all, it is measured by extent of agreement with experts or ability to apply knowledge. However, in line with the preceding discussion, a more learner-centered criterion of depth could be applied: *You have not understood something deeply unless it alters the way you apprehend the world.* This criterion opens up a field for practical and scientific inquiry that could well engage philosophers as investigators.

Teaching People to Think

Teaching people to think is a long-standing educational mandate and one in which philosophers have played a role that reaches back as far as classical times. However, treating thinking ability as a set of general skills separate from content is an innovation that appears to have originated in the 1950s and to have been embodied if not actually conceived in the aforementioned *Taxonomy of Educational Objectives*. Earlier conceptions of teaching to think are better characterized by a quotation attributed to Bertrand Russell that has appeared on homeschooling websites:

When you want to teach children to think, you begin by treating them seriously when they are little, giving them responsibilities, talking to them candidly, providing privacy and solitude for them, and making them readers and thinkers of significant thoughts from the beginning. That's if you want to teach them to think.

Here, teaching children to think is treated as a sort of character development – helping children become thinking people. There is no mention of skills, but there is of content: “significant thoughts.” A. N. Whitehead even more strongly emphasized the dependence of process on content:

Nobody can be a good reasoner unless by constant practice he has realized the importance of getting hold of the big ideas and of hanging on to them like grim death. (1929, p. 91)

In historical perspective, the “twenty-first-century skills” movement may be seen as an evolution or a revival of the “higher-order skills” movement of the 1970s. Within the thinking skills movement, “Philosophy for Children,” led by Matthew Lipman (2008), has been ahead of the curve in shifting from an emphasis on skill acquisition to thoughtful treatment of important questions. A number of other philosophy-based initiatives around the world also bring a measure of sanity to what, despite its “twenty-first century” label, is a movement grounded in obsolete psychology and wishful thinking. It could help greatly if more philosophers, like Lipman, got involved not merely as commentators but as working contributors to experiments in twenty-

first-century pedagogical reform. This means on one hand applying a heavy dose of critical thought to the utterances of thinking skills enthusiasts and on the other hand moving outside the comfort zone of argumentative thinking and applying design thinking to problems of improving student thought. A direction this creative work might take is suggested in the next section.

Children as Natural Philosophers

As every philosopher knows, philosophy used to encompass the entire rational pursuit of understanding. Then natural philosophy branched off, specialization ensued, and continued apace until today you may meet a neurophysiologist who specializes in research on one nerve. But children are where philosophy used to be. Given enough opportunity and supportive conditions, they will set about trying to understand the whole world. This may or may not imply that philosophy itself should become part of the curriculum. Philosophy as a discipline might well be deferred until secondary school, but a philosophical vocabulary could permeate classroom discourse at a much earlier age. In so far as young students become builders, critics, and improvers of theories about the world, they become through their own enterprise “natural philosophers” in the old sense. The natural world for them will encompass the subject matter of not only the physical sciences but also the biological and behavioral sciences; with no sharp internal breaks or breaks between them and the humanities.

This does not imply rolling all the disciplines into one “big ball of wax” nor a celebration of whatever ideas pop into children’s heads. It does, however, suggest that theoretical rigor is a gradual development and that it should not unnecessarily impede the growth of understanding. In science classes around the world, children are being guided in use of the “scientific method” (i.e., control of variables) to discover that the period of a pendulum depends on the length of the cord and not much else. But do they acquire any understanding of why this should be the case? Or do they in fact pursue explanations of any of the

lawful regularities revealed to them through “guided discovery”? If they do not, if instead they are rushed on to the next topic, they are clearly not being encouraged to function as natural philosophers.

Every child an Aristotle? Not quite. Children cannot be expected to have Aristotle’s fineness of conceptual discrimination, but on the other hand, they can be expected to have a more modern approach to theory building. The practical problem for educational designers is how students are to acquire modern competence in theory building. It cannot be assumed they will get it from their teachers, because there is evidence that teachers themselves have little sense of the productive role of theory in scientific progress (Windschitl 2004). And they will surely not get it from the mass media. An extensive bootstrapping operation seems required. If school students are to become genuine creators of enlightened and research-grounded understanding of their world, it will take sustained cooperation among a number of parties – teachers, administrators, teacher educators, learning scientists, technology developers, and school students themselves. Philosophers of education could play an active role in such collaborative bootstrapping. It is not necessary to specify the nature of that role: It should be enough that philosophers of education bring their distinctive knowledge and talents to the transformative effort and figure out for themselves how best to use them.

Conclusion

Philosophers can contribute significantly to progress in the learning sciences by performing their traditional role of clarifiers. To do this, however, they need to get into the substantive problems learning scientists are trying to solve. The everyday or ordinary language meanings of terms like “skill” and “understanding” are not at issue. They should become an issue, however, when educational designs and policies make consequential use of such terms without looking beyond their squishy everyday meanings. Philosophers in the learning sciences can also play active roles that go beyond

clarifying. They can take part in collaborative design thinking in projects concerned, for instance, with educating for deeper understanding or for knowledge creation. This article has said nothing about the role of philosophers of education as critics of the learning sciences. Criticism from philosophical perspectives could be valuable, as it is in other disciplines. However, it needs to be well informed about actual practice and the state of knowledge in this field. Learning scientists generally do not, for instance, need to be reminded that human beings are different from computers.

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White Supremacy

- [Critical Race Theory: A Marxist Critique](#)

Wikilearning

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Synonyms

[Collaborative knowledge production](#); [Networked learning](#)

Introduction

Wikilearning refers to learning activities people have *together* on the Internet, where people do not only share their ideas, information, and opinions but also cooperate, create, and evaluate things with each other. Researchers, educators, teachers, and other cultural workers are building wikis and forming alliances globally with their peers and like-minded people. They are parts of informal networks and “invisible colleges” and have joined forces in creating new forms of interaction and knowledge production outside closed educational systems. To paraphrase philosopher J. L. Austin (1911–1960), wikilearning is not only about how to do things with words but also how to do things with edits, saves, uploads, downloads, histories, revisions, and discussions.

Wikilearning is self-organized and self-determined by nature and has a common goal – editing a wiki page. By utilizing the power of wiki technologies, participants can engage in shared projects in various wikis. It is part of the “collaborative turn” and the associated participatory cultures, which are characterized by voluntary participation, altruistic sharing of ideas and resources, and anonymous collectivism. It exceeds the orthodox boundaries of formal schooling and other exclusive practices of education. Wikilearners do not need credentials, degrees, or diplomas to be involved and committed to learning together.

Wikilearning is an openly normative concept. It contains an ideological and political message: it highlights peoples’ knowledge (sometimes

referred to a contested concept of the wisdom of the crowds) and promotes a world in which knowledge production has been made equal among the people of the nations, and democracy prevails. Obviously, these ideals have their problems, including digital divide, gender bias of the learners, and censorship of the Internet in some parts of the world, which restricts the open educational process.

Wikilearning and Wikiworld

Ideally, wikilearners are autonomous and voluntary learners who self-organize participation in *shared* learning tasks on the Internet. Depending on the task, their number can be small or large, and their ages differ. Wikilearners act together locally (i.e., classroom students working on a wiki project) or globally (i.e., in a shared wiki page or a wiki project). Wikilearning presumes that all materials (i.e., texts, audios, and videos) are freely available on the Internet on the basis of open access (content is created under copyleft licenses, if licenses are needed at all). Everybody has in principle equal opportunity for contributing, commenting, and working on such materials. Of course, this is an idealized picture of the situation rather than an account of current state: not everyone has access to the Internet, let alone the skills necessary to participate, although doing wikis does not demand more than basic literacy and brief introduction to the basic functions of a wiki page.

Wikilearning is the learning model of the Wikiworld. The notion of Wikiworld refers to both the technical and the social spheres of the Internet. The prefix “wiki” – a Hawaiian language word for “quick” – comes from the characteristic software tool, that of wiki software, that has made collaboration on a webpage relatively fast and easy. The first wiki software and correspondingly the first wiki website were developed by Ward Cunningham in 1995. The idea was to provide users a fast way to edit a website without the need for extensive computer literacy. At the same time, Cunningham was aware of the social effects of the fact that anyone – without

registration or preapproved credentials – could provide content. As the “Welcome Visitors” page of the world’s first wiki, WikiWikiWeb puts it:

Welcome to WikiWikiWeb (...) We always accept newcomers with valuable contributions. If you haven’t used a wiki before, be prepared for a bit of CultureShock. The beauty of Wiki is in the freedom, simplicity, and power it offers. (...) Wiki content is WorkInProgress. Most of all, this is a forum where people share ideas! It changes as people come and go. Much of the information here is subjective. (<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/WikiWikiWeb>)

In outline, wiki software makes it possible to edit a webpage “live,” without leaving the page or using specific editing software. One just pushes the “edit” button, and the page appears in an editable version. After the edit, one can save and publish the page, and the new content is immediately visible. New pages can be created simply by adding a link to a new page. In addition, wiki software typically supports the possibility of two or more people working on the same page at the same time and provides a complete history of the changes made to the page.

The preserved history gives the freedom to tinker; it is impossible to accidentally destroy a wiki page, as it can always be easily restored. Moreover, there is often a separate discussion page connected to a wiki page (like in Wikipedia) promoting the “public use of reason.” These software features provide a low-threshold tool for collaboration without preexisting hierarchies, with space for deliberation, and with accumulated cultural memory. In general, the Wikiworld includes relatively low barriers to civic engagement and activism, artistic and other sorts of expression, easy access for creating and sharing one’s outputs with others, peer-to-peer relations and informal mentorship, as well as new forms of socialization, social connections, collectivism, and solidarity (see Jenkins et al. 2006). A case in point in the collaborative turn is Wikipedia and its sister projects such as Wikiversity.

However, the Wikiworld cannot be sufficiently scrutinized outside the larger sociopolitical context and without using the lens of radical political economy. From this angle, the Wikiworld is also

an ideological battlefield: the very ways in which the digital sphere and its physical counterparts are conceived are contested and defined by everyday actions (Suoranta and Vadén 2010, p. 2).

A growing number of researchers, educators, and other workers in the fields of science, education, and culture are forming alliances with their peers in global blogospheres and wikispheres and thus becoming parts of global informal networks and “invisible colleges.” As wikilearners, they are involved in an open digital knowledge production, often outside their home institutions (Suoranta and Vadén 2010, p. 2). In allowing and enhancing local and global collaboration, wikilearning can be thought of as a form of “commons-based peer production” (Benkler 2006) – a new modality of organizing production and learning. Commons-based peer pedagogy implies a form of learning that is

radically decentralized, collaborative, and non-proprietary; based on sharing resources and outputs among widely distributed, loosely connected individuals who cooperate with each other without relying on either market signals or managerial commands. (Benkler 2006, p. 60)

The use of noncommercial wikis, such as Wikipedia and its sister projects, is often a conscious action against corporatization and commodification of knowledge in profit-oriented universities and privatized schooling systems. Noncommercial wikis, as additions to educators’ conceptual and practical toolbox, facilitate the aim of border crossings, dialogues, and outreach. A crucial feature of wikis, in the light of these objectives, is their emphasis on collective, collaborative, and open approach to learning along with the belief in, and respect of, “the commons of culture, the immediately socialized forms of ‘cognitive’ capital, primarily language, our means of communication and education” (Žižek 2009, p. 91).

Wikilearning and Formal Learning

Wikilearning differs from formal, traditional view of learning in several ways. In this section, we follow comparison made by Suoranta and Vadén

(2012, pp. 105–109). Wikilearning is radically open and free in the sense that it is not regulated by educational laws or policies. It is an independent activity, which is not a part of the nation state and its educational system. Wikilearning does not exist in a written curriculum, although it can be incorporated into school settings as part of formal classroom learning. Whereas wikilearning is radically open and characterized by disorganization, formal school learning is politically and economically regulated by top-down, ready-made curricula.

Formal school learning is not only compulsory but also governed and regulated by many actors. The State has its say in general educational policies as well as funding and administration of educational systems. Teachers and their interest groups act as “disciplinary experts” who do not only decide what and how students ought to learn but also shape standards for curricula and assessment (Greenhow et al. 2009, p. 248). Wikilearning occurs in free spaces of civil society and voluntary participation, and voluntarism extends to all levels of the learning process: the decision to participate or not, to learn or not, and to be involved or not and the intensity and mode of participation.

However, one should keep in mind that “free” must be seen in relation to the more critical questions such as: who is paying for the hi-tech and the servers, or who is controlling and harvesting the data? In this respect, wikilearning does not exist in a totally “free space” but is determined by the political economics of the global technological industry and media markets. Although the flagship of all the wikis, the Wikipedia, lives with donations and does not allow advertising, the Wikiworld would be free if, and only if, there were not only open wikis and access to the Internet available as commons, but uncommodified natural resources controlled by the community of users (see Suoranta and Vadén 2010, pp. 158–162).

Wikilearning occurs in a peer-to-peer mode, that is, by learning from each other and helping each other to learn. Importantly, the peer-to-peer structure also allows giving without taking and taking without giving, i.e., it is not reciprocal.

Thus, due to the wiki technology itself, peer pressure is kept to a minimum. In schools, learning “technology” is utilized according to the habits and traditions of didactics and pedagogy (teacher-centered and student-centered pedagogy and so forth) and also embodied in school buildings and classroom designs. On the contrary, wikilearning is based on voluntary self-aggregation of participants and their immaterial and material productive assets. Immaterial assets include brainpower and cooperation (or “participatory processing”) with other users, and material assets include access to computers and digital networks (Bauwens 2009, p. 123).

An important feature of wikilearning is reflective uncertainty. Wiki information should not be taken for granted, because wikis are editable and the current edit may be erroneous if not outright malicious. However, the history of edits can, at least in principle, be traced back to the beginning. This, of course, is a dramatic difference between wiki information and printed information as well as Web 1 information. In comparison to textbooks’ qualities that often augment unreflective certainty, the “edit” and “history” buttons in every wiki page potentially increase learners’ skills in media literacy. Gradually, by using wiki pages, users learn to mentally expect and anticipate the structures of editability and genealogy also on other pages, including those of books. Thus, the reflective uncertainty of wikified information leaks to other areas of knowledge, in which learning is commonly defined by unreflective certainty. Reflective uncertainty also implies that the materials are not organized through preexisting taxonomies, but with dynamic “folksonomies” of tagging, linking, and categorizing.

In contrast to orthodox school learning, or what Freire (1993) called banking education, which emphasizes hearing, listening, and rote memorizing, in wikilearning it is crucial to negotiate on information and knowledge (e.g., in wikis’ discussion areas and so-called coffee rooms). As opposed to textbook approach, wikilearning includes searching information and comparing different sources of information.

In wikilearning, communication is not based on the model of sender and receiver (Shannon’s

transmission model of information), but on suggestion and evaluation. From an ethnographic perspective, traditional classroom activities are speaking, listening, making notes, and filling workbooks. The wikilearners are widely distributed, and their activities are typically computer mediated. At the level of cognition and experience, however, the difference grows bigger. Speaking, listening, and making notes correspond to the cognitive activities of conveying information and memorizing. When a wikilearner (or correspondingly an open source developer) receives a piece of new information (a code or a patch), the point is not to memorize or even to use it, but to evaluate it and synthesize it with possibly several versions of the existing database.

Ideally, all activities in wikilearning have this quality of evaluation and integration, rather than mere delivering and memorizing. Wikilearning thus entails that learning has not so much to do about rote learning, but everything to do about making connections bit by bit, even and often with strangers in the shared wiki project. As Greenhow et al. (2009, p. 251) point out, this quality of learning can be seen especially in young people's learning:

Contradicting traditional pedagogical models in which students submit their works to one authoritative source (the instructor) and receive feedback from that source, today's learners expect to participate in evaluating as well as in being evaluated and to share work and feedback among their peers. (Greenhow et al. 2009, p. 251.)

It is also noteworthy that in the hacker world, there is a militant ethos of evaluating the patch, the hack, and not the submitter, the author of the patch. The same applies to the Wikiworld: the question of who did it can be less important than the principles of anonymity and impersonality inherent in working with wikis (Suoranta 2010, p. 511).

Wikilearning is based on doing and creating together, with the underlying idea that no one can achieve alone what can be achieved together. Individual learning achievements are not measured, and criteria external to learning activities are not used. Participants judge the value of a learning activity based on own motivation for

participation (utility, fun, communality, etc.). The evaluation of learning extends also to formal educational systems and their learning techniques: even though traditional transmission models of knowledge die hard, they are nevertheless reinterpreted and remixed in the Wikiworld by the young and old wikilearners.

A wiki page aggregates the common pool of information by page editors. It is not the property or achievement of any one participant in the group and could not be written by any one editor. The software is built for aggregation, rather than publication or dissemination of preexisting knowledge. The process of aggregation does not have a predefined endpoint, as the aggregate is always freely available and subject to further uses, editions, modifications, and additions. Compared to the gated or closed forms of expert information often relied on by formal education, this promotes radical plurality of information.

Consequently, the artificial boundaries between academic subjects (such as math, literature, etc.) need not be replicated. In one way or another, motivation of each participant is *internal* and based on the desires and problems in everyday life. Again, this lies in clear contrast to formal education which is often compulsory and where individual learning tasks are often externally motivated (by the need to get good grades, to be a good pupil, etc.).

Wikilearning responds to local and contextual needs. As one of the earliest groups that have embraced wikilearning to the full, open source software developers call this phenomenon "scratching your own itch": developers typically develop software that they themselves need or want to learn about (see Raymond 1999). Similarly, unlike in formal schooling (where pre-existing goals have to be achieved and learning performances are evaluated with regard to preset benchmarking), engagement in wikilearning is based on real-world needs.

Wikilearning makes and takes all participants radically equal – the starting point is everyone's freedom to participate, create, and use the materials. Wikilearning is not regulated by academic degrees and does not intend to produce neither hierarchies nor competition between participants. In fact, typical

hierarchy in disorganization is task based, contextual, informal, and susceptible to rapid changes.

Perhaps the most important examples of wikilearning are various projects maintained by the Wikimedia Foundation, including Wikipedia and Wikiversity. They operationalize the key ideas of wikilearning, namely, participation, collaboration, commitment, and solidarity. For instance, Wikiversity consists of three core principles. First, no one controls the content of learning and no faculty decides about courses or granting diplomas. Second, Wikiversity is based on self-organization of users and editors, Wikiversitarians, who – regardless of their age, social status, gender, ethnicity, or religion – have the ability to contribute to the learning process. Third, Wikiversity is about mutual learning cultures, equal participation, and collaborative editing.

In lieu with these principles, the Wikiversitarians use models of learning-by-doing model and ideas of participatory action research. Thus, Wikiversity “is devoted to learning resources, learning projects and research for use in all levels, types, and styles of education” (Wikiversity: “Wikiversity”). It is a new global and collaborative infrastructure for knowledge production and also a potentially revolutionary learning environment in that it gives the users a chance for direct collaboration and sharing of their ideas and insights (Suoranta 2010, pp. 508–509).

From teacher’s and students’ point of view, the power of Wikiversity is precisely in its collaborative and public mode of communication. Wikiversity encourages participation in the public learning sphere and provides an uncensored and direct public arena for pedagogical and sociological communication to everyone – whether inside the university or elsewhere. It can be argued that Wikiversity abolishes the banking model of education as “an act of depositing, in which the students are the depositories and the teacher is the depositor” (Freire 1993).

Conclusion

Wikilearning may be a necessary (but by no means sufficient) concept for developing new

insights on the future of education and democracy. It opens up opportunities for developing peoples’ knowledge, for collective defiance, for popular insurgency through common knowledge building, and, for that matter, learning different positions and argumentation. At best, wikilearning creates passionate and responsible collaboration among teachers, students, colleagues, and other fellow human beings. At the same time it brings up critical questions such as: how is wikilearning being practiced in the real world where such qualities as collaboration and commitment, so crucial to wikilearning, are not widely acknowledged and immediately apparent?

Therefore, it is important to keep in mind the obvious issues of wikilearning. One concern has to do with technology and the digital divide. What used to be a question of having or not having a computer and Internet access has, during the 1990s, turned into relative inequality of having devices or wireless and broadband Internet access. Another issue has to do with gender gap among the users of Wikimedia. Some estimates suggest that less than 20% of all the active contributors of Wikipedia are women (Glott et al. 2010). The third problem seems to be the number of Wikipedians, which is slowly decreasing while the hierarchy of Wikipedia is actually increasing; thus, it is rather difficult for a newcomer to become an active contributor (see Simonite 2013). Contributing is even harder if altogether impossible if, and when, the Internet is being censored. In spite of these issues, the modes of learning in the Wikiworld might present a manifestation of radical openness, democracy, and free education. And as such, they can show in practice what people are able to do and possible to achieve in cooperation with others locally and globally.

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Wikis

- [Learning and Media Literacy](#)

Wisdom

- [Philosophical Idealism and Educational Theory](#)

Wittgenstein

- [On “the Temptation to Attack Common Sense”](#)
- [Wittgenstein and Philosophy of Education: A Feminist Reassessment](#)
- [Wittgenstein as Educator](#)

Wittgenstein and Philosophy of Education: A Feminist Reassessment

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The sickness of a time is cured by an alteration in the mode of life of human beings, and it was possible for the sickness of philosophical problems to get cured only through a changed mode of thought and of life, not through a medicine invented by an individual.

Wittgenstein, Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics

It is naïve to assume that the inferiority of women's moral voice can be overcome simply by asserting its equality. Several millennia of subordination are unlikely to be overcome by little more than a proclamation.

Susan J. Hekman, Moral Voices, Moral Selves

Synonyms

[Education](#); [Feminism](#); [Ordinary language philosophy](#); [Wittgenstein](#); [Zerilli](#)

Introduction

Why should feminist philosophers of education take an interest in Wittgenstein? In 2006, Toril Moi diagnosed feminism and feminist theory alike as having been befallen by a “feeling of exhaustion” (Moi 2006, p. 1735). Today, in times when Beyoncé and Emma Watson publicly (re)claim the title of feminist and mainstream pop stars as Miley Cyrus and Lady Gaga easily play with fluid gender expressions, feminism appears to be alive and thriving again. Above and beyond the question of how relevant these popular media examples actually are for furthering feminist politics and how deep their respective analyses cut, the impasse that Moi so poignantly described in her essay “‘I am not a feminist, but. . .’: How feminism became the f-word” is still not overcome, and her urge for feminist theory to reengage with “women who struggle to cope with everyday

problems” (Moi 2006, p. 1739) is as timely as ever. Wittgenstein’s philosophy of the ordinary offers surprising tools for moving feminist theorizing into exactly this direction. Nevertheless, I chose to open this entry with two rather humbling quotes. They are fitting insofar as the task I will undertake in the following is a humbling endeavor, too. Both Hekman and Wittgenstein caution us against overweening expectations for the transformative work we can expect theory or, more specifically, philosophy to accomplish in relationship to practice, and they also caution that it is not through one singular or individual effort that such change will come about. The relationship between Wittgenstein’s philosophy and feminism is a difficult one. It is in no way obvious or straightforward how the two hang together. Wittgenstein himself was not a feminist, neither did he explicitly reflect on issues of gender equality and the like; yet, if approached with care, reading feminist philosophy and Wittgenstein together can prove extremely fruitful and can lead to challenging results for both Wittgenstein and feminist scholarship. Out of the multitude of stimulating discussions of Wittgenstein’s work from feminist perspectives, I have selected a few central and recurring themes which are of particular relevance to the kind of questions, problems, and challenges feminist thinking faces in educational contexts.

Philosophy, Theory, and Social Change: Wittgenstein on the Place of Theory and Critique

Education has not only named the processes of transformation of the life of an individual, but educational institutions have often been created and are continuously confronted with the public hope and expectation of delivering positive transformation for whole societies. It is therefore no surprise that the field of education and pedagogy has provided a welcome and important playground for critical feminist analysis as well as practical interventions for furthering girls’ and women’s empowerment. One apparent discord between Wittgenstein and feminist theorizing might be

found in the way in which his analyses appear to draw attention to the limits rather than the possibilities of effecting change through theorizing, as when he proclaims that philosophy “leaves everything as it is” (Wittgenstein 1968, PI I, §124). Yet, this picture is not quite correct. Even if the limits of human knowledge and individual action are distinctly Wittgensteinian topics, a feminist reading of his writings can help us understand why it is so important to make a place for these limits in educational theorizing in order to avoid naïvely overestimating the powers of feminist educational interventions and in this way undermine or even reverse their own best intentions.

One of the prominent thoughts, which have inspired feminist philosophers, is Wittgenstein’s critique of the philosophical pursuit of an ideally transparent, abstract, logical language which is supposed to reveal and represent the true structure of reality beyond ordinary language: “We have got onto slippery ice where there is no friction and so in a certain sense the conditions are ideal, but also, just because of that, we are unable to walk. We want to walk so we need friction. Back to the rough ground!” (Wittgenstein 1968 PI I, §107). In a similar vein, feminist materialist Donna Haraway states, “Cyborg politics is the struggle for language and the struggle against perfect communication, against the one code that transmits all meaning perfectly, the central dogma of phallocentrism. That is why cyborg politics insist on noise and advocate pollution” (Haraway 1991, p. 176). Already in 1933, Wittgenstein suggests in *The Blue Book* that the philosopher’s “craving for generality” produces confusions for which we need a cure. His late philosophy then understands itself as a form of therapeutic method which leads us back to the rough ground of the ordinary. The language games within which our words acquire their meaning have no ultimate, perfect, and unchangeable foundation, but they are nevertheless solidly grounded in our life forms. This has led some conservative philosophers, for example, J. C. Nyíri and Ernest Gellner, to interpret Wittgenstein as saying that since it is impossible to determine any ultimate rational foundation for human practices beyond “*that’s how we do it*”

(Wittgenstein 1956, RFM II §74), we should cultivate a conservative attitude towards our own practices, and a nonjudgmental, tolerant attitude towards others' traditions. However, also non-conservative authors such as Richard Rorty subscribe to a similarly relativist interpretation of Wittgenstein's late philosophy only that here it is used to defend the possibility of radical social and political change (cf. Crary 2000).

Feminist philosophers do not necessarily lean on Rortyan relativist interpretations in order to argue for social and political change from a Wittgensteinian perspective. Even if Wittgenstein's analyses lead him to point to the ultimate "groundlessness of our believing" (Wittgenstein 1977, OC §166), this is not to say that there is no place from which to raise or justify critique. His point is rather that there is no place above, beyond, or outside of language from which we can launch such criticism of established practices. He turns our heads back on those cases in our ordinary linguistic practices in which we successfully manage to raise legitimate, justified criticism, even if there is no ultimate safeguard which allows us to secure that our critique will be heard, that our justifications will be accepted as legitimate. When we avoid, what Naomi Scheman following Cavell calls the "Manichean reading of Wittgenstein on rules" (Scheman 1996, p. 386), we can understand Wittgenstein as revealing the apparent choice between a narrow objectivism on one side or embracing relativism on the other, between "super-idealized guidance or caprice" (David Pears in Scheman 1996, p. 386), as misleading.

Wittgenstein's therapeutic endeavor to cure us from the idea of philosophy as developing theories which can then be "applied" is instead taken as an urge to understand philosophical theorizing as an effort to achieve clarity about contextualized examples and concrete situations of the infinitely varied, embodied, and lived experiences of women (cf. Moi 2015; Crary 2000; Scheman 1996). As Linda Zerilli states, the craving for generality is something that feminists are not immune to neither:

This craving is a product of centuries of philosophical and political thinking; it is a disposition to generalize against which feminists, working with

and against that inheritance, are by no means invulnerable. What drove some feminists to produce unified categories that did not attend to the particular case was in part this craving for generality, a craving that animated the hegemonic strand of the feminist theoretical enterprise through the 1980s and into the 1990s and that continues to haunt it even today, if only in the form of its nemesis, the refusal of theory, be that skepticism or radical particularism. (Zerilli 2005, p. 35)

When we now take a look at some central debates within feminist epistemology between feminist objectivists and feminist skeptics, we will find that Wittgenstein's broadening of our notions of objectivity and rationality offers a fresh perspective in steering these debates out of stilted and stifling oppositions.

Wittgenstein's Philosophy and Feminism: Between Epistemology, Ethics, and Politics

It is well known that for Wittgenstein epistemological, moral, and political reflections overlap and intersect in his writings. They are not neatly separated from each other as they have been in more traditional systematic philosophies, but for the present purpose, it seemed useful to try to disentangle some of the various lines of thought. In the following, I will mostly focus on Wittgenstein's later work in relation to which the feminist discussion has been most prolific, even if some interesting work on the *Tractatus* can also be found (e.g., Tanesini 2004, pp. 53–88; Cohen 2002). I will give some examples, respectively, for how central Wittgensteinian ideas have been useful to think about feminist epistemology, ethics, and politics. While this is by no means a comprehensive summary of the feminist discussion of Wittgenstein's philosophy, I nevertheless hope to highlight some interesting points of overlap and mutual inspiration so as to encourage further engagement with his work by feminist philosophers of education.

Feminists have significantly drawn attention to how the traditional exclusion of girls and women from educational opportunities and institutions has led to limitations and biases in our scientific

and historical bodies of knowledge almost exclusively produced by men and from male perspectives. Beyond claiming equal rights to education, striving to rectify the canon by lifting women's voices and contributions, and showing how women scientists and scholars cannot only produce equally valid and interesting research and scholarship as men, but broaden, enhance, and improve our knowledge by actually taking women's bodies, lives, and experiences into adequate account, feminists have also thought about knowledge in a philosophical sense. Early feminist standpoint epistemology drew on György Lukács' idea that the structural conditions of workers' lives afford them an epistemologically privileged position to gain an adequate picture of social relations in capitalist society, and argued that women similarly inhabit an epistemologically privileged position from which we can shed light on the objective reality of life in sexist societies. Hartsock's (1983/1998) initial approach has been criticized by postmodernist, black, Latina, lesbian, and more recently queer theorists for building her theory on an essentialist idea of the category of "woman" thus overlooking and potentially excluding women who experience their lives in radically different ways due to differences in class, gender identity, sexuality, ethnicity, race, or religion. Later feminist standpoint theorists such as Sandra Harding (1991) have therefore moved away from the idea of a unified women's standpoint to embrace a plurality of situated knowledges. In the debates between feminists who argued for the outright rejection of any claim to objectivity since they considered it tainted by flawed male ideals and those feminists who wanted to hold on to objectivity, in a reworked, broadened rendering, in order to be able to solidly ground their political demands for change, Wittgenstein has often been taken to align with the feminist skeptics and invited the charge of reducing epistemology to questions of power and politics. As Alice Crary shows, however, Wittgenstein can also be read differently, so that his "attack on an abstraction requirement is intended not to discredit the concept of objectivity per se but rather to correct what he sees as an inaccurate conception of it" (Crary 2007, p. 25).

An objective and rational account of reality is not available from an ideal, abstract standpoint that disregards all subjective endowments. On the contrary, it might require the active and conscious cultivation of certain sensitivities, not least through education: "I want to say: an education quite different from ours might also be the foundation of quite different concepts. For here life would run on differently. [...] In fact, this is the only way in which *essentially* different concepts are imaginable" (Wittgenstein 1967, Zettel §§ 387–8).

The postmodern emphasis on the internal complexity of the category of "woman," the idea that gender is socially constructed rather than a biologically given binary identity and that "the gendered body is performative" (Butler 1990, p. 136), even if considered convincing on an ontological level, has prominently been contrasted with the need for a unified category of "woman" in order to advance feminist politics. Wittgenstein's thought can provide helpful tools for rethinking the identity category of "woman" as a subject of and ground for feminist epistemology, ethics, and politics and for exploring the feminist foundations debates of the 1980s and 1990s from an angle which anticipates and aligns with contemporary conceptions. Hilde Lindemann Nelson (2002), for example, provides an insightful discussion of Wittgenstein's concept of "family resemblance" in that regard. When we look at different instantiations of a concept, so Wittgenstein, we "will not see something that is common to all, but similarities, relationships, and a whole series of them at that" (Wittgenstein 1968, PI §66). As feminist biologists and trans theorists have importantly brought to our attention, even the biological criteria for which kind of bodily and genetic constitutions count under the category of "woman" are much more diversified than previously thought. Of course, it is always possible to dismiss any divergences from a stipulated norm as a clinical aberrance to be dismissed as a mere exception. But current research has pushed even the medical community to take a more respectful stance towards the wide variety of intersex bodies and the interests of trans people.

The complexity increases even further if we leave these merely biological considerations and

turn to feminism as concerned with the whole variety of women's experiences. The kind of kinship relations which the idea of family resemblances invokes can help conceptualize a nonessentialist notion of "woman" not based on any core identity or fixed, exclusionary boundaries, and open to continuous change of the language game (cf. Nelson 2002). Linda Zerilli (2005, pp. 33–65) uses Wittgenstein's concept of aspect-dawning in her discussion of Butler's ideas on gender performativity and the question of the boundaries of the category "woman." She takes his thoughts on aspect-seeing to explain that while "under ordinary circumstances we do not doubt" (2005, p. 58) whether the woman that I see in front of me on the train actually "is" a woman, it does not imply that we can never see the same person or situation under a different aspect. She interprets Butler's account of drag as an "imaginative exercise" (Ibid.) which can provoke us to question the ways in which we have been introduced to the language game of distinguishing between men and women. The discussions put forth by queer theory in the last decades provide distinct examples for the relevance of Wittgenstein's thinking to current social and political issues beyond a purely academic discourse. Following his philosophical critique carries the potential to unhinge the complete architecture of how we think about gender, sex, and sexuality.

Concluding Remarks: Refocusing the Character of Feminist Critique with Wittgenstein

When Wittgenstein writes about his own role as a critic: "It came into my head today as I was thinking about my philosophical work and saying to myself: 'I destroy, I destroy, I destroy —'" (Wittgenstein 1980, CV p. 21), it evokes interesting parallels to Sara Ahmed's figure of the "feminist killjoy":

Let's take this figure of the feminist killjoy seriously. Does the feminist kill other people's joy by pointing out moments of sexism? Or does she expose the bad feelings that get hidden, displaced, or negated under public signs of joy? Does bad

feeling enter the room when somebody expresses anger about things, or could anger be the moment when the bad feelings that circulate through objects get brought to the surface in a certain way? (Ahmed 2010, p. 65f.)

Beyond Ahmed's point to not shoot the messenger, what unites both Wittgenstein and feminist negative-critical analyses is not only that they are undertaken with an earnest intention to reveal something correct about the reality we live in, but that they ultimately open new ways of understanding and living in this world in a thoroughly positive sense. Examples of the positive, constructive side of Wittgensteinian feminism can be found in Hekman's (1995) extension of moral theory to embrace a multiplicity of moral voices, in Zerilli's "freedom-centered feminism," which, "after all, is concerned not with knowing (that there are women) as such, but with doing – with transforming, world-building, beginning anew" (2005, p. 65), in Cray's (2000, 2007) urge to take the cultivation of our sensitivities as an integral part of objective moral judgment, in the refocusing of the role of embodiment (Tanesini 2004, pp. 114–121) and the "radical entanglement of affect and conceptual rationality" (Zerilli 2015, p. 282). What remains important in Wittgenstein's destructive gestures, however, in my view resides mainly in the fact that it is not only "students [who] often think change comes easily" (Stickney 2014, p. 209), but also educators and educational theorists who underestimate the "complexity" (Ibid.) of transforming practice. If nothing else, then what Wittgenstein can help demonstrate is why formal, top-down educational reforms are insufficient to realize gender equality in schools. While it is important to incorporate lessons into the curriculum which actively engage with women's struggle for emancipation and social and political equality, classes on diverse gender roles and sexualities beyond the heteronormative matrix, and courses on what constitutes sexual harassment and why it is more than a trivial offense, and while it is important to change the legal frameworks and school's policies for gender equality, it is not enough. Ultimately, what we have to aim at is a change of our form of life together, a change in the kind of culture which

we cultivate in our educational institutions, the kind of gender norms which we practice, enact, embody, and perpetuate together in our everyday lives as teachers, students, and administrators in schools, universities, and beyond.

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Wittgenstein and the Learning of Emotions

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Introduction

It is a methodological precept of Wittgenstein's later philosophy that greater clarity may be obtained by looking at how words are taught and learned: "One thing we always do when discussing a word is to ask how we were taught it. Doing this . . . destroys a variety of misconceptions" (Wittgenstein 1966, I, §5). Looking at how we learn psychological concepts can therefore be a way to break the hold that certain pictures of psychological states have on us. It may also be a way to break the hold that certain pictures of learning have on us.

Yet learning is not a uniform phenomenon. In his work on the foundations of mathematics, Wittgenstein talks about the *motley* of mathematics (Wittgenstein 1956, III, §48). Likewise, the concept of learning covers a motley of processes, and we should resist the impulse to force them all into a single mold or two. The aim of this chapter is accordingly to dip into the great variety of things that learning can be, concentrating mainly on some of the characteristic ways in which we

learn emotional concepts. In doing so, light will also be thrown on what Wittgenstein may have meant when he compared the learning of emotions to the learning of musical styles (Wittgenstein 1992, pp. 42–43).

Asymmetry and Expression

A good place to begin is the so-called asymmetry between first- and third-person statements about mental states. This asymmetry has two aspects. First, I am the authority on my thoughts, feelings, and emotions. If you want to know what I think or feel, then, normally, I am the one to ask (Finkelstein 2003, p. 9). You may also ask someone who knows me well, but the validity of that person's judgments will ordinarily be conditional on my acceptance of them. Second, I do not usually need to back up my claims about what I think and feel with behavioral evidence (Wittgenstein 1967, §472). When someone says that she is angry, we might very well ask why, but not how she knows. In special cases, we may think she is wrong, but if so we have to adduce quite strong evidence, and even then her sincere avowal may cancel out the evidence.

When we are in a certain philosophical frame of mind, this asymmetry might seem puzzling. How can we be said to know something simply on the basis of our saying so, without citing any evidence and sometimes even against the evidence? I do not know anything about my brain, but even when I am in an fMRI-machine I am the one to ask about what I feel and think, not the neuroscientist. And even though my wife seems to attend more carefully to my behavior than what my distracted self does, I still get to have the final say on what I feel and think. Why?

According to what Finkelstein (2003) calls *detectivism*, I have direct knowledge of my thoughts and feelings because I, unlike others, am able to *detect* them. Analogous to our perception of the outer world, we perceive (or “scan” or “monitor”) our own inner world and report on what we “see” there. Other people do not enjoy this special access to my inner states, and therefore, they have to deduce them from more or less

unreliable behavioral clues. This kind of view is a prominent target of Wittgenstein's criticism in his remarks on psychology, including the private language argument. A common thread in these remarks is Wittgenstein's juxtaposition of detectivism with *expressivism*: we dissolve many of the philosophical problems about first-person ascriptions of mental states by seeing them as expressions rather than reports (Wittgenstein 1967, §472).

Wittgenstein's target here is just as much a view of the body as a view of the mind. It is not only the picture of the inner world that creates problems but the corresponding picture of the body as a mere body, according to which bodily expressions are really only physical movements, devoid of significance, and in need of interpretation to invest them with meaning. Against this, Wittgenstein maintains that there is a literal sense in which we make emotions visible (or audible) by expressing them. Crying makes sadness manifest, and saying that you are sad can do the same (Finkelstein 2003, p. 93). When we talk about *seeing* what other people feel, this should not be dismissed as merely a metaphor for interpretation. Indeed, a child that had to learn how to interpret these expressions with the help of rules like “If people cry, they are sad” would be missing something.

“We *see* emotion.” – As opposed to what? – We do not see facial contortions and make inferences from them (like a doctor framing a diagnosis) to joy, grief, boredom. We describe a face immediately as sad, radiant, bored, even when we are unable to give any other description of the features. – Grief, one would like to say, is personified in the face. This belongs to the concept of emotion. (Wittgenstein 1967, §225)

This “expressivism” should not be understood as a general theory, but as an illuminating analogy. If we are puzzled about first-person authority, bodily expressions can function as helpful objects of comparison (Wittgenstein 1953, §130; Kuusela 2013). Seen in that light, it should be no more puzzling that I am the best one to ask than that “my face is the best one to look at” if you want to know how I feel (Finkelstein 2003, p. 101). Likewise, if we are mystified by the fact that we do not normally need evidence for our claims about how

we feel, it may help to note that neither do we need evidence for our smiling or crying. Yet since Wittgenstein's view is that psychological self-ascriptions are *akin* to expressions, there are differences, too. Unlike a smile, for instance, an avowal can be said to be true or false, as Finkelstein (2003) emphasizes. Moreover, psychological self-ascriptions can be used like reports in some situations, for instance, in the therapist's office.

Natural Expressions

The most famous and controversial of Wittgenstein's ideas on the learning of psychological words is his suggestion that they are learned as replacements for natural expressions:

Here is one possibility: words are connected with the primitive, the natural, expressions of the sensation and used in their place. A child has hurt himself and he cries; and then adults talk to him and teach him exclamations and, later, sentences. They teach the child new pain-behaviour. "So you are saying that the word 'pain' really means crying?" – On the contrary: the verbal expression of pain replaces crying and does not describe it. (Wittgenstein 1953, §244)

Wittgenstein's remark is on pain, but it seems reasonable to extend it to emotions like anger or sadness. Certainly, learning emotions involves being taught to use words instead of reacting "primitively": to say that one is angry instead of raging, or to go from screaming to crying to speaking. There is here both a gradual calming (or disciplining) of bodily expressions and a partial replacement of those expressions with words. This partial replacement allows for both reflection on and refinement of emotions: reflection, in the sense that language enables the child to think and talk about emotions, and refinement, in the sense that the child's space of expression becomes infinitely more nuanced and complex with language. Hence, learning emotions also involves coming to have *new* emotions – hope is often cited as an emotion that can only be had by those who possess a language.

Many have been critical to this picture of learning. To note just one problem, it does not seem to be valid for all mental states, not even all

emotions. More complex emotions, like guilt, do not even have natural expressions in the same sense as more elementary emotions like anger or sadness. They may have characteristic expressions, like a "guilty look," but these are more symbols of guilt than they are natural expressions of it. Hence, the replacement thesis looks incomplete and without empirical support. The question is what kind of thesis it is and whether it is a thesis at all. After all, Wittgenstein introduces it by calling it a mere possibility. In a similar discussion of language learning, Wittgenstein asks, "Am I doing child psychology?", and he answers, "I am making a connexion between the concept of teaching and the concept of meaning" (Wittgenstein 1967, §412). Hence, it is a logical point rather than an empirical one about the actual genesis of concepts.

That emotions like fear and joy have natural expressions is one of those general facts of nature without which "our normal language-games lose their point" (Wittgenstein 1953, §142). Children's learning of the language of emotion thus rests on these natural expressions: without them, the grammar of emotion would be very different; indeed, there is a sense in which there would be no such thing as fear and joy in that event. There is, that is to say, an internal connection between these natural expressions and the emotions that they express: knowing what sadness is involves knowing that crying is typically a reliable basis for ascribing sadness to others (and if they fake, then it is sadness they fake). The logical point can also be formulated temporally: we do not first know what sadness is and then make the empirical discovery that there is a connection between crying and sadness. In the words of Lars Hertzberg (2014), the account in Wittgenstein 1953, §244 is "an account of what might be termed a logical order: an indication of the circumstances in which we would be prepared to say that someone has learnt verbal expressions of pain" (p. 368).

Patterns of Life

One simple way to understand the philosophy of the later Wittgenstein is to say that it involves a

widening of the contextual principle of Frege and the *Tractatus* (Finkelstein 2003, pp. 107–109). The meaning of words must be seen not only in light of the sentences they form part of but also in light of the particular situation and narrative to which they belong (Wittgenstein 1953, §525; Wittgenstein 1953, II, §ix). The same applies to all emotional expressions: only in the context of a “far-reaching particular manifestation of life” is there such a thing as the expression of, say, sorrow (Wittgenstein 1967, §534).

In Wittgenstein’s later writings, the contextuality of emotions comes out most sharply in his idea of *patterns in the weave of life*. In this perspective, emotions are seen as constituted by complex and dynamic configurations of words and gestures, actions and reactions, appearing within the stream of life. Emotions like love and grief are more like such patterns than they are like feelings in the narrower sense:

“Grief” describes a pattern which recurs, with different variations, in the weave of our life. If a man’s bodily expression of sorrow and of joy alternated, say with the ticking of a clock, here we should not have the characteristic formation of the pattern of sorrow or of the pattern of joy. “For a second he felt violent pain.” – Why does it sound queer to say: “For a second he felt deep grief”? Only because it so seldom happens? (Wittgenstein 1953, II, p. 174)

The importance of context is not at odds with the importance of immediacy mentioned above. Dialectically put, an expression is only immediate when mediated by context. A smile is only a smile in a face, which again is only the kind of smile it is as part of a situation (Wittgenstein 1953, §583). Wittgenstein remarks that if we are to imagine a kind smile or a malicious smile, we typically imagine the face or, rather, the human being as a whole, within different contexts, smiling at playing children or at suffering enemies (Wittgenstein 1953, §539). Still, within those contexts we can *see* the kindness in the kind smile and the maliciousness in the malicious smile.

Acquiring concepts of emotions can therefore be understood as learning how to recognize certain patterns in the weave of life. These can be of an almost endless variety. No two patterns of grief are exactly alike – they may even be completely unlike each other. Moreover, “one pattern in the

weave is interwoven with many others” (Wittgenstein 1967, §569). The plasticity of emotional concepts, the variety of patterns they cover, as well as their being intricately intertwined with each other make it hard to understand how we can learn to recognize them. Wittgenstein suggests that we tend to learn the simple figures first and then proceed to the more complicated, “the way I learn to distinguish the styles of two composers” (Wittgenstein 1992, pp. 42–43).

Early on we learn what typically makes people happy or sad, whereas later in life we come to understand that one can become sad by happy events. Still, the concept of sadness would be very different from ours if we learned the concept of sadness in these latter circumstances. Hence, the intricate variety of emotional patterns is rooted in simpler connections. Analogously, even if we are inclined to call the letter “e” yellow, as Wittgenstein notes in his discussion of secondary sense (Wittgenstein 1953, II, p. 216), our color concepts would not be what they are if we learned them in connection with letters. As a matter of logical grammar, children will have to learn the concept of sadness in the context of sad things and may later learn to transfer it to very different cases (Wittgenstein 1982, pp. 966–967).

Imponderable Evidence

Agreement is part of the grammar of mathematics in the following sense: if we arrive at different results, then at least one of us is doing something wrong, and usually we will find out who (Wittgenstein 1976, p. 107). Now it would be an exaggeration to say that disagreement constitutes psychological concepts, since conflicting judgments are quite exceptional in the face of raw expressions of elementary feelings. In modern adult life, however, such raw expressions are almost the exception, and concerning judgments of subtler, verbal expressions, disagreement is nearly the norm (Wittgenstein 1953, II, p. 227).

Wittgenstein (1953, II, p. 228) remarks that judgments about sincerity and pretense are often backed up by *imponderable evidence*, which includes “subtleties of glance, of gesture, of

tone.” These nuances may be difficult to describe except in the vaguest of terms: “something about his smile,” “the way he looked at her,” or “as though a shadow came over his face.” This is a kind of evidence, but not the kind that any rational being has to see or accept (indeed, in many such cases seeing *is* accepting). True, we do not judge the sincerity of an expression merely on the basis of what is given to us in the moment but also by the surroundings, in particular our past dealings with the person in question. Moreover, pretense will have different consequences than sincerity, and these *may* decide the issue, for instance, if we hear her laughing after she thinks we have left. Then again, the question may arise again: wasn’t there something hollow about her laughter? The consequences may be just as hard to agree on as the original expression and the imponderable evidence just as ineradicable.

The pervasiveness of imponderable evidence means that learning emotions involves learning to appreciate this kind of evidence, although the skill with which we do so varies widely. Wittgenstein suggests that there is a connection between the judging of imponderable evidence and being a “Menschenkenner,” an expert judge of character (Wittgenstein 1953, II, p. 227). There is a striking illustration of this kind of knowledge in a novel by his Austrian contemporary Robert Musil, where “Menschenkenntnis” is translated as “knowledge of human nature”:

Keeping company with the prince thus became a source of refined psychological pleasure for Törless. Dawning within him was the kind of knowledge of human nature that teaches us to know and appreciate another person by the fall of his voice, the way he picks something up, even the timbre of his silence and the expression of the physical posture with which he occupies a space; in short, by that agile way, barely tangible and yet the only truly complete way, of being something spiritual and human, which is layered around the tangible, effable core as around a bare skeleton, and by means of that appreciation to anticipate his mental personality. (Musil 2001, p. 8)

One can learn to master the art of judging character, Wittgenstein adds, but only through experience, perhaps accompanied by an expert judge who can teach us by hints and tips. Here, we do not first learn a method and then arrive

at whatever results or judgments that the method leads to. We learn, Wittgenstein says (Wittgenstein 1953, II, p. 227), correct judgments (“Mummy looks a bit worried today”), perhaps helped by a few hints (“Isn’t there something distant in her eyes, as though she’s not *really* listening?”). There is no method or technique involved apart from seeing for yourself, guided by the verdicts of the more experienced. Gradually, one comes to formulate judgments of this sort oneself, autonomously, as it were, judgments that may serve as guides for others: the novice has then become a teacher. “This is what “learning” and “teaching” are like here” (Wittgenstein 1953, II, p. 227).

Summary

A nice way to summarize is by returning to Wittgenstein’s comparison between learning emotional concepts and learning styles of music (Wittgenstein 1992, pp. 42–43). The analogy highlights several interconnected similarities. First, primitive reactions and natural expressions play a corresponding role in the two fields, as has been well explored by Simo Säätelä (2002). Second, recognizing emotions and distinguishing musical styles involve perceptual discernment rather than rule-based reasoning. One may see the difference between real and feigned sorrow, and one may hear the difference between Beethoven and Brahms. Third, the analogy suggests that an emotion is more like a piece of music as a whole than a single note within this piece. And the character of a single note depends on its place in the piece, like the character of a single expression depends on its place in a pattern of life. Fourth, in both fields we learn by moving from simpler to more complex examples. We are shown the simplest and most typical cases first, and then, when recognizing these has become a matter of course, we proceed to more complex and less typical cases. Fifth, imponderable evidence is vital in both psychology and music: quite often we are not able to justify our judgment in any other way than by gesturing to the most delicate of nuances.

In this way, emotional concepts and musical styles function as objects of comparison for each other, highlighting similarities (and differences) in order to clarify their grammars and destroy misconceptions of them by attending to how they are learned.

Cross-References

- ▶ [Allegedly Conservative: Revisiting Wittgenstein's Legacy for Philosophy of Education](#)
- ▶ [Wittgenstein and the Philosophy of the Subject](#)
- ▶ [Wittgenstein and the Path of Learning](#)
- ▶ [Wittgenstein as Educator](#)

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Wittgenstein and the Path of Learning

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Introduction

The teacher/pupil relationship is ubiquitous in Wittgenstein's writings, but quite how he understood it and what goes on in the transactions that enable learning is not clear. The key to understanding Wittgenstein on learning is to understand the characteristics and skills that his remarks require of the pupil qua individual. Most commentators read Wittgenstein as endorsing a social model of the teacher/pupil relationship: the pupil learns by being initiated into a social practice by the teacher (Stickney 2008; Williams 1994, 2002, 2011; Smeyers and Burbules 2006; Bakhurst 2011).

The first section sketches four reasons for challenging the social reading of Wittgenstein. The second section outlines the shape of an individualistic account of the path to learning.

Challenging the Social Reading of Wittgenstein

1. Training. The English word "training" is elastic in meaning. It covers all sorts of learning schedules from simple Stimulus–response (S-R) conditioning to initiation into complex activities that require sophisticated thoughtfulness, from learning nuanced craft skills to intellectual pursuits such as chess. Wittgenstein's word for "training" is *Arbriechung* and this has none of the elasticity of the English word. It applies only to crude S-R conditioning. It's a word suitable for conditioning "dumb brutes" – for whipping horses. It is not a word that is suitable in German for human training (Huemer 2006). At the very least, this means that we must treat Wittgenstein's talk of training with extreme caution and would do well to assume that it means

only simple conditioning. If learning involves training in Wittgenstein's sense, it must include a good deal more too. Learning cannot consist simply in training; it must involve training plus something else (Stickney 2008, Luntley 2008, 2012).

2. Wittgenstein nowhere endorses a social account of practices; he nowhere says that a practice is *constituted* by being a shared activity. As David Pears pointed out long ago, in the one passage where his interlocutor directly raises the question, Wittgenstein ducks the issue, for he focuses on the need for repeatability over time, not across persons. In PI 199, his interlocutor says,

Is what we call "following a rule" something that it would be possible for only *one* person, only *once* in a lifetime to do?

to which Wittgenstein replies:

It is not possible that there should have been only one occasion on which only one person followed a rule. It is not possible that there should have been only one occasion on which a report was made, an order given or understood, and so on.

3. Wittgenstein's speaks of practices, habits, and customs as part of our "natural history" (PI 25, 415), but he nowhere says of these things that they are normative, nor does he speak of norms. These terms are not part of Wittgenstein's vocabulary. He speaks of rules – *Regln* – but this word is, of course, from the same root as *Regularitie*. What Wittgenstein is interested in are regularities (PI 208). The idea that the regularities or word use are normative or involve "grasp of norms" is a fiction of the secondary literature that has dominated much writing on Wittgenstein since Kripke's seminal work on rule-following. Furthermore, the idea that word use – linguistic meaning – is normative seems to be flatly false. To be interesting, the idea that word use is normative involves norms that are not reducible to mere causal regularities; that's the "space or reasons/space of causes" dichotomy that has become *de rigeur* for many scholars (McDowell 1994; Bakhurst 2011; Huemer 2006). But that requires categorical

norms, and not merely conditional norms, for the latter are easily handled in a teleological reduction. However, the idea that linguistic meaning imposes categorical norms on our word use is hard to sustain (Hattiangadi 2007). Some writers on Wittgenstein have accepted the point (Boghossian 2003), but most commentators from Baker and Hacker through to more recent studies continue to repeat the claim that meaning is normative without engaging with the substantive literature that has challenged the very coherence of Kripke's supposed insight (Williams 2010; McGinn 2013; Child 2010; Stern 2004).

4. The idea that learning involves a social model of initiation is incoherent. Assume that learning involves real cognitive development, e.g., the acquisition of new concepts. This is a challenging assumption, one that invites us to consider how learning so conceived is so much as possible. The invitation is to provide an explanation of how there can be a process by which one acquires new concepts. Many Wittgensteinians think the invitation to explain how learning is possible should be avoided (Bakhurst 2011), although some take the invitation seriously (Williams 1994). Williams' response is instructively clear and well argued.

Williams endorses a social model of how concept acquisition is possible in which the key ingredient to the model is outsourced to the social. Williams accepts that Wittgenstein's concept of training is, on its own, an insufficient resource to make learning possible – point (1) above. For Williams, learning = training plus X and her extra ingredient is outsourced to the learner's teachers, elders, and others. The learner acquires a new concept by being extended the "courtesy" of being treated as having acquired the concept by her "others." But that simply begs the question and cannot begin to be a coherent model of concept acquisition without an account of what it is about the individual that renders them apt to accept the courtesy extended by the others if they do not already have the concept in question. In short, such social outsourcing of the ingredient that makes learning possible is

either incoherent or it collapses into a form of nativism in which the individual already possesses the concept in question.

The threat of nativism, if one takes the invitation to explain the possibility of learning, is often taken as good reason to avoid the attempt to provide an explanation and to rest content with a description of learning. But the descriptivist strategy fares no better than Williams' bold attempt at explanation.

To advocate description in favor of explanation is, in effect, to agree with Baker and Hacker that all explanations of meaning are "internal" or "intra-linguistic." But that is a form of nativism, for it means that one can only explain/teach the meaning of a word to someone who already has the conceptual space for understanding the meaning. If all teaching (compare all ostension) only works "within language," then it can only work for those already equipped with the resources for understanding the word. And that's a disguised nativism. Here are two ways of seeing this point.

First, assume that learning is acquiring a new concept C by analysis; e.g., it's introduced as the word that attaches to things that are F, G, and H. For this to work, the conceptual slot for C must already be there in the combination of those concepts that provide the analysis. So it's not really a new concept, it is simply a new label for a way of thinking that was already available by combining simpler concepts.

Second, a more subtle version of this would be to introduce "C" by saying "it's one of those," or "it's like this. . .," or "it's similar to these. . .." These locutions are Wittgenstein's favored expressions when he is talking about learning, e.g., PI 69: "*This and similar things* are called 'games.'" There are two ways of understanding what is on offer here. Either these open-ended expressions pick out concepts that analyze the target concept C, or they provide something less than a conceptual encounter from which the learner must then build the new concept C. The latter would be a model in which Wittgenstein has an answer

to the invitation to explain how meaning is possible. It is my preferred reading of Wittgenstein. The former is the descriptivist position, but this is still analysis and it is no better than the analysis of C in terms of a combination of simpler concepts, F, G, and H. The descriptivist has analysis in terms of concepts that do not, until the learning encounter, have clear linguistic labels. But to understand these explanations – "it's like this. . ." – one must already have the conceptual space into which these words fit. This is a more sophisticated nativism, but fully compatible with Fodor's well-known version. The mind has a stock of innate concepts and learning is simply the transaction by which one acquires labels for these concepts. No learning as such, in the sense of acquiring concepts, takes place.

An Individualist Reading of Wittgenstein

If we take the descriptivist approach and eschew the invitation to explain how learning is possible, then we forego any answer to what seems to be a fundamental question:

What differentiates the subject with a capacity to learn (acquire concepts) from those that do not?

This question needs an individual answer. It asks for an account of what makes the individual apt to be a learner, for no matter how much scaffolding from others might support learning and provide important platforms that speed up the process, without an account of the individual's resource by which they access the social support, the social has nothing to support.

To be clear: the social is important. It is a powerful resource for learning, but it is not the key constitutive element to answering the invitation to explain how learning is possible. That has to be something about the individual. It has to be something about the individual that explains how by giving them less than a conceptual encounter with things – it's like this, go this way, these and similar things, etc. . . . – we can provide them enough whereby they come to grasp a new concept. But this means that we need an explanation,

an account of how encounters that are less than conceptually shaped encounters can provide the material from which conceptually shaped encounters can arise. This is a staging solution to the invitation to explain how learning is possible. Something of this form has to be available if we are to respond to the invitation to say how learning is possible. The basic form of a staging solution has to be like this: an individual who lacks the conceptual resources for encountering *F*s (lacks the resources for encountering *F*s in patterns answerable for truth and falsity) has the resources for encountering *F*s in patterns that are not answerable to truth and falsity. You might call these non-conceptual patterns, but the label tells us nothing about what sort of patterns they are, other than that they are not answerable to truth and falsity (i.e., they fail the generality constraint constitutive of conceptual content).

Any account of such a form will meet an obvious response from descriptivist readers of Wittgenstein: surely the dualism inherent in a staging solution inherits the problematic divide in the dichotomy between reasons and causes? The conceptual is the normative realm of reason-giving and the non-conceptual the causal realm of brute encounters. Set up the staging solution as outlined and we'll never get the two to meet; the space of reasons is distinct to the space of causes. But that riposte simply repeats the fiction that Kripke got Wittgenstein right in saying that meaning is normative. As I have suggested above: (a) Wittgenstein nowhere speaks of rules as norms, (b) Good job too! For there is good reason to think that the idea that there are irreducible norms governing how we use words meaningfully is simply false. Wittgenstein's own discussion of regularities in word use is much more relaxed than the somewhat fevered normativism found in many commentators.

We use words in patterns that are regular. Rules are like garden paths (BT 240, 243). Paths are natural, they are part of our natural history. They are, in many respects, quite unremarkable things. Our fondness for paths is a natural aspect of our being that we share with many creatures; even sheep manifest a sense of belonging to paths in their heftedness to their pastures. Paths are a

natural feature of how we are in the world. They are things we follow with a sense of allegiance that can provide a feeling that we are being led although we would be hard-pressed to say exactly what leads us. It is certainly not a platonic ideal path that guides us and it is difficult to countenance the bare grass leading us. The source of the feeling that we are following the path is not strictly external at all. Wittgenstein remarks:

When I follow the rule, I do not choose. I follow the rule blindly. (PI §219)

The same applies to the garden path. If we ask, "Why blindly?" the right answer is the one Pears gives. We follow "blindly"

because the constraint comes from within – from our own natures – and not from any external force, and so there is nothing to be seen, and it is even questionable whether what we feel should be called 'constraint.' (Pears 2006, p. 29)

Note, this is not the "blindly" that comes from internalizing a social norm (cp. Meredith Williams). This is a use of "blindly" that is part of our natural history of our being the kind of creature that has a sense of allegiance to ways of going that reflects something deep about our nature – the kit with which we confront things that, in themselves, give us no guidance whatsoever. Is there more we can say about this apparent "constraint" from within, something that would help make palatable the outline staging solution sketched above? One option would be to see this constraint as a subjective sense of "ought"; see Ginsborg (2011) on "primitive normativity" and Luntley (2015). We want an account of the individual's mindedness that has them engaged by patterns that are not conceptual and which give them the resources to acquire new concepts (cf Luntley 2015, 2016 for more).

A clue to how to begin lies in Wittgenstein's core metaphor for meaningful word use – language games. One of the hardest things to do justice to in reading Wittgenstein is the open-endedness of the regularities in our use of words. It provides a radical occasion-sensitivity to meaningful word use that is rarely fully acknowledged, although Travis (2008) is the key exception here.

The fact that Wittgenstein's central metaphor for these patterns is "game" can be hard to keep in focus. The concept of game serves many purposes. It says something about how the regularities in word use, however well-formed or flaccid, are in an important sense *our* regularities. They are not regularities sourced in Platonic abstractions; they are regularities in our uses of words, uses that are natural. The point is clear in a key metaphor for Wittgenstein – the garden path. Regularities are like garden paths (BT 240, 243). They are patterns we respect, to which we have some sense of allegiance, but which lay down no prescription about the way to go. The paths we walk with a clear sense of the way to go are also the paths we create as we go. How can this be? And how does this bear on what we add to training to get learning? Here's a speculative and tantalizing answer.

The patterns found in games are oftentimes not conceptual patterns. Our earliest games with words (the games we play when we understand very little) are games that pick up on formal patterns of language, patterns of rhythm, rhyme, and repetition. These are the sorts of patterns appreciation of which figures large in our aesthetic experience. These are the patterns we naturally (it is how we are) amend and improvise with. We play with these patterns. Why? Perhaps because we are animals that make and enjoy patterns. We are, first and foremost, animals with imagination and the capacity to make and enjoy, indeed relish, patterns. These are not patterns answerable to truth, but they might become such. And although the sheep responds to patterns in their sense of heftedness to a place (a response we share with them), they do not engage in that distinctively natural human practice of playing with patterns. They lack the imagination to leave the path; their paths do not display the elasticity of ours. So what's distinctive about us *qua* learner? The answer is that our paths are natural, but bendy! And they bend because we have the imagination to bend them, they are the patterns we make and shape in the service of the aesthetics of experience. In other words, it is the capacity for play and imagination that characterizes the patterns that provide our first encounter with things where that encounter is not one answerable to truth and

falsity. The shape of the non-conceptual is aesthetic. That's the extra to training that gives the start to learning.

It is instructive to think of this in term of Wittgenstein's Cartesian inheritance, an individualistic account of our mindedness based on an insight due to Descartes. In the *Discourse de la Methode* §V, Descartes says that what distinguishes an intelligent, or rational, animal from other beasts is the un-boundedness of his capacity to place himself under the sway of reason. That, of course, sounds like the outcome of learning, a sophisticated end point to education. Understood in the context of Wittgenstein's naturalism about paths, I suspect it can be the starting point.

Generalize Descartes's thesis: what distinguishes the animal with a capacity to learn, rather than merely be trained, is the un-boundedness of the animal's capacity when presented with a pattern to place it under another pattern. Animals that make patterns, that enjoy patterns, and that have a sense of allegiance to patterns respond quite differently to training to the so-called dumb brutes. Animals that relish patterns are subjects with imagination. They are richly resourced individuals. They do not carry the nativist's burden of a mind full of concepts, but they do carry a basic drive to respond to patterns with play – they make a game of the patterns. They "go on" when told "do it like this. . ." etc. (cp. PI 208) These phrases do not necessarily express fully conceptual encounters with things; they can be markers for patterns of aesthetic engagement that we can adapt free from the constraint of truth. When playful pattern-makers are subjected to S-R conditioning, the result is quite different to subjecting brutes to S-R conditioning. And when our pattern-making hits the distinctive recalcitrance of that which is non-negotiable (the material rather than the social environment), pattern-makers make first contact with the idea of patterns that are not merely imaginative, but which represent. Then the "do it like this" is answerable to truth. Then you start to move from an aesthetic un-boundedness in patterns to the un-boundedness of reasons that Descartes took as the hallmark of *res cogitans*. We find Wittgenstein's naturalism in the *res imaginatio*. It is part of our natural history

(we might as well say *res animus*). The point is simply this: the subject that responds to training with learning does so because they are creatures of the aesthetic, creatures with an innate capacity and drive to make and live in patterns. Training a *res imaginatio* means providing affordances that engage their sense of aesthetic patterns. It requires a pedagogy framed by playful encounters with the patterns of the aesthetic.

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Wittgenstein and the Philosophy of the Subject

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Introduction

Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889–1951) is considered by many to be one of the most important philosophers of the twentieth century. His work in the philosophy of logic, mathematics, mind, and language established him as one of the founders of two movements – logical empiricism (the Vienna Circle) and Oxford-style ordinary language analysis. The impact of his work has been felt in the arts, humanities, and social sciences and strongly influenced the directions of both analytic and post-analytical philosophy. His work is difficult to read and interpret, and there are many competing interpretations of his philosophy. This brief introduction is designed to introduce students to the man and his work through a reading that emphasizes a broadly cultural approach to his intellectual background, context, and life, recording the influence his thought has exerted on the disciplines, including education and pedagogy.

The analytic revolution in philosophy of education, what Stefaan Cuypers and Christopher Martin (2009) call “a singular analytical paradigm for puzzle-solving in the philosophy of education,” was conceived by R. S. Peters as “conceptually

foundational” in the sense that it involved “the analysis of concepts [constitutive of education] and with questions about the grounds of knowledge, belief, actions and activities” as a “necessary preliminary to answering other philosophical questions” (p. 5). In the same volume dedicated to a sympathetic rereading of R. S. Peters, Lavery (2009, p. 33) maintains, “Peters was clearly influenced by the revolution of post-war philosophy, particularly Wittgenstein’s original contribution; but he also strove to establish the revolution’s continuity” with the history of philosophy. Lavery (2009, p. 30) indicates that “Peters rarely theorized his analytic approach to philosophy of education” and that although he appealed to Wittgenstein on linguistic usage and the concept of games, “Peters held that Wittgenstein was wrong to overlook the possibility of a ‘general principle’ that distinguishes all games.” Peters’ contribution to the analytic paradigm was based on a commitment to a form of conceptual analysis that implied a view of philosophy as a second-order discipline that casts philosophers of education as “underlabourers in the garden of knowledge” (Peters 1966, p. 15).

The argument is that R. S. Peters’ analytic paradigm was based on an appeal to Wittgenstein that was misplaced and represents a gross mistaken misreading of Wittgenstein. By contrast, this entry proposes a reading of the work of the later Wittgenstein which both unsettles the view of Wittgenstein as a placeholder in the analytic tradition and provides interpretive grounds for viewing him closer to the tradition of Continental philosophy and as a thinker deeply influenced by Krauss, Spengler, Nietzsche, and Freud who embrace the notion of philosophy as a form of cultural criticism (Peters and Marshall 1999; Peters 2002a, b; Peters et al. 2008). The “post-modern” appropriation of the later Wittgenstein marks him out as a philosopher who anticipated central aspects of the reevaluation of the culture of modernity. This entry broadens this interpretation to outline a view of subjectivity, knowledge, and representation “after” Wittgenstein, a position that provides a more appropriate platform for philosophy of education in the age of globalization, preserving a link to Wittgenstein and his philosophy while investigating the sources for a

notion of education as openness, engagement, and *copoiesis*. The entry provides an account of the Cartesian philosophy of subjectivity and Wittgenstein’s attempt to provide a break with the Cartesian worldview that is much more important for contemporary philosophy of education than reference to a method of conceptual analysis that views philosophy as a meta-discipline. In the next section, Wittgenstein’s anti-Cartesianism is explored as a basis for deconstructing Descartes’ view of mind, human beings, and modern philosophy.

Descartes and the Philosophy of Subjectivity

The philosophy of subjectivity has been one of the crowning achievements of Western philosophy that has helped to shape and define modern philosophy, the foundations of science, liberal political and education thought, and the culture of modernity. Of all philosophers responsible for the subjective turn and for the subsequent epistemological foundations and direction of modern philosophy, René Descartes deserves special mention. In his own lifetime, his reputation rested on his contributions to mathematics and cosmology and only in the nineteenth century did his metaphysics and epistemology contribute to the Kantian project of reconstituting the nature of philosophy. His skepticism becomes important in the revival of Anglophone empiricist epistemology in the twentieth century, and his idea of the self as a locus of subjectivity independent of the world – its ethical and political implications – began to impact French and German philosophy from the 1930s with philosophical engagement of his work by Husserl, Heidegger, and Wittgenstein, among others (Gaukroger 2008).

Descartes’ “epistemological turn” (after Bergmann) is one of the centers of his works that lead him to counter skepticism by locating certainty in subjective consciousness and set modern philosophy on a path intimately connected to theory of knowledge and later embellished by Kant’s transcendental argument concerning synthetic a priori knowledge. Barry Stroud (2008, p. 513)

suggests, “The philosophical, mathematical and scientific of Descartes is now so deep and so pervasive in our culture that its full extent can no longer be measured with certainty or precision.” Descartes’ philosophy of mind embraced a mind/body dualism, individualism about mental contents and adherence to a strong doctrine of privileged first-person access that holds introspective judgments about one’s own mental states enjoy the privileged epistemic status of infallibility and immunity to error. Descartes was acknowledged by Husserl as “the genuine patriarch of phenomenology” and christened his own phenomenology a new Cartesianism. Heidegger, by contrast, saw the Cartesianism as a fundamental wrong turn and rebelled against its legacy suggesting that the *cogito sum* had to be “phenomenologically destroyed” (see Martin 2008, p. 496).

The words “subject” and “subjectivity” have many different meanings. The word “subject” comes from the Latin word “subjectum” which means something under or constituting the foundations of other things. In Aristotle “subject” is not a philosophical category that belongs to human beings and does not function as a philosophical category nor is it considered to take any kind of precedence to the concept of substance. “Subject” in addition to the use that Descartes firms up as a metaphysical dominant category as the mind, ego, or agent that sustains or assumes the form of thought or consciousness also carries the medieval political meaning of “vassal” – someone who owes fealty to a monarch one who lives in the territory and owes allegiance to a sovereign power. This is the political and ethical meaning of subject that Michel Foucault exploits in his studies of subjectivity. Subjectivity has been used to mean many things: consciousness, intentionality, the will, individual volition, and introspection.

An understanding of the significance of Wittgenstein’s work as *breaking with* and offering a critique of the Cartesian model of subjectivity is more significant to philosophy of education than the method of conceptual analysis that R. S. Peters and other analytical philosophers of education extract in an appeal to the work of Wittgenstein. It is both more fundamental and provides a basis

for a critique of various claims of essentialism in the philosophy of the subject, which is so important in the age of globalization when claims to identity and difference have come to the fore. The Cartesian model of subjectivity arises out of a certain picture or image of the knowing subject deeply embedded in the medieval culture of theology and scholastic philosophy (even though it tries to break with these influences) and a mathematical conception of certainty that is seen as providing appropriate foundations for knowledge. As Wittgenstein (1953, §115) suggests (speaking of the “picture language” and the general form of a proposition in the *Tractatus*), “a picture held us captive, and we could not get outside it, for it lay in our language and language seemed to repeat it to us inexorably.” The question so important to philosophy and the nature of education is how to dissemble this metaphysical Cartesian world picture that comprises the foundations of modern philosophy through the binary oppositions from mind/body, subject/object, inner/outer to word/object, signifier/signified, self/other, and male/female. On this view Wittgensteinian philosophy of education is an approach in part dedicated to the unpacking and critique of the Cartesian dualist theory of mind and the foundational epistemology that appeals to “certainty” and to accurate representation. On a Wittgensteinian approach, the dualist theory of mind gives way to the study of subjectivity as a result of cultural and historical influences, and both knowledge and learning are not seen as wedded to foundations in any sense. The Wittgensteinian view is thus both anti-foundational and antirepresentational (of an independently existing reality).

In the *Investigations* and later works, Wittgenstein wrestles with the Cartesian picture of subjectivity and its implications for knowledge and representation, providing us with an alternative vocabulary to discuss the Cartesian picture of mind as objects which possess properties and as a non-physical substance that thinks, famously referred to as *the ghost in the machine* (Gilbert Ryle’s expression). Wittgenstein takes on this philosophical struggle to unseat Descartes’ view of mind as both an essentialist and dualist conception – internalist, private, and nonphysical – that arises from his view of

nature and science as proceeding from mechanistic (“mechanics”) principles and a view of knowledge that embraces a form of epistemic internalism that holds that “the difference between true belief and knowledge consists in some form of justification and, crucially, that justification consists in factors that are, in some sense, internal to the subject of the belief” (Rowlands 2008, p. 6). The Cartesian picture of mind involves many different threads, not just a conception of mind, but also a view of knowledge and representation, an image of philosophy, and a view of the nature of human beings. Dislodging this picture by disassembling it and describing it as *mythology* (as legitimating a certain world picture) requires something more than argument or conceptual analysis. Wittgenstein demonstrates that dislodging the deeply embedded culture of Cartesianism is not a matter of proposing better arguments or of argumentation per se but rather rests on a variety of other rhetorical strategies. This point has a clear set of implications for Wittgensteinian pedagogy – teachers must engage with the emotions and imagination of students.

It is worth noting in passing that the appeal to Wittgenstein by R.S. Peters on the “revolution in philosophy” does nothing to justify the method of conceptual analysis he advocates but rarely spells out: Wittgenstein contra Peters does not see philosophy in any way as a foundational, second-order activity based on the clarification of concepts. While the early Wittgenstein of the *Tractatus* may have seen philosophy as a critique of language using logical analysis to reveal the general form of the proposition “in order to see the world rightly,” it does not result in linguistic hygiene or the ultimate meaning of concepts. His later conception of language games, family resemblance, and “meaning as use” further distances Wittgenstein from anything like Peters’ conceptual analysis: first, we must look to the variety of uses to which the word is put which is purely descriptive rather than explanatory or prescriptive; second, we must be aware of the diversity and multiplicity of uses that only have life within a language game and form of life; third, a concept or word only has meaning in the context of a sentence and sentences within the network of judgments; fourth, while language games have

rules, these cannot be learned theoretically but only in practice; fifth, by following the use, we discover only “a complicated network of similarities, overlapping and criss-crossing” (*Investigations*, 66), a family resemblance, that resists all explanation and definition in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions; sixth, the rules of grammar liberated from the bounds of strict logic express the norms of language and tell us what kind of object anything is (*Investigations*, 371, 373) for they are embedded in the culture and “the *speaking* of language is part of an activity, or of a form of life” (*Investigations*, 23). No reading of Wittgenstein validates or justifies anything like Peters’ version of conceptual analysis. Wittgenstein would only accept a form of analysis as a kind of therapeutic activity of “assembling reminders for a particular purpose” (*Investigations*, 127). As he writes in the *Investigations*, “there is not a philosophical method, though there are indeed methods, like different therapies” (133). The aim of philosophy is “to shew the fly out of the fly-bottle” (*Investigations*, 309).

It is significant that for Wittgenstein language is not the foundation – words and justifications come to an end (*On Certainty*, 192) on the base of “hinge propositions” which are neither true nor false but “remain firm” for us. When Wittgenstein writes: “Giving grounds, however, justifying the evidence, comes to an end; – but the end is not certain propositions’ striking us immediately as true, i.e., it is not a kind of seeing on our part; it is our acting, which lies at the bottom of the language-game” (*On Certainty*, 204), Wittgenstein is suggesting that there is only cultural practice at the bottom of our language games, an ungrounded way of acting. Contrary to Descartes’ starting point of the indubitability of the self-reflecting cogito as offering the foundations of knowledge based on a mathematical model of certainty that ultimately leads to a self-stultifying solipsistic self, Wittgenstein both naturalizes and socializes cognitive processes locating them first in language and then as part of the activity of a culture. He is thus not a foundationalist in any accepted definition of the term. For him certainty and the very possibility of meaning lie in the background context without which propositions

could not even be enunciated: "...I want to conceive [certainty] as something that lies beyond being justified or unjustified; as it were, as something animal" (*On Certainty*, 359).

The notion of philosophy as a kind of therapy has a set of link and references that take us back to the beginnings of philosophy and certainly to the Stoics who held "that emotions like fear or envy (or impassioned sexual attachments, or passionate love of anything whatsoever) either were or arose from false judgements and that the sage – a person who had attained moral and intellectual perfection – would not undergo them" (Baltzly 2014). The therapeutic notion of philosophy was intimately tied to the pursuit of the good life and philosophy as a therapy of emotions. Gordon Baker, among others, provides a therapeutic reading of *Investigations* that positions Wittgenstein as attempting to break us free of the impulse to metaphysics through an elaborately structured dialogue where the reader is encouraged to think for himself or herself. The work of Stanley Cavell, James Conant, and Cora Diamond regards Wittgenstein's philosophy as entirely therapeutic, rather than as having any theoretical or metaphysical aspects. Certainly there are a range of comments by Wittgenstein scattered throughout his work where he uses the notion of therapy to describe his activity of doing philosophy such as "In philosophizing we may not terminate a disease of thought. It must run its natural course, and slow cure is all important" (Zettel, 382). Wittgenstein also extends this conception to education when he says, "I trot out all the problems that education represses without solving. I say to those repressed doubts: you are quite correct, go on asking, demand clarification" (*Philosophical Grammar*, p. 382). The justification of R.S. Peters' approach to philosophy of education by means of a distinctive and foundational method of conceptual analysis does not hold water, and its justification cannot be found in Wittgenstein.

By contrast, the "new Wittgenstein" coalesces around a series of common interpretive protocols: Wittgenstein is not advancing theories in philosophy but rather employing a therapeutic method to deconstruct philosophical puzzles; he is helping us to work free of the conceptual confusions that become evident when we begin to philosophize;

at the same time, Wittgenstein is disabusing us of the notion that we can stand outside language and command an external view and that such an external view is both necessary and possible for grasping the essence of thought and language. On the new reading, Wittgenstein encourages us to see that our intuitions about meaning and thought are best accommodated "by attention to our everyday forms of expression and to the world those forms of expression serve to reveal" (Crary and Read 2000, p. 1). This new schema for reading Wittgenstein puts less emphasis on the decisive break in his thought, represented by the *Tractatus* and the posthumous *Investigations*, to emphasize, by comparison, significant continuities of his thought centering around his therapeutic conception of philosophy. The new reading that emphasizes the therapeutic character of Wittgenstein's philosophical aims and method is sympathetic to and consistent with the "postmodern" view of Wittgenstein (Peters and Marshall 1999) which explicitly provides an emphasis on a literary, cultural, and (auto)biographical reading of Wittgenstein's works, their intertextuality, the expression of the spirit of European (Viennese) modernism in the *Tractatus*, and the anticipation of certain "postmodern" themes in his later works which, on the one hand, cast him in close philosophical proximity to Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, and Heidegger and, on the other hand, project his writings into an interesting engagement with poststructuralist thought (Peters and Marshall 1999, pp. 19–20).

This cultural reading, in part, was inspired by Cavell's work, which serves as an exemplar both in reading Wittgenstein in relation to the movement of *modernism* and against Wittgenstein's Viennese cultural background where the influence of Nietzsche, Schopenhauer, and Freud is evident. Cavell's writings draw widely upon the philosophical tradition and emphasize the parallels between Wittgenstein and many contemporary thinkers, including both Derrida and Foucault. It is a view that sits well with Wittgenstein as a pedagogical philosopher (Peters et al. 2010). In the "postmodern" reading, the *Tractatus* is seen to be *modernist in its formalism*, while the *Investigations* anticipates certain "postmodernist" themes including anti-foundationalism and

antirepresentationalism (Peters and Marshall 1999). The distinction is principally a matter of the style of *doing* philosophy, and it is reflective of the impact of larger cultural forces upon Wittgenstein and, significantly, also the 7 years of Wittgenstein as an elementary schoolteacher in rural Austria. It does not deny that there are significant continuities in his thought, say, for instance, in his view of philosophy. In this reading it is possible to argue that the therapeutic aim became more manifest in Wittgenstein's "pedagogical" style and in a view called "philosophy as pedagogy" (Peters and Marshall 1999). This view does not entail necessarily an account of "social constructivism" or imply that "postmodernism" (whatever that elusive term means) necessarily entails social constructivism in any of its versions. In one sense "postfoundational" is a better term that serves to provide a general philosophical direction in epistemology, learning, and ethics.

The cultural and postmodern reading of Wittgenstein, like much of postmodernism, considered as a whole, tends to emphasize a number of overlapping cluster concepts that emphasize its openness and lack of essentiality, including the following:

- Anti-foundationalism
- Anti-essentialism
- Anti- or post-epistemological standpoint
- Anti-realism about meaning and reference
- Suspicion of transcendental arguments and viewpoints
- Rejection of the picture of knowledge as accurate representation
- Rejection of truth as correspondence to reality
- Rejection of canonical descriptions and final vocabularies
- Suspicion of metanarratives

The list is taken from Bernd Magnus' (1989) discussion of Nietzsche in relation to postmodern criticism. To Magnus' list it is relevant to add what Rorty calls "antirepresentationalism" and also to add, alongside "suspicion of metanarratives", the turn to narrative and narratology, more generally – *petite récits* pitted against metanarratives by Lyotard (1984) who significantly

makes central use of Wittgenstein in a creative misappropriation to emphasize the conflictual or dissensual nature of language games. We might add an emphasis on linguistic use and *therapeutic view of philosophy* – that is, an embodiment of many of the features of the list above and an ethos, above all, concerning philosophy as a critique of language summed up best in the famous quotation from the *Investigations*: "Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language" (#109). This is a view that underlies the development of social sciences and cultural studies in the latter half of the twentieth century, perhaps, sloganized in the twin methodological imperatives, the linguistic turn, the significance of representation, and the turn to social practices, on the one hand, and the attempt to overcome the dualistic thought, the search for certainty and essences, and the subjectivism that are the legacies of the Cartesian thought, on the other hand. Encouraged by Wittgenstein's expert disassembly of the Cartesian world view and model of subjectivity, we might entertain a model of education as openness, engagement, and *copoiesis*, one that is more suited to the global, networked, and digital environment we live in.

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Wittgenstein as Educator

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I cannot describe how (in general) to employ rules, except by teaching you, training you to employ rules. (Z §318)
Any explanation has its foundation in training.
(Educators ought to remember this.) (Z §419)

Synonyms

Causation; Education; Empirical science; Orthography; Philosophical grammar; Wittgenstein

N.b. Following convention, titles for Wittgenstein's works are abbreviated (PI = *Philosophical Investigations*), with section (§) or page number (p.), with full citation and initials (RFM) in the References.

Introduction

Sage advice is not to look for educational theory in Wittgenstein's writing but to see his later philosophy as pedagogical (Peters 1995; Peters and Marshall 1999; Peters et al. 2008) or as therapeutic (Smeyers et al. 2006). Accepting established boundaries, here I set Wittgenstein's later remarks on training against the background of his own elementary-school teaching in rural Austria (1920–26), sorting empirical matters related to education from his philosophical concern with the acquisition and judgment of meaning. Interested in securing learning in his elementary classroom, he later came to distinguish such causal inquiries from philosophical inspection of grammatical problems (PI §122). In this move, training is the avenue leading us into felicitous performance of language games (including math and music notation), but meaning (an ontological concern with significance) is socially governed in terms of our usage and judgment and is neither reducible to its prerequisite nor closed from change.

As Glock (1996, pp. 111–112) explains, in his later philosophy Wittgenstein attends to how words are taught not to “engage in armchair learning theory” or to offer any “empirical genetic theory” but to show conceptually that teaching by explanation presupposes basic linguistic skills we are not born with, but acquire by means of training. Early training provides a (nonrationalist) foundation for explanations as well as our basis for judging whether explanations are clear or not. Hunter (1985) illustrates this beautifully through the case of a frustrated mathematics teacher struggling with the problem of “retelling” (not merely repeating) instructions in such a way as to clarify intended rules for the perplexed student. How does the teacher know when the pupil “gets it”? Adeptly employing words or rules within their appropriate connotative, axiomatic, and grammatical ranges of usage, the pupil demonstrates learning achievement as a criterion for successful initiation into conventional practice or mastery of techniques (PI §199). Attention to training as the basis for judgment (PI, p. 227) sidesteps the vicious circularity, leaving

shared practice as our “ground” in an otherwise post-foundational epistemology.

Elementary School Teaching

When Wittgenstein moved to rural Austria to teach elementary school (1920–26), his sister Margarete protested that this “was like using a precision instrument to open crates,” to which he replied that it was a better alternative to suicide – the unfortunate demise of two of his older brothers (Bartley 1985, p. 37). Perhaps taken on as an escape from the world, like his subsequent gardening work in a monastery, he nevertheless embraced the challenge to become an educator and even wrote with enthusiasm to Russell about being “happy in my work at school” (Monk 1990, p. 193). The difficult task often proved to be frustrating, however, partly because the cultivated aristocrat was out of place among rural, poor folk who found him “strange” (Monk 1990, pp. 194, 197). His teaching career ended after 6 years with an inquest into his well-documented use of corporal punishment (see Monk 1990, pp. 194–195, e.g., accounts of pulling girls’ hair and cuffing boys’ ears). Wittgenstein’s rather Nietzschean views of education appear untimely now.

I think the way people are educated nowadays tends to diminish their capacity for suffering. At present a school is reckoned good ‘if the children have a good time’. And that used not to be the criterion. Parents moreover want their children to grow up like themselves (only more so), but nevertheless subject them to an education quite different from their own. – Endurance of suffering isn’t rated highly because there is supposed not to be any suffering – really it’s out of date. (CV, p. 71e)

Despite strict discipline, students later described Wittgenstein as a highly devoted, if demanding, teacher (see Bartley 1985; Monk 1990). In his elementary classroom, Wittgenstein assiduously compiled words students used, forming a reference dictionary. Edmonds and Eidnow (2001, p. 61) note that “his dictionary was in keeping with the [reform] movement and the position in the Investigations that rural

dialects could be in perfect order as they are.” Phillips (1977, p. 8, citing Bartley 1985, p. 117) claims that by keeping their own dictionary Wittgenstein’s students gained an appreciation of “the ambiguity of their own usage of the language.” In this sense, Wittgenstein was conservator of the child’s quotidian language: pedagogy congruent with his later philosophy – meaning-as-use (OC §61).

Wittgenstein’s practical approach to teaching was somewhat in keeping with child-centered movements in Austria, in vogue while attending Vienna’s teacher training college (1919–20; Philips 1977, pp. 7–10; cf. Savickey 1999). Bartley, however, recalls Wittgenstein joking about these reforms: perhaps embracing the anti-scholastic spirit and practices but amused by campaign rhetoric. Edmonds and Eidnow (2001, p. 61) also recall that “Wittgenstein poked fun at the programme’s ‘more vulgar slogans and projects’.” Wittgenstein was cautious about “language gone on holiday” (PI §38): “. . . Don’t let yourself be seduced by the terminology in common currency” (CV, p. 74e).

That early teaching experience influenced later thinking at Cambridge is apparent from Wittgenstein’s use of orthography as a paradigmatic case.

One might think: if philosophy speaks of the use of the word “philosophy” there must be a second-order philosophy. But it is not so; it is, rather, like the case of orthography, which deals with the word “orthography” among others without being second-order. (PI §121)

Remarks on orthography adduce Wittgenstein’s general attitude toward foundations and our later flexibility within rules and practices – some of which may be arbitrary and open to revision.

Just as in writing we learn a particular basic form of letters and then vary it later, so we learn first the stability of things as the norm, which is then subject to alteration. (OC §473)

Appealing to his superintendent’s attention, Wittgenstein says his *Dictionary for Elementary Schools* (1993) has the goal “to fill an urgent need with respect to the present teaching of

orthography” (PO, p. 15). Prefacing the dictionary “to make intelligible his general plan,” he justifies violating standard rules of alphabetical order, recognized for efficiency and logic. As though making a philosophical refutation, he argues it reduces slippage in learning:

But if the purely alphabetic order inserts a heterogeneous word between two closely related ones, then in my opinion the alphabetic order demands too much from a child’s power of abstraction. Thus, because of the comprehension of words and the highly important saving of space, the purely alphabetic order often cannot be recommended. Equally, each instance of clinging to a dogmatic principle leads to an arrangement that does not suit our purpose and has to be abandoned – even if this would make the author’s work much easier. Rather, it is necessary to compromise again and again. (PO, p. 23)

Acknowledging age-appropriate ranges for demanding, abstract concepts, Wittgenstein’s pedagogy sought to reduce what we may see through *On Certainty* as failure to concretize or erosion of *bedrock* (OC §94–98). Breaking convention, simplifying better secures learning, showing that teaching technique is not arbitrary. From what he refers to as his “subjective view” it was pedagogically better to group families of words sharing etymological roots, even if this method “clashes with the generally held principle of alphabetic order” (PO, p. 21). Under alphabetic order the words *alt* and *Alter* are broken up by a heterogeneous word, *Altar*:

alt, das Alter	old, old age
der Altar	altar
D[<i>d</i>]as Alterum, altermülich	Antiquity, antique

Pondering students’ learning slippage, he later remarked (1940):

A teacher may get good, even astounding, results from his pupils while he is teaching them and yet not be a good teacher; because it may be that, while his pupils are directly under his influence, he raises them to a height which is not natural to them, without fostering their own capacities for work at this level, so that they immediately decline again as soon as the teacher leaves the classroom. Perhaps this is how it is with me; I have sometimes thought so. (CV, p. 38e)

Philosophically Questioning Certainty

Wittgenstein later (c.1950) reflected on his certainty when professing the validity of his pedagogic techniques.

I myself wrote in my book that children learn to understand a word in such and such a way. Do I know that, or do I believe it? Why in such a case do I write not “I believe etc.” but simply the indicative sentence? (OC §290)

Weighing grammatical suitability in applying the concept “believing” versus “knowing” when no doubt occurs in *the flow* of teaching, Wittgenstein distinguishes his philosophical from pedagogical remarks. Repeatedly, Wittgenstein notes that reflections on students “taking things together” in arithmetic or learning the multiplication table are observations or “remarks about concepts, not about teaching methods” (PI, pp. 208, 227).

How does one teach a child (say in arithmetic) “Now take these things together!” or “Now these go together”? Clearly “taking together” and “going together” must originally have had another meaning for him than that of seeing in this way or that. – And this is a remark about concepts, not about teaching methods. (PI, p. 208)

“We all learn the same multiplication table.” This might, no doubt, be a remark about the teaching of arithmetic in our schools, – but also an observation about the concept of the multiplication table. (PI, p. 227)

Am I doing child psychology? I am making a connexion between the concept of teaching and the concept of meaning. (Z §412)

Philosophically, he was concerned at Cambridge with ontological problems of meaning instead of earlier training in pedagogy. It is highly unlikely that Wittgenstein saw teaching as a legitimate “science” (Standish 1995); his philosophical methods aver scientific approach, employing instead ethnography and attending to enculturation (Smeysers 1995, 2008).

When I write down a bit of a series, that you then see this regularity in it may be called an empirical fact, a psychological fact. But, if you have seen this law in it, that you then continue the series in this way – that is no longer an empirical fact. (RFM VI.26; cf. PI §109)

Adumbrated here, (empirical) science and (grammatical) philosophy are like passing trains:

The existence of the experimental method makes us think we have the means of solving the problems which trouble us; though problem and method pass one another by. (PI, xiv, p. 232)

Answering his interlocutor's accusation that emphasis on training amounts to operant conditioning Wittgenstein again shifts attention from science to grammar.

"Are you not really a behaviourist in disguise? Aren't you at bottom really saying that everything except human behaviour is a fiction?" – If I do speak of fiction, then it is of a grammatical fiction. (PI §307)

Not throwing out empirical studies on the basis of this distinction, Wittgenstein advises not waiting for a future science of "mental states" to answer our questions about what makes sense philosophically or pedagogically:

Sometime perhaps we shall know more about them – we think. But that is just what commits us to a particular way of looking at the matter. For we have a definite concept of what it means to learn to know a process better. (The decisive movement in the conjuring trick has been made, and it was the very one that we thought quite innocent.) (PI §308)

Deflating expectations, waiting for educational psychology to solve our problem of what constitutes "sound" teaching is like anticipating "science" to explain what is beautiful or tasteful.

You might think Aesthetics is a science telling us what's beautiful – almost too ridiculous for words. I suppose it ought to include also what sort of coffee tastes well. (CV, §2, p. 11)

Equally, however, Wittgenstein is not anti-etiological; recall that he came to Manchester to study aeronautical engineering (see Monk 1990). Demonstrating that interpretations of rules seem to "hang in the air," unable to support or determine meaning, Wittgenstein draws an illustrative connection.

"Then can whatever I do be brought into accord with the rule?" – Let me ask this: what has the expression of a rule – say a sign-post – got to do with my actions? What sort of connexion is there here? – Well, perhaps this one: I have been trained

to react to this sign in a particular way, and now I do so react to it.

But that is only to give a causal connexion; to tell how it has come about that we now go by the sign-post; not what this going-by-the-sign really consists in. On the contrary; I have further indicated that a person goes by a sign-post only in so far as there exists a regular use of sign posts, a custom. (PI §198)

His distinction shifts emphasis from etiological inquiries into learning to inspection of training into culturally sanctioned practices and customs.

"How am I able to obey a rule?" – If this is not a question about causes, then it is about justification for my following the rule in the way I do. (PI §217)

Here we are not asking ourselves what are the causes and what produces this impression in a particular case. (PI, p. 201, on seeing something *as*, say, a triangle)

Pragmatic learning theory as inquiry into causal processes (e.g., "teaching by means of indirection") attends, fallibly but instrumentally, to causal learning conditions. Contrast Dewey's interest with Wittgenstein's:

Growth in judgment and understanding is essentially growth in ability to form purposes and to select and arrange means for their realization. The most elementary experiences of the young are filled with cases of the means-consequences relationship. . . . The trouble with education is not the absence of situations in which the causal relation is exemplified in the relation of means and consequences. Failure to utilize the situations so as to lead the learner on to grasp the relation in given cases of experience is, however, only too common. (Dewey 1938, pp. 104–105)

Although Wittgenstein too appears to have been rearranging conditions to effect learning in his elementary classroom and dictionary, his later philosophical pursuit concerns how – once meaning is secured through training – it ranges "sensibly" within our grammar. For Wittgenstein, causal relationships securing learning – an educational psychology topic of possible importance in teaching – is not a philosophical (ontological) issue, whereas degrees of arbitrariness and grammatical entanglement in educational language is ostensibly "philosophical" (PI §§124–126).

Medina (2002, p. 158) notes this separation from causes was made too insistently in the early 1930s,

softening in Wittgenstein's thinking after 1938. Contrast his 1930s Cambridge lectures with 1940s emphasis (*RFM* and *PI*) on training securing rules.

The process of learning does not matter; it is history and history does not matter here. . . . This laying down of a rule is exactly analogous to learning language. The laying down of the rule is not contained in following the rule; the laying down is history. (CL #2, p. 55)

When we learn the meaning of a symbol the way in which we learn it is irrelevant to our future use and understanding of it. The way in which I learned my A B C and learned to read is irrelevant to my future understanding of written symbols — it is a matter of purely historical interest. But something does as it were adhere to the symbol in the process of my learning its meaning, and this becomes part of the symbol. (CL #3, p. 117)

Meredith Williams (1999, p. 216) explains that “The normativity of our practices involves non-causal necessity, that is, logical or grammatical necessity.” By this curious phrase she means to say that learning to follow directions (ostension or rule following) presupposes a common background of what is “obviously the same” for all participants in the learning. This common background for judgment is acquired in the process of training, or in mastering techniques, making the process of learning techniques constitutive of what is learned and enabling learners to recognize sameness and carry on in the same way as others do.

Medina (2002, p. 159) concurs, noting that in Wittgenstein's later reflections on learning, “He emphasizes that, through training processes, our behaviour becomes, not causally determined, but normatively structured; that is, we acquire the ability to engage in self-regulating behaviour”.

So, for Wittgenstein, our training into techniques is more than an inductive process or a process of conditioning: it is a process of structuring behaviour until it becomes self-regulated. Learning processes of this kind endow us with more than behavioral dispositions or empirical certainties. These processes lead to the adoption of normative standards. . . . (Medina, p. 159)

Addressing this normative aspect of training, Medina recalls Wittgenstein's descriptions of cajoling students during training: “The words ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ are used when giving instruction in proceeding according to a rule. The word

‘right’ makes the pupil go on, the word ‘wrong’ holds him back” (*RFM*, VI.39; cf. Medina, pp. 164–165). Through drilling and instilling students acquire, blindly, the normative attitude of their mentors.

When I obey a rule, I do not choose. I obey the rule blindly. (PI §219)

Our children are not only given practice in calculation but are also trained to adopt a particular attitude towards a mistake in calculating.

What I am saying is that mathematics is normative. But “norm”: does not mean the same thing as “ideal.” (*RFM*, VII.61)

Medina (p. 164) notes that for Wittgenstein, the teacher must treat the child with “courtesy,” as though he/she is capable of making correct usage of the rules. “The teacher treats the pupil's correct responses as indicative of an incipient competence and her incorrect responses as ‘mistakes’” (cf. *RFM*, VII.61). But the learner's reactions to the training are invested with normative significance only when viewed against the background of the whole rule-governed practice (cf. *RFM*, VII.47). The teacher checks and corrects the students responses until self-correction takes over, thus normatively structuring the pupil's behaviour. But this inculcation into norms is not simply what liberal-analytic philosophers have eloquently opposed as the ‘suppression of reason.’ Medina offers important qualification: that the higher goal of initiate-training is to open possibilities rather than merely fix them. Training students into normative attitudes, teachers create regularities, a “consensus of action” leading toward mastery of techniques (PI §199); adept pupils, however, show more autonomous, self-corrective behavior within the rules.

Gradually through normative training we respond “naturally” as most others do (PI §185). Specific techniques of training in different *language games* lend nuance and relative “degrees of certainty” (PI, p. 224) to words like “prediction”: for example, anticipating moves in gymnastics routines versus chemical reactions (PI §630). Wittgenstein reminds educators that we know a pupil has mastered the technique for using the word “red” when he/she responds “spontaneously” after seeing something we agree is red.

Customarily, showing something red affirms its meaning, though calling anything “red” doesn’t make it so (OC §429). Rather silly, Wittgenstein thinks, to begin the teaching process this way with school-age children: pointing to things and saying “That looks red” (Z §418). Infants absorb concepts from their surroundings, regularly coming to see spoons *as* “cutlery” (PI, p. 195). Pupils indicate uptake of such immersive training by reacting appropriately and fluently, but “this reaction, which is our guarantee of understanding, presupposes as a surrounding particular circumstances, particular forms of life and speech” (RFM, VII.47).

Musing on how “one belief hangs together with all the rest” and how it either accords or breaks with “our whole system of verification,” he remarks:

This system is something a human being acquires by means of observation and instruction. I intentionally do not say “learns”. (OC §279)

Similarly, we pick up background context needed to interpret facial expressions and pain behavior, but we do not explicitly learn this through formal instruction nor can we easily impart expert judgment to others (PI, pp. 227–228). Needed background for making inferences and judgments comes through tacitly in the process of instruction, rather like learning the significance of “making a mistake” in the course/flow of normative training in mathematics (RFM VII.6). In this post-foundational epistemology, the rational, autonomous subject of enlightenment and analytic philosophy is reimmersed in the flow of life, where background and training set the stage for meaning.

What determines our judgment, our concepts and reactions, is not what one man is doing now, an individual action, but the whole hurly-burly of human actions, the background against which we see any action. (Z §567-69)

Sharing a *form of life* means being socialized into accepting certain customs or commands (PI §206; PI, p. 226), giving us also shared “agreement in judgments” (PI §§241-2) upon which we can also challenge and advance claims, including the suitability of explanations delivered in the course of teaching.

“We are sure of it” does not just mean that every single person is certain of it, but that we belong to a community which is bound together by science and education. (OC §298)

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Wittgenstein, Language, and Instinct

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Synonyms

Animal; Cause; Instinct; Language; Norman Malcolm

Introduction

The piece has been designed to draw the reader in with this opening paragraph. I don't want to set out an introduction along the lines of “I shall address the topic of X. I shall first do A, then B, then C.” The reason is that I want to lead the reader more carefully into seeing the connections here.

Causation and Thinking

One thing causes another. This simple thought is basic not only to science but to our ordinary understanding of the world. But where does the concept of a cause come from? It has become mainstream to the philosophy of science that causation is not something discovered through experimentation but rather a principle according to which phenomena are interpreted. What, then, is its basis? Clap your hands in front of the face of the baby and her eyes will shut. The same happens with the adult. This is not the application of the concept of a cause. It is an instinctive reaction, and causation is inherent in this. One can build up from such examples to the developing infant's being pushed off balance by someone and naturally pushing back, or to her noticing that the piece of string that is wriggling on the floor in front of her is being pulled at the other end by the cat.

“That this is the case is at the heart of “Wittgenstein: the relation of language to instinctive behaviour,” an influential paper by Norman Malcolm, Wittgenstein's student, interpreter, and friend” (Malcolm 1982). The fallacy that Malcolm identifies is that of thinking that there must be a universal rule, in conjunction with which, at each instance of its application, a potential doubt arises as to whether the rule is satisfied by the events in question, and that this rule must be present from the start in our use of causal expressions. The target is, more or less, the fantasy that in our thinking we are like super-scientists, meticulous in removing any doubt that might jeopardize the identification of a causal process in any particular instance. In fact, not even meticulous scientists operate like this – not

because they are not meticulous enough, but because thinking in terms of causes could not operate in this way. And we could scarcely think *without* a notion of causation.

How, then, are we otherwise to account for what is happening? The crucial move for Malcolm is to put emphasis on instinctive or primitive reactions, and this achieves two things: first, it shows that, in seeing things in causal terms, there is “no uncertainty, guessing, conjecturing, conferring, concluding,” and, second, it drives home the point that such reactions are *actions*, with causal expressions such as “He knocked me down” grafted onto these immediate reactions. In other words, our ordinary perceptions of the world are not of pixelated instants seen cumulatively such that they add up to a picture or snapshots grafted together after the event. They are instead holistic from the start, such that perception is thematized or given a certain narrative structure, minimal though this may well be: the cat is pulling the string. In fact, to see the cat is already to react in thematized or narrative terms: cats are playful; they are living creatures capable of pain; they are pets to be cherished and stroked, etc. Something similar could be said of the string. Moreover, one cannot give any coherent account of action without this structure being, as it were, built in. There are occasions, perhaps many, where we are uncertain how to act. But all this occurs on the basis of a vast range of reactions in which hesitation and doubt play no part. “The primitive form of the language-game is certainty, not uncertainty,” Wittgenstein writes. “For uncertainty could never lead to action. The basic form of the game must be one in which we act” (Wittgenstein 1969, §421; hereafter referenced as OC §). So it is also with names. At the start of the *Philosophical Investigations*, Wittgenstein quotes from St Augustine’s *Confessions* where the idea is expressed that initial language learning takes place through ostensive definition: someone points to the cat and says “cat,” and the child picks up the expression; the child associates the name with the thing. Now this is indeed what partly happens – more obviously in second-language learning. But in first language learning it can be at most part of the picture: so much else

needs to take place, for without this how can the child begin to know what the point is of pointing and naming (how can they learn what pointing, etc., is?). Wittgenstein’s answer, as is well known, is that the child must be initiated into a variety of language games, where “language game” is taken to refer not only to the language but to the actions into which it is woven (Wittgenstein 1968, §7; hereafter referenced as PI§, or PI, pg.): the basis of the language game lies in action. It is worth reflecting on the fact that the small child does not learn words such as “cup” and “spoon” first as names for objects but rather in a more imperative form – that is, as compressions of “bring me the cup,” “use the spoon,” and so on. The holistic nature of this, in the broader context of eating, for example, is such that it is far from being a frozen moment but is dynamic and structured already by assumptions of causation. The differentiation and refinement progressively achieved with language emerges from prelinguistic reactions.

Language and Instinct

Malcolm’s discussion of causation constitutes an important element in his broader account of language’s emergence from instinctive behavior. Let me summarize the argument. A recurrent theme in Wittgenstein’s later writings is that language did not emerge from reasoning (OC, §475) but rather from simple reactions – reactions, for example, to pain. First-person pain *expressions* (“ouch!” “it hurts”) constitute new pain behavior (PI, §244). They are not the result of reasoning or of thought but are to be understood rather as immediate. This thought is extended in relation to the pain of others, such that tending another’s wound or saying “he’s in pain” is also to be seen as the refinement of instinct: “it is a primitive reaction to tend, to treat, the part that hurts when someone else is in pain, and not merely when oneself is” (Wittgenstein 1967, §540; hereafter referenced as Z §). Such behavior is the prototype and not the result of thinking. Reports of and responses to pain plainly become further refined as language advances, from the advent of temporal

expressions (“it hurts less than yesterday”) to the development of precision instruments such as thermometers, which themselves must be calibrated in some way to human natural reactions.

At the heart of Malcolm’s account is a discussion of causal expressions, which stresses the fact that a reaction to a cause can be immediate. It is not a matter of the “second-order” conjecturing, etc., referred to above: it is action. Moreover, it is misleading to say that the child will acquire “*the* concept” of cause-and-effect: the idea of an “essence of causation” would obscure the variety of uses of causal expressions. Furthermore, instinctive reactions would be one source of the learning of causal expressions. The child does not learn that there are books and armchairs but learns to fetch books and sit in armchairs (OC, §476). *Belief* in these things’ existence is to be construed in terms not of some kind of conceptual or primarily cognitive grasp but of *this* behavior in *these* circumstances. The belief is not a “source” of the behavior.

This account of language that emerges contrasts sharply, then, with such influential theories as those of Noam Chomsky and Jerry Fodor, and indeed with more recent ideas developed in neuroscience. While it is true that the nervous system of a human being is innate, it is a fallacy and ultimately vacuous to suppose that neural processes constitute a “language of thought” or a “representational system” (see also Williams and Standish 2015). No doubt it is true also that the position developed here is at odds with a vast range of thinking in psychology and linguistics that has contributed to ideas of language development.

But Malcolm’s purpose goes beyond this. It is not just that the child’s early language is grafted onto instinctive behavior. In fact, the adult’s complex employment of language embodies, strange though it may seem, something resembling instinct. A step forward can be made with this apparently extraordinary claim if we pause over the Pascalian thought that our nature is convention. If human beings are understood in purely biological terms, this will not begin to approach what it is that constitutes human life. We shall understand human beings on a par with the way we understand other life forms in biological terms. To understand the human being beyond this

involves attending to language and culture, and these are matters of convention: biologically, a human being without some kind of initiation into these things is scarcely recognizable as human. This helps to show that the human being cannot be understood in purely naturalistic terms. It shows also, perhaps, that while so much of this will be learned, it later becomes woven into a fabric of reactions and responses that have the spontaneity of instinct. Malcolm’s way of moving the discussion forward here is to focus on such claims of G.E. Moore as that he knows he is wearing clothes or knows he is in a room presenting a paper. The fact that Moore is wearing clothes – given the culture he is in, etc. – might be understood as something of which he has instinctive awareness: it is not something that, under normal circumstances, he could reasonably be said to check. If he were to check, this would be interpreted a sign not of conscientiousness but of mental disturbance. In this sense, then, as Malcolm argues, echoing Wittgenstein, it is not something that he can be said to “know” or to be “certain of.” It is not something he could ordinarily be mistaken about. And here distinctions between the empirical and the conceptual begin to break down. Does our use of words have an empirical basis? In a sense, yes, because we have learned them, and the particular language we learned was a contingent matter. But our relation to that background is not anything we would need to check. Our words are there for us in a way that we cannot ordinarily doubt, as close as our skin, as it were. The words stand fast for us.

In fact, as Malcolm goes on to say, such absence of doubt is there in any learning: there is necessarily this background of spontaneous reaction to a cause. Contra Jerry Fodor, for example, one does not need to form a hypothesis before one acts. You learn words (“Sit on the chair”) before you can employ them. The absence of doubt can be called instinctive because it is not learned. Standing on two feet was something that at one time one learned, but when one rises from a chair, one does not first check that one has two feet. Hence, there is an outgrowth from unthinking behavior that permeates and surrounds all human acting.

Animal and Beyond

Wittgenstein conceives of the absence of doubt as “something that lies beyond being justified or unjustified; as it were, as something animal” (OC, §358–359). To speak of knowledge or conviction or acceptance, etc., is not really appropriate in these circumstances as these expressions have their roles within specific language games: they are not appropriate when it comes to explaining the basis of *all* language games. In fact all such psychological terms lead us away from what is important here, from this “unthinking, instinctive behaviour” that, as Malcolm puts it, underlies all language games (p. 17). Wittgenstein makes the point in terms at once more stark and more graphic: “The fact that I use the word ‘hand’ and all the other words in my sentence without a second thought, indeed that I should stand before the abyss if I wanted so much as to try doubting their meanings – shows that the absence of doubt belongs to the essence of the language-game. . .” (OC, §370). This instinctive behavior is like the squirrel’s gathering of nuts or the cat’s watching a mouse hole. Can the child who is told to sit on a chair and responds appropriately be said to know what a chair is? What of the dog that is told to sit? Learned discriminative behavior does not depend upon mental states that “explain” the response: mental states are not the basis of mastery of language, for all psychological concepts have their basis in ways of acting.

It is plain, then, that Malcolm’s Wittgensteinianism militates against the Cartesian legacy – against mentalistic accounts of human being and against cognitivism as it has been found in psychology and education for most of the past century. There is every reason to support the broad direction of this critique, and certainly the emphasis on reactions and on the animal is a powerful driving force. But this position is open to question on grounds of a quite different kind.

It was suggested earlier that the above account gains plausibility if it is acknowledged that, paradoxical though it initially sounds, the nature of the human being is convention. But the account naturalizes convention. In its sustained attack on

mentalistic thinking, it frames language within the terms of the animal – that is, as a refinement of natural reactions, from the blinking of an eye and the adjustment of one’s balance to primitive reactions of sympathy when others are in pain. There is some truth to this, perhaps especially in phylogenetic terms. It understands the rule-following of language and so much ordinary behavior in terms of knowing how to go on in the same way; there is truth to this too, especially in the light of the vast background of consistency in our linguistic and social behavior. But there is no need to deny this in order to recognize something else – something that is of unique importance for education but also, in fact, for the understanding of human lives as a whole. This is that the signs human beings produce, with which and through which they live, are of a different order from those made by other animals. The signs of animals in general (and clearly we are speaking primarily about the higher animals) operate with a kind of push-pull regularity, sophisticated in varying ways but limited in the range of their possibility. Lions roar at one another in different ways, and their young learn this behavior. It is passed on from generation to generation. The lions roar, reproduce, eat, and sleep, and over time things remain the same. Human beings communicate through signs also, but their signs are of a quite different order. Human signs – words and gestures – are such as to admit open possibilities of response: chains of association and connection, and infinite possibilities of interpretation. The human sign is not of the order of a here-and-now but depends upon a distancing from things that can refer precisely to what is not present here and now, which in turn conditions what “here” and “now” can mean. And it is crucial that it can refer: language is generated where it is possible to say things about the world. Indeed, it is through language that the world comes into view. World, in the sense that we ordinarily mean it, is language dependent, and so too, of course, is the human being. Being open to association and connection in the way indicated, words do not remain within a closed circle of exchange: On the contrary, they become the engine of culture, the very possibility of new

departure, and in a sense the essence of education; and such can be seen in ordinary conversation, which can take directions that are not anticipated and produce effects as yet unknown.

The world the child comes into is not a world of similar beings, all making early moves in the refinement of natural reactions. It is a world where there are grown-ups with language full-blown. A consequence of this is that when the child is told to sit on a chair, their early understanding, which produces the correct behavior, occurs against a background that is at present, so to speak, above them. It occurs against refined cultural practices of sitting on chairs and having dinner or watching television or attending to a lecture... Without this framing from the top down, as it were, how could such practices be rightly understood? On this account then, the child's developing reactions, behavior, and language can be understood only in limited terms from below. This is not so much the case for the lion-cub for which the relevant signs are finite and circumscribed in their usage, as are the activities to which they relate. Not to mark this distinction between the animal and the human is to submit to a naturalism that falls short of what it is to be a human being. It is certainly the case that Wittgenstein said much in his last writings that would support such a view – perhaps because of the vehemence of his condemnation of Cartesianism and of the mentalistic philosophy of mind that persisted so stubbornly during his lifetime. But it is a mistake to confine the interpretation of his work to these passages, and there is much elsewhere in what he says that gestures towards a less naturalistic view. “My attitude to him is an attitude towards a soul. I am not of the *opinion* that he has a soul” (PI II, iv, p. 152). “The human body is the best picture of the human soul” (Ibid.). What is to be made of remarks such as these, or of the following from a few pages earlier in the same text?

One can imagine an animal angry, frightened, unhappy, happy, startled. But hopeful? And why not?

A dog believes his master is at the door. But can he also believe his master will come the day after to-morrow? – And *what* can he not do here? – How

do I do it? – How am I supposed to answer this? (PI II, i, p. 148).

In the face of such questions, the emphasis on language as a refinement of natural reactions seems of limited use, to say the least. In fact, however cogent its rejection of mentalistic pictures of psychological states, it seems here to miss the point.

Saying Things

A further question can also be raised against Malcolm, and perhaps against Wittgenstein, about how far the overemphasis in the account teeters on the brink of being wrong. Our everyday relation to words is such, it is said, that they stand fast for us and we do not call them into question. Yet this is plainly not true for everything we say. It is a common experience to find oneself at times unable to choose one's words well or simply at a loss as to what to say. Moreover, there is the eerie experience of repeating a word over and over again until it becomes difficult to connect it with its usual reference or at least until that connection no longer seems as natural as it did. Not to acknowledge this is to fail to recognize a degree of violence that exists in our coming into language, which both distances us from our animal-like, prelinguistic, seamless involvement in things present and opens for us a kind of alienation, the condition for entry into the world of human beings. Wittgenstein surely had some sense of this, with his remarks, for example, about the physiognomy of words (PI, §568; p. 155, 179, and 186), strange and surreal as these to some extent are, and with his respect for the human tendency to run up against the limits of language. But the philosopher who has most extended this line of thought is surely Stanley Cavell, whose purpose is other than the skeptic's but whose concern is with the all too human tendency to call into doubt the human condition. Language seems as close as one's skin, but at times one can feel oneself to be in the wrong skin, or perhaps find that the clothes one is no doubt wearing are not in fact one's own.

There is, however, a further, more powerful reason to resist the above account, and here the criticism may be leveled not only at Malcolm but at Wittgenstein himself. Rush Rhees, also himself a student, interpreter, and friend of Wittgenstein, took issue with Malcolm over the paper that has been the main subject of this discussion but also criticized Wittgenstein more broadly in respect of his account of language. For all the brilliance of his understanding of language, Wittgenstein had failed to pay attention to the fact that, when the child learns to speak, she can say *things*. She discovers that she can say things about the world. In a sense, as was indicated earlier, it is only through this that the world comes into view. In learning that she can say things, she learns also that this is something she can share with others. She participates, perhaps clumsily at first, in this possibility: she can make judgments and test them against others; through this she comes to see that we have a common world, contested though its nature will continually be. No amount of attention to “knowing how to go on” or to what it is to follow a rule will account for this aspect of language, which Rhees understands as something that conditions language as a whole and makes it a whole. The emphasis on language games rightly stresses the variety of things we do with words, but it risks hiding this unique importance of language for human beings. Overemphasizing the basis of language in the primitive reaction can only hide this some more.

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Wittgenstein's Pedagogical Metaphors

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Ludwig Wittgenstein's *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* (1961) is an argument for an austere, literal view of language. This core argument can be summarized by the following propositions:

(TLP 2) What is the case – a fact – is the existence of states of affairs.

(TLP 4.1) Propositions represent the existence and non-existence of states of affairs.

(TLP 4.11) The totality of true propositions is the whole of natural science. . .

The Logical Empiricists of the Vienna Circle took this argument as the basis for *positivism*: the view that language is a means for offering true statements about the world. Their “verification principle” asserted that a statement is meaningful only if there is a procedure for verifying whether it is true or not. Statements that do not fit this criterion are “nonsense.” Under such a definition, virtually all statements outside the realm of pure logic, mathematics, and empirical science are nonsense.

Wittgenstein believed, in fact, that a good deal of philosophy *was* nonsense (TLP 4.003), and that philosophy, by this definition, does not offer “propositions”:

(TLP 4.112) Philosophy aims at the logical clarification of thoughts. Philosophy is not a body of doctrine but an activity. A philosophical work consists essentially of elucidations. Philosophy does not result in “philosophical propositions,” but rather in the clarification of propositions. Without philosophy thoughts are, as it were, cloudy and indistinct: its task is to make them clear and to give them sharp boundaries.

Philosophical mistakes occur, Wittgenstein believed, when problems are phrased in ways that are not answerable, as formulated. The book ends with a simple assertion that reads like a koan from Zen Buddhism:

(TLP 7) What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence.

As many commentators have pointed out, however, this austere view of language is not supported by the *Tractatus* itself (Gill 1979, 1996; Maruta 2003; Nyiri 2010). Several of the key claims in the text are phrased in figurative language: one might call them analogies or similes, but here the author will use the most commonly used term, *metaphors*.

This fact suggests that the picture of language in the *Tractatus* is seriously incomplete, that even on its own terms it is not possible to maintain a purely literal language, and that the philosophical task of “elucidation” or “clarification of propositions,” as Wittgenstein carries it out, still relies on metaphors.

Here are three examples from the text. The first is Wittgenstein’s famous “picture theory” that a proposition is true if and only if it offers an accurate representation of the world:

(TLP 2.1) We picture facts to ourselves.

(TLP 2.11) A picture presents a situation in logical space, the existence and non-existence of states of affairs.

(TLP 2.12) A picture is a model of reality.

Here the most basic function of language – its essential function, on Wittgenstein’s account – can only be explained by comparing it to a nonlinguistic example. The following sections go into great detail about the way in which a picture (*Bild*) represents the world. At this crucial point (the question of truth), Wittgenstein relies on yet a further metaphor, a ruler:

(TLP 2.1511) That is how a picture is attached to reality; it reaches right out to it.

(TLP 2.1512) It is laid against reality like a measure.

(TLP 2.15121) Only the end-points of the graduating lines actually touch the object that is to be measured.

Finally, in the penultimate passage of the book, another famous metaphor:

(TLP 6.54) My propositions serve as elucidations in the following way: anyone who understands me eventually recognizes them as nonsensical, when he has used them – as steps – to climb up beyond them. (He must, so to speak, throw away the ladder after he has climbed up it.) He must transcend these propositions, and then he will see the world aright.

Here Wittgenstein acknowledges, in a strikingly self-referential way, that the very endeavor of elucidation, as he practices it, relies on the “nonsensical” (including, it appears, the use of language that directly violates the theory of referential truth argued for in the text). Even here, he relies on a metaphor, the ladder that, once it has served its purpose, we must “transcend” or throw away. Or can we? Jerry Gill summarizes this apparent paradox as follows:

Wittgenstein’s well known way of treating this difficulty is to take back with his left hand what he had offered with his right hand. . . . Clearly the main feature of the difficulty is that metaphorical expression is the necessary foundation for more explicit expression. The ladder that enables us to move from no expression to explicit expression is metaphoric expression. Thus it is not the sort of ladder which can be kicked over. For we are still and always standing on it! (Gill 1979, pp. 273–274)

In his later work, Wittgenstein relies even more extensively (and, one might say, more unapologetically) on metaphors of many types. He says, in the *Philosophical Investigations*, (1958) “A simile that has been absorbed into the forms of our language produces a false appearance, and this disquiets us” (§112). And he writes in *Culture and Value*, (1980) “A good simile refreshes the intellect” (p. 1) and “What I invent are new similes” (p. 19). So it appears from these comments that certain similes (or metaphors) inhibit thought; The author regard PI §112 as closely linked with PI §115, “A picture held us captive. And we could not get outside it, for it lay in our language and language seemed to repeat it to us inexorably.” Certain figurations in language become clichéd, so familiar that their original intent becomes invisible to us (some call these “dead metaphors”). A cliché becomes an encumbrance to thought, whereas a new or fresh metaphor can cause us to view the familiar in a new light. Wittgenstein’s goal, he says, is to invent new similes. This suggests an indispensable role for figurative language, such as metaphor.

In Wittgenstein’s famous metaphor (PI §309), “What is your aim in philosophy? – To shew the fly the way out of the fly-bottle,” the fly-bottle is both a trap from which one is trying to escape, but also – because we are *inside it* and because it is

transparent – a trap that we must first of all *recognize as such*. Here again there is a self-reflexive moment: you draw people's attention to the fly-bottle they are in by using a metaphor; the novel figuration highlights the clichéd, static language that “holds us captive.” Whereas the conception of language laid out in the *Tractatus* suggests that figurative language is an aberration from the representative function of propositions (because as a proposition, a metaphor is – literally speaking – false), in the *Investigations* figurative language is just another “language-game,” one that operates by different rules from the literal – and constitutes an important, complementary, corrective to it.

Many have commented on the plethora of metaphors (analogies, similes, etc.) Wittgenstein uses in his later work. Although all of them will not be reviewed here, two aspects of these metaphors will be focused here: the first is the frequent use of *tools* as his metaphorical objects; the second is the way in which these metaphors frequently are used to depict *educational* processes (see also Peters et al. 2008).

Christopher Benfey, in a wonderful essay entitled “Wittgenstein's Handles” (2016) draws attention to the work that Wittgenstein did in helping to design his sister Gretl's house in 1926. Benfey quotes from Ray Monk's biography of Wittgenstein:

His role in the design of the house was concerned chiefly with the design of the windows, doors, window-locks and radiators. This is not as marginal as it may at first appear, for it is precisely these details that lend what is otherwise a rather plain, even ugly, house its distinctive beauty. The complete lack of any external decoration gives a stark appearance, which is alleviated only by the graceful proportion and meticulous execution of the features designed by Wittgenstein. . . The details are thus everything, and Wittgenstein supervised their construction with an almost fanatical exactitude. (Monk 1991, p. 236)

It is not very surprising that Wittgenstein, trained as an engineer, would have an imagination that turned toward metaphors of handles, hinges, rulers, hammers, ladders, and spades. This much more pragmatic world view is captured in his famous aphorism (PI §43), “For a large class of cases – though not for all – in which we employ

the word ‘meaning’ it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language,” and the less well-known (PI §97): “Whereas, of course, if the words ‘language,’ ‘experience,’ ‘world,’ have a use, it must be as humble a one as that of the words ‘table,’ ‘lamp,’ ‘door.’” Wittgenstein makes the analogy of words with tools explicit:

(PI §11) Think of the tools in a tool-box: there is a hammer, pliers, a saw, a screw-driver, a rule, a glue-pot, glue, nails and screws. – The functions of words are as diverse as the functions of these objects. (And in both cases there are similarities.)

The last parenthetical comment is significant, because even the term “use” in the case of tools is not unambiguous. There is more than one way to use a tool, and more than one purpose to which a tool can be put; likewise, different tools can be used in similar ways. In *On Certainty* (1969), Wittgenstein asks, (OC §351) “Isn't the question ‘have these words a meaning?’ similar to ‘Is that a tool?’ asked as one produces, say, a hammer? I say ‘Yes, it's a hammer. But what if the thing that any of us would take for a hammer were somewhere else a missile, for example, or a conductor's baton? Now make the application yourself.” Therefore, describing meaning as use does not straightforwardly settle the matter, since we still need to ask “What use?” and “For what purposes?” Wittgenstein highlights this problem with yet another tool metaphor:

(PI §12) It is like looking into the cabin of a locomotive. We see handles all looking more or less alike. (Naturally, since they are all supposed to be handled.) But one is the handle of a crank which can be moved continuously (it regulates the opening of a valve); another is the handle of a switch, which has only a brake-lever, the harder one pulls on it, the harder it brakes; a fourth, the handle of a pump: it has an effect only so long as it is moved to and fro.

The handles all look alike, but they work in different ways and they accomplish different things. And here is the key point: the only way to learn these differences is by handling them and seeing the way they work. So if it is true that the meaning of a word is its use, then a corollary is that we learn the meaning(s) of a word *by* using it, and the same word can be used in different ways, for different purposes.

This discussion introduces the second theme the author want to highlight about Wittgenstein's metaphors: they often have a pedagogical component, they ask us to reflect on how we learn something or learn to do something. In fact, the *Investigations* famously starts with a passage from Augustine about how he learned language – an account that Wittgenstein goes on to question.

Here again we encounter a range of metaphors. The best known from the *Investigations* is the idea of a “language-game”:

(PI §23) There are *countless* kinds: countless different kinds of use of what we call “symbols,” “words,” “sentences.” And this multiplicity is not something fixed, given once for all; but new types of language, new language-games, as we may say, come into existence, and others become obsolete and get forgotten....Here the term “*language-game*” is meant to bring into prominence the fact that the *speaking* of language is part of an activity, or of a form of life.

Review the multiplicity of language-game in the following examples, and in others:

- * Giving orders, and obeying them—
- * Describing the appearance of an object, or giving its measurements—
- * Constructing an object from a description (a drawing)—
- * Reporting an event—
- * Speculating about an event—
- * Forming and testing a hypothesis—
- * Presenting the results of an experiment in tables and diagrams—
- * Making up a story; and reading it—
- * Play-acting—
- * Singing catches—
- * Guessing riddles—
- * Making a joke; telling it—
- * Solving a problem in practical arithmetic—
- * Translating from one language into another—
- * Asking, thanking, cursing, greeting, praying.

—It is interesting to compare the multiplicity of the tools in language and of the ways they are used, the multiplicity of kinds of word and sentence, with what logicians have said about the structure of language.(Including the author of the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*.)

In this summary we see the key elements of Wittgenstein's view of language: that whereas in the *Tractatus* language is for making propositional assertions about the world, and in which the aim is to state the truth (and where all else is “nonsense”), here language has an enormous

variety of uses and purposes – *games* – each governed by different rules and criteria of success. The “language-game,” Wittgenstein says, consists of (PI §7) “the whole, consisting of language and the actions into which it is woven” – not just words, but activities in which language plays a part (what is sometimes termed in other contexts discourse or *parole*). Learning the “language-game” entails learning not only words but their uses in the context of human doings.

How does this learning occur? Here, not surprisingly, we encounter another metaphor. We learn to participate in a language-game, as with any game, by learning the rules. But what does it mean to follow a rule?

(PI §85) A rule stands there like a sign-post. – Does the sign-post leave no doubt open about the way I have to go? Does it shew which direction I am to take when I have passed it; whether along the road or the footpath or cross-country? But where is it said which way I am to follow it; whether in the direction of its finger or (e.g.) in the opposite one? –And if there were, not a single sign-post, but a chain of adjacent ones or of chalk marks on the ground– is there only *one* way of interpreting them?– So I can say, the sign-post does after all leave no room for doubt. Or rather: it sometimes leaves room for doubt and sometimes not. And now this is no longer a philosophical proposition, but an empirical one.

A sign-post is, like other tools and objects, something that can be used in different ways, some of those uses straightforward, others ambiguous. One might say, “just follow the sign-post” (or follow the rule), but Wittgenstein says, there might be more than one way of doing that. This is one consequence of viewing language-games in the context of human doings. One might say that in order to engage successfully in an activity one must follow the rules – but it is sometimes just as true to say that we learn what it means to follow the rules from learning to engage in the activity successfully. And to add a further layer of complexity, Wittgenstein says (PI §83): “And is there not also the case where we play and make up the rules as we go along? And there is even one where we alter them-as we go along.” The key, for Wittgenstein, is to be able to say “Now I can go on” (PI §179), that is, to *show* through successful participation in the activity that one has learned and understands the rules.

A key part of this view of rule-following is that, for Wittgenstein (PI §1), “Explanations come to an end somewhere.” This is not a model of learning like direct instruction, in which all steps can be made explicit and learned sequentially (Burbules 2008). Indeed even the successful practitioner of an activity may not be able to fully articulate how they are doing it:

(PI §217) “How am I able to obey a rule?” – if this is not a question about causes, then it is about the justification for my following the rule in the way I do. If I have exhausted the justifications I have reached bedrock, and my spade is turned. Then I am inclined to say: “This is simply what I do.”

My spade is turned. Another tool metaphor. And another moment of reflexivity, because figurative language also exceeds the boundaries of explanation: to attempt to fully explain a metaphor is to kill it. Figurative language is open-ended, suggestive. A metaphor is not a proposition that makes an assertion, but an invitation to consider the ways in which a comparison opens up an exploration of similarities and differences that shed light on the objects of comparison. Metaphor does not come with instructions, and there are different ways to use it and understand it. This open-endedness and indeterminacy is its virtue.

And that, the author is arguing here, is why Wittgenstein uses metaphor, especially in his later work: because it exemplifies a key point about language use as a kind of doing, and as directed to other important purposes than just the assertion of propositional truths. His tool metaphors especially highlight these questions of uses, purposes, and doings; and these in turn raise the question of how we learn these uses, purposes, and doings – an exploration which, again, itself relies on a series of metaphors (games, sign-posts, and ladders that need to be thrown away after one has climbed them).

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Wittgensteinian Legacy

► Allegedly Conservative: Revisiting Wittgenstein’s Legacy for Philosophy of Education

Wittgensteinian Perspectives and Science Education Research

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Synonyms

Ludwig wittgenstein; Peter winch; Science learning;

Introduction

As one of the most influential philosophers of the twentieth century, Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889–1951) has impacted a variety of scholarly disciplines, including education theory and research. Wittgenstein's later works are often cited for their insights into a wide variety of philosophical topics, including meaning and understanding, rule following, the “inner” and “outer” realms of human activity, and certainty about knowledge. In contrast to the representationalist view of language expressed in his earlier work, these writings identify the meaning of an expression as its rule-governed use in language, inextricably tied to its use in our lives.

Wittgenstein's name has been invoked with increasing regularity, especially since what might be termed the “social turn” in research on learning in (science) education, including interest in the role of discursive interaction in human development and in sociological studies of scientific practice. Less understood but no less significant in education research are the implications of Wittgenstein's vision of an alternative orientation for philosophy and, in turn, the impact of this vision on theory and research in the various human sciences. Wittgenstein claimed that frustration with psychology should not be mistaken for problems related to its being an underdeveloped science. Rather, he faulted “conceptual confusions” in which prescribed methods are thought to deliver solutions to problems but instead miss the mark entirely.

Extending these Wittgensteinian points, philosopher Peter Winch argued that social science is much more conceptual than empirical and that the proper understanding of meaningful human action involves dialectical examination of language use. Producing empirical evidence to satisfy an essentially conceptual question – for example, concern with identifying the “most effective instructional method” or even “what was learned in a laboratory exercise” – results in begging the question, regardless of the depth of care we take in specifying operational definitions. Most theories that get adopted in education research end up simply replacing the answers given to the perpetual problems of educational

practice while leaving central analytic orientations intact; Wittgenstein's and Winch's notions force us to examine whether education researchers should instead fundamentally change the questions that are asked.

Wittgenstein's Philosophy

Numerous summaries of Wittgenstein's biography and philosophical contributions exist; only broad arguments related most directly to the uptake of his work in science education are given here. As outlined in *Philosophical Investigations* (Wittgenstein 1958) and other posthumously organized collections of his vast notes and dialectical exemplars, Wittgenstein's later work was concerned with pointing to the unrelieved role of grammar in philosophical puzzles. Wittgenstein proposed time and again that philosophical difficulties were often the result of a lack of clarity surrounding our concepts; certain expressions (e.g., “to be” or “to exist”) continually lure us into supposed philosophical crises, whereas examining the expression's logic in use suggests a “therapeutic” alternative analysis and resolution.

The analysis of the meaning of an expression relies on examination of its ordinary use in our lives, use that is embedded in what Wittgenstein referred to as “language games.” A language game is essentially a grammar of practice, rule governed, and knowable to competent speakers of a language. It is sometimes assumed that philosophy's task is to produce solutions to puzzles of meaning and existence, akin to the natural sciences' aim to produce causal explanations of observed patterns and relationships. Again, however, for Wittgenstein, the goal of philosophy properly conceived is to produce clarifying descriptions of the rule-governed use of concepts in our various language games.

One question raised by Wittgenstein's philosophy concerns the source of the aforementioned rules: is it in fact the case that the origin of these rules is what is in need of explanation? And if it is not the task of philosophy to produce this explanation, perhaps this is the rightful role of

linguistics or social science more generally? Although some have certainly advanced this interpretation of Wittgenstein, a more common response is to point to his numerous references to the commonly perceived but sorely misguided need to secure the foundations of all knowledge. Rather than suggesting a skeptical interpretation of his discussions of rule following, Wittgensteinian philosophers such as Peter Hacker (1999) and Cora Diamond (1989) urge us to understand his writings as pointing to the way that rules exist against a background of modes of living in and talking about the world; rules and contexts are mutually constitutive rather than causally emergent and in need of explanation.

Wittgenstein's insistence on the rule-governed nature of our lives may also be heard as validation of scholars who insist on the primacy of social, rather than psychological, explanations of human behavior. It is the case that Wittgenstein discusses and rejects the idea of a "private language" – the notion that an individual attaches unique names to individual experiences, and this creates an "inner world" known only to himself (e.g., see Hacker 1999). Typically, however, Wittgenstein should be interpreted not as "taking sides" in a familiar battle but as resetting the terms of the debate; in this case, it is not so much the triumph of "social" over "individual" worlds that is noteworthy but, rather, the way in which the "inner-outer divide" itself can be seen as illusory and a product of our ways of speaking rather than a conundrum in desperate need of resolution.

Related to this critique of the mind-body (or more contemporary brain-body) dualism, Wittgenstein is largely seen as having dismantled a representationalist view of language. "Representationalist" refers to the notion that language ties to and names the world, such that its use is indicative of something lying behind it; language "stands for" or "points to" something, in the way that announcing "I am hungry" is sometimes thought to imply that the speaker is translating introspection into words, orienting to her inner condition in order to communicate with others. Alternatively, stating "I am hungry" can be seen simply as a rule-governed behavior we engage in (rather than, e.g., crying or enduring the pain of an

empty stomach). It is a subtle distinction to talk of language as expressing rather than representing. And of course, language *can* be used to represent, or to name – Wittgenstein challenges us to see that representing is but *one* use for language, not a fundamental, singular, or universal relationship between language and the world.

Influence in Science Education Research

In order to appreciate the influence of Wittgenstein's writings in science education research, it is helpful to have a general outline of studies of student learning in the field. While consensus on the approach to research or even the goal of inquiry is not readily apparent, the overwhelming focus has been on *students' understanding of scientific concepts*. Conceptual learning has been and is often still thought of as the acquisition or restructuring of individual mental representations. Increasingly, though, language and social interaction have been viewed as critical in shaping these mental representations; in some cases, the notion of concept-as-mental-representation has been called into question. Attempts to determine the causal relevance of other factors such as motivation, attitude, elements of individual identities, learning environments, or other "internal" or "external" characteristics have also been undertaken.

In relation to research on students' learning in science, Wittgenstein's philosophy has been invoked in at least four broad ways over the last several decades (Heckler 2014). Early dissenters to the emerging "conceptual change" theory of cognitive learning in science as analogous to rational theory replacement in the discipline of science argued against the plausibility of novice students' ability to logically justify and appropriate scientifically superior counterparts to their naïve and unworkable explanations of the world. Wittgenstein's writings were used to emphasize the nonrational aspects of human interaction (persuasion versus reason; learning by imitation and training) or to point to multiple and local rationalities as more relevant to the student's task than a universal scientific logic.

A second strand of research has enlisted Wittgenstein in the project of theorizing student learning as a sociocultural rather than individual-psychological process. Students' acquisition of scientific concepts was characterized as successful participation in a scientific language game. Most theorists argued for a picture of learning that involved a combination of "individual" and "social" elements, for example, appropriate language performance as evidence of a scientific concept correctly internalized. However, occasionally Wittgenstein's philosophy has been used in science education to argue for rejecting the individual-social dichotomy and any sense of a uniquely individual cognition.

The introduction and use of the science studies literature – broadly, sociological, historical and philosophical inquiries into scientific practice as it occurs in particular settings, on particular occasions – in science education provided a third opening for the use of Wittgenstein's philosophy. An interest in science studies grew out of the sociocultural in research on science learning; rather than imagine logical scientific theory change as a cognitive development, investigators studied science classrooms as sites of scientific practice (and concept development), inspired by methods and arguments from science studies. The path to Wittgenstein here is somewhat indirect, but emanates largely from the writings of David Bloor, who as spokesperson for the "Edinburgh Strong Programme" in science studies argued (following Saul Kripke) that Wittgenstein's discussion of rule following licensed a skeptical interpretation: that if we can't point to empirically derived, natural causes for the rules we follow in various forms of practice (including rules for language use), the explanation must lie in social consensus, the formation of which should be studied and understood theoretically. This social-constructivist approach to explaining how students come to understand science in classroom settings was embraced by science education researchers beginning in the mid-to-late 1990s.

Finally, Wittgenstein's writings have inspired discussion of new methodologies in researching students' science learning. The most robust of these has been known as "practical epistemology

analysis," which involves analyzing transcripts of science learning activities, in order to pinpoint where students have difficulty understanding and how that difficulty is resolved via known concepts. Wittgenstein's notion of meanings that "stand fast" in relation to their surroundings was combined with the notion of "family resemblance" across language games in order to reimagine and investigate students' acquisition of new conceptual understanding in science. Such analysis was used to describe what students learned from various laboratory practicals and how student-teacher interaction guided learning, to identify metaphors as important connectors between students' established knowledge, and to illustrate students' use of aesthetic judgments in negotiating their participation in a school science classroom, among others.

The Problem of Scientism

Although Wittgenstein's philosophy has been cited in service of studying student learning in science in various ways, the claim has been made that ultimately these references miss the point of his arguments (Heckler 2014). To understand why, it is important to appreciate the undercurrents of anti-scientism (not *antisience*) at work in Wittgenstein's writings. In this context, "scientism" refers to the tendency to lift up scientific methodology as the preferred (if not sole) source of certain knowledge in all human practices. Many academic disciplines beyond the natural sciences model their modes of inquiry on the empirical methods of the natural sciences. However, we could ask whether some endeavors – for example, aesthetics, ethics, or philosophy more generally – need to emulate this methodology or whether they might rightfully pursue other approaches to generating knowledge. In part, the answer depends on how we think about what is *real*: must the concepts covered by epistemological or metaphysical questions be empirically observable to count as "real?" Lyas (1999) explains how Peter Winch draws from Wittgenstein in examining just these questions, asking, for example, should empirical linguistics replace

philosophy as the source of truth about our use of concepts? Winch's and Wittgenstein's philosophies suggest they would oppose such a conclusion for the study of much of human social life. However, the prevalence of scientistic tendencies across a vast swath of contemporary academic work may suggest a lack of familiarity with the argument – or perhaps, the common, scientistic assumptions behind the current plethora of “methods” and “theories” at play in the social studies are concealed by their seeming differences (Hutchinson et al. 2008).

Education research is not immune to these pressures. In fact, the desirability of a scientific approach to studies in education has been codified by laws such as the *Every Student Succeeds Act* (ESSA) of 2015 (which recently replaced the *No Child Left Behind Act* of 2001). ESSA specifies that educational initiatives deserving of federal funding for implementation and further study must be “evidence based,” defined as derived from experimental, quasi-experimental, or correlational studies that have demonstrated a statistically significant effect on student learning outcomes or from rationales for approaches that show promise of scientific validation.

This evidence-based orientation has affected traditional norms of educational practice, as well. For example, curriculum was once idealized as an expression of values or of an educational philosophy tied to its ultimate purpose: educating for individual development, social efficiency, social reform, vocational training, participation in democratic society, social mobility, knowledge replication and production, proof of status, transmission of cultural heritage, exposing and transgressing oppression and injustice, and so on. But increasingly today, curriculum is seen as necessarily tied to “models of student learning”; the curriculum itself must be “evidence based.” In a field where research traditions have been summarized as possessing “no rules that everyone follows, no beliefs that everyone shares, no findings that everyone agrees on” (Anderson 2007, p. 3), the assumption that research should set curricular policy might reasonably be called into question.

Wittgenstein spoke against the analytic tendency to reduce our human understanding of the

world to universal concepts and causal relationships – what he called a “craving for generality.” But the overwhelming imperative in contemporary education research is indeed to satisfy such a craving. To suggest otherwise invites charges ranging from naiveté to professional incompetence. With occasional exceptions, the use of Wittgenstein's philosophy in science education has *not* been to call for an alternative analytical orientation but, rather, to appropriate singular concepts or notions in service of the familiar ways of seeking to provide explanation for students' learning (or lack thereof) in educational settings. “Language games,” “standing fast,” “family resemblance,” and other Wittgensteinian notions have been used to provide new ways of characterizing students' learning in science, when what is needed instead is an inquiry into whether it makes sense to investigate learning as a process or a causal phenomenon in the first place.

Wittgensteinian Alternatives for Educational Inquiry

Peter Winch, in drawing upon and extending Wittgenstein's philosophy in his book, *The Idea of Social Science and its Relation to Philosophy* (Winch 1990), argued that the study of people is more akin to philosophical than to natural scientific inquiry. One way to summarize it might be this: philosophy (e.g., epistemology) is fundamentally concerned with the nature of human social life but not empirically so. Empirical study (in Winch's sense) reveals something new about the world and in particular about (causal) relationships between objects. But philosophy's interest is in conceptual truths – or how our concepts are related to the world – and typically, this is not new information but information that any competent user of a language knows and can recognize (Lyas 1999). Philosophers remind us of the various ways that concepts are used meaningfully in our lives (Diamond 1989).

To say that the study of social life is more often conceptual than empirical is to assert that such study takes interest in meaningful behavior, and following Wittgenstein, meaningful behavior is

rule-governed behavior, dependent on occasion and purpose. We expose and uncover social concepts and relationships by examining what we know about our rule-governed forms of life. Empirical investigation, on the other hand, depends on settling the criteria of what is to be observed. When social concepts are operationalized in order to perform experimental investigations of them, we can give the illusion of discovering new information or of exposing causal generalizations. But the act of operationalizing concepts in order to observe human interaction often masks myriad ways that rules are meaningfully followed and the choices people have in social life. Empirical analysis ends up begging philosophical questions about the occasion- and purpose-bound use of concepts in our lives (Hutchinson et al. 2008).

What might conceptual analysis look like in education research? One example is given in Francis (2005); this critique of radical and social constructivism relies on insights from both Wittgenstein and Winch, as well as analysis of the logic inherent in von Glasersfeld's "radical constructivism" and Bloor's "social constructivism" to illustrate the nonsensical elements of these research agendas. Francis observes that both theories are essentially philosophical arguments purporting to be empirical research programs. Similar critiques might be undertaken of the various theoretical traditions existing in science education research today.

A different approach, no less informed by Wittgensteinian philosophy, guides Macbeth's (2000) analysis of a recorded interview between a young student and a conceptual change researcher. Rather than using the analysis to suggest new theoretical understandings of science learning, Macbeth essentially exposes the logic of alternate "language games" at play during the interaction and foregrounds the way in which the professional analytic practice of a "diagnostic interview" both relies on and simultaneously disavows the student's everyday orientation to questions and answers in order to ascribe to her various levels of conceptual (mis)understanding.

The difficulty of resisting the urge to theorize, of ignoring the weight of expectations to produce

causal explanations of students' learning, or of eschewing the idea that social study should aspire to anything like prediction or control of interactional outcomes should not be underestimated. But the promise of clear and penetrating descriptions of education as rule-governed practice and of useful insights into our understanding of meaningful behavior will perhaps ultimately inspire fidelity to Wittgensteinian perspectives in researchers' future analytic undertakings.

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Women's Studies

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Wynter and Decolonization

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Sylvia Wynter: An Introduction

Sylvia Wynter is an Afro-Caribbean theorist, born in Cuba in 1928 and raised in Kingston, Jamaica. Growing up in Jamaica, she witnessed anti-colonial mass movements during the early 1940s. In 1947, Wynter moved to London, England, to study modern languages at the University of London, King's College, majoring in Spanish with a minor in English. She taught at the University of West Indies in Jamaica before moving to the USA and teaching at the University of California, San Diego, and then Stanford University, where she is currently Professor Emerita. While at the University of West Indies, Wynter taught in the Hispanic Literature Department, and then, in San Diego, she taught primarily in the Department of Literature. She also served as the Chair of the African and Afro-American Studies Department as well as Professor of Spanish in the Spanish and Portuguese Department at Stanford University (Wynter 2000). Prior to her employment at the University of West Indies, Wynter was a performer, both as an actor and a dancer. It was not until she left England and returned to Jamaica in 1957/1958 that Wynter began writing. Her first publication is a play entitled *Under the Sun*, coauthored with Jan Carew, which she later turned into her one and only novel entitled *The Hills of Hebron* (1962).

Wynter on a Western Conception of Man

A critical turn in Wynter's writing took place in the late 1960s. A central feature of this critical turn, and in her decolonial project more generally, was her reconceptualization of what it means to be "human." In "Unsettling the Coloniality of Being/Power/Truth/Freedom" (2003), Wynter offers a

critique of the concept of "Man" that has its origins in the Enlightenment era. Her critique is focused in part on a Judeo-Christian concept of the "human" that preceded the Copernican Revolution and a concept of "Man" that followed during the Enlightenment period, as well as the differences that mark these two eras. According to Wynter, following the Copernican Revolution, we find in the Enlightenment era a concept of Man that presupposes reason – via the new role of science – as its founding idea while purportedly assuming a kind of universality. Both the conception of the human and the conception of Man are representations of what it means to be human within these specific geopolitical contexts. At the same time, these geopolitical contexts – constituted by the fluctuating influence of religion and science – are sites of knowledge production. Thus, for Wynter there is a connection between the representation of the experience of being human (or what it means to be human) and the production of knowledge (or what counts as knowledge). The Enlightenment conception of Man is particularly important for our considerations because, according to Wynter, it continues to dominate a Western geopolitical context. For this reason, much of Wynter's discussion of pedagogy and her decolonial critique interrogate this conception of "Man."

In "Unsettling the Coloniality of Being," Wynter demonstrates the various ways in which Man is problematic. Broadly speaking, for Wynter Man is constructed through a binary that presupposes the existence of, and simultaneously the creation of, its negation. We can think of this as the concept of Man as constituted through a conception of nonMan, or similarly put the rational subject is premised on the existence of a non-rational subject (see also McKittrick 2015, Chapter 4, and Wynter 1995). As a result, the experience of what it means to be human, reified in the representation of Man, is founded upon the presupposition a group of persons that are *excluded* from the category of human and rationality. The implication is, therefore, that the rational characteristic of this Enlightenment concept of Man is in fact not universal, as it purports to be, rather it is dependent upon an Other that is effaced

from humanity. In addition, Wynter argues that the construction of the rational subject (Man) is bound up with European expansionism and colonization of parts of Africa and the Americas (Wynter 1995).

Wynter's Methodological Practice and Decolonization

Notably, a methodological practice is also intrinsic to Wynter's project of reconceiving what it means to be human. As noted by Katherine McKittrick in *Sylvia Wynter: On Being Human as Praxis* (2015)

[Wynter's] work speaks to a range of topics and ideas that interweave fiction, physics, neurobiology, film, music, economics, history, critical theory, literature, learning practices, coloniality, ritual narratives, and religion and draw attention to epistemological ruptures such as the secularization of humanism, the Copernican leap, Darwinian modes of biological representation, Fanonian socio-geny, the 1960s (pp. 1–2) (Fanonian socio-geny is in reference to the works of Frantz Fanon (1925–1961))

This interweaving of topics forms the backdrop of Wynter's methodology, a key proponent of her performance of the decolonization of pedagogical practices. Her method is dependent upon two central features: epistemic disobedience and a disenchantment of discourse. "Epistemic disobedience" is a pedagogical practice of engaging in a critical analysis of academic knowledge production both in terms of the content produced and the method through which the content is produced. Second, "a disenchantment of discourse" refers to an alternate method of knowledge production. Both of these concepts will be developed below in relation to Wynter's overall decolonial theory. It is important to note that while many of Wynter's writings revolve around a reconception of humanness, she does not provide her readers with the content of this category. Rather, for Wynter the experience of being human is a practice. This entry will culminate with a brief account of how these concepts are relevant to a theory of pedagogy.

Epistemic Disobedience

According to Walter Mignolo, in "Sylvia Wynter: What Does It Mean to Be Human?," Wynter is not attempting to overturn existing systems of knowledge. Rather, through her critique she is attempting to change the way in which knowledge is produced and knowing is constituted. At the same time, however, Mignolo claims that "Wynter is not proposing to contribute to and comfortably participate in a system of knowledge that left her out of humanity (as a black/Caribbean woman), but rather delink herself from this very system of knowledge in order to engage in epistemic disobedience" (McKittrick 2015, p. 106). Thus it would seem that for Wynter, in addition to offering a critique of how knowledge is produced, she is also attentive to her own positionality (as an academic) in relation to systems of knowledge production.

While epistemic disobedience is not a concept Wynter herself employs, it nonetheless provides a manner through which one can understand Wynter's methodology. Generally, epistemic disobedience refers to an approach to the study of knowledge; more specifically it addresses questions pertaining to how knowledge is produced, what counts as knowledge, and what certain constructions of knowledge perpetuate.

There are various ways in which Wynter performs epistemic disobedience of the production of knowledge. In "Unsettling the Coloniality of Being" and "1492: A New World View" (1995), two of Wynter's most foundational essays, Wynter investigates specific representations of what it means to be human, and the structure that gives rise to, or produces, such representation. For instance, the production of Man (or the rational subject) discussed above already presupposes what counts as knowledge. In a circular fashion, "Man" presupposes that knowledge can only be produced by rational subjects, yet rationality is attributed only to select groups of persons (ex. colonizers, persons with property, men). Accordingly, groups of people who are not considered rational are thereby excluded from humanity and are thus considered incapable of producing knowledge. As a result, knowledge has a very

specific structure that Wynter claims is bound up with colonial conquest (see Wynter 1995, 2003).

Epistemic disobedience is evident in Wynter's methodology as well. In "Sylvia Wynter: What Does It Mean to Be Human?," Mignolo states:

Under the rules of the epistemic cannon, and according to its racial mandates, if you have been classified in/as difference, then you are required to submit and to assimilate to the cannon or remain outside. Wynter does not follow either of these pathways. She instead engages what I call the decolonial option, a practice of rethinking and unraveling dominant world view that have been opened up by Indigenous and black and Caribbean thinkers since the sixteenth century in América (with accent) and the Caribbean. The decolonial option does not simply protest the contents of imperial Coloniality; it demands a delinking of oneself from the knowledge systems we take for granted (and can profit from) and practicing epistemic disobedience. (2015, pp. 106–107)

Methodologically speaking, Wynter pushes against disciplinary boundaries, challenging the establishment of such boundaries. For instance, in "But What Does Wonder Do?" (1994), Wynter emphasizes the importance of developing a relation between what she calls "scientific language" and "literary language." For Wynter, literary texts and cultural contexts inform and impress upon the biological and neurobiological process of the human animal. Drawing upon the words of David Bolm – who states that "meaning directly affect[s] matter" – Wynter underscores the importance of interdisciplinary discussions in order to provide a richer understanding of the human experience (1995, p. 3). (One way to conceive of the way that meaning can affect matter is to consider the manner in which the body becomes more rigid when racial slurs are uttered at a person of color, or how a glare in the crowd causes one to hunch over or stand up straighter.)

In many cases, scientific and literary disciplines are brought into conversation in her work. For instance, in "Columbus, the Ocean Blue, and Fables that Stir the Mind" (1997), Wynter provides an account of the role of literature in neurobiology. In addition, in "Ethno or Socio Poetics" (1976), Wynter draws from the work of Humberto R. Maturana and Francisco J. Varela, two Chilean

cellular biologists, who offer a method through which to understand cellular identity as self-enclosed and self-constituting. Wynter utilizes Maturana and Varela's discussion for the purpose of reconceiving what it means to be human as an identity that is similarly self-enclosed and self-constituting. In this same essay, Wynter draws upon the work of philosophers, critical theorists, and statesmen, such as Martin Heidegger, Theodor Adorno, and Léopold Sédar Senghor, for the purposes of achieving a reconceptualization of being human.

Demetrius L. Eudell's essay, "Come on Kid, Let's Go Get the Thing," advances a similar conclusion. According to Eudell, Wynter adapts Fanon's thesis in *Black Skin, White Masks*, whereby what it means to be human cannot be determined solely through natural sciences and physical laws alone. Rather, the experience of being human is a process that is "culturally and socio-situationally determined, [while also having] physicalist correlates" (McKittrick 2015, p. 236). This method of weaving together what are often thought of as radically distinct disciplines, as well as distinct systems of acquiring and producing knowledge (here the socio-cultural and the scientific), is evident in almost all of Wynter's essays. The desired effect of both the subject of investigation and the method employed by Wynter is to resist, destabilize, and offer an alternative to the ways in which knowledge is produced.

A Disenchantment of Discourse

A disenchantment of discourse could be considered as one of the primary aims motivating epistemic disobedience. In "On Disenchanting Discourse" (1987), Wynter provides an account of what it means to disenchant discourses and the manner in which such work is possible. Briefly, she states that to disenchant discourses is to disrupt the "episteme or fundamental arrangements of knowledge," insofar as knowledge practices perpetuate a specific world view (p. 208). If we recall the discussion of Man noted above, we can

think of world view as here referring to a rational world. Or, prior to the Enlightenment, Wynter notes that the world was organized via a conception of the human that was based in a belief in a Judeo-Christian god. In both cases, there is a strong connection between not only discourse and knowledge production but a world view as well. In fact, discourse, knowledge, and world view, according to Wynter, are in many ways mutually constituting.

In line with her method of epistemic disobedience, Wynter aims to “disenchant” discourse, which means “to introduce and integrate. . . several ‘new objects of knowledge’ which cannot meaningfully exist within. . . our present ‘fundamental arrangements of knowledge’” (1987, p. 207). In other words, to disenchant discourses is to open up the production of knowledge to “objects of knowledge” that might not obviously fit with the already existing structure of knowledge.

At the same time, these new objects of knowledge cannot emanate from the arrangement of knowledge they seek to unsettle, they must come from what is distinct from this arrangement. For this reason, a “disenchantment of discourse” is dependent upon what she calls the “liminal” position or similarly what she calls “minority discourse.” Wynter states “The role of Minority Discourse. . . is [a] calling in question which impels our going beyond the boundaries of our present episteme into a new constitutive domain of knowledge that we have called a science of human systems” (1987, p. 240). Her concepts of minority discourse and liminality are developed in a number of essays. For instance, in “The Ceremony Must be Found” (1984), Wynter defines liminality as ones “experience [of] a fundamental contradiction between their lived experience and the grammar of representation which generate the mode of reality by prescribing the parameters of collective behaviors that dynamically bring that ‘reality’ into being” (p. 39). But in addition, in “Beyond Liberal and Marxist Feminisms” (1982) (drawing upon the work of Asmaran Legesse), Wynter states that “it is the liminal category who ‘generates conscious change by exposing all the injustices inherent in structure’” (p. 36) (see also

Wynter 1984, p. 39). The new objects of knowledge through which the disenchantment of discourse is possible cannot arise *sui generis*; instead it is the liminal category or the liminal position that makes such objects of knowledge possible. In what way is this position locatable? Liminal refers to a subject position that exists outside of or at the limits of what can be thought from a dominant subject position. For instance, in the example above of what it means to be human in the geopolitical context that followed the Copernican Revolution, humanness was represented as the rational subject. The rational subject is, therefore, the dominant subject position. In addition, in “1492” Wynter describes the manner through which indigenous populations of the Americas or those persons who were enslaved and brought to the Americas were attributed non-rational or less rational subject positions. These subject positions are held in opposition to the dominant subject position (the rational subject) existing as outside to the fundamental arrangement of knowledge and as such are liminal subject positions. That said, according to Wynter, liminality can provide a view from which to both understand a fundamental arrangement of knowledge and to disenchant them.

Minority discourse refers to a kind of knowledge production that can emanate from these liminal positions. At the same time, minority discourse cannot disenchant discourses if it is held at the margins of discourses. Correspondingly, a “‘minority discourse’ can *not* be merely another voice in the present ongoing conversation or order of discourse” (Wynter 1987, pp. 207–208). In other words, the advantage of a liminal subject position, over and against a dominant subject position, is that the liminal provides a point of view which can serve to shift/disenchant a fundamental arrangement of knowledge that produces these liminal positions by introducing new objects of knowledge.

Summation

While Wynter does not provide an explicit account of pedagogy, both the form and the

content of her work provide useful insights for theories of pedagogical practices. For instance, Wynter's discussion of minority discourse provides an explicit account of how departments that are currently marginalized (such as African and Afro-American Departments) *should* be located within a university. Epistemic disobedience can also be understood as a pedagogical practice to the extent that disciplinary boundaries should be not considered static, but should continue to be challenged. In addition, Wynter's decolonial critique of knowledge production continues to be important for educational institutions. Not only are these institutions accountable for what counts as knowledge and who is capable of providing such knowledge (i.e., the figures of study and faculty/instructors) but, in addition, educators should also be attentive to the manner in which academic knowledge production can limit valuable expressions of the experience of being human.

Cross-References

- [Decolonization and Higher Education](#)
- [Decolonizing Knowledge Production](#)
- [Fanon and Decolonial Thought](#)

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Youth Movements

► Cultural Studies and New Student Resistance

Youth, Debt, and the Promise of Critical Pedagogy

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Introduction

Critical pedagogy is a progressive mode of education influenced by approaches to knowledge and culture developed by The Frankfurt School and by Brazilian educator Paulo Freire. Critical pedagogy emphasizes that to be meaningful and transformative, education needs to connect the knowledge learned inside the classroom to students' lived experiences outside the classroom. Drawing on Freire, Henry A. Giroux (2011) describes critical pedagogy as a progressive educational movement that provides students with a consciousness of freedom and an ability to identify authoritarian tendencies and make connections between knowledge and power. Critical pedagogy aims to cultivate in young people the capacity and desire to take action in the real world by challenging oppressive and antidemocratic structures of power. In this sense, critical

pedagogy is the opposite of the majority of contemporary neoliberal approaches to education, which see teaching primarily as the delivery of methods, skills, and predefined subject matter. For Freire and Giroux, education is always about the production of particular forms of subjectivity, identity, and desires and thus needs to be directed towards developing young people's critical faculties and a passion for social responsibility. Unfortunately, education in the neoliberal era is characterized by technical and instrumental approaches to teaching and learning and the banishment of critical thinking from corporatized and commercialized classrooms (Saltman 2012; Giroux 2011). One manifestation of this approach to education, and the primary focus of this entry, is the production of a generation of young people lacking an understanding of the violent ways in which neoliberalism and debt in particular are bearing down on their everyday lives and devastating their collective futures.

This entry briefly discusses the increasingly central role of financialization and indebtedness in the present moment. It then outlines some of the neoliberal and corporatizing forces bearing down on young people in their roles as students. The entry then addresses the role that education specialists and policy makers believe that financial literacy can play in protecting students and society from the pitfalls of credit and debt as well as the kind of violent financial crisis witnessed in 2008. Ultimately, the entry suggests that without a critical pedagogical approach to knowledge, which

has the potential to inspire hope and to provide young people with a language for connecting structural problems associated with free market fundamentalism to the daily, ordinary challenges of those in debt, even the most well-intentioned financial literacy will remain wedded to neoliberal capitalism. Critical pedagogy needs to be a fundamental component of the struggle against debt and indebtedness.

The Decline of the Social and the Emergence of Debtfare

Neoliberalism has entered a new phase, one no longer characterized by the expansion of markets and economic growth but rather one defined by intensifying austerity, debt, and authoritarian punishing and surveillance states. In response to the 2008 financial crisis, neoliberal power has insisted on reductions in public spending and ushered in what Giroux has called *the twilight of the social*. In this new age, the social no longer signals necessary democratic protections for vulnerable populations, but rather, handouts for lazy and unmotivated individuals who, the common neoliberal refrain goes, lack in character, self-reliance, and grit. With public debts soaring and the corporate elite benefiting from tax levels that harken back to the gilded age of the early twentieth century, austerity now provides the ideological support for public cuts, as well as the political rationale for poor and working poor peoples' skyrocketing dependence on predatory financial service industries.

In accounting for the collapse of the social and the increasing centrality of financialization and debt in peoples' lives, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (2012) argue that there has been a shift over the past several decades from a welfare to a "debtfare" society. Debtfare refers to the centrality of credit and debt in procuring what once were – or at least were considered potential – democratic public goods. Education, health and dental care, prescriptions, childcare, housing, and so on are now fixed in the popular imaginary as private goods and are accessible for the growing underclass only through credit and

debt. Higher education, as Jeffery Williams (2006) argues, has been coopted by a "pedagogy of debt," which sees young people entering their adult lives with massive debt loads in addition to their degrees, which may or, as is increasingly the case, may not, lead to well-paying and meaningful work. This means that the power to determine the values that inform our collective modes of life has shifted: if the welfare State was designed with the purpose of redressing the inequality that results from capitalism, debtfare refers to an economic and political formation in which the State's role is simply to guarantee the protection of markets so as to provide consumers – the only category left for thinking about citizenship (Bauman 2005) – with access to (often predatory) credit. The result is that credit, many peoples' only recourse to (fleeting) economic security, or for many people, survival, is causing obscene levels of financial and affective precariousness and suffering. Austerity and debt are part of an affective and subjective mode of violence percolating just beneath the surface of working and poor peoples' everyday struggles.

Debt, like poverty, unemployment, or really any social problem, has been individualized, rendered private by neoliberal power. Contemporary liberal discourses about education and the economy often view debt as the result of poor character traits or, at best, of a lack of the right financial literacy skills. In all cases, no matter the larger contributing factors to their troubles, individuals are deemed responsible for their failures. An individual who does not pay back debt is considered to be both economically and morally culpable; they are assumed to lack respect for him or herself and for the creditor. In the neoliberal moment, you alone "are responsible for your debts and guilty for the difficulties they create in your life" (Hardt and Negri 2012, p. 10). The effect of this moral liability is that subjects learn "to keep [their] nose to the grindstone" of the present, rather than learn to think in more imaginatively and politically empowering and hopeful ways about the future. Indeed, in the context of the neoliberal "war on youth" (Giroux 2013), debt and its individualizing morality are about the production of subjects with sympathies that align with the larger neoliberal

project and the new austerity and debt economies: unimaginative and depoliticized subjects, who anticipate no assistance from the State, are disposed to predatory financial technologies and expect punishment and exclusion should they fail in their roles as financial subjects. Ultimately, these are subjects who accept the suffering inherent to their indebted conditions without fundamentally trying to alter them.

Debt, as Gilles Deleuze first argued, is about control, not simply repayment. The debtor is not necessarily “expected to reimburse in actual money but rather in conduct, attitudes, ways of behaving, plans, subjective commitments, the time devoted to finding a job the time used for conforming oneself to the criteria dictated by the market” (Lazzarato 2012, p. 104). Debt, Lazzarato rightly argues, “directly entails life discipline and a way of life that requires ‘work on the self,’ a permanent negotiation with oneself, a specific form of subjectivity: that of the indebted man” (p. 104). Central to this “work on the self” has been a mode of neoliberal education that has eliminated the space for critical thinking.

Neoliberal Education and the Resiliently Indebted

Education has been transformed to align with permanent austerity and debt. Standardized testing, charter school and privatization schemes, corporatization, dehistoricizing and depoliticized curricula, the deskilling of teachers, and the collapse of carceral logics into public schools have combined to create an educative environment characterized by the production of youth tuned into the punitive logics of indebtedness and precariousness (Giroux 2013; Saltman 2012). Education in the age of debt and austerity is increasingly being stripped of its mandate to cultivate thoughtful democratic subjects with a sense of the importance of ethical and collective obligations and the public or common good. Education has lost its capacity to cultivate subjects with critical and ethical imaginations insofar as its primary aim has been transformed to the production of isolated subjects whose obligations to society are defined solely by their roles as

consumers. Indeed, informed largely by the values of the market, education today is quickly losing the capacity to provide young people with the critical skills necessary to resist the structural conditions of neoliberalism and the bonds of perpetual debt. Instead, education has abandoned its critical and democratic dimensions and become one of the primary apparatuses for disposing young people to a future defined by permanent debt and economic instability.

If the Foucaultian notion of “‘human capital’ was the logic of neoliberalism in its expansionist periods, austerity is its logic in periods of decline and public disinvestment” (Breu 2014, p. 30). In times of growth, neoliberals bank on educating entrepreneurial subjects, while in times of decline, such as we are experiencing now, they pour millions into educative and cultural apparatus meant to produce a “resilient” mode of subjectivity (Evans and Reid 2013). Resilient young people learn to do their part not by fundamentally resisting larger structures of capital, but rather by learning strategies to deal with unstable and precarious financial and social realities. Neoliberal educative efforts bear down with particular intensity on young people both in school and through powerful forms of “public pedagogy” outside of school (Giroux 2011, 2013). Neoliberal financial pedagogy teaches youth that *resilience* is synonymous with *resistance*; that debt and diminished opportunity is inevitable (Evans and Reid 2013). Ultimately, dominant neoliberal power uses education to teach young people that violent capitalist structures are to be mediated rather than transformed, and, worse still, that the only viable way to do this is through individual rather than collective techniques. Financial and economic resilience, rather than political and social resistance, and bare financial literacy, rather than a critical literacy informed by an empowering language of critical pedagogy, have become the dominant educational techniques of the contemporary moment.

Neoliberal regimes of power operate by convincing populations that a market society is synonymous with democracy and that the fundamental obligations of citizenship are commercial. This ideological influence works on young people at multiple points throughout

society: through corporatized curricula in schools, as well as through a larger educational culture steeped in corporate and commercial values. Addressing neoliberalism as an educational project which produces particular forms of subjectivity is important for recognizing the degree to which questions about subjectivity, identity, and morality, as well as the limits of political possibility and political imagination, are, in the current moment, also necessarily questions about debt and indebtedness.

Highly commercialized and corporatized forms of life are both cause and effect of a dominant mode of education that fails to teach young people to think politically and socially. Taken over by business interests and markets, public education teaches students about what life dominated by corporations looks and feels like. In urban centers across the country, funding cuts to public education are matched by “turnaround” and “leadership” schemes which result in the stripping of public schools’ capacities to defend themselves from privatization and to generate critical citizens (Saltman 2012). Instead, corporate education has introduced a set of conditions in which subjects are produced to conform to a corporate type of citizenship for an increasingly corporate kind of sovereignty. As Saltman (2012) argues, neoliberal corporate education reformers “champion private sector approaches to reform including, especially, privatization, deregulation, and the importation of terms and assumptions from business, while they imagine public schools as private businesses, districts as markets, students as consumers and knowledge as a product” (p. 1). Youth indebtedness is intensified by the assault on unions and teachers, the closure of dozens of public schools in impoverished neighborhoods, the expansion of charters and Educational Management Organizations, and the market-friendly developments of the new Common Core Curriculum. The modus operandi of public education has become indistinguishable from that of business and corporations, both demand the activity of consumers willing to rely on predatory financial service industries and to go into debt, whether for education, healthcare, or simply to eat. Education, much like market society more generally, has become primarily an

indebted space. The result is not only an education saturated in commercial and corporate values, but also a dominant mode of subjectivity dangerously disposed to the swindle of consumerism and, ultimately, the misery of indebtedness.

The increased domination of public education and culture by corporate and commercializing forces is part of a shift towards what Bauman (2005) calls a “society of consumers.” Bauman (2005) uses sociological analysis to argue that as the social state and the production base waned throughout the 1980s and 1990s in the West, a new neoliberal society emerged that resituated consumerism from the periphery directly into the center of a new form of social, political, and economic life. According to Bauman, consumerism has radically altered contemporary notions of work, ethics, and time. If work was once the determining factor of a productive economy, or productivity more generally, consumerism now fills that role. Consequently, notions of freedom and what it means to be a citizen in the company of others have been reconceived according to the narrowly circumscribed logic of consumerism.

If, as Bauman argues, there is a morality of consumerism, there is an inverse morality of debt. In fact, consumerism and debt are two intimately related vehicles driving the financialized violence at the heart of neoliberalism. So much of neoliberal education is about learning to live in the moment, to take risks, to be bold. Consumerism is about desire, pleasure, and, temporally speaking, the present moment. Debt, on the other hand, is about discipline, self-restraint, and the future. The short-termism that defines all facets of life in the neoliberal conjuncture is responsible for subjects’ incapacity to think clearly and collectively about the long-term consequences of debt and indebtedness. Neoliberal subjects are well versed in the lingua franca of consumerism, while being exceptionally poorly versed in the lexical complexity and perpetual obligations of debt and indebtedness. Indeed, young people learn to not see debt and its consequences by seeing the world through consumerism. Debt is the perpetual blind spot of neoliberal consumerism. And if consumerism has become an alibi for indebtedness, it has also impoverished the political imagination.

Neoliberal education and bankrupt notions of financial literacy have played a key part in this impoverishment.

Financial Literacy and the Promise of Critical Pedagogy

In the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, the US government established the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), part of the larger Dodd-Frank and Consumer Protection Act, in an effort to prevent reckless financial practices they deemed responsible for the subprime mortgage crisis. In April 2013, the CFPB's office of financial education policy published policy recommendations for advancing K-12 financial education called "Transforming the Financial Lives of a Generation of Young Americans." The white paper "aims to advance secondary financial education" through "a comprehensive strategy to impart personal financial-management skills to young people while they are in school." The paper proposes that the best way to "transform the financial lives of youth" is by cultivating more "resilient" financial subjects who are able to "take more control over their economic lives" by making sound decisions regarding what they define as "necessary" and "unnecessary" debt.

"Transforming the Financial Lives of a Generation of Young Americans" offers five recommendations, which, the authors insist, have the potential to provide young people with the knowledge and skills to avoid "repeat[ing] the financial mistakes made by earlier generations." The first recommendation is to "[i]ntroduce key financial education concepts early and continue to build on that foundation consistently throughout the K-12 school years." Second, to "[i]nclude personal financial management questions in standardized tests." Third, to "[p]rovide opportunities throughout the K-12 years to practice money management through innovative, hands-on learning opportunities." Fourth, to "[c]reate consistent opportunities and incentives for teachers to take financial education training with the express intention of teaching financial management to their students." And finally, to "[e]ncourage parents and guardians to discuss money management topics at home."

In seeking to provide young people with the tools to avoid another economic crisis, and completely ignoring the larger structural causes of the crisis, the document effectively reinforces many of the core values of neoliberalism. Moreover, the recommendations are symptomatic of a methods- and skills-based approach to education and are void of a critical pedagogic dimension that would make matters of justice, equality, and collective freedom part of the conversation (Giroux 2011; Saltman 2012). The document asks schools to introduce the disciplinary logic of the market to kids at a younger age; to further corporatize the curriculum and the delivery of education by including financial literacy on standardized Common Core testing; and to incorporate "money management" and "learning opportunities" by private financial companies and corporations, many of which were directly responsible for the structural conditions leading to the 2008 crisis. Moreover, it suggests incentivizing underpaid teachers to do even more volunteer work under the guise of "educational training." And finally, it recommends extending conversations about financial self-management into students' homes, where, for low-income families, for whom no amount of financial management will ever offer "transformation," such exchanges are likely to become a source of shame and anxiety for both parents and students.

The point of my critique is not to suggest that young people should not be taught about the differences between responsible and irresponsible financial choices. Indeed, cultivating sustainable consumer habits is an important part of the larger project of resisting capitalism. That being said, the document and neoliberal education more generally fails to contextualize the role of consumerism and credit and debt in young peoples' lives and offers inadequate individualized solutions to what are far more complex and collective issues. While ostensibly an attempt to give youth valuable and "transformative" financial tools, financial literacy in this case means educating financially literate but politically and socially illiterate students. With no understanding of the overarching logics of capitalism, and no real sense that a different kind of society could be possible, financial literacy at best provides subjects with basic financial tools

for survival, but certainly not the vision or skills to achieve social or political transformation. Meaningful collective transformation requires a critical approach to financial literacy that “take[s] young people beyond the world they are familiar with and makes clear how classroom knowledge, values, desires, and social relations are always implicated in power” (Giroux 2011, p. 6).

Schools and the larger educational culture are increasingly turning to this kind of financial literacy as a viable method for managing debt. Yet financial literacy, to use a distinction made by Paulo Freire, focuses on the *words* of finance at the expense of the often unhealthy, painful, shameful, and isolating *worlds* created by violent structures of capital. As a result, financial literacy without a critical pedagogic dimension paradoxically empowers youth individually at the same time as it disempowers them collectively. Seeing the *world* of debt and indebtedness requires critical pedagogy’s emphasis on empowerment, agency, imagination, and radical hope. Educators need to be given an opportunity to struggle over the conditions that would allow them to more clearly connect financial literacy skills to a critique of capitalism in the classroom. Ultimately, we need to transform not only the “financial lives of a generation of young Americans” but more importantly, the larger set of conditions that make those financialized forms of life available in the first place. Doing so will require introducing young people to a far more critical form of financial literacy, one that foregrounds critical pedagogy in order to teach students about the fundamental links between consumerism and indebtedness, on the one hand, and on the other, the violent ideology of finance capitalism (see Arthur 2012).

Conclusion

Resisting the educative forces teaching youth to learn to accept an indebted form of life is central to the struggle against neoliberal capitalism. This struggle requires strengthening the democratic formative cultures and the critical modes of pedagogy that Giroux argues are essential for young

people to reimagine and rebuild a way of living in common outside of the cruel economic and psychic privations of austerity and debt. And for that to happen we need activists, public intellectuals, artists, working people, and democratic citizens from all walks of life to come together to fight for education as a free and accessible public good. To develop the knowledge and skills to challenge the violence of neoliberal debt and austerity regimes, young people need to have the opportunity to be engaged in their role as students as public and critical citizens, and not as private consumers and resilient debtors. Education must be made hospitable to critical pedagogy so as to make financial literacy speak to the structural conditions of neoliberalism’s ongoing financial and ideological crises and thus to make it “meaningful” in order to make it “critical,” and, ultimately, “transformative” (Giroux 2011).

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Michael A. Peters

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Owing to an unfortunate oversight the first published version of these entries contained an error regarding the authorship which has now been corrected.

Nietzsche's Schopenhauer and Education: The author name is corrected as Peter Fitzsimons and affiliation is updated.

Human Capital Theory and Education: The second incorrect affiliation of Patrick Fitzsimons is removed.

Managerialism and Education: The second incorrect affiliation of Patrick Fitzsimons is removed.

Metaphor and Edusemiotics: The first incorrect affiliation of Peter Fitzsimons is removed.

FM: The affiliation details of Peter Fitzsimons and Patrick Fitzsimons is updated as below in the "List of Contributors".

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